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The Conference of Berlin
(The Potsdam Conference)
1945
(In Two Volumes)

Volume I



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PREFACE

This volume of documents (the first of two dealing with the Berlin or Potsdam Conference of 1945) is the second to appear in a special series of *Foreign Relations* volumes on the World War II conferences attended by President Roosevelt or President Truman, along with Prime Minister Churchill or Generalissimo Stalin, or both of the latter. The first volume issued in this special series dealt with the conferences at Malta and Yalta, and was published by the Department of State in 1955.

The principal editor of the present volume was Richardson Dougall, Officer in Charge, Policy Studies, in the Department's Historical Office. At various stages of the compilation and professional editing of the volume he had the assistance of the following members of the Department's historical staff: Robert C. Hayes (whose work particularly on the Briefing Book papers in this volume is acknowledged), Dwight R. Ambach, Peter V. Curl, Eula McDonald, Richard S. Patterson, Herbert Spielman, and Isaac A. Stone. Invaluable assistance in the annotation of papers was given by Myra J. DeBerry and other reference librarians in the Library of the Department and by the staff of the Division of Biographic Information.

The Division of Publishing Services, Department of State, was responsible for the proofreading and editing of copy and for the preparation of the index. Under the general direction of the Chief of this Division, Norris E. Drew, the editorial functions mentioned above were performed by the Foreign Relations Editing Branch in charge of Elizabeth A. Vary, Chief, and Ouida J. Ward, Assistant Chief.

In order to make this volume as complete and useful as possible, the Department of State not only drew upon its own resources but also sought the cooperation of other agencies and individuals, to whom the Department is grateful for their assistance. Particular acknowledgment is made of the help received from Vernon E. Davis, of the Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and from Walter G. Hermes, of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.

G. BERNARD NOBLE
Director, Historical Office
Bureau of Public Affairs

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1960.

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INTRODUCTION

This introduction deals with the scope of, the sources for, and the problems of editorial treatment met in the compilation of volume I of *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945. A separate introduction relating to the contents of volume II will be found in that volume.

ORGANIZATION AND SCOPE

Because the annual volumes for 1945 in the *Foreign Relations* series have not yet been issued, the editors considered it essential to make available to the reader a considerable amount of background material necessary for an understanding of the proceedings of the Berlin Conference. This entire volume is devoted to pre-Conference documents.

The first section of the volume presents information (*a*) on Prime Minister Churchill's suggestion of May 6, 1945, that a tripartite meeting of Heads of Government of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union should be held and on the discussions which ensued on this subject in the weeks immediately following that suggestion, and (*b*) on the conversations which Harry Hopkins had with Marshal Stalin in Moscow and those which Joseph E. Davies had with Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Minister Eden at Chequers and in London with respect to international problems of mutual concern. The Hopkins and Davies missions are recorded in some detail, since these conversations were conducted with the impending meeting of Heads of Government in view and since they explored Anglo-American and Soviet-American differences of opinion on subjects which were to be discussed by the Heads of Government.

The second section presents information on the final physical arrangements made for the Berlin Conference, on the appointment of delegations to the Conference, and on preparation of the agenda for the Conference.

In the third section are printed a number of reports submitted to the Secretary of State or the President before the Berlin Conference for their general background in connection with the forthcoming meeting, but not pointed toward any particular subject expected to arise during the international discussions.

The fourth, and by far the longest, section—about three quarters of the volume—presents information (*a*) on the recommendations

made to the President before the Berlin Conference with respect to the numerous questions discussed at the Conference; (b) on background reports submitted to the President on those questions; and (c) on international developments relating to those subjects which took place during the month immediately preceding the opening of the meeting of Heads of Government, specifically from June 18 to July 15, 1945.

The papers printed in the fourth section are arranged by subject. Under each subject heading the general background materials and recommendations, if any, which were submitted to the President are printed first, usually beginning with the principal memorandum on the subject submitted by the Department of State. Other background material reached the President, however, from his own staff and from committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in some cases the orderly presentation of the background information required that a paper from one of these sources precede the memorandum or memoranda prepared in the Department of State. The background papers have been placed first under each subject heading, regardless of the date of their preparation, because many of them review the history of the problem under discussion and lay a foundation for the papers which follow.

The papers which follow the background material were selected with the aim of giving the reader a good knowledge of the status of the particular problem when the Berlin Conference began. It was obviously impossible, within a single volume, to present a full and detailed documentary history, covering an extended period, of each question to be discussed at the Conference. Many of these questions will receive that type of detailed treatment when the annual volumes of *Foreign Relations* for the year 1945 are issued. Pending the publication of those volumes, the student of the Berlin Conference will have to turn to other sources if he wishes to study its background in depth, and to include in his study international crises and developments in the early months of 1945 which had been solved or which had sufficiently abated before the Berlin Conference met so that no discussion of them took place at that Conference (and which, therefore, are outside the scope of this volume). Much important background information is, of course, to be found in the special *Foreign Relations* volume entitled "The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945". In addition, the reader may wish to refer to the weekly Department of State *Bulletin* and to the authoritative sources listed below which are available as of November 1959. The Department of State, in listing these volumes here, takes no responsibility for the entire accuracy of their treatment of the events of 1945 nor, of course, for their interpretation of those events.

- James F. Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1958).
- James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947).
- Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (volume VI of *The Second World War*) (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953).
- John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation With Russia* (New York, The Viking Press, 1947).
- John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, volume VI (a volume in *History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series*) (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956).
- "The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945" (Washington, Department of Defense, 1955).
- Herbert Feis, *Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957).
- Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1944-June 1945* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947).
- Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952).
- Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1948).
- George Kirk, *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: The Middle East, 1945-1950* (London, Oxford University Press, 1954).
- William D. Leahy, *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time* (New York, Whittlesey House, 1950).
- William H. McNeill, *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: America, Britain, and Russia, Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946* (London, Oxford University Press, 1953).
- Harley A. Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949; Department of State publication No. 3580).
- Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1948).
- Stalin's Correspondence With Churchill, Atlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941-45* (New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1958). (This volume constitutes a reissue in the United States of an official publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. For fuller bibliographic information, see document No. 1, footnote 3, and document No. 21, footnote 1.)
- Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference*, ed. by Walter Johnson (Garden City, Doubleday and Company, 1949).
- Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947).
- Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee, eds., *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: Hitler's Europe* (London, Oxford University Press, 1954).
- Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee, eds., *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: The Realignment of Europe* (London, Oxford University Press, 1955).
- Harry S. Truman, *Year of Decisions* (volume I of *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*) (Garden City, Doubleday and Company, 1955).

The reader may also wish to refer to other works on narrower subjects which were of prime importance in early 1945.

Within the scope described above, the present volume documents the international developments on subjects later discussed at the

Berlin Conference according to the usual regulations applicable to the *Foreign Relations* series, viz.:

045 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

045.1 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

045.2 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, shall be edited by the Historical Office of the Department of State. The editing of the record shall be guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There shall be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion was made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents or parts of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

In presenting the documentation on Conference subjects from June 18 to July 15, 1945, no effort has been made to bring the bulk of documentation on a given subject in the immediate pre-Conference period into proportion with the extent of the discussion or the importance of the subject at the Conference. On some major Conference subjects, such as Germany, the bulk of pre-Conference documentation and of Conference discussion is great. On other subjects, however, such as the Balkans and Tangier, there was great diplomatic activity in the immediate pre-Conference period which is fully reflected in this volume, although the amount of discussion of these problems at the Conference itself was relatively small.

When the editors have felt that the documentation of developments during the last month before the Berlin Conference, under the standards described above, taken with the Briefing Book papers and other

background material, did not present an adequate picture of the status of an individual question on the eve of the Conference, key documents of earlier date have been quoted or summarized in the footnotes in this volume.

In accordance with the regulation quoted above, because the Berlin Conference dealt importantly with military as well as political problems, the Department of State asked for and received the cooperation of the Department of Defense in locating and releasing for publication documents relating to the military aspects of the Conference. So far as this volume is concerned, this type of material consists of papers documenting the official position or advice of the War and Navy Departments on politico-military subjects later discussed at the international level at the Berlin Conference, as presented by the civilian leaders of those Departments and by the military chiefs in their capacity as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combined Chiefs of Staff. In addition, some papers originating with or transmitted by military authorities below these levels have been included in order to clarify references in other papers or to set forth information pertinent to the Conference given to the President or his principal advisers but inadequately reflected in Department of State papers.

SOURCES

The papers printed in this volume (except for a very few items reprinted from published sources) were drawn from the following files and collections of official and private papers:

A. INSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. *Indexed Central Files*—Papers in the indexed Central Files of the Department of State are indicated by a file number in the headnote, in the usual style of *Foreign Relations* volumes. The most important single item from the indexed Central Files used in preparing this volume was a "Briefing Book"—actually five notebooks of background information and recommendations—prepared in the Department of State for the guidance of the Secretary of State and the President. This "Briefing Book" bears a single file number, and papers drawn from it are identified not only by that number but also by the editor's heading "Briefing Book Paper". A considerable number of documents (such as the translations of Japanese Foreign Ministry papers printed on pages 874-883) were not originally in the Central Files of the Department but have now been indexed and deposited in the Central Files.

2. *Staff Committee Files*—A collection of unindexed papers in the Records Service Center of the Department containing the minutes and documents of the Secretary's Staff Committee, a body which included

the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretaries, or their representatives.

3. *Coordinating Committee Files*—A collection of unindexed papers in the Records Service Center containing documents of the Coordinating Committee, a body which included the Under Secretary of State and officials of the Department at the level of office director.

4. *IPCOG Files*—A collection of unindexed papers in the Records Service Center containing the papers pertaining to the interdepartmental Informal Policy Committee on Germany.

5. *Pauley Files*—A collection of unindexed papers in the Records Service Center containing the office files of the United States Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations, Edwin W. Pauley.

6. *Moscow Embassy Files*—The files for 1945, now in the Records Service Center, of the American Embassy at Moscow.

7. *London Embassy Files*—The files for 1945, now in the Records Service Center, of the American Embassy at London.

8. *Frankfurt USPolAd Files*—The files for 1945, now in the Records Service Center, of the Office of the United States Political Adviser at Frankfurt.

9. *L/T Files*—The office files of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs.

10. *S/AE Files*—The office files of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy.

R. OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. *Truman Papers*—The private papers of former President Harry S. Truman. Photocopies of some of these papers were obtained by the Department of State while Mr. Truman was still in office, and others were obtained from Mr. Truman's office in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1956.

2. *Leahy Papers*—A collection of official papers, now in the custody of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the office of the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, the late Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy.

3. *J.C.S. Files*—The files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These files provided not only Joint Chiefs of Staff material but also Combined Chiefs of Staff documentation. The approval of the British Chiefs of Staff, along with that of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, was obtained for the declassification of Combined Chiefs of Staff documentation.

4. *Department of the Army Files*—These files provided, for this volume, several messages exchanged between United States Army officers in the field and the War Department.

5. *White House Files*—The list of the President's party printed as document No. 115 came from the files of the White House.

6. *Davies Papers*—A few gaps in the pre-Conference period were filled from the private papers of the late Joseph E. Davies.

It should be noted that the Harry Hopkins papers in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York, were searched, through the cooperation of the Director of the Library, Herman Kahn, for papers concerning Mr. Hopkins' mission to Moscow in May and June 1945, but nothing pertinent to this volume was found which was not already available in the Department of State.

EDITORIAL TREATMENT

Headings—The data appearing in the headings of the original documents (place, date, addressee, method and priority of transmission, and classification) have been harmonized by the editors into a reasonably standard pattern in the headings as printed herein. Any substantive titles appearing on the original documents have been retained.

Classification and priority indicators—The classification of documents (top secret, secret, confidential, restricted, or plain) and the priority indicators on telegrams (U. S. urgent, operational priority, priority, and routine) are included in the printed headings if such information appears on the documents themselves. It should be noted, however, that in 1945 many documents were not given any formal classification although they were handled as if classified.

Numbering of documents—For convenience in the identification of papers during the process of compilation, and as an experiment in format, the individual papers in this volume and in its companion volume (except for minutes and notes of proceedings) have been assigned document numbers, and cross references for the most part are made to documents by number rather than by page. In order to assist the reader in locating papers easily by document number, the editors have inserted in brackets at the foot of each odd-numbered page (unless a new chapter or section begins on such a page) the document number assigned to the last paper which appears on that page.

Extracts—The headnote "Extract" or "Extracts" indicates that less than half of the entire document is printed under a particular document number. Points are used in all documents to indicate omissions—three points for omissions of less than a paragraph and a line of seven points for omissions of a paragraph or more.

Signatures—Signatures as printed in this volume follow the source copy. If a document is printed from an original bearing a holograph signature with no points, it will appear with the signature "Harry S Truman". If, on the other hand, it is printed from a typed source

copy in which points were used, it will appear with the signature "Harry S. Truman".

Signing officers—All telegraphic instructions of the Department of State are issued over the name of the Secretary, the Secretary ad interim, or the Acting Secretary, although in many cases the name of that officer is actually signed by an appropriate official of lower rank who subscribes his own initials. In the telegrams sent by the Department which are printed in this volume, such initials have been retained as part of the signature, with a bracketed indication in each case of the identity of the signing officer. Similarly, in the case of those third-person communications which are customarily initialed rather than signed, the initials appearing on the original documents have been retained, and a bracketed indication of the name of the initialing officer has been added.

Real addressees and originators—When telegrams printed in this volume contain an internal caption indicating that they were to or from a specific individual other than the formal addressee or signer, the editor's heading is based on this internal caption, on the assumption (for example) that it would confuse the reader to head a telegram from the President to the British Prime Minister as "President Truman to the Naval Attaché in the United Kingdom" merely because the original document is cast in that form. In such cases, the formal addressee and signer, where they differ from the real addressee and originator, are indicated in footnotes.

Typographical errors—Obvious typographical errors have been corrected except in signed international agreements, which are printed *literatim*. All permissible variations in spelling, however, have been retained as in the original text.

Romanization—In all material provided by the editors (front matter, document headings, and footnotes) names of individuals from countries using non-roman alphabets have been romanized consistently in the normal *Foreign Relations* style. In the documents themselves, however, the editors have not altered whatever system (or lack thereof) the originators of the individual documents used to romanize proper names.

Identification of persons mentioned—Individuals mentioned by title or position in the documents have been identified in footnotes, where such identification was possible, at least once in every section or subsection of this volume, unless their identification is clear from the editor's headings or from the text of the documents themselves. Fuller identification of individuals mentioned by name only will be found in a List of Persons Mentioned, beginning on page xxv.

Translations—Translations printed in this volume are contemporary with the original documents unless it is specifically noted that they have been prepared especially for this volume.

Telegrams to and from special missions—Telegrams sent by the Department to special missions in care of a regular diplomatic post, and those transmitted by special missions to the Department through the facilities of a regular diplomatic post, were usually assigned serial numbers in the regular series of messages exchanged with the diplomatic post. The telegram numbers on messages to and from the United States Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations are thus to be construed (to give an example of this practice) as the numbers which these messages were assigned in the chronological sequence of the entire exchange of telegrams between the Department of State and the American Embassy at Moscow.

Citations—In citing to documents already officially published in multiple sources, the editors in general have given citations to *Foreign Relations* volumes, the Department of State *Bulletin*, the various series of treaties and international agreements published by the Department, and the *Statutes at Large*, in preference to citations to other official publications. Individual readers, however, may find it more convenient, in locating the texts cited, to look for them in other official compilations, such as *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49* (Senate document No. 123, 81st Congress, 1st Session); *The Axis in Defeat: A Collection of Documents on American Policy Toward Germany and Japan* (Department of State publication No. 2423); *Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress* (publication No. 2783); *Making the Peace Treaties, 1941-1947* (publication No. 2774); and *In Quest of Peace and Security: Selected Documents on American Foreign Policy, 1941-1951* (publication No. 4245). Many of the previously published documents cited in this volume are to be found in unofficial publications as well.

Papers cited as "not printed"—It is to be assumed that some papers annotated in the present volume as "not printed" will eventually be printed in the annual *Foreign Relations* volumes for 1945.

Index—The index beginning on page 1057 pertains to this volume only. Volume II of *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945*, is indexed separately.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS, AND CODE NAMES

EDITOR'S NOTE.—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

- A**, airgram
- A-2**, intelligence evaluation rating indicating that the source is reliable and the information supplied probably true
- AC**, Allied Commission; Air Corps
- ACC**, Allied Control Commission; Allied Control Council
- adm**, administrative
- admin**, administration
- AF**, Division of African Affairs, Department of State
- AFHQ**, Allied Force Headquarters (Caserta, Italy)
- AGD**, Adjutant General's Department
- AGWar**, Adjutant General, War Department
- AHS**, Adolf Hitler Schools
- AM**, Allied military
- Amb**, Ambassador
- AmCross**, American Red Cross
- AMG**, Allied Military Government
- AmPolAd**, American Political Adviser
- AMPOLAD**, communications indicator
- AmReps**, American Representatives
- ARGONAUT**, code name for the Yalta Conference, February 4-11, 1945
- asst**, assistant
- ATC**, Air Transport Command
- AUS**, Army of the United States
- AusPolAd**, United States Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs
- auths**, authorities
- AVNOJ**, Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Yugoslavia
- BBC**, British Broadcasting Corporation
- BCOS**, British Chiefs of Staff
- BD**, barrels per day
- BritEmb**, British Embassy
- BritGovt**, British Government
- CAC**, document symbol used by a Country and Area Committee, Department of State; Coast Artillery Corps
- caps**, capitals
- CC**, Control Council; document symbol used by the Coordinating Committee, Department of State, and by the Office of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (for Italy); military communications indicator
- CCk**, Chief Cook
- CCS**, Combined (American and British) Chiefs of Staff; document symbol used by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
- CG**, Commanding General
- CinC**, Commander(s) in Chief
- CM-IN**, classified message—incoming
- CO**, Commanding Officer
- COMEIA**, communications indicator used on messages concerning the European Advisory Commission
- ComGenMed**, Commanding General, Mediterranean
- CORONET**, code name for the second phase of the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands
- COS**, Chiefs of Staff
- CPhoM**, Chief Photographer's Mate
- CPRB**, Combined (American and British) Production and Resources Board
- CRAB**, Combined (American and British) Resources Allocation Board
- CSAB**, Combined (American and British) Shipping Adjustment Boards
- CSt**, Chief Steward

- del, delegation
- Depcirtels**, Department's circular telegrams
- Dept**, Department (usually the Department of State)
- Deptel**, Department's telegram
- Deptstel**, Department's telegram
- div(s)**, division(s)
- DP**, displaced persons
- EAC**, European Advisory Commission
- EAM**, National Liberation Front (Greece)
- ECITO**, European Central Inland Transport Organization
- ECO**, European Coal Organization
- EDES**, Greek Democratic National League
- EECE**, Emergency Economic Committee, Europe
- ELAS**, National Popular Liberation Army (Greece)
- EM**, enlisted men
- Emb**, Embassy
- Embstel**, Embassy's telegram
- Embtel**, Embassy's telegram
- Emtel**, Embassy's telegram
- ETA**, estimated time of arrival
- ETOUSA**, European Theater of Operations, United States Army
- EUR**, Office of European Affairs, Department of State
- EW**, European War
- EYES ONLY**, communications indicator used on messages which were to receive extremely limited distribution
- FAA**, First Airborne Army
- FACS**, military communications indicator
- FAN**, military communications indicator
- FEA**, Foreign Economic Administration
- FF**, Fatherland Front (Bulgaria)
- FO**, Foreign Office
- FonAffs**, Foreign Affairs
- FonAffairs**, Foreign Affairs
- FonMin(s)**, Foreign Minister(s)
- FonOff**, Foreign Office
- ForMin**, Foreign Minister
- FornOff**, Foreign Office
- ForOff**, Foreign Office
- fwd**, forward
- FWD**, military communications indicator
- FX**, military communications indicator
- Fxcs**, military communications indicator
- G-4**, Army general staff section dealing with supply at the divisional or higher level
- G-5**, Army general or special staff section dealing with civil affairs at the divisional or higher level
- GCT**, General Convention on Tangier
- GHQs**, general headquarters
- Gks**, Greeks
- Grk**, Greek
- H**, document symbol used by the Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State
- HJ**, Hitler Youth
- HMG**, His Majesty's Government (United Kingdom)
- HQ, HQs**, headquarters
- ILO**, International Labor Organization
- inf**, infantry
- info**, information; for information; for the information of
- IPCOG**, Informal Policy Committee on Germany; document symbol used by that Committee
- IRDp**, Rumanian Petroleum Enterprise
- ISO**, international security organization, i. e., the United Nations
- JCS**, Joint (United States Army and Navy) Chiefs of Staff; document symbol used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- KKE**, Communist Party of Greece
- LCPRB**, document symbol used by the London Branch of the Combined (American and British) Production and Resources Board
- LOCKUP**, code name for special handling of messages to the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union relating to the war against Japan

- L/T**, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Department of State
- M**, military communications indicator
- ME**, Division of Middle Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- Med**, Mediterranean
- MESC**, Middle East Supply Center
- MEW**, Ministry of Economic Warfare (United Kingdom)
- MEWFO**, Ministry of Economic Warfare and Foreign Office (United Kingdom)
- mid**, midnight
- mil**, military; million
- Mil Att**, Military Attaché
- MILEPOST**, code name referring to stockpiling of supplies in eastern Siberia for the use of Soviet forces in the war against Japan
- MilMis**, Military Mission
- Min**, Minister
- MinFonAff**, Minister of (or for) Foreign Affairs
- MR**, Map Room at the White House (served as the communications center for the President)
- MR-IN**, Map Room message—incoming
- MR-OUT**, Map Room message—outgoing
- msg**, message
- M/Sgt**, Master Sergeant
- MTOUSA**, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army
- MX**, military communications indicator
- mytel**, my telegram
- NAF**, military communications indicator
- NAJEB**, North African Joint Economic Board
- NAPOLAS**, National Political Education Institutes (Germany)
- NCO**, non-commissioned officer
- NDF**, National Democratic Front (Rumania)
- NEA**, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State
- NIACT**, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
- NKVD**, People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Soviet Union)
- nr**, number
- NSDAP**, National Socialist German Workers Party (Nazi Party)
- OCTAGON**, code name for the Second Quebec Conference, September 11-16, 1944
- OLYMPIC**, code name for the assault on Kyushu, scheduled for March 1, 1946
- ONA**, Overseas News Agency
- OpDiv**, Operations Division, War Department General Staff
- OpNav**, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
- OR**, other ranks, i. e., enlisted men
- OSS**, Office of Strategic Services
- OWI**, Office of War Information
- OZNA**, Division for People's Defense (the Yugoslav secret police)
- para**, paragraph
- PAW**, Petroleum Administration for War
- PEITO**, Provisional European Inland Transport Organization
- PGC**, Persian Gulf Command
- pgh**, paragraph
- POLCO**, communications indicator used on messages relating to the work of the Polish Commission at Moscow
- POW**, prisoner of war
- PriMin**, Prime Minister
- RAF**, Royal Air Force (United Kingdom)
- rece**, reconnaissance
- recd**, received
- reDept(s)**, regarding the Department of State's (telegram or instruction)
- reDeptel**, regarding the Department of State's telegram
- reEmbs**, regarding the Embassy's (telegram or despatch)
- reEmbtel**, regarding the Embassy's telegram
- reftel**, telegram under reference
- refteleg**, telegram under reference
- reg**, registry
- reLegtels**, regarding the Legation's telegrams

- rep(s), representative(s)
 rept(d), repeat(ed)
 reurtel, regarding your telegram
RM, Reichsmarks
 rpd, repeated
 rpt, repeat; repeated; reported
 rptd, repeated
- S**, military communications indicator;
Seite (page)
- SA**, National Socialist Storm Troops
 (Germany)
- SAC**, Supreme Allied Commander
SACMed, Supreme Allied Commander,
 Mediterranean
- SACSEA**, Supreme Allied Commander,
 Southeast Asia
- S/AE**, Office of the Special Assistant
 to the Secretary of State for Dis-
 armament and Atomic Energy
- SAFEHAVEN**, code name for the
 United States program to forestall
 German attempts to hide assets out-
 side Germany, particularly in Euro-
 pean neutral countries
- SARDEP**, Rumanian Petroleum Com-
 pany
- SARPetrol**, Rumanian Petroleum
 Company
- SC**, document symbol used by the
 Secretary's Staff Committee, De-
 partment of State
- SCAEF**, Supreme Commander, Allied
 Expeditionary Force
- SCAF**, military communications indi-
 cator
- SD**, Security Service of the National
 Socialist Elite Guard (Germany)
- SEAC**, Southeast Asia Command
 sec, secret; section
- SecState**, Secretary of State
- Secy**, Secretary
- sgd**, signed
- Sgs**, military communications indi-
 cator
- SHAEF**, Supreme Headquarters, Al-
 lied Expeditionary Force
- SM**, Secretariat memorandum, Joint
 Chiefs of Staff
- SovFonOff**, Soviet Foreign Office
- SovGovt**, Soviet Government
- SS**, National Socialist Elite Guard
 (Germany)
- St1c**, Steward First Class
- Stat**, *United States Statutes at Large*
- SWNCC**, document symbol used by
 the State-War-Navy Coordinating
 Committee
- SWPA**, Southwest Pacific Area
- TA**. See **TUBE ALLOYS**
- TANYUG**, Telegraphic Agency of
 New Yugoslavia
- TASS**, Telegraphic Agency of the
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- TERMINAL**, code name for the Berlin
 Conference, July 16-August 2, 1945
- topsec**, top secret
- TransPetrol**, Transylvania Petroleum
 Company
- TRC**, Office of Transport and Com-
 munications Policy, Department of
 State
- tt**, thousand tons
- TUBE ALLOYS**, code name for atomic
 energy research and development
- UJ**, Uncle Joe, i. e., Stalin
- UK**, United Kingdom
- UMA**, United Maritime Authority
- UNCIO**, United Nations Conference
 on International Organization, San
 Francisco, April 25-June 26, 1945
- UNRRA**, United Nations Relief and
 Rehabilitation Administration
- urtel**, your telegram
- USFET**, United States Forces, Euro-
 pean Theater
- USG**, United States Government
- USPolAd**, United States Political
 Adviser
- V**, military communications indicator
v, *vide* (see)
- V-E Day**, the day of Allied victory
 in Europe
- VG**, Venezia Giulia
- VICTORY**, communications indicator
 used on outgoing messages from
 the United States Delegation at the
 Berlin Conference (a **VICTORY-IN**
 number was also assigned to in-
 coming messages)
- VIP**, very important person
- V-J Day**, the day of Japanese capitu-
 lation
- VLR**, very long range

- W**, military communications indicator
- WAR**, military communications indicator
- WarCAD**, Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff
- WarCOS**, Chief of Staff, United States Army
- WarOff**, War Office (United Kingdom)
- WX**, military communications indicator
- Z**, time indicator (the four digits immediately preceding the indicator give the hour at which the message in question was sent, expressed in "Zebra" time, i. e., Greenwich Civil Time—e. g., 231350Z represents 1350 hours, or 1:50 p. m., Greenwich Civil Time, on the 23d day of an unspecified month)
- Zecho**, Czechoslovak; Czechoslovakia

LIST OF PERSONS MENTIONED

EDITOR'S NOTE.—The identification of the persons in this list is limited to circumstances and positions under reference in the papers printed in this volume, and is for the year 1945 unless otherwise indicated. Unless there is indication to the contrary, titles and positions given are those held in or for the United States Government. Authors and journalists are not included in this list unless they are mentioned in the papers printed in some other capacity.

Persons whose names are preceded by an asterisk were present at Berlin or Babelsberg at some time during the course of the Berlin Conference.

In this list, names with diacritical marks (e. g., š) are alphabetized as if they were English names with no diacritical marks, rather than in the position which they would occupy if alphabetized in their original language. Likewise transliterations (e. g., *Zh* for the Russian Ж) are alphabetized in English letter order.

ABBOTT, George Manlove, First Secretary, American Embassy, Paris.

'ABD-AL-HAMID II, Sultan of Turkey, 1876–1909.

'ABD-AL-MAJID, Sultan of Turkey, 1839–1861.

*ABIBA, Chief Steward Sotero, U. S. N., member of the President's messman detail.

*ABRAMOVITZ, Moses, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.

ACHESON, Dean, Assistant Secretary of State (for Congressional Relations).

AÇIKALIN, Cvat M., Secretary General, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

*ADAMS, Francis W. H., United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.

ADAMS, Ware, Office of the Political Adviser on Austrian Affairs to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater.

al-. For names beginning *al-*, see the second element.

ALEXANDER II, Tsar of Russia, 1855–1881.

*ALEXANDER, Field Marshal Sir Harold, (British) Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

*ALLEN, Denis, First Secretary, Northern Department, British Foreign Office.

ALLEN, George E., Vice President, Home Insurance Company of New York.

*ALLEN, GEORGE V., Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State.

*ANAMOSA, Chief Warrant Officer Harold D., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ANDERS, Lieutenant General Władysław, Commander in Chief, Polish Second Corps, in Italy.

ANDO, Yoshio, Director, Bureau of Political Affairs, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ANDREEV, Bane, Minister for Mines in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia.

ANTONESCU, Ion, Rumanian Prime Minister, 1940–1944.

*ANTONOV, Army General Alexey Innokentyevich, Chief of Staff, Soviet Army.

ARBUTHNOT, Charles, British Ambassador to Turkey, 1804–1807.

- ARMOUR, Norman, Ambassador to Spain.
- ARNOLD, Major-General Allan C., Military Attaché, British Embassy, Ankara.
- *ARNOLD, General of the Army Henry H., U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Air Forces.
- *ATTLEE, Clement R., Chairman, British Parliamentary Labour Party; also (to May 23) Lord President of the Council and Deputy Prime Minister.
- AVŠIĆ, Lieutenant General Jaka, member of the Yugoslav Delegation which negotiated the Duino agreement of June 20, 1945, relating to Venezia Giulia.
- AZM, Khalid al-, Syrian Minister to France.
- BADOGLIO, Marshal Pietro, Italian Prime Minister, 1943-1944.
- BAKER, George W., Assistant Chief, Division of Economic Security Controls, Department of State.
- BAKIRDJIS, Colonel Euripides, Commander in Chief, Greek National Popular Liberation Army.
- BAKIRDZIS. *See* Bakirdjis.
- BALDWIN, Stanley, British Prime Minister, 1923-1924, 1924-1929, 1935-1937.
- BALFOUR, The Earl of, Chairman, Inter-Imperial Relations Committee, 1926.
- BALFOUR, John, British Minister, Washington.
- *BALL, Edith, Secretary, Office of the Secretary of State.
- BALLANTINE, Joseph W., Director of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.
- BARBOUR, Walworth, Division of Southern European Affairs, Department of State.
- BARNES, Maynard B., United States Representative in Bulgaria.
- *BAUTISTA, Chief Steward Cayetano, U. S. N., member of the President's messman detail.
- BAXTER, Charles William, Head, Eastern Department, British Foreign Office.
- BAYDUR, Hüseyin Rağip, Turkish Ambassador to the United States.
- *BEATTY, Morgan, representative of the combined radio networks in the press, radio, and photographers' pool assigned to cover the Berlin Conference.
- BECKETT, William Eric, Second Legal Adviser, British Foreign Office.
- *BELKNAP, Chief Photographer's Mate William, Jr., U. S. N., an official photographer for the Berlin Conference.
- BENEŠ, Edvard, President of Czechoslovakia.
- BENNINGHOFF, H. Merrell, Assistant Executive Secretary, Central Secretariat, Department of State.
- *BERGSON, Abram, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- BERRY, Burton Y., United States Representative in Rumania.
- *BEVIN, Ernest, Member of the British Parliament.
- BEYNET, General Paul-Étienne, French Delegate General in the Levant.
- BIDAULT, Georges, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government of the French Republic.
- BIDDLE, Francis, Attorney General.
- *BIERUT, Boleslaw, President of the National Council of the Homeland in the Polish Provisional Government at Lublin; President of the National Council of the Homeland in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- *BIRSE, Major Arthur, Second Secretary and Translator, British Embassy, Moscow.
- BIRUZOV, Colonel General Sergey Semenovich, (Soviet) Deputy Chairman, Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria.
- BISMARCK, The Prince of, Chancellor of the German Empire, 1871-1890.
- BLAISDELL, Thomas C., Jr., Chief, Mission for Economic Affairs, American Embassy, London.

- *BOGOMOLOV, Alexander Efremovich, Soviet Ambassador to France.
- *BOHLEN, Charles E., Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- BONAPARTE, General Napoléon, Commander of the French expedition against Egypt, 1798-1799; (as Napoléon I) Emperor of the French, 1804-1814, 1815.
- BONCOUR. *See* Paul-Boncour.
- BONNET, Henri, French Ambassador to the United States.
- BONOMI, Ivanoe, Italian Prime Minister (to June 17).
- BOOTH, Brigadier General Donald P., U. S. A., Commanding General, Persian Gulf Command.
- BORMANN, Martin, Leader of the Chancellery, German National Socialist Party.
- BOUCHER, Major-General Charles Hamilton, Commander, British Forces in Northern Greece.
- BOWKER, Reginald James, British Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Spain.
- *BOYD, Colonel James, U. S. A., Director, Industry Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany).
- *BRADLEY, General Omar N., U. S. A., Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group.
- BRATIANU, Constantin (Dinu), President, Rumanian Liberal Party.
- *BRIDGES, Sir Edward, Secretary of the British Cabinet.
- BRIDGES, Harry, President, International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union.
- *BRIGHT, Chief Warrant Officer Earl E., U. S. A., War Department General Staff.
- BRISTOL, Rear Admiral Mark L., U. S. N., High Commissioner to Turkey, 1919-1927.
- BROAD, Philip, Acting Counsellor, Office of the British Minister Resident, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta.
- *BROOKE, Field Marshal Sir Alan, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.
- BROWDER, Earl, General Secretary, Communist Party in the United States, 1930-1944.
- *BROWN, Technician Third Grade Allen W., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- *BROWN, Walter J., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- BROZ TITO. *See* Tito.
- BULGARIA, The King of. *See* Simeon II.
- *BUNDY, Harvey H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of War; Joint Secretary, Combined Policy Committee (on atomic energy).
- BUSH, Vannevar, Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development; Chairman, Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment, Joint Chiefs of Staff; member of the Combined Policy Committee (on atomic energy).
- BUTLER, Nevile Montagu, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
- *BYRNES, James F., Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (to April 2); Secretary of State (from July 3).
- *CABELL, Brigadier General Charles P., U. S. A., member of the Joint Staff Planners, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Staff Planners, Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- *CABELL, Lieutenant Colonel John B., U. S. A., Staff Officer, Current Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff.
- CACCIA, Harold, British Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Greece.
- *CADOGAN, Hon. Sir Alexander, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
- *CAFFERY, Jefferson, Ambassador to France.

- *CALINAO, Chief Steward Federico, U. S. N., member of the President's messman detail.
- CAMPBELL, Sir Ronald I., British Representative, European Advisory Commission.
- *CANFIL, Fred E., United States Secret Service.
- CANNING, George, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1822-1827.
- CANNING, Stratford (Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe from 1852), British Ambassador to Turkey, 1825-1829, 1831-1832, 1841-1858.
- *CANNON, Cavendish W., First Secretary, American Embassy, Lisbon.
- CÁRDENAS, Juan Francisco de, Spanish Ambassador to the United States.
- CARLETON, Alford, President, Aleppo College, Aleppo, Syria.
- *CARTER, Lieutenant Colonel G. S., U. S. A., Assistant Chief of the Secretariat, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- CARTON DE WIART, Lieutenant-General Adrian, Personal Representative of the British Prime Minister to the President of the National Government of the Republic of China.
- *CARY, Colonel John B., U. S. A., Deputy Chief (Air), Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff.
- CASTILLO Y CAMPOS, Cristobal del, Under Secretary, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- CATROUX, General of the Army Georges, French Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
- CHADWICK, Sir James, Chief Scientific Adviser to the British Government on Atomic Matters.
- *CHAPMAN, Lieutenant Colonel William W., Jr., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- CHARPENTIER, Pierre, French Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in the Soviet Union.
- *CHASE, Lieutenant Joseph, U. S. N. R., Assistant Naval Attaché, American Embassy, Moscow.
- *CHERWELL, Lord, British Paymaster-General.
- CHESHMEDJIEFF. *See* Cheshmedzhev.
- CHESHMEDZHEV, Grigor, Bulgarian Minister of Social Policy.
- CHIANG Kai-shek, Generalissimo, President of the National Government of the Republic of China; Supreme Commander, China Theater.
- CHICHERIN, Georgy Vasilyevich, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 1918-1930.
- CHILDS, J. Rives, United States Representative, Paris Conversations Concerning Tangier.
- *CHURCHILL, Junior Commander Mary, daughter of the British Prime Minister.
- *CHURCHILL, Winston S., British Prime Minister; First Lord of the Treasury; Minister of Defence.
- CHURCHILL, Mrs. Winston S, wife of the British Prime Minister.
- CLARK, General Mark W., U. S. A., Commanding General, Fifteenth Army Group (to July 4); Commanding General, United States Forces in Austria (from July 5).
- CLARK KERR. *See* Kerr.
- CLARKE, Colonel J. R. S., Military Attaché, British Embassy, Belgrade.
- *CLAY, Lieutenant General Lucius DuB., U. S. A., Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany.
- *CLAYTON, William L., Assistant Secretary of State (for Economic Affairs); Chairman, Informal Policy Committee on Germany.
- CLEMENCEAU, Georges, French Premier, 1906-1909, 1917-1920.
- CLEMENTIS, Vladimir, Czechoslovak Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- COE, Frank, Director, Division of Monetary Research, Treasury Department.

- *COHEN, Benjamin V., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- *COLLADO, Emilio G., Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State.
- COLYER, Air Marshal Douglas, Acting Head, British Joint Staff Mission, Washington.
- *CONNOR, Cassie, Personal Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- *COOKE, Vice Admiral Charles M., Jr., U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
- COOPER, Alfred Duff, British Ambassador to France.
- *CORNWALL-JONES, Brigadier Arthur Thomas, British Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- *CORREA, Major Mathias F., U. S. M. C. R., Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy.
- *COSTELLO, Warrant Officer James R., U. S. A., Office of the Secretary of War.
- *COULSON, J. E., Acting Head, Economic Relations Department, British Foreign Office.
- COX, Raymond E., Joint Secretary, Informal Policy Committee on Germany.
- CRANBORNE, Viscount, British Secretary of State for the Colonies, February–November 1942.
- CRANE, Major General John A., U. S. A., United States Representative, Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria.
- *CRANKSHAW, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Eric, Secretary, British Government Hospitality Fund.
- CRAWFORD, Major General Robert W., U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- CROMIE, Leonard J., Third Secretary, American Embassy, Athens.
- CROWLEY, Leo T., Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration.
- CRUTICOV. *See* Krutikov.
- CUBRILOVIĆ, Branko, Vice President, Serbian Agrarian Party.
- *CUNNINGHAM, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew, Bart., British First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.
- CURZON of Kedleston, Marquess, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1919–1924.
- *CUSTODIO, Chief Steward Amando, U. S. N., member of the President's messman detail.
- *CUTTER, Colonel R. Ammi, U. S. A., Assistant Executive Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War.
- DĄBROWSKI, Konstanty, Minister of Finance in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- DA'UQ Bey, Ahmad, Lebanese Minister to France.
- *DAVIES, Joseph E., Chairman, The President's War Relief Control Board.
- DAVIES, Ralph K., Deputy Administrator, Petroleum Administration for War.
- DAVIS, Elmer, Director, Office of War Information.
- DAVIS, Colonel J. C., U. S. A., Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff.
- DAY, Edmund E., President, Cornell University; Chairman, Committee on German Reeducation (a committee formed to advise the Department of State).
- *DEAN, Colonel Fred M., U. S. A., Executive Assistant to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.
- *DEAN, Patrick, Fourth Legal Adviser, British Foreign Office.

- *DEANE, Major General John R., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- DE GASPERI, Alcide, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- DE GAULLE, General Charles, President of the Council of Ministers in the Provisional Government of the French Republic.
- DEMPSTER, Ernest J., United States Delegation, Paris Conversations Concerning Tangier.
- *DESPRES, Emile, Adviser on German Economic Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
- *DEVENNEY, Chief Warrant Officer John J., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- DEVERS, General Jacob L., U. S. A., Commanding General, Sixth Army Group.
- DEYM, Count Franz, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, 1888-1904.
- DHIMAKIS, Ilias, Slavo-Macedonian Communist guerrilla leader.
- DIMITROFF. *See* Dimitrov.
- DIMITROV, Georgy, President, Bulgarian Communist Party.
- DIMITROV, Georgy M., leader of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union.
- DONALDSON, E. P., (British) Secretary General, European Advisory Commission.
- *DONALDSON, Ian, (British) Allied Supplies Executive.
- *DONNELLY, Colonel Charles H., U. S. A., Secretary, Joint Staff Planners and Joint Logistics Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff; United States Secretary, Combined Staff Planners and Combined Administrative Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- *DOOMAN, Eugene H., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs.
- DOUGLAS, Colonel James H., Jr., U. S. A., Chief of Staff, Air Transport Command, Army Air Forces.
- DRAPER, Brigadier General William H., Jr., U. S. A., Chief, Economic Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany).
- *DRESCHER, George C., United States Secret Service.
- DROŹNIAK, Edward, Director, Polish National Bank.
- *DUBOIS, Josiah E., Jr., United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- DUCLOS, Jacques, Secretary, French Communist Party.
- *DUNN, James Clement, Assistant Secretary of State (for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs); Adviser, United States Delegation, United Nations Conference on International Organization.
- DURBROW, Elbridge, Chief, Division of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State.
- DURMA, Mircea, Rumanian Minister of Finance.
- DUVALL, Frank E., Administrative Officer, Office of the Secretary of State.
- EAKER, Lieutenant General Ira C., U. S. A., Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces, and Chief of Air Staff.
- EARLY, Stephen, Special Assistant to the President.
- *EDELSTEIN, Lieutenant Julius C., U. S. N. R., Aide to the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
- *EDEN, Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Chairman, Committee on German Dismemberment (established by the Yalta Conference).
- EDGCUMBE, Major-General Oliver Pearce, British Commissioner, Allied Control Commission for Hungary.

- EDWARD VII, King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 1901-1910.
- *EISENHOWER, General of the Army Dwight D., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater; Commander in Chief, United States Forces of Occupation in Germany; also (to July 14) Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- *ELLEGOOD, Technician Fourth Grade William C., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- *ELSEY, Lieutenant George M., U. S. N. R., Assistant to the Naval Aide to the President.
- EPSTEIN, Shachno, Secretary, Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the Soviet Union.
- ERHARDT, John G., Political Adviser on Austrian Affairs to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater.
- *ESPOSITO, Brigadier General Vincent J., U. S. A., Chief, Logistics Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff; member of the Joint Logistics Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Administrative Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- *ESTRADA, Chief Steward Pio, U. S. N., member of the President's messman detail.
- *FAIGLE, Captain John E., U. S. N., United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- *FILIPPELLI, Corporal Eugene T., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- *FINAN, Major William F., U. S. A., War Department General Staff.
- FISCHER, Ernst, State Secretary for Public Education and Cultural Affairs in the Provisional Government of Austria.
- *FLEENER, Ensign Cecil M., U. S. N. R., Administrative Assistant to the Naval Aide to the President.
- *FLICKINGER, Yeoman First Class Dwight C., U. S. N. R., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- *FLOM, Yeoman First Class Louis O., U. S. N. R., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- *FLORESCA, Chief Cook Mariano, U. S. N., member of the President's messman detail.
- FOCH, General Ferdinand (Marshal of France from August 7, 1918), Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies, 1918.
- FOEHL, Lieutenant Colonel C. A., U. S. A., Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff.
- *FOGELSON, Colonel Elijah E., U. S. A., Adviser on Organization and Production, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- *FOOTE, Wilder, Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- *FORRESTAL, James, Secretary of the Navy.
- *FOULDS, Linton, Head, Japan and Pacific Section, Far Eastern Department, British Foreign Office.
- FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE, Generalissimo Francisco, Chief of State and President of the Spanish Government.
- FRANGEŠ, Ivan, Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in the United States.
- *FRATZKE, Ralph C., Clerk, American Embassy, London.
- *GAMBACCINI, Technical Sergeant Henry J., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- *GAMMELL, Lieutenant-General Sir James Andrew Harcourt, Representative of the British Chiefs of Staff in the Soviet Union; Head, British Military Mission, Moscow.
- *GARDNER, Rear Admiral Matthias B., U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
- GARRAN, Isham Peter, Second Secretary, Western Department, British Foreign Office.
- GASCOIGNE, A. D. F., British Political Representative in Hungary.
- *GASKILL, Major Arthur L., U. S. A., an official photographer for the Berlin Conference.
- GEORGE II, King of the Hellenes.
- GEORGE VI, King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
- GEORGIEV, Kimon, Bulgarian Prime Minister.
- *GERHARDT, Colonel Harrison A., U. S. A., Executive Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War.
- GERNESS, a German official concerned with the food supply for Berlin (not otherwise identified).
- GHORMLEY, Vice Admiral Robert L., U. S. N., Commander, Naval Forces, Germany.
- GILL, Captain, officer attached to the 2/11 Sikh Regiments in Greece (not otherwise identified).
- GLENDINNING, Charles D., Treasury Representative, Cairo.
- GOEBBELS, Joseph, German Minister for Public Enlightenment.
- GOERING. *See* Göring.
- GOLDMANN, Nahum, Representative in the United States of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.
- *GOMUŁKA, Władysław, Deputy Prime Minister in the Polish Provisional Government at Lublin; Deputy Prime Minister in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- GORE-BOOTH, Paul, First Secretary, British Embassy, Washington.
- GÖRING, Reich Marshal Hermann, German Minister for Aviation.
- *GORLINSKY, Major General Nikolay Dmitriyevich, Assistant to the First Assistant People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union.
- GOTSI, *nom de guerre* of Ilias Dhimakis, q. v.
- *GOUGH, Commander Edward J., U. S. N. R., Medical Officer on the Staff of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
- GOUSEV. *See* Gusev.
- *GRABSKI, Stanisław, Vice President of the National Council of the Homeland in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- *GRAHAM, Captain Frank H., U. S. A., White House Signal Corps Detachment.
- GRAHAM, Frank P., President, University of North Carolina; member of the Committee on German Reeducation.
- *GRAHAM, Ralph L., Administrative Assistant, Department of State, on assignment to the United Nations.
- GREAT BRITAIN AND (NORTHERN) IRELAND, The King of the United Kingdom of. *See* Edward VII; George VI.
- GREECE, The King of. *See* George II; Otto.
- GREENBAUM, Brigadier General Edward S., U. S. A., Executive Officer, Office of the Under Secretary of War.
- GREENBERG, Chaim, Editor, *Jewish Frontier*; Editor, *Yiddisher Kempfer*.

- GREW, Joseph C., Under Secretary of State; Secretary of State ad interim, June 28–July 3, 1945; Acting Secretary of State during the absence of Secretary Stettinius at the United Nations Conference on International Organization and during the absence of Secretary Byrnes at the Berlin Conference.
- GREY, Sir Edward, Bart., British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1905–1916.
- *GRIFFIN, Ernest K., Clerk, American Embassy, London.
- GRIFFITH, John Eaton, Principal Assistant Secretary, Coal Division, British Ministry of Fuel and Power.
- GRIGG, Sir Edward, British Minister Resident in the Middle East.
- *GRIMES, Corporal Walter A., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- GROL, Milan, Deputy Prime Minister in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia.
- *GROMYKO, Andrey Andreyevich, Soviet Ambassador to the United States; Soviet Delegate, United Nations Conference on International Organization; Soviet Delegate, First Meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations.
- *GROSS, Major General Charles P., U. S. A., member of the Joint Military Transportation Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Military Transportation Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- GROSS, General Jean-Charles, Commander in Chief, French Forces in the Levant.
- GROVES, Major General Leslie R., U. S. A., Commanding General, MANHATTAN DISTRICT project.
- GROZA, Petru, Rumanian Prime Minister.
- GRYZLOV, Lieutenant General Anatoly Alexeyevich, Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Soviet Army.
- *GULICK, Luther H., Adviser on Administration and Political Science, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- *GUSEV, Fedor Tarasovich, Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Soviet Representative, European Advisory Commission; Soviet Representative, Committee on German Dismemberment (established by the Yalta Conference).
- HACKWORTH, Green H., Legal Adviser, Department of State.
- HALIFAX, The Earl of, British Ambassador to the United States.
- *HAMAN, Walter A., United States Secret Service.
- HANKEY, Hon. Robert M. A., Appointed British Chargé d'Affaires to Poland.
- *HANSON, Technician Third Grade William J., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- HARRIMAN, Kathleen, daughter of the Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
- *HARRIMAN, W. Averell, Ambassador to the Soviet Union; United States Representative, Commission on the Polish Question (established by the Yalta Conference).
- *HARRISON, Geoffrey Wedgwood, First Secretary, German Department, British Foreign Office.
- HARRISON, George L., Special Consultant to the Secretary of War.
- HARVEY, Oliver, Acting Assistant Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
- HAY, John, Secretary of State, 1898–1905.
- *HAYTER, William, Acting Counsellor, Southern Department, British Foreign Office; Secretary General, British Delegation to the Berlin Conference.
- HEARST, William Randolph, President and Editor in Chief, Hearst Consolidated Publications.

- *HEATH, Donald R., Director of Political Affairs, United States Group, Control Council (Germany).
- HELLENES, The King of the. *See* George II; Otto.
- HENDERSON, Loy W., Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State.
- *HENLY, Captain Elkan, Jr., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- HICKERSON, John D., Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State (Acting Director, July 7–August 7); Adviser, United States Delegation, United Nations Conference on International Organization.
- *HICKEY, Warrant Officer (Junior Grade) Richard G., U. S. A., War Department General Staff.
- *HILLDRING, Major General John H., U. S. A., Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff.
- *HINDE, Brigadier W. R. N., Deputy Director of the Military Government, British Sector, Berlin.
- *HIPSLEY, Elmer R., United States Secret Service.
- HIROHITO, Emperor of Japan.
- HIROTA, Koki, Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1930–1932; Prime Minister, 1936–1937.
- HITLER, Adolf, *Führer*, Chancellor of the German Reich, and Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces (to April 30).
- *HOLLADAY, Chief Warrant Officer Andrew B., U. S. A., Headquarters, Army Air Forces.
- HOLMAN, Adrian, British Minister, Paris.
- HOLMES, Julius C., Assistant Secretary of State (for Administration).
- HONNER, Franz, State Secretary for the Interior in the Provisional Government of Austria.
- HOOVER, Herbert, President of the United States, 1929–1933.
- HOPKINS, Harry L., Adviser and Assistant to the President.
- HOUSTON-BOSWALL, W. E., British Political Representative in Bulgaria.
- *HOWARD, Technician Fourth Grade Lynn H., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- HOWE, C. D., Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply; member of the Combined Policy Committee (on atomic energy).
- HOYER MILLAR. *See* Millar.
- *HOYING, Ship's Clerk Edwin L., U. S. N. R., Administrative Officer, White House Map Room.
- *HRONES, John G., Vice Consul, American Embassy, Paris.
- HULL, Cordell, Secretary of State, 1933–1944.
- *HULL, Lieutenant General John E., U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff.
- HUNT, Brigadier John, Commander, 11th Indian Infantry Brigade, in Greece.
- HURLEY, Major General Patrick J., U. S. A., Ambassador to China.
- HUSTON, Cloyce K., Chief, Division of Southern European Affairs, Department of State.
- HYNDLEY, Lord, Chairman, London Combined Coal Committee, Combined Production and Resources Board; Chairman, British National Coal Board.
- IBRAHIM I, Sultan of Turkey, 1640–1648.
- ICKES, Harold L., Administrator, Petroleum Administration for War.
- INGE, Very Reverend William Ralph, Dean of St. Paul's, London, 1911–1934.
- İNÖNÜ, İsmet, President of Turkey.
- IRAN, The Shah-in-Shah of. *See* Pahlevi.

- *ISMAY, General Sir Hastings, Chief of Staff to the British Minister of Defence.
ITALY, The King of. *See* Victor Emmanuel III.
- JABRI, Sa'dallah al-, President, Syrian Chamber of Deputies.
- *JACKSON, Robert H., Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality; United States Representative, International Conference on Military Trials.
- JACKSON, Lieutenant Colonel Virgil A., U. S. A., Military Attaché, American Legation, Beirut (assigned also to Damascus).
- JACKSON, Wayne G., Associate Chief, War Areas Economic Division, Department of State.
- *JAMISON, Brigadier General Glen C., U. S. A., Chief, Logistics Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans, Army Air Forces.
- JAPAN, The Emperor of. *See* Hirohito.
- *JEBB, Gladwyn, Head, Reconstruction Department, British Foreign Office; British Delegate, First Meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations.
- JEDRYCHOWSKI, Stefan, Minister of Navigation and Foreign Trade in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- JEFFERSON, Thomas, Secretary of State, 1790-1793.
- *JOHANSON, Yeoman First Class John R., U. S. N. R., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- *JOHNSON, Carl Hugo, representative of the combined newsreel companies in the press, radio, and photographers' pool assigned to cover the Berlin Conference.
- *JOHNSON, George H., United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- JOHNSON, Hiram W., United States Senator from California.
- JONES, G. Lewis, Jr., Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.
- JOVANOVIĆ, Lieutenant General Arso R., Chief of Staff, Yugoslav Army.
- JUIN, General Alphonse-Pierre, Chief, French General Staff of National Defense.
- KACZOROWSKI, Michał, Minister of Reconstruction in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- KALININ, Mikhail Ivanovich, Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union.
- KARDELJ, Edvard, Second Vice President in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia.
- *KARLIN, Captain Henry N., U. S. A., an official photographer for the Berlin Conference.
- *KARR, Yeoman First Class Lyman W., U. S. N. R., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- *KEHOE, Staff Sergeant Theodore R., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- KEMAL ATATÜRK (KEMAL MUSTAFA), President of Turkey, 1923-1938.
- KEMPKA, Erich, chauffeur to the Chancellor of the German Reich.
- KENNAN, George F., Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in the Soviet Union.
- *KERR, Sir Archibald Clark, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union; British Representative, Commission on the Polish Question (established by the Yalta Conference).
- *KEVAN, Lois, Clerk-Stenographer, Central Secretariat, Department of State.
- KEY, Major General William S., U. S. A., Chief, United States Section, Allied Control Commission for Hungary.
- KEYNES, Lord, member of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer's Consultative Council.

- KIERNIK, Władysław, Minister of Public Administration in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- KINDLEBERGER, Major Charles P., U. S. A., Washington Liaison Office, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- KING, Alfred Hazell, British Acting Consul General, Salonika.
- *KING, Fleet Admiral Ernest J., U. S. N., Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations.
- KIRK, Alexander, Ambassador to Italy.
- *KIRK, Major General Norman J., U. S. A., Surgeon General, United States Army.
- KLIEFORTH, A. W., Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Czechoslovakia.
- KOHLER, Foy D., Assistant Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.
- KOŁODZIEJ, Antoni, Chairman, Executive Committee, Polish Seamen's Union in the United Kingdom.
- KOŁODZIEJSKI, Henryk, member of the Polish National Council of the Homeland.
- KONEV, Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Stepanovich, Commander in Chief, First Ukrainian Front.
- KONIEV. *See* Konev.
- KONOYE, Prince Fumimaro, Japanese Prime Minister, 1937-1939, 1940-1941.
- KORNEICHUK, Alexander Evdokimovich, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 1943-1944; Chairman, Committee for Art Affairs, Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.
- KOSANOVIĆ, Sava, Minister of Information in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia.
- KOSTILEV. *See* Kostylev.
- KOSTYLEV, Mikhail Alexeyevich, Soviet Ambassador to Italy.
- KOWALSKI, Władysław, Vice President in the Polish Provisional Government at Lublin; Minister of Culture and Art in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- KREBS, General Hans, Chief, Headquarters Staff, German Army General Staff.
- *KREPS, Colonel Kenneth R., U. S. A., Pilot for the Secretary of War.
- KRESTINSKY, Nikolay Nikolayevich, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 1930-1937; Assistant People's Commissar for Justice, 1937.
- KRNJEVIĆ, Juraj, a leader of the Croatian Peasant Party in London.
- *KRUGLOV, Colonel General Sergey Nikiforovich, First Assistant People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union.
- KRUTIKOV, Alexey Dmitriyevich, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union.
- KRZYZANOWSKI, Adam, Professor of Political Economy, University of Kraków.
- KUTRZEBA, Stanisław M., Polish jurist, historian, and educator; President, Polish Academy of Science and Letters.
- *KYLE, Colonel William H., U. S. A., Aide to the Secretary of War.
- LACOSTE, Francis, French Minister, Washington.
- *LAFRANCE, Chief Warrant Officer Albert J., U. S. A., Headquarters, Army Air Forces.
- *LAND, Vice Admiral Emory S., U. S. N. (retired), Administrator, War Shipping Administration; Chairman, United States Maritime Commission; United States Member, Combined Shipping Adjustment Boards.
- *LANE, Arthur Bliss, Appointed Ambassador to Poland.

- *LANG, Master Sergeant Kenneth W., U. S. A., an official photographer for the Berlin Conference.
- LANGE, Oskar, Professor of Economics, University of Chicago.
- LARRABEE, Lieutenant Colonel Sterling L., U. S. A., Military Attaché, American Embassy, Athens.
- LASKI, Harold J., Chairman, British Labour Party.
- LAVAL, Pierre, French Deputy Premier, July–December 1940; also Minister of Foreign Affairs, October–December 1940.
- *LEAHY, Fleet Admiral William D., U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
- *LEATHERS, Lord, British Minister of War Transport.
- LEEPER, Sir Reginald, British Ambassador to Greece.
- LEHMAN, Herbert H., Governor of New York, 1932–1942.
- LENIN, Nikolay, leader of the Bolshevik Revolution of October–November 1917; Chairman, Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Government, 1917–1924.
- LE ROUGETEL, J. H., British Political Representative in Rumania.
- LEVCHENKO, Admiral Gordey Ivanovich, Assistant People's Commissar of the Soviet Navy.
- LEVERICH, Henry P., Acting Chief, Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State.
- *LEVERITTY, Technical Sergeant J. P., Jr., U. S. A., Office of the Secretary of War.
- *LEVINGTON, Master Sergeant Philip J., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- LEWIS, James H., Foreign Affairs Specialist, Central Secretariat, Department of State.
- *LICODO, Steward First Class Benjamin, U. S. N., member of the President's messman detail.
- *LINCOLN, Brigadier General George A., U. S. A., Chief, Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff; member of the Joint Staff Planners, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Staff Planners, Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- LINDEMAN, Eduard C., New York School of Social Work, Columbia University; member of the Committee on German Reeducation.
- LINDSAY, Lieutenant Colonel Franklin A., U. S. A., Intelligence Officer, 2677th Regiment, Office of Strategic Services (Provisional), Mediterranean Theater.
- LITVINOFF. *See* Litvinov.
- LITVINOV, Maxim Maximovich, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 1930–1939.
- LITWIN, Franciszek, Minister of Public Health in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- LLOYD GEORGE, David, British Prime Minister, 1916–1922.
- LOFTUS, John A., Special Assistant to the Director, Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State.
- LOUDON, Alexander, Netherland Ambassador to the United States.
- *LOWRY, Colonel Don E., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- LOZOVSKY, Solomon Abramovich, Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
- *LUBIN, Isador, Associate United States Representative, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- *LUCAS, Technician Third Grade John J., Jr., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- LUTHRINGER, George F., Chief, Division of Financial Affairs, Department of State, detailed to the United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- LYNCH, Robert J., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- MACARTHUR, General of the Army Douglas, U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Pacific; Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.
- *MACDOUGALL, Donald, Chief Assistant to the British Paymaster-General, Prime Minister's Statistical Branch.
- MAČEK, Vladimir, President, Croatian Peasant Party in Yugoslavia.
- MACLEISH, Archibald, Assistant Secretary of State (for Public and Cultural Relations).
- MACMILLAN, Harold, (British) Acting President, Allied Commission (for Italy).
- MACVEAGH, Lincoln, Ambassador to Greece.
- *MAHLER, Ernst, Adviser on Industry, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- *MAISKY, Ivan Mikhailovich, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; Chairman, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- MAKINS, Roger, British Minister, Washington; British Joint Secretary, Combined Policy Committee (on atomic energy).
- MALIK, Yakov Alexandrovich, Soviet Ambassador to Japan.
- MALINOVSKY, Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion, Chairman, Soviet Element, Allied Control Commission for Rumania.
- *MALONEY, James J., United States Secret Service.
- MANIU, Iuliu, President, Rumanian National Peasant Party.
- *MAPLES, Rear Admiral Houston L., U. S. N., Senior Naval Officer, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union; Naval Attaché, American Embassy, Moscow.
- *MARCHLENSKI, Technician Third Grade Peter P., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- MARDAM Bey, Jamil, Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- MARLEY, Brigadier Cuthbert David, (British) Controller-General, North German Coal Control, Control Council (Germany).
- *MARSHALL, General of the Army George C., U. S. A., Chief of Staff, United States Army.
- *MARSHALL, J. Howard, General Counsel, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- *MARTIN, Hunter L., Clerk-Stenographer, Central Secretariat, Department of State.
- MARTINOVIĆ, Milan, Yugoslav Minister to Egypt.
- MARTY, André, member of the Political Bureau and of the Central Committee, French Communist Party.
- *MARVEL, Technical Sergeant John W., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- MASARYK, Jan, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile at London.
- MASON, Edward S., Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
- MASSIGLI, René, French Ambassador to the United Kingdom; French Representative, European Advisory Commission.
- *MATTHEWS, H. Freeman, Director of European Affairs, Department of State.

- MATUSZEWSKI, Stefan, Minister of Information and Propaganda in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- *MAURER, Chief Yeoman Eugene J., U. S. N. R., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- MAXWELL, James A., Assistant Chief, Division of Lend-Lease and Surplus War Property Affairs, Department of State.
- McCAFFERY, Richard S., Jr., Mission for Economic Affairs, American Embassy, London.
- McCARTHY, Colonel Charles W., U. S. A., Joint Secretary, Informal Policy Committee on Germany.
- *McCARTHY, Colonel Frank, U. S. A., Secretary, War Department General Staff.
- *McCLOY, John J., Assistant Secretary of War.
- McCLURE, Brigadier General Robert A., U. S. A., Chief of Information, Control Division, United States Forces, European Theater.
- McCOMBE, F. W., Counsellor, British Embassy, Washington.
- McCORMICK, Robert R., Editor and Publisher, *Chicago Tribune*.
- *McCREERY, Lieutenant-General Sir Richard, Commander in Chief, British Forces of Occupation in Austria.
- McDERMOTT, Michael J., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (for Press Relations).
- *McDILL, Captain Alexander S., U. S. N., Aide to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
- *McFARLAND, Brigadier General Andrew J., U. S. A., Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff; United States Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- McGUIRE, Martin R. P., Dean, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The Catholic University of America; member of the Committee on German Reeducation.
- McINTIRE, Vice Admiral Ross T., U. S. N., Surgeon General, United States Navy.
- *McMAHON, Captain Alphonse, U. S. N. R., Personal Physician to the President.
- McNARNEY, General Joseph T., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater; Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.
- McNEILL, Captain William H., U. S. A., Assistant Military Attaché, American Embassy, Athens.
- McSHERRY, Brigadier General Frank J., U. S. A., Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- *MEIKLEJOHN, Lieutenant Robert P., U. S. N. R., Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air, American Embassy, Moscow.
- MELBOURNE, Roy M., Acting United States Representative in Rumania.
- *MENDLOW, Sergeant Robert, U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- MEYER, Brigadier General Vincent, U. S. A., Military Adviser, United States Delegation, European Advisory Commission.
- MEYRIER, Jacques, Director General of Administrative Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- MICHAEL (Mihai) I, King of Rumania.
- MIDDLETON, G. H., Second Secretary, British Embassy, Washington.
- MIKLÓS, Colonel General Béla, Hungarian Prime Minister.
- *MIKOŁAJCZYK, Stanisław, Prime Minister in the Polish Government-in-Exile at London, 1943-1944; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

- MIKOYAN, Anastas Ivanovich, Deputy Chairman, Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union; People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.
- MILES, Richard T. G., Third Secretary, British Embassy, Washington.
- *MILLAR, Frederick Hoyer, Head, Western Department, British Foreign Office.
- *MINC, Hilary, Minister of Industry in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- MINOR, Harold B., Acting Chief, Division of Middle Eastern Affairs, Department of State.
- *MITCHELL, Major Nicholas A., U. S. A., Assistant to the Military Aide to the President.
- *MOCIDLOWSKI, Sergeant Casimir F., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- *MODZELEWSKI, Zygmunt, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity; Polish Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
- MOHAMMED V, Sultan of Morocco.
- *MOLOTOV, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; Chairman, Soviet Delegation, United Nations Conference on International Organization; Soviet Representative, Commission on the Polish Question (established by the Yalta Conference).
- *MONCKTON, Sir Walter, Head, British Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- *MONTEFRONT, Staff Sergeant Thomas L., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- *MONTGOMERY, Field Marshal Sir Bernard, Commander in Chief, British Forces of Occupation in Germany.
- *MOORE, Captain Charles J., U. S. N., Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- MORAWSKI. *See* Osóbka-Morawski.
- *MORGAN, Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Rufus E., U. S. N. R., Office of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
- MORGAN, Lieutenant-General W. D., (British) Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.
- MORGENTHAU, Henry, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.
- MOROCCO, The Sultan of. *See* Mohammed V.
- MORRIS, Brewster H., Office of the Political Adviser on German Affairs, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- MORTON, Major Sir Desmond, Personal Assistant to the British Prime Minister.
- *MOSELY, Philip E., Political Adviser to the United States Representative, European Advisory Commission.
- *MOUNTBATTEN, Admiral Lord Louis, (British) Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia.
- MOYNE, Lord, British Minister Resident in the Middle East, January–November 1944.
- MURPHY, Raymond E., Special Assistant to the Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State.
- *MURPHY, Robert D., Political Adviser on German Affairs, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (to July 14); Political Adviser, Executive Office, United States Group, Control Council (Germany).
- MURRAY, Wallace, Ambassador to Iran.
- MURSHID, Sulayman, Alaouite tribal leader in Syria.
- MUSSOLINI, Benito, Italian Prime Minister, 1922–1943.

- NAPOLÉON I. *See* Bonaparte.
- NELSON, Rear Admiral Horatio, Commander of the British Fleet at the Battle of Aboukir, 1798.
- NICHOLAS I, Tsar of Russia, 1825-1855.
- NICHOLAS II, Tsar of Russia, 1894-1917.
- NICHOLS, Philip, British Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.
- NICOLE, Léon, leader of the Swiss Communist Party.
- NIEBUHR, Reinhold, Professor of Applied Christianity, Union Theological Seminary; member of the Committee on German Reeducation.
- NIMITZ, Fleet Admiral Chester W., U. S. N., Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
- *NIXON, Robert, representative of the International News Service in the press, radio, and photographers' pool assigned to cover the Berlin Conference.
- NOBEL, Alfred, creator of the Nobel Foundation from which the Nobel prizes are awarded (died 1896).
- *NORSTAD, Major General Lauris, U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, Headquarters, Army Air Forces.
- NOYES, Charles P., Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- OBBOV, Alexander Christov, Secretary General, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union (Fatherland Front wing).
- *O'DRISCOLL, Daniel J., United States Secret Service.
- OERIU, Simeon, Vice Chairman, Rumanian Armistice Commission.
- *OETH, Albert, representative of the combined newsreel companies in the press, radio, and photographers' pool assigned to cover the Berlin Conference.
- *O'LEARY, Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Francis V., U. S. N., Office of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
- *OLIVARES, Chief Steward Candido, U. S. N., member of the President's messman detail.
- OLIVER, Covey T., Acting Chief, Division of Economic Security Controls, Department of State.
- *ORDONA, Chief Cook Celedonio, U. S. N., member of the President's messman detail.
- *ORIG, Chief Cook Alfredo, U. S. N., member of the President's messman detail.
- *OSÓBKA-MORAWSKI, Edward Bolesław, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Polish Provisional Government at Lublin; Prime Minister in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- *OSTER, Captain Henry R., U. S. N., Deputy Director of Logistic Plans, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
- OSTROBOG, Count Stanislas, French Diplomatic and Political Adviser in the Levant.
- OTTO, King of the Hellenes, 1832-1862.
- OXLEY, Major-General W. H., Commissioner, British Military Mission in Bulgaria.
- *PAGE, Edward, Jr., First Secretary, American Embassy, Moscow.
- PAGER, General Sir Bernard, Commander in Chief, British Middle East Forces.
- PAHLEVI, Reza Shah, Shah-in-Shah of Iran, 1925-1941.
- PALMERSTON, Viscount, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1830-1834, 1835-1841, 1846-1851.

- *PALOMARIA, Chief Cook Jose, U. S. N., member of the President's messman detail.
- *PANTUHOFF, Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Ivan, Jr., U. S. A., Chief, Liaison and Protocol Section, Headquarters, United States Group, Control Council (Germany).
- PARES, Peter, First Secretary, British Embassy, Washington.
- *PARKS, Major General Floyd L., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Sector, Berlin District.
- PARRI, Ferruccio, Italian Prime Minister.
- *PARTEN, J. R., Chief of Staff, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- PASTOYEV, Vsevolod Vladimirovich, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
- PASVOLSKY, Leo, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; United States Delegate, First Meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations.
- PATTERSON, Paul, Publisher, Baltimore *Sun*.
- PATTERSON, Robert P., Under Secretary of War.
- PAUKER, Ana, member of the Central Committee, Rumanian Communist Party.
- *PAUL, Staff Sergeant William J., Jr., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- PAUL-BONCOUR, Jean-Louis, French Diplomatic Representative in Rumania.
- *PAULEY, Edwin W., United States Representative, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- PAUNCEFOTE, Sir Julian (Lord Pauncefote from 1899), British Ambassador to the United States, 1893-1902.
- *PAVLOV, Vladimir Nikolayevich, Personal Secretary and Interpreter to the Chairman, Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.
- PEAKE, Charles, British Consul General, Tangier; British Representative, Paris Conversations Concerning Tangier.
- *PECK, Colonel Clarence R., U. S. A., Executive Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- PÉTAÏN, Marshal Henri-Philippe, French Chief of State, 1940-1944.
- PETER I, Tsar of Russia, 1689-1725.
- PETER (Petar) II, King of Yugoslavia.
- *PETERSEN, First Lieutenant Breder J., U. S. A., an official photographer for the Berlin Conference.
- *PETERSON, Yeoman First Class Eric G., U. S. N. R., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- PETERSON, Sir Maurice Drummond, British Ambassador to Turkey.
- PETKOV, Nikola Dimitrov, Secretary General, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union.
- PETTIGREW, Colonel Moses W., U. S. A., Assistant to the Chief of Staff, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- *PFUNTNER, Technician Third Grade Carl H., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- PHARAON, Henri, Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- PHILLIPS, Joseph B., Outpost Chief, Office of War Information staff, Moscow.
- PHILLIPS, William, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- PILLEAU, Major-General Gerald A., Acting Commander, British Ninth Army, in the Levant.
- PINKERTON, Lowell Call, Consul General, Jerusalem.
- PINNEY, Commander Frank L., Jr., U. S. N., Aide to the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

- *POLLYEA, Technician Third Grade Alex, U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- POPIEL, Karol, head of the Polish Labor Party.
- *PORTAL, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles, British Chief of Air Staff.
- POSTOEV. *See* Pastoyev.
- POSTOYEV. *See* Pastoyev.
- POTER, Charles J., Deputy Administrator, Solid Fuels Administration for War; Chairman, Combined Coal Committee, Combined Production and Resources Board.
- POTER, John Milton, President, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Colleges of the Seneca; member of the Committee on German Reeducation.
- *POWDER, Master Sergeant James W., U. S. A., War Department General Staff.
- *PRETTYMAN, Chief Steward Arthur S., U. S. N., the President's valet.
- PRODANOVIĆ, Jaša, Minister for Serbia in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia.
- PRUNAS, Renato, Secretary General, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Quo T'ai-ch'i, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, April–December 1941.
- RABANOWSKI, Jan, Minister of Railway Transport in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- RADESCU, Nicolae, Rumanian Prime Minister, 1944–March 1945.
- RADKIEWICZ, Stanisław, Minister of Public Security in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- RAINEY, Froelich G., Senior Economic Analyst, Office of the Political Adviser on German Affairs, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- *RALL, Staff Sergeant Arthur F., U. S. A., Office of the Secretary of War.
- RAȘCANU. *See* Vasiliu Rașcanu.
- READ, Clifton R., Outpost Chief, Office of War Information staff, Belgrade.
- REALE, Eugenio, member of the Central Committee, Italian Communist Party.
- *REAMS, R. Borden, Information Officer, Office of the Secretary of State.
- REBER, Samuel, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State.
- RENNER, Karl, Federal Chancellor in the Provisional Government of Austria.
- RIBBENTROP, Joachim von, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1938–1945.
- RICHARDSON, Alvin F., Joint Secretary, Informal Policy Committee on Germany.
- RICHEY, Captain Homer G., U. S. A., Office of the Political Adviser on German Affairs, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- *RIDDLEBERGER, James W., Chief, Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State.
- *RIGDON, Lieutenant William M., U. S. N., Administrative Assistant to the Naval Aide to the President.
- RIGHEIMER, Lieutenant Colonel F. S., U. S. A., Headquarters, Army Air Forces.
- *RITCHE, Brigadier General William L., U. S. A., Army Air Forces member, Special Planning Staff, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- ROBERTS, Frank, British Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in the Soviet Union.
- ROBERTS, Brigadier General Frank N., U. S. A., War Department representative, Far East Subcommittee, State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee.
- ROCKEFELLER, Nelson A., Assistant Secretary of State (for American Republic Affairs).
- *ROLA-ŹYMIERSKI, Marshal Michał, Minister of National Defense in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- *ROMAGNA, Jack, Liaison Representative, The White House.

- ROOSEVELT, Franklin D., President of the United States, 1933–April 12, 1945.
- ROSEBERY, The Earl of, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, February–August 1886, 1892–1894; Prime Minister, 1894–1895.
- *ROSENMAN, Samuel I., Special Counsel to the President.
- ROSH, Andrey A., Acting Soviet Representative, European Advisory Commission, October 1944.
- *ROSS, Charles G., Secretary to the President.
- *RUBIN, Seymour J., Chief, Division of Economic Security Controls, Department of State, detailed to the United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- RUFFE, Henri, alternate member of the Central Committee, French Communist Party.
- RUMANIA, The King of. *See* Michael I.
- *RUSSELL, Donald, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- RUSSIA, The Tsar of. *See* Alexander II; Nicholas I and II; Peter I.
- RYMER-JONES, Captain John Murray, (British) Inspector-General of Police, Jerusalem.
- *RZYMOWSKI, Wincenty, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- SADCHIKOV, Ivan Vasilyevich, Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia.
- SADR, Mohsen, Iranian Prime Minister.
- SAKA, Hasan, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- SAKSIN, Georgy Filippovich, Acting Soviet Representative, European Advisory Commission.
- SAMBU, Zhamsurun, Outer Mongolian Delegate in the Soviet Union.
- SARACOĞLU, Şükrü, Turkish Prime Minister.
- SARGENT, Sir Orme, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
- SARPER, Selim, Turkish Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
- SATO, Naotake, Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
- SAUD, Ibn ('Abd-al-'Aziz ibn-'Abd-al-Rahman al-Faisal Al-Sa'ud), King of Saudi Arabia.
- SAUDI ARABIA, The King of. *See* Saud.
- *SCHLEIDER, Technician Third Grade Maurice E., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- SCHOENFELD, H. F. Arthur, United States Representative in Hungary.
- SCHOENFELD, Rudolf E., Chargé d'Affaires ad interim near the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments-in-Exile at London.
- SCHUYLER, Brigadier General Cortland T. Van R., U. S. A., Chief, United States Military Representation, Allied Control Commission for Rumania.
- *SCOTT, Master Sergeant Jake, U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- SÉBASTIANI, General of Division Horace-François-Bastien, French Ambassador to Turkey, 1806–1807.
- SEFAHBODI, Anoshiravan, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- SHANTZ, Harold, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Yugoslavia.
- SHARABATI, Ahmad, Syrian Minister of National Economy; Minister of Education.
- SHAW, J. V. W., (British) Acting High Commissioner for Palestine.
- SHAYESTEH, Mohammed, Iranian Minister to the United States.
- *SHEFFIELD, Major Thomas C., U. S. A., Headquarters, Army Air Forces.
- *SHINGLER, Brigadier General Don G., U. S. A., Assistant to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces.
- SHULMAN, Jewish leader (not otherwise identified).

- SHUSTER, George N., President, Hunter College; member of the Committee on German Reeducation.
- SIKORSKI, General of the Armies Władysław, Polish Prime Minister and Commander in Chief of the Polish Armies, 1939–1943.
- SIMEON II, King of Bulgaria.
- SIMON, Viscount, British Lord Chancellor.
- *SINCLAIR, Sir Robert, Chief Executive, British Ministry of Production.
- *SLAVIN, Lieutenant General Nikolay Vasilyevich, Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Soviet Army.
- *SMELLIE, Major Herbert H., U. S. A., Commanding Officer, Guard Detachment, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- *SMITH, Yeoman First Class Frank E., U. S. N. R., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- *SMITH, Merriman, representative of the United Press in the press, radio, and photographers' pool assigned to cover the Berlin Conference.
- SMUTS, Field Marshal Jan Christian, South African Prime Minister.
- SNYDER, John W., Federal Loan Administrator.
- SOBELEV. *See* Sobolev.
- *SOBOLEV, Arkady Alexandrovich, Chief, Political Section, Soviet Military Administration in Germany.
- *SOMERVELL, General Brehon B., U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Service Forces.
- SOONG, T. V., Chinese Prime Minister; Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- SPAACK, Paul-Henri, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- SPALDING, Major General Sidney P., U. S. A., Chief, Supply Division, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- *SPROUL, Robert G., Adviser on Human Relations, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- STAINOV, Petko, Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cults.
- *STALIN, Marshal of the Soviet Union Iosif Vissarionovich (Generalissimo from June 27), Chairman, Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union; People's Commissar for Defense.
- *STAŃCZYK, Jan, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- STETTINIUS, Edward R., Jr., Secretary of State (to June 27); Chairman, United States Delegation, United Nations Conference on International Organization.
- STEVENSON, Air Vice Marshal Donald, British High Commissioner in Rumania.
- STEVENSON, R. C. Skrine, British Ambassador to Yugoslavia.
- *STIMSON, Henry L., Secretary of War; Chairman, Combined Policy Committee (on atomic energy).
- STIRBEY, Prince Barbu, Rumanian Prime Minister, 1927–1930; head of the Rumanian Armistice Commission at Moscow, 1944.
- STONE, Rear Admiral Ellery W., U. S. N. R., Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (for Italy).
- *STONE, Colonel John N., U. S. A., Chief, Pacific Branch, Operational Plans Division, Headquarters, Army Air Forces.
- *STONER, Major General Frank E., U. S. A., Chief, Army Communications Service, Office of the Chief Signal Corps Officer, United States Army.
- STOYANOV, Christo, member of the Executive Committee, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union (Fatherland Front wing).

- *STRANG, Sir William, British Representative, European Advisory Commission (to June 3); Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, British Forces of Occupation in Germany (from June 4); Deputy British Representative, Committee on German Dismemberment (established by the Yalta Conference).
- *STROOP, Captain Paul D., U. S. N., Aviations Plans Officer on the Staff of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
- ŠUBAŠIĆ, Ivan, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia.
- SULTAN, Lieutenant General Daniel I., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Forces, India-Burma Theater.
- SUMER, Nurullah Esat, Turkish Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- SUSAIKOV, Colonel General Ivan Zakharovich, (Soviet) Deputy Chairman, Allied Control Commission for Rumania.
- ŠUTEJ, Juraj, Minister Without Portfolio in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia.
- SWIATKOWSKI, Henryk, Minister of Justice in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- SZTACHELSKI, Jerzy, Minister of Supplies and Trade in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- *SZWALBE, Stanisław, Deputy Chairman of the Presidium, Polish National Council of the Homeland.
- *TAKACS, Theresa, Secretary, Office of the Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State.
- TARCHIANI, Alberto, Italian Ambassador to the United States.
- TARNOWSKI, Adam, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Polish Government-in-Exile at London.
- TASCA, Henry J., Economic Analyst, Treasury Department, detailed to the American Embassy, Rome.
- TATARESCU, Gheorghe, Rumanian Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- *TAYLOR, Major Howard R., U. S. A., Aide to the Commanding General, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- TAYLOR, Myron C., Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII.
- TEDDER, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur, (British) Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- *THEAKSTONE, Major Louis Marguarde, (British) Interpreter to the Secretariat, Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- *THOMPSON, Francis I., representative of the combined still photographic services in the press, radio, and photographers' pool assigned to cover the Berlin Conference.
- *THOMPSON, Chief Warrant Officer Leland W., U. S. A., War Department General Staff.
- *THOMPSON, Llewellyn E., Jr., Second Secretary, American Embassy, London.
- THORP, Willard L., Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
- THUGUTT, Mieczysław, member of the Polish Peasants' Party.
- TIKHON (Vasily Ivanovich BELYAVIN), Patriarch of Moscow, 1917-1925.
- TITO, Marshal (Josip Broz), Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia; Supreme Commander, Yugoslav Army.

- TITTMANN, Harold H., Jr., Assistant to the Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII.
- TKACZOW, Stanisław, Minister of Forests in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
- TOGLIATTI, Palmiro, Secretary General, Italian Communist Party.
- TOGO, Shigenori, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- TOLBUKHIN, Marshal of the Soviet Union Fedor Ivanovich, Commander, Third Ukrainian Front.
- TOWNSEND, Colonel Dallas S., U. S. A. (retired), General Staff Officer, United States Military Representation, Allied Control Commission for Hungary.
- TROTSKY, Lev Davydovich, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Government, 1917-1918; People's Commissar for War, 1918-1925.
- *TRUMAN, Harry S., President of the United States; Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
- TURKEY, The Sultan of. *See* 'Abd-al-Hamid II; 'Abd-al-Majid; Ibrahim I.
- *TURNER, Mark, Principal Assistant Secretary, Economic Advisory Branch, British Foreign Office, detailed to the British Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
- *TYREE, Commander John A., U. S. N., Assistant Naval Aide to the President.
- TYSON, Major Terence Lloyd, U. S. A., Medical Officer assigned to Secretary of State Stettinius.
- UNAYDIN, Rusen Esref, Turkish Ambassador to the United Kingdom.
- UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND (NORTHERN) IRELAND, The King of. *See* Edward VII; George VI.
- *VACARRO, Ernest, representative of the Associated Press in the press, radio, and photographers' pool assigned to cover the Berlin Conference.
- *VAETH, Sergeant George J., U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- VALENTINY, Agoston, Hungarian Minister of Justice.
- VANDENBERG, Arthur H., United States Senator from Michigan.
- *VADAMAN, Captain James K., Jr., U. S. N. R., Naval Aide to the President.
- VASILIU RAȘCANU, General Constantin, Rumanian Minister of War.
- *VAUGHAN, Brigadier General Harry H., U. S. A., Military Aide to the President.
- VELEBIT, Major General Vladimir, member of the Yugoslav Delegation which negotiated the Duino agreement of June 20, 1945, relating to Venezia Giulia.
- VICTOR EMMANUEL (Vittorio Emanuele) III, King of Italy.
- VILLARD, Henry S., Chief, Division of African Affairs, Department of State; United States Representative, Paris Conversations Concerning Tangier.
- *VINCENT, John Carter, Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs, Department of State.
- VINOGRADOV, Sergey Alexandrovich, Soviet Ambassador to Turkey.
- VINOGRADOV, Lieutenant General Vladislav Petrovich, (Soviet) Chief of Staff, Allied Control Commission for Rumania.
- VINSON, Fred M., Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion.
- VISOIANU, Constantin, Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1944-March 1945.
- VISSERING, Colonel Norman H., U. S. A., Deputy to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- *VLASIK, Nikolay Sidorovich, Soviet Commissar of State Security, Third Rank.
- VOROSHILOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Efremovich, Chairman, Allied Control Commission for Hungary.
- VOULGARIS, Admiral Petros, Greek Prime Minister.
- VYSHINSKI. *See* Vyshinsky.
- *VYSHINSKY, Andrey Yanuaryevich, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

- *WADDELL, Harold Newton, Vice Consul, American Embassy, Moscow.
WADSWORTH, George, Minister to Lebanon and Syria.
*WALEY, Sir David, Under-Secretary, British Treasury, detailed to the British Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
WALLACE, Henry A., Vice President of the United States, 1941–January 20, 1945.
*WANDS, Second Lieutenant Robert A., U. S. A., an official photographer for the Berlin Conference.
*WARD, J. G., Acting First Secretary, Reconstruction Department, British Foreign Office.
*WARD, J. Langdon, Administrative Officer, Office of the Secretary of State.
WARNER, C. F. A., Head, Northern Department, British Foreign Office.
WARREN, George L., Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
WASILEWSKA, Wanda, head of the Union of Polish Patriots in the Soviet Union, 1943–1944.
WASSON, Thomas C., Acting Chief, Division of African Affairs, Department of State.
*WATKINS, Sergeant Donald, U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
WATSON, Hathaway, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
WEDEMEYER, Lieutenant General Albert C., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Forces, China Theater; Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander, China Theater.
*WEEKS, Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald, Deputy Military Governor and Chief of Staff, British Zone of Occupation in Germany.
*WEIR, Albert R., United States Secret Service.
WEIZMANN, Chaim, President, World Zionist Organization; President, Jewish Agency for Palestine.
WELLES, Sumner, Under Secretary of State, 1937–1943.
WERNER, Otto, Mayor of Berlin.
WESSON, Major General Charles M., U. S. A., Director, Division of Soviet Supply, Foreign Economic Administration.
WESTMINSTER, The Duke of, a guest of the British Prime Minister at Chequers, May 1945.
WHITE, Harry Dexter, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.
WILHELM, Prince Imperial of Germany and Crown Prince of Prussia, 1888–1918.
WILLIAMSON, Francis T., Assistant to Country Specialist, Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State.
WILSON, Edwin C., Ambassador to Turkey.
*WILSON, Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland, Head, British Joint Staff Mission, Washington; member of the Combined Policy Committee (on atomic energy).
WILSON, Woodrow, President of the United States, 1913–1921.
WINANT, John G., Ambassador to the United Kingdom; United States Representative, European Advisory Commission; United States Representative, Committee on German Dismemberment (established by the Yalta Conference).
*WISE, Colonel John S., U. S. A., Staff Officer, Theater (Operations) Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff.
WISE, Jonah Bondi, Rabbi, Central Synagogue, New York.
WITOS, Wincenty, Polish Prime Minister, 1920–1921, May–December 1923, May 10–14, 1926.
WOLF, Justin R., Washington Liaison Representative, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations.
*WOLFF, Technician Third Grade August, U. S. A., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*WOODWARD, Lieutenant Colonel Harper L., U. S. A., Administrative Officer, Advisory Council to the Commanding General, Headquarters, Army Air Forces.

WRIGHT, Michael, Counsellor, British Embassy, Washington.

WYCECH, Czesław, Minister of Education in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

YORK, Major General John Y., Jr., U. S. A., Vice Chairman and Executive, The President's Soviet Protocol Committee.

*YOST, Charles W., Executive Secretary, Central Secretariat, Department of State; Special Assistant to the Chairman, United States Delegation, United Nations Conference on International Organization.

YOUNG, John Parke, Acting Chief, Division of Foreign Economic Development, Department of State.

*YOVICH, Dorothy, Clerk-Stenographer, Office of the Secretary of State.

YUGOSLAVIA, The King of. *See* Peter II.

ZACHARIADES, Nikolaos, Secretary General, Communist Party of Greece.

ZAKOWSKI, Juliusz, member of the Polish Socialist Party; professor of architecture residing at Liverpool, England.

*ZHUKOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich, Chief, Soviet Military Administration in Germany; Commander in Chief, Soviet Forces of Occupation in Germany.

ZULAWSKI, Zygmunt, member of the Polish National Council of the Homeland.

LIST OF PAPERS

EDITOR'S NOTE.—This list of papers has been printed in chronological order to give the reader (a) a convenient aid in locating individual papers by date and (b) a better sense of the temporal relationship of events described in this volume than he might obtain from the subject arrangement of the documents themselves. Because of the limited scope of the volume (described on pages IX–XIII) most of the documents dated before June 18, 1945, are procedural in nature or are dependent in some way upon documents of later date.

In providing an aid in locating individual papers by date, it seemed desirable to include as separate items in this list papers which are quoted in substantial part within other documents, texts which appear in footnotes to other documents, and texts which are printed as enclosures, attachments, annexes, or appendices to documents bearing different dates. Information in this list concerning such papers is enclosed in brackets, and an indication is given as to the date and location of the principal documents to which these subordinate papers are related.

A considerable number of the documents printed in this volume were not dated. These papers are listed here under the date on which they were forwarded to higher officials, if that date is known; otherwise their placement in this list has been determined by their relationship to other documents of known date. The arrangement even of dated papers is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, since under a given date the time at which many of the documents originated is not known. In a few cases the order of related papers of the same date in this list differs from the order in which the same papers are printed in the body of the compilation, since time of origin was a prime factor in the preparation of this chronological list, whereas other factors, including time of receipt, were given weight in the arrangement of papers of even date in the body of the volume.

When different extracts from the same document have been printed under separate subject headings, the document number and the page reference for each extract are shown in this list in connection with the description of the paper in question. In a few cases, the full text of a paper has been printed under one subject heading and an extract from the same paper has been printed under a different subject heading; in such cases this list gives the document number and page reference for the full text only.

This list does not include very brief extracts from papers quoted in the footnotes or in the body of other documents, and it does not include papers merely referred to or summarized in the footnotes or the body of other documents.

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1944 May 16	[<i>The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State</i>] [Views on the postwar relationship of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union; printed as an attachment to a Briefing Book paper of June 28, 1945, on a British plan for a western European bloc (document No. 224, page 256), q. v.]		
1945 Jan. 31 (155)	[<i>The Chargé Near the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile to the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>] [Statement of United States policy on the transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia; quoted in a memorandum of July 11, 1945, from the Department of State to the British Embassy (document No. 440, page 647), q. v.]		

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1945 Feb. 27 (tel.)	<p>[<i>The British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Turkey</i>] [Report on a discussion at the Yalta Conference on February 10, 1945, between Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin concerning the Montreux Convention; printed as an enclosure to a letter of July 9, 1945, from the British Minister to the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs (document No. 705, page 1048), q. v.]</p>		
Mar. 17 (tel. 805)	<p>[<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State</i>] [Transmittal of a communication from Foreign Commissar Molotov in reply to United States proposals for consultation on the political situation in Rumania; quoted in footnote 1 to a telegram of June 29, 1945, from the Secretary of State ad interim to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (document No. 301, page 398), q. v.]</p>		
Mar. 23	<p>[<i>Memorandum Prepared Jointly by the Department of State, the War Department, and the Department of the Treasury</i>] [Statement of United States policy (approved by the President) relating to Germany in the initial post-defeat period; quoted in footnote 7 to an undated Briefing Book paper on policy toward Germany (document No. 327, page 435), q. v.]</p>		
Mar. 29	<p>[<i>Department of State Memorandum</i>] [Memorandum on German ships and shipbuilding as reparations items; enclosed with a Briefing Book paper of June 27, 1945, on German shipping and shipbuilding (document No. 387, page 563), q. v.]</p>		
Apr. 8	<p>[<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Soviet Foreign Commissar</i>] [Request for information concerning reports that certain territories in the Soviet military zone, including Danzig and parts of Lower and Upper Silesia, have been incorporated into Poland; quoted in footnote 4 to a Briefing Book paper of June 29, 1945, on policy regarding Poland (document No. 510, page 743), q. v.]</p>		
Apr. 18 (tel. 1252)	<p>[<i>The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State</i>] [Report that the Soviet Foreign Commissariat has stated that it had been necessary to create a Polish civil administration in Silesia and Danzig (all of which had no relation to the question of boundaries); quoted in footnote 4 to a Briefing Book paper of June 29, 1945, on policy regarding Poland (document No. 510, page 743), q. v.]</p>		
May 4 (tel.)	<p>[<i>Prime Minister Churchill to the British Foreign Secretary</i>] [Review of the outstanding European problems requiring examination by the principal powers; quoted in a telegram of May 11, 1945, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman (document No. 4, page 6), q. v.]</p>		

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1945 May 6 (tel. 34)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Suggestion that there be a tripartite meeting of Heads of Government as soon as possible and that in the meantime the United States and British armies hold firmly to their positions in Europe.	1	3
May 8 (tel. 1033)	<i>[The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union]</i> [Instruction to protest to the Soviet Government concerning the establishment of Polish administration in Danzig and occupied German territory; quoted in footnote 4 to a Briefing Book paper of June 29, 1945, on policy regarding Poland (document No. 510, page 743), q. v.]		
May 9 (tel. 31)	<i>President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Agreement that there should be a tripartite meeting of Heads of Government, the request for such a meeting to come preferably from Marshal Stalin; statement of the President's intention to adhere to the United States interpretation of the Yalta agreements.	2	4
May 11 (tel. 40)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Discussion of possible arrangements for a tripartite meeting of Heads of Government.	3	5
May 11 (tel. 41)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Transmittal of the text of a message of May 4, 1945, from Prime Minister Churchill to Foreign Secretary Eden reviewing the outstanding European problems requiring examination by the principal powers.	4	6
May 11 (tel. 36)	<i>President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Discussion of possible arrangements for a tripartite meeting of Heads of Government and of a possible visit by the President to England following such a meeting.	5	8
May 12 (tel. 44)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Expression of concern at the attitude and actions of the Soviet Union behind the iron curtain drawn down upon the Soviet front in Europe and at the future expansion of Soviet power following the relocation and partial withdrawal from Europe of the Allied armies.	6	8
May 13 (tel. 46)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Recommendation that the tripartite meeting be held in June; invitation to the President to visit England later.	7	10
May 14	<i>Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of a conversation between the President, Foreign Secretary Eden, and others, concerning the Polish problem and the proposed tripartite meeting.	8	10
May 14 (tel. 39)	<i>President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Comment on the impossibility of making a conjecture as to future Soviet policy and on the necessity of having reports from the American and British Embassies at Moscow before deciding on the time or place of a meeting of Heads of Government.	9	11

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May 15	<i>Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of a discussion with the President and others concerning arrangements for the proposed meeting of Heads of Government.	11	12
May 15	<i>Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of a discussion with Foreign Secretary Eden and others concerning arrangements for the proposed meeting of Heads of Government.	12	15
May 16	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the President</i> Suggestion that the President tell Foreign Minister Bidault that he is willing to put the matter of French participation in the proposed meeting of Heads of Government up to Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. (Enclosure: Telegram No. 6 of May 16, 1945, from the Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, giving notice that Mr. Bidault expects to make a strong plea to the President for the inclusion of General de Gaulle in the proposed meeting of Heads of Government.)	13	16
May 17 (tel. 1632)	[<i>The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State</i>] [Report on a communication of May 16, 1945, from the Soviet Foreign Commissariat justifying Polish administration in occupied German territory; quoted in footnote 4 to a Briefing Book paper of June 29, 1945, on policy regarding Poland (document No. 510, page 743), q. v.]		
May 18	<i>Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of a discussion between the President and Foreign Minister Bidault concerning French participation in meetings of Heads of Government.	14	17
May 18	[<i>Memorandum by the Informal Policy Committee on Germany</i>] [Basic instructions (approved by the President on May 18, 1945) for the United States Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations; quoted in footnote 3 to a telegram of July 2, 1945, from the Secretary of State ad interim to the United States Representative (document No. 363, page 519), q. v.]		
May 19	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the President</i> Suggestion that the President express to Foreign Minister Bidault the entire willingness of the United States to have France participate in a meeting of Heads of Government.	15	18
May 19 (tel. 267)	<i>President Truman to Marshal Stalin</i> Suggestion that Harry Hopkins be sent to Moscow to discuss with Marshal Stalin the complicated and important questions facing the United States and the Soviet Union.	20	21

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May 21	<i>Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of a telephone conversation with Secretary of State Stettinius concerning Harry Hopkins' mission to Moscow.	22	22
May 21 (tel. 53)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Request for the President's views as to the date and place of a meeting of Heads of Government.	16	19
May 21 (tel. 45)	<i>President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Comment that the President may soon have more information as to the date and place of a tripartite meeting; expression of the hope that Marshal Stalin will agree to come to Germany or farther west.	17	19
May 22 (tel. 271)	<i>President Truman to Marshal Stalin</i> Notification of Harry Hopkins' departure plans and of a proposed announcement to the press concerning his mission. (Footnote: White House press release of May 23, 1945, announcing the missions to be undertaken by Harry Hopkins and Joseph E. Davies.)	23	23
May 22 (tel. 46)	<i>President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Suggestion that Joseph E. Davies be sent to London to discuss with Prime Minister Churchill questions which the President would prefer not to handle by cable.	31	63
May 23 (tel. 54)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Assurance that Prime Minister Churchill will be glad to see Joseph E. Davies.	32	63
May 23	[<i>White House Press Release</i>] [Announcement of the missions to be undertaken by Harry Hopkins and Joseph E. Davies; quoted in footnote 3 to a telegram of May 22, 1945, from President Truman to Marshal Stalin (document No. 23, page 23), q. v.]		
May 23 (tel. 2913)	<i>The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (temporarily at Paris) to the President</i> Report of a conversation with Prime Minister Churchill concerning European issues and the proposed meeting of Heads of Government.	18	20
May 23	[<i>Marshal Stalin to President Truman</i>] [Soviet claim to one-third of the surrendered naval and merchant vessels of Germany and related requests; quoted in footnote 2 to an undated memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (document No. 386, page 562), q. v.]		
May 24 (tel. 2196)	<i>The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the President</i> Report of a conversation with Prime Minister Churchill, in which the latter gave assurances that the approaching general election in the United Kingdom would in no way interfere with the meeting of Heads of Government.	19	20

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1945 May 25 (C.C.S. 866)	<p>[<i>Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff</i>] [Statement of views on the future of Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean; quoted in footnote 1 to a memorandum of July 7, 1945, by the United States Chiefs of Staff (document No. 479, page 710), q. v.]</p>		
May 26	<p><i>Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of Harry Hopkins' first conversation with Marshal Stalin, during which they discussed President Roosevelt's death, Soviet-American relations, the meeting of Heads of Government, Germany, the Far East, Poland, and the death or disappearance of Hitler.</p>	24	24
May 26	<p><i>The Soviet Foreign Commissar to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Notification that Marshal Stalin had not exchanged messages with President Truman concerning Berlin as a place for the meeting of Heads of Government, but that Berlin had been mentioned in telegrams between Mr. Molotov and Joseph E. Davies concerning a possible meeting between the President and Marshal Stalin. (Footnote: Messages of May 26 and 27, 1945, between Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin concerning a meeting of Heads of Government.)</p>	35	85
May 27	<p>[<i>Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill</i>] [Suggestion for a tripartite meeting in the vicinity of Berlin; quoted in footnote 1 to a note of May 26, 1945, from Mr. Molotov to Ambassador Harriman (document No. 35, page 85), q. v.]</p>		
May 27 (tel. 56)	<p><i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Transmittal of the text of a message from Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin, stating that the question of the German Fleet should form part of the discussion which should take place between the three Heads of Government at the earliest possible date.</p>	141	156
May 27	<p><i>Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of Harry Hopkins' second conversation with Marshal Stalin, during which they discussed Argentine participation in the United Nations Conference on International Organization, the Allied Commission on Reparations, Poland, curtailment by the United States of lend-lease to the Soviet Union, and the disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Fleet.</p>	25	31
May 28 (tel.)	<p><i>The President's Adviser and Assistant to the President</i> Request for instructions with respect to the date and place of the meeting of Heads of Government.</p>	36	86
May 28 (tel. 48)	<p><i>President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Undertaking to send Marshal Stalin a reply with respect to the German Fleet similar to the reply already made by Prime Minister Churchill; notification that the President will inform Marshal Stalin that he has no objection to the Berlin area as a place for the meeting of Heads of Government.</p>	37, 142	86, 156

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May 28 (tel. 57)	<i>[Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman]</i> [Request for continued application of the principles worked out in 1944 with respect to lend-lease to the United Kingdom; quoted in footnote 5 to an undated Briefing Book paper on Phase II commitments to the British (document No. 537, page 806), q. v.]		
May 28 (tel. 1168)	<i>[The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union]</i> [Proposal for revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary; quoted in footnote 5 to a Briefing Book paper of July 5, 1945, on policy regarding Hungary (document No. 287, page 366), q. v.]		
May 28	<i>Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of Harry Hopkins' third conversation with Marshal Stalin, during which they discussed the Far East, German war criminals, prisoners of war, the German food problem, and the dismemberment of Germany.	26	41
May 29 (tel.)	<i>[The Ambassador in China to the President]</i> [Message with respect to Indochina and command difficulties in Southeast Asia; quoted in an undated memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (document No. 603, page 915), q. v.]		
May 29 (tel. 58)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Transmittal of the text of a message of May 29, 1945, from Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin, approving Berlin as a place for the proposed meeting of Heads of Government and suggesting the middle of June as the date.	39	87
May 29 (tel. 49)	<i>President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Notification that the President hopes to have further information soon with respect to a date for the meeting of Heads of Government.	40	87
May 29 (tel. 275)	<i>President Truman to Marshal Stalin</i> Suggestion that surrendered German shipping is an appropriate subject for discussion at the forthcoming meeting of Heads of Government.	143	157
May 29	<i>[Draft Aide-Mémoire by the Chairman of the President's War Relief Control Board]</i> [Statement of the President's position with respect to a meeting of Heads of Government and of his desire to have an opportunity before such a meeting to establish personal contact and relations with Marshal Stalin; quoted in footnote 22 to a report of June 12, 1945, from Joseph E. Davies to the President (document No. 33, page 64), q. v.]		

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1945 May 29	<i>The British Minister to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a list of suggested topics for the agenda for the meeting of Heads of Government.	144	157
May 30	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the President</i> Transmittal of the British suggestions for the agenda for the meeting of Heads of Government.	145	158
May 30 (tel.)	<i>The President's Adviser and Assistant to the President</i> Notification that Marshal Stalin wishes to discuss Japan at the meeting of Heads of Government and that he wants an understanding between the Allies as to areas of operation in Manchuria and China.	146	160
May 30 (tel.)	<i>The President's Adviser and Assistant to the President</i> Notification that Marshal Stalin will wish to discuss organization of a peace conference, dismemberment of Germany, prisoners of war, and war criminals at the meeting of Heads of Government.	147	160
May 30 (tel.)	<i>The President's Adviser and Assistant to the President</i> Notification that Marshal Stalin could attend a meeting at any time after June 27 and that a date about the middle of July is satisfactory to him.	41	88
May 30	<i>Marshal Stalin to President Truman</i> Notification of agreement to July 15 as a date for the meeting of Heads of Government.	42	88
May 30	<i>Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Notification that President Truman has suggested June [July] 15 as a date for the meeting of Heads of Government and that Marshal Stalin has no objection to that date. (Footnote: Memorandum of June 1, 1945, by the Assistant to the Secretary of State, confirming the fact that Marshal Stalin understood the President's desire that the meeting should be held about July 15, not June 15.)	43	88
May 30	<i>Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of Harry Hopkins' fourth conversation with Marshal Stalin, during which they discussed disposition of the German Fleet, a date for the meeting of Heads of Government, and Poland.	27	53
May 30 (tel. 59)	<i>[Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman]</i> [Transmittal of a draft telegram from Prime Minister Churchill to General de Gaulle concerning the situation in the Levant, and inquiry as to whether the United Kingdom would have American support if it intervened with British troops to stop the fighting in Syria; quoted in footnote 2 to a Briefing Book paper of June 30, 1945, on Syria and Lebanon (document No. 636, page 959), q. v.]		
May 31 (tel. 60)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Request for prompt notification of President Truman's proposals for a date for the meeting of Heads of Government; statement that Prime Minister Churchill would not be prepared to attend a meeting which was a continuation of a conference between the President and Marshal Stalin.	44	89

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1945 May 31	[<i>Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State</i>] [Memorandum of a conversation with the President concerning the agenda for the meeting of Heads of Government; quoted in footnote 3 to a memorandum of May 30, 1945, from the Acting Secretary of State to the President (document No. 145, page 158), q. v.]		
June 1 (tel. 51)	<i>President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Suggestion that the meeting of Heads of Government be held about July 15.	45	90
June 1 (tel. 278)	<i>President Truman to Marshal Stalin</i> Notification that the President has informed Prime Minister Churchill that Marshal Stalin and the President are agreeable to meeting near Berlin about July 15.	46	90
June 1 (tel. 63)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Suggestion that the meeting of Heads of Government, if it cannot be held June 15, be held July 1, 2, or 3.	47	90
June 1 (tel. 64)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Assurance that nothing concerning the British elections will prevent the tripartite meeting at the earliest possible date.	48	91
June 1	<i>Memorandum by the President's Adviser and Assistant</i> Memorandum of a conversation between Harry Hopkins and Marshal Stalin concerning Poland.	28	57
June 1	[<i>Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of State</i>] [Memorandum of a telephone conversation with Mr. Pavlov, Marshal Stalin's interpreter, confirming the fact that Marshal Stalin understood the President's desire that the meeting of Heads of Government should be held about July 15, not June 15; quoted in footnote 4 to a message of May 30, 1945, from Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill (document No. 43, page 88), q. v.]		
June 1	<i>The British Minister to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Proposal that disposition of the German Fleet and merchant ships be added to the agenda for the meeting of Heads of Government.	148	161
June 2	<i>The Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and the Director of European Affairs</i> [Summary of a memorandum on the possible resurrection of the Communist International and the resumption of extreme leftist activities, with the possible effect thereof on the United States; printed (together with the full text of the said memorandum) as an enclosure to a memorandum of June 27, 1945, from the Acting Secretary of State to the President (document No. 226, page 267), q. v.]		

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1945 June 2 (tel. Fwd 23168) (C.C.S. 861/1, appendix B)	[<i>The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, to the War Department</i>] [Statement of the policy of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, on repatriation of Soviet citizens to the Soviet Union; printed as appendix B to a report of July 8, 1945, by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (document No. 529, page 798), q. v.]		
June 3	<i>Marshal Stalin to President Truman</i> Confirmation that July 15 is satisfactory to Marshal Stalin for a meeting of Heads of Government.	49	91
June 4 (tel. 72)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Reiteration of Prime Minister Churchill's desire to meet earlier than July 15; expression of concern at the withdrawal of American forces to their occupation zone in Germany; notification that Clement Attlee will be a member of the British Delegation.	50	92
June 4 (tel. 282)	<i>The President to the Ambassador in China</i> Acknowledgment of messages on the military situation in China and on the political intentions in the Far East of European nations; comment on the possibility of improving the situation by a change of command and on the likelihood that many of the questions of concern to Ambassador Hurley will be discussed at the meeting of Heads of Government.	149	162
June 5	[<i>Memorandum by the Chief of the United States Section, Allied Control Commission for Hungary</i>] [Draft revision of the statutes of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary and Major General Key's comments thereon; printed as enclosures to an instruction of June 21, 1945, from the Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (document No. 289, page 374), q. v.]		
June 5 (tel. 61)	<i>President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Notification that July 15 is the earliest date for a meeting of Heads of Government that is practicable for the President.	51	93
June 5	<i>Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Reiteration of Marshal Stalin's agreement to July 15 as the date for the meeting of Heads of Government.	52	93
June 6 (tel. 75)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Acceptance of July 15 as the date for the meeting of Heads of Government.	53	93
June 6	<i>Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of Harry Hopkins' sixth conversation with Marshal Stalin, during which the latter confirmed the Soviet intention to carry out the Crimea decision on the Far East and confirmed that July 15 is acceptable to the Soviet Government for the meeting of Heads of Government.	29	60

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1945 June 7 (tel. 62)	<i>President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Expression of appreciation for Prime Minister Churchill's acceptance of July 15 as the date for the meeting of Heads of Government; acceptance of a simultaneous first meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin; comments on Joseph E. Davies' discussions with Mr. Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden.	54	94
June 7	[<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Soviet Foreign Commissar</i>] [Transmittal of a message from President Truman to Marshal Stalin on establishment of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania; text of message quoted in footnote 5 to a Briefing Book paper of June 29, 1945, on establishing diplomatic relations and concluding peace treaties with the former Axis satellite states (document No. 285, page 357), q. v.]		
June 7 (L.C.P.- R.B. (Coal) (45) 37)	[<i>Report by the Potter-Hyndley Mission to Northwest Europe</i>] [Report on the coal situation in northwestern Europe; summary of main recommendations printed as enclosure 2 to a despatch of June 28, 1945, from the Political Adviser in Germany to the Secretary of State ad interim (document No. 421, page 614), q. v.]		
June 8 (tel.)	[<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the President</i> Summary analysis of the results of Harry Hopkins' conversations with Marshal Stalin.	30	61
June 8 (tel. 1257)	[<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i>] [Instructions to approach the Soviet Government with respect to a review of the armistice with Rumania, and a summary of United States views concerning the armistice with Rumania; quoted in footnote 6 to a Briefing Book paper of July 5, 1945, on Rumania (document No. 288, page 370), q. v.]		
June 8	[<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War</i>] [Discussion of the questions of coal, rail transportation, use of raw materials and industrial equipment, and an export program in relation to the occupation of Germany; quoted in footnote 3 to extracts from a letter of July 4, 1945, from the Secretary of War to the Under Secretary of State (document No. 365, page 524) and in footnote 3 to other extracts from the same letter (document No. 427, page 628), q. v.]		
June 9 (tel. 82)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Request for the President's views on a proposal that the three delegations to the Berlin Conference should have separate quarters with their own guards and that a fourth place should be prepared in which they would confer.	55	94

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1945 June 9	<p><i>The President to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Request for suggestions for the agenda for the meeting of Heads of Government; request for the views of the Department of State on procedures for a European peace settlement and on a treaty providing for German demilitarization.</p>	150	162
June 9	<p>[<i>Marshal Stalin to President Truman</i>] [Suggestion that the re-establishment of relations with Bulgaria, Finland, and Rumania not be postponed further, although the question of Hungary could be settled later; quoted in footnote 5 to a Briefing Book paper of June 29, 1945, on establishing diplomatic relations and concluding peace treaties with the former Axis satellite states (document No. 285, page 357), q. v.]</p>		
Undated	<p>[<i>Department of State Memorandum</i>] [Draft of a message from President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill with respect to lend-lease from the United States to the United Kingdom; quoted in footnote 2 to a letter of June 19, 1945, from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State (document No. 540, page 814), q. v.]</p>		
June 10 (tel. 83)	<p><i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Transmittal of the text of a message from Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin suggesting that future relations with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania be discussed at the meeting of Heads of Government.</p>	151	163
June 11 (tel. SCAF 447) (C.C.S. 706/11, appendix D)	<p>[<i>The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i>] [Request for authority to fill the requirements of the London Munitions Assignments Board from war matériel in Austria and Germany, to render any excess war matériel unserviceable, and to dispose of such surplus equipment as scrap; printed as appendix D to a report of June 28, 1945, by the Combined Administrative Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (document No. 361, page 515), q. v.]</p>		
June 11 (tel. 67)	<p><i>President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Notification of agreement with Prime Minister Churchill's suggestion that the three delegations to the Berlin Conference should have separate quarters with their own guards, with a fourth place prepared in which they would confer. (Footnote: Instructions of June 12, 1945, to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, to make the necessary advance arrangements to carry out Mr. Churchill's suggestion summarized above.)</p>	56	95

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1945 June 12 (tel. W 15519)	<p>[<i>The Chief of Staff, United States Army, to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force</i>]</p> <p>[Instructions to make advance arrangements for the three delegations to the Berlin Conference to have separate quarters with their own guards, with a fourth place to be prepared in which they would confer; quoted in footnote 3 to a message of June 11, 1945, from President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill (document No. 56, page 95), q. v.]</p>		
June 12	<p><i>The Head of the British Joint Staff Mission to the President's Chief of Staff</i></p> <p>Notification that the British Chiefs of Staff will be in attendance at the Berlin Conference; suggestion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff meet in London before the meeting of the Heads of Government.</p>	57	95
June 12	<p><i>The Chairman of the President's War Relief Control Board to the President</i></p> <p>Report on the conversations which Joseph E. Davies had with Prime Minister Churchill on May 26, 27, and 29, 1945, in which they discussed the arrangements for the meeting of Heads of Government and outstanding European problems.</p> <p>(Footnote: Draft <i>aide-mémoire</i>, dated May 29, 1945, containing a statement of President Truman's position with respect to a meeting of Heads of Government and of his desire to have an opportunity before such a meeting to establish personal contact and relations with Marshal Stalin.)</p>	33	64
June 12	<p><i>The Chairman of the President's War Relief Control Board to the President</i></p> <p>Report on a conversation which Joseph E. Davies had with Foreign Secretary Eden on May 28, 1945, in which they discussed outstanding European problems.</p>	34	78
June 13	<p>[<i>The Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion to the Secretary of War</i>]</p> <p>[Summary of agreements reached at an interdepartmental meeting of June 4, 1945, with respect to lend-lease from the United States to the United Kingdom; printed as an enclosure to a letter of June 19, 1945, from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State (document No. 540, page 814), q. v.]</p>		
June 14 (tel. 88)	<p><i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i></p> <p>Notification that Prime Minister Churchill will bring with him to the Berlin Conference Clement R. Attlee, the official leader of the opposition.</p>	58	96
June 14 (tel. 290)	<p><i>President Truman to Marshal Stalin</i></p> <p>Statement of confidence that a continuation of Soviet-American cooperation will meet with success in preserving peace and international good will.</p>	59	96
June 14 (tel.)	<p><i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the President</i></p> <p>Inquiry as to whether the President wishes Ambassador Harriman to take up with Marshal Stalin anything in regard to arrangements for the Berlin Conference.</p>	60	97

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1945 June 14	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the President</i> Transmittal of comments on the British suggestions for the agenda for the Berlin Conference.	152	164
June 14	[<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the President</i>] [Review of the policy to give the Allied Commission in Italy an increasingly civilian character and of the decision to appoint Colonel James H. Douglas, Jr., as Chief Commissioner, and recommendation that Colonel Douglas be given the personal rank of Minister; quoted in footnote 2 to a message of July 13, 1945, from the Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs to the Director of European Affairs (document No. 482, page 712), q. v.]		
June 14 (C.C.S. 877)	[<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i>] [Recommendations concerning basic objectives, strategy, and policies in the war against Japan; quoted in footnote 1 to a memorandum of June 30, 1945, by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff (document No. 600, page 912), q. v.]		
June 15 (tel. 293)	<i>The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Notification that General Eisenhower has been directed to make advance arrangements for the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference; general information on the composition of the Delegation.	61	97
June 15 (tel. 89)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Suggestion that the code word TERMINAL be used for the Berlin Conference.	62	98
June 15 (tel. 74)	<i>President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Approval of the suggestion that the code word TERMINAL be used for the Berlin Conference.	63	98
June 15 (tel. 92)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Suggestions concerning a possible visit of King George VI to the Berlin Conference.	64	98
June 15	<i>The President's Chief of Staff to the Head of the British Joint Staff Mission</i> Notification that the United States Chiefs of Staff think it inadvisable for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to meet in London before the Berlin Conference, but that they will be willing to stop in London after the close of that meeting.	65	99
June 15 (tel. 3612)	<i>The Political Adviser for German Affairs to the Director of European Affairs</i> Notification that General Eisenhower intends to send a party to Berlin on June 17 to make advance arrangements for the Berlin Conference and has asked General Deane to ascertain if Marshal Zhukov will designate representatives to discuss this matter.	66	100
June 15	<i>Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Memorandum of a conversation between Ambassador Harriman and Assistant Foreign Commissar Vyshinsky concerning travel to Berlin of an advance American party to make arrangements for the Berlin Conference.	67	100

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June 15 (C.C.S. 880)	<i>Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Suggested agenda for the next conference of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff.	154	174
June 15	<i>The President's Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</i> Request for recommendations on ten questions likely to be raised at the Berlin Conference.	155	174
June 15 (tel. 4828)	[<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom</i>] [Instructions with respect to a <i>démarche</i> to Spain concerning the proposed vesting of all German assets in Spain in the Allied Control Council for Germany; quoted in footnote 1 to a message of June 28, 1945, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State ad interim (document No. 382, page 555), q. v. Identical instructions were sent on the same date to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union as telegram No. 1316.]		
Undated	[<i>Note by the Yugoslav Delegation to the Conference at Duino Concerning Venezia Giulia</i>] [Proposals on the civil administration of the zone of Venezia Giulia coming under Allied Military Government; printed as enclosure 1 to an agreed note of June 20, 1945, by the Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Army and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (document No. 561, page 843), q. v.]		
June 15	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the President's Naval Aide</i> Transmittal of a memorandum for the President and of a suggested list of Department of State personnel to assist the President at the Berlin Conference.	68	101
June 16 (tel. 12)	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i> Request for an opportunity to discuss with the President the proposed list of Department of State personnel to attend the Berlin Conference.	69	103
June 16	<i>Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of a discussion with the President concerning the list of Department of State personnel to attend the Berlin Conference and concerning a message from Ambassador Hurley in regard to Sino-Soviet relations.	70, 157	103, 176
June 16 (tel. 76)	<i>President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Agreement to any arrangements made by Prime Minister Churchill for a visit by King George VI to Berlin.	71	104

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June 16 (tel. 6104)	<i>The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report on Prime Minister Churchill's invitation to Clement Attlee to attend the Berlin Conference, on Harold Laski's statement on the subject, and on Mr. Attlee's acceptance of the invitation.	73	104
June 16	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the President</i> Notification that the Department of State is preparing material on Palestine for possible use by the President at the Berlin Conference; comment on the desirability of obtaining information on British intentions as to the future of Palestine.	156	175
June 16	[<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador</i>] [Request that the Italian Government be informed that the United States would welcome an Italian declaration of war on Japan but could give no commitment to provide resources or shipping for the prosecution by Italy of hostilities against Japan; quoted in footnote 4 to a memorandum of July 4, 1945, by the Under Secretary of State (document No. 236, page 298), q. v.]		
June 16	[<i>Memorandum by the Allied Delegation to the Conference at Duino Concerning Venezia Giulia</i>] [Statement of the position of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, with respect to civil administration of the zone of Venezia Giulia coming under Allied Military Government; printed as enclosure 2 to an agreed note of June 20, 1945, by the Supreme Allied Commander of the Yugoslav Army and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (document No. 561, page 843), q. v.]		
June 17 (tel. 94)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Transmittal of the text of a message from Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin concerning arrangements for separate enclaves for the three delegations to the Berlin Conference, with a fourth place in which the delegations could meet to confer.	74	106
June 18 (tel. 297)	<i>President Truman to Marshal Stalin</i> Notification that United States commanders have been instructed to begin the movement into the agreed zones of occupation in Germany and Austria on July 1; statement of the assumption that American troops will be in Berlin before that date to make arrangements for the Berlin Conference.	75	107
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June 18	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the President</i> Transmittal of a list of economic questions which may appropriately be discussed, either on a tripartite or on a bilateral basis, at the Berlin Conference.	160	178
June 18	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the President</i> Background information and recommendations with respect to United States policy on the treatment of Italy.	466	686
June 18 (tel. 817)	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report concerning Soviet desiderata, as explained to the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow on June 7, 1945, in connection with the conclusion of a new Soviet-Turkish treaty.	684	1020
June 18	<i>Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of a conversation with the British Minister concerning Soviet demands on Turkey and a possible joint Anglo-American approach to the Soviet Government along the lines of an attached <i>aide-memoire</i> .	683	1017
June 18	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</i> Minutes of a meeting of the President with a group of advisers at which the details of the military campaign against Japan were discussed.	598	903
June 18	<i>The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of War</i> Statement of the view that during the period of Allied military government in Germany the responsibility of the military authorities with respect to imports should include all imports which serve the purposes of the United States Government in Germany.	336	468
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June 18 (tel. 1336)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Transmittal of a message from President Truman to Marshal Stalin, suggesting that the question of establishing diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania be discussed at the Berlin Conference.	161	182

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June 19	<p><i>The Secretary of War to the Secretary of State</i></p> <p>Comment on a draft reply from President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill with respect to lend-lease from the United States to the United Kingdom.</p> <p>(Enclosure: Letter of June 13, 1945, from the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion to the Secretary of War, summarizing agreements reached on the above subject at an interdepartmental meeting of June 4, 1945.)</p> <p>(Footnote: Department of State draft of a reply on the above subject to Prime Minister Churchill.)</p>	540	814
June 19 (tel. 2673)	<p><i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State</i></p> <p>Report on the temporary suspension of the Duino negotiations, with respect to Venezia Giulia, between the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and a Yugoslav delegation.</p>	559	842
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June 20 (tel.)	<i>The President's Chief of Staff to the President</i> Notification that Fleet Admiral Leahy has asked Ambassador Harriman to ascertain Marshal Stalin's reaction to the President's bringing the United States Chiefs of Staff to Berlin.	79	110
June 20 (tel. MX 24738)	<i>The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union, to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force</i> Notification that the Soviet military authorities have indicated that they cannot change their decision to postpone until June 28 or 29 the visit of an American reconnaissance party to Berlin, but that efforts will be continued to arrange for reconnaissance.	80	110
June 20 (tel. S 91755)	<i>The Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, to the Chief of Staff, United States Army</i> Report that attempts to obtain permission for a reconnaissance party to proceed to Berlin have been unsuccessful; recommendation that steps be taken through governmental channels to secure the necessary permission.	81	111
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June 20	<i>The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State</i> Request that Ambassador Harriman be instructed to deliver a message to the Soviet Foreign Commissariat urgently requesting that permission be granted for an advance United States party to enter Berlin and stating that it may be necessary to delay the meeting of Heads of Government if the necessary permission is not granted at once.	83	112
June 20 (A-46)	[<i>The Political Adviser in Germany to the Secretary of State</i>] [Report on conditions in Vienna; printed as an enclosure to a message of July 9, 1945, from the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State (document No. 271, page 340), q. v.]		
June 20	[<i>The Political Adviser in Germany to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany</i>] [Arguments against combining Hessen-Nassau and parts of Baden and Württemberg into one Land; printed as enclosure 4 to a despatch of June 30, 1945, from the Political Adviser in Germany to the Secretary of State ad interim (document No. 340, page 474), q. v.]		

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June 20 (tel. 2695)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Notification that word has been received from Lieutenant-General Morgan that an agreement with the Yugoslavs was signed at 9 a. m. on June 20, 1945.	560	842
June 20	<i>Agreed Note by the Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Army and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean</i> Note on civil administration of the zone of Venezia Giulia coming under Allied Military Government, signed at Duino by Generals Jovanović and Morgan. (Enclosures: Note by the Yugoslav Delegation on Allied Military Government and comments thereon by the delegation representing the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.)	561	843
June 20	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chief of the Division of African Affairs</i> Instructions and guidance for the United States Representatives in the forthcoming negotiations with respect to the status of the International Zone of Tangier.	652	982
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June 20 (tel. 822)	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report of a conversation with the British Ambassador in Turkey concerning Soviet-Turkish relations; recommendation that the United States make a prompt and firm expression of its views on the subject to the Soviet Government.	685	1022
June 20 (tel. 24)	<i>The Assistant to the Secretary of State to the Special Assistant to the Chairman of the United States Delegation at the United Nations Conference on International Organization</i> Tentative United States suggestions for the agenda for the meeting of Heads of Government.	163	183
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June 21	<i>Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Memorandum of a conversation between Ambassador Harriman and Assistant Foreign Commissar Vyshinsky concerning arrangements for the advance American party to enter Berlin to make preparations for the Berlin Conference. (Enclosure: Mr. Vyshinsky's reply to Ambassador Harriman's note of June 20, 1945, on the above subject.)	84	113
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June 21 (tel. 177) (AMPOL-AD 104)	<i>The Chargé in Yugoslavia to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of the text of a TANYUG release concerning the Duino discussions on civil administration in Venezia Giulia.	563	847
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June 21	[<i>Text Agreed to by the Polish Leaders Meeting at Moscow</i>] [Agreement with respect to the formation of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, as submitted to the Commission on the Polish Question; quoted in a telegram of June 23, 1945, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State (document No. 486, page 722), q. v.]		
June 21 (659)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Transmittal of a revised draft of the statutes of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary and of Major General William S. Key's comments thereon.	289	374

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June 22 (tel. 36)	<i>The Political Adviser in Germany to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report of Ambassador Pauley's views that the division of the German Navy and Merchant Marine is a military matter so long as the United States is at war with Japan, but that the division of the Merchant Marine is ultimately a concern of the Allied Commission on Reparations.	389	572
June 22	<i>Briefing Book Paper</i> Background information with respect to Jewish immigration into Palestine; recommendation that a long-term settlement of the Palestine question be discussed at the Berlin Conference only in the most general terms.	646	972
June 22 (tel.)	[<i>The British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in the United States</i>] [Instructions to sound out the Department of State with respect to the desirability of a full exchange of views on the question of transfers of ethnic minority groups in Europe; paraphrase transmitted to the Department of State in a communication of June 28, 1945, from the British Embassy (document No. 437, page 644), q. v.]		
June 22 (tel.)	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the President's Chief of Staff</i> Request for information as to the size and composition of the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference.	86	116
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June 22 (tel. 844)	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report of a Soviet-Turkish conversation of June 18, 1945, in which the Soviet representative elaborated on Soviet desiderata vis-à-vis Turkey.	686	1024

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June 22 (tel. 4)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Comments on the tentative United States suggestions for the agenda for the Berlin Conference.	164	185
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June 22 (tel. 1370)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Notification of concurrence in Ambassador Harriman's acceptance of the Polish settlement worked out at Moscow; notification that Presidential approval of recognition of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been recommended.	484	720
June 22 (CC-63)	[<i>Coordinating Committee Paper</i>] [Background information and recommendations with respect to use of American property by the satellite countries for reparation; printed as an enclosure to an instruction of July 6, 1945, from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (document No. 324, page 426), q. v.]		
June 22 (tel. 1382)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Enumeration of questions regarding Polish-American relations concerning which the Department of State desires assurances from competent members of the new Polish Provisional Government.	485	721
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June 22 (tel. 2725)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report of a meeting with Lieutenant-General Morgan, at which the Duino negotiations with respect to Venezia Giulia were reviewed.	566	849
June 22 (tel. 188)	<i>The Chargé in Yugoslavia to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report of a public address by Prime Minister Tito, in which reference was made to the question of civil government in Venezia Giulia.	567	851
June 23 (tel. 430)	<i>The Acting Representative in Rumania to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Reply to a request for views on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Rumania.	293	385

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June 23	<i>Briefing Book Paper</i> Background information with respect to the role of France in United Nations councils and French views on the Rhineland.	222, 402	251, 592
June 23	<i>Briefing Book Paper</i> Background information and recommendations concerning recognition of the Renner government in Austria.	268	334
June 23	<i>Briefing Book Paper</i> Background information on the negotiations in the European Advisory Commission on the establishment of zones of occupation in Austria and on control machinery for Austria.	278	347
June 23	<i>Briefing Book Paper</i> Background information on the expulsion of minority groups from Czechoslovakia.	436	643
June 23	<i>Briefing Book Paper</i> Background information and recommendations with respect to the withdrawal of Allied forces from Iran.	628	949
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June 23 (IPCOG 9/2)	<i>The Informal Policy Committee on Germany to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a draft directive to the Commanding General, United States Forces in Austria, regarding the military government of Austria.	270	337
June 23 (tel. 98)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Transmittal of the text of a message from Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill concerning physical arrangements for the Berlin Conference.	90	118
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June 23 (tel. 2231)	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of the text of a communiqué to be issued at Moscow by the Commission on the Polish Question concerning the formation of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.	486	722
June 23 (tel. 1389)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Notification of Presidential approval in principle of the recognition by the United States of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity; proposal of a public statement concerning free elections in Poland.	487	724
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June 23 (tel. 2909)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France</i> Statement of the United States position that the Soviet Union should be kept informed concerning the proposed Anglo-Franco-American conversations on Tangier.	654	985
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June 23	<i>The Department of State to the British Embassy</i> Reply to a British surgestion that the United States and the United Kingdom make a <i>démarche</i> to the Soviet Union in connection with recent Soviet-Turkish conversations.	688	1027
June 23 (tel. 649)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey</i> Review of Anglo-American communications with regard to Soviet-Turkish relations; authorization for discussions with the Turkish Government concerning the United States position on this question.	689	1028
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June 24	<i>Memorandum by the Commanding General, United States Sector, Berlin District</i> Report on a visit to Berlin on June 22-23, 1945, to make arrangements concerning the Berlin Conference; recommendation that the Crown Prince's palace at Potsdam be accepted as suitable for the conference and that the Soviet plan for a compound of billets for the United States Delegation at Babelsberg also be accepted. (Footnote: Letter of June 25, 1945, from the Political Adviser in Germany to the Director of European Affairs, summarizing the physical arrangements made for the Berlin Conference.)	93	121
June 24 (tel.)	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the President's Chief of Staff</i> Report that Marshal Stalin has no objection to the President's bringing his Chiefs of Staff with him to Berlin.	94	125
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June 24 (tel. 2749)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Explanation of the delay in the receipt of information concerning the Yugoslav reservation relating to civil administration in Venezia Giulia.	569	852

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June 25	<p>[<i>The Political Adviser in Germany to the Director of European Affairs</i>]</p> <p>[Summary of the physical arrangements for the Berlin Conference; quoted in footnote 1 to a memorandum of June 24, 1945, by the Commanding General, United States Sector, Berlin District (document No. 93, page 121), q. v.]</p>		
June 25 (tel. S 93051)	<p><i>The Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, to the Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union</i></p> <p>Urgent request that action be taken to authorize local Soviet authorities in Berlin to arrange details concerning the Berlin Conference such as establishment of radiotelephone and teleprinter terminals and relay points.</p>	96	126
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June 25	<i>Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of a conversation with the French Ambassador, during which the following subjects were discussed: exclusion of France from the Berlin Conference; means for keeping France informed concerning the work of the Allied Commission on Reparations; participation of a French army corps in the war against Japan; and the position of the United States with respect to the crisis in the Levant.	99, 357, 616, 637	128, 512, 938, 961
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June 25 (382)	<i>The Acting Representative in Rumania to the Secretary of State</i> Report on the current status of the Rumanian armistice convention. (Enclosure: Statement by Mr. Constantin Visoianu concerning the application of the armistice.)	297	388
June 25 (tel. 201)	<i>The Chargé in Yugoslavia to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report on items in the Yugoslav press concerning Macedonia.	455	668
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June 26 (tel. 6429)	<i>The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report of a conversation with British officials concerning the problem of Tangier.	658	987
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June 26 (tel. 6433)	<i>The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report of tentative British views concerning an approach to the Soviet Government for reform of the Allied Control Commissions for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.	298	393
June 26 (tel. 1420)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations</i> Transmittal of the text of a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United States Forces of Occupation in Germany, concerning coordination with Ambassador Pauley on matters of restitution.	359	513
June 26	[<i>Draft of a Directive to the Commander in Chief, United States Forces of Occupation in Germany</i>] [Draft of a directive on the identification and apprehension of persons suspected of war crimes and other offenses and on the trial of certain offenders; printed as annex 3 to a Briefing Book paper on war crimes (document No. 395, page 578), q. v.]		
June 26 (tel. 1425)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Request for views concerning free elections in Poland.	489	725
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June 27	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the President</i> Transmittal of a memorandum of June 2, 1945, on possible resurrection of the Communist International and the resumption of extreme leftist activities, and the possible effect thereof on the United States. (The full text of the enclosed memorandum is printed, and also a summary of the enclosure in the form of a memorandum of June 2, 1945, from the Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and to the Director of European Affairs.)	226	267
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June 27 (1805)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of the text of memorandum No. CC 1001, of June 23, 1945, from the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, with respect to future Allied policy toward Italy.	467	688
June 27 (tel. MX 24829)	<i>The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union, to the Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force</i> Notification that Marshal Zhukov will meet British and American military representatives in Berlin on June 29, 1945; transmittal of a request that information be transmitted to Marshal Zhukov immediately as to the subjects which the British and American representatives wish to discuss.	104	131

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June 28 (C.C.S. 880/3)	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Views on the size of the military staffs to be taken to the Berlin Conference.	107	133
June 28 (C.C.S. 706/11)	<i>Report by the Combined Administrative Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Background information and recommendations concerning the disposal of enemy war matériel in Germany and Austria. (Appendix A: Draft message to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, on the above subject.) (Appendix B: Draft message to the London Munitions Assignments Board on the above subject.) (Appendix C: Analysis of facts bearing on the problem.) (Appendix D: Message of June 11, 1945, from the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the above subject.)	361	515
June 28	<i>The Secretary of State ad interim to the Secretary of War</i> Assurance that the views of the War Department will be borne in mind in any discussions with the Iranian Government on withdrawal of American forces from Iran.	633	957
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June 29 (tel. 2322)	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State ad interim</i> Report that recognition of the Yalta decisions by the new Polish Government applies to the holding of elections and that the list of members of the new government conforms to the agreement approved by the Commission on the Polish Question.	493	729

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June 29 (tel. 5306)	<i>The Secretary of State ad interim to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom</i> Statement of policy on United States participation in the administration of Tangier; discussion of the financing of the United States contribution to that administration.	660	989
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June 30	<i>Revised Briefing Book Paper</i> Background information and policy statement with respect to the Montreux Convention and the Turkish Straits. (Footnotes: Variant text of this revised Briefing Book paper.)	681	1013
June 30	[<i>Briefing Book Paper</i>] [Background information and recommendation concerning the disposition of East Prussia; printed as attachment 1 to a Briefing Book paper of July 4, 1945, on the eastern frontier of Germany (document No. 513, page 750), q. v.]		
June 30	[<i>Briefing Book Paper</i>] [Background information and recommendation concerning the disposition of Danzig; printed as attachment 2 to a Briefing Book paper of July 4, 1945, on the eastern frontier of Germany (document No. 513, page 750), q. v.]		
June 30	[<i>Briefing Book Paper</i>] [Background information and recommendation concerning the disposition of German Upper Silesia; printed as attachment 3 to a Briefing Book paper of July 4, 1945, on the eastern frontier of Germany (document No. 513, page 750), q. v.]		
June 30	[<i>Briefing Book Paper</i>] [Background information and recommendation concerning the disposition of eastern Pomerania; printed as attachment 4 to a Briefing Book paper of July 4, 1945, on the eastern frontier of Germany (document No. 513, page 750), q. v.]		
June 30	[<i>Briefing Book Paper</i>] [Background information and recommendation concerning the disposition of German territory east of the Oder River, excluding East Prussia, Upper Silesia, and eastern Pomerania; printed as attachment 5 to a Briefing Book paper of July 4, 1945, on the eastern frontier of Germany (document No. 513, page 750), q. v.]		
June 30	[<i>Briefing Book Paper</i>] [Background information and recommendations concerning the disposition of the territory between the Oder and Lower Neisse Rivers; printed as attachment 6 to a Briefing Book paper of July 4, 1945, on the eastern frontier of Germany (document No. 513, page 750), q. v.]		

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June 30	[<i>The British and French Embassies in the Soviet Union to the Soviet Foreign Commissariat</i>] [Notification concerning the forthcoming Anglo-Franco-American conversations on Tangier; quoted in a message of June 27, 1945, from the Ambassador in France to the Acting Secretary of State (document No. 659, page 988), q. v.]		
June 30 (519)	<i>The Political Adviser in Germany to the Secretary of State ad interim</i> Report on a new organization of <i>Länder</i> in western Germany. (Enclosure: Memorandum of June 20, 1945, from Ambassador Murphy to Lieutenant General Clay, summarizing arguments against combining Hessen-Nassau and parts of Baden and Württemberg into one <i>Land</i> .)	340	474
June 30	<i>The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of War</i> Transmittal of a memorandum on the financing of a procurement and supply program in Germany.	341	477
June 30 (tel. 2353)	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State ad interim</i> Report of a discussion with Assistant Foreign Commissar Vyshinsky concerning air communications with Moscow.	532	803
June 30 (tel. 2823)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Secretary of State ad interim</i> Additional report on the disposition of Soviet troops in Bulgaria.	457	670
June 30 (C.C.S. 877/1)	<i>Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Proposals for amending a memorandum of June 14, 1945, by the United States Chiefs of Staff with respect to basic objectives, strategy, and policies in the war against Japan. (Footnote: Quotations from the United States memorandum (C.C.S. 877) referred to above.)	600	912
June 30 (C.C.S. 880/6)	<i>Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Views on the size of the military staffs to be taken to the Berlin Conference.	111	135
June 30 (tel. 87)	<i>The Political Adviser in Germany to the Secretary of State ad interim</i> Report on communications arrangements with Berlin.	112	135
June 30 (tel. 1473)	<i>The Washington Liaison Representative for the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations</i> Transmittal of estimates of petroleum surpluses in eastern Europe.	622	944

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June 30 (tel. 2826)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Secretary of State ad interim</i> Report of Lieutenant General Anders' views with respect to Soviet policy toward Poland.	495	730
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Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide</i> Summary of references, in the Map Room papers, to Indochina, with special reference to command difficulties and to Ambassador Hurley's views on the subject.	603	915
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide</i> Summary of references, in the Map Room papers, to the Dardanelles and to revision of the Montreux Convention.	679	1010
July 2 (tel. 893)	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Secretary of State ad interim</i> Reflections on recent developments in Soviet-Turkish relations.	694	1033
July 2 (tel. 2367)	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State ad interim</i> Report on difficulties with the Soviet authorities in connection with occupying the United States zone of occupation in Austria.	279	348
July 2	<i>The Secretary of War to the President</i> Transmittal of a memorandum on the proposed program for Japan and of a draft proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan.	592	888

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July 2 (tel. 83)	<i>President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Notification that the United States intends to accord recognition to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity at 7 p. m. on July 3, 1945; suggestion that British recognition be accorded at the same time.	497	733
July 2 (tel. 1488)	<i>The Secretary of State ad interim to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations</i> Views on the amount and allocation of reparations from Germany. (Footnote: Principles to be followed with respect to reparations from Germany, quoted from the instructions for the United States Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations.)	363	519
July 2	<i>Briefing Book Paper</i> Background information on the position of the British Prime Minister at tripartite meetings of Heads of Government with respect to the United Kingdom and the other parts of the Commonwealth. (The covering summary of this Briefing Book paper is dated July 4, 1945.)	223	253
July 2	<i>Briefing Book Paper</i> Background information and recommendation concerning the retention of Allied forces in Italy. (This paper, in the form of a memorandum for the President, was forwarded to the President on July 4, 1945.)	473	704
July 2	<i>Briefing Book Paper</i> Background information and policy statement with respect to the repatriation of Baltic nationals.	526	794
July 2 (C.C.S. 888)	<i>Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Transmittal of a memorandum summarizing Anglo-American understandings reached in 1944 regarding the supply of military lend-lease in the period from the defeat of Germany to the surrender of Japan.	541	816
July 2 (R 125-45)	[<i>The Assistant Military Attaché in Greece to the War Department</i>] [Report on incidents along the Greek-Bulgarian and Greek-Yugoslav frontiers, and on Anglo-Soviet relations with respect to Greece; printed as an enclosure to a despatch of July 4, 1945, from the Ambassador in Greece to the Secretary of State (document No. 458, page 670), q. v.]		
July 2 (tel. 3981)	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State ad interim</i> Report of a Soviet approach to the French Government requesting Soviet participation in the forthcoming conversations on Tangier; report of French and British reactions to this approach.	662	991

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July 3 (tel. 101)	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman</i> Request that recognition of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity be postponed until July 4, 1945, to give the British Government more time in dealing with the problems of liquidating the affairs of the Polish Government-in-Exile.	498	733
July 3 (tel. 6674)	<i>The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a message from Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman expressing agreement in principle with the President's proposed directive concerning German coal.	423	622
July 3 (tel. 2846)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Secretary of State</i> Report on the strength of the Bulgarian Army and of Soviet forces in Bulgaria.	459	677
July 3 (tel. 898)	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Secretary of State</i> Report of a conversation with Prime Minister Saracoğlu concerning Soviet-Turkish relations.	695	1034
July 3	<i>Briefing Book Paper</i> Background information and recommendations concerning the disposition of eastern Poland between the Riga Line and the Curzon Line.	511	747
July 3	<i>Briefing Book Paper</i> Background information and recommendation concerning the return to Poland of Polish territory annexed by Germany in 1939.	512	749
July 3	<i>Briefing Book Paper</i> Background information and recommendation concerning Soviet participation in European economic organizations.	525	792
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July 3	<i>Briefing Book Paper</i> Background information and recommendations concerning the military government and occupation of Japan, with special reference to the position of the Emperor.	590	885

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July 3	<i>The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Chairman of the Allied Commission on Reparations</i> Suggested work program for the Commission in order to prepare a definitive reparations program for presentation to the Heads of Government at the Berlin Conference.	364	522
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July 3	<i>Memorandum by the Director of European Affairs</i> Memorandum of a conversation with the British Minister concerning the agenda for the Berlin Conference. (Attachment: <i>Aide-mémoire</i> attaching revised British suggestions for the agenda for the Berlin Conference.)	179	206
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July 3	<i>Memorandum by the Chairman of the President's War Relief Control Board</i> Suggestions for implementing the general concepts of basic United States foreign policy.	221	249
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July 4 (tel. 2406)	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Assistant to the Secretary of State</i> Inquiry concerning attendance at the Berlin Conference.	119	144
July 4 (tel. 6714)	<i>The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State</i> Report concerning British arrangements for liquidating the affairs of the Polish Government-in-Exile.	500	734
July 4	<i>Briefing Book Paper</i> Summary of background information on the position of the British Prime Minister at tripartite meetings of Heads of Government with respect to the United Kingdom and the other parts of the Commonwealth. (The full text of the Briefing Book paper to which this summary is attached is dated July 2, 1945.)	223	253
July 4	<i>Briefing Book Paper</i> Summary of background information and recommendations concerning a British plan for a western European bloc. (The full text of the Briefing Book paper to which this summary is attached is dated June 28, 1945.)	224	256
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July 4	<i>The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs to the Secretary of State</i> Summary of the status of negotiations for an agree- ment on the zones of occupation in Austria.	281	350
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July 4 (tel. 4005)	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State</i> Report on Anglo-American consultations concerning Soviet participation in the forthcoming conversations on Tangier.	664	993
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July 4 (1282)	<i>The Ambassador in Greece to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of, and comments on, a report of July 2, 1945, by the Assistant Military Attaché concerning incidents along the Greek-Bulgarian and Greek-Yugoslav frontiers and concerning Anglo-Soviet relations with respect to Greece.	458	670
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July 4	<i>Department of State Memorandum</i> Revised list of Department of State personnel to assist the President at the meeting of Heads of Government.	118	142
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July 5 (tel. 2866)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Secretary of State</i> Report concerning the strength of the Rumanian Army and the disposition of Soviet troops in the Balkans.	699	1042
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July 5 (tel. 2418)	<i>The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Secretary of State</i> Statement of problems arising from the nonmembership of France in the Allied Commission on Reparations.	366	526
July 5	<i>White House Press Release</i> Announcement by the President that the United States has established diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.	501	735
July 5	[<i>President Truman to Prime Minister Osóbka-Morawski</i>] [Acknowledgment of notification of the establishment of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and notification in reply that the United States is establishing diplomatic relations with that Government; printed as enclosure 1 to a memorandum of July 2, 1945, from the Secretary of State ad interim to the President (document No. 496, page 731), q. v.]		

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July 5 (778)	<i>The Chargé Near the Polish Government-in-Exile to the Secretary of State</i> Report on the termination of the mission of the American Embassy near the Polish Government-in-Exile at London. (Enclosure: Note of July 5, 1945, from the Chargé near the Polish Government-in-Exile to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs notifying the latter of the termination of the mission of the American Embassy near his Government.)	503	736
July 5	<i>The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State</i> Notification that the British Government has recognized the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, but reserves the right to raise at the Berlin Conference certain questions concerning Poland.	504	737
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July 5 (tel. 3112)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France</i> Statement of United States policy on the participation of the Soviet Union and other countries in the forthcoming conversations on Tangier.	667	995
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July 6	[<i>Briefing Book Paper</i>] [Background information on the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity; printed as an annex to a Briefing Book paper of June 29, 1945, on United States policy regarding Poland (document No. 483, page 714), q. v.]		
July 6 (tel. 339)	<i>The Representative in Bulgaria to the Secretary of State</i> Report on the hope held by democratic elements in Bulgaria for a concrete assurance of continued interest in Bulgaria on the part of the Western democracies.	305	401
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July 6	<i>Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of a conversation with the Italian Ambassador concerning the needs and aspirations of Italy and a declaration of war by Italy against Japan. (Attachments 1 and 2, printed as attachments to document No. 236: Two memoranda of July 6, 1945, concerning a declaration of war by Italy against Japan.) (Attachment 3, printed as document No. 249 and as an attachment and subattachment to document No. 468: Note of July 6, 1945, from the Italian Ambassador to President Truman, transmitting a memorandum on the position, needs, and aspirations of Italy.) (Footnote to document No. 236: Note of June 16, 1945, from the Acting Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador, requesting that the Italian Government be informed that the United States would welcome an Italian declaration of war on Japan but could give no commitment to provide resources or shipping for the prosecution by Italy of hostilities against Japan.)	236, 249, 468	248, 308, 695
July 6 (tel. 21)	<i>The Representative in Hungary to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Comments on possible lines of action in Hungary.	304	400
July 6 (tel. 2437)	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State</i> Report on United States personnel at Moscow who will attend the Berlin Conference.	128	149
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July 6	<i>The Federal Loan Administrator, the President's Special Counsel, and Mr. George E. Allen to the President</i> Summary of the important issues to be decided at the Berlin Conference.	192	228
July 6	<i>Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of African Affairs</i> Memorandum of a conversation between the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs and the Counselor of the French Embassy concerning Soviet participation in the forthcoming conversations on Tangier.	669	997
July 6 (tel. 2441)	<i>The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Secretary of State</i> Statement of eight principles concerning reparations from Germany adopted by the Allied Commission on Reparations for recommendation to member Governments.	367	527
July 6 (698)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Transmittal of a Coordinating Committee paper of June 22, 1945, containing background information and recommendations with respect to use of American property by the satellite countries for reparation. (Similar instructions were dispatched on the same date to the American Representatives in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.)	324	426
July 6	<i>The Secretary of State to the Petroleum Administrator for War</i> Résumé of developments and of action taken with respect to the petroleum situation in eastern Europe.	624	945
July 6 (tel. 72)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Germany</i> Further request that appropriate arrangements be made in Berlin for the United States Delegation.	126	147
July 6	<i>Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of a conversation between the President and the French Ambassador concerning the interest of France in questions to be discussed at the Berlin Conference.	127	147

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July 6 (tel. 1851)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report of a conversation with Prime Minister Parri; observations on factors affecting the possible success of the Parri government.	469	699
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July 12	<i>United States Delegation Position Paper</i> A five-part memorandum or "brief" containing United States views on the agenda for the Berlin Conference, as sent to the Soviet and British Governments on July 5, 1945, and United States proposals to be presented at the Conference with respect to a Council of Foreign Ministers, Germany, implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, and Italy.	214	239
July 12	<i>United States Delegation Working Paper</i> Draft of a proposal for an instruction to be issued to the Soviet, British, and United States commanders in Germany with respect to a German import program.	348	499
July 12 (SC-145)	<i>Memorandum by the Central Secretariat</i> Transmittal of a memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State MacLeish on United States objectives in the occupation of Germany, for possible communication to the Secretary of State at the Berlin Conference.	349	500
July 12 (tel. 4191)	<i>The Chief of the Division of African Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report on Anglo-Franco-American consultations concerning Soviet participation in the forthcoming conversations on Tangier.	674	1004
July 12 (tel. 157)	<i>The Political Adviser in Germany to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report on the meeting of the Berlin <i>Kommandatura</i> on July 10, 1945, at which United States and British representatives accepted commitments for the supply of specified quantities of coal and food to Berlin.	433	638
July 12 (tel. 7050)	<i>The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report of a conversation between the British Foreign Secretary and the Turkish Foreign Minister concerning Soviet-Turkish relations.	706	1050
July 12 (tel. 1382)	<i>The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs</i> Views on the position of Japan and on the possibility of using the Soviet Union in bringing about a termination of the war.	584	877
July 12 (tel. MR-1N-35)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Approval of the recommendation for an approach to the British Government concerning Italian membership in the United Nations.	241	303
July 12 (tel. 5701)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom</i> Report on the proposed schedule for the arrival of President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes at the Berlin Conference.	137	154

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1945 July 12 (tel. 3234)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Appointed Ambassador to Poland</i> Summary of United States policy with respect to economic assistance to Poland.	523	788
July 12 (tel. 7069) (COMEA 336)	<i>The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report on a discussion in the European Advisory Commission concerning a Soviet text and a new text submitted by the United States Representative for inclusion in the Commission's report with respect to the French sector of Berlin.	412	602
July 13 (tel. 898)	<i>The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Report that the Soviet Ambassador in Japan has been informed of the wish of the Emperor of Japan to end the war and has been requested to accord facilities in connection with the proposed mission of Prince Konoye to Moscow.	585	879
July 13	<i>The Ambassador in Greece to Prime Minister Voulgaris</i> Proposal that the United States and British Governments approach the Soviet and French Governments, if such action is agreeable to the Greek Government, with a suggestion for Allied supervision of elections in Greece.	451	663
July 13 (tel. 281)	<i>The Representative in Hungary to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report of the receipt of a note from the Soviet authorities in Hungary concerning a revised procedure for the work of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary.	311	408
July 13	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs</i> Memorandum of a conversation with the Second Secretary of the British Embassy concerning the western frontier of Poland. (Attachment: <i>Aide-mémoire</i> stating the British position on the above subject and suggesting a course of action at TERMINAL with respect to it.)	518	777
July 13 (tel. 107)	<i>The Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion to the Secretary of State</i> Review of developments relating to lend-lease policy and to the preparation of a reply to Prime Minister Churchill's message of May 28, 1945, on this subject.	546	820
July 13	<i>Mr. V. N. Pavlov, of the Soviet Foreign Commissariat, to the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Acknowledgment of a communication from Ambassador Harriman concerning the discussion of reparations at the Berlin Conference.	215	241
Undated	[<i>Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations</i>] [Soviet definition of restitution and replacement, submitted on July 13, 1945; printed as appendix F to a memorandum of July 14, 1945, by the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (document No. 376, page 538), q. v.]		

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July 13	<p>[<i>Memorandum by the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations</i>]</p> <p>[Tentative draft on the questions of interim deliveries and removals; printed as appendix I to a memorandum of July 14, 1945, by the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (document No. 376, page 538), q. v.]</p>		
July 13	<p>[<i>The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Chairman of the Allied Commission on Reparations</i>]</p> <p>Views on the relationship of reparations from Germany to a German export and import program; printed as appendix L to a memorandum of July 14, 1945, by the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (document No. 376, page 538), q. v.]</p>		
July 13 (tel.)	<p><i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the President and the Secretary of State</i></p> <p>Report on a discussion between Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Soong concerning railways in Manchuria, Port Arthur, and Dairen; report on Prime Minister Soong's reactions to the discussion.</p>	578	863
July 13 (tel. 7072)	<p><i>The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State</i></p> <p>Inquiry concerning press arrangements for the Berlin Conference.</p>	138	154
July 13	<p><i>The Chief of the Mission for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs</i></p> <p>Report of a conference with Lieutenant General Clay concerning the production and distribution of German coal.</p>	434	640
July 13 (tel. 7075)	<p><i>The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State</i></p> <p>Transmittal of considered British views concerning an approach to the Soviet Government for reform of the Allied Control Commissions for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania; notification that the British Government may wish to put forward at the Berlin Conference proposals concerning the conclusion of peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.</p>	312	408
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July 13	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a memorandum on interpretation of the Yalta Agreement Regarding Japan and on terms which China might appropriately accept in regard to Outer Mongolia and Manchuria.	579	864
July 13	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State</i> Report of a statement made to the press by the Acting Secretary with respect to Japanese peace feelers; recommendation that early action be taken on the proposed proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan.	597	902
July 13	<i>Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State</i> Memorandum of a conversation with the Netherland Ambassador concerning the possible participation of Netherland troops in the war against Japan.	618	940
July 13 (tel. 1385)	<i>The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs</i> Report of a conversation with Assistant Foreign Commissar Lozovsky at which the Japanese desire to send a special mission to Moscow was communicated to the Soviet Government.	586	879
July 13 (tel. 1386)	<i>The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs</i> Comments on the proposal to send Prince Konoye on a special mission to Moscow.	587	880
July 13 (tel. 20)	<i>The Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs to the Director of European Affairs</i> Report of a British proposal that Colonel James H. Douglas, Jr., be appointed temporarily as Deputy Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission in Italy; further report that the presentation of this proposal could be postponed pending discussion with the British Chiefs of Staff at TERMINAL. (Footnote: Memorandum of June 14, 1945, from the Acting Secretary of State to the President, reviewing the policy to give the Allied Commission an increasingly civilian character, informing the President of the selection of Colonel Douglas as Chief Commissioner, and recommending that Colonel Douglas be given the personal rank of Minister.)	482	712
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July 15 (tel. 113)	<i>The Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report on developments relating to the occupation of Vienna.	284	355
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July 15 (C.C.S. 884/2)	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Views with respect to supplying information to the Soviet Union concerning the war with Japan; request for an opportunity to discuss this subject with the United States Chiefs of Staff at TERMINAL.	614	935
July 15 (C.C.S. 891)	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Suggestion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff discuss at TERMINAL the continuation of machinery for combined Anglo-American collaboration in the military sphere after the defeat of Japan; views on this subject.	550	825
July 15 (tel. 471)	<i>The Acting Representative in Rumania to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Recommendations for alleviating the problem of censorship in Rumania.	321	418
July 15 (tel. 7144)	<i>The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report that the Embassy at London has executed the instructions of the Department of State with respect to approaching the British Government concerning a public announcement supporting admission of Italy to the United Nations.	243	303
July 15 (tel. 1392)	<i>The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs</i> Report that Generalissimo Stalin left for Berlin without replying to the Japanese request concerning the proposed mission of Prince Konoye; comments on Soviet hesitation to receive the Konoye mission.	588	882
July 15 (tel. 2964)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report of a conversation with Field Marshal Alexander concerning the latter's recent consultations in London on Italian questions.	471	700
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July 16 (C.C.S. 880/10)	[<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i>] [Comments on the program suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff for military discussions at the Berlin Conference; quoted in footnote 2 to a memorandum of July 15, 1945, by the British Chiefs of Staff (document No. 220, page 243), q. v.]		

I. GENESIS OF THE CONFERENCE

INITIAL CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING A TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE

No. 1

Truman Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 6 May 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Number 34. Personal and top secret.

I send you in my immediately following telegram² the personal answer³ which U. J.⁴ has sent to me on my long telegram of April 29⁵ which latter you thought well of and also supported by the message quoted in your Number 25.⁶ It seems to me that matters⁷ can hardly be carried further by correspondence and that, as soon as possible, there should be a meeting of the three heads of governments. Meanwhile we should hold firmly to the existing position obtained or being obtained by our armies in Yugoslavia, in Austria, in Czechoslovakia, on the main central United States front and on the British front reaching up to Lübeck including Denmark. There will be plenty to

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels. Text communicated to the Secretary of State by Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, in a memorandum of May 9 (file No. 860c.01/5-945).

² Not printed.

³ See Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (vol. vi of *The Second World War*) (Boston, 1953), p. 499; *Stalin's Correspondence With Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941-45* (New York, 1958), vol. I, p. 346. The short title *Stalin's Correspondence* is hereafter used to refer to the last-cited publication, which constitutes a reissue (including the original title pages and with the original pagination but bound in one volume) of the two volumes of *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945* (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957; Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication). For a citation to the Russian text of this compilation, see document No. 21, footnote 1.

⁴ Uncle Joe, i. e., Stalin.

⁵ See Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 494; *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 338.

⁶ Not printed. Truman's telegram No. 25 to Churchill quoted for the latter's information the text of Truman's message of May 4 to Stalin concerning Poland. See Harry S. Truman, *Year of Decisions* (vol. I of *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*) (Garden City, 1955), pp. 254-255; *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 228.

⁷ With respect to the "matters" which Churchill presumably had in mind, see document No. 4.

occupy both armies in collecting the prisoners during the next few days, and we may hope that the VE celebration will also occupy the public mind at home. Thereafter I feel that we must most earnestly consider our attitude towards the Soviets and show them how much we have to offer or withhold.

No. 2

Truman Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 9 May 1945.

31. Your messages 34² and 35.³

I am in agreement with your opinion that a meeting of the three heads of government would be desirable in order to get action on the questions of interest to the three governments upon which either a decision or a common understanding have not been reached.

I very much prefer to have the request for such a tripartite meeting originate from Marshal Stalin and not from either one of us. Perhaps you have means of some kind with which to endeavor to induce Stalin to suggest or request such a meeting.

In the meantime it is my present intention to adhere to our interpretation of the Yalta agreements,⁴ and to stand firmly on our present announced attitude toward all the questions at issue.

In order to prepare for a possible tripartite meeting in the not distant future, I would be very pleased to have from you a list of the questions that you consider it necessary or desirable for us to bring up for discussion, and also suggestions as to meeting places.

There should now be no valid excuse for Stalin's refusing to come west toward us.

In regard to timing, it will be extremely difficult for me to absent myself from Washington before the end of the fiscal year (30 June), but I probably will be able to get away after that date.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels. Text communicated to the Secretary of State by Leahy in a memorandum of May 9 (file No. 860c.01/5-945).

² Document No. 1.

³ Not printed herein. See Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 499.

⁴ See vol. II, documents Nos. 1416 and 1417.

No. 3

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 11 May 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 40.

1. Your 31.² I think we should offer an invitation jointly or severally at the same moment to Stalin to meet us at some agreed unshattered town in Germany for a tripartite meeting in July. We should not rendezvous at any place within the present Russian military zone. Twice running we have come to meet him. They are concerned about us on account of our civilization and various instrumentalities. But this will be greatly diminished when our armies are dispersed.

2. I do not know at the moment when our general election will be, but I do not see any reason why it should influence your movements or mine where public duty calls. If you will entertain the idea of coming over here in the early days of July, His Majesty will send you the most cordial invitation and you will have a great reception from the British Nation.

I would have suggested the middle of June but for your reference to your fiscal year (30 June) because I feel that every minute counts. Thereafter we might move to the rendezvous fixed in Germany and have the grave discussions on which the immediate future of the world depends.

I should of course bring with me representatives of both parties in our state and both would use exactly the same language about foreign affairs as we are closely agreed. Therefore I urge your coming here in the earliest days of July and that we leave together to meet U. J. at wherever is the best point outside Russian-occupied territory to which he can be induced to come. Meanwhile I earnestly hope that the American front will not recede from the now agreed tactical lines.

3. I doubt very much whether any enticements will get a proposal for a tripartite meeting out of Stalin. But I think he would respond to an invitation. If not what are we to do?

4. I rejoice that your present intention is to adhere to our rightful interpretation of the Yalta agreements and to stand firmly on our present announced attitude towards all the questions at issue.

Mr. President, in these next two months the gravest matters in the world will be decided. May I add that I have derived a great feeling of confidence from the correspondence we have interchanged.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² Document No. 2.

5. We are drawing up as you desire a list of subjects for discussion amongst us three which will take a few days but will be forwarded to you immediately.³

6. I also send you in my immediately following⁴ a copy of a telegram I sent on the 4th to Eden.⁵

³ See document No. 144 and the enclosure to document No. 145.

⁴ Document No. 4.

⁵ Eden was at San Francisco acting as chairman of the British Delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization.

No. 4

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 11 May 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 41.

Following is text of telegram referred to in my immediately preceding telegram.²

1. I consider that the Polish deadlock can now probably only be resolved at a conference between the three heads of governments in some unshattered town in Germany, if such can be found. This should take place at latest at the beginning of July. I propose to telegraph a suggestion to President Truman about his visit here and the further indispensable meeting of the three major powers.

2. The Polish problem may be easier to settle when set in relation to the now numerous outstanding questions of the utmost gravity which require urgent settlement with the Russians. I fear terrible things have happened during the Russian advance through Germany to the Elbe. The proposed withdrawal of the United States Army to the occupational lines which were arranged with the Russians and Americans in Quebec³ and which were marked in yellow on the maps we studied there, would mean the tide of Russian domination sweeping forward 120 miles on a front of 300 or 400 miles. This would be an event which, if it occurred, would be one of the most melancholy in history. After it was over and the territory occupied

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² Document No. 3. The text of the message which follows was communicated to the Secretary of State by Leahy in a memorandum of May 11 (file No. 860c.01/5-1145).

³ The records of the Second Quebec Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume in this series. Soviet representatives were not present at the Quebec Conference. Following Anglo-American agreement at Quebec with respect to zones of occupation in Germany, an agreement on the subject was signed at London on November 14, 1944, by the United States, British, and Soviet representatives on the European Advisory Commission (Department of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071*; Department of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2087).

by the Russians, Poland would be completely engulfed and buried deep in Russian-occupied lands. What would in fact be the Russian frontier would run from the North Cape in Norway along the Finnish-Swedish frontier, across the Baltic to a point just east of Lübeck along the at present agreed line of occupation and along the frontier between Bavaria to Czechoslovakia to the frontiers of Austria which is nominally to be in quadruple occupation, and half-way across that country to the Isonzo River behind which Tito and Russia will claim everything to the east. Thus the territories under Russian control would include the Baltic provinces, all of Germany to the occupational line, all Czechoslovakia, a large part of Austria, the whole of Yugoslavia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria until Greece in her present tottering condition is reached. It would include all the great capitals of middle Europe including Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia. The position of Turkey and Constantinople will certainly come immediately into discussion.

3. This constitutes an event in the history of Europe to which there has been no parallel, and which has not been faced by the Allies in their long and hazardous struggle. The Russian demands on Germany for reparations alone will be such as to enable her to prolong the occupation almost indefinitely, at any rate for many years during which time Poland will sink with many other states into the vast zone of Russian-controlled Europe, not necessarily economically Sovietised but police-governed.

4. It is just about time that these formidable issues were examined between the principal powers as a whole. We have several powerful bargaining counters on our side, the use of which might make for a peaceful agreement. First, the Allies ought not to retreat from their present positions to the occupational line until we are satisfied about Poland and also about the temporary character of the Russian occupation of Germany, and the conditions to be established in the Russianised or Russian-controlled countries in the Danube valley particularly Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia and the Balkans. Secondly, we may be able to please them about the exits from the Black Sea and the Baltic as part of a general settlement. All these matters can only be settled before the United States armies in Europe are weakened. If they are not settled before the United States armies withdraw from Europe and the Western world folds up its war machines, there are no prospects of a satisfactory solution and very little of preventing a third world war. It is to this early and speedy showdown and settlement with Russia that we must now turn our hopes. Meanwhile I am against weakening our claim against Russia on behalf of Poland in any way. I think it should stand where it was put in the telegrams from the President and me.⁴

⁴ For the messages referred to, see Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 254; Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 499; *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 338, and vol. II, p. 228.

No. 5

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 11 May 1945.

36. Your Number 40.²

I would much prefer to have Stalin propose the meeting and believe it is worth while to endeavor, through our Ambassadors,³ to induce him to propose the meeting. If such an effort fails, we can then consider our issuing an invitation jointly or severally.

When and if such a meeting is arranged, it appears to me that in order to avoid any suspicion of our "ganging up" it would be advantageous for us to proceed to the meeting place separately.

When the conference ends, if my duties here do not make it impossible, I shall be very pleased to make a visit to England where you and I may discuss fully our common interests and problems.

I am fully in agreement that the next few months will decide questions of the greatest consequence to the whole world.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Document No. 3.

³ W. Averell Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were, respectively, the American and British Ambassadors to the Soviet Union.

No. 6

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 12th May 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 44.

1. I am profoundly concerned about the European situation as outlined in my number 41.² I learn that half the American air force in Europe has already begun to move to the Pacific Theatre. The newspapers are full of the great movements of the American armies out of Europe. Our armies also are under previous arrangements likely to undergo a marked reduction. The Canadian Army will certainly leave. The French are weak and difficult to deal with. Anyone can see that in a very short space of time our armed power on the Continent will have vanished except for moderate forces to hold down Germany.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² Document No. 4.

2. Meanwhile what is to happen about Russia? I have always worked for friendship with Russia, but like you, I feel deep anxiety because of their misinterpretation of the Yalta decisions,³ their attitude towards Poland, their overwhelming influence in the Balkans excepting Greece, the difficulties they make about Vienna, the combination of Russian power and the territories under their control or occupied, coupled with the Communist technique in so many other countries, and above all their power to maintain very large armies in the field for a long time. What will be the position in a year or two, when the British and American armies have melted and the French has not yet been formed on any major scale, when we may have a handful of divisions mostly French, and when Russia may choose to keep two or three hundred on active service?

3. An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind. There seems little doubt that the whole of the regions east of the line Lübeck-Trieste-Corfu will soon be completely in their hands. To this must be added the further enormous area conquered by the American armies between Eisenach and [the] Elbe, which will I suppose in a few weeks be occupied, when the Americans retreat, by the Russian power. All kinds of arrangements will have to be made by General Eisenhower to prevent another immense flight of the German population westward as this enormous Muscovite advance into the centre of Europe takes place. And then the curtain will descend again to a very large extent if not entirely. Thus a broad band of many hundreds of miles of Russian-occupied territory will isolate us from Poland.

4. Meanwhile the attention of our peoples will be occupied in inflicting severities upon Germany, which is ruined and prostrate, and it would be open to the Russians in a very short time to advance if they chose to the waters of the North Sea and the Atlantic.

5. Surely it is vital now to come to an understanding with Russia, or see where we are with her, before we weaken our armies mortally or retire to the zones of occupation. This can only be done by a personal meeting. I should be most grateful for your opinion and advice. Of course we may take the view that Russia will behave impeccably and no doubt that offers the most convenient solution. To sum up, this issue of a settlement with Russia before our strength has gone seems to me to dwarf all others.

PRIME ⁴

³ See vol. II, documents Nos. 1416 and 1417.

⁴ i. e., Prime Minister.

No. 7

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 13th May 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 46. Your number 36.²

1. F. D. R.³ promised me he would visit England before he went to France or, as it has now become, Germany. We should feel disappointed if you did not come to us. But having regard to the gravity of the next few months, no question of ceremonial should intervene with the organized sequence of events. Therefore I am for the conference of the three as soon as possible and wherever possible.

2. In this case I consider that we should try to bring the meeting off some time in June, and I hope your fiscal year will not delay it. We greatly hope you will come to England later.

3. I agree that our Ambassadors should do their utmost to induce Stalin to propose the meeting, and instructions will be given accordingly by us. I doubt very much whether he will accede. Time is on his side if he digs in while we melt away.

4. I look forward to your meeting with Eden[.]

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² Document No. 5.

³ i. e., Roosevelt.

No. 8

500.CC/5-1445

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State[Extracts¹]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Conference with the President, 2:30 p. m.

Participants: The President, Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. Attlee, Mr. John Balfour, and Admiral Leahy;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew

At the President's expressed wish, I attended the conference this afternoon between the President, Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. Attlee, Mr. John Balfour, and Admiral Leahy.

¹ For another extract from this memorandum of conversation, see Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945* (Boston, 1952), vol. II, p. 1480.

(2) *Polish problem, and Big-Three meeting.*

There was some discussion of the Polish problem but Mr. Eden felt that no solution of the problem could be expected until there could be a meeting between the President, the Prime Minister and Stalin, which the Prime Minister hoped could take place as early as possible. The President said that, having been brought unexpectedly in[to] this job, he had many difficulties to contend with and he could not leave Washington before the end of the fiscal year on June 30, especially as he would have to be in touch with the Congress with regard to the budget. He said that he hoped a meeting could be arranged as soon as possible thereafter, perhaps early in July.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

No. 9

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

[WASHINGTON,] 14 May 1945.

39. Your numbers 44 and 46.²

Thank you for your estimate of the future situation in Europe as outlined in your No. 44. From the present point of view it is impossible to make a conjecture as to what the Soviet may do when Germany is under the small forces of occupation and the great part of such armies as we can maintain are fighting in the Orient against Japan.

I am in full agreement with you that an early tripartite meeting is necessary to come to an understanding with Russia.

A report from our Embassies in Moscow seems necessary before we can approach a decision on the time or place for the meeting.

I have talked with Mr. Eden today³ and I shall make every practicable effort to so arrange my affairs here as to permit an early meeting somewhere.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Documents Nos. 6 and 7, respectively.

³ See document No. 8.

No. 10

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 15 May 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 50.

1. Your number 39² has just arrived. I agree with what you say. I will take a chance of getting a snub from Stalin by sending him a telegram urging a friendly tripartite meeting.³

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² Document No. 9.

³ Churchill had already had one rebuff from Stalin on the subject of a Heads-of-Government meeting: On March 21 he had concluded a message to Stalin with an expression of confidence that all the difficulties which had arisen since the Yalta Conference "would soon be swept away if only we could meet together", and Stalin, in his reply, had ignored this statement. See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 308. This official Soviet compilation of Churchill-Stalin correspondence contains no evidence of a further initiative on Churchill's part until May 26, when Churchill sent a message to Stalin suggesting that the question of the German fleet "should form part of the general discussions which ought to take place between us and President Truman at the earliest possible date". See document No. 141. By this time, however, Truman had sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow for conversations with Stalin, and on the evening of May 26 Hopkins raised the question of a Heads-of-Government meeting directly with Stalin. See document No. 24 and footnote 1 to document No. 35.

No. 11

740.00119 Control (Italy)/5-1545

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 15, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: The President, the Acting Secretary of State, Ambassador Harriman, and Mr. Bohlen.

THE ACTING SECRETARY then said there was another matter which he would ask Ambassador Harriman to explain in detail, namely, that we all felt in the Department of State that it was of the utmost importance that the Big Three meeting should take place as soon as possible and not be postponed until July.

¹ For another portion of this memorandum, see Grew, *Turbulent Era*, vol. II, p. 1482.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said that the problem of our relations with Russia is the number one problem affecting the future of the world and the fact was that at the present moment we were getting farther and farther apart. In addition to the general picture there were the specific and immediate questions such as the treatment of Germany on a tripartite basis, setting up of the Control Council, etc. on which no progress had been made with the Russians. There was, of course, the Polish question and many others. He said he felt that the establishment of a basis for future relations with Russia and the settlement of these immediate issues could only be done at a tripartite meeting, that the longer the meeting was delayed the worse the situation would get, and that while he assumed of course that we were not prepared to use our troops in Europe for political bargaining nevertheless if the meeting could take place before we were in a large measure out of Europe he felt the atmosphere of the meeting would be more favorable and the chances of success increased. He said he felt that Stalin was not getting accurate reports from Molotov or any of his people and as a result had grown deeply and unjustifiably suspicious as to our motives which he probably thought were designed to deprive him of the fruits of victory.

THE PRESIDENT said that he agreed with that and felt that a meeting as soon as possible was most desirable. He added that he agreed with what the Ambassador said but that his difficulty was that he had a number of pressing domestic questions particularly the preparation of a budget message before the end of the fiscal year which made it difficult for him to leave before then. AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said that he felt the President would be confronted with a much more difficult situation two months from now than he would if the meeting could be arranged within the next few weeks. THE PRESIDENT said that he did not favor a meeting in Germany since he thought this time that Stalin should come over to meet us and he had in mind Alaska as a possible meeting place, and he was not favorably inclined to a prior meeting with the British which would give the Russians the impression that we were "ganging up" on them. He asked Mr. Bohlen's opinion on these two points.

MR. BOHLEN replied that he felt that somewhere nearer Moscow whether it be Germany or somewhere else would be preferable since it was of great importance that Stalin be able to communicate quickly and securely with Moscow; otherwise there might be delay or at least greater difficulty in having any agreements reached stick once Stalin had returned to Moscow. He added that even at Yalta we all had felt that the Soviet failure to carry out the agreement reached there had been due in large part to opposition inside the Soviet Government which Stalin had encountered on his return. In regard to the second

point Mr. Bohlen said that he did not feel that the fear of an impression of "ganging up" was very dangerous since he believed that the Russians considered it in the logic of things that Great Britain and America would be very close together and that a prior meeting with the British on the way to the Big Three meeting or in any other manner that could be arranged might on the contrary have a salutary effect and make Stalin more reasonable.

THE ACTING SECRETARY then asked the President what he thought of Vienna as a meeting place. THE PRESIDENT did not appear to be unfavorably impressed with this idea and added that while these pressing domestic matters made it difficult for him, if the foreign situation really required he would of course be prepared to go very soon. He added that he had just had a message from the Prime Minister² saying that the latter had taken up with Stalin the question of a meeting. AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN asked then would the President consider having the meeting in the early part of June to which THE PRESIDENT replied that he would certainly consider it if the other two wanted it then.

THE PRESIDENT asked Ambassador Harriman when he was going back³ and said that he felt someone should be in Moscow who could talk to Stalin. THE AMBASSADOR said he would of course go back whenever the President wanted him to but that he thought he should have a clear idea of what he was to say to Stalin and also some definite information as to the time and place of meeting. He added furthermore that in connection with the Yalta agreement on the Far East⁴ as the President knew Mr. Grew had been having meetings with the Secretaries of War and Navy⁵ as to the Yalta agreement and other questions affecting the Soviet Union in the Far East. He added that there were two subjects which had been discussed only orally at Yalta which should be clarified, namely, the question of Chinese unity and the question of a trusteeship for Korea.⁶ THE PRESIDENT said that he thought provided the Ambassador was not delayed too long it would be wise for him to go back to Moscow with clarity on those subjects.

² Document No. 10.

³ To his post at Moscow.

⁴ Signed at Yalta, February 11, 1945. For text, see Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 498; 59 Stat. (2) 1823; *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 984.

⁵ Henry L. Stimson and James Forrestal, respectively. With reference to Grew's consultations with Stimson and Forrestal, see Grew, *Turbulent Era*, vol. II, pp. 1455-1459; "The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945" (Washington, Department of Defense, processed, 1955), pp. 68-71.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, pp. 770-771.

In conclusion THE PRESIDENT said that he would await word from Churchill as to Stalin's reply before we would decide definitely in regard to the meeting.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

No. 12

740.00119 Control (Italy)/5-1545

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract ¹]

[WASHINGTON,] May 15, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: . . . ; meeting of Big Three

Participants: Mr. Anthony Eden
 Mr. Balfour
 Ambassador Harriman
 Mr. William Phillips
 Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Grew

Reference was made to a recent communication from the President to Stalin [*Churchill*] ² with regard to the meeting of the Big Three and to the suggestion that Stalin might take the initiative in calling the Conference. Mr. Eden asked whether the President had any suggestion as to how Stalin might be induced to take the initiative. Mr. Harriman thought that this might readily be done by Clark Kerr if he should arrive in Moscow before him, Harriman, by turning the conversation in such a way as to reveal whether Stalin would in fact take the initiative. Discussion followed as to the best place for the meeting and it was decided that Berlin or Vienna, preferably the latter, would be the most suitable places. In any event the Soviets would insist that the meeting would take place in an area policed by the Soviet Army. Berlin and Vienna seemed suitable since by that time it was hoped that they would be under a tripartite military control. . . .

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

¹ For another extract from this memorandum of conversation, see Grew, *Turbulent Era*, vol. II, p. 1481.

² Presumably document No. 2 or document No. 5.

No. 13

811.4611/5-1645

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 16, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: M. Bidault's Visit to Washington

Secretary Stettinius requested me to convey to you the information contained in his telegram No. 6 of May 16, in which he states that the French Foreign Minister, M. Bidault, who is arriving in Washington tomorrow, expects to make a strong plea to you to have General de Gaulle included in the proposed meeting between Mr. Churchill, Marshal Stalin and yourself. A copy of the Secretary's above-mentioned telegram is enclosed.

When you receive M. Bidault, it is suggested that you might care to open the subject of de Gaulle by referring to the question which you were asked at the press conference yesterday; that is as to whether a meeting of the Big Five would take place at San Francisco and to your reply, which was interpreted by the correspondent as excluding de Gaulle from the forthcoming meeting. This might give you the opportunity of saying that you yourself would be very glad to have de Gaulle invited to the forthcoming meeting, which would then be a meeting of the Big Four, but that in as much as it had to be acted upon by common agreement, you would put the matter up to Mr. Churchill and Stalin.

JOSEPH C. GREW

[Enclosure¹]*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

SAN FRANCISCO, May 16, 1945.

6. To Grew[,] Acting Secretary [of] State, Washing[ton,] D. C. from Stettinius, UNCIO, San Francisco, California.

Please inform the President that M. Bidault, who left here 10:00 a. m. this morning for Washington, told me today he expects to make a strong plea to President Truman to include de Gaulle in proposed meeting of the President, Churchill and Stalin and said that France if included in such meetings could be helpful in European questions and might cause difficulties if excluded. Bidault left here well pleased with inclusion in big-power group and has been fully cooperative.

¹ Not attached to the file copy of Grew's memorandum; printed from the file copy of Stettinius' telegram (file No. 740.00119 EW/5-1645).

I feel we have been successful in measurably improving relations with the French during his stay here.

Please tell Bidault of my appreciation of his collaboration and my conviction that our two countries must work closely together in these difficult times ahead.

No. 14

711.51/5-1845

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 18, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: French Position

Participants: President Truman;
M. Bidault, French Foreign Minister;
Admiral William D. Leahy;
Acting Secretary Grew

At 12:15 I met Mr. Bidault and the French Ambassador¹ at the White House and introduced the French Foreign Minister to the President. Admiral Leahy was also present at the conference. The President welcomed Mr. Bidault and told him how he desired to strengthen the friendship between the United States and France which had commenced with the founding of our nation. The President also thanked Mr. Bidault for his cooperation and helpfulness in San Francisco and his gratification at the contribution of the French Delegation to the work of the Conference.²

Mr. Bidault expressed pleasure at the President's remarks and said that France had once been great and hoped for the support of the United States in enabling France to return to her former position. He said that Europe could not get along with Soviet Russia and Great Britain as the only two great European powers, and that a strong France was needed in the interests of all.

Mr. Bidault said that a good many European matters had been decided at meetings at which France had not been present and he hoped that she would be included in such meetings in future. The President said that there had been a good deal of talk about a forthcoming meeting of Stalin, the Prime Minister and himself but no such meeting had yet been arranged and none of the three heads of govern-

¹ Henri Bonnet.

² i. e., the United Nations Conference on International Organization.

ment had yet taken the initiative in arranging such a meeting. The President indicated that in the event of such a meeting the participation of France might be given consideration by the three heads of government.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

No. 15

811.4611/5-1945

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 19, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: M. Bidault's request for a further interview.

Although in his conversation with you on May 18¹ M. Bidault did not directly bring up the subject of General de Gaulle's attendance at a proposed meeting of the Big Three, it is extremely likely that he will when he next sees you. Even if he does not do so, I should like to suggest that you seriously consider the possibility of raising the question yourself.

As you know, this Government has in the past been held largely responsible by the French Government and people—and by large sections of the American people—for the absence of General de Gaulle from the Big Three meetings. I feel certain that this Government could take no single step which would be more appreciated by the French nation and which would do more to improve our relations with the French than for you to eliminate from their minds the impression that it is the United States which is preventing their return to a status of full equality with the major Allied powers.

To this end, it occurs to me, that you might reiterate to M. Bidault that there is no definite assurance as yet of a meeting between you, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin, and add that if this question is decided in the affirmative, you will be happy to express to them your entire willingness to have General de Gaulle participate.

JOSEPH C. GREW

¹ See document No. 14.

No. 16

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 21 May 1945

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret.
Number 53.

Your Number 44.²

2. I think there is a very good chance that if our deployment is formidable, a solution may be reached [with respect to Venezia Giulia] without fighting. Our firm attitude in this matter will I believe be of value in our discussions with Stalin. It seems to me that the need for our triple meeting at the earliest moment is very great. There will probably be a general election campaign here during June, but as all parties are agreed on foreign policy it need not make any postponement necessary. Could you give me any idea of the date and place which would be suitable, so that we can make our several requests to Stalin? I have a fear he may play for time in order to remain all powerful in Europe when our forces have melted.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² Not printed herein. See Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 249.

No. 17

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill*¹[Extract²]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 21 May 1945.

45. Your number 53. . . .³

I may, within the next two weeks, have more information bearing on a date and location for the proposed tripartite meeting if Stalin agrees to participate.

I hope he will agree to come west into Germany or further west, but I am advised that he is not likely to go beyond Soviet controlled territory.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² The portion of this message not printed here related to Venezia Giulia. See Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 250-251.

³ Document No. 16.

No. 18

740.00119 EW/5-2345 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

[Extract]

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

PARIS, May 23, 1945—11 p. m.

2913. Personal and top secret for the President from Harriman.

My daughter, Kathleen, and I dined last night alone with Mr. and Mrs. Churchill. He is greatly pleased with your decision to send Harry² with me.³ The resignation of his Govt today and the coming election in the first week of July are much in his mind. He is gravely concerned over the developments with Russia, feels that it is of the utmost importance to go through firmly with the situation in Venezia Giulia, but does not believe that the basic issues such as Poland can be settled until you and he meet with Stalin. He expressed the hope that this could be arranged as early as possible. He assured me that he would not take any position in regard to Russia which did not have your full support. He said further that he is ready to come and meet you anywhere at any time you are prepared to see him.

¹ Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Jefferson Caffery, American Ambassador to France.

² i. e., Harry Hopkins.

³ To confer with Stalin. See *post*, p. 21.

No. 19

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 24 May 1945.

2196. To the President from Winant.

This afternoon when I was talking with the Prime Minister he said he wanted me to let you know that the coming election here would in no way interfere with an early meeting with you and Marshal Stalin. He told me during our conversation that if arrangements could be made for a meeting by the middle of June or before July 5th he would probably take Attlee with him. He added that there were no differences between them insofar as international relations were concerned.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

THE HOPKINS MISSION TO MOSCOW

EDITOR'S NOTE.—In addition to the general review of Soviet-American relations and the review of special problems in the light of the forthcoming meeting of Heads of Government which are reflected in the papers printed in this section, the Hopkins–Stalin discussions dealt in detail with (a) the composition of the Polish delegation which would hold discussions in Moscow with the Polish Commission established at Yalta; (b) the arrest of certain Polish leaders by the Soviet authorities; (c) the admission to Poland of representatives of the American Red Cross to supervise the distribution of American relief goods; and (d) the voting procedure to be established for the Security Council of the United Nations. Since none of these subjects was discussed at the Berlin Conference, they are not treated fully here. For additional information on these subjects see Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, 1948), chapter XXXV.

Messages sent to and from Moscow during the course of the Hopkins–Stalin conversations which pertain specifically to arrangements and agenda for the forthcoming Berlin Conference are printed under the following headings: (a) Physical Arrangements and Appointment of Delegations, *post*, page 85; and (b) Preparation of the Agenda, *post*, page 156.

No. 20

Truman Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Marshal Stalin*¹

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 19 May 1945.

Personal and top secret from the President for Marshal Stalin, Number 267.

I am sure you are as aware as I am of the difficulty of dealing by exchange of messages with the complicated and important questions with which we are faced. Pending the possibility of our meeting I am therefore sending Mr. Harry Hopkins with Ambassador Harri-man to Moscow in order that they may have an opportunity of dis-

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. Paraphrase incorporated into note No. 266 of May 20 from George F. Kennan, American Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union, to Foreign Commissar Molotov for delivery to Stalin.

cussing personally with you these matters. Following these talks Mr. Hopkins will return immediately to Washington in order to report personally to me. They plan to arrive in Moscow about May 26. I would appreciate your letting me know if this time is convenient for you.

TRUMAN

No. 21

Truman Papers

*Marshal Stalin to President Truman*¹

[Translation]

Personal and secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to President H. S. Truman.

I have received your message² regarding the arrival of Mr. Hopkins and Ambassador Harriman in Moscow by May 26. I readily accept your proposal to meet Mr. Hopkins and Ambassador Harriman. The date—May 26, is quite convenient for me.

[Moscow,] May 20, 1945.

¹ Russian original, accompanied by this translation, transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington. For Russian text, see Переписка Председателя Совета Министров СССР с Президентами США и Премьер-Министрами Великобритании во Время Великой Отечественной Войны, 1941–1945 гг. (Moscow, State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1957; Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication), vol. II, p. 231. Russian texts of the other Stalin-Truman messages printed below in English translation are likewise to be found in Переписка, vol. II.

² Document No. 20.

No. 22

121.8 Hopkins, Harry/5-2145

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

Subject: Mr. Hopkins' trip to Moscow

Participants: Secretary Stettinius;

Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew

I telephoned the Secretary¹ this afternoon to let him know that Mr. Harry Hopkins is going to Moscow with Ambassador Harriman, and I said that we wanted to keep that fact quiet until Mr. Hopkins

¹ Stettinius was at San Francisco attending the United Nations Conference on International Organization.

arrived in Moscow. The Secretary inquired whether they were leaving together and I replied that the Ambassador is leaving today and Mr. Hopkins is going in a couple of days with Mr. Bohlen. I said that Ambassador Harriman had wanted to clear it with the Secretary but it had come to a head very quickly. I added that I thought such a visit would be very helpful since Mr. Hopkins seemed to have Stalin's confidence. I stated that the President had approved the visit; he had tried to reach the Secretary on the telephone to discuss this matter but had not been able to get to him. The President had therefore asked me to inform the Secretary. Mr. Stettinius said that he thought it was an excellent arrangement and definitely the right thing to do. He inquired how long Mr. Hopkins expected to stay and I replied that he would remain only a short time. The Secretary asked whether Mr. Hopkins would discuss the entire situation with Stalin, and I replied that he would. The Secretary then asked whether there had been any reply from Stalin with regard to the Big Three meeting and I said that there had not been, adding that the President seems to feel that he can't attend such a meeting until after the end of the fiscal year.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

No. 23

Truman Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Marshal Stalin*¹

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 22 May 1945.

Number 271, personal and top secret, from the President to Marshal Stalin.

I was most pleased to receive your wire² in regard to Mr. Hopkins' visit. I feel that it is wiser that I make an announcement of his proposed visit to Moscow following his departure from the United States rather than risk having it leak out and become the subject of speculation in the press. Mr. Hopkins plans to leave tomorrow morning, May 23, and later in the day I propose to announce to the press that he is proceeding to Moscow with Ambassador Harriman

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² Document No. 21.

to talk over with you matters now in discussion between the Soviet and United States Governments.³

TRUMAN

³ The White House issued the following press release on May 23 (reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. xii, p. 953):

"The President has requested Harry Hopkins and Joseph E. Davies to undertake special missions for him.

"Mr. Hopkins will proceed in company with Ambassador Averell Harriman to Moscow to converse with Marshal Stalin upon matters now in discussion between the Soviet Government and the Government of the United States.

"Mr. Davies will go directly to London to discuss with Prime Minister Churchill and other members of the British Government certain matters of common interest to the United States and Great Britain arising out of the war. . . ."

With respect to the purpose of the Hopkins and Davies missions, see also Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 110, 257-259.

No. 24

740.00119 (Potsdam)/6-645

Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen)

TOP SECRET

[Moscow,] May 26, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF 1ST CONVERSATION AT THE KREMLIN, 8 PM MAY 26

Present: Mr. Hopkins, Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Bohlen
Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Pavlov

Subjects: President Roosevelt's death
Soviet-American relations
Meeting of Heads of State
Germany
Far East
Poles
Hitler

After an exchange of amenities during which Marshal Stalin expressed his great pleasure on seeing Mr. Hopkins again, there was a brief conversation concerning Mr. Hopkins's flight in over Germany.

MR. HOPKINS asked Mr. Molotov if he had recovered from the battle of San Francisco.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he did not recall any battle but merely arguments at San Francisco.

MR. HOPKINS then said before he told Marshal Stalin the reason why President Truman had asked him to come to Moscow, he thought the Marshal would be interested in a brief description of President Roosevelt's state of mind just prior to his death. He said that on the way back from Yalta it had been clear to him that President Roosevelt was very tired and that his energy was on the decline.

On the other hand, on the morning of his death he had done a good deal of work and had written a number of important letters relating to domestic and foreign policies. None of his doctors had expected that he would have a stroke. In fact his principal doctor, Admiral McIntire, had not even been at Warm Springs. The President never regained consciousness after his stroke and had died without any suffering whatsoever. Many of those who had been closest to him had felt that his quick, easy death was really preferable to his lingering on as a hopeless invalid. Mr. Hopkins said that the President had died fully confident of the victory which was in sight.

MARSHAL STALIN observed that Lenin had also died of a cerebral hemorrhage following a previous stroke which had left his hand paralyzed.

MR. HOPKINS said that on the trip home from Yalta the President had frequently reviewed with him the results of the Crimea Conference and that he had come away from that Conference with renewed confidence that the United States and the Soviet Union could work together in peace as they had in war. President Roosevelt on the trip home had frequently spoken of the respect and admiration he had for Marshal Stalin and he was looking forward to their next meeting which the President hoped would be in Berlin.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that he recalled the toast at the Crimea Conference to their next meeting in Berlin.¹

MR. HOPKINS said that he recalled his first meeting with the Marshal in July, 1941, during the troubled and anxious days of the German offensive. He said he remembered vividly the frankness with which Marshal Stalin had told him of the Soviet position and of the unalterable determination of the Soviet Union to wage war against Germany until final victory was assured. He had returned to the United States and conveyed to President Roosevelt his own conviction that the Soviet Union would hold fast and President Roosevelt had thereupon initiated the program of assistance to the Soviet Union. At that time most people believed that a German victory was inevitable but President Roosevelt, in spite of all such opinions had decided otherwise and through his leadership he had put through a program of aid to Russia.

MARSHAL STALIN observed that at that time there had been many doubts of the ability of the Soviet Union to keep going.

MR. HOPKINS said that although in 1941 the United States was not in the war, President Roosevelt had already decided that Hitler was just as much an enemy of the United States as he was of Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

¹ No record of the toast referred to has been found.

MR. HOPKINS then said that a few days ago President Truman had sent for him and had asked him to come to Moscow to have a talk with Marshal Stalin. There were a number of things that he and Mr. Harriman hoped to discuss with Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov while he was in Moscow, but before going into those specific questions he wished to tell the Marshal of the real reason why the President had asked him to come, and that was the question of the fundamental relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Two months ago there had been overwhelming sympathy among the American people for the Soviet Union and complete support for President Roosevelt's policies which the Marshal knew so well. This sympathy and support came primarily because of the brilliant achievements of the Soviet Union in the war and partly from President Roosevelt's leadership and the magnificent way in which our two countries had worked together to bring about the defeat of Germany. The American people at that time hoped and confidently believed that the two countries could work together in peace as well as they had in war. Mr. Hopkins said there had always been a small minority, the Hearsts and the McCormicks, who had been against the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union. These men had also been bitter political enemies of President Roosevelt but had never had any backing from the American people as was shown by the fact that against their bitter opposition President Roosevelt had been four times elected President. He said he did not intend to discuss this small minority but to discuss the general state of American opinion and particularly the present attitude of the millions of Americans who had supported President Roosevelt's policy in regard to the Soviet Union and who believed that despite different political and economic ideology of the two countries, the United States and the Soviet Union could work together after the war in order to bring about a secure peace for humanity. He said he wished to assure the Marshal with all the earnestness at his command that this body of American public opinion who had been the constant support of the Roosevelt policies were seriously disturbed about their relations with Russia. In fact, in the last six weeks deterioration of public opinion had been so serious as to affect adversely the relations between our two countries. He said he wished to emphasize that this change had occurred in the very people who had supported to the hilt Roosevelt's policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union. He said that for the moment he was not going into the reasons why this had occurred, or the merits of the case, but merely wished to emphasize that it was a fact. The friends of Roosevelt's policy and of the Soviet Union were alarmed and worried at the present trend of events and did not quite understand why, but it was obvious to them that if

present trends continued unchecked the entire structure of world cooperation and relations with the Soviet Union which President Roosevelt and the Marshal had labored so hard to build would be destroyed. Prior to his departure President Truman had expressed to him his great anxiety at the present situation and also his desire to continue President Roosevelt's policy of working with the Soviet Union and his intention to carry out in fact as well as in spirit all the arrangements, both formal and informal which President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin had worked out together. Mr. Hopkins added that as the Marshal knew he had not been well and he would not be in Moscow unless he had felt the situation was serious. He also said he would not have come had he not believed that the present trend could be halted and a common basis found to go forward in the future.

MR. HOPKINS said that it was not simple or easy to put a finger on the precise reasons for this deterioration but he must emphasize that without the support of public opinion and particularly of the supporters of President Roosevelt it would be very difficult for President Truman to carry forward President Roosevelt's policy. He said that, as the Marshal was aware, the cardinal basis of President Roosevelt's policy which the American people had fully supported had been the concept that the interests of the United States were world wide and not confined to North and South America and the Pacific Ocean and it was this concept that had led to the many conferences concerning the peace of the world which President Roosevelt had had with Marshal Stalin. President Roosevelt had believed that the Soviet Union had likewise world-wide interests and that the two countries could work out together any political or economic considerations at issue between them. After the Yalta Conference it looked as though we were well on the way to reaching a basic understanding on all questions of foreign affairs of interest to our respective countries, in regard to the treatment of Germany; Japan and the question of setting up a world security organization, to say nothing of the long term interests between the United States and the U. S. S. R. He said in a country like ours public opinion is affected by specific incidents and in this case the deterioration in public opinion in regard to our relations with the Soviet Union had been centered in our inability to carry into effect the Yalta Agreement on Poland.² There were also a train of events, each unimportant in themselves, which had grown up around the Polish question, which contributed to the deterioration in public opinion. President Truman feels, and so does the American public, although they are not familiar with all the details, a sense of bewilderment at our inability to solve the Polish question.

² See vol. II, document No. 1417, section VI.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the reason for the failure on the Polish question was that the Soviet Union desired to have a friendly Poland, but that Great Britain wanted to revive the system of *cordon sanitaire* on the Soviet borders.

MR. HOPKINS replied that neither the Government nor the people of the United States had any such intention.

MARSHAL STALIN replied he was speaking only of England and said that the British conservatives did not desire to see a Poland friendly to the Soviet Union.

MR. HOPKINS stated that the United States would desire a Poland friendly to the Soviet Union and in fact desired to see friendly countries all along the Soviet borders.

MARSHAL STALIN replied if that be so we can easily come to terms in regard to Poland.

MR. HOPKINS said that during his visit here there were a number of specific questions that he and Mr. Harriman hoped to discuss with Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov but that the general statement he had just made concerning public opinion in the United States was the principal reason for his coming and the principal cause of anxiety at the present time. He said he had wished to state frankly and as forcibly as he knew how to Marshal Stalin the importance that he, personally, attached to the present trend of events and that he felt that the situation would get rapidly worse unless we could clear up the Polish matter. He had therefore been glad to hear the Marshal say that he thought the question could be settled.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that in his opinion it was best to settle it but not if the British conservatives attempted to revive the *cordon sanitaire*.

MR. HOPKINS said that he had in mind the other following questions to discuss with Marshal Stalin while he was in Moscow: (1) The desire of President Truman to meet Marshal Stalin in order to discuss all of the problems arising out of the end of war in Europe and the time and place of such a meeting.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he had already replied to President Truman concerning the place of meeting and he had suggested the region of Berlin.³

MR. HOPKINS said that that message must have come in after he had left and MARSHAL STALIN instructed Mr. Molotov to give a copy to Mr. Hopkins and Ambassador Harriman.

MR. HOPKINS said the second question he desired to discuss was the setting up of the Control Council for Germany. General Eisenhower had already been appointed the American Representative on the Control Council and he hoped that at an early date the Soviet Repre-

³ Cf. *post*, pp. 31, 85.

sentative would be named so that the Council could meet and get to work.

MARSHAL STALIN apparently had not heard of the appointment of General Eisenhower and stated that Marshal Zhukov would be appointed the Soviet Representative on the Control Council for Germany. He implied that this appointment would be announced shortly.

MR. HOPKINS said the third question he wished to discuss was that of the Pacific War and the future relations of the United States and Soviet Union to China. He said that although he realized the answer would depend on a good many considerations it would be most useful to the American military authorities if he could take back some idea of the approximate date of the entry of the Soviet Union into the war in the Pacific.

MARSHAL STALIN said he would discuss that question with his advisors and let Mr. Hopkins know.

MR. HOPKINS concluded that there was of course the Polish question which he hoped to discuss here. He added that if Marshal Stalin for his part had any political questions concerning the United States which were worrying him he would of course be glad to discuss them.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that they had in fact several disturbing questions on their minds in regard to the United States. He added that he was very glad that the President had sent Mr. Hopkins to Moscow and thus give[n] him this opportunity to explore all these questions.

MR. HOPKINS stated that he would certainly not have gotten out of bed to come to Moscow had he not believed that the future well-being of hundreds of million[s] of people depended on the relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union, nor would he have come had he not believed that any difficulties could be reconciled.

MARSHAL STALIN said he hoped that Mr. Hopkins's views would prove to be right.

MR. HOPKINS said he would stay here as long as it was necessary to accomplish what could be accomplished, although naturally he did not wish to be away too long.

MARSHAL STALIN said he was entirely at Mr. Hopkins's service and now that war in Europe was over he had more time at his disposal than he had, for example, a year ago.

MR. HOPKINS said he hoped the Russians would find the body of Hitler.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that in his opinion Hitler was not dead but hiding somewhere. He said the Soviet doctors thought they had identified the body of Goebbels and Hitler's chauffeur,⁴ but that

⁴ Erich Kempka.

he, personally, even doubted if Goebbels was dead and said the whole matter was strange and the various talks of funerals and burials struck him as being very dubious. He said he thought that Bormann, Goebbels, Hitler and probably Krebs had escaped and were in hiding.

MR. HOPKINS said that he knew the Germans had several very large submarines but that no trace of these had been found. He said he hoped we would track Hitler down wherever he might be.

MARSHAL STALIN said he also knew of those submarines which had been running back and forth between Germany and Japan, taking gold and negotiable assets from Germany to Japan. He added that this had been done with the connivance of Switzerland. He said he had ordered his intelligence service to look into the matter of these submarines but so far they had failed to discover any trace and therefore he thought it was possible that Hitler and company had gone in them to Japan.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN then said he wished to observe that President Truman in selecting Mr. Hopkins had chosen a man who, as the Marshal knew, had not only been very close to President Roosevelt but personally was one of the leading proponents of the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union. President Truman had sent him to have the kind of frank talk with Marshal Stalin that we all knew Marshal Stalin liked to have. Ambassador Harriman continued that we had, as Marshal Stalin knew, very intimate relations with Great Britain which had been developed since the American Revolution and that the Soviet Union of course had their special relations with Great Britain and that although President Roosevelt had always felt that the three powers had a special responsibility, nevertheless it was obviously desirable that the United States and the Soviet Union should talk alone on matters of special interest to them and that that was also one of the reasons for Mr. Hopkins's visit.

MARSHAL STALIN said he thought the Ambassador's remarks were correct and very much to the point.

MR. HOPKINS then said that at San Francisco Mr. Molotov had scored a neat trick on us by quoting President Roosevelt and Mr. Hull on the Argentine question.⁵

MARSHAL STALIN and MR. MOLOTOV laughed and MR. HOPKINS observed that it was possible that some time in the future we might be quoting Marshal Stalin's own words to him.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that there was one question he wished to raise and that was the question of a peace conference to settle the European War. He said the question was ripe and, so to speak, knocking at the door.

⁵ See *The United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California, April 25 to June 26, 1945: Selected Documents* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946; Department of State publication No. 2490), p. 317.

MR. HOPKINS replied that he thought the forthcoming meeting between the President, Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister would be a preliminary step toward such a conference. He said he knew in general President Truman's views on the subject and would be glad while he was in Moscow to convey them to Marshal Stalin along general lines.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he felt the uncertainty as to the peace conference was having a bad effect and that it would be wise to select a time and place so that proper preparations could be made. The Versailles Conference had been badly prepared and as a result many mistakes had been made. He repeated that he had already sent a message to President Truman suggesting Berlin as a place for their preliminary meeting.

(In a message ⁶ received subsequently from Mr. Molotov it was explained that the reference to Berlin as a suggested place of meeting had not been in a message to President Truman but in a reply from Mr. Molotov to Mr. Joseph Davies concerning a meeting between Marshal Stalin and the President alone ⁷).

⁶ Document No. 35.

⁷ The correspondence between Davies and Molotov has not been found.

No. 25

740.00119 (Potsdam)/6-645

Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen)

TOP SECRET

[Moscow,] May 27, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF 2ND CONVERSATION AT THE KREMLIN, 8 PM MAY 27

Present: Mr. Hopkins, Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Bohlen
Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Pavlov

Subjects: Subjects about which Stalin expressed concern:

Invitation of Argentina to San Francisco

Reparation Commission

The Polish question

Curtailement of Lend Lease

Disposition of German Navy and Merchant Ships
Poland

MR. HOPKINS said that last night the Marshal had indicated that there were a number of questions concerning the United States which were worrying him. He asked Marshal Stalin if he would perhaps care to begin with these questions.

MARSHAL STALIN said he would not attempt to use Soviet public opinion as a screen but would speak of the feeling that had been created in Soviet governmental circles as a result of recent moves on the part of the United States Government. He said these circles felt a certain alarm in regard to the attitude of the United States Government. It was their impression that the American attitude towards the Soviet Union had perceptibly cooled once it became obvious that Germany was defeated, and that it was as though the Americans were saying that the Russians were no longer needed. He said he would give the following examples:

(1) The case of Argentina and the invitation to the San Francisco Conference. At Yalta it had been agreed that only those states which had declared war on Germany before the first of March would be invited¹ but at San Francisco this decision had been overturned.² He said it was not understood in the Soviet Union why Argentina could not have been asked to wait three months or so before joining the world organization. He added that the action of the Conference and the attitude of the United States had raised the question of the value of agreements between the three major powers if their decisions could be overturned by the votes of such countries as Honduras and Porto Rico.

(2) The question of the Reparations Commission. At Yalta it had been agreed that the three powers would sit on this Commission in Moscow³ and subsequently the United States Government had insisted that France should be represented on the same basis as the Soviet Union. This he felt was an insult to the Soviet Union in view of the fact that France had concluded a separate peace with Germany and had opened the frontier to the Germans. It was true that this had been done by Pétain's Government but nevertheless it was an action of France. To attempt to place France on the same footing as the Soviet Union looked like an attempt to humiliate the Russians.

(3) The attitude of the United States Government towards the Polish question. He said that at Yalta it had been agreed that the existing government was to be reconstructed⁴ and that anyone with common sense could see that this meant that the present government was to form the basis of the new. He said no other understanding of the Yalta Agreement was possible. Despite the fact that they were simple people the Russians should not be regarded as fools, which was a mistake the West frequently made, nor were they blind and could quite well see what was going on before their eyes. It is true that the Russians are patient in the interests of a common cause but that their patience has its limits.

(4) The manner in which Lend Lease had been curtailed.⁵ He said that if the United States was unable to supply the Soviet Union

¹ See vol. II, document No. 1416, section I.

² See *The United Nations Conference on International Organization: Selected Documents*, pp. 317-325, 405-406, 409-410.

³ See vol. II, document No. 1416, section V.

⁴ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section VI.

⁵ See Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 228.

further under Lend Lease that was one thing but that the manner in which it had been done had been unfortunate and even brutal. For example, certain ships had been unloaded and while it was true that this order had been cancelled the whole manner in which it had been done had caused concern to the Soviet Government. If the refusal to continue Lend Lease was designed as pressure on the Russians in order to soften them up then it was a fundamental mistake. He said he must tell Mr. Hopkins frankly that [if] the Russians were approached frankly on a friendly basis much could be done but that reprisals in any form would bring about the exact opposite effect.

(5) The disposition of the German Navy and merchant fleet which surrendered to the Allies. Stalin said that as we knew certain units of the German Army who had been fighting against the Russians had been anxious to surrender to the western allies but not to the Russians, but under the surrender terms German troops were supposed to surrender to the army against which they had fought. He said, for example General Eisenhower as an honest man had correctly turned over to the Soviet Command in Czechoslovakia some 135,000 German troops who had tried to surrender to the American Army. This was an example of fair and honest behavior. However, as regards to the German fleet which had caused so much damage to Leningrad and other Soviet ports not one had been turned over to the Russians despite the fact the fleet had surrendered. He added that he had sent a message to the President and Prime Minister suggesting that at least one-third of the German Navy and merchant marine thus surrendered be turned over to the Soviet Union.⁶ The rest could be disposed of by Great Britain and the United States as they saw fit. He added that if the Soviet Union had been entitled to a part of the Italian fleet they certainly had more right to their fair share of the German fleet, since they had suffered five million casualties in this war. He said that the Soviet Government had certain information leading it to believe that both the United States and England intended to reject the Soviet request and he must say that if this turned out to be true it would be very unpleasant. The Marshal concluded by saying that he had completed the range of his account.

MR. HOPKINS said he first of all wished to express his appreciation of the frankness with which Marshal Stalin had exposed his worries. He said that insofar as he and Ambassador Harriman were able they would answer equally frankly and if on certain points they did not have full information they would endeavor to obtain it. He said he would take the case of the German fleet first. From conversations he had had with Admiral King he was able to state that the United States had no desire to retain any portion of the German fleet and merely wished to examine the vessels for possible new inventions or technical improvements. After that we were prepared to sink the share turned over to us. He also said that he had always understood

⁶ See document No. 386, footnote 2.

that the fleet was to be divided between the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain and that insofar as the United States was concerned there was no objection to whatever disposition the Soviet Government wished to make with its share. He added that he thought that this matter could be definitely settled at the forthcoming meeting of the three heads of Government.

MR. HOPKINS then said on the subject of Lend Lease he thought it had been clear to the Soviet Union that the end of the war with Germany would necessitate a reconsideration of the old program of Lend Lease to the Soviet Union.

MARSHAL STALIN said that was entirely understandable.

MR. HOPKINS continued that the history of Lend Lease showed that although in certain cases we had not always been able to meet every Soviet request we had nonetheless freely accepted commitments which we had done our best to carry out in spirit as well as in fact.

MARSHAL STALIN said that was undoubtedly true.

MR. HOPKINS stated that even prior to the end of the war in Europe we had made an agreement with the Soviet Union known as Annex 3 to Protocol I [IV],⁷ which involved delivery of supplies which might be of use in the Far East. He said that this grew out of recent conferences in which Far Eastern matters had been discussed. He emphasized that this commitment was accepted in full by the United States and we were in the process of carrying it out. In regard to the unloading of the ships he said that that was a technical misunderstanding and did not in any sense represent a decision of policy on the part of the United States. That it had been the action of one government agency involved in Lend Lease and that it had been countermanded promptly within twenty-four hours. He said that no one who was responsible for Lend Lease policy or American Government policy had had anything to do with that mistaken order. The only question which had to be reconsidered was the program of deliveries to the Soviet Union which had been based on the needs of the war against Germany and that it had been made clear that on the basis of this reconsideration we would be glad to reconsider any Soviet requests and that he thought some were now being considered. He said he wished to emphasize that he had seen no tendency on the part of those responsible for American policy to handle the question of future Lend Lease to the Soviet Union in an arbitrary fashion. It was in fact a question of law, since the basic Lend Lease Act⁸ made it

⁷ The reference is to the so-called "Fourth Protocol" concerning lend-lease between the Soviet Union and the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, signed April 17, 1945. Text in *Wartime International Agreements: Soviet Supply Protocols* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947; Department of State publication No. 2759), p. 89. For the text of annex III to the Fourth Protocol, see *ibid.*, p. 141.

⁸ Approved March 11, 1941 (55 Stat. 31).

clear that materials could only be delivered which would be useful in the process of the war. The United States Government, however, had interpreted this in its broadest sense and had included in addition to munitions of war foodstuffs and other non-military items.

MARSHAL STALIN said this was true.

MR. HOPKINS concluded by saying that there had naturally been considerable confusion in the United States Government as to the status of Lend Lease towards Russia at the end of the war and that there had been varying legal interpretations but that he wished to emphasize that the incident to which Marshal Stalin referred did not have any fundamental policy significance.

MARSHAL STALIN said he wished to make it clear that he fully understood the right of the United States to curtail Lend Lease shipments to the Soviet Union under present conditions since our commitments in this respect had been freely entered into. Even two months ago it would have been quite correct for the United States to have begun to curtail shipments but what he had in mind was the manner and form in which it was done. He felt that what was after all an agreement between the two Governments had been ended in a scornful and abrupt manner. He said that if proper warning had been given to the Soviet Government there would have been no feeling of the kind he had spoken of; that this warning was important to them since their economy was based on plans. He added that they had intended to make a suitable expression of gratitude to the United States for the Lend Lease assistance during the war but the way in which this program had been halted now made that impossible to do.

MR. HOPKINS replied that what disturbed him most about the Marshal's statement was the revelation that he believed that the United States would use Lend Lease as a means of showing our displeasure with the Soviet Union. He wished to assure the Marshal that however unfortunate an impression this question had caused in the mind of the Soviet Government he must believe that there was no attempt or desire on the part of the United States to use it as a pressure weapon. He said the United States is a strong power and does not go in for those methods. Furthermore, we have no conflict of immediate interests with the Soviet Union and would have no reason to adopt such practices.

MARSHAL STALIN said he believed Mr. Hopkins and was fully satisfied with his statement in regard to Lend Lease but said he hoped Mr. Hopkins would consider how it had looked from their side.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN then suggested that he and Mr. Molotov might go into the details of the whole Lend Lease matter together with Mr. Mikoyan the following day.

MR. HOPKINS concluded the discussions of Lend Lease by stating that he thought it would be a great tragedy if the greatest achievement

in cooperation which the Soviet Union and the United States had on the whole worked out together on the basis of Lend Lease were to end on an unsatisfactory note. He said he wished to add that we had never believed that our Lend Lease help had been the chief factor in the Soviet defeat of Hitler on the eastern front. That this had been done by the heroism and blood of the Russian Army.

MR. HOPKINS then turned to the question of the Reparations Commission. He said it was true that we had suggested France as an additional member and that the Soviet Government had indicated that if France was to be a member there were other countries with equal or better claims to be represented. He said that he had not been directly involved in this question since the Yalta Conference because of his illness but so far as he knew our only motive was that France was to be represented on the Control Council for Germany and it therefore appeared reasonable and logical that she should participate in the reparations discussions. He said he realized that the Soviet Union had reluctantly agreed to the participation of France in the Control Council at the Crimea Conference. In any event the situation now was that the three powers were to go ahead and begin discussions in Moscow without France. He wished to state that he also had in mind the doubts which Stalin and Molotov had in regard to the subject of reparations and how seriously they regarded this question. He wished only to say that the United States for its part considered reparations a most important and serious question which must be thrashed out in the Reparations Commission. He said he did not of course know, but he felt that we would probably not insist in an unyielding manner on the question of the admission of France.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Poland, which had suffered even more than France should certainly be represented if France was to be, and that Yugoslavia also deserved a place.

MR. HOPKINS then said in regard to the Argentine question, since he had not been at San Francisco he would ask Ambassador Harriman to explain that situation. He added that he had been at Yalta and he must say that the Marshal was right in regard to the decision there.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said that he hoped that he could speak frankly on the subject of the Argentine and that Mr. Molotov would forgive him if he spoke in that fashion. He said he had not been at Mexico City⁹ and therefore was not familiar with all of the implications of certain commitments taken there. In brief, however, the situation was that we came to San Francisco with a commitment

⁹ At the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, February 21-March 8, 1945.

which President Roosevelt assumed at Yalta to support the admission of the Ukraine and White Russia as original members of the world organization¹⁰ and also with certain commitments with the South American countries in regard to Argentina.¹¹ At San Francisco, at Mr. Molotov's request, Mr. Stettinius had taken up with the Latin American countries the question of their willingness to support the Crimea Decision in regard to the Ukraine and White Russia. The Latin American countries had immediately tried to connect this question with that of the admission of the Argentine. Mr. Stettinius had made it plain that he would not make any such connection and if Mr. Molotov recalled the Latin American countries had voted solidly in support of the Yalta decision. There was, however, another step to the Ukraine and White Russia question, namely that of inviting them to the Conference, concerning which the United States had taken no commitment at Yalta. Mr. Harri- man said that he, personally, felt that if Mr. Molotov had not introduced the question of an invitation to the present Polish Government¹² we might have been successful in persuading the Latin American countries to postpone the question of Argentina, but that once Mr. Molotov had connected the question of Argentina with that of an invitation to the present Polish Government, Mr. Stettinius felt that because of the willingness of the South American countries to support the Crimea Decision and the invitation to the Ukraine and White Russia, he was committed to vote for the admission of Argentina.

MR. MOLOTOV said that his request for more time had not been granted.

MARSHAL STALIN said in any event what had been done could not be put right and that the Argentine question belonged to the past.

MR. HOPKINS then said with the Marshal's permission he would like to review the position of the United States in regard to Poland. He said first of all he wished to assure the Marshal that he had no thought or indeed any right to attempt to settle the Polish problem during his visit here in Moscow, nor was he intending to hide behind American public opinion in presenting the position of the United States.

MARSHAL STALIN said he was afraid that his remark concerning Soviet public opinion had cut Mr. Hopkins to the quick and that he had not meant to imply that Mr. Hopkins was hiding behind the screen of American public opinion. In fact he knew Mr. Hopkins to be an honest and frank man.

¹⁰ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 966.

¹¹ See *The United Nations Conference on International Organization: Selected Documents*, p. 405.

¹² See *ibid.*, p. 318.

MR. HOPKINS said that he wished to state this position as clearly and as forcibly as he knew how. He said the question of Poland per se was not so important as the fact that it had become a symbol of our ability to work out problems with the Soviet Union. He said that we had no special interests in Poland and no special desire to see any particular kind of government. That we would accept any government in Poland which was desired by the Polish people and was at the same time friendly to the Soviet Government. He said that the people and Government of the United States felt that this was a problem which should be worked out jointly between the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain and that we felt that the Polish people should be given the right to free elections to choose their own government and their own system and that Poland should genuinely be independent. The Government and people of the United States were disturbed because the preliminary steps towards the reestablishment of Poland appeared to have been taken unilaterally by the Soviet Union together with the present Warsaw Government and that in fact the United States was completely excluded. He said he hoped that Stalin would believe him when he said that this feeling was a fact. Mr. Hopkins said he urged that Marshal Stalin would judge American policy by the actions of the United States Government itself and not by the attitudes and public expressions of the Hearst newspapers and the *Chicago Tribune*. He hoped that the Marshal would put his mind to the task of thinking up what diplomatic methods could be used to settle this question, keeping in mind the feeling of the American people. He said he himself was not prepared to say how it could be done but that he felt it must be done. Poland had become a symbol in the sense that it bore a direct relation to the willingness of the United States to participate in international affairs on a world-wide basis and that our people must believe that they are joining their power with that of the Soviet Union and Great Britain in the promotion of international peace and the well being of humanity. Mr. Hopkins went on to say that he felt the overwhelming majority of the people of the United States felt that the relations between the United States and the USSR could be worked out in a spirit of cooperation despite the differences in ideology and that with all these factors in its favor he wished to appeal to the Marshal to help find a way to the solution of the Polish problem.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he wished Mr. Hopkins would take into consideration the following factors: He said it may seem strange although it appeared to be recognized in United States circles and Churchill in his speeches also recognized it, that the Soviet Government should wish for a friendly Poland. In the course of twenty-five

years the Germans had twice invaded Russia via Poland. Neither the British nor American people had experienced such German invasions which were a horrible thing to endure and the results of which were not easily forgotten. He said these German invasions were not warfare but were like the incursions of the Huns. He said that Germany had been able to do this because Poland had been regarded as a part of the *cordon sanitaire* around the Soviet Union and that previous European policy had been that Polish Governments must be hostile to Russia. In these circumstances either Poland had been too weak to oppose Germany or had let the Germans come through. Thus Poland had served as a corridor for the German attacks on Russia. He said Poland's weakness and hostility had been a great source of weakness to the Soviet Union and had permitted the Germans to do what they wished in the East and also in the West since the two were mixed together. It is therefore in Russia's vital interest that Poland should be both strong and friendly. He said there was no intention on the part of the Soviet Union to interfere in Poland's internal affairs, that Poland would live under the parliamentary system which is like Czechoslovakia, Belgium and Holland and that any talk of an intention to Sovietize Poland was stupid. He said even the Polish leaders, some of whom were communists, were against the Soviet system since the Polish people did not desire collective farms or other aspects of the Soviet system. In this the Polish leaders were right since the Soviet system was not exportable—it must develop from within on the basis of a set of conditions which were not present in Poland. He said all the Soviet Union wanted was that Poland should not be in a position to open the gates to Germany and in order to prevent this Poland must be strong and democratic. Stalin then said that before he came to his suggestion as to the practical solution of the question he would like to comment on Mr. Hopkins's remarks concerning future United States interests in the world. He said that whether the United States wished it or not it was a world power and would have to accept world-wide interests. Not only this war but the previous war had shown that without United States intervention Germany could not have been defeated and that all the events and developments of the last thirty years had confirmed this. In fact the United States had more reason to be a world power than any other state. For this reason he fully recognized the right of the United States as a world power to participate in the Polish question and that the Soviet interest in Poland does not in any way exclude those of England and the United States. Mr. Hopkins had spoken of Russian unilateral action in Poland and United States public opinion concerning it. It was true that Russia had taken such unilateral action but they had been compelled to. He said the Soviet

Government had recognized the Warsaw Government and concluded a treaty¹³ with it at a time when their Allies did not recognize this government. These were admittedly unilateral acts which would have been much better left undone but the fact was they had not met with any understanding on the part of their Allies. The need for these actions had arisen out of the presence of Soviet troops in Poland and it would have been impossible to have waited until such time as the Allies had come to an agreement on Poland. The logic of the war against Germany demanded that the Soviet rear be assured and the Lublin Committee had been of great assistance to the Red Army at all times and it was for this reason that these actions had been taken by the Soviet Government. He said it was contrary to the Soviet policy to set up [a] Soviet administration on foreign soil since this would look like occupation and be resented by the local inhabitants. It was for this reason that some Polish administration had to be established in Poland and this could be done only with those who had helped the Red Army. He said he wished to emphasize that these steps had not been taken with any desire to eliminate or exclude Russia's Allies. He must point out however that Soviet action in Poland had been more successful than British action in Greece and at no time had they been compelled to undertake the measures which they had done in Greece. Stalin then turned to his suggestion for the solution of the Polish problem.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he felt that we should examine the composition of the future Government of National Unity. He said there were eighteen or twenty ministries in the present Polish Government and that four or five of these portfolios could be given representatives of other Polish groups taken from the list submitted by Great Britain and the United States (Molotov whispered to Stalin who then said he meant four and not five posts in the government). He said he thought the Warsaw Poles would not accept more than four ministers from other democratic groups. He added that if this appears a suitable basis we could then proceed to consider what persons should be selected for these posts. He said of course that they would have to be friendly to the USSR and to the Allies. He added that Mikołajczyk had been suggested and he thought he was acceptable and that the question was now who else. He inquired of Mr. Hopkins whether possibly Professor Lange might be willing to join the government.

MR. HOPKINS said he doubted whether Professor Lange, who was an American citizen could be induced to give up his American citizenship for this purpose but that of course was only a private opinion.

¹³ Signed at Moscow, April 21, 1945. Text in United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 12, p. 391.

MARSHAL STALIN then said it might be wise to ask some of the Warsaw leaders to come to Moscow now and to hear what they had to say and to learn more of what had been decided. He added that if we are able to settle the composition of the new government he felt that no differences remained since we were all agreed on the free and unfettered elections and that no one intended to interfere with the Polish people.

MR. HOPKINS said he would like to have some time to consider the Marshal's suggestion.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that there were three other questions they had not touched on:

- (1) Future policy in regard to the occupation of Germany;
- (2) Japan; and
- (3) Meeting of the three heads of Government.

In reply to Mr. Hopkins's question MARSHAL STALIN said that he was prepared to meet at any time but had not yet heard from the President and Prime Minister whether the Berlin area was acceptable or not.

In conclusion MR. HOPKINS said he felt it would be most desirable if Marshal Stalin could announce publicly as soon as possible the appointment of Marshal Zhukov as Soviet Representative on the Control Council for Germany so that that body could start its work as soon as possible.

MARSHAL STALIN said he was prepared to announce Marshal Zhukov's appointment either tomorrow or the next day or whenever we wanted.

It was agreed that the next meeting would take place at 6 P. M. tomorrow, May 28th.

No. 26

740.00119 (Potsdam)/6-645

Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen)

TOP SECRET

[MOSCOW,] May 28, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF 3RD CONVERSATION AT THE KREMLIN, 6 PM ¹MAY 28

Present: Mr. Hopkins, Ambassador Harriman[,], Mr. Bohlen
Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Pavlov

Subjects: Far East
Germany—War Criminals, Prisoners of War, Food, Dis-
memberment of

MR. HOPKINS then said that he thought they might begin today by exploring the Far Eastern questions and the war against Japan.

¹ In a repetition of the substance of this heading on a later page, the time is given as 8 p. m.

He said that the other night he had indicated to Marshal Stalin that General Marshall and Admiral King would find it most helpful if they could know the approximate time of Soviet entry into the Pacific War.²

MARSHAL STALIN replied that it had been agreed at Yalta³ that the Soviet armies would be ready within two to three months after the surrender of Germany. He said that in the main the Soviet armies would be in a sufficient state of preparedness and in position by August 8, 1945. However, as to the actual date of operation he felt that would depend on the execution of the agreement made at Yalta concerning Soviet desires. He said it was necessary to have these agreements in order to justify entry into the Pacific War in the eyes of the Soviet people. Therefore, if China should agree to these desires the Soviet Union would be ready to commence operations in August.

MR. HOPKINS stated that as he recalled it the understanding at Yalta was that President Roosevelt, and of course now President Truman, would await word from Marshal Stalin before making any approach to the Chinese.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that this was correct since they had wished to postpone discussions with the Chinese while the principal movements of Soviet troops were proceeding to the Far East. He said he thought that they could perhaps raise the question directly with T. V. Soong when he made his expected visit to Moscow.

MR. HOPKINS said he thought that it would be better to raise the question here in Moscow directly with the Chinese. He added that we must bear in mind that Chinese discretion was not of the highest order.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed and he said that possibly the first part of July would be the best time to raise the question since it would obviously be impossible to conceal from the Japanese very much longer the movement of Soviet troops.

In reply to Marshal Stalin's question MR. MOLOTOV stated that Mr. Soong expected to come to Moscow immediately after the San Francisco Conference.

MR. HOPKINS said that we are then in agreement that the question of the Yalta Agreement should be raised by the Soviet Government with T. V. Soong during his visit here and at the same time Ambassador

² See *ante*, p. 29.

³ For the text of the Yalta agreement of February 11, 1945, regarding entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, see Executive Agreement Series No. 498; 59 Stat. (2) 1823; *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.

Hurley could discuss it in Chungking, but we would await Soong's visit to Moscow before doing anything.

In reply to Mr. Hopkins's question MARSHAL STALIN said that the weather in the Far East undoubtedly had a bearing on the time of the military operations since he thought that in the Autumn fogs set in which made operations difficult. He was not sure of the exact month of these fogs.

MR. HOPKINS then said that at Yalta there had been some discussions of other Far Eastern problems, such as the question of Chinese unity and others.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that it will be necessary to have serious talks in regard to the Far Eastern problems, particularly in regard to Japan, including such questions as the zone of operations for the armies and zones of occupation in Japan. He said it would also be necessary to discuss the question of unconditional surrender in regard to Japan.

MR. HOPKINS said he thoroughly agreed and in regard to the question of Chinese unity he knew his Government was most interested in seeing that accomplished but that he, personally, did not know of any specific plan. Ambassador Hurley had been making some attempts in that direction as the Marshal was aware and he would like to know of the Marshal's views on the prospect of Chinese unity and how it could be done.

MARSHAL STALIN replied he had no specific plan but he felt that all were agreed on the desirability of the unification of China so that China could become an integrated and stable state and not a conglomeration of separate states as had been the case in nineteenth century Germany. He then said it would be possible to develop a real policy towards China and to give her the economic help she would need, which could only come from the United States. He added that we should all occupy ourselves with helping China to achieve unity.

MR. HOPKINS then inquired whether Marshal Stalin had any doubts as to the desirability of applying the unconditional surrender principle to Japan.

MARSHAL STALIN said he thought it was better to apply that principle to Japan also. He said he had heard rumors of talks between the British and Japanese regarding conditional surrender. He felt it would be wise to occupy the island but that their treatment would be somewhat softer than in the case of Germany and that they should be left something to live on. He said from the point of view of immediate interests there were arguments for accepting a conditional surrender but that from the point of view of basic interest then unconditional surrender which would destroy the military potential

of Japan would be better. He said he personally favored unconditional surrender.

MR. HOPKINS inquired whether the Marshal thought the Japanese would surrender unconditionally before they were utterly destroyed to which MARSHAL STALIN replied in the negative.

MR. HOPKINS then asked whether the Marshal had any views concerning the Emperor and whether he thought Hirohito was closely linked up with the military caste.

MARSHAL STALIN said he did not think Hirohito as a person was important; he was not a leader but merely a figurehead. He added, in reply to Mr. Hopkins's question concerning the institution of the Emperor that he felt it would be better to do away with the post of Emperor since while the present incumbent was not an energetic leader and presented no great problem he might be succeeded at some time in the future by an energetic and vigorous figure who could cause trouble. He therefore felt it would be wiser to do away with the institution of the Emperor. Marshal Stalin said that in regard to the occupation of Japan he had no definite plans. He said, however, that Japan should be occupied. Japan was doomed and they knew it and already so-called Republican movements were beginning to arise behind the scenes which were attempting to play up to the Soviet Union in the hope that they could split the Allies. He said according to his information the Japanese would not accept unconditional surrender which would involve their giving up their military and naval establishments and personnel which would put their political leaders at the mercy of the Allies. He said he thought they might attempt conditional surrender in order to retain intact their military cards and, as Germany had done, prepare for future aggression. He said the Japanese had been much impressed with what had happened to Germany and their one desire was to preserve a future nucleus in order to obtain revenge.

MARSHAL STALIN said that war such as the present could only happen once in a hundred years and it was better to take advantage of it and utterly defeat Japan and cope with the military potential and in that manner assure fifty to sixty years of peace. He said the Japanese military were infected with anti-European and anti-American jingoism and that they would never rest until they could take revenge on those who had defeated them. He said there was one other possibility and that would be to accept a conditional surrender and then subsequently to impose in stages successively harsher terms which would cope with the Japanese military potential. In other words unconditional surrender by stages. He said he did not exclude this latter possibility.

MR. HOPKINS inquired what form the Marshal thought any Japanese peace feelers would take.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he had no precise information but he was judging from what had been overheard of the discussions in the Japanese Embassy here and information from Japan.

MR. HOPKINS replied that we had heard rumors from Switzerland of the desire of the Japanese industrial families to preserve their position and save Japan from destruction. Mr. Hopkins continued that he thought that these matters in regard to the surrender of Japan should be discussed between the three Allies and the sooner the better since time was short. He added that we were going ahead with our air, sea and land operations against Japan and that our bombardment was having a better effect than we had anticipated.

MARSHAL STALIN said that air bombardment had proved to be a very important weapon in this war since it weakened enemy will to resistance.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said he would like to continue the discussions on Far Eastern problems, particularly the desires of the Soviet Union. He said Marshal Stalin undoubtedly knew that President Truman had told Mr. Molotov in Washington that it was his intention to carry out the commitments undertaken by President Roosevelt at the Crimea.⁴

MARSHAL STALIN said he understood and appreciated that but it also depended on the Chinese.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN continued that it was obvious that the Soviet Union would re-assume Russia's historic position in the Far East and that it was important that both political and economic matters be settled by mutual agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in relation to the Far East as elsewhere. For example, he mentioned that of our traditional policy of the open door in China and inquired whether the Marshal thought China would soon become an industrial nation in a reasonable period of time.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he did not believe that China would soon become industrialized since they lacked the necessary experience and industrial personnel. He said the United States must play the largest part in helping China to get on their feet; the Soviet Union would be occupied with its own internal reconstruction and Great Britain would be occupied elsewhere.

MR. HOPKINS said he hoped the Marshal understood that we had no exclusive interest in China or the Far East and that we did not wish to see any other nation kept out.

MARSHAL STALIN replied he fully understood that but what he had meant was that the United States was the only country that had

⁴ See Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 75-76.

sufficient capital and personnel to be really of assistance to China in the immediate post-war period.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN then said what would be the attitude of the Soviet Union if Ambassador Hurley's efforts to help in the unification of China were not successful at the time the Soviet troops entered Manchuria. Would the Marshal consider it would be possible under those circumstances to make the necessary arrangements with the Generalissimo.⁵

MARSHAL STALIN replied that they did not propose to alter the sovereignty of the Chinese over Manchuria or any other part of China. He emphasized that the Soviet Union had no territorial claims in regard to China, either in Sinkiang or elsewhere. He said that in regard to Outer Mongolia it had been agreed at Yalta that that republic would remain in the same status it was now, namely not a part of the USSR and open to all. He said the Soviet system was not in existence in Mongolia. He added that the Soviet people would not be a factor in any way hindering Chinese unity but on the contrary would help the Chinese to achieve it. In regard to the Generalissimo the Marshal said he knew little of any Chinese leader but that he felt that Chiang Kai Shek was the best of the lot and would be the one to undertake the unification of China. He said he saw no other possible leader and that for example he did not believe that the Chinese communist leaders were as good or would be able to bring about the unification of China.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN inquired when the Soviet troops entered Manchuria if the Marshal intended to ask Chiang to organize the civil administration.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he would and that in Manchuria as in any part of China where Soviet troops went the Chinese administration would be set up by Chiang. That Chiang could send his representatives to set up the Kuomintang regime in any areas where the Red Army were.

MR. HOPKINS said he thought that Chiang would have to take certain steps and make certain reforms if he was to bring about the unification of China.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed provided Chiang understood the necessity of these reforms. If not he did not feel they could be fixed upon from without. He repeated that the Soviet Government was prepared to talk with the Chinese and if they wanted representatives in the areas where the Red Army would be they would be quite prepared to accept them.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said the Marshal had been most kind to answer so clearly and frankly the questions which had been put to

⁵ Chiang Kai-shek.

him and he wished to state in regard to Japan that President Roosevelt had adopted the principle of unconditional surrender and that there was no intention on our part as far as he knew to change this principle.

MARSHAL STALIN said he was glad to hear that and he agreed with it.

MR. HOPKINS said he thought at the next meeting of the three heads of Government all these matters should be discussed.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN observed that it was most important that with Far Eastern affairs entering the picture that the three powers should be in agreement on their general policy both political and economical in regard to that area.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that for their part they were ready to cooperate fully but inquired what about the attitude of England.

MR. HOPKINS said he of course did not know but judging from the past it must be admitted that the British and American approach to China had been quite different.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN remarked that he felt there would be no difficulty with the British in regard to Japan and that although Mr. Churchill had once termed American policy toward China as "the great illusion" they had nevertheless followed our lead in regard to China.

MARSHAL STALIN said he felt that these questions should be discussed between the three powers.

MR. HOPKINS said there remained one question in regard to the Far East, namely that of the status of Korea. He said at Yalta there had been some informal discussions of that subject⁶ and that after careful study the United States Government had come to the conclusion that it would be desirable to have a trusteeship for Korea made up of the Soviet Union, the United States, China and Great Britain. The period of trusteeship had not been fixed. It might be twenty-five years; it might be less, but it would certainly be five or ten.

MARSHAL STALIN said he fully agreed with the desirability of a four-power trusteeship for Korea.

MR. HOPKINS then said that there were a number of potentially difficult questions in the offing in regard to immediate problems affecting Germany and that anything he said would of course be preliminary to the meeting of the three heads of Government. He said he had in mind such problems as: (1) German prisoners of war; (2) the arrest and trial of war criminals and particularly the question of the German General Staff. He said we have already ordered all members of the Gestapo, SS, SD and the General Staff to be placed under arrest. He said in considering the General Staff we

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 770.

must ascertain if we have the same thing in mind when we use the term. For example do we mean twenty or thirty thousand officers directly connected with the Staff or do we mean a smaller number.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the German General Staff had two aspects; one formal and the other real. He said in its formal aspect it was composed of the official members of the German Staff which numbered seven thousand. These [were?] official members and liaison officers. In its real aspect, however, the General Staff should be regarded as composed of the whole conglomeration of staffs since every division and army staff in the German Army was closely linked with the General Staff and operated under its direct orders. Viewed in this light the real General Staff was composed of tens of thousands of officers. He said we should examine all the lists and concentrate on the real and not the formal General Staff. He felt we should arrest all of these officers and keep them out of the way in order to avoid planning for future war. He said this would be an effective method since it would be a long time before a new generation of officers would grow up and that without the General Staff they would develop different traditions. He said that it would be a very desirable and really radical treatment of the problem.

MR. HOPKINS said they were all prisoners of war and the question is what distinction should be made between the General Staff officers and the ordinary prisoners of war. He said we were considering the possibility of not permitting them to return to Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN said some undoubtedly put on civilian clothes and disappeared but that he thought it would be wise to keep these officers under arrest for as long as the period of occupation at least. Possibly for ten or twenty years. He said of course some members of the General Staff would be tried as war criminals.

MR. HOPKINS replied that we were considering the possibility of indicting the General Staff as an organization as we proposed to do in the case of the Gestapo and SS.

MARSHAL STALIN replied he thought that was a very good idea if it were legally possible.

MR. HOPKINS remarked that when he and Ambassador Harriman had seen General Eisenhower they had asked him about reports in the press that certain German prisoners of war had been released. General Eisenhower had replied that no prisoners of war had been released but that certain Germans had been ordered to return to work in agriculture but that they remained in the status of prisoners of war under the direct control and orders of the Allied authorities.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that they did not follow that practise in their zone but held all German prisoners of war in the camps.

MR. HOPKINS said he wished to make clear that this did not apply to members of the SS or Gestapo who were kept under arrest in the camps.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that they were only using German civilians for such work. In reply to Mr. Hopkins's question Marshal Stalin said that although he did not know the exact number he thought the Soviets had about two and a half million prisoners of war, of which one million seven hundred thousand were Germans. He said they were beginning to evacuate some to the rear areas, to the Ukraine, White Russia and the Moscow areas to work on reconstruction and in the coal mines and timber industry. He said only private soldiers were being so used and that officers were not required to work but were kept in the camps.

In reply to Ambassador Harriman's question MARSHAL STALIN said that they were only fair workers since physically they were undernourished and run down. He said their doctors had difficulty in helping them since they were so hungry that they ate too much food too quickly. He said the Hungarians and Rumanians who were better fed were better workers.

MR. HOPKINS inquired what practical problems the Marshal felt would be the most important for the Control Council to tackle in the immediate future.

MARSHAL STALIN replied he thought the question of food would be the most difficult.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN inquired whether the Marshal thought it would be possible if food from the Soviet zone of occupation could be exchanged for coal from the Allied zones.

MARSHAL STALIN replied he was not certain but he thought it would be most difficult since in the eastern part the Germans had all fled. He said for example that Stettin had had a population of 400,000 but now had only about 8,000 inhabitants when the Red Army reached it. He said some had been evacuated by the German Government itself but most had left independently. He said with a smile that many had gone to Berlin thinking that they would find better conditions there.

MARSHAL STALIN said he thought the main problems in Germany were first of all to assist the Germans in the reestablishment of agriculture and also in the reestablishment of light industry producing consumers goods such as clothes and shoes. He said obviously they could not be trusted with much heavy industry but they should be left with something in order to repair the railroads, metros, water system, sewage, etc. He said these latter were very important for health since the danger of epidemic diseases was great in view of the

absolute break down of all organized light [industry?] in Germany with one community completely isolated from the other.

MR. HOPKINS then said that on the occasion of victory Marshal Stalin had made a speech in which he had said the Soviet Union was against the dismembering of Germany.⁷ He wished to know if this was correct and if it represented a change in Soviet policy since the Crimea Conference.

MARSHAL STALIN said that subsequent events had shown that the proposal in regard to dismembering had really been rejected at the Crimea Conference. That at the special committee⁸ the British without objection from Ambassador Winant had interpreted the Crimea Decision⁹ not as a positive plan for the dismembering of Germany but as a threat to hold over the Germans' head in the event of bad behavior.

MR. HOPKINS said such was not his understanding of the Crimea Decision and he knew that President Truman was inclined towards dismemberment and in any event was for the detachment of the Saar, Ruhr and west bank of the Rhine under international control.

MARSHAL STALIN said that could be discussed at the forthcoming meeting but he did not believe that Great Britain was for the detachment of the Ruhr and Saar.

MR. HOPKINS said that he understood that Great Britain was against dismemberment but would favor detachment of those western areas.

MARSHAL STALIN said he frankly did not know. He merely knew that after Yalta the British press had consistently said that only Russia was for the dismemberment of Germany. He said that as you all well remember at Yalta we put forth the positive plan for the detachment of Germany but that at the meeting of the special commission in London the British had objected to this positive plan and had preferred to keep it as a threat over the German heads. He said that Ambassador Winant had not objected to this British interpretation although Gusev had. He said however the Soviet Union finally agreed since it was apparent that at Yalta no real decision had been reached in regard to the dismemberment and it was for that reason

⁷ The reference is to the following statement by Stalin on May 9: "The Soviet Union is celebrating victory, although it does not intend either to dismember or to destroy Germany." See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, May 12-19, 1945, p. 7193.

⁸ i. e., the committee consisting of Foreign Secretary Eden and Ambassadors Winant and Gusev to which the three Heads of Government at Yalta referred the "study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany." See vol. II, document No. 1416, section III.

⁹ See *ibid.*

that he had made his statement. He continued that if at the forthcoming meeting of the three they wished to discuss dismemberment he was prepared to do so, but he wished to state that he did not regard the lopping off parts of Germany as dismemberment. By dismemberment he meant the creation of separate German states and for example at Tehran President Roosevelt had spoken of five separate German states¹⁰ and at Moscow Churchill of two.¹¹ That was genuine dismemberment and not merely the slicing off of portions of Germany which would still be a unified or reduced German state.

In reply to Ambassador Harriman's question MARSHAL STALIN said he still had an open mind on the subject. He agreed with the Ambassador on the necessity of having a unified policy towards Germany for the Control Council to work on[;] otherwise he said the Germans would attempt to play one off against the other. They would come over from one zone to the other pretending that they were receiving better treatment from one or the other of the Allies.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said he thought we would do well to give authority to the Generals on the Control Council with little political interference.

MARSHAL STALIN said he agreed but that military men were so practical they could often be fooled politically, therefore it was necessary to give them a political directive to work by.

MARSHAL STALIN repeated that he felt that the best method of procedure would be to help reestablish German agriculture and consumer goods industries and that if this was done the Germans could live by their own means. He said that they would no longer have the burden of supporting an army of many millions of men and that about four million war prisoners would be outside Germany and hence no longer a burden. He said we should help them reestablish these branches of production which are necessary to maintain life.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN pointed out that in our zone there are large industrial areas and that General Eisenhower was particularly worried about the primary necessities of life such as food, shelter and heat.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that they had a somewhat similar situation in their zone; that the Germans had built an entire underground city under Berlin. He said it was impossible to imagine what they had accomplished.

¹⁰ The records of the Tehran Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume in this series. See Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 797-798.

¹¹ See Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 241.

MR. HOPKINS remarked that we had no intention of exporting food-stuffs to Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that some outside aid might be necessary at first.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN then inquired how the Russians were administering Germany and whether they had found Germans with whom they could cooperate.

MARSHAL STALIN said that a local administration of Germans had been set up in Berlin and also in Breslau, which consisted of so-called non-party people and intelligentsia. For example the Mayor of Berlin¹² under this local administration was a social democrat and Gerness, who was in charge of food supply was of the catholic center party. There were a few communists scattered through the administration in secondary positions. He said the Nazis [*sic*] party had been disbanded and their leaders arrested. He said that although few would admit being a local Nazi leader the people turned them in. Trade was beginning to revive and measures had been taken to enable the Germans to bring food into the towns and sell it. He said that under the Nazis the peasants had been forced to produce according to a plan and after the obligatory delivery to the state they were only allowed to retain seed and what was needed for their families. The rest they were obliged to sell at prices fixed by the Nazi Government. The peasants were encouraged to produce as much as they could and they delivered to the authorities much less than had been the case under the Nazis. In fact less than one-half of the total production and they were entitled to sell the remainder at any prices they could obtain. He said the price of the state delivery remained that charge which had been fixed by the Nazi authorities. He said this system was giving good results since the peasants were contented. He added that many Germans had objected to leaving so much food in the hands of the peasants on the grounds that it would encourage speculation.

MARSHAL STALIN said the present population of Berlin was about two and a half million and that of Dresden about five hundred thousand.

It was agreed that the next meeting would take place on Wednesday, May 30th, at 6 p. m.

¹² Otto Werner.

No. 27

740.00119 (Potsdam)/6-645

Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen)

TOP SECRET

[Moscow,] May 30, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF 4TH CONVERSATION AT THE KREMLIN,
6 PM MAY 30Present: Mr. Hopkins, Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Bohlen
Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Mr. PavlovSubjects: Disposition of German Fleet
Meeting of Heads of State
Poland

MARSHAL STALIN said that they had received a suggestion from General Eisenhower¹ that a naval commission composed of the four countries should be set up to consider the disposal and division of the German fleet; that the American representative on this commission would be Admiral Ghormley and that he would name Admiral Levchenko as Soviet representative. He also said suggestion had been received from General Eisenhower¹ that it would be wise to expedite the establishment of the Control Council for Germany and that therefore tomorrow he was publicly announcing the appointment of Marshal Zhukov as Soviet representative.

MR. HOPKINS expressed gratification at this news. He added that he had a message for Marshal Stalin from President Truman² to the effect that the Berlin area was acceptable to him as a meeting place and suggesting about July 15th as the date.

MARSHAL STALIN and MR. MOLOTOV inquired was this not a mistake and was not June 15th meant, since June 15th had been the date suggested by Prime Minister Churchill in a very recent message to Stalin.³

MR. HOPKINS assured them that there was no mistake and that the President had about July 15th in mind.

MARSHAL STALIN said that as he had told them there was to be a parade in Moscow on June 24th and that therefore it was impossible for him to accept Churchill's suggestion of June 15th. He said he was ready to meet at any time after the 28th of June and that therefore July 15th was entirely agreeable.

MR. HOPKINS said that he would like to know the Marshal's preference.

¹ Not printed.

² Document No. 38.

³ See document No. 39.

MARSHAL STALIN stated that he could not do it before June 28th but would do it at any time in July and that therefore he thought July 15th was entirely acceptable to him. He added that he thought that possibly Churchill had the elections in mind and seemed to be in a hurry to have the meeting before the elections. He inquired whether Churchill might not think, if July 15th were selected, that we wished to await the outcome of the elections before meeting and thus cast doubt on the question of Churchill's reelection.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said that when he had seen Churchill in London the latter had said that in view of the absentee ballots the results would not be known for several weeks after the voting.

MR. MOLOTOV observed that there had been an announcement to the effect that July 27th would be the date on which the final returns would be announced.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN added that he knew that irrespective of the time of meeting Churchill intended to bring with him Mr. Attlee[,] the leader of the Labor Party[,] and MARSHAL STALIN repeated that he thought July 15 was a very suitable date.

MR. HOPKINS then said he would like to continue the discussion on Poland. He said first of all he would like to make a general observation. Historically speaking the people of Russia and, since the revolution, the people of the Soviet Union, had distrusted successive Polish Governments and to some extent the Polish people. Likewise, for many years the Polish people had feared Russia and since the revolution the Soviet Union. He said that [at] their first meeting he had indicated to Marshal Stalin as clearly as he could that the United States was not only not interested in the establishment of a *cordon sanitaire* around Russia but on the contrary was aggressively opposed to it; that the United States had no economic interests of substantial importance in Poland and that we believed that the United States, the Soviet Union and England in working together to help create a new Polish state that would be friendly to Russia could have an immense moral and political effect in the task of bringing about genuine Polish-Soviet friendship. He said that the Soviet Union alone working directly with Poland would find this a more difficult task and in those circumstances Poland might remain a troublesome and even threatening area for Russia. However, if the three nations genuinely get together and are associated with the creation of a new Polish state we believe that would have a most helpful effect in the establishment of a friendly and independent Poland which would be genuinely friendly to the Soviet Union.

MARSHAL STALIN said he agreed. That there was no intention on the part of the Soviet Government to exclude her Allies England and America from participation in the solution of this problem.

MR. HOPKINS inquired if the Marshal believed it would be a fact that the United States and British participation would be helpful.

MARSHAL STALIN said that undoubtedly the solution would carry more weight if it was tripartite.

MR. HOPKINS said he would like to accent once again the reasons for our concern in regard to Poland, and indeed, in regard to other countries which were geographically far from our borders. He said there were certain fundamental rights which, when impinged [*infringed?*] upon or denied caused concern in the United States. These were cardinal elements which must be present if a parliamentary system is to be established and maintained. He said for example:

(1) There must be the right of freedom of speech so that people could say what they wanted to, right of assembly, right of movement and the right to worship at any church that they desired;

(2) All political parties[,] except the fascist party and fascist elements[,] who represented or could represent democratic governments should be permitted the free use, without distinction, of the press, radio, meetings and other facilities of political expression;

(3) All citizens should have the right of public trial, defense by council [*counsel*] of their own choosing, and the right of habeas corpus.

He concluded that if we could find a meeting of minds in regard to these general principles which would be the basis for future free elections then he was sure we could find ways and means to agree on procedures to carry them into effect. He then asked the Marshal if he would care to comment in a general sense or more specifically in regard to the general observations he had made concerning the fundamentals of a new Polish state.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that these principles of democracy are well known and would find no objection on the part of the Soviet Government. He was sure that the Polish Government, which in its declaration ⁴ had outlined just such principles, would not only not oppose them but would welcome them. He said, however, that in regard to the specific freedoms mentioned by Mr. Hopkins, they could only be applied in full in peace time, and even then with certain limitations. He said for example the fascist party, whose intention it was to overthrow democratic governments, could not be permitted to enjoy to the full extent these freedoms. He said secondly there were the limitations imposed by war. All states when they were threatened by war on [*or*] their frontiers were not secure had found it necessary to introduce certain restrictions. This had been done in England, France, the Soviet Union and elsewhere and perhaps to a lesser extent in the United States which was protected by wide oceans. It is for these reasons that only in time of peace could considerations

⁴ The declaration referred to has not been identified.

be given to the full application of these freedoms. For example he said that in time of war no state will allow the free unrestricted use of radio transmitters which could be used to convey information to the enemy. With reference to freedom of speech certain restrictions had to be imposed for military security. As to arrest, in England during the war individuals dangerous to the state had been arrested and tried in secret; these restrictions had been somewhat released [*relaxed?*] but not entirely repealed in England since the war in the Pacific was still going on.

He said, therefore, to sum up: (1) during time of war these political freedoms could not be enjoyed to the full extent, and (2) nor could they apply without reservations to fascist parties trying to overthrow the government.

MARSHAL STALIN continued that he wished to give a few examples from Russian history. He said that at the time of the revolution the Russian communist party had proclaimed the right of freedom of religion as one of the points of their program. The Russian Patriarch⁵ and the entire then existing church had declared the Soviet Government an anathema and had called on all church members not to pay taxes nor to obey the call to the Red Army but to resist mobilization, not to work, etc. He said what could the Soviet Government do but to in fact declare war on the church which assumed that attitude. He added that the present war had wiped out this antagonism and that now the freedom of religion, as promised, could be granted to the church.

MR. HOPKINS said he thoroughly understood the Marshal's opinions. He added that when he had left the Crimea Conference President Roosevelt had thought the Polish matter was virtually settled. He had been relaxed and pleased over the situation. Mr. Hopkins said he and all the other American representatives thought the same and felt that in very short time Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr would be able to carry out the Crimea Decision. Since that time he had been sick and out of touch with Washington and had only followed events from the press and from personal letters which he had received from time to time. He must confess that he had been bewildered and disturbed that one thing after another seemed to occur to prevent the carrying out of the decision which all had thought was clear and sure. He said that if, with his knowledge, he had been bewildered as to the real reason for this it was easy to imagine how bewildered and concerned the masses of people in the United States were over the situation. Mr. Hopkins said that he must say that rightly or wrongly there was a strong feeling among the American people that the Soviet Union wished to dominate

⁵ Tikhon (Vasily Ivanovich Belyavin).

Poland. He added that was not his point of view but it was widely held in the United States and that friends of international collaboration were wondering how it would be possible to work things out with the Soviet Union if we could not agree on the Polish question. Mr. Hopkins added that for himself he felt very strongly that if we could find a meeting of the minds on the substance of what we wished to see in the new Polish state we should be able to overcome the difficulties. He himself had had difficulty in understanding the immediate causes of disagreement, namely interpretation of wording such as the role of the existing government in the future Provisional Government of Poland. He concluded that he felt that the three great powers should in a short time be able to settle this matter.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that this was true but it was necessary for all three Governments genuinely to wish to settle this matter. If one of them secretly did not wish to see it settled then the difficulties were real.

MR. HOPKINS replied that as far as the United States Government was concerned we had no interest in seeing anyone connected with the present Polish Government in London involved in the new Provisional Government of Poland and he did not personally believe that the British had any such idea.

No. 28

740.00119 (Potsdam)/6-645

Memorandum by the President's Adviser and Assistant (Hopkins)

TOP SECRET

[Moscow,] June 1, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION DURING DINNER AT THE KREMLIN
8:00 PM JUNE 1, 1945

Present: Mr. Hopkins
Marshal Stalin, Mr. Pavlov

Subject: Poland

Last night after dinner I saw Stalin alone with Mr. Pavlov, interpreter. I told him that I wanted to impress on him as earnestly as I knew how the unfavorable effect in America caused by the detaining of the fourteen Poles within Poland and, specifically, those that were charged only with having illegal radio transmitters. I made it clear to him that I was not talking about the others charged with more serious crimes. I told him that I believed we would have no great difficulty with getting the list approved of names who might come to Moscow to consult with the Moscow Commission,

[No. 28]

if this business could be settled. I made it clear that while I did not know anything about the merits of the case, I nevertheless felt that even though the Marshal thought the offense was far more serious than it appeared to us, it was in the interest of good Russian-American relations that I hoped he would release these prisoners.

I told Marshal Stalin that if the solution of the Polish matter waited until the conference in Berlin on the 15th of July it would stir up endless trouble and probably take most of the time of the Berlin meeting. I outlined at great length the American position in regard to the Soviet Union after the war and told him that we believed the repeated assurances which he had given us that the Soviet Union also wanted to have a firm and friendly understanding with us; that we assumed that that was correct. But if that were to be accomplished I told him it had to be done in an environment that made it possible for President Truman to carry American public opinion with him.

I reminded him again of the many minority groups in America who were not sympathetic to the Soviet Union and told him very forcefully that he must believe me when I told him that our whole relationship was threatened by the impasse of Poland. I made it clear again to Stalin that Poland was only a symbol, that the United States had equal interests in all countries in this part of the world and that if we were going to act or maintain our interests on a tripartite basis, it was hopeless to do so without a strong American public opinion. I told him there was no hope of getting certain minority groups in sympathy with this position for many years and perhaps never, and reminded him again that he should not assume that the *Chicago Tribune* or the Hearst press had any real influence on American public opinion; that I was speaking for and on behalf of the millions of Americans who support a policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union.

I told Stalin further that I personally felt that our relations were threatened and that I frankly had many misgivings about it and with my intimate knowledge of the situation I was, frankly, bewildered with some of the things that were going on.

Stalin then said that he was unwilling to order those Poles released who were charged only with the use of illegal radio sets. He stated that he had information in regard to these prisoners which was not available to us and inferred that all of them were engaged in what he called diversionist activities. He stated that he believed that Churchill had misled the United States in regard to the facts

and had made the American Government believe that the statement of the Polish London Government was accurate. Just the opposite was the case.

Marshal Stalin stated that he did not intend to have the British manage the affairs of Poland and that is exactly what they want to do. Nevertheless, he stated that he believed me when I told him it was having an unfavorable effect on public opinion in America and he assumed the same was true in Great Britain, and therefore he was inclined to do everything he could to make it easy for Churchill to get out of a bad situation because if and when all the evidence is published it would look very bad for the British and he does not want to make the situation worse than it is. He stated that the men must be tried but that they would be treated leniently and he clearly inferred that he was going to consider at once what could be done in regard to these prisoners that I was concerned with to clear the matter up.

He did not, however, indicate at any time that he was not going to have them tried. I asked him that if he was determined to go through with the trial, when the trials would be held, reminding him that so long as things were in this kind of a state it was bound to create friction between all of us.

His reply to that was he did not know but that he would find out and let me know tomorrow. He said that we must take into consideration Russian opinion as well as American opinion; that it was the Russian forces that had liberated Poland and said that if they had not gained the victory in Poland, with such a great loss of Russian life, nobody would be talking about a new Poland. He said several times that he blamed the British for conniving with the London Poles, and each time I reminded him that we had no desire to support in any way the Polish Government in London.

He listened very attentively to everything I said in the first part of the conversation and I gained the impression that he is going to consider the move which the Soviet Union will make and that we would hear from him at an early date.

I closed the conversation by telling him that I thought the real solution lay in his releasing these men entirely so that we could clear the atmosphere not only for the immediate discussions about Poland but in preparation for the Berlin Conference.

He repeated that the men should be tried but that he would let me know.¹

¹ Hopkins raised this subject with Stalin again on June 6. Stalin replied that he would take Hopkins' statements fully into consideration.

No. 29

740.00119 (Potsdam)/6-645

Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen)[Extract¹]

TOP SECRET

[Moscow,] June 6, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF 6TH CONVERSATION AT THE KREMLIN, 6:00 PM
JUNE 6Present: Mr. Hopkins, Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Bohlen
Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Mr. PavlovSubjects: Poland
World Security Organization—Voting Procedure
Red Cross Representatives for Poland
Hitler
Meeting of Heads of State
General Eisenhower

Mr. HOPKINS inquired whether Marshal Stalin had any additional comments or observations for him to take to the President in regard to the Far East or whether he felt all aspects had been covered in their talks.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the Soviet Government intended to carry out the Crimea decision since it was not their habit to fail to carry out commitments unless there was some special necessity therefor. Marshal Stalin inquired whether the date of the meeting of the three heads of Government had been definitely clarified.

MR. HOPKINS said that he knew the Prime Minister had sent a message to the President² saying that if necessary he was prepared to agree to July 15th but that he would prefer an earlier date.

MARSHAL STALIN said in reply to his second message from President Truman³ he had repeated that July 15th was entirely acceptable to the Soviet Government.⁴

¹ For another extract from this memorandum, see Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 910-912.

² Document No. 50.

³ Document No. 46.

⁴ Document No. 49.

No. 30

711.61/6-1145 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

[Moscow,] 8 June 1945.

Now that Harry has left, I thought you might want me to give you a brief report on his visit.

There is no doubt when we saw Stalin the first time that he was gravely concerned over the adverse developments during the past three months in the relations between our two countries. A firm position which President Roosevelt took before he died and you have taken on several issues has had its effect. He showed, however, that he did not fully understand the basis of the difficulties. In the early talks he took the offensive in complaining about our misdeeds and aggressively indicated that if we did not wish to deal on a friendly basis with the Soviet Union, she was strong enough to look after herself. He was clearly glad to see Harry and accepted unquestioningly the fact that you sent him as an indication of your desire to work with him (Stalin). Harry did a first rate job in presenting your views and in explaining the most important matters, particularly Poland, which were causing us concern.

I am afraid Stalin does not and never will fully understand our interest in a free Poland as a matter of principle. He is a realist in all of his actions, and it is hard for him to appreciate our faith in abstract principles. It is difficult for him to understand why we should want to interfere with Soviet policy in a country like Poland, which he considers so important to Russia's security, unless we have some ulterior motive. He does, however, appreciate that he must deal with the position we have taken and, in addition, from all reports we have from inside Poland, he needs our assistance and that of Great Britain's in obtaining a stable political situation within that country.

I believe I told you that I was certain Molotov did not report to Stalin accurately and in fact truthfully in all cases. This was brought out again [in] our talks. It is also clear that Molotov is far more suspicious of us and less willing to view matters in our mutual relations from a broad standpoint than is Stalin. The fact that we were able to see Stalin six times and deal directly with him was a great help. If it were possible to see him more frequently, many of our difficulties could be overcome.

Although the agreement to start the consultations with the Poles in Moscow is a big step forward, I am afraid that we will have trouble with Molotov when it comes to working out the details of the reorganization of the Warsaw Government. He possibly will not continue in

¹ Printed from a copy forwarded to the Secretary of State by Leahy on June 11.

the spirit of our recent talks and the Poles themselves will also be difficult. I hope, however, to be able to handle the consultations for my part in such a way that we can either come to a conclusion or point up the differences sufficiently clearly so as to make it possible for you to come to a conclusion with Stalin when you meet him with Churchill.

The talks about the Far East, I feel, were of real value, particularly Stalin's agreement to take up with Soong in the first instance the political matters affecting China in the Yalta agreement, and also his agreement to allow the Generalissimo's representatives to go into Manchuria with the Russian troops to set up Chinese National Government Administration.

The last talk, on voting procedure,² was most interesting. It was clear that Stalin had not understood at all the issues between us. In spite of Molotov's explanation and defense of the Soviet position, Stalin waived [*waved*] him aside and accepted our position. He stated, however, he did not consider that "a country is virtuous because it is small". And he had a good deal to say about the troubles small nations have made in the world. This, he said, he was quite ready to state publicly as well as privately. He expressed emphatically his unwillingness to allow the Soviet Union's interests to be affected by such countries.

In conclusion, I feel that Harry's visit has been more successful than I had hoped. Although there are and will continue to be many unsolved problems with the Soviet Government, I believe that his visit has produced a much better atmosphere for your meeting with Stalin.

Physically Harry stood the trip reasonably well. The strain of the first week took a lot out of him, and it was a good thing that he had a few days to rest up before starting home.

Bohlen's presence was, as usual, most helpful.

² See Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 910-912.

THE DAVIES MISSION TO LONDON

No. 31

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 22 May 1945.

Number 46, personal and top secret, from the President to the Prime Minister.

I am asking Mr. Joseph E. Davies to come to see you prior to the pending conference between you, Marshal Stalin and myself. There are a number of matters that I want him to explore with you and which I would prefer not to handle by cable. Mr. Davies will be in London probably the twenty-fifth. I would appreciate it if you could see him at your convenience.

TRUMAN

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

No. 32

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 23 May 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman, personal and top secret, Number 54.

Thank you for your Number 46.² I shall be delighted to see Mr. Davies as soon as he arrives.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² Document No. 31.

No. 33

740.00119 Potsdam/7-345

*The Chairman of the President's War Relief Control Board*¹ (Davies)
to the President²TOP SECRET³

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1945.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT⁴ IN RE: MISSION TO LONDON

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: With reference to the above entitled matter, I have the honor to report my discussions with Prime Minister Churchill. I have gone into detail with the thought that it may prepare you for the atmosphere and attitude which may still confront you at the coming meeting.

These talks, alone with the Prime Minister, covered approximately eight hours. At Chequers we talked from 11 o'clock Saturday night⁵ until 4:30 Sunday morning. They were resumed in his bedroom Sunday morning at 11 o'clock (he sitting up in his bed) and lasted until 1:30 lunch, and were again resumed later in the afternoon and on the following Tuesday at 10 Downing Street.

On Saturday evening, first off, the Prime Minister said he wished to make his position clear. He was brief. He stood on his telegram to the President, #34.⁶ Great Britain might have to do certain things in her own interests, but would not oppose the U. S. He then asked me to go ahead.

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

Prefaced by a brief statement as to public opinion in the U. S., I gave him your message substantially as follows:

The President was gravely concerned over the serious deterioration in the relations of the Soviets with both Britain and the United States.

¹ This was Davies' only official position in the United States Government at this time, although he acted as an adviser to the President before and during the Berlin Conference and as a special representative of the President on the mission to London described in this report and in document No. 34.

² Printed from an unsigned carbon copy which Davies sent to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes on July 3. This is the version of this report which Davies submitted to Truman under cover of a personal note of July 1, with the observation that the perusal of this report and of document No. 34 would "be of value to you [Truman] as an indication of the positions which you may expect to confront" at the Berlin Conference (Truman Papers). In another version of this report in Department of State files (file No. 740.0011 EW/6-1245) there are a number of variations from the text here printed.

³ This paper bears also the following typed notation: "For the President of the United States, for his immediate advisors and the Secretary of State only."

⁴ Davies has supplied the information, in an interview with a Department of State historian on May 21, 1954, that this report and document No. 34 were supplemental to an earlier oral report to Truman. Concerning this oral report, see Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 260-262; William D. Leahy, *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time* (New York, 1950), pp. 378-380; and James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York, 1947), p. 64.

⁵ May 26.

⁶ Document No. 1.

It was clear that without continued unity of the Big Three there could be no reasonable prospect of Peace.

The causes of this dangerous situation were also clear. They were differences over what the agreements arrived at in Yalta⁷ actually were, conflict over new matters which the speed of military victory in Europe had developed, all induced by and fed by fears, distrusts, and suspicions, on both sides.

If these differences were to be composed, an early meeting of the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, and the President, was imperative.

He had therefore despatched Harry Hopkins to Moscow to explore Marshal Stalin's views with reference to this situation, and myself to London for similar discussions with the Prime Minister.

The President believed that the meeting should be directed to securing a meeting of the minds, clearly defining what the past agreements were, and similarly to arrive at and define agreements as to situations which had arisen since Yalta and might now be anticipated in future working together.

The President's position was that every agreement made by President Roosevelt would be scrupulously supported by him. If there were differences of opinion as to what these agreements were, he wanted them cleared up. If new decisions were required for continued unity, he wanted clear understandings as to the terms. The U. S. would then fulfill these obligations, and he would confidently expect the same from associated governments.

It is the President's conviction that the paramount objective now must be to conserve peace after victory. He conceives it to be the duty of the three nations which won the war to leave nothing undone in an effort to solve their differences, and through continued unity, make possible a just and durable peace structure.

The President had reason to believe that the situation was the more serious because of Soviet suspicion that now Britain and the U. S., along with the United Nations, were (to use the Prime Minister's own phrase) "ganging up" on them. Such suspicion in fact was unjustified, and ought to be dispelled. That required the establishment of confidence in the good faith and reliability of the parties, which came only through frank discussions and the opportunity to know and estimate each other.

On that score the President was at a disadvantage in contrast to that which the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin enjoyed. The Prime Minister and Mr. Eden, both had had the benefit of frequent contacts and friendly association with Marshal Stalin and Commissar Molotov.

It was the President's desire, therefore, in view of the responsibility which he must assume, to have a similar opportunity to know the Marshal and to have Marshal Stalin come to know him. Each was entitled to have an opportunity to know and assess the credibility, character, and purposes, and point of view of the other.

The President, therefore, desired an opportunity to meet the Marshal immediately before the scheduled, forthcoming meeting. He felt

⁷ See vol. II, documents Nos. 1416 and 1417.

certain the Prime Minister would appreciate the reasonableness of his position and facilitate such arrangement.

The President believed that Unity for Peace could only be assured on the basis of a balanced tripod of power, sustained by the justified mutual confidence of the Chiefs of State. As he saw it, that would permit neither "appeasement" nor "ganging up".

My instructions also were to discuss the time and place of the proposed meeting, and to explore matters which might be included on the agenda of the meeting.

The Prime Minister's response to both the general idea and the specific suggestion was favorable. He said he could quite understand the President's desire.

REVIEW OF EUROPEAN SITUATION

He then reviewed situations in Europe.

FRANCE AND DE GAULLE

As to France, he was bitter. He was completely fed up with de Gaulle and out of patience. He ought to be "brought up" sharply and be given to understand clearly that he can not act arbitrarily and inconsiderately and refuse to submit his operations to the Supreme Allied Command, when his armies were supplied by his associates.⁸ He nevertheless made a distinction between the French people and de Gaulle.

TITO AND YUGOSLAVIA

He was even more bitter towards Tito. He could not be permitted arbitrarily to stake out and occupy, and assert dominion over parts of Austria and the Trieste District. That was for the Peace Conference. Tito, he said, was thoroughly unreliable, a communist, and completely under the domination of Moscow.

THE BALKANS

As to the rest of the Balkans, he complained bitterly that there was no joint cooperation or "fifty fifty" control as to Yugoslavia, nor "eighty twenty" in Bulgaria or Rumania,⁹ nor "tripartite" control in Austria. As he saw it, Tito's attitude was a reflection of the Soviet policy and action, and failure of cooperation elsewhere disclosed what Europe had to confront and expect from the Soviets.

⁸ The reference is to the refusal of French troops to withdraw from Stuttgart and from northwestern Italy under orders from the Supreme Allied Command. See Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 238-240; Grew, *Turbulent Era*, vol. II, pp. 1512-1517.

⁹ For information on the Anglo-Soviet arrangement on spheres of influence here referred to, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 104-105.

RUSSIA

As the Prime Minister went on, he became vehement and even violent in his criticisms of the Soviet Armies and officials in the re-occupied areas. What was more horrible to him than Communism, was the imposition of the Secret Police and Gestapo methods. He spoke with much feeling of the "steel curtain" of the Soviets being "clamped down" on Eastern liberated areas, the horror of such a black out, etc. etc.

When Stalin, he said, had asked him recently why he feared the Soviets in Europe, he had replied that it was because they were sending, in advance of the Red Army, Communist propagandists and leaders, "like locusts", to establish communist cells. Stalin's attitude seemed to be that he had given his assurances as to his real purpose not to try to communize Europe; that this should be sufficient, particularly as an army had to take every precaution to protect itself in hostile, invaded territory.

"WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN ARMIES COURTED DISASTER"

What he elaborated upon at length, and with great emphasis and emotion, were the grave dangers which would arise with the withdrawal of American troops from Europe. It would be a "terrible thing" if the American Army were vacated from Europe. Europe would be prostrate and at the mercy of the Red Army and of Communism. Moreover, it would never do to permit those American Forces which had advanced some 120 miles east of the lines of the American occupational zones to retire now. The present lines, through Central Germany, of the British and U. S. Armies should be maintained, lest Communism should dominate and control all of Western Europe. The positions were strategic. They should be held to serve for bargaining purposes with the Soviets, despite the fact that they were in advance of the areas of occupancy agreed upon.¹⁰ When I suggested that there had been an express agreement as to these zones,¹¹ he said that conditions had greatly changed.

CHANGE OF ATTITUDE ON SPECIFIC PROPOSAL

As he developed the discussion and came to the matter of the coming meeting he suddenly reversed his attitude as to your meeting with Stalin. He seemed to realize suddenly its possible effect on his

¹⁰ For further information on the Truman-Churchill exchanges on this subject, see Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 213-216, 301-304; Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 601-606.

¹¹ i. e., the protocol signed at London, September 12, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, November 14, 1944. For texts, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071*; *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2078; *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, pp. 118, 121.

political situation. In any event, he made a complete "about face" and became quite emotional. He was both surprised and hurt that he should be "excluded" from the first meeting with Stalin after victory. The implication was that it was poor return for his support of and friendship for the U. S. He reviewed the history of that support all through the war. He had supported "unconditional surrender". He could have made peace with Hitler at any time. He could never, never consent. He would carry the issue to world public opinion. Such a meeting would be tantamount to a "Deal".

I had said little up to this time. Here, however, I interrupted quite abruptly, and walking over to the fire-place, said with suppressed feeling that I was a guest in his house, but that I could not do other than resent such an imputation as to the President of the United States.

He interrupted me quite as promptly; and very generously and, I am sure, sincerely, disclaimed any such personal opinion, and explained that he had meant to say only that this would be what a hostile public would say.

Obviously he was upset and concerned over two situations which he saw developing, which I could understand. First, the possible effect of the proposal upon his election; and second, confirmation of his fear of the withdrawal of the U. S. from Europe, and particularly that Britain might be deprived of our military strength in trading with the Soviets.

Indicative of his anxiety over Europe, and the deployment of our forces, at one time he turned to me suddenly and said, "Are you trying to say for the President that the U. S. is withdrawing from participation in European affairs?"

RESTATEMENT OF PRESIDENT'S POSITION

My reply was that I was not trying to convey or imply anything as to the President's attitude other than what I had expressed specifically and had stated with care. I restated it. The President's attitude was simple. He would definitely fulfill every engagement made by President Roosevelt. He desired to exhaust every possibility to avert disaster to unity. He wanted to know exactly what the engagements and agreements with the Soviets were. If there was disagreement as to what they were, he wanted to clarify that situation definitely, if possible. Matters in difference had arisen since Yalta which should be discussed and settled. Other matters as to Europe should also be discussed and an agreement arrived at which would preclude misunderstandings as far as possible. The only hope that peace should not be forfeited after victory lay in the continued unity of the three allied Powers. Every effort should now be directed through tolerant and

friendly discussion to restore the unity which alone had made victory certain; with such agreements defined and arrived at, the U. S. would live up to them and expected others to do the same. It was his imperative duty and that of the other Chiefs of State to exhaust every honorable means to settle differences and to cooperate to prevent a new war, and to create a just and durable peace.

EUROPE'S DANGER AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

The Prime Minister did not demur, but resumed again his elaboration upon what a desperate situation Europe confronted at the hands of the Soviets if American forces were withdrawn from Europe. If his fears were justified, England, he proclaimed, would stand her ground alone, if she had to. England was not a negligible factor in world affairs. England could still protect herself. The difficulties of crossing the Channel and her mastery of the air, made her still invulnerable to attack. If need be, England would stand alone. She had done it before, etc. It was in line with his address to the House of Commons two weeks ago. I checked back in my files and quote it here. It is an authoritative definition of the classic policy of England as to Europe.

"We have had to hold out from time to time all alone, or to be the mainspring of coalitions, against a continental tyrant or dictator, and we have had to hold out for quite a long time . . . In all these world wars our islands *kept the lead of Europe or else held out alone.*"¹²

The Prime Minister is one of the greatest men of our time, and the greatest Englishman of this or any other time, in my opinion. But he is first and foremost an Englishman. He is still the King's Minister who will not liquidate the Empire. He is still the great Briton of Runnymede and Dunkirk. He is superbly endowed and is a great advocate. He would be equally great in a courtroom, on the stage, or in any intellectual or fighting field. He was at his oratorical and powerful best.

When he finished I told him that he should not misconstrue the attitude of our President or of our people who held him and England always in great respect and infinite gratitude for "holding the fort" alone and saving the opportunity for ultimate victory over Hitler.

EXPRESSION OF MY PERSONAL VIEWS

I then observed that much of this discussion, while intensely interesting, was not immediately relevant to the matter I had presented. But before we returned to that, I asked him whether he would bear with me sufficiently to hear my personal reactions to his views. I felt

¹² Ellipsis and emphasis in the source copy. The quoted passage is from a radio address by Churchill on May 13, 1945; text in Charles Eade, comp., *The War Speeches of the Rt Hon Winston S. Churchill* (London, 1952), vol. III, p. 440.

strongly on this situation. With his consent, I would like to speak with complete frankness, but always with great respect and friendliness. My "future was behind me". There was no office which my doctors would permit me to hold. My only concern was to do what little I could to try to prevent once again the tragedy of winning a war, only to lose the peace. Generously, he asked me to go ahead and speak freely.

Then I told him frankly that I had been shocked beyond words to find so violent and bitter an attitude, and to find what appeared to me so violent a change in his attitude toward the Soviets. Its significance was appalling. It staggered me with the fear that there could be no peace. I had heard of such attitudes in Britain, but I had discounted these reports. Recently, a banker in San Francisco had come to tell me that a British officer, part of the British Delegation at the Conference,¹³ had declared publicly at a luncheon club and with feeling that the British and American Armies should not stop, but go right through and clean up the Red Army and destroy the Soviet menace now when we were at it. But in view of his past great statements with reference to the Soviets all during the war, I had found it difficult to bring myself to believe that I had heard him aright. No one, in the "dust and grime of the arena" (as he put it) had been publicly so generous, bold and fair, as had he, when, in the House of Commons only recently,¹⁴ he had declared that he "repudiated and repulsed" any suggestion that Britain had made "a questionable compromise in yielding to force or fear" and had forcefully then declared his "utmost conviction" in the broad justice of the Russian claim to the Curzon Line.¹⁵ He had never failed to give them credit for fidelity and great effectiveness during the war. I feared that the fears and suspicions of the Soviets as to the implacable hostility of the West, would harden into action if they knew of this attitude.

"LEGACIES OF SUSPICION"

No one knew better than did he, the Prime Minister, the "legacies of suspicion" under which the unity of the Allies had labored. The classic Bolshevick fear that they were surrounded by implacable, hostile nations; the many justifications of that suspicion through the long years of the twenties and the period of Munich, Prague, and Berlin, of the thirties; and the ideological, religious hatreds expressed in the forties against the Soviet Government, were all known to him;

¹³ i. e., the United Nations Conference on International Organization.

¹⁴ On February 27, 1945. See *Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report*, 5th series, vol. 408, col. 1277.

¹⁵ For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see *Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. XIII, pp. 793-794. See also the map facing p. 748, *post*.

for he had labored mightily in Moscow in '42, '43, '44, to allay their fears. That's what made it so shocking and fearful to me.

I recalled briefly the diplomatic and military negotiations between the three Allies; the desperate Soviet pleas for a Second Front in '41, '42, '43, and their bitter disappointment when the Germans were threatening Moscow, Stalingrad, and the Baku oil fields; their disappointment over the attitude of Britain and the U. S. in failing to recognize the reasonableness, justice, and fairness, of the Soviet position as to Poland, when there would be no Poland at all, except for the power of the Russian Army; of their feeling that they had not received the same consideration in the Polish matter from their Allies which they had extended, even as against their convictions, in "going along" with Britain and the U. S. in the recognition of Vichy in Africa, Badoglio and the King in Italy, and the domination of Britain in Greece. I recalled the inestimable service which he had rendered to preserve allied unity when, many times, he had gone to explain these things to Stalin in the Kremlin, and particularly when in 1942 he had entered into a twenty year treaty of alliance¹⁶ with Stalin to make no separate peace and to work together to win the war and also to restore and compose the peace of Europe after victory.

No one had done so much to allay the old "legacy of suspicion" which threatened allied unity during the war as had he.

The situation would be desperate indeed if it were he, who was to revive these threats to unity now. It was not the facts, so much as the interpretation of the facts, which might have a destructive effect upon all hope for a decent, just peace structure for humanity, even for the immediate years ahead.

If, after victory, the Soviet leadership were now to find an attitude so hostile as his attitude seemed to be, their memories would also undoubtedly revert to the Prime Minister's historic hostility towards them in '18 and '19, when he was the spearhead of the attack against the plan of Lloyd George, Wilson, and Clemenceau, to try to compose the peace in Russia with a conference of the Russian factions on the Island of Lemnos.¹⁷ This memory, and the memory of his bitter personal attacks on them at that time, would have an additional impact upon their fears which might be disastrous.

If his present attitude were known to them, it would be more than sufficient explanation for their actions in Europe during the past several weeks. I referred specifically to their position as to the Berne

¹⁶ Signed at London, May 26, 1942. Text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLIV, p. 1038.

¹⁷ See Winston S. Churchill, *The Aftermath* (London, 1929), pp. 169-177.

negotiations for surrender of German troops,¹⁸ their attitude toward Austria, their sensitivity to the advance of American Forces beyond the zones of occupation agreed upon, their attitude toward the inclusion of the French on the Reparations Commission, contrary to their understanding of the Yalta agreement; and their suspicions that the Germans had secured some sort of understanding from Britain and ourselves because of alleged agreements with the *Wehrmacht* to let our armies through on the Western Front. These actions were explainable and from their position justified and necessary, if their fears were justified.

They would naturally take steps to protect themselves from a hostile Britain. They always acted with speed and decision and resolve all doubts in favor of their own security. He well knew how quickly they acted in '39 to protect themselves when they found there was no hope of unity through collective security by an agreement with France and England when the Poles refused to permit the Red Army to join in the defense of Poland and fight with the Poles on the German borders only three weeks before Hitler attacked in September 1939.

His attitude placed not only the future, but possibly the immediate peace in real danger. To assume that we could win through a "tough" approach, in my opinion, would involve a terrific risk.

ADDITIONAL SUSPICION OF A "GANGING UP"

If to such a situation there were added other suspicions that Great Britain and the U. S. were "ganging up" on them, the danger would be intensified. I referred to the situations at the San Francisco Conference where the vote had been so overwhelmingly against the Soviet position on the Argentine and other issues, and where the leadership of the opposition to the Soviets was that of England and the United States.

The deductions, probably unjustified, which the Soviets had drawn from the Argentine situation, were emphasized by the fact that the attitude of the American Government was a complete reversal of the attitude of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull.¹⁹ It was only a few months ago that the liberal "*Manchester Guardian*" had bluntly stated that the British Government could not follow the American

¹⁸ For a narrative of the "Bern" conversations relating to the surrender of German forces in Italy, see Herbert Feis, *Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton, 1957), pp. 583-596. See also *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, pp. 311-320, and vol. II, pp. 198-214; *The Italian Campaign, 12th December 1944 to 2nd May 1945: A Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, Field-Marshal the Viscount Alexander of Tunis* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951), pp. 62-66.

¹⁹ In the discussion concerning the seating of the Argentine Delegation at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Molotov had quoted both Roosevelt and Hull in opposing the proposed admission of Argentina to the Conference. See *The United Nations Conference on International Organization: Selected Documents*, p. 317.

Government on sanctions directed against the Argentine because England's "bread and butter" was involved. The Soviets might find it difficult to understand why the American Government had not only receded from its attitude on the Argentine, but was now a proponent of the British policy and actively leading the United Nations in what was practically a united front against the Soviets.

I said that frankly, as I had listened to him inveigh so violently against the threat of Soviet domination and the spread of Communism in Europe, and disclose such a lack of confidence in the professions of good faith in Soviet leadership, I had wondered whether he, the Prime Minister, was now willing to declare to the world that he and Britain had made a mistake in not supporting Hitler, for as I understood him, he was now expressing the doctrine which Hitler and Goebbels had been proclaiming and reiterating for the past four years in an effort to break up allied unity and "divide and conquer". Exactly the same conditions which he described and the same deductions were drawn from them as he now appeared to assert.

I simply could not bring myself to believe that his considered judgment or expressions would ultimately confirm such an interpretation.

He heard me through, and with intentness. He said that he had been under very great pressure, that he had been just thinking out loud, and that the expressions might have been stronger than he had intended to convey. He said that he recognized the gravity of the immediate situation, that perhaps it would fall to a very few men to decide in the next few weeks the kind of life that would confront several generations to come.

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

As to the question of maintaining large armed American forces in Europe for an indefinite period, I gave him frankly my personal judgment, for such value as it might have. In my opinion, American armies would promptly be withdrawn to the occupational zones agreed upon. So far as holding large armed forces indefinitely in Europe in the present state of our public opinion, no President would be sustained by the country in such a decision, now or for some time to come.

There are many who believe that England, finding now no great rival power in Europe to offset the new rising power of Russia, would try to use American manpower and resources to support the classic British policy of "leading" Europe.

If agreements now entered into were clearly defined between the three great Powers and if such agreements were violated in such a way as to establish clearly that any great Power was bent on world domination hostile to the American way of life, then and only then, would the American people accept the possibility of having their armed

forces fighting in Europe. The moral impact of such a situation only would bring our people to such a decision.

OPINION AS TO SOVIET GOOD FAITH

For such value as it might have, I wished to give him my judgment as to the Soviets. My opinion was that we could rely upon the good faith of the Soviet leaders: 1. to work for a practical Peace Structure; 2. to cooperate with Western Europe as good neighbors and not seek to proselyte Europe, to the degree that was consistent with her security as against a possible implacable religious, economic, or political hostility of Western neighbors.

Whether that was sound or not, in my judgment it was common sense to proceed on that assumption always and without undue risk, until the contrary was clearly established.

UNDERSTANDING AS TO MEETING WITH STALIN

Reverting specifically to the meeting of the President with Marshal Stalin I said that I had been impressed by his point of view; and no less by his fairness in recognizing the reasonableness and good faith of the President's position. I asked if he could not make some suggestion whereby the interests of both parties would be accommodated.

He reiterated that he could not possibly attend a meeting which was a continuation of a conference between the President and Marshal Stalin. He was, however, entirely sympathetic and agreeable to their having opportunities after they had all arrived together, to come to know each other through such discussions as they might desire. There would be plenty of opportunities for that before the business actually began, while preliminaries were being arranged and the agenda discussed and fixed.

I told him that I was gratified by his suggestion and felt confident that the President would acquiesce.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE SUGGESTED

Previously he had said he would like to be "heard" personally by the President and had also suggested that I give him an *Aide-Mémoire* and that he also would give me one or that we would send a joint telegram with reference to the situation. I told him that I was agreeable to either procedure.

In a recent cable²⁰ he had sent to the President I had noted that he had suggested confining the distribution of cables to the President and to his immediate advisors and the Secretary of State, and none others, because of "leaks". I wondered whether this precaution could not

²⁰ The reference is to the last part (not printed) of document No. 1.

be very well applied to this situation, since there was the possibility that potential harm could be done to his campaign if there were to be a leak. He asked who knew of the proposal. I told him that the matter had been confined to the President and only his immediate advisors and was safe as it now stood. Nevertheless, I was entirely agreeable to any suggestion he might make in this connection. So far as I was concerned, here in London I was discussing matters only with him, and would have no discussions with either members of his Government or with the opposition. I would depart immediately that was done. He thought that was good judgment.

He then asked that I have a talk with Eden and tell him all of what I had told him. He had telephoned Eden, and Eden had asked me to have lunch with him Monday.²¹

It was 4:30 Sunday morning when we retired. He took me to my bedroom door and said goodnight with cordiality and fine hospitality. When we parted, he said that he had appreciated my frankness and had really enjoyed the discussions with one who was "so familiar with European problems during these years".

The following morning at 11 o'clock, upon his suggestion, I joined him for further conversations in his bedroom (he was sitting up in bed). He seemed to be still irked and troubled. He again reverted to the plight of Europe and the disaster that might result from withdrawal of American troops. He also came back to the question of the meeting with Stalin. I listened and finally suggested that I had assumed that this matter had been settled.

During lunch which followed, and in the presence of the Duke of Westminster and several others, the Prime Minister again berated the Communists and expatiated on the Communist "menace" vigorously.

I felt it unwise to engage in any discussion on the subject as he already knew my views; so I said nothing. He was still very much agitated.

After lunch we walked for a time in the garden and he again returned to the "desperate" conditions in Europe. He said that it probably would be wise to exchange *Aides-Mémoires*. That, I said, was entirely agreeable if he desired it, and I would have one ready for our next meeting. The Monday meeting was deferred until Tuesday afternoon, when we again met in his little sitting room at 10 Downing Street Annex. In the meantime I had concluded my talks with Eden. He said that he had talked with Eden since my meeting with the Foreign Minister and now was convinced that it was just as

²¹ See document No. 34.

well not to exchange *Aides-Mémoires*.²² Eden, he said, had said that I was confining my conversations exclusively to them, and had refused to hold press conferences or give statements to the press. We parted with cordiality. He insisted upon personally walking with me through the corridors to the front door of the building.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Prime Minister was tired, nervous, and obviously working under great stress. The vehemence and bitterness of his expressions would undoubtedly be much modified with considered judgment.

2. He was favorably disposed to the suggestion of preliminary meeting, but as its possible effects upon his political campaign developed in his thought, he became very much disturbed. That the President himself had taken the initiative with a plan for the meeting with Stalin, despite the Prime Minister's cable that he would "risk

²² For the text of a minute by Churchill on his conversation with Davies, see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 578. Churchill states (p. 577) that this minute was given to Davies. In an interview with a Department of State historian on May 21, 1954, Davies stated categorically that the minute was not given to him and that the draft *aide-mémoire* which Davies had prepared was likewise not given to Churchill. The text of Davies' draft *aide-mémoire*, dated at London, May 29, 1945, is as follows (copy supplied from the Davies Papers):

"As stated in the President's letter [*cablé?*] to you, he wished me to discuss and explore certain situations with the Prime Minister. That, he believed, would be more satisfactory than communication by cable.

"The President is concerned over serious deterioration in relations between Great Britain, the United States, and Russia. There can be no durable peace without continued unity. Everything that can honorably be done should be done to arrest and repair that situation.

"The achievement of durable peace, he believes, is still the objective of the peoples and Chiefs of State of the three countries. There are differences as to what the agreements at Yalta, etc. were and in the interpretation of other situations. These can be worked out only by a meeting of the Chiefs in an atmosphere of tolerance, consideration and confidence, similar to that which existed during the fighting.

"The vital objective now is to conserve peace after victory. He believes that a meeting must be had to clear up these disagreements and suspicions, and that exact understandings, both as to present and past, should be clearly defined. President Truman will scrupulously live up to the commitments of President Roosevelt and any others that will be entered into.

"Recent developments indicate that there has been aroused in the Soviets a groundless suspicion that there is a 'ganging up' against them. That has been aggravated, particularly, by the recent anti-Soviet propaganda in the United States, as well as by developments in Britain.

"Prime Minister and Mr. Eden have had the benefit of friendly association and contact with Marshal Stalin and Commissar Molotov on many occasions which would serve to alleviate such suspicions. The President has had no such personal contact with Premier Stalin. It would be helpful that he should have similar opportunity before the meeting to establish personal contact and relations with Marshal Stalin, so that both would have an opportunity to assess the motives and the reliability of the other.

"He would want to have the view of the Prime Minister personally on that situation before making a final decision, but assumes that he would recognize the desirability of such opportunity.

"The President feels confident that the Prime Minister will understand the spirit in which this is suggested, and will have complete confidence that he has no other purpose than that as above stated."

a snub by proposing to Marshal Stalin a tripartite meeting";²³ and that the President had courteously rejected some of his suggestions such as stopping in London en route to the meeting, and had probably been disturbed by the implications [*sic*].

3. The Prime Minister is a very great man, but there is no doubt but that he is "first, last, and all the time" a great Englishman. I could not escape the impression that he was basically more concerned over preserving England's position in Europe than in preserving Peace. In any event, he had convinced himself that by serving England, he was best serving Peace. He is also a great advocate, and uses with effect all the arts of negotiation.

4. He was bitterly disappointed by the President's decision and the fact that American troops were already being diverted from Europe to the Eastern Theatre, and would be withdrawn (retreat, as he called it) to the occupational zones agreed upon.

5. He was bitterly hostile to the Soviets.

6. His attitude must be known to or at least suspected by the Soviet Government. It is undoubtedly responsible for the suspicion voiced in the interchange of cables in connection with the surrender of German troops in Italy; the situation in Austria; the suspicion that secret arrangements had been made between the Germans and Allies on the Western Front at the expense of the Russians on the Eastern Front, and other troublesome situations. It could and does undoubtedly account for much of the aggressiveness and so-called unilateral action on the part of the Soviets since Yalta. They have not forgotten the frank speech of General Smuts.²⁴ They are protecting their position.

7. Back of all this, the Prime Minister is bedevilled by the consciousness that his Government no longer occupies its position of power and dominance in the world. He is resisting it gallantly and vigorously. As the King's Minister he is doggedly maintaining the classic British policy in Europe. He saw that his hope of using American manpower and resources to sustain Britain's "lead" in Europe was vanishing.

8. Undoubtedly he is also fearful that in connection with entering into tripartite agreements of the Big Three, the idealisms of our people are apt to inject matters which on the continent may be unrealistic and which may develop serious problems and differences for the future. America's abandonment of Europe would then leave Britain holding the bag alone. He undoubtedly still remembers our attitude in the Greek situation where he was left to fight alone in the

²³ See document No. 10.

²⁴ The reference is probably to Smuts' address of November 25, 1943, before the Empire Parliamentary Association. See Nicholas Mansergh, ed., *Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952* (London, 1953), vol. 1, p. 568.

“dust and grime of the arena”, as he expressed it in his bitter speech in Parliament.

9. It had been his purpose, and so avowedly stated, to employ the presence of American forces and their position in advance of their lines, as trading material to induce concessions from the Soviets. His policy was based upon the “tough approach”. He was willing to run the great risk which such a gamble entails. His position probably justifies that risk.

10. He, however, affirmatively asserts: 1. he will not oppose the American policy towards Russia. 2. he is entirely in accord with the policy of trying to exhaust all means consistent with self-respect to resolve the differences between the Big Three in order that unity may be preserved in order to maintain Peace after military victory. 3. he will agree to a meeting at the time and place which the President agrees upon with Marshal Stalin.

11. The net result is, that the meeting of the President and Marshal Stalin, prior to the business meetings of the Conference, in order to afford an opportunity for them to get acquainted and assess each other, has been worked out upon the counter-suggestion of the Prime Minister,—as the President anticipated it would.

Another result of the mission is that the spearhead of the Prime Minister’s disappointments as to the attitude of this country was broken and considerably dulled. That much in anticipation of the coming meeting has been accomplished.

The matters explored with Foreign Minister Eden I will submit in an additional report.²⁵

With great respect,

[JOSEPH E. DAVIES]

²⁵ Document No. 34.

No. 34

740.00119 Potsdam/7-345

*The Chairman of the President's War Relief Control Board (Davies)
to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 12 June 1945.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT² OF CONFERENCES WITH FOREIGN MINISTER EDEN

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: With reference to the above entitled matter, I have the honor to report as follows:

On Monday, May 28, Ambassador Winant, who has been most

¹ Printed from an unsigned carbon copy transmitted to Byrnes by Davies on July 3.

² Davies has supplied the information, in an interview with a Department of State historian on May 21, 1954, that this report was supplemental to an earlier oral report to Truman. See document No. 33, footnote 4.

considerate and helpful, presented me to the Foreign Minister at the Foreign Office.

Following the Prime Minister's suggestion, I covered the ground practically as in my discussions at Chequers, which were set forth in a previous report.³

In view of the Foreign Minister's connection with the San Francisco Conference, I spoke very frankly, in a friendly (and certainly not in critical spirit), of the unfortunate manner in which issues had arisen as between the Soviet delegation and the delegations of Britain and the United States, and the overwhelming majority of the United Nations. Quite apart from the facts, it gave ground for the Soviets' suspicion that not only was the United Nations opposed to them on a question of long avowed principle, to wit: the destruction of Naziism; but also that the leadership of the opposition to the Soviets resided in the United States and Great Britain.

Regardless of the friendly intent of these delegations to use the Argentine situation, in order to serve the Soviet desire to have additional votes for White Russia and the Ukraine,⁴ the manner in which the situation developed, (involving as it did a complete change of front in the policy of the United States as to the Argentine), undoubtedly served to give the impression that the United States and Britain were "ganging up" against the Soviets.

Eden replied that Molotov seemed to have left in good humor, and apparently no serious harm had been done. I replied that while I might be mistaken, I did not concur in that conclusion. The Soviets had already been greatly disturbed by recent events, culminating in the death of President Roosevelt. There had developed cumulatively a series of situations which had aggravated and tested their confidence. The Polish discussions, lend lease, matters connected with Rumania and Hungary, and situations which had developed in military operations, and alleged lack of compliance with the military agreements at Yalta,⁵ had caused them grave concern. It was not so much the facts, but their construction of the facts, which threatened a reappraisal of their entire policy. It was also, in my opinion, characteristic of the Soviets, as was illustrated in August 1939 when they suddenly entered into a non-aggression pact with Germany, once they made up their minds, to act quickly and without any previous indication of such action. There existed, in my opinion, a very serious deterioration in the relations between the Big Three. That condition existed, and could not be discounted because of Molotov's good humor and pro-

³ Document No. 33.

⁴ See *The United Nations Conference on International Organization: Selected Documents*, pp. 316-325, 403-407, 409-410; Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 280-282.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 985-987.

fessional attitude. There was grave danger that allied unity might be seriously impaired if not destroyed unless they were convinced that there was no implacable hostile intent as to the Soviets.

In the discussion of Soviet fears and suspicions which then developed, Eden agreed generally with me as to the "legacies of suspicion", which were a constant background in our relations.

He agreed heartily that every possible effort should be exhausted in an effort to compose differences, and reestablish confidence. For without unity, of course, he said, another war was inevitable.

TITO—TRIESTE, AND YUGOSLAVIA

The newspaper accounts of yesterday and today in connection with the delicate situation in Trieste, I said, had disturbed me. I asked what had happened in connection with the cabled request which the President had sent to the Prime Minister,⁶ that great care should be taken by General [*Field Marshal*] Alexander as Allied Commander, that nothing should be done which might involve the United States in a war with Yugoslavia unless it were perfectly clear that they had attacked us, in which case the President would feel that we would be justified in using force to throw them back.

Eden said that the Prime Minister, he knew, had given direct orders to General Alexander to arrive at such an agreement with Tito as would protect the situation along the lines the President desired. He called in one of his associates immediately, and when it appeared the matter was still unsettled (General Alexander, I gathered, being somewhat reluctant to recede from the position which he had taken), Eden gave peremptory instructions that the matter be settled at once, and that General Alexander be so directed.

Later I discussed it with Ambassador Winant, who immediately followed it up and advised me that it had been done.

MATTERS EXPLORED

We discussed at some length the problems which had developed in Germany.

In connection with the retirement of the armed forces into the zones of occupation, as agreed upon, I told Eden that in my opinion the President would require our armed forces to so retire in the near future, and probably before the coming meeting. This, I assumed, would be done in conjunction with similar action by the British forces, as the Combined Chiefs of Staff would decide. Eden, in contradistinction to Churchill, said nothing as to the desirability of delaying such action.

Eden considered that as to Germany it was necessary to have agreement as to inter-allied policies, and as to their administration

⁶ Not printed.

and machinery, as soon as possible. It would be unfortunate if in the different zones occupied by the four allies, there would not be uniformity in matters of administration and treatment of the German population, war prisoners, displaced persons, or in connection with their attitudes toward the civilian population or local governments. If these matters were not agreed upon through the decisions of the Military Commanders comprising the Berlin Allied Central Control Commission, they should be determined at the forthcoming meeting.

The matter of feeding the populations not only of Germany and Austria, but of Europe, was a very grave and serious situation, in his opinion. It was very important to have an agreement with the Soviets that food from the "granaries" of Germany, which were largely in the Soviet zone, should be also available for the populations in the other occupied zones.

The same necessity for arriving at an understanding and agreement existed as to Austria. Here the same problem was presented as in the creation and recognition of interim governments, in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria. Agreements should be had which would assure cooperation of the Allies through the Allied Control Commission. Here, as in the Balkans, it was necessary to define the control to be exercised, and particularly the extent of the control which would accrue to the British and American representatives.

Another serious question which might be considered was the matter of Peace Treaties with minor enemy or other states, providing for the withdrawal of Russian armies of occupation; or the withdrawal of British and American forces from Italy. The withdrawal of both Russian and British forces in Iran was a similar case.

I rather gathered that the British looked with favor upon some arrangement for recognizing Russia's need for access to warm water, both by way of access through the Baltic as well as through the Dardanelles.

I was impressed with the fairness, objectivity, and well-balanced attitude of Eden.

I cannot conclude this report without again referring to Ambassador Winant. He impressed me very much. He has a great deal of information with reference to all these matters, which I think it would be very valuable to you to have at the coming Conference.

Attached hereto is a list of matters which Mr. Eden gave to me in connection with subjects which might be considered at the coming meeting.⁷ I do not comment on certain matters as the attitude of their Foreign Office appears from the statement of the questions.

With great respect, I am [etc.]

[JOSEPH E. DAVIES]

⁷ See the enclosure to document No. 145.

II. FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS AND APPOINTMENT OF DELEGATIONS

No. 35

740.00119 Potsdam/6-645

*The Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) to the Ambassador in the Soviet
Union (Harriman)*

[Translation]

PERSONAL AND
TOP SECRET

Moscow, May 26, 1945.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Today, during the conversation between Marshal I. V. Stalin and Mr. Hopkins ¹ it was mentioned with regard to a place for the pending meeting of the Heads of Government of our countries that in the message of I. V. Stalin to President Truman the region of Berlin was spoken of. For the purpose of accuracy I must tell you now that mention was made of this area for a meeting not in the above mentioned message but in my answering telegram to Mr. Joseph Davies who, referring to his conversation with the President, recently raised the question of a meeting of the two heads of Government and also of a place of this meeting.²

Sincerely yours,

V. MOLOTOV

¹ For an account of Hopkins' conversation with Stalin regarding a meeting of Heads of Government, see *ante*, p. 28. Churchill, in a message to Stalin sent on the same day, May 26, regarding the disposition of the German Fleet, suggested to Stalin that the question of the German Fleet "should form part of the general discussions which ought to take place between us and President Truman at the earliest possible date". See document No. 141. Stalin replied to Churchill on May 27 as follows (text from *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 360):

"Mr. Hopkins, who has arrived in Moscow, on behalf of the President has suggested a meeting between the three of us in the immediate future. I think that a meeting is called for and that the most convenient place would be the vicinity of Berlin. That would probably be right politically as well.

"Have you any objections?"

For Churchill's reply to this message, see document No. 39.

² Copies of the Davies-Molotov correspondence referred to have not been found.

No. 36

Leahy Papers : Telegram

The President's Adviser and Assistant (Hopkins) to the President ¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 28 May 1945.

PRIORITY

Personal and top secret for the President from Hopkins.

We had another long talk with Stalin tonight ² the details of which I will report fully in the morning.³ He again indicated that he was anxious to meet you at any time you wished and said that in the suburbs of Berlin there would be adequate quarters for such a meeting. As he appeared desirous of getting your views you may wish to advise me whether you are willing to come to the Berlin area. Assuming that in the meantime the Control Council has been set up and our forces stationed in that area. Do you want me to tell him that you would like to meet around the 15th of July. I think Stalin would like to have the meeting at an earlier date because of the many pressing problems to be decided. . . .

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² i. e., May 27.

³ The telegraphic report referred to is not printed. For a detailed memorandum of the conversation, see document No. 25.

No. 37

Leahy Papers : Telegram

President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill ¹[Extract²]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 28 May 1945.

48. . . .

.

Stalin has informed me through Mr. Hopkins that he would like to have our three party meeting in the Berlin area and I will reply that I have no objection to the Berlin area.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² For the first two paragraphs of this message, omitted here, see document No. 142.

No. 38

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*The President to the President's Adviser and Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 28 May 1945.

274. Your messages 262101² and 272211³ received.

You may inform Stalin that I perceive no objection to meeting in the Berlin area and that about the 15th of July appears to be a practicable date for me.⁴

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² Not printed.

³ Document No. 36.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 53.

No. 39

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 29th May 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 58.

Your 48.²

I have sent the following telegram to Premier Stalin:

"1. Your message of May 27.³ I shall be very glad to meet you and President Truman in what is left of Berlin in the very near future. I hope this might take place about the middle of June.

2. Have repeated this telegram to President Truman who has informed me that this point was raised in your talks with Mr. Hopkins. All good wishes. I am very anxious to meet you soon."⁴

PRIME

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² Document No. 37.

³ See document No. 35, footnote 1.

⁴ Cf. *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 361.

No. 40

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 29 May 1945.

49. Your No. 58² received. I am now making a study of a possible date for our three party meeting and hope to have further information on the subject in the not distant future.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Document No. 39.

No. 41

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*The President's Adviser and Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*¹

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 30 May 1945.

PRIORITY

(Personal and top secret for the President from Hopkins.)

At our meeting this evening² Stalin said he would be ready to meet you and Churchill in Berlin area any time after June 27 and that therefore the date about the middle of July was satisfactory to him.

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. Text communicated to the Secretary of State by Leahy in a memorandum of May 31 (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/5-3145).

² See *ante*, p. 53.

No. 42

Truman Papers

*Marshal Stalin to President Truman*¹

[Translation]

Secret and personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to President H. S. Truman.

Mr. Hopkins has transmitted [to] me today your proposal regarding the meeting of the three.² I have no objections against the proposed by you date—July 15th.

[Moscow,] May 30, 1945.

¹ Russian original, accompanied by this translation, transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

² See document No. 38.

No. 43

740.00119 Potsdam/6-645

*Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

[Translation?]

TOP SECRET

[Moscow, May 30, 1945.²]

For Prime Minister Churchill from Stalin:

I have received your message of May 29th.³ A few hours after I had received it Mr. Hopkins was with me and told me that President

¹ Printed from a copy of a courtesy copy received by the American Embassy at Moscow on June 1.

² So dated in Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 581, and in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 362.

³ See document No. 39.

Truman thinks the most convenient date for a meeting of the three would be June 15th.⁴ I have no objection to that date if you also agree to it.

I send you my best wishes.

⁴ The following note by Charles E. Bohlen, dated June 1, is typed on the source copy:

"I called Mr. Pavlov to verify the question of the date of the meeting. He confirmed that both Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov and himself had clearly understood that the President desired it around the middle of July.

"After verifying the text of Marshal Stalin's message to Mr. Churchill, Mr. Pavlov telephoned back to say that in the original there was no mistake and the date had been clearly written July 15th and not repeat not June."

The correct date was in the message as received by Churchill. See Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 581.

No. 44

Leahy Papers : Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman ¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 31 May [19]45.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 60.

1. I am hoping that you will soon be able to let me know your date for the meeting of the three in Berlin. As you can imagine, many of my plans depend upon it at the present time.

2. I had agreeable talks with Mr. Davies, which he will report to you ² when he returns. I may say however at once that I should not be prepared to attend a meeting which was a continuation of a conference between you and Marshal Stalin. I consider that at this victory meeting, at which subjects of the gravest consequence are to be discussed, we three should meet simultaneously and on equal terms.

3. There are always plenty of opportunities for private discussion between the heads of governments at these meetings while the preliminaries are being arranged and the agenda fixed. I am also hoping to have the pleasure of meeting you for the first time.

PRIME

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² See document No. 33.

No. 45

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

[WASHINGTON,] 1 June 1945.

51. Your number 60.² Marshal Stalin has informed me that he is agreeable to having our forthcoming meeting in the vicinity of Berlin about July fifteenth, which date also seems to be possible from the point of view of my domestic duties. I am looking forward with pleasure to seeing you at that time and with confidence that the meeting will produce results of great value to the future of our world.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Document No. 44.

No. 46

Truman Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Marshal Stalin*¹TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 1 June 1945.

Number 278, personal and top secret, from the President for Marshal Stalin.

Thank you for your message dated May thirtieth² in regard to the date of our forthcoming tripartite meeting.

I have informed Prime Minister Churchill that you and I are agreeable to meeting in the vicinity of Berlin about the fifteenth of July.

TRUMAN

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. Paraphrase incorporated into a letter of June 2 from Harriman to Molotov for delivery to Stalin.

² Document No. 42.

No. 47

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 1 June 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 63.

1. I will gladly come to Berlin with a British delegation but I consider that July 15, repeat July the month after June, is much too

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

late for the urgent questions that demand attention between us, and that we shall do an injury to world hopes and unity if we allow personal or national requirements to stand in the way of an earlier meeting. Although I am in the midst of a hotly-contested election, I would not consider my tasks here as comparable to a meeting between the three of us. I have proposed June 15, repeat June the month before July, but if that is not possible why not July 1, 2, or 3?

2. I have sent a copy of this message to Premier Stalin.²

² See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 362.

No. 48

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 1 June 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 64.

1. I have been much occupied the last few days by the formation of our very complicated government, which is now completed. I have made it clear that nothing in the British election will prevent the meeting of the three major powers at the earliest possible date.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

No. 49

Truman Papers

*Marshal Stalin to President Truman*¹

[Translation]

Personal and secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to President H. S. Truman.

I have received your message of June 2nd [1st].²

I have already written to you³ that I agree to the date July 15 as an entirely suitable date for the meeting of the three.

[Moscow,] June 3, 1945.

¹ Russian original, accompanied by this translation, transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

² Document No. 46.

³ See document No. 42.

No. 50

860c.01/6-445: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman ¹[Extract ²]

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 4 June 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret.
No. 72.

4. I am particularly anxious for the conference ³ to resume, especially with the invited delegates, before we meet, because I am sure more business will be done between "The Three", as Stalin calls us, in a fortunate hour than can be wrangled out with Molotov and the Ambassadors, try they ever so skilfully.

5. You have no doubt seen my No. 63 ⁴ about the date of our next meeting. I am sure you understand the reason why I am anxious for an earlier date, say the 3rd or 4th. I view with profound misgivings the retreat of the American Army to our line of occupation in the Central Sector, thus bringing Soviet power into the heart of Western Europe and the descent of an iron curtain between us and everything to the eastward.

I hoped that this retreat, if it has to be made, would be accompanied by the settlement of many great things which would be the true foundation of world peace. Nothing really important has been settled yet and you and I will have to bear great responsibility for the future.

I still hope therefore that the date will be advanced. However, if this cannot be, I accept July 15. In either case it would be necessary to bring with me Mr. Attlee, the leader of the Socialist Party in Great Britain. He is, as you know, in full agreement at the present time with our foreign policy, but the United States and Soviet Russia have a right to know that they are dealing with the whole of Britain, whatever our immediate party future may be.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels. A courtesy copy was forwarded to the Acting Secretary of State by the British Minister at Washington on June 5 (file No. 860c.01/6-545).

² For paragraphs 2 and 3 of this message, see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 582.

³ Of the Polish Commission at Moscow, i. e., Harriman, Clark Kerr, and Molotov.

⁴ Document No. 47.

No. 51

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 5 June 1945.

61. Replying to your 63² and paragraph 5 of your 72³ in regard to the forthcoming meeting, I find, after full consideration, that July 15 is the earliest date that is practicable for me to attend. Arrangements are therefore being perfected for me to proceed to the vicinity of Berlin to arrive on July 15.

.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Document No. 47.

³ Document No. 50.

No. 52

740.00119 Potsdam/6-645

*Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

[Translation?]

TOP SECRET

[Moscow,] June 5, 1945.

PERSONAL

Arising from your message² on the desirability of transferring meeting of the Three to an earlier date than July 15th, I should like to say once again that the date of July 15th was proposed by President Truman; and I expressed agreement with that date. Inasmuch as correspondence is taking place between you and President Truman on this subject at the moment, I shall refrain from making any new proposals about the date of our meeting.

¹ Printed from a copy of a courtesy copy received by the American Embassy at Moscow.

² See document No. 47.

No. 53

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 6 June 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman, personal and top secret, Number 75.

Your Number 61.² I accept July 15 and am telling Stalin.³

.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² Document No. 51.

³ See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 363.

No. 54

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 7 June 1945.

62. Your No. 75² is received and I appreciate your agreement with my proposed date.

Mr. Davies has reported fully to me upon the matters discussed.³ Engagements made and the accumulation of important matters incident to the close of the fiscal year made it impossible for me to meet earlier than July fifteenth.

Your position as to the simultaneous character of the first meeting as reported by Mr. Davies I can readily understand and gladly concur with it.

The cooperation which I am assured you will extend connected with the purposes which I had in mind and which you appreciate and understand will be a helpful contribution to unity.

The discussions of the specific situation explored by Mr. Davies and Mr. Eden have also been fully reported⁴ and have been helpful to me. Thank you and Foreign Minister Eden for your courtesies to him.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Document No. 53.

³ See document No. 33.

⁴ See document No. 34.

No. 55

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 9 June [19]45.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 82.

While I have agreed in principle to our triple meeting in Berlin on July 15th, I hope you will agree with me that the British, American and Russian delegations shall have entirely separate quarters assigned to them and have their own guards, and that there shall be a fourth place prepared in which we meet to confer. I could not accept as at Yalta the principle that we go to Berlin, over which it is agreed we are to have triple or with the French quadruple parity, merely as guests of the Soviet Government and armies. We should provide

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

everything for ourselves and be able to meet on equal terms. I should like to know how you stand about this.

PRIME

No. 56

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 11 June 1945.

67. Your 82.² I am in agreement and will instruct Eisenhower to make the necessary arrangements to accomplish your expressed desires.³

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Document No. 55.

³ On June 12, in telegram No. W-15519, General of the Army George C. Marshall sent to Eisenhower the text of the final paragraph of document No. 55, prefaced with the following instruction (Department of the Army Files):

"The PRESIDENT directs that you make necessary advance arrangements to accomplish the desires expressed in the following quoted message from CHURCHILL with which he is in agreement."

No. 57

J. C. S. Files

The Head of the British Joint Staff Mission (Wilson) to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 12th June, 1945.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL. You will remember that at the end of the last C. C. S. Meeting you suggested that we ought to exchange ideas on the agenda for any Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting that might possibly be arranged in connection with the forthcoming meeting of the Big Three.

I communicated your views to the British Chiefs of Staff who now tell me that they agree entirely. Indeed they have carried the matter a step further forward and would like to suggest that the opportunity of the meeting of the three Heads of State should definitely be taken to hold a Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting.

As regards the meeting of the three Heads of State, which as you know is now fixed for the 15th July, I can now say that on the Prime Minister's instructions the British Chiefs of Staff will be in attendance throughout, and in the course of this meeting they agree that tripartite meetings with the Russians are likely. The British Chiefs of Staff propose however to take only very small staffs to Germany.

[No. 57]

With regard to meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff would like to propose that these take place in London before the meeting of the three Heads of State. They suggest that about three or four clear days might be allowed for work.

They tell me that they will be letting me have their views on the subjects for discussion very shortly. Obviously the various aspects of the war against Japan, including Russian participation, will form the main item.

Yours sincerely

H MAITLAND WILSON

No. 58

Leahy Papers : Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman ¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 14 June 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 88.

1. As our conference beginning on July 15 at Berlin will probably be continuing before the British election results are made known, I think it well to bring with me Mr Attlee, the official leader of the opposition, in order that full continuity of British policy may be assured. I have informed Premier Stalin of my intention in similar terms.²

2. I am looking forward very much to meeting you.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels. A courtesy copy was forwarded to the Acting Secretary of State by the British Minister at Washington on June 15 (file No. 841.00/6-1545).

² See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 364.

No. 59

Leahy Papers : Telegram

President Truman to Marshal Stalin ¹

[WASHINGTON,] 14 June 1945.

290. . . .²

I have every confidence that a continuation in the future of our friendly understanding cooperation will meet with the same success in preserving peace and international good will as did our common effort in the war against the Nazis.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² For the text of the paragraph omitted here, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 247.

I am looking forward with much pleasure to meeting you in the near future and discussing fully our common problems.

No. 60

Leahy Papers : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[Moscow,] 14 June 1945.

Personal and top secret for the President from Harriman.

I am wondering whether there is anything you wish me to take up with Marshal Stalin in regard to the arrangements for your forthcoming meeting. I had assumed that General Eisenhower would be instructed to work out the arrangements in Berlin with Marshal Zhukov, on the other hand there will undoubtedly be some matters which will have to be discussed in Moscow in order that appropriate instructions may be sent Zhukov.

From my experience with the last two meetings,¹ the Russians will probably be asking me shortly for information as to your plans. They will also wish to know who[m] you intend to bring so that they may select the members of their party[.]

¹ i. e., the conferences at Tehran and Yalta.

No. 61

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 14 [15] June 1945.

293. Replying to your 141505,² Eisenhower has been directed to make advance arrangements for accommodations and conference space for American members of the forthcoming conference.³ He has not yet been informed of the names or number of Americans who will be in my party. I intend to take with me my Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State with his assistants, two or three other officials of high rank, servants, secret service men, etc.

As soon as the number and names are known, I will send them for your information.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² Document No. 60.

³ See document No. 56, footnote 3.

[No. 61]

No. 62

Truman Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 15 June 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret.
Number 89.

I suggest that we use code word TERMINAL for the forthcoming Berlin conference. Do you agree?²

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels. A courtesy copy was forwarded to H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, Department of State, by Michael Wright, Counsellor of the British Embassy at Washington, on June 15 (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/6-1545).

² Churchill made the same suggestion on June 15 to Stalin, who replied affirmatively on the same day. See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. 1, p. 364.

No. 63

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

[WASHINGTON,] 15 June 1945.

74. Your number 89² meets with my approval.³

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Document No. 62.

³ Leahy notified the Secretary of State on June 15 that the President had approved the code word TERMINAL for the forthcoming tripartite conference (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/6-1545).

No. 64

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 15 June [19]45.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret.
Number 92.

1. During the progress of our conference from July 15th onwards, the King will be travelling in France and Germany inspecting his troops and I understand General Eisenhower hopes he will visit SHAEF. His Majesty desires to come to Berlin for a day. He would not, of course, take any part in our discussions. My idea is he would arrive in the British Sector and, if convenient to Marshal Stalin, would lunch with the Russians. In the evening there would

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

be a dinner in the British Sector at which you and he as heads of states, and Stalin would meet. The King would leave early the next morning to continue his inspection. The reason why I have been led to suggest that he would not have a meal with you is because we hope you will almost immediately afterwards be in London, where he is waiting to entertain you. If however it is desired that he should attend luncheon the next day at the American Headquarters, nothing would please him better. The interruption of our main discussions would be very slight and Committees of Foreign Secretaries and so forth could go on all the time. His Majesty would take the opportunity of his visit to give a number of decorations to various officers of the Allied Forces, and I think it might be an occasion for rejoicing.

2. I have sent the same news, *mutatis mutandis*, to Stalin.² Pray let me know what you think about this so that I may be in a position to advise His Majesty.

PRIME

² See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 365. For further Churchill-Stalin messages on this subject, see *ibid.*, pp. 369-371.

No. 65

J. C. S. Files

The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the Head of the British Joint Staff Mission (Wilson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 15 June 1945.

MY DEAR FIELD MARSHAL: Referring to your letter of 12 June,¹ after considering the matter therein presented, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff think it inadvisable for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to meet in London prior to the meeting of the Heads of State. It is agreeable to them to stop in London after completion of the meeting of the Heads of State in case it appears at that time that a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is required.

If, after considering the above, the British Chiefs of Staff still feel there are matters they wish to take up with the U. S. Chiefs of Staff prior to the meeting of the Heads of State, it is suggested that these be handled through the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, with the possible presence of one or more of the British Chiefs, the presence of the latter to be kept out of the press.

Yours sincerely,

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

¹ Document No. 57.

No. 66

740.0011 E. W./6-1545 : Telegram

*The Political Adviser for German Affairs (Murphy) to the Director of European Affairs (Matthews)*¹

SECRET

PARIS, June 15, 1945—10 p. m.

3612. (For Matthews from Murphy. No other distribution.)

General Eisenhower has telegraphed Deane² that he is sending to Berlin on June 17 a group of officers and enlisted personnel to hold preliminary conference with representatives of Marshal Zhukov for the purpose of making necessary advance arrangements for the meeting in Berlin on July 15. The arrangements would contemplate accommodations, signals, movement into Berlin of necessary US troops and supplies simultaneously with our withdrawal from Russian zone, and security measures. Deane is requested to ascertain if Marshal Zhukov will designate representatives to discuss this matter.

¹ Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Jefferson Caffery, American Ambassador to France.

² Eisenhower's telegram is not printed.

No. 67

Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference

Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Page)

Moscow, June 15, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Present: The Ambassador
Mr. Page
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Postoev

The Ambassador stated that he wished to bring up the subject of the preparation for the forthcoming Berlin meeting. General Deane had received instructions from General Eisenhower to obtain permission for an advance group to proceed to Berlin on June 17 to make preliminary arrangements. The Ambassador said that he desired to leave with Mr. Vyshinski a copy of General Deane's letter¹ on the subject and to state that he was always prepared to discuss the matter with Mr. Vyshinski.

E[DWARD] P[AGE, JR.]

¹ Not printed.

No. 68

740.0011 E. W./6-1545

The Acting Secretary of State to the President's Naval Aide (Vardaman)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1945.

DEAR CAPTAIN VARDAMAN: In accordance with your request, I append hereto a memorandum for the President, together with a tentative list of State Department personnel, whose presence at the forthcoming meeting of heads of government will, we believe, be helpful to the President.

Faithfully yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

[Enclosure]

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your request I attach a tentative suggested list of State Department personnel whose presence at your forthcoming meeting with the heads of government will, we believe, be helpful to you. This tentative list has been approved by Secretary Stettinius at San Francisco.

JOSEPH C. GREW

[Subenclosure]

CONFIDENTIAL

SUGGESTED LIST OF STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL TO ASSIST
THE PRESIDENT AT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF HEADS OF
GOVERNMENT

Number

- | | |
|---|---|
| (1) The Secretary of State | |
| Special Assistant (Mr. Robert Lynch) | |
| Assistants: (Mr. Charles Noyes, Mr. Hathaway Watson,
Mr. Wilder Foote) | |
| Military Aide (Major Lloyd Tyson) ¹ | 6 |

¹ Attached to the covering letter to Vardaman is the following manuscript note by Matthews: "I cleared this with San Francisco by phone this morning. The Secretary's Assistants were added at the Secretary's request."

Lynch, Noyes, Watson, and Tyson, however, were not actually included in the United States Delegation since the incoming Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, who took office on July 3, appointed a number of new officials in his immediate office who were added to the Delegation list. Cf. document No. 118.

	<i>Number</i>
(2) Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mr. William L. Clayton)	1
(3) Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs (Mr. James Clement Dunn)	
and/or	
Director, Office of European Affairs (Mr. H. Freeman Matthews)	2
(4) The Department's White House Liaison Officer—Russian Specialist and Interpreter (Mr. Charles E. Bohlen) Second Russian Specialist and Interpreter (Mr. Llewellyn Thompson or Mr. Edward Page)	2
(5) Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy— For general financial and economic questions—(Mr. Emilio Collado)	1
(6) Chief, Division of Central European Affairs—German Political Questions (Mr. James W. Riddleberger)	1
(7) German Economic Specialist—Reparations (Mr. Emile Despres)	1
(8) Chief, Division of Southern European Affairs ² —Balkan and Italian Questions (Mr. Cavendish W. Cannon)	1
(9) Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs—For Persian, Turkish, Levant and Palestine Questions (Mr. George V. Allen)	1
(10) Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs—(Mr. John Carter Vincent)	1
(11) Special Assistant to Mr. Dunn on Japanese Affairs—(Mr. Eugene Dooman)	1
(12) Adviser on European Advisory Commission—(Mr. Philip Mosely) (Mr. Mosely likewise is a Russian and German Specialist)	1
(13) Secretary General of Delegation (Mr. Charles Yost)	1
(14) Secretarial and stenographic staff	6
	<hr/>
Total	26

² So listed, although Cannon had been assigned as First Secretary at Lisbon effective April 18.

No. 69

740.00119 (Potsdam)/6-1645 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*TOP SECRET
URGENT

SAN FRANCISCO, June 16, 1945.

12. To the President from Stettinius, San Francisco.

Mr. Grew informs me that the State Department sent you yesterday a tentative list of State Department personnel to attend the forthcoming Big Three meeting.¹ The list is tentative because I would like to discuss with you, while you are in San Francisco, the size and make-up of your party to be sure that the number of State Department people I bring conforms with your own thinking.

Perhaps we can find an opportunity to talk about the matter out here for a few minutes before we make the list final.

¹ See the subenclosure to document No. 68.

No. 70

500.CC/6-1645

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State[Extracts ¹]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 16, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: President Truman;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew

I called on the President in his study in the White House at 6:50 this evening and took up the following matters:

3. I said to the President that the Secretary would be very glad to know if he had approved the list of personnel from the State Department, which we had recommended to him to accompany him to the meeting of the Big Three.² The President said that he had not seen the list, and I replied that I had sent it to him a day or two ago. He showed me the pile of papers on his desk and said he assumed it was somewhere in that pile, but at any rate, he would be satisfied with our recommendations, and this matter also he wished to leave entirely to the Secretary's discretion.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

¹ For another extract from this memorandum, see document No. 157.

² See the subenclosure to document No. 68.

No. 71

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 16 June 1945.

76. Replying to your No. 92,² I will be very pleased to agree to any arrangements you may make to accomplish His Majesty's desires during his projected visit in Berlin.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Document No. 64.

No. 72

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 16 June 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 93.

I see reports in the papers that you propose to stop in Paris and see General de Gaulle before coming on to the conference at Berlin. President Roosevelt promised me on several occasions that he would not visit France before he visited Britain. I am sure you will bear this in mind in any decision you may take.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels. A courtesy copy was forwarded to the Acting Secretary of State by the British Minister at Washington on June 18 (file No. 811.001 Truman, Harry S./6-1845).

No. 73

740.0011 E. W./6-1645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

PLAIN

LONDON, June 16, 1945.

6104. Sequence of events connected with Churchill's invitation to Attlee as leader of the opposition to attend Three Power Conference was as follows: (1) On Thursday Churchill announced to Commons that he had invited Attlee to accompany him. (2) On Thursday evening Harold Laski, Chairman of Labor Party, issued following statement: "It is of course essential that if Mr. Attlee attends this gathering he shall do so in the role of an observer only. Obviously it is desirable that the leader of the party which may shortly be

elected to govern the country should know what is said, discussed and agreed at this vitally important meeting. On the other hand the Labor Party cannot be committed to any decisions arrived at for the Three Power Conference will be discussing matters which have not been debated either in the Party Executive or at meetings of the Parliamentary Labor Party. Labor has a foreign policy which in many respects will not be continuous with that of a Tory dominated coalition[;] it has in fact a far sounder foreign policy. It is therefore essential that though Mr. Attlee should attend the Three Power talks Labor and he should not accept responsibility for agreements which on the British side will have been concluded by Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister. It is essential also that Mr. Churchill himself, Marshal Stalin, and President Truman should be fully aware of the position". (3) Yesterday the following letters were exchanged between Churchill and Attlee settling the whole issue: Mr. Churchill's letter says "I now send you a formal invitation to come with us to the forthcoming tri-partite conference in the near future. Since I announced this intention to Parliament I observe that a statement was made last night by Professor Harold Laski, the Chairman of the Labor Party, in which he said 'It is of course essential that if Mr. Attlee attends this gathering he shall do so in the role of an observer only.' His Majesty's Government must of course bear the responsibility for all decisions but my idea was that you should come as a friend and counsellor and help us on all the subjects on which we have been so long agreed and have been known to be agreed by public declaration. In practice I thought the British delegation would work just as they did at San Francisco except that as I have already stated you would not have official responsibility to the Crown otherwise than as a Privy Councillor. Merely to come as a mute observer would I think be derogatory to your position as the leader of your party and I should not have a right to throw this burden upon you in such circumstances. I hope, however, I may have your assurance that you accept my invitation". Mr. Attlee replied "I thank you for your letter of today's date. I had already on your informal intimation to me of your intention to invite me as the leader of the Labor Party to accompany you to the prospective conference in Berlin consulted my principal colleagues in the House of Commons. They agreed with me that the offer should be accepted on the basis which you have set out in your letter. There was never any suggestion that I should go as a mere observer. I have therefore the pleasure of accepting your invitation. There seems to me to be great public advantage in preserving and presenting to the world at this time that unity on foreign policy which we maintained through the last five years. I do not anticipate that we shall differ on the main lines of

policy which we have discussed together so often. I understand of course that responsibility must rest with the Government but I take it that we should consult together upon the issues that arise in order to present a policy consonant with the views of the great majority of the people of this country. The parallels which you draw to the arrangements at San Francisco are I think apposite. I appreciate that you have made this offer in view of the special conditions existing at the present time and that I should not base any claims to a precedent on the fact of its having been made". (4) Laski said last night "Everything has now been satisfactorily cleared up. Mr. Churchill had not made the position quite clear in the House of Commons, but now with the exchange of letters and now that the sphere of responsibility has been defined the position is entirely satisfactory".

WINANT

No. 74

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 17 June 1945

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 94.

Following is repetition of a telegram concerning "TERMINAL" which I have today sent Marshal Stalin:

"1. It is most important that the exact venue of the forthcoming conference should be settled as soon as possible since much preparatory work will be necessary.

2. I feel very strongly, and I am sure you will agree, that on this occasion the Russian, American and British delegations should each have separate enclaves, and that they should make their own arrangements for accommodation, food, transport, guards, communications, etc. I suggest that, in addition, there should be a fourth place in which the three delegations could meet to confer. It would be much appreciated if the Soviet Government would make arrangements for this common meeting place.

3. President Truman is in entire agreement with the above proposal.

4. I should therefore be glad if you would let me know as soon as possible the area in the vicinity of Berlin that you propose for the conference, and the precise localities within that area that it is proposed to allot to the Soviet, American and British delegations respectively. On receipt of your reply, I would immediately instruct Field Marshal Montgomery to send advance parties to make all arrangements for the British delegation, in consultation with Marshal Zhukov and General Eisenhower.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

5. I hope that it will be borne in mind that we will require the use of an airfield as near as possible to our delegation area. We could, if convenient, share an airfield with the Americans." ²

² Cf. *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 367.

No. 75

Truman Papers : Telegram

President Truman to Marshal Stalin ¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 18 June 1945.

PRIORITY

Number 297. Top secret and personal from the President for Marshal Stalin.

Your message of June 16 regarding Allied occupation of agreed zones in Germany and Austria ² is received.

I have issued instructions to the American commanders to begin the movement on July 1 as requested by you. It is assumed that American troops will be in Berlin at an earlier date in sufficient number to accomplish their duties in preparation for our conference.

TRUMAN

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. Text repeated *in extenso* for Churchill's information in Truman's telegram No. 77 of July 18 to Churchill (Leahy Papers).

² Not printed herein. Truman and Churchill had told Stalin on June 14 and 15, respectively, that they were prepared, among other things, to issue instructions for the withdrawal of American and British forces in Germany to their allotted zones of occupation in accordance with arrangements, to be worked out by the commanders in Germany, which would provide for the simultaneous movement of American and British garrisons into Greater Berlin. Truman had suggested June 21 as the date on which American forces would begin their withdrawal. Stalin had replied to Truman and Churchill on June 16 and 17, respectively, that mine-clearing operations in Berlin would not be completed until late in June and that Zhukov and other Soviet military commanders, who had been summoned to Moscow, would not be able to return to Germany until June 28-30. Stalin had therefore suggested beginning the withdrawal of American and British forces to their zones of occupation on July 1. See Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 303-305; Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 606-608; *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, pp. 365-367, and vol. II, pp. 245-248.

No. 76

Leahy Papers : Telegram

President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill ¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 18 June 1945.

78. The press reports referred to in your 93 ² are not authentic.

I shall keep the promise made to you by President Roosevelt if conditions at the time make it practicable.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Document No. 72.

May I express a hope that the contents of this message will not get into the papers.

No. 77

Leahy Papers : Telegram

The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower) to the Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane)

TOP SECRET

FRANKFURT, 19 June 1945.

URGENT

Ref no S 91539 top secret to Military Mission to Moscow for Deane for his eyes only repeat for information to AGWar for Marshall for his eyes only from ETOUSA Fwd sgd Eisenhower.

Reference your MX 24720 of 18 June.¹

In view brief time remaining before meeting of President Truman with Marshal Stalin, it is imperative that the reconnaissance group proceed to Berlin at once to survey facilities available locally for his accommodation and that of his party so as to assemble and move necessary men and supplementary equipment to Berlin and complete essential preparations by mid July. This cannot be postponed until return of Marshal Zhukov to Berlin on 28 June. Arrangements for a meeting of this magnitude cannot be made in two weeks time.

Absolutely necessary that General Parks and reconnaissance party of approximately 50 officers, 175 enlisted men and 50 vehicles with necessary transport aircraft go to Berlin tomorrow and be shown United States sector by Soviet Commander acting in Marshal Zhukov's absence. Based on Parks' reconnaissance the necessary troops and material to install communications, messes, quarters and other facilities must be sent to Berlin as and when determined necessary by Parks.

Continuing unrestricted running rights on *Autobahn* Dessau Berlin for vehicles and Air Way Halle Berlin for transport aircraft will be required effective tomorrow. This is a matter of urgency and agreement must be reached at once if target date for big three meeting is to be met.

Conference with Marshal Zhukov or his senior staff officers is not necessary for such administrative details and formal meeting with the Marshal can be deferred until 28th or 29th June as Antonov suggests.

¹ Not printed.

No. 78

Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Soviet Assistant Foreign Commissar (Vyshinsky)

SECRET
No. 347

Moscow, June 19, 1945.

DEAR MR. VYSHINSKI: General Eisenhower has been charged with the responsibility of making the arrangements in Berlin for the housing, feeding, and establishing communications for the American delegation at the meeting in mid-July.

He wishes to send his representatives headed by Major General Parks, including 50 officers, 175 enlisted men and 50 trucks to Berlin tomorrow, June 20. The truck transportation and the moving of the enlisted men will go by the Dessau-Berlin *Autobahn*, whereas General Parks and the officers will go to Berlin in 5 transport planes via Stendal.

In addition, General Eisenhower would like to have freedom of movement on the Dessau-Berlin *Autobahn* and permission to fly the necessary aircraft at will from Halle to Berlin, effective June 20 and thereafter, in order to bring the necessary supplies to Berlin.

General Deane has brought this matter up with the Soviet General Staff who have indicated that General Eisenhower's representatives should not go to Berlin until Marshal Zhukov arrives there on the 28th of June.

I am sure you will understand that this meeting involves a great deal of detailed preparation and a movement of a rather large party from the United States to Berlin. The slightly more than two weeks available after June 28 will not allow sufficient time to make adequate preparations.

I ask that the Soviet Government authorize the Soviet General Staff to approve General Eisenhower's request as indicated above and that General Deane be notified tonight so that the movement may start tomorrow.

Sincerely yours,

W. A. HARRIMAN

[No. 78]

No. 79

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 20 June 1945.

At the joint request of General Marshall and Mr. Hopkins I have today sent the following to Harriman:²

"The President has in mind bringing his American Chiefs of Staff with him to Berlin. Please ascertain Stalin's reaction to having the Chiefs of Staff come with the President, you Harriman having in mind the possible Japanese reaction.

Early information on this question is desired."

Both Marshall and Hopkins doubt the advisability and see no necessity of a staff meeting in Germany at this time and fear that Stalin would not like it.

¹ Then at Olympia, Washington.

² As telegram No. 300.

No. 80

Leahy Papers : Telegram

The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane) to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower)

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 20 June 1945.

URGENT

To ETOUSA Forward for Eisenhower and AGWar for General Marshall's eyes only from Deane top sec MX 24738.

Antonov informed me this morning that the question of advanced preparations in Berlin for the forthcoming conference was a matter that was being decided between our governments, indicating that he could not change his former decision to postpone General Parks reconnaissance until after Zhukov got back to Berlin on about 28 or 29 June. Harriman has already taken this question up twice with the Foreign Office, once on 15 June¹ when the original request was received to have General Parks authorized to go to Berlin and again last night² upon receipt of ETOUSA Fwd S 91539.³ We shall continue our efforts to arrange for General Parks reconnaissance.

¹ See document No. 67.

² See document No. 78.

³ Document No. 77.

No. 81

Leahy Papers : Telegram

The Commanding General, Sixth Army Group (Devers) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)

TOP SECRET

FRANKFURT, 20 June 1945.

PRIORITY

To AGWar for Marshall for his eyes only from ETOUSA Forward S-91755, signed Devers. Top secret.

All attempts to secure permission for General Parks and party to proceed to Berlin immediately for reconnaissance and making necessary arrangements for conference have been unsuccessful. Mission Moscow advising that Antonov will not agree to Parks entry prior to 28 or 29 June.

Reference MX 24738 20th June from Military Mission Moscow.¹ It is considered highly improbable that adequate arrangements can be completed by date now scheduled for conference if initiation of work is deferred until 28th or 29th June. Accordingly recommend that steps be taken through governmental channels to secure necessary Russian permission.

¹ Document No. 80.

No. 82

Leahy Papers : Telegram

The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane) to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower)

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 20 June 1945.

URGENT

To ETOUSA forward for General Eisenhower and info to AGWar for General Marshall's Eyes Only signed Deane top sec MX 24748 copy sent all.

Harriman spoke to Vyshinski last night¹ concerning the necessity for General Parks' reconnaissance party to proceed to Berlin at once in order to make arrangements for the American delegation at the Berlin July conference.

Vyshinski said it would be futile for Parks and his party to go to Berlin prior to Marshal Zhukov's return, as there were no Soviet officers left in Berlin who could act with authority on the questions that would arise. Vyshinski told Harriman that the Soviet authorities were fully aware of the problems involved and that as soon as Zhukov

¹ See document No. 78.

returns to Berlin, intensive preparations for the conference would start. Vyshinski assured Harriman that there was no need for worry.

The British have had the same response to their efforts to introduce a reconnaissance party to Berlin. Field Marshal Montgomery is sending a letter to Zhukov on the same subject through the British Mission in Moscow.

Harriman is again going to see Vyshinski, who is apparently to have an active part in the conference preparations. At this meeting Harriman will attempt to obtain the Russian views on the arrangements for the conference.

Harriman may also suggest that he and Vyshinski go to Berlin together after General Parks has been in Berlin for a few days, in the hope that he can obtain Soviet decisions on the spot that will assist General Parks in carrying out his mission.

You may wish to send a message to Zhukov which would include the major questions to which you require immediate answers. If so, I will attempt to get such message to Zhukov here in Moscow through Antonov.

No. 83

740.0011 EW/6-2045

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 20 June 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the following message be dispatched, without delay, to Ambassador Harriman for delivery to the Soviet Foreign Office: ¹

"This Government is informed that the Soviet authorities are withholding permission to allow the advance U. S. party to enter Berlin in order to get underway with the numerous arrangements necessary for U. S. communications and personnel for the coming conference of the Heads of State. If arrangements required for the President of the United States are to be completed by the proposed date, they should already have been initiated.

It is requested that the necessary permission be granted at once in order that all required preparations may go forward. In case this permission cannot be granted, it may be necessary to delay the proposed date of the meeting and, at the present time, there appears no

¹ The message which follows was dispatched verbatim to Harriman in telegram No. 1342 of June 20 and a paraphrase was incorporated into Harriman's note No. 348 of June 20 to Vyshinsky.

explanation can be given for such a delay except the lack of permission from the Soviet authorities for us to make the necessary arrangements.”

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff[:]
WILLIAM D LEAHY
Fleet Admiral, U. S. N.
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

No. 84

Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference

Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union
(Page)

SECRET

MOSCOW, June 21, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Present: The Ambassador
Mr. Page
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Postoev

The Ambassador stated that it was earnestly desired to send the advance group of American officers and men to Berlin as soon as possible in order to make preparations for the forthcoming conference.

Mr. Vyshinski stated that he had just received the Ambassador's letter on this subject¹ and that he unfortunately had not had time to discuss the matter with the Ambassador until this moment. He wished now to hand the Ambassador a reply to his letter. A copy of this reply is attached hereto.

Mr. Vyshinski briefly reviewed the contents of the letter and stated that the reason for the postponement of the sending of the American group was due to the fact that Marshal Zhukov was in Moscow and would not return to Berlin until June 28. However, if the United States Government desired to start the preparations for the meeting in the absence of Marshal Zhukov, it of course could send its advance group whenever it so desired.

Mr. Vyshinski said that it was necessary to know as soon as possible exactly how many officers and men would make up the advance group. The Ambassador said that insofar as he was aware, the group would be comprised of 50 officers, 175 enlisted men, 50 trucks and 5 airplanes. He said that he would check again with General Deane and communicate with Mr. Vyshinski.

¹ See document No. 83, footnote 1.

The Ambassador made inquiries as to what arrangements the Soviet Government had in mind for the meeting. Mr. Vyshinski stated that he could not give any definite information at the present time. However, it was proposed to assign a special zone, like at the Crimean Conference, to each delegation. There would thus be three zones for the British, American and Soviet delegations. Since Berlin was completely destroyed, it had been decided to hold the conference in Babelsberg near Potsdam. The Conference itself would be held in the Crown Prince's palace. Mr. Vyshinski continued that when the American advance party arrived it would be given further information.

(NOTE: After consultation with General Deane, Mr. Page telephoned Mr. Postoev and told him that the advance group and all the circumstances in connection with its travel to Berlin was fully set forth in the Ambassador's letter to Mr. Vyshinski of June 19.² On June 22 Mr. Page transmitted to Mr. Postoev the information contained in the Military Mission's telegram of that date.[])³

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Soviet Assistant Foreign Commissar (Vyshinsky) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

SECRET

Moscow, June 21, 1945.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Acknowledging receipt of your letter of June 20 concerning permission for the first American group to go to Berlin in connection with the preparation for the forthcoming meeting, I wish to draw your attention to the following.

In his letter addressed to Marshal Stalin of June 17,⁴ the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. W. Churchill, stated that he intended to send its [to?] Berlin advance groups in order that they might make preparations for the British delegation in consultation with Marshal Zhukov and General Eisenhower. In this message Mr. Churchill stated that President Truman fully agreed with his proposal concerning preparatory measures for the meeting in Berlin.

Having these circumstances in mind, the Soviet Government proposed to time the meeting of the advance English and American groups with Marshal Zhukov on June 28. If President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill find that this meeting may take place in Berlin in the absence of Marshal Zhukov, there is no objection on the part of the Soviet Government to sending to Berlin your advance groups any time at the discretion of the American Government.

² Document No. 78.

³ Not printed.

⁴ See document No. 74.

These groups will be met by the Soviet Command in Berlin which will render them the necessary assistance.

With respect to the threats contained in your letter to state, in case the requested permission is not received, that the Soviet authorities did not give such permission on time, this threat is ill advised. The Soviet Government has no intentions to limit the freedom of the American press, but it considers it necessary to draw the attention of the American Government to the fact that there is a press in the Soviet Union which will be able to give a proper reply to such a type of statement in the American press.

Please accept [etc.]

A. Y. VYSHINSKI

No. 85

740.00119 (Potsdam)/6-2145: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)*¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 21 June 1945.

ROUTINE

(Personal and top secret for Admiral Leahy from Harriman.)

I will attempt to get Stalin's reaction to the question contained in your Number 300² as soon as possible. In the meantime for your information I am personally quite sure that Stalin not only will have no objection to the Chiefs of Staff accompanying the President but will wish to have intimate talks with the President about the military operations in the Far East which would be possible only if the Chiefs of Staff accompany him. Stalin will of course wish first to discuss the political aspects.

Am I right in assuming that the Chiefs of Staff will wish to bring only a small staff and not such large numbers as at Yalta? In this connection I feel it important that General Deane, Admiral Maples and General Ritchie come from Moscow and I hope that General Marshall will decide to bring General Roberts, recently returned to Washington from Moscow, if his new duties do not prevent, as the question of lend lease aid may also come up. I feel it would be helpful if one of the following were also present: General Spalding, General York, or General Wesson.

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. Printed from a courtesy copy forwarded to the Department of State.

² See document No. 79.

No. 86

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)*¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 22 June 1945.

ROUTINE

(Personal and top secret for Admiral Leahy from Harriman.)

I asked Molotov last night to obtain Marshal Stalin[']s reaction to the question raised in your 201603 June 20² regarding the Chiefs of Staff coming to Berlin, explaining the reason for the request.

Molotov said he would consult Marshal Stalin at once and inform me but that he felt quite sure that Stalin would have no objection.

In my talk with Vyshinski yesterday, reported in State Department cable Number 2216 June 21,³ regarding the immediate entry into Berlin of the United States advance group under General Parks, he requested information urgently as to the number and character of the President[']s party in order that the Soviets may know what will be required in the way of accommodations.

It would be most helpful if you could give me promptly for guidance an approximate number of those who are probably coming, including the Chiefs of Staff, with the number and rank of officer[s] they will be bringing and the number of political advisors, also the estimated number of clerical staff. I realize that this can only be a first estimate subject to change.

It seems clear that Vyshinski will be directly involved in all arrangements for the meeting.

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² See document No. 79.

³ Not printed. This telegram reported the conversation recorded in document No. 84.

No. 87

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 23 June 1945.

302. Replying to your 221600² the President's party as now constituted totals 37 and comprises Admiral Leahy, Messrs. Byrnes,

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² Document No. 86.

Hopkins,³ Vinson,⁴ Ross, Admiral McIntire and the Military and Naval Aides, eight other junior Army and Navy officers, one civilian secretary, seven secret service and twelve servants. The Secretary of State's party totals 26⁵ and includes Stettinius, 19 Assistant Secretaries and Foreign Service officers, plus 6 stenographers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff party of 75 includes in addition to the Chiefs, 10 admirals or general officers, 13 colonels or Navy captains, 9 junior officers, 8 warrants and 32 enlisted. The composition and numbers of the advanced party communication personnel and air crews can be obtained from Eisenhower's headquarters.

I am reasonably certain the President and Churchill will wish to bring their Chiefs of Staff.

The question in my 201603⁶ was as to whether or not Stalin would prefer that staff meetings be not held in Berlin because of implications.

³ With respect to the tentative inclusion of Hopkins in the United States Delegation, see Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 915-916.

⁴ With respect to the tentative inclusion of Vinson in the United States Delegation, see Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 332; cf. p. 327. With respect to the possibility of including Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., in the Delegation, see *ibid.*, p. 327.

⁵ See document No. 68.

⁶ See document No. 79.

No. 88

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 23 June 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret No. 97.

I suggest that following the precedent of the Crimea Conference the press should not be allowed at TERMINAL, but that photographers should be permitted.²

I have repeated this telegram to Marshal Stalin.³

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² The source copy bears the following manuscript notation: "Sent to P[resident] & suggested that he concur."

³ See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. 1, p. 370. Stalin accepted the suggestion in a message to Churchill of June 27. See *ibid.*, p. 371.

[No. 88]

No. 89

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

[OLYMPIA, WASHINGTON,] 23 June 1945.

81. Your 97.² I am in agreement.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via the White House Map Room and Navy channels.² Document No. 88.

No. 90

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 23 June 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret.
Number 98.Reference my 94.²

a. Stalin has replied as follows:

"I have received your message of the 17th June.³

1. The delegations will be housed as you propose in your message and as was arranged in the Crimea. Each delegation will have its own closed territory under a regime regulated at the discretion of the head of the delegation. The area in which the three delegations will be housed is Babelsberg, southeast of Potsdam. There will be a fourth building for the joint sessions—the Palace of the German Crown Prince in Potsdam.

2. Marshal Zhukov will be in Berlin on June 28th. The advance parties of Montgomery and Eisenhower should be sent in about this time to reconnoitre and take over the buildings in Babelsberg. Montgomery's and Eisenhower's advance parties will be able to obtain on the spot all the necessary information and further details about the buildings from General Kruglov, who is known to your people from Yalta.

3. Not far from the area where the delegations will be housed there is a good airfield in the small village Kladow, which could also be used as a landing ground."⁴

b. I have instructed Montgomery to send an advance party to Babelsberg as soon as possible to reconnoitre and take over the buildings allotted to the British Delegation.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.² Document No. 74.³ See document No. 74.⁴ Cf. *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. 1, p. 368. Stalin's reply to Churchill was dated June 18.

No. 91

Leahy Papers : Telegram

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (Crawford) to the Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane)

TOP SECRET

FRANKFURT, 23 June 1945.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

S-92697 to Military Mission Moscow for Deane repeated for information to AGWar for Marshall's eyes only from SHAEF Main from Crawford signed Tedder cite SHGDS. Top secret.

Parks returned this afternoon. Crown Prince Palace Potsdam lends itself admirably for neutral meeting place. The residential section Babelsberg fronting on Griebnitz Sea has been evacuated of Germans and being renovated by Soviets for billeting conferees.

Three compounds therein have been laid out in which each nation will have absolute rights and responsibility as to security, messes, etc. About 70 residences in US compound.

Parks inspected one which Colonel General Kruglov suggests for the President. It is spacious, although old fashioned, and is believed adequate. Compound will house about 500 with some expansion possible by tentage. Space for Service Units, Press Camp, and overflow needed elsewhere, and can be found in Zehlendorf, a district in Berlin in US sector of Tripartite Division.

Parks cordially received by Colonel General Kruglov and every facility and request granted within his power.

Following matters beyond his authority need favorable action at once:

a. Authority to reconnoiter vicinity Zehlendorf for additional camp sites and billets.

b. Authority to operate supply vehicles over Halle-Berlin *Autobahn* without special permission in each case.

This to be in addition to vehicles now in Babelsberg, for which authority to operate over that route was given by Marshal Zhukov's Chief of Staff today.

c. Authority to increase size of Parks' party now at Babelsberg as deemed advisable by this headquarters without further reference to Soviet authorities. This must be expedited as Signal Technicians, including Major General Stoner who was sent by War Department especially for conference installations, should go to Babelsberg for survey not later than 25th June.

Stoner considers proposed site favorable for establishing satisfactory signal communications.

No. 92

Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Soviet Assistant Foreign Commissar (Vyshinsky)*TOP SECRET AND URGENT
No. 366

Moscow, June 23, 1945.

DEAR MR. VYSHINSKI: General Deane has just received a message from General Devers¹ who is in charge of the American forces during General Eisenhower's absence, informing him of the results of General Parks' visit to Berlin. General Parks states that he was very cordially received by Colonel General Kruglov who granted General Parks every facility within his power.

There are certain matters which Colonel General Kruglov said were not within his competency to decide, and therefore, I am submitting them to you for your approval.

1. Authority is requested to reconnoiter the vicinity of Zehlendorf for additional camp sites and billets. Zehlendorf is a district in Berlin in the area which the United States troops are eventually to occupy, and it is believed that some overflow space will be needed beyond that which has been provided in the Babelsberg district.

2. Authority is requested to operate supply vehicles over the Halle-Berlin *Autobahn* without special permission in each case. These vehicles to be in addition to those vehicles now in Babelsberg since authority for them to operate over the Halle-Berlin *Autobahn* has already been given by Marshal Zhukov's Chief of Staff.

3. Authority is requested to increase the size of General Parks' party now at Babelsberg as deemed advisable by General Devers without further reference to Soviet authorities. There is quite a task involved in getting communications set up. Major General Stoner and a group of signal technicians have been sent from Washington to establish communications, and it is necessary that they should be in Berlin by the 25th of June.

I would be very grateful for prompt action in this matter so that the preparations which have started so well can continue.

Sincerely yours,

W. A. HARRIMAN

¹ The message referred to appears to be the telegram to Deane from Major General Crawford (document No. 91) printed *supra*.

No. 93

740.00119 Potsdam/6-2545

*Memorandum by the Commanding General, United States Sector, Berlin District (Parks)*EXCERPT FROM MAJOR GENERAL PARKS' REPORT OF VISIT TO BERLIN, JUNE 24, 1945¹

1. Following instructions given me on 16th June, 1945, I departed at 1600 hours Frankfurt time, 22nd June and arrived at Tempelhof Airdrome 1900 hours Moscow time, same day. Moscow time is now used in Berlin by the Soviet troops and I agreed to its use by the U. S. forces in Berlin in order to avoid confusion. It is one hour earlier than double summer time used at Frankfurt and three hours earlier than Greenwich time.

2. Lt. Gen. Vlasik, Deputy to Col. Gen. Kruglov, met me at the airdrome. Gen. Kruglov is Chief of Security for Marshal Stalin and in charge of arrangements for the Big Three conference. Permission was given to set up the radio communications to establish direct contact with SHAEF, ample transportation was provided, and aircraft and crews were cared for at Tempelhof airdrome.

3. My staff and I were conducted by Gen. Vlasik to Babelsberg by way of Unter den Linden, Brandenburg Gates, Tiergarten, and the Grunewald Forest. I conferred immediately with Gen. Kruglov at

¹ The extract printed here constitutes the first enclosure *in toto* to an informal letter of June 25, 1945, from Robert Murphy, the Political Adviser in Germany, to H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, Department of State. Murphy's letter contained the following summary: (

"You will note therefrom, in the event this information has not already been conveyed to you, that the Schloss Cecilienhof, formerly the property of the Crown Prince, situated on the Jungfern See in the Neuer Garten, Potsdam, has been selected as the meeting place. The U. S. billet compound is in Babelsberg. We have now succeeded in establishing in that compound 50 officers, 175 enlisted men, and 50 motor vehicles, and the Russians have been informed that we would provide everything for ourselves. They had intended to provide service and act as hosts. According to General Parks, the house selected for the President, as well as the other houses, is none too satisfactory. While he was there the Russians were in the process of emptying them completely of their contents, the German residents having very recently been evacuated. All this household equipment was being loaded on trucks and dispatched to an unknown destination and other trucks were arriving with new furniture requisitioned from other houses. General Parks, however, believes that while the house allocated for the President is old-fashioned and not what he would like to see the President have, it probably will do for the purpose. He said that from what he could ascertain during the course of his visit, no other convenient arrangement would probably be possible in the short time remaining. As the compound is situated on the Griebnitz See, the President could proceed to the Schloss Cecilienhof if he wished by speedboat.

"I enclose a town plan of Potsdam [not found] indicating the conference site and the U. S. billet site. The British billet site is immediately north of ours, and the USSR billet site immediately north of the British, all of them in Neu Babelsberg."

his Headquarters, and also present were Gen. Vlasik and Maj. Gen. Gorlinsky, Commandant and Security Officer, Greater Berlin District, who was in charge of arrangements at Yalta.

4. General Kruglov stated that the Russians had intended to be the hosts and had selected Babelsberg to accommodate the official parties because it was a community of fairly pretentious residences and had comparatively light bomb damages. He also pointed out that it was convenient to the Crown Prince's palace at Potsdam, where the conference itself is to be held and that the routes from the billeting area to the conference building were easily protected and policed.

5. He stated that as his authority extended to arrangements for the conference only and these arrangements were confined to the Babelsberg-Potsdam area, he could not discuss entry into the Berlin District itself by U. S. troops. General Kruglov promised to arrange for me a courtesy call on Marshal Zhukov's Chief of Staff, or his representative, at which meeting I might ascertain whether or not any instructions had been received from Moscow permitting discussions relative to Berlin itself.

6. Gen. Kruglov indicated on a map the billet area which would be turned over to the U. S. for exclusive occupancy of conferees, administration, and guard. Everything within this area would be the responsibility of the U. S. and outside of this compound the Soviets would maintain security and guard. I pointed out that approximately 400 to 450 officials would be present with a corresponding number of service personnel to cater to them; that, in addition, there would be well over 1,000 other troops for the supply, maintenance, guard, etc. and that I felt the area was too small. Gen. Kruglov expressed great surprise at the size of the U. S. party and stated that Mr. Hopkins had estimated the number to be 150. He had not received a list of U. S. officials but assumed that approximately the same number would come that came to Yalta; they had planned to run the conference similar to the Yalta meeting and were installing approximately the same signal communication facilities.

7. When I pointed out to Gen. Kruglov that it would be necessary to begin truck movements of tentage, rations, petrol, etc. at once and that we desired to use the route Dessau-Berlin, he stated this would be satisfactory and would be arranged. I also stated that we desired to institute air courier service between Berlin-Halle-Frankfurt at once, using the direct route to Halle and he said this would be satisfactory.

8. Gen. Kruglov stated that since the airfield at Gatow (Kiadow) was only six miles from Potsdam, it had been designated as the terminus for the conference. I stated that we had no objections if it was adequate for C-54s and that I would have our air officer inspect it.

I have no report from my air officer yet, but I flew over Gatow leaving Berlin and it appears even better than Tempelhof as to approaches, length of runways, etc. Both are sod fields.

9. Gen. Kruglov stated that he would have the motor echelon of my recee party met the following day at the junction of the Berlin *Ringbahn* and the Dessau *Autobahn*.

10. My staff and I were conducted to a billet by Gen. Kruglov. It was completely outfitted with beds and clean linen. Since our rations had not arrived from the airdrome, he sent over rations for us and a cook to assist our cook. He also sent me a case of wine and General Vlasik sent me some champagne. The meal was delicious.

11. Maj. Gen. Gorlinsky conducted me through the billets of the U. S. compound on Saturday morning, June 23. There are about 70 houses, well built, but old, with one to two baths each, and the Soviet authorities are in the midst of completely renovating them, promising to complete it. The majority are middle-class homes, a few being large enough for VIPs. The one earmarked for President Truman is old-fashioned, but spacious. Others suitable for the various high military and civil officers are nearby. They will be adequate for the short sojourn of the party, if the party is small. A hasty survey indicates that from 500-600 individuals can be housed, this figure including orderlies and mess attendants. There will not be enough houses if 450 officials arrive and although tentage can help to some extent, it is not a solution. The matter will be solved only if the U. S. Sector, Berlin District, or the Zehlendorf portion thereof, is turned over to us and the excess stationed therein.

12. I conferred again with Col. Gen. Kruglov at 1230. A telephone message was received during this conference that the motor serial of my recee group had arrived at the border and was in excess of the agreed 50 officers, 175 EM and 50 vehicles. I requested Gen. Kruglov to pass only the agreed number. It developed later in this conference that he could not give the authority which he had promised yesterday for our trucks to use the Dessau-Berlin *Autobahn* for purposes of resupply. He did say, however, that the Soviet authorities agreed to the use of the airdrome by our courier planes.

13. General Kruglov, at 1300 hours, escorted me through the Crown Prince's palace in Potsdam where the conference itself will be held. While I have not seen other conferences, Lt. Col. Pantuhoff, who is my interpreter, states that the facilities are infinitely better than at Teheran or Yalta. There is a large vaulted banquet hall in which a round table will be placed for the conference and there is space in the wings for offices, committee rooms, conference rooms, etc. The Soviet authorities have put the building and grounds in excellent shape.

14. As no information had been received as to visiting Marshal Zhukov's headquarters, I proposed to depart for Frankfurt at 1500 hours. Just before leaving for the airdrome, I received a message that Marshal Zhukov's Chief of Staff would meet me at the airdrome.

15. He met me at Tempelhof and I expressed my appreciation at his courtesy for coming to see me in order to save my time and thanked him for the cordial hospitality I had received from Col. Gen. Kruglov. I told him that the only difficulty I had at the moment was in operating trucks between Berlin and Dessau for supply of rations, gasoline, tentage, etc. He stated he had no authority for permitting more than 50 vehicles in the Russian zone but that the 50 which had entered Babelsberg would be permitted to operate between Berlin and Dessau for supply purposes. Feeling that Gen. Kruglov's statement was sufficient, I did not mention the matter of aircraft to him. However, as I was boarding my plane, and after the departure of the Chief of Staff, Gorlinsky and the Field Commander at Tempelhof stated it would be necessary to get permission for aircraft to return. After much discussion I told General Gorlinsky I would return and the courier plane would return, and that we would send a radio message for the information of Gen. Kruglov giving the ETA. I stated that the route would be direct from Halle to Berlin and that it would be impracticable for me to secure permission from Moscow every time a plane was flown to Berlin with supplies. He agreed that this advance notice of ETA would be satisfactory and said that agreement would be reached after my return to Berlin as to procedure thereafter, whereby no notice would have to be given.

16. We departed Tempelhof at 1600 hours, Moscow time and flew over Swan Island in the Havel River, the alleged home of Goebbels; with one or two exceptions, the houses on Swan Island are severely damaged. We flew the direct route from Berlin to Halle, observing the *Autobahn*. One arch bridge over a ravine had been blown, and there are at least five overhead bridges which have been dropped on the *Autobahn*. At 1645, Moscow time, I noted the head of the column of my motor serial on the *Autobahn* about three miles east of [the] Elbe River.

17. At Halle I stopped and gave instructions to my Chief of Staff and arrived at Frankfurt at 1745 Frankfurt time.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Recommend acceptance of the Crown Prince's palace at Potsdam as suitable for the Big Three conference.
2. Recommend that the Soviet plan for a compound of billets for the U. S. conferees at Babelsberg be accepted.
3. Recommend expedition of negotiations to make available U. S. Sector, Berlin District, for quartering and bivouacking of supply

troops, minor officials, press, etc. as there is no room for them at Babelsberg. If adjustment of all zones of occupation is not effected on 1 July, pressure should be brought to bear to permit erection of camps and bivouacs in Zehlendorf which adjoins Babelsberg and is sure to be part of the U. S. zone. We urgently require authority for *immediate* reconnaissance in Berlin.

No. 94

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)*¹

TOP SECRET
ROUTINE

Moscow, 24 June 1945.

(Personal and top secret for Admiral Leahy from Harriman.)

Molotov told me last night that he had consulted Marshal Stalin (re your White House Number 300 Navy Number 201630 June 20²) and that the latter had no objection whatsoever to the President bringing his Chiefs of Staff with him to Berlin.

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² See document No. 79.

No. 95

Leahy Papers : Telegram

The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane) to the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group (Bradley)

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, 25 June 1945.

To Bradley citing SHGSD and to General Marshall for his eyes only from Deane top sec MX 24794.

As indicated in my M-24786, this date,¹ immediately upon receipt of your S-92697² at 2050Z³ on the 23rd, I submitted your request to General Antonov. At the same time the Ambassador submitted the same request to Mr. Vyshinski of the Foreign Office⁴ who is to have charge of the arrangements in Berlin.

Sunday, 24 June, there was a victory celebration in Moscow and

¹ Not printed.

² Document No. 91.

³ i. e., 8:50 p. m., Greenwich Civil Time.

⁴ See document No. 92.

no work was done. Thus far we have not had a reply to your request despite constant pressure on our part.

We fully appreciate the importance of starting on the communication installations and will continue to use every means at our disposal to get Soviet approval.

No. 96

Leahy Papers : Telegram

The Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group (Bradley) to the Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane)

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

FRANKFURT, 25 June 1945.

From ETOUSA Fwd, S 93051 to for action US Mission to Moscow for Deane, to for information FAA, Fwd for Parks, FAA Main for Parks, and AGWar for Marshall for his eyes only, top secret signed Bradley cite SHGSD.

Parks unable to secure permission locally in Berlin to establish radio telephone and teleprinter terminal and relay points to connect with this headquarters.

Essential that immediate instructions are sent from Moscow to Berlin Commander to agree to installation of very high frequency telephone terminal in Berlin area at suitable location and relay point in vicinity of Luckenwalde (near Belzig). No physical wire telephone circuits exist at present on axis of communications westward of Berlin into either US or British occupied areas.

Imperative that action be taken to authorize local Soviet authorities arrange these and similar details. Dealing thru Moscow on such minute points is so time consuming and cumbersome that target date cannot be met unless rectified. Introduction of air staff and airdrome control personnel now held in abeyance awaiting reply to our S 92697 ¹ relative to increasing Parks' party.

¹ Document No. 91.

No. 97

Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Soviet Assistant Foreign Commissar (Vyshinsky)

URGENT AND TOP SECRET
No. 362a

Moscow, June 25, 1945.

DEAR MR. VYSHINSKI: I have received another urgent cable ¹ from General Eisenhower repeating the requests that I submitted to you

¹ Document No. 96.

in my letter of June 23 ² with regard to reconnaissance of Zehlendorf for additional camp sites, the use of the Halle-Berlin *Autobahn* without special authority in each case, and authority to increase the size of General Parks' party at Babelsberg.

The most pressing matter is the establishment of a very high frequency radio-telephone terminal and teletypewriter facilities in the Berlin area with a relay point in the vicinity of Luckenwalde near Belzig. These installations take considerable time, and we are afraid that if the installations do not start at once we will be unable to have them completed by the time the Berlin conference opens. Major General Frank B. [E.] Stoner and a special group of Signal Corps personnel have been sent from Washington to make the installation, and they are now waiting at Frankfurt for authorization to proceed to Berlin.

It would be very helpful if authority could be issued to the local Soviet Commander in Berlin to grant authority for such operations as are necessary in Berlin in preparation for the conference. As General Eisenhower points out, it is time consuming and cumbersome to have to obtain permission from Moscow in each instance regarding these inconsequential matters.

I would be most grateful for an early reply.

Sincerely yours,

W. A. HARRIMAN

² Document No. 92.

No. 98

Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference

The Soviet Assistant Foreign Commissar (Vyshinsky) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

[Translation]

TOP SECRET

Moscow, June 25, 1945.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: In reply to your letter of June 23 ¹ concerning the preparations for the forthcoming meeting, I wish to state the following.

1. Since Zehlendorf is in the zone which is subject to eventual occupation by the American forces the question regarding the inspection of the Zehlendorf area should be decided in accordance with the existing agreement on the taking over of the zones of occupation.

2. With respect to permission for unhindered movement over the automobile road Halle-Berlin of the American means of transport without inquiring in each separate case to the Soviet military authorities, and also permission to increase General Parks' party which

¹ Document No. 92.

is in Berlin, these questions may be considered after the arrival in Berlin of Marshal Zhukov.

Please accept [etc.]

A. VYSHINSKI

No. 99

740.00119 E. W./6-2545

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[Extracts ¹]

[WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: United States-French Relations

Participants: The French Ambassador, Mr. Henri Bonnet;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew.

.

The Ambassador then said that while he had no instruction from his Government he wished in his capacity as Ambassador responsible for the good relations between our two countries to express to me his concern at the present unfortunate trend of these relations. He said that it was the earnest desire of General de Gaulle and, as I well knew, of himself to bring France and the United States steadily closer together and he felt that the present trend is unfortunately in the other direction. This arises from a number of issues in which France has been given little satisfaction and public opinion in his country, knowing of these issues, is at present developing in a way not conducive to the improvement of our relations.

.

The fourth point is the fact that in spite of the feeling engendered by France's exclusion from the Yalta Conference and in spite of all that France has suffered during the war and of her vital interests in many of the subjects which are bound to be discussed at the coming meeting of the Big Three, including the occupation of Germany and Austria, reparations, the Far Eastern situation, et cetera, France had not been invited to attend that meeting. This exclusion of France has, of course, had a very painful effect in his country.

.

I listened carefully to the Ambassador's presentation and when he had finished I said that he knew very well the desire of the President

¹ For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 357, 616, and 637.

and myself for good relations between our two countries. The Ambassador asked me especially to bring to the President's attention the points that he had raised. I said that Mr. Stettinius would in all probability return to Washington this week and would probably be here before the President's return so that it might be the Secretary and not I who would discuss these matters with the President. I, of course, gave the Ambassador no assurances of any kind.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

No. 100

J. C. S. Files

The Acting Head of the British Joint Staff Mission (Colyer) to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 25th June, 1945.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL, In a letter dated 15th June¹ you communicated to Field Marshal Wilson the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You explained that you all felt it inadvisable for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to meet in London prior to the meeting of the Heads of State but said that you would be quite agreeable to stop there after the completion of TERMINAL if at that time a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff appeared to be required.

In the absence of the Field Marshal I am now writing to tell you a reply to the above has come in from London in which the British Chiefs of Staff make it clear that they have dropped the idea of a meeting in London and would like to suggest, with the Prime Minister's approval, that the Combined Chiefs of Staff hold their next meeting during the conference of the three Heads of State at TERMINAL. They propose to arrive at TERMINAL 15th July and hope that the United States Chiefs of Staff will also be arriving at the same time.

The Field Marshal has gone away on tour for four days. I should be glad therefore if you would let me know whether the above proposal is agreeable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

Yours sincerely,

DOUGLAS COLYER

¹ Document No. 65.

No. 101

Leahy Papers : Telegram

The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane) to the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group (Bradley)

[Extract 1]

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 26 June 1945.

URGENT

For General Bradley and to General Marshall for his eyes only citing SHGES [sic] from Deane top sec MX 24797.

We have already emphasized the importance of General Stoner's proceeding to Berlin for the signal installations when we asked for authority to increase Parks' group.

Upon receipt of your S 93051² last night, I again presented the matter to General Antonov and Harriman presented it to Vyshinski.³ I shall see General Antonov or his representatives today and press the matter further.

¹ The portion of the message omitted here summarizes document No. 98.

² Document No. 96.

³ See document No. 97.

No. 102

Leahy Papers : Telegram

The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane) to the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group (Bradley)

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 26 June 1945.

URGENT

To ETOUSA Forward for Bradley SHGSD and to AGWar for General Marshall (eyes only) from Deane top secret MX 24807.

This afternoon again took up the matters raised in S-93051¹ and your S-92967 [S-92697]² with Lieutenant General Slavin representing General Antonov. I am hopeful that we will be allowed to send in the communications installation personnel at once and hope to get an official approval by telephone tonight. Slavin asked me how many individuals were involved in the signal communications installation, and rather than delay by sending a cable to you to inquire, I told him 90 persons would be necessary, believing that this would

¹ Document No. 96.

² Document No. 91.

suffice prior to 1 July, when we can move in as many as desired incident to the occupation of our sector in Berlin. Also hope to get replies on question of reconnoitering Zehlendorf and changing air route from Stendal-Berlin to Halle-Berlin.

No. 103

Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference

The Soviet Assistant Foreign Commissar (Vyshinsky) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

[Translation]

URGENT AND SECRET

Moscow, June 26, 1945.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR, With reference to your letter of June 25¹ in which you point out that among the preparatory measures for the meeting the most urgent is the erection of a high-frequency radio telephone station and of a teletype system, the People's Commissariat has given instructions to the Soviet military organs in Berlin to get in touch immediately with General Parks on this matter and, after having fixed the number of the communications group headed by Major General Frank B. [E.] Stoner, to permit this group to proceed to Berlin.

Please accept [etc.]

A. VYSHINSKI

¹ Document No. 97.

No. 104

Leahy Papers: Telegram

The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane) to the Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Tedder)

[Paraphrase]

TOP SECRET
URGENT

Moscow, 27 June 1945.

MX 24829. From Deane and Gammell. Sent to SHAEF Main for Tedder; to Twenty-First Army Group for Field-Marshal Montgomery; to the Special Signals Office of the Air Ministry, London, for the British Chiefs of Staff; and to the Adjutant General, War Department, for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Copy to the War Department.

Marshal Zhukov asks urgently that information be transmitted to him immediately through your representatives at present in Berlin concerning the subjects which Field-Marshal Montgomery, General Clay, and their party will want to discuss with him. We have just

[No. 104]

received information that Zhukov will meet Montgomery, Clay, and party on Friday, June 29, in Berlin.

No. 105

The President to the Secretary of State

[Extract ¹]

INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI, June 27th, 1945.

DEAR ED: . . .

.

I wanted you to come with me to the meeting with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill which will take place next month. But, since I shall be away during the Congressional hearings [on the Charter of the United Nations], I have reluctantly agreed to your suggestion that you remain in Washington while I am away. . . .

.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

¹ For the full text of this letter, in which Truman accepted Stettinius' resignation as Secretary of State, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XIII, p. 15, from which source this extract is printed.

No. 106

740.0011 EW/6-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, June 27, 1945—8 p. m.¹

2297. Personal and top secret for the Secretary.

Have assumed that the President and you would wish me to be present at the meeting in Berlin because of my familiarity with a number of the matters which will be discussed particularly those concerning the Far East. I would appreciate your informing me in order that I may make my plans.

I suggest that I be instructed to get Vyshinski to go to Berlin with me for a day sometime before the meeting. Vyshinski has told me he is charged by the Soviet Govt with responsibility for the arrangements for the meeting. There may be some matters on which General Eisenhower's representative may have difficulty in obtaining satisfaction on a Soviet military level and on which I could assist in getting a decision from Vyshinski on the spot.

HARRIMAN

¹ Not received by the Department of State until 5 p. m., July 4.

No. 107

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*TOP SECRET
C. C. S. 880/3

[WASHINGTON,] 28 June 1945.

SIZE OF MILITARY STAFFS FOR TERMINAL

1. With reference to the memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff of 25 June,¹ it is the opinion of the United States Chiefs of Staff that large military staffs should not be taken to TERMINAL and that detailed discussions which will involve the need for a large staff on the order of OCTAGON and ARGONAUT should not be engaged in at that place. The United States Chiefs of Staff have not proposed to take with them more than very small staffs. Their understanding of the agenda proposed to date is such that they believe it should be handled quickly and easily without need for any large accompanying staff at the meeting. It is their view that in general subjects involving detailed studies and consideration should be handled within the normal mechanism of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. In case the understanding the British Chiefs of Staff have of the discussions to be engaged in is such as to require a considerable staff, the United States Chiefs of Staff would like to be informed on this matter in order that they may consider it further.

¹ Document No. 100.

No. 108

740.0011 EW/6-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State ad interim

SECRET

LONDON, June 29, 1945—7 p. m.

6566. FonOff today informed us that its personnel in the Brit delegation to the Big Three meeting will be: Eden; Cadogan; Strang; Clark Kerr; and certain specialists on individual problems. These are: Geoffrey Harrison (Germany and Austria); William Hayter (Balkans, Turkey and Hungary); Denis Allen (Poland and Czechoslovakia);] L H Foulds (Far East); Patrick Dean (legal); and representatives of the Economic and Reconstruction Depts. In giving us this information FonOff said it would appreciate learning names of Dept personnel to accompany American delegation.

WINANT

[No. 108]

No. 109

Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference

*Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the
Soviet Union (Page)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Moscow,] June 29, 1945.

MEMORANDUM [OF] CONVERSATION

Present: W. A. Harriman, American Ambassador
Edward Page, First Secretary of Embassy
A. Ya. Vyshinski, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign
Affairs
Postoyev, Soviet Interpreter

Subject: Berlin Meeting

The Ambassador stated that the composition of the President's party to the Berlin meeting would be very similar to that at the Yalta Conference. He then read him the names of the senior officials who would accompany the President.¹ He explained the few changes such as that of Mr. Vinson in place of Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Ross in place of Mr. Early. He stated that at the present time the total party amounted to 150 persons. He could not guarantee that this would not be increased; however, he felt sure that it would not be contracted. This group did not include personnel from General Eisenhower's staff which would have charge of communications, airfield maintenance and other technical matters.

Mr. Vyshinski thanked the Ambassador for this information and said that he had no questions to raise at this time. He said that he was planning to proceed to Berlin shortly before the meeting and that he would notify the Ambassador at a later date as to exactly when he was departing. He indicated that he would be pleased to have the Ambassador accompany him.

¹ See document No. 87.

No. 110

740.00119 EW/6-2945 : Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)
to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, June 29, 1945—8 p. m.

2325. Top sec from Pauley to the President.

I am bending every effort to have a proposed reparation plan to submit to you and the heads of Great Brit and Russia at your forth-

¹ Sent to the Secretary of State ad interim over the signature of Harriman.

coming meeting. Maisky representing USSR and Monckton representing UK expect to be at such meeting and naturally I hope to be there as per my conversation with you before leaving US. Accordingly I would appreciate your notifying the Army and having the Army advise me of arrangements to attend this conference for myself, Dr. Lubin and four others. Best regards.

No. 111

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 30 June 1945.

C. C. S. 880/6

SIZE OF MILITARY STAFFS FOR TERMINAL

We communicated the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff regarding the size of the military staffs for TERMINAL as set out in C. C. S. 880/3¹ to the British Chiefs of Staff who replied saying that they agreed that large military staffs would not be required at TERMINAL. The order of the staffs which they have in mind to take is approximately as follows:—

a. Each chief of staff will have with him, in addition to his personal staff, four or five staff officers.

b. In addition the secretariat will take with it enough personnel to provide for the normal administrative running of the conference.

¹ Document No. 107.

No. 112

740.00119 Control (Germany)/6-3045 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State ad interim

SECRET

HOECHST, June 30, 1945—8 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

87. With respect to the imminent implementation of the zones agreement¹ and the establishment of US theater organization, the Depts attention is invited to SHAEF-AGWar signals Fxcs 253 and

¹ i.e., the protocol signed at London, September 12, 1944, as amended by an agreement signed at London November 14, 1944. For texts, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2078; *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 118, 121.

SCAF 469 as well as signal from AGWar to SHAEF reference No. WX-23672 of June 28.²

For the Depts most secret information, following is the gist of yesterday's conference at Berlin between Generals Clay and Weeks and Marshal Zhukov.

Soviets desire as quick withdrawal as possible from remainder of their zone starting July 1. Following is program which US Command will endeavor to fulfill: July 1—Russians send in reconnaissance parties to twelve towns; July 2—reconnaissance parties to certain airfields; July 4—Allied withdrawal to be completed. There is to be a gap of some three to five kilometres between Russian advanced and Allied rear guards. Allied move into Berlin to start on last day of withdrawal, with entry on following day.

Following is program for occupation of Berlin sectors: July 1—ground reconnaissance; July 2—airfield reconnaissance; July 3—main bodies troops start moving in and complete move in on July 4.

With respect to roads, *Autobahn* Hanau-Magdeburg-Berlin would be used unrestrictedly by US and British troops. Russians did not agree for free use of Berlin-Frankfurt *Autobahn* and road agreement is subject to reservation for consideration in Control Council or consideration by govts.

With respect to rail transport, Soviets are not at present converting to Russian gauge railways west of Berlin. They agree to exclusive use by the US of standard gauge line Greene-Goettingen-Bebra and unrestricted use by the Allies of line Goslar-Magdeburg-Berlin.

It was agreed that all road, rail and air traffic on authorized routes would be free from border search or control by customs or military authorities. Traffic would have to conform, however, to Russian police control in the normal way. Zhukov promised that all reasonable requests for transport of US and British troops essential for preparations for the conference would be met. Cable service between Berlin and Frankfurt agreed upon.

With respect to air routes, Russians offered air lane of approximately twenty miles width from Berlin to Magdeburg and two lanes from Magdeburg to Frankfurt. For the conference Gatow Airfield would be controlled entirely on US-British basis. Tempelhof in the US zone would be available to the US. Soviets require one hour notifica-

² Not printed.

tion of each flight but acknowledgment of notification prior to flight not required.

After subsequent clearance with the Russians it is arranged that a token French force of one thousand will accompany US-British forces into Berlin, and French reconnaissance party will proceed to Berlin tomorrow.

Press release is being issued announcing that withdrawal from Russian zone will start July 1.

MURPHY

No. 113

Leahy Papers : Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman ¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 1 July 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal, private and top secret. No. 99.

Your Number 76.²

The King has now decided he must visit Ulster in the period during the Berlin conference and therefore your kind telegram on this subject would have no application. You will no doubt have received His Majesty's invitation to visit this island.³

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² Document No. 71.

³ Not printed.

No. 114

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 3 July 1945.

Pauley, Dr. Lubin and four assistants are authorized to report to President on proposed reparation plan during forthcoming meeting. Army has been notified.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

[No. 114]

No. 115

White House Files

*Memorandum by the Administrative Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Rigdon)*¹

[Undated.²]

LIST OF PRESIDENT'S PARTY
(For entire trip except as noted)

The President.

Honorable James F. Byrnes, The Secretary of State.

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the President.

Honorable Charles G. Ross, The President's Press and Radio Secretary.

Honorable Samuel I. Rosenman, Special Assistant to the President.³

Brigadier General Harry H. Vaughan, A. U. S., Military Aide.

Captain Alphonse McMahon, Medical Corps, U. S. N. R., Personal Physician.

Captain James K. Vardaman, Jr., U. S. N. R., Naval Aide.

Commander John A. Tyree, Jr., U. S. N., Assistant Naval Aide.
(Washington to Plymouth. Returned via air.)

Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, State Department.

Mr. Donald Russell, State Department. (Berlin to Washington).

Mr. Walter Brown, State Department. (Berlin to Washington).

Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, State Department. (Washington to Berlin.
Returned via air.)

Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen, State Department.

Major Nicholas A. Mitchell, A. C., A. U. S. (Berlin to Washington).
Assistant to Military Aide.

Lieutenant George M. Elsey, U. S. N. R., Map Room Watch Officer.

Lieutenant Julius C. Edelstein, U. S. N. R., Aide to Admiral Leahy.

Captain Frank H. Graham, AGD, A. U. S., Map Room Watch Officer.

Lieutenant William M. Rigdon, U. S. N., Personal Secretary to the
President and Secretary for Presidential Party.

Ensign Cecil M. Fleener, U. S. N. R., Assistant to Lieutenant Rigdon.

Ship's Clerk Edwin L. Hoying, U. S. N. R., Map Room Officer.

Mr. James J. Maloney, U. S. Secret Service.

Mr. George C. Drescher, U. S. Secret Service.

Mr. Walter A. Haman, U. S. Secret Service.

Mr. Elmer R. Hipsley, U. S. Secret Service.

¹ Printed from the fourth section of the "Log of the President's Trip to the Berlin Conference (July 6, 1945, to August 7, 1945)". See vol. II, p. 3.

² Obviously prepared after the conclusion of the Berlin Conference, but included here because of its relationship to the papers printed *infra*.

³ According to the Log, Rosenman did not arrive at Babelsberg to join the President's party until July 27. See vol. II, p. 21.

Mr. Daniel J. O'Driscoll, U. S. Secret Service.
 Mr. Albert R. Weir, U. S. Secret Service.
 Mr. Fred E. Canfil, U. S. Secret Service.
 William Belknap, Jr., CPhoM, U. S. N., Navy Photographer.
 Arthur S. Prettyman, CSt, U. S. N., President's Valet.
 Sotero Abiba, CSt, U. S. N., President's Mess.
 Cayetano Bautista, CSt, U. S. N., President's Mess.
 Federico Calinao, CSt, U. S. N., President's Mess.
 Amando Custodio, CSt, U. S. N., President's Mess.
 Pio Estrada, CSt, U. S. N., President's Mess.
 Mariano Floresca, CCK, U. S. N., President's Mess.
 Benjamin Licodo, Std1c, U. S. N., President's Mess.
 Candido Olivares, CSt, U. S. N., President's Mess.
 Celedonio Ordoná, CCK, U. S. N., President's Mess.
 Alfredo Orig, CCK, U. S. N., Head Boy, President's Mess.
 Jose Palomaria, CCK, U. S. N., President's Mess.
 Mr. Jack Romagna, Secretary to Mr. Ross. (Washington to Plymouth. Mr. Romagna remained in England for a visit.)

PRESS, RADIO AND PHOTOGRAPHERS' POOL

NEWSPAPERMEN*

Mr. Robert Nixon, representing International News Service.
 Mr. Merriman Smith, representing United Press.
 Mr. Ernest Vacarro, representing Associated Press.
 Mr. Morgan Beatty, representing all radio networks.

PHOTOGRAPHERS*

Mr. Carl Hugo Johnson and
 Mr. Albert Oeth, representing all newsreel companies.
 Mr. Francis I. Thompson, representing all still photographic services.

(Traveled in U. S. S. *Philadelphia*)

Major Arthur L. Gaskill, Signal Corps, A. U. S. (Photographer)
 Captain Henry N. Karlin, Signal Corps, A. U. S. (Photographer)
 First Lieut. Breder J. Petersen, Signal Corps, A. U. S. (Photographer)
 Second Lieut. Robert A. Wands, Signal Corps, A. U. S. (Photographer)
 M/Sgt. Kenneth W. Lang, U. S. A. (Photographer) (Berlin to Washington).

*By special arrangement between Secretary Ross, the White House Correspondents Association and the Press, Radio and Photographic Services, it was agreed that the news and photographic party accompanying the President would be limited to those listed herein; further, it was agreed that Mr. Beatty's material would be made available for all radio broadcasting companies; that Mr. Johnson's and Mr. Oeth's material would be pooled for all newsreel services; and that Mr. Thompson's pictures would be available to all photographic services. It was necessary to so limit the party because of space limitations in the *Augusta*. [Footnote in the original.]

No. 116

Leahy Papers : Telegram

The Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McFarland) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison Officer at Berlin (Lowry)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 3 July 1945.

WAR 26351. Top sec from Secretary Joint Chiefs of Staff to Parks for Lowry.

1. Further reference your V 25081,¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff Party in addition to those with you will comprise the following:

- (a) General G. C. Marshall
Colonel Frank McCarthy
Master Sergeant J. B. [W.] Powder
Lieutenant General J. E. Hull
Brigadier General G. A. Lincoln
Brigadier General V. J. Esposito
Colonel J. B. Cary
Major W. F. Finan
Warrant Officer R. G. Hickey
Warrant Officer E. E. Bright
Warrant Officer L. W. Thompson
General B. B. Somervell
Major General C. P. Gross
Brigadier General D. G. Shingler.
- (b) Admiral E. J. King.
Vice Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr
Rear Admiral M. B. Gardner
Navy Captain P. D. Stroop
Navy Captain A. S. McDill
Navy Captain H. R. Oster
Commander E. J. Gough
Lieutenant (Junior Grade) R. E. Morgan
Lieutenant (Junior Grade) F. V. O'Leary.
- (c) General H. H. Arnold
Major T. C. Sheffield
Major General Lauris Norstad
Brigadier General C. P. Cabell
Brigadier General G. C. Jamison
Colonel John Stone
Colonel F. M. Dean
Lieutenant Colonel H. Woodward
Lieutenant Colonel F. S. Righeimer ²
Warrant Officer A. B. Holladay
- (d) Brigadier General A. J. McFarland
Navy Captain C. J. Moore
Colonel C. R. Peck

¹ Not printed.

² In subsequent lists found in the J. C. S. Files, Righeimer's name was deleted and that of Warrant Officer A. J. LaFrance was added to the roster of the Joint Chiefs of Staff party.

Colonel C. H. Donnelly
 Lieutenant Colonel W. W. Chapman
 Captain E. Henly
 Warrant Officer J. J. Devenney
 Warrant Officer H. D. Anamosa
 Chief Yeoman E. J. Maurer
 Yeoman First Class D. C. Flickinger
 Yeoman First Class E. G. Peterson
 Yeoman First Class L. O. Flom
 Yeoman First Class F. E. Smith
 Yeoman First Class L. W. Karr
 Yeoman First Class J. R. Johanson
 Master Sergeant P. J. Levington
 Technical Sergeant H. J. Gambaccini
 Technical Sergeant J. W. Marvel
 Technical Sergeant J. J. Lucas
 Staff Sergeant A. Wolff
 Technician Third Grade C. H. Pfuntner
 Technician Third Grade A. Pollyea
 Technician Third Grade M. E. Schleider
 Technician Third Grade A. W. Brown
 Technician Third Grade W. J. Hanson
 Technician Fourth Grade L. H. Howard
 Technician Fourth Grade W. C. Ellegood
 Technician Fourth [Third] Grade P. P. Marchlenski
 Major H. H. Smellie
 Master Sergeant Jake Scott
 Staff Sergeant W. J. Paul, Jr
 Staff Sergeant T. R. Kehoe
 Staff Sergeant T. L. Montefront
 Sergeant G. J. Vaeth
 Sergeant Robert Mendlow
 Sergeant C. F. Mucidowski
 Sergeant Donald Watkins
 Corporal E. T. Filippelli
 Corporal W. A. Grimes

No. 117

J. C. S. Files : Telegram

The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane) to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower)

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, 3 July 1945.

To SHAEF Main for Eisenhower info AGWar for Marshall from Deane top secret MX 24883. Please pass following message to Colonel D E Lowry, JCS Representative who is in Berlin.

[No. 117]

Composition of party attending Berlin conference is as follows:

Ambassador William Averell Harriman,
 Ambassador Edwin William Pauley,
 Mr Edward Page Embassy First Secretary,
 Minister Isador Lubin,
 Mr H Marshall, Counsel for Reparations Commission,
 Mr J Parten, Chief of Staff aide of Reparations Commission, and
 two others from Reparations Commission who have not yet
 been designated.¹

Military personnel will be:

Major General J R Deane,
 Rear Admiral H L Maples,
 Brigadier General William L Ritchie,
 Lt Chase, USNR,
 Major Taylor and
 Lt Meiklejohn, USNR.

Lt Chase is an excellent Russian interpreter. . . .

¹ According to the Pauley-Lubin Report (see vol. II, pp. 940-941), Pauley was accompanied to Babelsberg by Lubin, Parten, Marshall, and Luther Gulick. The following additional officers assigned to the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations reported to Babelsberg in the course of the Berlin Conference: Moses Abramovitz, Francis W. H. Adams, Abram Bergson, Lieutenant Colonel G. S. Carter, Josiah E. DuBois, Jr., George H. Johnson, Ernst Mahler, Seymour J. Rubin, and Robert G. Sproul.

No. 118

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-445

Department of State Memorandum

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

REVISED LIST OF STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL TO ASSIST THE PRESIDENT AT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

	<i>Number</i>
(1) The Secretary of State	1
(2) Special Assistants to the Secretary (Mr. Ben V. Cohen, Mr. Donald Russell, and Mr. Walter Brown)	3
(3) Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mr. William L. Clayton)]	1
(4) Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs (Mr. James Clement Dunn)	1
(5) Director, Office of European Affairs (Mr. H. Freeman Matthews)	1
(6) The Department's White House Liaison Officer—Russian Specialist and Interpreter (Mr. Charles E. Bohlen)	

Number

Additional Russian Specialists and Interpreters (Mr. Llewellyn Thompson and Mr. Edward Page)	3
(7) Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy— for general financial and economic questions (Mr. Emilio Collado)	1
(8) Chief, Division of Central European Affairs—German Political Questions (Mr. James W. Riddleberger)	1
(9) German Economic Specialist—Reparations (Mr. Emile Despres)	1
(10) Chief, Division of Southern European Affairs ¹ —Balkan and Italian Questions (Mr. Cavendish W. Cannon)	1
(11) Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs—For Persian, Turkish, Levant and Palestine Questions (Mr. George V. Allen)	1
(12) Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs (Mr. John Carter Vincent)	1
(13) Special Assistant to Mr. Dunn on Far Eastern Affairs (Mr. Eugene Dooman)	1
(14) Adviser on European Advisory Commission (Mr. Philip Mosely) (Mr. Mosely likewise is a Russian and German Specialist)	1
(15) Secretary General of Delegation (Mr. Charles Yost)	1
(16) Army Liaison Officer (Colonel John Wise)	1
(17) Special Assistants (Mr. R. Borden Reams) (Mr. Wilder Foote)	2
(18) Administrative and secretarial staff (Mr. J. Langdon Ward) (Mr. Ralph Graham) (Mr. Hunter Martin) (Mr. Ralph Fratzke, London Embassy) (Mr. Ernest K. Griffin, London Embassy) (Mr. John Hrones, Paris Embassy) (Mr. Harold N. Waddell, Moscow Embassy) (Miss Cassie Connor) (Miss Lois Kevan) (Miss Theresa Takacs) (Miss Dorothy Yovich) (Miss Edith Ball)	12
	34

In addition it is suggested that Ambassadors Harriman and Murphy be asked to attend the meeting.

¹ So listed, although Cannon had been assigned as First Secretary at Lisbon effective April 18.

No. 119

123 Harriman, W. Averell : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen)*¹

SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, July 4, 1945—9 a. m.

2406. Personal for Bohlen.

ReEmbs 2297, June 27, 8 p. m.²

Just before Mr. Stettinius' resignation I sent a personal message to the Secretary of State regarding my assumption that the President and he would wish me to be present at Berlin.

I would greatly appreciate if you could find this message and see that it is brought to the attention of Mr. Byrnes. For your information Genl Deane and the senior Naval and Air officers of the Military Mission have been ordered by the Chiefs of Staff to go but so far I have received no word. Also, the British Ambassador³ has received instructions to attend the meeting. In addition I had assumed that Page would be required to assist you in interpreting [*sic*] and in keeping the records of the Conference as he did at Yalta.

I would appreciate an urgent reply.

HARRIMAN

¹ Sent to the Secretary of State.

² Document No. 106.

³ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

No. 120

740.0011 EW/6-2745 : Telegram

*The Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*¹

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1945—3 p. m.

1513. Top secret and personal for the Ambassador from Bohlen.

I confirmed with the Secretary that both the President and he desire you to be present at Berlin. You should also bring Page. Your 2297, June 27.² We think it would be a good idea for you to go to Berlin a day or two in advance in order to look over accommodations and arrangements for civilian personnel. Official instructions follow.

¹ Sent over the signature of Byrnes.

² Document No. 106.

No. 121

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 4 July 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and secret. Number 103.

As we are all agreed that the press should not be allowed at TERMINAL I think that it would be advantageous to announce this publicly in advance. This will avoid disappointment and the sending to Berlin of high powered press representatives. I suggest we should each let it be known that they will not be allowed at TERMINAL and that all that will be issued will be official communiqués as may be decided from time to time.

I am sending a similar telegram to Stalin.²

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 371. Stalin accepted Churchill's suggestion in a message of July 6. See *ibid.*, p. 372.

No. 122

Truman Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 5 July 1945.

PRIORITY

Number 309. Secret and personal from the President for Premier Stalin.

In conformity with our understanding, I am announcing today that the press will not be allowed at TERMINAL and that all that will be issued from TERMINAL will be such official communiqués as may be decided upon from time to time.

I am sending a similar message to Prime Minister Churchill.²

TRUMAN

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. Paraphrase incorporated into note No. 380 of July 5 from Harriman to Molotov for delivery to Stalin.

² Not printed.

No. 123

740.0011 EW/6-2945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1945—10 a. m.

5446. You may inform the Foreign Office (*your 6566, June 29*¹) that the State Department Delegation to the Big Three meeting will

¹ Document No. 108.

[No. 123]

include Secretary Byrnes, Assistant Secretaries Dunn and Clayton, Ambassadors Murphy and Harriman, H. F. Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs, and several specialists on European and Far Eastern political and economic matters.

BYRNES

No. 124

740.0011 EW/7-545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1945—10 a. m.

1521. I should like to invite you to be present at the forthcoming meeting of the three Heads of Government. Page should accompany you. State Department party expects to arrive in Berlin July 13.

BYRNES

No. 125

740.0011 EW/7-545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1945—11 a. m.

61. I wish to invite you to be present at the forthcoming meeting of the three Heads of Government.

Following is the list of State Department personnel totalling thirty-six people who make up my party: Secretary Byrnes; Ambassador Harriman, Ambassador Murphy; Assistant Secretary Clayton, Assistant Secretary Dunn; Ben Cohen, Donald Russell and Walter Brown, Special Assistants to the Secretary; H. F. Matthews, C. E. Bohlen, Llewellyn Thompson, Edward Page, Emilio Collado, James Riddleberger, Emile Despres, Cavendish Cannon, George Allen, J. C. Vincent, Eugene Dooman, Philip Mosely, Charles Yost, Colonel John Wise, R. B. Reams, Wilder Foote and an administrative and secretarial staff of twelve.

I should appreciate it if you would take proper steps to make sure that appropriate arrangements are made in Berlin for this group which is scheduled to arrive July 13.

BYRNES

J[oseph] C. G[rew]

No. 126

740.0011 EW/7-645 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy)

[Extract]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1945—7 p. m.

72. . . .

We have sent through the Joint Chiefs a description ¹ of the office and living quarters which will be required by the delegation. We would appreciate your good offices in cooperating with the military authorities to see to it that these accommodations are as satisfactory as possible.

BYRNES

C[harles] W Y[ost]

¹ Not printed.

No. 127

811.4611/7-645

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Grew)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Reception of the French Ambassador by the President

Participants: The President;

The French Ambassador, Mr. Henri Bonnet;

Under Secretary, Mr. Grew.

At the President's wish I was present this afternoon when he received the French Ambassador on the eve of the former's departure tonight for the Big Three meeting in Berlin. The President at first said that he could not see the Ambassador and Mr. Bonnet was so informed but I felt that the political effect of such a refusal would be important and I was, therefore, fortunately able to arrange for a reconsideration of the matter and the appointment was made. The President was, of course, exceedingly busy and was obliged to keep the Ambassador waiting an hour after the time of his appointment. The Ambassador took up the following matters:

1. He said that General de Gaulle had been very much pleased with the invitation to visit the President in Washington towards the end of August and, as Mr. Truman had already been informed through Ambassador Caffery, General de Gaulle accepted the invitation. The President said that he was very happy to know that de Gaulle will come and that he would let him know of the date when he could

[No. 127]

receive him as soon as possible after Mr. Truman's return from his forthcoming journey.

2. The Ambassador also spoke of General de Gaulle's satisfaction with the President's message concerning coal¹ and he said that coal is the number one commodity of greatest importance in the rehabilitation of the liberated areas, especially in France. Political conditions could never be stable until Europe was once again economically sound. In order to accomplish this the liberated areas, especially France, must count in large measure on American assistance and support.

3. The Ambassador said that he now came to the main purpose of his visit which he wished to discharge before the President's departure for the Berlin meeting. After the Yalta meeting there had been unfortunate repercussions because France had not been included and while he admitted that some things had been done by the French Government which were open to criticism, partly as a result of the disappointment at being excluded from the Yalta Conference, the French Government and also the French people earnestly desired the best possible relations with the United States. Now again there was to be a meeting of Stalin, Churchill and the President of the United States with France once more excluded. Subjects would be discussed in which France was inevitably interested especially in view of the position taken by France as one of the Big Five at the San Francisco Conference and he wished to express the earnest hope that no final decisions on matters affecting France would be taken at the Berlin meeting until the French Government could be heard. Among such questions would be reparations and arrangements for the future disposal of German territory. In this connection the Ambassador reiterated the view that the Ruhr should be internationalized and that French interest in other areas should be given full consideration. The Ambassador spoke briefly, obviously unwilling to take up the President's time, and talked mainly in general rather than specific terms.

The President listened carefully to the Ambassador's presentation and said that he also desired the best possible relationship between France and the United States. While making no commitment he expressed the opinion that no matters of interest to France would be finally decided at the coming conference until the French Government had been consulted. The President was thoroughly friendly throughout the conversation.

It was perhaps significant that the Ambassador did not touch upon either of the outstanding matters which now especially concern the French Government, namely, the renewal of military supplies and the question of French forces participating in the war against Japan.

The Ambassador indicated to the President that he was speaking on his own initiative and not under instructions.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

¹ See document No. 420, footnote 2.

No. 128

740.0011 EW/7-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, July 6, 1945—7 p. m.

2437. Personal and secret for the Secretary.

Will plan to be in Berlin on arrival of State Dept party. [(ReDepts 1521, July 5, 10 p. m. [a. m.]¹) I will be accompanied by Page and my assistant Lt. Meiklejohn as well as Genl Deane, Adm Maples and Genl Ritchie of our Mil Mission here, on instructions from War and Navy Depts.

HARRIMAN

¹ Document No. 124.

No. 129

740.0011 EW/7-745 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

HOECHST, July 7, 1945—2 p. m.

124. Your 61, July 5, 11 a. m.¹

I thank you for your invitation to attend the meeting of the three heads of govt.

General Clay and I are proceeding to Berlin this morning and we shall do everything possible to ensure that satisfactory arrangements are made in Berlin for the Dept's delegation. I shall hope to telegraph you an account of the situation tomorrow.

MURPHY

¹ Document No. 125.

No. 130

740.00119 (Potsdam)/8-645 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1945.

6. Top secret for the Secretary.

Lord Halifax requests me to send the following message to the President:

"Mr. Churchill asks me to send you his warm personal regards and to say how much he is looking forward to meeting you.

2. Mr. Churchill asks me to tell you that he is led to believe that the present government will obtain a majority, but that, as you know,

¹ Byrnes was aboard the U. S. S. *Augusta* en route to the Berlin Conference.

electioneering is full of surprises. He adds that it is most unlikely in any event that he would resign on an adverse declaration of the poll unless it amounted to a very extreme expression of national displeasure. He would await the result of a confidence vote in the House of Commons on The King's speech, and would take his dismissal from the House of Commons. This would enable the various authorities and individuals to define their position by a vote. The political members of the British delegation to TERMINAL will quit the conference on July 25th in order to await the results of the poll in England. This will avoid any possible embarrassment when the results are made known. But the British delegation could return to Berlin on July 27th, and Mr. Churchill personally would be able to stay there if necessary until about August 5th or August 6th. Parliament meets on August 1st to elect a Speaker and to swear in members. But it will not be until Wednesday, August 8th, that The King will open Parliament and a parliamentary division would not take place before August 10th.

3. It is Mr. Churchill's thought that all these details, some of which are extremely private, will be of interest to you.

4. Mr. Churchill also wishes me to say that he is delighted to hear that you contemplate full discussions at TERMINAL, as he thinks it is of the utmost importance that whatever happens in England the conference should not be hurried. He recalls that the Crimea Conference was somewhat abruptly curtailed. He is impressed with the fact that we have at TERMINAL to try to reach settlements on a great number of questions of the greatest consequence, and to prepare the way for a peace conference which will presumably be held later in the year or in the early spring."

[GREW]

No. 131

740.0011 EW/7-745

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: British desire for the visit to London of one or more of our representatives at the Big Three Meeting

Participants: British Minister, Mr. John Balfour;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew

In the course of his conversation with me this morning Mr. Balfour of the British Embassy said his Government hoped very much that one or more of our group which would attend the forthcoming meeting of heads of government in Berlin might pass through London so that there might be a preliminary discussion of various matters which would come up at the main meeting. He realized that we would not wish to give any impression to the Russians that we were gang-

ing up on them but he thought that if one or more of our lower level experts could come to London in advance it would be very helpful.

I replied that I thought the feeling in our group was opposed to such preliminary talks but that I would look into the matter immediately.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

No. 132

J. C. S. Files

The Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McFarland) to the British Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Cornwall-Jones)

TOP SECRET
SM-2438

[WASHINGTON,] 8 July 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER CORNWALL-JONES

Reference is made to your memorandum 725/CJ, dated 6 July 1945.¹

The Secretary of War's party, consisting of the following members, will arrive at Gibraltar at approximately 0800Z² 14 July 1945:

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy
Special Assistant to Secretary of War Harvey H. Bundy, Sr.
Major General Norman J. Kirk, Surgeon General
Colonel William H. Kyle
Colonel Kenneth R. Kreps
Colonel Richard A. Cutter
Colonel Harrison A. Gerhardt
Lieutenant Colonel John B. Cabell
Warrant Officer James R. Costello
Technical Sergeant J. P. Leveritty, Jr.
Staff Sergeant Arthur F. Rall

The numbers of the two aircraft (C-54 and C-47) for transportation of the party to their ultimate destination³ are not yet available and will be forwarded as soon as they can be determined.

A. J. McFARLAND

¹ Not printed.

² i. e., 8:00 a. m., Greenwich Civil Time.

³ i. e., Babelsberg.

No. 133

740.0011 E. W./7-945 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State*SECRET
US URGENT

LONDON, July 9, 1945—noon.

6879. Downing Street has provided us with full list of Brit delegation to meeting.¹ (See your 5409, July 3¹).

Churchill will be accompanied by daughter Mary and personal staff of twelve. Attlee is going. FonOff delegation principals as in our 6566, June 29² with addition F. [sic] J. G. Ward who has been to several big meetings. Hayter is Secretary General FonOff delegation.

Other principals are Lord Leathers, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Marshal of RAF Sir Charles Portal, Sir Edward Bridges, Sir Hastings Ismay, Field Marshals Alexander and Wilson, General Gammell, Sir Walter Monckton (Solicitor General)[,] Lord Cherwell (Paymaster General formerly Professor Lindemann) and Colonel Sir Eric Crankshaw (in charge of catering and general hospitality).

Staff of interpreters is headed by Major A. Birse for PriMin and Major L. M. Theakstone who is Secretary.

Total Brit delegation will be approximately 250 in number.

Full list by airmail also to Murphy.

This telegram plus names of principals of FonOff delegation repeated to Murphy as 26.

WINANT

¹ Not printed.

² Document No. 108.

No. 134

Truman Papers : Telegram

The Aide to the President's Chief of Staff (Pinney) to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 9 July 1945.

MR-OUT-72. Admiral Land has learned Lord Leathers will probably attend TERMINAL and believes he should also be there. Land is still standing by per your orders and is prepared to go if you desire.¹ Memorandum from Gen. Marshall² being forwarded by pouch indicates use of certain large captured ships considered urgent by JCS for redeployment. Land and Leathers have been negotiating this matter for some time.

¹ Land left Washington for Babelsberg on July 17.

² Document No. 549.

No. 135

740.0011 E. W./7-1045: Telegram

The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

HOECHST, July 10, 1945—5 p. m.

147. Your 61 of July 5.¹

The arrangements being made to accommodate the State Dept delegation at the Berlin meeting seem to be reasonably satisfactory. Officers in charge anticipate that the Secretary will reside in the President's villa. A further villa has been reserved for the Secretary as office quarters. This villa has three rooms which it is contemplated will accommodate Dunn, Clayton and Matthews. Three additional villas are being arranged as billets for the balance of the delegation. These accommodations will provide everyone with individual rooms. Two small bungalows are provided for Harriman, Pauley and myself.

A small apartment house will provide general office space for the delegation. It includes 20-odd rooms which vary in size but which should be adequate for the purpose, if not ideal.

While I did not have time to examine the Schloss Cecilienhof, General Parks expresses himself as well pleased stating that officers who had been to Yalta and Tehran believe that present arrangement is far more convenient and satisfactory.

MURPHY

¹ Document No. 125.

No. 136

740.0011 EW/7-1145: Telegram

*The Acting Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1945—7 p. m.

U. S. URGENT

3214. Personal for Caffery from Hickerson.

Will you please give the following message to Jimmy Dunn?

"The British Embassy received a telegram this afternoon stating that Cadogan would arrive at TERMINAL in the early afternoon of July 14 and that he hopes very much to be able to have an informal talk with you that day."

¹ Sent over the signature of Grew.

No. 137

740.0011 EW/7-1245 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

SECRET
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1945—5 p. m.

5701. For the Ambassador.

Yesterday we had an oral inquiry from Halifax concerning the day on which the President and the Secretary would arrive at TERMINAL. Halifax explained that the Prime Minister and Eden wished to time their departure in such a way as to arrive on the same day as the President and the Secretary.

We communicated with the Secretary and have now been informed that the present schedule is arranged to permit arrival at TERMINAL about 3 p. m. local time Sunday, July 15. The Secretary asked that we inform you of this. We have informed Halifax.

GREW
J[ohn] D H[ickerson]

No. 138

740.0011 EW/7-1345 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting
Secretary of State*

SECRET
US URGENT—NIACT

LONDON, July 13, 1945—4 p. m.

7072. Press correspondents in London say have received word from their Washington offices that in closing days of Big Three Conference a rendezvous somewhere on continent will be fixed for correspondents from here whence they may go to join President's party. Correspondents claim Washington sources also say Embassy in London will notify them of time and place for rendezvous.

We have no record of any instructions on this point. Please instruct that we may deal with such inquiries.

WINANT

No. 139

740.0011 EW/7-1345 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United
Kingdom (Winant)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1945—1 p. m.

5777. One representative each of the Associated Press, United Press, International News Service, Radio pool and motion picture

pool are accompanying the President. They will not attend the Big Three Conference but will await the adjournment of the Conference at a rendezvous yet to be designated. Some correspondents from Washington expect to join them there. The time and place for rendezvous has not been determined. Understand this accreditation will be for American correspondents only and details will be sent you as soon as obtained by the White House from Presidential Secretary Ross. Your NIACT 7072, July 13, 4 p. m.¹

GREW

[Michael J.] McD[ermott]

¹ Document No. 138.

No. 140

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹[Extracts²]

SECRET

POTSDAM, July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, called this afternoon and discussed for two hours in a preliminary way a number of matters on the agenda of the Conference.³

2. *Procedure of the Conference.*

Sir Alexander asked whether the Conference would follow the procedure of Yalta, where meetings of the Foreign Ministers were held daily from 12 to 1, followed by meetings of heads of governments in the afternoon. It was agreed that at Yalta the Secretaries' meetings had been too brief to be of maximum usefulness.

It was pointed out that at Tehran President Roosevelt, on Stalin's proposal, had served as Chairman, by virtue of being the only Chief of State present, and that at Yalta he had almost automatically continued in this role.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 218, 234, 258, 319, 351, 379, 404, 470, 519, 635, 645, 678, and 708.

³ For a list of persons present at this meeting, see document No. 234, footnote 3.

PREPARATION OF THE AGENDA

No. 141

Leahy Papers : Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman ¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 27 May 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 56.

I have sent the following message to Marshal Stalin in reply to his telegram of May 23 ² about the German fleet.

“Prime Minister to Premier Stalin Personal and top secret.

I thank you for your telegram of May 23. It seems to me that these matters should form part of the general discussions which ought to take place between us and President Truman at the earliest possible date, and I thank you for giving me this outline of your views beforehand.” ³

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² See document No. 386, footnote 2.

³ Cf. *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. 1, p. 360.

No. 142

Leahy Papers : Telegram

President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill ¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 28 May 1945.

48. Your messages 55 ² and 56 ³ received.

I am in general agreement with your reply to Stalin regarding surrendered German naval and merchant ships and I will send him a similar message.⁴

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Not printed herein.

³ Document No. 141.

⁴ See document No. 143. For the final paragraph of this message, omitted here, see document No. 37.

No. 143

Truman Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Marshal Stalin*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 29 May 1945.

PRIORITY

Number 275, personal and top secret, from the President for Premier J. V. Stalin.

Thank you for your suggestion regarding surrendered German ships contained in your message dated May 23, 1945.²

It appears to me that this is an appropriate subject for discussion by the three of us at the forthcoming meeting at which time I am sure a solution can be reached which will be fully acceptable to all of us.

Regarding the available records of the German Naval surrender it is my understanding that examination of the German files is now being considered by our appropriate commanders in the areas concerned.

TRUMAN

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. Paraphrase incorporated into a note of May 29 from Harriman to Molotov for delivery to Stalin.

² See document No. 386, footnote 2.

No. 144

740.00119 EW/5-2945

The British Minister (Balfour) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 29th, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. UNDER SECRETARY:—In his telegram no. 40 to the President,¹ Mr. Churchill mentioned that H. M. G. were drawing up, as the President desired, a suggested list of subjects for discussion at the next meeting of Heads of Governments. Mr. Eden has now asked me to forward you the enclosed list of suggested topics.² I expect you will wish to inform the President.

Yours very sincerely,

J. BALFOUR

¹ Document No. 3.

² For the list referred to, see the enclosure to document No. 145.

[No. 144]

No. 145

740.00119 E. W./5-2945

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 30, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested British List of Subjects To Be Discussed at Next Meeting of the Heads of Government.

I have been informed by the British Embassy¹ that in his telegram No. 40 to you,² Prime Minister Churchill stated that the British Government was drawing up, in accordance with your suggestion, a suggested list of subjects for discussion at the next meeting of the Heads of Government. The British Embassy enclosed such a list of suggested topics for discussion and I attach a copy hereto.

If you so desire, I shall be glad to prepare a memorandum containing our comments with regard to the British list.³

JOSEPH C. GREW

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

1. Poland.

(a) Main question.

(b) Russian action in handing over German territory to Poland before peace settlement and without consulting either United States or British Governments.

2. Germany. Inter-Allied policy and machinery as regards Germany including

(a) Conditions and timing for bringing into force of occupational zones.

(b) Establishment of a German Government or local administrations.

(c) Feeding of Germany as a whole.

(d) Disposal of displaced persons in Germany especially Russians.

(e) Problem of German reparation with particular reference to Russian habit of stripping bare territories which they control (see 5 (a) (3) below).

¹ See document No. 144.

² Document No. 3.

³ Grew handed the enclosure to this memorandum, and presumably the memorandum itself, to Truman on the morning of May 31, and inquired whether Truman wished the Department of State to prepare studies on the various points listed. Grew's memorandum of the conversation (file No. 890d.01/5-3145) states: "The President expressed gratification at receiving this proposed agenda and said that not only would he be glad to have studies on the points proposed by the British, but that he wanted to be very thoroughly briefed on all matters which we ourselves might wish to have brought up at the meeting, together with an indication of what points we should stand out for and upon what points we could compromise or yield. I said to the President that I would have such studies prepared at once." See documents Nos. 152 and 177.

3. Austria.

- (a) Establishment of zones, particularly in Vienna, and of Control Commission.
- (b) Recognition of an Austrian Government satisfactory to all⁴ Allied Governments.
- (c) Feeding of Austria.

4. Yugoslavia.

Maintenance of *status quo* with regard to Yugoslav-Italian and Yugoslav-Austrian frontiers pending peace settlement.

5. Balkans.

- (a) Russian behaviour generally in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.
 - (1) As regards treatment of British and American representatives on Control Commission.
 - (2) As regards the setting up of puppet governments in those countries.
 - (3) As regards removal by Soviet authorities of industrial equipment especially in Rumania under the guise of booty.
- (b) Question of concluding peace treaties with these minor enemy states with a view to withdrawal of Russian armies of occupation (see 7 (b) below).

6. Persia.

Question of mutual withdrawal of troops.

7. Italy, Greece and Turkey.

- (a) Re-definition of our policy and interests in these countries.
- (b) Conclusion of a peace treaty with Italy.

8. Russian access to the sea.

- (a) [?Agreement]s⁵ of Montreux Convention⁶ (if raised by the Russians).
- (b) Special [? interests]⁷ regarding entrances to the Baltic (if raised by the Russians).

9. General.

- (a) Refusal of Soviet Government to allow Yalta declaration on liberated Europe⁸ to be applied to countries in which they are interested.
- (b) Refusal of Soviet Government to allow representatives of the Press to function freely in countries under Soviet military administration.
- (c) Transfer of German population from Poland and Czechoslovakia.

⁴ The text received from the British Embassy (see document No. 144) and the text which Davies received from Eden (see document No. 34) both read "all three Allied Governments".

⁵ As received from the British Embassy and as transmitted to Truman. The text Davies received from Eden (see document No. 34) reads "Modifications".

⁶ League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213.

⁷ As received from the British Embassy and as transmitted to Truman. The text Davies received from Eden reads "regime".

⁸ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

No. 146

Truman Papers : Telegram

*The President's Adviser and Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*¹[Extracts²]

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 30 May 1945.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Personal and top secret for the eyes of the President only from Hopkins.

Stalin is very anxious to discuss problems concerning Japan at his following [*forthcoming*] conference with you.

2. Certain elements in Japan are putting out peace feelers[.] Therefore we should consider together our joint attitude and act in concert about the surrender of Japan. . . .

3. Stalin expects that Russia will share in the actual occupation of Japan and wants an agreement with us and the British as to zones of occupation.

4. Stalin also wants an understanding between the Allies as to areas of operation in Manchuria and China.

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. Cf. document No. 26.

² For a fuller text of this message, see "The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945" (Washington, Department of Defense, processed, 1955), p. 73.

No. 147

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*The President's Adviser and Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*¹[Extract²]

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 30 May 1945.

PRIORITY

Top secret for the President only from Hopkins.

Stalin on two occasions has emphasized the importance of planning at once for the organization of the peace conference insofar as

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. Cf. document No. 26. Text communicated to the Secretary of State by Leahy in a memorandum of May 31 (file No. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/5-3145).

² For a paraphrase of the full text of the body of this message, see Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 904-905.

it relates to Europe. He apparently is thinking about a formal conference and emphasized that the Allies were not properly prepared at Versailles and that we should not make that mistake again. He will bring this up at your forthcoming meeting.

Some days ago we reminded Stalin that he made a speech³ in which he said that he did not favor the dismemberment of Germany. . . . Stalin stated that it was his understanding that both Great Britain and the United States were opposed to dismemberment. I undertook to tell him that this [was] not the case, that while you had made no final decision in regard to this, the United States considered this an open question and that you would surely want to thrash this out at your next meeting. . . . He then said that he would keep an open mind in regard to it and that dismemberment was a matter which the three Allies must settle amongst themselves.

. . . You can be sure that at your meeting Stalin will have some pretty specific proposals to make about prisoners of war, and more particularly, I believe, about war criminals. . . .

³ See document No. 26, footnote 7.

No. 148

740.0011 E. W./6-145

The British Minister (Balfour) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PERSONAL

WASHINGTON, 1st June, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. UNDER SECRETARY, With reference to my letter of May 29th,¹ Mr. Eden has asked me to tell you that in view of Marshal Stalin's message about surrendered German naval and merchant ships,² His Majesty's Government propose the addition of the following item to Section 2 of the Agenda for the forthcoming meeting of Heads of Governments:

"Disposal of German Fleet and Merchant Ships".³

Yours very sincerely,

JOHN BALFOUR

¹ Document No. 144.

² See document No. 386, footnote 2.

³ The substance of this message was forwarded by Grew to Truman on June 5.

[No. 148]

No. 149

Truman Papers : Telegram

The President to the Ambassador in China (Hurley)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 4 June 1945.

282. I have studied carefully your messages May 201118¹ and 282000,² and your letter dated 13 May¹ delivered by Mr. Paul Patterson.

I fully appreciate the frank statement of the military situation in China at the present time as it appears from your point of view and your equally frank estimate of the world wide political intentions of those European Nations that are allied with us in this war.

You may be assured that these matters are receiving full consideration in America's planning for the future.

I have not yet received any official information that Great Britain wishes to obtain command of the Chinese Armies, and there does not at the present time appear to be any promise of improvement by changing the existing command set up in the China theatre.

Many of the questions³ presented in your above noted communications may be discussed in a forthcoming tripartite conference.

¹ Not printed.

² See document No. 603.

³ In the telegrams referred to Hurley had discussed British and French colonialism in Asia, the possible return of Hong Kong to China, a possible trusteeship for Indochina, problems of command in China and Indochina, and support for democratic government in China.

No. 150

740.0011 EW (Peace)/6-945

The President to the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GREW, ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

With reference to your letter of May 30¹ and supplementary memorandum of June 5² giving me the list of subjects suggested by the British for discussion at the next meeting of the heads of government, I should appreciate it if you could give me a brief and informal statement of the Department's position on these various points.

I wish you would also let me know what subjects, if any, the Department believes should be added to the agenda.

I should also like to know what procedures the Department has in mind or would recommend to facilitate the interchange of views

¹ Document No. 145.

² See document No. 148, footnote 3.

between the great powers and possibly other powers on the terms of the European Peace settlements. Should these settlements be worked out over a period of time at different conferences at different places or is it desirable and practicable to attempt to arrange a conference somewhat similar to Dumbarton Oaks,³ where under the leadership of responsible representatives of the great powers, continuous negotiations can proceed until definite proposals for the European Peace settlements can be agreed upon?

I wish you would also let me have the Department's views as to the wisdom of attempting to secure agreement at the forthcoming conference on a 25 year Treaty between the three or four principal powers to demilitarize Germany, to keep her demilitarized by force if necessary, somewhat along the lines suggested by Senator Vandenberg in his speech in the Senate last winter.⁴

H[ARRY] S T[RUMAN]

³ Concerning the Dumbarton Oaks conversations with respect to the establishment of the United Nations, see Harley A. Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949; Department of State publication No. 3580), pp. 301-338.

⁴ The reference is to Vandenberg's speech in the Senate on January 10, 1945; see *Congressional Record*, vol. 91, pt. 1, pp. 164-167.

No. 151

Leahy Papers : Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman ¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 10 June 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 83.

Thank you for your Number 65.² I have sent the following to Stalin:

"Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. 10th June 1945.

"Thank you for your message of the 27th May³ informing me that you think the time has come to resume diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria and Finland with the possibility that a similar action can be taken with regard to Hungary in the near future.

"2. We have ourselves been considering our future relations with these states and we hope very shortly to put comprehensive proposals before you and the United States Government. I should hope that we might then discuss them when next we meet."⁴

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² Not printed. This message informed Churchill concerning the final text of Truman's reply to Stalin's message of May 27 concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania. Cf. document No. 285, footnote 5.

³ Text in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 361.

⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 363.

No. 152

740.0011 E. W./6-1445

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Comments on Prime Minister Churchill's Suggested Topics for Discussion at the Next Meeting of the Heads of Government

With my memorandum of May 30¹ submitting Prime Minister Churchill's suggested list of subjects for discussion for the next meeting of the heads of government I offered to send you the Department's comments thereon. A memorandum commenting upon the topics is now attached.

While in general the subject matter covered by Mr. Churchill is satisfactory and deals with a number of problems requiring urgent clarification, the form of presentation, I feel, is unfortunate: Mr. Churchill's list is so drawn as to give the appearance largely of a bill of complaints against the Soviet Government, which seems hardly the proper approach to the forthcoming meeting. Presumably he would wish to reword his list of subjects prior to any communication of it to Marshal Stalin. Furthermore, several of the problems mentioned by Mr. Churchill seem to be on the way to settlement and may well be solved before your meeting.

I am having prepared in the Department:

(1) A suggested list of questions which you may wish to bring up for discussion, together with pertinent memoranda. These will include the two points raised in your memoranda of July [*June*] 9² concerning procedure to facilitate interchange of views on the terms of the European Peace Settlements and the Twenty-five Year Treaty for the demilitarization of Germany.

(2) A full set of detailed memoranda on policy with regard to the subjects suggested by the British Prime Minister;

(3) A complete set of memoranda covering various policy questions which conceivably may be raised by Marshal Stalin or may arise in the course of discussion, and

(4) A full collection of pertinent maps.

JOSEPH C. GREW

¹ Document No. 145.

² Document No. 150.

[Attachment]

MEMORANDUM

*British Agenda**Comments*1. *Poland*

(a) Main question.

(b) Russian action in handing over German territory to Poland before peace settlement and without consulting either United States or British Governments.

No comment required pending outcome of talks in Moscow and further study of Mr. Hopkins' report.

2. *Germany*. Inter-Allied policy and machinery as regards Germany including

(a) Conditions and timing for bringing into force of occupational zones.

As you are aware this subject is now under discussion between the Governments. The State and War Departments are not prepared to defer indefinitely the withdrawal into the zones. According to Article 6 of the protocol on the zones of occupation,³ this protocol is to go into effect simultaneously with the signing of the surrender instrument.⁴ The Prime Minister has now agreed that this should be done, and that the settlement of the Austrian zones should be part of this arrangement. It is likely that sufficient progress will be achieved in the present discussions, so that the question will not have to be further considered at the forthcoming meeting.

³ Signed at London, September 12, 1944. For text, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071*; *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2078; *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 118.

⁴ i. e., May 8, 1945. See Executive Agreement Series No. 502; 59 Stat. (2) 1857.

British Agenda

(b) Establishment of a German Government or local administrations.

Comments

(1) It is recommended that this Government propose the restoration throughout Germany of local self-government through elective councils and proceed forthwith to put this proposal into effect in the United States zone.

(2) It is recommended that this Government propose the authorization for the whole of Germany of non-Nazi political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion and proceed forthwith to put this proposal into effect in the United States zone.

(3) It is recommended that this Government propose the introduction of the representative and elective principles into regional, provincial and state (*Land*) administration as rapidly as results of local self-government seem to warrant this further step.

(4) It is recommended that this Government oppose the creation of separate integrated German administrative and political entities coinciding with the four zones of occupation and favor, on the contrary, the use of central German administrative machinery, in so far as possible, for the despatch of business above the provincial or state level. It is in consequence further recommended that this Government oppose the partition of Germany, either *de facto* or *de jure*, along the lines of the zones of occupation.

(5) It is recommended that this Government oppose the establishment for the time being of a central German Government in contradistinction to the restoration of such central administrative agencies as would serve the interests of the Control Council.

*British Agenda**Comments*

(c) Feeding of Germany as a whole.

(d) Disposal of displaced persons in Germany especially Russians.

(e) Problem of German reparation with particular reference to Russian habit of stripping bare territories which they control.

(f) Disposal of German fleet and merchant ships.

3. *Austria.*

(a) Establishment of zones, particularly in Vienna, and of Control Commission.

No comment on the inclusion of these items. Pertinent memoranda are being prepared.

The European Advisory Commission has been deadlocked for some time in completing arrangements on zones and occupational machinery for Austria. This situation results from the Soviet Government's insistence that in zoning Vienna for occupation by the four Powers, the city limits be delineated as they were before 1938 (which would leave no airfield in our Vienna zone), while we prefer use of the present wider limits of the city, including the suburbs, with an airfield in our zone. The War Department has insisted upon having adequate facilities in Vienna, particularly airfields, and has not been willing to accept the airport offered by the Soviet Government. To solve this difficulty, military missions of the United States, United Kingdom and France have gone to Vienna to survey the situation and make recommendations to the European Advisory Commission, which it is hoped, will lead to a settlement.

While the agreement on control machinery for Austria and a protocol on zones (exclusive of Vienna) have not yet been formally recommended by the European Advisory Commission, these questions should not present great diffi-

*British Agenda**Comments*

(b) Recognition of an Austrian Government satisfactory to all Allied Governments.

culty once the Vienna zone is agreed upon. If the present survey leads to a rapid agreement on Vienna, the European Advisory Commission can presumably make its recommendations at once in a form in which the four governments will approve.

Therefore this question may or may not require discussion in the meeting, depending upon developments in the next few weeks.

It is recommended that this Government agree to give prompt consideration to the question of the recognition of the Renner Government after the zones of occupation, including the subdivision of Vienna, are satisfactorily delineated and our troops have taken up their positions accordingly and after an agreement on inter-Allied control machinery has been concluded and put into effect. We should also stipulate that the Renner Government should prepare to hold elections as soon as possible, under the supervision of the Occupying Powers, for a constituent assembly.

(c) Feeding of Austria.

4. *Yugoslavia*

Maintenance of *status quo* with regard to Yugoslav-Italian and Yugoslav-Austrian frontiers pending peace settlement.

As regards the Trieste and Carinthia questions an adequate settlement has now been reached which will make it possible to cover this topic very briefly. The *status quo* should be maintained in respect of the Klagenfurt region. No zone of occupation should be given to Yugoslavia and in the final peace settlement this area will be retained by Austria. More important, however, would be the application of the Yalta principles⁵ to the totalitarian regime which has been set up in Yugoslavia. Our recommendation as seen at the

⁵ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section VII.

*British Agenda**Comments*

moment would not be for formal tripartite consultation under the Yalta formula if Yugoslavs could themselves be induced to move in this direction, since the unrepresentative character of the Government and political intolerance of the Partisans is cause for some real concern.

5. *Balkans*

(a) Russian behaviour generally in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

(1) As regards treatment of British and American representatives on Control Commission.

(2) As regards the setting up of puppet governments in those countries.

(3) As regards removal by Soviet authorities of industrial equipment especially in Rumania under the guise of booty.

Although this section with its three sub-headings covers the main points there should be some differentiation of treatment between them as regards their importance. Sub-heading (3) (removal of industrial equipment) hardly seems appropriate for discussion between the Heads of States since probably the worst part of it has already taken place. It would seem appropriate, therefore, that discussions in respect of this point take place on the diplomatic level. Since Anglo-American interests and responsibilities under the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe⁶ in Rumania require that we have a greater share in the Allied Control Commissions and other Allied activities the Soviet Government should be induced to agree that future Allied activities in these countries be on a genuinely tripartite basis. Joint decisions should be taken regarding:

1. The manner of the execution of the armistice agreements in the second period.

2. A program for the withdrawal of Soviet troops on the basis of the four Nations' agreement at Moscow on October 30, 1943.⁷

3. The implementation of the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe, in-

⁶ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

⁷ Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. IX, p. 308.

*British Agenda**Comments*

(b) Question of concluding peace treaties with these minor enemy states with a view to withdrawal of Russian armies of occupation.

cluding its application in the matter of elections.

4. The conclusion of peace treaties and reestablishment of diplomatic relations.

5. The recognition and application of the principle of non-exclusion and equal access in economic relations between former satellites and other countries.

This section requires rewording in the light of Marshal Stalin's proposal to establish regular diplomatic relations.⁸ Essentially the whole problem in the satellite states is to determine:

1. Are they really independent.

2. Is the Soviet Army to remain.

3. If we accept less than really tripartite authority can we obtain firm assurances of non-exclusion for our rightful activities.

5B Albania

A short topic on Albania might be added worded as follows:

Agreement on parallel action regarding recognition of an Albanian Government. It would be desirable for the three Governments to reach agreement to the effect that no action will be taken with respect to the recognition of an Albanian Government without prior consultation.

6. Persia

Question of mutual withdrawal of troops.

No comment upon the wording of this section.

7. Italy, Greece and Turkey

(a) Re-definition of our policy and interests in these countries.

These topics are substantially what we proposed but a separate agenda in regard to Italy might be suggested as follows:

⁸ See document No. 285, footnote 5.

British Agenda

Comments

(b) Conclusion of a peace treaty with Italy.

1. Review of tripartite policy, the U. S. objectives being the early political independence and economic recovery of Italy.

2. Italy's admission to the ranks of the United Nations.

3. Immediate revision of the surrender terms, keeping only controls essential:

a) to cover Allied military requirements as long as Allied forces remain in or operate from Italy;

b) to implement the pledge that the people will have an untrammelled choice of their form of government;

c) to safeguard disputed territories within the 1939 frontiers against settlements forced either by the Italians or rival claimants pending the final peace negotiations.

4. Negotiation in the near future of a definitive peace treaty, permitting the Italians to take part in discussions at an early stage rather than being forced to sign a treaty already negotiated in all details by the victorious powers.

8. *Russian access to the sea.*

(a) Agreements of Montreux Convention⁹ (if raised by the Russians).

(b) Special interests regarding entrances to the Baltic (if raised by the Russians).

It would be preferable that these subjects not be placed upon the agenda unless specifically requested by the Soviets. If the Montreux Convention and entrances to the Baltic are discussed it might also be desirable to include a discussion on Russian access to the Persian Gulf through Iran.

9. *General*

(a) Refusal of Soviet Government to allow Yalta declaration on liberated Europe to be applied to

Difficulties on this subject have arisen in Czechoslovakia and Austria. In Austria, the Soviet Government has permitted establishment of a Provisional

⁹ League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213.

British Agenda

countries in which they are interested.

(b) Refusal of Soviet Government to allow representatives of the Press to function freely in countries under Soviet military administration.

(c) Transfer of German population from Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Comments

Austrian Government without consultation with us. The joint occupation plans for Austria are discussed above under 3 (a) [.]

With respect to Czechoslovakia, the situation is now somewhat improved. For some weeks, the Soviet Government refused to grant permission for our mission to proceed to the seat of the Czechoslovak Government at Košice and cancelled abruptly plans which had been under way for some time to send the diplomatic corps from London to Košice. However, the Beneš Government has now moved to Prague and our mission proceeded from London to Prague about June 1. We do not as yet have much information about the conditions there and consequently are not yet ready to decide whether or not the status of Czechoslovakia should be discussed at the meeting.

No comment as to the inclusion of these subjects on the agenda.

While we do not feel that it would be desirable to raise the Palestine question at this time and it is noted that it is apparently not the intention of the British Government to do so, a memorandum on the subject will be prepared for use in case the Soviets should bring the matter up for discussion. A memorandum on the current situation in the Levant States for use in case the Soviet Government introduces the subject is also being prepared. It is felt, however, that since it has been publicly stated

*British Agenda**Comments*

that it is not the intention of the United States Government to endeavor to reach a solution of this question in the absence of representatives of France and the Levant States it would be desirable to avoid discussions of it in the meeting of the Big Three.

No. 153

740.00119 PW/6-1545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

SAN FRANCISCO, June 15, 1945.

7. For Acting Secretary Grew (eyes only) from Edward R. Stettinius, UNCIO, San Francisco, Calif[.]

I have seen a summary of a memorandum to be sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be printed as document SWNCC-149,¹ reporting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that Japan may seek a termination of hostilities on certain specified terms. It may be worth considering whether the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding a demand for unconditional surrender should be made into a three or four power demand to be issued at or after the Big Three meeting. You might also consider whether it would be useful to couple such a demand with some assurances to the Japanese regarding their future. I think we should give careful thought to placing this matter on the agenda of the Big Three meeting. The four power ultimatum suggested by the Prime Minister at Yalta² seems well worth our careful consideration at this time. Certainly, if there is any chance of success, we should explore every possibility at the Big Three meeting, and make a real effort to get the Russians to agree to join us. This approach might well fit in with the discussions you have been having with Soong and which he will shortly have with Stalin.³

If the Joint Chiefs feel that a demand for unconditional surrender is in any case advisable on the occasion of the termination of the Okinawa operation, I suggest that it be made unilaterally by the President in such a way so as not to prejudice any action which the Big Three may desire to take.

I have discussed this matter with Hickerson who agrees with me that it deserves your careful consideration. I would be glad to hear your reaction, after you have considered the matter.

¹ Not printed.

² See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 826.

³ See *post*, p. 857.

No. 154

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff*TOP SECRET
C. C. S. 880

[WASHINGTON,] 15 June 1945.

AGENDA FOR THE NEXT UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF
CONFERENCE

1. The British Chiefs of Staff put forward the following tentative outline agenda for the next United States-British Staff Conference:—

- (1) Progress reports on operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia Command (SEAC).
- (2) Estimate of Japanese situation.
- (3) Development of operations in the Pacific.
- (4) British participation in the war against Japan.
- (5) Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.
- (6) Control and command of the war against Japan.
- (7) Russian participation in the war against Japan.
- (8) French, Dutch, and Portuguese participation in the war against Japan.
- (9) Planning date for the end of the war against Japan.
- (10) Over-all priorities.

2. As to the preparation of papers, the British Chiefs of Staff assume that the United States Chiefs of Staff would deal with items 3, 7, 8, and 9. They themselves would be prepared to table papers on items 4, 5, and 6, and will probably wish to comment on C. C. S. 877¹ under item 10. They suggest that the Combined Intelligence Committee should be asked to prepare a report on item 2.

3. The British Chiefs of Staff would be glad to have the reactions of the United States Chiefs of Staff to the above which is, of course, purely provisional at this stage.

¹ Not printed as a whole. See document No. 600, footnote 1.

No. 155

J. C. S. Files

The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McFarland)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 15 JUNE 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The following subjects have been mentioned to the President as likely to be brought up before the forthcoming tripartite meeting.

Will you please, as a matter of urgency endeavor to obtain from the appropriate agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff brief but pertinent and useful recommendations on these questions that will be useful to the President in preparing himself for the conference?—

1. Dismemberment of Germany.¹
2. Internationalization of the Ruhr and the Saar.²
3. Arrangements to get coal for other European countries.³
4. Exchange of commodities between zones of occupation—food from the Russian zone for other areas in Germany.⁴
5. Civil government in Germany—when should it be established and how?⁵
6. What will be the banking arrangements in Germany? What money will be used, and what exchange arrangements made?⁶
7. Establishment of a unified agreed propaganda in Germany.⁷
8. What disposition, distribution, should be made of the German Fleet and captured German merchant ships?⁸
9. What should [the] American attitude be toward the selection and treatment of war criminals?⁹
10. When should we agree to making the peace treaty with Italy and what terms should be agreeable to the United States?¹⁰

W[ILLIAM] D. L[EAHY]

¹ See documents Nos. 332 and 514.

² See document No. 403.

³ See document No. 418.

⁴ See document No. 419.

⁵ See document No. 333.

⁶ See document No. 334.

⁷ See document No. 335.

⁸ See documents Nos. 391 and 392, *post*, and vol. II, document No. 1005.

⁹ See document No. 396.

¹⁰ See document No. 465.

No. 156

867n.01/6-1645

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 16, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Palestine

According to information reaching us from Zionist sources at San Francisco, the Zionists desire to confer with you in the near future in anticipation of your meeting with Mr. Churchill, as they think it is likely that Palestine will be discussed at that meeting.

For your information, we are preparing some material for you on Palestine¹ for possible use at the meeting, as we feel that it will be necessary for the British to make some decision regarding that

¹ See document No. 646.

country in the near future. It is not our belief that the question is one which will require detailed discussion, or any decision on your part, during the course of your meeting with Mr. Churchill. It would be most helpful, however, if we could have some idea of the intentions of the British Government with regard to the future of Palestine.

JOSEPH C. GREW

No. 157

500.CC/6-1645

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

Extracts¹]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 16, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: President Truman;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew

I called on the President in his study in the White House at 6:50 this evening and took up the following matters:

6. I then referred to Ambassador Hurley's telegram² to the President setting forth certain questions³ which had been asked by Chiang Kai-shek with regard to the implementation of certain points in the Yalta agreement with regard to the Far East,⁴ which Admiral Leahy had sent to me with the request that we draft a reply to Ambassador Hurley. I said to the President that I did not see how we could possibly answer these questions until the matter had been discussed with Marshal Stalin, and I thought the replies would have to await the meeting of the Big Three. I also said that I did not see how Dr. Soong could very well take these matters up with Marshal Stalin himself without the presence of others. The President definitely concurred. . . .

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

¹ For another extract from this memorandum, see document No. 70.

² Not printed.

³ The questions referred to are summarized in Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle: The American Effort in China From Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission* (Princeton, 1953), p. 314.

⁴ For text, see Executive Agreement Series No. 498; 59 Stat. (2) 1823; *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 984.

No. 158

761.6711/6-1845

The British Embassy to the Department of State[Extract¹]

SECRET

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

If the Turkish Government have no objection to such an approach,² His Majesty's Government hope that the United States Government will agree that a joint Anglo-American approach on the above lines should be made to the Soviet Government in firm language and soon, that is, before the Big Three meeting at which it may well be necessary subsequently to discuss the whole question.

WASHINGTON, 18th June, 1945.

¹ For the full text of this *aide-mémoire*, see the attachment to document No. 683.

² i. e., representations to the Soviet Government concerning Soviet demands on Turkey, along lines indicated in the attachment to document No. 683.

No. 159

740.00119 PW/6-1845

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 18, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Appointment with the President, 9:30 a. m.

Participants: The President;
The Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew.

I went to the President at 9:30 this morning and took up the following matters:

1. The President said that he had carefully considered yesterday the draft statement which I had given to Judge Rosenman calling on Japan for unconditional surrender to be considered for release at the moment of the announcement of the fall of Okinawa¹ but that while he liked the idea he had decided to hold this up until it could be discussed at the Big Three meeting. I said to the President that I merely wished to square my own conscience at having omitted no recommendation which might conceivably result in the saving of the lives of

¹ For an account of Grew's recommendations and consultations on this subject, see Grew, *Turbulent Era*, vol. II, pp. 1421-1438.

[No. 159]

thousands of our fighting men so long as we did not recede an inch from our objectives in rendering Japan powerless to threaten the peace in future. I wanted to see every appropriate step taken which might encourage a peace movement in Japan and while it was all guesswork as to whether such a statement would have that effect I nevertheless felt very strongly that something might be gained and nothing could be lost by such a step and in my opinion the sooner it was taken the better. The President having ruled against the step at this time there was of course nothing more to be done but I felt that this question should be kept prominently in mind. The President asked me to have the subject entered on the agenda for the Big Three meeting and I so informed Mr. Matthews. The President had before him the Secretary's telegram No. 7 of June 15.²

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

Document No. 153.

No. 160

740.0011 E. W./6-1845

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, June 18, 1945.¹]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This memorandum relates to the economic issues which may appropriately be discussed at the coming three-power meeting.

Outlined below is a list of economic questions on which memoranda are being prepared for the forthcoming meeting. You may wish to raise some of these questions, while others on this list may be raised by the United Kingdom or the USSR.

In view of the importance of these questions, it is suggested that at least three representatives of the economic side of the State Department be included in the American delegation.

MATTERS FOR THREE-POWER DISCUSSIONS

A. *Germany*

1. *Treatment of Germany as an economic unit:* It is urgently necessary that uniform policies be adopted in all zones with respect to ration scales, industrial and agricultural questions, foreign trade, and currency; and that barriers to the interzonal movement of goods be prevented from arising.

¹ The signed original in the Truman Papers is so dated.

2. *German exports prior to the reparation settlement:* An agreement should be obtained governing the export of German goods and equipment, which are urgently needed for relief and rehabilitation, in the period before the conclusion of a formal agreement on reparations.

3. *Territorial partitions or cessions:* We should be prepared to deal with these questions in case they are raised by another government.

4. *Permanent economic and industrial restrictions:* Although we should avoid, at this time, any commitment on measures involving permanent or indefinitely prolonged controls on German industry, we should be prepared on this question in case it is raised by another government.

5. *Establishment of a combined transportation agency in Germany:* Since transportation is a key problem which must be dealt with as a matter of top priority, agreement should be sought on the immediate establishment of an inland transportation agency under the Control Council.

6. *Establishment of a combined coal agency in Germany:* To solve the critical European coal problem, we should press for the immediate establishment of a combined coal agency, under the Control Council, to maximize the production of coal and to distribute it equitably.

7. *German property and assets located in neutral and other countries:* A three-power understanding is necessary on principles and mechanisms for the control and disposition of this property.

8. *Admission of France and possibly other countries to the Reparations Commission:* This question may be raised by another government.

B. Austria

1. *Financing of Austrian imports:* Agreement should be obtained on the principle that the occupying powers should share the cost of initial Austrian imports, and should obtain repayment from the proceeds of Austrian exports.

2. *Payment for Austrian exports:* Agreement should be obtained on the principle that no goods and equipment, with certain specified exceptions, should be taken from Austria except against payment.

3. *Economic and financial assistance to Austria:* Plans for the extension of assistance to Austria should be considered as a necessary means of implementing the Moscow Declaration on the restoration of an independent Austria.²

C. Italy

In connection with a re-examination of Italy's status, consideration should be given to the revision of the economic terms of the

² Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. IX, p. 310.

Italian armistice³ and to the economic elements in a possible peace settlement with Italy.

D. *Eastern Europe*

1. *Role of US and UNRRA representatives in the satellite countries and of the US members of the Allied Control Councils:* We should seek assurances on the freedom of movement of US and UNRRA representatives in Eastern Europe and on full participation of US members in the Control Councils.

2. *Utilization of Eastern European production for military and relief purposes:* Agreement should be sought to bring the production of Eastern Europe into the general planning of the United Nations for military and relief needs.

3. *Treatment of US trade and investments in satellite countries:* We should endeavor to obtain equality of opportunity for US business interests in these areas, and an agreement protecting the rights of US property owners.

4. *Relief and reconstruction needs of satellite countries:* To establish a workable basis for US assistance to these countries, we need an agreement on principles governing the uses of indigenous production, including the question of removal of goods to other areas.

5. *Bulgarian reparations to Greece:* An agreement should be sought on the necessity for increasing Bulgarian reparations deliveries to Greece.

E. *International Organizations*

1. *Participation in EECE and ECO:* We may wish to make further efforts to obtain Russian participation in the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe and the European Coal Organization.

2. *UNRRA problems:* These include the questions of requirements and surpluses of Eastern Europe, additional contributions to the resources of UNRRA, admission to UNRRA of certain neutrals and other non-participating countries, and organizational matters.

3. *The World Federation of Trade Unions:* The USSR may raise the matter of relating the World Federation of Trade Unions in some official way to the General International Organization. The status of the International Labor Organization is involved.

F. *Shipping*

We should seek an arrangement with the USSR which would enable us to deal directly with Moscow, rather than with the Russian representative in London, on a number of important current shipping questions, including the matter of Russian relations with the United Maritime Authority.

³ Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2740.

MATTERS FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS

A. *USSR*

1. *Credits to the USSR.*
2. *Lend-lease policy, lend-lease settlement policy, and recapture questions.*
3. *Retransfer of lend-lease goods:* We should endeavor to obtain a satisfactory understanding on the question of Russian retransfer of lend-lease goods or equivalent goods to third countries.
4. *Soviet commercial policy:* This may be an appropriate occasion to discuss Russian commercial policy questions, particularly such matters as export dumping, barter, restrictive bilateral agreements, and the use of the Russian foreign trade monopoly to obtain political objectives.
5. *Exchange of technology:* Discussions may be desirable on the protection of US-owned technology in the Soviet Union.
6. *Radio-telegraph circuits:* We should seek the concurrence of the USSR in our plan for the establishment of direct radio-telegraph circuits between the US and Rumania and between the US and Bulgaria.
7. *Civil aviation matters:* We should seek to obtain adherence of the USSR to the Chicago aviation agreements;⁴ acceptance by the USSR of a seat on the interim council; and an agreement permitting US civil air carriers to serve Russian territory.

B. *United Kingdom*

1. *Post V-J Day financial arrangements:* It would be desirable for the President to suggest to the Prime Minister that, in view of the approach of V-J Day, integrated discussions of lend-lease settlement, foreign exchange policy, postwar credit arrangements and multilateral trade policy take place between the two governments in the near future.
2. *Lend-lease questions:* An understanding should be sought on the proposed 3 (c) agreement⁵ with the United Kingdom, principles to govern the disposal of fixed lend-lease installations, and principles of payment for surplus property.
3. *Radio-telegraph circuits:* We should seek the concurrence of the UK in our plan for the establishment of direct radio-telegraph circuits between the US and Iraq and between the US and Saudi Arabia.
4. *Civil aviation matters:* Agreement should be sought with the Prime Minister on several civil aviation questions, including civil aviation rights between US and British territory; British opposition

⁴ Executive Agreement Series Nos. 469, 487, and 488; 59 Stat. (2) 1516, 1693, and 1701. Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1591; 61 Stat. (2) 1180.

⁵ i. e., an agreement under section 3 (c) of the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941 (55 Stat. 31), as amended April 16, 1945 (59 Stat. 52).

to our acquisition of landing rights in the Near and Middle East and elsewhere; and British use of exchange controls in the sterling area to prevent the purchase of American aircraft.

JOSEPH C. GREW

No. 161

701.6174/6-1845 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1945—6 p. m.

1336. The following message¹ from the President is for transmission to Marshal Stalin:

"1. I fully agree that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland, to which you revert in your telegram of June 9,² would be a constructive step. Our exchange of messages on this subject shows that our Governments may not be approaching the matter in quite the same way because the state of our respective relations with these various states is not identical. For example, there would be no obstacle to the immediate resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Finland, and as regards Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, while our general interests are the same all around, we find that the present internal situation has different aspects in each country.

2. I am giving this matter further study. As the most practical way of coming to a uniform agreement I therefore propose that we discuss it at our forthcoming meeting."

GREW
S[amuel] R[eber]

¹ Drafted in the Department of State and forwarded by Grew to Truman for the latter's approval under cover of a memorandum of June 18 (file No. 701.6174/6-1845). Harriman forwarded the message on June 19.

² See document No. 285, footnote 5.

No. 162

740.00119 EW/6-1945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

Extract¹

TOP SECRET
URGENT

SAN FRANCISCO, June 19, 1945.

3. To Grew, Acting Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. from Stettinius, UNCIO, San Francisco, California.

The following memorandum may be helpful in the preparation of a reply to the President's memorandum of June 15 [9]:²

¹ For the full text of this message, see document No. 227.

² Document No. 150.

"It seems clear that it would be desirable to avoid the convocation of a full-fledged peace conference to deal with the major political problems that have arisen as a result of the termination of the war in Europe. . . . It is therefore suggested that the problems concerned to [sic] be dealt with on an *ad hoc* basis by a council of Foreign Ministers. . . .

1. The proposal might be discussed informally with the British and we could inform the Russians that we intended to raise this question at the meeting of the three Chiefs of State. . . .

2. At the Big Three meeting, we would endeavor to obtain Soviet and British agreement as to the time and place of the meeting [of the proposed council] as well as to some of the items that would be placed on the agenda of the first meeting. . . .[']

No. 163

740.00119 Potsdam/6-2045 : Telegram

*The Assistant to the Secretary of State (Noyes) to the Special Assistant to the Chairman of the United States Delegation at the United Nations Conference on International Organization*¹ (Yost)

TOP SECRET
URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 20 [1945]—7:36 p. m.

24. To Yost from Noyes.

I am sending you herewith a suggested United States Agenda for the Big Three Meeting which we are working on but which has not been fully cleared. For your information and guidance I am including a short paragraph of explanation after each item. We are continuing work on this tentative list and shall advise you further of any changes.

(1) *Procedure and Machinery for Peace Negotiations and Territorial Settlements with Germany.*

This item is self-explanatory and is intended to cover discussion of the proposed Council of Foreign Ministers or other similar machinery.

(2) *General Lines of Territorial Settlements and Transfers of Populations; and Peace Treaties with Axis Satellites.*

Under this item we would propose certain principles which should be followed in these matters, and suggest that the detailed negotiations should be handled by the machinery set up under paragraph (1) above.

¹ Then in session at San Francisco.

(3) *Policy Towards Germany.*

This item is intended to cover a wide variety of political, economic and territorial questions which must be settled at this meeting. This would include establishment of local German administrations; disposal of displaced persons; treatment of Germany as an economic unit; German exports prior to the reparations settlement; establishment of a combined transportation agency and combined coal agency under the Control Council; settlement of the status and membership of the Reparations Commission; and all German territorial problems including internationalization of the Rhineland.

(4) *Unconditional Surrender of Japan and Policies toward Liberated Areas in the Far East.*

This item is intended to cover a discussion of all outstanding Far Eastern problems.

(5) *Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe² in the Treatment of Axis Satellites during Armistice Control Period.*

This item includes question of establishing diplomatic relations with the Axis Satellites and true tripartite control of them under the armistice agreements; a program for the withdrawal of Soviet troops on the basis of the four-nation declaration at Moscow;³ the manner of holding elections; relaxation of the news blackout and introduction of representatives of the Foreign Press; and recognition and application of the principle of non-exclusion and equal access in economic relations.

(6) *Policy Towards Italy.*

a. Review of tripartite policy, the U. S. objectives being the early political independence and economic recovery of Italy.

b. Italy's admission to the ranks of the United Nations.

c. Immediate revision of the surrender terms,⁴ keeping only controls essential: (*a*) to cover allied military requirements as long as Allied forces remain in or operate from Italy; (*b*) to implement the pledge that the people will have an untrammelled choice of their form of government; (*c*) to safeguard disputed territories within the 1939 frontiers against settlements forced either by the Italians or rival claimants pending the final peace negotiations.

d. Negotiations in the near future of a definitive peace treaty, permitting the Italians to take part in discussions at an early stage rather than being forced to sign a treaty already negotiated in all details by the victorious powers. (Negotiations to be conducted by machinery proposed in paragraph (1) above.)

² See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

³ Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. IX, p. 308.

⁴ Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2740.

(7) *International Bases or Strong Points.*

(Such as Kiel Canal, Dakar, Bornholm?)

(8) *Russian Participation in Solving European Economic Problems.*

Under this item we propose to press the Russians to join the EITO [ECITO], EECE and ECO, and to use the food production of Eastern Europe to help feed populations of Western Europe including Western Germany and Austria.

CHARLES P NOYES

No. 164

740.0011 EW/6-2245 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

SAN FRANCISCO, June 22, 1945.

URGENT

4. To Grew Acting [Secretary], State Dept, Washington, from Stettinius, UNCIO, San Francisco.

With reference to the telegram from Noyes dated June 20¹ outlining a suggested United States agenda for the Big Three meeting, we have the following preliminary comments. These comments relate to the numbers of topics contained in the telegram:

(5) We note that this relates to the treatment of Axis satellites. We assume that you have given consideration to liberated areas other than satellites. For instance the question of the admission of foreign correspondents into Yugoslavia (if this has not already been settled) might well be considered. The same, of course, applies to Poland and Czechoslovakia.

(6) Policy toward Italy. Item *b* "Italy's admission to the ranks of the United Nations" as we understand it means the question of the election of Italy to membership in the proposed United Nations organization. We feel that with the signature of the charter setting up an international organization² the roster on adherence to the United Nations declaration of January 1, 1942³ might well be considered closed. It would seem preferable to include this as Item *d*, that is, the final one on Italy.

Item *c* under paragraph 6 related to the revision of the Italian surrender terms. Should not the question of the abolition of the Advisory Council for Italy be suggested under this paragraph?

As regards (7) international bases, we feel that it would be preferable for the United States not to take the initiative in proposing the discussion of any questions relating to international bases at this time. Our delegation should be documented to discuss the question if others raise it.

¹ Document No. 163.² Department of State, Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031.³ Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1600.

No. 165

Staff Committee Files

*Staff Committee Paper*TOP SECRET
SC-136¹

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1945.

AGENDA FOR THE MEETING OF THE THREE CHIEFS OF STATE
PROBLEM

The Acting Secretary has advised the President² that we are preparing for him a suggested list of matters which he may wish to bring up at the meeting, together with pertinent memoranda. The Secretary has urgently requested that a proposed Agenda of these matters be sent to him for consideration. Below is a tentative list of such questions, together with a summary statement of the proposals to be made under each main item. It should be noted that these items include only those matters on which the United States Government desires to take the initiative and make affirmative proposals. Items which the British or the Soviets will or may raise are not included in this list, although memoranda of the United States position on such matters are being prepared in case of need.

(There is attached as Annex I³ a copy of a telegram from the Secretary setting forth in general terms the proposal covered in item I below. There is attached as Annex II a copy of a memorandum sent by the Acting Secretary to the President on June 14,⁴ setting forth the proposed British Agenda, together with the Department's comments on the various items.)

I. *Procedure and Machinery for Peace Negotiations and Territorial Settlements*

Annex I describes the tentative proposal in general terms.

II. *Territorial Settlements and Transfers of Populations Arising Out of the War in Europe, and Peace Treaties With Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary*

It is recommended that the United States Government propose the discussion of the general lines of settlements of these matters with a view to reaching general agreement on the more important issue[s] and their reference to the proposed Council of Foreign Ministers for detailed negotiation and final settlement.

¹ This symbol is the number assigned to the memorandum as a document presented to the Secretary's Staff Committee.

² See document No. 152.

³ Document No. 227.

⁴ Document No. 152.

III. *Policy Toward Germany*

1. *Establishment of Control Council*

It is recommended that this Government propose that the agreement on control machinery in Germany⁵ be implemented as soon as possible. This means the immediate establishment of the Control Council in all its divisions in Berlin, or in some other city if Berlin is not suitable. The American and British groups are prepared to start at once. The French group is being formed, but we have no information respecting the Soviet counterpart in spite of repeated promises that their representatives would join with us in preliminary discussions. It is assumed that withdrawal into the respective zones will be completed before the Big Three Meeting takes place.

2. *Establishment of German Local Administrations*

(a) It is recommended that this Government propose the restoration throughout Germany of local self-government through elective councils and proceed forthwith to put this proposal into effect in the United States zone.

(b) It is recommended that this Government propose the authorization for the whole of Germany of non-Nazi political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion and proceed forthwith to put this proposal into effect in the United States zone.

(c) It is recommended that this Government propose the introduction of the representative and elective principles into regional, provincial, and state (*Land*) administration as rapidly as results of local self-government seem to warrant this further step.

(d) It is recommended that this Government oppose the creation of separate integrated German administrative and political entities coinciding with the four zones of occupation and favor, on the contrary, the use of central German administrative machinery, in so far as possible, for the despatch of business above the provincial or state level. It is in consequence further recommended that this Government oppose the partition of Germany, either *de facto* or *de jure*, along the lines of the zones of occupation.

(e) It is recommended that this Government oppose the establishment for the time being of a central German Government in contradistinction to the restoration of such central administrative agencies as would serve the interests of the Control Council.

⁵ Signed at London, November 14, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, May 1, 1945. For texts, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3070*; *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2062. Text of the agreement of November 14, 1944, also in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 124.

3. *Treatment of Germany as an Economic Unit*

It is recommended that the Government propose that uniform economic policies be adopted in all occupation zones in Germany, and to that end agreement should be reached in respect to the following matters:

- (a) Uniform ration scales and allocations.
- (b) Equitable distribution and unrestricted interzonal movement of essential goods and services.
- (c) Uniform policies for industry and agriculture.
- (d) Unified control of German exports and imports.
- (e) Centralized issuance and control of currency.
- (f) Arrangements for financing of an approved minimum of imports required for all of Germany.
- (g) Adoption of a centralized transportation system under the Control Council.
- (h) Agreement on immediate exports for purposes of relief and rehabilitation of countries devastated by Germany, prior to reparations settlement.

4. *Settlement of the Status and Membership of the Reparations Commission*

It is recommended that the Government propose that the Control Council should have responsibility pursuant to directives from the four occupying powers for determining the supplies available for reparations deliveries from Germany and that the reparations body should determine the allocation of such supplies among the claimant countries; and that the membership of the Commission should be enlarged.

IV. *Unconditional Surrender of Japan and Policy Toward Liberated Areas in the Far East*

It is recommended that this Government propose:

- (a) That the principal United Nations at war with Japan issue a joint statement outlining the program for the treatment of a defeated Japan in the hope that Japan will be more inclined to accept unconditional surrender if the Japanese people know what their future is to be;
- (b) That the Soviet Government be invited to announce at an appropriate time its adherence to the Cairo Declaration⁶ and that there be agreement among the Three Powers that there shall be advance consultation among themselves and with China on all matters relating to the implementation of the territorial dispositions provided under that Declaration;
- (c) That in relation to the areas restored to China, as in relation to China as a whole, the Three Powers agree that they will be governed

⁶ Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 393.

by the principles set forth in Article I of the Nine Power Treaty of Washington of 1922⁷ in relation to China, as follows:

“Article I.

“The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.”

V. *Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe*⁸ *in the Treatment of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary During the Armistice Control Period*

1. It is recommended that the agreement of the Soviet and British Governments should be sought on the reorganization of the Allied Control Commissions on a genuinely tripartite basis.

2. It is recommended that the principles of the Declaration should be reaffirmed and agreement of the British and Soviet Governments should be sought on procedures for its application, including the supervision of elections.

3. It is recommended that a program for the withdrawal of Soviet troops should be agreed upon in accordance with the Four-Nation Declaration of Moscow (October 30, 1943).⁹

4. It is recommended that this Government should express its willingness to proceed with the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations and with the conclusion of peace treaties as soon as the question of the character of the governments in these countries, in the light of the Crimea Declaration, has been satisfactorily settled.

5. It is recommended that assurance should be sought that the Soviet Government does not pursue the aim of making exclusive economic arrangements with these countries and cutting them off from economic relations, on a basis of equal opportunity with the rest of the world.

6. It is recommended that the agreement of the Soviet Government should be sought on the admission of American and other press

⁷ Treaty Series No. 723; 44 Stat. (3) 2113.

⁸ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

⁹ Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 308.

correspondents into these countries and the provision of reporting facilities to them.

VI. *Policy Towards Italy*

It is recommended that this Government propose:

(a) A review of tripartite policy, the United States objectives being the early political independence and economic recovery of Italy.

(b) Italy's admission to the ranks of the United Nations.

(c) Immediate revision of the surrender terms, keeping only controls essential: (1) to cover allied military requirements as long as Allied forces remain in or operate from Italy; (2) to implement the pledge that the people will have an untrammelled choice of their form of government; (3) to safeguard disputed territories within the 1939 frontiers against settlements forced either by the Italians or rival claimants pending the final peace negotiations.

(d) Negotiations in the near future of a definitive peace treaty, permitting the Italians to take part in discussions at an early stage rather than being forced to sign a treaty already negotiated in all details by the victorious powers. (Negotiations to be conducted by machinery proposed in paragraph I above.)

VII. *Soviet Participation in Solving European Economic Problems*

It is recommended that this Government press the Russians to join the Emergency Economic Committee of Europe, the European Coal Organization, and the European Inland Transport Organization, and to associate themselves in such planning of the use of European food and other resources as properly comes within the scope of these organizations; and also press for Russian participation in the United Maritime Agency.

DISCUSSION

1. *Comparison With British Agenda*¹⁰

It will be noted that a number of the items on the British Agenda have not been included:

(a) The main Polish question has been left off pending further developments in the talks now going on in Moscow for the establishment of the Polish Government of National Unity.

(b) It is considered likely that the matter of withdrawal of United States and British forces into their own occupation zones, which is on the British Agenda, will be settled before the meeting.

(c) There is no objection to placing the question of disposal of the German fleet and merchant ships upon the final Agenda, as suggested by the British, but it is considered that this is primarily a military problem.

¹⁰ See the enclosure to document No. 145, and document No. 148.

(d) There is no objection to a discussion of the Austrian problems, or the maintenance of the *status quo* in Venezia Giulia and Carinthia, pending peace settlements, as suggested by the British, but it is considered likely that these matters will be settled satisfactorily before the meeting.

(e) There is no objection to the discussion of the question of mutual withdrawal of troops from Persia, as suggested by the British, but it is recommended that the initiative be left to the British in this matter.

(f) There is no objection to discussion of our policy and interests in Greece and Turkey as suggested by the British, but it is recommended that the initiative be left to the British in this matter.

Except for the above items, it is felt that the proposed United States Agenda effectively covers all matters on the proposed British Agenda.

2. *Comparison With Memorandum to the President, Attached as Annex I*¹¹

The proposed United States Agenda is entirely consistent with the comments contained in the memorandum to the President, with the following exceptions:

(a) *Austria*. Developments in Austria indicate that it may not be necessary to place this matter upon the Agenda.

(b) *Albania*. It is considered that the proposed agreement on parallel action regarding recognition of an Albanian Government mentioned in the memorandum to the President is a matter at most for discussion between the Foreign Ministers at the Big Three Meeting.

(c) *The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe in Respect to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Austria*. On further consideration, it is recommended that these matters not be placed upon the Agenda at the present time.

3. *Proposal for a Twenty-five-Year Treaty for the Demilitarization of Germany*

The President has requested the State Department's views regarding the advisability of proposing at the Big Three Meeting that the Big Three and France, and possibly other European countries, should enter into a twenty-five year treaty committing the parties to use force to effect and maintain the demilitarization of Germany. This matter is being carefully considered. Pending final decision as to the Department's position, it has been left off the Agenda.

¹¹ Actually attached as annex II; printed as document No. 152.

No. 166

761.6711/6-1845

The Department of State to the British Embassy[Extract¹]

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

In accordance with the understanding reached at Yalta,² this Government stands ready to discuss the question of the [Turkish] Straits at the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of Government when, presumably, the Soviet Government will present its desiderata in this connection. So far as the Department can ascertain, the conversation between Mr. Molotov and the Turkish Ambassador³ took place in a friendly atmosphere and was of an exploratory character. If this is the case, the Department considers it premature to protest what amounts to a preliminary exchange of views. . . .

. . . In any case, this Government would not wish to appear as having reached any decision on this question prior to the Heads of Government meeting.

J[OSEPH] C G[REW]

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1945.

¹ For the full text of this memorandum, see document No. 688.

² See vol. II, document No. 1416, section XIV.

³ Selim Sarper. For an account of the conversation referred to, see document No. 684.

No. 167

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

CASERTA, June 23, 1945—7 p. m.

2734. Our 2725, June 22.¹

Gen Morgan has addressed us a memo² setting forth that since mil agreement has been reached re occupation of VG³ it would be most advantageous to try to arrange a final settlement of this question soon as possible. His memo added that if VG continues to be regarded as "reserved" subject for late settlement we shall be exposed to a long period of Yugo penetration and intense propaganda with increasing incidents. Yugos will clearly bend every effort to consolidate and develop their post occupational organization on Allied side of

¹ Document No. 566.

² Not printed.

³ See document No. 560.

Morgan Line⁴ and will hope for lag in Allied interest and determination and Anglo Amer opposition to Yugo power politics. Morgan feels that prompt settlement of this problem by concerted Allied action will have favorable effect on European opinion and may well facilitate solution of similar problems in future.

Morgan's memo then recommended that final settlement in VG be taken up at forthcoming Big Three meeting.

KIRK

⁴ The Morgan Line is shown on the map attached to the Belgrade agreement of June 9, 1945 (Executive Agreement Series No. 501). This map is also reproduced in *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 59, pt. 2 (inside back cover). A map showing the Morgan Line in less detail is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. xvi, p. 1264.

No. 168

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2345 : Telegram

*President Truman to Marshal Stalin*¹

[Extract²]

TOP SECRET

[OLYMPIA, WASHINGTON,] 25 June 1945.

304 . . .

.
Should there be any further aspect of the agreement³ which you feel should be considered, we shall have an opportunity to discuss this at our early meeting.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via the White House Map Room and Navy channels.

² For the full text of this message, see document No. 570.

³ i. e., the Anglo-American-Yugoslav agreement relating to Venezia Giulia, signed at Belgrade, June 9, 1945 (Executive Agreement Series No. 501; 59 Stat. (2) 1855).

No. 169

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 25 June 1945.

C. C. S. 880/1

AGENDA FOR THE NEXT UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have now one further item to add to the tentative outline agenda proposed in C. C. S. 880.¹ They suggest that the following item be added:

(11) Combined Chiefs of Staff Machinery after the war with Japan.

¹ Document No. 154.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff would submit a paper on this item as a basis for discussion.

No. 170

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 27 June 1945.

C. C. S. 880/2

AGENDA FOR MILITARY STAFF CONFERENCES

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff agree to the tentative outline agenda for the next United States-British Staff Conference proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 880¹ and C. C. S. 880/1,² and to the proposed scheme for the preparation of papers in connection therewith.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff assume that the question of control and command in the war against Japan concerns the reorganization of command in the Southwest Pacific Area now under discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 852 Series³ and in C. C. S. 878.³ The United States Chiefs of Staff believe it would be desirable to resolve this matter before the forthcoming conference if at all practicable.

3. As to the matter of Russian participation in the war against Japan, there is a question as to whether discussion of this on a combined basis will be necessary, and, in any event, the United States Chiefs of Staff will not be prepared to take up the matter until after conclusion of any conversations with the Russians.

4. It is suggested that in so far as practicable the papers on each side be presented for consideration of the other prior to the conferences.

¹ Document No. 154.

² Document No. 169.

³Not printed.

No. 171

J. C. S. Files : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 27 June 1945.

WAR 23447. TopSec to Deane from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

With regard to U. S.-Russian military conversations at the forthcoming conference, the United States Chiefs of Staff will be prepared

to exchange with the Russians estimates of the Japanese situation and to discuss plans for the conduct of the war against Japan, with a view to effecting necessary coordination. They will be glad to discuss other appropriate subjects desired by the Russians. You should request the Soviet General Staff to advise the United States Chiefs of Staff in the near future as to additional subjects they may desire to discuss.

No. 172

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State ad interim

TOP SECRET

CASERTA, June 28, 1945—5 p. m.

2801. At dinner last evening SAC¹ informed us that he was frankly disappointed with statement (our 2650, June 16²) recently made by McNarney on arrival US that by end of [19]45 only 2500 Amer troops would be left in Italy with exception of Amer div allocated for occupation of VG. He inquired whether we have rec'd any info from Washington as to possible change in Amer redeployment policy and whether we could not be persuaded to retain on continent of Europe considerable number of troops for some time or at least until there had been a full settlement of all major problems as result of war. We said to SAC that we had rec'd no info on this subject but that in any event we considered it one which should properly be dealt with on highest level. He then said in presence of Sir Desmond Morton Churchill's asst also at dinner that he had rec'd personal msg from Brit PriMin asking him (SAC) to prepare carefully estimates as to what Allied forces should be left in Italy to handle any foreseeable situation.

He added that Church[ill] would take up with Truman "with great vigor" urgent desirability of leaving substantial Amer forces in Italy and elsewhere in Europe.³

KIRK

¹ Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander.

² Not printed.

³ For other indications that the British Delegation would wish to discuss this subject and the related question of the retention of a combined command in Italy at the Berlin Conference, see documents Nos. 193, 476, 480, and 481.

No. 173

860f.4016/6-2845

The British Embassy to the Department of State[Extract ¹]

Ref: 512/15/45

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON
DATED JUNE 22ND, 1945

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3. It seems to us that a full exchange of views with the Americans on the whole question of transfers of ethnic minority groups in Europe is desirable, . . . Such an exchange of views might lead up to tripartite discussion on the subject at the forthcoming meeting of the "Big Three". Will you sound the State Department on the latter proposal and let us know their reactions to it?

.

WASHINGTON, June 28th, 1945.

¹ For the full text of this message, see document No. 437.

No. 174

J. C. S. Files : Telegram

The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 29 June 1945.

PRIORITY

LOCKUP to AGWar for General Marshall from Deane TopSec M 24854.

As directed in WAR 23447,¹ I have queried General Antonov as to the subjects that the Soviet Staff will wish to discuss with United States Chiefs of Staff at the coming conference. Pending his reply, we here believe that the following subjects may be among those raised by the Soviet Staff:

1. Question of convoying supplies via the Pacific after the outbreak of hostilities. This may be an immediate problem in view of the number of ships that will probably be loaded or enroute at the time hostilities commence.

2. The question of providing Russia with heavy bombers.

3. The question of sending Lend Lease cargo via the Atlantic in case the Pacific supply route is closed.

¹ Document No. 171.

4. Renewed request for all those items on the MILEPOST list or on the 28th of May list ² that we have thus far been unable to agree to supply. Among these may be renewed requests for A-26 aircraft, canned meats, shoes, and uniform cloth.

5. Request to be told our strategic plans.

Subjects which we believe the United States Chiefs of Staff should raise are:

1. An exchange of estimates of the Japanese situation.

2. Method of establishing operational liaison effective from the outbreak of hostilities.

3. Requirements for emergency services and repair for U. S. naval vessels at Soviet ports.

4. Use of Soviet airdromes for emergency landings of U. S. aircraft.

U. S. Military Mission is preparing studies on most of the above subjects and we shall be prepared to give you our views either at or before the conference. Believe that a decision should be reached prior to arrival as to the extent to which our strategic plans are to be disclosed and also a study indicating the exact status of the Lend Lease supply program.

I recommend that Admiral Maples, General Ritchie and I be directed to attend the conference. We shall be prepared to furnish up to three first-class Russian interpreters if you want us to bring them.

² These references are to lists (not printed) containing Soviet requests for lend-lease items.

No. 175

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 29 June 1945.

C. C. S. 880/5

AGENDA FOR MILITARY STAFF CONFERENCES

1. We communicated the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff, as set out in C. C. S. 880/2,¹ to the British Chiefs of Staff.

2. With regard to paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 880/2, the British Chiefs of Staff say that their paper on the control and command of the war against Japan will include proposals for the reorganization of command in the Southwest Pacific.

3. With regard to paragraph 3 of C. C. S. 880/2, the British Chiefs of Staff agree that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should defer discussion of this problem until after the conclusion of any conversations with the Russians.

¹ Document No. 170.

4. With regard to paragraph 4 of C. C. S. 880/2, the British Chiefs of Staff agree that papers should be exchanged in advance of the conference so far as practicable. They doubt, however, whether under present circumstances they will be able to present their papers on British participation in the war against Japan (item 4) and control and command of the war against Japan (item 6) more than a few days before TERMINAL. The directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command (item 5) will depend upon the outcome of the Combined Chiefs of Staff discussion on British participation in the war against Japan (item 4) and cannot therefore be tabled in advance.

No. 176

740.00116 EW/6-2945

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State ad interim

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 29th, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. UNDER SECRETARY, With reference to Mr. Balfour's letter of May 29th,¹ I am writing to say that His Majesty's Government propose that the subject of "War Criminals" should be added to the list of topics for discussion at the next meeting of Heads of Governments. Discussions between representatives of the United States Government, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the Soviet Government and the French Government on war criminals started in London on June 26th.² His Majesty's Government consider however that it is likely that there will be matters connected with war crimes still unresolved at the time of the meeting and that in any case a brief review of the position would be valuable.

Y[our]s sincerely

HALIFAX

¹ Document No. 144.² See documents Nos. 394 and 395.

No. 177

740.00119 Control (Germany)/6-3045

*The Secretary of State ad interim to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Subjects for Discussion at the Meeting of the Three Heads of Government

Before your departure from Washington you requested that the State Department transmit to you as soon as possible a fully docu-

¹ Grew sent copies of this memorandum and of its attachment to Leahy and Byrnes on June 30 (file No. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/6-3045).

mented agenda for the forthcoming meeting in Germany. Since there is at the present moment no Secretary of State it has been impossible to obtain for the attached memorandum and documents the clearance I should have desired but, in view of your request and the shortness of the time remaining before the meeting, I thought it best to submit the material without delay. It represents of course the carefully considered recommendations of the Department of State. Copies are being sent to Justice Byrnes and Admiral Leahy.

The attached memorandum is divided into the following three parts:

I. The items which we recommend that the United States raise for discussion, together with supporting memoranda recommending the United States position on each of these matters.

II. The items which the British intend to raise for discussion not included under paragraph I above, together with supporting memoranda recommending the United States position on each of these matters.

III. Important additional items which are likely to be raised at the meeting.

[JOSEPH C. GREW]

[Attachment 2]

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

I. PROPOSED ITEMS FOR THE AGENDA

The following is a list of matters which you may wish to bring up at the meeting, with a short statement of the action which we recommend. There are attached as Annexes memoranda briefly supporting our recommendations.

1. *Procedure and Machinery for Peace Negotiations and Territorial Settlements* (See Annex 1³)

It is recommended that the United States Government propose that there be no formal Peace Conference but that there be established a Council of the Foreign Ministers of U. S. S. R., Great Britain, China, France and the United States to deal with the problems of the peace in Europe.

² Not attached to the file copy of the above memorandum. The text of the attachment is printed from Byrnes' copy of the Briefing Book (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446).

³ Document No. 228.

2. *Policy toward Germany* (See Annex 2⁴)

A. *Establishment of Control Council*

It is recommended that this Government propose that the agreement on control machinery in Germany⁵ be implemented as soon as possible.

B. *Agreement on the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period*

It is recommended that this Government present, for tripartite approval and later confirmation by the European Advisory Commission, a revised statement of policy on the treatment of Germany during the initial control period. The revised statement, which is included in Annex 2, is based on the U. S. memorandum approved by President Roosevelt on March 23⁶ and subsequent discussion of this memorandum in the European Advisory Commission.

C. *Establishment of German Local Administrations*

(a) It is recommended that this Government propose the restoration throughout Germany of local self-government through elective councils and proceed forthwith to put this proposal into effect in the United States zone.

(b) It is recommended that this Government propose the authorization for the whole of Germany of non-Nazi political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion and proceed forthwith to put this proposal into effect in the United States zone.

(c) It is recommended that this Government propose the introduction of the representative and elective principles into regional, provincial, and state (*Land*) administration as rapidly as results of local self-government seem to warrant this further step.

D. *Treatment of Germany as an Economic Unit*

It is recommended that the [*this*] Government propose that uniform economic policies be adopted in all occupation zones in Germany, and to that end agreement should be reached in respect to the following matters:

- (a) Uniform ration scales and allocations.
- (b) Equitable distribution and unrestricted interzonal movement of essential goods and services.
- (c) Uniform policies for industry and agriculture.
- (d) Unified control of German exports and imports.
- (e) Centralized issuance and control of currency.
- (f) Arrangements for financing of an approved minimum of imports required for all of Germany.

⁴ Document No. 327.

⁵ Signed at London, November 14, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, May 1, 1945. For texts, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3070; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2062. Text of the agreement of November 14, 1944, also in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 124.

⁶ See document No. 327, footnote 7.

(g) Adoption of a centralized transportation system under the Control Council.

(h) Agreement on immediate exports for purposes of relief and rehabilitation of countries devastated by Germany, prior to reparations settlement.

A concrete program embodying these points, for presentation to the British and Soviets at the meeting, is included in Annex 2.

3.⁷ *Unconditional Surrender of Japan and Policy toward Liberated Areas in the Far East* (See Annex 3⁸)

It is recommended that this Government propose:

(a) That the principal United Nations at war with Japan issue a joint statement outlining the program for the treatment of a defeated Japan in the hope that Japan will be more inclined to accept unconditional surrender if the Japanese people know what their future is to be;

(b) That the Soviet Government be invited to announce at an appropriate time its adherence to the Cairo Declaration⁹ and that there be agreement among the Three Powers that there shall be advance consultation among themselves and with China on all matters relating to the implementation of the territorial dispositions provided under that Declaration;

(c) That in relation to the areas restored to China, as in relation to China as a whole, the Three Powers agree that they will be governed by the principles set forth in the Nine Power Treaty of Washington of 1922¹⁰ in relation to China, committing the signatories to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China, to provide the fullest opportunity to China to develop and maintain a stable government, to safeguard the principle of equal commercial opportunity for all nations in China, and to refrain from seeking special rights and privileges in China.

4. *Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe*¹¹ *in the Treatment of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Greece* (See Annexes 4 and 5¹²)

It is recommended:

(a) in regard to Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary

(1) That the three Allied Governments agree in principle to the reorganization of the present governments in Rumania and Bulgaria, and, should it become necessary, in Hungary, and to the postponement of diplomatic recognition and the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries until such reorganization has taken place.

(2) That provision be made for tripartite consultation (later to include French representatives) to work out any procedures which

⁷ This entire item is deleted in pencil in Dunn's copy of the Briefing Book.

⁸ See documents Nos. 574, 589, and 607.

⁹ Of December 1, 1943. Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 393.

¹⁰ Treaty Series No. 723; 44 Stat. (3) 2113.

¹¹ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

¹² Documents Nos. 285 and 443, respectively.

may be necessary for the reorganization of the governments to include representatives of all significant democratic elements, with a view to the early holding of free and unfettered elections.

(3) That the three Allied Governments consider how best to assist the local governments in the holding of such elections, bearing in mind that while it may be preferable to have the actual conduct of elections in the hands of the local governments themselves rather than in those of Allied representatives, there must be adequate assurances that all democratic elements will have the opportunity to present candidates and that the voting will be in fact free.

(b) in regard to Greece

That, pursuant to a joint Anglo-U.S. approach in regard to Allied supervision of Greek elections which is being made to the Greek Government before the Big Three meeting, the U. S. Government propose to Great Britain and the Soviet Union at the meeting that the three Governments, possibly with the participation of France, send observers to Greece to supervise the elections to be held later this year.

5. *Policy towards Italy* (See Annex 6¹³)

It is recommended that this Government propose:

(a) A review of tripartite policy, the United States objectives being the early political independence and economic recovery of Italy.

(b) Immediate revision of the surrender terms and the abolition of the Advisory Council.

(c) Negotiation in the near future of a definitive peace treaty. Negotiations would be conducted by machinery proposed in paragraph I above.

6. *Soviet Cooperation in Solving European Economic Problems* (See Annex 7¹⁴)

It is recommended that this Government urge the Soviet Government to cooperate to the full in solving the emergency economic problems which are the aftermath of the war in Europe. Concrete proposals in this sense are set forth in Annex 7.

7. *Freedom of Communication and Information in Europe* (See Annex 8¹⁵)

It is recommended that an effort be made to obtain agreement of the Russians to a more liberal policy in this matter in Germany and Eastern Europe.

II. ITEMS WHICH THE BRITISH INTEND TO RAISE FOR DISCUSSION NOT INCLUDED UNDER PARAGRAPH I ABOVE

8. *Poland*

No recommendations are being submitted under this heading at this time as events are moving too rapidly.

¹³ Document No. 464.

¹⁴ Document No. 524.

¹⁵ Document No. 257.

9.¹⁶ *Conditions and Timing for Bringing into Force of Occupation Zones in Germany*

No recommendations are being submitted under this heading at this time. It is understood that this matter has been settled.

10.¹⁷ *Disposal of German Fleet and Merchant Ships*

No recommendation is being submitted in regard to the disposition of the German Fleet as this is a military problem and one which we understand is being considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁸

In regard to the disposition of the Merchant Ships, it is recommended that, subject to the approval of the military authorities, we agree with the Soviet claim to one-third of these ships.

11.¹⁹ *Settlement of the Status and Membership of the Reparations Commission*

It is recommended that this Government propose that the Control Council should have responsibility, pursuant to directives from the four occupying powers, for determining the supplies available for reparations deliveries from Germany and that the reparations body should determine the allocation of such supplies among the claimant countries; and that the membership of the Commission should be enlarged. (A detailed paper on this subject will be available before the meeting.)²⁰

12.²¹ *Austria*

It is expected that the question of the establishment of zones in Vienna²² and of the Control Commission²³ will be settled before the

¹⁶ In another version of this memorandum in Department of State files (file No. 740.00119 Council/6-3045), also dated June 30 but apparently amended by the substitution of two pages prepared early in July, this item 9 is omitted entirely and replaced by the following:

"9. *War Crimes.*

"Discussions on this subject are now being conducted in London. Justice Jackson doubts the advisability of raising so technical a matter in the Berlin Meeting. (A paper on this subject is available in the background book)."

The paper referred to is presumably document No. 395; see also document No. 394.

¹⁷ In the version referred to in the preceding footnote, this item appears as No. 14 under heading III.

¹⁸ See documents Nos. 391 and 392, *post*, and vol. II, document No. 1005.

¹⁹ In the version referred to in footnote 16, *ante*, this item appears as No. 15 under heading III.

²⁰ Such a paper was not included in the Briefing Book.

²¹ In the version referred to in footnote 16, *ante*, this item is omitted and the following substitute appears as the first item under heading III:

"13. *Austria.*

"The questions of the establishment of zones in Vienna and of the Control Commission have been settled in [the] EAC and have been referred to the Governments concerned."

²² See *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1600; 61 Stat. (3) 2679.*

²³ See document No. 282.

meeting. Recommendations are made in Annex 9 attached²⁴ regarding the recognition of the Austrian Government.

13.²⁵ *Yugoslavia*

Recommendations are made in Annex 10 attached²⁶ respecting the maintenance of the *status quo* with regard to Yugoslav-Italian and Yugoslav-Austrian frontiers pending peace settlement.

14.²⁷ *Iran*

Recommendations regarding the question of mutual withdrawal of troops are made in Annex 11 attached.²⁸

15.²⁹ *Turkey*

Recommendations in regard to our attitude toward a revision of the Montreux Convention³⁰ governing the control of the Straits are made in Annex 12 attached.³¹

III. ADDITIONAL IMPORTANT MATTERS WHICH ARE LIKELY
TO BE RAISED

16. *European Territorial Settlements*

Annex 13 attached³² contains recommendations and brief discussions on the most important and troublesome European territorial issues. Papers on the lesser territorial issues will be available for use at the meeting if necessary.³³

17. *Twenty-five-year Treaty*³⁴ *for the Demilitarization of Germany* (See Annex 14³⁵)

It is recommended that this matter not be raised formally but that the opportunity be taken to sound out the Prime Minister and Stalin on the matter.

²⁴ Document No. 268.

²⁵ In the version referred to in footnote 16, *ante*, this item appears as No. 10 under heading II.

²⁶ Document No. 558.

²⁷ In the version referred to in footnote 16, *ante*, this item appears as No. 11 under heading II.

²⁸ Document No. 628.

²⁹ In the version referred to in footnote 16, *ante*, this item appears as No. 12 under heading II.

³⁰ League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213.

³¹ Document No. 680. Cf. document No. 681.

³² See documents Nos. 259, 398, and 509.

³³ See documents Nos. 246, 247, 248, 400, 401, 511, 512, and 513.

³⁴ In the version referred to in footnote 16, *ante*, this heading reads "Long-Term Treaty".

³⁵ Document No. 328.

18. *Germany: Partition* (See Annex 15³⁶)

The supporting paper, Annex 15, sets forth in detail the reasons which lead the State Department to believe that the disadvantages of partitioning Germany outweigh the advantages.

19. *Germany: Disposition of the Ruhr* (See Annex 16³⁷)

It is recommended that this Government oppose the separation of the Ruhr from Germany either through internationalization or through the creation of a separate state or through annexation by one or more neighboring states.

20. *International Military Bases*

While there were no definite conclusions or commitments, at previous meetings of the heads of government there was some discussion of the question of establishing international military bases in Europe and Africa.³⁸ In view of these previous discussions, the question may be raised by one of the other participants. It is understood that the Army and Navy are at present giving consideration to the matter, and the State Department will consult with them with a view to reaching certain agreed recommendations.³⁹

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

³⁶ Document No. 331.

³⁷ Document No. 399.

³⁸ The records of the Tehran Conference, where the discussion referred to took place, are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume in this series.

³⁹ The agreed recommendations referred to were not submitted before or during the Berlin Conference.

No. 178

840.811/7-2545: Telegram

*The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower)
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

[Paraphrase—Extract ¹]

SECRET

[SHAEF,] 3 July 1945.

SCAF 471. The urgency of the international problem discussed herein [internationalization of the Danube] would suggest its inclusion on the agenda of the forthcoming Conference of the Big Three, if such action is deemed appropriate.

¹ For the full paraphrased text of this message, see vol. II, document No. 754, enclosure B.

No. 179

740.0011 EW/7-345

Memorandum by the Director of European Affairs (Matthews)

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. John Balfour, British Minister Counselor;
Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Director, Office of
European Affairs.

Mr. Balfour called at his request, accompanied by Mr. Neville Butler, whom I had not seen since leaving Malta last February. Mr. Balfour left with me the attached *Aide-Mémoire* containing a revision of the British suggestions for topics to be discussed at the forthcoming Berlin meeting. He likewise left with me the attached comments on the various items proposed. In addition to the latter, he said that the Foreign Office hoped that if the United States were in agreement, we might "take the lead" in presenting points 5 (a), (c) and (f), as well as point 3 (b). Mr. Balfour also asked if we could give some indication of our views with regard to the British suggestions and also an indication of who will be accompanying the President and Secretary of State.

I told Mr. Balfour that I could not of course comment upon the British list until the President and the new Secretary of State had had an opportunity to study the papers which we had tentatively prepared in the Department. I said, however, that as far as the thinking on my level was concerned, the British list of suggested topics in general ran somewhat parallel to our own thoughts. I remarked, however, on the omission of any item dealing with the situation in the Far East. I added that I noted that a number of the items on the original list had already become obsolete and their elimination was consequently in accord with our own thinking. I said that I would be glad to report our conversation to the Secretary and hoped to be able to communicate with him further in the near future.

H F[REEMAN] M[ATTHEWS]

[Attachment 1]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On the 29th May His Majesty's Minister sent to the Under Secretary of State a list of subjects suggested by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for discussion at the next meeting of

Heads of Government.¹ Additional suggestions were made in Mr. Balfour's letter to Mr. Grew of June 1st² and the Ambassador's letter to Mr. Grew of June 29th.³

His Majesty's Government have been considering the agenda in the light of developments since the first draft was presented and the enclosure to the *Aide-Mémoire* contains a revised list. This list has been drawn up in the form considered suitable for possible communication to the Soviet Government.

WASHINGTON, July 3rd, 1945.

[Subattachment]

REVISED LIST OF SUGGESTED TOPICS⁴

1. General.
 - a) Question of procedure for a general European settlement.
 - b) Application of the Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe.⁵
 - c) Permission for representatives of the press to function freely in countries of Eastern Europe.
 - d) War Crimes.
2. Poland.
3. Germany.
 - a) Polish western frontier. Status of Polish administration in former German territory.
 - b) Transfer of German populations from Poland and Czechoslovakia.
 - c) Exchange of views about the setting up of a central German administration in Berlin to coordinate transport, etc.; future German Government.
 - d) Attitude towards political parties and activities.
 - e) Treatment of Germany as an economic whole.
 - f) Coordination of propaganda and information services to Germany.
4. Italy. Conclusion of a Peace Treaty.
5. Balkans.
 - a) Internal situation in ex-satellite countries, with particular reference to the form of governments which have been set up.

¹ See document No. 144 and the enclosure to document No. 145.

² Document No. 148.

³ Document No. 176.

⁴ On July 11 the British Ambassador at Moscow presented to Molotov a "List of Subjects To Be Raised by the British Delegation at 'TERMINAL'" which was substantially the same as this list, except that, at least on the courtesy copy supplied to the American Embassy at Moscow, item 2 (Poland) was omitted.

⁵ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

- b) Question of eventual peace treaties with these countries.
 - c) The status of British and American representatives on the Control Commissions pending conclusion of peace treaties.
 - d) Removal of industrial equipment, especially in Roumania, under the guise of booty.
 - e) Situation in Yugoslavia and implementation of the Tito-Šubašić agreement.⁶
 - f) The assurance of free elections in all Balkan countries.
6. Turkey.
- a) Russo-Turkish relations.
 - b) Modification of the Montreux Convention.⁷
7. Iran.
- Question of the mutual withdrawal of troops.

[Attachment 2]

BRITISH COMMENT ON THEIR PROPOSED AGENDA ⁸

1. Under Item 1 *a*) it would be possible to discuss such questions as the holding of a Peace Conference, the future of the European Advisory Commission and permanent machinery for dealing with problems of countries in Allied occupation. We do not propose to discuss at the meeting the details of actual settlement, frontiers, etc. Item *b*) (application of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe) may be largely covered by discussions under Item 5 *a*) and *f*); The former Item 9 *c*) (transfer of German population from Poland and Czechoslovakia) has now been included in the German paragraph which seems a better place for it. Item 1 *d*) (War Crimes) is new and may perhaps prove unnecessary in view of the talks now proceeding in London.

2. Poland has been retained in the list in case problems are outstanding or are thrown up by the negotiations now proceeding in Moscow.

3. Of the questions listed under 3 we think that *a*) and *b*) should certainly be discussed. The Americans may wish to take the initiative as regards *b*), since they have already raised this matter with us. Items *c*) to *f*) all come within the sphere of the Allied Control Commission. We are enquiring of the British element of the Control Commission whether they think it would be useful to exchange views on some or all of them at the forthcoming meeting. There are further German topics which might come up but which we ourselves

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 251-254.

⁷ League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213.

⁸ This caption appears as a manuscript heading on the original.

do not propose to raise. These include 1) disposal of German merchant ships; 2) the future of German industry; 3) reparations; 4) disposal of Russian and Polish displaced persons in Germany. While it will not be possible to avoid discussion of 4) if the Russians raise it we would take the line that the first three are a matter for Reparation Commission and not suitable for discussion at meeting. We would not propose ourselves to raise the question of the composition of a new Austrian Government at the meeting.

4. As regards 4) our idea would be to inform the Russians in general terms of our intention to conclude a treaty of peace with Italy and to express hope that they will agree. We do not consider that re-definition of our policy and interests in Italy need be discussed at present with the Soviet Government, though we should welcome an opportunity for an exchange of views with members of the United States delegation, if this could be arranged, in London after the meeting.

5. Under 5, Item *f*) would afford an opportunity of discussing elections in Greece and possibly Albania if that were thought desirable.

6. As regards 6 we think the Straits question will inevitably have to be discussed at TERMINAL in view of the recent exchanges between the Russian and Turkish governments on their general relations.

7. In addition to the subjects mentioned, our delegation will be briefed on a number of subjects which we ourselves do not intend to raise but which we are prepared to discuss if the Soviet delegation bring them up. These will include, besides those mentioned under 3 above, the proposals for arming European allies, the disposal of the Italian fleet, Venezia Giulia, Greek internal affairs, Albania, a special régime regarding entrances to the Baltic, the Levantine question, the Russian attitude towards Switzerland, and Tangier.

No. 180

740.0011 E. W./7-345

The Under Secretary of State (Grew) to the President

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will recall that on May 30 the Department transmitted a memorandum submitting Prime Minister Churchill's suggested list of subjects for discussion at the next meeting of Heads of Governments¹ and that on June 14 in a subsequent memorandum the Department's comments thereon were likewise forwarded to you.² The

¹ Document No. 145.

² Document No. 152.

British Embassy has now handed to the Department a "Revised List of Suggested Topics" and certain comments thereon. Copies of both the list and comments³ are enclosed for your information. The British Embassy states that the attached list "has been drawn up in a form considered suitable for possible communication to the Soviet Government".

Many of the problems presented in the original British list have, as the Department indicated would probably be the case, subsequently been solved. The present list is in most respects parallel to the items suggested for discussion in the Department's draft agenda. The principal difference is the omission of any topic therein on the situation in the Far East. This omission was drawn to the British Embassy's attention.

JOSEPH C. GREW

³ See document No. 179.

No. 181

Truman Papers

*The Chairman of the President's War Relief Control Board (Davies)
to the President*

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Here is the memorandum which I spoke to you about this morning. I think it will give you a reasonably comprehensive perspective, in short compass, of what the agenda might cover.

It was good to see you looking so well this morning.

You are on the verge of great decisions. Your high purpose and dedication to our country, and to a peaceful world, will surely be crowned with success.

With great respect [etc.]

JOSEPH E DAVIES

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM RE COMING CONFERENCE OF BIG THREE IN JULY, 1945¹

PURPOSE

This memorandum was prepared to give a perspective upon matters which may be included in the agenda or in the discussions of the coming Conference.

UNFINISHED OLD BUSINESS

At the Crimean Conference, according to the published report²

¹ Davies submitted a copy of this memorandum to Byrnes, together with copies of documents Nos. 33 and 34, on July 3, 1945.

² Document No. 1417, printed in vol. II.

(February 12, 1945), eight matters were specifically covered by agreements. Some have been executed and are closed. As to others, there still remain matters for further consideration and possible agreement.

The following is an analysis of that report with comment as to possible unfinished business.

I. *Agreements for Joint Military Operations.*

1. Timing of attacks against the enemy.
2. Zones of occupation agreed upon.
3. Coordinated administration of occupied Germany through a Central Control Commission.
4. Purpose—The destruction of Naziism.

Comment:—Only #3 of the foregoing, “Coordinated administration, etc.”, will probably involve matters to be settled by the higher political levels. Numbers 1, 2, and 4, will have been executed and disposed of by the Joint Allied Command, or by agreements through the European Advisory Council [*Commission*].

II. *Agreements as to Reparations*—extent and methods of—Commission to function in Moscow.

Comment:—There will probably be differences developed at the Reparations Commission in Moscow which may require settlement in principle at Berlin.

III. *Agreement to promote “International Organization to maintain peace and security”.*

Comment:—There will probably be no unfinished matters connected with the International Peace Organization.

IV. *Agreement as to Liberated Europe*—Agreement “when in their judgment conditions require it”, to assist the peoples of Europe by democratic means to solve their political and economic problems—for the purpose of:—

1. To establish *Internal Peace*.
2. To carry out *Emergency Relief*.
3. To assist in creation of *Interim Governments “broadly representative of democratic elements,[”]* etc.
4. Facilitate “where necessary” free elections, etc.

Comment:—This will be one of the thorns. It is most important and must be settled and defined. Before that can be done, our own policy must be settled as to Europe. (See subsequent discussion.)

V. *China and France.*

Comment:—As to China and France, there will undoubtedly be some questions left for consideration by the Conference, both as to France in connection with Austria, and as to China in connection with Japan.

VI. *Agreement as to Poland*—Recognizing the Curzon Line, Establishing Commission to project POLISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY.

Comment:—After the establishment of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity there will remain questions as to the recognition of the new government, the time thereof, the rectification of the Curzon Line, the evacuation of Soviet troops, the determination of eastern and northern boundaries, elections—time of, etc.

VII. *Yugoslavia*—Agreement that Tito's Government should be formed along certain lines.

Comment:—Assuming the Trieste situation to be temporarily disposed of, the principal question as to territorial adjustments and boundaries still remains.

VIII. *Balkan Questions*—General Review of.

Comment:—The Balkan situation—Clarification of the functions of the Allied Control Commissions—the matter of recognition of Rumania and Bulgaria, will be among the most important of unfinished business matters to be considered. This is tied up with the general question of policy as to the Yalta Declaration as to Liberated Europe. (See IV—above).

IX. *Periodic meetings of Foreign Secretaries* for consultation agreed upon, "about every three of [or] four months".

Comment:—The only question remaining is whether it might not be advisable to have periodic meetings definitely fixed.

SPECIFIC MATTERS, INCLUDED IN ABOVE OR NEW

The following is a list of matters generally which might be placed on the agenda.

I

GERMANY

I *Determine the date of retirement to, and occupancy of zones.* This will probably be settled before meeting by Joint Chiefs of Staff.

II *Allied Control Council in Berlin.*

(a) Settle and define the organization of the Council itself, and the machinery for joint administration, officers, etc. (unless already done by the Commission).

(b) Secure definite understanding and specific agreement, as far as possible, as to the general policies to be projected, and also policies as to respective zones. Are the policies in each zone to be determined by the several occupying governments or is there to be a uniform policy prescribed by the Control Council, applicable to all as to such

matters as: control of the civilian populations—fraternization—feeding of populations—character of local administrations to be used—attitude toward civilians—public relations—admission of the Press, etc., etc.?

The question is whether it is to be a joint policy, agreed upon, or a unilateral policy in the respective zones.

Comment:—Much of this may have been already determined. But it is of paramount importance that the situation should be defined as clearly as possible. It is a field most fertile for future trouble affecting essential future unity, and will probably be a critical situation for some time, in spite of all that can be done. There will inevitably be suspicions and fears as to both the Soviets and Britain and France, that each is building up an ally for the future as against the other. To preserve unity, which will give the Peace Organization a chance to function, there should be agreement as far as possible, *now*, as to just what the Russians consider a *sine qua non* to their security in handling the zone which they occupy. Suspicions which were generated, despite the character of “joint and coordinated” military operations in Germany, where the parties were bound together by need for military victory, indicate clearly what may develop to disturb allied unity for peace, from here on. Clear, definite, facing-up to the necessities which each side regards as vital, *now*, will save future trouble.

Here again is the question of what is our policy going to be as to Europe.

III *Other matters connected with Germany*, and [which] will probably come up are:

1. Differences as to matters concerning *Reparations*—Labor—Capital goods—machinery, etc.—Soldier labor, etc.
2. Will food in the eastern zone (Germany’s “granary”) be available also for populations in the other zones of occupation?
3. What portions of Germany are to be turned over to *Poland*, and *when*?

II

AUSTRIA

I *Settlement of the following matters*, unless disposed of, will be required.

1. The question of the *constitution and function* of the *Allied Control Commission*.
2. The question of the *recognition of the Renner Government*.
3. The determination of the *respective zones of occupation*.
4. The demarcation of the *zone for France*.
5. The question of the *feeding of Austria*.

III

ITALY AND GREECE

I The following matters will require settlement.

1. The question of conclusion of *Peace Treaty with Italy*, and its terms.
2. *The redefinition of policy toward and interest in these countries to avoid future conflict of interest.*
3. *General clarification* of understandings with reference to the general or specific relations of the Allies to them.

IV

THE BALKANS—RUMANIA, BULGARIA, YUGOSLAVIA, AND HUNGARY

I Unquestionably, one of the major problems confronting the Conference arises here. If trouble is to be avoided between the Powers because of continued bickerings and disputes, which will arise here, the situation has to be clarified and defined by specific agreement.

The questions presented are: whether Allied Control Commissions are to continue to function; and, if so, the extent of influence or control which the British and American members are to exercise; or whether the dominant Soviet interest in control exercised during war conditions shall continue in the reconstruction of the interim governments.

Unless there is clear definition here, there will be constant charges of unilateral action, etc., to disturb Allied unity.

Comment:—The determination of this question involves the formulation of our own policy in connection with the European situation. It is really the same question that is presented in connection with Germany.

The Balkans will continue to be the breeding place of future trouble. Rumania has a population of approximately twenty million, Bulgaria—eight million, Yugoslavia—sixteen million—a total of approximately forty-four million. Their peoples are intensely race conscious. Their hatreds are bred on centuries of conflict. Their nationalisms, chauvinisms, and political concepts are all extreme. Democracy does not mean the same thing in the Balkans as it does to us, or to England.

The Balkans border on the Black Sea, the Dardanelles, the Suez Canal, and are the focal point of the old empire ambitions of centuries. England has had an historic interest in the Balkans because of India and its desire to maintain its Mediterranean lifeline. The Soviets are also deeply concerned with the Balkans. First, there is their racial interest—the Slavs. Second, there is their vital interest in the control of the Dardanelles, not only as an outlet for Russian ships to the Mediterranean, but also as a protection against attack upon Russia by water, through the Dardanelles to the Black Sea.

The Soviets also regard a friendly Rumania as vital to their physical security. It has been used in the past as an avenue for aggressive attack from Europe. Their foreign policy desires to prevent such recurrence.

Bulgaria is generally friendly to the Soviets, as is Yugoslavia. Rumania, however, has been generally considered to be hostile, in a class with the old Polish Government. Between the two wars, Rumania and Poland had a military treaty,³ the main purpose of which was directed against Russia. The Soviets require that Rumania, first, be a friendly neighbor and, second, that their Government there shall be stable.

In the conduct of the war, the civil, as well as the military administrations of countries, generally have been vested completely in the control of the Military Command of the various areas. Greece, for instance, was under the British High Command, and General Eisenhower controlled western Europe in his area.

With the invasion of the Balkans last year by the Soviets, they insisted upon similar controls. I am informed that in October of last year, this was one of the main topics of discussion between Churchill and Stalin, and a loose arrangement was made whereby the British were to exercise practically exclusive control in Greece; but that in Rumania and Bulgaria there was to be a predominant Soviet control, with a British participation of practically roughly 20 per cent. In Yugoslavia, the basis was 50 per cent, so far as the British were concerned.⁴ This arrangement was, I understand, translated into the Armistice Agreements⁵ incident to Soviet victories. Allied Control Commissions were set up *pro forma*. They have not worked satisfactorily, either in Rumania or Bulgaria. The dominant interests of Britain were asserted in Greece, and in Italy, and recognized. The Soviets had insisted their dominant interest in the Balkans required similar recognition. In Rumania, the Soviets apparently became convinced that the interim government, as originally created, could not be relied on, and they insisted upon a new government which they believed they could rely on.

Apparently some things were done which members of the Allied Control Commission did not approve of. In any event, they were overridden, on the assumption that there was a carry-over of the War Controls. That has induced criticisms of alleged unilateral

³ Signed at Bucharest, March 26, 1926. Text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxxv, p. 981.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 104-105.

⁵ i. e., the Armistice with Rumania, signed at Moscow, September 12, 1944 (Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (2) 1712), and the Armistice with Bulgaria, signed at Moscow, October 28, 1944 (Executive Agreement Series No. 437; 58 Stat. (2) 1498).

action and violations of the so-called Declarations of Yalta as to Liberated Europe.⁶

The Crimean Declaration declared that the parties were

“to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated . . .⁷ to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems”[.]

It also provided that

“the three governments will jointly assist the people . . . *where in their judgment conditions require* (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities *broadly representative of all democratic elements* . . . and pledged” to free elections and to facilitate the holding thereof.

It is also provided that

“when in the opinion of the three governments conditions . . . *make such action necessary*, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration”.

It will be noted that the language is broad. It might permit of the construction that before any such consultation, there had to be unanimous agreement that the conditions “required such action”, or that “conditions made such action necessary”.

This very question has arisen in connection with the proposed recognition of the governments of Rumania and Bulgaria, recently suggested by the Soviet Government. It is clear, therefore, that if trouble is going to be avoided, either this tripartite arrangement will have to be abandoned, or it will have to be clarified by specific agreements as to the exact function of the other than Soviet members of the Control Commission. Difficulty was had with reference to a similar situation in the agreement as to Poland.

A “meeting of the minds” should be arrived at in the interest of the preservation of unity for peace.

II The question of concluding peace treaties with the enemy states, and having understandings with reference to the withdrawal of the Allied Armies of occupation applies also to these situations.

III In Rumania there is also the question of removal by the Russian Armies of industrial oil equipment belonging to nationals other than Rumania—Reparation therefore [*sic*]. The question of what is booty and what is property which should be not removed, but held

⁶ For the full text of the declaration referred to, see vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

⁷ Ellipses throughout this document are in the original.

for the joint account of the Allies, may have been disposed of before the meeting. If not, it should be considered.

V

TURKEY

I *The relations between Russia and Turkey, and the relations of England and Europe to Turkey*, should be explored and, if possible, settled, by common agreement.

II *The old question of the Dardanelles*—the Montreux Convention⁸—the question of Russian participation in the military protection of the Straits, etc., should be discussed and agreement arrived at.

(NOTE:—A separate memo on the question of the Dardanelles is available, if desired).⁹

VI

FINLAND AND THE BALTIC

I The Conference, with reference to the above, will probably consider:

1. Russian access to warm water ports and freedom of access to the Atlantic.
2. The recognition of Finland in relation to time of recognition of Rumania and Bulgaria.
3. Russian relations to and interest in the ports and islands on the northern coast of Germany, within its zone of occupation.
4. What entrances to the Baltic will the Russians require?

These questions will be natural corollaries to the question of the Dardanelles.

VII

PERSIA AND THE NEAR EAST

I *Questions attaching to oil*. Disparity in proportion of beneficial output as between the three great Powers now existing—Russia's vital interest both as to possible share in oil, and in security from attack in the Near East and from Persia.

Comments—The Near Eastern oil reserves are estimated at 15,000,000,000 barrels, as contrasted to 20,000,000,000 barrels of the United States. They constitute about one third of the world's supply. Of this oil in the Near East, England now controls 74 per cent, while American interests control 24 per cent.

So far as the Soviets are concerned, the Near East is in her immediate "military security" zone, and oil is a vital military protection.

We should be prepared for an assertion by the Soviets that with the United States controlling 57 per cent of the world's oil resources,

⁸ Signed at Montreux, July 20, 1936 (League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213).

⁹ See document No. 697.

and Britain 27 per cent, the Soviets are equitably entitled to more than its [*sic*] present 11 per cent.

The Near East is rapidly developing into one of the vital danger spots in world relationships.

II *The question of the time of the withdrawal of Russian and British Troops from Persia.* The British promised to evacuate simultaneously with the Soviets, six months after the war. Clear understanding as to the attitude of ourselves, Britain and Russia to Iran, and to Iranian oil.

VIII

CHINA AND JAPAN

Undoubtedly there will be discussions as to the relationship between the Soviet Government and the Chinese. This, it is necessary to clarify in connection with our war against Japan.

IX

WAR CRIMES, ETC.

In addition to the foregoing there will probably be questions raised which should be settled either by the Council of Foreign Ministers or by the principals at the Berlin Conference with reference to procedure in punishment of War Crimes—Feeding the populations in Europe—by whom, UNRRA, or military, and how—Release of German soldiers for farm work in Germany—The restoration and handling of displaced persons—etc., etc.

In addition to the foregoing there are the following considerations which are pertinent in connection with this meeting.

PRINCIPAL THREATS TO WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY

I Obviously, the most serious threat to world peace and security would be the destruction of unity by the withdrawal or action of any of the three.

1. *Russia*

(a) *Classic suspicions and distrust*, if revived and fortified by facts which the Soviets would construe as indicative of an implacable hostility and enmity on the part of the Western World because of ideological, political, economic, racial, or religious hostility, might result in the withdrawal and isolationism of Russia, which would inevitably destroy peace.

(b) So might also the rise of a SOVIET NAPOLEON, and dreams of empire and conquest, if he were able to overthrow and destroy the

present altruistic, ideological purposes of peace and brotherhood, which the present Government avows, and, in my opinion, sustains.

(c) Clashes of interest due to British interests in regions vital to Soviet security, or vice versa, such as the Balkans, the Dardanelles, the Near East, and the British lifeline to Egypt.

(d) Suspicion or fact that the Soviets were faced with a hostile working coalition of Britain and the United States.

Any one of the foregoing would be serious threats to peace.

2. *The British Empire*

(a) *Competitions and economic needs*, or dreams of a restoration of empire by the British, might impair or destroy unity in Europe; or destroy unity as between the United States and Britain in struggle over South American and world trade.

(b) Because of the fact that England and the British Empire does not have the power which it had, and which it deserves, either politically, because of lack of solidarity of the Dominions, or economically, because of the great wastage of war, it has lost both prestige and power. They are down but not out, and driven by necessity they will be very energetic in projecting a comeback. That, if it gets out of hand, may constitute a very real threat.

(c) So, too, conflict for control of Europe between England and Russia might induce a conflagration in Europe, which would be disastrous.

3. *The United States*

(a) Justified suspicion as to the good faith of either the Soviet Union or of Britain.

(b) Breach of clear and specific agreements with the United States by either of its principal associates.

(c) Competitive rivalries and unfairness in trade relations which affected our standard of living seriously.

4. *France*, because it asserts its importance, and because it fails to realize its weakness, may precipitate trouble, and threaten peace because of its relation to Europe, its imperial ambitions, and the mercurial and sometimes paranoiac attitude of its leadership. It is particularly disturbing that de Gaulle, or some similar [person], could exercise the veto in the Security Council.

5. *Conflict of Racial, Ideological, and, Very Important, Religious Interests*, and their capacity through the Press to sway large sections of democratic opinion, after the physical danger of immediate war no longer threatens.

6. *The Medium Sized and Smaller Nations* may, because of their lack of responsibility, incite public opinion on issues which have much emotional appeal, and even appear to be ethically right, but which from the point of view of relative values should not be employed to break the peace.

Men of intellectual stature in smaller countries, because of personal ambition for publicity or other reasons, might galvanize the smaller nations into a bloc which might make practical united action impossible.

Nationalisms, paranoiac concepts of greatness, dreams of empire in the leadership in smaller countries has, in the past, brought on great wars. They might again.

"Because nations are small, they may not necessarily be virtuous".

7. *Failure of the Leadership of the Big Powers* to exercise tolerance, patience, and size, in granting to each other what they assume for themselves—good faith. If in their dealings with each other there is a desire to compose differences for the paramount purpose of preventing war, then peace may be kept. It is a large order, but not too much to hope for, or even to expect.

II Most Important, in My Opinion, as a Threat to the Future Peace, would be the lack of clear definition of basic foreign policy of the three Great Powers, and particularly that of the United States. A clear definition of just what we would exact for our own protection and which we would be prepared to fight for, if necessary, would do as much to maintain peace as any single thing. To illustrate, in my judgment and experience in Europe, lack of a clear definition and agreement upon a basic and specific foreign policy on the part of France and England, brought on the war with Hitler. When they should have fought, at the time of the occupation of the Ruhr, they didn't. When they should not have fought, because they were not ready, they did. If Hitler had been advised clearly and specifically as to the exact conditions under which Britain and France would consider it vital to their security that they fight to sustain it, the present war might possibly have been avoided. In any event, it certainly would have been delayed. Agreement between the political parties of our country as to what we are ready to fight for, and a clear declaration that we would fight, if need be, together with such declaration to the world, would be a most potent and important factor in the preservation of future peace for at least a time. That should be coupled with a statement that this attitude is not in derogation of, but in support of the freedoms of the Atlantic Charter,¹⁰ and our classic policy of the good neighbor live-and-let-live policy in world affairs.

¹⁰ Of August 14, 1941 (Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603).

No. 182

S/AE Files

*Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee*¹

[Extract²]

TOP SECRET

MINUTES OF COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING HELD AT THE
PENTAGON ON JULY 4TH, 1945—9:30 A. M.

3. USE OF WEAPON AGAINST THIRD PARTIES

FIELD MARSHAL WILSON stated that the British Government concurred in the use of the T. A. weapon against Japan. He added that the Prime Minister might wish to discuss this matter with the President at the forthcoming meeting in Berlin.³

HARVEY H BUNDY
ROGER MAKINS
Joint Secretaries

¹ See document No. 619, footnote 1, for information on the creation of this Committee.

² For a list of the persons present at this meeting and for another extract from the minutes, see document No. 619.

³ Secretary of War Stimson also discussed at this meeting the possibility that Truman might wish to speak to Stalin at the Berlin Conference about the development and use of a new atomic weapon. See document No. 619.

No. 183

740.00116 EW/7-445 : Telegram

*The Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials
(Jackson) to the Secretary of State*¹

[Extracts²]

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

LONDON, July 4, 1945—5 p. m.

6729. Top secret for Secretary Byrnes from Justice Jackson.

Your cable 5383, July 3.³ Negotiations of agreement trial principal war criminals progressing slowly due difficulty Russian understanding our system of law and our difficulty comprehending theirs. . . .

Am rather appalled at thought of Big Three trying to discuss subject so technical and involved and one where details so important. Mr.

¹ Sent over the signature of Winant.

² For a summary of the substantive portions of this message, see document No. 395.

³ Not printed.

Dean of British Foreign Office explains British suggestions ⁴ as not intending detailed discussion but rather as intended to allay Russian suspicion that prosecution is being evaded.

If Big Three undertake discussion seems important that I review matter in some detail President and you because important differences lurk in small phrases. . . .

⁴ See document No. 176.

No. 184

500. CC/7-545

*The British Minister (Balfour) to the Director of European Affairs
(Matthews)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 5th, 1945.

DEAR DOC, I send you herewith a paraphrase of a telegram just received from London in which the addition of two subjects to the agenda for TERMINAL is suggested.

Would you let me know whether the United States Government have any comments on these suggestions.

Yours ever

JOCK BALFOUR

[Enclosure]

PARAPHRASE OF A MESSAGE SENT FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO LORD HALIFAX DATED 5TH JULY

It now seems to us that it will in addition be necessary to discuss under the heading "General" ¹ the question of the allocation of posts in the Executive Committee and Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. No decision was reached on this point at the first meeting of the Preparatory Commission ² and it is evident that we must, if possible, get agreement as between the Big Five on at any rate the posts of Chairman of the Executive Committee and Executive Secretary before the Executive Committee meets at the beginning of August. If agreement can be reached as between the three Heads of Governments at TERMINAL, the French and Chinese might be approached before the end of the month, and there should then be little difficulty in getting the Executive Committee to agree at its first

¹ See the subattachment to document No. 179.

² Held at San Francisco, June 27, 1945. See *The United Nations Conference on International Organization: Selected Documents*, p. 987.

meeting on whatever may be arranged as between the Big Five. It is therefore proposed to add in this connection as 1 (e) the following point: "Allocation of posts on the Executive Committee and Preparatory Commission".

We also feel that it might well be desirable to have a preliminary discussion on the seat of the World Organisation. This item is on the agenda of the Executive Committee and it may well come up for examination during August. The meeting of the three Heads of Governments seems well suited for a general exchange of views on this important point, but it is felt that no final decision should be taken there since the views of other countries will obviously have to be taken into account.

It is proposed therefore to add the following point as 1 (f) to the existing agenda:

"Preliminary exchange of views regarding the seat of the World Organisation".

No. 185

J. C. S. Files

*The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane) to the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army (Antonov)*¹

TOP SECRET
No. 1142

[Moscow,] 5 July 1945.

DEAR GENERAL ANTONOV: In connection with the agenda for discussions referred to in my letter of 28 June 1945 (No. 1134),² the United States Chiefs of Staff have directed me to present the following proposal to you for your consideration prior to your meeting with them in Berlin in the middle of July. The proposal is laid before you now, not for the purpose of obtaining a decision at this time, but simply so that you can consider the matter prior to the meeting at which time appropriate action can be taken.

The United States Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that a system of local liaison communication should be established between the American commanders in the Pacific and the Soviet commanders in the Far East to be effective on the outbreak of hostilities between the Soviet Union and Japan. They consider that it would be most desirable to enable local commanders to rapidly exchange air, ground, and sea

¹ Printed from a mimeographed text circulated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 14 as J. C. S. 1420. This letter was delivered and explained to Lieutenant General Nikolay Vasilyevich Slavin, Assistant to the Chief of Staff, on July 5.

² Not printed. Cf. documents Nos. 171 and 174.

combat intelligence. In addition, there will be certain matters that will require rapid coordination, especially with regard to anti-submarine activities, aircraft patrol activities, and merchant shipping convoy activities. They feel that liaison effected by communications almost circling the globe through Moscow and Washington will be obviously too slow for the purely local adjustments necessary between our forces in the Far East.

The United States Chiefs of Staff therefore propose that there be an exchange of liaison officers and a system of radio teletype communications established between the Soviet Far Eastern Headquarters and General MacArthur's headquarters in Manila and Admiral Nimitz's headquarters on the island of Guam. They propose that the communication facilities be established with the least possible delay in order to be operational at the outbreak of the Soviet-Japanese hostilities.

They propose that the American liaison group with the Soviet Far Eastern Headquarters and the Soviet liaison groups with General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz should each have one general officer of the Ground Forces, one general officer of the Air Forces, and one flag officer of the Navy. Each group should have the necessary clerical and signal communications personnel. The United States Chiefs of Staff envisage each group as being in the neighborhood of 10 officers and 30 enlisted men. They suggest that rations and quarters should be provided by the headquarters to which each liaison group is accredited. The United States is prepared to provide the necessary radio teletype equipment and install it at once in Manila and Guam. It will also provide the radio teletype equipment necessary for American use at the Soviet Far Eastern Headquarters, but for reasons of secrecy and security it is suggested that the installation be made at once by Soviet personnel. They propose further that the personnel comprising all three liaison groups should be flown to the various headquarters to which they are accredited immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities or as much sooner as may be agreed upon.

As stated above, the United States Chiefs of Staff would be pleased to discuss this proposal with you at the forthcoming conference.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. DEANE

No. 186

840.4016 DP/7-545

The Chargé in Czechoslovakia (Klieforth) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PRAHA, July 5, 1945.

No. 42

Subject: Czechoslovakia's desire to have application for transfer of minorities placed on agenda for forthcoming meeting of Big Three.

SIR: With reference to my telegram No. 59 of July 4, 1945,¹ I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the Foreign Office note in English expressing the desire of the President² and Government of Czechoslovakia to have the application for the transfer of the minorities placed on the agenda at the forthcoming meeting of President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin.

Respectfully yours,

A W KLIEFORTH

¹ Not printed. This telegram transmitted a telegraphic text of the enclosure to the despatch here printed. For the text of the enclosure, see document No. 439.

² Edvard Beneš.

No. 187

868.00/6-1645

The Department of State to the British Embassy[Extract ¹]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

.

The Department is of the opinion that it would be desirable for the British and American Ambassadors to make the suggested approaches to the Greek Government² within the next few days so that the matter may be discussed at the meeting of the Big Three, scheduled early in July.

.

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1945.

¹ For the full text of this *aide-mémoire*, see document No. 445.

² To inform that Government that in the view of the United States and the United Kingdom the Greek elections should take place under the supervision of the Allies. Cf. document No. 445. The British and American Ambassadors to Greece were Sir Reginald Leeper and Lincoln MacVeagh, respectively.

[No. 187]

No. 188

860c.01/7-545

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State[Extract ¹]

. . . Lord Halifax is further instructed to inform Mr. Byrnes that, although His Majesty's Government is proceeding to recognize the new Polish Government of National Unity,² the Foreign Office is by no means satisfied with the assurances that have so far been forthcoming from the Polish Ambassador in Moscow³ regarding the participation of the recognized Polish political parties in the elections which the government is pledged to hold. His Majesty's Ambassador⁴ has accordingly been instructed to address immediately in this sense, a note to the Soviet Government stating that the Prime Minister reserves the right to raise this matter at the forthcoming meeting of the three heads of State as a point that affects the implementation of the Crimean decisions. . . .⁵

WASHINGTON, July 5th, 1945.

¹ For the full text of this note, see document No. 504.

² Cf. *post*, p. 733.

³ Zygmunt Modzelewski.

⁴ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

⁵ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section vi.

No. 189

740.0011 E. W./7-545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1945—6 p. m.

5473. You should inform the British Government that the following is a list of topics which the President may wish to raise for discussion at the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of Government:

- (1) Procedure and machinery for peace negotiations and territorial settlements.
- (2) Policy toward Germany:
 - (a) Establishment of Control Council[.]
 - (b) Agreement on the treatment of Germany in the initial control period.
 - (c) Establishment of German local administrations.
 - (d) Treatment of Germany as an economic unit.

¹ A parallel instruction was sent to Harriman at the same hour as telegram No. 1526 (file No. 740.0011 E. W./7-545). Winant and Harriman submitted the contents of these instructions to Eden and Molotov, respectively, in notes dated July 7.

- (3) Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe.
- (4) Policy toward Italy.
- (5) Cooperation in solving European economic problems.
- (6) Freedom of communication and information in Europe.

It is likewise expected that there will be some discussion of policy with respect to the Far East.

The foregoing list is not intended to be exclusive and the President will, of course, be prepared to discuss other questions which Marshal Stalin or Prime Minister Churchill may wish to raise.

BYRNES

No. 190

740.00119 EW/6-2345 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

[Extract ¹]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1945—6 p. m.

5517. . . .

You may accordingly tell FonOff that . . . at forthcoming highest-level discussions we intend to press strongly proposals for implementation of Yalta Declaration ² and reorganization of ACC's in all three ex-satellites. We shall oppose proposals to establish diplomatic relations or conclude peace with present Govts there. . . .

GREW

¹ For the full text of this message, see document No. 303.

² On Liberated Europe. See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

No. 191

Truman Papers

Generalissimo Stalin to President Truman ¹

[Translation]

Personal and secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to President H. S. Truman.

I have received your message of June 26 [25] ² on the question of Trieste-Istria and Yugoslavia.

¹ Russian original, accompanied by this translation, transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington. Relayed by the White House Map Room to Truman, then at sea, in telegram MR-OUT-52 of July 7. Stalin sent a similar message on July 6 to Churchill. See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. 1, p. 372.

² Document No. 168.

This matter has, of course, a number of questions demanding our mutual consideration. I am prepared to discuss these questions at our meeting in Germany.

[Moscow,] July 6, 1945.

No. 192

Truman Papers

The Federal Loan Administrator (Snyder), the President's Special Counsel (Rosenman), and Mr. George E. Allen to the President

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following is what we think was the consensus expressed on the boat¹ on July 4th with respect to the important issues to be decided at the forthcoming conference:

- (1) The entry of Russia into the Japanese war.
- (2) The Economic stabilization of Europe.
 - (a) Immediate needs: Coal (especially out of Germany itself), food, transportation and a few raw materials.
 - (b) Assistance in long-range reconstruction and rehabilitation of the devastated countries.
- (3) Full participation by Great Britain in the Pacific war.
- (4) Policy toward Germany.
 - (a) Demilitarization by reparations and otherwise.
 - (b) Geographical dismemberment.
 - (c) Reeducation.
 - (d) Disbursement [*Dispersement?*] of German scientific personnel.
 - (e) Proper public relations of United States toward the German population.
- (5) Holding the peace conference in the U. S. A.
- (6) Some military and naval bases, if possible.

In other words, we think that as a well known Missouri horse trader, the American people expect you to bring something home to them.

J[OHN] W S[NYDER]
S[AMUEL] I R[OSENMAN]
G[EORGE] E A[LLEN]

¹ i. e., the *Potomac*, on which Truman took a cruise on July 4 with a group of aides, friends, and advisers.

No. 193

740.00119 Control (Italy)/7-745 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

CASERTA, July 7, 1945—8 p. m.

2895. We have just seen telegram from ForOff to Broad in which (our 2794, June 27, mid²) our Brit colleague is instructed to inform Gen Morgan that Brit Govt sympathize fully with Gen Morgan's views that it would be most desirable to endeavor to obtain final settlement of Venezia Giulia problem at forthcoming meeting of Big Three and that Brit Govt "as matter of principle favors such settlement before the final peace conference." Msg added that question of Venezia Giulia was on the agenda for the Big Three meeting but that Brit Govt envisaged great difficulty in persuading US Govt to accept its point of view. ForOff tel concluded with statement that procedure would be a most complicated one inasmuch as quite aside from question of Venezia Giulia there would have to be some special arrangement made on Port of Trieste itself.

KIRK

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 11 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1045).

² Document No. 573.

No. 194

740.00116 E. W./6-2945

The Acting Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1945.

MY DEAR LORD HALIFAX: I have your letter of June 29¹ proposing that the subject of "war criminals" be discussed at the next meeting of Heads of Governments.

The question is being given careful consideration by this Government. Much will depend undoubtedly on the discussions now taking place in London between representatives of the British, United States, French and Soviet Governments.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

¹ Document No. 176.

No. 195

500.CC/7-545

The Acting Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the British Minister (Balfour)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1945.

DEAR BALFOUR, Doc Matthews discussed with the Secretary the Foreign Office's proposal enclosed with your letter of July 5,¹ that certain matters concerning the Preparatory Commission and the seat of the world organization be discussed at TERMINAL. The Secretary questions whether these subjects are sufficiently important to be discussed by the three Heads of Government. He feels that these matters might well be left for solution at the Executive Committee meeting.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN D. HICKERSON

¹ Document No. 184.

No. 196

761.6711/7-745

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*¹

[Extract²]

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

.

Sir A. Clark Kerr has accordingly been instructed to point out to the Soviet Government that, as they are aware, the Turkish Government have consulted His Majesty's Government about the recent Turco-Soviet conversations. . . . They wish the Soviet Government to be aware of their views on these recent developments as they consider the whole question will have to be discussed at TERMINAL.

WASHINGTON, 7th July, 1945.

¹ The gist of this memorandum was included in telegram No. 11 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1045).

² For the full text of this memorandum, see document No. 704.

No. 197

860h.00/7-745 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹[Extract²]

SECRET

BELGRADE, July 7, 1945—2 p. m.

247. . . .

Šubašić expressed hope that Big Three meeting will make a public reference to this³ and remind Yugo Govt that [Tito-Šubašić] agreement⁴ must be carried out. . . .

Stevenson and I believe such action desirable.

SHANTZ

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 11 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1045).

² For the full text of this message, see document No. 553.

³ See document No. 553.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 251-254.

No. 198

761.93/7-745 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President and the Secretary of State*¹

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 7 July 1945.

PRIORITY

(Personal and top secret for the President and the Secretary of State from Harriman.)

I took the occasion of Soong[']s lunch with me informally today to inform him of the President[']s and your desire to be consulted before any arrangements were concluded based on the Yalta Agreement.² He readily agreed. Reference White House message Number 310 Navy Number 061511.³ I also informed Molotov this afternoon. He asked whether you had in mind consultation at Berlin or before. I explained that if an understanding were reached in the next few days I assumed that you would wish to be informed at once. He said he would consult Stalin. . . .

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. Sent to Washington; relayed to Truman and Byrnes, then at sea, by the White House Map Room in telegram No. MR 57 of July 8.

² i. e., the agreement regarding entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan signed at Yalta on February 11, 1945, by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill. For text, see Executive Agreement Series No. 498; 59 Stat. (2) 1823; *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.

³ Not printed.

No. 199

740.00119 EW/7-745 : Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)
to the Secretary of State*¹

[Extract²]

TOP SECRET

Moscow, July 7, 1945—8 p. m.

2466. Top secret to the Secretary from Pauley.

I consider it most important that the agenda of the coming conference provide for consideration of these reparation matters³ as well as the question of the inclusion of France.⁴ You would favor me greatly if you would see that these matters are given a high place on the agenda as they are questions of high policy which must be determined.

¹ Sent over the signature of Harriman. Sent to Washington; relayed to Byrnes, then at sea, in telegram No. 9 of July 9 (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8-645).

² For the full text of this message, see document No. 370.

³ For the details of the matters referred to, see document No. 370.

⁴ i. e., in the Allied Commission on Reparations.

No. 200

103.9169/7-845 : Telegram

*The Chief of the Mission for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom
(Blaisdell) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton)*¹

RESTRICTED

LONDON, July 8, 1945—4 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

6878. From Blaisdell for Clayton.

After careful consideration and consultation with Amb Winant, we believe that Soviet Govt should be informed that US intends to raise questions at Berlin Conference concerning organization for production and distribution of German coal on open account as indicated in Dept's 5415.² We feel it would be more effective for Dept to notify Soviet Govt from Washington where agenda for Berlin Conference has been formulated than through Embassies in London.³

¹ Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Winant.

² Document No. 426.

³ See vol. II, document No. 1040.

No. 201

740.0011 EW/7-845 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

Moscow, July 8, 1945—8 p. m.

2479. I informed Molotov this afternoon of the topics the President might wish to discuss at the forthcoming meeting. (Reurtel 1526, June [July] 5, 6 p. m.²) I added that the President would of course be prepared to discuss any other questions which the Prime Minister or Generalissimo Stalin might wish to raise.

Molotov inquired whether it was contemplated to discuss reparations. I pointed out that Pauley was going to Berlin and said I felt sure that if the Soviets desired to raise this question the President would be ready to discuss it. He then inquired whether the whole administration of Germany would be discussed. I stated I assumed that this was pretty well covered in topic No. 2.²

Molotov stated he would bring the topics to the Generalissimo's attention and would let me know if the latter had any comments to make or topics he wished to present.

HARRIMAN

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 11 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1045).

² See document No. 189, footnote 1.

No. 202

740.0011 EW/7-845 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

LONDON, July 8, 1945—4 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

6877. Personal for the Secretary from Winant.

The Dept's 5473² and 5474³ (both July 5) were received here yesterday and communicated to the FonOff. I had a brief talk with Mr. Eden over his private wire. He volunteered the statement that he was very much pleased with the agenda for the conference as forwarded. He is coming on to London for the first time in some weeks Tuesday to take over his task as Acting Prime Minister because of Mr. Churchill's absence on vacation in France. I am

¹ Sent to Washington; relayed to Byrnes, then at sea, in telegram No. 8 of July 9 (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8-645).

² Document No. 189.

³ Not printed. This telegram instructed Winant to take the action reflected in document No. 231.

having dinner alone with him that night and after it will forward you a more detailed account of the Brit reaction to the proposals we have put forward.⁴

WINANT

⁴ No report from Winant concerning such a dinner meeting has been found.

No. 203

761.93/7-945 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President and the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 9 [8] July 1945.

ROUTINE

(Personal and top sec for the President and the Secretary from Harriman.)

As the time is so short before the Berlin meeting and as it seems doubtful that Soong will be successful in reaching agreement with Stalin² I recommend that immediate steps be taken to prepare for use at Berlin a study of our interpretation of the Yalta agreement³ specifically the terms which we believe China should grant the Soviet Government in regard to the ports and railroads and what action should be expected of China at this time in connection with preservation of *status quo* in Outer Mongolia.

In addition I suggest that preparations should be made for a detailed discussion of the character of the proposed four power trusteeship for Korea.

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. Sent to Washington; relayed to Truman and Byrnes, then at sea, by the White House Map Room.

² See *post*, pp. 857, 862-864.

³ i. e., the agreement regarding entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, signed February 11, 1945, by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill. For text, see Executive Agreement Series No. 498; 59 Stat. (2) 1823; *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.

No. 204

Truman Papers : Telegram

The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the White House Map Room

[ON BOARD THE U. S. S. "AUGUSTA",]

9 July 1945.

MR-IN-19. Send messages from Ambassador Harriman MR-OUT-64 and 65¹ to Grew with information that Secretary Byrnes wishes him to prepare the studies recommended therein.²

¹ For one of these messages, see document No. 203. The other message (not printed) did not recommend preparation of any study for use at the Berlin Conference.

² See documents Nos. 252, 253, and 579.

No. 205

881.00/7-1145 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

LONDON, July 11, 1945—6 p. m.

6984. Hoyer Millar said to us today that he did not see how talks on Tangier, now that Russians have asked to participate, could be opened unless Russians were brought in. Bringing the Russians into the talks immediately raised the question of how far they were to take part in any plan which might be agreed upon for the future administration of the zone. That point, it seemed to him, had to be decided first and it was one that could not be decided "on the minute". It might be best, therefore, to go into it at the Big Three meeting. . . .

WINANT

¹ For the full text of this message, see document No. 673. The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 19 of July 12 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1245).

No. 206

Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference

The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

[Moscow,] July 11, 1945.

DEAR AVERELL: I am attaching you two copies of a letter which I have just written to Mr. Maisky. I shall appreciate your sending one copy of this letter together with an appropriate letter of transmittal to Mr. Molotov in order that there may be no question that the Soviet Government has been properly notified that reparations may be a subject for discussion at the forthcoming meeting of the heads of the three governments.

Sincerely yours,

EDWIN W PAULEY

[Enclosure]

The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Chairman of the Allied Commission on Reparations (Maisky)

[Moscow,] July 11, 1945.

DEAR MR. MAISKY: As the personal representative of the President of the United States and as the American Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations, I wish to advise your Government that

[No. 206]

the general subject of reparations will be one of the topics which the President may wish to raise for discussion at the forthcoming meeting of the heads of the three Governments and that such discussion among other items related to reparations may cover the points raised in my letter to you of July 3, 1945.¹

Sincerely yours,

[EDWIN W. PAULEY]

¹ Document No. 364.

No. 207

Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference

Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union
(Page)

[Extract¹]

[Moscow,] July 11, 1945.

MEMORANDUM [OF] CONVERSATION

Present: Mr. W. A. Harriman, American Ambassador
Mr. Edward Page, Jr., First Secretary of Embassy
Mr. V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs
of the U. S. S. R.
Mr. Pavlov, Soviet Interpreter

Subject: Agenda for Forthcoming Berlin Meeting.

The Ambassador inquired whether Mr. Molotov had any questions to ask with reference to the agenda for the forthcoming meeting as contained in his letter of July 7.²

Mr. Molotov asked whether it was proposed to study the peace treaty for Italy. The Ambassador replied that as he recalled his letter, reference was made only to "Policy toward Italy". He said he did not know whether the President would propose that the Italian peace treaty be studied at Berlin or whether such study was timely. He inquired whether the Soviet Government had given any study to this matter.

Mr. Molotov did not answer this question. He said however that he was anxious to know whether anything was being prepared on a draft treaty.

¹ For the paragraphs of this memorandum not printed here, see document No. 232.

² See document No. 189, footnote 1.

No. 208

740.00119 E. W./7-1145 : Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)
to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

Moscow, July 11, 1945—7 p. m.

URGENT

2516. From Pauley to SecState.

Have received a copy of Harriman's communication to Molotov² listing 6 items which it is indicated the President may wish to raise for discussion at forthcoming meeting of the Big Three. I am strongly of the opinion that the topic "reparations" should be added to this agenda. Will appreciate your advising the President immediately of my views.

¹ Sent over the signature of Harriman. Sent to Washington; relayed to Byrnes, then at sea, in telegram No. 14 of July 11 (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8-645).

² See document No. 189, footnote 1.

No. 209

860f.4016/6-2845

The Department of State to the British Embassy

[Extract¹]

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State believes that an exchange of views on the whole question of the transfers of ethnic minority groups in Europe is not required at this time in view of the clear statements of policy by the British and American Governments, and could be deferred pending a possible discussion of this question at the forthcoming tripartite conference.

WASHINGTON, [July 11, 1945.]

¹ For the full text of this memorandum, see document No. 440. This paper was a reply to document No. 173.

[No. 209]

No. 210

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1245 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials (Jackson)*¹

[ON BOARD THE U. S. S. "AUGUSTA",]
12 July 1945.

For Justice Jackson from the Secretary of State.

Your cable 6729 July 4.² Appreciate your report. I agree with you subject too technical for detailed discussion by Big Three. But if I find discussion unavoidable, I will try to let you know in time for consultation with President and me.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Document No. 183.

No. 211

860h.01/7-1245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

CASERTA, July 12, 1945—6 p. m.

2932. Alexander informed us this evening that he learned in London that British Govt expected to discuss Tito-Šubašić agreement¹ at forthcoming Big Three meeting. He stated that Churchill would make it quite clear that British Govt was not satisfied with carrying out of that accord up to present time and that it would hold Tito to strict account for its implementation.

KIRK

¹ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 251-254.

No. 212

Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov)

No. 387

Moscow, July 12, 1945.

DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: As you will recall, when I gave you my letter of July 7¹ listing topics which the President might wish to discuss at the forthcoming meeting you inquired regarding the subject of reparations. I explained that the President had asked Mr. Pauley to come to Berlin to give him a report on the status of the discussions

¹ See document No. 189, footnote 1.

of the Reparation Commission. I explained further that I was satisfied that the President would wish to discuss at the Conference those matters regarding reparations which had not been settled. Mr. Pauley has confirmed this and has so informed Mr. Maiski.²

Sincerely yours,

W. A. HARRIMAN

² See the enclosure to document No. 206.

No. 213

761.93/7-1245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President and the Secretary of State

[Extract¹]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[Moscow,] 12 July 1945.

Personal and top secret for the President and the Secretary of State from Harriman.

.

Soong suggested to Stalin that he return to Chungking to consult the Generalissimo over the points still at issue. Stalin however said that it was better to come to agreement before he met you at Berlin as he wished to decide with you date of his entry into the war. . . .

.

¹ For the complete text of this message, see document No. 577.

No. 214

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-1245

United States Delegation Position Paper

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—The Log for July 13 (volume II, page 6) states that Truman, Byrnes, and Leahy spent a part of the day “shaping up the agenda for the tripartite conference and preparing a written brief on the problems that were expected to be brought up at the conference.” In a conversation with a Department of State historian on August 3, 1954, Byrnes identified the five-part document outlined below as the “brief” in question. It is dated July 12, 1945, at the end of part 5. Truman used this document as an action paper at the First Plenary Meeting of the Conference on July 17 and introduced the proposals contained therein at that meeting (see volume II, pages 52-54).

Byrnes and Dunn had copies of the “brief” before them at the First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers on July 18. For the manuscript notations which they made on it, see the footnotes to documents Nos. 711 and 852, printed in volume II.]

[Part 1]

AGENDA AS TELEGRAPHED TO THE SOVIET AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS
BY THE SECRETARY'S TELEGRAM OF JULY 5

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—This paper is identical with the six numbered items and the final two paragraphs of document No. 189.]

[Part 2]

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Draft Proposal for the Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—This paper and its annex are identical with document No. 711, printed in volume II.]

[Part 3]

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Policy with regard to Germany

1. I propose that the Control Council should commence to function immediately in accordance with the agreement which we have already entered into.¹

2. For this purpose I am submitting for your consideration a draft containing the principles which the United States Government believes should be followed.

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—Attached to this memorandum, as appendix A, is a paper entitled "Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles To Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period" which, except for minor editorial differences, is identical with document No. 852, printed in volume II.

Annexed to appendix A is a paper entitled "German Reparations", with four attachments. This annex and its attachments are identical with document No. 894 and its attachments (printed in volume II). Although these papers appear as an integral part of the "brief" prepared on board the U. S. S. *Augusta*, they were actually inserted in the "brief" after Truman arrived at Babelsberg (see volume II, page 941). The *Augusta* draft of the annex (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-1245), which had no attachments, consisted merely of the text of the eight principles quoted in document No. 367.]

¹ In the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany signed at London, November 14, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, May 1, 1945. For texts, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3070; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2062. Text of the agreement of November 14, 1944, also in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 124.

[Part 4]

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE YALTA DECLARATION ON LIBERATED
EUROPE

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—This paper is identical with document No. 745, printed in volume II.]

[Part 5]

POLICY TOWARD ITALY

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—This paper is identical with document No. 1089, printed in volume II.]

No. 215

Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference

Mr. V. N. Pavlov, of the Soviet Foreign Commissariat, to the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Page)

[Translation]

Moscow, July 13, 1945.

DEAR MR. PAGE: At the instruction of the People's Commissar I request you to inform Mr. W. A. Harriman that V. M. Molotov has received his letter of July 12¹ regarding consideration of the reparations problem at the forthcoming meeting of the heads of the three governments.

Respectfully yours,

PAVLOV

¹ Document No. 212.

No. 216

740.00119 E. W./7-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extracts ¹]

SECRET

LONDON, July 13, 1945—5 p. m.

7075. FonOff has replied as follows to our communications ². . . :

In view of the opinions expressed by the State Dept we have not as we had intended put our proposals ³ to the Soviet Govt in advance

¹ For the full text of this message, see document No. 312.

² See documents Nos. 190 and 303.

³ Concerning the conclusion of peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.

[No. 216]

of the forthcoming conference. We may, however, wish to put them forward at the conference.

WINANT

No. 217

Pauley Files

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Chairman of the Allied Commission on Reparations (Maisky)*¹

[Moscow,] July 14, 1945.

DEAR MR. MAISKY: You mentioned yesterday at the Steering Committee Meeting² that I used the word "may" in notifying you that at the forthcoming meeting of the Big Three the President would desire to take up the subject of reparations, and more particularly, the questions raised in my letter of July 3rd.³

I wish to confirm in writing my verbal assurance already given that the subject of reparations will definitely be brought up by the President at the meeting of the Big Three.

Sincerely yours,

EDWIN W. PAULEY

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² i. e., at a meeting of the Steering Committee of the Allied Commission on Reparations.

³ Document No. 364.

No. 218

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹

[Extracts²]

SECRET

POTSDAM, July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, called this afternoon and discussed for two hours in a preliminary way a number of matters on the agenda of the Conference.³

4. *German-Polish Frontier.*

. . . Sir Alexander . . . expressed opposition to the Oder-Neisse line, which would raise to between ten and twelve million the number of Germans subject to transfer.⁴ Sir Alexander thought the problem

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 140, 234, 258, 319, 351, 379, 404, 470, 519, 635, 645, 678, and 708.

³ For a list of persons present at this meeting, see document No. 234, footnote 3.

⁴ From German territory placed under Polish administration.

of the transfer of the German population from these territories and from Czechoslovakia was bound to come up at the Conference because of its effect on the rest of Germany and on the responsibilities of the Control Council.

10. *The Balkans.*

. . . He [Cadogan] proposes to raise questions concerning the Russian removals of oil equipment from Rumania and the failure of the Yugoslav Government to carry out the Tito-Šubašić agreement.⁵

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 251-254.

No. 219

740.0011 P. W./7-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract ¹]

SECRET

LONDON, July 15, 1945—6 p. m.

US URGENT

7146. We were called to FonOff this afternoon by Harvey who was considerably disturbed about Department's proposed announcement July 17 re Italy and World Security Organization. . . .² British Embassy Washington is being instructed to approach Department and request announcement be postponed until the question of future status of Italy can be discussed at Big Three meeting.

WINANT

¹ For the full text of this message, see document No. 244.

² See document No. 240.

No. 220

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[BABELSBERG,] 15 July 1945.

C. C. S. 880/9

PROGRAM AND PROCEDURE FOR THE CONFERENCE

1. We suggest that in accordance with the procedure we have adopted at previous conferences, the United States and British Chiefs

[No. 220]

of Staff should hold their domestic meetings in the morning and the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet in the afternoon at 1430.¹

2. We suggest also that we should aim to work to the attached programme.

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

PROGRAMME FOR TERMINAL

- | | |
|---|--|
| <i>1st Meeting</i>
(Monday, 16th) | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Programme and Procedure for the Conference 2. Estimate of the Japanese Situation 3. Progress Reports on Operations in Pacific and SEAC 4. Development of Operations in the Pacific 5. Report on Air Operations in the War Against Japan |
| <i>2nd Meeting</i>
(Tuesday, 17th) | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. British Participation in the War Against Japan 2. Control and Command in the War Against Japan |
| <i>3rd Meeting</i>
(Wednesday, 18th) | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies 2. French, Dutch, and Portuguese Participation in the War Against Japan |
| <i>4th Meeting</i>
(Thursday, 19th) | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Directive to SACSEA 2. Russian Participation 3. Relations With the Russians 4. Planning Date for End of War Against Japan 5. C. C. S. Machinery After the End of War Against Japan ² |

¹ i. e., at 2:30 p.m.

² The United States Chiefs of Staff commented on this program as follows in a memorandum of July 16 (C. C. S. 880/10), which was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 193d Meeting, July 16 (see vol. II, p. 36):

"1. The program suggested by C. C. S. 880/9 is satisfactory, subject to such rearrangement of subjects as may later appear desirable, except that:—

"a. No dates should be specified for the meetings, as such cannot be determined at this time.

"b. Whether discussion of Russian participation will prove appropriate or necessary remains to be determined. This item has been left on the agenda pending firm determination in light of later developments.

"c. It is presumed that item 3 of the 4th Meeting, as listed in the Enclosure to C. C. S. 880/9 refers to the subject matter of C. C. S. 884/2 [document No. 614] and that the title of this item should be the same as the title of that paper, 'Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War.' "

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—The papers printed above reflect the status of discussions concerning the agenda for the Berlin Conference as of July 16, 1945, the date of President Truman's arrival at the Conference site. In the course of Truman's first meeting with Stalin on July 17, the Soviet Delegation requested that the following subjects be included on the agenda: Tangier, the Levant, disposition of the German navy and merchant marine, the Franco regime in Spain, the Polish question, reparations, trusteeship for the Soviet Union, and relationships with the former Axis satellite states. For a memorandum by Charles E. Bohlen listing these subjects, see volume II, page 46. At the First Plenary Meeting of the Conference later on July 17, Stalin reiterated the desire of the Soviet Delegation to have these questions discussed, making it clear that by "reparations" he meant reparations from both Germany and Italy. See volume II, page 55.

The Heads of Government, although they discussed "the agenda" and spoke of adding subjects to "the agenda", never established the agenda formally or inflexibly. There was therefore no restriction on the introduction of other subjects for discussion as the Conference progressed. For a list of the subjects actually discussed during the Conference, either on a tripartite basis or in bilateral conversations in which the United States Delegation took part, see the table of contents in volume II.]

III. GENERAL BACKGROUND REPORTS

GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY

No. 221

Davies Papers

*Memorandum by the Chairman of the President's War Relief Control Board (Davies)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1945.

MEMORANDUM ON FOREIGN POLICY

The foreign policy of any country is nothing more or less than setting rules to govern its relations with nations and peoples outside of its own borders. The purpose of these rules, whether the country be great or small, is to protect its people from the outside, and then to promote the general welfare of the world and the administration of justice, consistent with its own well-being.

The primary concern is to prevent physical invasion, attack, or enslavement—Freedom from Fear. The next purpose is to preserve the standard of living and the way of life of its own people—Freedom from Want, and other freedoms.

To implement the foregoing general concepts of our basic foreign policy, the following is suggested:

1. For the immediate future, the world threatens to be in a condition of ferment and instability. No nation, probably, will be willing to give up those protections which are required for its security against outside attack, until it is clearly established that the International Peace Organization and its Police Force will function to justly preserve the peace, and not be diverted to the destructive use of aggressors.

Our military and naval people know what the minimum requirements for such protections to our borders are. We should state clearly that [*what?*] our foreign policy is[.]

2. We should also clearly declare that the western hemisphere, and the nations thereof, are our natural friends and immediate neighbors, and that we will protect the inviolability of this continent.

3. We should declare that the fundamental spirit of our people is based upon the concepts of justice and liberty, and the Four Freedoms.²

¹ In an interview with a Department of State historian on June 17, 1954, Davies identified this memorandum as one which probably accompanied copies of documents Nos. 33, 34, and 181 when those papers were transmitted to Byrnes on July 3, 1945.

² Four "essential human freedoms" were enumerated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in an address to the Congress on January 6, 1941. For the text of his remarks on this subject, see *Congressional Record*, vol. 87, pt. 1, pp. 46-47.

These personal liberties are limited only by the principle that such individual rights shall not encroach upon the safety or the rights of the community. The principle of our people and country is to live and let live. It desires friendly relations with all its neighbors.

4. We should declare that we desire no territory other than that which we have, and that we covet nothing of other nations.

5. We should declare that the foreign policy of this country is based upon the principle that agreements between nations on essential matters should be clearly and specifically defined; that once these agreements are made, the United States will scrupulously fulfill every obligation, and will expect others to do the same.

6. We should declare that the United States will not attempt to impose its political, religious, or social ideologies upon other peoples or nations. It concedes to each people the right to determine for themselves, under what conditions they wish to live, as determined by themselves, or "through whatever organ it thinks proper, whether King, Convention, Assembly, Committee, President, or anything else it may choose" (Thomas Jefferson).³ [It however demands that no aggressor shall impose by internal or external aggression—its ideologies upon other nations.⁴]

7. It is the policy of our government and our people to do all that we can, consistent with preserving our way of life, to afford others the abundance of life, which an intelligent administration of the world should provide.

³ The quotation is from an instruction of March 12, 1793, from the Secretary of State to the American Minister at Paris. Full text in Paul Leicester Ford, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (New York, 1892-1899), vol. vi, p. 199.

⁴ The sentence in brackets is a manuscript addition.

EUROPEAN QUESTIONS

No. 222

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

[Extracts ¹]

TOP SECRET

FRANCE

SUMMARY

1) *Role in United Nations Councils*

Since liberation, France has made great strides towards resuming her former position of influence in world councils. Our policy of treating her on the basis of her potential power rather than on that of her present strength has been justified and should continue. It is believed that her usefulness to us and her contribution to the construction of a peaceful future world will be increased by her full participation in world affairs on a basis of parity with the Great Powers, and it is recommended that her desire for such participation be met where possible by anticipation rather than tardy or reluctant compliance.

.
FRANCE

(1) *Role in United Nations Councils*

The recognition of the French provisional government by the major powers last October,² and the Dumbarton Oaks proposal that she should in due course have a permanent seat on the Security Council,³ were the first steps in the return of France to her former position of influence in world Councils. They were followed by the inclusion of France as a permanent member of the European Advisory Commission.⁴ At Yalta, her importance in the post hostilities phase in Europe was recognized by inviting her participation as a full partner in the control machinery for Germany (including a separate zone of occupation),

¹ For the other sections of this paper, see document No. 402.

² With respect to recognition by the United States, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XI, p. 491.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 369-370.

⁴ Following an invitation extended by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on November 11, 1944. See *ibid.*, p. 583.

her sponsorship of the United Nations Conference and her association with the Big Three in consultations on the problems of liberated or former Axis dominated European States. No specific mention of France was made with respect to the procedure for reorganizing the Polish and Yugoslav governments, nor was she specifically designated to sit on the Reparations Commission or attend the meetings of Foreign Ministers.⁵

While, for reasons both complex and obscure, France declined the invitation to sponsor the San Francisco Conference,⁶ she quickly took her place, largely through the efforts of the American delegation, at the Sponsors' table when questions of high conference policy were under discussion. The Conference has voted her the permanent seat on the Security Council which was envisaged at Dumbarton Oaks.

Since the liberation of France and our recognition of the de Gaulle government, it has been our policy to make every effort to assist France, morally as well as physically, to regain her strength and her influence, not only with the view towards increasing the French contribution to the war effort but also with a view towards enabling the French to assume larger responsibilities in connection with the maintenance of peace. A corollary to this policy, in recognition of the fact that the French provisional government (and to a somewhat lesser extent the French people) are unduly preoccupied with questions of national prestige, has been to treat France in all respects on the basis of her potential power and influence rather than on the basis of her present strength. In spite of unfortunate incidents, such as those of the Levant and Northwestern Italy, in which an unwise reaching out for prestige has resulted in French humiliation and the lowering of the very prestige which France sought, it is believed that the wisdom of our policy has been justified and that it should continue. The example of the San Francisco Conference, where the inclusion of France in the discussions of the Sponsors not only prevented her from siding with the lesser powers but permitted her to contribute to the success of the Conference by her international experience and her influence over the lesser States, should not be forgotten. It is believed that her somewhat intransigent attitude on questions of reparations and restitution springs largely from her exclusion, at Soviet insistence, from the Reparations Commission. It would appear desirable for us to continue to press for her inclusion in this Commission, provided that larger issues are not prejudiced thereby.

In conclusion, it is believed that France's usefulness to us and her contribution to the construction of a peaceful future world will be increased by her full participation in world affairs. Her almost

⁵ See vol. II, document No. 1416.

⁶ See Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XII, pp. 394-395.

pathological craving for prestige can be turned to good account by anticipation of rather than tardy compliance with her wish for fuller participation. It is believed that the responsibilities which such participation implies will, at least in the immediate future, act as a curb on her impulsive and petulant instincts.

[WASHINGTON,] June 23, 1945.

No. 223

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

BRITAIN AS MEMBER OF THE BIG THREE

SUMMARY

At meetings of the "Big Three", Mr. Churchill may, occasionally, without due reflection, give the impression that he is the spokesman for the whole British Commonwealth. He is, on the contrary, only the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which, despite its controlling authority over India and the colonial empire, forms one part and not the whole of the larger association of powers known as the British Commonwealth of Nations. Although the Dominions are kept closely informed, and consulted when time permits, Mr. Churchill has no authority to speak for or make commitments on behalf of Canada, Australia, South Africa, or New Zealand, not to mention Eire (Ireland) which has remained neutral in the war and is not a member of the United Nations.

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

BRITAIN AS MEMBER OF THE "BIG THREE"

Britain's position in the "Big Three" inevitably differs from that of her two great allies which are geographically compact political entities. No one can think of the power popularly called Britain but legally known as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland without simultaneously thinking of the world-wide constellation of nations and territories which make up the British Commonwealth and Empire. It is nevertheless the United Kingdom which is represented at "Big Three" meetings. On such occasions, Mr. Churchill may be more than usually conscious of the added prestige and influence in world affairs which accrues to the United Kingdom because of its special relationship with the countries of the British Commonwealth. It should, however, be borne in mind

that, as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Churchill has no power to speak for or make commitments on behalf of Canada, Australia, South Africa, or New Zealand, not to mention Eire (Ireland) which has remained neutral in the war and is not a member of the United Nations.

According to accepted international and British constitutional usage, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and Eire are, like the United Kingdom, separate members of the "community of nations". The Statute of Westminster¹ was passed in 1931 to remove all legal obstacles to the exercise by each of them of that equality of status with the United Kingdom enshrined in the famous Balfour Declaration of 1926: "They (the United Kingdom and the Dominions) are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as member[s] of the British Commonwealth of Nations."² At foreign capitals where their interests demand it, the Dominions are represented by fully accredited diplomatic representatives; they separately negotiate treaties, and are treated like any other foreign nation by the Government of the United States and other governments with which they have to deal.

The British Commonwealth is, even if Eire be here left out of account, a group of nations whose divergent interests are apparent at every international gathering at which they are represented. The United Kingdom may be *primus inter pares*, but the Dominions do not hesitate to speak and vote against the United Kingdom when, in their opinion, their interests so dictate. This was notably true in the League of Nations (especially at the time of the Ethiopian crisis), in the Chicago Aviation Conference [1944] (especially on the issue of the "five freedoms" of the air), and it has been markedly true at San Francisco³ where Australia made herself a leading champion of the small states. Canadian interests in particular often do not coincide with United Kingdom interests on many important issues. Such disagreements among the members of the British Commonwealth will bear watching in this post-hostilities period in Europe which calls up memories of strained *intra*-imperial relations in the British family over policy toward Turkey in 1922 and which likewise may accentuate differences between the United Kingdom and Australia over policy in the Pacific.

¹ 22 Geo. V, ch. 4.

² See the "Report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee", of which Balfour was chairman, printed in *Imperial Conference, 1926: Summary of Proceedings* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1926; Cmd. 2768), p. 14.

³ i. e., at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, 1945.

At the same time, these very real divergencies among members of the British Commonwealth must not be allowed to hide from view those unwritten conventions and customs which give vitality to a unique political association possessing far more cohesion than any other grouping of separate nations in this disturbed and unsettled world. Psychologically the symbol of the common Crown, though recognized by Eire only in the formalities necessary for the conduct of external relations, may be the most important of these conventions, but, practically, from the standpoint of day to day governmental administration, the constant consultation which takes place between and among the capitals—London, Ottawa, Canberra, Pretoria, Wellington and New Delhi—is the cement of the Empire-Commonwealth. Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand, though not attending “Big Three” meetings can never be as completely out of the picture there as are many other small or “middle” powers. On such occasions, they can, as a diplomat representing a small European state recently put it, “peek through a small window on the patio”. The extent to which their view is obstructed or “colored” from that vantage point is naturally known only to those high British officials intimately acquainted with the exact extent of consultation within the Commonwealth. There are undoubtedly secrets which the senior member of the association does not or cannot share with its other members—witness Australia’s extreme discomfiture at not being consulted before the Roosevelt-Churchill conference with Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo. The belligerent members of the Commonwealth now have highly developed machinery, through High Commissioners and other facilities, for consultation *inter se*. India, for which His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom can, and often does, still legally speak, is being more and more regarded as a *quasi*-Dominion which can avail itself of this machinery to a greater and greater extent as time goes on.

At meetings of the “Big Three”, Mr. Churchill, representing the United Kingdom which controls India and the colonial empire, acts for a power which is part of a larger association of powers of a very special character. The United Kingdom, though more populous and powerful than all the Dominions put together, and though a great power in its own right under existing world conditions, cannot be disassociated from the co-belligerent Dominions. Britain’s two great allies, conscious of the Dominion statesmen behind the scenes, must gauge the limitations of the influence of those gentlemen upon Mr. Churchill, and of his upon them, remembering always that Mr. Churchill often offends the susceptibilities of the Dominions by forgetting that the British Empire has changed since Kipling’s day.

[WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1945.

No. 224

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

BRITISH PLAN FOR A WESTERN EUROPEAN BLOC

SUMMARY

As a "hedge" against the possible failure of Big Three collaboration in the post-war world, the British are following the policy recommended by General Smuts of strengthening their position by drawing the nations of Western Europe into closer association with the Commonwealth. They have taken pains to affirm that such an arrangement would be within the framework of the World Security Organization, and to assure the Russians that the policy is not directed against them. They have also called attention to the fact that the Russians are following a similar line in Eastern Europe.

The Smuts idea was to offer France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark something in the nature of dominion status in the Commonwealth. It would involve such steps as the creation of a common foreign policy; coordination of military strategy; combined boards for finance, transport, production, supplies, resources, and raw materials; a customs union; currency agreements; and a joint approach to civil aviation and colonial problems.

The Russians are opposed to the plan, seeing in it primarily an attempt by Britain to strengthen her sphere of influence as against Russia. It is the British claim, and they have so informed the Russians, that it is directed against Germany. Russian opposition has led the British to "pull in their horns", but they will undoubtedly try to achieve as many as possible of the objectives of the plan by one means or another as additional security insurance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in a letter to the Secretary of State written March [May] 16, 1944 (excerpt attached) stated:

"The greatest likelihood of eventual conflict between Britain and Russia would seem to grow out of either nation initiating attempts to build up its strength, by seeking to attach to herself parts of Europe to the disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary. Having regard to the inherent suspicions of the Russians, to present Russia with any agreement on such matters as between the British and ourselves, prior to consultation with Russia, might well result in starting a train of events that would lead eventually to the situation we most wish to avoid."

However, it must be recognized that the Russians have already gone far to establish an effective sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

Our definitive position with respect to a British sphere in Western Europe must await further clarification of the Soviet Union's intentions. In the meantime our policy should be to discourage the development of rival spheres of influence, both Russian and British. Our attitude toward any regional political arrangements should be determined by our estimate of: (1) whether they will contribute toward the maintenance of peace; (2) whether they will be subordinate to and in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations Organization; and (3) whether there is danger that they will stimulate the development of competitive regional arrangements. In the economic field we should at all times oppose any features which would place additional restrictions on trade, run counter to the principles of free access to foreign markets and raw materials, or tend to divide Europe into rival economic spheres.

We should direct our best efforts toward smoothing out points of friction between Great Britain and Russia and fostering the tripartite collaboration upon which lasting peace depends.

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

BRITISH PLAN FOR A WESTERN EUROPEAN BLOC

On September 29, 1944, Eden informed the House of Commons¹ that the Government had embarked on a policy of drawing the countries of Western Europe into a closer association with the British Commonwealth of Nations, thereby giving official approval to the ideas enunciated by General Smuts in 1943.²

Eden emphasized that the plan was in no wise contrary to the principles of Dumbarton Oaks, that it was merely an "element in the general international system", and that it would be a buttress to strengthen the general world structure. He has also taken pains to assure the Russians that a Western Security bloc would not be directed against them, but rather against a resurgent Germany, and through his Ambassador at Moscow has said that provided, in fact, regional arrangements are definitely made subordinate to a World Organization, he could not imagine that the Soviet Union would have any objection to their establishment either in the West or in the East of Europe.

Traditional British policy in Europe has been, of course, that of preventing any one state from dominating the continent. The weakness of Britain's geographical position has always been that some nation would unite the countries of Europe against her. To combat this danger, Britain has thrown her support first to one and

¹ For the full text of Eden's statement, see *Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report*, 5th series, vol. 403, cols. 704-706.

² See footnote 11, *post*.

then to another, thereby maintaining the balance of power necessary to her interests.

Heretofore there have always been several strong European powers providing the basic elements for this policy. Upon the ending of the war, however, this situation has completely changed in that Russia is left as the sole great power on the Continent—a position unique in modern history. Britain accordingly feels that Russia will dominate the Continent (including Germany) and she therefore finds that her political thinking must be thoroughly revised. There is no longer power to balance.

Far from holding the key as being the determining influence in the picture, therefore, Britain perforce now falls into a secondary role, and she must look to her security in other ways. She hopes to find it first in a strong and effective international organization backed by force. As the weakest of the three major powers, and as one occupying an exposed position, she could not logically adopt any other course even if she did not in fact possess the sincere desire to see established an organization capable of maintaining peace. However, the effectiveness of cooperation between the great powers and of an international security organization remains to be seen, and it is not a characteristic of European politics to place sole reliance on untried methods and means. Furthermore, Britain entertains grave doubts as to the intentions of the Russians in the whole scheme of things, and questions the sincerity of their expressed willingness to settle European problems through agreement between the parties concerned. The British are afraid that the Russians may play a lone hand—which they are in a position to do if they so desire, and which they already have shown positive signs of doing in matters affecting the countries on Russia's borders. Britain would prefer to cooperate, but realizes that she may have to compete.

The Russians have taken steps to solidify their control over Eastern Europe. They have concluded bilateral treaties of alliance with the Lublin Poles (in spite of our objections) and with the Governments of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.³ They have taken unilateral action with respect to the formation of an Austrian Government,⁴ and have acted independently in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary without consultation with the American and British representatives in those countries.⁵ An exclusive economic agreement has been concluded with Rumania⁶ which makes possible extensive Soviet control

³ The three treaties referred to were signed at Moscow on April 21, 1945, April 11, 1945, and December 12, 1943, respectively. For the texts, see Department of State, *Documents and State Papers*, vol. 1, pp. 228, 231.

⁴ See document No. 268.

⁵ See *post*, pp. 357-419.

⁶ Signed at Moscow, May 8, 1945. Text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxxlix, p. 876.

over Rumanian industry and which may virtually cut off Rumanian trade with the rest of the world. The Russians have rejected British and American proposals that discussions should take place regarding the political situation in Rumania and elections in Bulgaria.⁷ These actions are not in accordance with the Crimea Declaration on liberated Europe⁸ whereby the Big Three agreed to concert their policies in assisting the liberated peoples to solve their pressing political and economic problems by democratic means. Eastern Europe is, in fact, a Soviet sphere of influence.

In view of these circumstances, it is to be expected that the British will "hedge" against a possible unsuccessful outcome of international collaboration, and will attempt at the same time to strengthen their position by the old power politics system. We can hardly blame them for seeking any additional means of making themselves secure—they who through bitter personal experience know the grim realities of war and the ever-present danger of it—and, as previously indicated, they have already adopted the plan as basic policy.

Since there is no longer power to balance in Europe, Britain would logically turn to the United States as the greatest potential source of support in developing an adequate counterpoise to Russia. Without the assured support of the United States, any combination of powers which Britain might be able to assemble would still leave Russia preponderantly strong. The British know that we have always regarded them as our first line of defense and that any threat to their security would most likely cause armed intervention on our part. However, they are also aware of our traditional antipathy to power politics, and naturally discount the possibility of getting from us an advance commitment to protect the security of the British Isles. In any event, she will at all times follow a policy of seeking such assistance and support from us as we will be willing to give.

The next best "hedge" would be to strengthen the bonds of the Commonwealth. Lord Halifax in his Toronto speech⁹ developed the thesis that the mother country and the Dominions should speak "with one voice" in international affairs. As desirable as this might be from the point of view of the mother country, there is but little chance of the Dominions' falling in with the idea, judging from the reception which the speech had in the several Capitals, the opposition expressed at the meeting of the Prime Ministers,¹⁰ and the divergence of views which has been apparent at recent international conferences. The interests of the Dominions are very often different from those of the

⁷ See documents Nos. 286 and 288.

⁸ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

⁹ To the Toronto Board of Trade, January 24, 1944. Text in *The American Speeches of the Earl of Halifax* (New York, 1947), p. 275.

¹⁰ Held at London, May 1-15, 1944.

mother country, and the inability of the mother country to defend them has been demonstrated. If anything, the political ties are becoming weaker rather than stronger. Here again, however, Britain will do what she can to draw strength to herself in this way.

The policy of drawing the nations of Western Europe into close association with the British Commonwealth is in furtherance of this same end. General Smuts was the first prominent official to give expression to the idea, which he did in a speech before the Empire Parliamentary Association on November 25, 1943.¹¹ Smuts recommended that the Western European nations align themselves with Britain—for their own good as well as Britain's. The countries involved would be, at first, France, Belgium, Holland and, possibly, Norway and Denmark. The precise nature of the alignment has never been defined, and in fact most of the talk about it has been done in unofficial circles—doubtless purposely so. It has nevertheless caused official repercussions in the countries concerned, as well as in Russia. Generally speaking, the idea appears to be to offer these countries something in the nature of dominion status in the British Commonwealth. It might properly be regarded as an extension of the Halifax thesis of "one voice being the unison of many"—the intention being to get more voices in the "unison". One exponent of the plan has said:

"Complete coordination of foreign policies is perhaps too much to expect. But the British Government should cultivate the habit of consulting as regularly with Paris, Brussels, the Hague, Copenhagen and Oslo as it already does with Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington and Pretoria. And in the one case as in the other such consultation will almost always result in an agreed policy."

In addition to establishing a common foreign policy it has been pointed out by those favoring the plan that in the field of strategy the war has shown how many other different forms of collaboration it is possible to achieve without an official abatement of sovereignty. They cite the Combined Chiefs of Staff now linking the American and British Forces as an example, and state that something like it might be reproduced in a more permanent form to insure the strategic unity of Western Europe. They also note the Combined Boards—each dealing jointly with a specific problem—finance, transport, supplies, production, resources, raw materials, et cetera. They point out too that types of weapons might be standardized, as could instruction in staff colleges—thereby building up a "staff mind".

The possibilities of collaboration in the economic field are discussed in more vague terms—most probably because considerable opposition

¹¹ Text published by the Empire Parliamentary Association, 1943, under the title, *Thoughts on the New World*. Extracts in Mansergh, ed., *Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952*, vol. 1, pp. 568-575.

would doubtless develop both at home and abroad. The potentialities, however, are great. A customs union is suggested—presumably an extension of Imperial Preference—and one author states:

“The creation of such a union—a unified market of 115,000,000 people not counting any of their colonial dependencies—would be an immense benefit to its members and to the world at large.”

Currency agreements are spoken of, and civil aviation is cited as a field in which the countries have a community of interest. Mention is also made of the fact that these powers have common colonial problems, which might be treated on a regional scale.

One British commentator states:

“Such suggestions may sound revolutionary. But the Lancaster bomber and the assault craft and the duck and the doodle are all revolutionary. The environment of peaceful living in Europe has changed drastically in the last twenty years, and unless the nations are prepared to alter their habits as drastically, they will go the way of all those who have failed to adapt themselves to their environment—they will not survive.”

The plan has had a varied reception in the countries concerned. Belgium seems to be the most enthusiastic about it; Holland less so, but still not unfavorably disposed. France has been more cool to the idea, but although Anglo-French relations are very strained at the present time and bid fair to lack cordiality as long as de Gaulle remains in power, in the long run France will probably not be averse to making bilateral agreements with Britain on “equal” terms, provided they can be made in such a way as not to weaken the Security Organization or appear to be directed against the Soviet Union. France is the cornerstone of the plan, and without her support the idea will not advance very far. An improvement in Anglo-French relations is a necessary prerequisite to any possible concrete results along these lines. It should be noted, too, that France has aspirations of regaining her former “greatness” and doubtless has ideas of her own of taking the lead in Western Europe. In this connection mention should be made of the statement to Caffery by the Russian Ambassador in Paris to the effect that his Government was opposed to the formation of a Western European Bloc under British leadership, but had no objection whatever to France’s being the principal nation among a group of free and prosperous European nations. This was just after de Gaulle’s visit to Moscow last year. However, Franco-Russian relations have cooled somewhat since that time.

The Russians are suspicious of the British move, and the British Ambassador to Moscow reported that Molotov was obviously “relieved” by his statement to him on November 28, 1944 that the object of any so-called “Western European Bloc” would in no wise be to

form a counterpoise to the Soviet Union. Clark Kerr also assured Molotov that in accordance with the established policy of his Government the Russians would at all times be kept fully informed of any developments along these lines. It is deemed most likely that he attempted to convey to Molotov the idea that the motive which impelled the British to adopt this policy in Western Europe was the same which led the Russians to take an interest in Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, and Rumania.

At the time when the formulation of the European Economic Committee was under consideration, the British led the countries of Western Europe to believe that they regarded it as a part of a larger project for Western European collaboration along political as well as economic lines. This point was not brought out at the time, and apparently the British had not contemplated informing the Russians of the proposal to create such a Committee, the approach to the Soviets having been made by others, much to British annoyance. In any case, Russia, for various reasons, refused to participate in the European Economic Committee, as well as in the European Inland Transport Organization and the European Coal Organization, all of which have consequently become organs of Western European cooperation only, and which may therefore be interpreted as being a small step along the path toward the British goal. The inference which may be drawn from the Russians' attitude thus far is that they are not too greatly concerned about developments in Western Europe so long as the Western European countries do not show signs of ganging up on them.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Spheres of influence do in fact exist, and will probably continue to do so for some time to come. Regional arrangements are recognized as necessary and legitimate features of international security, provided they are subordinate to the General Security Organization. In view of the actual Eastern European sphere and the Western Hemisphere bloc (Act of Chapultepec),¹² we are hardly in a position to frown upon the establishment of measures designed to strengthen the security of nations in other areas of the world. However, such measures represent power politics pure and simple, with all the concomitant disadvantages. The only hope of their resulting in lessening the chances of war in the future lies in their being subordinated to the General Security Organization.

Basic United States policy has been to oppose spheres of influence in Europe. Claiming military necessity, the Russians and the

¹² Incorporated in the Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace signed at Mexico City, March 8, 1945 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1543; 60 Stat. (2) 1831).

British made an agreement in the spring of 1944 whereby Rumanian affairs would be the "main concern" of the Soviet Government, while Greek affairs would be the "main concern" of the British Government. Subsequently the arrangement was extended to include Bulgaria as a Soviet "concern", with the British receiving roughly an equal position with the Russians in Yugoslavia. Our assent was requested to these arrangements. It was reluctantly given solely in consideration of war strategy and for a three months' trial period only. At the same time we made known our apprehension lest the arrangement lead to the division of the Balkan region into spheres of influence.¹³

The critical importance of taking this stand and of preventing an intensification of British-Russian rivalry is made clear in the attached excerpts from a letter addressed to the Secretary of State by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our primary objective should be to remove the *causes* which make nations feel that such spheres are necessary to their security, rather than to assist one country to build up strength against another. Such an objective would probably be more susceptible of realization if *quid pro quo* reductions of the dominant role each plays in its area could be devised—i. e. a lessening of the influence of one *pari passu* with the other. An agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France in the form of a treaty or an advance commitment in the Security Council to use force to effect and maintain the demilitarization of Germany or to suppress future German aggression, would go far to weaken British and Soviet justifications for the maintenance of spheres of influence in Western and Eastern Europe respectively.

A proposal¹⁴ has also been made for the creation of a Council of Foreign Ministers of the Big Five which would settle on an *ad hoc* basis particular problems growing out of the war and which would replace a formal peace conference. Such a Council would tend to reduce the possibilities of unilateral action by either the Russians or the British and would serve as a useful *interim* means through which the United States could work for the liquidation of spheres of influence. For a more permanent arrangement consideration might be given to the British suggestion made some time ago for creating a "Council of Europe", as a permanent part of the machinery of the International Security Organization.

Since the San Francisco Conference is over, the British will doubtless go ahead with their attempt to carry out the Smuts proposal. The matter has been left more or less in abeyance pending the determination as to what part regionalism would play in the General Organiza-

¹³ Relevant communications of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin concerning this question are printed in Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 73-81. See also *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 103-106.

¹⁴ See document No. 228.

tion. Before long Britain will probably initiate treaty negotiations with France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway. In general, we should neither endorse nor oppose such *political* arrangements as are in fact subordinated to the General Organization. In the economic field, however, we should at all times strongly oppose any features which would place additional restrictions on trade and run counter to our announced principles of free access to foreign markets and raw materials.

The need of the moment is to promote understanding between Great Britain and Russia on all matters in dispute. We should do all we can in this connection and direct our best efforts towards smoothing out the points of friction between the two, thereby fostering the tripartite collaboration so necessary to lasting peace. However, American policy must be attuned to events in Europe *as a whole* and to the consequences of general European conditions on the stability of Great Britain. Specifically, it is not in our interest to deny to the United Kingdom protection against possible dangers from the Soviet Union, especially since the Soviets have established domination of Eastern Europe and since the International Security Organization would not be effective in case of a clash between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Until it is determined which course events in Europe will take—i. e. whether Russia will collaborate or not—we should not take a positive stand one way or the other on this proposal to draw the nations of Western Europe into closer association.

[WASHINGTON,] JUNE 28, 1945.

[Attachment]

TOP SECRET

EXCERPTS FROM A LETTER FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, DATED MARCH [May] 16, 1944¹⁵

“From the point of view of national and world-wide security, our basic national policy in post-war settlements of this kind [disposition of Italian colonies] should seek to maintain the solidarity of the three great powers and in all other respects to establish conditions calculated to assure a long period of peace, during which, it may be hoped, arrangements will be perfected for the prevention of future world conflicts. The cardinal importance of this national policy is emphasized by a consideration of the fundamental and revolutionary changes

¹⁵ This excerpt comprises the attachment *in toto*. For the introductory and concluding paragraphs of this letter, which was signed for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Leahy, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 106, footnote 4.

in relative national military strengths that are being brought about in Europe as a result of the war.

“It would seem clear that there can not be a world war, or even a great war, which does not find one or more of the great military powers on each side. At the conclusion of the present war, there will be, for the foreseeable future, only three such powers—the United States, Britain, and Russia. Since it would seem in the highest degree unlikely that Britain and Russia, or Russia alone, would be aligned against the United States, it is apparent that any future world conflict in the foreseeable future will find Britain and Russia in opposite camps.

“In appraising possibilities of this nature, the outstanding fact to be noted is the recent phenomenal development of the heretofore latent Russian military and economic strength—a development which seems certain to prove epochal in its bearing on future politico-military international relationships, and which has yet to reach the full scope attainable with Russian resources. In contrast, as regards Britain several developments have combined to lessen her relative military and economic strength and gravely to impair, if not preclude, her ability to offer effective military opposition to Russia on the continent except possibly in defensive operations in the Atlantic coastal areas. In a conflict between these two powers the disparity in the military strengths that they could dispose upon that continent would, under present conditions, be far too great to be overcome by our intervention on the side of Britain. Having due regard to the military factors involved—resources, manpower, geography and particularly our ability to project our strength across the ocean and exert it decisively upon the continent—we might be able to successfully defend Britain, but we could not, under existing conditions, defeat Russia. In other words, we would find ourselves engaged in a war which we could not win even though the United States would be in no danger of defeat and occupation.

“It is apparent that the United States should, now and in the future, exert its utmost efforts and utilize all its influence to prevent such a situation arising and to promote a spirit of mutual cooperation between Britain, Russia and ourselves. So long as Britain and Russia cooperate and collaborate in the interests of peace, there can be no great war in the foreseeable future.

“The greatest likelihood of eventual conflict between Britain and Russia would seem to grow out of either nation initiating attempts to build up its strength, by seeking to attach to herself parts of Europe to the disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary. Having regard to the inherent suspicions of the Russians, to present Russia with any agreement on such matters as between the British

and ourselves, prior to consultation with Russia, might well result in starting a train of events that would lead eventually to the situation we most wish to avoid."

No. 225

841.61/7-1245 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

CASERTA, July 12, 1945—2 p. m.

2928. During course of our conversation today Field Marshal Alexander confided that he found Churchill "very ill at ease" with regard to Russians. The latter had cited various reports made by Clark Kerr recounting conversations with Soviet officials including Molotov and Maiski which left no doubt in Churchill's mind of the ultimate intentions of the Russians. He said that it was Brit Prime Minister's impression that Stalin was being amiable at present time in order to "sweeten the atmosphere" just before Big Three meeting, but that it was to be fully expected that several unpleasant things would be tabled by Russian Premier during course of conference and indeed it should not be excluded that even a *fait accompli* or two might be presented. When we asked SAC to clarify this point he stated that everyone in London is most uneasy on display of force in Bulgaria and pressure being brought to bear on Turks. He added that Churchill had requested British COS views as to possible role which might be played by the Russians in war in Far East and was not satisfied with any of results produced.

Alexander made flat statement that if Anglo-American policy is to be a wise one we must begin to knot together immediately those pieces which can be salvaged from what is left in our way of life on continent of Europe and do most possible with it. He added that he included Germany in this statement. SAC stated that he was not at all encouraged by point of view of key people in London but he did not know whether this was due to reality or to fact that everyone had been burdened with rigors of a very dirty political campaign. Alexander informed us that he expects to leave Caserta morning July 15 in order to accompany Churchill to meeting of Big Three.

KIRK

¹ The gist of this message was included in an unnumbered communication of July 13 sent by Grew to Byrnes by pouch (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1345).

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

No. 226

811.00b/6-245

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: "Possible Resurrection of Communist International, Resumption of Extreme Leftist Activities, Possible Effect on United States."

This top secret memorandum has been prepared after long study and is the result of intensive research. We feel that the broad situation in the memorandum is one which should be watched with great care and we believe that you will wish to read this paper before the coming meeting of heads of government.

JOSEPH C. GREW

[Summary of Enclosure 1]

The Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs (Murphy) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Phillips) and the Director of European Affairs (Matthews)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 2, 1945.

SUMMARY

In May, 1944, the Communist Party of the United States changed its name to that of Communist Political Association, diluted its Marxian program considerably, and announced its willingness to collaborate with all classes, except potential "fascists", during and after the war. This stand was approved by the Central Committee of the French Communist Party as announced in May, 1944, issue of its official publication, *France Nouvelle*.

¹ This summary is attached to the file copy of Grew's memorandum to Truman of June 27, but there is no indication that it accompanied that memorandum and its enclosure when they were delivered to Truman. The enclosure here summarized is printed *infra*.

With the approaching end of the war in Europe the American Communist Political Association began to make attacks on the public administration and began to accuse officials of an anti-Russian complex and consequently unfit to hold public office—the principal offense of these officials actually having been the attempt to lay down a policy of benefit to the United States.

On May 24, 1945, the *Daily Worker*, organ of the Communist Political Association, published a criticism by Jacques Duclos, official of the French Communist Party, of the change of tactics in 1944 of the American Communist Party. Specifically, Duclos accused the American Communist Party of abandoning a Marxist line, of class collaboration and of treating the situation in the United States in a false light with no emphasis on the necessity for “conquest of power”: Browder had a companion piece in the same issue informing members of the Communist Political Association of the United States that since the war in Europe was over, American Communists must now reexamine their positions and if necessary prepare to make changes.

The transition to a more radical policy had already begun, however, as presaged by the attacks on the administration. In Western Europe all communist parties have recently reverted to their original formula of radical solutions of political and economic problems preliminary to their “conquest of power”.

These changes may well precede the reconstitution of the Communist International, perhaps with headquarters in Paris. While the Communist International theoretically was dissolved in June, 1943, the constituent sections have worked together as a team since then and have never wavered in their absolute support of Moscow's policies. This is a force to be reckoned with in the application of this government's policies abroad for the reconstituted Communist International may be expected to attempt to undermine and discredit our policies if they do not coincide with those of the Soviet Union.

To meet the situation firmly and resolutely and thereby improve relations with the Soviet Union requires this government to treat the American Communist movement as a potential fifth column. Such action would have a beneficial effect in other foreign countries by showing that a given country can maintain correct and cordial relations with the Soviet Union and simultaneously hold its own citizens to strict accountability for their actions as agents of an organization of the Soviet Union.

R[AYMOND] E M[URPHY]

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 2, 1945.

POSSIBLE RESURRECTION OF COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL, RESUMPTION OF EXTREME LEFTIST ACTIVITIES, POSSIBLE EFFECT ON UNITED STATES

RESUMPTION OF MORE RADICAL POLICIES BY COMMUNIST MOVEMENTS

Since the summer of 1941, or after the attack on the Soviet Union by Germany, all communist parties have stressed the virtues of patriotism, prompted efforts to insure maximum production and win the war, deprecated strikes, and criticized anything which tended to weaken the unity of the allied nations which opposed Germany.

With the approaching defeat of Germany and a series of unilateral actions by the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the countries its armies occupied, a gradual change in the attitude of various communist parties has become obvious. The generally belligerent treatment of democratic forces by communist elements in all Eastern European countries is well-known in spite of the strict news censorship imposed in those areas by the Russians and their satellites. Professing to applaud democratic practices, those Communists in power in Eastern Europe have applied terror, intimidation, mass deportation and murder under the guise of necessary purges, all of which has proved shocking to our concept of democracy and free speech. It is plain that democracy to a Communist has not the same connotation it has to an occidental democrat.

The carrying out of these practices in Eastern Europe has been performed under conditions ideal from the communist point of view. Executed by governments professing, according to Communists, to carry out the will of the people, the excesses are cloaked with the mask of respectability of *puppet* governments which have pretended to be executing anti-fascist purges.

The line of the communist parties in Western Europe has been different. There they had to accommodate themselves to an approach calculated to gain them more freedom of action under the western liberating forces and simultaneously propose measures which would make Communists more acceptable to their fellow citizens, who knew that formerly Communists were traitors to their own countries. Likewise, these countries were further removed from the Soviet sphere of immediate influence and traditionally, by cultural, religious and economic ties, had been integrated along western democratic lines.

In Western Europe for months the Communists have played the role of a moderating force, and their most compelling objective has

been to win the war. This is true for Italy, France, the low countries, England, and especially the United States. This mask deceived many persons even in countries where the history of the communist movement and the activities of its leaders during the German-Soviet pact should have made them suspicious of the genuineness of the conversion to democracy.

Within the past three months the communist parties of France and Italy have openly advocated a return to fundamental Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist tactics. They declare that the time has come for a more radical solution of the economic and political conditions confronting those countries. The emphasis is again on the class character of the problem with the recommended solution lying in expropriation of means of production and attacks on the capitalist class generally. The Italian Communist Party in addition has reverted to its anti-monarchical stand of 1942 by the authoritative pronouncement in the May 6, 1945, issue of *L'Unità*, Rome, organ of the Party, that Italians must, "end the institutional compromise of June 1944". It was because of political chicanery that Togliatti, Italian communist leader, agreed to recognize the monarchy in 1944.

The French Communist Party has begun to reprint as fundamental documents the theses and recommendations of Lenin of 1920, the most revolutionary period of the Communist International.

—The most significant and far-reaching indication of a return to a more radical program is contained in an article by Jacques Duclos in the April 1945 *Cahiers du Communisme*, official monthly organ of the French Communist Party. Duclos was a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International at the time of its alleged dissolution in June 1943. He resided in Moscow from 1940 to 1943 and is one of the leading interpreters in France of the official communist line. In this article Duclos excoriates Earl Browder and the leading officials of the Party in this country for having deviated from the official Leninist-Stalinist line. Specifically, he accuses Browder of opportunism, of "tailism" or following in the wake of political developments and abandoning the role of leader of the revolutionary vanguard of the workers, and of "exceptionalism" or attempting to draw up a different set of standards of conduct because of the allegedly different character of American problems.

Duclos alone could not have made these accusations. The consensus of opinion based upon the history of the Communist International is that the Duclos article represents instructions originating in Moscow. Weight is given this view by the fact that in May 1944 the Central Committee of the French Communist Party approved the change of tactics of Browder and the American Communist Party which it now condemns. There is every indication that the American

Communist Party has been studying these charges for some time prior to its publication of the document in the May 24, 1945, *Daily Worker* with a very contrite preface by Browder himself. As a matter of fact, over three weeks ago the Party in this country made its first attacks on the State Department after having ceased criticism for two years and these were followed up by attacks on the President. Curiously enough, Duclos' article seems to have been prepared before the death of President Roosevelt.

This sequence of events seems to indicate the return to activity of the Communist International; hence a consideration of that phenomenon is necessary for a clearer understanding of the entire question.

THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

Purpose of the Communist International

The Communist International was established in March 1919 by Lenin, Trotsky and other Bolshevnik leaders for the purpose of enlisting the aid of workers in other countries in support of the Russian revolution. It was the hope of these Bolshevniks that the Russian example would be followed in other countries. That hope was fulfilled briefly in other countries such as Hungary, Estonia and Bavaria, the revolution of longest duration, in Hungary, having been 92 days.

Thereafter, while emphasizing the revolutionary purpose of the Communist International and the ultimate hope that the world would be transformed politically into a system of soviet republics, the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union realized that this objective was mainly an illusion. Consequently, the Soviet communist leaders who controlled the Soviet Government and the Communist International decided to make the latter a tool or weapon to serve Soviet interests throughout the world. The channels of use were varied including pressure groups to influence other countries' foreign policy in favor of the Soviet Union; attempts to obtain control of the labor movement in other countries, especially key industries such as shipping and radio; enlistment of communists abroad for espionage in behalf of the Soviet Union against their own or other countries; and the setting up of groups to agitate on colonial problems.

Most important was the inculcation of discipline in Communists and the adoption of a system of ethics whereby the end always justified the means. The Communist International finally had sixty-five sections in other countries and in the colonies of those countries, each country or colony being represented by but one section. Communist members accepted the decisions of the Executive Committee of their own country in case of conflict. These sections were rigidly controlled and their activities carefully supervised for over a quarter of a century by representatives of the Communist International.

And the members of these sections accepted this regime as a natural corollary of the revolutionary movement. In accepting membership in a section, the prospective member pledged his allegiance to the Communist International, not to the country of which he was a citizen. As part of the training of members of these sections and required reading as a guide to action, the Communist International formulated a series of fundamental documents, the most important of which was its Program, adopted on September 1, 1928. All sections accepted this Program, which was never repudiated and is still regarded as a living, basic document for all Communists.

Abundant evidence exists, even with respect to the American Communist Party, of the absolute obedience and primary loyalty of members to the Communist International, even when espionage is involved. This Communist International was a tool or weapon such as no other country possessed, and the Soviet Union never hesitated to use it when the occasion demanded. Masquerading as a political party in a country permitting it to operate openly, a communist party was in fact a fifth column as much as any *Bund* group, except that the latter were crude and ineffective in comparison with Communists.

Ample cases are on record of interference by the Communist International in the affairs of other countries. A few instances will suffice to illustrate the scope and gravity of such occurrences:

Germany—Abortive revolutions of 1921 and 1923.

England—Interference in coal strike of 1926, several cases of espionage using English Communists as tools.

France—Black Sea mutiny 1920 led by André Marty, espionage cases of 1933 involving French and American Communists, promotion of sit-down strikes affecting entire country in 1936, promotion of defeatism in war.

Denmark—Arrest in February 1935 of Americans later convicted of espionage against Germany using Denmark as a base.

Austria—Arrest in Vienna, September 1936 of American Communist who was head of a center of international operators for Soviet Military Intelligence.

Spain—1937-1938 Ascendancy of Communist machine under guise of Soviet aid to Loyalist Spain. Hierarchy of international Communists, including American, operating as a government within a government.

China—Abortive revolution 1927. Arrest June 1931 of organization leaders in Shanghai (Russian and American agents of Communist International covering the entire Far East.) Assistance to communist Eighth Route Army in early thirties.

Netherlands—Mutiny of crew of cruiser *Sven Provincien* in Netherlands East Indies 1933.

Chile—1932 Revolt of Chilean fleet led by Communists.

Brazil—Revolution of November 1935.

United States—1926 Passaic, New Jersey strike and fur workers' strike, New York City. July 1934 general strike in San Francisco. Several cases of promoting disaffection in army. 1931 espionage in army headquarters Panama. 1931 espionage New York City. Many cases of espionage.

These are only a few of the outstanding examples of interference by communist parties in the internal affairs of other or their own countries pursuant to orders from the Communist International or the Soviet Military Intelligence.

Most persons are prone to dismiss the communist movement as of no importance because it acknowledges few members. That is the sort of mistake Communists appreciate because their influence always far outweighs their numerical strength and generally is exercised through their peripheral groups of fellow-travellers or innocents who are enrolled in the front organizations controlled by Communists although superficially having no connection with the Party. For example, communist parties in Europe consistently polled in national elections over ten times their numerical strength. In the United States the Party deliberately concealed its national strength by restricting its Party membership and failing to make real campaigns nationally. It decided the 1938 gubernatorial election in New York by withdrawing its candidate and throwing the votes to Governor Lehman.

Thus, the Communist Political Association of the United States has about 100,000 members now but it influences several millions. It controls some C. I. O. Unions such as the Fur Workers, the National Maritime, the Miners and Smelters, the Architects, the Radio, and the Cannerymen, not to mention Bridges' longshoremen on the West Coast. It exerts considerable influence in intellectual fields. For instance, it is nonsensical to think that a small party of 100,000 members can support three daily publications, at least ten schools with an enrollment of 500 to 5,500, numerous weekly publications, and the upkeep of several office buildings. Yet that is what the Communist Political Association does and the conclusion is warranted that it has access to funds and sources far greater than its modest membership would sustain.

Technique of Communists of Identifying Their Activities with the Soviet Union

American Communists while attacking the policies of the United States carefully implant the feeling in the public mind that any adverse action the United States may take against them for violations of the law will have an unfortunate repercussion on this country's relations with the Soviet Union. By smear campaigns and unbridled criticism of public servants who view the interests of the United

States as paramount to those of the Soviet Union Communists attempt to force these officials to change their views. While Communists were in the forefront of those demanding extreme punishment of American Bundists, they denounce public officials as fascist who attempt to punish Communists for infraction of the laws. In brief, Communists have the same attitude as Goebbels did—that the civil liberty laws of the democracies are convenient instruments for Communists to facilitate their tearing down the structure of the state and thereafter abolishing all civil rights.

It is preposterous to believe that a state's treatment of its own citizens who are Communists and violate the law will have any effect on relations with the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union maintained most cordial relations with Italy and Turkey when Mussolini and Kemal Pasha were dealing with their communist citizens with extreme harshness. At a later date much the same situation prevailed with Nazi Germany after Hitler had abolished all civil rights and was beheading German Communists. Conversely, in the democracies, which leaned over backwards lest there be an infringement of civil liberties, generosity was held in contempt by Communists as prime examples of decadent democracy.

For a powerful country to be hesitant to apply the law to its own citizens is an abnegation of sovereignty and a sign of weakness. Hesitation in this respect will be interpreted as weakness in other countries. American Communists on the one hand attempt to identify themselves with the success of the Red Army and lead Americans to believe that the imposition of penalties on American Communists for infractions of the law will exacerbate or impair this country's relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, in order to avoid compliance with mild administrative regulations such as the Registration of Agents' Act ² the American Communists loudly proclaim their complete severance of ties with the Communist international and from Moscow. Manifestly, the alleged abandonment of ties is solely for purposes of evasion.

However, for the sake of the record and as a guide of [*for?*] action this country should accept American Communists' claims of severance as a statement of fact for the purpose of prosecution and treat them solely as American citizens not as privileged persons enjoying a hybrid status.

So far as the Soviet Government is concerned the United States would strengthen its relations with that country by a firm attitude towards American citizens who are Communists. On November 16, 1933, in the document pertaining to the establishment of relations

² i. e., the Foreign Agents Registration Act of June 8, 1938 (52 Stat. 631), as amended by an act of April 29, 1942 (56 Stat. 248).

between the two countries³ Commissar Litvinoff gave a specific pledge that there would be no interference by organizations in the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of the United States. The next day in a press interview Litvinoff specifically stated that the pledge did not relate to the Communist Party of the United States as "The Communist Party of Russia does not concern America and the Communist Party of the United States does not concern Russia".

On August 25, 1935, as a result of inflammatory speeches made in Moscow by American Communists at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International this government made sharp protest to the Soviet Government charging violation of the Litvinoff pledge.⁴ In declining to receive the protest Acting People's Commissar Krestinsky wrote: "It is certainly not new to the Government of the United States that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can not take upon itself and has not taken upon itself obligations of any kind with regard to the Communist International."⁵

It may be observed that the Soviet inability to interpret simple, plain, explicit language in agreements long preceded Yalta and Crimea, and the apparent incapacity and unwillingness to interpret simple clauses has been characteristic of Soviet diplomacy with all countries, especially if the Communist International was concerned.

There would be no useful purpose served in war between the two countries as that would be a most stupid and senseless act by this Government until its vital interests were at stake. Far from being a step to war, an active, vigilant and forceful policy with regard to our own citizens who may be Soviet puppets would promote better relations if the history of Soviet diplomacy is a guide.

Alleged Dissolution of Communist International

In June 1943 the Communist International ostensibly was officially dissolved. The dissolution was hailed as a step in promoting better relations between the allied nations. Apparently overlooked was the fact that in 1941 and 1942 a host of organizations had been set up in Moscow on an international scale to take over in a different field the work of front organizations. All had tie-ups in the United States. For example, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee organized in September 1941 had direct connections in the United States and its Secretary, Shachno Epstein, who had spent many years in the United States is still wanted on a passport charge in New York. The Pan Slav Committee of Moscow, parent organization of the communist-controlled American Slav Congress which was established in April 1942 in the United States, was another. Likewise, the Free Germany

³ Text in *Foreign Relations*, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, p. 28.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 250.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 252.

Committee and various intellectual bodies. The official journal, *The Communist International*, was replaced by *War and the Working Class* and a number of press associations set up to cover the world, the Inter-Continent News having been the intermediary in this hemisphere. The contents of these Soviet journals were cabled promptly and pre-paid to the various communist parties, which accepted the line laid down in those journals as directions for their own activities. These articles were also promptly reprinted in the official press of these parties, presumably in accordance with the former instructions of the Communist International to publish all decisions, and were accepted by Party members as directions. At the same time the various Soviet Embassies began publication of bulletins principally of a propaganda nature which featured the aims and activities of these front organizations.

Thus the dissolution of the Communist International was anticipated by the setting up of propaganda agencies which were well-received in quarters which the Communist International never could penetrate.

But the dissolution was more a shadow than substance. In looking through the fiction to the reality, it was found that no former sections of the Communist International went out of business, on the contrary they became far more active on a larger scale. It was not long before some foreign members of the Communist International were publicized as the logical leaders of their countries when liberated. The following may be mentioned in this connection:

Bierut in Poland
Pauker in Rumania
Tito (Broz) in Yugoslavia
Togliatti in Italy
Dimitroff in Bulgaria

In other countries of the allied nations such as China and France efforts were made, and are being made, to force acceptance by those governments as equals prominent Communists who formerly were either in active, fighting opposition to the central government or traitors. Now the Communists in several countries are so audacious as to press for the recognition of their own armies not subject to the discipline of the central government. China is an outstanding example; on a lesser scale the same procedure was attempted in Greece, Italy, and France.

In no country after the dissolution of the Communist International was there ever a deviation in loyalty by a communist party towards the Soviet Union. Their primary allegiance was still to the Soviet Union in whose interest all questions, political and military, were considered. In the United States and Great Britain the central

theme after the dissolution still remained the agitation for an immediate opening of the Second Front with the customary aspersions on military leaders for lack of leadership and imputations of bad faith of our political leaders.

Recently there have been clear signs of a reversion to a more militant line by these parties. In the April 1945 issue of *Cahiers du Communisme*, Paris, writing on the subject of the Dissolution of the Communist International one H. Ruffe, a member of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party stated the following:

“Today as in the past, the ultimate goal of the Communists is the same. The rich and fruitful teachings of the glorious Communist International will remain forever inscribed in the hearts and minds of all Communists.”

And on May 21, 1945, in the *Voix Ouvrière Suisse*, organ of the Swiss Communist Party, Nicole, its Secretary, had the following to say in attacking the policies of Premier Churchill: “Mr. Churchill wants to defend Freedom. That’s fine! But it is necessary to ask whose freedom. For in a Capitalist society, wherever the freedom of exploitation begins, there ends the freedom of the worker.”

In his recent criticism of the American Communist Political Association Duclos made the following important point regarding the program of a genuine Communist Party:

“Nationalization of monopolies actually in no sense constitutes a socialist movement, contrary to what certain people would be inclined to believe. No, in nationalization it is simply a matter of reforms of a democratic character, *achievement of socialism being impossible to imagine without preliminary conquest of power.*” (emphasis ours)

No clearer statement is necessary to justify the conclusion that Communists now are prepared to revert to the Program adopted by the Communist International in 1928 as a blueprint for the seizure of power by violent means, if necessary.

Much the same sentiments were expressed by Reale, important Italian communist leader in a recent issue of *L’Unità* of Rome.

Coupled with these expressions of policy by important communist leaders is the fact that the communist parties are now advocating a more leftist line. Likewise, the well-meshed machinery of Italian, French and German Communists working as a team is added evidence of the continuing and effective operation of the Communist International.

That an important change is taking place is indicated by Browder’s preface to Duclos’ article in the May 24, 1945, *Daily Worker*. Browder said *inter alia*:

“It has been clear at all times that the end of the war in Europe would require a fundamental review of all problems by American

Marxists. We must estimate our past work, and face the tasks of the future. We must make the most careful inventory, balance our political books, and know clearly how we stand as we enter a new period of sharpening struggles, crisis and profound changes."

This is about the same language as was customary in the early part of the thirties during a period when the Communist parties were especially active in fomenting disturbances during the economic crisis. It is significant that Browder, an American, who had been issuing demagogic statements since June 22, 1941, about the necessity of all-out efforts for the war regards the end of the European war, the only war in which Russia was engaged, as the occasion for a re-examination of a so-called American political association's line. While the government to which he owes allegiance is prosecuting the war against Japan, Mr. Browder makes public statements the plain implication of which may mean an interference with that war effort by the American Communists. No better evidence is necessary to indicate that Browder's professed devotion to the United States is a sham, that he still remains an internationalist devoted to alien ideas.

CONDITIONS IN EUROPE FAVORABLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

The smoothly-functioning, experienced and disciplined communist machine has been demonstrated. At the end of the last World War the Communists had no such machine. Hence, from an operational viewpoint, the apparatus is in position to take advantage immediately of any opportunities which may be presented. In fact the elite of the communist refugees have returned to their respective countries after several years of safe haven and training in Moscow. These elements are far more skillful than any this country can propose.

To a Communist, Europe today politically and economically represents a perfect situation for the propagation of their doctrines. Dean Inge has cogently expressed the feature which makes for communist success. He said, "In their quest for security, people will accept serfdom."

Europe is emerging from probably the most devastating war in its history. Concomitantly, the Red Army's exploits have been so well advertised that the majority of Europeans regard them as their liberators. Even in the West the Red Army receives the major share of the credit, thanks to the publicity given it by the communist press. The excesses of the Nazi regime and the fear of a rejuvenated Germany impel most Europeans to gravitate naturally toward the strongest remaining power in Europe—the Soviet Union. Furthermore, almost all Europeans have been living under totalitarian regimes, causing their thinking to be so conditioned at this time that the

transition to another totalitarian regime is perfectly natural. The same situation may be true of Germany itself.

In addition, press censorship and radio control (always effective instruments of totalitarians) will again be utilized for that purpose.

Hitler's actions in thoroughly mixing up the economy of Europe, merging its various industries under Goering and seizing and consolidating banks serve now to facilitate the growth of communism, for it is an herculean if not impossible task to unscramble the mixup and find the original owners. Likewise, there is so much poverty and destitution in Europe that the mere possession of a better than average standard of living is viewed with suspicion by the masses. Europe affords now a perfect background for spontaneous class hatred to be channeled by a skillful agitator.

The thesis of the communist agitator in these circumstances has been praise of the Soviet Union as the liberator of the oppressed masses and the logical guarantor against a repetition of the causes. Consequently, each European country, it is emphasized, should align itself with the Soviet Union.

Simultaneously, the inhabitants of the afflicted countries expect the United States to feed them at least for the next year and provide machinery and credits for the rehabilitation of their economy. Communist parties, including that in the United States, emphasize in their propaganda that this role of the United States as almoner for Europe is a duty. Altruism is not expected to pay dividends even of good will.

POSSIBLE EFFECT ON THE UNITED STATES OF CHANGE IN POLICY

While conjectural, it is possible to anticipate certain changes towards this country. Some changes are already clear. An attempt will be made to enumerate and describe possible changes.

1. Attacks on the Administration on grounds of abandoning the policies of the late President. Communists reserve for themselves the interpretation of the late President's policies.

2. Attacks on top personnel of State Department on grounds they are anti-Russian.

3. Use of communist underground in government departments to obtain confidential information.

4. Use of communist-controlled unions in key industries to strike if necessary, apparently for economic demands, actually for political purposes.

5. Use of communist apparatus in certain European countries to interfere with administration of our sphere of occupied Germany and perhaps to interfere with supply line of our troops.

The foregoing can be amplified considerably but it is unnecessary as the damage that can be done under the points enumerated would be serious. Now that an American organization has announced that

it may have to change its tactics because one phase of the war is over, this Government is challenged. To recognize such a group as un-American, a potential fifth column with foreign allegiance, and to deal with it accordingly would be realistic. Decisive action against the American Communists would be a convincing demonstration to Stalin of the inherent strength of this country and would strengthen relations between the two countries.

**IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND LATE
DEVELOPMENTS ON CONFERENCE SUBJECTS**

GENERAL QUESTIONS

ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS AND DISSOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION

No. 227

740.00119 EW/6-1945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
URGENT

SAN FRANCISCO, June 19, 1945.

3. To Grew, Acting Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. from Stettinius, UNCIO, San Francisco, California.

The following memorandum may be helpful in the preparation of a reply to the President's memorandum of June 15 [9]:¹

"It seems clear that it would be desirable to avoid the convocation of a full-fledged peace conference to deal with the major political problems that have arisen as a result of the termination of the war in Europe. A formal peace conference would be slow and unwieldy and ratification of the resulting document might be long delayed. On the other hand, a formal 'peace conference' limited to a few states such as the Big Four, would probably encounter much opposition on the part of the States not invited to participate. It is therefore suggested that the problems concerned to [sic] be dealt with on an *ad hoc* basis by a council of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, the U. S. S. R., China and France with the inclusion of other states whenever problems of particular interest to them were under consideration.

1. The proposal might be discussed informally with the British and we could inform the Russians that we intended to raise this question at the meeting of the three Chiefs of State. The Chinese and French would be informed as soon as British and Soviet agreement is obtained.

2. At the Big Three meeting, we would endeavor to obtain Soviet and British agreement as to the time and place of the meeting as well as to some of the items that would be placed on the agenda of the first meeting. It would probably not be advisable to hold a meeting in a capital of the participating powers. Brussels or Vienna might be suitable. The latter would probably be favored by the Russians as they would there be able to make their own security arrangements and

¹ Document No. 150.

communication facilities. The meeting should be held as soon after the Big Three meeting as the necessary preparations can be completed.

3. Each of the Foreign Ministers should be accompanied by a high ranking deputy capable of carrying on the work of the Council in the absence of his chief.

4. Each Foreign Minister should also be accompanied by a small group of experts and advisers; but it should be agreed that the major portion of the work of preparation of the various agreements [is] to be undertaken by the respective Foreign Offices.

5. The procedure to be followed by the Council should be adapted to the particular problem under consideration. Whenever the Council was considering a question of particular interest to a state not represented, such state could be invited to send a representative to participate in the discussion of that question. This should not, however, preclude preliminary consideration by the Big Five of any question without the participation of other states. In some cases the Council might find it advisable to convoke a formal conference of the states chiefly interested to deal with a particular problem such as, for example, the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Italy. In other cases such as the settlement of the Yugoslav and Italian frontier, the Big Five might reach agreement in consultation with Italian and Yugoslav representatives and embody the results in a treaty to be concluded between Italy and Yugoslavia only.

6. The European Advisory Commission could probably be liquidated as soon as the control machinery is in effective operation in Germany and Austria.

The various control commissions, being chiefly operating organizations, would not conflict with the Council of Foreign Ministers, but the latter could, of course, consider any question referred to it by their Governments.

7. In view of the position of the Soviet Government that Poland and Yugoslavia should be included in the Reparations Commission if France were to be included the inclusion of China may be essential in order to avoid a similar Soviet position with respect to the Council of Foreign Ministers. By including China the Council would consist of all the permanent members of the proposed security council² and this would furnish a basis for excluding other countries from full membership. It might also be well to relate the creation of the Council to the liquidation of the EAC. It would, in any event, probably be desirable to avoid undue emphasis on the establishment of the council as an organization but rather to allow its functions to become clear as they evolve in practice. [']³

² Of the United Nations.

³ In connection with the genesis of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see also Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 70-71; James F. Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime* (New York, 1958), pp. 288-289.

No. 228

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Proposal for the Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers.

One of the most urgent problems in the field of foreign relations facing us today is the establishment of some procedure and machinery for the development of peace negotiations and territorial settlements without which the existing confusion, political uncertainty and economic stagnation will continue to the serious detriment of Europe and the world. The experience at Versailles following the last war does not encourage the belief that a full, formal peace conference is the best procedure. Such a conference would be slow and unwieldy, its sessions would be conducted in a heated atmosphere of rival claims and counter-claims and ratification of the resulting documents might be long delayed. On the other hand a formal peace conference limited to the three or four principal nations would encounter much opposition from [on?] the part of other members of the United Nations not invited to participate. It would also be subject to the oft-heard criticism that the big powers are running the world without consideration for the interests of smaller nations. The Department feels, therefore, that the best formula to meet the situation would be the establishment of a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States. These are the countries which compose the permanent members of the Security Council of the world organization and by limiting its membership to these five the possible efforts which Russia or Great Britain might make to include in the membership countries closely identified with their respective foreign policies could be forestalled. It is our thought that this Council should meet as soon after the meeting of the three heads of government as preparations therefor can be completed. It would probably be advisable to hold the meeting elsewhere than in one of the capitals of the participating powers. Brussels or Vienna might be suitable. Each Foreign Minister should be accompanied by a high-ranking deputy who could carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Chief. He should also be accompanied by a small group of experts and advisers, but it should be agreed that the major work of preparation would be undertaken by the respective foreign offices. The procedure of the Council should be

¹ Annex 1 to the attachment to document No. 177.

adapted to the particular problem under consideration. Whenever the Council was considering a question of particular interest to a state not represented thereon, such a state should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question. It is not intended, however, to fix hard and fast rules but rather to permit the Council to adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration.

There is attached a draft proposal which you may wish to present to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill for consideration at the forthcoming meeting.

[Attachment]

TOP SECRET

DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

With the termination of hostilities in Europe the United Nations are faced with the urgent problem of peace negotiations and territorial settlements without which the existing confusion, political uncertainty and economic stagnation will continue to the serious detriment of Europe and the world. The experience at Versailles following the last war does not encourage the belief that a full, formal peace conference is the procedure best suited to obtain the best results or to arrive at a solution conducive to those conditions of permanent peace which the United Nations organization is dedicated to uphold. Such a formal peace conference would necessarily be slow and unwieldy, its sessions would be conducted in an atmosphere of rival claims and counter-claims and ratification of the resulting documents might be long delayed. On the other hand, a formal peace conference limited to the three or four principal nations would almost certainly encounter much opposition on the part of other members of the United Nations not invited to participate. They would feel that problems of direct concern to them were being decided in their absence. The United States, therefore, offers the following proposal as the formula best suited to meet the problems ahead:

(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States.²

(2) The Council shall hold its first meeting at on³ Each of the Foreign Ministers shall be accompanied by

² In another copy of this paper in the Department of State files (file No. 740.00119 Council/6-3045), the word "China" has been deleted, and the following manuscript addition to this paragraph has been made by Yost: "If & when the Council deals with Asiatic affairs China shall become a full member."

³ Blanks in the original. Manuscript revisions in Matthews' copy of the Briefing Book make this sentence read as follows: "The Council shall meet at and its first meeting shall be held on"

a high-ranking deputy duly authorized and capable of carrying on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister. He will likewise be accompanied by a small staff of technical advisers suited to the problems concerned and to the organization of a joint secretariat.

[(3)] As its immediate important task, the Council would be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. (At a later date, if the five governments agree, the Council might⁴ be utilized for the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany when it is mutually agreed that a German government adequate to the purpose is functioning.) The Council should not be limited, however, to consideration of the foregoing problems. It may by common accord give its attention to such other European problems of an emergency character as it may feel it can properly take up.

(4) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a state not represented thereon, such state should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question. It is not intended, however, to fix hard and fast rules but rather to permit the Council to adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration. In some cases it might desire to hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested states. In other cases the Council might desire to convoke a formal conference of the states chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem. It is so authorized.

⁴ In Byrnes' copy the word "shall" has been substituted in pencil for "might". In Matthews' copy the parentheses surrounding this sentence and the word "treaty" have been stricken, and the following substitute phrase has been written in the margin: "settlement for Germany to be accepted [by] the government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established."

No. 229

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Elsley)*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

THE PEACE CONFERENCE

On two occasions during Mr. Hopkins' recent visit to Moscow, Marshal Stalin emphasized the importance of planning at once for the organization of the Peace Conference insofar as it relates to Europe. Mr. Hopkins reported to the President that Stalin was apparently thinking about a formal conference, for he referred to the Versailles Conference at which he said the Allies were not properly prepared, and he stated that was a mistake which should not be made again.

¹ Submitted to Leahy July 1 and subsequently forwarded to Truman.

Mr. Hopkins reported that Stalin will discuss arrangements for a Peace Conference at the meeting in Berlin.²

G. M. ELSEY

² Cf. document No. 147.

No. 230

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Joint Civil Affairs Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

TERMINATION OF EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION AND DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO NATIONAL COMMANDERS IN CHIEF

DISCUSSION

1. The European Advisory Commission was established for the purpose of making recommendations concerning European questions connected with the termination of hostilities. Hostilities have now terminated. In Germany the four national commanders have been designated as the representatives of their respective governments. Similar designations will shortly be made with respect to Austria.

2. During hostilities the European Advisory Commission was the one organization through which the four [*sic*] powers could regularly consult together on problems relating to Germany and Austria. That has ceased to be true of Germany and will shortly cease to be true of Austria. If the problems of military government in Germany and Austria are to be handled expeditiously it is essential that there should be no needless duplication of consultative agencies. The European Advisory Commission should, accordingly, cease forthwith to consider problems relating to the control of Germany and should deal with no problems concerning the control of Austria after the Allied administration is established there.

3. Experience in the European Advisory Commission has shown that a principal cause of delay in the solution of problems of pressing importance is the reluctance of the respective governments, and particularly of the Soviet Government, to delegate to their representa-

¹ This memorandum was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.

tives on the Commission broad authority to decide current questions. It is most important that the respective national commanders be vested with broad authority to decide the day-to-day questions of policy with which they will be confronted.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. *a.* It is recommended that agreement be sought that the jurisdiction of the European Advisory Commission with respect to problems concerning Germany shall terminate forthwith and, with respect to those concerning Austria, be terminated upon the establishment of the Allied administration in Austria.

b. It is recommended that the United States urge the broadest possible delegation of authority to the respective commanders in chief in Germany and Austria, and insist that on all matters, other than those involving the alteration or establishment of basic policy, such commanders must be empowered to act without advance reference of the questions to their governments.

No. 231

London Embassy Files—710 Tripartite Conference Berlin

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)*¹

SECRET

LONDON, July 8, 1945.

DEAR MR. EDEN: In connection with the first item of the suggested list of topics for discussion at the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of Government transmitted in my letter of July 7, 1945,² I have been requested to communicate to you the proposal enclosed herewith³ which the President plans to present to Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin at an early stage in their forthcoming conversations.

This document is being communicated in advance to the British and Soviet Governments in the belief that they may wish to be giving the matter some thought prior to the meeting.

Sincerely,

JOHN G. WINANT

¹ Harriman conveyed the same information to Molotov in note No. 384 of July 8 (Moscow Embassy Files).

² See document No. 189, footnote 1.

³ Except for minor editorial variations, the text enclosed is identical with the attachment to document No. 228.

No. 232

Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference

*Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Page)*¹

[Moscow,] July 11, 1945.

MEMORANDUM [OF] CONVERSATION

Present: Mr. W. A. Harriman, American Ambassador
 Mr. Edward Page, Jr., First Secretary of Embassy
 Mr. V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs
 of the U. S. S. R.
 Mr. Pavlov, Soviet Interpreter

Subject: Agenda for Forthcoming Berlin Meeting.

Mr. Molotov then referred to the first topic in Mr. Harriman's letter³ regarding procedure and machinery for peace negotiations. He said that it was evident that this question involved a general peace conference for Europe. According to the Ambassador's letter of July 8⁴ it was proposed that China should take part in the Council of Foreign Ministers which would study this question. He seemed to question the advisability of Chinese participation. He stated that there were many subjects which are absolutely new to the Chinese since they had not participated in discussions on European matters and were not members of the European Advisory Council [*Commission*]. He inquired whether the Ambassador could give him any additional information on such Chinese participation. The Ambassador stated that he had no information save what was included in his letter of July 7. The subject was a new one to him. He did not know the reason for including China. However, he assumed that since the German attack had world wide implications and since the Far Eastern countries had interests in Europe just like the European countries had interests in the Far East (although not so comprehensive) it appeared reasonable to expect China to participate in the European peace talks. In addition, China was one of the permanent members of the Security Council which would certainly deal with European questions. It would therefore be advisable for the Chinese member to be kept closely informed of European questions.

¹ Harriman sent a summary of the portion of this memorandum here printed to Grew in telegram No. 2523 of July 11 (file No. 740.0011 EW/7-1145) and the gist of this message was included in telegram No. 19 of July 12 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1245).

² For the paragraphs omitted here, see document No. 207.

³ Of July 7. See document No. 189, footnote 1.

⁴ See document No. 231, footnote 1.

The Ambassador inquired whether Mr. Molotov had made the inquiry concerning China because he did not fully understand all the considerations or because he was unfavorably disposed to Chinese participation.

Mr. Molotov said that he had made the inquiry because the inclusion of China in European talks had been unexpected. He said the question certainly needed further study and exchange of views. He stated that China should of course participate in the final peace conference.

No. 233

740.00119 EAC/7-1245

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 12, 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On the occasion of the meeting of heads of Governments you may find it useful to have a brief summary of the work of the European Advisory Commission over the last eighteen months, and some account of its accumulated experience. I believe you would find it helpful to read over the attached Summary Report.

Over many months I have felt that sooner or later the time would come to consider whether the European Advisory Commission had any further function to perform, since its work has been confined in practice to German and Austrian questions. It has always seemed to me that the Commission could not continue to work side by side with the Control Council which is to be set up to run Germany and which will have the widest knowledge and complete responsibility for what is done in Germany. It would not be practicable to have a separate body sitting in London and negotiating agreements on policies which are conducted on a day-to-day basis by the Control Council. I have assumed that the heads of Governments will wish, as soon as the Control Council has begun operation, to make provision for closing out the work of the European Advisory Commission, although they might wish to use the experience of the members of the Commission in carrying out your plan for a Council of Foreign Ministers.

I cannot submit my Summary Report on the work of the European Advisory Commission without expressing my appreciation for having been given the responsibility of taking part in a body concerned with coordination of Allied policies in a critical field of common concern.

Sincerely,

JOHN G. WINANT

[No. 233]

[Enclosure 1]

SECRET

[LONDON,] July 12, 1945.

THE WORK OF THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION
(JANUARY 1944—JULY 1945)

A SUMMARY REPORT

1. *Origins.*

One of the principal decisions of the Moscow Conference of October 1943 was to set up a European Advisory Commission to work on the principal political problems arising from the termination of the war in Europe.¹ At the time of the Teheran Conference the three heads of Governments appointed their representatives on the Commission, which held a first informal, organizing meeting on December 15, 1943, and its first formal meeting on January 14, 1944. In November 1944 the three Governments invited the French Provisional Government to join the Commission as a fourth member. Since its inception the E. A. C. has held 95 discussion meetings and 10 meetings for signature of agreements.

2. *Range of Responsibility.*

At the Moscow Conference the U. S. and Soviet Governments maintained that the E. A. C. should deal with problems arising from the surrender of the Axis countries in Europe. The U. K. Government urged that it should deal with any political problems arising out of the war in Europe, including problems of liberated countries. The terms of reference laid down for the E. A. C. were broad, but in practice the U. S. and Soviet views have prevailed, as the Commission has dealt almost exclusively with problems concerning Germany and Austria. The E. A. C. did substantial work on the terms of Bulgarian surrender, but did not deal with the surrender terms for Finland, Rumania and Hungary, which were negotiated in Moscow. The E. A. C. has not been authorized by Governments to consider problems of liberated areas.

3. *Method of Work.*

Under its terms of reference the E. A. C. was designed to be a recommending body. In practice it has been a negotiating rather than an advisory organ. Its discussions have been conducted, and its decisions reached, on the basis of detailed instructions from the Governments. None of the agreements recommended by it has been rejected or amended by the member-Governments.

Because the Commission has been a negotiating body its pace has varied. Speed of work has depended upon all three, later four, Gov-

¹ See Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 308.

ernments being prepared to negotiate on a particular subject at a particular time, and on their being willing to make the adjustments and mutual concessions necessary to reach an agreed policy. The Commission has had periods of intensive work, and other periods when, either through indifference on the part of some one of the Governments or because of its reluctance to undertake commitments at a particular time, the Commission was unable to reach decisions. The E. A. C. has never failed to meet when any one Government had any matter to bring forward.

In general, the U. K. Government has made the most sustained effort to make the E. A. C. a center for arriving at agreement on major policy toward Germany. The support given by the U. S. Government has been uneven, partly because of the difficulties of formulating, within the Government, a unified policy towards Germany. Since joining the E. A. C. on November 27, 1944, the French Delegation has shown a desire to facilitate four-Power agreement and to avoid raising issues which might impede the work of the E. A. C. The Soviet Delegation has at times worked hard and cooperatively to reach agreement on a limited series of subjects, but it has never shown the range of initiative of other Delegations. Its ability to negotiate effectively has been restricted by rigid instructions and by an apparent absence of instructions over several extended periods.

Continuous contact of the four Representatives has enabled them to consider informally a range of problems considerably wider than that of the agreements which have actually been formalized, and to acquaint their Governments with the views of the other Governments on many aspects of the treatment of Germany. Messages exchanged with the State Department number approximately nine hundred and fifty. Mutual confidence, built up over many months of face-to-face dealing, has facilitated the removal of misunderstandings which might otherwise have led to serious difficulties in the work of the Allied coalition. The E. A. C. has perhaps been as useful in the misunderstandings which it has forestalled or removed as in the actual agreements which it has drafted.²

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5. *Organization of the European Advisory Commission.*

The Commission consists of four Representatives, one appointed by each Government. Each Representative is assisted by Political, Military and other Advisers as directed by his Government. The U. S. Representative has had the assistance of a Political Adviser provided by the Department of State, and of Military, Naval and Air

² For extracts from paragraph 4, omitted here, see documents Nos. 405 and 415.

Advisers appointed by their respective Services. Final responsibility for the work of the U. S. Delegation rests with the Representative.

The E. A. C. has made use of a Secretariat, consisting of a Secretary-General and a small staff of interpreters and clerks, with its headquarters in Lancaster House, which is also the meeting-place of the Commission. Expenses, which have been negligible in amount, have been shared equally between the three, later four, Governments.

6. *Work of the U. S. Delegation.*

In addition to advising the U. S. Representative on matters under negotiation, the U. S. Joint Advisers have conducted a large amount of work in preparation for negotiation. In the absence of agreed directives from Washington concerning post-surrender policy toward Germany, the U. S. Joint Advisers surveyed the field in which Allied agreement would be useful in the immediate post-surrender period and prepared 36 draft directives, designed to provide agreed policy guidance to the Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany, and 5 draft agreements. After consideration by the appropriate authorities in Washington 24 draft directives and the 5 draft agreements were transmitted, with slight revisions, to the U. S. Representative, for circulation and negotiation in the Commission. In carrying on their work the Joint Advisers have held 76 formal meetings, many of which were also attended by U. S. civilian experts in London and by officers of the U. S. Control Groups for Germany and Austria, as the Advisers dealt with subjects of concern to them. In this work the Joint Advisers made full use of policy documents and studies made available to them by their respective Departments and Services. To assist in their work the Joint Advisers organized a Planning Committee, consisting of junior members of their staffs, which has held approximately 150 meetings. Through their initiative in the preparation of directives, the Joint Advisers helped to keep to the fore both in London and in Washington the need for developing a consistent U. S. policy for Germany.

Although the draft U. S. directives have not been negotiated in the E. A. C., principally because the Soviet Delegation, despite repeated promises and assurances, has never been instructed by its Government to proceed with their negotiation, they have met a number of important needs. Their circulation in the Commission has served to inform the other Allied Governments of U. S. policies toward Germany and has had a strong influence on the policies of those Governments. The draft directives also provided the U. S. Control Group for Germany with its first systematic guidance for preparatory planning and were incorporated, in large measure, in the General Directive for Germany, which, on instructions from Washington, was circulated to the E. A. C. for information, in May 1945.

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—A second enclosure, giving a statistical report on the work of the Commission, a list of documents signed, and a partial list of papers circulated, is not printed.]

No. 234

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹[Extract²]

SECRET

POTSDAM, July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, called this afternoon and discussed for two hours in a preliminary way a number of matters on the agenda of the Conference.³

1. *Council of Foreign Ministers.*

Sir Alexander expressed general agreement with our proposal for setting up a Council of Foreign Ministers to handle the peace settlement. He felt that this should not be first on the agenda and that it would be desirable to begin with German questions. He suggested that the Council would probably require a definite location for its Deputies and Staff, but that the Foreign Ministers might well meet in various capitals; presumably he considers London the best location for the Deputies and Secretariat.

To my suggestion that the European Advisory Commission should terminate its work shortly, in view of the establishment of the Control Council for Germany, Sir Alexander hinted that the EAC might be utilized for dealing with other than German problems, by broadening its terms of reference and perhaps making some changes of personnel.

I explained to Sir Alexander that we had felt at first that the best arrangement for dealing with European problems would be to have a council of four, including France; however, in view of the difficulties regarding French membership on the Reparation Commission we had come to feel it would be better to follow the model of the Security Council [of the United Nations], with its five members, since, more-

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 140, 218, 258, 319, 351, 379, 404, 470, 519, 635, 645, 678, and 708.

³ Cadogan was accompanied by J. E. Coulson, Acting Head of the Economic Relations Department of the Foreign Office, and William Hayter, Secretary General of the British Delegation to the Berlin Conference. The following United States officials were present: Dunn; Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton; Harriman; Joseph E. Davies (for the last part of the meeting only); and Philip E. Mosely, Political Adviser to the United States Representative on the European Advisory Commission.

over, the same five powers would later have to deal with Asiatic problems. Sir Alexander agreed that in view of the composition of the Security Council it was reasonable to include China in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

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JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

UNITED NATIONS
ADMISSION OF ITALY AND SPAIN

No. 235

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

We wish British concurrence with the principle that the United States and Great Britain should take the lead in bringing Italy back into international life without awaiting a definitive solution of Italy's status. As one example we favor Italy's being permitted to join the United Maritime Authority now, whereas the British have indicated the view that she should not be allowed to do so until she has signed a peace treaty. Italy should also be brought back into the International Labor Organization, whose Governing Body at its recent meeting in Montreal recommended favorable consideration of Italy's application by the general assembly next fall.

The question of Italy's relation to the World Security Organization should be clarified. At San Francisco the American view that Italy should be invited to attend the Conference was not pressed in order to avoid injecting any further complications into the discussions. In reply to our inquiry regarding British views on the subject, we were informed that the British in principle were sympathetic but that (a) the Soviets would probably insist on bringing in Rumania and Bulgaria if Italy entered while (b) British would demand that Portugal—who is a neutral and not a cobelligerent state—be brought in if Italy were. We believe that Italy should enter this world organization at the earliest possible date. It is therefore recommended that the United States request British concurrence in our intention, if and when Italy declares war on Japan, to support officially and publicly Italy's admission to the world security organization.

Steps of this kind need not prejudice Allied claims in the final settlement, and at the same time they would do much to raise Italian morale and strengthen the more moderate elements in Italy.

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

No. 236

740.0011 PW/7-645

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Grew)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Declaration of War against Japan

Participants: Italian Ambassador, Signor Alberto Tarchiani;
Under Secretary, Mr. Grew

The Italian Ambassador called on me this morning and took up with me the following matters: ¹

2. The Ambassador then read to me a secret paper ² concerning a declaration of war by Italy against Japan. He spoke of his talk with Mr. Phillips on this subject and said he knew that our Government favors such a step and that his own Government at a recent secret meeting had also expressed itself in favor of such a declaration of war. The Ambassador is aware that while such a declaration would be of especial interest to the United States nevertheless Sir Alexander Cadogan had stated that the British Government would interpose no objection to Italy's declaring war against Japan. The Ambassador assumed that the Soviet Government might have to be consulted but hoped that no objection would be raised by the Soviet Union. He said he thought the matter was very urgent and that his Government would be especially glad to have the proposed step approved prior to the meeting of the Big Three. I said I did not know whether this could be done, and that it might have to be discussed at that meeting but that in any case I would explore the matter at once and would let the Ambassador know as soon as we are in a position to give him further information on the subject.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

[Attachment 1]

SECRET

The Italian Ambassador has received instructions to ask for an audience with the President of the United States and to communicate to Mr. Truman, in a preliminary and confidential way, that the newly constituted Italian Government, in its recent secret meeting, has expressed itself in favor of the declaration of war against Japan.

¹ For the paragraph omitted here, see document No. 468.

² See the attachments, *infra*.

Such an initiative on the part of Italy intends to be, first of all, a gesture of solidarity towards the United States, a solidarity which would be concretely and actively evidenced through the effective participation of the fleet, aviation and a Corps of volunteers.

The initiative also corresponds to the political directives of democratic Italy to align herself against aggression and militarism, and to her desire to join the cause of the United Nations even when specific interests of Italy be not directly at stake.

The Ambassador has been directed by his Minister of Foreign Affairs³ to ask the Department of State to kindly see the possibility of giving some precise indications as far as the moment deemed most convenient and timely for the official announcement of the Italian declaration of war on Japan is concerned.

The Department of State will certainly appreciate that the Italian Government must be in a position to justify, at the proper time, its decision in front of public opinion, and to explain it, with clear and plausible reasons, as well as with motives of national interest.

The Ambassador has also been instructed to convey the deep feelings of gratitude of the Italian Government for the oral statements of encouragement and assurance made by the Department of State through Special Assistant Ambassador Phillips.

WASHINGTON, July 6th, 1945.

[Attachment 2]

SECRET

The Cabinet of the Italian Government has held, in the last days, a meeting in which took part all the Ministers leaders of the six parties forming the present Government. The Cabinet examined the Note of the Department of State of June 16th⁴ stating that the Government of the United States would welcome an Italian declaration of war on Japan, thus extending to the conflict with the common enemy in the Far East that solidarity with the United Nations which the

³ Alcide De Gasperi.

⁴ The text of the note referred to is as follows (file No. 740.0011 PW/6-1645):

"The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Italy and has the honor to refer to recent conversations between the Ambassador and officials of the Department on the desire of the Italian Government to declare war on Japan.

"It is requested that the Italian Government be informed that the Government of the United States would welcome an Italian declaration of war on Japan, thus extending to the conflict with the common enemy in the Far East that solidarity with the United Nations which the Italian Government and people have recently demonstrated in the struggle against the common enemy in Europe.

"In making this communication to the Italian Government, the Government of the United States wishes to make clear that such a declaration of war would involve no commitment on the part of the Allied Governments to provide resources or shipping for the prosecution by Italy of hostilities against Japan."

Italian Government and People have recently demonstrated in the struggle against the common enemy in Europe.

It appears that two Ministers have represented their fear that, recalling the Armistice Terms,⁵ some major or smaller Power could interfere with the Italian initiative. The said Ministers were therefore deeming it indispensable that some assurances in the matter were given to the Italian Government at least on the American side.

As far as the substance of the question is concerned, several Ministers have shared the opinion that Italy should give an effective contribution to the war within her possibilities (Navy, Air Forces, Corps of volunteers).

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1945.

⁵ Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2740.

No. 237

740.0011 PW/7-745

The Acting Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador (Tarchiani)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: With reference to our conversation of yesterday,¹ in which you told me of the decision of the Italian Government to declare war against Japan, I need not assure you that this news will be greeted with approval by the American people.

The time of the announcement of the declaration is of course a matter for decision by the Italian Government. The British, French, and Soviet Governments, which have already been informed of American approval of the Italian intention to declare war against Japan, have interposed no objection thereto, and the American Government naturally hopes that the announcement will be made at an early date.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

¹ See document No. 236.

No. 238

740.0011 P. W./7-945 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

ROME, July 9, 1945—4 p. m.

1898. I saw Prunas last evening and took occasion to inquire about his govt's intention to declare war on Japan. He said that after

¹ A summary of this message was included in telegram No. 12 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1045).

Tarchiani has reported US approval of Ital declaration of war against Japan, Council of Ministers had met. Most of the ministers, including the Socialists, were in favor of immediate and active Ital participation. Only the Communists were cool to this proposal and insisted that any Ital participation in the war in the Far East should be symbolic rather than actual. Since there was some difference of opinion among the ministers with regard to the timing and degree of Ital participation, it was decided to instruct Tarchiani to ask the US Govt when the declaration should take place (Depts 1128, July 7, 7 p. m.²) Prunas added that reports from the Ital Emb at Moscow indicated that the Soviets did not regard favorably an Italian declaration of war against Japan at this time.

I repeated Dept's statement to Tarchiani, namely that the question of timing was, of course, one for the Itals to decide, but that as far as my govt was concerned the sooner the declaration came the better we would be pleased. Prunas said that he had no idea what date the Council of Ministers would set for the announcement of the declaration of war.

KIRK

² Not printed. Cf. document No. 237.

No. 239

719.52/7-945

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[Extracts]

[WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: The Spanish Ambassador, Sr. Don Juan Francisco de Cárdenas;

Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew.

The Spanish Ambassador, Mr. de Cárdenas, called on me this afternoon and took up the following matters. . . .

.

2. The Ambassador then referred to the action taken with regard to Spain at the San Francisco Conference by which there had been placed on the record the understanding that membership in the world organization would not be open to states whose regimes were established with the help of military forces belonging to the states which have waged war against the United Nations as long as these

[No. 239]

regimes are in power.¹ The Ambassador asked if I was aware of some proposed action by Chile and Uruguay by which they would openly assert the application to Spain of this provision and whether Mr. Armour had recently made some statement on this subject in Madrid. I said I had no information regarding any such action by either Chile and Uruguay or by Armour. In this connection the Ambassador said that he was not speaking under instructions and only as from friend to friend.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

¹ The reference is to the following declaration by the Mexican Delegation at the Third Meeting of Commission I of the United Nations Conference on International Organization on June 19:

"It is the understanding of the Delegation of Mexico that paragraph 2 of Chapter III [of the Charter of the United Nations] cannot be applied to the states whose regimes have been established with the help of military forces belonging to the countries which have waged war against the United Nations, as long as those regimes are in power."

In presenting this declaration, which was adopted by Commission I, which exercised jurisdiction over questions of membership, the Mexican Delegate referred specifically to the Franco regime in Spain. In the course of the discussion of this declaration, Assistant Secretary of State James Clement Dunn made the following statement for the United States:

"The United States Delegation is in complete accord with the statement of interpretation made by the Delegation of Mexico and desires to associate itself with that declaration."

See *The United Nations Conference on International Organization: Selected Documents*, pp. 569-578.

No. 240

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1145: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 11, 1945.

16. Recommendation that we request British concurrence in our intention, if and when Italy declares war against Japan, to support officially and publicly Italy's admission in due course to world security organization is now before the President in papers prepared for Big Three meeting (See Italy: Topics on Which Discussion is Desired; III, Participation in World Organizations¹). Inasmuch as it now appears that Italy may declare war before Big Three meeting, and since effective value of American action both in US and abroad may depend to great extent upon prompt announcement thereof following Italian declaration, it is believed that we should proceed immediately with recommendation.

¹ Document No. 235.

If you agree, and President approves, instructions will be sent Winant to inform British Government and inquire if it is prepared to support American position.

[GREW]

No. 241

Truman Papers : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

[ON BOARD THE U. S. S. "AUGUSTA",]

12 July 1945.

MR-IN-35. Reference your MR-OUT-99 (State Department No. 16, 11 July).¹ I concur with your recommendation and approve your suggested approach to the British Government.

¹ Document No. 240.

No. 242

740.0011 PW/7-1445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1945—noon.

U. S. URGENT

5773. Ital Ambassador has informed Dept Italy has declared war against Japan and that declaration will be made public July 15. Dept therefore proposes to announce on July 17 this Govt's intention to support officially Italy's admission in due course to world security organization.

Inform Foreign Office urgently of Dept's intention and express hope that British Govt will support American position.

GREW

No. 243

740.0011 P. W./7-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 15, 1945—noon.

US URGENT

7144. Foreign Office given substance of Department's 5773, July 14¹ this morning.

WINANT

¹ Document No. 242.

[No. 243]

No. 244

740.0011 P. W./7-1545 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the
Acting Secretary of State*¹SECRET
US URGENT

LONDON, July 15, 1945—6 p. m.

7146. We were called to FonOff this afternoon by Harvey who was considerably disturbed about Department's proposed announcement July 17 re Italy and World Security Organization. (Re Department's 5773, July 14² and Embassy's 7144, July 15³). British Embassy Washington is being instructed to approach Department and request announcement be postponed until the question of future status of Italy can be discussed at Big Three meeting.

Harvey felt question of admittance of Italy to World Security Organization was tied up with peace treaty and said that British delegation to Berlin conference was thoroughly briefed on this subject and had hoped to discuss it there after which a three power declaration regarding future of Italy could be made. FonOff, according to Harvey, had tried to keep in step with Department on all matters affecting Italy but it felt in this case such short notice had been given that it would be impossible. Harvey pointed out that Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary both in Berlin and with best will in world FonOff unable to make decision on this matter in time available. Question is being referred to Mr Eden with request he discuss matter with Mr Byrnes and in meantime Harvey strongly urged that announcement be postponed.

WINANT

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 35 of July 16 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1645). See also vol. II, document No. 723.

² Document No. 242.

³ Document No. 243.

No. 245

865.01/7-1545 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

PLAIN

ROME, July 15, 1945.

1987. The following is a translation of article entitled "the substance of Parri-Kostilev meeting: USSR godfather to Italy for its admission to the United Nations" which appeared in *Il Secolo* July 13 a Rome newspaper.

¹ Text repeated *in extenso* in telegram No. 37 of July 17 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 865.01/7-1745).

“If our information is correct and we have good reason to so believe, during the recent meeting between the President of the Council of Ministers Ferruccio Parri and the Soviet Ambassador Kostilev the latter declared in the name of his Government that for the imminent Big Three Potsdam meeting Russia was to first take the initiative and will support unconditionally the admission of Italy among the United Nations. The Soviet Ambassador added that as in January 1944 when Russia was the first to resume regular diplomatic relations with the Italian democracy with the exchange of Ambassadors so now Russia takes the initiative for the admission of Italy among the United Nations.

We can also add from authoritative sources that Russia will do everything possible to assist in the immediate resumption of economic relations between Italy and Poland; the latter in normal times furnished Italy with coal from Polish Silesia lumber, woodpulp and cellulose which were shipped from Gdynia. It is also anticipated that the Moscow Government will facilitate the resumption of trade with Italy particularly by supplying coal from the Donetz basin the nearest to Italy, the quality of which is equal to the best English and American coal”.

Repeat to Treasury for Tasca.

KIRK

**POSSIBLE TRUSTEESHIP FOR ITALIAN COLONIAL TERRITORIES
AND KOREA**

No. 246

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

ITALY: TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

LIBYA

a. The Government of the United States does not propose a program for the disposition of Libya. Nevertheless this Government would concur and would support any one of the following solutions, listed in order of preference, if proposed by another Government:

1. *Return of the whole of Libya to Italian sovereignty, subject to such general measures of demilitarization as are devised for Italy;*
2. *Partition of Libya into its historic parts, Tripolitania to be retained under Italian sovereignty, Cyrenaica to be established as an autonomous Senussi Amirate under Egyptian or British trusteeship;*
3. *Partition of Libya, Tripolitania to be placed under International Trusteeship exercised by Italy, Cyrenaica to be established as an autonomous Senussi Amirate under Egyptian or British Trusteeship.*

[No. 246]

b. Basic data.

Libya has an area of 680,000 square miles, but only about 2.5 percent of the area is cultivable. It is a poor agricultural and pastoral country with practically no natural resources.

Libya was taken from Turkey in 1911–1912, but during the first World War the Italians were driven back into the coastal towns by the Turks and Arabs. The pacification of the country began in 1922 and was practically completed in 1932 after a series of bitter campaigns against the Senussi of Cyrenaica. In 1939 the four coastal provinces Tripoli, Misurata, Bengasi, and Derna were declared to be integral parts of Italy.

In 1939 the total population was 878,650 of whom 101,986 were Italians. These were distributed as follows:

Tripoli.....	56,214
Misurata.....	9,713
Bengasi.....	26,419
Derna.....	9,441
Sahara territory.....	199
	101,986

The provinces Tripoli and Misurata correspond roughly to the historic Tripolitania and maintained about two-thirds (65,927) of the Italian population. Although most of the Italian population was concentrated in the coastal towns, about 30,000 persons had been established as agricultural colonists, chiefly through the colonization project begun in 1937. A great number of Italian colonists appear to have abandoned their holdings in Cyrenaica with the advance of the British armies, but in Tripolitania large numbers apparently have remained. Some of the Italian settlers have been repatriated to Italy, increasing the burdens of the Italian Government.

Libya is strategically important for control of the central Mediterranean because of its ports and air fields.

On January 8, 1942, Mr. Eden stated: "His Majesty's Government are determined that at the end of the war the Senussis in Cyrenaica will in no circumstances again fall under Italian domination."¹

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

¹ See *Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report*, 5th Series, vol. 377, col. 78. Concerning later statements by Eden with respect to the Italian colonies, see vol. II, p. 239.

No. 247

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

ITALY: TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

ITALIAN SOMALILAND (SOMALI)

a. *Italian Somaliland, together with French and British Somaliland, should be placed under International Trusteeship.* A feasible alternative would be to place *Italian and British Somalilands under International Trusteeship* while leaving French Somaliland under French control, but with *arrangements for a genuinely free port at Jibuti.*

b. The Italian colony of Somaliland had an area in 1931 of 194,000 square miles, a total population of 1,021,572 persons most of whom were Somalis. There were at that time 1,668 Europeans, all but 37 being Italians.

The Italian colony was begun in the 1880s and in 1936, after the conquest of Ethiopia, was incorporated as a "government" of Italian East Africa. The area is unsuited for European colonization, but it has a certain strategic significance because of its location on the Indian Ocean near the entrance to the Red Sea.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

No. 248

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

ITALY: TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

ERITREA

a. The Government of the United States favors the *creation of an international Trusteeship over the area embraced within the former Italian colony of Eritrea.*

b. *Basic data*

The Italian colony of Eritrea began with the purchase of Assab in 1869 and reached its approximate modern boundaries during the 1880s. In the periods 1893-1896 and 1935-1936 the colony served as the basis for attacks against Ethiopia.

In 1931 it had an area of 46,000 square miles and a total population of 600,000 of whom 4,600 were Europeans. In 1936 after the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, Eritrea was incorporated as a "government" of Italian East Africa. A considerable number of Italians went to

[No. 248]

East Africa after this conquest, but most of the settlers in Ethiopia were driven out during the war. In 1943 it was reported that there was a total of 48,718 Italians in Eritrea.

Eritrea in itself did not attract colonists, and the lowlands are not suitable for European settlers. Ethiopia has certain vague historic claims to the region which, together with French Somaliland, blocks her from access to the sea. Outright cession to Ethiopia, however, might jeopardize the Italian population and appear as a violation of the Atlantic Charter.¹

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

¹ Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603.

No. 249

740.0011 PW/7-645

*The Italian Ambassador (Tarchiani) to President Truman*¹

[Extract²]

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TRUMAN PRESIDENT OF THE U. S. A. ON THE POSITION, WISHES AND HOPES OF ITALY

4. a) Italy has willingly abandoned the Fascist dream of the recent colonial empire in East Africa, where, however, she has spent more than 36 billion lire at the pre-war value to establish and develop modern civilized systems.

b) Libya—as Algeria for France—is part of the national territory with the same administration of the Italian metropolitan provinces.

c) Eritrea and Somaliland are the two oldest Italian colonies—established in the second half of the Nineteenth Century—in which Italian capital and work have created, with long meritorious efforts, means and methods of civilization to the great advantage of the natives, whose feelings are wholeheartedly in favor of the continuance of Italian administration. Italy trusts that in giving all the cooperation and the guarantees which may be requested, her well-established rights will be recognized under such a form that may not injure her modest African patrimony and her national dignity at this moment of distress.

In examining the Italian colonial questions from a general point of view, the following considerations ought to be kept in mind.

¹ Handed to Grew on July 6 for transmittal to Truman. See document No. 468.

² For the other paragraphs of this memorandum, see the subattachment to document No. 468.

Italy, whose population reaches nearly 46 million inhabitants (representing about one third of the entire population of continental United States) has a metropolitan territory, for a considerable extent mountainous and barren, of nearly 120,000 square miles (that is, less than 1/25th of the continental area of the United States). The yearly increase in population is about 400,000. Italy is a poor country, lacking all essential raw materials. Her population is very thrifty. These factors have induced tens of thousands of Italian pioneers to settle in Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, Eritrea and Somaliland, where, in spite of the desert region and difficult local conditions, they have already carried out an extensive land rehabilitation through the constant effort of their hard work.

It is because of the above-mentioned factors that these colonies are considered by the Italian people as an essential part of their national territory.

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1945.

No. 250

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Elsey)*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

KOREA

The Declaration issued at Cairo in November [on December 1,] 1943 by Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek said, in part:

["]The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. . . . The aforesaid Three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." ²

There was no reference to Korea in Map Room messages or documents until the Yalta Conference. On 8 February 1945, during a discussion on the Far East when Churchill was not present,³ President Roosevelt explained to Marshal Stalin his intentions with regard to Korea.

The President said he had in mind for Korea a trusteeship composed of a Soviet, an American and a Chinese representative. He felt the trusteeship might last from 20 to 30 years. Marshal Stalin said the shorter the trusteeship period the better, and he expressed approval

¹ Submitted to Leahy July 1 and subsequently forwarded to Truman.

² Full text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 393.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 770.

when the President said foreign troops would not be stationed in Korea.

President Roosevelt said he did not feel it was necessary to invite the British to participate in the Korean trusteeship, except that they would probably resent their exclusion. Stalin replied that British resentment would be strong, and his opinion was that the British should be invited.

Korea was not discussed again at Yalta, nor was the subject pursued in Map Room messages.

When Mr. Hopkins arrived in Moscow, he found Stalin's views had not changed and he reported to President Truman on 29 May that Stalin agreed to a trusteeship for Korea under China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States.⁴

On the basis of this report, the President informed Chiang on 15 June that the U. S. S. R., Great Britain and the United States agree to a Four-Power Trusteeship for Korea.⁵

G. M. ELSEY

⁴ For the text of the telegraphic report referred to, see "The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945" (Washington, Department of Defense, processed, 1955), p. 72; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 902. Cf. document No. 26.

⁵ See Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 269.

No. 251

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper ¹

[Extract ²]

TOP SECRET

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF JAPAN AND POLICY TOWARD LIBERATED AREAS IN THE FAR EAST IN RELATION TO UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

.

II. SOVIET SUPPORT OF THE CAIRO DECLARATION

A. *Minimum objective:* To obtain (1) the adherence of the Soviet Government to the Cairo Declaration, . . .

The adherence of the Soviet Government would give the support of that Government to the important provisions in the Declaration . . . that Korea in due course shall be free and independent.

¹ Annex 3 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² For the full text of this section of the briefing paper, see document No. 607. For other extracts from this paper, see documents Nos. 574 and 589.

The agreement would prevent unilateral action by any of the three states to establish a "friendly" government in any of the territories under consideration.

B. *Maximum objective*: To obtain an agreement among the three powers that, with China's anticipated cooperation, they will jointly support whatever measures appear best adapted to develop in Korea a strong, democratic, independent nation.³

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

³ In another version of this paper (undated) in the Department of State files (file No. 740.00119 Council/6-3045), the following language is used with respect to Korea:

"It is also proposed that [the] three powers enter into an agreement that they will consult in advance among themselves and with China on all matters relating to the implementation of the territorial dispositions provided under that Declaration. Such an agreement would be especially important in reaching a successful solution of the post-war problems of Korea. The interest of the three powers and China in Korea, the probable inability of the Koreans themselves to establish a satisfactory government immediately following liberation, and the commitment as to Korea in the Cairo Declaration make it evident that it would be to the interest of each of the States concerned that they consult among themselves as to the measures which may need to be taken, such as the possible creation of an interim administration in Korea, to assist the Korean people in the early establishment of a free and independent state."

No. 252

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

INTERIM ADMINISTRATION FOR KOREA AND POSSIBLE SOVIET ATTITUDES

NEED FOR JOINT ACTION

Joint action in connection with an interim international supervisory administration for Korea is both important and necessary for the following reasons:

- (1) China and the Soviet Union are contiguous to Korea and have had a traditional interest in Korean affairs;
- (2) The United States, the United Kingdom and China have stated in the Cairo Declaration that they "are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent";
- (3) It is recommended by the Department of State that there should be Allied representation in the military government in Korea; and
- (4) If Korea were to be designated as a trust area to be placed under the trusteeship of a single power, the selection of any power as trustee would be extremely difficult and might cause serious international consequences.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is the opinion of the Department of State that, in view of the international character of the problems of Korea and of the probable inability of the Koreans to govern themselves immediately following liberation:

(1) Some form of interim international supervisory administration or trusteeship should be established for Korea either under the authority of the proposed international organization or independently of it.

(2) The United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China should be included in any such administration.

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

[Appendix]

TOP SECRET

[MEMORANDUM]

I. ADVANTAGES OF AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION

The establishment of an interim international supervisory administration or trusteeship for Korea, to function after the termination of military government and until such time as the Koreans are able to govern themselves, would make possible the preparation of the Korean people for the responsibilities and privileges which will come with independence. Qualified Koreans could be used in the employ of the administration and could progressively turn over the functions of government to the Koreans themselves. Furthermore, the establishment of such an administration would make possible the early transfer of the functions of military government to the administration and hence shorten the period of military government. Finally, it would allow those powers most vitally interested in the future of Korea to share in the temporary supervision over Korean affairs and it would lessen the international friction that might develop if this supervision were left to a single power.

II. RELATIONSHIP WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The draft charter of the United Nations provides that the trusteeship system is applicable to "territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of this war" such as Korea, and that a single state or the United Nations' organization itself should be designated to exercise the administration of a trust territory. Consequently, if

joint action is to be taken in connection with an interim government for Korea, decision must be reached as to whether Korea is to be designated as a trust area and placed under the administration of the United Nations' organization itself or whether a special interim supervisory administration is established for Korea.

III. POSITION OF SOVIET UNION

If an interim administration for Korea is established independently of the projected international organization, the United States, the United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union would naturally wish to take an active part in such an administration. The position of the Soviet Union in the Far East is such that it would seem advisable to have Soviet representation on an interim supervisory administration regardless of whether or not the Soviet Union enters the war against Japan.

The attitude of the Soviet Union toward an interim administration for Korea is not known, but it is possible that it will make strong demands that it have a leading part in the control of Korean affairs. If such demands required the establishment of an administrative authority in which powers other than the Soviet Union had only a nominal voice, it might be advisable to designate Korea as a trust area and to place it under the authority of the United Nations' organization itself.

IV. STATUS OF STUDIES ON KOREA

The studies on problems of post-war Korea undertaken by the Department of State and the British and Chinese Foreign Offices have not yet progressed far enough to enable the Department to make recommendations on either the exact structure of any interim international supervisory authority for Korea, or the time when Korea should be granted independence. However, it is the view of the Department that an agreement should be reached at an early date among the principal interested powers on the question of whether an interim international supervisory authority is to be established for Korea and if so what powers are to be represented thereon in order to avoid the possibility of an extended period of occupation and to prevent an unnecessary postponement of Korean independence.

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

No. 253

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

POST-WAR GOVERNMENT OF KOREA

TYPES OF POST-WAR GOVERNMENT

It is envisaged that the post-war government of Korea will be divided into three stages, and [an] Allied Military Government, an interim international supervisory administration and a free and independent Korea.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *Allied Military Government*

The Department of State has recommended that with the completion of military operations in Korea there should be, so far as practicable, Allied representation in the army of occupation and in military government in Korea.

2. *Interim International Supervisory Administration*

The Department has recommended that an interim international supervisory administration for Korea be established to succeed Allied Military Government in Korea and to function until such time as the Koreans are able to govern themselves.

3. *A Free and Independent Korea*

The United States, the United Kingdom and China have stated in the Cairo Declaration that they "are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent". This pledge implies that Korea shall be completely free and independent following the termination of the functions of any interim international supervisory authority for Korea.

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

No. 254

Truman Papers

*Note by the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)*¹

[Undated.]

KOREA

Recommend a four power agreement that upon the defeat of Japan Korea be placed under a trusteeship composed of China, Great Britain, the Soviet Republic [sic], and the United States for

¹ Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned.

so long a time as is necessary for it to demonstrate, and until it shall have demonstrated, its capacity to govern itself as a free and independent sovereign state.

OFFICERS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

No. 255

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible discussion at meeting between the President, Churchill and Stalin of the selection of officers of the Preparatory Commission

I. BACKGROUND

In the brief initial meeting of the Preparatory Commission at San Francisco¹ it was agreed that the choice of officers of the Preparatory Commission and of its Executive Committee would be left open for subsequent determination.

The evening before the initial meeting of the Preparatory Commission our representative for that particular meeting, Dr. Pasvolsky, met with Mr. Jebb, the British representative, and Ambassador Gromyko, the Soviet representative. Dr. Pasvolsky and Mr. Jebb expressed the opinion that the question of filling the post of Chairman of the Executive Committee and the post of Executive Secretary of the Commission should be settled at the forthcoming meeting of the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. Ambassador Gromyko appeared to agree with this opinion. In view of the fact that it is hoped that the Executive Committee can have its first meeting in London during the first week of August, it is desirable to have these two questions settled promptly and your forthcoming meeting with Churchill and Stalin seems to offer the best opportunity for a prompt settlement of the matter.

From statements made by Ambassador Gromyko at San Francisco, it would appear that the Soviet Government attaches considerable importance to the choice of Chairman of the Executive Committee. It appears likely that the Soviet position in this matter will be first to ask that its representative on the Executive Committee be the Chairman of the Committee and as a second choice to propose that,

¹ Held June 27, 1945. See *The United Nations Conference on International Organization: Selected Documents*, p. 987.

following the procedure adopted with respect to the presidency of the San Francisco Conference, the position of Chairman be held in rotation by the representatives of the Big Five (China, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States).

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

I believe that our own position in this matter should be as follows:

1. The Executive Secretary of the Commission should clearly be a British national in as much as effective discharge of the Secretariat's functions will require ability to call upon the resources of the British Government and of various private British institutions.

2. I believe that we should oppose so far as possible the principle of rotation among the Big Five of the office of Chairman of the Executive Committee. We should be prepared to support the British Government if it desires to press for having the British representative as Chairman.

3. Our next choice, which may be unpalatable to the British, should be to let the Soviets have the Chairmanship, in order to avoid the principle of rotation. In this connection it should be noted that the Commission, acting through the Executive Committee, will almost certainly have to create a number of subcommittees or similar organs to specialize on various aspects of the Commission's duties. The chairmanships of these subcommittees might perhaps be allocated among the members of the Big Five in such a way as to make more palatable the selection of the British or the Soviet representative as the Chairman of the Executive Committee without rotation.

4. If, as appears likely, the British do not make much of an effort to obtain the chairmanship and oppose the Soviet representative being chairman, they are likely to propose instead that this position be held in rotation by representatives of the Big Five. We should oppose this because of the aspect of great power domination which would be inevitable. Such a solution would be especially undesirable from the point of view of precedent as it will affect the choice of the President of the Security Council of the Organization. It would be preferable from our point of view for rotation to be among all fourteen members of the Executive Committee.

The question of the selection of the President of the Preparatory Commission as a whole will probably not arise at your meeting. It was agreed at San Francisco that this question could be left until the first business session of the full Commission, which will not occur for several months. My present feeling is that it might be wise to select a representative of one of the smaller powers for this position. You may wish to bear this possibility in mind in the discussions which are likely to arise with respect to the chairmanship of the Executive Committee.

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

EUROPEAN QUESTIONS

GENERAL EUROPEAN QUESTIONS

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE YALTA DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE; FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN EASTERN EUROPE

No. 256

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Department of State Memorandum

[Extract ¹]

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

I. PROPOSED ITEMS FOR THE AGENDA

-
4. *Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe* ² *in the Treatment of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Greece* (see Annexes 4 and 5 ³)

It is recommended:

(a) in regard to Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary

(1) That the three Allied Governments agree in principle to the reorganization of the present governments in Rumania and Bulgaria, and should it become necessary, in Hungary, and to the postponement of diplomatic recognition and the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries until such reorganization has taken place.

(2) That provision be made for tripartite consultation (later to include French representatives) to work out any procedures which may be necessary for the reorganization of the governments to include representatives of all significant democratic elements, with a view to the early holding of free and unfettered elections.

(3) That the three Allied Governments consider how best to assist the local governments in the holding of such elections, bearing in mind that while it may be preferable to have the actual conduct of elections in the hands of the local governments themselves rather

¹ For the full text of this memorandum, see the attachment to document No. 177.

² See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

³ Documents Nos. 285 and 443, respectively. Concerning Poland and Yugoslavia, which were the subject of separate declarations at the Yalta Conference, see documents Nos. 483, 551, and 552.

than in those of Allied representatives, there must be adequate assurances that all democratic elements will have the opportunity to present candidates and that the voting will be in fact free.

(b) in regard to Greece

That, pursuant to a joint Anglo-U. S. approach in regard to Allied supervision of Greek elections which is being made to the Greek Government before the Big Three meeting, the U. S. Government propose to Great Britain and the Soviet Union at the meeting that the three Governments, possibly with the participation of France, send observers to Greece to supervise the elections to be held later this year.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

No. 257

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹

TOP SECRET

ADMISSION OF AMERICAN PRESS CORRESPONDENTS INTO EASTERN EUROPE

American press correspondents have found it practically impossible to report news from, or even to enter, the countries of eastern Europe liberated from German control by the Soviet armies. A consistent policy of excluding foreign journalists has been followed by Soviet military authorities in "operational" areas, which until Germany's surrender included eastern Germany, Poland, Austria, and most of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and by the Allied (Soviet) Control Commissions in the three former satellite states. In the United Nations with governments recognized by us (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) the situation is somewhat better; correspondents have been able to get into Yugoslavia, after delays in getting clearance, but military-political censorship has been so strict as to make it impossible to send out fair and adequate reports on the course of events; a few correspondents have been to Prague, but have had to file their stories from outside the country, and no regular system for having American journalists operate in Czechoslovakia on a permanent basis has been established. In Allied-controlled and liberated areas of Western Europe, on the other hand, Soviet newsmen have been allowed the same freedom enjoyed by American and British correspondents.

The Department has taken the position that American correspondents should be granted every reasonable facility for reporting to the

¹ Annex 8 to the attachment to document No. 177.

American people events in this area. We have so informed the Soviet Government and have presented in Moscow the names of those correspondents who desired to go there. We have complied with the requirements for "clearance" established by the Control Commissions in the ex-satellite states. The Soviet Government has not replied to our approaches in Moscow, and the Control Commissions have either refused or taken no action on all applications made to them since last December. The Soviet Government has arranged a few conducted tours to specific points in eastern Europe (e. g. to the Majdanek concentration camp in Poland and to pro-Soviet celebrations in Cluj and Bucharest in Rumania), and one or two have been able to get into the Balkan countries by their own devices, chiefly in the period before the Russians were able to establish strict control; it is from these men, filing their stories from Istanbul, Cairo and other points outside the Soviet-controlled area, that the American public has had its few glimpses of what is going on in eastern Europe. Its regular diet of news comes from Soviet sources.

A strong stand by the United States Government on this question is justified not only by our belief in the principle of the fullest possible freedom of information but also because our effort to bring about the establishment of more representative governments in eastern Europe is hampered by the American public's lack of knowledge of developments there. If the United States is to be in a position to exert its influence in this direction, it must have the full backing and understanding of the American people, who can be properly and adequately informed only by our press and radio, since it is not advisable to give out officially information of this kind. With the spotlight trained on these areas through the stories of American correspondents, the Soviet Government might be constrained to modify some of its more drastic policies and to become more amenable to our suggestions for the establishment of more representative regimes in the countries concerned.

American press circles have sufficient information to know that important events are taking place in the Soviet-controlled countries and have urged the Department to obtain authorization for their representatives to go there. Our efforts to date having been uniformly unsuccessful, it is recommended that an earnest and firm request be made to Marshal Stalin to lift the "news blackout" in eastern Europe. It could be stated that, in view of the end of hostilities in Europe, there is no good reason for the exclusion of American correspondents from this area or for the continuance of censorship of press dispatches from these countries, and that maintenance of the present "blackout" would not be understood by the American people. In the event of a refusal of this request, we should make it clear to the

Soviet Government that we may be obliged to inform the American press that the Soviet Government insists on excluding American correspondents from Eastern Europe despite our earnest and firm requests, from which the press will undoubtedly conclude that the situation there is such that the Soviet authorities do not wish it brought to the attention of American and world opinion. Should the Soviet Government not refuse our request directly but endeavor to put the onus on the respective governments of the countries of Eastern Europe, we should seek Soviet agreement in principle to our position and later exert pressure on those governments to permit the entry of American journalists and to grant them the necessary facilities.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

No. 258

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹

[Extracts²]

SECRET

POTSDAM, July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, called this afternoon and discussed for two hours in a preliminary way a number of matters on the agenda of the Conference.³

15. *Yalta Declaration on Liberated Areas.*

Sir Alexander felt that we had more faith in the Declaration than he, but said the U. K. Delegation would "come along behind us" in any effort to secure its implementation. In justifying his government's preference for the conclusion of peace treaties, Sir Alexander explained that, contrary to our situation with regard to Italy, his government cannot resume diplomatic relations with a country with which it is at war.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 140, 218, 234, 319, 351, 379, 404, 470, 519, 635, 645, 678, and 708.

³ For a list of persons present at this meeting, see document No. 234, footnote 3.

INLAND WATERWAYS

No. 259

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹[Extract²]

TOP SECRET

EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENTS

I. GERMANY

. . . We are opposed to revision of the Danish-German frontier unless such action is considered necessary in connection with a possible internationalization of the Kiel Canal.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

¹ Annex 13 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² For other extracts from this paper, see documents Nos. 398 and 509.

No. 260

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper[Extracts¹]

TOP SECRET

RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS
RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that we endeavor to obtain agreement from the Soviet Government to participate fully in . . . the European Central Inland Transport Organization (ECITO), . . . including designation of representatives to cooperate in the day-to-day activities of these organizations.

DISCUSSION

. . . Principally due to disagreement on the issue of Polish representation, the Soviets have not participated in recent discussions concerning the ECITO. Their delegation in London, however, has informally indicated that the present agreement² has substantially met the objections which they had to earlier drafts. . . .

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1945.

¹ For the full text of this paper, see document No. 525. The recommendation here printed also appears in substantially the same language in document No. 524.

² For the text of the agreement as signed on September 27, 1945, see Executive Agreement Series No. 494; 59 Stat. (2) 1740.

[No. 260]

No. 261

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Elsey)*¹

[Undated.]

FREE USE OF RHINE AND DANUBE RIVERS

There has been no reference to the free use of the Rhine and Danube Rivers in President Roosevelt's and President Truman's messages and papers in the Map Room.

G. M. ELSEY

¹ Submitted to Leahy July 1 and subsequently forwarded to Truman.

No. 262

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Elsey)*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

CANALS

SUEZ—PANAMA—KIEL

There has been no reference to the free use of the Suez and Panama Canals in President Roosevelt's and President Truman's messages and papers in the Map Room.

Churchill reported to President Roosevelt, following his meeting with Stalin in Moscow in October 1944, that Stalin wanted the internationalization of the Kiel Canal and that he agreed with Stalin.² Churchill gave no details of his conversations with Stalin on Kiel. The subject was not discussed at Yalta and has not been mentioned since in President Roosevelt's or President Truman's messages.

G. M. ELSEY

¹ Submitted to Leahy July 1 and subsequently forwarded to Truman.

² See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 160.

No. 263

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL REGIME WITH RESPECT TO ENTRANCES TO THE BALTIC

The Baltic Sea possesses three sea entrances, namely, the White Sea route, the Kiel Canal and the Skagerrak-Kattegat route.

B. KIEL CANAL

The Kiel Canal, which was completed in 1895, was constructed with two objectives in mind; (1) to permit the German fleet to move rapidly from the North Sea to the Baltic or vice versa to meet threats arising to the security of the Reich, and (2) to provide a shorter and safer route than via the Skagerrak for commercial traffic between the Baltic and North Seas.

Prior to 1920, the Canal was open to navigation by foreign vessels without treaty arrangements or guarantees. Foreign vessels using the Canal were subject to such navigation customs and police regulations as the German Government saw fit to enforce. By ordinance, foreign warships were admitted toll free, but all merchant vessels were required to pay tolls designed to cover the costs of administration, upkeep, improvements and amortization of the original investment. Regulations and tolls were changeable at will by the German Government, without advance notice. No assurance was given to foreign powers that the Canal would be open in time of war as in time of peace. No promise was requested of others that belligerents refrain from acts of war against or within the Canal. No "neutralization" rules were promulgated. Hence, the Canal was neither internationalized nor neutralized. It was administered by the German Government and protected by the German Government [*sic*] and protected by the German Army and Navy without restriction as to militarization or fortification.

The Versailles Treaty introduced a fundamental change in the status of the Canal.¹ Although administration was left in German hands, the freedom of German control was limited in various ways.

Germany was required to maintain the Canal and its approaches "free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality". She was obligated

¹ See articles 380-386 of the Treaty of Versailles, signed June 28, 1919, *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, pp. 689-691.

to accord equality of treatment to the nationals, property and vessels of all nations. Germany was constrained to place no impediment on the movement of persons and vessels other than those arising out of police, customs, sanitary and immigration regulations. The Treaty stipulated that all regulations must be "reasonable and uniform and must not unnecessarily impede traffic". Charges over and above those intended to cover "in an equitable manner" the cost of maintaining the Canal in a navigable condition or of improving it or "to meet expenses incurred in the interests of navigation", were prohibited. Germany was bound to maintain the Canal in good condition of navigation and to remove all dangers to navigation. At the same time, she was required to refrain from any "works" which might impede navigation.

In addition to these provisions, the Versailles Treaty specified that all fortifications should be abolished in an area extending north from the 54th parallel of latitude to the German-Danish border and east from the 9th degree of East Longitude to the Baltic.² Although it had originally been proposed to prohibit all fortifications within 30 miles of the Elbe River and of the Kiel Canal, the lines were drawn in such a manner that the western approach to the Canal and the port of Brunsbüttelkoog were actually left out of the demilitarized zone, thereby leaving Germany free to fortify this approach and the Brunsbüttel locks. Although the Kiel Canal was thus "internationalized", it was not "neutralized". No rules of "neutrality" comparable to those found in the Convention of Constantinople³ for the Suez Canal and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty⁴ for the Panama Canal were incorporated in the Versailles Treaty for the Kiel Canal. Germany was thus left full right to close the Canal to her enemies and to defend it against attack.

During the Russo-Polish War in 1921, the German Government, which was neutral, forbade the passage of two foreign vessels loaded with contraband of war destined for Poland on the grounds that as the Treaty left German sovereignty intact regarding the operation of the Canal, the German Government was within her rights in applying such neutrality regulations as were deemed necessary to protect the Reich. This decision was protested at the Conference of Ambassadors and was referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice under the name of the *Wimbledon* case. The court ruled

² See article 195 of the Treaty of Versailles, *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, p. 350.

³ Signed October 29, 1888. Text in *The Suez Canal Problem, July 26-September 22, 1956* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1956; Department of State publication No. 6392), p. 16. Text of the substantive provisions also in John Bassett Moore, *A Digest of International Law* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1906), vol. III, p. 264.

⁴ Signed at Washington, November 18, 1901 (Treaty Series No. 401; 32 Stat. (2) 1903).

that the German Government did not possess authority to refuse passage to vessels of commerce at peace with Germany irrespective of the nature of their cargoes.⁵

On November 14, 1936, the German Government denounced Part XII of the Treaty of Versailles.⁶ As a result, the Kiel Canal in so far as Germany was concerned again became what it had been prior to 1919, namely, a national waterway completely subject to the jurisdiction of the Reich.

Although the Kiel Canal has undoubtedly been of greater value to Germany than to any other state, the number of foreign vessels which have made use of this route prove that the Canal has international usefulness as well and that other nations have a very real interest in freedom of transit through it.

There are three possible solutions to the question of the future status of the Kiel Canal (the restoration of full German sovereignty over the Canal on the same basis as that existing prior to 1920 and subsequent to 1936, is obviously out of the question).

The first solution would involve an internationalization but not neutralization of the Canal thereby reverting to the status existent from 1920 to 1936. Should this be done, it would be advisable to modify the provisions contained in the Versailles Treaty so as to restrict still further the construction of fortifications.

The second possible solution would involve the extension southward of the Danish frontier to include the Kiel Canal. This could be partially justified on historic grounds, would deprive Germany of an important strategic waterway and would give the northern European States a continuing interest in preventing the military resurgence of Germany. If the solution were supplemented by international agreements with Denmark regarding the use and protection of the Kiel Canal, it would constitute an important link in a chain of possible provisions aimed at depriving Germany of the opportunity for future military aggression. This solution, however, might be opposed by Denmark as constituting an invitation to Germany to repeat the aggression of 1864, and as being a threat to the internal social and political stability of the Danish state.

The third and preferred solution relates to the establishment of an international zone extending for say ten miles to the north and south of the Canal. The Canal would be open to navigation by vessels of all maritime states upon the payment of tolls sufficient to cover

⁵ For further details of the case of *The Wimbledon*, see Green H. Hackworth, *Digest of International Law* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940-1944), vol. i, pp. 52-53; vol. ii, pp. 15, 770, 780-781, 823-824, 827-829; vol. v, pp. 167, 226-228; vol. vii, pp. 436-437.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, pp. 651-652; *Foreign Relations*, 1936, vol. i, pp. 372-374, 379.

administrative costs and upkeep. It would be administered by an international body appointed by and subject to the Security Council of the United Nations. This solution would have the effect of guaranteeing the status of the Kiel Canal as an international waterway.

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

No. 264

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF THE DANUBE

A series of treaties, beginning with the Treaty of Vienna in 1815,¹ established the foundations for the international control of international rivers. The basic principles of which were (1) commercial navigation to be free for all nations, (2) no fiscal charges except reasonable compensation for maintenance and improvements, and (3) regulation of navigation by common consent of the states bordering on or crossed by such rivers. In the case of the Danube these provisions were not immediately applied because of the exclusion of Turkey from the Concert of Europe. However, when in 1856 the Ottoman Empire was admitted, the Treaty of Paris expressly provided that the principles of the Treaty of Vienna on the internationalization of rivers were to be applied to the Danube.

The Treaty of 1856 also provided for an *European Commission of the Danube* composed of representatives of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and the Ottoman Empire; it was charged with the control of the *maritime* section of the Danube (from Brăila to the Black Sea). To cover the cost of this work the European Commission could establish duties to be assessed on a basis of complete equality. Conceived as a transitory body to be followed by a permanent international commission composed solely of the riverain states, it continued to function until Rumania's entry into the World War in 1916, by which time it had extended its activities and attained a special juridical status. There was no international regulation of the *fluvial* Danube until after 1918.

¹ The pertinent provisions of this treaty, and of the other agreements mentioned in this Briefing Book paper and not separately cited, are quoted in Fred L. Hadsel, comp., "Principal Treaties and Conventions Relating to Freedom of Navigation on the Danube", in Department of State, *Documents and State Papers*, vol. 1, p. 250.

The system of internationalization of certain waterways was reaffirmed by the treaties which concluded the first World War. The Danube was declared an "international" river. With the exception of Germany, which was not allowed to carry passengers or goods by regular service between ports of any Allied or Associated Power, the Danube (like other international rivers) was to be open to all countries on the basis of equality. The European Commission of the Danube was reestablished with representation, of only Great Britain, France, Italy and Rumania as a "provisional measure". An *International Commission of the Danube* was also provided for in the Treaty of Versailles² to oversee river development and apply navigation rules over the fluvial portion from Brăila to the highest navigable point. This commission was composed of two representatives of each of the German riparian states (Württemberg and Bavaria), one from each of the other riparian states (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, [the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes,] Bulgaria and Rumania) and one representative of each non-riparian state on the European Commission—that is, Great Britain, France and Italy.

A Convention Instituting the Definitive Statute of the Danube was drawn up at Paris in July 1921. It embodied most of the relevant provisions of the previous treaties, reaffirmed the authority of the European Commission and defined the powers and organization of the International Commission. Provision was made to permit the entry into the European Commission by unanimous consent of other European states having sufficient maritime commercial interests at the mouth of the Danube.

The status of the European Commission met with continued objection on the part of Rumania and in August 1938 a protocol was signed at Sinaia which left the Commission little more than a consultative and advisory body. On March 1, 1939 the European Commission admitted Germany to membership on a basis of complete equality. With the outbreak of the present European war the European Commission, which had proved a powerful and effective international authority preparing and promoting navigation and police regulations for the maritime Danube, ceased to function. The International Commission, which was authorized by the Convention of 1921 to prepare programs of river improvement and regulations to be enforced by the individual states, had less power and a far shorter span of activity than the European Commission and had never assumed the same importance. Germany withdrew in November 1936 and remained out until it was in a position to dominate the entire length of the Danube and to control both Commissions.

² See articles 347 and 348 of the Treaty, *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, pp. 664-665

Extensive plans for German utilization and control of the Danube developed after Munich. With the meeting of the European Commission in the autumn of 1939 the German representative became chairman and Great Britain and France were no longer represented. A year later, under German guidance, both Commissions were suppressed and replaced by an amalgamated Danube Commission including the riparian states and Italy.

Russia, a party to the Treaty of Paris of 1856, was a member of the European Commission until 1919 but was excluded from both Commissions after the first World War. Following the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia in the summer of 1940 and after Soviet representations to Germany an agreement was negotiated abolishing the European Commission and the International Commission and setting up an Amalgamated Danube Commission consisting of the USSR, Germany, Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Yugoslavia. A conference on Danube problems was held in Bucharest in October 1940 but without results since agreement apparently could not be reached on the control of the mouth of the river. Germany remained in effective control of the entire course of the river from July 1941 until 1944.

A British suggestion for a provisional international administration of the Danube made during the Rumanian armistice negotiations, was not included in the armistice terms. Soviet authorities have control under the terms of the armistice agreements with Rumania,³ Bulgaria⁴ and Hungary,⁵ of all shipping on the Danube. Official and unofficial Soviet statements in recent years indicate that the Soviet Union, which in 1940-41 and again since September 1944 borders on the lower Danube, considers itself a "Danubian power" entitled to participate in any regime of control which may be established. The Soviet Government may also wish to limit membership in such a regime to the riparian states.

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

³ Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (2) 1712.

⁴ Executive Agreement Series No. 437; 58 Stat. (2) 1498.

⁵ Executive Agreement Series No. 456; 59 Stat. (2) 1321.

No. 265

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-545 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

HOECHST, July 5, 1945—10 a. m.

108. Reference my 73, June 29, 6 p. m.¹ Dept will wish to look at SCAF 471, July 3 to CCS,² concerning problems involved in reopen-

¹ Not printed.

² See vol. II, document No. 754, enclosure B.

ing Danube waterway and disposition of river shipping now in American hands. Message recommends that policy in this connection be directed toward reestablishment of international character of the river and that as initial step there be set up an interim Danubian navigation agency. Message was coordinated with reparations commission representative here and information copy repeated to military mission Moscow for Ambassador Pauley.

At same time SHAEF issued instructions that reply sent to Marshal Tolbukhin's inquiry regarding Danubian fleet point out that subject of restitution of Allied nations property capture[d] within Germany or Austria was matter now under consideration by the governments, that survey was being made of all craft under Allied control and that SCAEF was recommending earliest possible use of this craft for mutual Allied benefit.

Repeated to Moscow as 10 and to Caserta for Erhardt as 4.

MURPHY

No. 266

840.811/7-1045

*Department of State Memorandum*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 10, 1945.

POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DANUBE

The underlying recommendation of a provisional arrangement for the administration of the Danube has been prompted by a telegram from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SCAF 471, July 3, 1945).²

This telegram is summarized as follows: Before surrender of German forces, Danube shipping under German control was moved into the United States area; Soviet officers claim that some of the vessels did not reach the United States area before surrender and ask to have them delivered. Reply has been made that restitution of such property is under consideration by the Governments.

Soviet commanders contiguous to the United States area have no authority to enter local agreement for the use of Danube shipping, which in large proportion belongs to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and other riparian states.

SHAEF recommends initial measure in restoration of international control of the Danube to be the creation of an interim Danube Navigation Agency on which initially would be represented the United

¹ Printed from an unsigned mimeographed copy.

² See vol. II, document No. 754, enclosure B.

States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union; membership subsequently would be expanded to include all states interested in Danube navigation. This problem has appeared so urgent to SHAEF that it has suggested discussion at the meeting of the three heads of states.

So far as is known in the Department of State, the War Department has taken no action on this telegram. A copy of the attached recommendation is being sent to the Pentagon.

This recommendation was prepared by an *ad hoc* committee of interested divisions of the Department and has been cleared with Major Kindleberger of the White House Staff.

[Attachment]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM REGARDING POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE DANUBE RIVER

RECOMMENDATIONS

1) The ultimate objective of policy with respect to the administration of the Danube River is the reestablishment of the international character of the Danube waterway and the eventual reestablishment of a permanent international Danube authority representative of all nations interested in Danube navigation and tied in with a permanent European transport organization if such is established.

2) As an initial step there should be set up as soon as possible an interim Danube navigation agency.

(a) The functions of this agency should be the restoration and development of navigation facilities in the Danube, the supervision of river activities in the interest of equal treatment for various nationalities and establishment of uniform regulations concerning leasing, rules of navigation, customs and sanitation formalities, and other similar questions. The functions of this body should extend to all questions involving water use on the Danube.

(b) The membership of this body should include the U. S., U. K., U. S. S. R., France and the sovereign riparian states recognized by these governments.

(c) This body should be of a purely interim character, and while carrying on in part functions formerly performed by the International Commission of the Danube and the European Commission of the Danube it should not be considered as prejudicing the organization and functions of a permanent Danube authority which should be set up in the future. Its jurisdiction should cover the entire navigable length of the Danube.

3) The problems of the use of inland transport equipment, the pooling of such equipment, the restoration of such equipment to

former owners and the regulation of traffic of common concern should be the subject of separate agreement between the occupation authorities and the states owning equipment operating on the Danube.

(a) The best procedure for handling this arrangement would be through the Provisional Organization for European Inland Transport, provided the U. S. S. R., Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia participated in that organization.

(b) If the U. S. S. R., Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia do not participate in the Transport Organization, a separate agreement should be reached between occupying authorities and those states owning equipment on the Danube which would put into effect the principles embodied in the Inland Transport Agreement.³ These would relate primarily to Article VII, Sections 7, 9, 10, 12 and 15, and Article VIII, Sections 2, 5 and 6, and the annex covering traffic on inland waterways.

4) This Government has subscribed in the ECITO agreement to the principle that identifiable transport equipment should be restored to the country of previous ownership subject to any general policies determined by the appropriate authorities of the United Nations regarding restitution of property removed by the enemy. Such delivery of equipment, however, should only be made on condition that this equipment is used with greatest efficiency for the handling of traffic of common concern under some form of arrangement as indicated above.

DISCUSSION

This Government believes that it is essential to set up an interim body pending the establishment of a permanent authority in order to deal with the immediate problems of restoration of navigation and control equipment and traffic movements. This interim body should function until a new permanent authority can be established which would supersede the previous Commissions which have only been suspended by the war and not abrogated.

The fact that a considerable portion of the waterway equipment is located within the American zone of occupation in Germany provides a strong bargaining point in securing an adequate organization for the pooling of inland water craft and the administration of its use in handling traffic of common concern. Equipment belonging to enemy countries might be assigned to participating countries for operation in conjunction with the pool, but such assignment should be without prejudice to its ultimate disposition. This would enable the craft to be put into use and the question of ultimate reparations to be deferred.

³ Signed at London, May 8, 1945 (Executive Agreement Series No. 458; 59 Stat. (2) 1359).

In order to adequately handle this problem the first step would be the taking of a complete inventory of all water craft under the control of each of the riparian states or the respective control authorities.

The second step would be an analysis of the requirements for traffic within the U. S. occupation area.

The third step would be the working out of the transfer of surplus equipment to the countries outside of the U. S. zone upon the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement with respect to its use.

Close contact should be maintained with the Provisional Organization for European Inland Transport as that body is in a position to deal with the legal and technical problems involved.

No. 267

840.70/7-1145

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Ref: 820/-/45

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

It appears to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the recognition of the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity by His Majesty's Government, the United States Government¹ and the French Provisional Government should permit the early resumption of the Soviet Government's participation in the European Inland Transport Conference.²

2. His Majesty's Government propose that they, as the Host Government of the European Inland Transport Conference, should immediately inform the Soviet Government that in their view it is urgent that the Lancaster House Conference should now resume and complete its work as soon as possible. The communication to the Soviet Government would go on to say that His Majesty's Government are disposed at once to invite the Provisional Polish Government to appoint a delegation to the Conference but before doing so they would welcome an assurance that the Soviet Delegation, which is still in London, will receive instructions to resume full participation in the work of the Conference as soon as the Polish Delegation is ready to take part.

3. His Majesty's Embassy is instructed to add that His Majesty's Government had considered also inviting the Danish and Turkish Governments, as members of the Emergency Economic Committee, Europe, and of the European Coal Organisation, to send delegations

¹ See document No. 501.

² See *Participation of the United States Government in International Conferences, July 1, 1941-June 30, 1945* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947; Department of State publication No. 2665), p. 138.

to the reconvened Conference, but if the United States Government think that to invite either or both might entail still further delays, consideration of whether or not to invite them might be left until the Conference meets and is in a position itself to consider the question.

4. His Majesty's Government assume that the United States Government agree that the Provisional Organisation for European Inland Transport should continue its activities until the European Central Inland Transport Organisation proper comes into being.

5. A similar communication is being made to the French Provisional Government.

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1945.

[No. 267]

AUSTRIA
EXTENSION OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE RENNER GOVERNMENT

No. 268

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹

TOP SECRET

AUSTRIA
RECOGNITION OF AN AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT SATISFACTORY TO ALL
ALLIED GOVERNMENTS

I. COMMENT

The Soviet Government informed us on April 24² that it was agreeing to the establishment of a provisional Austrian Government under Karl Renner. On April 28 this Renner Government was set up in Vienna without further consultation with us. The Soviet Government's dealing with the Renner Government without consulting us represents a unilateral action hardly to be reconciled with the principle of joint action on the part of the major Powers. The Soviet Government has defended itself by asserting that its method of administering an occupied area requires the existence of indigenous political authority. This reply is not entirely satisfactory in that Soviet troops were in occupation of only a part of Austria when the Renner Government was set up and the practical necessities of administration could have been met, as they are being met in Russian-occupied Germany, by local and regional organization.

At the same time the Soviet Government has not accorded the Renner Government a formal recognition and has not proposed or supported an extension of its authority into that part of Austria occupied by United States troops.

Whatever might be the regrettable nature of Soviet action, it appears beyond serious doubt that, in terms of the men themselves and in terms of representation of political forces, the Renner Government is as good a coalition as could be devised at the present time. It equally appears that the distribution of offices among the three Austrian parties is not a serious misrepresentation of current political forces although the allocation of the Interior portfolio to a Communist³ suggests a

¹ Annex 9 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² Communication not printed.

³ Franz Honner.

special advantage for the Communist group by virtue of the importance of that office. The portfolio of Public Instruction and Worship in the hands of a Communist may appear dubious from our point of view, but Ernst Fischer, the incumbent, is a post-1934 convert to Communism and a cultured man highly esteemed by persons of contrary political outlooks. The authority of the minister over religious affairs was not such in the pre-*Anschluss* days to allow him to do damage to church activities.

Generally Austrians at home and abroad, except Fascist and monarchist elements, have approved the Renner Government.

Our disagreement with the Soviet Government, therefore, can only be one concerning the Soviet method of action, not the character of the Renner Government as such. To refuse indefinitely to recognize it would lay us open to the charge of opposing an incontestably representative and democratic movement, a charge which would be all the more convincing because of certain unfortunate choices of Austrian personnel in areas under American occupation. The only practical course open to us is to proceed with recognition as soon as our desiderata with respect to zones of occupation and control machinery are met, provided reports from our own representatives then functioning in Vienna confirm our present impressions.

The British take a less favorable view of the Renner Cabinet than we do, and may insist that it is too far to the left to recognize without some changes.

The initial announcement of the Renner Government itself characterized the Cabinet a provisional one, envisaged Cabinet changes if necessary as new areas of Austria come under its jurisdiction, and called for its ultimate replacement by a government chosen through democratic elections.

II. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that this Government agree to give prompt consideration to the question of recognition of the Renner Government after the zones of occupation, including the sub-division of Vienna, are satisfactorily delineated and our troops have taken up their positions accordingly and after an agreement on inter-Allied control machinery has been concluded and put into effect.⁴ We should also stipulate that the Renner Government should prepare to hold elections as soon as possible, under the supervision of the Occupying Powers, for a constituent assembly.

[WASHINGTON,] June 23, 1945.

⁴ For the final agreement on zones of occupation, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1600*; 61 Stat. (3) 2679. For the final agreement on control machinery in Austria, see document No. 282.

No. 269

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Joint Civil Affairs Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

POSITION OF INDIGENOUS NATIONAL "GOVERNMENTS" IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

DISCUSSION

1. The support by the Soviets of the Renner "Government" in Austria and their previous experiments with the Committee of German Officers indicates the need for agreement on the role to be played by indigenous so-called national governments in the quadripartite military government control of Germany and Austria.

2. The United States, United Kingdom and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are in substantial agreement that central administrative agencies will be used for implementation of national policies in both Germany and Austria and that, one day, the Germans and Austrians may establish democratic governments. They have also agreed that matters affecting Germany and Austria as a whole will be dealt with by the Control Councils in the respective countries. There is, however, no explicit agreement that no one of the occupying powers will effect unilateral recognition of indigenous agencies claiming national civil authority. Such agreement should be sought as an aid to efficient operation of the quadripartite military government in these countries.

3. The United States should urge that the military government shall not recognize such interim organizations claiming national authority, either on the national or zonal level, until the four governments have agreed to do so and the Control Council has established the exact extent of the organizations' functions and responsibilities. Such agreement shall be without prejudice to the right of any of the four powers to collaborate with any local interim organization through which it will implement policy in its zones in Germany or Austria.

RECOMMENDATION

4. It is recommended that agreement be sought that neither the government of any one of the occupying powers nor the commander-in-chief of any one of such powers shall recognize the claim to national governmental authority of any indigenous group in Germany or Austria without the concurrence of the other occupying powers.

¹ This memorandum was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.

No. 270

740.00119 Control (Austria)/6-2345

The Informal Policy Committee on Germany to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 23 June 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Directive to Commander in Chief of U. S. Forces of Occupation¹ regarding the Military Government of Austria.

References: a. IPCOG 9.²
 b. IPCOG 9/1.²
 c. IPCOG 9/2.³

On 23 June 1945 the Informal Policy Committee on Germany approved the enclosed "Directive to Commander in Chief of U. S. Forces of Occupation regarding the Military Government of Austria". The Joint Chiefs of Staff have advised the Committee that they perceive no objection to this directive from a military point of view.

The enclosure is transmitted for your guidance and such implementation as is deemed appropriate. Copies of this directive are being similarly forwarded to the Secretaries of War, the Navy and the Treasury; the Foreign Economic Administrator; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the Informal Policy Committee on Germany:
 W. L. CLAYTON
Chairman

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET
 IPCOG 9/2

[WASHINGTON,] 23 June 1945.

DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF U. S. FORCES OF OCCUPATION
 REGARDING THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRIA

References: a. IPCOG 9
 b. IPCOG 9/1

1. The enclosure, a revision of IPCOG 9 to incorporate the amendment proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as approved by the Infor-

¹ General Mark W. Clark.

² Not printed.

³ The enclosure to this memorandum constitutes a portion of IPCOG 9/2.

mal Policy Committee on Germany on 23 June 1945, is circulated for information and guidance.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

[Subenclosure—Extracts ⁴]

TOP SECRET

DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF US FORCES OF OCCUPATION
REGARDING THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRIA

1. *The Purpose and Scope of this Directive:*

a. This directive is issued to you as Commanding General of the United States forces of occupation in Austria. As such you will serve as United States member of the Governing Body of the Allied Administration and will also be responsible for the administration of military government in the zone or zones assigned to the United States for purposes of occupation and administration. It outlines the basic policies which will guide you in those two capacities after the termination of the combined command in Austria. Supplemental directives will be issued to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as may be required.

b. As a member of the Governing Body you will urge the adoption by the other occupying powers of the principles and policies set forth in this directive and, pending Governing Body agreement, you will follow them in your zone. It is anticipated that substantially similar directives will be issued to the Commanders in Chief of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and French forces of occupation.

c. In the event that recognition is given by the four governments to a provisional national government of Austria, such government should be delegated authority in appropriate matters to conduct public affairs in accordance with the principles set forth in this directive or agreed upon by the occupying powers. Such delegation, however, shall be subject to the authority of the occupying powers and to their responsibility to see that their policies are in fact carried out.

d. Any provisional national government of Austria which is not recognized by all of the four Governments of the occupying powers

⁴ An almost complete text of this directive, as transmitted to Clark on June 27, 1945, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XIII, p. 661.

shall not be treated by you as possessing any authority. Only individuals who recognize your supreme authority in your zone will be utilized by you in administration.

PART I

GENERAL AND POLITICAL

4. *Basic Objectives of Military Government in Austria:*

a. You will be chiefly concerned in the initial stages of military government with the elimination of German domination and Nazi influences. Consistently with this purpose, you will be guided at every step by the necessity to ensure the reconstruction of Austria as a free, independent and democratic state. It will be essential therefore that every measure be undertaken from the early stages of occupation with this objective in mind.

b. The Governing Body should, as soon as it is established, proclaim the complete political and administrative separation of Austria from Germany, and the intention of the occupying powers to pave the way for the reestablishment of Austria as an independent democratic state. You will make it clear to the Austrian people that military occupation of Austria is intended principally (1) to aid Allied military operations and the strict enforcement of the applicable provisions of the German unconditional surrender instrument in Austria; (2) to eliminate Nazism, Pan-Germanism, militarism, and other forces opposed to the democratic reconstitution of Austria; (3) to cooperate with the Control Council for Germany in the application and enforcement of measures designed to prevent the recurrence of German aggression; (4) to establish Allied control over the use and disposition of German property in Austria; (5) to effect the complete political and administrative separation of Austria from Germany and free Austria from Nazi and German economic and financial influences; (6) to facilitate the development of a sound Austrian economy devoted to peaceful pursuits and not vitally dependent upon German supplies, markets and technical and financial assistance; and (7) to foster the restoration of local self-government and the establishment of an Austrian central government freely elected by the Austrian people themselves. Other objectives of the occupation will be to apprehend war criminals, to care for and repatriate displaced persons and prisoners-of-war who are members of the armed forces of the United Nations, and to carry out approved programs of reparation and restitution insofar as these are applicable to Austria.

No. 271

740.00119 Control (Austria)/7-945

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I think you will wish to have before you, and perhaps to submit to the President, the enclosed telegram [*air-gram*] of June 20 from Ambassador Murphy (received here July 6) on "Conditions in Vienna as Revealed by Interrogation".

Faithfully yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

[Enclosure—Extracts]

The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SHAEF, June 20, 1945.

Subject: Conditions in Vienna as revealed by Interrogation.

A-46. During the course of his recent trip into Bavaria, Capt. Homer G. Richey of my staff interrogated . . . a member of the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra, who had entered the American Zone from Vienna at the beginning of June. The interrogation . . . elicited some interesting statements about conditions in Vienna and particularly about the alleged violent reaction of the population against the Soviet troops. The text of Capt. Richey's report on this interrogation reads as follows:

.
 "The Russians in Vienna are agitating with every propaganda agency at their disposal. It is intended to hold an election, probably not until Fall, however, and the Russians are working towards this election day and night. . . . ["

.
MURPHY

No. 272

740.00119 Control (Germany)7-1045

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*¹

TOP SECRET

EXTRACT FROM POLITICAL DIRECTIVE SENT TO GENERAL MCCREERY
IN HIS DUAL CAPACITY AS BRITISH COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN
AUSTRIA AND BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE ON THE PROSPECTIVE
ALLIED COUNCIL FOR AUSTRIA

The views of His Majesty's Government on the question of the establishment of self-government in Austria were set out in a memorandum circulated to European Advisory Commission on December 14th, 1944 as European Advisory Commission (44) 45.² However, developments in Austria since her liberation make it desirable that you should receive fresh guidance in dealing with the situation.

It remains the policy of His Majesty's Government to secure the restoration of a free and independent Austrian State. In furtherance of this aim and with a view to lightening the burden of the Military Government it is considered essential that responsibility for the administration of Austria should be placed at as early a date as possible on the shoulders of the Austrians themselves under Allied control and guidance. In order to attain this objective the early establishment of a provisional Austrian Government which would be genuinely representative of Austria both politically and territorially and which could receive recognition of the four occupying powers, is of first importance.

One of your first tasks will be to secure, in agreement with your Soviet, United States and French colleagues, an early transition from the Renner Government to a fully representative Austrian Government which it will be possible for the four controlling powers to recognize.

With a view to bringing this about you should take the following line in discussion with your colleagues. While admitting that the Renner Government may have fulfilled a useful purpose at a time when only a limited part of Austria had been liberated, you should assume that there can be no question of that Government, recruited on so narrow a territorial basis, continuing to survive once Austria is placed as a whole under Allied control. Allied forces have now moved into their allotted zones and provincial Governments or committees have been formed in all or most of these. It is essential that the provinces should have a substantial say in the formation

¹ This document bears the following manuscript notation: "Handed in strict confidence to Mr. Williamson & Mr. Adams by Mr. Pares."

² Not printed.

of any Government which claims to call itself Austrian. You should accordingly propose that delegates of the various provincial administrations should assemble in Vienna at an early date and submit to the Allied Council recommendations for the composition of a provisional Austrian Government. The numbers of delegates from the Provinces might be as follows: three from Vienna; two each from Styria[,] Carinthia, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, the Tyrol and Salzburg; and one each from Vorarlberg and the Burgenland. A body so constituted should be capable of nominating a representative Austrian Government which would be recognised as such by the Four Powers and would hold office until free elections could be held. The above plan represents the general lines on which His Majesty's Government consider that an Austrian Provisional Government might most satisfactorily be formed in the absence of elections.

WASHINGTON, July 10th, 1945.

REPARATIONS

No. 273

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

PAYMENT OF REPARATIONS BY AUSTRIA

Agreement should be reached by the three powers on the question of reparation payments by Austria.

The United States Government is opposed to the exaction of reparations from Austria despite her contribution to the German war effort. It feels that such an attempt would be economically unrealistic and would have dangerous political implications in Central Europe.

Considerations

The policy of this Government is based on these considerations:

(a) A program of reparations for Austria analogous to that projected for Germany would be inconsistent with the sense of the Moscow Declaration¹ and would require a reversal of the policy on which the Declaration is based. This policy implied an undertaking on the part of the subscribers to the Moscow Declaration to create economic conditions favorable to the preservation of Austrian independence.

(b) It is believed that an attempt to force reparations from Austria would turn the Austrians against us and tend ultimately to strengthen Germany in future years by forcing Austria back into her arms.

(c) This Government is highly skeptical of the ability of Austria to make substantial payments of reparations. In this connection it is

¹ Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 310.

recalled that Austria's World War I reparation obligations were virtually cancelled by the Allies as early as 1923 in appreciation of her difficult international economic position.

(d) The dislocation of Austrian economy ensuing from her separation from Germany and the fact that Austria is a food deficit area indicate that in the early post-war period the country will require substantial relief and possibly also financial assistance. If the United States should participate in such measures of assistance while Austria is forced to carry a reparations burden, this country would, in effect, be financing in major part the payment of Austria's reparations.

(e) This Government feels that the Austrian people cannot be judged now to have failed to aid in their own liberation, considering the power of the Gestapo in Austria and the little aid received from outside until the entry into Austria of the Soviet Army in April 1945.

A program limited to the transfer of existing capital equipment clearly in excess of the healthy peacetime requirements of the Austrian economy, such as machinery in armament plants erected since 1938, might be advanced for consideration by the three powers and need not necessarily conflict with the policy of this Government as stated.

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

No. 274

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

AUSTRIAN ECONOMIC QUESTIONS WHICH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SHOULD RAISE

It is assumed that it will not be necessary for this government to insist that Austria be treated as an economic unit. None of the occupying powers have any interest in the partitioning of Austria and all of them will probably agree eventually to recognize an Austrian government which will, itself, insist upon the administration of the Austrian economy as a unit. We should, however, attempt to reach an agreement on the following questions:

1. *Financing of Austrian Imports.*

This question is the same in essence as that which arises in the case of Germany; and the proposed solution for Germany¹ is equally applicable to Austria.

2. *Payment for Austrian Exports.*

The establishment of a sound Austrian economy is essential to the maintenance of Austria's independence on which the three powers

¹ See document No. 327 and the attachment to document No. 341.

agreed in the Moscow Declaration. The task of creating such an economy is extremely difficult in view of the paucity of Austrian resources and the limited foreign trade possibilities. It is essential, therefore, that the powers concerned agree that goods and equipment should not in general be taken from Austria except against payment, the proceeds to be applied against Austrian imports. Only two exceptions should be made to this general principle; first, there should be restitution of identifiable looted property found in Austria; and second, Austria might be required, as part of the German reparation settlement, to make available on reparation account at least a portion of the plant and equipment which was erected in Austria after the *Anschluss* as part of the German program for the preparation and prosecution of the war. We should resist any claim on the part of the Soviet Union that all German property in Austria should be made available as reparation, because much of this property was part and parcel of Austria's economic resources prior to *Anschluss* and cannot be considered as redundant to the productive resources which Austria needs for the development of a sound economy. Austrian authorities should, of course, be permitted or even required to seize German assets in Austria generally with such settlement as may be determined later by the governing body in Austria and the Control Council in Germany.

3. *Economic and Financial Assistance to Austria.*

The Moscow Declaration on the restoration of an independent Austria implied that Austria would be assimilated as promptly as possible to the status of a liberated country. We should, therefore, urge that the powers concerned consider plans for the extension of financial and economic assistance to Austria on a scale at least equal to that which has been extended to other liberated countries. In addition to possible loans to Austria, assimilation to liberated country status means that at the appropriate time the dollar (and sterling and ruble) equivalent of net troop pay expended in Austria should be made available to the Austrian authorities. It also implies that efforts will be made to keep to a minimum any occupation costs for which Austria is determined to be liable. The precise determination of occupation costs chargeable to the occupying countries and those chargeable to Austria will presumably be made later, possibly not until peace arrangements are concluded. It is, however, not unreasonable at this time to ask the United Kingdom and USSR Governments for a commitment on troop pay. There should also be a general understanding that genuine efforts will be made to cope effectively with the threat of uncontrolled inflation.

The economic and financial assistance accorded to Austria should be directed toward giving Austria a standard of living higher than that in

Germany. Otherwise, public sentiment in favor of a new *Anschluss* with Germany will undoubtedly grow rapidly. A positive program of financial and trade assistance is required so that those industries which are, from an economic point of view, most efficient can be developed and so that opportunities for an active exchange of Austrian goods and services with those of other countries will be promoted.

No. 275

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Joint Civil Affairs Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO TREATMENT
OF AUSTRIA

DISCUSSION

1. Decision has not been reached concerning the question whether Austria is to be required to pay reparations, and if so, whether the reparations should consist of money, capital goods, labor or current production. Inasmuch as it is the United States policy to favor the development of a sound, integrated economy for Austria as a whole, not dependent on Germany, the form and amount of Austrian reparation should be geared to the accomplishment of this objective. It seems that the exaction of labor or financial reparations from Austria would not be in accord with this policy. Reparations in the form of capital goods should be limited to items redundant to a stable Austrian economy. Recurrent reparations should, insofar as possible, be confined to items the production of which tends to support a sound Austrian economy.

2. In order to accomplish the objective of divorcing the Austrian economy from that of Germany, Austrian private export trade should be encouraged.

3. Agreement should be sought concerning the extent to which an economic disarmament program for Austria is desirable or necessary as a corollary to the elimination of Germany's war potential. Agreement should be reached for a close coordination between the Control Council for Germany and the Governing Body for Austria in this field. The Governing Body for Austria, in consultation with the Control Council for Germany, should establish procedures to control

¹ This memorandum was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.

the establishment or expansion of industries in Austria which are of a type prohibited or eliminated in Germany.

RECOMMENDATION

4. In order to permit the military authorities to administer Austria, decision at governmental levels be sought on the questions of:

- a. Reparations policy for Austria.
- b. Economic disarmament.
- c. Extent to which Austrian economy will be affirmatively supported or subsidized.

No. 276

740.00119 EAC/7-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 4, 1945—8 p. m.

US URGENT

6742. COMEA 319. Sent Dept, AusPolAd 16, Paris 437, secret for Murphy; Moscow 234 for Paule[y.]

In signing today EAC agreement on Austrian control machinery ¹ I made the following statement re US position re Austrian reparation.

"In connection with the signature by the EAC of the agreement on control machinery in Austria for submission to the four govts I have informed my Govt as follows: In discussing the inclusion, in Article 4 of the draft agreement on control machinery in Austria of a provision for a reparation, deliveries and restitution division, the EAC was not empowered to consider and did not consider the substantive aspects of the question of Austrian reparation. In informing the members of the commission that my Govt concurs in the inclusion of this provision I have stated that my Govt recognizes in principle Austria's obligation to provide reparation and that it assumes that the four govts will consider together in the light of the general position and prospects of the Austrian economy the form and amount of reparation to be provided by Austria. The other members of the EAC have stated that they have informed their respective govts of the views which I have set forth in this regard on behalf of my Govt."

Copies of this statement were handed to other three reps and Sec General EAC ² for recording. UK and French reps ³ stated they would make similar communications to their govts and likewise inform EAC colleague[s] thereof. Soviet rep ⁴ stated he had repeatedly informed his govt of viewpoints expressed and discussions held re inclusion reparation division at earlier EAC meetings. Dept will

¹ Document No. 282.

² E. P. Donaldson.

³ Sir Ronald I. Campbell and René Massigli, respectively.

⁴ Fedor Tarasovich Gusev.

have noted protracted Soviet efforts avoid any form of US reservation re Austrian reparation particularly any reference to any relation between reparation policy and Austria's economic prospects.

WINANT

No. 277

740.00119 EAC/7-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 7, 1945—2 p. m.

6858. Under date July 4 UK representative EAC reports communication made by him to his Govt re Austrian reparation. (Sent Dept; COMEA 326; rptd AusPolAd 18, Murphy 22 from Winant, Moscow 238 for Pauley). UK statement parallels US statement rpt my tel 6742 rpt AusPolAd 16, Paris 437, for Murphy, Moscow 234 for Pauley.¹

Beginning of text:

The EAC have today approved the text of an agreement on control machinery for Austria and submitted it for approval to the UK, US, Soviet and French Govts. In discussing the inclusion in article 4 of that agreement of a provision for a reparation deliveries and restitution division, I stated that while His Majesty's Govt recognized in principle Austria's obligation to furnish reparation they are not to be understood as thereby prejudging either the form or the amount of such reparation or Austria's capacity to furnish reparation. The EAC was not empowered to consider and did not consider the substantive aspects of the question of Austrian reparation. I assume that the four govts will now wish to consider that question in the light of the general prospects of Austria's economy. End of text.

WINANT

¹ Document No. 276.

AGREEMENTS ON ZONES OF OCCUPATION AND CONTROL MACHINERY; OCCUPATION OF THE WESTERN ZONES AND OF VIENNA

No. 278

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

AUSTRIA

ESTABLISHMENT OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION AND CONTROL MACHINERY (INTER-ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT)

The Inter-Allied Administration of Austria can, and should, be established as soon as (but not before) the European Advisory Com-

[No. 278]

mission has completed, and the Governments have signed, the agreements now pending in the European Advisory Commission for (1) zones of occupation, and (2) control machinery, for Austria.

The European Advisory Commission negotiations are proceeding on the basis of the British proposals for zones of occupation and control machinery, copies of which are included in the basic documents accompanying these memoranda.¹ The commission expects to reach agreement on the control machinery, with modifications, without difficulty as soon as the zoning of Vienna has been agreed. For zones of occupation in Austria there is already satisfactory agreement in principle to allot to United States forces: the province of Salzburg, and that part of the province of Upper Austria south of the Danube River; to the Soviet forces: Burgenland, Lower Austria, and that part of Upper Austria north of the Danube; to British forces: Styria and Carinthia; and to French forces: the Tirol and Vorarlberg.

The one main obstacle to completion of these agreements has been the zoning of the capital Vienna. As a result of the recent reconnaissance mission to Vienna, it now appears possible to settle all differences except possibly the question of airfields in the Vienna area. The United States, Great Britain and France are pressing for allotment of a field to each of these countries, while the Soviet Government has hitherto been willing to consider only one airfield for the use of all three. An effort is now (June 23, 1945) being made in the European Advisory Commission to settle this final point.²

[WASHINGTON,] June 23, 1945.

¹ Not included in the Briefing Book.

² For the text of the agreement on control machinery, signed at London, July 4, 1945, see document No. 282. For the agreement on zones of occupation, signed at London, July 9, 1945, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1600; 61 Stat. (3) 2679.

No. 279

740.00119 Control (Austria)/7-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State ad interim

SECRET
US URGENT

Moscow, July 2, 1945—1 p. m.

2367. General Deane has been informed by SHAEF that the Soviet commanders in Austria have refused to allow Amer troops to enter proposed zones of occupation on the grounds that they have no instructions. General Deane (sent to Dept as 2367, rptd to London

as 337) has been attempting to ascertain from the Red Army General Staff the reasons why instructions were not issued. In Generalissimo Stalin's reply of June 16¹ to the President's message,² setting July 1 as the date of occupation for both German and Austrian zones, Stalin refers to the intervening period as giving the EAC time to complete its work.

As General Deane is requesting me to support with Molotov SHAEF request to obtain Soviet agreement to start movement of American occupational troops, I would appreciate urgent advice as to the status of the decisions in the EAC regarding the occupational zones for Austria.

HARRIMAN

¹ See Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 305; *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 247.

² See Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 303-304; *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 245. Cf. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 603-606. See also document No. 75, footnote 2.

No. 280

740.00119 Control Austria/7-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CASERTA, July 3, 1945—3 p. m.

2850. Our 2842, July 2.¹

June 30 [A]FHQ directed Brit Eight Army to contact local Russ Commander Sov Forces in Styria to arrange for Sov withdrawal and subsequent Brit movement into Styria and Carinthia areas of Austria.

July 1 Brit officer commanding Fifth Corps met Russians at Sov Fourth Army HQ delivered letter from CG Eight Army addressed to Tolbukhin and discussed withdrawal Russ forces from Styria. Russ Commander said he had not recd any orders to withdraw and until such time he would maintain his position. USS[R] Com also asked what Brit intended to do with White Russ Corps now in Brit occupied zone to which Brit officer replied he had no knowledge of its existence. July 2 Brit officer CG Five Corps again met Russ and recd written reply addressed to CG Eight Army saying latter's letter would be delivered promptly to Sov CinC Central Army group Marshal Koniev; that until receipt orders from CinC Russ Forces in Styria could not be withdrawn. Note was cordial in tone.

KIRK

¹ Not printed.

No. 281

740.00119 Control (Austria)/7-445

*The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Zones of Occupation in Austria

The question of the delineation of Allied zones of occupation in Austria has been under negotiation in EAC during the last eight months. The following arrangement has been given tentative, although not final, approval by the four members of the Commission:

1. United States zone—provinces of Salzburg, and Upper Austria south of the Danube.
2. British zone—provinces of Carinthia, and Styria minus that small portion thereof designated as Burgenland.
3. Russian zone—provinces of Upper Austria north of the Danube, Lower Austria, and Burgenland.
4. French zone—provinces of Tirol and Vorarlberg.

The principal obstacle still blocking final agreement is the allocation of airfields to the Americans, British and French in the Vienna area which, although the city is to be occupied and administered jointly, lies within the Soviet zone. The latest American proposal in EAC (June 23) was that three airfields be allotted to the American, French and British Governments. The Soviet representative offered the counterproposal that only two airfields were necessary for the other three forces, specifying Tulln and Schwechat. This difference has not yet been resolved. A telegram¹ is being sent to Ambassador Winant today, however, authorizing him, if he considers it necessary to conclude the agreement on zones in Austria, to accept the Soviet counterproposal provided it is agreed to assign the Tulln field to the United States.² The United States would invite the French to share Tulln on a lodger basis, and it might be suggested to the British that they grant similar facilities at Schwechat.

During the course of these negotiations, it was proposed to the Soviet Government that occupation of the tentative zones as described

¹ Not printed.

² The agreement reached on this point, as signed on July 9 (see document No. 283), was as follows:

"5. The Tulln airdrome, together with all installations and facilities pertaining thereto, will be under the administrative and operational control of the armed forces of the United States of America. The Schwechat airdrome, together with all installations and facilities pertaining thereto, will be under the administrative and operational control of the armed forces of the United Kingdom for the joint use of the British and French armed forces. . . ."

above should be undertaken and arrangements worked out for the movements of the respective Allied troops to accomplish this. The Soviets have thus far refused to accede to this proposal on the ground that no final delineation of the zones for Austria has been agreed upon inasmuch as the question of airfields in Vienna remains undecided.

J[AMES] W R[IDDLERBERGER]

No. 282

L/T Files

*European Advisory Commission Agreement*¹

AGREEMENT ON CONTROL MACHINERY IN AUSTRIA

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Provisional Government of the French Republic;

in view of the declaration issued at Moscow on the 1st November 1943,² in the name of the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, whereby the three Governments announced their agreement that Austria should be liberated from German domination, and declared that they wished to see re-established a free and independent Austria; and in view of the subsequent declaration issued at Algiers on 16th November, 1943, by the French Committee of National Liberation, concerning the independence of Austria;³

have reached the following agreement with regard to the Allied Control Machinery which will operate in Austria until the establishment of a freely elected Austrian government recognised by the four Powers:—

ARTICLE 1.

The Allied Control Machinery in Austria will consist of an Allied Council, an Executive Committee and staffs appointed by the four Governments concerned, the whole organisation being known as the Allied Commission for Austria.

ARTICLE 2.

(a) The Allied Council will consist of four Military Commissioners, one appointed by each of the Governments concerned. In addition

¹ Signed *ad referendum* on July 4, 1945, at a meeting of the European Advisory Commission at London. Notification of approval by the signatories was given by their respective representatives on the Commission on the following dates: the United Kingdom, July 12; France, July 12; the Soviet Union, July 21; and the United States, July 24, 1945.

² Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 310.

³ Text in *Recueil de textes à l'usage des conférences de la paix* (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1946), p. 123.

to being members of the Allied Council, the Military Commissioners will each be in supreme command of the forces of occupation in Austria furnished by his Government. Supreme authority in Austria will be exercised jointly, in respect of matters affecting Austria as a whole, by the Military Commissioners on instructions from their respective Governments, in their capacity as members of the Allied Council. Subject to this, each Military Commissioner, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the forces of occupation furnished by his Government, will exercise supreme authority in the zone occupied by those forces. Each Commander-in-Chief in his zone of occupation will have attached to him for liaison duties military, naval and air representatives of the other Commanders-in-Chief of forces of occupation in Austria.

(b) The Allied Council will meet at least once in ten days; and it will meet at any time upon request of any one of its members. Decisions of the Allied Council shall be unanimous. The Chairmanship of the Allied Council will be held in rotation by each of its four members.

(c) Each Military Commissioner will be assisted by a political adviser who will, when necessary, attend meetings of the Allied Council.

ARTICLE 3.

The Executive Committee will consist of one high-ranking representative of each of the four Commissioners. Members of the Executive Committee will, when necessary, attend meetings of the Allied Council.

ARTICLE 4.

(a) The staffs of the Allied Commission in Vienna, appointed by their respective national authorities, will be organised in the following Divisions:—

Military; Naval; Air; Economic; Finance; Reparation, Deliveries and Restitution; Internal Affairs; Labour; Legal; Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons; Political; and Transport.

Adjustments in the number and functions of the Divisions may be made in the light of experience.

(b) At the head of each Division there will be four officials, one from each Power. Heads of Divisions will take part in meetings of the Executive Committee at which matters affecting the work of their Divisions are on the agenda.

(c) The staffs of the Divisions may include civilian as well as military personnel. They may also, in special cases, include nationals of other United Nations, appointed in a personal capacity.

ARTICLE 5.

The Allied Council will

(a) initiate plans and reach decisions of [on?] the chief military, political, economic and other questions affecting Austria as a whole, on the basis of instructions received by each Commissioner from his Government;

(b) ensure appropriate uniformity of action in the zones of occupation.

ARTICLE 6.

The Executive Committee, acting on behalf of the Allied Council, will

(a) ensure the carrying out of the decisions of the Allied Council through the appropriate Divisions of the Allied Commission referred to in Article 4;

(b) co-ordinate the activities of the Divisions of the Allied Commission, and examine and prepare all questions referred to it by the Allied Council.

ARTICLE 7.

The Divisions of the Allied Commission will

(a) advise the Allied Council and the Executive Committee;

(b) carry out the decisions of the Allied Council conveyed to them through the Executive Committee.

ARTICLE 8.

The primary tasks of the Allied Commission for Austria will be

(a) to ensure the enforcement in Austria of the provisions of the Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany signed at Berlin on 5th June, 1945;⁴

(b) to achieve the separation of Austria from Germany;

(c) to secure the establishment, as soon as possible, of a central Austrian administrative machine;

(d) to prepare the way for the establishment of a freely elected Austrian government;

(e) meanwhile to provide for the administration of Austria to be carried on satisfactorily.

ARTICLE 9.

In the period before the establishment of departments of a central Austrian administration, which period shall be as short as possible, the decisions of the Allied Commission, insofar as they may require action in the respective zones, will be carried out through the occupation authorities. The necessary instructions to those authorities will be given by the respective Military Commissioners, in their capacity as Commanders-in-Chief, on the basis of decisions of the Allied Council.

⁴ Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520; 60 Stat. (2) 1649.

ARTICLE 10.

As soon as departments of a central Austrian administration are in a position to operate satisfactorily, they will be directed to assume their respective functions as regards Austria as a whole. In the fulfilment of its tasks, the Allied Commission will thenceforward work through such departments. It will then be the duty of the Divisions of the Allied Commission to control the activities of the respective departments and to communicate to them the decisions of the Allied Council and Executive Committee.

ARTICLE 11.

(a) An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Komendatura) consisting of four Commandants, one from each Power, appointed by their respective Commissioners, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the City of Vienna. Each of the Commandants will serve in rotation, in the position of Chief Commandant, as head of the Inter-Allied Governing Authority.

(b) A Technical Staff, consisting of personnel of each of the four Powers, will be established under the Inter-Allied Governing Authority, and will be organised for the purpose of supervising and controlling the activities of the organs of the City of Vienna responsible for its municipal services.

(c) The Inter-Allied Governing Authority will operate under the general direction of the Allied Council and will receive orders through the Executive Committee.

ARTICLE 12.

The necessary liaison with the Governments of other United Nations chiefly interested will be ensured by the appointment by such Governments of military missions (which may include civilian members) to the Allied Council.

ARTICLE 13.

United Nations' organisations which may be admitted by the Allied Council to operate in Austria will, in respect of their activities in Austria, be subordinate to the Allied Commission and answerable to it.

ARTICLE 14.

The nature and extent of the Allied direction and guidance which will be required after the establishment of a freely elected Austrian Government recognised by the four Powers will form the subject of a separate agreement between those Powers.

The above text of the Agreement on Control Machinery in Austria between the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on 4th July, 1945.

Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission:	Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission:	Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission:	Representative of the Provisional Government of the French Republic on the European Advisory Commission:
JOHN G. WINANT	Ф Гусев ⁵	RONALD I. CAMPBELL	R. MASSIGLI

LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, S. W. 1.
4th July, 1945.

⁵ F Gusev.

No. 283

European Advisory Commission Agreement

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—An "Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on Zones of Occupation in Austria and the Administration of the City of Vienna" was signed *ad referendum* at a meeting of the European Advisory Commission at London on July 9, 1945. Notification of approval by the respective signatories was given by their representatives on the Commission on the following dates: the United Kingdom, July 12; France, July 16; the Soviet Union, July 21; and the United States, July 24, 1945. For the text of the agreement and for the annexed maps, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1600*; 61 Stat. (3) 2679.]

No. 284

740.00119 Control (Austria)/7-1545 : Telegram

The Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs (Erhardt) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

FLORENCE, July 15, 1945—9 a. m.

113. General Clark left for Brazil yesterday and returns July 26. British and French commanders have agreed with him that in his

[No. 284]

absence the deputy commanders should confer with Soviet officers in Vienna to settle details for taking over national sectors. Based on experience gained from Berlin entry it is felt that organization of HQ and movement of garrisons should be carefully planned and executed only after complete agreement with Soviet officers. Discussions will be purely military and no political advisers will be present. Assuming that agreements on zones and control machinery will be ratified by July 26 it is hoped that US, British and French CinC, accompanied by their political advisers, will enter Vienna soon thereafter and remain there permanently.

British courier returned July 13 from Koniev's HQ reporting US, British, French deputy commanders would be received 3 p. m., July 16. However, it was specified all three parties must proceed Vienna via Judenburg. Since it is important to US, French parties to travel via Linz not Judenburg, Pettigrew in Moscow has been requested to arrange for their taking that route July 16.

See General Clark's cable to AGWar for JCS July 12, ref Sgs 610.¹

ERHARDT

¹ Not printed.

BULGARIA, FINLAND, HUNGARY, AND RUMANIA
GOVERNMENTS, CONTROL COMMISSIONS, ELECTIONS, CONCLUSION
OF PEACE TREATIES, AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS¹

No. 285

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹

TOP SECRET

RECOMMENDED POLICY ON THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING DIPLO-
MATIC RELATIONS AND CONCLUDING PEACE TREATIES WITH THE
FORMER AXIS SATELLITE STATES

Information received from our representatives in Rumania and Bulgaria indicates that the Soviet authorities and the local Communist parties are actively engaged in establishing regimes based on the one-party or "one-front" system, thus excluding from political life all democratic elements which do not subordinate themselves to the "popular front" organizations which now hold governmental power. These organizations include several parties and groups, many of which bear the names of established popular parties, but they are dominated by the Communists and exclude important democratic groups which have a consistent record of opposition to the Nazis. A similar situation appears to be developing in Hungary although the government there is still a fairly representative coalition and not a "Communist-controlled" leftist bloc. The Soviet authorities have effectively prevented the American and British representatives in these countries from exercising any appreciable influence on this course of events. The proposals which we made in Moscow on the subject of the change of regime in Rumania² and the forthcoming elections in Bulgaria,³ with a view to application of the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe,⁴ were curtly rejected by the Soviet Government. In view of these developments our military representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, as well as our informal civilian representatives there, have consistently and unanimously urged that we make strong efforts to carry out the Declaration on Liberated Europe and use our full influence to prevent the crystal-

¹ Annex 4 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² See document No. 288, footnote 6, and document No. 301, footnote 1.

³ See document No. 286.

⁴ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

lization of the present situation into a system of one-party governments to the exclusion of democratic elements and in contradiction to the obligations assumed by the three Allied Governments at Yalta.

The Soviet Government has proposed that diplomatic relations be established immediately with Finland, Rumania and Bulgaria, and at a later date with Hungary.⁵ We would welcome the resumption of relations with Finland and have so informed the Soviet Govern-

⁵ This proposal was made in a message from Stalin to Truman dated May 27. See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 239.

On June 7 Harriman delivered to Molotov the following reply from Truman to Stalin (file No. 711.60/6-745):

"I have given considerable thought to your message of May 27 in which you propose that our Governments should establish diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania and Bulgaria at this time and with Hungary at a later time.

"The suggestion you have made shows that you feel, as I do, that we should endeavor to make the period of the armistice regimes as short as possible and also give prompt recognition to all efforts which may be made by those countries formerly our enemies to align themselves with the democratic principles of the allied nations. I agree, therefore, that at the earliest feasible time normal relations with these countries should be established.

"Accordingly, I am prepared to proceed with the exchange of diplomatic representatives with Finland at once because the Finnish people, through their elections and other political adjustments, have demonstrated their genuine devotion to democratic procedures and principles.

"However, I have not found in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria the same encouraging signs. Particularly in the latter two countries, I have been disturbed to find governments which do not accord to all democratic elements of the people the rights of free expression and which in their system of administration are, in my opinion, neither representative of or responsive to the will of the people. From Ambassador Harriman's note of March 14 you already know the reasons why the United States Government considers that the political situation in Rumania should be made the subject of consultation among the three principal allied governments. You are also aware of American concern over the proposed electoral procedures and certain other political manifestations in Bulgaria.

"It is my sincere hope that the time may soon come when I can accredit formal diplomatic representatives to these countries. To this end I am ready at any moment to have my representatives meet with Soviet and British representatives in order to concert more effectively our policies and actions in this area. This would, I think, be a constructive move towards the restoration of normal peace-time relations with them as independent states ready to assume the responsibilities and to share the benefits of participation in the family of nations.

"Prime Minister Churchill is being informed of this message."

To this message Stalin replied as follows on June 9 (file No. 711.60/6-1145):

"I have received your reply message on the question of reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria, Finland and Hungary.

"It can be seen from your message that you also consider desirable an earliest establishment of normal relations with the said countries. However, I do not see any reasons to give any preference to Finland in this matter, which unlike Roumania and Bulgaria did not participate with its armed forces on the side of the Allies in the war against Hitlerite Germany. The public opinion of the Soviet Union and the entire Soviet Command would not understand if Roumania and Bulgaria, whose armed forces participated actively in the defeat of Hitlerite Germany would be put in a worse position as compared to Finland.

"As regards the question of the political regime, in Roumania and Bulgaria are no less possibilities for democratic elements as, for instance, in Italy with whom the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have already reestablished diplomatic relations. On the other hand it is impossible not to note that lately the political development of Roumania and Bulgaria has entered a calm channel and I see no such facts which could be cause for anxiety for the further development of democratic beginnings in those countries. In connection

ment. Such a step would in the case of the Balkan states, however, represent Allied approval of the present unrepresentative governments in those countries and would entrench them in power. The British Government has suggested to us⁶ that it would be desirable to proceed immediately with the conclusion of peace treaties with the ex-satellites. It is the British belief that the conclusion of peace will bring about the withdrawal of Soviet troops and give democratic elements a chance to assert themselves. In reply to these proposals the Department has agreed in principle that it is desirable to conclude peace and establish diplomatic relations with the ex-satellites as soon as possible, but has stated that we are not convinced that democratic principles and the interests of the peoples involved would be best served by recognizing or concluding peace with the present governments; furthermore, we are unwilling to abandon our proposals for real participation in the Allied Control Commissions and an improved status for our representatives. We have indicated our expectation that the question will be discussed at the forthcoming tripartite conference.⁷

There appear to be three main courses of action open to us:

1. *To accept Stalin's proposal and establish relations with the present governments.*

This policy would involve abandonment of the attempt to put into practice the Declaration on Liberated Europe and tacit approval of the Soviet policy of installing in those countries Communist-dominated unrepresentative regimes which will look only to the east and will cut to a minimum all contacts with the United States. It would discourage democratic elements in those countries and probably pave the way for their elimination from the political scene. While this policy might contribute to the easing of our relations with the U. S. S. R. at the moment, it might well encourage the repetition of the same process in countries farther to the west.

Since Stalin's proposal did not mention peace treaties, it is presumed that the Soviet Government would expect the armistice regime to continue, as in Italy, after the exchange of diplomatic representatives. Under such an arrangement we would have deprived ourselves of a

with this it seems to me that there is no necessity in any special measures on the part of the Allies in respect to the said countries.

"That is why the Soviet Government adheres to the opinion that a further postponement of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria and Finland would not be expedient and that the question regarding Hungary could be settled somewhat later."

For Truman's reply, suggesting that the question be discussed at the Berlin Conference, see document No. 161. For Stalin's reply to that suggestion, see document No. 295.

⁶ The British suggestion referred to is not printed.

⁷ See document No. 291.

means of pressure on the local governments, and at the same time the Soviets would be able to act both through the local governments and through the Control Commissions and to continue in military occupation of these countries.

2. *To support the British proposal for the immediate conclusion of peace treaties with the present governments.*

The British proposal is based on the theory that the restoration of normal peacetime relationships will put an end to the direct Soviet influence exercised by virtue of the presence of Soviet troops and the powerful position of the Soviet representatives under the armistice agreements, and that the present governments would then find it impossible to survive. It is by no means certain that the present predominant Soviet influence would be greatly weakened by the conclusion of peace treaties and the withdrawal of troops, since the present pro-Soviet regimes would have acquired great authority and prestige merely by having signed the treaties and thus brought their countries back into the community of nations. If there has been no basic Allied agreement on these countries, it is doubtful that the Russians would allow themselves to be maneuvered out of their predominant position just because they had signed peace treaties and withdrawn all or most of their troops. It is possible that they may insist on keeping some troops in Rumania until all reparation obligations are fulfilled.

The British proposal, which necessarily involves diplomatic recognition is open to the principal objections made to the Soviet proposal, namely that it requires acceptance of the present governments as the legitimate representatives of the peoples of those countries and implies approval of the methods by which they came to power and have since exercised governmental authority. It would leave the responsibility for consulting the people on the question of basic governmental institutions in the hands of these unrepresentative governments, since it would be more difficult for the Allied Governments to act under the Declaration on Liberated Europe after concluding definitive peace treaties with them.

3. *To insist on the reorganization of the present governments or the holding of free general elections at an early date as a condition precedent to the establishment of diplomatic relations and the conclusion of peace.*

In order to attain at least the same position for which we have consistently striven in the case of United Nations now in the Soviet zone of military control (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Poland), where there are some elements not completely subservient to Moscow, it could be made clear to Stalin that we cannot accord diplomatic recognition to regimes such as those in Bulgaria and Rumania until

they have been fundamentally changed in line with the Declaration on Liberated Europe. Such a policy would be consistent with our public declarations and with our recent representations to the Soviet and British Governments. We cannot accept the Soviet contention that the present regimes are coalitions of all democratic groups and are "truly representative of the broad masses of the population", or that they can be relied upon to hold free elections.

Whether the desired reorganization of the Governments is brought about by Allied consultation and agreement on an interim regime which would then conduct elections, or by the holding of elections, with adequate guarantees that they would be free, under the present governments, probably would be immaterial. Under the first alternative we might be willing to establish diplomatic relations and conclude peace before the elections: under the second we would wish to postpone this step until after new governments were formed on the basis of the elections. In either case, should it be decided that Allied observation or supervision of elections was necessary as a means of assuring the freest possible choice on the part of the people, we should be willing to assign our quota of observers. It might be that the elections would be "rigged" any way, but we would at least have the reports of [our] own observers on which to base subsequent decisions. The supervision of elections by the Allied Governments, including France, is definitely envisaged by the Declaration on Liberated Europe and would be a procedure well calculated to clarify our position with respect to the ex-satellite countries.

It is not a matter of great importance whether diplomatic relations are established before or after the conclusion of peace. The essential point is that neither should take place with puppet governments which have neither a representative character nor a mandate from the people.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that the third alternative be adopted, and that the following proposals be made:⁸

⁸ In Matthews' copy of the Briefing Book, recommendation 3 below has been stricken from the draft, with a manuscript marginal notation, "Rewrite". Manuscript revisions of recommendations 1 and 2 make those paragraphs read as follows:

"1. The three Allied Governments should agree on the necessity of the immediate reorganization of the present governments in Rumania and Bulgaria, in conformity with clause (c) of the third paragraph of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe.

"2. That there be immediate consultation to work out any procedures which may be necessary for the reorganization of these governments to include representatives of all significant democratic elements, in conformity with clause (d) of the 3rd par. of the Ya. Decl on lib Eur[.] Diplomatic recognition shall be accorded and peace treaties concluded with those countries as soon as such reorganization has taken place."

1. That the three Allied Governments agree in principle⁹ to the reorganization of the present governments in Rumania and Bulgaria, and should it become necessary, in Hungary, and to the postponement of diplomatic recognition and the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries until such reorganization has taken place.

2. That provision be made for tripartite consultation (later to include French representatives)¹⁰ to work out any procedures which may be necessary for the reorganization of the governments to include representatives of all significant democratic elements, with a view to the early holding of free and unfettered elections.

3. That these governments consider how best to assist the local governments in the holding of such elections, bearing in mind that while it may be preferable to have the actual conduct of elections in the hands of the local governments themselves rather than in those of Allied representatives, there must be adequate assurances that all democratic elements will have the opportunity to present candidates and that the voting will be in fact free.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

⁹ The words "in principle" have been deleted in Byrnes' copy

¹⁰ The parenthetical phrase has been deleted in Byrnes' copy.

No. 286

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

BULGARIAN BACKGROUND INFORMATION

SUMMARY

Since the formation of the present Fatherland Front Government in Bulgaria and the institution of the armistice regime under an Allied (Soviet) Control Commission, the Bulgarian Workers' Party (communist) has spared no effort to consolidate its control of the country. By means of political maneuvering and intimidation by the communist-controlled militia, moderate elements in the Agrarian, Social Democratic and Union-Zveno parties have been eliminated from the Fatherland Front, and the latter, still nominally including those parties, now faces the forthcoming elections, announced for August 26, with an entirely communist complexion.

The Allied Control Commission has entered the so-called "second" period (that following the cessation of hostilities) still without effective American and British participation, and the news blackout of the satellite countries is complete in Bulgaria, the United States Government having so far been unable to arrange for the entry of any American correspondents.

Soviet forces in the country are now said to number 200,000 and the recently concluded Bulgarian-U. S. S. R. trade pact¹ is contributing to the deterioration of a Bulgarian economy already strained by Soviet demands for provisions for her military establishment and for export to Russia.

Meanwhile, Bulgaria continues to orient itself toward Yugoslavia, federation with that country or some other similar close association being widely discussed. A Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of friendship² is proposed and a Yugoslav Minister has been appointed to Sofia.

[WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1945.

BULGARIAN BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Government

Bulgaria is a constitutional monarchy, the constitution of 1879, as subsequently revised, providing for a strongly centralized government. The present Bulgarian Government was formed under the Premiership of Kimon Georgiev on September 9, 1944, from a coalition group known as the Fatherland Front and includes four representatives of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (communist), four of the Agrarian Party, four of the Union-Zveno, two of the Social Democratic Party and two independents, the communists being the most influential and the Agrarians having the largest popular following. A regency Council exercises the royal prerogatives on behalf of the young King Simeon II.

The Allied Control Commission

Pursuant to Article 18 of the armistice signed at Moscow on October 28, 1944,³ an Allied Control Commission has been set up in Sofia to supervise the execution of the armistice terms. The Chairman of the Commission is, according to the armistice, the Russian member, General Biryusov. The American member is Major General John A. Crane and the British member is Major General W. H. Oxley. During the period preceding the cessation of hostilities it was provided in the armistice agreement that the Commission should be under the general direction of the Soviet member. The American and British members have not been permitted to take any part in the work of the Commission. Only two meetings of the Commission have been held despite formal representations by the American and British representatives. Decisions in the name of the Commission have been taken by the Soviet Chairman without prior consultation or subsequent notification to his Allied colleagues. Now that hostilities in Europe have ceased, the American and British Governments have approached the Soviet

¹ Signed at Moscow, March 14-15, 1945. Not printed.

² For the text of this proposed agreement, as eventually signed on November 27, 1947, see Department of State, *Documents and State Papers*, vol. 1, p. 241.

³ Executive Agreement Series No. 437; 58 Stat. (2) 1498.

Government with a view to obtaining actual participation by the American and British delegates during this second period as provided in Article 18 of the armistice agreement.⁴

It should be particularly noted that under the Commission regime, the United States Government has been unable to arrange for the entry of journalists into Bulgaria and has encountered prolonged delay in getting clearance for official American personnel.

American Civilian Representation in Bulgaria

Since Bulgaria still has the status of an enemy nation and has not been made a co-belligerent, no formal diplomatic relations are maintained between that country and the United States or Britain. The United States is informally represented in Bulgaria by Mr. Maynard Barnes, a Foreign Service Officer with the personal rank of Minister and the British Government is similarly represented by Mr. William Houstoun-Boswall.

Political Conditions

Since the establishment of the present government, the Bulgarian Workers' Party (communist) has been actively engaged in an effort to achieve complete political domination of Bulgaria. Working within the framework of the Fatherland Front and with the ruthless assistance of the Communist-controlled militia, it has endeavored to purge the country of non-communist opponents, branding all unfriendly elements not subservient to its will as "Fascist". It has succeeded in eliminating non-communist sympathizers from the direction of its ostensible opposition parties, the Agrarian and the Social Democrats. With a view to the forthcoming elections announced for August 26, the Communists have succeeded in reducing the Agrarian and Social Democratic representation in the Fatherland Front to the position of communist supporters. Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, Leader of the majority Agrarians[,] has been eliminated not only from his position as Secretary General of the Agrarian Party but also from the Party itself, following a campaign of vilification. The election decree recently approved by

⁴ The approach referred to was made by Harriman on June 14 on the basis of instructions from Grew contained in telegram No. 1281 of June 12 (file No. 740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/5-1745). These instructions were substantially the same as those of May 28 relating to Hungary (see document No. 287, footnote 5), with two exceptions: (a) Since the terms of the Bulgarian armistice were worked out in London, the United States reservation with respect to article 18 had been made in letters of October 22, 1944, from the American Ambassador at London to the Soviet and British Representatives on the European Advisory Commission and in a letter of January 5, 1945, to the Soviet Ambassador at London. (b) The following language was substituted for the last two sentences of the antepenultimate paragraph of the instructions relating to Hungary: "Although Article 18 of the Armistice terms provides for the 'participation' of the United States representative in regulating and supervising the execution of the Armistice terms effective participation has in practice thus far been denied us."

the Regents will preclude the submission of separate electoral lists by parties outside the Communist dominated Fatherland Front. Prior to the publication of this decree the United States and United Kingdom Governments had proposed to the Soviet Government that a tripartite commission be formed to observe the conduct of the elections.⁵ The Soviets replied that they did not expect elections to be held at once and that, in any case, they did not consider outside interference to be necessary, since the Bulgarian authorities were capable of conducting elections themselves as the Finns had done.

Relations with the Soviet Union

The Soviet authorities are in effective control of Bulgaria, not only through the Control Commission but also as a result of the presence in the country of a sizable Soviet army, recently increased to 200,000 men.

The Communist George Dimitrov who resides in Moscow is regarded as the supreme authority in the Fatherland Front.

The Soviet Government has concluded a trade agreement with the Bulgarians, of which an official text has not been furnished us. In effect, the agreement is disadvantageous to Bulgarian economy. In addition the Soviet authorities are taking large quantities of supplies from the country both for their local military forces and for shipment to Russia.

Relations with Greece and Yugoslavia

Bulgarian foreign relations are under the supervision of the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission. Yugoslavia has appointed a minister to Bulgaria and the American Government has made representations⁶ in Moscow against the appointment, which is contrary to the policy previously agreed to by the Soviet Government that members of the United Nations should not appoint diplomatic representatives to former satellite countries during this period. Other evidence of an effort by the Bulgarian Government, with Soviet support, to increase Bulgarian ties with Yugoslavia is noticeable in statements by Bulgarian officials and the Bulgarian press concerning the close attachment of the two countries and in the fact that Bulgarian deliveries to Yugoslavia under the armistice are understood to have been made in considerable quantities. References to Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation or similar close association appear continuously and a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of friendship and mutual assistance has been proposed. The latter has been the subject of discussions between the British, United States and Soviet representatives in Moscow. It is the American and British view that such a pact would be a disturbing

⁵ The proposals referred to and the Soviet reply are not printed.

⁶ Not printed.

influence in the Balkans arousing fear and suspicion among the neighbors of the two countries. The Soviet Government holds the opposite opinion.

As regards Greece, the Soviet Government has failed to reply to repeated requests to permit Greece to appoint a liaison officer to the Control Commission as the Yugoslavs have been allowed to do and the only reparations so far received by Greece from Bulgaria under the armistice are said to be 17 horses and 85 mules. A Greek request for consular representation in Bulgaria is likewise unanswered.

[WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1945.

No. 287

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

HUNGARY: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

SUMMARY

1. *Execution of the Armistice*

The provisional Hungarian Government signed an armistice with the three principal Allied Governments on January 20, 1945.¹ Enforcement of the terms, with which Hungary has thus far complied more or less satisfactorily, rests with the Allied Control Commission established by the armistice. Executory and administrative functions of the Commission have been in the hands of the Soviet military authorities, who have made decisions without reference to the views of the American and British representatives. It is hoped that provision will now be made for the active participation of the latter in the work of the Commission, especially since military considerations, after the surrender of Germany, are no longer paramount.

2. *The Economic Situation*

Hungary's economic life was badly disrupted by military operations and by Nazi looting. Soviet requisitioning on a large scale and heavy demands under the reparation clause of the armistice are making the situation even more difficult, so that Hungary will be able to produce this year only a fraction of its normal production. Probably Hungary will have no surplus of agricultural or industrial products for export to other European countries or the United States.

¹ Executive Agreement Series No. 456; 59 Stat. (2) 1321.

3. *The Political Situation*

The present "Provisional National Government" is a coalition regime representing all important anti-Nazi parties. Real political power is in the hands of the party organizations and leaders, the strongest of which are the Communists although their popular support in terms of numbers may not be great. The Soviet Government has not attempted to install a purely leftist regime as in Rumania. We believe nevertheless that the three powers should reach agreement on the application in Hungary of the Yalta Declaration,² so that the forthcoming elections may be truly free.

[WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1945.

HUNGARY: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. *Long-range American Interest*

The principal long-range American interest in Hungary is that that country should once more become a peaceful member of the community of nations and should not, either through its relationships with larger powers or through the policies of its own rulers, become a menace to peace. It is our belief that this aim is most likely of attainment if Hungary is an independent state with a government of its own choosing, cooperating closely with neighboring states, and if solutions of its territorial and economic problems are found which represent a maximum contribution to the stability of the region.

2. *Execution of the Armistice*

Hungary, as an enemy state which was associated with Germany's aggressions since 1938³ and the last satellite to desert Germany, has no valid claim to leniency on the part of the Allies. In accordance with the armistice terms which it signed on January 20, 1945, which were roughly the same as those for Rumania, Hungary was to participate in the war against Germany, but by the time Germany surrendered Hungary had made no significant military contribution to the Allied victory.

The armistice agreement, to which all three principal Allies were parties, established an Allied Control Commission which has operated under the direction of its Soviet chairman, the American and British members having more or less the status of observers. The latter were not allowed to exercise all the rights vouchsafed to them by the agreed statutes of the Control Commission⁴ during the period preceding Germany's surrender. For the "second period" of the

² On Liberated Europe. See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

³ By the Vienna Arbitration Award of November 2, 1938, which was engineered by Germany and Italy, Hungary received some 5,000 square miles of southern Slovakia. Hungary joined the Anti-Comintern Pact on February 24, 1939.

⁴ Not printed.

armistice, following Germany's surrender, we have proposed, in accordance with a reservation made at the time the armistice was signed, that the Commission be made genuinely tripartite.⁵ The Soviet Government has not replied to this proposal.

⁵ The proposal referred to was sent by Grew to Harriman in telegram No. 1168 of May 28 (repeated to the American Representative in Hungary as telegram No. 57 of the same date), as follows (file No. 740.00119 E. W./5-2845):

"During the discussions in Moscow on armistice terms for Hungary full agreement was not reached on the wording of Article 18 concerning the Allied Control Commission. In accepting the text of that Article as it appeared in the terms signed on January 20, the American Ambassador in Moscow reserved this Government's position in identical letters addressed to the Soviet and British Governments. These letters stated the opinion of the United States Government that Article 18 should have included an additional provision as follows: 'Upon the conclusion of hostilities against Germany and until the conclusion of peace with Hungary the ACC will supervise the execution of the Armistice according to instructions of the Governments of the U. S. A., the U. S. S. R., and U. K.', and that since such a clause was not included the United States Government might consider it necessary to confer at a later date with the Soviet and British Governments regarding the detailed manner in which Article 18 should be implemented during the period following the cessation of hostilities against Germany.

"In view of the end of hostilities with Germany, the United States Government considers it appropriate to reopen at this time discussion among the three Allied Governments on the subject of the organization and functions of the ACC for Hungary in this second period.

"The United States Government presents the following proposals as a basis for discussion among the three Governments:

"(1) The ACC, the functions of which should remain limited to the enforcement of the terms of armistice, should operate henceforward under standing instructions of the three Allied Governments, whose principal representatives on the ACC would have equal status, although the Soviet representative would be Chairman.

"(2) ACC decisions should have the concurrence of all three principal representatives, who would refer to their respective Governments for instructions on important questions of policy.

"(3) All three Allied Governments should have the right to be represented on the sections and subcommittees of the ACC, but need not be represented in equal numbers.

"In submitting the foregoing proposals we are desirous of reaching an agreement which will eliminate all misunderstanding respecting the rights to which the American Representative on the ACC is entitled. Although the ACC statutes agreed upon in Moscow on January 20 expressly provided that during the first period the U. S. and U. K. representatives should have the right to receive oral and written information from the Soviet officials of the Commission on any matter connected with the fulfillment of the Armistice Agreement, to receive copies of all communications, reports and other documents which might interest the U. S. and U. K. Governments, and to be informed of policy directions prior to their issuance in the name of the ACC to the Hungarian authorities, these provisions, as General Key informed Marshal Voroshilov on April 30, have not been carried out. There has moreover been but one full meeting of the ACC since its establishment.

"The U. S. Government has been aware that in this first period military operations were conducted in or near Hungarian territory, and that direct military responsibility in Hungary lay with the Soviet High Command. Since military considerations were recognized as overriding, this Government was willing temporarily to subordinate its own interests and responsibilities in Hungary to the common interest and responsibility of the successful prosecution of Allied military operations. This Government has been none the less concerned over the failure to accord to the American representative the rights and prerogatives guaranteed by the ACC statutes. These grounds for complaint will of course disappear if the ACC operates henceforth as a tripartite body.

"In as much as the surrender of Germany has now greatly reduced the importance of the factor of military responsibility, the U. S. Government is especially

In general it can be said that the provisional Hungarian Government has complied with the armistice terms to the best of its ability. It has enacted a series of decrees based on the various clauses of the agreement and has put them into effect. The ultimate authority in the country is of course the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission, which has officers in local centers throughout Hungary to ensure compliance with the armistice obligations.

3. *The Economic Situation*

Hungary's economic life was badly disrupted by military operations and by the removal of supplies, equipment and key personnel by the Germans. For the next year at least there will be no surplus for export, and Hungary will be unable to satisfy its own needs in many products. The situation has been aggravated by heavy Soviet requisitioning, since for some time there have been from one to two million Soviet troops in Hungary, and by the removal of capital equipment and commodities to the Soviet Union as war booty or on reparation account under the armistice. A six-year agreement on reparation deliveries was signed on June 15, 1945.⁶ American representatives have had no part in these arrangements. However, at the time the armistice terms were negotiated and the total sum of Hungary's reparation obligation to the U. S. S. R. was fixed, we formally reserved the right to reopen the question if in the administration of the reparation clause American interests should be unwarrantably prejudiced.⁷

4. *The Political Situation*

The successive governments in Budapest during 1944 having been either unwilling or unable to surrender to the Allies, in December the Russians took the step of sponsoring the establishment of a "Provisional National Government" in the Soviet-occupied eastern part of Hungary. This government accepted the armistice terms presented by the three Allied Governments and has since established its administration throughout Hungary. It is a coalition government headed by a conservative general⁸ and includes representatives of the five principal parties of the center and the left. There is also a provisional assembly in which the Communists have the strongest representation. Real political power resides not in the cabinet or the assembly but in

desirous of reaching with the Soviet and British Governments as soon as possible full agreement on the organization and functions of the ACC in the second period along the lines suggested in the present communication."

Harriman reported on June 2 (telegram No. 1876, file No. 740.00119 Control (Hungary)/6-245) that this proposal had been transmitted to the Soviet Government on June 1.

⁶ At Budapest. Not printed.

⁷ The reservation referred to is not printed.

⁸ Colonel General Béla Miklós.

the party organizations and leaders, of whom the Communists, encouraged by the presence of the Red Army, are the strongest.

There have been some instances of direct Soviet intervention in Hungarian internal affairs, but there has been no attempt, as in Rumania, to substitute a purely leftist regime for the present coalition government. We believe nevertheless that the principal Allied Governments should come to an agreement on the supervision of elections in Hungary, so that the transition from the present provisional regime to a permanent government may take place in accordance with the principles of the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe.

[WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1945.

No. 288

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

RUMANIA: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

SUMMARY

1. *Execution of the Armistice*

An Allied Control Commission, in which the Soviet member exercises all real authority although the United States and the United Kingdom are also represented, was established to enforce the terms of armistice which Rumania accepted from the three principal Allied Governments on September 12, 1944.¹ The Soviet authorities in Rumania have interpreted and enforced the armistice terms without reference to the views of the American and British representatives. It is hoped that provision will now be made for active participation of the latter in the work of the Commission, especially since military considerations, after the surrender of Germany, are no longer paramount.

2. *The Economic Situation*

Heavy Soviet demands under the armistice plus the obligations Rumania has undertaken in recently concluded economic agreements with the U. S. S. R.² probably will have the effect of breaking down Rumania's economy, tying Rumania economically to the Soviet Union to the exclusion of trade and financial relations with other countries and making it impossible for American business interests to operate in Rumania.

¹ Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (2) 1712.

² Signed at Moscow, May 8, 1945. Text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxlix, p. 876.

3. *The Political Situation*

The present Groza Government was imposed on Rumania by the Soviet Government. It represents only the leftist bloc and not the National Peasant and National Liberal parties, which our representatives believe have a large popular following. We regard it as an unrepresentative minority government and have attempted to bring about conversations with the Soviet and British Governments³ in order to review the whole situation in the light of the Declaration on Liberated Europe.⁴ Although our request was refused by the Soviet Government, we still hope to secure tripartite agreement on the reorganization of the Rumanian government and on procedures for free elections.

[WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1945.

RUMANIA: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. *Long-range American Interest*

The long-range interest of the United States in the maintenance of peace and stability in eastern Europe may be involved in the issues now arising in connection with the control of Rumania during the armistice period and with the peace settlement. The fundamental problem is the degree to which the United States will acquiesce in the exercise by the Soviet Union of a dominant or exclusive political and economic influence in Rumania. It poses the need for reconciling, in this region, our policy of cooperation with the U. S. S. R. for the preservation of peace with our principles and commitments embodied in the Atlantic Charter,⁵ in the Yalta agreements, and in many general statements of policy.

2. *Execution of the Armistice*

Rumania surrendered to the three principal Allies on August 23, 1944 and signed an armistice with them in Moscow on September 12. The armistice terms were presented to the Rumanians after agreement on them was reached by the three Allied Governments. In accordance with them Rumania participated in the war against Germany maintaining about fourteen divisions in the field.

An Allied Control Commission was established by the armistice agreement for the enforcement of its terms. As Rumania was in the Soviet Theater of military operations, the Soviet military authorities have exercised the administrative and executory functions of the Commission, the American and British members having more or less the position of observers. In interpreting and enforcing the armistice terms the Soviet authorities have acted without reference to the views

³ See document No. 301, footnote 1.

⁴ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

⁵ Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603.

of the United States and British Governments or of the representatives of those Governments in Rumania.

By their presence on the Allied Control Commission the American representatives bear a certain responsibility for its decisions in which they have no voice. It is hoped that provision will be made for their actual participation, particularly now that the Commission will be concerned less with the military clauses of the armistice and more with the problems of transition to normal peacetime relations between Rumania and the United Nations. We have proposed that the Commission be made truly tripartite ⁶ but have received no reply to our proposal from the Soviet Government.

⁶ Grew informed Harriman as follows in telegram No. 1257 of June 8 (file No. 740.00119 EW/6-845):

"General Vinogradov has told General Schuyler in Bucharest that Soviet ACC authorities in Rumania are making recommendations to Moscow on possible changes in Rumanian armistice to meet changed situation brought about by end of hostilities in Europe. Vinogradov asked Schuyler for US Govt's suggestions on this matter. Schuyler is withholding reply pending receipt of instructions. (Sent to Moscow and London, repeated to Bucharest).

"While we do not know whether Soviet Govt proposes to reopen in Moscow more or less formal review of Rumanian armistice terms or merely to work out in Rumania a new approach to problems connected with execution of armistice agreement, it appears to us in either case to be a matter for discussion and agreement on government level. We believe it would be sufficient for three Allied Governments to reach informal understanding on interpretation and application of armistice terms in second period without actually re-negotiating the Armistice Agreement of September 12.

"Please inform Soviet Government of General Vinogradov's approach to General Schuyler, stating this Govt's readiness to participate in discussions on this subject in Moscow or elsewhere and to make certain concrete proposals. Your communication should then set forth for the information of Soviet Govt our view that the ACC should be reorganized along lines proposed for Hungarian ACC in Deptel 1168, May 28 [see document No. 287, footnote 5]. While this suggestion cannot be based on any reservation made at the time of the armistice negotiations and would involve modification of ACC procedures as set up under Article 18, in that ACC no longer would operate under general direction of Soviet High Command, we put it forward because we believe the situation requires such a change in Rumania as well as in Hungary and Bulgaria, our interests and general attitude being substantially the same in all three ex-satellite states.

"You may also say that, in view of the greatly reduced importance of the factor of military responsibility, we would expect the ACC, reorganized in the manner set forth in preceding paragraph, to exercise most of the functions assigned by the Armistice to the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

"For your information and general guidance the following are main points of Dept's thinking on execution of certain of the Articles of the Armistice in the second period in the event the subject is discussed in Moscow:

"1. Article 1, so far as it refers to Rumanian participation in military operations, should be considered no longer operative. Although Armistice does not provide for demobilization, as do Bulgarian and Hungarian armistice agreements, we would have no objection to any proposals for the reduction of the Rumanian Army, including units formed in USSR, to size necessary for purpose of maintaining order, a responsibility which should be transferred from Soviet High Command to Rumanian authorities.

"Transfer to the Rumanian Government of responsibility for keeping order raises the question of maintenance of Soviet forces in Rumania which presumably will be dealt with in accordance with article 6 of the Four-Nation Declaration of Moscow, October 30, 1943.

"2. Allied censorship provided for in Article 16 should be relaxed in order to

3. *The Economic Situation*

In the execution of the economic clauses of the armistice the Soviet Government has compelled Rumania to accept very heavy demands which we consider not wholly justified under the armistice. Fulfillment of these demands would, in the opinion of our representatives, speed up the present ruinous inflation, disrupt the entire economy of Rumania, and make it virtually impossible for Rumania to supply relief to such countries as Greece and Yugoslavia or to engage in trade with countries other than the U. S. S. R.

The Soviet Union has recently concluded economic agreements with Rumania under which Rumania's entire exportable surplus would go to the U. S. S. R., and special Soviet-Rumanian companies are to be formed for the operation of key Rumanian industries. If carried out, these agreements will have the effect of making Rumania economically dependent on the U. S. S. R., without economic contact with other countries outside eastern Europe. Under these conditions it will probably be impossible for American interests to engage in trade with Rumania or to carry on business in that country.

4. *The Political Situation*

The United States has maintained in Rumania since November 1944, in addition to our representation on the Allied Control Commission, an informal civilian mission headed by Mr. Burton Y. Berry, who is charged with the protection of American citizens and property interests.

From the time of its surrender Rumania was administered by a series of three coalition governments in which all the major parties, from the National Liberals on the right to the Communists on the extreme left, were represented. In the absence of general elections since 1937 these governments seemed to be roughly representative of the popular will as expressed openly in the pre-dictatorship period and more recently in the movement of opposition during the Anton-allow freedom of the press and of other forms of expression and the restoration of postal and telecommunications between Rumania and all Allied countries.

"3. Final settlement of Rumania's boundaries is properly a matter for the peace treaty between Rumania and the Allies. Article 19 provides for review 'at the peace settlement' of the return of Transylvania (or the greater part thereof). We are prepared to begin preliminary discussions with Soviet and British Governments concerning the procedures which may be adopted in arriving at a definitive settlement of this question, possibly in connection with general procedures for reaching agreement on other European territorial problems.

"4. There are several other matters connected with interpretation of the armistice, such as definition of war booty, demands for damages under Article 12 which provides only for specific restitution, etc., all of which might well be discussed in ACC if it is reorganized in accordance with our present proposal. Department will send you specific instructions on these points if they should be raised in Moscow."

Harriman informed Molotov of the views of the United States Government on June 12, and so reported to the Department of State on June 13 (telegram No. 2056, file No. 740.00119 E. W./6-1345).

escu regime. In February of this year an acute political crisis arose when the leftist parties, grouped in the National Democratic Front led by the Communists, began a campaign to overthrow the government and establish a purely leftist regime. This campaign had the support of the Soviet press and radio and was aided by measures taken by the Soviet authorities in Rumania. It culminated in the visit to Bucharest of Vice-Commissar Vyshinsky, who forced the Rumanian King to dismiss the Radescu Government and to install a leftist government under Petru Groza.

We did not regard the Groza regime as a broadly representative interim government within the meaning of the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe and have since maintained an attitude of reserve toward it. On March 14 we formally invoked that Declaration, requesting tripartite consultation on the political situation in Rumania.⁷ The British Government accepted the proposal, but the Soviet Government refused, saying that it did not believe any further steps were necessary.⁸ It accepted responsibility for the change of regime in Rumania, justifying its action on the ground that the Radescu Government had failed to keep order in the rear of the Red Army and that the Groza Government had restored order and was truly representative of the democratic elements of the population.

The Groza regime, which is dominated by the Communists, has followed a policy of full compliance with all Soviet desires and of suppression of political opposition, which is represented chiefly by the National Peasant and National Liberal Parties. Unless the government is reorganized to include representatives of these parties, or unless elections are supervised by representatives of the Allied Governments, it is obvious that the Rumanian people will not be given an opportunity to choose freely the institutions under which they are to live.

[WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1945.

⁷ The communication referred to is not printed.

⁸ See document No. 301, footnote 1.

No. 289

Moscow Embassy Files—711 Hungary—ACC

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

SECRET
No. 659

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1945.

The Acting Secretary of State encloses for the Ambassador's background information a copy of recommendations made by Major General William S. Key, American Representative on the Allied

Control Commission for Hungary, for the reorganization of the Control Commission in the second period of the Armistice, in the form of a revised draft of the present statutes of the Commission, together with a copy of General Key's explanatory comments.¹

Copies of the enclosed documents have also been transmitted to the American Embassy in London.

C[LOYCE] K H[USTON]

[Enclosure 1]

SECRET

[BUDAPEST,] 5 JUNE 1945.

DRAFT OF STATUTES OF THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
IN HUNGARY

(NOTE: By this draft it is intended to prescribe the organization and procedure of the Commission during the second period of the Armistice, i. e., from the end of hostilities against Germany, May 8th, to the conclusion of peace. In their present form the Statutes prescribe the organization and procedure, in certain respects, only for the first period of the Armistice, i. e., from the date of the Armistice Agreement, January 20th, to the end of hostilities against Germany. Consequently certain old provisions, applicable only to the first period, may now be omitted, and certain new provisions are required. So far as feasible the form and terminology of the present Statutes have been retained.)

1. The principal functions of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary shall consist of the regulation and control, for the period up to the conclusion of peace, over the exact fulfillment of the Armistice terms set forth in the Agreement concluded on the 20th January 1945 between the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, on the one hand, and the Provisional National Government of Hungary on the other.

2. The Allied Control Commission shall be headed by a Chairman who shall be a representative of the Soviet High Command and the Commander of Soviet Forces in Hungary. The Chiefs of the American and British Missions shall be Vice Chairmen of the Commission. The Chairman may also appoint a third Vice Chairman of the Commission and such political and military assistants as may be required, and a Chief of Staff of the Commission. Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States will be included in the composition of the Control Commission and of each division thereof. The Allied Control Commission shall have its own seal and its headquarters shall be at Budapest.

¹ The two enclosures, together with a covering memorandum, had been referred on June 18 to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Europe as SWNCC 151/D. For the report of the Subcommittee, see the attachment to document No. 808, printed in vol. II.

3. The Allied Control Commission shall be composed of—

- (a) A staff.
- (b) A political division.
- (c) An administrative division.
- (d) A Military division.
- (e) An Air force division.
- (f) A river fleet division.
- (g) An economic division.

The staff will include officers of the armed forces of all three participating governments and will have a liaison section. The duties of the liaison section will include receipt from and transmission to the Hungarian Government of all communications, reports, directives, or other documents relating to the fulfillment of the Armistice terms.

4. The Chairman shall call meetings of the Commission at least twice each month and shall cause agenda to be prepared for such meetings and delivered to each participating government at least two days in advance of the meeting for which prepared. Only matters appearing on the agenda shall be considered at each meeting. Questions of policy shall be referred to the governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, and decisions of the Commission shall be made only upon the concurrence of the three participating governments.

5. The representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States shall have the right

(a) To receive oral and written information from any official of the Commission on all matters connected with the fulfillment of the Armistice Agreement;

(b) To put forward for consideration of the Commission proposals of their governments on questions connected with the fulfillment of the Armistice Agreement;

(c) To receive promptly copies of all communications, reports and other documents which may interest their respective governments;

(d) To make journeys and move freely anywhere, and by any means of transportation, on Hungarian territory, with complete freedom of entrance from outside Hungary to any point within Hungary, and with complete freedom of exit from Hungary;

(e) To participate in all general conferences of the Commission or meetings of Chiefs of Divisions of the Commission;

(f) To communicate with the Hungarian Government or any of its agencies, through the liaison section of the staff;

(g) To determine the size and composition of their own delegations;

(h) To communicate directly with their respective governments by cypher, telegram and by diplomatic mail, for which purpose they shall have the right to receive and dispatch diplomatic couriers by air at regular intervals, upon notification to the Chairman;

(i) To determine the amount of money required from the Hungarian Government for the expenses of their respective staffs and to obtain such funds through the Commission;

(j) To transport personnel, mail and supplies to and from Hungary by airplane or by motor or other transportation, upon notification to the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission;

(k) To call in specialist-officers or other experts for consultation, for making surveys or for working out special questions which arise during the work of the Allied Control Commission.

6. The Allied Control Commission shall have its representatives in the provinces, districts, ports and at the most important enterprises for the organization of local control.

[Enclosure 2]

SECRET

[BUDAPEST,] 5 June 1945.

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED STATUTES ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
FOR HUNGARY

1. This memorandum is written for the purpose of commenting upon certain proposed modifications in the original Statutes of the ACC agreed upon when the Armistice Agreement with Hungary was signed 20 January 1945. The draft to which the memorandum refers particularly is dated 5 June 1945.

2. These comments are intended to be read in connection with the note appearing at the head of the draft of 5 June 1945.

3. *Par. 1:* The word "principal" in the first sentence has been added. The U. S. Military Mission in Hungary has heretofore acted, and is continuing to act, in various matters which might be construed to be outside the functions of the ACC as defined in *Par. 1* of the present Statutes. The Mission has cared for and repatriated a great many U. S. airmen and numerous escaped U. S. prisoners of war, has obtained information concerning the military, economic and political situation in Hungary, et cet. It is believed that it would be undesirable to attempt to use language to cover such miscellaneous and minor services of the Mission, and that any such new provisions would be objected to. On the other hand these minor and collateral functions have not been objected to by our Allies, and it is thought that the functions specifically referred to may be described as "principal", so that it cannot be said that the miscellaneous services mentioned above are excluded from the legitimate field of the Mission's activity.

4. *Par. 2:* The new draft substantially modifies this Statute. The expression "headed by" is not approved, but in preparing the new draft it was thought best to change the terminology as slightly as possible, particularly in view of the problems of translation. Accordingly the first sentence of this paragraph is left in substantially its present form, but the meaning has been greatly changed by the

addition of the phrase "the Commander of Soviet Forces in Hungary." The experience of our Mission here has shown one of our most difficult problems to be the fact that the zone of the front line, which at this date still includes a substantial part of Hungary, is completely independent of the ACC. In fact the Chairman of the ACC is apparently not informed when the front line command removes an industrial plant or a vast amount of other property. Moreover, representatives of the American Mission are not permitted free movement in all of Hungary, the explanation being that certain areas desired to be entered are still under the "front line command", with which the Chairman of the ACC has no connection and over which he can exercise no control. The phrase added in the draft is intended to identify the "representative of the Soviet High Command" (as provided in the present statute) with the Chairman of the ACC. It is believed that this is the least objectionable form in which to deal with the problem. The second sentence of the new draft provides that the Chiefs of the American and British Missions are to be Vice Chairmen of the ACC. This is considered an important provision, and should be acceptable to our Allies, particularly since this paragraph also provides that the Chairman may appoint a third Vice Chairman. A further modification is to be noted: the present statute provides that "representatives of the UK and the USA will be included in the composition" of the ACC. This is insufficient, and the redraft provides "and of each division thereof."

5. *Par. 3:* The redraft of this Statute provides for a liaison section. This is based on our suggestion made heretofore that a Joint Secretariat should be established. The suggestion was objected to on the ground that the Statutes did not provide for a Joint Secretariat. In this case the terminology is not important and the redraft merely provides that the staff must include a liaison section which will be in effect a channel of communication. The purpose of the new provision is to make sure that each participating government will be completely informed as to matters relating to fulfillment of the Armistice terms.

6. *Par. 4:* This paragraph is entirely new as Par. 4 of the present Statutes relates only to the first period of the Armistice. This new provision attempts to insure that the Commission will meet at least twice each month and that all participating governments will be informed in *advance* of matters to be acted upon. The paragraph also provides that decisions of the Commission must be unanimous. The requirement of unanimity of the three Allied powers is almost

certain to meet objection and it may be reasonably argued that the requirement of unanimity, as insisted upon, should be limited to important questions of policy at government level. The last sentence of the redraft might perhaps be improved by some special limitation as "upon the concurrence of the Chairman and Vice Chairman." It is, of course, not intended that each decision of the Commission should necessarily be made at government level; the "concurrence" of a government would be expressed by its principal representative on the Commission.

7. *Par. 5:* The substance of this provision is new but in form it appears in the present Statutes. The present *Par. 5* applies only to the first period of the Armistice and provides that the British and American representatives may have certain rights. As redrawn the provision puts the representatives of all three governments upon the same basis, and enumerates specifically certain rights they may exercise. The specific provisions are mostly self-explanatory, but attention is invited to the following comments: As to "*f*", it should be noted that communications with the Hungarian Government are to be effected through the Liaison Section of the Staff, so that each Mission will be fully informed of such communications; as to "*j*", it is intended by this provision to avoid the problem of obtaining clearances for movements within Hungary and particularly for the arrival and departure of aircraft. It is recognized that Russian authorities should be fully informed in respect of arriving and departing personnel, but it is not considered that the power to veto such arrivals and departures should be conceded.

8. *Par. 6:* At the meeting of the ACC March 26th it was stated, in reply to a question, that the ACC, meaning the Russian Section of the ACC, had ten representatives in the provinces. At the second meeting of the ACC on 5 June 1945 it was stated, in answer to a question, that the number of provincial representatives had been increased to twenty. In the redraft this provision is retained.

9. The present Statutes contain a paragraph, No. 7, which provides that the Vice Chairman and assistants and Chiefs of Divisions (all Russian) may call specialist-officers for consultation. As redrawn this paragraph appears as a subdivision (*k*) of *Par. 5*, and the privilege may be exercised by representatives of all three Allied powers. The words "or other experts" are new.

10. Paragraph 8 of the present Statutes has been omitted. It provides that "Liaison with Hungarian governmental authorities shall be effected by representatives of the Allied Control Commission not lower than a chief of division", et cet. This provision is considered unnecessary in view of the provisions of *Par. 5 (f)*, under which rep-

representatives of any of the three powers may communicate with the Hungarian Government or any of its agencies.

WILLIAM S. KEY
Major General, U. S. A.
Chief U. S. Section

No. 290

740.00119 EW/6-2145 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes)*¹

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1945—7 p. m.

181. Brit FonOff has proposed that US and Brit Govts "work for early conclusion of peace treaties" with Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania rather than negotiate for improvement of status of our representatives in those countries. (Deptel 168 June 8 Urtel 311 June 11²). Principal Brit arguments are: (a) Soviet Government is not likely to give fuller voice to US and Brit representatives on ACC's and (b) conclusion of peace would entail withdrawal of Soviet troops and so free these countries from direct Soviet domination in determining their destinies. Sent to Sofia, Bucharest, Budapest; repeated to London and Moscow.

Please report urgently briefly your views and recommendations with particular reference to: (1) Brit thesis that advantages resulting from shortening armistice period by concluding peace would outweigh disadvantages of continuing meanwhile present basis of our participation in ACC and other activities and (2) ultimate effect which conclusion of peace with present government would have on problem of providing opportunity for people to determine the form of government under which they will live and on our fulfillment of Yalta undertakings, expressed in Declaration on Liberated Europe.

GREW
S[amuel] R[eber]

¹ The same message was sent at the same hour to the Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) as telegram No. 310, and to the Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) as telegram No. 113. It was repeated to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) as telegram No. 5008.

² Neither printed.

No. 291

740.00119 E. W./6-1145 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1945—8 p. m.

5097. Dept is requesting by telegram¹ repeated to you views and recommendations from Missions Budapest Bucharest Sofia regarding British proposal for proceeding to conclusion of peace treaties with Hungary Rumania Bulgaria (urtels 5631 June 4 and 5898 June 11²).

You may inform FO that pending receipt such views and recommendations our position is tentatively as follows:

1. We fully agree that it is desirable to conclude peace with these countries as soon as possible.

2. Since negotiation of peace treaties can not, particularly in view of complicated territorial settlements involved, reasonably be expected to be completed in brief period, we are unwilling meanwhile to abandon our proposals, already made for all these countries, for real participation in ACC's and improved status for our representatives.

3. We are not wholly convinced that democratic principles and interests of peoples involved would, with particular reference to Rumania and Bulgaria, be best served by our conclusion of peace with present governments, even though that procedure might hasten withdrawal of Soviet troops.

4. We accordingly believe that we should, while having conclusion of peace treaties as our goal and not neglecting any opportunities to hasten that end, continue (a) to demand real participation in ACC's and improved position for our representatives and (b) to press for application of Yalta principles in such important matters as constitution of governments and preparations for elections. (Sent to London; repeated to Moscow.)

We will give you definitive statement of our conclusions as formulated for presentation in forthcoming highest-level discussions with British and Russian[s] following receipt of views and recommendations requested from missions concerned.

GREW

¹ Document No. 290.

² Neither printed.

No. 292

874.01/6-2345 : Telegram

The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

SOFIA, June 23, 1945—11 p. m.

US URGENT

332. I consider the position taken in the Pres message to Stalin¹ (Dept's 168, June 8²) to be the only feasible one with respect to recognition of the Bulgarian Govt. (This is reply to Dept's 181, June 21³).

In my tel 257, May 19² I expressed the opinion that the time when official representations direct to the Bulgarian Govt could be made, should be hastened by us. This opinion was based on extreme doubt that our participation of [*in?*] the AC[C] could ever become effective. It was also based on the assumption that until a popularly elected Govt has taken office the reestablishment of official relations with Bulgaria is out of the question. Nothing has occurred since to cause me to alter my views. In fact, subsequent developments in Bulgaria have served to strengthen me in the opinion that for the time being our total effort should be devoted to convincing everyone concerned with the conduct of the forthcoming elections, with participation therein and with the outcome thereof, that the democratic powers will not conclude a treaty of peace with any minority-dominated Bulgarian Govt. In this connection please see my tels 302 and 303 of June 7; 311, June 11; 320 and 321 of June 16.⁴

I assumed if we were prepared to recognize a Govt we would also be prepared to negotiate peace with that Govt. Certainly the present Communist dominated Govt is not one with which we should be prepared to conclude a peace treaty, even though we do desire, as I think we should, to shorten the armistice period to the briefest time possible. To recognize the present Govt or any Govt that might issue from Communist-rigged elections could only confirm the Russians in their maximum objectives in this country at the expense of Bulgarian independence.

Seven months of observing the Russians in Bulgaria has convinced me that their maximum objectives here are:

1. Establishment of a one-party system with Communist influence dominant in the single party;
2. Assimilation of the royal militia to the Russian NKVD;

¹ i. e., Truman's message of June 7. See document No. 285, footnote 5.

² Not printed.

³ Document No. 290.

⁴ None printed.

3. Utmost expansion of Bulgaro-Soviet economic ties and limitation of Bulgar economic relations with other countries;

4. Complete control of Bulgar Army through less trained and communist formed [*sic*] officers on general staff and "purification" of the Bulgar military establishment in the sense of creating a "peoples army" with political commissars (assistant commanders) assigned to each subdivision thereof;

5. Use of Bulgaria as a stepping stone to seizure and retention of control of the Dardanelles and

6. Use of Bulgarian [*Bulgaria*] and Yugo to assure access to the Med. If Yugo cannot provide Trieste, and Albania the outlet from the Adriatic then a Bulgaro-Yugo federation can perhaps ensure Salonica to Russia's plans.

These, in my opinion, are Russ maximum objectives here. I also believe that insofar as Russ may be allowed to rest and recuperate from her exhaustive [*exhausting?*] efforts of the past four years so may she be expected to become insistent upon maximum solutions and scornful of compromise. I therefore believe that now is the moment for maximum resistance to Russ designs in all areas of interest to US with respect to the maintenance of peace and opposition to aggression.

If we are in the poker game of world affairs, and I assume we are, then we should play the game to the best of our ability. I believe that we have more chips than any one at the table. Circumstances in this area suggest that we should play our cards close to the chest but that when we do have a good hand we should not fail to make a bet. It seems, that in the case of elections in Bulgaria we do have a good hand, not four aces but enough to justify a call or even to make a modest bet. If we refuse to play the cards that come our way it hardly seems that we have the right to stay in the game. At any rate, if we do not make a serious effort to bring forth a Govt in Bulgaria in which the democratic elements of the country are effectively represented, we cannot with very good face claim later that we did our best in Bulgaria to carry out our commitments under the armistice terms and the Yalta declaration of [*on*] liberated Europe or to check the spread of totalitarian Govt.

If efforts to assure free elections fail then, in my opinion, would be the time to take stock again of a thoroughly unsatisfactory situation. If the Communists and the Russians have their way with the elections Russia will no doubt recognize the new Govt when it takes office and at the same time declare the armistice terms fulfilled. Hence the only time left to us during which we may possibly share in shaping the political future of this country for some time to come is between now and elections.

The Brit contention that conclusion of peace with Bulgaria now would entail withdrawal of Soviet troops in my opinion is spurious. On the other hand, conclusion of peace with a Bulgn Govt issuing

from free democratic elections would certainly afford the hope that in the event we raised the question with Russia of continued occupation of Bulgaria by its troops we could count not only upon having the mass of Bulgn people behind us, but also the Bulgn Govt. So long as the Govt is dominated by the Communists so [long] will the controlling elements of the Govt oppose us in any efforts to terminate the occupation and favor against us and the future of peace, the designs of Russia as I have outlined them in the second pgh of this tel.

In 1940 and again twice in the spring of 1941 Pierre Laval told me he knew so much more about the strength of Germany than Americans possibly could that any argument that the US would ultimately be at war with the [sic] Germany and Germany would finally be defeated could have no effect upon his decision to have [sic] France along the road of collaboration. Today the situation is much the same with the Communists in Bulgaria, and I fear even with the Zveno group in the present Govt they are convinced of the overwhelming power of Russia in world affairs.

As I see matters so far as Bulgaria is concerned, the hope of the democratic nations must be based on the wide mass of agrarian opinion in this country which remains truly democratic and truly desirous of cooperating with the nations of the west while not ignoring the legitimate right of Russia to insist that never again shall there be a Govt in Bulgaria which will turn the country over as a military spring board to the enemies of Russia. In making a determined effort for free, democratic elections we will, in my opinion, be supporting this overwhelming mass of the Bulgn population in the only way that is left to us.

I realize that much of the foregoing may appear unsubstantiated by chapter and verse and perhaps too personal in the views expressed. Space does not permit citation of chapter and verse. As for the personal nature of the views I can assure the Dept they are fully shared by Gen Crane who has asked me to associate him with them in this tel. I can also say that my Brit colleague⁵ and Gen Oxley agree with them in the main. Both of them have strongly recommended against recognition of the present govt.

Rptd to Moscow as 178.

BARNES

⁵ W. E. Houstoun-Boswall.

No. 293

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/6-2345 : Telegram

The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

BUCHAREST, June 23, 1945—noon.

US URGENT

430. The Brit political representative¹ and Mr. Berry discussed the question of a possible peace treaty with Rumania before the latter's departure for the US (Dept's 310, June 21²). Since he is scheduled to arrive in the US within a day or two of this telegram it is felt that Dept may wish to gain Mr. Berry's personal views.³ Rptd Moscow as 114 and London as 1.

Upon Genl Schuyler's return from an inspection trip in three days I will suggest to him that he may wish to present his views by telegram reflecting his experience upon the ACC.⁴

MELBOURNE

¹ J. H. Le Rougetel.

² See document No. 290, footnote 1.

³ No memorandum reflecting Berry's views on this subject has been found.

⁴ See documents Nos. 299 and 300.

No. 294

740.00119 Control (Hungary)/6-2345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1945—3 p. m.

1391. In connection with your discussion of organization and activities of ACC in Hungary during second period of Armistice (Dept's 1168, May 28¹) you may wish to consider desirability of proposing for inclusion in statutes following points which are based on draft prepared by General Key² and on which Dept would like to have your comments. (Sent to Moscow, repeated to London and Budapest³).

1. Functions of ACC would be limited to regulation and control of fulfillment of armistice terms, as stated in article 1 of present statutes.

2. Composition of ACC: chairman would represent Soviet Govt and Soviet Military Command in Hungary; two vice-chairmen would be chiefs of Brit and American Military Missions; third vice-chairman,

¹ See document No. 287, footnote 5.

² See enclosure 1 to document No. 289.

³ As telegram No. 124.

[No. 294]

such political and military assistants as may be required, and Chief of Staff of Commission would be appointed by chairman. Representatives of three powers should be included on several divisions of Control Commission. Liaison section should be provided to assure effective channel of communications between members of Commission and with Hungarian authorities.

3. There should be periodic meetings of Commission and agenda should be submitted to principal representatives of participating powers specified period in advance of meetings.

4. Action to be taken by Commission shall have been agreed upon unanimously by three Allied representatives; questions of important political nature which can be dealt with only on governmental level shall be referred to respective governments.

5. Specific provisions which should be included:

(a) Principal representatives of three powers will receive oral and written information, including copies of official communications, on all activities of Commission.

(b) They and their staffs may enter, move freely within, and leave Hungarian territory, communicate direct with their respective governments by usual methods of diplomatic communication including, after previous notification to chairman, dispatch and receipt of diplomatic couriers by air or otherwise and transport by any means of personnel, mail and supplies to and from Hungary.

(c) They may determine size and composition of their delegations and amount of funds required from Hungarian Govt for expenses of their respective staffs.

(d) They may call in specialist-officers or other experts in connection with special questions.

Dept prefers that if possible negotiations to revise ACC statutes along lines of foregoing points take place at Moscow. However, should it be decided to limit the discussion there to the broad principles included in Dept's 1168 with provision for working out procedural details at Budapest, General Key will be so informed in order that he may discuss latter with Brit and Soviet members of Commission⁴ on his return to Hungary.

Dept is forwarding by courier for your and General Deane's background information copy² of General Key's original draft and comments.⁵

GREW

S[amuel] R[eber]

⁴ The British and Soviet members of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary were Major-General Oliver Pearce Edgumbe and Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, respectively.

⁵ See document No. 289.

No. 295

760.61/6-2545

Marshal Stalin to President Truman ¹

[Translation]

I have received your message of June 19 ² regarding reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

I take notice that you continue to study this question. However, I adhere to my previous point of view that nothing can justify any further postponement in reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Roumania and Bulgaria.

[Moscow, June 23, 1945.]

¹ Printed from the text communicated to the Department of State in a memorandum of June 25 from Commander F. L. Pinney, Jr., Leahy's aide.

² See document No. 161.

No. 296

740.00119 Control (Hungary)/6-2545 : Telegram

The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

BUDAPEST, June 25, 1945—10 p. m.

US URGENT

211. Your 113, June 21.¹ See also Dept's 84, June 8 and my 176, June 19.²

1. It seems very doubtful that alternatives set forth under heading 1 of British thesis regarding conclusion of peace with Hungary are only choice. So far as I know our Govt has not exhausted possibility of winning Soviet consent to broaden basis of our participation in ACC. Until negotiations with Soviet Union on this subject prove futile we are not justified in assuming that equality in participation in ACC cannot be secured for our representatives. British may be more sensitive to impairment of their prestige here than we need be.

2. It may be expected that peace treaty if concluded will incorporate recently signed reparations agreement between USSR and Hungary ³ and will provide for sanctions apart from other political pressure in case of default on part of Hungary thereby affording pretext for unilateral action by USSR against Hungary when de-

¹ See document No. 290, footnote 1.

² Neither printed.

³ Signed June 15, 1945. Not printed.

fault occurs as it easily may. Hence in any case Soviet predominance here will continue after conclusion of peace.

3. Since as reported we have reason to think Hungarian election will not await conclusion of peace treaty if present plans are carried out it is plain that unless we soon secure full equality of status on ACC no election in spirit of Yalta declaration can take place here. Only full participation and cooperation of representatives of all three powers in ACC enabling their respective agents to supervise election effectively throughout this country can insure free expression of national will in any election. We are obligated under Yalta declaration to see free election held here. It is true that declaration does not specify timing of such election with reference to conclusion of peace but we can safely assume that no fair election will take place here unless the three allied powers take active part in preparing for and supervising it either before or after conclusion of peace. For these reasons I have recommended that Dept make persistent effort at Moscow to secure more than nominal American participation in ACC before any electoral law is promulgated here and an election is held thereunder.

In general it seems to me there is real risk of forfeiting such respect on part of USSR as we painfully gained during European hostilities if we accept prematurely British assumption cleavage between great powers in this area cannot be bridged thereby giving up fundamental principles previously agreed on at Yalta and in Hungarian armistice negotiations at Moscow.

I respectfully renew recommendation that every possibility be explored of securing agreement with Allies regarding any action of ACC in Hungary before giving consideration to alternatives. Townsend concurs.

Sent to Dept rptd to Moscow as 16 and to London as No. 2.

SCHOENFELD

No. 297

740.00119 EW/6-2545

*The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to
the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

BUCHAREST, June 25, 1945.

No. 382

Subject: The Rumanian Armistice Today

SIR: I have the honor to report upon the present status of the Rumanian Armistice Convention as it is regarded by Rumanian officials, the public, and the Soviet authorities. The Armistice Convention is an all-embracing instrument encompassing within the

application of its provisions the overwhelming bulk of the country's present problems. For this reason the subject is related to this Mission's despatches Nos. 354 and 371 of June 11 and 19, which are respectively entitled, "The Rumanian Attitude Today" and "The Russian Attitude Today".¹ It is thus the third in a series attempting to depict the present temper and atmosphere of Rumania upon the broadest political lines.

With the end of the war in Europe, Rumanians naturally consider that the Armistice Convention is in need of revision, since some of its provisions automatically become obsolete with the cessation of hostilities. This view is uniformly held by the opposition and the NDF Government. In fact, the Rumanian Commission for the Execution of the Armistice presented such a request to the Allied Control Commission, which was reported in the Mission's despatch No. 349 of June 8 entitled "Rumanian Note to the ACC Requesting Revisionary Studies of the Armistice Terms".²

Supplementing the Government's position, the opposition has sought to present arguments showing that the application of the Armistice far exceeded the original significance and meaning of the articles at the time of signature. A memorandum in French, attached as enclosure No. 1,² from Mr. Julius Maniu, President of the National Peasant Party, is illustrative of this viewpoint in the elaboration of the position that Rumania when signing the Armistice expected different terms and an administration of the Convention at variance with that later practiced. The main point of this memorandum rests in the contention that the original articles of surrender evolved in Cairo in the spring of 1944 were understood by the Rumanian groups cooperating in the *coup d'état* of August to be in force, with the addition of three points agreed upon by the Soviet Government through its representative in Stockholm.

Former Foreign Minister C. Visoianu, who was present in Moscow at the time of the signature of the Armistice and who, together with Prince Stirbey, had negotiated with the Allied Governments at Cairo, has prepared a statement concerning the matters discussed in Moscow at the time of the Armistice signature. Mr. Visoianu was not one of the Rumanian signatories at the Convention, but was, in fact, chief counselor of the Rumanian delegation. His statement in English is given as enclosure No. 2, and its object is to point to a certain part of the proceedings wherein the Allied Government representatives agreed that it was a matter of course that all "Soviet forces would leave Rumanian territory at the cessation of hostilities".

¹ Neither printed.

² Not printed.

The common bond uniting both the NDF and the opposition in urging a revision of the Armistice and a change in the practices of its administration is the realization that the Armistice Convention in itself is the country's greatest single problem, because through it every aspect of the country's life is vitally affected. Similarly, the application of its provisions through unilateral interpretation, such as is done by the dominant Soviet officials acting through the Allied Control Commission in the name of the three Allied Government[s], means political and economic chaos, a progressive social deterioration of the country, and most important to the NDF—growing popular discontent with the Government. This is the prospect confronting the NDF Government, of which all its elements were not fully aware when it assumed office, since the present Government is now being subjected to as strong criticism for non-fulfillment of the Armistice obligations as any of its predecessors.

In the very presence of Soviet troops in Rumania the Left Parties find a strong support for the attempted impression of their views upon the Rumanian public. The success of this indirect pressure, however, has been extremely limited, as described in this Mission's previous despatch entitled "The Rumanian Attitude Today". Nevertheless the opposition, which comprises the overwhelming majority of the country, realizes that it is impossible to hold free elections here so long as Soviet troops remain on the ground. Political life in the western democratic sense is made impossible to operate.

In economic matters by the constantly changing and ever-rising Soviet demands under the key articles 10, 11 and 12, it is impossible for any type of Government to evolve a coherent program. Brief examples might be given at this juncture. Article 11 describes the indemnity Rumania should pay for damages inflicted on the Soviet Union, which by June 1, were reported by the Rumanian Commission for Execution of the Armistice to have been fulfilled for that period by more than fifteen percent in an estimated yearly indemnity of two hundred billion *lei*. The present total bill to be paid over six years at present would amount to one thousand two hundred billion *lei*, which at the time of the signature of the protocol for the execution of Article 11 was considered satisfactory by the Soviet and Rumanian Governments. Under Article 10, which provides for Rumanian maintenance of all Red Army military establishments in the country, for the ten months of the Armistice up to July 1 it was reported by Rumanian sources that official requisitions had totaled four hundred billion *lei* and unofficial spot takings by Soviet troops were reckoned at four hundred and eighty-eight billion *lei*. Thus in that time [the] Rumanian Government has given two-thirds of the sum it is paying over six years under Article 11. And now there is the new shock of

maintaining well over a million men of the Red Army while they recuperate or proceed in very slow transit through Rumania bound for the Soviet Union.

The requests under the above two articles could be met in a sound economic way if it were not for what reputable Rumanian sources consider the catastrophic requests totalling one thousand billion *lei* suddenly being made under Article 12, wherein it is demanded that the country return establishments and material within a three-month time limit of everything the Russians consider Rumania to have taken in three years of operations in the Soviet Union. This includes crops and livestock consumed by the Rumanian Army in Russia and impossible to duplicate quickly. Details revealed of the impending economic chaos of the country caused through surprise requests of the Russians have served to keep the entire structure of the country in both an economic and social turmoil as inflation grips Rumania through Government large-scale printing of bank notes to meet sudden and quantitatively large Soviet demands.

The causes of conflict between Rumanians and Russians over the Armistice arise because of their fundamentally opposite concepts in considering the Convention. The Rumanians prefer to regard the Armistice clauses as a series of servitudes imposed upon them for a period of time as a result of their losing the war, as a means of assisting the United Nations in the war against Nazi Germany, and as a program of indemnification to the Soviet Union for the economic losses they caused that country. The Russians, on the other hand, interpret every Armistice clause in a political sense that startles and antagonizes the Rumanian population. The Rumanians see the Armistice as an itemized bill for damages, while the Russians see it as a guarantee of future security and of local political domination.

The Russians are aware that public sentiment because of the application of the Armistice is beginning to run stronger against them. Reports available to this Mission of peasants refusing to sell their livestock to the Government in return for newly printed bank notes and of isolated cases of force employed against Rumanian officials seeking to collect material to be turned over to the Soviet Union are certainly not unknown to the Soviet authorities. This has caused a series of sparks to arise from the growing friction between the Rumanian people and the occupying troops.

In the growing warmth of sparks of discontent, balanced Rumanians are alleging that the Soviet Union, failing to secure any popular support for its political ideas through the Rumanian Communist Party, has decided to utilize the many weapons offered by the Armistice, notably its economic clauses, to force unrest, inflation, and acute economic distress. These Rumanians fear this would virtually liquidate

the middle class and would inaugurate a chaotic period which would secure that growth of communism which present efforts have failed to achieve. However, if the Russians are sincerely concerned, as some believe, with the growing bitter Rumanian attitude over the application of the Armistice, they may be serious in their present criticism of NDF tactics in this respect. In that event, if one may utilize the Antonescu regime as a precedent, just as the latter was realistically backed by the Nazis because it could better control the country in contrast to the previously supported Legionnaire regime, so may the Russians decide to relax support for an outright communist-dominated Government and settle upon a composition that could more efficiently give them their desires under the Armistice and keep the country to the Soviet heel.

Respectfully yours,

ROY M. MELBOURNE

[Enclosure 2]

STATEMENT OF MR. C. VISOIANU CONCERNING THE APPLICATION
OF THE ARMISTICE

At the Moscow Conference which met in order to establish the armistice terms between the United Nations and Rumania, the Rumanian Delegation proposed to add to the text set up by the Three, one article with the following wording:

“At the cessation of hostilities against Hungary and Germany, the Soviet forces will leave Rumanian territory. At the same moment, the articles 3, 9, 10, 16 and its annex E, the restrictions included in article 17, connected with the persistence of military operations, will come to an end”.

The Chairman of the Conference, Mr. Molotov, replied that it was not necessary to add this article, because it was a matter of course that the Red Armies should leave Rumanian territory at the cessation of hostilities.

The Rumanian Delegation insisted upon the necessity of adding this article, making it clear that since it expressed the opinion of the United Nations it would not appear inconvenient for such an article to be included in the Agreement's text.

Mr. Molotov mentioned his point of view, repeating that it would be unnecessary to add a text for an idea that was a matter of course.

The talk was long on this matter, for the Rumanian Delegation insisted firmly on the point. For this reason the two Ambassadors (American and British)³ had to intervene. The United States Ambassador declared that it was useless to add the proposed article, be-

³ W. Averell Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, respectively.

cause "truly Mr. Molotov's opinion was the right one, that it was a matter of course that the Soviet forces would leave Rumanian territory at the cessation of hostilities". The British Ambassador added that "the Allies themselves had forces in France, and they were not asked for a similar declaration".

Seeing that it would not be possible to obtain the inclusion of the proposed text in the Agreement, in the name of the Rumanian Delegation I said: "I ask to be authorized to take official note that the Conference's opinion is that it should be unnecessary to add the proposed article because it was a matter of course that the Soviet armies would leave Rumanian territory at the cessation of hostilities".

Mr. Molotov, Chairman of the Conference, replied: "I agree".

2. We could also add that, as well as in the terms transmitted to the Rumanian Delegates at Cairo, as in the Armistice Agreement, it is said that the United Nations would not occupy Rumania, but only ask for a right of passage for their forces in pursuing military operations.

3. We consider then that the moment has arrived for the evacuation of Rumanian territory, according to the declarations and engagements taken by the Three. We are firmly convinced that this question, of such vital importance for Rumania, will find its legitimate solution on the occasion of the Conference of the Three which will take place soon—if, until then, it should not have been yet resolved, as it would be both right and reasonable. With the same occasion it will be for certain decided to put an end to the application of articles 3, 9, 10 and its annex E, the restrictions included in article 17 of the Armistice Agreement—which are connected with the presence of foreign forces in Rumania and with the direction of military operations.

No. 298

740.00119 E. W./6-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, June 26, 1945—7 p. m.

6433. FonOff official made following comments after receiving note based on your 5097, June 23: ¹

Tentative position of FonOff, which must be approved by PriMin, is that it is willing to adopt parallel action with Dept on question of Control Commissions in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. Embassy in Washington has reported Dept's attitude which differs from FonOff point of view that it is useless again to ask Russians for necessary radical steps to regularize position of Brit and AmReps on Commissions. However FonOff is willing to take measures parallel to

¹ Document No. 291.

those of Dept in making one more such request to Soviet Govt. Brit feel that, although Soviets would make minor concessions such as removing restrictions on Brit and AmReps and permitting more of our planes to go into those countries, Moscow would never allow itself to be maneuvered into position where Brit and AmReps would be able to outvote Soviets on matters dealing with reparations and requisitions. Sent to Dept as 6433; repeated to Moscow as 222.

FonOff will give us its considered views when they have been finally approved by Churchill.

WINANT

No. 299

Department of the Army Files : Telegram

*The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department*¹

TOP SECRET

[BUCHAREST,] 28 June 1945.

PRIORITY

M 1149 from Schuyler Rumania to AGWar for War Op Div top secret.

Having recently seen State Department message number 310 dated 21 June to US Representative in Rumania, I desire to invite attention of the War Department to certain considerations which have come to my attention as ACC Representative and which may have an important bearing on any decision relative to the British proposals [f]or conclusion of an early peace with Rumania:

1. Participation by the United States in peace negotiations with the present Government would appear to be tantamount to a recognition that such Government is acceptable to US. Since the Government as presently constituted is representative of only a small proportion of the Rumanian people, any such recognition by the United States would seem to be a distinct violation of principles agreed upon and announced at Yalta.² Undoubtedly any such action would be viewed in this light by the majority of the Rumanian people.

2. There appears to be little basis for the British assumption that with the conclusion of peace Soviet troops should be entirely withdrawn from the country. At present the authority of the Rumanian Government is by no means effective throughout the nation, and that

¹ Cf. telegram No. 439 of June 28 from the Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State ad interim (file No. 740.00119 EW/6-2845): "On the subject of the Dept's tel 310 of June 21 [document No. 290], please see Genl Schuyler's telegrams M-1149 and 1150 dated today."

² See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

Government appears quite willing to accept Soviet military assistance in preserving order generally patrolling the country. The Government, being representative of only a small minority, actually depends on this Russian backing to maintain its position, and its Communist elements, who are now virtually in full control, would without question be entirely content to have small Soviet forces remain here on one pretext or another long after an actual Treaty of Peace has been signed. The Russians themselves cannot fail to realize the danger of a *Coup d'État*, and would, I believe, be most reluctant to withdraw completely at this time.

3. Entirely apart from the need for continued Russian military support to maintain the Government, there is a further need for Russian troops to insure strict compliance with Armistice provisions as presently interpreted by Soviet authorities. Russian ACC officials with small groups of Russian soldiers are now scattered throughout the nation in all the more important towns and villages. Their activities have been highly effective in expediting Armistice deliveries. Assuming that current Soviet interpretations of the Armistice provisions will continue in force, it is doubtful that withdrawal of these Russian forces would be practicable for a long time to come.

4. Although the authority exercised by this delegation is admittedly meager and although our prestige is certainly suffering under present conditions, nevertheless I am convinced that as a result of the mere presence in Rumania of this and the British Delegation, the general political and economic situation within the country is somewhat better than it might otherwise have been. Moreover, by timely intervention with Soviet ACC authorities we have at times been able to afford some measure of protection to American firms and American commercial interests in the country. Since on conclusion of peace the ACC would be withdrawn, there would no longer exist in Rumania any over-all Allied Agency responsible for the protection of Allied interests. It is doubtful whether or not the present Communist controlled Government could be counted on to afford adequate protection.

In view of the above considerations, I strongly recommend against any action at this time looming [*looking?*] toward an early conclusion of peace with the present Rumanian Government. In lieu of such action, I feel that we should henceforth direct our policy for Rumania toward the attainment of certain clearly defined primary objectives with a view to effecting such improvement in the present situation as may be practicable in the light of other world problems.

These objectives will be discussed in a succeeding cable.³

³ Document No. 300.

No. 300

Department of the Army Files : Telegram

*The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department*¹

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

BUCHAREST, 28 June 1945.

M 1150 from Schuyler Rumania to AGWar for War Op Div. Top Secret. ComGenMed, ACC Bulgaria and ACC Hungary.

In my M-1149 of this date,² I outlined to the War Department certain considerations which may affect decision by the United States in the matter of current British proposals for conclusion of an early peace with Rumania. I now wish to set forth certain objectives toward which I believe our policy should be directed, with a view to improving the present situation to the maximum extent practicable.

First. There is an urgent and immediate need for establishing once and for all the total value of the obligations which Rumania must meet under the various clauses of the Armistice, particularly articles 10, 11 and 12. As reported in my M-1063 of 8 June 1945,³ present Russian demands under article 12 amount to some 950 billion *lei*, which sum is 75 percent as large as the entire six-year reparations obligations under article 11. Under article 10, Rumania has already furnished supplies and services for Russian troops amounting to approximately twice her article 11 reparations payments. With over one million troops now being quartered in Rumania, additional obligations under this article will tend to become astronomical. Considered altogether, total Russian demands under these three articles [are] sufficient to ruin completely the economic structure of the nation. Since our government participated in the initial discussions which established the reparations values prescribed in article 11 it is equally logical that we should now participate in full and final discussions as to total demands to be made on Rumania under the even more burdensome articles 10 and 12. It is recognized that the finally determined total value of goods and supplies to be furnished under these articles will be such as to place a severe strain on Rumanian resources, but the total should of course be determined with proper consideration for the minimum internal needs of the nation. The important point is that the definite fixing of the total of obligations will permit the country to begin readjusting itself to the new situation, with some hope of a return to normal life after these specific obligations have been met. Under present conditions no such hope exists and the national economy may be said to be operating entirely on a day-to-day basis.

¹ Received by the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference on July 16 as a retransmission from the War Department. See document No. 299, footnote 1.

² Document No. 299.

³ Not printed.

Second. There is of course an urgent need for the establishment of a truly tripartite Allied Control Commission. Though this is recognized as probably impracticable at present, nevertheless it is obvious that we should work toward a broadening of the commission as far as may be feasible. This objective needs no further elaboration here.

Third. There is also a basic need for establishment of a government in Rumania truly representative of all political parties. Such a government should not be made up of ministers hand picked by the Russians, but rather it should include proportionate representation from all parties, each such party being permitted to select or at least to pass upon its own representatives in the cabinet. The posts of Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior and Minister of War should go to individuals who either have no political affiliations or who are members of a "middle of the road" party.

Fourth. Even under normal peace time conditions, a representative government in Rumania would find it difficult to maintain itself in power. Rumanians have had no experience in democracy for over ten years, and the ability of members of any coalition government to work in harmony for the common goal, regardless of personal or party problems, must be open to question. With the added difficulties occasioned by the necessity for meeting the ever-increasing armistice burden, any such government will for some time to come require careful supervision by and probably active support from Allied agencies. To meet this end I feel we should insist that the Allied Control Commission, operating on as near to a tripartite basis as may be practicable, remain in existence in Rumania for a considerable period in a general supervisory capacity.

Fifth. One of the primary though not necessarily immediate duties of a representative government should be preparation for and the holding of free elections. Since Rumanians have had little experience in such matters, the ACC will find it necessary to supervise carefully all activities connected with the election. Detailed agreement on governmental levels should be reached as to exactly how and [to] what extent such control should be exercised. If practicable, arrangements should be made for increasing temporarily United States and British representations on the ACC in order to permit tripartite supervision throughout the country both during the electioneering period and during the elections themselves.

While I do not consider that our complete objectives as set forth above are attainable at the present time, nevertheless I feel that our attitude on these matters should be clearly stated on a high level and that we should continue to press these points at every opportunity. Until some generally satisfactory solution along these lines can be reached, our participation in the ACC should continue under the most favorable terms which may be practicable of attainment at present.

The contents of this cable have been discussed in detail with my British colleague on the ACC, Air Vice Marshal Stevenson, and he has expressed full agreement on all points covered therein.

No. 301

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-1745 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State ad interim to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1945—6 p. m.

1467. Dept left unanswered for a considerable time Molotov's note (reurtel 805, March 17¹) refusing our request for consultation on political situation in Rumania not through any inclination to accept Soviet arguments or to drop the matter but because it was desired to make the main effort on Polish issue (Your 756, March 14²). Sent to Moscow, repeated to Bucharest.

Dept now believes no useful purpose would be served by presenting detailed reply to Molotov's note of March 17 or taking any further action in Moscow prior to forthcoming conference of heads of Govts where we expect subject to be discussed in connection with situation in other ex-satellite states. Soviet Govt knows from President's reply to Stalin's proposal³ to establish diplomatic relations with these states that we remain unsatisfied with situation in Rumania.

GREW

H F[reeman] M[atthews]

¹ In this telegram (file No. 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-1745) Harriman had transmitted the following paraphrase of a letter from Molotov in response to an American *démarche* of March 14:

"The Soviet Government is of the opinion that following the formation in Rumania of the government of concentration of national democratic forces which established order and tranquility in that country, this having an important effect on the rail line communications of the Soviet armies, the situation in Rumania does not require that any special steps should be taken by the three principal Allies at the present time.

"2. It should be pointed out that in setting forth the reasons for your proposals there is envisaged a broader interpretation of the Crimea decisions as set forth in the declaration on liberated Europe, than corresponds with the facts. The declaration in question, in so far as the mutual obligations of the three powers are concerned in relation to the former satellites and the measures which might be taken under certain conditions in those states, is based upon the presence therein of Allied Control Commissions. Certain obligations are imposed upon these commissions. However, the United States Government proposed that a tri-partite commission be set up for Rumania. This is directed toward the annulling of the Allied Control Commission in that country and to the emasculating the role of its chairman.

"3. Your statement to the effect that the Allied Control Commission in Rumania never consulted the United States Government on events in that country does not conform to the facts. Vyshinski and Susaikov repeatedly discussed in Bucharest these events with Berry and Schuyler as well as with the British representatives all of whom were furnished complete information. It should be pointed out that these discussions and exchange of information were quite contrary to the situation in Italy where on no occasion did the Allied representatives on the Allied Control Commission in that country inform the Soviet representative of important measures undertaken.

"In view of the above the Soviet Government cannot agree with the proposals of the American Government as contained in your letter of March 14."

² Not printed.

³ See document No. 285, footnote 5, and document No. 161.

No. 302

740.00119 Control (Hungary)/6-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State ad interim

SECRET

Moscow, June 30, 1945—12 midnight.

2354. Reorganization of ACC Hungary for second period.

I feel that Gen Key is in a better position than we are here to judge which points are suitable for inclusion in a re-draft of Control Commission statutes for second period and I have no doubt that the ones he has listed ¹ are well chosen as maximum desiderata on our part. However I have received no response from Molotov to my letter of June 1 proposing effective tripartite authority over ACC (ReEmbs 1876, June 2²) and have no assurance [*doubt?*] that the Russians will certainly have misgivings about any arrangements whereby the Brit and Amer reps acting singly or together could veto any action on the part of the commission on which they were not in agreement. Judging from our previous experience we cannot regard it as probable that the Russians will accept such arrangements unless some form of strong pressure is brought to bear. If this is correct the real question is how far our govt is willing to go in backing this plan against possible Soviet opposition. (To Dept as 2354 rptd Budapest 19 London 34) If we are not prepared to bring pressure to bear it is probably better tactics not to press too vigorously for it at this stage.

HARRIMAN

¹ See enclosure 1 to document No. 289.² See document No. 287, footnote 5.

No. 303

740.00119 EW/6-2345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1945—6 p. m.

5517. Reports from AmReps Budapest Bucharest Sofia regarding Brit proposal for proceeding at once to conclusion of peace treaties with Hungary Rumania Bulgaria (Deptels 5008 June 21 ¹ and 5097 June 23 ²) recommend that we pursue vigorously our efforts to secure application of Declaration on Liberated Europe ³ and reorganization

¹ See document No. 290, footnote 1.² Document No. 291.³ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

of ACC's and they do not consider that such efforts are doomed in advance to failure. (Sent to London; repeated to Moscow for information.) They advise against concluding peace treaties with the present governments on the ground that it would mean (1) formal recognition of puppet governments and acceptance of Soviet domination of three countries (2) abandonment of attempt to arrive at agreed Allied policy on applying Yalta principles to ex-satellites, particularly in assuring free elections. They do not believe conclusion of peace would necessarily result in withdrawal of Russian troops, especially if real political authority remains in hands of Communists.

Dept is in agreement with these views.

You may accordingly tell FonOff that points set forth in Deptel 5097 represent this Govt's considered position at this time and that at forthcoming highest-level discussions we intend to press strongly proposals for implementation of Yalta Declaration and reorganization of ACC's in all three ex-satellites. We shall oppose proposals to establish diplomatic relations or conclude peace with present Govts there for reasons stated above and in our 5097.

GREW

No. 304

740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7-645 : Telegram

*The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*¹

SECRET

BUDAPEST, July 6, 1945—4 p. m.

21. Your 19, June 30, 2354 to Dept.² With reference to view that Russians are unlikely to accept our maximum proposals for revision of ACC statutes³ it may be helpful to point out that this mission considers it likely Hungarian Communists and local representation of Soviet Govt will learn from Moscow very soon whether US proposes to take active interest in Hungary by securing equality of participation in activities of ACC. With end of hostilities in Europe both Russians and Hungarians expected and Voroshilov so declared at ACC meeting June 5 that revision of ACC procedure is contemplated.

Meanwhile Communist effort to strengthen their local authority has been steady but thus far supported with great discretion by Soviet members ACC. Procedure has been more restrained than it would

¹ Text received in the Department of State July 10. The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 15 of July 11 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1145).

² Document No. 302.

³ See document No. 289.

have been if Soviet representatives and local Communists had been confident of American disinterest in situation here. Such restraint cannot be expected to last much longer. As soon as word comes from Moscow that we do not mean to insist on active participation in ACC with attendant interest in Hungarian political stabilization along democratic lines as we understand them, Communists will feel free to use whatever means deemed necessary to gain their ends.

We note you believe Russians will be adamant in opposing equality of voting rights in ACC because they fear their influence here would be minimized by Anglo American solidarity in ACC. We feel such fear is not necessarily justified. Nevertheless you may deem it possible at least to secure from Russians right of complete information for our representative on ACC and right of full consultation in advance of decisions taken in name of ACC. Such agreement would tend to encourage Hungarian elements which hope to prevent dictatorship of a distinct minority group known to be dominated by USSR. Notwithstanding aspirations of majority of Hungarian people at this time for liberal democracy that majority can be swayed in direction of renewed reaction as in 1920. We are in position by securing even such partial equality in ACC to keep balance on middle line which will best insure stability in this country. Opportunity to exert our influence to that end is passing rapidly and now depends on extent to which Hungarians believe we are able to implement Crimea declaration.⁴ As indicated in mytel 16, June 25 [to Moscow], 211 to Dept⁵ we differ from British view that opportunity to influence election here in democratic sense has already passed and we think revision of ACC statutes is best occasion to achieve our purposes. Gascoigne even says Yalta declaration is already out of date but we presume this is not our Govt's view.

Sent Moscow as 21, rptd Dept 258.

⁴ On Liberated Europe. See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

⁵ Document No. 296.

No. 305

874.00/7-645 : Telegram

The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET

SOFIA, July 6, 1945—3 p. m.

339. . . .

In this connection it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the firmness of the Democratic Cabinet members, including the Socialist Cheshmedjieff and the independent Stoyanov, in addition to

[No. 305]

Petkov's Agrarians, is predicted [*predicated*] largely on the hope that the cessation of hostilities in Europe will shortly bring an end to exclusive Soviet domination of Bulgar affairs. They greet eagerly all indications even the most inconclusive that we and the Brit have not abandoned the south Slav to Russia. While these elements doubtless realize that we and the Brit were not prepared dangerously to star in our relation with Russia over Bulg'n domestic political affairs they hope for some form of concrete assurance that the western democracies will not deviate from their traditional interest in this country and that they will never hypocritically welcome a Communist dominated Bulgaria into the family of United Nations as a bona fide democracy.

While hope for signs of encouragement from the west still sustains the bulk of the Agrarians and other democratic elements in the country the communists and their allies are busily engaged in the more realistic business of preparing for election. The press regularly carries detailed instructions regarding duties and rights of the citizens with respect to registration, obtaining election cards, etc., and local officials of all categories are being indoctrinated by reps of Min of Interior. Carefully selected committees of Communist-dominated Obbov Agrarians are meeting on July 8 to choose their party's candidates for each district and Obbov's comm will then elect from this group the number of candidates as voted by the FF to the Agrarian Party. Obbov's committee further reserves to itself the right to replace candidates selected by local committees with others on [of?] Obbov's choice.

Rptd to Moscow as 182.

No. 306

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7-845 : Telegram

*The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

BUCHAREST, July 8, 1945—8 p. m.

457. Yesterday the King expressed to me his bewilderment in being awarded the Soviet Order of Victory by Marshal Stalin and in being given two airplanes by the Russians since his past experience has been that the Russians have most realistic motives for their actions (my 451, July 4²). (Rptd Moscow as 122) He plainly distrusts these sudden gestures of amiability.

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 11 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1045).

² Not printed.

Rumors have spread that the permission to grant Rumania 16 army divisions (my 449, July 3³) was accompanied by the signature of a Rumanian-Soviet military pact but the King stated that he had been told that this was not the case.

At present in common with the bulk of Rumanians the King expressed hopes that the impending Potsdam conference would give a reasonable interpretation to the Yalta declaration and secure a truly representative govt for Rumania.

MELBOURNE

³ Not printed.

No. 307

761.67/7-945 : Telegram

*The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

SOPIA, July 9, 1945—5 p. m.

US URGENT

350. Numerous conversations over the weekend this time with respect to Russia's threat against the Straits have served further to impress me with the improbability that we shall never [ever] be able to affect matters in this part of the world for the better by a diplomacy of silence and apparent inaction, except for discreet observations now and then made in Moscow.

Our failure thus far publicly to react to Russia's threat of force against Turkey² at the very moment when the United Nations charter was being signed is pointed to by local Communists as a further sign of American impotence as compared to the virility of Soviet Russia. Thus are the hands of the local Communists strengthened at the expense of the democratic elements in the country who still struggle for a Bulgarian policy both internal and external, based on the principles for which the Western Allies fought a second war in Europe.

I am sorry to keep harping on this point of our apparent inaction with respect to what is occurring in southwestern [southeastern] Europe but my conscience as a representative of the Govt of the US compels me to do so. The world situation as seen from this area in which Russian policy is most active and Anglo Saxon policy appears to be inactive suggests the war in Europe has not ceased but has developed into a new phase [in] which ideas rather than men and arms have become instruments of warfare, and in which the old line up of Brit US and Russia together against Germany has become Russia against Brit and US.

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 12 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1045).

² See documents Nos. 683 and 684.

Perhaps to some it may appear unpardonable to sketch the picture in this fashion but I am sure that for anyone who has observed on the spot what has been transpiring in Bulgaria during past eight months such a sketch would require no explanation; also that a willingness so to describe matters would not be surprising to anyone aware of conditions under which those who represent the US and Brit in this part of the world are compelled to serve by virtue of the attitude toward us of those who give effect to Russian police [*policy*] whether they be Russian officials or local Communists inspired and controlled by Moscow.

I sincerely hope that on the eve of the meeting of the Big Three the Dept can assure those of us who represent the US here and elsewhere under similar conditions imposed by Russia that a strenuous effort will be made at that meeting to correct the situation responsible for the misconception of those in this part of the world who today see Russia sitting in the seat of world dictatorship.

Sent Dept, rptd Moscow 190 to Budapest to Bucharest to Vienna to Caserta as 179 and to Ankara.

BARNES

No. 308

Department of the Army Files : Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria (Crane) to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations (McNarney)*¹

SECRET
PRIORITY

[SOFIA,] 10 July [19]45.

CG MTOUSA ACC Hungary and ACC Rumania US Delegations from ACC Bulgaria US. Msg Nr 1906.

More than two months have passed since the end of hostilities with Germany. According to the terms of the Armistice with Bulgaria,² there should have been certain changes in the operation of the ACC. No changes have taken place.

I am unable to find out what is being done in the name of the ACC.

Complete control is still being exercised by the Russians over our plane and personnel entry into Bulgaria for no reason whatever. This includes officials and employees of our Government. We are still confined to Sofia unless under escort of a Russian officer.

Our position here is most embarrassing. People, Bulgarians and

¹ Received by the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference on July 13 as a retransmission from the War Department.

² Signed at Moscow, October 28, 1944 (Executive Agreement Series No. 437; 58 Stat. (2) 1498).

representatives of other governments, openly comment on our apparent helplessness before the power of Russia.

In view of our treatment it is difficult to explain the fact that we are still furnishing them with lend-lease supplies, and are apparently preparing to lend them \$6,000,000,000.

The failure to reach any decision in the Dimitroff case is greatly strengthening the hands of the local Communists.

Incidentally Barnes is becoming much harassed by the long visit, over six weeks now.³

Can't we talk a little tough to the Russians in Moscow and avoid being kicked in the face every day?

³ Georgy M. Dimitrov, leader of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, had sought refuge in Barnes' home at Sofia.

No. 309

Department of the Army Files : Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria
(Crane) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹

SECRET
PRIORITY

[SOFIA,] 11 July [19]45.

Ref number 1910 action to AGWar for JCS info to CG MTOUSA, ACC Rumania US, ACC Hungary US from ACC Bulgaria US signed Crane, AFHQ passing. Note our radio number 1906.²

Following is the text of a letter just received from the Russians here: "In view of the changed situation, due to the end of the war with Germany, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to establish the following procedure in the work of the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria:

1. The Chairman (Deputy Chairman) of the Allied Control Commission at least once every ten days or if necessary oftener will hold consultations with the representatives of Great Britain and United States to discuss the most important problems arising in connection with the work of the Allied Control Commission.

2. The Directives of the Allied Control Commission involving basic problems are given by the Chairman (Deputy Chairman) of the Allied Control Commission after the preliminary discussion of those directives with the representatives of the US and Great Britain.

3. The representatives of Great Britain and USA take part in the general consultations with the chief of the sections or authorized

¹ Sent to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Caserta, for relay. Received by the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference on July 13 as a retransmission from the War Department.

² Document No. 308.

members of the Allied Control Commission; the meetings are called regularly by the Chairman (Deputy Chairman) of the Allied Control Commission. They also can take part personally or through their representatives in mixed commissions, which in suitable cases would be summoned by the Chairman (Deputy Chairman) of the Allied Control Commission to solve the problems arising in fulfillment of these functions by the Allied Control Commission.

4. The representatives of Great Britain and USA have the right to travel freely throughout the country. They will advise in advance the Allied Control Commission of the time and route of their trip.

5. The representatives of Great Britain and USA have the right to determine the number of personnel of their mission.

6. Delivery and dispatch of mail, cargo, and diplomatic couriers are carried out by representatives of Great Britain and USA in accordance with the arrangements made by Chairman (Deputy Chairman) of the Allied Control Commission and in exceptional cases with preliminary agreement with the Chairman (Deputy Chairman) of the Allied Control Commission. To this I must add that all other clauses of the agreement of the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria remain in force".

There are many points in it which need clarification. Further developments will be reported.

No. 310

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/7-1245: Telegram

The Representative in Bulgaria (Byrnes) to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

SECRET

SOFIA, July 12, 1945—1 p. m.

US URGENT

360. Please see General Crane's telegram 1910 to Joint Chiefs of Staff ² for statement of "procedure in the work of the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria" that "the Soviet Government finds it necessary to establish".

I quote the above phrases to point the contrast with the following from Mr. Winant's letter of October 22, 1944, to the acting Soviet representative on the European Advisory Commission: ³

"Upon the conclusion of hostilities against Germany and until the conclusion of peace with Bulgaria the Allied Control Commission will regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice according to instructions of the govts of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom".

¹ In telegram No. 30 of July 16 (file No. 740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/7-1245), Grew informed Byrnes that no action on this message, which had been forwarded to Byrnes, was being taken in Washington.

² Document No. 309.

³ Alexey A. Rosh.

"Consultation" as provided in numbered paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the Soviet statement of procedure could in my opinion only make our representation and that of the British on the Allied Control Commission even more effective as a tool of Russian policy than has been the case hitherto. If we accept the procedure outlined, the Russians will be able to contend with better face than ever that directives of the Commission are Allied in character.

Eight months of experience with Soviet authorities have taught all of us here how little Russians in Bulgaria care for our advice or interference. It should take far more than a note providing for "consultation" and sent at the appropriate moment to attenuate our observations on the state of affairs in southeastern Europe at the conference of the Big Three to "unlearn" us about Russian methods and Russian respect for the views of its Allies.

My doubts that our participation on the Allied Control Commission can ever become effective are even stronger today than when I sent my telegram 332 of June 23.⁴ I am, therefore, more than ever of opinion that the course suggested in that telegram is the course we should seek to follow with respect to the state of affairs now obtaining in this country. Hence with respect to Allied Control Commission procedure during such time as the "second period" of armistice may run, I reiterate the view (second section my 247, May 10⁵) that all decisions of the Control Commission should bear signatures of the three Allied representatives, otherwise such directives as are issued should be construed as decisions of Soviet authorities alone.

The thoroughness of Russian efforts to sidetrack us and the British in Bulgaria on to a "deadline" was revealed to me yesterday in a conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.⁶ He asked me why my British colleague⁷ and I did not seek to make our respective roles in Bulgaria really effective by persuading General Biryusov to withdraw his directive to the Foreign Office interdicting any correspondence between the Bulgarian Government and "foreign political representatives" except through the Allied Control Commission. I have long suspected the existence of such a directive but have never before had proof of its reality. I mention it now not as something that I shall respect any more in the future than I have been guided in the past by the suspicion of its existence but to point up the argument that if we now abandon the position set forth in Mr. Winant's letter of October 22 by accepting the proffered procedure of "consultation", we will indeed be building on sand with respect to our relations with Bulgaria.

⁴ Document No. 292.

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ Petko Stainov.

⁷ W. E. Houstoun-Boswall.

The result of such a course would be, in my opinion, for Bulgaria, complete freedom for the Russians and the Bulgarian Communists to rig the forthcoming elections, and for us a stalemate something in the nature of that which now obtains for us in Rumania, namely, non-intercourse with the govt because it does not correspond to what a representative govt should be. Now, and not after the fact, is the time to resist and to influence matters for the better insofar as we and the British can.

Rptd to Moscow as 192, to Budapest and Bucharest.

BARNES

No. 311

740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7-1345: Telegram

*The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET
PRIORITY

BUDAPEST, July 13, 1945—3 p. m.

281. Key informed me he received yesterday note from Voroshilov dated July 11 and setting forth "decision" of Soviet Govt regarding revised procedure of ACC.² So far as could be gathered from preliminary translation procedure is substantially along lines indicated in Dept's 57 May 28³ with supplementary details as worked out by American representation ACC. However, there is considerable ambiguity in Voroshilov's statement and Key proposes to discuss matter with him as soon as possible.

Sent Dept repeated to Moscow as Nr 23 and London as Nr [blank.]

SCHOENFELD

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 35 of July 16 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1645).

² See vol. II, document No. 796 and document No. 1383, annex to section XII (XI).

³ Document No. 287, footnote 5.

No. 312

740.00119 E. W./7-1345: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

LONDON, July 13, 1945—5 p. m.

7075. FonOff has replied as follows to our communication based on Dept's 5097, June 23, 8 p. m.,² and 5517, July 6, 6 p. m.:³

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 28 of July 14 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1445).

² Document No. 291.

³ Document No. 303.

(Sent Dept as 7075; repeated Moscow as 248.)

We have given very careful consideration to your letters of the 25th June and 9th July in which you informed us of the views of the State Dept on the proposals we had made for the conclusion of peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania.

We sympathize entirely with the desire of the State Dept to secure effective participation in the Control Commissions in these three countries at the same time securing a better position for the American representatives and an improvement in the present extremely unsatisfactory political conditions in these countries. I must confess, however, that we are still doubtful whether the action which the State Dept are now taking is likely to secure the practical results which both our Govts desire. You will, of course, recall the determination with which the Soviet Govt refused in Feb and March of this year to admit that the Yalta Declaration on liberated territories should be applied to Rumania.⁴ Persistent pressure from both the US and British Ambassadors in Moscow entirely failed to move them from this position and I fear that we can see little prospect that further representations will now have effect. Similarly it appears to us unlikely that the Soviet Govt will accept without very considerable modification the US Govt's proposals for the reorganization of the Control Commissions.⁵ Under these proposals as we understand them a decision of the commissions would require the concurrence of all three Govts and the commissions would concern themselves with all matters relating to the fulfillment of the various armistice terms. If these proposals were accepted such matters as Rumanian reparation deliveries to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would come under a genuine tripartite control. His Majesty's Govt would find it extremely difficult to approve the very extensive demands which have been made by Soviet authorities under the title of reparations since it appears to us that these demands greatly exceed the quantities agreed upon during the discussions leading up to the signature of the Rumanian armistice. It appears clear, however, that Soviet Govt are determined to secure reparation deliveries on the scale which they have now demanded. There are also other important matters in which a similar situation would result from the acceptance of the US Govt's proposals. For example, it would be possible for the British and US representatives to raise in the commissions with much more force than has hitherto been possible the question of the removal of equipment from the British and US owned oil companies another matter upon which our views and those of the Soviet Govt are diametrically opposed. For these reasons I fear that we see little chance of persuading the Soviet Govt to put the Control Commissions upon a genuinely tripartite basis.

We understand the reluctance of the State Dept to conclude peace treaties with govts so unrepresentative as those of Bulgaria and Rumania. We recognize that to do so would to some extent increase such prestige as these govts have although it would be our intention to make our disapproval of them abundantly clear at the time of the signature of any treaty and maybe to make the negotiation of such treaties conditional on satisfactory undertakings in respect of certain

⁴ See document No. 301, footnote 1.

⁵ See documents Nos. 286, 287, and 288.

internal improvements. After very careful consideration, however, we remain of the opinion that it will probably be necessary to accept this disadvantage in order to create conditions in which democratic govts may later emerge. There are clearly strong arguments for concluding treaties as soon as possible before the present govts can entrench themselves too strongly. In Bulgaria we appear already to have reached the stage at which the purge of "Fascists" has eliminated the great majority of politicians who might be capable of organizing any representative opposition to the present govt.

In view of the opinions expressed by the State Dept we have not as we had intended put our proposals to the Soviet Govt in advance of the forthcoming conference. We may, however, wish to put them forward at the conference.

WINANT

No. 313

864.007-1345 : Telegram

*The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

[Extract]

SECRET

BUDAPEST, July 13, 1945—5 p. m.

283. Valentiny, resigning Minister of Justice, called today to take leave. He reiterated statement that Govt's lack of control over political police which remains instrument of Communist Party was most dangerous element in present political situation. He was sure his successor would be no better able to secure submission of political police to governmental authority than he had been. He expected repression [*repression?*] of all non-Communist political activity to be further extended. He again intimated hope US would exert its influence in favor of democratic political developments here but was pessimistic crediting Soviet authorities with definite purpose of Sovietizing Hungary.

Alluding again to restrictions by Russians on public information here he indicated desire for active American intervention in this respect.

I was able only to assure Valentiny of our hope that increased facilities for information and free discussion as well as free political activity would follow agreement among Allies in spirit of Crimea Declaration on these and related matters at forthcoming Conference of Big Three.

SCHOENFELD

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 43 of July 17 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1745).

No. 314

740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7-1345 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative in Hungary
(Schoenfeld)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1945—7 p. m.

185. Dept is in general agreement with your view that three principal Allied Govts should concert their policies under Crimea Declaration to assure to Hungarian people exercise of their right to create democratic institutions of their own choice, and that joint action may be called for in connection with forthcoming elections in Hungary (urtels 165 June 16,¹ 172 June 18,¹ 211 June 25²). We would not however press for actual supervision of elections by Allied representatives unless it should become apparent that Hungarian authorities intend to conduct them in way which will not allow the people a free choice.

Application of Crimea Declaration in ex-satellite states is on US agenda for forthcoming meeting of heads of Govts, and it is planned that Soviet and Brit Govts will be apprised of our general views on Hungary at that time.

Before that meeting Dept does not believe it advisable to make specific proposal regarding Hungarian elections to Soviet and Brit Govts through regular diplomatic channels.

GREW

S[amuel] R[eber]

¹ Not printed.² Document No. 296.

No. 315

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7-1345 : Telegram

*The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Acting
Secretary of State*

SECRET

BUCHAREST, July 13, 1945—midnight.

US URGENT

469. Several responsible sources confirm that Soviet armistice demands actually remain unchanged despite reported statements of War Minister Raşcanu and Premier Groza (my 449, July 3. Rptd Moscow as 125¹). Not only has there been no official time extension for fulfillment of Article XII, but Soviet requests under Article X

¹ Not printed.

just presented for the third quarter of 1945 somewhat exceed in actual value the requirements for the second quarter. Thus Articles XI and XII are not being used to defray the upkeep of newly arriving Soviet troops.

Business circles are greatly depressed by, in addition to other Communist pressures, the real threat of an extensive capital levy under the guise of equalizing the armistice burden and relieving the peasants and workers. Vice Chairman Oeriu of the Rumanian Armistice Commission is the foremost advocate of the measure and is considered the instrument of the Rumanian Communist Central Committee. The project has split the cabinet with Premier Groza reportedly opposed. Finance Minister Durma depressed by the economic outlook has submitted his resignation suggesting that Mr. Oeriu bear as Finance Minister the responsibility for his own schemes.

The Soviet assurance that it would reequip a sizeable Rumanian army is regarded by some as a gesture of military policy to indicate that Rumanian troops would be beside Russia if additional pressure is necessary upon Turkey over the Straits question. Similarly the award of the Victory Order decoration to the King (my 457, July 8²) is held to show him to the world as a complete Soviet ally.

While a strong official campaign . . .³ in use against the Peasant and Liberal party leaders, Maniu and Bratianu, the dissident liberals of Tatarescu have sought to capture the official Liberal party (my 450, July 3⁴) and so called dissident Peasants of the National Democratic Front are organizing for a congress purporting to represent the National Peasant Party.

Over the above picture of realities the Russians are believed by responsible observers to be attempting to smudge a short term propaganda impression for both the Rumanian public and abroad that all aspects of relations with Rumania are improving. Soviet desires have been sponsored through wide diffusion of War Minister Raşcanu's statements concerning "generous" armistice concessions, the announcement of the altruistic Soviet intention to equip a sizeable Rumanian army, press reports of speeches by Marshal Tolbukhin and General Susaikov insisting upon the generosity of the Red Army and the Soviet wish to establish friendly relations with the Rumanian people, and finally through hailing the decoration awarded the Kin[g] as an expression of Soviet willingness to cooperate with a monarchy.

Every effort is made to show that a popular and liberty loving regime exists in Rumania with strong bourgeois support in National Liberal Party of Mr. Tatarescu and impending conference of a group

² Document No. 306.

³ There is a garble at this point in the original.

⁴ Not printed.

purporting [to] represent the National Peasants. Publicity was given to compromised [*sic*] Mr. Tatarescu, who during his party congress was allowed to declare that he was not a Communist and opposed a Communist doctrine for Rumania.

Local observers consider sole reason for the striking differences between the realistic subject and the happy portrait described above is based upon a Soviet desire to introduce a certain confusion into the present and future prospects of the Rumanian situation at a time when this may be discussed by the Potsdam Conference.

MELBOURNE

No. 316

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/7-1445

*Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of European Affairs
(Hickerson)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Paul Gore-Booth, First Secretary, British Embassy;
Mr. Hickerson, EUR

Mr. Paul Gore-Booth, First Secretary of the British Embassy, came in to see me late yesterday afternoon at his request. He said that although members of the Embassy had had several discussions with State Department officials on the subject and although the Embassy had received several telegrams from the British foreign office in regard to its understanding of the U. S. attitude on the subject, he was not clear in his own mind about one aspect of our attitude concerning Bulgaria and Roumania. This was, he continued, the question of whether the U. S. believed that recognition of the two governments and perhaps conclusion of peace treaties should be deferred until after the governments had been reorganized.

I told Mr. Gore-Booth that the U. S. position was that the governments should be reorganized before either diplomatic recognition or the conclusion of peace treaties with them and that the President and the Secretary of State would take this position in the forthcoming conversations at Potsdam and endeavor to induce Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin to agree to that position.

Mr. Gore-Booth said that he was certain that British officials at Potsdam would support the American view even though they had little hope that the Soviet Government would agree to it. He added that it was his understanding that if the Soviet Government does not

agree to the U. S. position the British officials will then endeavor to persuade the U. S. to agree to the early recognition of the two governments and the early conclusion of peace treaties with them.

J[OHN] D H[ICKERSON]

No. 317

Department of the Army Files : Telegram

The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department ¹

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[BUCHAREST,] 14 July 1945.

Our M 1226. AFHQ pass to AGWar for War OpDiv info to ComGenMed, ACC Bulgaria and ACC Hungary from ACC Rumania signed Schuyler.

Our relations with Soviet Section, ACC in Rumania and particularly with General Susaikov himself continue to be entirely unsatisfactory. In the period which has ensued since the termination of hostilities with Germany, this delegation has participated to an even less extent than formerly in the affairs of the Allied Control Commission. Following are my specific objections to the attitude displayed by Susaikov and other key Russian ACC officials:

1. Susaikov continues to refrain from answering many of my official letters addressed directly to him, in spite of my reminders that such letters are remaining unanswered. Among such letters are:

- (a). A number of requests for clearances to enter Rumania both for officers intended as replacements for officers already here, and
- (b). Requests for arrangements for field trips by members of this delegation (including a proposed boat trip by myself through the Danube Delta area).

Certain of these letters remain unanswered after three months.

2. Susaikov failed to inform me as to change in Soviet policy reference admission to Rumania of French representative Jean Paul Boncour. Last March in reply to my request, Susaikov stated to me that Boncour's arrival was not considered desirable at the time. I so informed the War Department and General Eisenhower. Two weeks ago I discovered that Boncour had arrived several days previously by train from Istanbul, having received necessary Russian clearances.

3. Susaikov has refused to furnish me any information on numbers, locations or length of stay of Russian troops in Rumania, despite the

¹ Sent to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Caserta, for relay. Received by the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference on July 15 as a retransmission from the War Department.

fact that he has admitted such troops are being housed and fed by Rumanian Government under Article 10 of the Armistice.²

4. Susaikov has failed to hold regular meetings of all three chief ACC representatives (the last such meeting occurred on the 17th March 1945) and he does not furnish me information on ACC policies and operations. The Rumanian Government continues to receive instructions on ACC matters and also to receive requisitions for food and other items for Russian forces, but this delegation remains in ignorance of the contents of such documents, although they are issued in the name of the ACC.

5. Conferences and informal discussions are continually being held between key Russian ACC officers and Rumanian Government officials relative to Armistice matters without prior notification to this Delegation and without inviting my representative to be present.

6. Without any prior discussion with this Delegation, Susaikov has informed the Rumanian Government in writing that all German held shares in petroleum companies in Rumania must pass to the control of the Soviet Union (see Melbourne's cable to State Department number 465 of 12th July³). This appears to be a violation of Article 8 of the Armistice which requires Rumania not to permit the export or expropriation of such property.

7. Susaikov has consistently failed to advise me of Russian demands on Rumania under Article 12, which demands now aggregate a sum 75 percent as large as the total reparations indemnity specified under Article 11.

In general, it may be stated that this Delegation is not participating in any way in the work of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania, that such few meetings between us and Russian ACC officials as do occur are arranged only on our specific request and then after long delay, and that at these meetings no information except on a few minor points is vouchsafed by the Russians and our own questions are invariably either evaded entirely or are answered in such general terms as to afford no information of real value concerning the subject discussed.

I have kept the War Department informed of the actions which I have taken at various times to bring this unsatisfactory condition to the attention of the senior Russian representative. In view of the coming high level conference at Berlin, I do not propose to register further objection here at this time since I feel that the result might be the granting of a few minor concessions which would thereafter serve as a possible Russian argument at the Berlin conference against the necessity for a basic change in organization and method of operation of the Control Commission.

In a succeeding message, I propose to set forth what I consider to be the minimum essential changes in the operation of the Commission, which will ensure full opportunity to this representation for obser-

² Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (2) 1712.

³ Document No. 385.

vation of the conduct of Armistice affairs, and will in some measure furnish us the means for protecting the rights and prestige of the United States Government and its nationals in Rumania.

No. 318

Department of the Army Files : Telegram

*The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department*¹

TOP SECRET

[BUCHAREST,] 14 July 1945.

PRIORITY

M 1227. AFHQ pass to AGWar for War OpDiv Info to ComGen-Med, ACC Bulgaria and ACC Hungary from Schuyler Rumania.

In my M 1226 of this date² I stated to the War Department certain difficulties which now prevent this delegation from carrying its full share of duties and responsibilities as a body duly representative of the United States Government on the Control Commission for Rumania. I now propose to outline certain changes in the present situation which must be accomplished if we are to overcome these difficulties.

As stated in my M 1150 of 28th June³ I feel that the only fully acceptable solution to the Rumanian Armistice problem requires, among other things, the reorganization of the Armistice commission along truly tripartite lines. Realizing that such reorganization may be impracticable of accomplishment at present I feel nevertheless that there are certain additional rights and privileges which must in any event be granted this representation if it is to report fully on the conduct of Armistice matters, and to furnish reasonably adequate safeguard for the rights and prestige of the United States in Rumania. These additional rights and privileges are as follows:

1. All directives to the Rumanian Government should be discussed with British and American representatives prior to their issuance and all ACC policies should be promulgated only after agreement with British and American representatives has been secured. If general agreement cannot be secured, action in the matter should be suspended pending discussion and agreement on governmental levels.

2. Representatives of this delegation should have free access to copies of all letters, directives or other correspondence on Armistice matters and all notes of conferences thereon which may be in possession of either Russian or Rumanian agencies or officials dealing

¹ Sent to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Caserta, for relay. Received by the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference on July 16 as a retransmission from the War Department.

² Document No. 317.

³ Document No. 300.

with Armistice problems. Such Rumanian agencies and officials should be required to discuss Armistice problems freely and frankly with US representatives.

3. Regularly scheduled meetings of the three chief representatives should be held at least once each week. At these meetings the ACC Chairman should outline in detail all general actions taken by the ACC subsequent to the last meeting, should answer all questions by other members and should discuss all mutual problems freely. Similar meetings on subcommittee levels should be held also.

4. Members of this delegation should have the right to travel anywhere within the boundaries of Rumania or to leave and reenter Rumania as necessary, after due notice of the proposed itinerary has been furnished the ACC chairman. This should include the right to visit any area, district, building or institution in Rumania.

5. This representation should have the right to bring into Rumania such additional military or other personnel as may be required, without the necessity for formal clearances from Russian authorities. A similar right should accrue to all members of the staff of the United States representative in Rumania.

6. This representation should have the right to deal directly with Rumanian government agencies in obtaining subsistence, funds or services required for maintenance of its personnel and for the conduct of its activities in Rumania. The Chief United States Military representative should have the sole right to determine the quality and amount of subsistence, funds or services required for this purpose.

No. 319

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹

[Extracts²]

SECRET

POTSDAM, July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, called this afternoon and discussed for two hours in a preliminary way a number of matters on the agenda of the Conference.³

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10. *The Balkans.*

Sir Alexander expressed disagreement with our reluctance to conclude peace with Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary and reiterated UK view that treaties of peace would solve our difficulties in those countries. . . .

.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 140, 218, 234, 258, 351, 379, 404, 470, 519, 635, 645, 678, and 708.

³ For a list of persons present at this meeting, see document No. 234, footnote 3.

No. 320

711.60d/7-1545

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Thompson) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)*¹

SECRET

[BABELSBERG,] July 15, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Finland

MR. DUNN: . . . Stalin informed Churchill on June 14² that he saw no reason to defer the restoration of diplomatic relations with Finland, which was fulfilling the armistice conditions.³ It will be recalled that the Soviets had earlier informed us that they did not consider that the resumption of diplomatic relations with Finland before the resumption of relations with Rumania and Bulgaria would be justified.⁴

Since we have never been at war with Finland⁵ we are in a better position to resume relations than the British and Soviets and it is believed that we should do so as soon as this can be accomplished without seriously offending the Russians. At this meeting it would appear advisable to take any opportunity that may present itself to clear the way for this action.

¹ Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned.

² See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 363.

³ i. e., the terms of the armistice (to which the United States was not a party) signed at Moscow, September 19, 1944. Text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLV, p. 513.

⁴ See document No. 285, footnote 5.

⁵ The United States severed diplomatic relations with Finland on June 30, 1944, but at no time during World War II did it declare war on Finland.

No. 321

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7-1545 : Telegram

*The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

BUCHAREST, July 15, 1945—11 a. m.

US URGENT

471. General Schuyler is transmitting two messages Nrs. M-1226² and 1227,³ July 14 expressing his views upon the minimum needed administrative revisions in the execution of the armistice convention as it affects the work and operations of his military representation.

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 43 of July 17 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1745).

² Document No. 317.

³ Document No. 318.

One great political and cultural weapon now unilaterally in the hands of Soviet officials is the censorship control specified by Armistice Article 16. With the end of the war it would appear the logic of a tripartite censorship control can no longer be deferred through the argument of Soviet military considerations. Therefore, it is suggested that, while the armistice lasts and the Soviet authorities refuse to permit freedom of publication in the American sense, the American Govt should have the right to assist in determining what Rumanians read and see.

As a basic requirement pending establishment of a free press and to avoid Soviet and NDF evasion tactics through newsprint controls and other administrative acts the suggestion is advanced that the American representation should have the same right as the Russians to stop any articles publications films or radio broadcasts that it consider objectionable. Thus, for example, instead of the present violently one sided press daily pillorying democratic friends of the United States there would be a colorless press until it is possible for it to be free.

A second consideration under Article 16 would make it impossible for the Rumanian Govt unilaterally to decide whether an American publication or film can be printed or sent in [*sic*] Rumania. The Rumanian Govt, for example, has recently refused although not in writing to allow publication of Walter Lippmann's "*United States War Aims*" which circumstances are being reported by despatch.⁴ It is suggested that the Rumanian Govt, if at first it refuses a unilateral approach and then is notified by the tripartite representation of the ACC that it approves of a particular publication or film, should unquestioningly comply and place no restrictions on newsprint allocations or distribution facilities.

The above suggestions would have the advantage of placing censorship responsibility on the ACC and avoid the present Soviet sponsored plan of its puppet NDF regime nominally bearing the responsibility for censorship actions.

MELBOURNE

⁴ Not printed.

USE OF ALLIED PROPERTY FOR REPARATIONS OR WAR BOOTY

No. 322

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP IN COUNTRIES OF
EASTERN EUROPE

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that the President request that the USSR agree:

1. To stop the removals from the countries of Eastern Europe of capital equipment, wholly or substantially owned by American nationals; to return capital equipment previously removed; and to insure that these countries make adequate, effective and prompt compensation, on a parity with reparations payments, to American nationals for capital equipment previously removed which cannot be returned and for current output delivered on reparations account.

2. To permit American nationals to enter, move about freely and carry on commercial and government operations unmolested in the countries in question.

3. Not to conclude treaties, agreements or arrangements which give to the USSR an exclusive or monopolistic position in the trade, raw materials, or industry of these countries, or which deny to American nationals access, on equal terms, to such trade, raw materials and industry; and appropriately to modify existing arrangements which have that effect.

DISCUSSION

Removal of American Property

American property rights and interests in countries occupied by the Red Army and under Soviet influence have not been adequately protected or respected by the USSR. In Rumania and Hungary the USSR has been removing capital equipment and current output wholly or substantially owned by American nationals without regard for production schedules or payment of adequate, effective and prompt compensation. In Finland oil tankers have been requisitioned and marketing installations withheld in ceded territory with no arrangement for compensation.

In the latter part of 1944 the United States raised with Russia the question of the removal of American owned oil equipment from Rumania. The Russian attitude at that time was that Germany had brought pipe and other equipment into Rumania, and that, moreover, the oil companies had assisted Germany in fighting the Allies by supplying her with oil, so that the pipes and other equipment

were military trophies and could be properly seized by Russia. The British argued that machinery which was the property of British companies should not be removed without British consent. Furthermore, the British contemplate protesting strongly to Soviet removals on the ground that such action (1) disregarded Soviet Government's assurances of last January; (2) directly injures an indisputable British interest; and (3) could not fail to have damaging effect upon production capacity of Rumanian oil fields and therefore upon world oil supplies. The Russians have recently given assurances that rolling stock in Rumania owned by British and American companies would no longer be taken.

The question of removal of property is complicated by the reparations provisions of the armistice agreements signed by Bulgaria,¹ Finland,² Hungary³ and Rumania.⁴ The agreements, which provide for reparations transfers in kind, are not sufficiently specific regarding the conditions under which American property may be transferred. It is clear, however, that there was no intention to shift any part of the reparations burden onto American property owners. This is confirmed by the fact that the armistices contain other provisions guaranteeing the restoration of all legal rights and interests of United Nations and their nationals as they existed before the war and for the return of their property in complete good order.

The removal of capital equipment results in destruction of plants, loss of foreign markets and trading connections, and decreases production schedules of strategic materials, for which there is global demand and distribution. Russia should therefore stop the removals of capital equipment, return such equipment previously removed, and adjust its reparations demands and trade relations with these countries so that plants may be retained intact, production schedules of strategic materials may be maintained at maximum levels, and adequate, effective and prompt compensation, on a parity with reparations payments, may be paid by them to American owners for capital equipment which cannot be returned.*

This Government has been unable to obtain adequate or accurate information with respect to what has actually taken place. No United States businessmen have been allowed to enter these countries, and United States Government officials have not been allowed to

¹ Executive Agreement Series No. 437; 58 Stat. (2) 1498.

² Text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxlv, p. 513.

³ Executive Agreement Series No. 456; 59 Stat. (2) 1321.

⁴ Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (2) 1712.

*In the case of Germany, where the policy is to reduce German industrial capacity in the interests of security, instructions to the United States member of the Reparations Commission permit removal of American property, but provide that the owner may retain his interests in the property if practical, or if not, Germany shall furnish reparations to cover such interest. [Footnote in the original.]

travel freely and observe conditions, although Moscow recently stated that such movement is possible.

Entry and Freedom of Movement of United States Nationals in Countries of Eastern Europe.

The United States Government believes that it is improper on the part of the Soviet Government to refuse to accord to American official personnel and private citizens the right of free entry into Europe and free movement within the countries of Eastern Europe.

It is incumbent upon the Allied Government to arrange for the equitable allocation of materials and equipment in critically short supply and for assignment of transportation priorities on the basis of carefully reviewed requirements. It is impossible for the United States adequately to discharge its responsibility to seek the most effective utilization of scarce commodities so long as limitations upon the freedom of United States observers to move about in the countries of Eastern Europe preclude access to data on local supply availability, effective use of capital equipment, and true requirements with respect to these areas.

Furthermore, American private citizens must be permitted to enter, move about freely, and carry on business in these countries. This is also necessary in order to step up production of critical materials and for the protection of American property rights and interests. Administrative, engineering and technical personnel are badly needed to maintain substantial local production. In this connection it will be noted that Soviet representatives on governmental and commercial missions are accorded complete freedom of movement within the United States and its possessions.

Economic Interests of the United States in Eastern Europe

Secret agreements have recently been concluded with Bulgaria⁵ and Rumania⁶ giving to the USSR a predominant, if not exclusive, control of industry and trade. The agreements in effect provide that virtually the country's entire exports be delivered to the Soviet Union, that extensive raw material concessions be placed under Soviet control, and that Soviet controlled commercial monopolies be established. Russo-Rumanian companies have been established in important branches of the Rumanian economy (oil, lumber, metals, sea, river and air transportation, et cetera).

This kind of exclusive economic penetration is at variance with the general commercial policy of this Government, which looks toward the expansion of trade and investment on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis. The United States has a strong interest in the

⁵ Signed at Moscow, March 14-15, 1945. Not printed.

⁶ Signed at Moscow, May 8, 1945. Text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLIX, p. 876.

preservation of conditions in the countries of Eastern Europe which will permit the continued operation of such multilateral trade, and accordingly sees a necessity for maintaining not only its own trading interests and position in those countries, but also the trading interest and position of other countries which were importers to, and exporters from, Eastern Europe before the war. The United States would be greatly concerned if the Government of the USSR persists in the negotiation and execution of commercial treaties giving it an exclusive position in the foreign trade of the countries of Eastern Europe, and effectively denying to nationals of the United States equality of access to the raw materials and trade of these countries.

The USSR, it is believed, should understand at the outset that the United States, while recognizing that the USSR may have special security interests in certain neighboring countries, is vigorously opposed to preferential economic arrangements, to monopolistic devices favoring the USSR, to unequal investment opportunity, and to any interference with American property or trade in these sovereign countries.

No. 323

871.6363/6-2945 : Airgram

*The Secretary of State ad interim to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1945.

A-276. According to information from Bucharest the Soviet military authorities in Rumania have recommended removal of oilfield equipment from premises of certain British-owned oil companies on pretext it is war booty. British in Bucharest have protested to ACC citing Soviet Government's assurance given last January that there would be no further removals.

British Government contemplates instructing British Embassy in Moscow to protest strongly to Soviet Government on ground that Soviet action (1) disregarded Soviet Government's assurances of last January, (2) directly injures an indisputable British interest, and (3) could not fail to have damaging effect upon production capacity of Rumanian oil fields and therefore upon world oil supplies. In making last point British Government favors pointing out to Soviet Government that the fact that USSR has been obtaining considerable supplies of oil products from British and American sources makes it impossible to be indifferent to actions which must inevitably reduce capacity of important oil fields now under Russian control.

[No. 323]

British Government has also been considering whether Soviet action in Rumania should be raised by British delegate on reparation commission at Moscow. When and how it is raised would be matter for determination of British and American delegates.¹ British suggest trying to secure at Moscow Allied agreement on definition of war booty and on retroactive application of that definition to goods Russians have already removed from Rumania.

British Embassy has requested Department's views suggesting you be instructed to support Clark Kerr's representations.

Department's views on general questions raised by removal of equipment last November and December have already been presented to Soviet Government (ReEmbs 4979, December 24 and [Embtel 439,] February 16²). However, since the last communication from this side, your note of February 16, apparently has remained unanswered, Department believes it would be timely if you should now take the opportunity provided by recent removals to re-state our view that equipment taken from American oil companies in Rumania cannot properly be considered war booty and to remind the Soviet Government of its pledge (ReEmbs 55, January 5³) that no more equipment would be taken. You may also inquire whether the Soviet Government has returned or intends to return any of the equipment already taken.

Department does not think it necessary that you support directly Clark Kerr's representations since it is preferable to take parallel rather than joint action and further we are not entirely sure that equipment taken from British-owned companies in April has actually been moved to USSR.

In view of the important and difficult task before the Reparations Commission in formulating policy with respect to Germany, the Department does not agree with the British that it would be desirable to bring Rumanian and other satellite problems within its scope at this time. It therefore believes that satellite reparations matters should continue to be handled directly by you and your British colleague with the Soviet Government.

As policy decisions are reached by the Reparations Commission with respect to Germany on subjects such as reparations and war booty, they can be applied to satellite situations. Ambassador Pauley has been instructed to seek agreement on the scope of war booty in relation to reparations and restitution deliveries, and Luthringer has considerable background in the matter. The Department will attempt shortly to provide its further views on the scope of war booty.

¹ Sir Walter Monckton and Edwin W. Pauley, respectively.

² Neither printed.

³ Not printed.

It is requested that American representative on Reparations Commission be informed concerning this message.

There follows a discussion of the prime factors regarding the oil situation emphasizing the inseparable relation between the rapid rehabilitation of the petroleum industry and maintenance of maximum production in Southeastern Europe and global production required to meet the enormously expanded military and essential civilian needs. You may use in your discretion any of this information in future discussions with the Soviet authorities.

Russians have unduly delayed granting permission for entry of American oil representatives into Rumania and Hungary to step up production.

It is becoming evident that the USSR seeks to obtain a predominant, if not exclusive, control of petroleum industry and trading position in Rumania by negotiation of economic treaty which in effect provides (1) that virtually the entire exportable surplus of petroleum be delivered to the Soviet Union (in addition to substantial portion taken by Soviets as reparations), (2) that extensive petroleum concessions be placed under Soviet control, and (3) that Soviet-controlled petroleum monopoly be established which existing petroleum companies are invited to join. It is anticipated that Soviets will endeavor to negotiate similar petroleum agreement in Hungary and other producing areas.

Department considers satisfactory solution of these problems should be obtained in conversations with Soviets and believes following subjects of considerable interest to USSR (1) supply of petroleum to USSR from US sources, (2) allocation of oil well drilling, refining, and marketing equipment to USSR from US sources, and (3) interchange of information, technical data and processes relating to the production, refining, marketing and transportation of petroleum and associated hydrocarbons.

American people have accepted fuel oil and gasoline rationing substantially restricting their use for domestic military, industrial, and civilian consumption as a means of creating large exportable surplus to meet the critical shortage created by an expanding global demand including needs of USSR. USSR has been allocated aviation gasoline and components at expense of U. S. military and essential industrial requirements. Soviets continue to obtain critical supplies from U. S. sources and there is under consideration for shipment during the last half of the calendar year 1945 the sum of 410 thousand tons of petroleum products.

The U. S. Government allocates oil well drilling, refining and marketing equipment on the basis of global needs in which USSR is beneficiary and [there] has been allocated to date, *inter alia*, 6 refineries

for high octane gasoline and other products. Owing to the rapid depreciation of petroleum equipment USSR may realize short-term gains from the seizure of Rumanian and other equipment but stands to lose on a long-term basis if such seizures exclude future allocations in their favor. American petroleum industry has accepted substantially curtailed drilling programs at home and abroad to make equipment available on a global basis.

In the past Soviet missions have been shown many U. S. petroleum war plants and have been given the benefit of considerable petroleum engineering technique, refining processes, and other data. Presumably USSR is anxious to obtain best information available for use in building Soviet petroleum industry as number of requests for refining processes, petroleum technical data, and inspection of petroleum plants have been received and are under consideration.

Rumanian-Hungarian oil picture is but one aspect of a worldwide problem and arbitrary measures taken by the Soviet authorities in former satellite states, such as removing equipment, monopolizing petroleum supply, and delaying entry of petroleum experts which result in decreased production and jeopardy of American interests, may have an adverse effect on the willingness and ability of the U. S. to furnish to Russians petroleum technical data, producing and refining equipment, or such petroleum products as Soviets may need; and may require appropriate adjustments in policies of this Government which heretofore have been extremely sympathetic to Soviet needs.

GREW

J[ohn] A. L[oftus]⁴

⁴ Loftus' initials are not in his own handwriting on the file copy.

No. 324

861.6363/7-1345

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*¹

SECRET
No. 698

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

The Secretary of State transmits herewith, in duplicate, a policy document under the subject "Use of American Property by Satellite Countries for Reparation".

It is requested that the Mission be guided by this document in all matters relating to the subject and that one copy thereof be trans-

¹ Similar instructions were dispatched on the same date to the American Representatives in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.

mitted to the American representative on the Reparations Commission for his information and guidance.

J[OHN] A L[OFTUS]

[Enclosure ²]

SECRET
CC-63

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1945.

USE OF AMERICAN PROPERTY BY SATELLITE COUNTRIES FOR
REPARATION

THE PROBLEM

The armistice agreements signed by the four former Axis satellite states (Finland, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, but not Germany) oblige those states to pay reparation for war damage. The Finnish, Rumanian and Hungarian Armistices provide for payment to the Soviet Union in each case in a specified amount of United States dollars payable over six years in designated commodities. Transfers under these reparations provisions may be in the form of either (1) capital equipment including existing plants, or (2) current output including inventory accumulations, and are now being made in accordance with bilateral agreements negotiated by the USSR with each satellite country. In the case of Hungary there is also an obligation to make deliveries of a smaller sum to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The Bulgarian Armistice contains merely a provision that Bulgaria will make such reparation for loss and damage caused by the war to the United Nations as may be determined later. The United States was a signatory to the Rumanian, Hungarian and Bulgarian Armistices; and in becoming signatory did not contemplate that a part of the real burden of the reparations payments agreed upon and included in the reparations clauses should fall upon American nationals. Even in the case of the Finnish Armistice, to which the United States Government is not a signatory, it would be unreasonable if the burden of reparations were shifted to anyone other than the government and people of the defeated country.

All four armistices contain provisions for indemnification by satellite states of losses caused during the war to property of Allied Nations and their nationals in those states. There is also a provision in each armistice for the restoration of all legal rights and interests of United Nations and their nationals as they existed before the war and for the return of their property in complete good order.

² Not attached to the file copy of the above instruction; supplied from the files of the Department of State Coordinating Committee (a body comprising the Under Secretary of State, the Directors of Offices, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations).

American property situated in these countries which might be taken by the respective governments in order to fulfill their reparations obligations to the USSR consists principally of two large subsidiaries of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey in Rumania and Hungary, representing roughly 33 and 59 million dollars respectively. There are also in those two countries smaller American interests in the refining and distribution of petroleum products, in textile plants, factories for telecommunications equipment, distilleries, et cetera, as well as property connected with organizations for the sale and distribution of American-made products. American property interests in Bulgaria are unimportant aside from the property of certain educational institutions. In Finland American property interests are confined principally to facilities for the transportation and marketing of petroleum.

In the fulfillment of their reparations obligations to the USSR the satellite governments apparently have not attempted to discriminate against American property, nor have the Russians made a practice of demanding American-owned plants and factories under the respective reparations clauses. The two most important cases in which American property interests have been affected by removals by the Soviet authorities, that of the "lifting" of oil equipment from the Romano-Americana Company in Rumania and the dismantling of the Tungsram bulb factory in Hungary, in which American nationals held only a minority interest, were justified by the Russians on the basis of the property being German and therefore liable to seizure as war booty.

As a result of the use for reparations payments of property in which American nationals have interests, the Department must determine the position which should be taken by this Government in future in order to provide realistic solutions for the problems involved in such payments and at the same time afford the maximum protection possible for American property in ex-enemy satellite countries.

It should be noted that this document deals only with the problem of American property taken as reparation—not with the seizure of such property as war booty. Where American properties are concerned the Russians have shown a tendency to remove equipment as war booty rather than as reparations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A note should be addressed to the chairman of the Allied Control Commission of each of the satellite countries pointing out that the use for payment of reparations of property in which there is an American interest is a matter of concern to the United States Government. The chairman should consequently be requested to inform

the American representative on the ACC of the intended transfer as well as past removals to the Soviet Union or other countries of any capital equipment or current output on reparation account in order that full data on such property may be furnished to the United States Government.

2. In cases where the property involved in making reparations payments consists of capital equipment in which American nationals have a substantial interest, the United States should make appropriate representations to the Soviet authorities against the removal of the property, pointing out:

a) the American interest therein.

b) the loss that would accrue to American nationals as a result of (1) destruction of plants, (2) the consequent loss of foreign markets and trading connections.

c) the fact that seizure of American property for reparation makes impossible the fulfillment by the satellite country of its obligation under the armistice to restore intact the rights and interests of the United States and its nationals.

d) the anomaly of a situation in which part of the burden of reparation payable by an ex-enemy country is in reality borne by American nationals.

e) that in case equipment has already been removed the United States Government would look to the Soviet Government for its return.

f) that, where such equipment will not or cannot be returned by the Soviet Government, the United States will demand of the satellite country in question adequate, effective, and prompt compensation to American nationals for the loss of the property; that such compensation will be expected to have a priority equal to that of reparations payment by the satellite country; and that the Soviet Government will be expected so to adjust its reparations demands and/or trade relationships with the satellite country in question as to make possible the payment of adequate, effective, and prompt compensation by it to American nationals suffering loss of their property.

3. In cases where the property involved in reparations payments consists of current output in which American nationals have a substantial interest, the United States should make appropriate representations to the Soviet and satellite authorities for the attainment of the following objectives:

a) that the satellite country be required to provide immediate and adequate compensation to the American nationals and that such compensation in part be in the form of satisfactory foreign exchange or in kind as a means of ultimately obtaining satisfactory foreign exchange.

b) that these claims on the satellite government should have equal priority with reparations being paid by that government.

c) that the Soviet Government make the necessary adjustments in its economic relationships with the satellite country to insure that the burden of reparations remain on the ex-enemy satellites and not be shifted to American nationals because of the inability of the satellite country to make adequate, effective and prompt compensation.

4. The United States representative on the ACC should be instructed to issue protection cards to American enterprises only in cases where he has definite knowledge that there is a direct majority American interest. In other cases, protection cards should be issued only after approval by the Department.

DISCUSSION

In dealing with the expropriation of American property for use in payment of reparations, it is necessary to distinguish between capital equipment on the one hand, and current output and inventories of finished products on the other. When capital equipment is expropriated and removed the American concern is destroyed, the intangible values disappear, and future participation in foreign trade is denied. Furthermore, the satellite nation is deprived of its ability to produce goods to be used in payment of its reparations obligations, and its internal economy is disrupted.

When current output is taken against payment in local currency, but plant and equipment are left intact, the enterprise retains the opportunity of continuing the manufacture or production of materials. Continued operation by the enterprise beyond a relatively short period of time, however, depends on its ability to meet current costs and to make replacement of worn-out equipment. Moreover, the American nationals have the right to expect some profit on their investment. Insofar as local currency is required by the enterprise to meet current costs it, of course, constitutes a satisfactory compensation for current output. However, in order to meet other financial items such as costs involved in making replacements of equipment which must be secured abroad or effective transfers of profits, the enterprise must be able to dispose of a certain amount of its current earnings in the form of satisfactory foreign currencies. These currencies may be secured by the enterprise exporting part of its product to selected foreign markets and retaining the proceeds therefrom or through allocations to it from the general fund of foreign exchange accruing from the country's exports. A realistic approach to a solution of this problem where a country lacks foreign exchange, as do the ex-enemy satellites, would be to allow the American-owned enterprise a certain percentage of its production, which would be freely exportable in order that the enterprise realize a suitable currency which it might use to make effective transfer of its profits and to pro-

vide for its replacement or depreciation costs. Such a plan would avoid placing the reparations burdens on American nationals which would result from the exchange of all current output for local blocked or depreciated currency.

The degree of protection to which rights and interests of American nationals are entitled will be determined in each case in light of the proportion or money value of the American interests, the directness or remoteness of the American ownership, and the relations between American and ex-enemy interests. Wholly owned subsidiaries of American enterprises, for example, should have their property rights and interests protected to a much greater degree than holdings acquired through cartel agreements involving ex-enemy firms.

The United States Government took the position in the Mexican case in 1938 that the properties of American citizens could not be expropriated "without adequate, effective and prompt compensation. . . . The taking of property without compensation is not expropriation. It is confiscation. . . . We cannot question the right of a foreign government to treat its own nationals in this fashion if it so desires. This is a matter of domestic concern. But we cannot admit that a foreign government may take the property of American nationals in disregard of the rule of compensation under international law." (*Press Releases* July 23, 1938, No. 1202, pp. 51-52)

Since practically all the seizures in question are effected either by the Soviet Government or on its demand, it is believed that representations to the Soviet Government along the suggested lines afford the best available means of protecting American interests. By its control of a vast industrial potentiality, a highly advanced scientific and engineering technique, and carefully developed sources of raw materials, the United States enjoys powerful bargaining advantages in its foreign relations with other nations. These advantages can be used in support of the American position as outlined in Recommendations above, especially when a case for protection of American property interests also involves broader aspects of our economic policy. Nevertheless, it is recognized that the issue under discussion is but a small part of the much larger problem of our over-all relations with the Soviet Union and must be approached in the light of our general policy toward that country.

The case for demanding that compensation by the satellite country to the United States nationals suffering a property loss should have a priority equal to that of reparation rests on the following grounds. Vis-à-vis the satellite country it may be argued that since American property is being used to pay reparation, the United States' claim arising out of such action by that country should be put on a par with reparation claims. If the Soviet Union objects to the American

claims having a priority equal with its reparation claim, it may be pointed out that the Russian seizure of American property makes it impossible for the satellite country to restore American rights and interests in accordance with the armistice, or at best permits only a formal compliance with that obligation; therefore, the least that this Government can expect is that the claims arising out of such action should not be subordinated to the reparation claims of the Soviet Union.

CONTROL OF EXTERNAL ASSETS

No. 325

800.515/6-1845 : Telegram

The Secretary of State ad interim to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1945—3 p. m.

5327. Emb Moscow has transmitted in its 2146, June 18¹ views of Soviet Government re blocking of satellite assets in Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden. Soviets feel that since Finland, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria declared war on Axis we should permit resources of these countries to be used for rehabilitation and reconstruction and that consequently they do not wish assets of state or state-controlled enterprises blocked.

Soviets, however, recommend blocking in neutrals of private assets belonging to aforementioned countries with control over such assets vested in ACC's. As Embassy is aware, blocking has already been accomplished in Spain, and Portuguese have been requested to take parallel action. Department concurs in Soviet recommendation regarding blocking private assets but feels that blocking of state properties should also take place not only to maintain harmony with respect to blocking of other territories formerly occupied by Germany, but to avoid confusion which may arise from attempting to block on partial basis. Once general blocking has been achieved, there should be no difficulty in impressing upon neutral governments desirability broad utilization assets under general authorization or elastic administrative technique.

Assuming Russians would agree to general freeze of both official and private assets in neutrals with proviso that ACC's would supervise expenditures, Department believes that missions in neutrals of governments represented on ACC's should act as liaison between ACC's and neutral governments with respect to questions of unblocking or utilization of assets covered by blocked measures. This would

¹ Not printed.

seem to be essential due to lack Russian representation in neutrals except Sweden. Furthermore, it is desirable to have some form of control exercised by our missions in neutrals for reasons that (a) recently concluded Soviet-Balkan trade pacts² make it apparent that uncontrolled use of balances of these countries would result only in importations from abroad which would swell the amount of goods available in these countries for exportation to Soviet Union as reparations, or under trade agreements (b) accomplishment of SAFEHAVEN objectives is largely dependent on our missions and (c) there must be some means of assuring Allied countries equal access to neutral exports during the emergency rehabilitation period.

In case of Switzerland, it is now our opinion that control should be exercised by Brit and American missions dealing directly with Swiss Govt rather than through Mixed Commission. With re to London's 4642, May 8,³ we have no objection to Brit proposal that Bulgarian and Rumanian assets be utilized for purchases of essential supplies in Switzerland in addition suggestion contained Dept's telegram 3445, May 2 (1671 to Bern, 119 to Sofia, 228 to Bucharest)³ for utilization of such assets for diplomatic expenses and relief supplies. Also no objection to their being used for similar purposes in Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden.

Before proceeding with approach to neutral governments, Department wishes comments Embassies at London and Moscow re foregoing. If Moscow perceives no objection, further discussions should be held with Russians explaining that general freeze is considered to be more practicable than mere freeze private assets and that should Russians assent to complete freeze, Department believes that in light of current relationships with neutral governments arrangements can be made to work out elastic administration blocking regulations in such a way as to prevent undue interference with normal transactions incident to administration of the areas within the sphere of Russian interest.

Emb Moscow also reports Soviet view that blocking should not be extended to territories previously occupied by Germany such as Czech, France, Yugoslavia, etc. since the assets of these countries should be left at the disposal of their governments. Moscow should explain to Russians that blocking in neutrals of assets of these formerly occupied countries is primarily precautionary measure directed at identifying and controlling enemy property. Such blocking does not necessarily imply complete immobilization and Dept has already expressed to neutral

² Such agreements had been signed at Moscow with Bulgaria on March 14-15, 1945 (not printed), and with Rumania on May 8, 1945 (text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLIX, p. 876).

³ Not printed.

govts desirability of modifying blocking measures in order that legitimate interests will not be injured. Generally speaking, govts of these formerly occupied countries have assented to blocking measures.

Sent to London and Moscow as 1475 for action, repeated for information to Bern as 2192; to Stockholm as 1237; to Madrid as 1099; to Lisbon as 1055; to Ankara as 670; to Sofia as 190; and to Bucharest as 331.⁴

GREW

G[eorge] W B[aker]

⁴ As repeated to Sofia and Bucharest, this message had an additional introductory sentence not printed here.

No. 326

800.515/7-1445 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, July 14, 1945—9 p. m.

2570. SAFEHAVEN.

Emb has not rec'd any reply (ReDeptel 1475, June 30¹) to its SAFEHAVEN notes to FonOff of April 30 (London tel 4254, April 26²) and June 18 (ReEmbtel 2169, June 19³) or any indication of desire to discuss matter.

We believe Russians likely to persist in refusal to assent to general freezing of state as well as private assets unless strong pressure can be brought to bear or arguments adduced more forceful from Russian point of view than fact that general freeze is technically more practicable (sent Dept as 2570 rptd London as 360).

Russian aim is naturally to obtain for Soviet Govt maximum effective power of disposition over all these assets. Russians wish private assets blocked and placed at disposition of ACCs because they control all ACCs and only in this way can they effectively guard against disposal over these assets by private individuals without their knowledge or consent. They do not wish state assets blocked because they effectively control govts in question and are thus able to control all dispositions over these assets. Hence they have a clear material interest in arrangement they have proposed whereby private assets would be blocked and released only on orders of respective ACCs and state assets would not be blocked at all, and this interest will be uppermost in their minds in any consideration of these questions.

In view of above Emb would prefer to discuss entire problem with Rubin who is expected here shortly before recommending further approach to FonOff.

KENNAN

¹ Document No. 325.

² Not printed.

³ Not printed. This message reported execution of the instructions printed in footnote 1 to document No. 382.

GERMANY

PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY IN THE INITIAL CONTROL PERIOD

No. 327

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

POLICY TOWARD GERMANY

A: IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENT ON CONTROL MACHINERY

Comment:

The Allied declaration on Germany² was issued June 5 in Berlin and simultaneously the first meeting of the Control Council was held. In spite of American, British and French willingness to discuss a number of questions, the Russian Commander Zhukov stated that the Control Council could not function until withdrawal into the zones was made. Consequently nothing beyond the issuance of the declaration on Germany was accomplished.³

Prior to the issuance of the declaration, the British Government had proposed that withdrawal into the zones be delayed until a number of questions outstanding with the Soviet Government were clarified, including zones of occupation in Austria. The United States Government agreed to go along partially with this, but in the meantime progress has been made in settling the Austrian zones and a decision is expected momentarily. As a result of telegraphic exchanges between the President, Stalin and Churchill,⁴ July 1 has been fixed as the tentative date for withdrawal into the zones. It is anticipated that SHAEF will be dissolved shortly thereafter.

There are a number of pressing problems, particularly economic, which require the immediate attention of the Control Council. In spite of repeated promises by the Soviet Government to send representatives to the "nucleus groups" formed in London last year as part of the Control Council machinery, no Soviet counterpart has ever been produced.

¹ Annex 2 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520; 60 Stat. (2) 1649.

³ With respect to the initial meeting of the Allied Control Council, see Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, 1948), pp. 435-437, and Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, 1950), pp. 20-23.

⁴ See document No. 75.

Recommendation:

The United States Government should urge at the meeting the immediate implementation of the agreement on control machinery⁵ and the establishment at once of the Control Council. It should be recalled that the Soviet Representative in the EAC⁶ has frequently stressed the need of uniform policies by the Allied Governments in Germany and this cannot be done until the Control Council is established and functioning. We should furthermore urge that questions now under negotiation in the EAC on Germany should be transferred to the Control Council upon its establishment.

B: DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY IN THE INITIAL CONTROL PERIOD

Recommendation

It is recommended that this Government at the forthcoming meeting propose the initialling of the appended statement of policy toward Germany. (Appendix A)

The statement should thereafter be referred to the representatives of the three Powers on the European Advisory Commission, with instructions to expedite its formal recommendation as a protocol of agreement among the four occupying powers, in order that the French Government may express its views. France is an occupying power and the fourth member of the Control Council.

Discussion

The proposed draft agreement (Appendix A) is based on the U. S. policy memorandum of March 23, 1945.⁷ It reflects also the exchange

⁵ i. e., the agreement signed at London, November 14, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, May 1, 1945. For texts, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3070; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2062. Text of the agreement of November 14, 1944, also in *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 124.

⁶ Fedor Tarasovich Gusev.

⁷ The text of the memorandum referred to is as follows (here printed from the annex to the appendix to IPCOG 1/1 (Revised), from the IPCOG Files):

"The following is a summary of U. S. policy relating to Germany in the initial post-defeat period. As such it will be introduced into the European Advisory Commission, and will be used as the basis for directives to be issued to the U. S. Commanding General in Germany.

"The authority of the Control Council to formulate policy with respect to matters affecting Germany as a whole shall be paramount, and its agreed policies shall be carried out in each zone by the zone commander. In the absence of such agreed policies, and in matters exclusively affecting his own zone, the zone commander will exercise his authority in accordance with directives received from his own government.

"The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed toward the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. The German economy shall also be decentralized, except that to the minimum extent required for carrying out the purposes set forth herein, the Control Council may permit or establish central control of (a) essential national public services such as railroads, communications and power, (b) finance and

of views which took place when the U. S. memorandum was considered in the European Advisory Commission.

Attachments:

Appendix A:—Draft Agreement on Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period.

[The text of Appendix A, which appears at this point in the original briefing paper, is printed *post*, page 443.]

foreign affairs, and (c) production and distribution of essential commodities. There shall be equitable distribution of such commodities between the several zones.

"Germany's ruthless warfare and fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable. The Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves.

"Controls may be imposed upon the German economy only as may be necessary (a) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament and demilitarization, reparations, and of relief for liberated areas as prescribed by appropriate higher authority and (b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany, and essential to prevent starvation or such disease or civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces. No action shall be taken, in execution of the reparations program or otherwise, which would tend to support basic living standards in Germany on a higher level than that existing in any one of the neighboring United Nations. All economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, shall be controlled with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein. The first charge on all approved exports for reparations or otherwise shall be a sum necessary to pay for imports. No extension of credit to Germany or Germans by any foreign person or Government shall be permitted, except that the Control Council may in special emergencies grant such permission. Recurrent reparations should not, by their form or amount, require the rehabilitation or development of German heavy industry and should not foster the dependence of other countries upon the German economy.

"In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls, German authorities will to the fullest extent practicable be ordered to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and for any breakdowns in those controls, will rest with themselves and their own authorities.

"The Nazi party and its affiliated and supervised organizations and all Nazi public institutions shall be dissolved and their revival prevented. Nazi and militaristic activity or propaganda in any form shall be prevented.

"There shall be established a coordinated system of control over German education designed completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the developments [*sic*] of democratic ideas.

"Nazi laws which provide the basis of the Hitler regime or which establish discriminations on grounds of race, creed or political opinion, shall be abolished.

"All members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities, and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes will be removed from public office and from positions of responsibility in private enterprise.

"War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes, shall be arrested, brought to trial and punished. Nazi leaders and influential Nazi supporters and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives, shall be arrested and interned.

"A suitable program for the restitution of property looted by Germans shall be carried out promptly.

"The German armed forces, including the General Staff, and all para-military organizations, shall be promptly demobilized and disbanded in such a manner as permanently to prevent their revival or reorganization.

"The German war potential shall be destroyed. As part of the program to

C: ESTABLISHMENT OF A GERMAN GOVERNMENT OR LOCAL
ADMINISTRATIONS

Comment

(1) The first task of military government has been to restore machinery of local government and find suitable people to run it. A further task incumbent on military government is to inaugurate political practices which will, we hope, in the long run make possible the development of genuinely democratic government in Germany. Since the process of appointing local officials has not been altogether wisely carried out, and since it would be desirable to begin democratic training when the Nazis are under the immediate impact of defeat, these two tasks of military government can be profitably undertaken in the immediate future by establishing popularly elected officials in office in the areas of local self-government.

The German people have had long experience in local self-government and a commendable administrative reputation. Restoration of their basically healthy local political institutions would be the most assured initial step in the fostering of a national democracy. The essential precaution would be to disqualify active Nazis from voting and office-holding and to attempt, in this early period, to secure a proportional representation of the several political groups. The participation of all the significant political groups in local self-government will be the best means of avoiding the highly dangerous situation which would arise if some parties were identified with doing the will of the victors and others with opposing it.

(2) Reports from Germany⁸ indicate that it is impossible to maintain the political vacuum created by defeat. We have even now a choice between underground politics and politics in the open which we can watch and in some measure influence. A healthier situation would obtain if we not only permitted but indeed encouraged political activity of a non-Nazi kind. Under present military government regulations we pursue the dubious policy of suppressing the expression and the action of those anti-Nazis who, we must hope, will eventually assume control of Germany.

(Footnote 7—continued)
attain this objective, all implements of war and all specialized facilities for the production of armaments shall be seized or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and implements of war shall be prevented.

"Joseph C. Grew

"J. J. McCloy

"Harry D. White

"J. H. Hildring

"William L. Clayton

"H. Freeman Matthews

"Frank Coe

"Henry Morgenthau, Jr."

This memorandum was endorsed by Roosevelt as follows: "O.K. F.D.R. superseding memo of Mar 10 '45."

⁸ e. g., document No. 339.

(3) The third recommendation proposes the extension of democratic procedure if trial at the local level is satisfactory. In the early stages it might be useful to have local councils send their representatives to regional bodies, of which there was a multiplicity in pre-Nazi Germany. The exact character of regional bodies and procedures for choosing their members can best be determined in consultation with Germans who have proven their sense of responsibility in local government. If we are to avoid duplication of poor choices of officials by military government and further unfortunate criticisms for such action, it is important to establish representative and elective procedures in regional and state administration as soon as possible.

(4) This fourth recommendation rests on belief in the necessity of treating Germany as a unity in so far as agreement between the four governments and on the Control Council is possible. If each zone is set up as a separate and distinct political or administrative unit of its own, the prospective result will be the creation of partite states having diverging political philosophies and the termination of inter-zonal commerce to the great detriment of the United States zone, and to the greater detriment of the British zone. Any break-up of the effective unity of Germany at the present time would mean either a poor-house standard of living in the West with Communism the probable end-result or an elaborate relief program at American and British expense.

(5) Until German affairs are more settled and until the Germans have suffered the immediate impact of the rigorous Allied measures under the banner of economic disarmament and reparation, it is preferable that there be no politically responsible central government in Germany. Any political groups which accept and carry out the heavy demands now contemplated will inevitably be quislings and Vichyites in German eyes and in so far as possible, moderate and anti-Nazi [*sic*] parties should be spared the odium of this collaboration. If, however, it should become necessary to agree to the formation of a politically responsible German Government we should use every effort to make it and to keep it a broadly based coalition. It is highly imperative, for long-range considerations that the Weimar experience be avoided; i. e., that rightist and nationalistic parties appear to have a monopolistic claim on German patriotism.

Recommendation

(1) It is recommended that this Government propose the restoration throughout Germany of local self-government through elective councils and proceed forthwith to put this proposal into effect in the United States zone.

(2) It is recommended that this Government propose the authorization for the whole of Germany of non-Nazi political parties with rights

of assembly and of public discussion and proceed forthwith to put this proposal into effect in the United States zone.

(3) It is recommended that this Government propose the introduction of the representative and elective principles into regional, provincial and state (*Land*) administration as rapidly as results of local self-government seem to warrant this further step.

(4) It is recommended that this Government oppose the creation of separate integrated German administrative and political entities coinciding with the four zones of occupation and favor, on the contrary, the use of central German administrative machinery, in so far as possible, for the despatch of business above the provincial or state level. It is in consequence further recommended that this Government oppose the partition of Germany, either *de facto* or *de jure*, along the lines of the zones of occupation.

(5) It is recommended that this Government oppose the establishment for the time being of a central German Government in contradistinction to the restoration of such central administrative agencies as would serve the interests of the Control Council.

D: AGREEMENT ON TREATMENT OF GERMANY AS AN ECONOMIC UNIT

This Government should make clear its understanding that the division of Germany into zones of occupation does not imply the erection of barriers to the inter-zonal movement of goods. The U. S. zone of occupation is deficient in food and is almost completely lacking in coal and other major industrial materials. Its operation as a closed economic entity would be utterly impracticable. The British zone has an even larger food deficit, but would provide the logical source of supply for coal and some other industrial materials. The Russian zone has a food surplus and, apart from Berlin—which, according to present agreements, would be under quadripartite administration—has suffered much less bomb damage than Western Germany.

The British Government has expressed its adherence to the principle that Germany as a whole should be treated as an economic unit during the period of Allied military control, and they are particularly eager to secure access to Eastern European food supplies. However, this matter has not yet been raised by the Soviet Government except as regards reparation, and the British have made clear that they desire to retain existing combined arrangements among the Western Allies until the Russian position has become known.

The continuation of present combined arrangements among the Western Allies for supply and other economic and financial matters after SHAEF has been terminated would involve serious dangers. It would greatly prejudice the chances of reaching agreement with the

Russians on economic matters, and it would tend toward the establishment of an economic wall between Eastern and Western Germany, and, probably between Eastern and Western Europe. The economy of Eastern Germany can be readily assimilated into an Eastern economic sphere. In contrast, acceptance by the Western powers of the task of finding a place for a Western German economy would create extreme difficulties and would greatly intensify the post-war economic problems of the United States, Great Britain and Western Europe.

The urgency of this problem and the need for prompt discussion arise from the fact that arrangements among the Western Allies, limited in their application to Western Germany, will soon be essential if initial agreements which include the Russian zone are not quickly reached. The U. S. zone in Germany depends on Ruhr and Saar coal and the British would need assistance from the United States in meeting the large food deficit in Northwest Germany.

If inter-zonal economic barriers are to be avoided and the whole German economy treated as a unit it will be necessary to ensure uniform economic treatment of the German population and of agriculture and industry. The occupying powers will have to agree on the scale of supplies to be permitted to the German people, on the type of economic or industrial activities which will be suppressed or allowed or encouraged to some degree, and on the measures which will be required to stimulate agricultural production and to facilitate the distribution of foodstuffs.

Full implementation of the principle that inter-zonal economic barriers should be avoided and the whole German economy treated as a unit for purposes of military government and control will require extensive, detailed Allied agreement covering a broad range of economic matters.

Although these agreements cannot possibly be framed in the time available at the forthcoming conference, it would be desirable to obtain explicit recognition of the need for agreement on the following matters:

- a.* equitable distribution and unrestricted inter-zonal movement of essential goods and services (e. g. food, coal);
- b.* adoption of uniform ration scales throughout Germany;
- c.* adoption of uniform policies for industry and agriculture;
- d.* formulation of agreed programs for German exports and imports;
- e.* establishment of an Allied agency for centralized issuance and control of currency;
- f.* agreed arrangements for financing of approved minimum imports required for Germany as a whole.

With respect to "f.", this Government should obtain an agreement in principle that all the occupying powers should share the cost of financing initial German imports and should obtain repayment of

this initial outlay from the proceeds of German exports in accordance with the principle that the first charge on German exports (other than removals of existing plant and equipment) should be a sum sufficient to pay for essential imports. In order to implement this agreement in practice, the governments should undertake to formulate as soon as possible a program which would (1) set forth the imports which will be needed for Germany as a whole both to meet the minimum needs of the population and to permit Germany to make such exports as will be required on relief, rehabilitation and reparation account, and (2) specify the respective contributions of the occupying powers to the cost of such initial imports.

Agreement on a Transportation Agency in Germany

Reports from Germany have made clear that transportation is a key problem which must be dealt with as a matter of top priority. Germany cannot be effectively treated as an economic unit and its resources cannot be adequately mobilized for the benefit of the occupying forces and the victims of Nazi aggression until Germany's transport system is organized on a national basis and an integrated program of minimum essential rehabilitation is carried out. Such organization is also necessary in order to meet the pressing needs of Allied countries for locomotives and rolling stock which may be available in Germany.

This Government should, therefore, propose that the Commanders-in-Chief of the occupying forces in Germany be instructed by their respective Governments to establish at once an inland transport agency under the Control Council. The chairmanship of this agency should be rotated among the four occupying powers, and it should be given the following immediate tasks:

a. to receive information from the occupying forces of the four governments on the condition of the transportation system, and on the number, nationality, and state of repair of freight cars, locomotives, and inland waterway vessels;

b. to arrange for the prompt return to liberated countries of their transportation equipment found in Germany;

c. to coordinate and expedite plans for the minimum, essential repair of the German transportation network;

d. to determine the minimum German requirements for railroad rolling stock, and to arrange for the immediate use of surplus German rolling stock in liberated countries pending the subsequent, final allocation of such surplus as reparation;

e. to pool railroad rolling stock retained within Germany and to provide such central supervision of transportation as is necessary to assure integrated operation for the purpose of inter-zonal shipments.

Agreement on German Exports Prior to a Reparation Settlement

This Government recognizes that it may be necessary for each of the occupying powers to make available to the countries for which they

have some supply responsibility German goods and equipment urgently needed for relief and rehabilitation. In many cases, it will be impossible to await the conclusion of formal agreements on reparation before undertaking such exports from Germany. This government, however, would like to obtain agreement among the occupying powers, (1) that such exports should be confined to goods and equipment which are urgently needed for the relief and rehabilitation of liberated countries, with special emphasis on railroad rolling stock, coal, and textiles, and (2) that a complete record be kept of all goods and equipment taken out of Germany for this purpose and that this record be made available promptly to the Control Council.

[Appendix A]

TOP SECRET

DRAFT AGREEMENT ON TREATMENT OF GERMANY IN THE INITIAL CONTROL PERIOD⁹

1. The authority of the Control Council to initiate plans and reach agreed decisions on the chief military, political, economic and other questions affecting Germany as a whole shall be paramount,¹⁰ and those plans and decisions shall be carried out in each zone of occupation by the national Commander-in-Chief concerned. In matters exclusively affecting his own zone, each national Commander-in-Chief shall exercise supreme authority in accordance with directives received from his own Government.

2. The purposes of the occupation of Germany, to the promotion of which the above plans and decisions are to be directed, are:—¹¹

(i) The complete disarmament of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. For these purposes:—¹²

(a) the German armed forces, including the General Staff and all para-military organisations, shall be demobilized as soon as practicable and disbanded in such manner as permanently to prevent their revival or reorganisation; and

⁹ In Matthews' copy of the Briefing Book, the title has been changed by hand to read as follows: "Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles To Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period". Manuscript subtitles have also been inserted in this copy as follows: *Authority of the Control Council* before paragraph 1; *Political Principles* before paragraph 2; and *Economic Principles* before paragraph 7.

¹⁰ In Matthews' copy there is the following manuscript interpolation at this point: "in Germany".

¹¹ In Matthews' copy, the last fifteen words have been stricken from the draft and the following manuscript substitution has been inserted: "by which the Control Council shall be guided".

¹² In Matthews' copy, the last three words have been changed by hand to read: "To these ends".

(b) as part of the programme to attain this objective,¹³ all arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialised facilities for their production shall be seized or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.

(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organisations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militaristic activity or propaganda.

(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.

3. Nazi laws which provide the basis of the Hitler regime or which establish discriminations on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated. National Socialist courts shall likewise be abolished.¹⁴

4. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested, with a view to their ultimate disposal.¹⁵ Nazi leaders and influential Nazi supporters and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

5. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Those Germans who are permitted to remain in, or are appointed to, official posts (e. g. in the police or the administration) should understand that they hold office only during good behaviour.

6. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the development of democratic ideas.

7. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralisation of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. The German economy shall also ¹⁶ be

¹³ In Matthews' copy, the first nine words of this subparagraph have been stricken from the draft.

¹⁴ The final sentence of this paragraph has been stricken from the draft in Byrnes' and Matthews' copies.

¹⁵ A manuscript change by Byrnes substitutes "and prosecuted to final judgment" for the last seven words of this sentence. In Matthews' copy the words "and brought to judgment" are substituted for the same seven words.

¹⁶ The word "also" has been stricken from Matthews' copy.

decentralised, except that to the minimum¹⁷ extent required for carrying out the purposes set forth herein, the Control Council shall permit or secure the establishment of central controls¹⁸ and, in particular, of (a) essential national public services such as railroads, communications and power, (b) finance and foreign economic affairs, (c) production and distribution of essential commodities, and (d) such other matters as may be directed from time to time.

8.¹⁹ In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls, German authorities shall to the fullest extent practicable be ordered to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and for any breakdown in those controls will rest with themselves and their own authorities. Any German controls which run counter to the objectives of occupation will be abolished.

9.²⁰ Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only as may be necessary:—

(a) to carry out programmes, as prescribed by higher authority,²¹ of industrial disarmament and demilitarisation, of reparations, of relief for liberated areas and of other supplies as may be notified;

(b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to prevent starvation, disease or civil unrest;

(c) to ensure the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones;

(d) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein. For the same purpose

¹⁷ The word "minimum" has been stricken from Matthews' copy.

¹⁸ In Matthews' copy this sentence, which is marked to become paragraph 9, ends with the word "controls", the rest of the paragraph being stricken from the draft. The following revised version of the *Recommendations* (*ante*, p. 439) is marked for inclusion at the end of the paragraph:

"To this end:

"(i) Local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany through elective councils.

"(ii) Non-Nazi political parties with the rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany.

"(iii) Representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (*Land*) administration as rapidly as results of local self-government seem to warrant.

"(iv) For the time being no central German political government shall be established."

In the margin opposite this redraft is written the word, "Done".

¹⁹ In Matthews' copy this paragraph has been marked to become paragraph 10.

²⁰ In Matthews' copy this paragraph has been marked to become paragraph 11.

²¹ The words "as prescribed by higher authority" have been stricken from the draft in Byrnes' and Matthews' copies.

no extension of credit to Germany or Germans by any foreign person or Government shall be permitted, except that the Control Council may in special emergencies grant such permission.²²

(e) otherwise to carry out the objectives of occupation and prevent conditions arising which would endanger the occupying forces or impede them in their tasks.

10. No action shall be taken in execution of the reparations programme or otherwise which would tend to support basic living standards in Germany on a higher level than that existing in any one of the neighboring United Nations.²³

11.²⁴ The first charge on all approved exports for reparations or otherwise shall be a sum necessary to pay for approved imports.

12.²⁵ Recurrent reparations should not by their form or amount require the rehabilitation or development of German heavy industry and should not foster the dependence of other countries upon the German economy.

13. A suitable programme for the restitution of identifiable property looted by Germans from Allied territory shall be carried out promptly.

14. Subject to the overriding necessity for the maintenance of military security, political activities (including public demonstrations or meetings) shall not be forbidden, but support of Allied authority shall not be lent to any particular political party or policy in Germany.²⁶

²² Manuscript revisions in Matthews' copy make the final clause read as follows: "except that in special emergencies on notice to the control council which shall have power to prohibit such transactions." In Byrnes' copy there is the following marginal shorthand notation by Byrnes, apparently intended as substitute language: "in special emergency and on or with notice to the Control Council and the Control Council shall have power to prohibit such extension".

²³ The following manuscript notation appears in the margin of Byrnes' copy opposite this paragraph: "out". In Matthews' copy this paragraph has been stricken from the draft.

²⁴ In Matthews' copy this paragraph has been marked to be stricken from the draft.

²⁵ In Matthews' copy this paragraph has been stricken from the draft and the following manuscript substitute written in the margin: "12. The principles governing the exaction of reparations from Germany are set forth in Annex 1 to this agreement."

²⁶ The last eighteen words of this paragraph have been stricken from Byrnes' copy. The entire paragraph has been stricken from Matthews' copy, in which the following revision of the "Proposal on Treatment of Germany as an Economic Unit" (see footnote 29, *post*) has been marked for insertion here as paragraph 14:

"14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end:

"(i) no barriers should be erected to the movement of goods and services which are required for (a) the discharge of Germany's reparation obligations, (b) the maintenance of occupying forces and displaced persons, and (c) the maintenance of a subsistence standard of living in Germany.

"(ii) To the fullest extent possible there shall be Uniform Ration Scales throughout Germany[.]

"(iii) To the fullest extent possible there shall be Uniform Policies for Industry and Agriculture throughout Germany. (Footnote 26 continued on p. 447)

15.²⁷ Subject again to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

16.²⁸ This agreement does not apply to Austria.

[Supplement]

TOP SECRET

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

PROPOSAL ON TREATMENT OF GERMANY AS AN ECONOMIC UNIT FOR PRESENTATION TO THE BRITISH AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS²⁹

It is the belief of the United States Government that the division of Germany into zones of occupation does not imply the creation of separate zonal economies. This Government believes that the maintenance of a single national economy in Germany during the period of occupation will have manifest advantages for all the occupying powers.

1. It will make possible full and effective mobilization of German economic resources for the relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction of countries which have suffered from German aggression.

2. It will permit all the occupying powers to share equitably both the advantages and the burdens of occupation.

3. It will make it possible to confine German imports to a minimum and to make adequate arrangements for maintaining in Germany a subsistence standard of living.

4. It will help to avoid substantial differences in the treatment accorded to the German people and minimize the effect of German efforts to play one occupying power against another.

5. It should render easier of execution the joint policy of the occupying powers of preventing the rebuilding of German military industrial power.

The Government of the United States hopes that the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics [*sic*]

“(iv) There shall be agreed programs for imports and exports for Germany as a whole.

“(v) There shall be Agreed Programs on German Coal Production and Allocation[.]

“(v) [(vi)] There shall be Centralized Organization of Transport[.]

“(vi) [(vii)] There shall be established a Centralized Control of Currency.”

²⁷ In Matthews' copy this paragraph has been marked to become paragraph 8.

²⁸ In Matthews' copy this paragraph has been marked to become paragraph 15.

²⁹ In Matthews' copy of the Briefing Book, this supplement has been drastically shortened and revised by hand, and the revision has been marked for inclusion as paragraph 14 in the above "Draft Agreement on Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period". See footnote 26, *ante*.

share its view that Germany should continue to be treated as an economic unit and are willing, in cooperation with the Provisional Government of France, to implement this policy through the Control Council. In particular, the United States Government considers that it would be highly desirable to reach agreement at an early date on the following questions:

1. *Equitable Distribution and Unrestricted Interzonal Movement of Essential Goods and Services*

It would be desirable to agree in principle that no barriers should be erected to the movement of goods and services which are required for (a) the discharge of Germany's reparation obligations, (b) the maintenance of occupying forces and displaced persons, and (c) the maintenance of a subsistence standard of living in Germany.

2. *Adoption of Uniform Ration Scales Throughout Germany*

Agreement in principle on free interzonal movements of essential goods and services would be difficult to translate into practice unless agreement were also reached among the occupying powers regarding the standard of living which they intend to maintain for the German population of their respective zones. It would be difficult, for example, for one occupying power to consent to the shipment of food from its zone of occupation to another zone of occupation if the ration scales in the latter zone were higher than in the former zone. Moreover, differences in the standard of supply in the various zones of occupation would undoubtedly be exploited by the German people for the purpose of causing dissension among the occupying powers.

3. *Adoption of Uniform Policies for Industry and Agriculture*

It would be advisable to reach agreements as early as possible on those types of industries which the occupying powers wish to destroy or discourage in Germany, and on those types of economic activity which the occupying powers wish to foster. Such an agreement would be essential not only to ensure uniform treatment of the German people, but also to ensure operation, in practice, of any agreement to permit free interzonal movement of raw materials and fuel essential to industry. For the same reasons it would be desirable to formulate uniform policies respecting the treatment of monopolies, combines and cartels. It would also be advisable to formulate a joint program for the exploitation of German agriculture in order to minimize the necessity for imports into Germany and to make available any surpluses for the relief of other countries. Such a program would involve agreement on the treatment of large landed estates and the extent to which it would be necessary to make available supplies to stimulate German agricultural production.

4. *Formulation of Agreed Programs for German Exports*

Such programs would have to cover, not only the types and quantities of equipment and supplies which Germany would have to make available on reparation account, but also the types and quantities of goods which Germany would have to export in order to make payment for such imports as are essential to the German economy.

5. *Formulation of Agreed Programs for German Imports*

It is highly desirable that the occupying powers reach agreement on the types and quantities of goods which it will be necessary to import into Germany for the needs of the occupying forces, for the execution of the reparation program, and for the minimum requirements of the German people. Once agreement on an import program has been reached, it will also be necessary to determine how such imports will be financed, and to what extent the occupying powers should contribute to the initial financing of such imports in the event that German means of payment are inadequate.

6. *Formulation of an Agreed Program on Coal Production and Allocation*

It is clear that adequate production and distribution of coal is of key importance to all European countries. At present, the acute shortage of coal is the most important obstacle to the revival of economic life in Europe. It is essential for Europe, as a whole, that maximum efforts be made to increase coal output in Germany and to allocate the output equitably among all countries having a coal deficit. To this end, a program for the German coal industry as a whole should be worked out as quickly as possible.

7. *Agreement on Centralized Organization of Transport*

Transportation, like coal, is a key problem which must be considered a matter of top priority. It is essential that the occupying powers agree promptly on the measures which must be taken to rehabilitate the German transport system and to operate it as a unit. Until such measures are taken, it will be impossible to mobilize resources effectively for the benefit of countries which have suffered from Nazi aggression and to effect restitution of looted rolling stock and locomotives. Such measures will also greatly facilitate the task of occupying and administering Germany.

8. *Establishment of an Allied Agency for Centralized Control of Currency*

If it is agreed that Germany should be administered as a single national economy, it follows that Germany must also be treated as a unit with respect to currency and credit. It is essential, therefore, that a centralized agency be established to control currency and credit and that a uniform policy be followed with respect to the use of Allied military currency. It will be impossible to treat Germany as an economic unit if inflationary policies are adopted in one zone and deflationary policies in another. The establishment of a single centrally controlled currency will also necessitate prompt agreement on measures of foreign exchange control.

This Government hopes that it will be possible to obtain agreement in principle on all these points and that all of the occupying powers will instruct their representatives on the Control Council for Germany to take prompt steps to implement these agreements in practice.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

[No. 327]

No. 328

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Treaty for Demilitarization of Germany with Commitment to Use United States Forces

The conclusion of such a treaty has certain specific advantages at this time. Action taken in the near future by the United States, Great Britain, France and the U. S. S. R. to assure the permanent demilitarization of Germany as a safeguard against any further German aggression would strengthen the relationship between the Allies and eliminate or minimize other conflicts which might arise between them. It would greatly reduce Soviet fears that Germany will one day be permitted to regain its strength and be used by the Western Powers in an anti-Soviet combination. If the demilitarization of Germany is secured by such a commitment no combination of European powers could effectively threaten the Soviet Union and the latter could afford to adopt a more liberal policy, particularly in Eastern Europe, thus making it possible to break the vicious circle in which Soviet [*the Soviet Union?*] moves to insure its own security and which tends to bring about the very combination of powers against it that it is seeking to avoid. It would also counteract the threat of both British and Soviet Governments to establish spheres of influence on the continent of Europe with their potential dangers by eliminating justification for the maintenance of such spheres of influence.

Furthermore, such a treaty would strengthen the influence of the United States in European affairs as it would go far to remove the fear that within a very few years the United States might again turn its back on Europe and once more resort to a policy of isolation.

The chief arguments against such a treaty seem to be the following:

1. The conclusion of the treaty might be interpreted as showing lack of faith in the efficacy of the United Nations organization. It would undoubtedly detract from the charter of the United Nations² if such a treaty were submitted to the Senate at about the same time as the charter. Chapter XII of the Security Charter envisages, however, that the governments may take action in relation to enemy states as a result of the present war. Therefore such a treaty would in fact be part of the framework of the security organization although in practice it would be restricted by the four powers maintaining control of Germany under the terms of the surrender. As to timing, however, such a treaty could not in the ordinary course of events be

¹ Annex 14 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031.

concluded and ready for signature until after approval by the United States of the charter. Presumably Congress will have reached its conclusions with regard to the charter at about the same time that this subject might be discussed in a preliminary fashion at the Big Three meeting.

2. There is great risk in proposing a treaty of this kind unless it is virtually certain that the Senate would accept it. A Senate debate on the subject, which might rally isolationist and anti-Soviet forces would probably be bitter and would not strengthen our international position at this critical time. There is, however, likely to be a considerable measure of political support in this country for such a treaty of demilitarization. On January 10, 1945 Senator Vandenberg in substance advocated the proposal³ and in all probability he would support it at the present time if prior consultations were held with him. On the other hand, it would appear premature to submit any formal project to the Senate until the views of the British Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin have at least been obtained in a preliminary fashion. It is not believed that we have yet reached the point of considering any draft but it does appear that the idea is at least worthy of exploration in the forthcoming meeting.

3. The third argument against the early conclusion of such a treaty relates to the question of timing. It may be argued that Germany is already effectively being demilitarized and will remain so as long as it is occupied by Allied troops, and that if the treaty is to be fully effective, it should contain provisions or be related to other arrangements difficult to determine at the present time. The advocates of delaying consideration of the treaty may further state that it would only be appropriate to conclude the treaty at the time when Allied troops are withdrawn from Germany or Allied Control machinery ceases to function. At that time there would presumably be the further advantage of having a similar treaty with respect to Japan. On the other hand, the United States fully expects to participate in the demilitarization of Germany in any event and to keep Germany demilitarized for an indefinite period in the future. If there is advantage to the United States in agreeing to do this in a formal treaty which would remove any Soviet fears that the Western countries might at some time wish to strengthen Germany against the Soviet Union, the treaty could secure this advantage in return for something we expect to do anyway. Further, if discussions of the treaty are delayed until the conclusion of Allied occupation of Germany, it seems likely that popular interest will have diminished and we shall be faced with greater difficulties in securing Congressional approval. During or immediately after a war people are more prone to understand the necessity for enforcing the peace against the very enemy whom they have been fighting. Nor should it await the conclusion of a similar treaty with Japan since in the discussions it could be made clear that if we are expecting to sign a treaty to demilitarize Germany we would expect a similar treaty to be concluded in regard to Japan at the appropriate time. China might be added as a signatory not only because it adhered to the

³ For text of Vandenberg's speech, see *Congressional Record*, vol. 91, pt. 1, pp. 164-167.

Moscow Declaration⁴ but it also would be a useful preliminary to the conclusion of a similar treaty in regard to Japan to which China by force of circumstances would of course be a signatory.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the President might wish to take an appropriate occasion informally to sound out Churchill and Stalin in this respect in order to determine whether in fact conclusion of such a treaty would achieve the advantages foreseen for it. It would seem undesirable to go further at this time than to express an interest in the proposal and to say that the President would be willing to consider it and to discuss it further through diplomatic channels if Churchill and Stalin think it is a good idea. If this procedure is agreed by the heads of government then preliminary conversations with the leading Senators in this country might be held. Although it is agreed that it would be unwise at this time to progress beyond the preliminary stage which would only commit this Government to further exploration through diplomatic channels, it might be borne in mind that this exploration could be along the lines of proposing that the four (five) governments undertake in treaty form what would amount to an advance commitment in the Security Council to utilize all their forces and resources to suppress any further German aggression against any other power. Such commitment, if in treaty form, would of course require ratification by the Senate but could also be approved by joint resolution of both houses. This differs slightly from Senator Vandenberg's proposal but harmonizes more closely with the concept developed at San Francisco.

⁴ i. e., the Declaration on General Security of October 30, 1943. Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 308.

No. 329

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

PERMANENT ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESTRICTIONS ON GERMANY

This government stands committed to a policy of complete military disarmament of Germany and the prohibition of the manufacture of arms, ammunition and implements of war, including all types of aircraft, as well as the destruction or removal of all plant and equipment established or designed to produce such armament. It also favors a policy of maximum removal of productive equipment on reparation account as a measure of security, and it desires that Allied control of the German economy be exercised in such a way as to promote the more adequate industrialization of other parts of Europe and to reduce their dependence on the German metal and chemical

industries. We should avoid, at this time, any commitment to measures involving permanent or indefinitely prolonged restrictions on the German economy. Decisions on the advisability of such restrictions can be taken only after full information is obtained concerning the present state of German industry and after removals have been effected on reparation account. Moreover, this government now has under way a series of technical and economic studies bearing on this problem and does not want to prejudice the recommendations which may be made as a result of such studies.

No. 330

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Elsey)*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

In a brief discussion at Teheran² in December 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin agreed that Germany should be dismembered after the war. Minutes of the Teheran Conference are not now available, but it appears from discussion at Yalta,³ where the Teheran conversations on Germany were reviewed, that President Roosevelt proposed at Teheran the division of Germany into five parts. Churchill, after some hesitation, suggested the division of Germany into two parts—Prussia and southern Germany. Stalin, as he phrased it, “associated himself with the views of the President.” He did not seem to favor a large southern German state. The discussion at Teheran was an exchange of views only and no fixed conclusions were reached.

When Churchill visited Moscow in October 1944, he and Stalin again discussed the post-war partition of Germany. Churchill informed President Roosevelt on 22 October⁴ that Stalin wanted Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary “to form a realm of independent anti-Nazi pro-Russian states, the first two of which might join together.” Contrary to the views he had expressed at Teheran, Stalin now agreed with Churchill in the desirability of a strong southern German state—or, as Churchill expressed it, “a federation of south-German states, including Austria, Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden.”

¹ Submitted to Leahy July 1 and subsequently forwarded to Truman.

² The records of the Tehran Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume in this series. Cf. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 797–798; Leahy, *I Was There*, pp. 210–211.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 611–614.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 159–160.

Churchill reported that Stalin would be glad to see Vienna the capital of such a federation and, Churchill continued, "the idea of Vienna's becoming the capital of a large Danubian federation has always been attractive to me, though I should prefer to add Hungary, to which Stalin is strongly opposed."

Churchill also reported that Stalin wanted the Ruhr and the Saar detached from Prussia "and put out of action, probably under international control, and a separate state formed in the Rhineland."

Churchill and Stalin agreed that internationalization of the Kiel Canal would be desirable.

No definite conclusions on Germany were reached at the October Churchill-Stalin meeting pending a meeting with President Roosevelt. However, Churchill and Stalin did make a formal agreement on behalf of their respective governments to guarantee to Poland the following German territory: "The Free City of Danzig, the regions of East Prussia, west and south [of] Königsberg, the administrative district of Oppeln in Silesia and lands desired by Poland to east of line of the Oder."⁵

President Roosevelt thanked Churchill for his report of the Moscow conversations but he made no comment on Germany.

In a Plenary Session on 5 February 1945 at Yalta,⁶ Stalin reminded Roosevelt and Churchill of their discussion at Teheran and asked if they still agreed in principle to the dismemberment of Germany. He felt the time had come to make a decision, and he thought the plan discussed in Moscow with Churchill was feasible; namely, Germany divided into two parts (Prussia on the one hand and southern Germany and Austria on the other), with the Ruhr and Westphalia under international control.

President Roosevelt spoke briefly on the recent growth of the concept of the German Reich and he answered Stalin's questions by replying that he thought "the division of Germany into five states or seven states was a good idea." Churchill interrupted to say "or less"; to which the President agreed.

Churchill said he agreed in principle to dismemberment but the question was far too complicated to settle at Yalta. It would require lengthy study and he could not, he said, commit himself to any specific plan for that reason. Minutes of the meeting read as follows:

"The Prime Minister said, however, that personally he felt the isolation of Prussia and the elimination of her might from Germany would remove the arch evil—the German war potential would be greatly diminished. He added that a south German state with perhaps a government in Vienna might indicate the line of great division of Germany. He said that we are agreed that Germany should lose

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 203.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 611-614.

certain territories conquered by the Red Army which would form part of the Polish settlement, but he added that the question of the Rhine Valley and the industrial areas of the Ruhr and Saar capable of producing armaments had not yet been decided; should they go to one country, or should they be independent, or part of Germany, or should they come under the trusteeship of the world organization which would delegate certain large powers to see to it that these areas were not used to threaten the peace of the world."

Churchill also stated that there was no decision as to whether Prussia, after being isolated from the rest of Germany, should be further divided internally.

Stalin and Molotov were anxious to reach a decision on Germany; Churchill and Eden were not. The President had no comments after his initial statement that he agreed to the dismemberment of Germany. At Soviet instigation, a clause was added to the surrender terms for Germany and a commission was appointed to study the question. Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terms for Germany, as amended at Yalta,⁷ then read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and [the] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

There was no further general conversation on the partition of Germany, but some light is cast on British reluctance to come to any decisions at Yalta by a statement of Eden's on 10 February concerning reparations.⁸ The Minutes report his statement as follows:

"Mr. Eden stated that reparations should be considered in connection with the dismemberment of Germany. There seemed to be two Russian objectives which were difficult to reconcile—the depletion of German manufacturing capacity and the insuring of German ability to make large payments at a later date. The British were most anxious to avoid conditions in which it would be necessary for them to finance and feed Germany at a later date as a result of reparations."

The Commission appointed at Yalta to study the question of dismemberment consists of Anthony Eden (Chairman), Ambassador Winant and Ambassador Gousev. William Strang of the British Foreign Office has been acting as Eden's deputy at the meetings held in London.

No information concerning the Commission's meetings is available in the Map Room. The only Presidential message concerning Ger-

⁷ See vol. II, document No. 1416, section III.

⁸ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 874.

man dismemberment is a report to President Truman from Mr. Hopkins, sent from Moscow on 30 May.⁹ It reads as follows:

“Some days ago we reminded Stalin that he made a speech in which he said that he did not favor the dismemberment of Germany. This appeared to be contrary to the position he took both at Tehran and Yalta. His explanation of this action on his part was that his recommendation had been turned down at Yalta and more specifically that Eden and Strang on behalf of the British had stated that dismemberment was to be accomplished only as a last resort and that Winant, who was present at the conference at which this discussion took place in London, interposed no objection, hence Stalin stated that it was his understanding that both Great Britain and the United States were opposed to dismemberment. I undertook to tell him that this was not the case, that while you had made no final decision in regard to this, the United States considered this an open question and that you would surely want to thrash this out at your next meeting. I told him that he must not assume that the United States is opposed to dismemberment because he may learn from you that just the opposite was the case. He then said that he would keep an open mind in regard to it and that dismemberment was a matter which the three Allies must settle amongst themselves.”

G. M. ELSEY

⁹ For the full paraphrased text of the report referred to, see Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 904-905. Cf. document No. 26.

No. 331

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹

TOP SECRET

GERMANY—PARTITION

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that this Government oppose the partition of Germany into two or more separate states as distinct from border cessions or readjustments.

DISCUSSION

Previous Considerations: When the question of a possible dismemberment of Germany as a security measure was first discussed in governmental circles in Washington, the late President Roosevelt was disposed to favor the proposal. At the Tehran Conference it is understood that he was prepared to see Germany divided into five separate states. By the time of the Crimea Conference, however, he had reconsidered his original judgment and expressed himself in opposition to considering partition prior to termination of hostilities

¹ Annex 15 to the attachment to document No. 177.

and an opportunity to study actual conditions and trends in Germany. He agreed, none the less, to a modification of the original instrument of unconditional surrender to provide for German recognition of the right of the victor powers to dismember Germany if they deemed it desirable. It was further agreed that a committee consisting of Ambassador Winant, Ambassador Gousev, and Mr. Eden (Chairman) should study the procedure for effecting dismemberment and whether it appeared desirable.

The committee at its first meeting in London decided to consider not only procedures but also the prior questions of the desirability and the feasibility of dismemberment. In comment on the report of this meeting, Mr. Roosevelt wrote on April 6, "I think our attitude should be one of study and postponement of final decision." The committee has not had further meetings.

In the Department of State the Committee on Post-War Programs, composed of the higher officers of the Department, in May 1944 unanimously approved a recommendation of the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany that this Government oppose the forcible partition of Germany.

The Bases of the Recommendation: Opposition to partition rests on the following considerations:

Partition as a device for stripping the Germans of the ability to make war would necessitate a genuine and lasting dispersal of their national energies. This dispersal would imply prevention of political and military collaboration and, to be effective, would likewise entail a break-up of Germany's economic unity since, without it, a political dismemberment would be useless.

It is submitted that such a program is unnecessary as a security measure, that it would be injurious to the economic rehabilitation of Europe, and that it would be a source of disturbance and danger to the peace of Europe rather than a source of tranquillity.

Partition could not for some time to come be trusted as a substitute for the basic demilitarization controls which, if adequately enforced, would provide adequate security. In the uncertainties of the coming years it would not be prudent to give up the strictest supervision of Germany's war-making potentialities whether Germany is divided or not. It would follow, therefore, that the victor powers by adding the enforcement of partition to the enforcement of the basic demilitarization controls would be assuming an unnecessary burden—unless it could be foreseen that, in time, partition would be accepted by the German people and could be considered assured grounds for relaxing otherwise necessary measures.

The best calculation is that the German people will not willingly accept dismemberment as a permanent fate. The growth of the

sense of German national unity has been such that no significant group has questioned the verdict of 1871. The attempts to promote separatism in the Rhineland after the last war had little popular support and French patronage robbed the movement of any decency in German eyes. At the present time, while there is probably some reaction to Nazi over-centralization, the collapse of Germany in defeat has as yet given rise to no regional expressions of a desire to separate from the rest of Germany.

It must be anticipated, consequently, that when the Germans have recovered somewhat from the shock of defeat their patriotic sense of national unity will again assert itself—unless the victors can discover and exploit some geographic lines of fissure within Germany.

There seems at present little likelihood that such lines can be found. The historic divisions of Germany offer little basis of hope. The old *Laender* provide at best some grounds for moderate decentralization. Religious differences, as indicated by voting habits during the Weimar period, indicate no substantial cleavage. The historic differences between East and West on the one hand and North and South on the other have virtually no substance in contemporary Germany, certainly not enough to count on as bases of lasting partition. And even if these areas were substantially different, they would be inappropriate as partite states; the great concentration of population and economic development which has taken place in the Northwest has robbed them of usefulness in seeking a balance between German regions. As further evidence of the present-day homogeneity of Germany it may be noted that a political analysis of the northwestern, southern and eastern regions shows a remarkable consistency in the growth of National Socialism throughout Germany.

These considerations indicate, accordingly, that the four zones of military occupation would offer no prospect of serving as effective lines of internal cleavage and therefore of partition, and they were certainly not drawn for the purpose of partition.

The only tenable calculation is that partition, regardless of the number of partite states and their specific boundaries, would have to be maintained indefinitely by force. It would follow that the end consequence would be that the victors could not rely on partition as a substitute for demilitarization controls and would therefore not only have to continue a machinery of control adequate to restrain a united Germany but would also have to take on the additional and superfluous burden of maintaining partition.

It should furthermore be emphasized that a partition of Germany could also result in a highly dangerous competition on the part of various states to control or to influence the governments of the partite

states. The Germans will thereby be enabled to play off one ally against another in pursuance of what could well form a common plan on their part. By inviting the east or the west to stake out special claims and exert a predominant role in one or more of the new states, the Germans might well obtain special concessions for one state or another and jeopardize the unity of the Allies in preventing the renewal of German aggression. The skill with which the Germans played one power off against another during the Hitler period is evidence of their capacity to take every advantage of the political possibilities that would be provided by the establishment of several German states.

The judgment that dismemberment of Germany would be injurious to the economic rehabilitation of Europe derives from the conclusion that, if it is to be more than a nominal or transitory device, substantial economic barriers must be erected between the partite states. A customs-union or other form of special economic collaboration could only result in a consolidation of resources, partly legitimate but in large measure probably illicit, which would jeopardize the purposes of partition. Economic dismemberment, however, would entail an economic regression, not only for Germany but also for the whole of Europe. Segments of Germany could undoubtedly be ordered to live, and perhaps with outside assistance made to live on a lowered standard, but economic frontiers erected within Germany would stand as barriers to the most effective contribution of Germany to immediate reparation and reconstruction and to the ultimate improvement of the European standard of life.

The judgment, finally, that partition would be a source of disturbance and danger rests on the implications of continued resistance and on the possible consequences for Allied policy of changing conditions.

If continued German resistance be a reasonable anticipation, there is need to canvass the means whereby the Germans could circumvent partition by actions short of those that would expose the several states to disciplinary action.

Any permitted form of special economic collaboration between the states would open the door to a considerable area of common action. Complete economic separation, on the other hand, would inspire a diversity of parallel activities, some ostensibly innocent and legally unimpeachable and others surreptitious, which would in the end be common activities. Under such circumstances a system of controls would inevitably be only partially effective while vexations and bickerings would be the usual order of the day. Identical legislation in the several states, or the choice of the same executives, could easily go a considerable distance toward defeating partition. The co-ordi-

nating work of like-minded, and for all practical purposes identical, political parties would tax the ingenuity of the most skillful and far-sighted enforcement officers. The activities of the Nazi government of the Free City of Danzig paralleling those of the Nazi Reich offer an illustration of what might be done and of how difficult it would be to take effective action against it.

The result of such a state of affairs might be a Germany unable to make war but nonetheless a Germany able to keep the world in lasting perturbation.

A greater danger for the peace settlement and for world security would arise from the problem of the continued unanimity of the victors in the face of German evasions and equally unremitting protests. The history of the treaty of Versailles,² if it can be translated into a general principle, points to the dangers inherent in a disagreement between the United Nations as to whether the various treaty provisions are compatible with a peace-time sense of justice and with the economic requirements of peace-time life. The more rigorous, the more obviously unnecessary the provisions of a treaty the more quickly divergences of opinion among the Allies will arise. Any concessions born of a changed sense of what is just will merely encourage the Germans in patriotic protests and resistance; any conflicts of opinion among the enforcing Powers over the merits of a given prescription would prepare the way for some German *fait accompli*. Once this process had begun there would be no logical halting place in the emancipation of Germany from external control.

Since at the present, when most of the world is embittered by Nazi misdeeds, almost no responsible statesman and few voices of public opinion in Europe favor partition, it would be prudent to anticipate the time when partition, if imposed, would appear unjust and economically bad and one or more of the enforcing powers would refuse further responsibility for it.

That possibility, with its disastrous consequences for the whole program of control, might well counsel the adoption of a program of

² Signed June 28, 1919. Annotated text in *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, p. 57.

restraint that would not lend itself to a reversal of policy when the dangers of Germany's aggressive militarism are not so poignantly felt as during and immediately after the war.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

No. 332

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹

[Extract ²]

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

DISEMBEUREMENT OF GERMANY

Partitioning of Germany into several German states would not be fully effective in breaking down the aggressive nationalism which has characterized the German people during the past century. Furthermore, the establishment of several additional small states in Central Europe would tend to enlarge the field for rivalries and political schemes of the European powers without compensating advantages in solving the basic problem of how to bring Germany back into the family of nations. For these reasons, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee considers that from the long range military-political point of view, a substantial dismemberment of Germany is undesirable.

The Committee, however, perceives no objection to such reasonable boundary adjustments as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium may demand.

¹ This memorandum was prepared in response to a request from Leahy (document No. 155) for recommendations which would be "useful to the President in preparing himself for the [Berlin] conference". It was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.

² For another extract from this memorandum, see document No. 514.

No. 333

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Joint Civil Affairs Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY—WHEN SHOULD IT BE ESTABLISHED AND HOW?

DISCUSSION

1. It is the United States policy that state, municipal and local administration in Germany should as quickly as possible be reestablished, purged of Nazi personnel and practices, and thereafter operate under the close supervision and control of the military government. Consistently with this policy local German agencies of government have been and are being reestablished.

2. At the present time there is no central civil government of Germany. On 5 June the four Allied powers assumed supreme responsibility with respect to Germany.² The four Allied Commanders, representing their Governments on the Control Council, are jointly vested with supreme authority in matters affecting Germany as a whole and are empowered to control such German agencies of central administration as may be permitted to function.

3. It is United States policy that when and if an independent Germany is finally reconstituted, the powers of its national government shall be limited, and regional and local autonomy encouraged. Accordingly, it has been provided in the directive to General Eisenhower³ that "the administration of affairs in Germany shall be directed towards the decentralization of the political and administrative structure and the development of local responsibility". Gen-

¹ This memorandum was prepared in response to a request from Leahy (document No. 155) for recommendations which would be "useful to the President in preparing himself for the [Berlin] conference". It was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.

² Text of the "Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority With Respect to Germany" in *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520*; 60 Stat. (2) 1649.

³ See Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. xiii, p. 596.

eral Eisenhower has been instructed to seek agreement on this basic principle in the Control Council. If it is accepted, it will delay the formation of a national civil government in Germany. United States policy, however, permits the establishment, under Allied control, of a minimum of centralized administration with respect to essential national public services such as railroads, communications and power, and with respect to finance, foreign affairs and the production and distribution of essential commodities.

4. The establishment and utilization of German national agencies of administration and government is a matter affecting Germany as a whole, and, therefore, under the protocol on control machinery,⁴ cannot be dealt with unilaterally outside of the Control Council. If the policy of dismemberment should be adopted there would, of course, be no question of reestablishing a permanent national civil authority. Whatever policy may be adopted, it is considered important that the reconstitution of a central German government, as distinguished from agencies for the control of essential national services, should be postponed until latent forces of democracy have been given an opportunity of asserting themselves locally, and until the Control Council has been able to estimate the nature of emergent tendencies within Germany.

RECOMMENDATION

5. It is recommended that the United States make no present commitment as to the time when a central indigenous government should be established in Germany. The time and means of its reconstitution should be a matter for determination and recommendation to the governments by the Control Council. The Control Council, however, should immediately seek to effect the necessary minimum of centralized administration of those essential national services as to which uniformity of policy and procedure throughout Germany is necessary, such as railroads, communications, and power and with respect to finance, foreign affairs, and the production and distribution of essential commodities.

⁴ Signed at London, November 14, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, May 1, 1945. For texts, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3070*; *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2062. Text of the agreement of November 14, 1944, also in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 124.

No. 334

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Joint Civil Affairs Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

WHAT WILL BE THE BANKING ARRANGEMENTS IN GERMANY? WHAT MONEY WILL BE USED, AND WHAT EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS MADE?

DISCUSSION

1. British and American troops are using a military currency in Germany known as Allied Military Marks. Plates for the production of this currency have been furnished to the Soviet authorities, who are also using this currency in the area under their control. This currency is supplemental to the indigenous legal tender currencies. German Military and certain local emergency currencies are also circulating. A uniform currency system for Germany is basic to contractual relationships and the maintenance of any sound level of commerce and industry. Also, a definition of the purpose for which such currency will be used in the respective zones by the occupying forces, and others, is necessary in order to ensure uniform policy relative to occupation costs as well as for inflation reasons. In view of the several currencies now circulating in Germany, a redefinition of what comprises legal tender currency is necessary, in order to establish uniform standards. In order to maintain uniformity of currency, effective records and to control amount, character and flow of currency, a central bank of issue should be recognized or established.

2. Exchange rates and exchange controls should be uniformly effective in the respective zones of occupation as a necessary step to the restoration of German foreign financial relationships, including the financing of approved German imports and exports. A uniform system of public finance for the treatment of the problems of budget, taxation and public debt as well as for the reestablishment of German domestic and foreign credit and trade within the limitations of military government objectives is one of the factors necessary to support a general rate of exchange for the German mark. Valuables, including gold and currencies, have been uncovered in Germany by military forces and are now held by Allied, United States and other

¹ This memorandum was prepared in response to a request from Leahy (document No. 155) for recommendations which would be "useful to the President in preparing himself for the [Berlin] conference". It was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.

forces. Agreement should be reached for uniform disposition of such valuables.

3. The foregoing discussion is also applicable to similar problems in Austria.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. Effort should be made to secure agreement of the Heads of State with respect to each of Germany and Austria:

a. To the establishment of a uniform currency system with provisions for a central bank of issue for the purpose of centralizing the production and issuance of currency; to a redefinition of what comprises legal tender currency; and to the necessity for an agreement by the Control Council to determine the amounts of such currency which will be made available to the zonal commanders and others.

b. To the establishment of a uniform system of exchange control and exchange rates.

c. To the establishment of a uniform system of national and local public finance.

d. To consideration by the Control Council of the question of the resumption of service at an early date on the internal public debt.

e. That identified valuables uncovered by military forces will be restored to their country of origin and that unidentified valuables will be held in custody by such forces, subject to their disposition by the Reparation Authorities.

No. 335

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED AGREED PROPAGANDA IN GERMANY

DISCUSSION

1. Recent information from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force has pointed out that the contrast between official public announcements of United States policy, and policy announcements originating in other zones, already has had a marked psychological affect [*effect*] on the German population in the United States zone. It has been estimated that should this lack of coordination continue,

¹ This memorandum was prepared in response to a request from Leahy (document No. 155) for recommendations which would be "useful to the President in preparing himself for the [Berlin] conference". It was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.

undesirable psychological repercussions also may be produced in zones occupied by other Allies.

2. A United States policy² on "Control of Public Information in Germany", agreed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department and Office of War Information sets forth substantially the following objectives for the control of dissemination of public information in Germany:

a. Facilitating the tasks of the armed forces occupying Germany.

b. Promoting and enforcing compliance by the German people with all orders issued by the occupation authorities.

c. Serving the administration of the Allied Military Government in Germany.

d. Convincing the German people of their total defeat by the United Nations and of the futility of future wars of aggression.

e. Destroying the Nazi party (NSDAP) and system, and preventing the dissemination of doctrines and propaganda of the nature which were advocated by the former Nazi party.

f. Conducting counter propaganda to destroy the attitudes created under the propaganda program of the Nazi party.

g. Displaying to the German people the unity of purpose toward Germany, existing among the Allied Nations.

h. Assisting the military operations of any of the Allied Nations against any country with which it remains at war subsequent to the surrender of Germany.

3. The foregoing policy has been placed before the European Advisory Commission for possible adoption as a uniform policy by the four controlling powers. If adopted it would be used as a basis for instructions to the Control Council for Germany to establish agreed and uniform policies relating to the dissemination of public information throughout Germany.

4. Working staff officials of the State Department have advised that member nations of the European Advisory Commission agree in principle on the necessity for control of information in Germany. While no particular objections have been raised to any portion of the United States sponsored, proposed directive,² no definite stand has been taken by any of the other nations for either acceptance or rejection.

5. Senior staff officers of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force believe that it will be difficult to achieve agreement in the Control Council for Germany on even the major problems vitally affecting German economy. As to matters of lesser importance and the settlement of details, they definitely question the ability of the control machinery to handle such matters. While there is always the hope that some coordination of propaganda could

² Not printed.

be obtained through a section working under the Control Council for Germany, the consideration of such a solution should include weighing the desirability of loading down the Control Council with details not absolutely essential, thus reducing the chance of success in solving vital matters, such as transportation, currency, food, and coal.

6. In any consideration of the propaganda problem, it must be recognized that the national aims and ideologies of France and Russia, particularly Russia, are such that they may well intend to further them, at least in their Zones of Occupation, by propaganda means, and perhaps to do this with or without the consent of the other occupying powers. Therefore, it would appear that any attempt to achieve a complete overall agreement on the policies and objectives for all propaganda directed towards Germany is unlikely to succeed. The best that might be expected is possible agreement by the powers on certain of the aims, and these are likely to be only the more "negative" ones which are directed towards the eradication of Nazism and the elimination of Germany's war-making potential. This leaves "positive" propaganda outside the realm of probable agreement.

7. The present United States policy, with the probable exception of the undefined "counter-propaganda" objective, concerns itself with the more negative propaganda aims and as such is a reasonable basis for discussion with the other powers in the effort to reach agreement on at least a partial basis.

8. The question of whether the United States should develop further and more positive propaganda objectives is to a great extent beyond the purview of the military. It appears that the present policy is incomplete and that perhaps an effort should be made to extend the policy, looking towards the post-war years. Such a further development and definition of our propaganda policy would appear to be a suitable task for the State Department and the Office of War Information.

9. The individual stand of the United Nations at the present on the coordination of propaganda appears to be:

a. Russia—Recent cable advice from the Office of War Information representative³ in Moscow indicates a slight softening in the Soviet attitude against multilateral control of propaganda for Germany. The opinion was expressed by an official of the Soviet Information Bureau that "the Berlin accord⁴ will make it possible now to take steps for propaganda coordination." Since the Russians have their

³ Joseph B. Phillips.

⁴ The reference is probably to the quadripartite statement of June 5, 1945, on control machinery in Germany. Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XII, p. 1054.

own communistic ideological propaganda line it is considered that it will be difficult to obtain agreement in this connection.

b. France—There is no available evidence that the French would object to participation in multilateral control of propaganda for Germany. However, the French propaganda line is different from our own and might be difficult to reconcile. Very little French propaganda has been directed at Germany. Rather, the principal part has been directed at the Allies, attempting to justify the French position regarding the Saar and Rhineland areas.

c. Great Britain—There is no evidence to indicate any change in the British attitude from that inferred in a statement of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force Psychological Warfare Division on 24 April 1944, to the effect: "As a result of the experience with Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean Theater, there is wholehearted agreement that even though there may be separate U. S. and British zones of military occupation there should be a fully integrated Psychological Warfare organization . . . ⁵rather than a distinct national organization for each zone." Therefore, it seems possible that some arrangement could be obtained with the British regarding propaganda.

RECOMMENDATIONS

10. It is recommended:

a. At the forthcoming tripartite conference the U. S. should reasonably press for approval by the Heads of State of a propaganda policy along the lines of the present United States agreed policy now before the European Advisory Commission. Later agreement with France would then be necessary.

b. As to coordination of the implementation of any policy agreed by the four nations, the only available instrument appears to be the Control Council, and exploratory conversations might be conducted on the political level with a view to ascertaining the desirability of setting up a propaganda committee as part of the functioning organization of the Control Council.

c. The problem of United States propaganda policy towards Germany be reviewed by the State Department and the Office of War Information prior to the coming conference.

⁵ Ellipsis in the original.

No. 336

840.24/6-1845

The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 18, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. MCCLOY: In recent conversations with representatives of the War Department, officers of the Department have been informed that the War Department does not consider itself responsible for exports from Germany except to the extent that the goods ex-

ported serve to meet some direct military use or responsibility. Consequently, in the judgment of these representatives, the War Department would not be able to finance the procurement of supplies needed to increase German production for export other than in the limited circumstances in which the military authorities have a direct interest in the goods exported.

The point came up in connection with a discussion of measures necessary to ensure the increased exportation of coal from Germany to the liberated countries of Northwest Europe. As I understand it, the War Department representatives recognized that an obligation rests upon the military authorities to see that coal is exported from Germany to these countries so long as SHAEF is responsible for the distribution of coal in Northwest Europe. However, once the period of military supply responsibility for Northwest Europe is terminated (as will soon occur), it was their view that the responsibility of the military authorities in Germany would be limited to ensuring the production only of the minimum amount of coal needed to prevent disease and unrest in Germany.

The expression of this narrow view of the responsibilities of the military authorities in Germany has caused considerable concern to the Department. It appears to me so clearly inconsistent with the directives which have been issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army Forces of Occupation in Germany,¹ that it seemed desirable to inquire whether it does in fact represent the considered view of the War Department. Under the directive to the Commander-in-Chief approved by the President on May 11, 1945 (IPCOG 1/4),² he is directed in his dual capacity as United States member of the Control Council and commander of the American zone of occupation to carry out certain basic objectives of United States policy. These include the provision of relief for the benefit of countries devastated by Nazi aggression, and the directive orders the taking of all feasible measures to facilitate the production of coal and, subject to certain limitations, other types of goods and services needed for this purpose. Since only the military authorities are in a position to implement this directive, it has seemed to us that the responsibility for determining what imported supplies are needed to make use of German resources for this purpose must be determined by the military, and that the responsibility for procurement of such supplies must rest with the military.

¹ General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.

² This paper circulated the text (approved by Truman on May 11, 1945) of a "Directive to Commander in Chief of U. S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany". A slightly modified version of this text is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XIII, p. 596.

It is the State Department's view that for the period of Allied military government in Germany, the procurement and initial financing responsibilities of the military authorities with respect to imports are not limited to consumption of occupying forces, displaced persons, and such minimum consumption by German civilians as are necessary to prevent disease and unrest, such responsibility should include all imports which serve the purposes of the United States government in Germany. This responsibility, moreover, in the view of the Department, extends to the United States' share of any combined financing which may be undertaken in concert by the occupying powers. As you are aware, it has been decided as a matter of government policy that this Government will seek to make the reimbursement of all expenses incurred by it in importing supplies into Germany a first charge on German ability to make foreign payments.

I should very much appreciate receiving your comments on this matter at an early date.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. CLAYTON

No. 337

840.48/6-2145

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 21 June 1945.

DEAR MR. CLAYTON: I have your note of June 18th,¹ and I will see that the subject is discussed and given careful consideration in the Department. I will then advise you formally of our conclusions.

Pending this notification, however, I think that our chief difficulty arises from the fact that once we are in our separate zones, it is very difficult for us to justify expenditures for Army appropriations for the provision of civilian supplies in foreign occupied zones, the benefits of which would accrue to civilians of liberated areas. It is true that the Army in its zone and the Commander of the Army in his capacity as a member of the Control Council is an agent to carry out the policies of this Government, which include the utilization of German resources for the benefit of liberated areas.

We have heretofore justified our Army appropriations for civilian supplies on the basis of protecting our tactical operations against an enemy in the field. When those operations cease, it becomes, at least in respect of non-occupied territory, a matter for the relief and rehabilitation agencies of the Government to deal with and to finance. If this were not the case, I think we would have the rather anomalous

¹ Document No. 336.

situation of the Army determining the rehabilitation program of foreign countries. I do not believe that either the Congressional policy or the Administration policy encompass such an activity for the Army. The Army can supervise the work of the Germans in the production of German resources, but this is an entirely different function than financing the production of those resources, and some financing is needed. In other words, this is an expense of rehabilitation and not an expense of occupation. With every desire to be helpful in a situation, the acuteness of which we are all aware, I do not believe that we are taking a narrow point of view when we contend that the Army should not be called upon to produce these funds.

As I say, we will endeavor to give you a more formal reply to your letter. I am merely giving you my first reaction to it.

Sincerely,

JOHN J McCLOY

No. 338

740.00119 Control (Germany)/6-2745 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET

HOECHST, June 27, 1945—8 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

62. Most Immediate.

2. I regret the insistence that the French accept southern Württemberg¹ against their apparent desires since it involves the division and possible political obliteration of an important and historically liberal German federal unit.

It is noted that Ambassador Winant and Mr. Mosely have voiced objection to this solution which appears to us to be at variance with the directive to obtain the political decentralization of the Reich, the sound accomplishment of which would seem to depend on rebuilding and reviving the traditional federal units of Germany other than modern Prussia.

Sent Dept repeated to London as No. 10; copy to Paris.

MURPHY

¹ In the delineation of the French zone of occupation in Germany.

No. 339

740.00119 (Control) Germany/6-2845 : Airgram

*The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Director of European Affairs (Matthews)*¹

TOP SECRET

SHAEF, June 28, 1945.

A-63. Following considerations appear pertinent (top secret for Matthews) to our present policy of completely banning all political activity in Germany (supplementing my 3268 June 2, 2 p. m.²).

Any or most political groups we permit to organize in near future seem likely to become anti-American-Military Government, particularly if as appears probable German people will suffer an adverse economic existence for some time to come. And once we lift present ban on political activity it would be extremely difficult to reintroduce it.

Our current policy is essentially negative and suppressive and results in a political vacuum which various groups will undoubtedly try to fill. If we continue ban too long, it may discourage the more democratic elements which begin to show signs, though these are faint and timid, of a desire to express themselves following years of Nazi suppression. Continuation of ban may well provide milieu for exploitation by totalitarian extremists of both Right and Left who are only too adept at disciplined underground activity. Relatively unorganized Social Democrats and Centrists might be inclined to obey our orders while Communists and Nazis advance their own organizations.

An added and most important consideration is that ban on political activity will not be in effect throughout Reich. There is good reason to believe that Free Germany Movement (see Morris' memorandum no. 33² for comprehensive analysis of present situation) is already being given administrative power on exclusive basis in Russian areas, with obvious future political implications.

Department has presumably already received Radio Monitoring Report of Berlin broadcast on June 10 giving Zhukov's Order No. 2.³ Besides permitting establishment of free trade unions, this authorizes formation and activity in Soviet Zone of all anti-fascist parties to extent that they are aimed at exterminating fascist remnants and consolidating democracy.

The accompanying commentary broadcast suggests strongly that this order will lead to development of one party totalitarian political

¹ Sent to the Secretary of State ad interim.

² Not printed.

³ For the text of Zhukov's Order No. 2, see Beate Ruhm von Oppen, ed., *Documents on Germany Under Occupation, 1945-1954* (London, 1955), p. 37.

system of type already established in eastern Europe and Balkans. The commentary calls for a strong democracy, not a democracy of the Weimar type, and emphasizes that the democratic forces must be united and not split up. It ends by warning that whoever tries to interfere with the unity of these democratic forces will be treated as an enemy of democracy.

The above will probably have as its net results placing political control in the Russian Zone completely in the hands of the Free Germany movement. Its activities will tend to overflow into our Zone, and when we finally raise the present ban on political activity, Communists may profit from a considerable head start as the only political group in Germany organized and active on a national basis. The possibility that they may be strongly supported by one of the four occupation powers will be an additional factor in their favor.

The Political Division has just submitted to General Clay a proposed directive ⁴ to the American Military District Commanders for the implementation of JCS 1067 ⁵ after the dissolution of SHAEF. The proposed directive covers paragraphs 9a and 9c of JCS 1067 dealing with political activity and parades. We have sought in an accompanying memorandum ⁴ to give some guidance to Military Government officers in their handling of purely local political and quasi-political groups which have sprung up here and there. We have suggested the possibility of making some informal use of local non-political groups to assist in the handling of Military Government problems. We have particularly emphasized the possibility of using individual members of such groups as are democratic and represent more than extremist minorities. All of this has been based on the rule laid down in JCS 1067 that there shall be no political activity, except as may be authorized by the Theater Commander. So long as the ban continues absolute, as it has been hitherto, it will remain difficult to avoid stifling completely all democratic elements in our zone. It now appears however that General Clay is inclined to strengthen our memorandum in a positive sense and to make it an integral part of the directive when issued. This would mean in effect a modification for the first time of the absolute ban on political activity.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ J. C. S. 1067 was the first in a series of drafts and papers produced during the development of the directive to the Commander in Chief, United States Forces of Occupation in Germany, regarding the military government of Germany (text in *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 143). The reference throughout this paragraph, however, is actually to a later paper in the series, viz., the directive as finally issued in May 1945 (see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XIII, p. 596).

The problem is one to which we will undoubtedly have to give continuing serious attention and I would appreciate the Department's reactions.

MURPHY

No. 340

740.00119 Control (Germany)/6-3045

*The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State
ad interim*

TOP SECRET

[SHAEF,] June 30, 1945.

No. 519

Subject: New State Organization in Western Germany

SIR: With reference to my telegram no. 3749 of June 21 ¹ regarding the proposal put forward by American officers in SHAEF for the constitution of a new German State (*Land*), I have the honor to inform the Department that Headquarters of the European Theater of Operation, United States Army (ETOUSA) has directed U. S. Twelfth Army Group, pending the definitive fixing of the French zone and establishment of the Western Military District, to proceed with the organization of the Western Military District for Military Government purposes on the basis of three German States (*Laender*), as follows:

Hessen-Nassau (including Provinces Kurhessen and Nassau), capital: Kassel

Hessen (North and South Hessen, excluding that portion of South Hessen West of the Rhine), capital: Darmstadt

N. E. Württemberg, (roughly north of a line drawn from Karlsruhe to Ulm), and N. Baden (including LKB [*Landeskommissärbezirk*] Mannheim and LKB Karlsruhe less the *Kreise* of Rastatt and Buehl), capital: Stuttgart

A copy of the pertinent instruction is enclosed herewith. ¹

This provisional arrangement appears to meet, in substance, the very strong reservations which we entered to the original proposal for a single German State in the Western Military District, and which were approved by the Department in its telegram no. 12 of June 21, 7 p. m. ¹ It affords the military authorities the framework for a coordination of the German regional administrations which they desired, yet does not commit us to an entity which would obliterate the larger traditional State units such as Württemberg. It will be noted that paragraph 6 of the ETOUSA instruction will

¹ Not printed.

permit the German authorities in each of the *Laender* to establish machinery to coordinate functional activities in such matters as food control, communications, and transportation. This provision meets the requirements of the U. S. economic authorities for an over-all control in the Western U. S. area which in large part were the motivating reason for the suggestion for the establishment of a single State in the military district comprising that part of the U. S. zone West of Bavaria.

For the Department's background information, the following papers are enclosed which throw an interesting light on the discussions that took place here with respect to the single State arrangement:

1. A memorandum² submitting the proposal to General McSherry of SHAEF G-5;
2. A memorandum² with supporting arguments drawn up by the proponents of the proposal;
3. My memorandum to General Clay requesting that action be suspended on the proposal and suggesting that certain arrangements might be made to meet urgent administrative necessities in the field of transport, food control and communications, etc. (See paragraph 2 of my telegram under reference).

It may be acknowledged that the supporting memorandum, attached as enclosure 3, presents some cogent arguments in favor of the proposed new State in the Western Military District. These arguments draw further weight from the conclusions of the German States Conferences (*Laenderkonferenz*) of 1928 which, seeking to counteract the dominance of Prussia, put forward a suggestion for the constitution of a similar State to be known as *Rheinfranken*, with the addition, however, of the Rhine Province.

The supporting memorandum also takes up several arguments against the proposed new State, but it may be held to dismiss some of them in too summary a fashion. The main argument which I stressed in discussions here and in my memorandum attached as enclosure 4, was that the proposal in any event was premature at the present stage of our occupation of Germany. Furthermore, we felt we did not yet possess sufficient knowledge of German public opinion to say with certainty that the proposal would meet with the support necessary to sustain it.

The following other reservations of a more long-range nature which suggested themselves in connection with the single State

² Not printed.

proposal appear to have been in large measure taken into account in the arrangement for the three-State organization:

a. Whether it is desirable to dilute, by submergence in an arbitrarily created State, the desire for local autonomy of the populations of areas such as Württemberg and Baden which might be turned to advantage later in establishing a federative structure based on the historical German States;

b. Whether such a step taken now would not render difficult any decision which might eventually be agreed upon to divide Germany into independent, homogeneous units comprising either the Southern or Western areas;

c. Whether the suggested single State would command sufficient popular support and would be economically stable enough to withstand the pull toward Prussia or toward a nationalist German government, which would find it all the easier to take over an already highly centralized organism.

I trust the Department will find these considerations of interest and I would appreciate being kept informed of current thinking in the Department on the general problem of German government organization.

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT MURPHY

[Enclosure 4]

TOP SECRET

[SHAEF,] June 20, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

There are weighty arguments in favor of a proposal to combine the area of Hesse-Nassau and the parts of Baden and Württemberg into one *Land*. The chief argument however seems to be one of immediate expediency in the administration of food and transportation. The problem imposed by the food and transportation shortage is of the highest priority and there should be no hesitation in using new administrative procedures to cope with it.

On the other hand, there is the objective of political decentralization, the solution of which is not immediately urgent but which may be of the greatest eventual importance. While it is possible that the proposal may meet the needs of the decentralization policy later on, at the present time decentralization can only be started by emphasizing the traditional and existing governmental units. The early and arbitrary establishment of the new political unit would certainly seem to interfere with future decisions about the government structure of the Reich. A solution should be sought which will meet the present administrative and economic emergency but which will not prejudice future political development and policies which we are not yet able to foresee.

It is suggested that the economic emergency toward whose solution the present proposal is directed could be met by a special German economic administration for the western military district. This administration could handle distribution of food, rationing, transportation, communications, and such other economic problems as cannot be solved on the basis of the present political subdivisions of the district. To avoid giving it any political character the administration might be known, say, as "Economic Authority West". The creation of such a special and non-political administrative organization would enable ETOUSA to confine its supervisory contacts to two units, *Land* Bavaria and the Economic Authority West. At the same time this would preserve the existing political divisions and local sentiment which exists and may be re-developed.

In any event it would seem inadvisable for us now in the absence of consultation with our Government to go beyond any arrangement such as the above in the direction of the constitution of new political entities within the Reich. The proposal would also have a bearing on decisions for the treatment of Germany as a whole which must be decided by Allied Control Council authority.

From recent developments in the negotiations concerning the boundaries of the French zone, it appears that practically all of Württemberg may remain in the American zone. Instead of dealing with fragments of the state of Württemberg therefore, we may have the opportunity of maintaining this historic state practically in its entirety. This state has a long history and has been one of the most democratic of the German regions.

No. 341

840.48/6-2145

The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. MCCLOY: I have studied your preliminary reply of June 21¹ to my letter of June 18² regarding German financing. As you may be aware, the whole subject was extensively discussed in a meeting in Mr. Mason's office on June 25 which was attended by Colonel Davis and Lt. Colonel Foehl. At that meeting tentative agreement was reached on a proposal to be made to the British and Canadians later this week with respect to interim financing as related to the zonal issues.³

¹ Document No. 337.

² Document No. 336.

³ No evidence has been found in Department of State files to indicate that the anticipated conversations took place at this time.

With respect to the type of imports to be financed, the Department believes that it is essential that a policy decision be reached at the highest level that the War Department should, for the reasons outlined in my previous letter, be responsible for all imports which serve the purpose of the United States Government in Germany.

There is attached a draft of memorandum covering both of these points.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. CLAYTON

[Attachment]

GERMAN FINANCE

1. It is the expectation of the United States Government that the Control Council for Germany will begin to function quickly in accordance with existing Allied agreements⁴ and that redeployment of Allied Forces in conformity to agreed zonal boundaries can be carried through without delay. The present combined command (SHAEF) will be discontinued on July 1, 1945 or shortly thereafter.

2. Formulation of the principles governing the procurement and financing of essential German imports should be an immediate task of the Control Council. If possible, an agreed supply program for Germany as a whole should be put into effect as soon as redeployment into zones has been completed. Such a program should include provision for equitable inter-zonal distribution of supplies available within Germany so as to minimize the net deficit for, and imports into, Germany as a whole. The sum necessary to pay for imports into Germany should be a first charge on all German exports from current production or stocks on hand. In the event, and to the extent, that the proceeds of exports are insufficient to pay for approved minimum imports, the necessary arrangements for interim financing should be made by the Allied countries concerned on a basis to be negotiated. Reimbursement for any net outlays made in connection with the provision of supplies for Germany should be sought from subsequent German exports. Claims for reimbursement of this type should rank above reparation.

3. The United States Government is not prepared to continue the present combined procurement and supply program and machinery beyond October 31, 1945.

4. Arrangements should be made effective August 1, 1945 for making records of all distribution of supplies into the three western zones.

⁴ i. e., the agreement signed at London, November 14, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, May 1, 1945. For texts, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3070; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2062. Text of the agreement of November 14, 1944, also in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 124.

The three occupying powers, the United States, U. K. and France, would be billed for supplies distributed to their respective zones after August 1. The amounts for which the three governments would thus become individually responsible as well as the amount arising out of deliveries to Germany prior to August 1, 1945 would of course be a first charge on German exports.

5. If the Control Council has not reached agreement on a supply program along the lines of paragraph 2 by October 31, 1945, each occupying power should, in the view of the United States Government, assume procurement and financing responsibility for the supplies required in its zone.

6. Since the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army Forces in Germany in his dual capacity as United States member of the Control Council and Commander of the zone of occupation is entrusted with full responsibility for carrying out all objectives of United States policy in Germany, it is the Department's view that the War Department should assume procurement and initial financing responsibilities with respect to imports not only for the consumption of occupying forces, displaced persons, and such minimum consumption by German civilians as is necessary to prevent disease and unrest, but also all imports into Germany for which the United States Government assumes responsibility. In the view of this Department, moreover, the War Department's responsibility should extend to the United States' share of any combined financing which may be undertaken in concert with the occupying powers.

No. 342

840.24/7-445

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have given careful consideration to the points raised in the letter dated June 18, 1945¹ from the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Clayton, to the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy, with respect to the responsibility in this Government for financing imports into Germany.

Mr. Clayton's letter was apparently written before the State Department had had an opportunity to consider my letter to the Acting Secretary of State dated June 14, 1945² in which I pointed out that no provision has been made by this Government to finance supplies which may have to be provided to Germany and Austria,

¹ Document No. 336.

² Not printed.

from U. S. sources, beyond the limited provision the War Department is making to meet our strictly military obligation. As no funds have been appropriated for the purpose of financing imports to Germany beyond those necessary for purely military purposes, recourse to the Congress will be necessary. In my opinion, any approach to Congress for the purpose should be based upon an agreed governmental policy approved by the President.

General Eisenhower, during the period of the military government of Germany, will act in a dual capacity. As the Commanding General of U. S. forces in Germany his responsibility is purely a military one. In this connection he is responsible for the care, maintenance, and security of the troops under his command. The funds necessary to permit him to discharge this military responsibility, i. e., funds required to finance supplies for U. S. troops and for sufficient provision to civilians to assure the security of such troops in the zones which will be occupied by U. S. forces, have been included in the War Department budget estimates for 1946.

In addition to his purely military capacity, General Eisenhower will act as the U. S. member of the Control Council for Germany. In carrying on the military government in the U. S. Zone in Germany, General Eisenhower acts not merely as a soldier in accomplishing a military mission but as the representative of our Government in implementing the Government's foreign policy with respect to Germany.

As a member of the Control Council General Eisenhower is also responsible equally with other governmental representatives on the Control Council for the government of the zones of Germany which our troops do not occupy. In this latter capacity the General will serve not as a military commander but exclusively as the representative of his government.

As Mr. Clayton states, directives have been given to General Eisenhower "in his dual capacity". Such directives are transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As is stated in Mr. Clayton's letter, however, the directives represent "the basic objectives of United States policy". They do not reflect the views or responsibilities of any single department but represent the policy of the Government as a whole. It follows that responsibility for their implementation is a governmental responsibility and not merely a departmental one.

I recognize the validity of the statement in the letter from the Assistant Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of War that "it has been decided as a matter of governmental policy that this Government will seek to make the reimbursement of all expenses

incurred by it in importing supplies into Germany a first charge on German ability to make foreign payments". At the present time, however, the stated policy has not been agreed by all of the governments who will be responsible for the government of Germany. Moreover, even if their agreement is obtained a substantial period of time will have elapsed before the expected reimbursement can be accomplished. In the meantime we are confronted with the problem of initial financing of German imports.

German imports during the period of military government will fall into the following categories:

1. Imports into the zone occupied by U. S. forces for the purpose of maintaining and protecting our troops.
2. Imports into the zone occupied by U. S. forces to implement the political policy of our Government.
3. Imports into the zones occupied by forces of the other occupying powers, either from abroad or from the United States Zone in Germany, for the maintenance and protection of their troops or to accomplish the political policy of the U. S. or of the other occupying powers.

It is probable that imports for the zone occupied by U. S. forces will be required not only from the U. S. but from other sources of world supply. It is also probable that the necessary imports for zone[s] occupied by the forces of our Allies cannot be met completely from their sources, and that imports will have to be procured in the U. S. for introduction into zones which we do not occupy.

After full consideration of the factors involved it is the view of the War Department that, in the absence of an authoritative governmental policy to the contrary, its responsibility, as a military department, should be limited to providing the initial financing necessary to maintain the flow of supplies for U. S. troops and sufficient supplies for civilians in the zone occupied by U. S. forces to assure the security of our troops. If the War Department is to finance additional supplies for import into Germany, it should do so only pursuant to policy established on a governmental basis and approved by the President.

In summary, it seems to me that the foregoing analysis discloses the necessity for determining the answers to the following questions:

1. For what areas in Germany, for what purposes (production for reparations, to meet British or Russian military needs, for European relief, etc.) will our Government initially finance supplies (a) procured in the U. S. and (b) procured from non-U. S. sources?
2. To what agency of the Government should Congress be requested to appropriate the necessary funds to implement policy determined in answer to the preceding question?

The questions raised above are applicable to Austria as well as to Germany.

In my letter of June 14, 1945 to the Acting Secretary of State I stated my conviction that steps should be taken to centralize the administration of our assistance to Europe and that, as a prerequisite to our continued help, the European nations themselves should be induced to integrate the consideration of their own basic problems, such as coal and transportation. The question of how our Government will finance German and Austrian imports is merely one phase of the overall question as to what shall be our economic policy in Europe.

As I believe formulation of definite governmental policy on these questions is urgently required I renew the suggestion, made in my letter of June 14, that you or your representative call together Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Morgenthau, and Mr. Crowley, or their appropriate representatives, with Mr. McCloy and Judge Rosenman for the purpose of making recommendations to the President.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L STIMSON

No. 343

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-445

The Assistant Secretary of State (MacLeish) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

You asked me at the Staff Committee meeting this morning to submit a paper on the Department's efforts to prepare a long-range policy for German reeducation. The paper is attached.

A[RCHIBALD] MACL[EISH]

[Enclosure]

The Assistant Secretary of State (MacLeish) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

Subject: Long-Range Policy for German Reeducation.

The Present Status of the Problem.

The War Department has repeatedly requested the Department to prepare a long-range policy directive on German reeducation for the guidance of its representatives in Germany. Since the problem is one of the greatest difficulty, the Department invited a group of citizens distinguished and experienced in the field of education to advise with it. The Chairman of the Committee was President Edmund E. Day of Cornell. Members were: President George Shuster of Hunter College, President Frank Graham of the University of North Carolina, President John Milton Potter of Hobart College, Dean Martin

McGuire of the Graduate School of Catholic University, Professor Eduard C. Lindeman of Columbia University, and Professor Reinhold Niebuhr of Union Theological Seminary. Not all members attended all meetings.

The Committee met on two occasions in May and June, its sessions covering two days in each case. Its recommendations were subsequently submitted to, and approved by, the Coordinating Committee of the Department of State and the Secretary's Staff Committee, certain changes being made by both Committees. The recommendations as approved were subsequently discussed by President Frank Graham with Assistant Secretary of War McCloy and General Hilldring, Director of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department. Mr. McCloy and General Hilldring expressed informal approval.¹ To avoid undue delay in IPCOG, the approved statement was discussed by me directly with Secretary Morgenthau who undertook to communicate his reactions promptly.

Assumptions Underlying Proposed Statement of Policy.

The Advisory Committee and the Departmental Committees which formulated the proposed policy stated that their proposals were based upon certain assumptions as to the character of the military occupation of Germany, the economic reorganization of Germany, the transformation of the German social structure, the political and cultural structure of Germany following the occupation, and the long-range objectives of American foreign policy as they effect [*affect*] Germany. The Advisory Committee has pointed out that an educational program cannot be devised in an economic, social, and political vacuum. The reeducation of the German people should be an integral part of a comprehensive program of rehabilitation which would eliminate Nazi and militaristic influences and convince the German people of their defeat in the war and their responsibility for the inhuman manner in which it was conducted. The specific assumptions made by the Committees were listed by them as follows:

(1) *Character of the Military Occupation of Germany.* The Committee assumes that the military occupation of Germany will be of such a character as to eradicate from German public life and from German schools Nazi and militaristic personnel and propaganda materials, and to offer the German people present and tangible evidence that Germany lost the war, that Germans individually and through national organizations were responsible for brutalities and inhumanities in the prosecution of the war for which punishment is due, and that the constraint of the German people during the period

¹ In a letter to Byrnes dated July 13 (file No. 862.42/7-2845) MacLeish stated that this paper had been approved informally by Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson as well as by McCloy and Hilldring.

of occupation is a direct and necessary consequence of Germany's fanatical conduct of the war.

(2) *Economic Reorganization of Germany.* The Committee assumes that the economic reorganization of Germany, while impressing upon the German people the consequences of their responsibility for the war, will permit them to survive as a nation and to participate creatively in the economic life of their time.

(3) *The Transformation of the German Social Structure.* The Committee assumes that a fundamental transformation of the German social structure will be necessary to eliminate permanently the Nazi and militaristic elements, that the Germans themselves will attempt to carry through this change in a democratic direction, and that the occupation authorities should encourage these efforts.

(4) *The Political and Cultural Structures of Germany Following the Occupation.* The Committee assumes that no partition of Germany is intended, that the division of Germany into zones of occupation is a temporary division and that, following the occupation, Germany will emerge, with whatever territorial alterations are determined upon, as a political and cultural entity.

(5) *Long-Range Objectives of American Foreign Policy as They Affect Germany and the German People.* The Committee assumes that it is the policy of the United States Government, while avoiding interference in the domestic affairs of other nations, to encourage the self-government of peoples on the ground that tyrannies have been demonstrated to be dangerous to the security of the world and that nations in which the people govern themselves are more likely to keep the peace and to promote the common interests of mankind. It is therefore the assumption of the Committee that the Government of the United States wishes to see Germany emerge from the period of occupation as a self-governing nation in which individuals are responsible for the conduct of the state, rather than as a totalitarian nation in which the state exercises responsibility for the individual citizens.

Reasoning Behind Proposed Statement of Policy.

The Advisory Committee, throughout its deliberations, was much impressed by the need for a common educational policy as among the occupying powers. It was recognized that a basic policy directive in the field of education would be applicable not only to formal education in schools and universities but also to programs of adult education through mass media and otherwise. The Committee was acutely conscious of the danger that, unless the occupying powers agreed among themselves, Germany might be turned into the cockpit of an ideological war with serious future implications. It was felt, therefore, that every effort should be made to discover a common denominator of policy in this field which would be acceptable to all the occupying powers.

While recognizing fully the extraordinary difficulty of the problem, the Committee felt that such a common denominator could be found. It believed that here as in other areas the most effective common denominator on which to base common action by peoples with different

political systems was opposition to the common enemy—in this case to the ideas and practices of the common enemy. Specifically, it was the opinion of the Committee that certain principles, diametrically opposed to the practices of Nazism offered common ground for a program of reeducation intended to undo the evil which the Nazi system of education had perpetrated. These principles, as the Committee saw it, are the “universally valid principles of justice”. The policy they recommend, therefore, is a policy based upon the inculcation of these principles. It is worthy of note that it is not a policy based upon the inculcation of specific political ideas associated with the form and practices of government of any one of the Allied powers. On the contrary, universally valid principles of justice are postulated. The inconsistency with these principles of prevalent Nazi practices is pointed out. And conclusions are drawn as to the educational operation recommended.

The recommended long-range policy statement for German reeducation follows. I have omitted two introductory paragraphs in which the assumptions of the Committee as to the place of the reeducation program in a comprehensive program for rehabilitation, and the responsibility of the military occupation for the elimination of Nazi and militaristic doctrines and practices, are stated.

Statement of Policy.

(1) The political and moral reeducation of the German people will foster the reestablishment of universally valid principles of justice.

(2) The German people must come to understand that the Nazi repudiation of these principles destroyed all individual rights in the Nazi state, made the effort at world tyranny inevitable and brought Germany to its present disaster. They must come to understand that the present control measures over Germany are not prompted solely by the German violation of the rights of other peoples. They are also made necessary by the political chaos in Germany, which is the direct consequence of the Nazi denial of all political rights and the destruction of all alternative organized forces within the nation.

(3) The primary principles of justice, basic to the program of reeducation, are:

(a) That men and nations owe obligations to each other; and that these responsibilities are not, as Nazism maintained, limited to a single race, nation or group.

(b) That the dignity and integrity of the individual must be respected by society and other individuals; and that the individual is not, as Nazism maintained, merely a tool of the state.

(c) That citizens bear their share of responsibility for public policy and that they have the right and duty to participate in government resting on the consent of the governed.

(d) That the untrammelled pursuit of truth is a prerequisite for the maintenance of justice; and that free communication between individuals, groups and nations is a necessary condition for national and international understanding. Experience with Nazism proves what evil consequences flow from the suppression and corruption of the truth.

(e) That toleration between diverse cultural and racial groups is the basis of national and international tranquillity; and that coerced unity of culture, after the manner of Nazism, is the source of both tyranny and anarchy.

(4) To be effective, the program of German reeducation must make use of those native resources of German civilization which offer promise of the peaceful development of new ideals and institutions. The collapse of centralized authority in Germany is conducive to the assumption of local and regional initiative and responsibility for such civic enterprises as schools, literary societies, libraries, social agencies and hospitals. But in addition to the mobilization of healthy cultural influence in the locality and in the region, it is essential that the cultural revival be allowed on a national scale. A potential basis for German self-respect is the justifiable pride of Germans in their former great literary, artistic, scholarly, scientific and religious contributions to civilization.

(5) The occupation authorities will bear in mind that permanent cultural changes can be effected only as they are developed and maintained by the Germans themselves. Having first eliminated the Nazi elements, they will seek to effect the progressive transfer of authority in reeducation to responsible Germans as rapidly as conditions permit. The most obvious evidences of anti-Nazi resources will be found in specific religious, intellectual, trade union and political resistance to Nazism. A further source of anti-Nazism should be considered: that springing from the resistance of the family, particularly of the women, to the Nazi state. Similar resources must also be looked for in members of welfare and teaching organizations who remained unpolitical and thus possibly avoided the taint of Nazism. The occupation authorities will encourage the revival of educational and other cultural activities of those groups and organizations (such as the family, the churches, trade unions and welfare organizations) many of which have suffered under Nazism and which form a natural basis for the realization of the principles formulated above.

(6) During the Nazi epoch, Germany was virtually cut off from outside cultural influences and a perverted German culture was deliberately used both at home and abroad as an insidious political weapon. Under no circumstances must this be permitted to happen again. The best way to prevent it, after the occupation authorities have taken the necessary measures of control, and subject to the

willingness of individuals and cultural communities outside of Germany, is to encourage a resumption of carefully selected activities in the field of cultural relations between other nations and non-Nazi elements in Germany.

ARCHIBALD MACLEISH²

² The signature on the enclosure is typed.

No. 344

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-445

The Director of the Office of War Information (Davis) to the President

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1945.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: While the subjoined suggestion proposes action which would not be taken until after the Berlin conference, it might perhaps usefully be borne in mind during the discussions.

The central problem of Germany is the reeducation of the German people, without which our other measures may be no more than temporary palliatives. I suppose that what we all want is a Germany which will no longer be dangerous to its neighbors; but how best to attain that objective is a problem that calls for the best intelligence available in the world. The problem is of course far beyond the competence of OWI, as the execution of the program will far outlast our lifetime; yet the information which the OWI-Army news team is now providing the Germans, through newspapers, the radio, and newsreels, cannot help being the actual beginning of that reeducation. We plan it as well as we can; but we cannot see very far ahead, and we could make a better beginning if we knew more about the ultimate goal.

Ideally, it may be hoped that the four occupying powers will agree on the general outline of a reeducation program; but if they should fail to do so we shall still have an education problem in our own occupation zone. Somebody, whether well equipped or not, whether sure of his objective or not, will have to start doing the job pretty soon; and it seems to me clearly to our interest to have it done as well as possible.

I venture to suggest, therefore, that on your return you appoint a commission of the ablest educators obtainable, plus representatives from the State and War Departments, to recommend for your consideration a program of both objectives and methods for German reeducation; and that one or more of the members of that commission be placed in charge of its execution for so long as the United States government may be involved in the responsibility. An OWI representative, I think, might usefully participate in the deliberations of

the commission; though we shall pass out of existence before the execution of the program has much more than begun.

Bearing on a more immediate problem, I enclose a memorandum¹ on the coordination of propaganda, the principle of which has been approved by the State and War Departments.

Very respectfully,

ELMER DAVIS

¹ Not attached to the original covering letter in Department of State files.

No. 345

Department of the Army Files : Telegram

*The Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany (Clay)
to the War Department*¹

SECRET

HOECHST, 5 July [19]45.

PRIORITY

Ref number CC 13081 to WarCAD from US Group CC signed Clay.

1. Following preliminary political report on conditions in Germany has been prepared in consultation with Ambassador Murphy. Similar reports are expected to be made periodically in future covering developments of a political nature. This report is based on intelligence received to the end of June. It is not an exhaustive review but covers some of principal topics which have political implications at present moment.

2. Denazification. Denazification program as it relates to removal of Nazis from public office is proceeding with varying degrees of rapidity. In some areas such as Aachen and Cologne screening process is virtually complete[;] less progress has been made in Wuerttemberg and Bavaria, while program is slowest in SHAEF occupied areas of Soviet Zone. No reliable information received as to Soviet denazification program. Scattered reports indicate French are implementing removal directives reasonably well in their area.

It is reported that about 75,000 persons have been detained to date on basis of black list and arrest directives. Size and administrative complexity of task may be illustrated by facts that administrative and executive personnel of police have generally been found 100% Nazi, while 60% of rank and file of criminal police and 40% of all other police were Nazi. In Frankfurt 50% of 326 bank per-

¹ Cf. telegram No. 137 from the Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Acting Secretary of State (file No. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-1045): "The Department will wish to see US group CC signal No. CC-13081 . . . to War Dept. Signal in question is summary of more important factors in present political situation in Germany and was prepared by my office. . . ."

sonnel examined were dismissed as Nazis. Program of arrest and removal has suffered from past lack of trained personnel but is being speeded by shift from combat to occupational phase, by steps under way to train reliable German personnel to assist in screening program and by issuance of clarified removal directive in US Zone after SHAEF dissolution. New directive on political activity also being drafted to permit use of anti Nazi prodemocratic groups which are eager to assist in denazification.

Report forms now being distributed to field will assist in supplying statistical information in future.

3. Political activity. No general pattern of political feeling or activity has emerged. SHAEF area continues dormant partly under influence of ban on political activity and partly because German masses seem totally unpolitical, apathetic and primarily concerned with everyday problems of food, clothing and shelter. Local groups of varying types have been formed in some places, chiefly larger communities. In some places they are joint groups of all former Center and Leftist parties. In other places they represent new groups such as Bavarian Freedom action in Munich or Anti-Fascist League in Bremen. In some places chief stirrings are by some one of former parties such as Social Democrats in Kassel or Communists in Leipzig. All organizations carrying on political activity have been dissolved. This does not prevent subsequent underground activity especially by better organized Communists. Field reports stress foregoing point. This situation is being carefully watched. All nascent groups seem small in numbers and no groups appear to have more than local ramifications or leaders as yet except Communists. While there is no evidence of mass Communist movement, Communist groups are widely scattered, active, and well organized. There are some indications of outside guidance.

There is no evidence of an attempt to organize a Nazi underground.

We are carefully studying the potential political danger which exists. Fact [*exists in the fact?*] that people in urban areas are largely idle. The entire absence or low level of industrial activity is unavoidable result of war and directives of course prohibit us from maintaining or strengthening German economy. Reactivation of industries necessary to occupying forces will somewhat ameliorate situation. Children are idle because of school closing but program of reopening schools has already begun in Aachen and certain other places.

Separatist sentiment is not apparent anywhere though some desire is expressed to regain lost local rights and recreate former Federalism. This desire finds most expression in Bavaria and to lesser extent in Wuerttemberg. The continued split of latter state between US and French Zones may damage chances of stimulating this local feeling.

No general feeling of war guilt or repugnance for Nazi doctrine and regime has yet manifested itself. Germans blame Nazis for losing war, protest ignorance of regime[']s crimes and shrug off their own support or silence as incidental and unavoidable. They are however generally cooperative with military government, whose courts in US Zone have handled 12,000 cases, mostly of minor violations, with only 18 serious cases in entire Zone to date.

Except for disciplined Communists most Germans in SHAEF area still appear under influence of Nazi anti-Bolshevik propaganda and fear Soviet occupation. More recently there is some evidence of paradoxical feeling of envy of conditions in Soviet Zone under influence of optimistic friendly broadcasts from Berlin radio.

New directive on political activity referred to above will generally continue ban on political party activity for time being but will permit and encourage use of organizations eager to help solve food and housing problems as well as to assist denazification program. This step is intended to encourage most clearly Democratic elements to assert themselves for constructive purposes.

4. Political aspects of coal problem. In connection with paramount problem of coal production it may be noted that German management has remained in control in Saar Basin but not in Ruhr where Rhine coal control organization of US and British engineers has taken over top management. Saar miners have agitated against managers on ground they are Nazis but this maneuver may be inspired as prelude to return of former French managerial staff after French take over Saar. Mine owners in Ruhr charge miners with Communism and assert Communists use reemerging trade unions as vehicle for political activity. Clear evidence lacking except that handbills are circulating among Ruhr miners comparing ample rations of 4,000 calories assertedly received by miners in Soviet Zone with 1,100 calories allegedly received in Ruhr. Fact is Ruhr miners now beginning to receive 2,800 calories and even 3,500 calories in some cases.

It appears that desired production of coal for overall European purposes can be achieved only if general economy of Ruhr and Saar areas is revived to minimum extent necessary to provide miners with sufficient food, clothing and services to maintain their strength and willingness to cooperate. Under such circumstances adverse political propaganda will not be effective. Intermingled political and economic importance of these special areas cannot be overestimated.

5. Information control. In realm of information control, there has been conscious policy of "austerity" in fields of press, radio, films, and music while encouraging Germans to assume self-administration as rapidly as they showed the desire, ability and proper mentality. Thus one newspaper has been licensed at Aachen for production by

a German under SHAEF supervision, and others will soon be licensed at Frankfurt and Munich, and I am activating entire program of reestablishment of German directed publications.

Germans in Frankfurt area are being allowed to reestablish symphony orchestra as rapidly as they can assemble musicians and instruments and tendency is to encourage same thing elsewhere.

Policy is to make fully and frankly known to press correspondents the facts of organization, activities, problems, and results of work of US Group CC in Germany.

No. 346

800.515/7-545

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: German Interim Financing

1. There is full agreement among the Department of State, the Treasury Department, the War Department and the Foreign Economic Administration regarding proposals which should be made to the British, the French and the Soviets with respect to procurement and interim financing of essential German imports. Such proposals would, of course, state that the sum necessary to pay for imports into Germany should be a first charge on all German exports from current German production or stocks on hand. These proposals, as recently advanced to the British, are contained in the attached memorandum.

2. In recent discussions the War Department has pointed out that up to the present its financial responsibility for supplies for Germany has not included imports necessary to meet all of the objectives of the Government of the United States included in the directive to General Eisenhower. In particular, the War Department has confirmed [*confined?*] its financing to imports for the consumption of occupying forces, displaced persons, and such minimum consumption by German civilians as is necessary to prevent disease and unrest. This would exclude imports necessary to effectuate approved programs of reparation, restitution and relief of Allied countries, and imports made necessary by reason of the elimination or restriction of particular German industries for disarmament purposes.

¹ Printed from the copy forwarded to Clayton and Byrnes as an attachment to document No. 854 (see vol. II, p. 779).

3. The War Department has not indicated any unwillingness to accept any of these responsibilities but is of the view that it should do so only under explicit instruction from you.

4. Since the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army Forces in Germany in his dual capacity as United States member of the Control Council and Commander of the zone of occupation is entrusted with full responsibility for carrying out all objectives of United States policy in Germany, it is the Department's view that the War Department should assume procurement and initial financing responsibilities with respect to all imports into Germany for which the Government of the United States assumes responsibility. In the view of this Department, moreover, the War Department's responsibility should extend to the United States' share of any combined financing which may be undertaken in concert with the other occupying powers.

J[AMES] F. B[YRNES]

[Attachment]

GERMAN FINANCING

1. It is the expectation of the United States Government that the Control Council for Germany will begin to function quickly in accordance with existing Allied agreements and that redeployment of Allied Forces in conformity to agreed zonal boundaries can be carried through without delay. It is expected that the present combined command (SHAEF) will be discontinued on July 1, 1945 or shortly thereafter.

2. Formulation of the principles governing the procurement and financing of essential German imports should be an immediate task of the Control Council. If possible, an agreed supply program for Germany as a whole should be put into effect as soon as redeployment into zones has been completed. Such a program should include provision for equitable inter-zonal distribution of supplies available within Germany so as to minimize the net deficit for, and imports into, Germany as a whole. The sum necessary to pay for imports into Germany should be a first charge on all German exports from current production or stocks on hand. In the event, and to the extent, that the proceeds of exports are insufficient to pay for approved minimum imports, the necessary arrangements for interim financing should be made by the Allied countries concerned on a basis to be negotiated. Reimbursement for any net outlays made in connection with the provision of supplies for Germany should be sought from subsequent German exports.

3. The United States Government is not prepared to continue the present combined military procurement and supply program and machinery beyond October 1945 loadings.

4. Arrangements should be made effective August 1, 1945 for making records of all distribution of supplies into the three western zones. The three occupying powers, the United States, U. K. and France, would be billed for supplies imported into Germany distributed to their respective zones after August 1. The amounts for which the three governments would thus become individually responsible as well as the amount arising out of deliveries to Germany prior to August 1, 1945 would of course be a first charge on German exports.

5. Each occupying power should, in [the] view of the United States Government, assume procurement and financial responsibilities for the supplies required in its zones with November loadings unless prior to that time the Control Council has established in effective operation a supply mechanism along the lines of paragraph 2.

No. 347

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-745

The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

SECRET

FRANKFURT, July 7, 1945.

No. 576

Subject: Report on Denazification

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith the following report on denazification matters.

Some time ago Lt. General Clay considered the question of holding a press conference on denazification and requested the Political Division to prepare necessary basic information on which such a press conference could be conducted. The question of the advisability and also of the nature of such a press conference was discussed at the informal Denazification Interdivisional Committee meetings, the results of which were reported to the Department in my confidential despatch no. 535,¹ referred to immediately above. In accordance with the suggestions made at these committee meetings, a series of basic questions and a statement of fundamental elements of the denazification program was prepared and are transmitted herewith in enclosure no. 3.

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT MURPHY

¹ Not printed.

[Enclosure 3]

SECRET

INFORMATION FOR PRESS CONFERENCE ON DENAZIFICATION ²

1. *Denazification as War Aim.* One of the principal objectives of the war is the denazification of Germany. The announcement of the Crimea Conference states that the aim of the three Powers is "to destroy German militarism and Nazism" and "to remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public offices and from cultural and economic life of the German people."

2. *Objective of Denazification Program.* The denazification program embraces the following: *a.* Arrest and detention of Nazi leaders and influential Nazi supporters and any other persons dangerous to the Allied occupation or its objectives; *b.* Removal and exclusion from public office and from positions of responsibility and importance in quasi-public and private enterprises of members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities, active supporters of Nazism, and other persons hostile to Allied purposes; *c.* Eradication of Nazism from German legislation and decrees; *d.* Liquidation of the Nazi Party, together with its affiliated and subsidiary organizations, and the prevention of their revival; *e.* Elimination of Nazi symbols, anthems, flags, and insignia; *f.* Prevention of Nazi propaganda in any form and the removal of Nazism from German information services, education, and religion.

3. *Quadripartite Program.* This program will be discussed and if possible coordinated on a quadripartite basis. Pending such quadripartite discussion and decision, however, the US Group CC is proceeding with its own plans to effect this program in the American Zone of Occupation.

4. *Staff Responsibility within US Group CC.* The staff responsibility within the US Group CC for the planning and implementation of this program devolves upon the following Divisions and Branches:

a. Political Division: over-all denazification policy coordination.

b. Legal Division: elimination of Nazism from German legislation and decrees, courts, and legal institutions.

c. Counter Intelligence Branch: dissolution of the Nazi Party and its affiliated and subsidiary organizations, arrest and detention of Nazi leaders and influential Nazi supporters, and prevention of Nazi underground.

d. Information Control Services Branch: denazifying German information services.

e. Education and Religious Affairs Branch: denazifying German education and religion.

² The draft questions to which this statement is responsive, which questions were also part of enclosure 3, are not printed.

f. Local Government Branch: applying denazification to German street names and memorials.

g. Finance Division: denazifying financial institutions and blocking Nazi financial holdings.

h. Economics Division: denazifying economic and industrial concerns.

i. Manpower Division: denazifying German labor organizations and labor reserves.

j. Property Control Branch: custodianship of the property of the Nazi Party and its members.

The Staff Divisions/Branches are responsible for seeing to it that denazification is given appropriate priority and that denazification policy and directives are applied in the field by Military Government Detachments.

5. *Liquidation of Nazi Party and Organizations.* The dissolution of the Nazi Party is required by Military Government Law No. 5,³ which declares illegal some 50 Nazi Party offices and organizations and prohibits their activities. The same is true of the Party paramilitary organizations, including the SA (*Sturmabteilung*), the SS (*Schutzstaffel*), HJ (*Hitler Jugend*), and the Organisation Todt. Military Government Law No. 5 is posted in every occupied community and violators are subject to arrest and conviction by Military Government Courts. At present, reports indicate that there is no organized effort to create a Nazi underground.

6. *Arrest Program.* The arrest program is enforced by Counter Intelligence officers in the field. Plans call for the detection and detention of the following two groups: those who are included in prescribed arrest categories and are arbitrarily to be arrested by virtue of the positions they held in the Nazi Party or the German government, and those who are included in the Blacklist and are individually sought out by name.

a. More specifically, automatic arrest of the following groups is required:

(1) All persons who have held office in the Party administration, down to a low level.

(2) All persons who have held Party ranks, down to a low level.

(3) All persons who have held commissions, down to and including the equivalent rank of major, in the para-military organizations.

(4) All officials in the higher ranks of the German Civil Service.

(5) All officers and senior NCOs in the SS.

b. Although accurate information as to the arrests made to date is not yet possible, because reporting through channels is apt to lag, nevertheless, it is estimated that to date upward of 40,000 persons

³ *Military Government Regulations* (Frankfurt, Office of Military Government for Germany (U. S.), 1947), sec. 23-204.

have been arrested. This figure is for the entire SHAEF area and it includes war criminals and other persons on the Black List and also those to be arrested on the basis of the arrest categories.

c. In addition, when German Prisoners of War are released, they are screened in order to weed out those Nazis who fall within either the Black List or the arrest categories. Thus, a sizeable number of such Nazis are already under detention and when screened will be transferred directly from Prisoner of War cages to arrestee detention camps.

7. *Removal from Office Program.*

a. It is not intended to remove all members of the Nazi Party from all jobs. Plans rather call for the removal and exclusion from public office and from positions of importance in quasi-public and private enterprises of active members of the Nazi Party, active supporters of Nazism, and persons hostile to Allied purposes.

b. *Mandatory* removal from office is required for former officials and officers of the Nazi Party and Party members who have been more than nominal participants in its activities; certain categories of officials and officers of the various Nazi Party formations, and affiliated, supervised and other organizations; Germans who received certain Nazi Party decorations; and certain officials in the German Government and Civil Service. Such mandatory removals will embrace the upper levels of Nazi leadership, and will affect a broader group than those subject to the arrest program.

c. In addition, other groups are subject to removal from office at the *discretion* of the Military Government Detachments. Such groups include those individuals who did not *per se* constitute Nazi leadership and therefore are subject to removal on the basis of their individual acts.

d. As far as private enterprise is concerned, plans call for the removal of individuals in policy making and executive positions and personnel officers in important industrial, commercial, agricultural, and financial institutions. Such institutions include all those directly supervised, utilized, or controlled by Military Government and industrial, mining, public utility and commercial enterprises, combines and cartels which by virtue of their capitalization (more than RM 1,000,000), number of employees (more than 250), type of products produced or services rendered—are important factors in the German economy or in the economy of the region or community in which they operate. In the discretion of the Military Government detachments, the removal of Nazis from less important industrial, commercial, agricultural, and financial institutions is authorized.

e. The removal procedure is founded upon a system of vetting and screening. All persons used by Military Government in public office

or in positions of importance in quasi-public or private enterprises are required to fill out a detailed six-page personnel questionnaire called the *Fragebogen*, prepared by the Public Safety Branch. The purpose of this *Fragebogen* is to obtain information which will enable Military Government officers to determine whether a person should be removed or excluded from the position he held or seeks to hold.

f. The *Fragebogen* includes questions intended to make the person reveal his personal history; secondary and higher education; professional and trade training; record of full time employment, experience and military service; membership and role in all types of organizations before and after the Hitler regime, especially the Nazi Party and its organizations; writings and speeches since 1923; income and assets since 1 January 1931; and travel and residence abroad.

g. When the *Fragebogen* has been filled out the person signs and certifies that the answers are true and that he understands that he will be prosecuted in a U. S. Military Government Court for falsification. The *Fragebogen* is then evaluated, in close cooperation with the Counter Intelligence Corps by a Special Branch Section of the U. S. Public Safety Division of US Military Government Detachment. Answers are checked against all available police, civil service, Nazi Party, intelligence and other records. Military Government officers have prosecuted cases of falsification and offenders have been sentenced from two to five year imprisonment by Military Government Courts. Publication of the results has served to keep violations to a minimum.

h. Vetting is not a mere arbitrary process. Careful screening must be done. A process is being established that safeguards the purely nominal member of the Nazi Party who was forced to join in order to retain his position of livelihood or escape the concentration camp. Under approved directives and procedures, however, not even a nominal party member may be hired without additional screening and evaluation, and then only upon approval of the Supreme Commander of U. S. Military Government.

i. Valuable service is rendered by reliable Germans who are used by Special Branch/Section of Public Safety in evaluating *Fragebogen* and for field investigation to verify information contained in the *Fragebogen*. Such Germans are not used, however, in making actual decisions as to removal or retention of an individual. That is done by Military Government officers.

8. *Denazification of German Law.* Nazi ideology and concepts are to be eliminated from German law. To this end, according to Military Government Law No. 1,⁴ certain specified fundamental

⁴ *Military Government Regulations*, sec. 23-201. Text also in Ruhm von Oppen, ed., *Documents on Germany Under Occupation, 1945-1954*, p. 9.

laws enacted since 30 January 1933, with all subsidiary and carrying out laws, decrees, and regulations, are to be abrogated. Furthermore no German law is to continue in force if it either (a) discriminates against any person by reason of his race, nationality, religious beliefs, or opposition to the Nazi Party or its doctrines, or (b) favors any person because of his connection with the Nazi Party or its affiliated or subsidiary organizations.

9. *Denazification of Education.* The purely Nazi schools such as the *Adolf Hitler Schulen* (AHS), *National-politische Erziehungsanstalten* (NAPOLAS, or National Political Education Institutes), *Ordensburgen* (or Nazi Leaders Colleges), and other Nazi schools, are to be liquidated. Ordinary schools and educational institutions gradually will be opened, but only after objectionable courses of instruction are eliminated, the teaching staffs have been screened, and the textbooks revised. The teaching program is to be oriented towards (a) the eradication of Nazi and militaristic influences or doctrines, especially instruction giving support to the "*Führer*" principle, aggression, nationalism, militarism, and the right of world domination, and discrimination on the basis of race and religion; and (b) encouraging the inculcation in the German people of democratic and humanitarian principles and values.

10. *Denazification of Religion.* In the field of religious affairs the denazification program is largely a matter of removing Nazi restraint on the freedom of religion and establishing the protection of freedom of religious belief and worship, and the abrogation of Nazi laws and decrees directed against any particular religious group as such; and upon the use of religious groups and leaders in the reeducation of Germans through emphasis on moral values.

11. *Elimination of Nazi Ideology.* The problem of eliminating Nazi ideology from public information media is one of the important aspects of the program. German information services, including the radio, press, books and periodicals, films, theaters, operas, concerts, and the like, are to be controlled in order to eliminate the dissemination of Nazi propaganda and to regulate the nature and substance of information made available to the Germans. This program is to eliminate information media which:

a. Propagate Nazi or related "*völkisch*" ideas including racism and race hatred.

b. Propagate Fascist or anti-democratic ideas.

c. Constitute an incitement to riot or disorder, or interfere in any way with the process of Military Government.

As conditions permit, fuller scope for self-expression is to be permitted to reliable Germans, but not until we are certain that the information services will not be used for Nazi and militaristic purposes.

12. *Nazi Symbols.*

a. No German parades, military or political, are permitted in Germany, and no Nazi anthems may be played or sung in public or before any groups or gatherings.

b. Public display of Nazi flags and other paraphernalia of the Nazi Party is prohibited.

c. Names of parks, streets and public ways, institutions and buildings named after persons or things associated with Nazism are to be removed from display and use and will be replaced by more suitable names. Movable monuments and statues associated with Nazism will be removed. Emblems, insignia, or symbols of Nazism will be removed from such statues, monuments or edifices which are not amenable to removal, and the eventual disposition of such statues, monuments, and edifices will be decided upon later. This program is to be carried out by Germans themselves under the direction of the Military Government Detachments.

13. *Nazi Property and Finances.* Property, owned or controlled by the Nazi Party will be seized and held. The same is true of the property of leading members and officials of the Nazi Party.

No. 348

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-1245

*United States Delegation Working Paper*¹

[ON BOARD THE U. S. S. "AUGUSTA",
July 12, 1945.]

GERMAN IMPORT PROGRAM

It is proposed that the U. S. S. R., the U. K. and the U. S. instruct their respective Commanders to recommend in the Control Council the immediate formulation of a single program of minimum required imports for Germany as a whole. Such a program shall include provision for equitable inter-zonal distribution of supplies available within Germany, so as to minimize the net deficit for, and imports into, Germany as a whole. Ration scales, and the standards for the determination of minimum requirements, shall be uniform among the several zones. Procurement and financing responsibility with respect to imports for Germany as a whole shall be shared on a basis to be negotiated in the Control Council. Reimbursement for any initial net outlays made in connection with the provision of supplies for Germany shall be made from subsequent German exports, and payment for imports shall constitute a first charge on German exports from current production or stocks.

¹ This paper appears as an annex in a variant copy of document No. 214. Cf. vol. II, document No. 852, footnote 9.

No. 349

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-1745

*Memorandum by the Central Secretariat*¹TOP SECRET
SC-145

[WASHINGTON,] July 12, 1945.

PROPOSED COMMUNICATION TO THE SECRETARY AT THE BERLIN
MEETING ON THE OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

It is suggested that the Staff Committee forward to the Secretary for his possible use in connection with the Big Three meeting, a statement of views on the clearer definition of the objective of this Government in the occupation of Germany. The reason for such a communication is indicated in the attached draft prepared and submitted by Mr. MacLeish.

[Annex²]

Subject: Objective of the United States Government in the Occupation of Germany

(1) There are indications that common agreement as to the American purpose in the occupation of Germany does not exist. No comprehensive definition of purpose is to be found in existing documents. Directives to cover the various phases of the occupation are not based upon explicit statements of the objective to be achieved.

(2) It is essential to the proper planning and administration of the program for occupation that the end purpose of the occupation should be explicitly declared.

(3) It is submitted that the purpose of the occupation can be stated by reference to the factual situation as it now exists.

(4) There were three logical possibilities open to the Allies at the moment of the German surrender. They were determined, in part, by the unconditional surrender of the German Government; in part by the past conduct of the German nation[;] and, in part, by the fact that weapons have become increasingly deadly with scientific advance and that access to such weapons, by a scientifically-minded nation which cannot be trusted with their possession, is, and will increasingly be, a danger to mankind. The three possibilities were:

(a) To destroy the German nation as a nation which had proved itself to be criminal and which could not be trusted to continue to exist in the modern scientific world with its scientific means of destruction.

¹ Circulated to the Secretary's Staff Committee (a body comprising the officers of the Department of State of the rank of Assistant Secretary or above, or their deputies). For the revision of this paper actually forwarded to Byrnes at Babelsberg, see vol. II, document No. 855.

² Printed from the unsigned hectographed copy circulated to the Secretary's Staff Committee.

(b) To condemn the German nation to be forcibly and permanently deprived of the means to make war, including the industrial and scientific means which can be readily converted to warlike use.

(c) To attempt to change the character of the German nation by changing the mentality of the German people to the end that Germany might be permitted to continue to exist as a nation and might eventually be permitted to live without surveillance and control.

(5) The third of these three possibilities has, in fact, been adopted, although certain public statements imply that the second choice has been made by this Government and its Allies.

(a) The first of the three possibilities was never considered. The destruction of the German nation was unthinkable, at least to the people of the United States.

(b) The second possibility has, in fact, not been adopted, whatever forms of language may have been used. The fact that we propose to destroy the German war potential during the period of occupation does not mean that we have thereby destroyed the German war potential for good. It is clear, from the history of Germany itself over the past twenty-five years, that, if the safety of the world, so far as Germany is concerned, is to be entrusted to the occupation of Germany and the policing of Germany to prevent her from rearming or preparing to rearm, *the policing and occupation must be permanent*. Permanent occupation of Germany by the Allies, and particularly by the United States, is inconceivable.

(c) There remains the third possibility. If we are not prepared to destroy the German nation, and if we are not prepared to occupy or police Germany *permanently*, we have no choice but to attempt to change the German character in such a way that the German nation, when finally freed of occupation and surveillance, will be a nation which can be trusted with access to modern industry and modern science, and therefore to modern weapons of destruction.

(6) The real objective of the German occupation can therefore be stated as follows: we are occupying Germany for the purpose of changing the inward character of the German nation and the German people to such an extent that Germany can be trusted at some future time with independent existence as a nation in a world in which weapons will be more destructive and more difficult to control than they are today.

(7) It should be noted that this objective conforms to the objectives of the United Nations Organization and to the situation which the establishment of that Organization will create. A peaceful and peace-loving Germany could be introduced at some appropriate time into the United Nations where the measures of the Organization for security and for peace could be brought to play affirmatively rather than negatively.

(8) The explicit recognition of the purpose defined above would enable us to plan the various measures of occupation more intelligently

and to administer them more effectively than we can today. At the present time, there is a tendency to make a distinction between political, economic, and military measures for Germany, on the one hand, and measures for the reeducation of the German people, on the other. Measures for reeducation have been treated as though their objective differed from the objectives of economic and political and military measures. Actually, if the above analysis is correct, all aspects of the occupation, whether military or economic or political or social, have one ultimate objective, which is largely psychological: to create a Germany which can be trusted to exist without continuing occupation and surveillance in the modern scientific world. All measures taken in the occupation, including measures for the destruction of the present German power to make war, are measures of "reeducation" in the sense that their success should be judged not by their immediate consequences but by their ultimate effect upon the German mentality and the German national character.

(9) If, however, the true purpose of the occupation is the purpose stated above, then something more is required than its explicit declaration. The purpose must also be warmly approved and not shamefacedly admitted. In the past, the American position has been too frequently expressed in "realistic" terms which represented entirely unrealistic thinking. We have played down any serious intention to reeducate the German people, protesting that our real purpose is merely to destroy their power to make another war. As a matter of realistic fact, we cannot *destroy* the German power to make another war unless we are prepared to (a) destroy Germany, or (b) occupy Germany permanently. Since we are not prepared to do either, we are remitted to the "reeducation" of the German people as our sole effective means of preventing Germany from waging another war. Moreover the reeducation we must bring about is not reeducation in the academic or educational sense alone. It is reeducation by the use of every means which can produce the change in German thinking and German beliefs and German psychology and German character which we desire.

(10) Furthermore, we must be clear in our own minds, not only as to the Germany we wish to change but as to the Germany we wish to put in its place. The soul of man abhors a vacuum quite as much as nature abhors one. You cannot replace something with nothing in the mind of an individual or the mind of a nation. The Russians have no difficulty on this point. They propose to substitute Communism for Nazism. They believe that a Germany converted to Communism will be a Germany no longer dangerous to them. We presumably believe that a Germany converted to respect for the worth and dignity of human beings and a belief in basic principles of

justice and in the right of men to govern themselves would be a Germany which we could trust. If this, however, is our purpose, we must recognize it and pursue it consciously. We must play again the role we played at the beginning of our history. We must be ready and willing to propagate ideas of liberty and justice and human dignity.

(11) It has been pointed out in a paper delivered to the Secretary on the subject of German reeducation³ that it is highly desirable that the occupying powers should reach an understanding as to the common denominators of a policy for reeducation in order that Germany may not be turned, under the occupation, into an ideological cockpit. If, however, no such understanding can be reached, it is essential to the success of the American occupation that we should be clear in our own minds as to the beliefs we wish to see adopted by the German people in the interest of peace and security.

³ Document No. 343.

No. 350

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-1745

*The Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) to the Assistant Secretary of State (MacLeish)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 14, 1945.

In accordance with our brief conversation, and in view of the fact that I cannot attend the Secretary's Staff Committee meeting on Monday, this is an attempt to put down on paper some of my reactions to your proposed memorandum to the Secretary on the *Objective of the United States Government in the Occupation of Germany*.² The present directives and the immediate handling of various problems in connection with the occupation do not appear to recognize any single basic objective. We seem to have a series of objectives, some immediate and some long-run, and many of which may be, from time to time, in conflict with each other. The following is a partial list of these objectives:

1. The reform objective to which you refer.
2. The removal or destruction of a considerable part of the industrial base of German military might.
3. The prevention of starvation and epidemic disease.
4. The satisfaction of reparation and restitution claims against Germany, and the use of German output for the relief of liberated countries.

¹ Printed from an unsigned carbon copy forwarded to Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton at Babelsberg.

² Annex to document No. 349.

5. The satisfaction of American public opinion and of public and official opinion in other countries where we have important political interests.

6. The development of friendly and harmonious relations with the Soviet Union.

It is obvious that these objectives are likely to conflict with each other at many points. Examples may serve to clarify this point. The use of German output for the relief of liberated areas (a purpose not related to the question of German aggression) may increase the acute economic distress in Germany in the near future. It now appears that Germans will be cold next winter because German coal will be used to provide heat in the countries of Western Europe. It will not be a free choice by the German people or producers that this shall happen. Unhappily, the creation of economic distress in Germany is not a policy which would be chosen if our sole interest were to convert Germany to our values and our outlook. It is apparently felt to be less important that a good start be made immediately in the reeducation of the German people than that the people of the liberated countries be warm this winter.

The same conflict appears in connection with our longer-range economic policy. Germany's military potential is to be destroyed. Her standard of living is to be held down to that of neighboring countries. She is to have no credit and little assistance in reconstruction. Substantial reparations are to be collected. Her imports and exports are to be completely controlled. Any technological and scientific eminence is to be destroyed. To accomplish this, the occupation must last for a substantial period. Parenthetically, it is the thought of those who have emphasized this objective, that *permanent* security can be obtained if Germany is reduced to a low economic level in contrast to other states,—that she cannot possibly recover from such a condition ever again to be a world threat. However, the point to be made here is that the steps involved in pursuing this objective do not encourage the concepts of the rights, dignity and freedom of individuals, or the limited authority of the state.

A third important example relates to the question of our relations with the Soviet Union. It is by now a commonplace that Germany cannot commit another aggression so long as the Big Three remain united. Occupation policies designed to cement our alliance with the Soviet Union could thus be considered as serving indirectly the purpose of overcoming the threat of another German aggression. Yet the policies which may be chosen to serve this objective seem certain to make impossible the adoption of a clean-cut pattern of policies related to the reeducation of Germany. It seems highly unlikely that the best program that we could devise for the reeduca-

tion of Germany, from our viewpoint, would be acceptable to the Russians. We should then have to face the choice of agreeing to an unsatisfactory compromise, or jeopardizing one of the basic principles of the occupation by adopting a unilateral policy in our zone. If and when this choice has to be made, I do not know how we shall decide; but I know that we shall be very reluctant to acknowledge the failure of the Control Council to agree on uniform policies in the various zones.

In brief, while I certainly do not wish to argue against giving explicit recognition to the reeducation aspect of the occupation, I find it difficult to regard that as the real, or true, or basic, or fundamental purpose of the occupation. This would imply that other objectives, when conflict occurs, should be overridden by the reeducation objective. Rather, we are in the state, which is perhaps the more usual one, of having multiple objectives and of being required to make policy decisions in the light of a number of goals.

A word as to procedure. Mr. Clayton, as Chairman of IPCOG, was instrumental in developing the compromises which are apparent in its directives. I am sure that he endeavored to achieve as much clarification as possible. I am, therefore, not sure as to the propriety of formal action in his absence which might be interpreted as reopening the whole issue of the objective(s) of the occupation.

No. 351

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹

[Extracts²]

SECRET

POTSDAM, July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, called this afternoon and discussed for two hours in a preliminary way a number of matters on the agenda of the Conference.³

3. *Creation of German Central Administrative Agencies.*

Sir Alexander referred to a memorandum,⁴ presented by Field Marshal Montgomery and approved by the Prime Minister, urging the necessity for reestablishing central German "ministries" in order

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 140, 218, 234, 258, 319, 379, 404, 470, 519, 635, 645, 678, and 708.

³ For a list of persons present at this meeting, see document No. 234, footnote 3.

⁴ Not found in United States files.

to enable the Control Council to cope with the problems affecting Germany as a whole. He expressed some doubt as to whether Berlin could offer sufficient accommodation for these agencies. I stated that we favored developing German control [*central*] administrative agencies, under some less imposing title than that of "ministries."

5. *Financing of German Imports.*

Coulson, Cadogan's assistant, felt that Germany might need a considerable volume of imports in excess of exports before it can begin to provide substantial exports on reparation account. He felt a US-UK-French agency to regulate the foreign trade of the three western zones was necessary as a stop-gap to carry through the handling of combined supplies already allocated, pending establishment of four-power control over German exports and imports. Mr. Clayton and I felt that any such three-power arrangement should be avoided until we had explored the possibility of four-power arrangements to deal with this problem for Germany as a whole.

Mr. Clayton pointed out that if the Control Council agrees on the financing of German imports by exports, this will promote freer interzonal movement of goods within Germany since each zone would prefer to give available goods to other zones rather than provide exports to cover imports. Coulson felt it was difficult to plan a four-power policy on imports into Germany in the absence of agreement on what to do with German industry and that conflict over available supplies and shipping would arise between requirements for Germany and those of liberated countries.

7. *German Political Activity.*

Sir Alexander agreed that it was time to drop the SHAEF policy of forbidding political activity in Germany and read from a British memorandum⁵ which favored free political activity.

Sir Alexander stated that his delegation would bring up the question of coordinating propaganda in the different zones, in the hope that some provision might be made for regular consultation, which in turn might result in applying some restraint to Soviet propaganda. He expressed skepticism regarding the possibility of achieving much in this field, but felt that some provisions should be made for exchanging views in order to have some consistency in the various zones.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

⁵ Not printed.

REPARATIONS, RESTITUTION, AND WAR BOOTY

No. 352

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹[Extract²]

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

POLICY TOWARD GERMANY

Agreement on German Exports Prior to a Reparation Settlement

This Government recognizes that it may be necessary for each of the occupying powers to make available to the countries for which they have some supply responsibility German goods and equipment urgently needed for relief and rehabilitation. In many cases, it will be impossible to await the conclusion of formal agreements on reparation before undertaking such exports from Germany. This government, however, would like to obtain agreement among the occupying powers, (1) that such exports should be confined to goods and equipment which are urgently needed for the relief and rehabilitation of liberated countries, with special emphasis on railroad rolling stock, coal, and textiles, and (2) that a complete record be kept of all goods and equipment taken out of Germany for this purpose and that this record be made available promptly to the Control Council.

[Appendix A—Extracts]

TOP SECRET

DRAFT AGREEMENT ON TREATMENT OF GERMANY IN THE INITIAL CONTROL PERIOD

9. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only as may be necessary:—

(a) to carry out programmes, as prescribed by higher authority,³ of industrial disarmament and demilitarisation, of reparations, of relief for liberated areas and of other supplies as may be notified;

¹ Annex 2 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² For the full text of this paper and its appendix, see document No. 327.

³ The words "as prescribed by higher authority" have been stricken from the draft in Byrnes' and Matthews' copies of the Briefing Book.

10. No action shall be taken in execution of the reparations programme or otherwise which would tend to support basic living standards in Germany on a higher level than that existing in any one of the neighboring United Nations.⁴

11. The first charge on all approved exports for reparations or otherwise shall be a sum necessary to pay for approved imports.⁵

12. Recurrent reparations should not by their form or amount require the rehabilitation or development of German heavy industry and should not foster the dependence of other countries upon the German economy.⁶

⁴ The following manuscript notation appears in the margin of Byrnes' copy of the Briefing Book opposite this paragraph: "out". In Matthews' copy this paragraph has been stricken from the draft.

⁵ In Matthews' copy this paragraph has been marked to be stricken from the draft.

⁶ In Matthews' copy this paragraph has been stricken from the draft and the following manuscript substitute written in the margin: "12. The principles governing the exaction of reparations from Germany are set forth in Annex I to this agreement."

No. 353

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Joint Civil Affairs Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REPARATIONS COMMISSION AND CONTROL COUNCIL

DISCUSSION

1. The United States policy with respect to the relationship between the Reparations Commission and the Control Council has been set forth for Mr. Pauley's guidance. His instructions² contain the following provision:

"The occupation authorities should be responsible for the execution of the [reparations] plan within Germany. In the execution of the plan, the Control Council should have the authority to withhold from transfer as reparations specific items the removal of which in its judgment would reduce the available economic means below the minimum required to meet the other purposes of the occupation. After review by the Control Council and in the absence of agree-

¹ This memorandum was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.

² Not printed as a whole.

ment, the zone commander if he believes that any specific item should be retained within his zone may with the specific determination of his government that such item is essential for the purpose of the occupation withhold the removal of such item. The zone commander may, of course, withhold the removal of such items pending such determination."

RECOMMENDATION

2. In the interest of the efficient operation of the quadripartite military government, it is recommended that efforts be made to have the above-stated policy agreed to at the conference. Because the problem involves the inter-relationship of the Control Council and the Reparations Commission, its solution must be found at a level above that of either one of the two organizations.

No. 354

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Elsey)*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

OCCUPATION OF PART OF GERMANY BY THE NETHERLANDS AND
BELGIUM AS REPARATION FOR DAMAGES INFLICTED BY THE
GERMANS

In a plenary session at Yalta on 5 February, President Roosevelt said during a discussion on the occupation of Germany "that as a result of the deliberate German destruction of the dikes large sections of Dutch farm land had been inundated by salt water and that it would be necessary to give the Dutch farmers compensation for a temporary period from German territory. He said that he understood that it would be at least five years before the flooded lands would be suitable for cultivation. If this were done, and he personally felt that it should be done, the Dutch might well claim a voice in the control machinery for Germany."²

The President did not elaborate on his views, nor refer to this subject again at Yalta. When Molotov asked if Great Britain and the United States wanted the Belgians or the Dutch to have a zone of occupation in Germany, President Roosevelt did not comment. Both Churchill and Eden assured Molotov that they had no intention of giving the Belgians or the Dutch a zone.

Occupation of part of Germany by the Belgians and Dutch was not

¹ Submitted to Leahy July 1 and subsequently forwarded to Truman.

² See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 618-619.

referred to in the Reparations Protocol signed at Yalta³ nor in the discussions concerning reparation.

The subject has not been referred to since Yalta in President Roosevelt's or President Truman's correspondence with Churchill and Stalin, nor was it mentioned during Mr. Hopkins' meetings with Stalin in Moscow.⁴

G. M. ELSEY

³ See vol. II, document No. 1416, section v.

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 24-60.

No. 355

Truman Papers

*Note by the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)*¹

[Undated.]

FLOODED LANDS IN HOLLAND

Propose that the Reparations Commission be directed to recommend the temporary occupation by Holland of an acreage of contiguous agricultural land equal in area to the agricultural land inundated by salt water by German action during the occupation of Holland by German forces.

¹ Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned.

No. 356

740.00119 EW/6-1945: Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Commission for Reparations (Pauley)
to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

Moscow, June 19, 1945—8 p. m.

2165. Top secret for the Secretary from Pauley.

In numerous informal conversations with Mr. Maisky, he keeps coming back to the 20 billion dollar sum that was discussed at Yalta¹ of (sent to Dept as Moscow's No. 2165) which the Soviet Union would receive 10 billion or 50%, the British and the US 8 billion or 40% and all others 2 billion or 10%. Inasmuch as Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill agreed at Yalta to use this as a basis of discussion, I have not officially resisted this basis. At this moment, however, I am strongly of the opinion that:

1. It is too early until at least a preliminary survey of German ability to pay is determined to discuss an exact amount of dollar value.

¹ See vol. II, document No. 1416, section v.

2. Until other countries entitled to reparations are considered we should not fix any total figure in advance of hearing their claims.

3. That a formula [should] be adopted which will emphasize percentages, rather than dollars, and which will [bring]² Russia into partnership with US and UK in relinquishing reparations to be assigned to other Allies.

In explanation of this last point, disregarding the amounts of money involved, the formula discussed at Yalta expressed in percentages was: USSR 50%, Great Britain and the US 20% each (assuming Great Britain and the US divided equally the 40% allocated to them), all others 10%.

In order that the three powers now meeting may share together on a proportionate basis, whatever benefits or burdens may arise from the allowance or disallowance of the claims of other nations to reparations, I propose to suggest that, in so far as the Big Three are concerned, they shall divide whatever reparations may become available to them as a group as follows: USSR 55%, Great Britain 22½%, USA 22½%. But this agreement among the Big Three as to the initial division as between themselves shall be accompanied by their publicly proclaimed willingness to bring all other nations in, hear their claims and give up proportionately to meet such claims as appear justified. This would:

1. Keep all of the Big Three together.
2. Keep other nations from believing that the Big Three have prejudged the amounts of their claims.
3. Give time for full consideration of (a) dollar value of immediate removables (war factories, plants, machine tools and other capital equipment); (b) what is left to take from Germany in the form of deliveries of natural resources, current manufacture, and other items to be produced over a period of time set by the Reparations Commission.

We must claim all we can accept. The US might well demand more reparations except that we are limited as to the kind and type of thing we can take. We cannot use plants, machinery and labor. But we can take and should assert to the fullest extent our demand for gold currencies, foreign assets, patents, processes, technical know how of every type. Also we may desire to reduce our percentage to conform to what we may be able practically to accept.

Ambassador Harriman shares and endorses the views above set forth.

² This word, which is missing in the Department of State file copy, has been supplied from a copy in the Moscow Embassy Files (file No. 711.9 Reparations Commission).

No. 357

740.00119 E. W./6-2545

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State[Extract ¹]

[WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: United States-French Relations

Participants: The French Ambassador, Mr. Henri Bonnet:
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew.

The French Ambassador called on me this morning and took up first the request of his Government, presented in the appended *aide-mémoire*,² that we instruct our Ambassador in Moscow to keep the French Ambassador³ informed of developments in the work of the tripartite Reparations Commission. The Ambassador pointed out once more the interest of France in the whole subject of reparations and the feeling of his Government that a French representative should have been included in the Commission especially in view of the great sufferings which France had endured during the war. I said to the Ambassador that I would immediately give consideration to his request and that in the meantime he was well aware of the position we had taken that we would like to have France included in the Commission and that our position in principle had not altered.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

¹ For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 99, 616, and 637.

² Not found.

³ General of the Army Georges Catroux.

No. 358

740.00119 EW/6-2545 : Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)
to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, June 25, 1945—8 p. m.

2262. TopSec from Pauley for Secretary.

Supplementing my wire of June 19² relating to allocation formula for reparations between the Big Three, after conferring with rep of the

¹ Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Harriman.

² Document No. 356.

UK,³ I would now propose that in addition to public statement that Big Three will give up proportionately to other nations as may appear justified, it shall also be understood between the Big Three that unless all of the Big Three ultimately agree on the actual amounts to be allowed other nations and do in fact make such amounts available on the basis of 55, 22½, and 22½ percent respectively, then the whole question of distribution of reparations between the Big Three themselves shall be reopened.

³ Sir Walter Monckton.

No. 359

740.00119 EW/6-2645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)

SECRET
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1945—4 p. m.

1420. For Pauley.

Following message sent to Eisenhower from JCS at President's request, June 23, 1945. Refer to our 1407, June 23.¹

"The President has approved a recommendation made by Ambassador Pauley that any removals of property from territories under the control of US forces in Germany and Austria for the purpose of restitution should first be submitted by you for the approval of the US Representative on the Reparation Commission. Such coordination is essential because of the close relationship between restitution and broad questions of reparation policy.

However, the President has expressed the view that such coordination with respect to restitution should not operate to delay unduly (1) the return of works of art to the countries from which they were obtained, or (2) the removal from Germany, as restitution or otherwise, of goods urgently needed for the economic restoration of Allied countries. To assure efficient coordination, the President has instructed Ambassador Pauley to make available to you a member of his staff with authority to act promptly on matters submitted by you."

GREW
E[mile] D[espres]

¹ Not printed.

No. 360

740.00119 EW/6-2745 : Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower)*¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, June 27, 1945—9 p. m.

For General Eisenhower from Pauley.

The President has approved as requisite to effective coordination my recommendation that matters of restitution or the transfer of property as restitution shall be made subject to the approval of the Allied Commission on Reparations. The President has also approved my recommendation that Gen Eisenhower first present for my approval as theater rep on the Allied Commission on Reparations any contemplated removals of property for the purpose of restitution from the Amer controlled regions in Germany and Austria. The President desires howeve[r] that the required coordination between reparations and restitution shall not act to retard unnecessarily (1) the withdrawal from Germany in the form of restitution or any other form of supplies badly needed by Allied Nations for their economic reconstruction or (2) the return of works of art to those nations from which they were taken.

The President suggests that in order to achieve effective coordination and prompt decisions I assign a rep to Gen Eisenhower authorized to act on these matters as presented by him.

In accordance with the President's request Mr Frank Adams of my staff who is now in Frankfurt is hereby designated as my rep to Gen Eisenhower and authorized to take prompt action on such specific cases of the foregoing character as may be presented by Gen Eisenhower.

In carrying out the duties hereby assigned my rep will be guided as follows:

1. Approve the return of works of art only to the govt of an Allied Nation and not to private persons and only if evidence submitted to my rep conclusively establishes identity of particular works of art. Prior to each and every delivery of an art object to any Allied Nation a proper statement shall be sent to the appropriate national authorities to the effect that the value of the art object returned may or may not be included in the final reparations accounting for such nation depending upon policies to be determined by the Allied Commission on Reparations and the circumstances and conditions under which each particular art object was taken or removed.

2. In order to avoid abuses by and unwarranted preferences to particular nations and private interests no withdrawals of supplies or

¹ Printed from the text repeated to the Acting Secretary of State as telegram No. 2298.

property in the form of restitution in kind shall be approved. Withdrawals of supplies or property from Germany by Allied Nations for their economic reconstruction may be approved provided the proper authorities in the receiving nation are notified in advance that the question of whether any or all of the supplies or property delivered shall be deemed to be reparations restitution or exports for which payment must be made in acceptable currencies remains to be determined by the Allied Commission on Reparations and that the acceptance of the supplies or property by the govt of the receiving nation constitutes an agreement of such govt to the foregoing condition.

3. In order that proper future accounting may be made both in the case of art objects and in the case of property and supplies, accurate and detailed descriptions and records of all such objects property or supplies delivered or withdrawn shall be kept and maintained and copies forwarded to me immediately. Also in the case of art objects detailed records and sworn statements shall be required showing all of the conditions and circumstances under which such objects were acquired or removed by the Germans.

I have every confidence in the care which I know Gen Eisenhower and his staff will exercise in the withdrawal or delivery from Germany of any art objects, property or supplies. I am most anxious that our policies and records shall be so clearly defined and maintained that no possible question of consistency may arise in our forthcoming reparations negotiations.

Pursuant to instructions received from the President, I have sent the preceding wire to Captain Faigle and Mr Frank Adams as my representatives in Frankfurt.

No. 361

J. C. S. Files

*Report by the Combined Administrative Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 28 June 1945.

C. C. S. 706/11

DISPOSAL OF ENEMY WAR MATÉRIEL IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA THE PROBLEM

1. As a matter of priority to draft a reply to SCAF 447 (Appendix "D," page 6),² in which the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF) requests authority to:—

a. Fill London Munitions Assignment[s] Board requirements from war material in Germany and Austria.

¹ Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 197th Meeting, July 20. See vol. II, p. 162.

² The pages mentioned in this document refer to the original pagination.

b. Render surplus enemy warlike equipment unserviceable and dispose of it as scrap.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "C" (page 5).

DISCUSSION

3. Informal discussions are taking place on governmental levels as to the disposal of enemy equipment. It has been indicated informally that some nations desire the distribution of enemy war matériel among the United Nations, and are directly opposed to widespread destruction of German warlike equipment.

4. Because it appears that there will be considerable delay prior to the formulation of an intergovernmental policy on this subject, it appears necessary to make available a means by which enemy war matériel, captured or surrendered, which might be used profitably in the war against Japan, could be obtained immediately by those nations now actively engaged in the Japanese war.

CONCLUSIONS

5. Until a policy of disposal, agreed upon by the nations represented on the European Advisory Commission, has become effective, the London Munitions Assignment Board should be empowered to assign captured or surrendered enemy matériel in the hands of forces under U. S. or British command in Germany and Austria to the forces of those nations employed in furtherance of the agreed strategy in the war against Japan.

6. Because of the imminent dissolution of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, instructions relative to the destruction of enemy matériel surplus to the needs of the military forces and those of the London Munitions Assignment Board are a matter for consideration by the respective United States and British Chiefs of Staff rather than the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That the message in Appendix "A" (page 3) be dispatched to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.³

8. That the message in Appendix "B" (page 4) be dispatched to the London Munitions Assignment Board.

³ Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander.

[Appendix A—Paraphrase]

SECRET

DRAFT

MESSAGE TO SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN

The London Munitions Assignments Board is being authorized to assign surrendered or captured enemy matériel in the hands of British- or American-commanded forces in Austria and Germany to the forces of those countries employed in furtherance of the agreed strategy in the war against Japan. After the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, the respective Chiefs of Staff will issue instructions to the commanding officers of the British and United States zones of occupation with respect to treatment of enemy matériel which is in excess of the requirements of the military commanders and in excess of the matériel needed to fill the requirements of the London Munitions Assignments Board.

The above message is in reply to SCAF 447, which is being repeated to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, today.

[Appendix B—Paraphrase]

SECRET

DRAFT

MESSAGE TO THE LONDON MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENTS BOARD

Until the countries which are members of the European Advisory Commission have agreed upon a disposal policy, and until such an agreed policy is implemented, the London Munitions Assignments Board is authorized to assign surrendered or captured enemy matériel in the hands of British- or American-commanded forces in Austria and Germany to the forces of those countries which will use such matériel in furtherance of the agreed strategy in the war against Japan.

[Appendix C]

SECRET

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. FACS 159—FAN 507 ⁴ authorized the destruction of captured enemy war matériel in Germany and Austria, which was surplus to the requirements of the Supreme Command and the London Munitions Assignment Board, such authority to remain in force until cessa-

⁴ Not printed.

tion of hostilities or until superseded by a later directive (page 4 of C. C. S. 200/5 as amended by C. C. S. 200/6 ⁵).

2. Present handling of captured and surrendered war matériel in Germany and Austria is based on FACS 149—FAN 500 (page 3 of C. C. S. 706/7 ⁶) and FACS 109—FAN 453 (page 3 of C. C. S. 706/2 ⁶) by which surplus enemy war matériel is being safeguarded, inventoried, and pooled as the property of the United Nations pending multipartite agreement as to disposal by the governments represented on the European Advisory Commission.

3. SCAEF states in SCAF 447 (Appendix "D") that long-term guarding and maintenance of warlike equipment constitutes a heavy burden on occupational forces and is considered impracticable particularly in view of the redeployment program.

4. The Military Advisor, European Advisory Commission,⁷ writing on behalf of the Joint Advisors, U. S. Delegation, European Advisory Commission (EAC), states that it is doubted whether EAC will be in position to consider question of disposal of enemy matériel in the near future.

5. In C. C. S. 706/7, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that if, at the time of the defeat of Germany, there was no prospect of a speedy agreement on policies for the disposal of enemy war matériel, action should be taken to seek the agreement on a governmental level of the authorities of the nations represented on the EAC for the immediate disposal of war matériel in Germany and Austria required for the war against Japan.

[Appendix D—Paraphrase]

*The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower)
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

11 JUNE 1945.

SCAF 447. FWD 24508. The guarding and maintaining of war matériel over a long period of time imposes a heavy burden on the armies of occupation. This is especially true in the light of the redeployment program, and it is considered to be impracticable.

Our present policy, based upon FACS 109 and 149,⁵ is to inventory, safeguard, and pool surplus enemy war matériel in Austria and Germany as the property of the United Nations, pending a multilateral agreement on the part of the member governments of the European Advisory Commission as to its disposal.

⁵ Neither printed.

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ Brigadier General Vincent Meyer.

The destruction of such matériel, in so far as it exceeds the needs of the London Munitions Assignments Board and the Supreme Command, was authorized by FACS 159.⁸ This authorization was made effective until hostilities ceased or until it was superseded by a new directive.

I request authority, unless a new directive is to be issued in the near future, to fill from war matériel in Austria and Germany the requirements of the London Munitions Assignments Board, to render unserviceable any excess enemy war matériel, and to dispose of such surplus equipment as scrap.

⁸ Not printed.

No. 362

740.00119 EW/6-2945 : Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the President*¹

[Extract²]

TOP SECRET

Moscow, June 29, 1945—8 p. m.

2325. Top sec from Pauley to the President.

I am bending every effort to have a proposed reparation plan to submit to you and the heads of Great Brit and Russia at your forthcoming meeting. . . .

¹ Sent to the Secretary of State ad interim over the signature of Harriman.

² For the full text of this message, see document No. 110.

No. 363

740.00119 EW/6-2545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State ad interim to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1945—9 a. m.

1488. For Pauley from the Acting Secretary.

1. Reurtel 2165, June 19¹ and 2262, June 25,² the Department is not opposed to the discussion of an amount of reparations. While it is felt that a figure of twenty billion dollars is too high and that one approaching twelve or fourteen billion dollars would be more appropriate, the twenty billion dollar figure may be adopted as a starting point for exploration and discussion. In this connection it should be established (a) that transfers from Germany of existing wealth cannot

¹ Document No. 356.

² Document No. 358.

now be expected to reach the figure ten billion dollars indicated in the Yalta discussions, (b) that attempts to secure from Germany within a reasonable period ten billion dollars of reparations transfers over and above exports required to pay for necessary German imports may result in the sacrifice of those German industrial disarmament objectives which are of prime concern to the United States.

The interest of this Government in questions of the total amount of reparations paid and the division of this total among various claimants is subservient to its interest in the firm application of those principles and procedures set forth under paragraph 3 of the Instructions for United States Representative on the Reparations Commission.³

³ The principles referred to, here printed from appendix 5 to the Pauley-Lubin Report (see vol. II, p. 940), are as follows:

"a. The Reparation Plan should assist in the elimination of industrial capacity in Germany considered to be dangerous to the security of the United Nations.

"b. The Reparation Plan should aid in strengthening and developing on a sound basis the industries and trade of the devastated non-enemy countries of Europe and of other United Nations, and in raising the living standards of these countries.

"c. The reparation burden should be distributed in so far as practicable so as to impose equality of sacrifice upon, and result in an equal general standard of living for the German populations of each of the zones under the control of the respective occupying nations.

"d. This Government opposes any reparation plan based upon the assumption that the United States or any other country will finance directly or indirectly any reconstruction in Germany or reparation by Germany.

"e. The Reparation Plan should not maintain or foster dependence of other countries upon the German economy.

"f. The Reparation Plan should not be of such a nature as to promote or require the building up of German economic capacity.

"g. To the maximum extent possible, reparations should be taken from the national wealth of Germany existing at the time of collapse, with primary emphasis upon the removal of industrial machinery, equipment and plants, particularly the shipbuilding, metallurgical, machine tool producing, electrical machinery, and chemical industries (including all industries producing oil and oil products, synthetic nitrogen and synthetic rubber), ships, rolling stock, patents, copyrights, and German foreign exchange assets including investments abroad. Capacity for the production of component parts that enter into the production of the industries noted above should also be eligible for removal. Reparation in kind should not include arms, ammunition, and implements of war. (This Government favors the inclusion of German ocean-going merchant tonnage in the shipping pool until the end of the war against Japan and its division on some fair basis thereafter, and negotiations with other governments are in progress on this subject.)

"h. To the extent that for political reasons it may become necessary in the negotiations to agree that reparations be collected in the form of deliveries of goods from current production over a period of years, such goods should be of such nature and in such amounts as not to require the maintenance of the German war potential or the continued dependence of other countries on Germany after reparations cease. Accordingly, recurring reparations, over a period of years, should be:

"(1) As small as possible in relation to the reparations to be paid in the form of industrial plants and equipment; and

"(2) Primarily in the form of raw materials and natural resources, and to the smallest extent possible in the form of manufactured products.

"i. The removal of plants and equipment shall take place regardless of the fact that they are owned in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, by United Nations nationals. Where plants or equipment which are owned in whole or in part by a United National [*sic*] national are to be so removed arrangements shall

2. The Department feels that a Soviet receipt of 50 percent of total reparations payments as discussed at Yalta is not excessive on any probable basis of division. However, an allocation of 20 percent for United States, 20 percent for United Kingdom and 10 percent for the remaining countries leaves too little for these last claimants.

Although the Department concurs fully in your desire to avoid the possibility that the USSR become responsible for reparations for Eastern Europe on the one hand, and the United States and the United Kingdom for Western Europe on the other, the Department does not believe that your suggestion for an initial three-way distribution of reparations on the basis of 55, 22½ and 22½ percent should be put forward. Such an approach would be inconsistent with this Government's stated desire for equal French participation in the discussions and decisions of the Reparations Commission. The Department is of the opinion that if any new formula were now proposed by you as a basis for discussion to replace the formula which we accepted at Yalta for discussion purposes, such new formula should provide for a four power apportionment. It would be prepared to support a four power formula along the lines you suggest which would include France on a proportionate basis along with the Big Three. The Department believes that in such a four power initial apportionment, the Soviet share should be sufficiently in excess of fifty percent so that the net portion of reparation finally allocated to the Soviet Union will be approximately fifty percent after joint contributions by the four powers for the benefit of the smaller Allies.

3. With reference to your suggestion that the United States assert to the fullest extent its demand for gold, among other things, it is the view of the Department that, apart from the question of gold restitution as against its use for reparation, the disadvantages resulting from such a demand on the part of this Government would greatly outweigh the benefits to be gained from an increase in this country's gold stocks.

GREW⁴

be made, if practicable and desired by the government of such national, for the owner to retain his interest in such plant and equipment after removal. If not practicable or so desired, Germany shall furnish to the government of such national adequate reparation to cover the interest of such national.

"j. It will be inevitable that the German standard of living will be adversely affected by the carrying out of the Reparation Plan. However, the reparation exactions should be held within such limits as to leave the German people with sufficient means to provide a minimum subsistence standard of living without sustained outside relief; but under no condition should this limitation operate to require the retention in Germany of means to support basic living standards on a higher level than that existing in any one of the neighboring United Nations.

"k. The Reparation Plan should not put the United States in a position where it will have to assume responsibility for sustained relief to the German people."

⁴ The initials of the signing officer do not appear on the substitute file copy.

No. 364

740.00119 EW/9-2045

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)
to the Chairman of the Allied Commission on Reparations (Maisky)*¹

[Moscow,] July 3, 1945.

DEAR MR. MAISKY: I was informed this morning that for the third time you again postponed the scheduled Plenary Meeting of the Allied Commission on Reparations. As in the case of the other postponements, this Plenary Meeting was scheduled to discuss your original Memorandum No. 2² which embodies the Soviet Proposal referred to in the Crimea Protocol.³ The American Delegation has now been here twenty-two days. We have not received a single figure supporting the Soviet proposal nor has any attempt been made on the part of the Soviet Government to enlighten either the American Delegation, or so far as I know, the British Delegation as to the basis of this Soviet proposal.

You will recall that at the first informal meeting between you, Sir Walter Monckton and myself, I stated, and you concurred in my belief that it was the joint responsibility of our three delegations to present as much as possible in the way of a definitive reparation program to the heads of our respective governments at their forthcoming meeting about the middle of July.

It is with reluctance that I must point to the lack of progress thus far made toward this end. If we are to have reparations in kind, as all agreed at the Crimea Conference, such a program must be based, in the first instance, upon things and not upon dollars.

At the time you made your twenty billion dollar proposal at the Crimea Conference, none of us had access to Germany. Any money figures which may have been discussed then could only have been based upon pre-war data of a very general character. Now we are in a position to undertake a complete physical inventory of present German assets and to make reasonably accurate estimates of future German requirements for whatever minimum standard of living may

¹ Printed from a copy included as an appendix to the Pauley-Lubin Report (see vol. II, p. 940).

² Not printed.

³ See vol. II, document No. 1416, section v.

be agreed upon. Only by deducting permitted future German minimum requirements from the sum of actual present assets and estimated future production, can realistic net reparation figures be reached.

To attempt to arrive at any fixed monetary figure at this time before making a physical inventory and careful calculations as to permitted German requirements will lead to:

1. A total of reparations expressed in money less than the physical amounts available for collection from Germany or,
2. A money figure too large for Germany to deliver in physical terms under even the reduced standard of living which is to be allowed and,
3. A delay in a program for interim reparation deliveries.

Any approach to the problem of reparations which results in any of the above seems to me wholly unrealistic. I, therefore, suggest in order to have a definitive program to present to the heads of our three governments, that the Allied Commission on Reparations shall:

1. Arrive at an agreement between the Big Three as to the relative proportions, expressed in percentages rather than money, to which, as between themselves, each is entitled from such reparations as shall be determined to be available for these powers.
2. Agree on principles and procedures whereby the percentages of other claimant nations may be determined.
3. Define "reparation", "restitution" and "war booty" and provide a speedy program of interim reparations for all countries entitled thereto.

In my judgment, it is necessary that we either reach an agreement on the above points to be presented to the heads of our governments on July 15th or failing to agree, that the points of disagreement be presented for decision.

I know that you realize that the lives and future of hundreds of millions of people both in the Soviet Union and in Western Europe are dependent upon prompt and realistic decisions on German reparations. It is for this reason that I believe it my duty to ask for a daily meeting of the three representatives of our respective governments and that a complete report on the program for each Committee as described in the Minutes of the Steering Committee be presented by each such Committee not later than July 10, 1945.

Cordially yours,

[EDWIN W. PAULEY]

[No. 364]

No. 365

711.51/7-445

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Under Secretary of State (Grew)*¹[Extracts ²]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have carefully considered the many points which you raised in your letter of 8 June 1945 ³ with respect to conditions in Western Europe. I share your concern over what I think we all recognize to be a distressing situation.

¹ Actually addressed to the Acting Secretary of State, but Grew was only Under Secretary on the date of signature.

² For other extracts from this letter, see document No. 427.

³ The pertinent passages of Grew's letter of June 8 read as follows (file No. 711.51/6-845):

"I am deeply concerned over conditions in Western Europe and the possibility that serious disorders may develop during the coming months. If the people of that area, particularly those in France, have to face another winter without heat or without adequate food and clothing, I can foresee disturbances of such serious consequence as not only to involve conflict with our troops, but to imperil gravely our long-term interests. The outlook at best is a gloomy one. It is already aggravated by repatriated prisoners of war and deportees who, on returning, expect more in the way of food, clothing and employment than can be provided.

"As I know that you are aware of the situation and of its implications, I am taking the liberty of seeking your assistance on the following points, which I believe are in line with the policy enunciated in the President's letter to you of May 21, 1945.

"4. Another factor of importance to be considered in connection with this general matter is that of rail transportation. From fragmentary information, it would appear possible that the Germans have withdrawn into Germany a substantial amount of rolling stock from Allied countries, and that, despite war damage, their position in this respect is much more comfortable than that of our Western European Allies. If such should prove to be the case, would it not be possible to return to those Allies at least their own cars and locomotives found in Germany?

"5. I understand that the U. S. and British military authorities in Germany have uncovered certain stocks of raw materials and industrial equipment which are of important interest to the liberated countries of Western Europe in their present economic straits. I realize that the disposition of such German materials and equipment involves the question of reparations. On the other hand, the need for certain of them is so great at the present time that I do not feel it would be appropriate to await action by the Reparations Commission before putting the materials to use. Adequate records, however, should be kept by SHAEF of any such deliveries in order that they may be taken appropriately into account in the later determinations of the Reparations Commission.

"I accordingly urge that an allocations committee be set up immediately and that General Eisenhower be instructed to interpret liberally his outstanding directive on this subject. Pending the working out of more definitive machinery, I feel that such a committee should be set up within SHAEF, with a high ranking SHAEF officer as chairman. . . .

"6. There is no longer disagreement concerning the need for assuring such essential economic rehabilitation in Germany as is necessary to the fulfillment of the purposes of occupation. We will doubtless have to ship some supplies into Germany from overseas. Also, the military will doubtless move into Germany certain types of equipment, such as cranes and other harbor and engineering

I recognize the importance of all of the points which you raise and assure you that the War Department, in its appropriate sphere will cooperate in carrying out such policy as our government may establish. I feel, however, that many of the points you raise fall outside of the policy enunciated in the President's letter of 21 May 1945⁴ to which you refer. The policy conveyed to the War Department by the President in his letter was that after prompt termination of military responsibility for the provision of civilian supplies in liberated areas the Army should assist the national governments involved to the extent the military situation permits, which assistance should include the transfer of military supplies in excess of essential military requirements to the extent legally permissible. Many of the questions which you raise such as the determination of this government's lend lease policy, the establishment of a reparations policy, and the policy of our government with respect to the provision of supplies to and the handling of exports from Germany seem clearly to fall outside the President's letter. As, however, I recognize fully the importance of the questions which you raise I will attempt to treat with them in the order in which they were submitted:

4. Your letter poses the question as to whether it would be possible to return to the allied countries in Europe their own railroad cars and locomotives found in Germany. Up until the present time the military necessities of the situation in Europe have required that the military authorities operate all railroad power and rolling stock in Northwest Europe, without regard to the country of ownership, in a transportation pool. Only by this method has the limited amount of equipment available been found sufficient to meet military requirements. As operations have now terminated and as it is reasonable to expect that conditions in Germany will become more stabilized as time goes on, it should be possible, so far as military considerations are concerned, to gradually return to our Allies their cars and locomotives, where identification of the country of ownership is possible.

The fundamental problem raised by your question, however, is whether or not such restitution is consistent with this government's

facilities, which are now serving and are vitally needed by our Allies. In order that our Allies may recognize that our action in these respects is directly related to their own economic interests, an adequate program of exports from Germany, to be undertaken at once, is of crucial importance, and should be given clear priority over the satisfaction of needs within Germany. In the absence of clear and continuing guidance from Washington on this point, I fear that there would be an inevitable tendency for the occupying authorities in the field to become chiefly absorbed in meeting the needs of the area for which they have a direct responsibility."

⁴ Not printed.

reparations policy. The War Department has received informal advice from the State Department staff that the government's policy was against recognition of an automatic right to restitution of the character under discussion and that it was desired that the return of property of this character found in Germany, even though capable of identification as to its national source, would be a matter of discussion in connection with reparations decisions. I would very much appreciate your definitive advice on this subject.

5. In this paragraph your letter raises the whole problem of interim reparations. I feel strongly that the War Department should not determine the reparations policy to be followed in the administration of military government in Germany. In my opinion such policy should not be the subject of military decision but should be established by the appropriate policy making agencies of the government and transmitted to the War Department for administration.

In your letter you pose several alternate methods of dealing with the reparations problem in the interim before the Reparations Commission begins to operate. In this situation any affirmative action by the War Department would of necessity result in determination by it in this policy field where, in my opinion, it is inappropriate for the War Department to function. If the State Department will transmit to the War Department a definite policy to be followed in the administration of Germany with respect to reparations pending action by the Reparations Commission, the War Department will gladly endeavor to carry out such a policy.

6. In this paragraph of your letter you raise again the two questions of the extent of supplies which will be imported to Germany from overseas and the program of exports from Germany which will be undertaken. I believe that my views on these two questions have been covered in the previous discussion.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L STIMSON

No. 366

740.00119 EW/7-545 : Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)
to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, July 5, 1945—8 p. m.

2418. From Pauley to Secretary of State.

I have your cable of July 2² answering mine of June 19.³ As I read

¹ Sent over the signature of Harriman.

² Document No. 363.

³ Document No. 356.

your message you agree with me in principle on all important points with the exception of two as follows:

1. You urge that any new tripartite percentage formula [for reparations from Germany] include at this time a fixed percentage for France even though France is not now represented in this conference.⁴ Maisky has insisted and still stands on the Crimea protocol⁵ that the conference remain tripartite. Both Mr. Harriman and myself as well as Archibald [Clark] Kerr and Sir Walter Monckton of Brit have constantly urged the inclusion of France in the Reparations Conference with Soviet officials to no avail. In the circumstances, your suggestion if followed would leave me in an impossible position. I would have only one alternative, namely, to sponsor a determination of the percentage share of France by the Tripartite Conference which even if accomplished would in the absence of the French obviously prove wholly unsatisfactory to and bring about criticism from the French. It is my considered opinion that my proposal which determines ex parte none of the claims of any nations shows adequate respect for and properly insures a reasonable determination of the claims of France and all other nations. Since France is on the Control Council, naturally under my proposal France would of necessity be the first nation whose claim would be considered and have its percentage determined. Certainly the matter of the inclusion of France as a member of the Reparations Commission should be made an urgent item on the agenda of the Big Three at the forthcoming conference. Obviously this is a matter which cannot be handled conclusively at any lower level. Accordingly, I request that you inform the President of my views upon this subject.

2. I have noted your exception to my proposal that we should demand as fully as possible gold as reparations. As this seems to be one of the few items which we can take, it occurs to me that the Dept should make further study of this matter, particularly since the receipt of gold as reparations may prove particularly convenient and useful for our country to defray occupation costs in supplying our army of occupation with such goods as are not obtainable within Germany.

⁴ i. e., the Allied Commission on Reparations.

⁵ See vol. II, document No. 1416, section v.

No. 367

740.00119 EW/7-645 : Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)
to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, July 6, 1945—11 p. m.

US URGENT

2441. Top secret from Pauley to the Secretary.

Several weeks ago at the first meeting of the Steering Committee named by the Allied Reparations Commission, I proposed that the

¹ Sent over the signature of Harriman. Sent to Washington; relayed to Byrnes, then at sea, in telegram No. 2 of July 7 (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8-645).

Commission adopt certain principles which I derived from IPCOG No. 2.² After painstaking negotiation, each delegate on the Allied Commission on Reparations has now agreed to recommend that the following principles be adopted by the Commission in the preparation and administration of a reparations plan:

“1. Removals of property for reparations shall be primarily such as to assist in bringing to an end the war-making power of Germany by eliminating that part of Germany’s industrial capacity which constitutes war potential.

2. Reparations shall be such as will speed recovery and reconstruction in countries devastated at German hands.

3. For the purposes of making a reparations plan Germany will be treated as a single economic unit.

4. Any plan of reparations shall be avoided which necessitates external financial assistance either to enable reparations deliveries to be made or to facilitate economic reconstruction required for reparation purposes or which might in the opinion of the govt concerned prejudice the successful execution of the task entrusted to the armies of occupation.

5. To a maximum extent reparation shall be taken from existing national wealth of Germany. While for convenience claims may be stated in money, it is necessary to bear in mind that in contrast to reparations after World War I which were assessed and exacted in money, this time reparations will be assessed and exacted in kind in the form of things such as plants, machines, equipment, stocks, foreign investments, etc.

6. In order to avoid building up German industrial capacity and disturbing the long term stability of the economies of the United Nations, long run payment of reparations in the form of manufactured products shall be restricted to a minimum.

7. In justice to those countries occupied by the enemy, reparations shall be calculated upon the basis that the average living standards in Germany during the reparation period, shall not exceed the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding UK and USSR).

8. After payments of reparations enough resources must be left to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided for payment of imports approved by the govts concerned before reparation deliveries are made from current production or from stocks of goods.”

I hope I may have your immediate concurrence in subscribing to the foregoing principles.

² Not printed as such. For the principles set forth in Pauley’s instructions (IPCOG 2/2), see document No. 363, footnote 3.

No. 368

740.00119 Potsdam/7-745: Telegram

*The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) and the Adviser on German Economic Affairs (Despres) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 7 [1945.]

1. For the Secretary. From Collado and Despres.

Pursuant to our discussion, you may wish to consider the following paragraph as a substitute for para. 3 in the proposed telegram to Pauley.²

"The Dept is fully in accord with the general principle embodied in your proposed formula of apportionment under which the major powers would decide the apportionment among themselves of the aggregate share of reparation going to them collectively but would not try to fix definitely the apportionment between the major powers, on the one hand, and the other Allies on the other, in advance of consultation with other Allies. We also agree that inclusion of France as a major power in such a formula raises the most acute difficulties in the absence of French representation on the Reparation Commission. We therefore favor your proposing in the Commission a three power formula of the type which you have recommended, but we feel that you should state to your colleagues that we would prefer a formula fixing the relative shares of the four powers which will occupy Germany if the absence of French representation on the Commission did not make consideration of such a formula impracticable. We also believe that the percentages recommended by you, would give too large a share of total reparation to Britain and the US, and that unless Russia is willing to accept much less than 50 percent of total reparation little will be available under your formula for the other Allies. We propose therefore that you consider a modification of your ratios. For example, if it were agreed that the Big Three share should be divided seventy percent to USSR and fifteen percent each to US and UK, and that at least thirty percent of total reparation would be reserved for other Allies, this would give Russia about fifty percent of total reparation and US and UK about ten percent each. We hope that you will consider some such modification, because our limited capacity to absorb reparation in goods and labor services and our disinclination to assert a claim to gold looted by the Germans in Allied countries make it unlikely that we can collect a larger share of total reparation than ten percent. Moreover, our direct war damage has been relatively small, even though the volume of our resources devoted to the war has been large."

¹ Sent over the signature of Grew.

² Replying to document No. 366.

[No. 368]

No. 369

740.00119 Potsdam/7-745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1945.

3. The agreed recommendations submitted for your concurrence in Pauley's 2441, July 6,¹ are in full conformity with the principles formulated in the instructions to Pauley prepared by the Informal Policy Committee on Germany, cleared with JCS and approved by the President. Pauley's success in obtaining agreement of his Russian and British colleagues represents a considerable achievement. It is recommended that you communicate to Pauley your concurrence and gratification.

GREW

¹ Document No. 367.

No. 370

740.00119 EW/7-745 : Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, July 7, 1945—8 p. m.

2466. Top secret to the Secretary from Pauley.

Further to my 2418, July 5.²

Now that you have become active in your new and important responsibility I wish to acquaint you with certain reparations problems here in order to have the fullest possible benefit of your thinking prior to and at the conference.

1. The inclusion of France in the reparations discussions here though urged by the Brit and supported by myself and Harriman is not acceptable to the Soviets. Maisky stands on the Crimea protocol. Since this question arose basically out of the Crimean agreement of the Big Three it is obvious that the question cannot be conclusively resolved at any lower level than the Big Three.

2. The attempt of the Soviets to place a total dollar value on reparations leads I fear into the very difficulty that President Roosevelt foresaw at Crimea, namely that it will appear to the Amer people that again reparations are to be paid in money and not in

¹ Sent over the signature of Harriman. Sent to Washington; relayed to Byrnes, then at sea, in telegram No. 9 of July 9 (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8-645).

² Document No. 366.

things. It is my belief that reparations should first be assessed and exacted on things[—]particularly plants and equipment to disarm and deindustrialize Germany—and only secondarily should money values be placed upon the things taken.

3. Despite the above fundamental problems I have proposed to the Allied Commission on Reparations here and have consent of all reps that we prepare as much of a definitive program as possible for presentation to the heads of the three Govts at the forthcoming conference as follows:

(a). Arrive at an agreement between the Big Three as to the relative proportions, expressed in percentages rather than money, to which, as between themselves, each is entitled from such reparations as shall be determined to be available for these powers;

(b). Agree on principles and procedures whereby the percentages of other claimant nations may be determined;

(c). Define "reparation", "restitution" and "war booty" and provide a speedy program of interim reparations for all countries entitled thereto; and

(d). That agreement either be reached upon the three foregoing points or that the points of disagreement be stipulated in either case for presentation to the heads of the three Govts at the conference for decision.

Upon a proposed percentage formula relating to point number *a* above I cabled the Secretary (see my 2165, June 19³) and have Acting Secretary's 1488, July 2⁴ in reply and further cabled you (see my 2418, July 5). It would be helpful if you would secure and read these cables which will define my attitude and as well show one major point of possible difference between myself and your predecessors on policy. You will observe particularly objectives in the proposed formula are:

(1). To avoid fixing the percentage of any other nation in advance of a review of its claim;

(2). To place the burden upon all of the Three Powers for proper allocation of reparations due other nations;

(3). To maintain unity of the Big Three.

I consider it most important that the agenda of the coming conference provide for consideration of these reparation matters as well as the question of the inclusion of France. You would favor me greatly if you would see that these matters are given a high place on the agenda as they are questions of high policy which must be determined.

³ Document No. 356.

⁴ Document No. 363.

No. 371

740.00119 EW/7-545 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)*TOP SECRET
US URGENT

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1945—2 p. m.

1557. For Pauley.

Instead of replying now to the questions raised in your 2418, July 5, 8 p. m.¹ Secretary suggests that these issues be discussed and decided when you join President at Berlin.

GREW²¹ Document No. 366.² The initials of the signing officer do not appear on the substitute file copy.

No. 372

740.00119 EW/7-945

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*¹

Ref: 1608/-/45

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On June 27th Mr. Pauley communicated to Sir Walter Monckton in Moscow a paraphrase of a telegram to the State Department² describing the communication he had sent to his representative at Frankfurt and to the Commander of the United States zone in Germany on the subject of the withdrawal from Germany of art objects, other property and supplies. Mr. Pauley suggested that similar instructions should be sent to Field Marshal Montgomery.

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would have been glad to have been given an opportunity to comment on this matter before action was taken. The subject is one on which it is most desirable to work out a policy common to all four zones, particularly in view of the wider aim to secure the treatment of Germany as an economic unit.

3. As action has been taken and in order to give effect to Mr. Pauley's suggestion, His Majesty's Government desire to reach agreement with the United States Government on the policy to be adopted in the United States and British zones, on the understanding that the arrangements made and the policy covering interim deliveries from

¹ The original of this *aide-mémoire* bears the following manuscript notation: "Note: Instructions referred to in this *Aide-Mémoire* were communicated to Sir Walter Monckton on July 6".² See document No. 360.

Germany shall be discussed at the earliest possible date at the Allied Control Commission and that pending such discussion the Commanders-in-Chief of the British, United States and French zones should exchange information and co-ordinate action with regard to the movement of goods from Germany. This, it is suggested, should be done through the agency of the newly created Combined Resources and Allocation Board.

4. A statement of the views of His Majesty's Government on this matter, (excluding the movement of goods or property for purposes of restitution), are contained in the enclosure. This statement has been sent to Sir Walter Monckton with instructions to discuss it with Mr. Pauley and to ascertain from him whether he is prepared to modify the instructions which he has issued so as to bring them more into line with the arrangements proposed by His Majesty's Government for the British zone.

5. It is the belief of His Majesty's Government that it is essential to inform the Soviet Government of these arrangements and the reason why they have been made and to leave the Soviet Government in no doubt of their limited scope and interim nature. Sir Walter Monckton has therefore been instructed also to propose to Mr. Pauley that, after agreement has been reached on the instructions for the British and American zones and after they have been issued to Field Marshal Montgomery and the United States Commander-in-Chief, they should jointly explain to Monsieur Maisky the nature of these arrangements for interim deliveries. Monsieur Maisky could be told that the two Governments have felt bound to take this action in view of the crying needs of the European Allies and that they will take the earliest opportunity of informing the Allied Control Commission and of securing its concurrence. The two Governments appreciate that the Soviet Commander-in-Chief may wish to take comparable action in the Soviet zone. If so, they very much hope that in respect of any exports therefrom the principle of accountability agreed between the two Governments would be preserved.

6. It will be noted from the final paragraph of the enclosure that His Majesty's Government intend to send to Sir Walter Monckton a separate statement of their views on the interim movement of goods or property for purposes of restitution.

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1945.

[Enclosure]

The arrangements here outlined would apply only to deliveries of goods from Germany on supply grounds. They should be regarded as interim and will no doubt be replaced by other arrangements when

the Allied Control machinery comes into full operation, when reparation policy is decided and when the organization of the Emergency Economic Committee, Europe, is further developed and its relations in [to?] the Control Powers further defined.

2. His Majesty's Government would be prepared to authorize Field Marshal Montgomery at his discretion to permit the export from the British zone of occupation to Allied countries of Western Europe of commodities essential to their economic life. The extent of Field Marshal Montgomery's discretion in this matter would be limited by the following conditions:

(a) as a general rule exports should for the present be limited in kind to raw materials and consumer goods and exports of capital equipment should not be permitted save in exceptional circumstances and after prior reference to His Majesty's Government;

(b) exports of a type which have been agreed as likely to prejudice the work of the Reparation Commission or reparation settlement should not be permitted;

(c) in considering whether a given export should be permitted, the Control authorities will have regard to whether the export would necessitate the subsequent import of goods into Germany;

(d) the Allied Government receiving such an export from the British zone would, before being permitted to take delivery, be required to accept accountability for them in due course under whatever scheme may be agreed and to recognize that they have received them without prejudice to the question whether they shall be considered to be reparation[,] restitution or exports for which payment must be made in acceptable currencies;

(e) demands by Allied countries and availabilities for export in the British zone should be considered so far as possible in collaboration with the Control Authorities in the French and American zones, so that a consistent and co-ordinated policy should be followed in the three zones.

3. Field Marshal Montgomery would be authorized to grant priority for the export from the British zone of material immediately required for the direct war effort of the Allied Nations against Japan.

4. Field Marshal Montgomery would keep Sir Walter Monckton informed of the exports which he had permitted; and would designate a member of the British element of the Allied Control Commission to maintain liaison with him. Inter-zonal co-ordination would presumably be maintained by the newly created Combined Resources and Allocation Board.

5. A scheme whereby information about requirements and availabilities could be exchanged between the E. E. C. E. and the Commanders-in-Chief of the British, United States and French zones has been approved by the E. E. C. E. and it is hoped that it will shortly be put into operation. Information obtained under this scheme may be of use to the Commanders-in-Chief in determining priorities. His

Majesty's Government now propose to inform the E. E. C. E. that further definition of its functions in relation to German exports must await a clarification of reparation and restitution policy and full establishment of Allied Control machinery in Germany; but that in the meantime some movement of goods from the British zone would be permitted. His Majesty's Government would hope that the United States representative on the E. E. C. E. would make a similar statement about the United States zone.

6. His Majesty's Government's views upon interim movement of goods or property in the way of restitution and not on grounds of supply will be contained in a separate statement.³

³ Not printed.

No. 373

740.00110 E. W./6-2545 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] July 11, 1945—7 p. m

1577. Department has received from French Embassy an *Aide-Mémoire* dated June 25¹ referring to exclusion of France from Reparation Commission at Moscow. Although French government maintains the position that France should be represented on the Commission it asks that instructions be issued to the Chief of the American Delegation to keep the French Ambassador at Moscow closely informed of the Commission's labors.

(Sent to Moscow as 1577 for action. Repeated to Paris as 3213 and London as 5671.)

We are told that the French have addressed similar communications to British and Soviet governments.

Please discuss the matter informally with the appropriate authorities and report their reaction to the French request. If questioned concerning our position, you may say that we are most sympathetic to the French desire not only to be kept informed but to be admitted to full membership.² We are not certain, however, that the French suggestion, which would involve the receipt of information by the French Ambassador at Moscow from three separate sources, is the most practical way of accomplishing the desired purpose. We would be quite agreeable to having the American delegate work out with his British and Soviet colleagues on the Commission a procedure for

¹ Not found. Cf. document No. 357.

² The United States had earlier proposed French membership on the Allied Commission on Reparations, but had not been willing to accept a Soviet counter-proposal that other governments be admitted to membership at the same time.

keeping the French government informed concerning the decisions taken by the Commission, pending full French participation. This might be done through the Commission's commissariat.

Please inform Pauley.

[GREW] ³

² The initials of the signing officer do not appear on the substitute file copy.

No. 374

Pauley Files

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)
to the Chairman of the Allied Commission on Reparations (Maisky)*¹

[Moscow,] July 11, 1945.

DEAR MR. MAISKY: In as much as I intend to depart for Berlin along with a few of my staff for the meeting of The Big Three, I feel that it is extremely urgent that we resolve all the matters contained in my letter of July 3rd ² for a final decision by the heads of our respective governments.

The specific questions raised and the status of each is as follows:

1. The percentage formula for the division of reparations as between the three governments has been thoroughly discussed and it is my understanding that we are not far from agreement.

2. The principles and procedures whereby the percentages of other claimant nations may be determined have been discussed and it is my understanding that we are near agreement.

3. (a) I believe we have agreed upon a definition of "restitution."

(b) The definition of "war booty" has not been discussed and we have been awaiting the definition which you agreed to submit to the Steering Committee. In the interest of time I have prepared and herewith submit for your consideration such a definition.³

(c) The interim reparation plan is still subject to discussion but I understand that you share my views on this subject.

Since Sir Walter Monckton has informed me that he has waived the last remaining objection to Principle No. 4,⁴ I take it we are all in agreement upon the eight principles which shall be the basis of the reparations plan.

Though we are near agreement upon the subject matter of all of the above points advanced in my letter of July 3rd, the time before

¹ Printed from an unsigned carbon copy.

² Document No. 364.

³ See appendix G to document No. 376.

⁴ See document No. 367.

our contemplated departure for Berlin is running so short that I have grave concern that our work will not be completed to the point where it may be properly submitted to the heads of our governments. I trust therefore that you will spare no effort either to reach agreement upon all of these points before the Big Three Conference or prepare ourselves specifically to state our differences for presentation at this Conference.

Especially do I request that you give me as early as possible your reaction to the definition of "war booty" which I enclose herewith.

Sincerely yours,

[EDWIN W. PAULEY]

No. 375

740.00119 EW/7-1445 : Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)
to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

Moscow, July 14, 1945—4 p. m.

US URGENT

2564. From Pauley to Secretary [of] State.

I refer to the statement of principles which all members of the Commission had agreed should be immediately submitted to their governments for approval. (See my 2441, July 6, 11 p. m.²). Although our Government and the British are in agreement, today Maisky said the Soviet would not take the last sentence of paragraph 8 which reads as follows: "In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided for payment of imports approved by the governments concerned before reparation deliveries are made from current production or from stocks of goods". I stated that my own Government stands firmly on the principle that approved imports shall be a prior charge against approved exports of current production and stocks of goods and that I was sure that my Government would not recede from this position. I added that personally I felt so keenly on the subject that I would not recommend the deletion of this clause in the principles. It was left that the matter would have to be handled directly by the Big Three in their forthcoming meeting.

Repeated to Eisenhower and Clay as 14.

¹ Sent over the signature of Harriman. The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 35 of July 16 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1645).

² Document No. 367.

No. 376

740.00119 EW/7-1445

*Memorandum by the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations*¹

TOP SECRET

[Moscow,] July 14, 1945.

SUPPLEMENT TO PROGRESS REPORT
ALLIED COMMISSION ON REPARATIONS

SUMMARY

On July 3 Ambassador Pauley asked for clarification of certain reparation problems before the meeting of the heads of governments. (Appendix AA ²)

1. Relative shares of participating governments: agreement reached July 13 (Appendix A).
2. Procedures for determining minor nation claims: agreement reached and recommended to governments on July 13 (Appendix D).
3. The definition of reparation, restitution and war booty: no agreement due to Soviet unpreparedness to discuss war booty.
4. Interim reparations: no agreement, though respective proposals not far apart.
5. General principles of the Reparations Settlement: agreement reached on all principles except the status of necessary exports as a prior charge against reparations: decided to place this issue before the heads of governments.

PROGRAM ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE REPARATIONS SETTLEMENT

On July 3, 1945, Ambassador Pauley wrote to Mr. Maisky proposing that the Reparations Commission either reach an agreement on certain specified points or, failing to agree, be in a position to present the points of disagreement to the heads of the three governments during their forthcoming meeting. The following sets forth the present position on the points raised by Ambassador Pauley in his letter:

1. *To arrive at an agreement between the Big Three as to the relative shares, expressed in percentages, to which each is entitled in the form of reparation payments from Germany.* Full agreement on this point was reached at a meeting of the Steering Committee on July 12, 1945. (Appendix A ³)
2. *To agree on procedures whereby the percentages of other claimant nations may be determined.*
 - a. The British delegation presented a proposal to the Steering Committee on July 7. (Appendix B)

¹ According to part II (not printed) of the Pauley-Lubin Report (see vol. II, p. 940) this supplementary report was presented to Truman at Babelsberg on July 16. The progress report which it supplements is not printed. Concerning the other appendices mentioned in this summary, see the footnotes to the body of the report, *infra*.

² See document No. 364.

³ This appendix is identical with the body of attachment 3 to document No. 894, printed in vol. II.

b. The U. S. delegation presented a revised version of the British paper on July 11. (Appendix C)

c. A further revision was circulated by the Soviet delegation on July 13.

d. At the Steering Committee meeting on July 13, the Soviet proposal was accepted and recommended to the respective governments[.] (Appendix D ⁴)

3. *To define reparation, restitution, and war booty.*

a. Restitution.

(1) After a preliminary discussion in the Steering Committee on July 5, the British delegation presented a paper on July 7th. (Appendix E ⁵)

(2) U. S. concurrence with the British paper was communicated to the Steering Committee on July 11th.

(3) A Soviet paper, differing drastically from the British and U. S. views, was circulated on July 13th. (Appendix F)

(4) At the Steering Committee meeting on July 13, tentative revisions to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the Soviet paper were discussed, but the U. S. Representative stressed the necessity of concurrent consideration of definitions for restitution, war booty, "trophies", etc.

b. War booty.

(1) Soviets agreed on July 5 to present a paper on war booty by July 11.

(2) Soviet paper was not received and the U. S. presented a paper on July 11. (Appendix G) (Appendix S of Status Report)

(3) At the Steering Committee meeting on July 13, the Soviet Representative stated that he was not prepared to discuss the proposed U. S. definition nor any other aspect of the problem at the present time.

c. Reparation.

(1) No discussion has taken place, but U. S. staff memorandum points out certain problems involved. (Appendix H)

4. *To provide a speedy program of interim reparations to all countries entitled thereto.*

a. Tentative U. S. proposal circulated on July 7th and presented to Steering Committee in amplified form on July 9th[.] (Appendix I)

⁴ This appendix is identical with attachment 4 to document No. 894, printed in vol. II, except for minor editorial differences and except that it does not bear the heading "Agreed in the Allied Commission on Reparations".

⁵ This appendix is identical with document No. 906, printed in vol. II, except that the passages italicized in that document were not emphasized in appendix E.

b. Tentative British and Soviet points of view were expressed at Steering Committee meeting on July 10th.

c. At the Steering Committee meeting on July 13, this matter was only touched on, with the UK Representative indicating unwillingness to agree to an interim program until the main issues of a permanent settlement are agreed.

5. *To agree on general principles to govern the reparations settlement and its future administration.*

a. U. S. proposed formal adoption of general principles at first Steering Committee meeting on June 22nd. (Appendix J)

b. After prolonged discussion at several meetings of the Steering Committee, an agreement was reached on July 6th, subject to approval of the participating governments[.] (Appendix K ⁶)

c. U. S. and British governments accepted the principles as agreed.

d. At a Steering Committee meeting on July 12th, the Soviet delegation announced its reservation with respect to the last sentence of principle 8 which provides for payment for necessary imports into Germany as a prior charge before reparation exports.

e. On July 13th, Ambassador Pauley communicated with Mr. Maisky, explaining his position with respect to necessary German imports. (Appendix L)

f. At the Steering Committee meeting on July 13th, final agreement was reached on the language of Principle 6. An impasse was reached on the last sentence of Principle 8 and it was agreed to present the issue to the heads of governments.

[Appendix B]

SECRET

[Moscow,] July 9, 1945.

BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR DETERMINING SHARE OF MINOR CLAIMANTS

1. The Allied Commission on Reparations will send a communication as soon as possible through the Governments of the UK, USA and USSR inviting all the United Nations that have been at war with Germany to submit within one month to the Allied Commission on Reparations through their Diplomatic Representative in Moscow, or otherwise, statements showing data for establishing their reparation claims against Germany and the value of German pre-war assets in their territory.

2. The data for establishing reparation claims should be laid down by the Commission and should in the first instance be few and simple; for example,

⁶ For the eight principles agreed upon, see document No. 367.

- (i) shipping losses in gross tons and 1938 replacement value.
- (ii) destruction and partial destruction of private residences, factories and other buildings, plant and equipment, in number and 1938 replacement value. Damage to forests and agricultural land. Any other physical damage and losses in terms of 1938 replacement value.
- (iii) man-years served in armed forces including full-time Resistance Movements.
- (iv) fatal casualties in armed forces while carrying on war against Germany.
- (v) any other simple basic statistical data which the claimant government desires to put forward for consideration. NOTE In all cases the data should exclude those relating to the war against Japan.

3. The Allied Commission on Reparations would decide as a basis for discussion on a provisional list of countries entitled to receive reparation and on the percentages to be allotted to each.

4. The United Nations whose claims to receive reparations were approved would be approached individually and informally through diplomatic channels in an attempt to persuade them to accept as fair the percentage provisionally suggested for each of them.

5. The Allied Commission on Reparations would then through the Governments of the UK, USA, and USSR address a further communication to these United Nations inviting them to take part in a discussion in order to reach agreement on reparation percentages. This discussion might take the form of

- (i) these Nations becoming associated with the Allied Commission on Reparation in its final stage or
- (ii) the creation of a semi-permanent inter-Allied Commission for executing the Reparation Plan of which all the United Nations entitled to reparation would be members, the semi-permanent Commission being empowered to reach agreement on reparation percentages and
- (iii) a separate *ad hoc* Conference of Ministers.

6. At the same time a further communication would be sent through the same channel to the United Nations whose claims to receive reparation were not approved, informing them that their claims had been examined but that it was considered that

- (a) they were not entitled to receive reparation because their losses and war effort had been too small in comparison with the losses and war efforts of others, or
- (b) that their share of reparation would be covered by the German assets in their territories or a portion of those assets so that they were not entitled to share in other deliveries, or
- (c) such other explanation as might be appropriate.

SECRET

[Appendix C]

U. S. PROPOSALS FOR DETERMINING SHARES OF MINOR CLAIMANTS

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—Paragraphs 1, 5, and 6 of this proposal, except for minor editorial differences, are identical with paragraphs 1, 5, and 6 of appendix B, *supra*. The new or amended language proposed for paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 is as follows:]

2. The form and content of data submitted by each nation for establishing its claims should be determined so as to reflect its war burdens, its war losses, and its contributions toward organizing the victory. For the sake of uniformity, losses should be stated in physical units, as far as possible, and in 1938 replacement values. Indices of burdens and contributions toward the victory might for example include, without excluding other elements, such items as budgetary expenses, man-years in fighting forces, man-years in war production for use against Germany, and any other simple basic statistical data which a nation desires to put forward for consideration.

In all cases the data should relate to the war against the European Axis Powers and exclude those relating to the war against Japan.

3. *On the basis of the material submitted*, the Allied Commission on Reparations would *prepare* ~~decide as a basis for discussion on~~ a provisional list of countries entitled to receive reparation and ~~on the~~ *for purposes of discussion*, tentative percentages to be allotted to each.

4. The United Nations whose claims to receive reparations were *thus* ~~approved~~ *set forth* would be approached individually and informally through diplomatic channels in an attempt to persuade them to accept as fair the percentage provisionally suggested for each of them.

Moscow, 8th July 1945.

Revised: 11th July 1945.

[Appendix F—Translation]

RESTITUTION AND REPLACEMENT

1. Restitution covers all property which can be identified as having existed at the moment of enemy occupation of the territory from which this property was removed, as well as property which came into existence on the said territory during the period of enemy occupation if this can be established and irrespective of the manner in which it fell into the hands of the enemy.

2. As regards property which was destroyed by the enemy or utilized or lost value as a result of enemy action, the right is retained to replace it by similar or comparable property. This applies to

objects of unique character such as works of art, historical objects, libraries, unique installation, etc.

3. The injured country retains the right to make claims to restitution in respect of property removed by the enemy which is found in any third country.

4. It is moreover agreed that all questions of restitution will be dealt with on behalf of the injured property owners by the country of which they are citizens.

[Appendix G]

SECRET

U. S. STAFF PROPOSAL ON DEFINITION OF WAR BOOTY

War booty shall consist of all finished war material, but shall not include equipment used to produce war material. What constitutes war material shall be defined by Military representatives of the three powers represented on the Allied Commission on Reparations.

[Appendix H]

Mr. Abram Bergson, of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations, to the Chief of Staff of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Parten)

SECRET

[Moscow,] July 13, 1945.

Subject: The Territorial Question in the Reparations Settlement.

The Reparations Settlement necessarily will have to be worked out and administered on the basis of a definition of the territory of Germany to be subject to reparations. Not only is it necessary that the territory subject to reparations be defined in advance, but it is of the utmost importance that this territory correspond as nearly as possible to the area that will be left to Germany when her boundaries are finally determined, and thus that probable territorial cessions be at least tentatively agreed upon so that they can be taken [into account?] and, from the outset, in its administration.

The reasons for this are as follows:

(a) Any calculation either of a total reparations bill in money terms or of the amounts of goods to be paid in physical quantities necessarily will have to refer to a specified territory. But territorial changes made after the Reparations Settlement was reached might cause such dislocations in the German economy as to necessitate a complete recalculation of Germany's capacity to pay. No general formula could be found that would define in advance the effects on Germany's capacity to pay of all major territorial changes that are possible.

[No. 376]

(b) The nature of the policies which must be adopted for economic disarmament purposes depends on the extent and character of disarmament that is accomplished by way of territorial dismemberment.

(c) It is contemplated that interim reparations will go into effect as soon as possible. For the purposes of the administration of such reparations, it is essential that the territories from which plant and equipment are to be removed, and recurring reparations drawn, must be known in advance. To carry out removals from territories that ultimately would be transferred to United Nations obviously might be unwise, and in the case of the territories claimed by Poland might, in any event, be administratively impracticable.

(d) Ultimately, and for the same reasons, the work of the Reparations Agency would be severely handicapped, if not made impossible, if the territories subject to reparations had not been determined in advance with some finality.

(e) The likely territorial cessions in certain instances might alone yield to a reparations claimant more than its total reparations share. In these cases, it probably would be desirable to assure from the outset that this claimant did not receive any payments in the form of capital and recurring reparations from other sources.

[Appendix I]

SECRET

[Moscow,] July 13, 1945.⁷

TENTATIVE DRAFT ON INTERIM DELIVERIES AND REMOVALS—FOR
DISCUSSION

1. An orderly flow of deliveries and removals from Germany should begin at the earliest possible date to achieve the earliest possible relief of devastated areas in the United Nations. Deliveries and removals shall be made in accordance with the principles and policies already agreed upon by the Allied Commission of [on] Reparations.

2. Pending the establishment of a permanent allied reparations agency, interim deliveries and removals should be based upon the urgency of need for rehabilitation purposes and should not be designated initially as reparation, restitution (British question) or for purchase of the recipient nations. (Soviet question?)

3. With respect to interim deliveries and removals of capital goods to all United Nations, the following procedure should be adopted:

a. Immediate establishment of a sub-commission of the Allied Commission on Reparations to be situated in Berlin and to be composed of representatives of the nations participating in the Allied Commission on Reparations. This sub-commission should keep in constant consultation with the Control Council and should keep the Control Council informed of its activities.

b. The Allied Commission on Reparations will transmit to its sub-commission a list of industries from which interim deliveries and removals of equipment will be allowed.

⁷ The appendix is so dated, but cf. *ante*, p. 539.

c. Interim deliveries and removals of capital equipment from those industries up to an agreed limit of the movable assets, expressed in physical terms, may be made upon the approval or recommendations of the sub-commission. Shipping documents covering such interim deliveries and removals shall include notification to the receiving country that in the final accounting such deliveries and removals may be deemed by the Allied Commission on Reparations to be on account of reparations or restitution.

d. Each of the occupying powers may remove or permit to be removed from its zone of occupation plant and equipment from any industry in such list, subject to the following conditions:

(1) With respect to any removal by an occupying power for its own account the respective zone commander shall notify the sub-commission of the contemplated removal. If the sub-commission recommends that such removal shall not be made, it shall so notify the Allied Commission on Reparations which shall make such representations to the governments as it deems appropriate. Pending the decision of the governments, the contemplated removal shall be suspended.

(2) With respect to any removal from the zone of one occupying power for the account of another United Nation (whether or not such United Nation be an occupying power) such removal shall be permitted upon the approval or recommendation of the sub-commission.

4. With respect to interim deliveries and removals to all United Nations of raw materials out of current production or stocks of goods and manufactured goods out of stocks, such deliveries and removals may be made upon the approval or recommendation of the sub-commission on the basis of the need of the claimants after due regard to the supplies available and the requirements of the occupation forces. Shipping documents covering such interim deliveries and removals shall include notification to the receiving country that in the final accounting such deliveries and removals may be deemed by the Allied Commission on Reparations to be on (1) export account to be paid for in acceptable currencies, (2) reparation, or (3) restitution. (Soviet question on last clause; British question on "restitution").

5. Adequate and uniform accounting controls shall be instituted with respect to all deliveries and removals affected under the above proposed procedures.

6. The governments concerned should be notified of the establishment of the foregoing procedures for effecting urgently needed interim deliveries and removals.

7. As a condition precedent to the movement of any interim deliveries or removals, it shall be mutually agreed that each of the occupying powers shall submit, within six weeks of the date hereof, a statement of all property removed from Germany since its invasion.

[No. 376]

(Questioned by Soviet; British and U. S. position believe it an important point but willing to discuss under "war booty".)

[Appendix J]

SECRET

GENERAL PRINCIPLES SUBMITTED BY U. S. DELEGATION

1. THAT, removals of property for reparations shall be such as to assist in bringing to an end the war-making power of Germany by eliminating that part of Germany's industrial capacity which remains as a direct war potential.

2. THAT, reparations shall be such as will speed recovery and reconstruction in countries devastated at German hands and, at the same time, impose the economic penalty uniformly and fairly upon the German people as a whole.

3. THAT, any plan of reparations shall be avoided which results in placing on any other nations the burden of financing German reparations or reconstruction, or which might render other nations dependent on the German economy.

4. THAT, to a maximum extent reparations shall be taken from the existing national wealth of Germany such as machines, equipment, plants, products, and foreign investments, and while for convenience, claims against these assets may be stated in terms of money value, care must be exercised not to confuse real values with those monetary values which proved so illusory when considered as reparations after the last war.

5. THAT, in order to avoid building up German economic capacity, long run payment of reparations in the form of manufactured products shall be restricted to a minimum.

6. THAT, enough must be left, after the payment of reparations, to enable the German people to subsist without sustained outside relief and no reparations plan shall become operative so long as support for the German people from outside their own country continues necessary.

7. THAT, living standards in Germany must be kept from rising above those of neighboring countries.

8. THAT, reparations shall be fairly distributed among the nations entitled thereto based upon damages sustained at the hands of the enemy and contributions made toward the defeat of that enemy—contributions in blood, work, treasure, and irreplaceable natural resources.

[Appendix L]

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)
to the Chairman of the Allied Commission on Reparations (Maisky)*

[Moscow,] July 13, 1945.

DEAR MR. MAISKY, I want to make my position perfectly clear with regard to the charges against German exports which we discussed yesterday.

Surely we both understand there can be no current annual reparations from Germany except as more goods are shipped out of Germany than are shipped in, that is, there must be a large export balance. An export balance cannot be produced in Germany without some imports, such as food, alloys, cotton, etc. If these indispensable imports (without which there would be no exports of certain highly important types) are not a charge against the exports, then you, or we or some other economy will have to pay for the imports. Neither the USSR, nor the USA can think of recommending to its people a reparations plan which overlooks this elemental fact.

Mathematically it may be stated as follows: Current *Reparations* equal German current *Production* less the sum of *Occupation* costs, minimum essential German *Consumption* and *Imports* required to achieve the production permitted by the Allies. In symbols this reads:

$$R = P - (O + C + I)$$

You say that the Russian people are more interested in "R" in this formula than in anything else. My people, remembering the last reparations settlement, when the final element of this formula was overlooked, insist that we do not forget the "I", the imports. But we do so in order that the "R" will be true net reparations, and not fictitious reparations which come out of your pockets or ours. When we say that essential imports are a prior charge on exports, this is not because we think that imports are more important than reparations. Quite the contrary. All we are saying is that you must feed the cow to get the milk. The food is a "prior" charge, it comes first in time, but it is not more important.

Without carrying this simile too far could we say that you want a plan which will give lots of milk. We both expect that the cow will lose both horns and will get mighty thin. We want to be sure that the small amount of fodder required will be paid for with some of the milk. Last time we put up the fodder.

If you can think of any way of making this clear in economic language which says just this and will be more acceptable to your people

than the words of principle 8,⁸ I shall be more than happy to agree, as I know that we are pursuing the same objectives.

Sincerely yours,

EDWIN W. PAULEY

⁸ See document No. 367.

No. 377

740.00119 EW/7-1445

*United States Delegation Working Paper*¹

[Undated.]

(DRAFT OF PROPOSED LETTER BY THE PRESIDENT TO GENERALISSIMO STALIN AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL)

My personal representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations, Ambassador Pauley, has reported the progress made by that commission. He states that two important accomplishments have been made,—namely, that the members of the Commission are agreed:

(1) Upon a 56, 22 and 22 percentage allocation between the USSR, UK and USA, respectively, of whatever amount of reparations may be available to these nations. To meet the validated claims for reparations on the part of other nations, as determined by the mutual agreement of the three powers, each of the three powers will give up from their share in the ratio that each share bears to the total.²

(2) Upon a procedure for settling the division of reparations between countries other than the UK, USA, and USSR, which procedure neither pre-judges the claims of any nation nor attempts to award any fixed percentage of reparations even to any of those represented on the Allied Commission on Reparations.³

I am sure that these two important points of agreement will have your whole-hearted approval as they have mine. Copies of the texts of these points of agreement are attached.⁴

Ambassador Pauley has reported further progress by the Allied Commission on Reparations in reaching almost complete agreement on a series of eight important principles upon which the entire reparations program should be based. These principles I find soundly conceived and evidence a broad understanding on the part of the three great powers in their proposed treatment of the internal economic problems of Germany. Agreement has not yet been reached

¹ This appears to be a paper prepared by Pauley's staff at Moscow for use in opening the negotiations at the Conference with respect to reparations. Truman, however, used for this purpose document No. 894, printed in vol. II. Cf. document No. 214.

² Cf. attachment 3 to document No. 894.

³ Cf. attachment 4 to document No. 894.

⁴ No papers found attached to this draft.

on the last clause in the last sentence of the final principle. I quote these principles in full, underlining this one last clause which the representatives on the Commission submit to us for decision: ⁵

I feel sure you will concur in these principles including the underlined clause. The United States must insist that such necessary imports as are approved by our governments shall constitute a first charge against exports from Germany of current production and stocks of goods. To do otherwise, will lead either to a repetition of our mistakes at the end of the last war, or leave us unable to bring about the desired industrial disarmament of Germany.

I am also informed that the commission has discussed war booty and restitution as related to reparations. No common definition of terms has been set down. No definitive plan of reparations can be drawn properly, and no program can be administered uniformly and effectively unless the subject matter of that plan is clearly and definitely agreed upon by our three governments.

The United States proposes that:

1) Restitution shall be confined to identifiable artistic, religious and cultural objects existing at the date of the invasion of the territories from which such objects have been removed, insofar as such objects can be recovered and irrespective of the form of dispossession by which they came into enemy hands. While any nation entitled to reparation may be allowed a prior claim for the return of certain other particular types of identifiable property removed by the enemy, the value of such property, if returned, shall be entered on the reparations account of such nation.

2) *War booty* shall be limited to finished equipment and supplies produced for and belonging to the German armed forces exclusive of any facilities used to produce such equipment or supplies.

3) Except for transfers of property ⁶ as restitution, war booty or exports to pay for approved imports, all transfers from ⁷ territory within the boundaries of the German Reich as it existed on December 31, 1937, should be deemed ⁸ *reparations*.⁹

⁵ For the text of the eight principles here omitted, see document No. 367.

⁶ The words "transfers of property" have been changed by hand to "property transferred".

⁷ The words "transfers from" have been changed by hand to "property in the".

⁸ The words "should be deemed" have been changed by hand to "shall be subject to".

⁹ Cf. the following undated working paper in the Pauley Files, headed "Relation of Reparation Deliveries and Other Property Removals":

"All property removed from Germany by any United Nation shall be considered as reparations, unless it falls within one of the following categories:

"(1) Exports payable in currencies acceptable to the Allied Commission on Reparations;

"(2) War booty; and

"(3) Restitutions."

I am confident that you will appreciate the need for resolving these important questions immediately. Otherwise, it will be impossible to implement the reparations program so essential for the removal of German war potential and the reconstruction of the liberated countries of Europe which have suffered so much from German aggression. It is for these reasons that I am presenting our proposed definite answers to these questions for your concurrence at our coming conference.

No. 378

740.00119 EW/7-1445

*United States Delegation Working Paper*¹

[BABELSBERG,] July 14, 1945.

NOTES ON REPARATION

I. *Scope of Reparation:*

Before considering the question of division of reparation among the various claimants, agreement should be sought, in as precise terms as possible, on the scope of reparation in relation to other forms of compensation by Germany.

a. War Booty—

War Booty should be defined narrowly, preferably to include only equipment and supplies belonging to the German armed forces.

b. Labor Services—

The net value of labor services rendered by Germans outside Germany (i. e., the portion of the workers' wages, allowances and maintenances provided by Germany or paid in marks) should be credited to reparation account.

c. Restitution—

In the determination of reparation claims, account should be taken not only of property destroyed but also of property removed by Germany from Allied countries, and reparation should be regarded as compensation for both destruction and removal of property. Consequently, the value of property found in Germany and restored to its place of origin in an Allied country should be credited to reparation account. Works of art, however, should be an exception to this rule. The looting of art treasures should not be taken into account in fixing reparation claims, and the return of such property should not count towards meeting Germany's reparation liabilities.

In subsuming restitution under reparation for accounting purposes, there should be no abandonment of the general rule that property removed to Germany from Allied countries should be returned to the government having jurisdiction over the territory from which the property was taken. Thus, French railroad rolling stock found in

¹ Authorship not indicated. This paper was used in the Pauley-Monckton meeting of July 15. See document No. 380.

Germany would be returned to France and its value credited as reparation by Germany. The attempt to identify and return all Allied property in Germany to its country of origin could lead to absurd results if pressed to the limit. For example, manufacturers in German-occupied countries have produced components for motor vehicles. Their physical return would require the disassembly of completed vehicles. It is safe to assume that demands for the return of this type of property will not be pressed, particularly if restitution is assumed [*subsumed?*] under reparation so that the countries in question can obtain something else instead.

d. Gold—

We have repeatedly stated our position that monetary gold found in Germany is all looted and should be returned. Our present position is that such gold, together with any "tainted" gold which we may induce neutral countries to surrender, should be prorated among Allied countries from which gold was looted in proportion to their total losses of gold from this source. This is an adaptation of the admiralty principle of general average. Gold returned to Allied countries on the above basis would be credited to reparation.

e. Territorial Cessions—

Property acquired from German owners by a country to which German territory is ceded should be counted as reparation. Where German minorities are expropriated and expelled, but where no cession of territory is involved, a logically strong case can be made for counting such property transferred as reparation also, but it may be politically unwise to press this case.

II. *Apportionment of Reparation:*

Mr. Pauley has recommended that the Big Three should decide the apportionment among themselves of the aggregate share of total reparation going to them collectively, but should not attempt to determine, in advance of consultation with the other Allies, the division of reparation between the Big Three on one hand and the other claimants on the other. This principle seems entirely sound, except that it would be far better if "Big Three" could be replaced by "Big Four". This matter of French participation in the initial formulation of a reparation plan is one on which the Russian view has prevailed so far. With four power occupation of Germany, three power handling of reparation is [*has?*] raised and is going to raise innumerable difficulties. This issue ought to be brought up again at the present conference.

III. *Share of the United States in Total Reparation:*

Mr. Pauley is of the view that the United States should assert as large a claim to reparation as possible and that we should seek payment in German gold and external assets. The Department's view has been that we should not seek to obtain the German gold, and, in general, that we should seek an adequate share of total reparation for the European countries which fell under German occupation rather than

for ourselves. The reparation program should contribute to the economic restoration of these countries. We also believe that, provided the scope of reparation is properly defined, along the general lines indicated above, 50% of total reparation is not an excessive share for the Soviet Union. With, say 50% for Russia and 30 or 35% for other continental European Allies, only 15 or 20% would be left for the United States and United Kingdom.

No. 379

40.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹

[Extracts²]

SECRET

POTSDAM, July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, called this afternoon and discussed for two hours in a preliminary way a number of matters on the agenda of the Conference.³

6. *Reparation.*

Coulson was skeptical of a policy of moving capital goods out of Germany in advance of reaching basic decisions on reparation and expressed some dissent from the proposal that substantial interim deliveries of capital goods can be made, pending decisions on reparations.

Sir Alexander agreed that we should strive for a narrow definition of "booty of war."

Sir Alexander felt that the UK and US should secure as high a percentage of reparation as possible; if, later, they did not utilize fully the shares assigned to them, they might re-allocate a part of them to other United Nations; a smaller initial allocation to them would not increase the share of the smaller United Nations.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² For other extracts from this memorandum see documents Nos. 140, 218, 234, 253, 319, 351, 404, 470, 519, 635, 645, 678, and 708.

³ For a list of persons present at this meeting, see document No. 234, footnote 3.

No. 380

740.00119 EW/7-1545

*United States Delegation Memorandum*¹

TOP SECRET

[BABELSBERG, July 15, 1945.]

MEETING WITH BRITISH REPARATION GROUP JULY 15, 1945

Present:

British: Sir Walter Monckton, Sir David Waley, Mark Turner, MacDougall, Donaldson*United States:* Pauley, Lubin, Marshall, Parten, Clayton, Collado, Despres, Murphy, Heath.

Mr. Clayton read those sections of our memorandum² on the scope of reparation dealing with war booty, labor services, restitution and territorial cessions. Mr. Pauley then reviewed his proposal³ for payments by countries receiving property from Germany in connection with territorial cessions, when such property transfers exceeded their admissible reparation claims.

The British position was somewhat as follows:

a) British agreed in principle on war booty, but felt that the matter should not be pressed because an agreed definition would be adhered to by us and would restrict us but would not restrict the Russians. Pauley strongly opposed postponement of the issue.

b) British agreed in principle on labor services, but had assumed we were disposed to leave out labor services and to agree on apportionment of reparation excluding labor, and they were therefore ready to do the same.

c) British position has been that restitution of identifiable property in existence prior to German occupation should be a matter wholly separate from reparation. They will consider our position.

d) British agreed that property transferred in connection with frontier changes should be treated as reparation, but were dubious about Pauley's proposal.

The group then discussed what reparation questions should be considered by the heads of government at the Conference.

It was agreed that the following matters should be considered:

- a)* Payment for current imports a first charge.
- b)* French participation.
- c)* Austrian reparation.

There was disagreement concerning whether the scope of reparation in relation to war booty, labor services, restitution, etc., should be considered. The British held that no agreed limitations would be enforceable as regards Russia, and in accepting limitations ourselves

¹ Authorship not indicated.

² Document No. 378.

³ Attachment to document No. 893, printed in vol. II.

we would only be tying our own hands. Mr. Pauley disagreed, and said that the negotiations would be indefinitely prolonged unless agreement was reached.

EXTERNAL ASSETS

No. 381

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

CONTROL OF GERMAN EXTERNAL ASSETS

The United States has recently approached Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union suggesting that the Allied Control Council as the government of Germany should declare that all German external assets, private as well as public, are subject to the Council's control. German official property, including corporations and other entities which were owned by the Reich, will immediately be taken over by the Missions of the occupying powers in the various neutral countries. This was prompted by an emergency situation in Spain, where there was evidence that the Spanish State might expropriate or purchase for an inadequate figure certain properties belonging to a German government corporation.

The primary purpose for assuming control over German external private assets is economic security. In most of the other American countries the influence of German spearhead firms has been removed as a result of local legislation pursuant to Resolution V of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers held at Rio de Janeiro in 1942.¹ In the European neutral countries there has been no comparable local legislation. It is believed that at this date it would be more desirable for the occupying powers to act directly on the basis of successorship to the German State for control purposes rather than to rely upon local legislation. A selective exercise of the power of control is envisaged. Spearheads of German influence and economic aggression should be completely eliminated. Where these spearhead concerns are not essential to the local economy, the elimination of German influence should be by means of complete liquidation of the concern. Where German-controlled companies are essential to the local economy, as in the case of industrial establishments employing large numbers of people, the German control must be transferred to non-German hands. In both instances, the net proceeds could be used for purchasing

¹ Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. VI, p. 124.

essential supplies for Germany under the disease and unrest formula or for the satisfaction of reparation claims.

Agreement is expected at a lower level, but it was deemed desirable to prepare this memorandum for the President in the event that difficulties should develop or that the other conferees should bring up the matter.

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

No. 382

800.515/6-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State ad interim

RESTRICTED
U. S. URGENT

LONDON, June 28, 1945—noon.

6507. 1. Emb discussed last week with MEWFO all recent telegrams from Dept, Madrid and Paris on Allied claim to ownership and control of Germany's external assets. (SAFEHAVEN)

2. MEW has now shown us draft of a telegram to Monckton in Moscow (which is being repeated to Washington) and is apparently approved by all Brit interested agencies. MEWFO's telegram is in reply to certain telegrams from Monckton which apparently indicated that Pauley had suggested either Reparations Commission or ACC make immediate claim to German external assets. Brit added that the telegram to Monckton also included views of Brit govt on all telegrams referred to in pgh 1 above. For confidential information of Dept and Missions, following are points emphasized by MEWFO in our talk and also appear, *inter alia*, in MEWFO's draft telegram:

(a) Brit disagree with Dept's 4828, June 15 to London¹ (also sent to Moscow and Paris and rptd to Ankara, Stockholm, Bern, Lisbon and Madrid). They feel since freezing and census of German non-governmental assets in neutral countries are proceeding sufficiently

¹ On June 15 the following instructions were sent to Winant and Harriman in telegrams numbered 4828 and 1316 respectively (file No. 800.515/6-1545):

"SAFEHAVEN. Series of telegrams from Iberian Peninsula indicates grave danger Spain in particular will dissipate German assets, public and private, unless there is early indication ACC will assert its exclusive power to control such assets. This has precipitated problem of creating authority for assuming such control of German external assets. In order to preserve German assets from dissipation by Spanish, it is proposed that US and UK on behalf of occupying powers make joint *démarche* to Spain pointing out to Span that ACC is expected shortly to issue decree vesting all German assets in Spain and designating as its agents for administration thereof US and UK Embs in Spain on behalf of ACC. This will it is believed forestall Span designs on non-governmental German property in Spain. It is proposed that prior to four power agreement regarding vesting order this Govt and UK should assume active management and control of German official properties in Spain including corporations and other entities owned by former German state. Such properties will be administered in trust

satisfactorily, no Allied claim to assets should be made at this time; that vesting order by ACC in near future (even if it were prepared to make such order) would create difficult legal position which might involve adverse decisions by neutral govts and neutral courts; any such claim would raise immediate counter claim by neutrals to such German assets; and such claim would inevitably diminish chances of neutrals doing their best to uncover German secreted assets. For these reasons they apparently also do not agree with proposed *démarche* of [to?] Spain and other European neutrals.

(b) Brit consider Reparations Commission is not appropriate body to claim such assets, especially since France is not represented thereon.

(c) To overcome foregoing difficulties Brit think we should await assumption of active control by ACC of Germany and then after making requisite decrees, operate through a recognized German Govt institution (such as *Reichsbank*) to claim German nongovernmental assets abroad.

(d) Since requisite Allied personnel is lacking to assume active management and control of German parastatal corporations, appointment of interventors approved by our Missions would be sufficient safeguard against dissipation of German assets. Brit do not see how control by any designated Allied body would meet requirements of active management of even such parastatal corporations, much less, ultimately, of German nongovernmental assets.

(e) Brit feel that approach to Turkey at the same time when approach is being made to neutrals is inadvisable since Turkey is not technically a neutral. They believe approach to Turkey should be deferred to a somewhat later and more appropriate time.

(f) Our govts operating through their Missions as heretofore should continue to deal with neutrals as regards German assets (for the time being at least) until situation is clearer. They feel that at this time the interposition of any specially designated body to deal with neutrals would be a mistake (this telegram sent to Dept as 6507, rptd 224 to Moscow, 409 Paris, 177 Madrid, 141 Lisbon, 200 Bern, 476 Stockholm and 63 Ankara).]

2. [3.] We pointed out that foregoing in effect meant Brit opposed any immediate change in existing procedure as regards neutrals and that their views were contrary to those expressed in the telegrams referred to in pgh 1 above. MEWFO agreed that this was the case. We

(Footnote 1—continued)

by US-UK for ACC. . . . This action must be taken on security grounds and to avoid dissipation of assets, records, etc.

"Regarding German private assets, effect of proposed *démarche* will be to warn Span that *status quo* must be maintained in anticipation of ACC action. It is proposed that other European neutrals and Turkey be informed simultaneously along similar lines.

"Moscow is instructed to inform Russians of our proposed action regarding German official properties as defined herein and to seek Soviet concurrence to proposed notes to Span and other countries regarding private properties. Soviet and France should be invited to join approaches to govts with which [they] maintain relation[s]. Missions in London and Paris should obtain agreement of govts to which accredited for participation in co-trusteeship (except in Spain where France unrepresented) over German official assets and to presentation of joint notes regarding private German properties."

emphasized that this created a situation in the nature of an impasse with resultant obvious acute difficulties.

3. [4.] Brit feel that failure to clear with them before instructing Moscow (in Dept's 4828, June 15 to London) to proceed has caused them embarrassment and "has rendered a difficult situation more difficult" [.]

WINANT

No. 383

800.515/6-2845 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1945—1 p. m.

U. S. URGENT

5499. It is hoped Brit in expressing views reported urtel 6507 June 28 rptd Paris 409 and Moscow 224,² were addressing themselves to procedural matters and not exhibiting negative attitude toward policy of extirpating spearheads of German economic penetration in European neutral countries and Turkey. Following observations regarding reftel and 3669 from Paris, rptd London 439 June 18,³ were informally made by Oliver to McCombe of Brit Emb:

1. US proposal for agreement to address notes to neutrals was suggested as holding device until ACC should be able to act. It was prompted by repeated reports from Iberian Peninsula that delay was encouraging dissipation and weakening our chances of achieving control. Presentation such notes need not immediately raise legal questions in neutral countries. On other hand, statement our position might forestall nationalizing decrees by neutrals. It was not contemplated all neutrals would be treated exactly alike or Turkey should be approached at same time. Rather, objective was to obtain general agreement among occupying powers in order that there should be available way of forestalling inconsistent neutral action should need arise.

2. McCombe was told that principal objective was economic security. Our attention should be directed primarily to extirpation of German spearheads in neutral European countries, Turkey, and perhaps other American republics which have not made satisfactory progress under replacement program. It was observed Reparation Commission, lacking attributes of sovereignty in Germany, was hardly an appropriate body for attempting to control directly German assets abroad. Apparently, Monckton's reports from Moscow regarding presentation of vesting decree purporting to take over all German external assets primarily for reparation purposes had taken London by surprise. (No such decree has been cleared by Depart-

¹ This message was repeated to the American Embassy at Moscow as telegram No. 1534.

² Document No. 382.

³ Not printed.

ment and other agencies interested in control of German external assets.)

3. Surprise was expressed at generally negative tone of Brit reaction. It was pointed out Bretton Woods Resolution VI⁴ obligates neutrals to hold German assets for Allied disposition and this portion of resolution did not relate to loot and flight capital alone. Moreover, sections 12 and 14 of EAC draft general order⁵ very clearly provide for occupying powers to assert control over German external assets. In this connection it was observed French proposal that EAC depart from its advisory role and assume interim operational function as to external assets was impractical.

4. It was recognized that personnel problems would arise. However, they might not be so serious as Brit suggest because US does not visualize problem as one of operating great variety of going business enterprises but of eliminating spearheads of German aggression. Concerns such as parastatal enterprises, insurance companies, banks, airlines, tourist agencies, motion picture companies and the like should be wound up straight away. Industrial plants important to local economy should continue in operation under local freezing controls and German controlling interests be transferred to unobjectionable persons.

5. It was agreed approach to Turkey not as urgent as to neutrals. If Russians have unilaterally approached Turks along lines suggested by US for joint action after all occupying powers had agreed, Moscow was to be instructed to voice objection. US could not admit, however, Brit contention that proposal should have been cleared with them before being suggested to other occupying powers. Such a course would inevitably have delayed action even further.

6. It was pointed out that should Brit continue to object it might become necessary to take action in American zone with respect to external assets of German corporations domiciled therein. It was stated that such procedure would be regarded as unfortunate but perhaps necessary if agreement could not be reached soon. Later, Madrid's 1439, July 3⁶ (428 to London and 354 to Paris) was used to illustrate dangers inherent in further delay and to point out keen interest of US Zone Commander in external assets of corporations domiciled in US Zone. McCombe indicated understanding and agreement with our position.

7. In view Span situation take up matter with MEWFO again along lines of foregoing.

Sent to London. Repeated to Paris as 3121, to Moscow as 1534, to Madrid as 1146, to Bern as 2244, to Stockholm as 1276 and to Ankara as 685.

BYRNES

C[ovey] T. O[liver]

⁴ *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948; Department of State publication No. 2866), vol. I, p. 939.

⁵ See the accompaniment to document No. 1038, printed in vol. II.

⁶ Not printed.

No. 384

740.00119 Potsdam/7-745

The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) and the Adviser on German Economic Affairs (Despres)

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1945.

Subject: The necessity of agreement among the occupying powers regarding the control of German external assets.

It is the policy of the United States as reflected in IPCOG 1/4 ¹ to control German external assets. It is the policy of the Department that this control be a joint one heading up to the Allied Control Council. It would be decidedly unfortunate from an economic security standpoint should control over German external assets be the exclusive province of the zone commanders in which the parent concerns or indicia of ownership have their situs. It is necessary, therefore, to press for a common policy. There are in this connection three [four] problems:

1. The problem of obtaining agreement that external assets should be controlled. All indications are that France and the Soviet Union will agree with the principle. Until recently it had been thought that the British would also. Probably as a result of unfortunate lack of coordination within this government, the British have reacted negatively to the general principle.² It is believed that this attitude can be changed by: (a) adopting a firm tone with the British in the interests of economic security, (b) pointing out that the EAC draft general directive³ clearly contemplates control of German external assets, and (c) by disabusing the British of any incorrect inferences they may have drawn from Ambassador Pauley's presentation at Moscow of an unauthorized proposal for a vesting decree. The Department's 5499 of July 6 to London⁴ attempts to do these three things. It is predicted that the British will agree to the policy already adopted by the United States on more mature reflection.

2. The problem of the interim situation in the neutral countries. Some way must be found to prevent the neutral countries from developing proprietary interest in the German external assets pending the time when the ACC can act to assume control over them. The Department's proposal is for the occupying powers to join in warning the neutrals to refrain from action inconsistent with the superior rights to be asserted by the Allied Control Council. Once there is agreement as to the general policy of seeking to control German external assets, there should be no difficulty about obtaining agreement to warn the neutrals. That the British have refused to join with us in

¹ This paper circulated the text (approved by Truman on May 11, 1945) of a "Directive to Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany". A slightly modified version of this text is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XIII, p. 596.

² See document No. 382.

³ See the accompaniment to document No. 1038 (paragraphs 12, 14), printed in vol. II.

⁴ Document No. 383.

this is attributable to the unfortunate misconceptions resulting from discussion of the unauthorized proposal for a vesting decree.

3. The problem of agreeing upon a vesting decree. This will be covered in a separate memorandum.⁵ It is clear, however, at this stage and in view of the developments regarding the British, that the terms of the decree will be drawn into any discussion of problems 1 and 2. Problems 1 and 2 should be disassociated from 3 to the extent possible. In discussing a vesting decree with the British it must be kept in mind that the British have voiced three fears regarding such a decree: (a) A fear that the decree will not be accorded full faith and credit by the neutral countries. It is obvious that a decree which purports to vest all German assets will be more difficult for Switzerland and Sweden to recognize than one confining itself to those properties ostensibly private but in reality used as part of the German war machine. Switzerland has a consistent record of refusing to recognize as to property within its borders the extra-territorial effect of foreign nationalizing and other control decrees. Moreover, principles of national self-interest will incline the Swiss to resist such legislation. To a lesser extent the same is true of Sweden. Less difficulty is anticipated in Spain and Portugal, because of the political situation, particularly in Spain. Some degree of pressure must be exercised on the neutrals. The question is whether we should not assist the neutrals to distinguish the previous decisions of their courts refusing to recognize extra-territorial decrees. (b) The fear that personnel demands impossible of fulfillment will be made. The British point out that the administration of all German external assets would be a tremendous drain upon skilled personnel. Thought should be given as to whether this fear might not be met by pointing out to the British that the primary objective is the economic security one of eliminating the German spearheads in the neutral European countries, Turkey and, perhaps, such American republics as have not made satisfactory progress under the replacement program. It may be that the ACC decree should assume jurisdiction (power of control) over all German external assets. This need not necessarily mean that all of such assets would be actually subjected to Allied managerial control. In other words, actual administration should be selective in order that the most dangerous elements receive full attention. (c) The fear that the Reparation Commission is to undertake the administration of the external assets program. The British fear in this connection seems to be based upon a belief that the Reparation Commission would not have sufficient jurisdictional status to command full faith and credit in the neutral countries. This is correct, and the United States should continue to maintain that the ACC is the appropriate body.

4. The problem of whether the ACC should have its own foreign service. The United States should take the position that the administrative work regarding the control of German external assets should

⁵ Not printed. For the draft vesting decree transmitted to Clay on August 1, see the attachment to document No. 1003, printed in vol. II.

be done abroad by the regular missions of the occupying powers. To the extent that those powers are not represented in all countries, the missions of those powers which are represented should act for the whole.

C[OVEY] T. O[LIVER]

No. 385

840.6363/7-1245 : Telegram

The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

BUCHAREST, July 12, 1945—1 p. m.

US URGENT

465. In connection with negotiations relative creation Soviet-Rumanian petroleum company (reference my telegram 456 of July 8 ¹) I have just received from a reliable source copy of letter dated July 3 addressed to Prime Minister Groza by General Susaikov as Deputy President of AIC [ACC] which in English translation reads as follows:

“This is to bring to your knowledge that the shares of the Rumanian petroleum societies which belonged to the Germans, enumerated in the annexed table, pass into the patrimony of the Soviet Union as partial compensation for damages caused to USSR by Germany.

“In view of this please take the necessary measures on behalf of Rumanian Govt to turn over the rights to the above mentioned shares to Government of the USSR which has charged the association ‘UCR Petrol’ to take over these shares”.

Following is annexed list of companies followed by the value of shares: Buna Speranta—14,900,000; Explora—59,100,000; IRDP—115,500,000; Columbia—325,000,000; Concordia—755,800,000; Meotica Romana—21,300,000; Petrol Block—285,500,000; SARDEP—43,300,000; SARPetrol—3,490,000; [T]ranspetrol—4,500,000; Continental—100,000,000;.]

It was previously reported that during discussions Cruticov informed Tatarescu it has been agreed upon at Yalta that USSR should have undisputed disposition over shares of all German interests in Rumanian petroleum companies including “Concordia and Columbia” but, it will be noted, no mention is made of this in Susaikov’s letter.

It is believed Department will desire repeat text this telegram to Moscow.

MELBOURNE

¹ Not printed.

DISPOSITION OF THE GERMAN NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE

No. 386

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Elsey)*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

DISPOSITION OF GERMAN SHIPS

On 23 May 1945, Stalin cabled to President Truman² and Prime Minister Churchill that not a single German naval or merchant vessel had surrendered to Soviet forces. The question naturally arose, said Stalin, as to how the Soviet Union would obtain possession of one-third of the German ships which "rightfully and justly" should be allotted to it. He also said that he considered it necessary for the Red Navy to have the opportunity of examining all documents on the surrender and the current state of German ships.

Churchill replied to Stalin on 27 May that "These matters should form part of the general discussion which ought to take place between us."³

Before the President had answered Stalin, however, Mr. Hopkins reported a discussion he had had with Stalin.⁴ On 28 May, he cabled:

"Two nights ago Stalin indicated that the Soviet Government had a number of questions which were annoying them concerning recent actions of the United States Government. I asked him last night if he would tell me frankly what they were. Stalin said the Soviet Government felt that the attitude of the United States seemed to

¹ Submitted to Leahy July 1 and subsequently forwarded to Truman.

² Following is the English translation of Stalin's message transmitted to Truman by the Soviet Embassy, Washington, on May 23 (Truman Papers):

"Personal and secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to President H. S. Truman.

"According to data of the Soviet Military and Naval Command, Germany, on the basis of the capitulation act [*instrument of surrender*], has surrendered all her naval and merchant vessels to the British and the Americans. I have to inform you that the Germans have refused to surrender to the Russians even a single naval or merchant vessel having directed their entire fleet for [*to?*] surrender to the Anglo-American armed forces.

"Under such circumstances, naturally, [there] arises the question that the Soviet Union be allotted its share of military and merchant vessels of Germany as it was done, in due time, in respect to Italy. The Soviet Government considers that it can rightfully and justly count on the minimum of one third of the naval and merchant vessels of Germany. I consider it also necessary that the representatives of the Naval forces of the USSR be provided with the opportunity to acquaint themselves with all documents on the surrender of naval and merchant vessels of Germany and also with the virtual [*present?*] state of the surrendered fleet.

"On its part, the Soviet Naval Command appoints for this purpose Admiral Levchenko with a group of assistants.

"I am sending a similar message to Prime-Minister Churchill."

³ See document No. 141.

⁴ For a memorandum of the discussion referred to, see document No. 25.

promptly cool towards the Soviet Union once it became clear that Germany was defeated."

One example Stalin cited in support of his criticism of the United States was the failure of the Soviet Union to receive any indication from the British and American Governments that it would receive at least one-third of the German Navy and merchant fleet.

Mr. Hopkins assured Stalin that there was no intention on the part of the U. S. Government to withhold from the Soviet Union its just share of surrendered German equipment and material.

The President added his assurance to that of Mr. Hopkins on the 29th.⁵ He thanked Stalin for his message of the 23rd and said that he was sure a fully acceptable solution could be reached at the Berlin Conference. "Regarding the available records of the German naval surrender," he concluded, "it is my understanding that examination of German files is now being considered by our appropriate commanders in the areas concerned."

The next day Mr. Hopkins reported to the President that Stalin had appointed Admiral Levchenko to a Four Power Naval Commission to consider the disposition of the German fleet.

There has been no reference to captured and surrendered German shipping since 30 May in the President's messages in the Map Room.

It may be noted that neither the President nor the Prime Minister has yet indicated to Stalin that the Soviet Union will receive "at least one-third" of German shipping for which Stalin has asked.

G. M. ELSEY

⁵ See document No. 143.

No. 387

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

GERMAN SHIPPING AND SHIPBUILDING

SUMMARY

Questions relating to the treatment of German shipping and shipbuilding need to be considered from two aspects:

- (a) The immediate disposition of German resources for utilization in the United Nations war and rehabilitation program;
- (b) Long-range policies involving the future of German shipping and shipbuilding.

Both aspects need to be considered in relation to each other, so that decision and action in one phase may avoid so far as possible prejudicing decision and action in the other.

In general, Soviet accession to the United Maritime Authority (UMA), or at least a benevolent and cooperative Soviet attitude toward that Authority would be a major step toward the satisfactory handling of problems relating to German shipping and shipbuilding. This is discussed in a separate memorandum.¹ In addition, it is desirable that Soviet policy and procedure be brought into line with principles agreed between the United States and British Governments relative to the handling of recaptured, captured, and surrendered German vessels; agreement needs to be reached regarding the immediate disposition of German shipbuilding and ship repair resources; and the development of reparations and economic disarmament policies calls for agreement on long-range policies toward German shipping and shipbuilding.

[GERMAN SHIPPING AND SHIPBUILDING]

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Complete and precise facts regarding the condition of German shipping and shipbuilding at the time of surrender have not yet become available. Presumably amplified information will be available in Berlin. It appears however:

(a) That a substantial volume of merchant shipping has come into Allied possession in the course of events leading up to and including the German surrender. Much of this tonnage is doubtless in a condition requiring substantial repair or reconditioning. It includes a large variety of vessels, from small coasting cargo vessels up to large passenger liners. The greater number of these vessels have evidently fallen into American or British hands; of these, the military authorities retain what they require to fulfill their responsibilities, and all other sea-going tonnage acquired is turned over to the Anglo-American Combined Shipping Adjustment Boards (CSAB) acting on behalf of UMA, for temporary disposition and immediate utilization in United Nations Service. Little if any information has become available as to Soviet acquisitions, either as to their number or character, or as to their disposition.

The interest of the United States is primarily in the acquisition of the larger passenger-carrying vessels for use as troop carriers and possibly hospital ships. United States Army and War Shipping Administration representatives have been dealing with British representatives in connection with the disposition of the vessels acquired.

(b) That much of the German shipbuilding and ship repair capacity has been damaged, but not so completely that a substantial part of it could not be put into condition for utilization without great delay, provided required materials and supplies are made available,

¹ See documents Nos. 524 and 525.

if decision to utilize these resources should be reached. The principal resources are in British-occupied territory, but substantial facilities are located in the Soviet-occupied area.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

1. Immediate Objective. The essential immediate objective is to make the vessels and other useful shipping industry resources acquired from Germany available to the fullest possible extent, in a fair and orderly manner, to serve the current requirements of the United Nations and other friendly countries. Consideration may here be confined to questions of principle: details involved in the implementation of policy decisions reached may satisfactorily be left to the authorities concerned with shipping operations to work out. As between the United States and British Governments satisfactory progress and results are generally achieved through established procedures and channels; the salient problem is to achieve Soviet concurrence in policies already established and a satisfactory basis for Soviet collaboration (a) in reaching further policy decisions of tripartite importance, and (b) in the implementation of decisions of significance to all three Governments. In this respect the essential problem is similar to that involved in Soviet relationship to UMA, discussed in a separate memorandum; Soviet decision to join UMA would be a major step forward in handling all these problems.

With reference to vessels previously under enemy control which have now come under United Nations control:

(a) The United States and British Governments have reached agreement on principles to be followed in the handling of *recaptured* vessels, which were of United Nations' ownership prior to their capture. These are to be returned to the United Nations' Government under whose flag they were registered, but are to be immediately available for operation for United Nations purposes through UMA. It would be desirable to reach similar agreement with the Soviet authorities.

(b) Similarly, agreement in principle with respect to *captured* and *surrendered* vessels is most desirable. These have mostly come into the possession of the United States or the British, but the Soviet authorities have some, and since the surrendered ships have technically been surrendered to all these governments, it is most desirable that there be tripartite agreement as to their use, to facilitate their immediate utilization for United Nations purposes through UMA, without prejudice to and pending determination of their ultimate disposition.

(c) The Allied Control Commission in Berlin is of course concerned in the disposition of vessels surrendered by Germany, but it is the general consensus of United States and British authorities that the Commission be guided by the purposes and objectives of the above-mentioned agreements including the agreement establish-

ing UMA,² and Soviet concurrence in this is most desirable. The military authorities participating in the Control Commission will presumably retain within their own control such inland and coasting or short sea watercraft as they find necessary for the conduct of operations which are their responsibility as occupational forces, and it is to be assumed that the requirements of tripartite understanding and collaboration in this respect will be effected through the Allied Control Commission itself. It is with respect to sea-going vessels not required to meet the essential inland and local responsibility of the occupying military forces that tripartite understanding and agreement as to policies and as to the continuing handling of problems of tripartite interest is essential.

(d) Somewhat similar considerations may arise in connection with the possible utilization of ship repair and ship building resources of the surrendered enemy. It may be found essential and desirable to make some temporary utilization of these resources for current requirements but in general such utilization should be confined to the minimum for the sake of the longer range considerations relating to reparations and economic disarmament discussed below.

2. Longer Range Objectives: With respect to all of these matters, there are longer range aspects of less immediately pressing character, which fall outside the present purpose. They involve questions of reparations policy, economic and industrial disarmament of the enemy, and long-range commercial and international policy including national shipping policies, and international shipping relations which it is desirable to avoid freezing too quickly before the long-range situation clarifies. In deferring or dealing with these aspects, however, it is most desirable that the more deliberate handling of the longer range questions should not be complicated by, nor in turn complicate the most effective disposition of the resources available for the immediate purposes of the United Nations.

There is enclosed a memorandum on German Ships and Shipbuilding as Reparations Items prepared for the use of the American representatives on the Reparations Commission, in which the essential considerations of a longer range character are set forth from the American point of view. The statements of fact set forth in the first section of this enclosure are of course subject to correction and amplification on the basis of additional information available to the occupying forces following the surrender of Germany, but their general character is believed to be correct or at least not to involve any change in the policy considerations set forth which may be summarized as follows:

(a) The basic principle should be the avoidance of action which would contribute to or stimulate the resumption of German sea-going shipping or shipbuilding. In view of the importance of merchant shipping and shipbuilding in the conduct of oversea military operations, these industries are clearly involved in the problem of economic

² Signed at London, August 5, 1944 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1722; 61 Stat. (4) 3784).

disarmament. In so far as disarmament and reparations considerations clash, the former should take precedence, so far as possible.

(b) All efforts on the part of our Allies to employ German yards for the construction of new merchant vessels on reparations account should therefore be resisted. In this connection, the possibilities of sale of surplus vessels from our war-time construction program, at low prices for the reestablishment of Allied merchant fleets may provide a useful consideration.

(c) The repair and reconditioning of damaged German merchant vessels should be limited to those required for immediate use and to those of types which war-time (and early post-war) construction will not have supplied in numbers adequate to meet early post-war requirements. The extensive repair and reconditioning of German ships which are comparable to our war-built ships of which we will have a surplus, should be avoided so far as possible consistent with essential immediate requirements, in order to avoid augmenting the problem of post-war surplus of these types of vessels.

(d) The United States should participate actively in the distribution of German merchant vessels on reparations account, on the basis of equitable principles taking into account war losses of allied nations and their post-war requirements. Such participation should include the assertion of claims to a fair share in the ultimate disposition of German merchant shipping acquired as a result of the defeat of Germany.

(e) The assertion of such claims is motivated primarily by general considerations, including:

- (1) the interest of the Government of the United States as the World's largest shipowner, in achieving the most rational possible readjustment of world shipping to peace-time requirements, and
- (2) the United States Government's concurrent interest on security grounds involving the limitation of German war potential, in the restriction of German participation in post-war ocean shipping.

The purpose of maintaining the position of the United States as a claimant is essentially to preserve any means of exercising influence toward the effective and judicious settlement of these issues.

(f) In addition, but as a relatively secondary consideration, the United States is likely to be interested in the ultimate disposal of a few German ships of special types in deficient supply for post-war needs. This is likely to be true chiefly with respect to passenger ships useful for the prompt reestablishment of overseas passenger services, for a temporary period pending the restoration of the American passenger fleet with modern and efficient ships constructed in American yards. In asserting claims on this account, however, it will be necessary to exercise care to avoid:

- (1) loading down the American merchant marine with obsolescent white elephants;
- (2) confusing immediate short-run objectives (troop transport and hospital ship requirements) with long-range post-war objectives: any grounds for suspicion that the latter are being advanced under cloak of the former will immediately complicate

the handling of immediate requirements by introducing considerations relating to the parallel long-range interests of Great Britain, the Netherlands, France and possibly other Allied countries in post-war competition in ocean passenger services.

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1945.

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

GERMAN SHIPS AND SHIPBUILDING AS REPARATIONS ITEMS

I. Presently available information indicates that there are now in German possession around 700 or 800 sea-going merchant ships (this refers to coasting and deep-sea craft of 1,000 gross tons and over, but excludes inland waterway craft, barges, tugs, lighters and other harbor craft). About 400 to 500 of these will be ships of pre-war German ownership, or ships built for German account during the war (of which there is record of some 75). The remainder, 300 or more, are ships acquired by Germany from other flags during the war. It is anticipated that the disposition of many of these ships will be subject to arrangement for handling of recaptured vessels now in process of being worked out by representatives of the United States and British Governments.

All of these ships are of many designs, types and sizes. Among them are ships comparable to the large freighters, fast and slow, and the large ocean-going tankers which have constituted the bulk of British and American war-time shipbuilding. There are, however, also a considerable proportion of small coastwise craft of less than 5,000 deadweight tons and about 30 good-sized passenger carrying vessels of more than 10,000 gross tons. There are, therefore, a substantial proportion of types which are likely to be in demand at the end of the war, as well as of others of which there will be a post-war surplus in the American fleet.

The condition in which these ships will be found at the end of the war in Germany cannot be anticipated. Presumably many of them will require considerable conversion, restoration or repair before they can be usefully employed. It appears evident, however, that unless the Germans carry out a scuttling program of substantial proportions, there will be found in German hands, when the enemy in Europe is defeated, a substantial supply of sea-going ships. It is to be anticipated that some at least of our Allies, whose merchant fleets have been severely diminished by war causes, will consider these ships as proper objects for delivery on reparations account. Moreover, since Germany was an important shipbuilding country in pre-war years, it is

not unlikely that some of our Allies may wish to enter claims for post-war construction by Germany of new ships to be delivered to them on reparations account.

II. The question therefore arises as to the line of policy the Government of the United States should follow with respect to these issues when they arise. The following proposed recommendations are formulated from the point of view of the national interest in merchant shipping, and are therefore subject to such over-riding considerations as to general policy with respect to the reparations issue as may be applicable.

1. *The United States should formulate for presentation and be prepared to present and maintain its claims to an equitable share in any distribution on reparation account, of German shipping in existence at the end of the war, for the following reasons:*

(a) As the world's largest shipowner, the Government of the United States is directly concerned in achieving the most rational possible readjustment of world shipping to peace-time requirements. Among other things, this implies judicious decisions as to the treatment of German shipping. The complete or excessive stripping of German economy of all sea-going ships, entirely disregarding the minimum essential German need, particularly of ships for local and coastwise service, would probably not be a sound or judicious procedure. On the other hand, the extensive repair or reconditioning of German ships which are comparable to our war-built ships, of which we will have a surplus for distribution, would not be to our advantage. This is because such action would tend to augment the post-war surplus. Therefore, the United States should maintain its position as a claimant, as a means of exercising its influence toward a satisfactory and judicious settlement of this question.

(b) It is unlikely that the United States will have much need for German ships, except for war-time and immediate post-war Allied services. It is expected that allocation of German ships for these Allied services will be controlled through the United Maritime Authority established by the international agreement signed in London on August 5, 1944. Allocation and crediting to reparations account of the earnings of German ships in these services will involve questions which those concerned with reparations determination will need to consider. These questions are however not discussed in the present memorandum, which is concerned with questions relating to the more permanent and definitive disposition of German vessels.

It is likely that the United States will have a definite interest in any ultimate disposal on reparations accounts of German ships of certain types which will be in post-war short-supply. This is likely to be especially true of passenger ships. The United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, France and possibly other Allied countries will each have a post-war interest in the prompt reestablishment of overseas passenger services. Ultimately, there is to be anticipated the restoration of the American passenger fleet with modern and efficient ships constructed in American yards. Uncertainty as to the post-war development of oversea air passenger services may, how-

ever, make unwise a hasty rebuilding of our passenger fleet. This is the more likely since it would mean the building in short order of a brand new passenger fleet which, like those built at the end of the last war's emergency shipbuilding program will all grow old together. Therefore, an equitable participation in the distribution of German passenger ships on reparations account for interim use, pending the deliberate and considered rebuilding of the American passenger fleet, in accordance with post-war requirements, may well prove advantageous. Certainly the United States should be prepared to present and maintain its just claims on this account.

2. *The United States should not only refrain from demanding post-war construction of new ships in German yards to be delivered on reparations account, but should seek diligently to dissuade its Allies, so far as possible, from presenting and maintaining corresponding claims.* This for the following reasons:

(a) Fulfillment of such claims would constitute an extraneous non-commercial stimulus to the reestablishment of German shipbuilding. Meanwhile, the American and Canadian shipbuilding industries will be faced with the problem of demobilization of their war-time expansion; the same will ultimately be true of the British shipbuilding industry. Unnecessary stimulus of German shipyard restoration will therefore complicate the problem of post-war shipbuilding readjustment. This problem is the more important since the long-run maintenance of a moderate American peacetime shipbuilding industry is an essential element of national defense.

(b) Post-war construction in German shipyards of vessels for purposes which could be served through the disposition of surplus American war-built tonnage would complicate and intensify the problem of disposition of the American war-built merchant fleet. It would conflict with the principle of making the utmost economic use in post-war years of the ships built to meet war-time necessity.

(c) If German manpower is to be used in the production of articles for delivery on reparations account, there will be many other reconstruction activities aside from shipbuilding on which such manpower will be usefully employable. Obviously, European needs for reconstruction will be immense. Post-war construction of ships in Germany on reparations account, for purposes which could be served by vessels available from the American (or Canadian or British) war-built tonnage, would constitute a diversion of manpower from a more essential to a less essential reconstruction purpose, especially if it would involve substantial reconstruction of German war-damaged shipyards.

III. The major objective of American participation in this entire question is to influence Allied governments in the direction of rational and judiciously moderate demands. Appropriate sharing in the possible distribution of some German vessels may prove of some advantage to the United States. The greater advantage however will lie in the extent to which successful influence can be asserted to achieve a rational settlement judiciously dovetailed into the general problem of

post-war merchant shipping readjustment. This problem is of major importance to the United States for two major reasons: first, because it is the principal shipowner of the world and will have more ships than it can hope to dispose of to citizen and foreign purchasers; secondly, because of the importance of effecting successful readjustment of the American shipping and shipbuilding industry to the long-range peace-time policy and program of national merchant marine development.

The United States cannot of course expect to achieve its own purposes in full measure against what may be contrary or diverging purposes of its allies. It will probably not prove possible, for instance, for the United States to completely dissuade all of its allies from demanding German construction of new merchant vessels on reparations account. Nevertheless, it will be to American interest to do so to the fullest extent possible.

This presents an additional reason for including adequately liberal provision for sale of Government-owned ships to foreign purchasers, in current legislation for post-war disposal of the war-built fleet. Obviously, the United States Government could not very consistently seek to dissuade its allies from demanding German construction of ships on reparations account if at the same time it were, or appeared to be, seeking to withhold its own ships from disposal to Allied purchasers on reasonable terms and conditions. On the other hand, authority for such disposal should facilitate the efforts of this Government in seeking the objectives herein outlined, by providing in some measure at least an alternative source for the acquisition of vessels required to restore the war-depleted ships of our Allies.

[WASHINGTON?], March 29, 1945.

No. 388

Truman Papers

*Note by the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)*¹

[Undated.]

DISPOSITION OF GERMAN SHIPS (CAPTURED)

In regard to captured German merchant ships it is apparent that an acute shortage of ocean going tonnage for redeployment of troops and their equipment against Japan necessitates temporary transfer of captured German merchant ships to the United Maritime Authority of which the U. S. S. R. should be a member.

¹ Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned. It bears the following typed notation above the heading: "(To be used only if brought up by Stalin or Churchill)".

Upon the surrender or defeat of Japan I propose that the then remaining captured German merchant tonnage be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., Great Britain, and the United States.

It is also proposed that captured German war vessels be divided as equally as may be possible among the three above enumerated powers at the earliest practicable date.

No. 389

740.00119 EW/6-2245 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

HOECHST, June 22, 1945—noon.

36. With reference to the division by agreement between the US, UK, USSR and France of the Naval and merchant fleets of Germany, Ambassador Pauley has informed General Eisenhower that, as US Representative on the Allied Reparations Commission, it is his view that as long as the US is at war with Japan the division of both the German naval and merchant fleet is strictly a military matter. The division of the German merchant fleet, however, is a matter within the ultimate concern of the Reparations Commission, and Pauley added that it was desired that a careful record and description of the ships involved be made with a view to future discussion and reparations accounting. In this connection Pauley asked Eisenhower's permission to appoint as observer at the discussions of the division of the German Merchant Fleet Captain John Faigle USN of the Reparations Commission staff.

MURPHY

No. 390

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Department of State Memorandum

[Extract ¹]

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

10. *Disposal of German Fleet and Merchant Ships*

No recommendation is being submitted in regard to the disposition of the German Fleet as this is a military problem and one which we understand is being considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²

¹ For the full text of this memorandum, which was forwarded to Truman on June 30, see the attachment to document No. 177.

² See documents Nos. 391 and 392, *post*, and vol. II, document No. 1005.

In regard to the disposition of the Merchant Ships, it is recommended that, subject to the approval of the military authorities, we agree with the Soviet claim to one-third of these ships.³

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

³ See document No. 386.

No. 391

Truman Papers

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 10 July 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following statement of policy in regard to the disposition and distribution of the German Fleet:

a. The United States policy in regard to the disposition of the German Fleet is that, except for (1) a limited number of ships for experimental and test purposes and (2) any naval auxiliary vessels having further usefulness, all naval vessels should be destroyed, i. e., sunk on the high seas or scrapped.

b. Failing agreement by the nations represented on the European Advisory Commission (whose functions may be taken over by the Allied Control Commission) as to this disposition, then the United States should press for:

(1) Agreement that all capital ships such as battleships, pocket battleships, cruisers, and also submarines be destroyed (as provided above) while smaller craft and more lightly armed vessels be shared equally by the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and France; or failing this

(2) Agreement that one-fourth share of each category of ships in the German Fleet be assigned to each of these four major powers.

(3) In any event the United States should press for the sinking of German submarines.

c. Only the governments represented on the European Advisory Commission (whose functions may be taken over by the Allied Control Commission) constitute the agency to determine the final disposition of all captured or surrendered German war material including the German Fleet. Others of the United Nations will probably submit claims for warships. In this event the United States policy should be that the European Advisory Commission (or Allied Control Commission) should make an equitable distribution, counting the bids of each of the four major powers as being one-fourth of each category.

[No. 391]

d. No distinction should be made between surrendered and captured war vessels.

e. In the event the Soviets ask for the United States share, it would then appear necessary first to ascertain if this retransfer is acceptable to the United Kingdom and France, and if agreed by them then to use this Soviet desire to obtain the best bargain possible in the light of over-all assistance to the war against Japan.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
G C MARSHALL
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

No. 392

Truman Papers : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations (King) to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

[WASHINGTON,] 11 July 1945,

94. The Joint Chiefs approved a memorandum to the President on the disposition and distribution of the German Fleet.¹ It was my intention that paragraph "e" on the treatment of a Soviet request for the U. S. share be deleted. Request you so advise the President.²

¹ Document No. 391.

² This message was sent to rectify a misunderstanding of the conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. J. C. S. Files record the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretariat was informed of this message before dispatch.

WAR CRIMINALS

No. 393

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Department of State Memorandum ¹

[Extract ²]

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

DRAFT AGREEMENT ON TREATMENT OF GERMANY IN THE INITIAL CONTROL PERIOD

4. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested, with a view to their ultimate dis-

¹ Appendix A to annex 2 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² For the full text of this draft agreement, which constitutes a part of the Briefing Book paper on Germany, see appendix A to document No. 327.

posal.³ Nazi leaders and influential Nazi supporters and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

³ A manuscript change by Byrnes substitutes "and prosecuted to final judgment" for the last seven words of this sentence. In Matthews' copy of the Briefing Book the words "and brought to judgment" are substituted for the same seven words.

No. 394

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS

Following preliminary discussion with British authorities in London in April,¹ Judge Rosenman, acting as personal representative of President Truman, presented to the British, French and Soviet representatives at San Francisco early in May a draft of a proposed agreement between the four governments containing this government's suggested plan for the punishment of war criminals.² This draft was based on an earlier report submitted to President Roosevelt by the Secretaries of State and War and the Attorney General.³

NATURE OF PROPOSALS

In brief, the proposed agreement contemplated:

(a) That in conformity with the Moscow Declaration (Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin) of November 1, 1943,⁴ European Axis war criminals, against whom there is proof of personal participation in specific atrocities, be returned to the former occupied countries where their crimes were committed for prosecution and punishment by the authorities of such countries;

(b) That the major war criminals in Europe, whose crimes have no particular geographical localization, and organizations, official or unofficial, charged with crimes or complicity therein, be tried before one or more international military tribunals, such tribunals to be composed of a member (and alternate) each designated by the United States, France, Great Britain and U. S. S. R. respectively;

¹ See *Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949; Department of State publication No. 3080), pp. 18-20.

² Text printed *ibid.*, p. 22.

³ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Henry L. Stimson, and Francis Biddle, respectively. Text printed *ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴ Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 310.

(c) That each of the four governments designate a representative who, acting as a group, shall prepare charges and conduct the prosecutions contemplated by (b) above; and

(d) That all members of the United Nations be invited to adhere to the agreement.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

On May 2 President Truman issued a press statement regarding the appointment of Mr. Justice Jackson as "Chief of Counsel for the United States in preparing and prosecuting the charges of atrocities and war crimes against such of the leaders of the European Axis powers, and their principal agents and accessories, as the United States may agree with any of the United Nations to bring to trial before an international military tribunal".⁵ The British and French governments have each recently announced the appointment of similar representatives. On June 7 [6], Mr. Justice Jackson submitted a report to the President summarizing developments since his designation as Chief of Counsel and outlining the basic features of the plan of prosecution.⁶

On June 26, at the invitation of the British Government, Mr. Justice Jackson and representatives of Great Britain, France and U. S. S. R. began conferences in London with a view to formulating a final agreement. Prior to that date the three interested governments were furnished for purposes of discussion at the conferences, with a draft agreement prepared by Mr. Justice Jackson revising, but not in any substantial way, the draft agreement submitted at San Francisco.⁷

ATTITUDE OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS

It is understood that the British and French governments are in general agreement with the proposals advanced by this Government. On June 14 a representative of the Soviet Embassy called on Mr. Justice Jackson and left with him an *Aide-Mémoire* raising certain questions regarding this Government's proposal.⁸ Mr. Justice Jackson indicates that, with few exceptions, they related to matters of inconsequential detail which would cause no difficulty whatever and that it was probable that the remaining questions raised could be ironed out at the London conference.

WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

Sixteen countries, including the United States, Great Britain and France, are represented on the United Nations War Crimes Commis-

⁵ See Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XII, p. 866.

⁶ Text in *Report of Robert H. Jackson*, p. 42.

⁷ Text printed *ibid.*, p. 55.

⁸ Text printed *ibid.*, p. 61.

sion. The U. S. S. R. is not represented on the Commission, and it has been the subject of a number of attacks by the Soviet press.

The terms of reference of the Commission are found in notes addressed in 1942 by the British Government to various other governments suggesting the establishment of the Commission, in which reference was made to the Lord Chancellor's announcement in the House of Lords on October 7, 1942, that "The Commission will investigate war crimes committed against nationals of the United Nations recording the testimony available, and the Commission will report from time to time to the Governments of those nations cases in which such crimes appear to have been committed, naming and identifying wherever possible the persons responsible."⁹ The Commission is also charged with making recommendations of a "politico-legal" nature to the governments.

Upon the basis of the cases presented to it, and also on its own initiative, the Commission prepares lists of war criminals, which it is authorized to communicate directly to the Theater Commanders. The latter have been authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take the persons on the lists into custody without requirement of further proof.

Since the Commission has no judicial or prosecuting functions, there would seem to be no conflict of jurisdiction between it and the proposed military tribunals to adjudicate cases against major war criminals or the joint prosecutors of such cases. It is understood to be the Department's view that the Commission should be kept in existence, for the time being at least, as it serves a useful purpose as a clearing house for information on war criminals. Moreover its continued existence probably serves to make the small nations represented on it feel that, even though they may not have a direct part in the prosecution of major criminals under the plan discussed above, they nevertheless are participating in the over-all plan and determination of all of the United Nations to prosecute and punish all war criminals.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

⁹ See the statement by Viscount Simon in *Parliamentary Debates: House of Lords Official Report*, 5th series, vol. 124, col. 582.

No. 395

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

REPORT BY JUSTICE JACKSON ON WAR CRIMES QUESTIONS¹

THE SECRETARY: Reference is made to the memorandum on "Prosecution of War Criminals" delivered to the Central Secretariat on June 29.²

The British Government has suggested that "war criminals" be discussed at the Big Three meeting.³

Justice Jackson states in a telegram of July 4 (Annex 1)⁴ that the British and French are in substantial agreement with the United States proposals for the punishment of the Axis leaders, but that the Soviets have presented a counterproposal⁵ which appears to reject the substance of his proposals, and to substitute many trials under Soviet procedure mostly in territory controlled by the U. S. S. R., and following the surrender to (these?)⁶ tribunals of our prisoners, in place of one main trial at Nuremberg. He is not sure that agreement will be reached but considers it by no means hopeless. Unless he can obtain the substance of his proposals, he says, the only alternative will be agreement on general substantive law principles regarding crimes and allowing each country to establish its own courts and try its own prisoners under its own procedural system.

He has been informed by the British Foreign Office that the British did not intend to suggest detailed discussion of war crimes at the Big Three meeting but wished to allay Soviet suspicion of evasion of prosecution. He himself is "rather appalled" at the thought of Big Three discussion of such an involved, technical subject. He suggests that he should review the subject with you and the President if such discussion is undertaken, since significant differences lurk in small phrases.

The U. S. S. R. has insisted that there be incorporated (in the agreement regarding the major trial) an agreement concerning the handing over of prisoners wanted for trial in other countries. Justice Jackson has taken the position that only cases for international trial are within the scope of his authority.

¹ This paper is not itself a report by Jackson; it is rather a memorandum addressed to the Secretary of State by the Legal Adviser of the Department or by one of his subordinates on the subject of recent messages from Jackson.

² Document No. 394.

³ See document No. 176.

⁴ Not included in the Briefing Book. Cf. document No. 183.

⁵ Text in *Report of Robert H. Jackson*, p. 128.

⁶ As in the original.

In a further telegram of July 6 (Annex 2)⁷ Justice Jackson says that it is clear that the military and political authorities of the United States should adopt a policy on demands for the surrender of alleged war criminals not needed as witnesses or defendants in the proposed international case. This should cover cases where the same person is demanded by two or more countries, he says. The U. S. S. R. wants the trial to be where the offense was the worst. This involves weighing the evidence. Justice Jackson thinks the U. S. should not pass on the merits of the claims. With reference to the possibility of demands for purely political reasons, which he emphasizes in both telegrams, he suggests that some statement of charges and supporting evidence might be required. He also suggests that some consideration might be given to the type of trial likely to result after surrender.

The U. S. S. R. is also urging an article in the proposed agreement for the trial of the Axis leaders which would bind the signatories to take all necessary steps for the surrender of war criminals by the neutrals. Justice Jackson has agreed that the U. S. would join in any request for surrender by a neutral of anyone needed for the proposed international trial, but has taken the position that any further commitment is beyond the scope of his commission to negotiate.

The question of surrender has been covered in a draft directive (Annex 3) which is expected shortly to come before the Informal Policy Committee on Germany. If the draft is approved by the U. S. authorities it will be circulated in the European Advisory Commission. Upon approval by the United States authorities it will also be issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States forces of occupation in Germany.⁸ If agreement has not been reached in the EAC with regard to the draft directive, the U. S. Commander-in-Chief is also instructed by the terms of the draft to urge in the Control Council the adoption of its principles by the other occupying powers in Germany.

Section 6 of the draft directive, on surrender, requires no supporting evidence to be supplied by the demanding government.

Paragraph *a* (2) of that section leaves the question of who is to receive a criminal wanted by two or more countries for determination by the Control Council without guiding criteria.

Paragraph *d* is intended to cover cases of possible political persecution (e. g. in the case of dissident Yugoslavs and Poles) and it is intended that it should be implemented by explanatory instructions to the U. S. Commander-in-Chief.

There is also pending before the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, a sub-committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, a draft directive which has cleared the U. S. side of the Committee and is now before

⁷ Not included in the Briefing Book.

⁸ General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.

the British side. If approved by the latter, it will go before the Combined Chiefs of Staff for issuance to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force,⁹ and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.¹⁰ (Annex 4) Exception number (5) in the second paragraph is intended to protect against demands for surrender of alleged "war criminals" for political reasons. Cases of demands by two or more countries for surrender are to be referred to the CCS.

It is understood that Mr. McCloy and Colonel Cutter of the War Department will be at the Big Three meeting. They are familiar with the draft directives referred to above.

In view of Justice Jackson's telegrams, it is suggested that, if the question of war criminals does come up, you may wish to get in touch with him as he suggests.

The meeting might afford an opportunity to clear up outstanding important questions relating to war crimes.

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1945.

[Annex 3]

TOP SECRET

DIRECTIVE ON THE IDENTIFICATION AND APPREHENSION OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF WAR CRIMES OR OTHER OFFENSES AND TRIAL OF CERTAIN OFFENDERS¹¹

1. This directive is issued to you as Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. (U. K.), (U. S. S. R.) (French) forces of occupation. As a member of the Control Council, you will urge the adoption by the other occupying powers of the principles and policies set forth in this directive and, pending Control Council agreement, you will follow them in your zone.

2. The crimes covered by this directive are:

a. Atrocities and offenses against persons or property constituting violations of international law, including the laws, rules and customs of land and naval warfare.

b. Initiation of invasions of other countries and of wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties.

c. Other atrocities and offenses, including atrocities and persecutions on racial, religious or political grounds, committed since 30 January 1933.

⁹ Eisenhower.

¹⁰ Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander.

¹¹ The Informal Policy Committee on Germany notified the Secretary of State on July 25 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been requested to transmit this draft directive as revised (see footnote 13, *post*) to the Commander in Chief, United States Forces of Occupation in Germany, "as an interim directive pending its approval and issuance by the governments represented in the European Advisory Commission."

3. The term "criminal" as used herein includes all persons, without regard to their nationality or capacity in which they acted, who have committed any of the crimes referred to in paragraph 2 above, including all persons who (1) have been accessories to the commission of such crimes, (2) have taken a consenting part therein, (3) have been connected with plans or enterprises involving their commission, or (4) have been members of organizations or groups connected with the commission of such crimes. With reference to paragraph 2 *b*, the term "criminal" is intended to refer to persons who have held high political, civil or military (including General Staff) positions in Germany or in one of its allies, cobelligerents or satellites or in the financial, industrial or economic life of any of these countries.

4. The Control Council should coordinate policies with respect to the matters covered by this directive.

5. Subject to the coordination of such matters by the Control Council and to its agreed policies:

a. In addition to the persons and classes of persons referred to in paragraph 8 of the Directive to the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany (J. C. S. 1067/6)¹² or in other instructions, you will take all practicable measures to identify, investigate, apprehend and detain all persons whom you suspect to be criminals as defined in paragraph 3 above and all persons whom the Control Council, any one of the United Nations, or Italy notifies to you as being charged as criminals.

b. You will take under your control pending decision by the Control Council or higher authority as to its eventual disposition, property, real and personal found in your zone and owned or controlled by the persons referred to in subparagraph *a* above.

c. You will report to the Control Council the names of suspected criminals, their places of detention, the charges against them, the results of investigations and the nature of the evidence, the names and locations of witnesses, and the nature and locations of the property so coming under your control.

d. You will take such measures as you deem necessary to insure that witnesses to the crimes covered by this directive will be available when required.

e. You may require the Germans to give you such assistance as you deem necessary.

6. Subject to the coordination of such matters by the Control Council and to its agreed policies:

a. You will promptly comply with a request by any one of the United Nations or Italy for the delivery to it of any person who is stated in such request to be charged with a crime to which this directive is applicable, subject to the following exceptions:

(1) Persons who have held high political, civil or military position in Germany or in one of its allies, cobelligerents, or

¹² See Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XIII, p. 596.

satellites will not be delivered to any one of the United Nations or Italy, pending consultation with the Control Council to ascertain whether it is desired to try such persons before an international military tribunal. Suspected criminals desired for trial before international military tribunals or persons desired as witnesses at trials before such tribunals will not be turned over to the nation requesting them so long as their presence is desired in connection with such trials.

(2) Persons requested by two or more of the United Nations or one or more of the United Nations and Italy for trial for a crime will not be delivered pending determination by the Control Council of their disposition. The Control Council should take all practicable measures to insure the availability of such persons to the several United Nations concerned or Italy, in such priority as the Control Council shall determine. If in any case the Control Council fails to make such determination within a reasonable period of time, you will make your own determination based on all the circumstances including the relative seriousness of the respective charges against such person and will deliver the requested person to the United Nation or Italy accordingly.

b. Compliance with any request for the delivery of a person shall not be delayed on the ground that other requests for the same person are anticipated.

c. Delivery of a person to a requesting nation shall be subject to the condition that if such person is not brought to trial, tried and convicted within six months from the date he is so delivered, he will be returned to you upon request for trial by any of the other United Nations or Italy.

d. In exceptional cases in which you have a doubt as to whether you should deliver a person demanded under subparagraph *a* above, you should refer the matter for decision to the Control Council with your recommendations.

The Control Council should determine promptly any dispute as to the disposition of any person detained within Germany in accordance with this directive.

7. Appropriate military courts may conduct trials of suspected criminals in your custody. In general these courts should be separate from the courts trying current offenses against your occupation, and, to the greatest practicable extent, should adopt fair, simple and expeditious procedures designed to accomplish substantial justice without technicality. You should proceed with such trials and the execution of sentences except in the following cases:

a. Trials should be deferred of suspected criminals who have held high political, civil or military positions in Germany or in one of its allies, cobelligerents, or satellites, pending consultation with the Control Council to ascertain whether it is desired to try such persons before an international military tribunal.

b. Where charges are pending¹³ in your zone against a person also known to you to be wanted elsewhere for trial, the trial in your zone should be deferred for a reasonable period of time, pending consultation with the Control Council as to the disposition of such person for trial.

c. Execution of death sentence should be deferred when you have reason to believe that the testimony of those convicted would be of value in the trial of other criminals in any area whether within or without your zone.

[WASHINGTON,] June 26, 1945.

[Annex 4]

TOP SECRET

DRAFT

CABLE TO SCAEF AND SACMED

Reference is to SCAF 406 and NAF 973.¹⁴

This directive applies to all persons held by forces under your command suspected of having committed war crimes in a country formerly occupied by the Germans or in Italy. It does not apply to such renegades and quislings as are not war criminals.

You should deliver immediately to the requesting nation any person requested by one of the United Nations or Italy for trial for a war crime alleged to have been committed in the territory of that nation, except:

- (1) Persons wanted for trial before courts under your command.
- (2) Persons who held high political, civil or military position in Germany or in one of its allies, cobelligerents, or satellites, who may be desired for trial before an international tribunal.
- (3) Persons wanted as witnesses in the trials referred to in (1) or (2) above.
- (4) Persons requested by two or more such nations.
- (5) Persons whose cases involve special political or other unusual considerations, which cases should be given careful study in consultation with your political advisors before delivery is made.

In any case covered by subparagraph (4) above, you will report the facts to the CCS together with your recommendations as to its disposition.

¹³ The words "and the trial has not commenced" appear at this point in the draft directive as approved in July by the Informal Policy Committee on Germany.

¹⁴ Neither printed.

No. 396

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

WHAT SHOULD AMERICAN ATTITUDE BE TOWARD THE SELECTION
AND TREATMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS?

An International Military Tribunal should be established for the trial of major war criminals whose offenses have no particular national or geographical character.

The United States should demand custody of every Axis individual triable for any war crime committed primarily against United States military personnel or nationals. Punishment accorded should be severe, prompt and public.

Upon request and on a reciprocal basis, the United States should undertake to turn over to our Allies for trial Axis individuals charged with war crimes against their respective military personnel or nationals. Each case or category should be decided on its merits with due regard to political or military considerations entering into the request.

Axis subjects accused of war crimes committed during the war against other Axis subjects should, as far as possible, be tried by local courts made up of subjects of the occupied area who are acceptable to the United States military authorities in charge.

¹ This memorandum was prepared in response to a request from Leahy (document No. 155) for recommendations which would be "useful to the President in preparing himself for the [Berlin] conference". It was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.

SOVIET ANNEXATION OF KÖNIGSBERG AND NORTHERN EAST
PRUSSIA

No. 397

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

[Extract ¹]

TOP SECRET

EAST PRUSSIA

a. Recommendation.—East Prussia (except for the Koenigsberg district, which presumably will go to the Soviet Union) should be ceded to Poland.

b. Basic Data.— . . .

. . . The whole of East Prussia is claimed by the Warsaw Polish Government. The Soviet Union favors Polish acquisition of East Prussia or all of the province except for the northeastern sector, including the chief city and part [*port*] of Koenigsberg which it intends to annex. . . .

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

¹ For the full text of this briefing paper, see attachment 1 to document No. 513.

THE RHINELAND AND THE RUHR

No. 398

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper ¹

[Extract ²]

TOP SECRET

EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENTS

I. GERMANY

.
The United States Government is opposed to the separation from Germany of the Ruhr ³ or the left bank of the Rhine either by internationalization or by other means. . . .
.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

¹ Annex 13 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² For other extracts from this paper, see documents Nos. 259 and 509.

³ For a map of the Ruhr, see vol. II, facing p. 926.

No. 399

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹

TOP SECRET

GERMANY

THE DISPOSITION OF THE RUHR

I. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that this Government oppose the separation of the Ruhr from Germany either through internationalization or through the creation of a separate state or through annexation by one or more neighboring states.

II. DISCUSSION

Proposals for the disposition of the Ruhr need to be judged by their contribution of long-range security and by the degree to which they would allow a full utilization of the resources of the area for the restoration of European productivity and living conditions.

Security proposals, in turn, need to be measured by the criteria of effectiveness, economy of effort, and prospects of durability.

To find effective security measures against Germany, it is submitted, constitutes no serious or complicated problem. A Germany deprived of trained soldiers and arsenals could not launch a new war and a few and relatively simple restraints can effect that deprivation. Multiplication of restraints and their attendant instrumentalities of enforcement beyond the minimum consistent with effectiveness would mean for the victor powers a rejection of the principle of economy of effort and the assumption of unnecessary burdens. Such a multiplication of controls, however, would not only entail a superfluous expenditure of international energy; it would also constitute a potential threat to the durability of the whole system of security. The more complicated the control machinery the more quickly all or some of the enforcing powers will tire of maintaining it and divisions of opinion will arise between them. Once the victors in weariness and mutual hostility begin to abandon controls there is little prospect of agreement on a stopping place short of the complete emancipation of Germany from any control whatever. The experiences of the victor powers after 1918 suggest the validity of such considerations and emphasize the fact that the danger does not reside so much in Germany's evasion of controls as in the Allies' unwillingness to enforce them when the heat of war has abated.

Since it is unreasonable to suppose that Germany could fight without trained soldiers and arsenals, the impulse toward a great multiplication of prohibitions and controls must apparently be ex-

¹ Annex 16 to the attachment to document No. 177.

plained as the result of a fear that a lesser number of prohibitions and controls would not be effectively enforced. The assumption is not well grounded, however, that security can be bulwarked by additional measures of control when the victors are unable or unwilling to enforce the basic prohibitions of trained soldiers and arsenals. The rational means of dispelling such a fear is not to seek further and more complicated controls which would tax still more seriously the energies of the enforcing powers but to concentrate on those controls which, by their simplicity and economy of expenditure, offer the best prospect of being maintained.

Since the separation of the Ruhr from the remainder of Germany could not prudently be considered an alternative to basic security controls for the whole of the country which, if enforced, would suffice to keep the peace, a special regime for the Ruhr would clearly be subject to the criticisms stated above.

An effective security plan requires a calculation of the eventual political consequences in Germany of any proposed course of action. In the long run the most effective form of control over Germany would be the self-control of a nation willing to play a constructive role in the world's peaceful pursuits. Under the best of circumstances such a Germany will be hard to build and it behooves the victor powers to avoid giving unnecessary opportunities to ultra-nationalistic agitators to exploit not only the grievances of the German people but the discords which may arise amongst the victors over the treatment of Germany. The loss of the Ruhr would probably be second only to the forcible breakup of Germany into partite states as an incitement to embittered resistance on the part of the German people. Since this recommendation is based on the conviction that the separation of the Ruhr from Germany is not necessary for security reasons, its internationalization would mean delivering into the hands of the most dangerous elements in Germany a powerful weapon and would, therefore, endanger security rather than make it doubly certain.

Any proposal for the separation of the Ruhr from Germany raises a further question involving security implications. This question is to what state, or states, the Ruhr should be assigned?

Direct cession to one state would create too many political and economic dislocations to be admissible. Likewise a single trustee or mandatory is hardly a feasible solution. The small neighboring powers would not have the resources to undertake such a formidable task and there are strong objections on both political and economic grounds to allowing any one of the large European powers to attempt it. Under present circumstances an extension of Soviet power and influence into the heart of Western Europe through the device of trusteeship would manifestly be open to grave doubt. The assign-

ment of the Ruhr to France, in turn, would be equally questionable since it cannot be accepted as axiomatic that the increment of national strength which would come to France through acquisition of the Ruhr would be a guaranty of security. It can be anticipated that French control would cause serious perturbation in Belgium and the Netherlands and would create such resistance in the Ruhr that the area's productive capacity, so essential for European reconstruction, would be heavily impaired.

A multiple trusteeship would also raise difficult and prospectively insuperable problems: selecting the states which would participate, determining the powers of the trustees, allocating the degree of authority of each, prescribing the character of the administration and the political role of the inhabitants, deciding the economic relationships with other areas, and devising machinery for composing the differences which would be inevitable in such a complex undertaking. If the several trustees brought to the Ruhr divergent conceptions of economic organization and equally different views of the uses to be made of the trusteeship—and this state of affairs would be hardly inescapable in almost any circumstances and notably certain in the case of Soviet participation—the consequences could only be to the jeopardy of European tranquillity.

An examination of the Ruhr in the light of the second criterion—full utilization of its resources for European reconstruction—likewise results in a judgment against the separation of this area from the rest of Germany.

Any form of removal of the Ruhr from Germany which did not entail a substantial degree of economic separation would be meaningless in terms of the generally professed security reasons for the action. It must be assumed therefore that under internationalization, as well as through annexation by another power, Germany would lose control of the enormous productive capacity to some international agency. It is therefore in order to consider the consequences for Germany and for the whole of European reconstruction and to anticipate how the Ruhr could be treated economically.

This Government has already agreed to a considerable transfer of German territory in the East.² Into the Germany thus reduced in size and resources and heavily damaged by the war there will be poured several million persons of Germanic stock from Poland and Czechoslovakia. It is no sentimental generosity to point out that the seventy and more million Germans concentrated in restricted frontiers must be allowed a tolerable standard of living. In our treatment of the Germans the immediate necessity, and equally the long-range necessity, is enough sustenance for them to prevent starvation, disease and

² See vol. II, document No. 1417, section VI.

dangerous political unrest. To make Germany into a permanent national poorhouse would be to close the door to any hope of Germany's eventual assimilation into the society of law-abiding peoples. The simplest form of security insurance is to spare Germany a standard of living so low as to engender political desperation.

Without the Ruhr's production of legitimate peace-time goods German economy would be gravely impaired and, in all probability, the national life could be put on a functioning basis only through the reintroduction of some form of autarchy, a development which it is to our national interest to forestall.

It is furthermore the policy of this Government that Germany shall make reparation for damages inflicted upon its victims both out of existing stocks and out of current production. The Ruhr is an essential source of reparation if payment out of production is to make a significant contribution to European reconstruction. The most equitable use of that productivity would be made, not through separating the Ruhr from Germany and placing its wealth at the disposition of annexing powers or of the states represented in an international administration, but by pooling its reparation production with that of the remainder of Germany and distributing it on the basis of a fair division among the claimant states.

The Ruhr economy has developed in an extensive free-trade area and to cut it off from that area would be to introduce serious disturbances over and above war damages that would impede its own conversion to peace-time production and therefore the rehabilitation of Europe. Establishment of the Ruhr as a separate economic unity would obviously doom it to a decline accompanied by local disturbances and by agitation throughout Germany. Finally, a plan whereby all of the states participating in international control would have a special economic relationship to the Ruhr would raise up insuperable tasks of reconciling national objectives in the treatment of the area, of allocating the degrees of national authority in the administration as between the participating small and large states, of adjusting the production of the Ruhr to that of the participating states, and of assigning responsibilities and profits and losses. In the face of these and other material difficulties, it can only be anticipated that such a plan would mean not only economic confusions but also political frictions.

The most efficient exploitation of the area in the interest of European recovery can be achieved by allowing it to retain its organic relationships within the German economy while, of course, demilitarizing the industry and bringing it through economic reform into freer and closer relations with European and world economy.

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1945.

No. 400

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

THE RUHR

a. Recommendation:—It is recommended that this Government oppose the separation of the Ruhr from Germany either through internationalization or through the creation of a separate state or through annexation by one or more neighboring states. (The considerations on which this recommendation is based are presented in a separate paper.¹)

b. Basic Data:—The Ruhr industrial area embraces a portion of the Rhenish and Westphalian provinces of Prussia centering in the basin of the Ruhr river and extending somewhat west of the Rhine. The greater Ruhr zone has an area of about 3,000 square miles with a population of 6,800,000; the main industrial zone has an area of about 1,000 square miles and a population of 5,300,000. It is the most highly urbanized area of Europe with twelve cities of over 100,000 inhabitants and three of over 400,000. Ninety-five percent of the population density is 5,795 per square mile in the smaller area [*sic*]. It possesses a vast and closely integrated network of railroads, waterways and highways. Its railways carry 35 percent of all German rail tonnage; its waterways 56 percent of water-borne traffic.

The industrial importance of the Ruhr rests upon its coal reserves which are near the surface and of high grade, excellent for coking. Its production of coal and of iron and crude steel is about 70 percent of that of all Germany. Other major industries are finished steel goods, machinery, electro-chemical products, chemicals, petroleum products, gas electric power, synthetic rubber and textiles. Its output is vital to all Europe. It furnishes a major market for industrial raw materials from many countries. Its steel production in 1937 exceeded that of any country except the United States and the Soviet Union. It accounts normally for about one-third of Germany's industrial exports. Ownership of Ruhr enterprises is tied in with the great German combines, trusts and cartels. Ruhr industry also forms part of a great industrial complex including Lorraine, the Saar, northeastern France, Luxembourg and Belgium.

Ruhr industries were extensively converted to war purposes and new ones (synthetic oil and rubber) built. The war has considerably reduced Ruhr industrial capacity. Its rehabilitation will involve a care-

¹ Document No. 399.

ful weighing of the danger of restoring German war potential against the contribution which the Ruhr may make to European reconstruction. This contribution can be of the greatest significance because of the unique advantages of the area—its strategic location, transportation facilities, coal reserves, plant capacity, and skilled labor force.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

No. 401

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

a. Recommendation:—The disposition of the left bank of the Rhine is essentially a problem of military security in which the legitimate needs of France, Belgium and the Netherlands should be recognized. This problem should ultimately be solved by a system of long-range controls over Germany rather than by transfers of Rhenish territory. Since the states of western Europe need have no concern about their security against German aggression so long as Allied military government exists in Germany, it would seem unnecessary at the present time to determine the nature of military establishments which may be required in the Rhine area after the termination of military government.

b. Basic Data:—The left bank of the Rhine includes the Saar, the Palatinate, Western Hesse and the bulk of the Rhine Province. It covers an area of 10,598 square miles and had a population of about 6,550,000 according to the census of 1939. Eight cities of 100,000 residents or more in 1939—Cologne, Krefeld-Uerdingen, Aachen, Mainz, Ludwigshafen, Saarbrücken, München-Gladbach, and Bonn—are located here, and the Saar and the western Ruhr constitute two important industrial centers. This region together with the Rhine itself is one of the most concentrated transportation areas in the world. Possession of the left bank and bridgeheads across the Rhine allows strategic domination of the Ruhr and command of the gateways into central Germany.

At the Paris Peace Conference Foch and his supporters were determined to establish one or more autonomous republics in the Rhineland protected by French military forces. The minimum objective of the French delegation was to extend the permanent military frontier of France to the Rhine. French aims were thus hardly realized by Treaty of Versailles providing for German demilitarization of the

Rhineland and its occupation for a fifteen-year period by Allied forces.¹

In the French view the Rhine is still the defensive bastion of France. De Gaulle has stated (July 10, 1944) that the flag of the French army must fly over the Rhineland,² and there is evidence of an increasing tendency on his part to favor annexation of the left bank. Bidault has disclaimed any desire for annexation but is of the view that the Rhineland-Ruhr area should be separated from Germany and that France must have complete security control over the area north of the Saar extending through Cologne. He apparently believes that the remainder of the Rhineland north of this area and the Ruhr should be brought under some form of international regime. Other French leaders have in general advocated either French or international control of the Rhine area.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

¹ The provisions referred to were contained in articles 42-43 and 428-432 of the Treaty of Versailles, signed June 28, 1919. Annotated text in *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, pp. 159, 720-725.

² See Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages, 1940-1946* (Paris, 1946), p. 455.

No. 402

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

[Extracts¹]

TOP SECRET

FRANCE

SUMMARY

(2) *Views on the Rhineland.*

While the French government has not put forward concrete proposals or formalized her desiderata with respect to the German settlement, the expressed views of French officials may be summarized as follows:

France disclaims any designs involving annexation of German territory.

She advocates the separation from Germany of the Rhineland and of Westphalia including the Ruhr, opposes their being combined into a single State and wishes them to be governed by distinct regimes.

a) *Ruhr-Westphalia* should be placed under an international regime.

b) *The Rhineland*, from the Swiss frontier to beyond Cologne, including the Saar and appropriate bridgeheads on the right bank,

¹ For the other sections of this paper, see document No. 222.

should be placed under permanent French military and economic control, possibly with Luxembourg, Belgian and Dutch participation.

While it is not possible now to foresee the degree of support we shall afford French desiderata in the German settlement, we should recognize that France considers the German problem as the cardinal point of her foreign policy and will pursue her ends with great tenacity. In view of the value to us of a strong and friendly France, we should oppose treatment of her claims less favorable than that accorded our other major allies.

FRANCE

(2) *French Views on the Rhineland*

While the French government has not yet put forward concrete proposals on the subject of the Western part of the German settlement, General de Gaulle and other French officials have made numerous public utterances on this question. In a press conference on January 28, 1945, General de Gaulle stated that the security of France (and consequently that of Western Europe and hence a large part of the world) lay from one end of the Rhine to the other, and that France would not end the war without being assured that her forces would be permanently stationed along the entire length of the river.² In his radio address of February 5th, he enumerated among the conditions of the peace settlement which France considered essential: "the definitive presence of French forces from one end to the other of the Rhine, and the separation from what is to be the German State, or States, of the territory on the left bank of the river and of the Ruhr basin".³ While French officials have assiduously avoided the word "annexation," their views clearly anticipate the separation from Germany of both the Rhineland and the Ruhr. General de Gaulle told Spaak, in February, that "while his views on the Rhineland had not crystallized, he did feel that the Ruhr should be placed under international administration". He again stressed the separation theme in a conversation in April with Mr. McCloy when, in stating France's desire to control the left bank of the Rhine from Cologne to the Swiss frontier, he stated that the Rhineland should be made up of small semi-independent States, not Rhine confederation, but operating under French influence. The Ruhr area, he again indicated, should be under international control, its mines and industries being operated for the benefit of all Western European countries.

² See de Gaulle, *Discours et messages, 1940-1946*, pp. 546-547, 552-553, 557.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 561.

A memorandum obtained by a journalist from the French delegation in San Francisco,⁴ and purporting to have been prepared by General Juin's Committee of National Defense, envisages the creation of a broad security zone in Western Germany for the period following total military occupation. It contemplates the division of this zone into three parts: a British-dominated area, with Netherland participation, beginning North of the Rhine, and running along the Dutch border to the North Sea; next, an internationalized Ruhr basin administered and policed by an inter-allied Commission; lastly a French-dominated zone largely corresponding to the present French occupation zone but reaching North of Cologne, in which Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands would participate. These three zones would form a permanent occupation region.

The most recent and authoritative declaration of French views on the Rhineland and the Ruhr were made by M. Bidault to the Acting Secretary on May 19th. He presented the following definitive ideas:

The Rhineland, and the Ruhr plus Westphalia should be separated from Germany but should not be combined into a single State under international control. Such a State would be too strong and might ultimately form the rallying point for a new, unified Germany. Also, Russian participation in the control of such a State would lead to disagreements and complications. They should be separated into:

(a) *Ruhr-Westphalia*. This region was the source of the power and wealth of Germany and should be definitely placed under the control of an international regime.

(b) *The Rhineland*. France does not wish to annex this region or the Saar basin within it. She wants economic control of the Saar and security control of the whole Rhineland up through Cologne with the necessary bridgeheads on the right bank. She does not want the area internationalized since in an international regime France might be outvoted. She will insist on control without any restrictive international supervision.

To summarize, the French want both the Ruhr and the Rhineland separated from Germany, but regard administration of the two zones as distinct problems. With respect to the Ruhr, the French appear to agree that it should be under international administration with British and possibly American participation. While French ideas on the ultimate form of government of the Rhineland have not yet crystallized, the French will insist on permanent occupation and control thereof plus bridgeheads on the right bank from Duesseldorf to Karlsruhe.

France's obsession with the idea of complete and final security against Germany will cause her to pursue her desiderata on this

⁴ i. e., the French Delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization, which met at San Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945.

question with the utmost tenacity. The German settlement lies at the heart of French foreign policy, and it is believed that she will make broad concessions elsewhere in order to obtain her ends there. The economic motive, while mentioned less often than the security one, is likewise strong and may well become stronger as the fear of a German resurgence subsides and gives way to the fear of a new enemy; or the military obsolescence of the Rhine as a security frontier finally becomes apparent to the French people. While it cannot yet be anticipated to what extent France will wish to make her military occupation of the Rhineland an economic exploitation thereof to the detriment of German economy as a whole, it is probable that she will take steps during the military occupation period to assure for herself exclusive exploitation of the Saar basin. The exercise of these exclusive economic rights over the military occupation period may well mean the permanent loss for Germany of the resources of the Saar.

While it is difficult to frame at this moment a recommendation as to the degree of our support of or opposition to French desiderata, they should be given extremely careful consideration. France's friendship for us will depend to a great extent on the support we give her in the German settlement. Whether or not she receives any appreciable degree of satisfaction, we should oppose treatment for her less favorable than that accorded our other major allies.

[WASHINGTON,] June 23, 1945.

No. 403

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE RUHR AND THE SAAR

Internationalization of the Ruhr and the Saar, however established, would eventually involve the World Organization,² presumably as represented by the Security Council. Such an arrangement could not but inject Russia into the affairs of Western Europe to an undesirable degree, which might well require larger United States commitments

¹ This memorandum was prepared in response to a request from Leahy (document No. 155) for recommendations which would be "useful to the President in preparing himself for the [Berlin] conference". It was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.

² i. e., the United Nations.

in the areas internationalized and for longer periods of time. For these reasons, the internationalization of the Ruhr and the Saar is not favorably considered.

With respect to the Ruhr area, if Germany loses Silesia and the Saar, her future economic stability is in danger unless the Ruhr area is eventually restored to her. It would appear highly desirable, however, that the British occupational period of that area should extend until such time as an acceptable German Government is established. It should be noted in this connection that permanent loss by Germany of Silesia and of the Saar will reduce her war potential of strategic material to such a degree as to practically eliminate her, while acting alone, as a menace to the future peace of Europe. Under these conditions, it would seem desirable that the Ruhr area be eventually restored to Germany.

No. 404

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹

[Extracts²]

SECRET

POTSDAM, July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, called this afternoon and discussed for two hours in a preliminary way a number of matters on the agenda of the Conference.³

8. *Partition of Germany.*

Sir Alexander agreed that partition would be desirable if promoted by the Germans but should not be forced on Germany. He professed ignorance of French projects for internationalizing the Ruhr.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 140, 218, 234, 258, 319, 351, 379, 470, 519, 635, 645, 678, and 708.

³ For a list of persons present at this meeting, see document No. 234, footnote 3.

THE FRENCH ZONE OF OCCUPATION AND THE FRENCH SECTOR
IN BERLIN

No. 405

740.00119 EAC/7-1245

*Memorandum by the Delegation to the European Advisory Commission*¹[Extract²]

SECRET

[LONDON,] July 12, 1945.

THE WORK OF THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION (JANUARY
1944-JULY 1945)

A SUMMARY REPORT

(2) *Zones of Occupation in Germany.* From March to September 1944 the Commission considered the problem of zones of occupation in Germany and the joint occupation of Berlin. The first step in agreement was set forth in an E. A. C. Protocol of September 12, 1944,³ outlining three zones of occupation in Germany and three areas of occupation in Berlin. By a further Agreement of November 14, 1944,⁴ the U. S. and U. K. zones in Germany were fixed. At Yalta it was agreed that the French zone would be formed out of the U. S. and British zones,⁵ and the French zone has been agreed between the U. S., French and British Representatives on the E. A. C. Except for determining a French area of occupation in Greater Berlin, the Commission has completed a draft Agreement to provide for this adjustment in the zones.⁶ The E. A. C. agreements on zones in Germany are now being carried out by the military authorities.

¹ Submitted to Byrnes as an enclosure to document No. 233.

² For other extracts from this report, see enclosure 1 to document No. 233, and document No. 415.

³ For text, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2078; *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 118.

⁴ For text, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2087; *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 121.

⁵ See vol. II, document No. 1416, section IV.

⁶ See document No. 406.

No. 406

740.00119 EAC/7-445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 4, 1945—8 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

6740. COMEA 318. Today EAC approved in substance draft agreement on French zone in Germany. Texts to be checked tomorrow by experts subcommittee preparatory to signature.

Sent Dept 6740; rptd Paris 435 secret for Caffery and Murphy.

WINANT

No. 407

740.00119 EAC/7-745: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extracts]

SECRET

LONDON, July 7, 1945—2 p. m.

US URGENT

6856. At July 6 meeting EAC agreed preamble to agreement French zone in Germany. . . .

Sent Dept as 6856, COMEA 324; rptd Murphy as 20 from Winant.

July 6 EAC approved text of report to accompany agreement on French zone except final sentence. . . .

Dispute[d] final sentence of report follows: "The Commission recommends that the four govts instruct their respective Commanders in Chief in Germany acting jointly to determine the area in 'greater Berlin' to be assigned to occupation by forces of the French Republic"[.] July 6, US, UK and French delegations approved final sentence. Soviet rep pressed for its omission.

Gousev insisted that the Crimea decision that the French zone in Germany be formed out of the US and UK zones means that French area in Berlin must also be formed out of US and UK areas. Gousev stated determination French area in Berlin is matter for US, UK and French Commanders not for Soviet Commander.

I stated that Crimea decision contains no provision of this nature re Berlin and that on behalf of my Govt I reject any attempt to extend Crimea decision by implication to read this meaning into it. I stated any such extension of meaning of Crimea decision was a matter requiring further and specific agreement between govts and

that I had no instructions to accept such an extension or interpretation of the Crimea decision.

UK rep¹ stated that UK, US and Soviet should all contribute to provide a French area in Berlin. I stated that I could have no view re whether it would be found by four commanders on spot more convenient to form French area out of two or three of present areas and that this decision could best be made by the four commanders with full knowledge and responsibility in Berlin.

July 6 meeting unable complete agreement French zone Germany because of this deadlock. At close meeting Soviet rep still insisted on omission final sentence report.

Dept will have noted article 7 of agreement (my tel 6776²) provides for inclusion France among powers occupying Berlin and for creation of a fourth area of occupation in Berlin. Presumably omission of last sentence of report would leave open question whether three or four commanders would participate in defining French area and whether the French area would be formed out of two or three of present areas. Next EAC meeting July 9.

WINANT

¹ Sir Ronald I. Campbell.

² Not printed.

No. 408

740.00119 EAC/7-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 7, 1945—6 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

6863. COMEA 327. Re final para mytel 6856, July 7¹ repeated Murphy as 20.

UK and French EAC delegations have considered Soviet proposal of July 6 re omission final sentence report accompanying agreement French zone in Germany. Both delegations have recommended their Govts agree this omission. They feel more important conclude agreement and leave open question of procedure for determining French area in Berlin than to force decision in EAC at this point.

Sent Dept as 6863; repeated Murphy as 24 from Winant.

UK and French EAC delegations expect final word this point Mon morning from their Govts.

WINANT

¹ Document No. 407.

No. 409

740.00119 EAC/7-845: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1945—1 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

5561. You are authorized to accept the Soviet proposal to omit final sentence of report accompanying agreement re French zone in Germany. (Your COMEAS 324¹ and 327²)

GREW

H[enry] P L[everich]

¹ Document No. 407.

² Document No. 408.

No. 410

740.00119 E. A. C./7-1045: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting
Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

LONDON, July 10, 1945—2 p. m.

US URGENT

6932. COMEA 331. I appreciated Dept's prompt action (urtel 5561, July 8²) to facilitate conclusion agreement on French zones in Germany. After lengthy discussion last night with EAC unable at present complete this agreement.

Marked shift occurred yesterday in Soviet approach. Gousev now states that he does not know whether his Govt would approve postponing for later decision delimitation of French area in Berlin; that his Govt may wish description French area included in agreement; and that he must consult his Govt. Gousev expected to leave this morning for Moscow.

Sent Dept as 6932; repton secret for Murphy as 30 from Winant.

Must assume this shift based on instructions from Moscow. Since June 29 Gousev has been entirely familiar with our proposal contained in final paragraph draft report.³ As late as July 6 he approved draft agreement which omits description French area Berlin and approved draft report except final sentence (mytel 6856, July 7⁴ rptd Murphy as 20).

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 15 of July 11 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1145).

² Document No. 409.

³ See document No. 407.

⁴ Document No. 407.

Last night several formulas, including omission final sentence draft report, were discussed in lengthy effort complete agreement. Gousev was adamant in stating his inability conclude at this time and in objecting to each formula in turn, including his own proposal of July 6.⁵

New Soviet tactic may mean that Gousev will consult his Govt and that Moscow may then send instruction enabling EAC conclude agreement this week. I believe this would be Gousev's desire. On other hand Soviet Govt may intend leave this question unsettled until conference⁶ with view to insisting at conference on its view that French area in Berlin be formed from US and UK areas.

WINANT

⁵ See document No. 407.

⁶ i. e., the Berlin Conference.

No. 411

740.00119 (Control) Germany/7-1145:Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET
 NIACT

LONDON, July 11, 1945—8 p. m.

6997. COMEA 333. Soviet EAC delegation tonight communicated new formula for final para report transmitting agreement French zone in Germany. This formula sent by Moscow following Gusev's return (mytel 6932, July 10 rptd for Murphy 30²).

[(]Sent to Dept rptd for Murphy as 34).

Soviet formula follows:

"The commission recommends that the question of determinating [*sic*] the boundaries of the French area in greater Berlin, which area in consequence of the Soviet area of the city having suffered the greatest destruction, will be formed out of the US and UK areas of greater Berlin, should be referred for consideration to the Control Council in Berlin."

This formula has also been referred to UK and French Delegations. EAC meeting July 12, 4 p. m.

Mosely's immediate personal comment to acting Soviet representative³ was that US formula⁴ is more practical since it does not attempt

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 19 of July 12 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1245).

² Document No. 410.

³ Georgy Filippovich Saksin.

⁴ See the final sentence of the draft report quoted in document No. 407.

in absence of specific information and recommendations re division of Berlin to decide in advance whether formation of French area will require adjustments in two or three of present areas. Mosely also made clear that US delegation not authorized to accept new Soviet formula.

WINANT

No. 412

740.00119 (Control) Germany/7-1245 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

LONDON, July 12, 1945—noon [sic].

7069. Tonight EAC held lengthy inconclusive discussion new Soviet proposal for final paragraph report on French zone in Germany re delimitation of French Berlin area out of US and UK areas only (mytel 6997, July 11, repeated Murphy 34²) COMEA 336. Sent Dept 7069 repeated Murphy as 35. Present position is that Soviet delegation has authorit[y] conclude French zone agreement only with addition new Soviet formula. US and UK representatives continue oppose any formulae stating that French area will be formed out of US and UK areas. French representative³ eager to conclude agreement on any basis satisfactory to other three delegations.

To offset Soviet information re degree of destruction in Soviet area in Berlin allegedly received yesterday from Marshal Zhukov, US delegation should have from US representative in Berlin information re destruction in US and other areas. US and UK representatives promised at close of meeting ask for such information. Naturally I urged omission all reference to question whether French area will be formed from three or only two areas. At close of meeting I offered following formula for final sentence of report: "The commission hopes shortly to present to four govts recommendation re delimitation of the French area in Berlin." Soviet representative promised to report fully to his govt on this proposal but obviously has little hope through own action of securing reversal of formal instruction received yesterday from Moscow.

I also proposed that EAC sign agreement as so far determined leaving question of delimitation of French Berlin area to a supple-

¹ The gist of this message was included in an unnumbered communication of July 13 sent by Grew to Byrnes by pouch (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1345)

² Document No. 411.

³ René Massigli.

mentary agreement. Soviet delegate opposed dividing agreement in two.

I believe it would now be wise for our military authorities in Berlin to examine concretely whether delimitation of French area requires adjustment of all three present areas because of physical conditions. Such recommendations from US military authorities in Berlin supported by substantial evidence would greatly facilitate conclusion agreement on French zone. Naturally we have preferred referring this decision to Control Council but we have at present no means of moving Soviet delegation from position of insisting that formula referring the question to Control Council shall include statement that French area is to be formed out of UK and US areas only.

WINANT

No. 413

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-1545

The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)

SECRET

[BABELSBERG,] July 15, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DUNN

Subject: Agreement on French Zone in Germany.

The European Advisory Commission has completed the draft agreement on the French zone in Germany. Its submission to the four governments has been held up by inability to agree in EAC on the procedure for defining the French area of occupation in Berlin.

The U. S. proposal of June 30¹ simply referred the whole question to the Control Council, without prejudging whether the French area would be formed out of the U. S. and U. K. areas or out of the three areas as defined by the Agreement of September 12, 1944.

The Soviet proposal of July 11² provides that, in view of the greater destruction allegedly suffered by the Soviet area in Berlin, the French area should be formed out of the US and U. K. areas. The EAC is therefore unable, without receiving fresh instructions from the governments, to decide this question and conclude the agreement.

The following procedure for securing a decision is suggested:

1. The U. S. and U. K. military authorities in Berlin should examine the present areas and decide whether, in fact, the degree of destruction is so great in the Soviet area that it would be fair to form a French area out of the U. S. and U. K. areas, perhaps by each of the two giving up one district.

¹ See the final sentence of the draft report quoted in document No. 407.

² See document No. 411.

2. If the U. S. and U. K. military authorities decide that such an arrangement is not reasonable, then it will be necessary to take up this question during the Conference and to secure from the Soviet authorities a change in the instructions which they have given their EAC delegation.

3. It might be possible for the U. S. and U. K. Commanders in Berlin to arrive at an exact definition of the French area, which could then be referred to the EAC for inclusion in the draft Agreement. If the creation of the French area requires adjustments in all three existing areas, the Conference might be able to entrust to the U. S., U. K. and Soviet Commanders the preparation of an agreed recommendation which would provide for the necessary adjustments and which could then be referred to EAC for inclusion in the final draft Agreement.

It should be pointed out that tentative U. K. proposals for readjustment provided for each of the three occupying powers giving up one district apiece in order to form a French zone.

When the U. S. proposal was at first presented in EAC, Gousev maintained that the Yalta Agreement³ for forming the French zone in Germany out of the U. S. and U. K. zones was also intended to apply to the forming of the French area in Berlin. The U. S. representative in EAC rejected this attempt to extend or interpret the Yalta arrangement. In an attempt to be more conciliatory in approach the Soviet delegation in EAC has now shifted its grounds to the assertion that the greater degree of destruction in the Soviet area makes it necessary for that area to remain unchanged.

P[HILIP] E M[OSELY]

³ See vol. II, document No. 1416, section IV.

THE "ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS" AGREEMENT

No. 414

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—Included in the Briefing Book were copies of a Report by the European Advisory Commission as agreed upon (but not signed) on July 4, 1945, and the accompanying draft Agreement on Certain Additional Requirements To Be Imposed on Germany. For the texts as signed in the European Advisory Commission on July 25, see document No. 1038, printed in volume II. The final texts have only minor editorial variations from the drafts included in the Briefing Book.]

No. 415

740.00119 EAC/7-1245

*Memorandum by the Delegation to the European Advisory Commission*¹[Extract²]

SECRET

[LONDON,] July 12, 1945.

THE WORK OF THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION (JANUARY
1944-JULY 1945)

A SUMMARY REPORT

(4) *Additional Requirements.* From the beginning of the negotiations regarding the German Surrender Instrument³ it was realized that the Allies needed to agree on a wide range of joint action in the political and economic sphere, going beyond the military requirements laid down in the Instrument of Surrender. After preliminary discussions in late 1944 and early 1945, the Commission, during May and June 1945, worked out a draft Agreement on Additional Requirements to be imposed on Germany. This Agreement, which covers a wide range of matters of common concern to the Allies, including joint control of German production, trade and finance, is ready for submission to the four Governments, except for approval of a single paragraph.

¹ Submitted to Byrnes as an enclosure to document No. 233.

² For other extracts from this report, see enclosure 1 to document No. 233, and document No. 405.

³ For the text of the draft surrender instrument negotiated in the European Advisory Commission, but not used on the occasion of the actual surrender of Germany, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 113.

No. 416

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-1445 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1945—10 a. m.

U. S. URGENT

5766. Following is paraphrase of tel from McCloy dated July 11:

“It is requested that you postpone, until we have a chance of discussing the matter, giving U. S. sanction to the suggested instructions

¹ The same message was sent directly to the Office of the Political Adviser at Frankfurt, presumably for transmittal to the United States Delegation at Babelsberg.

to Allied representatives concerning additional requirements as set out in the 5 June declaration.² As I see it, the document is negative in character and may create confusion because of the possibility of different interpretations.

"The term 'Allied representative' is not positively defined either in meaning or in application. This fact may promote confusion should an individual zone commander take action on subject matter, which according to this document, should be taken by representatives of the Allies. This would be in the absence of agreement by the Control Council, of course.

"Furthermore there is reserved to the Allied representatives in this document some rights which clearly should belong to the Control Council, as well as some which should be the prerogative of the individual zone commanders. Inasmuch as this proposed instruction was the end result of the 1943 dispute over British long surrender terms, it now seems to have been rendered largely inoperative by the force of recent developments. Another defect is that this paper assumes the existence of more of a central German Government than is now contemplated. In the light of these facts I believe that any action on the proposed instruction be delayed until the final results of the pending Big Three meeting becomes clearer [*sic*]. It should also be considered in the light of not altering the effect of control machinery protocol or the jurisdiction of zone commanders and the Control Council."

Further action on additional requirements agreement here postponed pending advice from Potsdam.

Repeated to USPolAd—Hoechst 112.

GREW
S[amuel] R[eber]

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520; 60 Stat. (2) 1649.

COAL AND FOOD

No. 417

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

[Extracts ¹]

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

POLICY TOWARD GERMANY

D: AGREEMENT ON TREATMENT OF GERMANY AS AN ECONOMIC UNIT

This Government should make clear its understanding that the division of Germany into zones of occupation does not imply the erection of barriers to the inter-zonal movement of goods. The

¹ For the full text of this briefing paper and of its supplement, see document No. 327.

U. S. zone of occupation is deficient in food and is almost completely lacking in coal and other major industrial materials. Its operation as a closed economic entity would be utterly impracticable. The British zone has an even larger food deficit, but would provide the logical source of supply for coal and some other industrial materials. The Russian zone has a food surplus and, apart from Berlin—which, according to present agreements, would be under quadripartite administration—has suffered much less bomb damage than Western Germany.

The urgency of this problem and the need for prompt decision arise from the fact that arrangements among the Western Allies, limited in their application to Western Germany, will soon be essential if initial agreements which include the Russian zone are not quickly reached. The U. S. zone in Germany depends on Ruhr and Saar coal and the British would need assistance from the United States in meeting the large food deficit in Northwest Germany.

[Supplement—Extracts]

TOP SECRET

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

PROPOSAL ON TREATMENT OF GERMANY AS AN ECONOMIC UNIT FOR
PRESENTATION TO THE BRITISH AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS ²

2. *Adoption of Uniform Ration Scales Throughout Germany*

Agreement in principle on free interzonal movements of essential goods and services would be difficult to translate into practice unless agreement were also reached among the occupying powers regarding the standard of living which they intend to maintain for the German population of their respective zones. It would be difficult, for ex-

² In Matthews' copy of the Briefing Book, this supplement has been thoroughly revised (see document No. 327, footnotes 26 and 29). The pertinent passages of the revision are as follows:

"14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end:

"(i) no barriers should be erected to the movement of goods and services which are required for (a) the discharge of Germany's reparation obligations, (b) the maintenance of occupying forces and displaced persons, and (c) the maintenance of a subsistence standard of living in Germany.

"(ii) To the fullest extent possible there shall be Uniform Ration Scales throughout Germany[.]

"(v) There shall be Agreed Programs on German Coal Production and Allocation[.]"

ample, for one occupying power to consent to the shipment of food from its zone of occupation to another zone of occupation if the ration scales in the latter zone were higher than in the former zone. . . .

6. *Formulation of an Agreed Program on Coal Production and Allocation*

It is clear that adequate production and distribution of coal is of key importance to all European countries. At present, the acute shortage of coal is the most important obstacle to the revival of economic life in Europe. It is essential for Europe, as a whole, that maximum efforts be made to increase coal output in Germany and to allocate the output equitably among all countries having a coal deficit. To this end, a program for the German coal industry as a whole should be worked out as quickly as possible.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

No. 418

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Joint Civil Affairs Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

ARRANGEMENTS TO GET COAL FOR OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

DISCUSSION

1. At the present time the coal industry of Northwest Europe, including Germany, is integrated under the supervision of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. After the dissolution of that Headquarters, this integration must be continued through another agency or agencies.

2. The Belgium and Netherlands mines are now operating at sufficient production rate to maintain the Belgian and Dutch economies, but only at the barest minimum. France, Norway, Denmark, and Italy are dependent upon imports.

¹ This memorandum was prepared in response to a request from Leahy (document No. 155) for recommendations which would be "useful to the President in preparing himself for the [Berlin] conference". It was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.

3. The United States and United Kingdom coal production will not be sufficient on present estimates to meet United States and United Kingdom requirements during the coal year 1945-1946. The only remaining sources to meet Europe's needs are Germany and Poland.

4. Under present conditions, with limited production in German mines, a disrupted European transport system, no agreement for the use of coal produced in eastern Germany and Poland and a limited export availability from the United Kingdom, it is necessary to ship coal from the United States (shipments of 204,000 tons are planned in June) in order to maintain a minimum economy in the western European countries. The needs of these countries will increase during the coming winter months.

5. Increased coal production in Europe, particularly Germany, is therefore essential, but solution of the problem is also dependent upon an efficient transportation system to distribute the coal to the countries where it is needed. This requires rehabilitation of the transportation both in Germany and the other European countries and their integration into an effective coal distribution system.

6. Increased production is dependent upon repair of damaged mines, recruitment of mine labor, the productive efficiency of miners for which extra rations, housing, medical care, means of transportation from homes to mines and consumer goods as an incentive to work are necessary, and an available stock of coal mining supplies and equipment.

7. As to Germany, all of these factors can be provided most effectively by treating Germany as an economic whole with equitable distribution of necessary supplies between zones. Imports of mining machinery and equipment will undoubtedly be necessary. The method of initial financing of such imports will have to be solved. If imports from the United States are to be effected, Congressional action for initial financing is required.

8. The level of coal production in liberated Europe cannot be permanently increased to any substantial extent until and unless the general level of economy in the area improves concurrently. Coal production cannot be accelerated much beyond its present level in France, Belgium, and Holland without taking the necessary steps to raise the general business and industrial activity. The state of transport, level of consumers' goods, distribution and pricing of goods, general labor situation and other basic elements of the general economy directly affect coal production.

9. Exports of coal from Germany to other European countries are needed now. Pending formulation of plans and allocations by the

[No. 418]

Moscow Reparations Commission, an interim reparations program on an *ad hoc* basis must be developed.

10. To make effective use of European production as one of the world's coal resources, a central European agency for the establishment and screening of requirements and the allocation of production and distribution thereof should be established. Only in this way can European requirements and production be utilized efficiently in relation to total world supply and demand. Eastern Germany and Polish coal production as well as that in western Germany and the liberated countries should be integrated in this way.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. *a.* Every effort be made to secure agreement of the Heads of State to unified treatment in Germany of the factors necessary to maximum coal production and integrated movement thereof. To this end agreement should be sought to have the Control Council function on the basis of such a policy.

b. Agreement of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics be secured for use of coal production in eastern Germany and Poland to meet the needs of other European countries.

c. Agreement of the Heads of State be sought to the policy of an interim reparations program to permit immediate export of coal from Germany.

d. Steps be taken to secure governmental agreement for the initial financing of imports to Germany required to effect maximum coal production.

e. Agreement be reached on policy of establishing a centralized European coal agency to effect integration of all European coal production and the allocation and transportation thereof. Because of the fact that coal production is not an isolated economic problem but is necessarily interwoven with the overall problem of economic restoration, such a coal agency should in due time be subordinate and responsible to a top European central economic authority responsible for integrating all of Europe's basic economic problems during this emergency period.

No. 419

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Joint Civil Affairs Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

EXCHANGE OF COMMODITIES BETWEEN ZONES OF OCCUPATION—
FOOD FROM THE RUSSIAN ZONE AND OTHER AREAS IN GERMANY

DISCUSSION

1. To attain the most effective use of German resources for the supply of German civilians, inter-zonal exchange of commodities is essential. In general, Germany as a whole is self-sufficient in vital supplies such as food and coal. However, each of the zones of occupation is predominant over the others in one or more important supply commodity. The Russian zone, for example, has been referred to as the "bread basket" of Germany, while the United States, United Kingdom and French zones together constitute a deficit food area. On the other hand, the United Kingdom zone contains the rich Ruhr coal fields, but does not have the necessary pitprops; while the United States zone does not have any coal assets, but it does have timber to provide pitprops for the coal mining industry. Surveys of supplies and resources should be made in each zone and the result thereof made available to the Control Council.

2. Distribution of food and other commodities across zonal boundaries from surplus to deficit areas requires integrated transportation, the effective use of which is dependent upon equitable distribution of coal.

3. To secure food surpluses from the Russian zone, the United States, United Kingdom and French will probably be asked to agree to equitable distribution of commodities which are surplus in their zones and deficit in the Russian zone.

4. Under the present world supply shortage of agricultural products and coal, maximum production of these commodities within Germany is imperative not only to meet the needs of Germany, but also to provide exportable surpluses for distribution to the other countries of Europe, including Italy and the Balkans. If this is not done, an unnecessary strain will be placed upon other world resources, par-

¹ This memorandum was prepared in response to a request from Leahy (document No. 155) for recommendations which would be "useful to the President in preparing himself for the [Berlin] conference". It was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.

ticularly the United States, to provide imports for even a minimum economy for Europe.

5. To maximize production in Germany, certain imports will be required: for example, coal mining and farm machinery. Provision must be made to provide and finance initially a large portion of these necessary imports from resources outside Germany.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. *a.* Agreement should be reached that in each of the zones immediate surveys should be conducted to determine the supplies and resources available throughout Germany and the results of such surveys made known to the Control Council.

b. Every effort be made at the conference to secure governmental agreement to the equitable distribution between zones of occupation of supplies locally available within Germany and an integrated German transport system to effect the movement of such supplies. To this end the respective Heads of State should agree that the Control Council will follow the general policy of equitable inter-zonal distribution through an integrated transport system.

No. 420

840.6362/6-2445 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1945—6 p. m.

5117. Following message from the President should be delivered to Prime Minister Churchill:

“The coal famine which threatens Europe this coming winter has impressed me with the great urgency of directing our military authorities in Germany to exert every effort to increase German coal production and to furnish for export the whole quantity over and above minimum German needs.

From all the reports which reach me,¹ I believe that without immediate concentration on the production of German coal we will have turmoil and unrest in the very areas of Western Europe on which the whole stability of the continent depends.

Similar representation should be made to France and Belgium to take drastic steps to increase their production within their own boundaries.

¹ Truman is probably referring particularly to the Potter-Hyndley report on “The Coal Situation in North West Europe”, dated June 7, on which portions of the draft directive quoted below are based. For the “Summary of Main Recommendations” from the Potter-Hyndley report, see enclosure 2 to document No. 421.

I, therefore, propose to send the following directive to General Eisenhower. Before dispatching it I should like to have your agreement that a similar directive will be sent by you to General [*Field Marshal*] Montgomery.

I am sending a similar communication to the Provisional French Government to cover the production in the Saar region.²

It is my belief that there are a number of other urgent measures relating to coal which must be undertaken if a situation dangerous to the stability of Western Europe is to be averted. However, I think the steps proposed above should be taken at once. Text of directive follows:

‘Directive to the American Commander-in-Chief in Europe.

Unless large quantities of coal are made available to liberated Europe in forthcoming months, there is grave danger of such political and economic chaos as to prejudice the redeployment of Allied troops and to jeopardise the achievement of the restoration of economic stability which is the necessary basis for a firm and just peace. Coal for Western Europe in adequate quantities cannot, as a practical matter, be obtained from any source other than Germany. It is a matter of great urgency that Germany be made to produce for export to other European nations the coal which they must have to support economic life on at least a minimum basis.

You are therefore directed, in your capacity of Commanding General of United States Forces in Germany and as United States member of the Allied Control Council, to take all steps necessary to achieve the following objectives:

1. To make available for export from Germany out of the production of the coal mines in Western Germany, a minimum of 10 million tons of coal during 1945, and a further 15 million tons by the end of April, 1946.
2. To the extent necessary to accomplish the export of 25 million tons of coal at the rate directed, to assign the highest priority to all matters pertaining to maximizing the production and transportation of German coal, with this priority to be subordinate only to requirements necessary to ensure the safety, security, health, maintenance, and operation of the occupying forces and the speedy redeployment of the Allied Forces from Germany.
3. To recommend to the Allied Control Council an assignment to the production and export of coal from Eastern Germany of an urgency as great as that implied in the required export of 25 million tons of coal from Western Germany by the end of April, 1946.

² Sent to Caffery on June 24 for delivery to de Gaulle (telegram No. 2923, file No. 840.6362/6-2445). De Gaulle's reply, transmitted by Caffery in telegram No. 3890 of June 28 to the Secretary of State ad interim (file No. 840.6362/6-2845), stated that the principles expressed in Truman's message "regarding the coal crisis in western Europe and the means of ending it are in entire agreement with the views of the Fren Govt. . . . I accordingly give you my full agreement on the directives which you propose to send to Gen Eisenhower concerning coal production in Germany. I add that I intend to send without delay similar directives to the Commander in Chief of the Fren forces in Germany."

4. To follow the principle, in the allocation of coal within Germany, that the export of coal from Germany is to take precedence over the use of coal for industrial production and civilian purposes within Germany, to the extent necessary to accomplish the export of 25 million tons of coal from Western Germany at the rate directed and to comply with paragraph 3 above, subject only to providing for the safety of the occupying forces and the redeployment of Allied Forces from Germany. It is recognized that the following of this policy during the period of critical coal shortage will delay the resumption of industrial activity in Germany.

5. To make available to the European Coal Organization full and complete details of coal production and coal allocations within Germany, in order that the member nations of the European Coal Organization may know the relationship that prevails between the level of coal consumption in Germany and the level of coal consumption in liberated Europe.

6. To assign a high priority status to the production of brown coal and the production and export of brown coal briquettes and of additional quantities of other coal in excess of the 25 million tons specified in paragraph 1.

7. In order to meet the emergency existing in western Europe, you are requested to assist in every reasonable way efforts in the Ruhr and the Saar areas to maximize the production of coal there.

It is recognized that the carrying out of the above policies with respect to German coal may cause unemployment, unrest and dissatisfaction among Germans of a magnitude which may necessitate firm and rigorous action. Any action required to control the situation will be fully supported.'³

GREW

F[rank] E D[uvall]

³ For the text of the directive on this subject actually issued to Eisenhower on July 26, see the attachment to document No. 1046, printed in vol. II.

No. 421

740.00112 E. W./6-2845

*The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State
ad interim*

SECRET

[SHAEF,] June 28, 1945.

No. 539

Subject: German Coal

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a memorandum on the present German coal situation written by Mr. Rainey, an economic officer of my staff, together with a copy of the report by Dr. Potter and Lord Hyndley on the coal situation in North West Europe, dated June, 1945.

I wish particularly to call your attention to paragraphs *e*, *f*, and *g* of the Summary to the Potter-Hyndley report. The extremely critical nature of the coal supply problem in Western Europe un-

questionably requires that all matters pertaining to the production and movement of German coal must be given the highest priority. Critical coal shortages in France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Norway require export of all available coal from Western Germany if civil order is to be maintained in Western Europe during the coming winter. However, present indications are that Western German production will not meet the essential requirements of North West Europe for several months and it is evident that imports from U. S. and U. K. must be maintained.

I also wish to call your attention to page 4 of Mr. Rainey's report, where reference is made to the organization of the North German Coal Control under Military Government, British 21st Army Group. You will note that British 21st Army Group officers have agreed that German management and organization must be utilized to run the Ruhr mines under military supervision. This reverses the policy of the recently dissolved Rhine Coal Control, which was opposed to the use of over-all German management organizations.

With the termination of Combined Command, the functions of SHAEF G-4 Solid Fuels Section will now be divided between the Combined Resources Allocation Board and the European Coal Organization, as far as the allocation of German coal is concerned. Production in the Ruhr and Cologne areas will be a primary responsibility of the British 21st Army Group. However, everyone concerned recognizes the necessity for a strong coal committee at the Allied Control Authority level, which will be able to deal with German coal production and allocation as a whole. The formation of a coal committee within the Combined Resources Allocations Board is the first step toward a coal committee including Russian and French members of the Allied Control Authority.

It is my intention from this time on to forward a weekly summary of the coal situation in Germany.

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT MURPHY

[Enclosure 1—Extracts]

Mr. Froelich G. Rainey, of the Office of the Political Adviser in Germany, to the Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) and the Director of Political Affairs, United States Group, Control Council, Germany (Heath)

SECRET

JUNE 27, 1945.

Subject: German Coal.

2. *The impending coal famine.* The attached report of the Potter-Hyndley Mission is a more authoritative and effective summary of

[No. 421]

the coal situation in Northwest Europe than I could hope to give. I can only add that my own observations and conversations (in the same area and generally with the same field personnel) lead me to believe that the critical nature of the coal problem is not overdrawn in that report. The following clear-cut facts stand out: With any sizeable imports of coal from UK and US to Western Europe highly unlikely after August 1945, with coal production in France, Belgium, and Holland not more than 50% of normal, and with negligible production in Scandinavia, Northwest Europe must look to Western Germany for coal to fill its absolute minimum requirements. But coal production in Western Germany, rising from 3 to 5% of normal during June, provides for an almost negligible export at the moment. The most optimistic do not see a Western German production more than 25% of normal by the end of the year and even if this rate is achieved there still remains a deficit in Western Europe which will have far-reaching repercussions on the social, political, and economic stability of the continent. Under these circumstances Western Europe unquestionably faces a very grim winter in 1945-1946.

The seriousness of the situation was underscored at the London Coal Committee meeting where Lord Hyndley and Dr. Potter vied with each other in painting an increasingly gloomy picture. Both men, impressed by the enormous destruction in the Ruhr and Saar areas, see little hope for an adequate recovery of Western German coal production in time to meet the urgent demands. Mr. Eaton Griffith (Ministry of Fuel and Power) took a slightly more optimistic view but recognized the necessity for almost superhuman effort on the part of the Allied Control Authority and specifically the British Army of Occupation in the Ruhr Area if a chaotic situation in Western Europe is to be avoided. All of the officers assigned to SHAEF G-4 Solid Fuels who have been working in Germany, Belgium, France, Holland, Denmark, and Norway are extremely pessimistic about achieving sufficient production to meet the absolute basic minimum requirements in Western Europe this winter and they feel that no matter what steps are taken the coal deficiency will cause extreme hardship and increasing political unrest.

3. *Production in Germany.* . . .

One point which was not clearly emphasized in the Potter-Hyndley report is the fundamental question as to whether it is possible to raise coal production greatly in excess of general economic rehabilitation in the Ruhr and Saar areas. It is my impression that the signers of this report do not entirely agree on this point. Most of the technical

men in the field believe that general economic rehabilitation must be carried out in order to raise coal production materially. Whether the rate of coal production can greatly exceed the rate of rehabilitation remains one of the most discussed problems in the field. I have the impression that most of the British personnel who will be engaged in managing coal production in the Ruhr, such as Brigadier Marley of the British Element Control Council, will bring about great pressure to favor rehabilitation in the industrial Ruhr. Thus another important political decision is involved.

Dr. Potter takes the point of view that many of the mine supplies required to operate the Ruhr mines can be produced in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, and that there is no need for rehabilitating factories in Germany to produce these things. Many other men concerned believe that these must be produced by German factories and the German Sub-Section has already made a survey of potential mine supply production in the area. There was a similar question with regard to reconstruction of housing, transportation, etc.

Most of the men in the field agree that during the next few months the German miners will work for the bare necessities of life and that the manufacture of consumer goods in order to provide an incentive for miners is not necessary at the moment. However, these bare necessities of life are numerous under the present circumstances, following the enormous destruction in the Ruhr area, and if we may judge from conditions in Belgium, Holland, and France, mine labor cannot long be maintained unless consumer goods are made available. With fixed food prices and with a growing feeling among the miners that paper marks will be worthless, there would be no incentive for the miners, once they earn enough money to supply themselves with the little food they can buy. Mine operators in the Ruhr already describe this condition as partly responsible for the high rate of absenteeism in the Ruhr mines. This fact, coupled with the general feeling of uncertainty and insecurity, brings about a condition in which the miners work only long enough to supply themselves with rationed food and then absent themselves from the mine in order to repair their houses or care for their garden plots. Attempts to penalize the workers and to force them into the mines have not been successful. Men in the field believe that adequate labor supply can be obtained only after some semblance of normal conditions are achieved.

There are no reports of resistance in the Ruhr, Saar, and Cologne mining areas. Everyone emphasizes the fact that the Germans appear to be extremely tractable and cooperative, realizing that their only salvation is to produce as much coal as possible during the next year.

4. *Allocations.* . . .

The most difficult problem will be a decision as to how much coal is exported from Germany. The Potter-Hyndley report takes the natural position that large quantities of coal must be exported from Germany, regardless of the effect upon German economy. On the other hand, the occupying forces and the Allied Control Authority, concerned with maintaining civil order in Germany, will present demands for large quantities of German coal for military and essential civilian requirements within Germany. It is clear that no one of the organizations referred to above can make a decision as to what part of the coal produced in Germany shall be exported. In the last analysis this decision must be made by the highest authorities in Great Britain and the United States, at least until Russia is brought into an operating Allied Control Authority. The difficulty in determining coal exports from Germany is emphasized by the coal requirements for Germany submitted by the Production Control Agency. These requirements exceed the probable production of German coal during the rest of the year and thus it is obvious that some very high level policy decision must be reached as to the degree of reactivation of German industry in view of the urgent demands for German coal in the liberated countries. A further and purely technical question arises as to how much coal can be exported without crippling the German coal industry itself.

Under Combined Command, coal production and movement in Western Germany, and to a large extent in all North West Europe, has been controlled jointly by U. S. and U. K. personnel serving under the Supreme Commander. Most of these individuals, both British and American, have come to think in terms of Western Europe including Germany up to the Russian Zone of Occupation. All of their studies of coal requirements, supply, and movement have been limited to Western Europe and all their calculations are based upon a knowledge of the transportation and production possibilities in Western Europe alone. There have been no detailed investigations of the extensive brown coal fields of Central Germany (largely included in the Russian Zone) and there are no adequate reports of conditions in the Silesian and Polish hard coal fields. There has been a tacit assumption, following Russia's failure to participate in the European Coal Organization, that the critical coal problem must be solved by the Western nations, together with British and American forces of occupation in Germany, without taking into account the coal resources and coal demands of the East.

This Western orientation has been natural under SHAEF authority and under war conditions when transport and coal distribution were

military responsibilities, but it continues into the post-defeat period because of the present uncertain relations with Russia.

Now, with the termination of Combined Command, the Governments of the liberated nations take over control from SHAEF within their respective boundaries; the British 21st Army Group takes over the primary supervision of coal production in and movement from the Ruhr; and in effect, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, and even U. S. forces in Germany, must look to British-controlled sources (U. K. and the Ruhr) for coal imports to maintain their essential industry and transport. Some coal is being imported to France and Scandinavia from the U. S. but this is an emergency measure which probably cannot be expected to alter the basic situation. This condition will continue to exist unless, or until, a strong, integrated Allied Control Authority succeeds in establishing quadripartite supervision over all German coal resources in Silesia and Central Germany as well as in the Ruhr and the Saar. With joint four-power control over these major sources of European coal, the tendencies toward a Western European economic orientation, which are now inevitable, can be avoided.

The recently established Combined Resources Allocations Board, which provides for Russian participation on an Allied Control Authority level at the earliest possible moment, may succeed in counteracting, or at least delaying, the present tendency to think in terms of Western Europe alone until Allied economic perspective is broadened by a functioning Allied Control Authority.

F[ROELICH] G. R[AINEY]

[Enclosure 2—Extract 1]

SECRET

L. C. P. R. B. (Coal) (45) 37

THE COAL SITUATION IN NORTH WEST EUROPE

REPORT BY THE POTTER/HYNDLEY MISSION TO NORTH WEST EUROPE
JUNE, 1945

(Where the word coal is used, it excludes brown coal unless expressly stated)

SUMMARY OF MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That it be recognized by the highest authorities in the United States and Great Britain that, unless immediate and drastic steps

¹ Only the "Summary of Main Recommendations" is printed here. For the text of the report proper, see "Report of War Activities, Revised to September 30, 1945" (Washington, Department of the Interior, Solid Fuels Administration for War, mimeographed, 1945), appendix A, p. R-19.

are taken, there will occur in North West Europe and the Mediterranean next winter a coal famine of such severity as to destroy all semblance of law and order, and thus delay any chance of reasonable stability.

b. That, to avert or at least minimize this danger, a minimum of 30 million tons of coal be accepted as the requirement between now and April, 1946, over and above that which is now in sight. The U. S., U. K., and South Africa are now supplying at a rate which will contribute 5 million tons to this requirement. There is, at present, no prospect of any increase from these sources. The remaining 25 million tons can only come from the two other normal exporting areas: Germany and/or Poland. For the next few months, the maximum contribution of coal from U. S., U. K., and South Africa will be essential, but, in view of the inherent limitations to the amount which can thus be made available, this can be only a palliative.

c. That an approach be made through the highest channels to ascertain what relief for North West Europe can be obtained by way of coal from Polish and German Silesia. Ten million tons between now and the end of April, 1946, would about halve the problem.

d. That it be recognized by the Controlling Powers that the only practicable solution lies in taking quite extraordinary steps to stimulate the production in, and movement of coal from, Western Germany.

e. That a directive be issued from the highest level that, short of endangering the safety of the occupying forces, all matters pertaining to the production and movement of German coal are to be given the highest authority [*priority?*].

f. That a pre-requisite to the stimulation of German coal production is to increase the amount of food available to the German miner. This is essential for the heavy work of mining, and would provide the only incentive necessary to work.

g. That a directive be issued that Western Germany is to make available for export a minimum of 10 million tons during 1945, and a further 15 million tons by the end of April, 1946. It should be made clear that this amount must be made available irrespective of the consequences to Germany, and irrespective of plans for other industries or the internal economy of Germany, and that any action deemed necessary by the Zone Commander to deal with any unemployment or unrest which may result will be fully supported.

h. That there be set up a strong solid fuel committee at Allied Control Headquarters to coordinate the coal and mining supplies requirements and the general policies pertaining to solid fuels within the various zones. Should it occur that no representative from the

Russian zone attends this committee, then it should function in respect of the remaining three zones.

C. J. POTTER
 HYNDLEY
 THOMAS C. BLAISDELL, JNR.
 J. EATON GRIFFITH

7th JUNE, 1945.

No. 422

840.6363/6-2945 : Telegram

*The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton)*¹

SECRET

HÖECHST, June 29, 1945—7 p. m.

74. Secret for Clayton.

With reference to the Dept's 25, June 24, 6 p. m.,² I thought you might be interested in the following informal summary of the Ruhr coal situation.

Stocks on hand now total between six and seven million tons on the surface.

Production has jumped to 60,000 tons of marketable coal daily. This, of course, is in addition to the coal consumed at the mines for operations and is the equivalent of about a million and a half marketable tons monthly. It is estimated that this production will be increased to four million tons monthly within two months. I am informed that one of the earlier reasons for delay in production was an unhappy choice of British military personnel selected by 21st Army Group which allocated something like 4000 officers and men for this purpose. According to my information this group rather interfered with the German personnel instead of inspiring production. This situation I am told has now been rectified by the designation of well-qualified British mining engineers and management staff. You will also be interested to know that today two French representatives will arrive to assist in this problem.

Labor. As you know approximately 325,000 miners were normally employed in the Ruhr area. Of these probably 50% were imported miners. However, the labor situation in this respect is not unfavorable. According to my information approximately 175,000 German miners are now at work and additional personnel is rapidly being obtained from released German prisoners of war. The fact also that

¹ Sent to the Secretary of State ad interim.

² Not printed. This message transmitted to Murphy the text of the proposed coal directive to Eisenhower (see document No. 420).

the Ruhr industries are for a large part at a standstill has released labor which is being inducted into mining.

Transportation would seem to be the ceiling rather than production. The key to this for the moment is the waterway system of the canals and the Ruhr and the Rhine. Rail transport is now well developed to the Rhine. The key port at Duisburg is in fairly good condition.

On the basis of the information available at present, it would appear that the ten million ton figure can well be met by the end of this year and I should say that there should be no great difficulty in obtaining required fifteen million tons by the end of April 1946.

This situation is far better than many had anticipated.

There is one problem which will have to be met and that is food for the miners. The calorie rate now permitted apparently is too low. At the same time there is great reluctance on the part of those here to import food for Germans. The British as I understand it are pressing for the release to that area of a certain tonnage of imported wheat. However, a careful investigation is being made of this situation and in any event an effort will be made to meet the local Ruhr food requirements out of German stocks and delay if possible any importation of food for German consumption.

MURPHY

No. 423

840.6362/7-345 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 3, 1945—10 a. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

6674. The following reply to the President's message (Deptel 5117, June 24¹) has just been received from the Prime Minister:

"Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret.

I am in full agreement in principle with your proposal and a similar directive to Field Marshal Montgomery is being prepared. There are certain points on which the Foreign Office are addressing the State Dept,² and we should like to have these considered before despatching our telegram."

WINANT

¹ Document No. 420.

² See document No. 425.

No. 424

740.00119 E. W./7-345: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Representative on the Allied Commission
on Reparations (Pauley)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1945—11 a. m.

1500. For Pauley.

For your information, this Government has received from the Potter Hyndley Mission a report on the coal situation in Northwest Europe.¹ This report concludes that, unless immediate and drastic steps are taken, there will occur in Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean area next winter a coal famine of such severity as to destroy all semblance of law and order and thus delay any chance of reasonable stability in these areas. This Government concurs in the major findings of the report and in its recommendation for immediate action (1) to secure the early attainment of maximum coal production in Germany, (2) to export from Germany to Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean all coal in excess of German needs.

The President proposes to issue a directive to the American Commander-in-Chief in Europe to take all steps necessary to make available for export from Germany out of the production of the coal mines in western Germany a minimum of ten million tons in 1945 and an additional fifteen million tons by end of April 1946.

The President has sent to Prime Minister Churchill and to General de Gaulle copies of this proposed directive² with a request that similar directives be sent by them to the appropriate British and French occupation authorities.

The priority to be accorded the steps contained in the President's proposed directive will be subordinate only to requirements necessary to ensure the safety and health of the occupying forces and the speedy redeployment of Allied forces in Germany. It is recognized that the following of this policy during the period of critical coal shortage will delay the resumption of industrial activity in Germany.

BYRNES

W L C[layton]

¹ See enclosure 2 to document No. 421.

² See document No. 420.

No. 425

840.6362/7-345

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Ref: G269/-/45

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Embassy is instructed to bring the following proposals to the attention of the State Department with reference to the messages recently exchanged between the President and the Prime Minister ¹ regarding the steps to be taken in Germany to relieve the threatening coal famine in Europe.

2. Firstly, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom consider that procedure should immediately be concerted for consultation with the Soviet Government on this question, as well as with the French Government, who, it is understood have already been approached by the United States Government. It is believed to be common ground between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government that in economic, as in other spheres, Germany should be administered as a whole in accordance with policies agreed between the four Controlling Powers. This is necessary both for the purpose of taking full advantage of German assets and of meeting German minimum needs in order to ensure the fullest development of those assets to that end. His Majesty's Government are anxious to ensure that the Soviet Government should not misinterpret their actions and those of the United States Government with regard to the export of coal from their zones of occupation in Germany as abandoning this principle. There is a clear danger of such misinterpretation since the Soviet Government are known to attach much importance to early deliveries of coal on reparation account.

3. His Majesty's Government suggest therefore that General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery respectively should be instructed to discuss the directives now to be issued to them in the Allied Control Council at the earliest possible date with a view to securing a policy common to the four Controlling Powers. General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery should at the same time be instructed to put its provisions into force straightaway pending agreement in the Allied Control Council.

4. His Majesty's Government suggest that simultaneously they and the United States Government should make a joint approach to

¹ See documents Nos. 420 and 423.

the Soviet Government (and also to the French Government following up the approach already made to them by the President), informing them of the nature of the instructions sent to the United States and United Kingdom Commanders-in-Chief and asking them to authorise their representatives on the Control Council to join in discussion at the earliest possible date with a view to securing a common policy. It would be explained to the Soviet and French Governments that, in view of the crying needs of Western Europe, the two Commanders-in-Chief had been authorised to put these instructions into force pending agreement in the Control Council and that a most careful account of any coal exported would be kept in order that the achievement of a common reparation policy should not be prejudiced. It might be added that, if these two Governments considered that they should take comparable action in their zones pending discussion in the Allied Control Council, His Majesty's Government and the United States Government hoped that they would likewise keep a similar account of all coal exports from areas for which their military authorities were responsible. Recipients would naturally be required to provide suitable acknowledgments that they were accountable under such schemes as might be agreed to.

5. Secondly, His Majesty's Government consider that the United States and United Kingdom Commanders-in-Chief should be given some discretion to supply from German mines the minimum amount of coal which they consider necessary to prevent the development of unrest and disorder to an extent which would not only render impossible the proper administration of their zones but would also hinder the redeployment of United Kingdom and United States Forces and the production of coal itself. With this end in view, His Majesty's Government suggest the amendments to the texts of the directives shown in the enclosure.

6. If the United States Government agree, His Majesty's Government suggest that arrangements should be made forthwith for directives in these terms to be despatched to General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery, respectively, to be tabled at the Allied Control Council at the earliest possible date and to be put into operation meanwhile. His Majesty's Ambassadors and the United States Ambassadors in Moscow and Paris would be instructed simultaneously to make representations to the Soviet and French Governments on the lines set out above.

R[ICHARD] M[ILES]

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1945.

[No. 425]

[Enclosure]

AMENDMENTS IN TEXTS OF DIRECTIVES

Paragraph 2² to read:—"To the extent necessary to accomplish the export of twenty-five million tons of coal, at the rate directed, to assign highest priority to all matters pertaining to maximizing the production and transportation of German coal, this priority to be subordinated only to *civil and military* requirements necessary to ensure the safety, security, health, maintenance and operation of the occupying forces, *the effective working of the Allied Control Commissions, and the speedy redeployment of Allied forces from Germany.*"

Paragraph 4, first sentence to read:—"to follow the principle, in the allocation of coal within Germany, that the export of coal from Germany is to take precedence over the use of coal for industrial production and civilian purposes within Germany, to the extent necessary to accomplish the export of twenty-five million tons of coal from Western Germany at the rate directed and to comply with paragraph 3 above, *subject* only to the requirements set out in paragraph 2 above."

Paragraph 7:—Omit the second sub-paragraph beginning "it is recognised".³

² The paragraphs referred to in these amendments are the numbered paragraphs in the directive quoted in document No. 420.

³ i. e., the final paragraph of document No. 420.

No. 426

103.9169/7-445 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chief of the Mission for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom (Blaisdell)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1945—3 p. m.

5415. For Blaisdell.

Following is text of letter being sent to you from Clayton:

"In a meeting held in my office on June 28, at which you were present along with representatives of the Department, the Foreign Economic Administration, the War Department, and the United States side of the Combined Production and Resources Board, agreement was reached on several aspects of this Government's policy with respect to stimulating German coal production for export and distribution thereof. It is contemplated that participation by the Soviets in the German coal export program, along these lines, will be sought at the forthcoming conferences in Berlin. I wish to confirm those policy recommendations which you were specifically asked to act upon

I. United States Policy with Respect to German Export Coal

It was agreed that the European Coal Organization should be the agency which, in effect, determines the physical distribution of German export coal among the claimant nations by recommending allocations to the appropriate Allied Control authorities after the latter have informed the ECO of expected export availabilities and probable transport restrictions under the contemplated directive for such production. The question of whether these exports shall be charged to the receiving countries on reparations or commercial account will remain in suspense and supplies necessary for production as well as exports will move forward without reference to solution of this problem. You are authorized to take the following action in this connection:

1. Inform your French and British colleagues on ECO of the United States policy above stated, and invite their participation in discussions of implementing this policy with the United States, French and British military officers concerned.

2. Seek acceptance of this policy by the ECO after consultation with the military and your French and British colleagues. It is understood that the allocating authority of ECO will not affect operations of the CPRB coal allocating machinery outside of Europe.

3. Make clear to ECO and the military that this policy for determining distribution of coal exported from Germany does not apply to allocation of coal within Germany, which latter function remains the responsibility of the Control Commission and the Zone Commanders.

II. Responsibility for Coal Production within Germany

It was agreed that it was desirable to have a strong central organization responsible for coal production in Germany but that the United States authorities in Washington should not attempt to establish the details of such an organization beyond recommending that it should consist of representatives from either the three or the four zones participating. You are authorized to discuss with the United States Zone Commander the development of practical solutions to the organizational problems which will arise from the interzonal and international character of this proposed control of German coal production for export. You should give particular attention to the methods of resolving disagreements which may arise among the zone commands in attaining maximum production of German coal.

III. Procurement of Imported Supplies Needed to Achieve German Coal Export Target

It was agreed that the United States would press for a development of an efficient channel for procurement, from sources outside Germany, of those supplies, including food, which are essential to exportable coal production in Germany. It is conceded that such a procurement

mechanism cannot proceed effectively if it is necessary, for example, for the French authorities in the Saar to seek coal production incentive supplies from the United States through the French Supply Council. You are authorized to discuss with your French and British colleagues, and the military, alternative methods of procurement and delivery of such supplies for all of the coal producing zones as a matter of the highest priority.

It is of course a prime objective of this Government to include the Soviets in any organization having to do with production, export, or allocation of German coal. If, in the course of the Berlin discussions, such an agreement can be reached, the above instructions and possibly the present constitution of ECO will have to be modified accordingly. Should you feel, after consultation with Ambassador Winant, that communication of the above to Soviet representatives in London is advisable as a summary of our tentative views, you are authorized to take such action. Please keep the interested US agencies and the US side of CPRB informed of developments."

BYRNES
W L C[layton]

No. 427

711.51/7-445

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Under Secretary of State (Grew)*¹

[Extracts ²]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have carefully considered the many points which you raised in your letter of 8 June 1945³ with respect to conditions in Western Europe. I share your concern over what I think we all recognize to be a distressing situation.

¹ Actually addressed to the Acting Secretary of State, but Grew was only Under Secretary on the date of signature.

² For other extracts from this letter, see document No. 365.

³ The pertinent passages of Grew's letter of June 8 read as follows (file No. 711.51/6-845):

"I am deeply concerned over conditions in Western Europe and the possibility that serious disorders may develop during the coming months. If the people of that area, particularly those in France, have to face another winter without heat or without adequate food and clothing, I can foresee disturbances of such serious consequence as not only to involve conflict with our troops, but to imperil gravely our long-term interests. The outlook at best is a gloomy one. . . .

"3. Although there are of course many factors contributing to social and economic instability in Western Europe, one of the most important is the lack of coal. I am convinced that drastic steps must be taken to provide coal for our Western European Allies, particularly France. I understand that steps are

3. You are correct in your assumption that the War Department has undertaken to ship coal to Northwest Europe during June, July, and August, within the limits of shipping and supply availabilities, to meet valid combined military import requirements therefor. It is expected that War Department responsibility for providing coal from the United States for Europe will terminate with August 1945 loadings.

At this time the combined British and American military authorities are making every effort to maximize the production of coal in the areas of Germany which they occupy. So long as combined military responsibility for the provision of coal in liberated areas of Europe continues, the combined military authorities will undertake to allocate any surplus of German coal which may be available on an equitable basis among those countries for the coal supply of which they are responsible. After the termination of combined military responsibility for the supply of coal, however, the amount of coal to be provided to liberated areas from Germany will involve reparations decisions which have not yet been made by this government. Moreover, to maximize the production of German coal will require the importation into Germany of substantial amounts of coal mining machinery. Determination to provide this machinery if it is to be financed by or provided from the U. S. involves a policy decision of our government and is not one for which the War Department should accept primary responsibility.

Much or all of such machinery may be placed in coal mines lying outside of zones of Germany for which the U. S. Army is responsible. The War Department has no funds to finance the procurement of such machinery and has been advised of no other funds available for the purpose. While I share your interest in this matter and your desire that everything possible be done to insure the maximum coal production in Germany, I feel that it is the responsibility of the civilian policy

underway which may permit the shipment, under military auspices, of certain limited quantities of coal from this country to the Western European countries. I sincerely hope that this will be done.

"I also understand that steps are being taken by the military authorities to push German coal production. I have been troubled, however, over reports to the effect that this production may, in large part, be allocated for use in Germany. I should therefore like to urge that an appropriate directive or order be issued which would

"(a) make the production and transportation of coal from the Ruhr and Saar a matter of first military operational priority;

"(b) assure equitable and prompt allocation of substantial quantities of such coal among our Western European Allies.

"Pending the setting up of more definitive allocating machinery, it would appear necessary that this responsibility be vested in SHAEF, which should act in consultation with the European Coal Organization (when that body commences to function) and, in the interim, in accordance with the procedure suggested in the following paragraph 5 [see footnote 3 to document No. 365] for allocations of German surpluses."

making agencies of our government to provide the solution to this financing problem. The War Department, in its administration of military government in Germany, will seek to carry out any policy so established. This subject was covered in greater detail in my letter to you of 14 June 1945.⁴

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L STIMSON

⁴ Not printed. Cf. document No. 342.

No. 428

740.00119 EW/7-745 : Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

Moscow, July 7, 1945—7 p. m.

2465. From Pauley for the Secretary.

Concerning Potter Hyndley report² on coal situation I fully agree that immediate action should be taken to export from Germany all coal in excess of German needs and to secure early attainment of maximum production. (Reurtel 1500, July 3, 11 a. m.³)

However, I feel that those countries that do not pay for the coal received should be given definite notice that such coal deliveries may either be considered as part of reparations payments when final reparation plan is put into effect or considered exports for which payment in acceptable currencies will be required.

¹ Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Harriman.

² See enclosure 2 to document No. 421.

³ Document No. 424.

No. 429

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-745 : Telegram

*The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

HOECHST, July 7, 1945—8 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

130. There was a second meeting of the Berlin *Kommandatura* this afternoon in Berlin at Marshal Zhukov's headquarters attended by Zhukov and his staff, General Clay, General Weeks representing the American and British control groups, Sobolev and myself. The purpose of the meeting was a discussion of some of the practical aspects

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 11 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1045).

of the occupation of Berlin and the organization of the *Kommandatura*. Zhukov presided.

The agenda included discussion of the (1) status of each nationality in its own sector of Berlin; (2) joint, common policies for military government in Greater Berlin, (3) coordination of military government in all sections of Berlin at three operational levels: (a) regular meetings of all Berlin sector commanders (*Kommandatura*), (b) regular meetings of chief military government officers of all sectors of Berlin (G-5's) and (c) frequent meetings of military government technicians of all sectors of Berlin (welfare, legal, engineers, etc.); (4) responsibility for supply of food for civil population of Greater Berlin; (5) responsibility for supply of fuel for civil population and installations of Greater Berlin.

Prior to our arrival a slight misunderstanding had arisen between the Commandant of our sector, Major General Parks and the Soviet Command. Parks had mistakenly believed that the military government of the US sector was vested solely in the United States. The Soviet Command had referred Parks to the contents of paragraph 5 of the agreement of Sept 1944² providing for the establishment of an Inter-Allied Council charged with the joint administration of the district of Greater Berlin. The meeting confirmed the latter point of view.

It was agreed that according to the terms of the governmental understanding of September 12, 1944, the Berlin area would be governed by joint direction on a quadripartite basis. When we first used the word "quadripartite" Zhukov jocularly inquired whether there would be French participation and as everyone agreed that there would be, it was also understood that until French participation had been formalized by the governments, that provision would be made for a French liaison officer or officers to attend meetings. It was agreed also that the chairmanship of the *Kommandatura* would rotate every 15 days.

Zhukov described the administration of Greater Berlin as consisting of 17 depts plus 1 for religious matters. His suggestion that an equal number of quadripartite committees be organized by the *Kommandatura* to supervise and control the work of these German administrative units was approved.

Zhukov also insisted, and it seems to me quite correctly, that the administration of the district of Greater Berlin should begin with the organization of an Inter-Allied Council. He proposed that the

² i. e., the protocol relating to the zones of occupation in Germany signed at London, September 12, 1944. For text, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071*; *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2078; *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 118.

Supreme Commanders should reach full agreement on matters pertaining to food supply, services to be rendered by the municipality to the garrison and the city, establishment of garrison regulations, fuel supply, and other important matters governing every day life of the garrison and the city of Berlin. He maintained that the administration of the district of Greater Berlin should not begin with the removal of Soviet military government agencies which are handling such matters.

Food supply. This imperative question was the first subject of debate. Zhukov blandly stated that now that the American and British authorities were occupying their sectors of Berlin, they had assumed responsibility for the feeding of the German civilian population in those areas. According to Russian figures there are approximately 787,000 German civilians in the American sector and approximately 900,000 in the British sector. In the Soviet sector there are about 1,106,000. According to Zhukov the normal system of food supply to Berlin is completely broken down in the absence of transportation and also because there is no food in the outlying districts of Pomerania, Mecklenburg, Brandenburg, and Saxony which ordinarily supply about 93 percent of Berlin's food. Zhukov said that Soviet authorities would continue to supply their sector in Berlin but that he considered that their responsibility ceased in respect of the British and American sectors. If this position is maintained our authorities are faced with an almost impossible supply problem. On the basis of rough calculation (this is under active study by our military authorities) this would require the American military authorities to lay down in Berlin monthly a minimum of 21,000 tons which might supply the barest essentials of life for the population in our sector. Even if the supplies were available and we were willing to provide them, present lack of rail transport might prevent us from doing so. Our military authorities are now engaged in an intensive study of this question, which was laid over for a further meeting on July 10.

Discussion of the *fuel supply* elicited some illuminating comments from Zhukov. Berlin requires for its present population of some 2,800,000 a daily supply for minimum utilities (not including domestic heating of course) [of] an estimated 7,500 tons of coal. General Clay pointed out that as the American zone provides no coal the supply would have to come from one of the other zones. Zhukov stated that there remained only the Ruhr and the Saar. Weeks inquired regarding Silesia as a possible source. Zhukov said that as the Silesian coal deposits were now in another jurisdiction, i. e. Poland, they were not available. I expressed surprise, stating that it was my understanding that Silesia formed part of the Soviet

zone of occupation of Germany. Zhukov corrected me, saying that Germany did not exist and that everyone knew that the Crimea Conference established the Polish frontier along the Oder and Neisse rivers.³ I replied that I had been laboring under the impression that for the purpose of the Control Council for Germany the territory whose resources would be available was as described in the agreement on zones of occupation recommended by EAC and approved by the govts. Zhukov left no doubt in our minds that any resources east of the Oder-Neisse line are not available in the joint administration of German territory. *I would appreciate the Dept's immediate advice on this point.*

After a description by Weeks of the present difficulties surrounding the production and transportation of Ruhr coal it was agreed to postpone further discussion until July 10 permitting consultation with the govts. When Weeks informed Zhukov that the lack of skilled miners was one of the impediments to Ruhr coal production, Zhukov said that he would be glad to supply 50,000 German men from the Greater Berlin area. Weeks inquired whether they would know anything about mining, Zhukov shrugged his shoulders and said they would be capable of labor and could be trained.

MURPHY

³ Cf. *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 680, 716, 777, 792, 869, 898-899, 905-906, 974.

No. 430

Frankfurt USPOLAD Files—820 Military Government Germany : Telegram

*The Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany (Clay)
to the War Department*

TOP SECRET

[FRANKFURT, 9 July 1945.]

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From USFET Main, from Clay, signed Bradley, to AGWar for WarCAD, passed to US Group CC for info, ref No S-96126.

At Saturday conference with Zhukov in Berlin agreements were reached for governing City of Berlin by *Kommandatura* and formal paper is being prepared for signature at Berlin on Tuesday. The proposed arrangement provides for a Tripartite Government of Berlin as a unit in all respects with French liaison until French Zone is defined, except that each Commander within his sector of Berlin will retain responsibility for law and order. The governing of the city will be in 18 Departments to include such matters as education, religion, press et cetera. While this number of Departments

[No. 430]

seems large, the *Kommandatura* can make such consolidations and changes as may be necessary. The Commandant rotating each 2 weeks will be Executive Officer for the running of the city. If this arrangement is a pattern for Group Council Control of Germany as a whole it is most encouraging.

However, the Russians demanded United States and United Kingdom accept proportionate responsibility for bringing in food and coal for Berlin. While we argued that Berlin had always been fed from Eastern Germany and had always received a large proportion of its coal from Silesia, Zhukov insisted that Russia did not have either the food or the coal. He claimed that those portions of Pomerania and Prussia which had fed Berlin in the past had been the scene of bitter fighting and that Germans had moved out of the area in such large numbers that there is little agriculture remaining for this season. He also claimed that Silesia had been turned over to the Polish Government and that Russia had no access to this coal except by payment. He stated that next year's harvest conditions may be much better but that at present his own commitments in Berlin were being met from Red Army stocks.

Since we must accept his statements as correct in the absence of confirming information it leaves us with no choice but to provide food and coal for Berlin. The food requirements for United States and United Kingdom zones are about the same and will total approximately 40,000 tons per month for both zones for a population of about 1,700,000. The coal supply required only for utilities will approximate 6,000 tons a day of hard coal which of course can come only from the Ruhr. The Russians will provide 1,500 tons a day of lignite.

To meet the existing food demand it will be essential until the harvest season to use imported wheat. Later it may be possible in part to supply Berlin from this year's harvest although all indications are that the harvest in Western Germany will not suffice for Western Germany exclusive of Berlin. However, we would propose to use this year's harvest to supply Berlin to the fullest extent compatible [*sic*], using imported stocks only as Germany's own resources are fully utilized. We cannot however gather sufficient stocks before the harvest to supply Berlin and must begin immediately to use imported stocks now presently available for both United States and United Kingdom. Our rail line into Berlin will be completed about July 25th and will carry the necessary tonnage.

It is our view that we must accept commitment for food and coal to Berlin as an interim measure until Allied Control Council machinery has had further opportunity to investigate and we propose to do so at tomorrow's meeting in Berlin.

No. 431

Frankfurt USPOLAD Files : Telegram

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany (Clay)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 10 July 1945.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From AGWar signed WarCOS to CG USFET Main for Clay, passed to US Group CC for action, ref No W-29913.

1. Interim commitment to provide food and coal for Berlin outlined your S-96126 dated 9 July ¹ causes concern here. Desirability of obtaining agreement for tripartite control and government of Berlin is appreciated but it is important that attainment of such agreement should not prejudice our basic principles and objectives in Germany.

2. Proposed interim agreement raises following questions which are disturbing to us as possibly prejudicing our basic position in Germany:

a. The State Department advises that this Government cannot accept Soviet position that Silesia has been turned over to Poland. Tripartite agreement for occupation of Germany was based on 1937 German boundaries which place Silesia in Soviet occupation zone. No interim agreement should be made which implicitly or impliedly accepts the view that Soviets may unilaterally and without consultation or agreement with the other occupying powers dispose of segments of the Soviet zone. Additional detail on this point has been communicated to Murphy by State Department.²

b. Although this Government's desire and objective is that Germany, for the purposes of the occupation must be treated as an entity it is recognized that as a practical matter, if agreement to entity theory is not reached, each occupying power will be obliged to supply its own zone. Under such circumstances the Soviets would be obliged to provide coal for the Soviet zone in Berlin. The fact that payment for supplies would be necessary would not relieve the Soviet obligation to supply coal for the Soviet zone. United States and United Kingdom would have to purchase supplies, not available in Germany, which are required in their respective zones. In light of these facts and your statement that Soviet demand is that the United States and United Kingdom should accept proportionate responsibility for bringing in coal for Berlin it is believed that even in negotiating an interim agreement you are justified in pressing the Soviets to furnish their due proportion of Berlin's coal.

c. Despite serious domestic shortages increasing pressure is being brought on the United States to export coal for liberated Europe. The amount of such export of necessity has definite limits and will be inadequate to meet the admitted minimum needs in such countries as France, Italy, Norway, and Denmark. The President has

¹ Document No. 430.

² See document No. 516.

expressed the view that meeting liberated Europe's minimum coal need to the extent possible from the Ruhr and Saar should have highest priority. In this situation an undertaking to provide approximately 2,000 tons per annum [*day*] of Ruhr coal to Berlin in face of Soviet refusal to make equitable provision from Eastern Germany would cause serious difficulty for this Government because any action which would inequitably reduce supply of German coal for liberated Europe would increase demand for export from the United States with resulting serious repercussions here.

d. In setting up War Department budget for imports to Germany estimates furnished to Congress were based on full use of indigenous resources to support the Berlin area.

e. No agreement has been reached as to the method by which imports for United Kingdom and French occupation zones from the United States will be financed.

3. No interim agreement should compromise the ultimate position of the United States with respect to the points above enumerated. It is assumed from your suggestion that the proposed agreement is an interim measure until Allied Control machinery has had further opportunity to investigate and that the United States will remain free to assert its position on any points and to terminate the interim arrangement at any time vis[-à-vis?] the United Kingdom, USSR, or French.

4. It is recognized that you may be influenced by factors not known here. Therefore will concur in such decision as you may make in light of foregoing analysis either to enter into appropriate interim arrangement with proper reservations or to continue negotiations pending opportunity to consult with United States representatives who have departed for conference. Desire that you keep War Department advised and that full information be furnished to appropriate United States representatives at conference.

5. This reply has been agreed [to?] by representatives of the State and War Departments. State Department will advise Murphy.

No. 432

840.6362/7-345

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State has considered the *Aide-Mémoire* presented by the British Embassy (Ref: G 269/-/45)¹ with regard to the messages recently exchanged between the President and the Prime Minister² regarding the steps to be taken in Germany concerning coal production.

¹ Document No. 425.

² See documents Nos. 420 and 423.

The Department of State proposes to take the following steps to meet the points raised in the *Aide-Mémoire*:

1. The Department of State has revised the suggested Directive in order to (a) instruct each Commander-in-Chief to seek agreement in the Control Council on a coal program for Germany as a whole[;] (b) provide for concerted action by the Zone Commanders on the measures required to meet the coal export target for Western Germany, and to carry out any agreed program which may be reached in the Control Council[;] (c) take into account certain other suggestions made by the British Government.

It will be noted that paragraph 2 has been revised to include the suggested changes put forward by the British Government, and that all exports of coal are subordinated to the civil and military requirements necessary to insure the safety, security, health, maintenance, and operation of the occupying forces, and speedy redeployment of the Allied forces from Germany. This Government does not consider it desirable, however, to make specific provision for the allocation of sufficient coal to prevent the development of disease and unrest in Germany. It is felt, rather, that the original wording of paragraph 7 should be retained to emphasize the importance attached to the proposed export program. The United States Government is aware that maximum exports of German coal can only be achieved by causing great privation and hardship to the German people. This should be clearly understood by the Zone Commanders.

2. The President will inform Marshal Stalin of the directive which the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States are issuing to their Commanders-in-Chief in Germany in view of the acute shortage of coal and urge the Soviet Government to instruct its Commander-in-Chief to concert with the other Commanders-in-Chief in the Control Council with a view to the formulation of a coal production and export program for Germany as a whole and the adoption of measures required to carry out this program. The President will also point out to Marshal Stalin that accounts will be kept of all coal exported from Germany and that all such exports would be without prejudice to agreed decisions on reparation.

The United States Government has received from General de Gaulle a message³ expressing complete concurrence with the original proposed directive. It has informed General de Gaulle that the Prime Minister has agreed in principle subject to certain points which are now being considered by the two Governments and that it will inform him of the result.

If the British Government concurs with the revised directive enclosed with this *Aide-Mémoire*,⁴ the United States Government will communicate once more with the French Government. It is under-

³ See document No. 420, footnote 2.

⁴ The enclosure is headed "Proposed Directive to the American Commander-in-Chief in Europe". Apart from the heading, it is identical with the attachment to document No. 1046, printed in vol. II.

stood that the three Governments will promptly issue the revised directive after general agreement is obtained.

W L C[LAYTON]

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1945.

No. 433

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-1245: Telegram

*The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

HOECHST, July 12, 1945—8 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

157. Please relay to the Secretary. My 130, July 7.²

General Clay and I attended the meeting in Berlin on July 10. Clay and Weeks each accepted commitments starting July 15 to supply 20,000 tons of food monthly to the civilian population in Berlin. The meeting stressed that every effort would be made to provide food from indigenous resources but the immediate requirements will necessarily be met in part from imported stocks. This supply of food is proportioned to the size of the American Berlin sector. The commitment was made with the understanding that it would be subject to review and modification by our respective governments and that it would probably be discussed at the pending conference.

General Weeks for the United Kingdom also agreed to supply, after exposition of the many difficulties involved and the state of public opinion in the United Kingdom and the liberated areas, 2,400 tons of coal per day from the Ruhr as soon as rail communications permit and subject to further study by the commandature as to minimum needs. The supply of coal is also to be on a proportionate basis and the Soviet Union will supply either $\frac{1}{3}$ of the total amount or a tonnage to be based on kilowatt usage. A committee of technicians is at present working on this problem.

At the meeting, Strang stated in behalf of the United Kingdom the reservation which I had made at the first meeting regarding Marshal Zhukov's statement that the Crimea Conference had determined that the western Polish frontier would be along the Oder and Neisse Rivers. Strang insisted that under present agreements the Control Council should consider its jurisdiction over German territory as inclusive of that territory within the 1937 boundaries. Zhukov

¹ The gist of this message was included in an unnumbered communication of July 13 sent by Grew to Byrnes by pouch (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1345).

² Document No. 429.

reacted mildly, stating that under his orders his jurisdiction did not extend east of the Oder and Neisse line. We felt it best under the circumstances to allow matters to stand at that, since Zhukov made it clear that he had no authority to take any other position.

General Clay in his report to the War Dept³ has emphasized that the Soviet request has always been limited to the United States and United Kingdom each furnishing a proportionate share of the requirements for Berlin. The Russians, of course, have indicated their willingness to have a complete review of this question made when the Allied Control Council begins operations. General Clay has also pointed out that as we are now in Berlin we have the obligation to see that the civilians living in our zone have sufficient food to live and the minimum of utility service.

General Clay has also made the point, in which I concur fully, that we have very little to bargain with in meeting the Russians in so far as the output of the American zone is concerned. He suggests that we could bargain more successfully if we were given authority to discuss transfers between zones, particularly with relation to Lend-Lease and other forms of aid which are being given directly to the Soviet Union by the United States. We are, of course, convinced that the Allied control machinery will be established but feel that this operation will take weeks, if not months, to function efficiently. Pending the establishment of such machinery it is obvious that we must negotiate with respect to any exchange of resources between the zones.

This meeting went off smoothly. The Russian attitude was conciliatory and I believe that the publicity which first broke in the London press as a result of statements made by Brigadier Hinde in Berlin⁴ may have had a salutary effect. In that connection, both General Weeks and General Hinde apologized to the American staff for Hinde's unauthorized account to the press of the first meeting and the emphasis which he laid on the difficulties confronting the Berlin administration.

MURPHY

³ Not printed.

⁴ Hinde had held a press conference at Berlin on July 8, in the course of which he had indicated (a) that British military government would not begin to operate in Berlin until the problem of supplying the city had been settled by the occupying powers; (b) that in the meantime the Soviet authorities would continue to supply food and fuel to the city; (c) that in these circumstances it was obviously impracticable for the British to govern alongside the Soviet authorities; and (d) that the problem would have to be settled by the Control Council or by even higher authority. The British press, which reported Hinde's remarks prominently, interpreted the last point as a reference to the possibility that the problems referred to would be discussed at the forthcoming conference of Heads of Government.

No. 434

103.9169/7-1645

*The Chief of the Mission for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom
(Blaisdell) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton)*¹

SECRET

[LONDON,] July 13, 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

1. This is to acknowledge your cable 5415 of July 4² in which you repeat the text of a letter which you have addressed to me regarding several aspects of the US Government's policy with respect to the stimulation of German coal production for export and the distribution of exportable German coal surpluses.

2. I am sorry to say that . . . your cable did not reach me until July 8. However on that date I had an opportunity to discuss your cable with Ambassador Winant and we mutually agreed that I should go to Frankfurt to talk with Lt. General Clay to get his slant on the various policy recommendations which you specifically asked me to act upon.

3. On July 11, together with Wayne Jackson of the Department and R. S. McCaffery of this Mission, I had an extended interview with General Clay at US Control Group Headquarters, Frankfurt, Germany.

4. Before I attempt to summarize for you certain of General Clay's comments with respect to specific aspects of your cable, I want to make clear that General Clay is not only vividly aware of the gravity of the coal position, both as regards US zone requirements and as regards the situation of Europe as a whole, but that he is, as well, making every effort to contribute what he can to the solution of this problem within the powers granted him as he sees them.

5. (a) With respect to your paragraph C-2:³

General Clay pointed out the split jurisdiction which exists as between the Reparations Commission and the Allied Control Commission and the likely difficulties resulting from this none too clearly defined authority. We agreed that this difficulty was a real one but expressed the hope that this jurisdictional aspect of the problem might be resolved at the forthcoming conference in Berlin.

(b) With respect to your paragraph G-2:

General Clay stated that the Combined Coal Committee under the recently set up Combined Resources Allocation Board (CRAB) of ACC constituted in his opinion suitable machinery in terms of "a strong

¹ Printed from a carbon copy forwarded to the Department of State. The original was sent to Clayton at Babelsberg by courier on July 14.

² Document No. 426.

³ The paragraphs referred to by Blaisdell are not so numbered in the file copy of Clayton's message.

central organization responsible for coal production in Germany," and that any other agency which might be set up to cut across zonal lines would be extremely impracticable under existing zonal arrangements. In the light of existing conditions we believe this view to be a reasonable one if ways and means can be found to fortify and strengthen the hand of the US side of CRAB. At the moment General Clay and the US element of the Control Group feel that they have little power, except that of persuasion, to induce the other controlling powers to accept any specific US suggestion leading toward the maximum coal production in those zones (the Ruhr and the Saar) not under US control.

All concerned strongly hope that, as a result of the forthcoming conferences in Berlin, the Russians will become active participants in CRAB (that is to say a four-partite [*sic*] equivalent of CRAB), and it would therefore seem most important that U. S. representatives at the Berlin conferences recognize that the effectiveness of such a four-partite CRAB and its Coal Committee will be in fact, as well as from the US point of view alone, largely determined by the effectiveness of the tools we can put in the hands of our very able US control group. The situation discussed in paragraph (c) below, will serve to illustrate this point.

It also becomes clear after discussions with General Draper, Col. James Boyd, and others in Frankfurt directly concerned with the working of CRAB, that one of the next steps should be the establishment of effective working arrangements between CRAB and the other recently established European economic organizations such as EEC, ECO and PEITO. We were asked numerous questions with regard to the development of these organizations and the extent to which they could supply working data with respect to requirements etc. to be considered by CRAB at the time allocations are made within Germany.

(c) With respect to your paragraph H-3 which states that "the US would press for development of an efficient channel for procurement from sources outside Germany, of those supplies, including food, which are essential to exportable coal production in Germany:"—General Clay stated that this was, of course, most desirable but that his latest directive⁴ (which we have not seen), just received from the JCS clearly cut the ground out from under the proposal put forward in paragraph H-3. This is because this directive places the allocation of all imported food (most of which will be from US) on a *combined* basis, and the British are already in receipt of a large propor-

⁴ The Department of Defense has supplied the information that no Joint Chiefs of Staff or Combined Chiefs of Staff directive having the substance and approximate date suggested by this paragraph has been identified.

tion of this food, including most of the wheat, at ports controlled by them. The US Control Group had hoped that, at least in respect of food procured in the USA, it would be in a controlling position and thus in a stronger bargaining position in terms of the implementation of such suggestions as it might put forward regarding, let us say, the stimulation of Ruhr coal production.

I had no advance knowledge of the existence of the above mentioned directive on the combined distribution of food, and I share General Clay's attitude with regard to its having weakened the US hand in the sense of our US Control authorities being able to indicate the specific material contributions which they might make under given circumstances to the solution of the coal production problem in the British and French zones.

Incidentally, General Clay is most pessimistic about the probability of getting increased production in the Saar under French occupation, and all informed opinion on this side with which I have been in touch concurs in this view. Under present arrangements I think we can expect little or no coal from this source. You will recall that I reported this to you in Washington.

6. To continue with one more aspect of the problem posed in connection with incentive supplies for coal production mentioned in your paragraph H-3 I think it should be recognized that the procurement of such supplies is only part of the wider problem of a general German import program and the relationship of such a program to foreign exchange questions. However, while recognizing that the procurement of supplies which might be sent into Germany for the express purpose of stimulating coal production must be integrated with the broader import policy I nevertheless feel that the US should contrive to set up a procurement channel for the former which will keep such supplies on the same level of high priority as we have proposed to put coal production itself.

7. The other aspects of your cable, namely those portions which require discussion with our French and British colleagues on ECO, will be covered in a later communication.

8. I am forwarding a copy of this letter to General Clay in Frankfurt.

Yours sincerely,

THOMAS C. BLAISDELL

TRANSFERS OF POPULATION

No. 435

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper[Extract ¹]

TOP SECRET

SUGGESTED UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING POLAND

SUMMARY

. . . We should facilitate insofar as our aid is requested the transfer of minority groups but we should not permit the forced repatriation of Poles now in the West or the uncontrolled deportation by unilateral Polish action of the 8-10,000,000 Germans formerly domiciled in the areas claimed by the Soviet-sponsored Polish Government.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

¹ For other sections of this paper, see documents Nos. 483, 510, and 521.

No. 436

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

EXPULSION OF MINORITY GROUPS

The United States has been officially informed by the Czechoslovak Republic that it desires to expel immediately the Sudeten German and Hungarian minorities.¹ Although the Government of the United States has expressed its sympathy with the concern of the Czechoslovak Government over its minority problems, it opposes any unilateral action to transfer these minorities until a satisfactory agreement is reached with the powers responsible for the maintenance of order and military security in Germany.

The transfer of the Sudeten German minority is part of the large problem of the transfer of German minorities from Poland and other states. The heads of the Allied governments may wish to discuss this question in its larger context in order to provide for an orderly solution of the whole problem of German minorities. Unless an agreement is

¹ See document No. 439.

reached, the Czechoslovak Government may attempt unilateral action, since the continued presence of the Sudeten German minority is the most pressing and important political question in Czechoslovakia.

[WASHINGTON,] June 23, 1945.

No. 437

860f.4016/6-2845

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Ref: 512/15/45

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON
DATED JUNE 22ND, 1945

My immediately following telegram¹ contains text of instructions I proposed sending to Mr. Nichols. But before despatching these I am anxious to know the views of the State Department. Please discuss these draft instructions with State Department and let us have any comments they have to make as soon as possible. You should point out that we recognise that the matter in its immediate aspect concerns the Americans more closely than ourselves since they occupy at present a large part of Czechoslovakia and also their zone of occupation in Germany marches for many miles with the Czech frontier.

2. It is in our view important that we should make clear to the Czechs that it will be for the Allied Control Commission in Germany, when the main questions of principle have been decided between the Governments, to decide when and by what stages German minorities outside the frontiers of Germany can be admitted into that country. This question will affect the general administration of Germany far more closely than that of the repatriation to Germany of Reich Germans now in Czechoslovakia, which according to His Majesty's Ambassador in Prague is in the Russian view a matter for the Control Commission to decide.

3. It seems to us that a full exchange of views with the Americans on the whole question of transfers of ethnic minority groups in Europe is desirable, with special reference to United States proposals as reported in Prague telegram No. 44.² Such an exchange of views

¹ Although the text of the message referred to was apparently made available to the Department of State (see document No. 440), it has not been found in the Department's files.

² i. e., from the British Embassy at Prague to the Foreign Office. Not found in Department of State files.

might lead up to tripartite discussion on the subject at the forthcoming meeting of the "Big Three". Will you sound the State Department on the latter proposal and let us know their reactions to it?

4. We have now been approached by the United States Embassy on the lines anticipated in Prague telegram No. 44. They are being informed of the instructions sent to you in this and my immediately following telegram.

WASHINGTON, June 28th, 1945.

No. 438

860f.4016/6-2845 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Czechoslovakia (Klieforth) to the Secretary of State
ad interim*

SECRET

PRAHA, June 28, 1945—6 p. m.

44. Regardless of the importance and gravity of Zecho-Russian relations, the outstanding issue in Zecho, on which the country's reconstruction depends, is solution of the minority problem involving transfer to Germany and Hungary of about three million Czech nationals who constitute 20% of the country's population. Replacement of minority people by approximately the same number of Czechos, 90% of whom will have to be uprooted and transferred, constitutes the second and related phase of this problem. Transfer and replacement of minorities will involve 40% of Zecho population.

Zecho Govt realizes that transfers must be undertaken in agreement with the Allied Govts. However it is essential that the earliest possible agreement be reached in this matter. All reconstruction is makeshift until the transfer problem is solved. The people of Zecho demand an early solution or at least an agreement outlining the proposed stages of the transfer and, most important of all, the time envisaged to complete the operation. This problem unsolved presents the greatest danger to President Beneš' prestige. The possibility cannot be excluded that the situation affords opportunity for a dramatic leader with radical support to arouse the people and seek solution by force, on the model of similar action elsewhere in Europe after 1918.

KLIEFORTH

[No. 438]

No. 439

840.4016 DP/7-545

*The Czechoslovak Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
(Clementis) to the Chargé in Czechoslovakia (Klieforth)*¹

7359/II/S/1945

PRAHA, July 3rd, 1945.

MONSIEUR LE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES, On behalf of the Czechoslovak Government I have the honour to make the following communication:

Prior to the cessation of hostilities the President of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak Government submitted to the Allied Governments a detailed memorandum² accounting for the political necessity to evacuate a predominant part of the German and Hungarian population out of this country.

In this way, they acted as interpreters of elemental and unanimous wishes of the Czech and Slovak nations, who, anxious about the future of the State, entertain the desire to exclude from their midst any elements, that proved by their attitude to have been propagators of national hatred, willing instruments of hostile propaganda and instigators of dissension among states. The ultimate phase of the struggle for liberation strengthened in the Czechoslovak people the conviction that without the removal of a great majority of Germans and Magyars, by the way of transfer, no sound and peaceful development of our State and no lasting peace and stability in Central Europe could be secured.

The proposals contained in the aforesaid memorandum met with agreement, that is to say, no particular objection in principle has been raised. It has merely been pointed out by all our Allies that the transfer must proceed on organised lines, according to plan and in accord with relevant allied bodies.³ In view of the fact that in this transfer 2 to 2½ a million [*sic*] of Germans and approximately 400.000 Magyars are involved, the Czech Government came to the conviction that it is indispensable to carry out this scheme according to plan and on organised lines. The Czechoslovak Government is preparing a plan and a proper organisation of the transfer.

As to the transfer of Germans out of Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak Government would suggest that the Great Powers, performing the control over Germany, determine in accord with the Czechoslovak Government the number of people to be transferred into the respective zone of occupation and within fixed intervals. The technical execu-

¹ This note was transmitted to the Secretary of State as an enclosure to document No. 186.

² Not printed.

³ See document No. 440.

tion of the transfer could be secured by the mediation of Czechoslovak coordinating missions, to be attached to the headquarters of each zone of occupation.

In respect of the transfer of the Magyars, the delegate of the Czechoslovak Government could discuss this question with the Control Commission in Budapest, to the effect that a major part of the transfer of the Magyar population out of Slovakia could be carried out on the basis of exchange of population, for there are approximately 345,000 Slovaks living in Hungary, who are desirous to be moved into Slovakia.

As stated above, the Czech and Slovak nations consider unanimously the transfer of Germans and Hungarians an essential necessity for the future of the Czechoslovak State and for the preservation of peace in Central Europe. It is, therefore, obvious that the attention of the entire Czechoslovak public opinion is drawn to this question, which is undoubtedly the most burning of all problems, the solution of which the Czechoslovak Government is endeavouring to attain. Any postponement of its settlement cannot but considerably disquiet all Czech and Slovak population.

As long as this elemental problem is not solved, all administrative, economic and social reconstruction and consolidation of the State is being hampered and delayed.

I should, therefore, Monsieur le Chargé [d']Affaires, feel very grateful if you would convey this point of view of the President of the Czechoslovak Republic and of the Czechoslovak Government to the President Truman so as to make this question an object of discussion and decision for the coming conference of the Three.

A similar note is being addressed to representatives of the Governments of Great Britain and USSR.

Accept [etc.]

DR. V. CLEMENTIS

No. 440

860f.4016/6-2845

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has considered the telegram of June 22, 1945 (512/15/45) from the Foreign Office to the Embassy¹ and the draft instructions to Ambassador Nichols in Praha (6652, June 22, 1945).²

The views of the United States with regard to the transfer of minorities from Czechoslovakia were made known to the Czechoslovak

¹ Document No. 437.

² See document No. 437, footnote 1.

Government on January 31, 1945,³ in answer to its note of November 23, 1944,⁴ in the following terms:

"The American Government fully appreciates the injuries suffered by Czechoslovakia at the hands of Germany and of the German minority during the past decade or so and is prepared to examine the problem in an effort to seek a satisfactory solution for the future. This solution, of course, will have to take into account the needs of Czechoslovakia referred to in your note, and also the broader aspects of the problem in its relation to general measures for the future peace and security of Europe as a whole, as well as the particular problem which will face the Governments accepting the unconditional surrender of Germany, which thereby become responsible, as occupying powers, for the control and administration of Germany.

"There will also undoubtedly arise related questions with regard to the transfer of Germans from other territories. Since this problem may therefore involve an aggregate of some millions of people, it would be a matter of major concern to the occupying powers in the maintenance of order in Germany during the absorption of such people from abroad simultaneously with the repatriation or resettlement of millions of displaced persons now within Germany.

"The American Government therefore feels that transfers of the kind contemplated in your Excellency's note should only be carried out pursuant to appropriate international arrangement, as suggested in your Excellency's address of October 8, 1944, and under international auspices. It also agrees with the Czechoslovak Government that any process of transfer should be a gradual one, in order to provide facilities for the orderly settlement of transferred persons. Pending such international arrangements, the American Government feels that no unilateral action should be taken to transfer large groups, and understands from the statements cited above that the Czechoslovak Government does not envisage any unilateral action to do so."

Inasmuch as there has been no reason to alter these views since they were communicated to the Czechoslovak Government, the Department of State is in agreement with the draft instructions to Ambassador Nichols that the determination of the method and timing of the repatriation of the Reich Germans now in Czechoslovakia and the transfer of the German minority in Czechoslovakia must be left to the Allied Control Council in Germany.

Since the receipt of the Foreign Office telegram, a note, dated July 3, 1945,⁵ has been received from the Czechoslovak Government stating that, since the Allied States had made no objection in principle to the proposed transfer of the German and Hungarian minorities, the Czechoslovak Government was preparing a plan for an organized and orderly transfer.

The Department's reply⁶ to the Czechoslovak note reiterates the

³ In note No. 155 from Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim near the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile at London, to Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk (file No. 740.00119 E. A. C./1-3145).

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ Document No. 439.

⁶ See document No. 441.

views of the United States, as set forth above, and requests the Czechoslovak Government to bring its plan for the repatriation of Reich Germans and the transfer of the minorities immediately to the attention of the Allied States represented on the Control Council in Germany and the Control Commission in Hungary through the appropriate Czechoslovak Coordinating Missions attached to these bodies.

The Department of State believes that an exchange of views on the whole question of the transfers of ethnic minority groups in Europe is not required at this time in view of the clear statements of policy by the British and American Governments, and could be deferred pending a possible discussion of this question at the forthcoming tripartite conference.

WASHINGTON, [July 11, 1945.]

No. 441

860f.4016/7-445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Czechoslovakia (Klieforth)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1945—7 p. m.

54. Please deliver note along following lines to Zecho Govt (urtel 44 June 28 ¹ and 59 July 4 ²):

US Govt acknowledges receipt of Zecho note of July 3 ³ concerning transfer of German and Hungarian minorities. US Govt has already made its views known to Zecho Govt in note of Jan 31, 1945.⁴ At that time US Govt stated it fully appreciated injuries suffered by Zecho at hands of Germans and German minority during past decade and was prepared to examine question in effort to arrive at satisfactory solution. US pointed out that solution will have to take into account broader aspects of problem in relation to future peace and security in Europe as well as particular problems facing Govts responsible for military occupation in Germany.

In view of importance of questions of minority transfers for European peace as a whole, US Govt believes that transfers as proposed in Zecho notes Nov 23, 1944 ⁵ and July 3, 1945 should be carried out only on organized lines and in accordance with international agreement. US also appreciates importance attached by Zecho Govt to early solution of problem as basis for national rehabilitation and reconstruction. Therefore US Govt is gratified that Zecho Govt is preparing plan for organized transfer of minority population which will take into account particular problems facing Allied powers. If

¹ Document No. 438.

² This message transmitted a telegraphic text of document No. 439.

³ Document No. 439.

⁴ See document No. 440.

⁵ Not printed.

plan is presented immediately upon completion to Control Council Germany and Allied Control Commission Hungary, US Govt confident it will receive immediate consideration by states represented on these bodies and will be discussed with appropriate Zecho authorities. End of summary.

For your background information and possible informal communication in your discretion to Pres Beneš, US delegation to Big Three briefed to discuss this question in relation to whole minority problem.

GREW

H[enry] P L[everich]

GREECE
GOVERNMENT AND ELECTIONS

No. 442

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

GREECE

To take an active and benevolent interest in Greece at this time offers one of the most practical means of demonstrating this Government's determination to play an international role commensurate with its strength and public commitments. Although Greece has been traditionally closer to Great Britain than to any other great power, there has always been a friendly bond between the United States and Greece, the ancient home of democratic ideals. Classical education derived through Rome from Greece helped to shape the republican ideals of the emergent United States. The American experiment in democracy in turn exerted an influence on Greece in its struggle for freedom from the Ottoman Empire in the early 19th century. The bond of sympathy between the two countries has strengthened ever since the renaissance of Greece as a modern European nation. American prestige has been built up by our interests in Greece, which, though not extensive, have been of a type to promote good-will: trade, banking, engineering and development projects, philanthropy, archeology, and education. Large numbers of Greeks have emigrated to America. Approximately half a million have become progressive and patriotic American citizens, although retaining strong interest in the land of their origin, and the many who have returned to Greece after living in this country are almost unanimously pro-American in their sentiments.

Traditionally our policy towards Greece has been one of friendliness characterized by refusal to intervene in internal Greek affairs. The Yalta decisions necessitate a reorientation of this policy, for at that meeting this Government indicated its willingness and determination to participate in Allied guarantees that smaller nations liberated from Axis domination should be guaranteed the right of choosing by peaceful and democratic means the government under which they wish to live.¹ It is obvious that tranquillity necessary for constitu-

¹ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

tional elections is closely tied up with economic stability and that we as a nation should not shirk the responsibility of contributing to a revival of economic health. In the case of Greece we have a particularly heavy moral responsibility because among the smaller Allied nations it is the one which has most steadfastly upheld the United Nations cause, materially contributing to the final victory by its unexpectedly effective resistance to Italian and German aggression in the early stages of the war.

It is possible that a closed Russian-controlled economy in the Balkans and an extreme nationalism in certain countries of the Near East will for a time interpose obstacles to American influence. Greece, geographically a part of southeastern Europe but closely associated with the Near East because of its maritime trade and its islands, is a bridge between these two parts of the Eastern Mediterranean; a strong American role there could not but be felt in both directions. Greece is the only one of the Balkans or Near Eastern countries (with the possible exception of Syria and Lebanon) which is not characterized by xenophobia. On the contrary, the Greek people have unmistakably indicated their desire for a closer *rapprochement* with the United States. The present Greek fear of Russia is probably partly responsible for this attitude—an attitude which this Government deprecates but which is understandable and might better be dissipated by our becoming an active mediator than by our relinquishing all of Greek affairs to the control of Great Britain.

To implement our policy toward Greece we should be prepared:

1. To advance the suggestion, already written into the Varkiza Agreement of February 12, 1945,² that at an early date the Greek Government should invite Allied observers to assist in and supervise democratic elections for a constituent assembly and a plebiscite on the question of the form of government. It might even be possible to indicate our belief that a republican form of government offers more possibilities for a peaceful future than the return of a monarchy already stigmatized by totalitarianism.

2. To assist actively in the economic reconstruction and development of the country and its resources, including its merchant marine, and in the revival of its foreign trade. Although we are contributing generously to UNRRA, we should plan to make industrial credits available to Greece, perhaps through the Export-Import Bank, if forthcoming legislation removes present barriers.

3. To encourage Greece to an early reconciliation and the development of good relations with her neighbors by supporting the reduction or removal of commercial, financial, social and cultural barriers. The situation in which British-dominated Greece and Turkey (and perhaps Albania) would become isolated economically and politically from a

² Between the Greek Government and the National Liberation Front. Text in C. M. Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord: A Survey of Recent Greek Politics in Their International Setting* (London, 1948), p. 308.

group of Russian-dominated Slavic neighbors on the north would be a real menace to world peace.

4. To adopt positions outlined in separate territorial papers.³

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

³ Not printed.

No. 443

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper ¹

TOP SECRET

ELECTIONS IN GREECE

At Yalta this Government agreed to concert with Russia and Great Britain in assisting the liberated nations of Europe "to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems." In the case of Greece, where the United States had no military commitments and was responsible to only a limited extent for the distribution of civilian relief during the Military Liaison period, we made no public comment on the Varkiza Agreement of February 12, 1945, between EAM and the Greek Government, Article 9 of which stipulated Allied supervision for a plebiscite to be held within the current year and subsequent elections; but this Government has been prepared since that time to consider favorably a request from the Greek Government for participation in administering such elections.

Several months elapsed after the Varkiza Agreement without any indication that the Greek Government was actively attempting to implement the proviso calling for elections. In reply² to a British *aide-mémoire* of July [June] 16³ requesting the views of this Government on the subject, the Department is suggesting that the British and American Ambassadors in Athens⁴ should make parallel representations at once to the Greek Government, pointing out that in the opinion of their respective Governments elections should be held as soon as possible, that the three Allies who participated in the Crimea Conference should have observers present to supervise the elections, and that it is hoped that the Greek Government will agree to the presence of these observers. There will also be no objection on the part of this Government if the Greek Government wishes France also to participate in the supervision of these elections. It is being further

¹ Annex 5 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² See document No. 445.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Sir Reginald Leeper and Lincoln MacVeagh, respectively. In the papers relating to the Berlin Conference, however, Leeper is never mentioned as being present in Athens. In his absence Harold Caccia acted as British Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

suggested that the Greek Government might wish to give favorable consideration to the recent request of the EAM representatives who signed the Varkiza Agreement that the election of a representative assembly should precede the plebiscite. In this way a democratically elected government, after a period of perhaps six months in which to establish itself, would be in a position to conduct a plebiscite on the question of the monarchy.

It is hoped that the Greek Government will have replied favorably to this approach before the Big Three meeting. At the time of the meeting, the United States Government will recommend that Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, and if considered desirable, France send observers to supervise the elections, at the same time indicating its own willingness to send observers to Greece to help with the polling and the operation of the returning machinery at whatever time within the year is specified by the Greek Government. This step would be made in a spirit of friendly desire to aid one of the United Nations whose normal democratic procedures have been disrupted by years of aggression and occupation, and through no wish to influence the free expression of the will of the Greek people.

In this connection, however, it must be remembered that Marshal Stalin in a recent message⁵ to Prime Minister Churchill has stated his belief that the participation of foreign observers in the Greek elections would be an insult to the Greek people and an interference in Greek internal affairs. The Marshal is of course reluctant to see established a precedent which might be used to urge similar supervision of elections in other countries of Eastern Europe in the so-called Soviet sphere.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

⁵ For the text of Stalin's message to Churchill of May 4, which contained the statement summarized here, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. 1, p. 346.

No. 444

868.00/7-445

The Secretary of State to the President

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: American Participation in the Supervision of Greek Elections.

The question of American participation in the supervision of Greek elections raises an issue of the first importance. This Government has repeatedly affirmed its purpose, as stated by President Roosevelt

in his Message on the State of the Union of January 6, 1945,¹ "to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them".

We have further asserted an obligation to see to it that the right of the peoples of the liberated areas to choose their own government and institutions should not be defeated by interim governmental authorities. President Roosevelt stated this obligation, in the same speech, in the following words:

"Until conditions permit a genuine expression of the peoples' will, we and our Allies have a duty, which we cannot ignore, to use our influence to the end that no temporary or provisional authorities in the liberated countries block the eventual exercise of the peoples' right freely to choose the government and institutions under which, as free men, they are to live".

This general obligation on the part of the Allies was specifically formulated at the Crimea Conference. In his report of March 1, 1945,² on that Conference, President Roosevelt stated that the three powers had agreed that the political and economic problem "of any area liberated from the Nazi conquest, or of any former Axis satellite, are a joint responsibility of all three governments". The three powers, he continued, would endeavor to see that interim governing authorities were "as representative as possible of all democratic elements in the population", and specifically to see to it "that free elections are held as soon as possible". This purpose to assure to the peoples of the liberated and satellite areas an opportunity to determine their own forms of government through free elections has provided the moral basis of our political policy with reference to the peoples of areas overrun by the Axis. The question of the implementation of this policy is now urgently raised by the still unfulfilled agreement made in February³ between the Greek Government and EAM that elections to determine the will of the Greek people be held with Allied assistance. Furthermore, the decision made and the procedures employed as to the Greek elections will have a controlling effect upon the policy and procedures to be adopted in other liberated areas and former satellite states.

In view of these facts, it is considered essential that this Government should participate, preferably in association with the other Yalta powers, in the supervision of the approaching Greek elections.

¹ Text in *Congressional Record*, vol. 91, pt. 1, p. 65. The portions of the message pertaining to foreign affairs are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XII, p. 22.

² See *Congressional Record*, vol. 91, pt. 2, p. 1618; Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XII, p. 321.

³ The so-called Varkiza Agreement. Text in Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, p. 308.

It is believed, further, that the participation of this Government should not be conditional upon the invitation of the interim governing authorities in Greece, since its obligation in this respect is an undertaking not so much to the interim authorities as to the Greek people themselves. It was specifically stated by the President in his Message on the State of the Union on January 6, 1945, that the peoples' right to choose the government and institutions under which they wish to live should not be blocked by temporary or provisional authorities.

It is recommended, therefore, that the American and British Ambassadors in Athens, who are the only diplomatic representatives in Greece of the Yalta powers, should call the Yalta undertaking to the attention of the Greek Government, and should inform the Greek Government that their Governments are prepared to participate in the supervision of Greek elections and that they assume the Greek Government will wish them to do so. It is anticipated that the Greek Government would thereupon express its desire for Allied participation, requesting the three Yalta Powers, and, conceivably, France, to supervise Greek elections. It is believed important also that our willingness to fulfill the obligation we have assumed with reference to the areas in question should be made explicit and public.

In order that any Allied assistance with elections should be on a scale sufficiently large to be effective, it is suggested that the War Department be asked to furnish five hundred American personnel. Such a mission should be headed by someone other than our Ambassador to Greece, who might find the duties of supervision of elections prejudicial to his diplomatic status.

If you agree, the War Department will be requested to make the required personnel available for temporary duty in Greece.⁴

JAMES F. BYRNES

⁴ At the end of the paper is the following manuscript endorsement by the President: "I agree Harry S Truman".

No. 445

868.00/6-1645

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department has received the *aide-mémoire* of June 16, 1945,¹ from the British Embassy requesting the views of this Government on the Allied supervision of a plebiscite and elections in Greece in accordance with Article 9 of the Varkiza Agreement of February 12, 1945.

¹ Not printed.

The Department is in agreement with the Foreign Office that chances for the success of elections in Greece would be enhanced by Allied supervision.

The signatories of the Crimea Communiqué expressed their willingness jointly to assist the liberated countries of Europe in establishing stable governments by democratic processes expressive of the will of the people. In the case of Greece we cannot consider the responsibility of the United States discharged until the Greek people are assured fair elections under circumstances in which the voters will not be subjected to undue pressure from embittered factions.

The Department does not believe that the presence of friendly observers at elections could justifiably be considered a violation of Greek sovereignty. In this connection, it will be recalled that Allied supervision of elections was explicitly authorized in an agreement signed by representatives of both the Greek Government and EAM, and that the political coalition of EAM has repeatedly since that time urged the Greek Government to give evidence of its intention to honor this mutually agreed stipulation.

The Department suggests that, with the concurrence of the British Government, the British and American Ambassadors in Athens, who are the only diplomatic representatives in Greece of the Governments present at Yalta, inform the Greek Government that in view of their obligations to the people of Greece and of their undertakings at Yalta, the British and American Governments feel that the Greek elections should take place under the supervision of the Allies, namely, Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and, if agreeable to the Greek and French Governments, France. They may at the same time refer to Article 9 of the Varkiza Agreement providing for Allied supervision of Greek elections. In case the Greek Government agrees to Allied supervision, the Ambassadors will inform it that the Governments of the United States and Great Britain will take up the matter with the Soviet Government and, if desired, with the French, in the immediate future.

The Department is of the opinion that it would be desirable for the British and American Ambassadors to make the suggested approaches to the Greek Government within the next few days so that the matter may be discussed at the meeting of the Big Three, scheduled early in July.

If agreeable to the British Government, it might also be suggested to the Greek Government that it give favorable consideration to the idea, which has been gaining popular approval in Greece and which has recently been subscribed to by the three EAM signers of the Varkiza Agreement, that elections for a constituent assembly precede the plebiscite. This order of events appears to offer a better solution

to Greek problems in that it would at an early date give Greece a representative political government which would then be in a position to make plans for a plebiscite on the question of the monarchy. It may also be considered desirable that an approximate date be set for the plebiscite, preferably some six months after the convening of a duly elected constituent assembly. Thus the democratically elected government would be given a brief period in which to establish itself.

It is the opinion of this Government that, if Allied assistance is to be offered in the hope of accomplishing fair and free elections in Greece, Allied observers should assist both at the polls on election day and in the operation of the returning machinery. The number of observers mentioned in the British *aide-mémoire* seems somewhat low, and this Government is now exploring the possibility of making available several hundred personnel for the purpose.

In the absence of extensive information on the Greek National Guard and *Gendarmerie* the Department is inclined to agree that the use of some British troops to supervise the polling would be advisable. A final decision on this matter, however, might await discussion between the British and the American Ambassadors in Athens.

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1945.

No. 446

868.00/7-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, July 7, 1945—midnight.

2472. Sharp protest was made by Brit Ambassador¹ in letter to Molotov dated July 6 (to Dept 2472 rptd Athens 31, London 348) regarding recent criticism in Soviet Press and radio of Greek Govt, Brit policy in Greece and conduct of Scobie and Brit troops in that country. Statement in Shalitov article in *New Times* June 15 on Greece described by Clark Kerr as misleading and hostile.

HARRIMAN

¹ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

No. 447

868.00/7-945 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, July 9, 1945—7 p. m.

690. Glad this problem² now receiving attention (urtel 641, July 5³). Fundamental local situation unchanged hence following preliminary comments recommendations offered against background mytel 132, Dec 8, 1944.³

Believe Russian participation essential satisfy Left and this necessary allays [*sic*] suspicions, pacify country. Unable determine urtel whether commission now envisaged would only supply "friendly observers" to influence by their presence and ultimately pass on fairness of Greek elections, or actually intervene in operation. Latter alternative, involving Allied assistance at polls and use of Brit troops to supervise polling, might justify Soviet view violation Greek sovereignty and also cause endless discussion here as to "undue influence". Have discussed this with Brit Chargé, Caccia, who agrees. Firmer alternative, however, not incompatible expressed desires all parties. EAM and KKE specially vocal demanding Allied "supervision" and this might be usefully recalled Soviet attention. Should Moscow remain firm against sending mission might not three Yalta powers jointly depute us [*U. S.?*] act alone this matter their name? This not discussed Caccia. Believe Partisan suspicions unlikely attach our action such conditions, but association with Brit to exclusion Soviets certain involve us in anti-Brit charges Partisanship if Leftists unsuccessful and render costly effort help Greece null.

Concerning proposed suggestion to Greek Govt that elections precede Plebiscite this would contravene provisions Varkiza agreement and Caccia feels his Govt more closely involved this agreement than us. He queries advisability intervening to upset it this particular specially as question relative timing elections Plebiscite highly controversial and wholly internal. Caccia has copy Dept's reply⁴ FonOff's *aide-mémoire* but has not been asked comment.

If Commission constituted Dept's figures would not seem exaggerated for proper job and fully agree wisdom keeping diplomatic mission uninvolved.

MACVEAGH

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 19 of July 12 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1245).

² i. e., Allied supervision of Greek elections.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Document No. 445.

No. 448

740.00119 PW/7-1045

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[Extracts]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: . . . Greek elections.

Participants: The British Ambassador, the Earl of Halifax;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew.

Lord Halifax called on me this afternoon and the following matters were discussed:

3. The Ambassador then discussed with me my recent *aide-mémoire* concerning the Greek elections.¹ He said that with regard to approaching the Greek Government and eventually the Soviet and French Governments the British Government was in accord. The British Government did not, however, concur in our recommendation concerning the sequence of a plebiscite and the elections in Greece as it was felt that this was a matter for the Greek Government to determine. I asked the Ambassador if he would not like me to request Mr. Kohler to come in to the conversation in order to discuss the subject in detail but Lord Halifax said that he merely wished to leave his reply² to our *aide-mémoire* and as it was self-explanatory he did not think we needed to discuss the details at this time.

A number of other matters were discussed informally but there was nothing of importance to place on the record.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

¹ Document No. 445.

² Document No. 449.

No. 449

868.00/7-1045

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*¹

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON,
DATED JULY 9TH, 1945

The proposal that invitations to the Soviet and French Governments should be issued by the Americans and ourselves and not by

¹ This document bears the following manuscript notation: "Handed to Mr. Grew by the British Ambassador. July 10, 1945". A summary of this communication was included in telegram No. 19 of July 12 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1245).

the Greek Government is not strictly in accordance with the Varkiza Agreement and it may cause some resentment on the part of the Greek Government. Nevertheless, I do not regard these objections as too serious and I am prepared to support President Truman's proposal ² particularly as time is getting so short.

2. I am, however, strongly opposed to the suggestion that we and the Americans should advise the Greek Government to hold elections before the plebiscite. My reasons for this view are as follows:

(a) this is essentially a matter of Greek internal politics and should be settled by them. Outside interference would probably be resented.

(b) opinion in Greece itself does not appear to have crystallized. We should be taking a very heavy responsibility on ourselves if we attempted to direct it one way or the other. This argument has special force since we should be advising a contrary course to that laid down in the Varkiza Agreement. This agreement is the only statement of policy which has so far been accepted by all parties in Greece and we do not wish to be the first to suggest that it should be modified in any essential way.

(c) if the plebiscite goes in favour of the King the consequences foreseen by the State Department may ensue, but it is by no means certain that these dangers would be avoided by holding the elections first and by delaying the plebiscite for six months. A better alternative might be to hold the plebiscite and elections on the same day. We ourselves have not yet made up our minds about the different alternatives and we should prefer to await the development of public opinion in Greece itself.

3. I hope the United States Government will agree, but in any case it does not appear that a decision on this point need be taken immediately. It is essential, however, that invitations should be issued this week in order that the matter may be discussed with the Soviet Government at TERMINAL and we therefore suggest that instructions should immediately be sent to the British and American representatives in Athens to approach the Greek Government on the lines suggested in paragraph five of the State Department's memorandum.³ We should, ourselves, be in favour of invitations being extended to France, though it appears probable that the French Government will in fact decline.

WASHINGTON, July 10th, 1945.

² As contained in document No. 445.

³ Document No. 445.

No. 450

868.00/7-1145: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1945—7 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

670. Brit FonOff telegram July 9¹ to Brit Emb Washington repeated to Athens is favorable reply to Depts *aide-mémoire*² summarized paragraph 3 Deptel 641 July 5.³ Brit Emb Athens being authorized make text or paraphrase available to you.

Briefly Brit accept proposal that invitations to supervise Greek elections be issued to Soviet and French Govts by US and UK Govts instead of by Greek Govt though procedure not strictly in accordance Varkiza Agreement.

Brit are "strongly opposed" to advising Greek Govt to hold elections before plebiscite as "this is essentially a matter of Greek internal politics and should be settled by them"[.] Brit consider essential issuance invitations this week in order matter be discussed at imminent Big Three conversations and are in favor including France. Dept agrees and you are therefore authorized to approach Greek Govt along lines outlined Deptel 641,⁴ omitting suggestion that elections precede plebiscite. However, if you think advisable you may informally indicate to Greek Govt that Dept perceives no objection to modifying, reversing, or combining procedures for plebiscite and elections if mutually agreed upon by Greeks themselves.

As soon as Dept advised of Greek acceptance of principle, arrangements will be made for presentation to Soviet at Big Three meeting. Contemplated that US and UK Ambassadors in Paris⁵ will make simultaneous approach to French Govt. Dept will probably take steps in consultation with Brit Govt to issue public statement, as Depts memo on this subject approved by President states "it is believed important also that our willingness to fulfill the obligations we have assumed with reference to the areas in question should be made explicit and public"[.]⁶

GREW

¹ Document No. 449.² Document No. 445.³ Not printed.⁴ i. e., along the lines indicated in document No. 445.⁵ Jefferson Caffery and Alfred Duff Cooper, respectively.⁶ See document No. 444.

No. 451

868.00/7-2745

*The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to Prime Minister Voulgaris*¹

ATHENS, July 13, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: Under instructions from my Government I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that in view of Allied obligations to Greece and the undertakings at Yalta, as well as of Article IX of the Varkiza Agreement, the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have agreed and are willing, in the event of such action being agreeable to the Royal Hellenic Government, to approach the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of France with the proposal that the approaching Greek national elections be held under the supervision of the four Allies named.

My Government feels that if the Royal Hellenic Government accepts this invitation in principle, it should be possible to take up the matter with the Soviet Government during the immediately forthcoming international Conference at Potsdam, while the French Government could be approached at the same time by the United States and United Kingdom Ambassadors in Paris. I am therefore instructed to ask that the Royal Hellenic Government give it the earliest possible consideration.

In anticipation of Your Excellency's reply, I have [etc.]²

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

¹ Enclosure 1 to MacVeagh's despatch No. 1349 to the Secretary of State, July 27, 1945. MacVeagh sent a summary of this communication and the text of Voulgaris' endorsement (see footnote 2, *infra*) to the Acting Secretary of State in telegram No. 704 of July 13 (file No. 868.00/7-1345).

² MacVeagh presented this letter to Voulgaris on the morning of July 13. The latter returned it at once with the following manuscript endorsement: "On behalf of the Royal Hellenic Government I agree[.] Athens, the 13th July, 1945 The Prime Minister Admiral P. Voulgaris".

No. 452

868.00/7-1445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 14 [1945.]

US URGENT

22. Amb MacVeagh and Brit colleague called on Greek PriMin July 13 and presented identical notes stating "in view of Allied obligations to Greece and the undertakings at Yalta as well as of Article 9 of the Varkiza Agreement the Govts of the USA and the UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have agreed and are willing, in the event

[No. 452]

of such action being agreeable to the Royal Hellenic Govt, to approach the Govt of the USSR and the Govt of France with the proposal that the approaching Greek national elections be held under the supervision of the four Allies named"[.] In reply PriMin immediately produced signed statement "on behalf of Royal Hellenic Govt I agree"[.]¹

You may wish in consultation with Brit to inform Soviets of foregoing developments and express hope that USSR will aid jointly in carrying out Crimea responsibility to Greek people. In event Soviets object to procedure as challenging Greek sovereignty, it might usefully be recalled to their attention that Allied supervision would be in accordance with expressed desires all parties. EAM and KKE especially insistent on "Allied supervision". Quadripartite cooperation most desirable eventuality. However Amb MacVeagh suggests that if Moscow refuses send Mission US Govt might be deputed by Yalta Powers to act alone in name of Three or Four Great Powers. He feels Greek suspicions unlikely attach our action such conditions, but association with Brit to exclusion Soviets and/or French certain to involve US in anti-Brit charges by Leftists if Leftists unsuccessful in elections. This suggestion not discussed with Brit either Washington or Athens but we believe it merits serious consideration.

Brit suggest and we concur that approach to French Govt in Paris by US and UK Amb should be simultaneous with discussions at TERMINAL with Soviets. This message being repeated to Paris so that you may reference it and instruct Caffery directly to take action, repeating to Dept. Full background information cabled Caffery today.

Greek PriMin agreed to keep this matter completely confidential until given release by us, but would be grateful for some advance notice. MacVeagh hopes such notice possible in view PriMin's cooperation.

Assume most acceptable method public release would be joint communiqué from TERMINAL. In event Soviet refusal to participate or to delegate powers we propose Dept concert with Brit FonOff on agreed simultaneous release to be made Washington and London immediately following TERMINAL.

Sent to SecState for action as no. 22[.] Repeated to Paris for information and to Athens.

[GREW]

¹ Cf. document No. 451, footnote 2.

No. 453

868.00/7-1545

The Secretary General of the British Delegation (Hayter) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)

[BABELSBERG,] 15th July, 1945.

DEAR DUNN, Since I wrote to you last night¹ about the Greek elections we have heard from the Foreign Office that the Greek Government have agreed with the proposals made to them by the British and American representatives in Athens. The way is therefore open for invitations to be issued to the Soviet and French Governments. The Foreign Office have suggested to the State Department that the invitation to the Russians might be made to their representatives here on July 17th or 18th. This should give time for a Soviet reply to be received and for consideration of any action which might then be required by our two Governments before the end of TERMINAL. The invitation to the French Government could be made in Paris on the same day.

The Foreign Office have proposed to the State Department a draft wording for the invitation, as follows:

“Article 59 [9] of the agreement signed at Varkiza on February 12th between representatives of the Greek Government and representatives of E. A. M. provides for the supervision by observers from the Great Allied Powers of the plebiscite and elections to be held in Greece. In view of this Article and of the undertakings towards the liberated countries assumed by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the declaration signed in the Crimea on February 11th His Majesty's Government and the United States Government are prepared to appoint observers to supervise the forthcoming plebiscite and elections in Greece. The Greek Government have agreed and have also agreed to the suggestion put forward by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government that the Soviet Government and the Provisional Government of France should be invited to share their responsibility in the supervision of the Greek plebiscite and elections. His Majesty's Government and the United States Government hope that the Soviet Government (Provisional Government of France) will agree to participate in joint supervision of the Greek plebiscite and elections.[”]

Yours sincerely,

W G HAYTER

¹ Letter not found.

RELATIONS WITH ALBANIA, BULGARIA, AND YUGOSLAVIA

No. 454

124.686/6-2345

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET

ATHENS, June 23, 1945.

No. 1213

SIR: . . .

. . . I take pleasure in enclosing a copy of Mr. Cromie's first report in the form of a letter to me from Salonika, dated June 15th,¹ together with a copy of Captain McNeill's first report which Mr. Cromie forwarded therewith. . . . Captain McNeill's report concerns partisan troop concentrations in Yugoslav Macedonia, a matter of extreme importance from the politico-psychological, as well as the military, point of view, and one regarding which it is most desirable to know the truth, if the truth can be known. Of particular note in this report would appear to be the statement that "no intensification of the autonomous Macedonian agitation in Greece has been detected" as a result of these concentrations, and the implication that Greece has more to fear, at least for the moment, from Bulgarian than Yugoslav disruptive penetration in its northern provinces.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

[Enclosure]

SECRET

[Undated.]

PARTISAN TROOP CONCENTRATIONS IN YUGOSLAV MACEDONIA

Source: Brigadier Hunt, CO 11 Brigade, 4 Indian Division, Salonika.
Evaluation: A-2.

1. About 10 May 1945, Yugoslav Partisan troops began to move from central Yugoslavia into Yugoslav Macedonia, and by the end of the month two complete army corps were deployed within easy reach of the Greek frontier. According to information gathered by interrogation of deserters and other persons who have come across the border during the past month, both of these corps are under the command of an army headquarters established in the town of Štip. Each corps comprises at least two divisions; and they are relatively well equipped with German and Russian matériel. There is some artillery, but little or no motor transport.

¹ Not printed.

2. Detailed dispositions of the Partisan troops are not known to the British in Salonika; but it is sure that one of the two new corps is deployed around Bitolj (Monastir) immediately to the north of Florina; and the other is located between Lake Dojran and the Vardar River, within 70 miles of Salonika. The troops are Serb and Montenegrin. They were engaged in harassing the Germans until the beginning of May, and it seems probable that they are among the best of Tito's troops. No special effort seems to have been made to keep the movement secret, though reliable numbers and unit identifications have been difficult to establish from the vague and conflicting reports available to the British in Salonika.

3. In addition to the newly arrived Serbian troops, Yugoslav Macedonia is garrisoned by a division of soldiers who were recruited locally, and by a "brigade" of ELASites who fled across the Greek border following the disarmament of ELAS. The division of Macedonians is poorly equipped, having nothing but small arms. It consists of two brigades, one of which formerly manned the frontier posts in the Monastir gap, while the other guarded the border between Lake Dojran and the Vardar. About the middle of May most of the frontier posts were taken over by the newly arrived Serbs, but the Macedonian division is still stationed near the border.

4. The ELAS brigade is believed to be concentrated near the town of Kičevo (about 40 miles NNW of Bitolj). It consists mainly of members of Gotsi's band (Slavic Macedonians recruited from the area around Florina, committed to the Autonomous Macedonia movement); but it has been considerably reinforced by Greeks who crossed the border individually and in small groups after the collapse of ELAS in Greece. The exact number of men belonging to this brigade is not known; but the British believe that they are not more than 2500. Morale is bad, and the ELASites are not sure whether they are in a concentration camp or whether they are a part of the Partisan army.

5. The arrival of the two Serbian army corps along the Greek border coincided with the period of friction between Tito and Field Marshal Alexander over Trieste, and the higher British commanders in Salonika were distinctly worried by the threat which such a large concentration seemed to offer. If Tito should wish to invade Greece, no force is available to stop him short of Salonika, and the British have made no effort to concentrate their own or Greek troops to meet an attack.

6. *Comment.* It is possible that Tito wished to threaten Salonika when he ordered two army corps into Yugoslav Macedonia. It is also possible that the movement merely reflects a readjustment of troop dispositions following the German surrender; and, if OSS reports

of the recent increase of Bulgarian influence in Yugoslav Macedonia are well founded, it may be that the Yugoslavs wished principally to reassert their control over this disputed area. No intensification of the autonomous Macedonia agitation in Greece has been detected, as might be expected if Tito intended immediate aggression against Greece. This fact is not conclusive, however, since the Independent Macedonia propaganda organization has hitherto been largely in Bulgar hands, and Tito may not be in a position to use it, nor yet to improvise a substitute overnight.

No. 455

860h.9111 RR/6-2545: Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract]

PLAIN

BELGRADE, June 25, 1945.

201. Current Macedonian press campaign is continued with lengthy editorial in *Borba* for 25 June strongly condemning "Fascist reign of terror in Aegean Macedonia." Methods used by EDES are compared to those of Hitler's SS troops as well as those used by Greek reactionaries in latter half nineteenth century. Editorial states "attitude of Pan Greek Fascists toward those people (Macedonians) also includes unfriendliness toward Tito's Yugoslavia and democratic achievements gained by our people in our war of liberation." It is asserted that ample indications of Greek intentions are provided by slogans used by Greek terrorists such as "to Bitolj" or "we want all of Macedonia." Editorial concludes that these provocations aim at justifications of Greek Government's program "to liquidate anti-Fascist forces in Greece" but it is asserted that examples of Istria, Carinthia and Slovene Littoral are proof that Slavs cannot be eradicated. Editorial invokes Atlantic Charter¹ and Crimean² and Tehran declarations³ in appealing for security of Greek Macedonia. Speech by Macedonian Bane Andreev, Minister for Mines in national Yugoslav Government, reproduced in *Politika* for 24 June contains following remarks: "Boundary of Macedonia Istria; boundary of Serbia is Djevdjelia and beyond."

SHANTZ

¹ Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603.

² See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

³ Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. IX, p. 409.

No. 456

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/6-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State ad interim

TOP SECRET

CASERTA, June 29, 1945—5 p. m.

2814. Gen Oxley head Brit delegation ACC Bulgaria (re our 2540, June 9¹) has just returned from tour Sofia to Varna, going by route north of Balkan mountains and returning by more southerly route. Russians made strenuous efforts prevent Oxley or party to talk with anyone without presence of Russian officer.

In area north of Balkan mountains Russian troops have been seen in towns of Lovech, Trnovo and Shumen, although they may have been only advance parties preparing for future arrivals. No Russian troops have arrived at Varna or Burgas during past three months but there are and apparently have always been two Russian divisions this area.

Traffic outward from Varna and Burgas has consisted of food and ex-POW's and inward cotton and some airplanes. There is definite increase in numbers Russian troops south of Balkan mountains since Oxley's last visit in April. Every town and village west of Avtos showed signs of Russian occupation.

Towns of Sliven and Plovdiv were seething with Russian troops. At Plovdiv Bulgarian Army Commander was unable see Oxley because he was occupied with several Russian Generals. Accommodation requisitioning at Plovdiv has been extensive and it is reported Red Army HQ will be set up there.

Oxley met several columns and bivouacked units of Marshal Tolbukhin's Army which is beginning to trickle through Bulgaria. They may be returning Russia via Varna although there are no indications at latter place. Route to Varna via Plovdiv is in any case extraordinary.²

Oxley's summary impression was that Russian forces are massing in depth north from Greek and Turk frontiers.

KIRK

¹ Not printed.

² For the other portion of this telegram, see document No. 693.

No. 457

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/6-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State ad interim

TOP SECRET

CASERTA, June 30, 1945—5 p. m.

2823. Gen Oxley head Brit Del ACC Bulgaria (our 2814, June 29¹) reports he is informed Russian division completed crossing of Danube at Ruse about three days ago and moved southward towards Trnovo and Shumen. Oxley's tentative estimate of Russian troops in Bulgar is ten divs located roughly as follows:

Two divs Varna Burgas; two divs Sliven Kotel area; one div between Yambol and Turk frontier; one div Khaskovo Nomchilgrad; one div Plovdiv area; one div along road south from Gorna Dzhumaya; probably at least two divs north of Balkan Mountains. General opinion is that there are now 200,000 Soviet troops in Bulgar.

Oxley's msg stated that in spite of doubtful veracity of many sources of info today, above is probably fair picture of situation and it is impossible to obtain any more accurate info.

KIRK

¹ See documents Nos. 456 and 693.

No. 458

868.007-445

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, July 4, 1945.

No. 1282

Subject: Developments in the North of Greece: Frontier Incidents and Anglo-Russian Relations.

SIR: Following my despatch No. 1213 of June 23¹ entitled "Report on Developments in the North of Greece", I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a recent secret report (No. R 125-45 of July 2) rendered to the War Department by the Assistant Military Attaché of this Embassy whom I have caused to be stationed temporarily in Salonika as a special political observer. This report discusses recent incidents, beginning with the 20th of May and ending with the 20th of June, occurring along both the Yugoslav and Bulgarian borders of Greece, most of which have been, as the report states, insignificant in themselves but which in the total are undeniably impressive, and which must be considered as having at least a psycho-

¹ Document No. 454.

logical importance in connection with the present international situation in the Balkans.

In an appendix attached to the report the Department will find a list of the incidents treated, three of which Captain McNeill singles out for special consideration as having been particularly disturbing to the British authorities. Two of these occurred early in the period under consideration, and are credited by Captain McNeill with altering the British attitude toward the Russians in the entire area under consideration. "Up to that time they had regarded the frontier incidents more or less as pin pricks due to irresponsible guards", the irresponsibility being evinced on both sides. After May 30, however, "General Boucher decided to treat the Russians in the same way that they treated his own troops. The frontier was closed; and only upon prior notice and authorization from the ACC in Bulgaria, or the British Embassy in Belgrade, will Russians be admitted in the future . . .² and to avoid further incidents, British troops were forbidden to approach nearer than one mile from the frontier, without special permission."

Captain McNeill notes activity on the part of the Communist Party in Greece aimed apparently at intensifying this distrustful situation. This activity, he says, takes the form of spreading disaffection among the Indian troops in the North, even going so far as "bribery, in the form of offers of money in exchange for weapons and ammunition". When he adds, however, that "British officers generally believe that the policies of the local Communist Party, as well as its monetary resources, stem from Russian sources, probably through the mediation of Bulgarian and Yugoslav agents", he should not be understood to mean more than he says. The fact reported is pertinent so far as it goes, since the belief of the British officers must be considered a psychological element in the situation. But, according to secret sources both British and American, no direct evidence has yet been found to prove financial connection between the Soviets and the KKE. It seems more likely that the latter, which together with its democratic "front", the EAM, undoubtedly continues to constitute the richest political organization in Greece, still derives its monetary resources from the gold contributed by the British to the resistance movement during the Greek occupation. The question of the extent of Russian influence on KKE policies is, of course, another matter, but even here "stemming from Russian sources" may be taken to mean too much. Captain McNeill's final words in this connection are, "KKE couriers between Bulgaria and Greece have been intercepted on two occasions, but the documents in their possession were both times of a relatively innocuous nature." Possibly the Russians,

² Ellipsis in the original.

who are showing themselves in these days to be supreme realists, do not feel it necessary, in order to keep the leftist pot here boiling merrily, to do more than fan the flames with a sympathetic press and radio and keep the local communists in a constant state of hopeful expectation of more definite assistance to come.

In conclusion Captain McNeill shrewdly suggests that the Russians, "unaccustomed to the subtlety of a free press" may suspect the British of backing present Greek agitation for territorial revision (see my despatch No. 1228 of June 16 entitled "Continuing Agitation regarding Greek Territorial Claims"³). But he adds with wisdom that "the behavior of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav frontier guards, and of the Russians in Bulgaria, has certainly not been such as to inspire confidence on the part of the Greeks and British, and, under present circumstances, the Northern Greek frontier is a constant irritant, not only to Greco-Bulgar and Greco-Yugoslav, but also to Anglo-Russian relations."

The Department will note that Captain McNeill's report does not cover the situation on the Greek northwestern frontier with Albania. This situation, which has evoked excited allegations on the part of the Greeks of a definite plan to exterminate the Greek population of northern Epirus, is more difficult to appraise from here because most of the alleged trouble is located on the Albanian side of the border. Also the lack of military forces in the area has so far kept this trouble from touching directly on the British nerve. But that it may eventually become a problem necessitating attention by the Great Powers seems only too likely and separate despatches will be forwarded shortly in its regard.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

[Enclosure]

SECRET
No. R 125-45

[SALONIKA?], July 2, 1945.

1. During the past two months, British officers stationed in Northern Greece have felt a growing impatience and distrust of Russian behavior toward them. This irritation has arisen chiefly from a series of frontier incidents in which British and Greek troops were treated more as enemies than as allies. In retaliation, British authorities decided early in June not to admit any future Russian parties which might wish to visit Greece unless such visits were authorized by Allied Control Commission, Sofia. . . . A further index of worsening relations lies in the fact that, about a month ago, the Communist Party in Northern Greece began a campaign of propaganda, rumors,

³ Not printed.

and bribery designed to demoralize the British and especially the Indian troops which are stationed there.

The Frontier Incidents:

2. Most of the clashes on the northern frontier of Greece are, in themselves, quite insignificant. (See list for 1 month period, 20 May–20 June, Appendix A.) They seem to arise chiefly from cockiness on the part of the Bulgarian frontier guards (due to real or imagined Russian support); and involve nothing more serious than smuggling and cattle rustling. There have been, however, three incidents during the past six weeks which have disturbed the British authorities. These incidents are: Capt. Gill's loss of a jeep north of Komotini; the arrest and interrogation of a patrol which blundered into Bulgaria; the arrest and detention of Mr. King, the British Consul in Salonika when he stepped across the Yugoslav frontier.

3. On 15 May 1945, Capt. Gill, an Indian of the 2/11 Sikhs, was detailed to supervise a Boy Scout picnic, which was transported in British army vehicles to a picnic place within sight of the Bulgarian frontier post on the road North of Komotini, Thrace. He drove ahead in his jeep to tell the Bulgar guard that his party was only a Boy Scout picnic, not the advance guard of an invasion; but when he came up to the Bulgar post (perhaps 30 yds beyond an unmarked frontier line), he found himself covered by rifles, was ordered to fold his arms and wait. After five hours a Russian officer arrived at the frontier post and released Capt. Gill, but kept the jeep. Repeated representations to the ACC in Sofia have not yet secured the return of the jeep.

4. On 29 May a mixed British-Greek patrol in 3 carriers misread their map and crossed over into Bulgaria (at Topoinitsa, NE of Serres). About 100 yards across the boundary, the patrol was surrounded by a Bulgarian force, and after some delay was escorted to a Bulgarian barracks in Petritsi [*Petrich?*]. On the following day a Russian colonel and another officer came from Sofia, and proceeded to interrogate the members of the patrol separately. Questions were asked about British and Greek troop distribution and strength, unit identifications, morale, equipment, whether or not British troops were going to the Far East, economic conditions in Greece, the strength of ELAS, etc. With the exception of the Greek interpreter, all the members of the patrol refused to give any information, despite some threats directed against the Greek soldiers. Following the interrogation, the Russian officers left, and two days later (1 June) the patrol was brought back to the frontier and released (with the carriers). Before release, however, the interpreter was required to sign a statement to the effect that he had *not* been interrogated and had been well treated. Note: It appears that the Bulgarian frontier guard

[No. 458]

reported the three carriers as tanks, and thought the patrol was the spearhead of an invasion. They were most surprised to find the carriers unarmed, and believed at first that the armament had somehow been jettisoned before capture.

5. On 17 June, Mr. King, the British Consul in Salonika, went picnicking north of Ardea. He and two Red Cross nurses walked up toward the frontier, stopped short of a barbed wire entanglement which they took to be the boundary mark, and fell into conversation with some Yugoslav frontier guards. When Mr. King prepared to leave, the guards told him that he was inside Yugoslavia (by about 20 yards) and refused to permit him to retire without approval from higher authority. High enough authority for Mr. King's release was not found short of Bitolj, and he and the two nurses were not finally returned to Greece until a week later. Having walked the distance from the frontier to Bitolj (the nurses rode on requisitioned mules), Mr. King and his party rode back to the frontier in a broken down civilian car. They were not interrogated; saw but had no dealings with a Russian mission in Bitolj.

British Retaliation:

6. The turning point in the British attitude toward the Russians came after the interrogation of their patrol on 30 May. Up to that time they had regarded the frontier incidents more or less as pin pricks due to irresponsible guards. Russian parties had been allowed to cross the Greek frontier on several occasions upon the presentation of identification papers, and Russian deserters had not been interrogated, but were handed over to the Russian mission in Athens.

7. As soon as the details of the interrogation of the patrol were known, General Boucher decided to treat the Russians in the same way that they treated his own troops. The frontier was closed; and only upon prior notice and authorization from the ACC in Bulgaria, or the British Embassy in Belgrade, will Russians be admitted in the future. (Despite this order, a party of 4 Russian officers and a driver bluffed their way across the Bulgarian frontier 24 June, and "disappeared" as far as the British knew until they turned up in Athens two days later.) . . .

8. To avoid further incidents, British troops were forbidden to approach nearer than 1 mile from the frontier, without special permission.

Policy of the Communist Party in Greece toward British troops:

9. A further factor which disturbs the British in their relations with the Russians is the current effort of the Communist Party to demoralize British troops. The effort has been directed especially toward the Indians, and takes the form (a) of rumors (e. g., the British

will not allow Indian soldiers to return to India, having sunk the last three ships which were carrying Indian troops home); (b) of propaganda against the British Raj, advocating immediate independence for India; and (c) of bribery, in the form of offers of money in exchange for weapons and ammunition. British officers generally believe that the policies of the local Communist Party, as well as its monetary resources, stem from Russian sources, probably through the mediation of Bulgarian and Yugoslav agents. KKE couriers between Bulgaria and Greece have been intercepted on two occasions, but the documents in their possession were both times of a relatively innocuous nature.

Comment:

10. It must be borne in mind that Greek newspapers of the Right constantly speak of frontier revisions, and of a Greek-British campaign against Sofia. Doubtless the Russians, unaccustomed to the subtlety of a free press, suspect that the British back such a scheme. The interrogation of the British patrol came, in fact, only a few days after a leading Salonika newspaper had announced under banner headlines that British and Greek troops were about to invade and occupy Bulgaria, so that the Bulgarian frontier post had some slight excuse for regarding the patrol as a spearhead of invasion.

11. Nevertheless, the behavior of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav frontier guards, and of the Russians in Bulgaria has certainly not been such as to inspire confidence on the part of the Greeks and British, and, under present circumstances, the Northern Greek frontier is a constant irritant, not only to Greco-Bulgar and Greco-Yugoslav, but also to Anglo-Russian relations.

Approved and forwarded.

STERLING L. LARRABEE,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.,
Military Attaché.

WILLIAM H. McNEILL,
Captain, C. A. C.,
Asst. Military Attaché.

[Appendix A]

SECRET

20 May Eight Bulgar soldiers occupied the Greek frontier post at Tsingeli (north of Alexandroupolis). Greek National Guard protested to Bulgarian Captain, who withdrew his men.

22 May Patrol of 167 Greek National Guard (1 officer, and 10 men) wandered into Bulgaria north of Komotini by mistake. They were arrested, but released when mistake was explained.

- 23 May National Guard patrol was ambushed by Bulgarians North of Komotini at a point within Greek territory. Patrol was searched, interrogated and then released. Bulgarians said they had mistaken the Greek soldiers for smugglers.
- 29 May Patrol of Camerons (10 British OR's and 5 Greek National Guard) were captured by Bulgars when they crossed frontier by mistake northeast of Serres. Patrol was escorted to Petritsi, interrogated by Russian officers, released 1 June.
- 30 May Patrol of First Royal Sussex fired on from Bulgarian territory by light machine gun. No casualties. Bulgarians explained that they had not seen troops in that area previously, and thought they were about to cross into Bulgaria.
- 30 May Yugoslav border guards seized a Greek civilian and his donkey near Gevgeli, in a place which Greeks claim to be part of Greece and Yugoslav guards say is in Yugoslavia. Man has not been returned.
- 31 May National Guard reports that two Bulgarian soldiers crossed Greek frontier north of Xanthi, kidnapped two Greek civilians, and took them to Bulgaria.
- 1 June Bulgars scuttled back across Greek frontier upon approach of British patrol. Claimed they had been seeking water.
- 4 June Patrol of Greek National Guard fired on by Bulgars in area north of Drama, about 4 kms. inside Greek territory. Bulgars withdrew when fire was returned. No casualties.
- 9 June Seven Bulgarian soldiers crossed Greek frontier north of Ano Parroia, beat a Greek shepherd and stole a few of his sheep.
- 10 June Several armed Bulgars crossed the Greek frontier north of Potomoi, asked a Greek cowherd about British troops in neighborhood. When told there were British close by (falsely) they moved off northwards.
- 10 June Bulgarian civilian crossed Greek frontier in northern tip of Evros province. When Greek told him to get back to Bulgaria, Bulgarian frontier guard came across the line and beat up the remonstrating Greek.
- 13 June One officer and 7 men of the Greek National Guard crossed Bulgarian frontier north of Potomoi to the Bulgarian frontier post. The patrol was sent out to reclaim 700 goats which had been stolen by Bulgarians some days before; and arrangements had been made

with Bulgaria frontier post to effect the return. But when National Guard patrol had just crossed the line, Bulgarians ambushed them, killed two of their horses, and took the patrol prisoner. One of the men was released on the night of 14 June, and release of the rest was promised. But neither men nor goats have yet been returned (27 June).

- 17 June Mr. King, British Consul in Salonika, was taken prisoner by Yugoslav border guards North of Ardea when he crossed over the frontier inadvertently. Held for a week, he was returned to Greek frontier post north of Florina on 24 June.
- 18 June Three Bulgarians (2 soldiers and 1 civilian), crossed Greek border near Koula, attacked a Greek shepherd and stole some clothing from him. Greek frontier guard opened fire, and Bulgarians escaped across the border.
- 20 June Six Greek civilians were kidnapped near Albanian frontier, and taken to Bileshte in Albania (south of Lake Mikra Prespa).

No. 459

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/7-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CASERTA, July 3, 1945—11 a. m.

2846. Our 2832, July 1.¹

Oxley ACC Bulgar Brit Del has reported that previous figs on Bulgar Army strength should be revised to read 13 inf divs, 1 cavalry div, 1 guards div at Sofia, 1 armored div in process of formation.

Red Army strength in Bulg today estimated at 250,000 men.

Most Sov aircraft are reportedly in Bulg, and airdromes north and south of Balkan Mts will be taken into use. Bulg War Min info bulletin gives Brit strength in Greece at 9 motorized inf divs, 4 in Greek Thrace and 5 in Turk Thrace. Obviously Russians who travel extensively in Greece know these figs are false but may agree to their publication in order to justify great increases of Sov troops in Bulg.

KIRK

¹ Not printed.

No. 460

860h.9111 RR/7-945 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extracts]

PLAIN

BELGRADE, July 9, 1945.

251. *Borba* and *Politika* July 8 feature speeches of government officials at meetings throughout Serbia on anniversary of Partisan uprising in 1941. . . .

Borba prints three-column editorial against expansionist threat of "leading political circles in Greece" and prints Greek map showing a greater Greece including Yugoslav Macedonia, half of Albania and Bulgaria, and all of European Turkey. Editorialist Blagojević concludes: "The peoples of Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria naturally cannot be indifferent to the course of events in Greece today. The extensive Fascist reign of terror imposed upon the minorities of Greece and open imperialist propaganda directed against the integrity of neighboring Balkan countries brings into question relations between our countries and Greece during a fairly pressing phase which demands a speedy solution."

SHANTZ

No. 461

868.00/7-1045 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, July 10, 1945—8 p. m.

695. Referring Tito broadcast July 8² stating Gks firing across border trying provoke Yugos while "thousands and thousands" Macedonians and Gks being fed Yugoslavia after escaping terror

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 19 of July 12 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1245).

² The reference is to the following passage in a broadcast by Tito, transmitted at 1:30 p. m. E. W. T., July 8, here reprinted from "Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts, Monday, July 9, 1945" (Washington, Federal Communications Commission, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, mimeographed, 1945), p. 8-8:

"Unfortunately our relations with our neighbor, Greece, are not very sound. Our peoples have the greatest sympathy toward Greece because the Greek people in their critical years showed, like the peoples of Yugoslavia, unexampled heroism in the struggle against the German-Italian invaders who wanted to enslave them. The Greek people had [have?] the misfortune of having again on top various reactionaries who are oppressing, not only the Slav people in Macedonia but also the Greek people themselves.

"A few days ago the Greek Minister of Interior declared that not a single Greek or Slav from Greece had passed the frontier to seek refuge in Yugoslavia. Today,

Grk reactionaries, PriMin ³ called today express concern alarm. Said intends fly Salonika tomorrow returning Thurs purpose determine facts personally. Plans give trip no publicity likely complicate situation, but intends make temperate factual broadcast on return.

American observers north Greece fail confirm Tito statements. Disturbed conditions both sides border plentifully reported past months but no recent accentuation while figures given refugees unquestionably fantastic.

Local political struggle intensified ideological grounds. Press public deeply stirred. Right and center accusing Tito waging war nerves Grk national aspirations, call tactics reminiscent Axis methods. Left omitting comment specific charges gladly hails fresh evidence Russia's Tito's knowledge Grk patriots persecuted and scores anti-Soviet policy Grk reactionaries.

MACVEAGH

here before all of you, I say that there are thousands and thousands, not only of Macedonians, who took refuge in Yugoslavia but of Greeks, real Hellenes, who today live in Vojvodina, where we have put them so that they could be better fed. They escaped from the terror of the Greek reactionaries. Thus by these facts I refute the statement of that Minister who wanted to deceive the world.

"I may say today here that in spite of all our wishes to maintain the best of friendship with Greece on our Greek frontier, without any reason Greek *provocateurs*, reactionaries, and troops are firing from mortars across our frontier, trying to provoke us. We look calmly on all this. We do not respond to the provocations of the reactionaries because we know they are hated by the Greek people themselves.

"I believe that the Greek people will gain their freedom. We will not succumb to any provocation. This does not represent any danger but it shows only how democracy works in Greece. This is what they show by their provocations. Accordingly, when I speak of our relations with other countries, it is clear that Yugoslavia has made many friends whom she did not have prior to this war and that she will continue on this road and strengthen these relations."

³ Petros Voulgaris.

No. 462

860h.9111 RR/7-1145: Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract]

PLAIN

BELGRADE, July 11, 1945.

261. . . .

Borba sharply criticizes Reuters for attitude of "protectionism" and "inclination contrary to fact" in favor of Greeks during Yugoslav-Greek dispute on treatment of Macedonians in north Greece. Editorialist denies charge of Reuters editor that Yugoslavia wishes to make territorial claims on Greece and hence press campaign by pointing out alleged expansionist ambitions of Greek chauvinist officials. He admits that Yugoslavs and "all true democrats" are

[No. 462]

against Athens Government and that Yugoslavia hopes question of Greek misrule in Macedonia will be subject of "international forum" if not Big Three Conference.

No. 463

868.00/7-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, July 14, 1945—2 p. m.

708. Prime Minister's broadcast June [July] 12 following Salonika visit (my telegram 695, July 10¹) insisted complete quiet prevails northern Greece and no "arbitrary acts" have occurred Greek side border. Stated Greece has "strong allies and sincere friends" and expressed confidence Greek integrity and national claims not endangered. Strongly condemned Bulgarian war atrocities but stressed cordial relations Yugoslav Greek peoples and added official Yugoslav Greek relations will improve when "freely elected" representatives can meet. Local press public opinion exception KKE (Communist Party) applaud PriMins firm moderate stand. KKE organs reprint speech without comment.

Referring general situation, ex ELAS (National Popular Liberation Army) General Bakirdzis following conference with KKE chief Zachariades told OSS agent Athens July 10 "Russia will take positive action to obtain stronger hold over Turkey regardless of what Britain does". Correlating this with Belgrade reports, OSS feels agitation Greek frontier may be smoke screen conceal preparation attack Turkey.

MACVEAGH

¹ Document No. 461.

ITALY
GENERAL POLICY, REVISION OF SURRENDER TERMS, AND
CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY

No. 464

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

ITALY

(a) Redefinition of Policy and Interests in Italy

Our objective is to strengthen Italy economically and politically so that she can withstand the forces that threaten to sweep her into a new totalitarianism. Those forces are: economic distress; national humiliation; uncertainty regarding British intentions toward Italy and American readiness effectively to implement friendly policy; the power and will of the USSR as typified in Tito's nearly successful move in Venezia Giulia;² internal political confusion and a well organized Communist party; the absence of any machinery for, and indeed any real experience of, democratic government; the knowledge that American troops are being withdrawn and with them the assurance of disinterested protection.

Italian sympathies naturally and traditionally lie with the western democracies; with proper support from them Italy would tend to become a factor for balance in Europe. Her strategic position and economic ties with the Danubian countries would probably make it impossible for her ever to become a purely British sphere of influence, even were that desirable. She would naturally tend toward a balance between east and west, and to encourage such a balance would be wise. With reasonable economic well-being, sound government, and fair treatment by the victorious powers a violent ideological swing to right or left could be discounted. A moderate left movement is not only inevitable but should be encouraged so as to give scope to the essentially sound peasant and laboring classes and in order to avoid exasperating by vain opposition a natural trend.

¹ Annex 6 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² See document No. 558.

If the western Allies are to achieve these objectives they must take immediate steps to improve Italy's economic and political situation. These steps, covered in separate memoranda,³ fall into two categories:

1. Urgent economic assistance to enable Italy to stand on her own feet again. This assistance falls into three main categories: transportation, coal, and raw materials.
2. Political action to raise Italian morale, make an authoritative government possible, and permit Italy to become a responsible participant in international affairs rather than the ward or the victim of the victorious powers.

(b) *Revision of the Surrender Terms*

The anomalous status of cobelligerent and unconditionally surrendered enemy hampers every effort both by the Allies, and by Italy herself, to improve Italy's economic and political situation. Any plan to provide credits for essential Italian imports will involve discussions of Italy's status in Congress and Parliament. No Italian Government can establish its authority and prestige at home as long as it is bound by the still secret terms of unconditional surrender. Every move to bring Italy back into the family of nations is opposed on the ground that she is an ex-enemy. This anomaly can be finally solved only through the negotiation of a definitive peace treaty, which would at best require some months. Meanwhile, however, the Italian internal situation and our own efforts would be greatly facilitated by some immediate interim arrangement whereby the agencies of the Allied Governments would have a clear cut policy directive and the Italian Government would have tangible recognition of Italy's substantial contribution toward the defeat of Germany.

Only on a military level, without necessity for approval by all our allies or reference to treaty-making bodies, does an interim arrangement seem immediately feasible. Revision of the surrender terms is suggested for that reason and also because of mounting pressure for their publication. Publication, unless accompanied by announced improvement in Italy's status, would have a demoralizing effect inside Italy, would lead to agitation by groups in this country, and might well be exploited against us by certain foreign powers.

It is therefore recommended that the short terms⁴ and the numerous obsolete clauses of the long terms of surrender⁵ be terminated and replaced by two simply worded undertakings on the part of the Italian Government in substance as follows:

³ Not included in the Briefing Book. For one of the memoranda referred to, see document No. 466.

⁴ i. e., the Conditions of an Armistice signed at Fairfield Camp, Sicily, September 3, 1943 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2740).

⁵ i. e., the Instrument of Surrender of Italy, signed at Malta, September 29, 1943 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2742).

1. The Italian Government will refrain from any hostile action against any of the United Nations pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace.

2. The Italian Government will maintain no military, naval, or air forces or equipment except as authorized by the United Nations and will comply with all instructions issued by the United Nations on the subject of such forces and equipment.

Allied rights as occupying powers would be terminated except in the areas to be occupied indefinitely (disputed border areas, certain bases, lines of communication, and the colonies). They would be replaced by specific arrangements covering our requirements for redeployment, for maintenance of forces in AMG territory, and for safeguarding our lines of communications to Germany and Austria.

Allied rights to intervention in purely internal Italian political and economic affairs would also be terminated. Control of foreign trade and foreign financial transactions should likewise be terminated.

There would be retained such provisions as those obligating Italy to pay reparations and restore looted property, suppress fascist organizations, repeal discriminatory laws, and surrender war criminals. Clauses which provide a basis for our position regarding war booty and occupation costs, which are matters of final settlement, would also be retained.

The new agreement would become effective simultaneously with the withdrawal of AMG from Northern Italy and would be made public together with the long terms. The Allied Commission would continue to represent the Allies in regard to Italian compliance with the new agreement.

Any undertaking which it might be desirable to obtain from Italy in the immediate future should be secured in connection with the modification of the armistice. It will, for example, probably be useful to obtain assurances of cooperation in the wartime economic controls of the Allies and an undertaking to accord non-discriminatory treatment to nationals, property, vessels, and commerce of all United Nations.

It is also recommended that at the same time the abolition of the Advisory Council⁶ should be announced. This body has performed no useful functions and recently, chiefly through the activities of the Yugoslav representative, has had a certain nuisance value. Its existence has moreover afforded the Yugoslavs and Greece representation in Italy without having to re-establish any form of diplomatic relations with the Italian Government. Should it be decided that further efforts to use the existence of the Advisory

⁶ Concerning the establishment of the Inter-Allied Advisory Council for Italy, see the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Moscow Conference, October 30, 1943, printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 307. See also *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), vol. ii, pp. 1283-1284, 1551.

Council for Italy as an argument in obtaining adequate representation for ourselves and the British in Soviet-controlled territory are futile, the only remaining reason to maintain this body in Italy would disappear.

(c) Conclusion of a Definitive Peace Treaty with Italy

We have agreed with the British to consider negotiations for a definitive peace treaty, and both governments are formulating their desiderata.

Early negotiations are desirable, especially in view of the intention to withdraw our forces from Italy and of the necessity for putting an end to the question mark concerning Italy's future. We must, however, avoid (a) hasty solutions dictated by animus toward an ex-enemy, territorial ambitions, or contingent political situations rather than by serious evaluation of the interests of future peace; and (b) a "dictated" as opposed to a "negotiated" peace by allowing the Italians themselves to come into the negotiations and present their case before every term has become crystallized through a process of discussion, disagreement, and ultimate irreducible compromise among the victorious powers, all of whom, except ourselves, will have booty of some sort to claim. Italian participation would remove any future pretext for Italian repudiation of the treaty on the argument that it was dictated.

We believe the treaty should be negotiated by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, Greece, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, and Italy.

The negotiation of a final treaty, especially if it meets the above requirements, will be protracted. Therefore, we should proceed to a revision of the surrender terms as an immediately feasible and urgently needed interim step.

It is recommended that we seek the agreement of the Soviets and the British to place this matter on the Agenda of the first meeting of the proposed Foreign Ministers Council.

No. 465

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

WHEN SHOULD WE AGREE TO MAKING THE PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY AND WHAT TERMS SHOULD BE AGREEABLE TO THE UNITED STATES?

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee is in agreement with a statement of the Acting Secretary of State,² that it is to the advantage of this government "to assist and encourage the conversion of Italy into a stable, peaceful and constructive element among the nations of Europe." Consequently, "some constructive steps should be taken to move away from the present anomalous situation of onerous and obsolete surrender terms which are no longer pertinent to the situation today." However, it appears that the Department of State is now considering the matter of permanent settlement of Italian frontiers in Europe and Africa. This Committee wishes to point out that such negotiations concerning frontiers should be approached with great caution and initiated only with a clear understanding of the political-military considerations involved. There is little in recent events or problems in Europe and the Mediterranean area to justify the assumption that negotiations concerning Italian frontiers can be carried through without strong reactions and possibly bitter disagreement among our Allies. Such conditions, at best, would not help in the war against Japan, and might, in fact, prejudice our efforts by keeping in Europe larger United States forces than now intended.

¹ This memorandum was prepared in response to a request from Leahy (document No. 155) for recommendations which would be "useful to the President in preparing himself for the [Berlin] conference". It was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.

² Not printed. Cf. a statement by Grew released to the press on May 31, 1945, printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XII, p. 1006.

No. 466

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-1845

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 18, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Principal Questions of Policy in the Treatment of Italy

During the twenty months since Italy became a co-belligerent this Government, in acknowledgment of Italy's very real contributions to the war and in recognition of the importance of a soundly democratic Italy in achieving general European security and stability, has sought by various means to promote Italian political and economic well-being. The purposes of the program have had wide support in American public opinion, but the measures taken have been inadequate to serve those purposes effectively.

The long-range objective, from the point of view of our national interest, is to enable Italy to become a constructive element in a peaceful Europe. To reach this objective both the political and the economic planning need a more vigorous and realistic treatment.

The problem is immediate. In northern Italy, with its large and restless population in industrial areas left idle and more or less free from military controls, the liberation has not been followed by constructive measures. Anarchy may result from the present economic distress and political unrest unless the work is taken in hand without delay.

There follows an outline of the present situation which is submitted for your approval.

In the economic field the main problems are coal and credit. It is important to note that northern Italy was not badly devastated and that with only moderate support from abroad for the supply of coal, certain key raw materials and transportation equipment the Italians can themselves undertake the major effort in restoring industry and agriculture to production and reactivating the transportation system. The need is urgent, since the program of military expenditure will be terminated within the next few months.

It is evident that even in what remains of the present period of joint responsibility the British will not be able to carry an equal share of economic help to Italy; with the termination of joint activity British resources will be still more difficult to obtain for Italian relief.

A proposal is now in consideration for the use of \$100,000,000 of FEA funds from its 1946 lend-lease appropriations, which would be transferred to the War Department to carry the Army supply program forward to November or December, if there is military justification

for its extension to that time. In any case we must now determine what type of financial assistance should be made available to enable Italy to meet its essential import requirements after the military program is terminated.

If UNRRA funds are to be used, a larger American contribution to UNRRA would be necessary, and the allocation of the funds would have to have the approval of the UNRRA Council as well. Loans through the Export-Import Bank, which would in any event be needed to supplement an UNRRA relief program, a direct grant or credit by Congressional appropriation (perhaps including other liberated areas as well) or some new type of relief scheme seem to be the only alternatives.

For any of these projects it would be necessary to set forth, for Congress and for public opinion, the reasonable expectations for an improvement of conditions in Italy, under the Allied machinery now operative. The political situation is equally disturbing, and this at a time when Allied military forces are preparing to withdraw, though we still have important political and economic responsibilities in the administration. The following reforms or projects are considered essential:

1. More rapid progress in converting the Allied Commission from a military to a civilian organization, with a more dynamic American participation, in order to make sure that American ideas and plans are given real effectiveness. The proposed change in the position of the Chief Commissioner, discussed in a separate memorandum,¹ is an important step in this direction;

2. Rapid diminution in the control authority, to place greater responsibility and initiative with the Italian Government;

3. Revision of the Armistice terms. The Department is now working on this matter, the project being to strip down the present document, many clauses of which are no longer applicable, thus providing a more realistic document as a basis for a *modus operandi* pending the conclusion of a definite settlement. This will require inter-Departmental agreement, negotiation with the British Government, and consultation, at least, with the USSR;

4. Preparation of a general settlement. This is a longer range project, preliminary work on which has started. The British are agreeable to the idea and are also working on a draft;

5. A program of guidance for the Italian Government in arranging for local elections, to precede general elections, and the convocation of a constituent assembly. The real "liberation" of Italy and establishment of democratic government can only be achieved when these civic responsibilities are assumed by the people. The earlier idea of physical supervision or control of elections by Allied administrators and indefinite postponement of constitutional and institutional questions (the Crown) seems no longer practicable.

¹ See document No. 482, footnote 2.

In the measure that progress can be made with these projects the reintegration of Italy in the family of nations (United Nations status, membership in the ILO, etc.) and the consequent self-reliance and initiative in political and economic rehabilitation can be facilitated.

If you approve of action along the foregoing lines, the Department will submit detailed recommendations for a solution of the principal problems.

JOSEPH C. GREW

No. 467

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2745

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ROME, June 27, 1945.

No. 1805

Subject: Future Allied Policy Toward Italy.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith for the information of the Department a copy of a report prepared in the Allied Commission for the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, on the subject of the future Allied policy toward Italy and to suggest that it be read in connection with the reports from this Embassy¹ on the matter of the substitution of a simple interim arrangement for the present armistice regime in Italy and the establishment of a Tripartite Economic Advisory Council.

Respectfully yours,

A. KIRK

[Enclosure]

The Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission (Stone) to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (Alexander)

SECRET

23 JUNE 1945.

CC 1001

Subject: Future Policy Toward Italy.

1. Italy is at the parting of the ways. Defeated in 1943, she has been fought over and occupied by Allies or Germans for two years; she has suffered civil war in the North where partisans have fought Fascists, and Republican troops have been in battle against the new Italian Army. She is split into eight conflicting political parties with membership of less than 10 per cent of the population and no outstanding leader has come to the fore; she has had five Governments since September 1943; a million of her men have been in exile either as slave labor or as prisoners of war; more than half a million

¹ Not printed.

of her people have suffered dislocation of home; her financial position is precarious; her economy has been totally disrupted; she has no merchant fleet and few foreign markets; without coal and raw materials she faces unemployment amounting to several millions; the country is full of arms illegally held. Like other European countries devastated by the war, the ground in Italy is fertile for the rapid growth of the seeds of an anarchical movement fostered by Moscow to bring Italy within the sphere of Russian influence. Already there are signs that, if present conditions long continue, Communism will triumph—possibly by force.

2. Communistic growth cannot be blocked by restrictive or repressive measures. Since the conditions which engender it are both material and moral, the only hope of restraining it in Italy is to ameliorate these conditions—to assist Italy economically, and to lift her morale by admitting her to a position of respectability in the family of nations.

3. It can be argued that the expiation of Italy's crime of 1940 must rightly be prolonged: indeed, her defeat and the course of battle since 1943 have tended to ensure that. Circumstances, if not the will of the United Nations, will see to it that she will not revert again to the artificial position of a great power which Mussolini's regime achieved. But already her people have shown, by their profession and acts of co-belligerency with the Allies, not only in the armed forces of the post-armistice Italian Government, but among the Partisans in the North, that they are willing to abandon totalitarianism and work for the same freedoms as the Allies who liberated them. The great majority of Italians desire to see a democratic Italy. They will only permit Communism to take hold because of fear—since that party is the best organized and best armed in the country—or because of apathy arising from a generation of non-participation in democratic political life, the shame of defeat, and the results of privation. Their efforts to attain democracy may be ineffective compared with others: they may appear self centered, and, like many liberated peoples, show scant gratitude to their liberators. But unless they receive help and guidance from the democracies, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, they will inevitably turn to the USSR and join the group of "police" states, united by Communism, which is extending westward from Russia.

4. It is in the material interests of the United States and Great Britain to prevent this. Nor can the historical and moral issues be disregarded. American and British influence, military, political and economic, have been predominant in Italy for nearly two years. They have brought freedom from the common enemy; they have ensured freedom from hunger; they have not yet provided freedom

from fear. Posterity would judge harshly if the endeavors of two great democratic states were to result in the institution of a second dictatorship in the first European country to be liberated from Fascism and Nazism.

5. An expression of positive policy towards Italy by the US and UK Governments is necessary. The policy should be one which, by restoring confidence in herself and in the Allies, will assist Italy towards recovery as a healthy nation politically and economically. Moreover, it is in the interests of the Allies to make use of Italy. She is geographically important in any strategic plans for regional security in the Mediterranean. She owned a naval fleet (which still exists) which, if properly employed, would be an important addition to regional security. She has a small army which, reorganized under Allied guidance, has won merit and would improve greatly under further Allied help. The industries in Northern Italy lack only raw materials and coal to be employed immediately for Allied war production and to supplement in the Mediterranean the commodities necessary for the clothing and rehabilitation of Europe.

6. But a change in relationship between the three nations must be effected. Having "worked her passage", Italy must be allowed to emerge from defeat through co-belligerency to the position of an active partner, however lowly, in the maintenance of post-war security. If she is to serve as a bastion of democracy in Southern Europe, such a recovery is essential and must be encouraged.

7. The implementation of this policy would require certain positive steps, assurances, and conditions. These might be included in the agreement between the Allies and Italy which would formally terminate the state of hostilities and replace the Terms of Surrender as a prelude to her joining the United Nations now or in the very near future. The agreement might include, among others, the following provisions:

(a) Italy to regain control of her naval fleet for employment under any regional security scheme which might be evolved for the Mediterranean.

The fleet consists of 5 battleships, 9 cruisers, 11 fleet destroyers, 40 small craft and 28 submarines. Two of the battleships are now in the Bitter Lakes, three in Taranto. It is estimated that it would cost five hundred million lire each to make them fit for service. 13 Submarines are in Allied operations overseas. It would require a Navy of 50,000 to maintain the fleet without the battleships, and of 75,000 with them. Even having regard to the comparative ineffectiveness of the fleet, its physical presence would be an assurance towards regional security. But its retention would be a major contribution to Italian morale.

(b) The Italian Army to be maintained at a reasonable strength (say 200,000 or 250,000 men).

In my memorandum 8251/180/EC of 7 June 1945 ² I have suggested the maintenance of the Italian Army at an interim strength of 140,000 men consisting of five combat groups and one reserve regiment (50,000), three internal security divisions for Sicily and Sardinia, and one internal security brigade for each of ten military regions (40,000), with the remainder to be control and administrative units. In addition, the present strength of 65,000 men of the Royal *Carabinieri* should be maintained. Such a strength would suffice so long as Allied troops, mentioned in subpara (f) below, remained, but should be increased as these are withdrawn.

(c) The Italian Air Force to be maintained at a token strength, or at present strength.

It is presumed that no military air force will be maintained but it is suggested that sufficient aircraft be allocated to the Navy and Army for reconnaissance and spotting purposes. If, however, it were considered possible to permit an air force, then it is recommended that it be maintained at its present strength. Restoration of civil air transport domestically and in the Mediterranean should be encouraged.

(d) To enable her to fill her role as a "junior partner" in the maintenance of Mediterranean security, the Allies would agree to furnish a military mission to assist in the training and organization of the Italian land, sea, and air forces, similar to the pre-war military and naval missions provided by the United States for certain South American republics.

(e) Similarly, an Allied Police Mission to assist the Italian Government in the reorganization and training of the Police Forces of Italy could be offered.

The introduction of an Allied Police Mission of high quality is essential. Although in two years of occupation the Allies have been compelled to employ the existing Italian Police Forces, they still lack the confidence of themselves, the public, or the Allies. With the difficulties of military occupation it may not have been possible to achieve this. It is essential, however, that immediate steps be taken to overhaul and possibly reconstitute the whole of the public security agencies in Italy, based on democratic principles.

(f) The retention in Italy of an Allied Military Force of five Divisions (excluding Allied Forces in Venezia Giulia) until such time as revitalized Italian civil and military services were in a position to ensure democratic security in Italy.

The role of the Allied troops at all times would be as representatives of the democracies and it would be necessary to arrange for special

² Not printed.

instruction and even training to this end. Intervention in Italian affairs except in the gravest emergency would be avoided and the greatest care would be taken in the handling of such administrative problems as accommodation and requisitioning. The troops would be not so much forces of occupation in a defeated country but forces of assistance provided by the Allies in order to give confidence to the population and the Government: to strengthen merely by their presence the authority of the Italian machinery of law and order (but only in exceptional cases to supplant it) and to be used in a last resort to prevent the imposition of undemocratic methods by force.

(g) The establishment of an Allied economic organization (joint or separate) to assist Italy in correcting the basic defects of her former economy, in the procurement of raw materials and the rehabilitation of her commerce and industry; and

(h) The provision of an annual quota of coal sufficient to enable Italian industry to function.

A prerequisite for a healthy Italy is the immediate provision of sufficient coal and raw materials to maintain a modicum of the industries of Italy at work and to prevent unemployment on such a vast scale that it must lead to disorder. Provision of raw materials and coal must be assured and equally the retention of an Allied economic organization (or separate U. S. and British missions) to ensure procurement and to advise the Italian Government on the proper use and distribution of such imports is essential. It would contain, of course, a financial section. Some such body as NAJEB or MESC is envisaged with strong Italian representation dependent from the Allied Commission, or its successor. Alternatively, separate U. S. and U. K. economic missions depending from the Embassies or the Governments could be provided. The economic problems of post-war Italy are immense and unless Allied assistance by means of imports and guidance is provided, all other measures to preserve the country may be discounted.

(i) The reassurance of credits in the U. S. and an increase in credits in the U. K. The latter might well take the form of financial assistance with regard to the import of coal.

(j) The replacement of the Allied Commission by a small Allied Mission to coordinate (d) to (h) above and to function as advisors to the Italian Government.

(k) Arrangements with respect to the Italian colonies to be considered with due regard to the interests of the inhabitants and to the assistance given by Italy as a co-belligerent and in no punitive sense.

Little perhaps can be said for the return of any of her colonies to Italy. But if she were to achieve the position of an active partner in regional security in the Mediterranean then it might be possible to allow her, under the same regional agreement, to administer the colony

of Tripolitania. She might also be permitted to be represented on any international body set up to administer Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.

9. [*sic*] The first and last of these suggested conditions are of course the assurances that would create most satisfaction in Italy and restore the self respect of her people.

10. A further safeguard to preserve Italy among the free nations of democracy, and indeed a duty of the Allies, is the education of the minds of the Italians towards a democratic way of life. Not enough has been done in this direction. We have established freedom of speech and of the press—but freedom without the self-imposed restraints of a democratically educated nation tends to become license. We have done much in the schools and universities. But the people, the Government, and the local authorities, after 20 years of Fascism, need advice on the interpretation of democracy. We cannot expect, nor should we try, to impose Anglo-American methods on a Latin country: but in the field of national and local government, of justice and police methods, of agriculture and labor, of electoral systems and social welfare, the Allies still have much to teach and the Italians much to learn. If the Italians are to become partners with the Allies they must be prepared to assimilate their national characteristics with the principles of democracy and take advice from the two democratic powers who are willing to help them materially.

11. Much can be done in this way by institutions such as the British Council, the interchange of American cultural representatives, and by sympathetic treatment of Italian problems in the Allied press. The Military Mission and the Police Mission would represent direct forms of advice. The Allied Mission referred to in subpara 7(j) should contain a very small number of highly qualified men who, without semblance of control, would be accepted by the Italian Government and act to them as advisors in their task of setting up a democratic form of administration. Such men might be supplemented by special missions to advise on especial problems.

12. The Allied Commission, therefore, should be succeeded by an Allied Mission for the following purposes: Except in Venezia Giulia, and possibly in the Southern Tyrolean provinces, Allied Military Government should have disappeared by September 1945. In order to ensure free elections and a free referendum, it will be recommended that a number of Allied officers, under the direction of the Commission or its successor, remain in the provinces, and a considerable number may be required in connection with the rehabilitation of industry. But by the end of 1945 both the redeployment of Allied troops, except those recommended in para 7(f) above, and the removal of Allied Commission officers in the field, will probably have been completed. It is recommended that the Head of the Mission with access to the

United States and British Governments should be charged with the following functions:

(a) As Chief Civil Affairs Officer, the administration of Venezia Giulia and any other areas under AMG.

(b) As Head of the Allied Mission:

(i) To coordinate the work of the military mission or missions.

(ii) To supervise the Allied Police Mission.

(iii) To supervise the Economic Board or to coordinate independent economic missions.

(iv) To coordinate the work of the Displaced Persons and Refugees Sub-Commission with UNRRA, the Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees, and other organizations until such time as UNRRA took over all such functions.

(v) To supervise the work of the Enemy War Materials Disposal Sub-Commission.

(vi) To interpret to the Italian Government the conditions of any agreement made, *vide* para 7, and to safeguard Allied interests under such an agreement.

(vii) To provide liaison between Allied Military Commander or Commanders and the Italian Government.

13. To sum up, in order to prevent Italy from leaning toward the USSR and succumbing to its influence, an expression of positive, non-vindictive policy by the US and UK Governments is necessary. This policy should make Italy a useful partner of the Allies in the Mediterranean and so create a healthy Italy. Important conditions are: the rebuilding of her morale by restoring to her the control of her fleet and a non-punitive policy with regard to her colonies; the retention of 5 divisions of Allied troops and the establishment of Allied Military and Police Missions to enable her to regain internal security under a democracy; and practical economic assistance. More must be done to encourage the education of the Italians towards the democratic way of life: the Allied Commission should be replaced by an Allied Mission.

14. In short, neither a *laissez-faire* attitude toward Italy by the U. S. and the U. K. nor the imposition of a harsh peace is compatible with a policy of preserving Italy as a bastion of democracy in the Mediterranean area.

ELLERY W. STONE

No. 468

740.0011 PW/7-645

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Grew)[Extract ¹]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Declaration of War against Japan

Participants: Italian Ambassador, Signor Alberto Tarchiani;
Under Secretary, Mr. Grew

The Italian Ambassador called on me this morning and took up with me the following matters:

1. He left with me a letter addressed to the President enclosing a memorandum outlining the present position of Italy and her vital needs and aspirations. The Ambassador said that knowing how occupied the President must be at this particular moment he had not ventured to ask to see the President personally, and he had therefore sought me as an intermediary for delivering his letter. I said that I would with pleasure see that the letter gets into the hands of the President without delay.

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J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

[Attachment 3 ²]*The Italian Ambassador (Tarchiani) to President Truman*

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1945.

MR. PRESIDENT: On the eve of your eventful voyage to Berlin, allow me to express to you the fervid wishes of the Italian people, and to invite your attention to the enclosed memorandum in which the present position of Italy and her vital needs and aspirations are outlined.

My country places its confidence in the human friendship of America and in the clear sense of justice of her President.

Faithfully yours,

ALBERTO TARCHIANI

¹ For the paragraph of this memorandum not printed here, see document No. 236.

² Printed from a carbon copy with a typed signature which appears to have accompanied the original and to have been detached for the files of the Department of State. For attachments 1 and 2, see document No. 236.

[Subattachment]

*The Italian Ambassador (Tarchiani) to President Truman*MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TRUMAN PRESIDENT OF THE U. S. A.
ON THE POSITION, WISHES AND HOPES OF ITALY

1. Twenty-two months ago, on September 3, 1943, the Armistice³ was signed between Italy and the United Nations, putting an end to a war in which the Italian people were thrust against their will by Fascist dictatorship and which they always disapproved and opposed.

Such Armistice, the duration of which has no precedent in our times, is still in force today in spite of the fact that Italy has not remained inactive, but has on the contrary enthusiastically joined, since October 13, 1943, the cause of the Allied Nations, taking full part in the common struggle against the enemy.

During twenty months of co-belligerency, Italy has fought at the side of the Allies, with her whole fleet, the forces of her regular army, her air corps, and with more than two-hundred thousand patriots. In the northern provinces under German tyranny, the Italian people have also bravely taken part in the struggle with their active and organized underground forces, contributing in bringing to a speedy and successful end the fight for liberty and democracy on Italian soil.

All through these months of common struggle Italy has endured miseries and sacrifices and suffered tremendous ruins which have brought destruction to a great part of the country.

Several months ago Italy indicated also her willingness to take part with her military means in the war against the Japanese aggressor. The newly formed Italian Government, following the recent American communication,⁴ is preparing the ways and means of an effective intervention.

2. Italy has thus proved her continued good faith as a democratic nation; she has fought and is prepared to fight for the common cause and has repeatedly shown her determination to practice the principles of international friendship and cooperation. Yet today, as it is well known, Italy finds herself in the most tragic plight: millions of citizens are homeless, displaced persons within and beyond her borders are innumerable, her entire economic and financial structure is disrupted, millions of workers are faced with unemployment. The provisions set up in the Armistice of twenty-two months ago are still in force and this humiliating position deprives the people and the Government of Italy of the possibility of thoroughly normalizing the life of the country.

³ Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2740.

⁴ See document No. 236, footnote 4.

The Italian people are expecting now from the Allies the acknowledgement of their right to an honorable peace that should raise them from the present situation to a normal status of a well-meaning and well-doing nation. The Italian nation is confident that the United States, which have already given so much evidence of their friendship and comprehension towards her, may take such an initiative which might put an end to her present plight, and the advantageous consequences of which would not be in Italy's favor alone.

3. Italy has a natural geographic frontier that history and civilization have preserved. She wants to be at peace and on the most friendly terms with all her neighbors.

a) With France Italy has frontiers, based upon sound ethnical and geographic principles, which were fixed by mutual agreement between the two countries in 1860 and upon which, for eighty-four years, never was there any claim on the French part. Italy has recently given evidence of her good will and friendship for France by settling through direct negotiations the only problem existing between the two countries. In fact, although Tunisia was inhabited for nearly three ninths of the population [*sic*] by Italians, Italy has made the substantial sacrifice of giving up all her rights recognized by previous agreements since 1881.⁵ The Italian people feel, therefore, that no territorial questions may exist between the two countries.

b) Italy has already declared to be ready to negotiate an honorable and equitable agreement for Venezia Giulia with the Yugoslavs, if her vital national interests are safe where, for more than twenty centuries, a majority of Italians have lived, many hundreds of years prior to the appearance of Slavs in those regions.

If to preserve peace in Europe and the amicable cohabitation of the two populations some compromise would prove absolutely necessary, it is fair and equitable that sacrifices be made by both sides and not only by the Italians: it cannot be forgotten that Fiume and Zara and other areas, at present occupied by the Yugoslavs, are entirely or prevalently inhabited by Italians.

c) The Brenner frontier line is the natural geographic and strategic border between the Italians and the Germans. There was a German minority within the Italian borders: not long ago they were given the opportunity of choosing between remaining in Italy or emigrating to Germany. In fact, a part of them decided to leave and

⁵ The reference is apparently to the Treaty of Bardo of May 12, 1881 (text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXII, p. 247), to which only France and Tunis were parties, imposing a French protectorate in Tunis. It was not until September 28, 1896, that France and Italy signed three conventions at Paris (see *ibid.*, vol. LXXXVIII, p. 717) guaranteeing French recognition of the rights of Italians in Tunis in exchange for Italian recognition of the French protectorate.

went to the Nazi Reich, while a substantial share of the alien population freely determined to stay within the Italian nation.⁶

5. As far as the Greeks are concerned, the Dodecanese question—instead of a cause of enmity—may become a link of friendship and understanding between the Italian and the Greek nations, which have no reason for hate or serious conflicting interests.

6. At Tangier Italy has a place among the Powers entitled to preserve the Mediterranean *status quo*. Such a position constitutes for Italy a bond with all the participating nations and with those which will subsequently join the agreement, in the interest of furthering the internationalization of the zone, as it is heralded by the United States.

7. In the painful period of transition between an upsetting war and a reorganized state of peace, Italy has to face the problems of her economic reconstruction, the gravity of which has already been a matter of consideration on the part of the United States Government.

With the purpose of furthering her economic reconstruction Italy, which is a maritime country, needs to have the possibility of gathering a small merchant fleet for her essential transports.

Italy needs to resume free trade with every allied and neutral country; but a fruitful and fairly balanced partnership could be easily organized between American powerful means and Italian reorganized capacity of skill and labor. Being in dire need of economic assistance, Italy obviously will not be in a position of paying reparations.

To help Italy in the process of reconstruction she must be reinstated in what was stolen from her and particularly the very inadequate stock of gold of the Bank of Italy, the machinery depredated from factories and plants, the works of art—of state and private ownership—of which she has been despoiled.

8. Italian prisoners of war, still detained by the Allies, and particularly those who have so well contributed by their work to the common cause, should be immediately liberated and repatriated by a generous act of humanity and fair play.

The Italian people firmly trust that President Truman and the men who have in their hands the destiny of Italy, will consider with sound wisdom and enlightened comprehension the tragedy that she

⁶ For the paragraph omitted at this point, see document No. 249.

has lived and suffered, her effort toward a quick material and political rehabilitation, her immense contribution to the civilization which all nations enjoy, her strong will to become again, and soon, a distinct active element of equilibrium and progress in a better world.

If all these well-founded reasons are taken in due consideration, the supreme aspiration of Italy for an equitable recognition and an honorable and just peace will certainly be fulfilled.

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1945.

No. 469

865.00/7-645 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

ROME, July 6, 1945—midnight.

1851. Strictly confidential.

I had a conversation with Parri yesterday evening. The gist of his remark[s] was in particular the necessity for material aid to Italy with emphasis on the immediate requirement for coal to prevent further unrest in the north and in general the difficulty which he was experiencing in his efforts at reconstruction owing to the restrictions imposed by the armistice regime.

Personal contact with the new pres of the council confirms the general impression of his seriousness simplicity and intellectual distinction. Last night however, he gave no indication of the vitality alertness or assurance which even Bonomi displayed and certainly there was lacking any show of dynamic leadership.

In view of the lack of outstanding quality or proven ability in the members of the cabinet it is useless to speculate on the chance of success of this ministry as only time can tell. It must be admitted, however, that in the present circumstances no govt however gifted can prove its effectiveness unless the armistice regime is abolished[,] unless Allied troops are maintained in the country to give confidence to the people in their prevailing state of demoralization and unless material aid is immediately forthcoming to prevent unrest through widespread unemployment and undernourishment.

KIRK

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 11 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1045).

No. 470

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹[Extracts²]

SECRET

POTSDAM, July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, called this afternoon and discussed for two hours in a preliminary way a number of matters on the agenda of the Conference.³

9. *Italy.*

Sir Alexander stated that his government agreed with ours in wishing to conclude peace with Italy and that the Foreign Office has been working on a draft for a treaty. He showed no enthusiasm for bringing the Italian treaty before the Council of Foreign Ministers; he wishes first to show the UK draft to us. He agreed that early elections were desirable, to be held in 1945 if possible.

Sir Alexander laid emphasis on the importance of drawing Italy closer to the "West" and of enabling her to rebuild her army sufficiently to keep order at home and resist aggression from without. Sir Alexander assumed that Italy would receive economic help principally from the United States and from UNRRA.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 140, 218, 234, 258, 319, 351, 379, 404, 519, 635, 645, 678, and 708.

³ For a list of persons present at this meeting, see document No. 234, footnote 3.

No. 471

740.00119 EW/7-1545 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

CASERTA, July 15, 1945—1 p. m.

2964. SAC² informed us last evening that during his recent visit to London Churchill had requested him to confer with officials of

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 35 of July 16 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1645).

² Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander.

the FonOff with regard to proposed peace treaty with Italy. He said that in absence of Eden who was ill, he conducted conversations with Sargent. After studying FonOff draft carefully Alexander informed Sargent and other FonOff officials that in his opinion their draft was far too severe and he could not concur in it. He reiterated his belief that Tripoli should now definitely be returned to Italy without any strings tied and that Eritrea and Italian Somaliland should be given back to Italy with certain conditions attached. He stated that in his opinion the Italians should also be given a small fleet which would be excellent for their morale.

KIRK

No. 472

740.00119 E. W./7-1545: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

ROME, July 15, 1945—5 p. m.

1983. With reference to Dept's circular information telegram of July 3, 10 a. m.¹ regarding immediate revision of Italian armistice terms, I submit herewith suggestion for possible use in a draft agreement of a *modus vivendi* or interim arrangement [to be] signed by SACMed² to replace the instrument of surrender.

(Begin Summary of Draft Agreement)

SECTION I. ABROGATION OF PRIOR AGREEMENTS

1. Armistice of Sept 3³ and instrument of surrender of Sept 29, 1943⁴ and all terms relating to restoration of Italian territory effective Feb 11, 1944 and subsequently shall, from date of execution of this agreement, be abrogated. Following provisions shall govern relations of contracting parties.

SECTION II. ALLIED AID TO ITALY

1. Allied Commission is hereby dissolved with exception of land, navy and air forces subcommissions, which will be attached to Allied Military HQs. A special section composed of representatives of British, Soviet and US Govts will be established at AFHQ to direct foregoing subcommissions or a military mission under AFHQ with same composition may be established for that purpose.

2. In order to facilitate the normal development of Italian economic life there shall be established a Tripartite Economic Advisory Council,

¹ Not printed.

² Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander.

³ Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2740.

⁴ Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2742.

the members of which will represent the US, UK and Italian Govts. It will function as described in my 1403, May 24, 6 p. m.⁵

3. HQs for Allied Military Govt will be at Allied Military HQs.

4. Italian prisoners of war under the jurisdiction of the UK and US will be liberated from that status or repatriated with the greatest possible urgency that present transportation facilities permit.

SECTION III. ITALIAN AID TO THE ALLIES

1. Italian Govt and people will abstain from all acts detrimental to interests of United Nations and will carry out promptly all orders given by them.

2. Italian Army, Navy and Air Force and equipment will be subject to SACMed as though under his command. He shall direct the size and character of Italian military establishment.

3. For a period not yet determined, Allied force requirements in Italy shall be accorded SACMed by Italian Govt in perpetuation of rights and powers formerly his by conquest or agreement as follows: (a) Such areas, facilities, utilities and installations as SACMed may require will be made available to Allied forces; (b) right to maintain and quarter troops in Italy; (c) right to declare any area a military zone; (d) right to convene Allied military tribunals to try and punish persons violating Allied military orders or performing hostile acts against Allied forces; (e) right to hold or require Italian Govt to hold civilian internees, POWs and displaced persons; (f) Italian courts may not try members of Allied forces or officials of United Nations, civilian or military; (g) members of Allied forces or officials of the United Nations may not be taxed without consent of AAC [SAC?]; (h) complete freedom of movement for Allied forces and officials of United Nations in Italy.

4. All information concerning military installations and technical information of value to the United Nations in connection with military operations in Italy and elsewhere shall be made available to SAC by Italian Govt.

5. Mutual cooperation between Italian Govt and United Nations for repatriation or movement of displaced and stateless persons.

6. Cooperation in apprehension and trial of war criminals.

7. SAC or other appropriate Allied authority shall control for operational purposes, in general interest of the United Nations, Italian merchant vessels.

8. Italian Govt will establish and maintain an effective foreign exchange control agency for the purpose of implementing the economic warfare objectives of United Nations Govts and to assure the most effective use of Italy's foreign exchange resources.

The Italian Govt will adopt measures in support of economic warfare objectives of the United Nations to be worked out in consultation with the appropriate United Nations diplomatic missions in Rome.

9. The Italian Govt will be issuing authority for AM lire or such other lire currency as may be used by the Allied forces in Italy in such quantities as are required.

⁵ Not printed.

10. The Italian Govt will request the Tripartite Economic Advisory Council for guidance before entering into any agreement or settlement involving the use of Italian external assets for the purpose of paying claims arising prior to Sept 8, 1943.

11. Obligation to pay for supplies imported into Italy by Allied forces is recognized by Italian Govt as well as all services, installations, et cetera, furnished by Allied forces for benefit of Italy.

SECTION IV. POLITICAL STATUS OF ITALY

1. All territory restored to its jurisdiction will be administered by Italian Govt free of control by Allied forces, except in case of military necessity or when assistance or advice may be requested by Italian Govt of Tripartite Economic Advisory Council (see Section II, paragraph 2 above).

2. Italian diplomatic relations with other states will be solely within competence of Govt of Italy.

3. Italian Govt will continue to carry out without control by Allied forces program of defascistization. Italian Govt may request assistance or advice of Tripartite Economic Advisory Council.

4. Italian Govt communications and Italian communications within Italy will not be subject to Allied control or censorship.

5. Allied pledge to Italian people that they may determine their form of Govt is recognized by Italian Govt as likewise binding upon it. In order to ensure the fullest possible expression of the Italian people on this important question, Italian Govt undertakes to submit it to the Italian people in the form of a plebiscite or a national referendum, notwithstanding previous Italian legislation to the contrary.

SECTION V. LIMITATIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT

1. The rights of Allied forces to continue to occupy Italian territory governed by AMG and to continue to use and possess property and facilities now under requisition remain entirely unprejudiced by this agreement.

2. No disposition or predetermination of any disputed Italian territory is contemplated by this agreement, all such questions being relegated to ultimate agreement between Italian Govt and United Nations.

3. Full rights of the Allied forces and of the United Nations to reparations for war damage suffered by them at the hands of the Italian people or Govt or for cost of Allied occupation of Italy will not be impaired by this agreement, which in no sense constitutes a final settlement. (End of Draft Agreement.)

It is further suggested that decision be taken by interested powers to permit Italy to adhere to United Nations Declaration.⁶ Italian Govt could then be informed at time of signing of new agreement that Italy would be admitted to ranks of United Nations upon application.

KIRK

⁶ Of January 1, 1942. Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1600.

RETENTION OF ALLIED FORCES AND OF A COMBINED COMMAND
IN ITALY

No. 473

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Retention of Allied Forces in Italy

The attached telegram from Caserta (2801—June 28)¹ indicates that Prime Minister Churchill will take up with you at the meeting the desirability of leaving substantial American forces in Italy and elsewhere in Europe until major problems are settled.

The military requirements of the redeployment program must, of course, come first. Nevertheless from the political aspect it is most important to maintain the Allied character of the forces remaining in Europe during this interim period through at least token American participation. Total withdrawal would inevitably be interpreted as a sign that the United States is relinquishing a direct influence on future settlements and cannot be counted on strongly to implement the principles we have proclaimed. The presence of American troops even in limited numbers inspires confidence because the United States is felt to be the only truly disinterested great power participating in European affairs.

As regards Italy, it is essential to retain Allied troops during the interim period. Many indications point to the fact that subversive elements are counting upon their withdrawal in order to further their own ends, whereas moderate elements have repeatedly asked for the maintenance of Allied, and especially American, forces. There are large quantities of partisan arms still in the hands of the more irresponsible elements, and the natural disintegration of law and order in a defeated, devastated country affords a favorable atmosphere for a resort to violence for the settlement of political and social problems such as that which in 1919 led to fascist totalitarianism. It cannot be excluded, either, that the powerful armed forces which still exist just outside Italy's frontiers might find in these possible disturbances an excuse to intervene and "restore order". It is probable that the mere presence of Allied troops will suffice to preserve a satisfactory measure of law and order, precluding the development of a situation which would result in losing all we have thus far achieved in Italy.

Italian internal security forces and the small Italian Army which is now being recreated have thus far done a reasonably satisfactory job

¹ Document No. 172.

in maintaining public order, but they are still largely dependent upon the moral and material support of the Allied forces and could hardly be expected to cope alone with the situation which would undoubtedly arise upon the rapid withdrawal of Allied troops.

The Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission² has formulated a plan for the retention of five Allied divisions in Italy in addition to service and administrative units employed in the redeployment of personnel and matériel and exclusive of Allied forces in Venezia Giulia; this plan is outlined in a telegram from Rome (1693—June 20), also attached.³

The principle should be established that Allied troops will not be wholly withdrawn from Italy until after the Italian people have had an opportunity, in accordance with the Moscow Declaration,⁴ to choose their form of democratic government. It is therefore recommended that at least a token force of United States troops be left in Italy in order to inspire Italian confidence and to avoid the suspicion and the possible serious trouble which might result if British forces alone remained in Italy.

[WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1945.⁵

² Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone.

³ Document No. 474.

⁴ i. e., the Declaration Regarding Italy released November 1, 1943. Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 309.

⁵ So dated in the Briefing Book, but the original of the memorandum, signed by Byrnes, was dispatched to Truman on July 4 (file No. 740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2845).

No. 474

740.0011 EW/6-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

ROME, June 20, 1945—6 p. m.

1693. Chief Commissioner AC¹ sent the following memo to SACMed² containing recommendations on redeployment of Allied troops in Italy:

1. In examining the question of the redeployment and distribution of Allied troops in Italy, consideration must be given to external and internal security and the undoubted duty of the Allied Govts to ensure so far as possible that free elections are held so that the population may express its opinion on (a) the institutional question; and (b) the constitutional Govt of the country without fear.

2. Consideration must also be given to the size and location of Ital land forces.

¹ Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone.

² Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander.

[No. 474]

3. If the proposals for the maintenance of an interim Ital Army of 140,000 submitted in HQ AC memorandum 251-180-EC of 7 June 1945³ are approved then the following distribution of the troops is recommended: Combat groups one each in Turin, Milan, Brescia, Udine and Bologna. Internal security divisions strength 2500 each: Two divisions in Sicily, one div in Sardinia, one div in each of the military regions viz. Palermo, Bari, Naples, Rome, Florence, Bologna, Genoa, Turin, Milan, Bolzano and Udine.

4. The primary functions of the combat groups are for frontier defence and control. The group at Bologna could be used as a reserve.

5. If the above distribution of the Ital Army is approved then the maintenance of five Allied Div is recommended in addition to the administrative and service units employed in redeployment of personnel and material and exclusive of any Allied forces in Venezia Giulia. Consideration has been given to the fact that Ital troops will not be maintained within fifteen miles of the French frontier.

6. It is recommended that one division be placed in each of the following areas: Milan, Padua, Florence-Bologna, Rome-Naples, Bari.

7. The distribution of troops within these areas is a matter for military consideration. It is obvious, however, that a small force will be needed on the Franco-Ital frontier and possibly in the southern Tyrol and Udine. Mobility would be a prerequisite and during the weeks preceding the election, it would be expedient to allow a very *[sic]* wide distribution of troops in order to cover the larger towns and some of the more important rural areas. They would naturally take the form of a special exercise or operation and need not be considered in detail in this memorandum.

8. It is considered that it would be retrogressive to station Allied troops in Sardinia or Sicily even during the election period. Sardinia can very well be left to Ital troops and in Sicily particularly during election times the employment of Allied troops would be unfair.

9. The role of the Allied troops at all times and especially during the election period would be as representatives of the democracies and it would be necessary to arrange for special instruction and even training to this end. Intervention in Italian affairs except in the gravest emergency would have to be avoided and the greatest care would have to be taken in the handling of such administrative problems as accommodations, requisitioning, etc. The troops would be not so much forces of occupation in a defeated country but forces of assistance provided by the Allies in order to give confidence to the population and the Govt: To strengthen by their presence the authority of the Ital machinery of law and order (but only in exceptional cases to supplant it) and to be used in a last resort to prevent the opposition of radical methods by force.

10. The Allied troops should be maintained in this country until such time as the Italian Army and the forces of public security in Italy can play a competent role in the preservation of security. It is estimated that at the earliest, this cannot take place before Sept 1, 1946. End Memo.

³ Not printed.

I consider Chief Commissioner's recommendation regarding maintenance of Allied divisions in Italy as the minimum at least until some basis for stability is established in Italy and some assurance can be found that this area will not be subverted by Communist and anarchist propaganda for imperialistic Russian purposes.

KIRK

No. 475

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2845: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

ROME, June 25, 1945—7 p. m.

1741. Bonomi called on me today following his relinquishment of the office of President of the Council and said that the retention of Allied troops in Italy was essential not only for the development of confidence in the people in the preservation of order inside the country but also as a deterrent to foreign elements seeking to jeopardize that order through intrigue from within or through threats, from without against the security of Italy. See my 1409, May 25,¹ and my 1693, June 20.²

KIRK

¹ Not printed.² Document No. 474.

No. 476

740.00119 Control (Italy)/7-145: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State ad interim

TOP SECRET

CASERTA, July 1, 1945—9 a. m.

2828. From a series of conversations (our 2539, June 9 and 2650, June 15¹) with Chief of Staff² and other high ranking Brit mil and civilian officials at AFHQ we gather that Alexander during his present visit to England will urge Churchill to endeavor persuade Truman and high ranking Amer military and political auths during course of forthcoming Big Three Meeting to maintain in this theater for as long as possible Combined Command. While Brit will attempt hold out for maximum retention of a SAC in this theater they are aware that we probably will not go along on this basis and they have already prepared plans for formation of Inter-Allied Service Committee to carry on functions of Allied character until peace settlement is made. They will argue that while purpose for which a SAC was appointed

¹ Neither printed.² Lieutenant-General W. D. Morgan.

in Med theater no longer exists whole of Europe is in most unsettled state and this applies particularly to south Europe and Balkans where ultimate ownership of territories on frontiers of Yugo Bulgaria Greece Austria Italy and France is in dispute and that general situation will inevitably be uneasy until final European peace settlement. They will insist that possibility of having to use force to impose terms of that settlement or to prevent unilateral military action by any of interested parties will always exist and that responsibility for controlling this situation will be Allied commitment and that only a SAC with prestige and power of putting over Anglo-Amer policy is of vital importance [*sic*].

Brit will insist further that Allied Command is indispensable for execution of Allied admin responsibilities such as repair and docking of war and merchant ships civil affairs in Venezia Giulia communications and labor solid and liquid fuel local resources and financial affairs.

They will point out that if there is no form of Allied Command action could only be taken after coordination and agreement between Brit and US Staffs concerned which would be so cumbersome and slow as to make impossible orderly execution of Allied admin responsibilities. They will also insist that both politically and from intelligence aspect Balkan countries should be dealt with as whole by one HQ. Their position is that Yugo affairs and reactions will continue affect Italy and Albania and there is always possibility of difficulties and incidents over Yugo Greek Alban Bulgar relations.

As Dept aware Amer mil auths at AFHQ have pressed for early dissolution of Allied Command in Italy and are proceeding rapidly as possible with evacuation of Amer troops from this theater. Morton (our 2801, June 28³) informed us before his departure for London with SAC that there would undoubtedly be a high ranking Brit civilian official who would have full authority on all political matters in this theater and would probably bear title "personal rep of PriMin".

KIRK

³ Document No. 172.

No. 477

865.00/7-645 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹[Extract²]

SECRET

ROME, July 6, 1945—midnight.

1851. Strictly confidential.

. . . It must be admitted, however, that in the present circumstances no govt however gifted can prove its effectiveness unless the armistice regime is abolished[,] unless Allied troops are maintained in the country to give confidence to the people in their prevailing state of demoralization and unless material aid is immediately forthcoming to prevent unrest through widespread unemployment and undernourishment.

KIRK

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 11 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1045).

² For the full text of this message, see document No. 469.

No. 478

740.00119 Control (Italy)/7-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

CASERTA, July 7, 1945—3 p. m.

2890. We have made it so clear how essential to the preservation of (re our 2828, July 1¹) order in Europe we consider the retention in Europe of Allied troops in general and American troops in particular that we need not emphasize our concurrence in views of SACMed along the lines of paragraph 1 of tel 2828.

It would seem that as long as there is an Allied military commitment in this area, AFHQ should preserve an Allied character.

AFHQ should be reduced in size and moved to Trieste as the vital strategic point in southeastern Europe.

It is our opinion that the office of AmPolAd should be abolished and such information activities of that office as are considered continuously useful should be carried on by a liaison officer from offices of military and/or Naval Attaché to Rome Embassy established at AFHQ who would report to War and/or Navy Depts for information of State Dept.

KIRK

¹ Document No. 476.

No. 479

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*TOP SECRET
C. C. S. 866/1

[WASHINGTON,] 7 July 1945.

FUTURE OF ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, MEDITERRANEAN

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff are in general agreement with views set forth in C. C. S. 866,¹ but note that since C. C. S. 866 was written, the question of combined command in Austria has been discussed in the C. C. S. 481 series.²

2. With termination of operations and redeployment of United States and British forces from the Mediterranean Theater, it should be possible to reduce progressively the size of Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ). In this regard the United States Chiefs of Staff believe that Field Marshal Alexander should be directed to restrict AFHQ activities to essentially Allied matters and to reduce his headquarters as the number of troops in the theater and commitments diminish. It does not appear possible at this time, in view of commitments mentioned in paragraphs 2 *a.* and 2 *b.* of C. C. S. 866, to determine the future of AFHQ, but it is suggested that the situation might be reviewed about 1 September 1945.

3. In light of the foregoing it is recommended that the attached message (Enclosure) be dispatched to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMed).³

¹ The views referred to were presented in a memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, dated May 25, as follows (J. C. S. Files):

"2. The British Chiefs of Staff consider that the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, should not be terminated until the Quadripartite Commission in Vienna has taken over control of Austria and the situation in each zone and on the lines of communication is firmly in hand. When this condition is fulfilled they believe that a small combined United States-British headquarters will be required to replace Allied Force Headquarters in Italy until:—

"*a.* The Allied Commission in Italy has been dissolved, and,
"*b.* Allied Military Government in Bolzano and the Allied commitment in Venezia Giulia have ceased."

² Not printed.

³ A note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff dated August 1 (C. C. S. 866/3) recorded that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had approved the recommendation in C. C. S. 866/1 as amended by C. C. S. 866/2 (see document No. 480) and that the message to Alexander had been dispatched on July 20.

[Enclosure—Paraphrase]

TOP SECRET

DRAFT

MESSAGE TO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN

1. It is not possible now, in view of Allied commitments in the Mediterranean area, to determine when Allied Force Headquarters might be dissolved as a combined command. The Combined Chiefs of Staff wish, however, (a) to reduce progressively the size of the Headquarters as troops are redeployed and as other commitments decrease and (b) to restrict the activities of the Headquarters to matters which are essentially Allied in nature.

2. Recommendations as to the future of Allied Force Headquarters are requested on September 1.

No. 480

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 12 July 1945.

C. C. S. 866/2

FUTURE OF ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, MEDITERRANEAN

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have informed us that they have given further consideration to the question of the dissolution of Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) and subsequent organization. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and the Commanders-in-Chief Middle East have sent the British Chiefs of Staff their comments on the original proposals, and when these have been considered the British Chiefs of Staff will put forward further draft proposals for the consideration of the United States Chiefs of Staff.

2. In the meanwhile, they agree to the dispatch of the message in the Enclosure to C. C. S. 866/1,¹ amended as follows:—

Delete paragraph 2 and substitute:²

“The Combined Chiefs of Staff will send you direction for the future of Allied Force Headquarters following the TERMINAL Conference.”³

¹ Document No. 479.

² The proposed substitution which follows is in paraphrase.

³ Concerning action taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see document No. 479, footnote 3.

No. 481

740.00119 (Control) Italy/7-1245 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

CASERTA, July 12, 1945—5 p. m.

2931. Field Marshal Alexander who returned from London last night informed us today that during his sojourn in England he had conferred with Churchill on three occasions. He said that British Prime Minister had displayed keen interest in situation in Italy and promised SAC that he would not fail to impress on President of the US importance of adopting an active policy with regard to Italy. SAC added that Churchill had pointed out that for a people who had been in Fascist camp for over 20 years it would not be difficult for them to slide over almost overnight into Red camp if Allies were not careful. Churchill shared Alexander's concern with regard to rapid withdrawal of American troops from Italy and Europe in general and stated that matter would be discussed with President Truman.

Alexander said that Churchill also promised him that SAC would be given every opportunity to explain to all members of American delegation at forthcoming Big Three meeting importance of doing everything possible at this time to help Italy back on her feet.

SAC stated that he expected Italy to be given full Allied status in near future.

KIRK

¹ The gist of this message was included in an unnumbered communication of July 13 sent by Grew to Byrnes by pouch (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1345).

PROPOSED APPOINTMENT OF JAMES H. DOUGLAS, JR., AS CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

No. 482

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1345 : Telegram

*The Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs (Reber) to the Director of European Affairs (Matthews)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1945.

20. For Matthews from Reber.

I understand that Field Marshal Alexander has proposed that Stone be retained as Chief Commissioner for a period of three to four

¹ Sent to the Secretary of State over the signature of Grew.

months in view of the difficulty of having a civilian chief commissioner² while military government is still maintained in the north of Italy. He has suggested that during the interim Douglas proceed to Italy as Vice President Economic Section with the understanding he would replace Stone at the expiration of this period. The British Chiefs of Staff recognizing that this would probably be unacceptable propose instead that Douglas be appointed temporarily as Deputy Chief Commissioner.

Douglas and the War Department have not yet been informed. It will be possible to postpone the presentation of this British proposal for a few days until you and possibly McCloy have had time to explore the matter further with the British Chiefs of Staff at TERMINAL. It is further understood that Alexander will arrive there on July 15.

² Cf. the following memorandum of June 14 from Grew to Truman, headed "Appointment of James H. Douglas, Jr. as Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission in Italy" (file No. 740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-1445):

"A basic principle in our treatment of Italy has been the idea of encouraging the Italians to assume their civic responsibilities, with less reliance on Allied guidance, and to develop a competent administration under their own leadership. To this end we have sought progressively to eliminate the control features of the Allied Commission, and, as rapidly as possible, to reduce the military functions of the Commission and to give to it an increasingly civilian character.

"We now have an opportunity, upon the departure from Italy of Mr. Harold Macmillan (British), who, in addition to his political functions, had been designated by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, as 'Acting President' of the Allied Commission, to review that organization from the standpoint of making it a more effective instrument, with emphasis on its civilian functions.

"The President of the Commission is the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and if, as we understand, the position of 'Acting President' will not be filled, the Chief Commissioner would thus again be the ranking officer of the Commission, responsible directly to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. Recognizing the definite advantages in having a civilian officer in this key position, steps are now being taken through the Combined Chiefs of Staff to relieve Rear Admiral Stone, USN, of these duties and to replace him by Colonel James H. Douglas, Jr., AUS, who has recently returned from service in a key post in the Air Transport Command. The choice of Colonel Douglas has the full approval of the Foreign Economic Administration and the War Department which is prepared to release him from his military status so that he could serve in a civilian capacity. He is fully familiar with the problems involved, is an advocate of the policy of giving to the Commission a more definitely civilian character, and is himself ready to revert to civilian status.

"I think this is an excellent choice, and I should like now to suggest that Colonel Douglas be given the personal rank of Minister, which would facilitate in many ways the performance of his work. I should be grateful if you would let me know whether you would approve such a designation for him."

POLAND

GOVERNMENT AND ELECTIONS; LIQUIDATION OF THE AFFAIRS OF THE GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE

No. 483

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

[Extract ¹]

TOP SECRET

SUGGESTED UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING POLAND

SUMMARY

Our policy regarding Poland, as defined at Yalta,² has for its chief objectives the establishment by the Polish people of a truly democratic government of their own choice, the rapid reintegration of Poland into international life as a United Nation, and its early reconstruction accompanied by the reestablishment of mutually beneficial relations between the United States and Poland. The termination on June 22, 1945 of the activities of the Polish Commission at Moscow by the achievement of agreement between the three Polish groups for the creation of the new Provisional Polish Government of National Unity leaves for immediate consideration the following questions:

1. Establishment of our representation in Poland and transfer of Polish representation here to the new Polish Government;
2. Holding of free and unfettered elections in Poland to provide a popular basis for the new Government;
3. Participation of Poland in reparation, war crime, relief and other similar activities of the United Nations;
4. Determination of the definitive Polish boundaries;
5. Transfer of population incidental to territorial transfers or wartime displacements; and
6. Physical and moral reconstruction of Poland.

While treating Poland scrupulously as an independent state and supporting those elements in the new Government which oppose its becoming a Soviet satellite, it appears necessary to sponsor "Big Three" arrangements for the supervision of the elections and the

¹ For other sections of this paper, see documents Nos. 510 and 521.

² See vol. II, document No. 1417, section VI.

determination of the boundaries. Unsupervised elections might give free hand to the growth of Soviet influence and the boundary question involves important ex-enemy territory whose disposition might effect [*affect*] future peace. . . . We should facilitate insofar as our aid is requested the transfer of minority groups but we should not permit the forced repatriation of Poles now in the West or the uncontrolled deportation by unilateral Polish action of the 8-10,000,000 Germans formerly domiciled in the areas claimed by the Soviet-sponsored Polish Government.

We should support participation by Poland with other United Nations similarly concerned in postwar international activities such as reparations, war crimes, and relief and rehabilitation, but in no circumstances as a Soviet satellite. Our relief work in Poland should be generous and carried out preferably by the American Red Cross. While this Government may not want to oppose a political configuration in Eastern Europe which gives the Soviet Union a predominant influence in Poland, neither would it desire to see Poland become in fact a Soviet satellite and have American influence there completely eliminated. In assisting through credits and otherwise in the physical reconstruction of Polish economy, we should insist on the acceptance by Poland of a policy of equal opportunity for us in trade, investments and access to sources of information. The large population of Polish extraction in the United States will undoubtedly seek to make an internal American political issue of Polish affairs if free relations between the two countries are seriously impeded.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

SUGGESTED UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING POLAND

It is hoped that the progress recently made by the Polish Commission in Moscow in achieving agreement among the three Polish groups for the formation of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity will result in the establishment of a truly democratic and acceptable Polish Government at Warsaw. However, reports from our Ambassador at Moscow³ indicate there is little fundamental change in the attitude of the Soviet authorities and the Bierut Government on Polish matters. It would thus appear necessary that we maintain our vigilance and continue to pursue a firm and active Policy regarding Poland.

While establishing diplomatic relations with Warsaw as soon as practicable, we should insist on the fulfillment at the earliest possible moment of the pledge, foreseen at Yalta, for the holding of free and unfettered elections in Poland. Soviet military and police formations

³ W. Averell Harriman.

beyond those necessary to protect lines of communications between Russia and the occupied-German areas should be withdrawn in order not to be an intimidating factor in the elections. The prestige and democratic functioning of any government at Warsaw meeting our requirements will adversely be affected by the continuing presence in Poland of large Soviet forces. These elections should likewise be supervised by representatives of the Three Great Powers, otherwise, the presence of Soviet officials and troops in Poland would result in supervision by the Soviet Government alone and in possible undue and undesirable Soviet influence on the outcome of the elections.

We should support actively those elements in the new Government which oppose Poland's becoming a Soviet satellite. Such support should not become open interference in internal Polish affairs but it should be effective enough to enable the democratic Polish leaders to carry out the pledge we have made to the Polish nation. Their task and our task will be greatly simplified if we can use this to foster the maintenance of freedom of expression, freedom of the press and information and personal liberty in reconstructed Poland. The free exchange of information between Poland and the Western World, accompanied by a wide interchange of visitors which is impossible at the present time, should be among our chief objectives, since contact between Poland and the Western World will be reestablished thereby. It is chiefly through support of Mikołajczyk and his fellow democratic ministers in the new government that we can hope to end the present "blackout" in Poland.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

Annex]

TOP SECRET

THE NEW POLISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

Sixteen out of the twenty-one members of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity were already in the Warsaw Provisional Government or were closely associated with that Soviet-sponsored group before the reorganization. The three Polish groups which met in Moscow under the aegis of the Polish Commission set up at Yalta agreed that seven persons not connected with the Warsaw Provisional Government were to be in the new Government. However, three of these persons because of health or for other reasons refused to take portfolios in the new Government. The following

are the names of the four non-Warsaw Poles who have accepted posts in the new Government:

1. Stanisław Mikołajczyk, Vice-Premier and Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. He has been the leader of the Peasant Party, the largest party in Poland, since 1937. He was Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-exile from July 1943, after the death of General Sikorski, until November 1944 when he resigned because the majority of his Government would not accept the proposals for the reestablishment of relations between the Government-in-exile and the U. S. S. R. worked out by Mikołajczyk and Marshal Stalin in October 1944. Mikołajczyk is considered to be a truly democratic Polish leader and is reputed to have a large following in Poland. He is the principal candidate the American and British Governments put forward under the Yalta agreement as a member of the new Government.

2. Jan Stańczyk, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare. Stańczyk has been for many years a prominent leader in Polish labor circles and in the Polish Socialist Party. He is well known in both American and British labor circles.

3. Władysław Kiernik, Minister of Public Administration. Unlike Mikołajczyk and Stańczyk, who have resided abroad since the partition of Poland by the U. S. S. R. and Germany in 1939, Kiernik, who is a prominent leader in the Peasant Party, remained in Poland. He is reputed to be well respected by democratic elements and is a close associate of Witos and Mikołajczyk.

4. Czesław Wycech, Minister of Education. He is also a member of the Peasant Party. Little is known about Wycech outside of Poland although Mikołajczyk is reported to have confidence in him.

Mr. Mieczysław Thugutt, a member of the Peasant Party in London and who was offered the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, is reported to have refused to accept the portfolio.

Mr. Kołodziejski, a non-party man who was former Librarian of the Polish Parliament and who is reported to be a strong figure behind the scenes in Poland, refused to join the Government for personal reasons.

Mr. Zuławski, a prominent leader from the Socialist Party in Poland refused to join the Government because of his age and poor health.

The other sixteen members of the new Polish Government for the most part must be considered as persons who may be Poles at heart but who realize that their political strength comes from Moscow and not from the Polish people. Some of them are reliably reported to have been active Comintern agents for many years, and therefore it is to be expected that they will follow closely directives from Moscow.

By way of background, it will be recalled that the Soviet-sponsored Warsaw Provisional Government which was recognized by the Soviet

Union on January 1, 1945 was the successor to other Soviet-sponsored Polish committees. The steps leading up to the formation of the Warsaw Provisional Government may be outlined as follows:

In March 1943 there was formed in Moscow from the many thousands of Poles who had been deported to the Soviet Union in 1939 after the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact ⁴ a small committee known as the Union of Polish Patriots. This group, which was led by Wanda Wasilewska, a Soviet citizen of Polish origin who is married to Alexander Korneichuk, an Ukrainian playwright, one-time Soviet Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs and now an official of the Ukrainian Government, held itself out as representing true democratic Poles. Shortly after the Red Army had liberated eastern Poland in 1944, there was established at Lublin, Poland, a group known as the Polish Committee of National Liberation. This Committee which was headed by Osóbka-Morawski, the present Premier of the new Government[,] absorbed the Union of Polish Patriots.

A short time thereafter a new organization was created known as the Polish National Council headed by Boleslaw Bierut, the President of the new Polish Government. This organization, which allegedly was set up along parliamentary lines, claimed to be truly representative of the majority of the Polish people and the source from which the Polish Committee of National Liberation obtained its authority and power. The combined Polish National Council and the Polish Committee of National Liberation formed the organization from which was set up the Provisional Government of Poland, which was accorded recognition by Stalin on January 1, 1945.

The Polish National Council, in which Polish sovereignty is said to reside, still exists and is part of the new governmental apparatus of Poland. Mr. Bierut, who is reliably reported to have been a Comintern agent for over twenty years, is still President of the National Council and thereby Provisional President of the Polish State.

In the newly reorganized governmental setup, three non-Lublin Poles have been added to the Presidium of the National Council which formerly was made up of five members including Bierut, Marshal Rola-Żymierski and Kowalski. The three new members who occupy positions of future parliamentary importance are Mr. Szwalbe, a left wing Socialist; Mr. Witos, long-time head of the Peasant Party and close associate of Mikołajczyk; and Mr. Grabski, a close collaborator of Mikołajczyk, from London who has no definite

⁴ The reference may be to either the German-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression, signed at Moscow, August 23, 1939, with its secret additional protocol, or the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, signed at Moscow, September 28, 1939, with its supplementary protocols, notes, and joint declaration. For texts, see Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949-), series D, vol. vii, pp. 245-247, and vol. viii, pp. 164-169.

party affiliations. Bierut stated recently in Moscow that as soon as the new Government is formed the National Council, which formerly had 140 members, would be enlarged considerably by the inclusion of Polish democratic leaders not directly affiliated with the Soviet-sponsored Warsaw Government. So far as is known, this action has not yet been taken.

It will be seen from the above that in actual fact the composition of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity is made up, for the most part, of the same group which formed the Soviet-sponsored Warsaw Government. While there has been too little time yet to predict with accuracy whether the new Government will act in a more democratic way than the former Soviet-sponsored Government, there are indications from many of the statements made by Bierut and his associates that the new Government will endeavor to carry on the same program as heretofore. For instance, Mr. Gomulka, one of the Vice-Premiers and Secretary General of the Polish Communist Party, indicated at a press conference in Moscow last month that the new Government would endeavor to establish a one-party system purporting to represent all political parties. Under this system there would be presented to the electors, in the usual Soviet manner, a single list of candidates in the promised "free and unfettered elections" called for by the Yalta decision.

Therefore, while the formation of the new Government is a definite and positive step forward, it is by no means certain that the Polish people will be given an opportunity to pick a government of their own choice and that Poland shall in fact be free and independent. We should, nevertheless, continue to use our full influence in order to assist the Polish people to establish a free and democratic government as we interpret that term. This may prove a difficult task and it is not beyond the realm of probability that we may face another Polish crisis in the not too distant future.

A list of the new Polish Provisional Government as recently reported from Warsaw is attached.

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

[Subattachment]

TOP SECRET

THE POLISH GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

Edward B. Osóbka-Morawski...	Premier
Władysław Gomulka.....	Vice-Premier
Stanisław Mikołajczyk.....	Vice-Premier and Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform

[No. 483]

Wincenty Rzymowski.....	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Marshal Michał Rola-Żymierski.	Minister of National Defense
Władysław Kiernik.....	Minister of Public Administration
Stanisław Radkiewicz.....	Minister of Public Security
Konstanty Dąbrowski.....	Minister of Finance
Hilary Mine.....	Minister of Industry
Jan Rabanowski.....	Minister of Communications
Prof. Michał Kaczorowski.....	Minister of Reconstruction
Jan Stańczyk.....	Minister of Labor and Social Wel- fare
Czesław Wycech.....	Minister of Education
Henryk Świątkowski.....	Minister of Justice
Władysław Kowalski.....	Minister of Culture and Art
Stefan Matuszewski.....	Minister of Public Information
Dr. Franciszek Litwin.....	Minister of Public Health
Mieczysław Thugutt.....	Minister of Posts and Telegraph
Jerzy Sztachelski.....	Minister of Supplies and Trade
Dr. Stefan Jedrychowski.....	Minister of Foreign Trade
Stanisław Tkaczow.....	Minister of Forestry

No. 484

860c.01/6-2145 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1945—3 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

1370. Dept concurs in your action as Commissioner in accepting the settlement.¹

For your information, I have telegraphed the President² giving him an outline of your 2218, June 21,³ regarding agreement on Polish Government. I have recommended that he give favorable consideration, if the British Government concurs, to grant recognition to the newly-constituted government as the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

As soon as I hear from the President I shall inform you of his decision.

GREW

¹ See document No. 486.

² Then at Olympia, Washington.

³ Not printed.

No. 485

860c.01/6-2245 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1945—7 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

1382. Top Secret for the Ambassador.

As indicated in Depts 1370 June 22 3 p. m.¹ this Govt is giving careful consideration to recognizing in the near future the Provisional Government of National Unity as the government of Poland. It would be most helpful in making our decision if we could have prior assurances from the competent members of the new Polish Govt, the more important of whom are now in Moscow, on the points enumerated below which are in conformity with the facilities extended by this Govt to duly accredited diplomatic and consular officials in the United States:

(1) This Govt would expect the new Polish Govt to grant to the Embassy to be established in Poland adequate facilities to communicate by mail telegraph radio and by courier with the Dept of State and with other American missions in Europe. . . .

(2) This Govt would expect that the Ambassador and members of his staff would be given every appropriate facility to travel throughout Poland in order to carry out the legitimate functions of the Embassy and would be granted without delay permission to enter and to leave the country on receipt of application therefor;

(3) This Govt would expect that consular offices would be permitted to be established at such commercial and shipping centers as might be considered appropriate by this Govt.

Please, in such manner as you deem appropriate, take up the foregoing at the earliest opportunity with Bierut and any other members of the proposed Provisional Govt of National Unity whose support or views would in your opinion be helpful and point out that presumably the new Polish Govt will wish to maintain consulates throughout the United States and will desire its representatives to enjoy unlimited travel facilities in the United States.

You may likewise say in a personal and unofficial capacity that if facilities were promptly extended to representatives of the American press to visit Poland the reaction in this country would undoubtedly be immediately sympathetic.

While the Dept does not desire to imply that this Govt will make its recognition of the Polish Government of National Unity conditional on the granting of the assurances requested above it would

¹ Document No. 484.

obviously facilitate matters if a favorable reply were received at the earliest possible moment.

We hope for your early and favorable report.

GREW

No. 486

860c.01/6-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

PLAIN

Moscow, June 23, 1945.

US URGENT

2231. Polish Commission tonight agreed to following communiqué for release at twenty-four hours GMT June 23:

“On the question of the formation of a Provisional Polish Government of National Unity.

As has already been announced, the Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V[.] M[.] Molotov, the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald C. Kerr, and the Ambassador of the United States of America, Mr. W. A. Harriman, were empowered by the Crimea Conference of the three Allied powers to consult with members of the Provisional Polish Government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and abroad concerning the reorganization of the Provisional Polish Government on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and of Poles from abroad, and concerning the formation of a Provisional Polish Government of National Unity.

Between June 17 and 21, a series of meetings has taken place between members of the Provisional Polish Government and other democratic leaders from Poland and abroad who have come to Moscow, regarding the reorganization of the Provisional Polish Government and the formation of a Provisional Polish Government of National Unity. As a result of these meetings between members of the Provisional Polish Government and the above-mentioned democratic leaders, complete agreement has been reached on the formation of a Provisional Polish Government of National Unity on the basis indicated above. The text of this agreement, which has been submitted to the Commission on the Polish question, reads as follows:

‘Representatives of the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic: President, M. Bolesław Bierut; Vice President, Mr. Władysław Kowalski; Premier, Mr. Edward Osóbka-Morawski; and Vice Premier, Mr. Władysław Gomułka.

Democratic leaders from Poland: Doctor Władysław Kiernik (who arrived in place of Mr. Wincenty Witos, who is indisposed), Dr. Henryk Kołodziejski, Professor Doctor Adam Krzyżanowski, Professor Stanisław Kutrzeba and Mr. Zygmunt Zuławski.

Polish democratic leaders from abroad: Mr. Stanisław Mikołajczyk, Mr. Antoni Kołodziej (who arrived in place of engineer Juliusz Zakowski) as well as Mr. Jan Stańczyk—arrived in Moscow on invitation of the Commission set up on the basis of the Crimea decision and consisting of Mr. Molotov, Peoples Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Ambassador of Great Britain and Mr. Averell Harriman, Ambassador of the United States of America.

The above-mentioned representatives of the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic as well as democratic leaders from Poland and from abroad, convinced that the feeling of national dignity and sovereignty of the Polish state require that Polish affairs be settled by Poles themselves, reached full understanding as regards the re-organization of the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic. This understanding is expressed in the following decisions unanimously adopted:

a. Invitation to Mr. Wincenty Witos from Poland and Mr. Stanisław Grabski from abroad to join the Presidium of the National Council of Poland.

b. Inclusion of Messrs. Wł. Kiernik and Wycech from Poland, as well as Messrs. Stanisław Mikołajczyk, J. Stańczyk and M. Thugutt from abroad in the Government of National Unity.

c. Full composition of the Government of National Unity will be published in Warsaw within the next few days.¹

Simultaneously it was decided to invite to participate in state activities a number of Polish democratic leaders hitherto resident abroad, among them Mr. Popiel, chairman of the Christian Labor Party as well as Messrs. Kołodziej and Zakowski.

President Bierut undertook to notify the Commission consisting of V. M. Molotov, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and Mr. W. A. Harriman of the above decisions.

Moscow[,] June 21, 1945.[']

V. M. Molotov, Mr. W. A. Harriman, and Sir Archibald C. Kerr, acting on the authorization of the Crimea Conference as the Commission on the Polish question, have noted with satisfaction the agreement reached between the Provisional Polish Government and the other democratic leaders from Poland and abroad on the formation of a Provisional Polish Government of National Unity.”

¹ See the subattachment to document No. 483.

No. 487

860c.01/6-2345 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1945—1 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

1389. The President has approved in principle recommendation that we recognize the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. (ReDept 1370, June 22.¹)

As soon as it is announced that the new Government is functioning in Poland (paragraph *c* of your 2231, June 23 ²), the Secretary will telegraph to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw informing him that the US Government has decided to recognize the new Government. It is then planned to have the President announce that we have accorded recognition to the new Government.

In this connection, Dept also proposes that in making this announcement the President reiterate the provisions of the Yalta agreement to the effect that the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to hold free and unfettered elections on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. The President will also announce that Ambassador Lane and his staff will proceed to Warsaw as soon as possible.

Dept hopes that before the foregoing steps are taken you will have had an opportunity to obtain the assurances outlined in Dept 1382, June 22.³

Repeated to London as 5062 of June 23.

GREW

¹ Document No. 484.

² Document No. 486.

³ Document No. 485.

No. 488

860c.01/6-2545 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary
of State*

SECRET

LONDON, June 25, 1945—7 p. m.

US URGENT

6398. . . .

Warner also told us that FonOff was considering suggesting to Dept through Brit Emb at Washington that when New Warsaw Govt notifies US Brit and Soviet Govts that it has been established in

conformity with the Yalta Agreement it add a pledge in this message of notification to hold free elections.

Robert Hankey who served at Brit Emb Warsaw from 1936 to 1939, and who is at present in Eastern Dept of FonOff will, when recognition is extended[,] go to Warsaw as Chargé d'Affaires. Sent Dept as 6398, rptd to Moscow as 219.

WINANT

No. 489

860c.01/6-2645: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1945—7 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

1425. Dept would appreciate receiving your reactions to the British Government's suggestion contained in London's telegram repeated to you as no. 219¹ that recognition be accorded when the new Warsaw Government notifies the three Governments that it has been established in conformity with the Yalta agreement and it has added a pledge in the message of notification that it will hold free elections.

It is clear from the Yalta declaration that the new Government "shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections" and that the new Government "has been properly formed in conformity with the above". Any reasonable interpretation of the Yalta agreement shows that the question of the pledge to hold elections is a condition to recognition. Are you of the opinion that the pledge given by Bierut is sufficient to cover this point or do you feel that we should agree with the British suggestion? As an alternative we might put into the message the Secretary is to send to the Foreign Minister a sentence indicating that we understand that the formation of the new Government is a preliminary step and that in conformity with the Yalta agreement we understand that this new Government is pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible. The press has been asking whether we have already received a definite pledge from the new Government regarding elections and therefore we must be prepared to make some concrete statement on this point. Dept would appreciate receiving an early reply.

¹ Document No. 488.

Text of suggested message from the Secretary to the Polish Foreign Minister is contained in my immediately following telegram.²

Repeated to London as 5202.

GREW

² Not printed. Cf. enclosure 1 to document No. 496.

No. 490

860c.01/6-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract ¹]

SECRET

Moscow, June 26, 1945—7 p. m.

2274. . . .

I discussed with Bierut specifically the points raised in Dept's 1382, June 22, 7 p. m.² . . . Bierut said that our reps would be given every opportunity to travel within Poland and see what they wished.

I emphasized the importance of rapid communications between our Emb in Warsaw and Wash. Bierut said the Govt was working on this and anxious to establish direct radio communication with the US. I explained that we now had regular trans-Atlantic air service to England, France Frankfurt and Stockholm and that we would wish to establish an Amer connecting service with one of these points and Warsaw. Bierut said he understood the importance of air communications with Amer and that these arrangements could be worked out after our Amb's arrival in Warsaw. He said that the port of Danzig would be open by July 1 and suggested that UNRRA and other shipments from Amer should be delivered to that port. He agreed to the dispatch of naval officers from the mil mission here to Danzig and Gdynia to inspect present condition of facilities and is anxious for these officers to discuss with Polish authorities the requirements of those two ports.

I mentioned the value of the establishment of Amer consular offices in Poland and Polish consulates in the US and suggested that the details could be settled when our Amb arrives in Warsaw. Bierut agreed.

I had previously raised with Gomulka the question of Amer correspondents in Poland and had been assured that the Polish Govt desired Amer correspondents in Poland as soon as diplomatic relations were established.

¹ For the first section of this message, see document No. 522.

² Document No. 485.

During the conversation I had the opportunity to ask Bierut directly whether it was their intention to adopt the Russian attitude of suspicion towards foreigners or to continue Poland's traditional attitude of free relationship with the western countries. He replied without hesitation that the latter would be the policy of the govt and emphasized the admiration that all Poles had for America and hoped for close and friendly relations with the US in all fields. It is my feeling that Bierut is sincere in his statements, but I cannot predict to what extent the Russians will attempt to put a brake on Polish desires for open contact with the west.

HARRIMAN

No. 491

860c.01/6-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State ad interim

SECRET

CASERTA, June 28, 1945—noon.

2795. Broad showed us a tel he has just recd from ForOff instructing him if SAC¹ perceived no objection to proceeding Polish GHQs in Italy and explain to Gen Anders in as favorable a manner as possible why Poles abroad should welcome formation of new Pole Govt. ForOff was [has] authorized Broad to give to Anders story of Moscow negotiations more or less as outlined in Depcirtels on this subject² and to point out obvious advantages accruing to Poland by constitution of new Govt. . . .

Sent Dept, rptd Moscow 188.

KIRK

¹ Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander.

² Not printed.

No. 492

860c.01/6-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State ad interim

SECRET

Moscow, June 28, 1945—7 p. m.

2313. Secret for the Acting Secretary.

Following is briefly my reaction to the Polish Agreement. I am somewhat disappointed that the outsiders did not get seven instead of five posts in the new Govt—one additional Socialist and one from the Christian Labor Party. I believe this could have been done if the outside Socialists had taken a stronger position in the negotiations with the Warsaw reps. Zuławski if his health had permitted would

[No. 492]

have been accepted. There appears to be a gentlemen's agreement that the Christian Labor leader, Popiel will be admitted to the Govt on his return from London. The Socialists also hope to consolidate their party and obtain stronger representation in the Govt at a later date.

I feel that Mikołajczyk is better off not to be Prime Minister under the present difficult situation both economic and political and that he has as strong a position as he could hope for as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture which latter post will necessitate his traveling around the country. With four new members of the Peasant Party in important posts in the Govt he should be in a position to exercise substantial influence.

The matter which gives all concern is the retention of the independent Ministry of Internal Security under a Communist.¹ This Ministry is developing a secret police on the Russian style. The manner in which this Ministry is administered is the crux of whether Poland will have her independence, whether reasonable personal freedoms will be permitted and whether reasonably free elections can be held.

Mikołajczyk does not expect the full freedoms which he would like for Poland and the Polish people. On the other hand he is hopeful that through the strength of the Peasant Party a reasonable degree of freedom and independence can be preserved now and that in time after conditions in Europe become more stable and Russia turns her attention to her internal development controls will be relaxed and Poland will be able to gain for herself her independence of life as a nation even though he freely accepts that Poland's security and foreign policy must follow the lead of Moscow.

During the course of the negotiations I spent a good many hours with the principal Warsaw leaders, Bierut, Morawski and Gomułka. . . . Mikołajczyk recognizes the importance of the Communist Party and of these men particularly the two Communists in the all important relations with Russia and says that he is ready to work closely with them even though they represent only a very small fraction of the Polish people.

I feel that Mikołajczyk and his associates have been wise in accepting the best deal they could make on their own and not coming to Clark Kerr and myself for direct assistance on improving the present agreement since it is the future decisions that are all important. It is impossible to predict the trend of events in Poland but I believe that the stage is set as well as can be done at the present time and that if we continue to take a sympathetic interest in Polish affairs and are reasonably generous in our economic relations there is a fair chance that things will work out satisfactorily from our standpoint.

¹ Stanisław Radkiewicz.

No. 493

860c.01/6-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State ad interim

SECRET

Moscow, June 29, 1945—6 p. m.

US URGENT

2322. POLCO. The Polish Amb¹ handed me this afternoon a message addressed to Pres. Truman signed by Osóbka-Morawski PriMin with the request that I transmit it to my govt. Translation of text of message is quoted in my next following tel.²

Modzelewski referring to the second pgh of the message stated that the new govt had at its first meeting recognized the Yalta decisions in their entirety and that this of course applied to the holding of elections as well as the other matters contained therein.

The word "Provisional" has not been included in the title of the new govt. I did not notice this until after the Amb had departed. It will be recalled that at the last meeting of the Commission Bierut on behalf of his associates of the Warsaw Govt and the new Ministers pledged himself unequivocally to the acceptance of the word Provisional unless the Brit and American Govts were prepared to agree to its elimination Mr. Molotov having already indicated the Soviet Govt's approval of its deletion.

I have asked the Brit Amb³ to raise this question with Modzelewski when he calls on him later this afternoon.⁴

I find also that the Moscow morning papers in referring to the new govt have omitted the word Provisional so that it is to be assumed that in Poland in the announcement of the formation of the new govt the word Provisional has not been included.

I will comment (ReDept's 1426, June 26, 7 p. m.⁵) on the draft text of the proposed reply⁶ in a subsequent message.

The list of the members of the new govt⁷ conforms to the tentative list handed me in Moscow by Mikołajczyk except for the addition of the two new Ministries created at yesterday's meeting of the presidium.

I therefore consider it as conforming with the agreement approved by the Commission.

HARRIMAN

¹ Zygmunt Modzelewski.

² Not printed. For the final text of Osóbka-Morawski's message, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XIII, p. 47.

³ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

⁴ The word "Provisional" was subsequently inserted in the phrase "Polish Provisional Government of National Unity" in Osóbka-Morawski's message.

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ See enclosure 1 to document No. 496.

⁷ See the subattachment to document No. 483.

No. 494

860c.01/6-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State ad interim

[Extract]

SECRET
US URGENT

Moscow, June 30, 1945—2 p. m.

2345. POLCO. Sent Dept as 2345 rptd London as 332; ReEmb's 2334, June 29, midnight.¹

. . . Bierut in his conversation with me as reported in my 2259 June 25, 5 p. m.¹ did not raise the constitutional question in connection with the legality of the obligations of the pre-war Govt. He did indicate that he wished to scrutinize the transactions of the Govt in Exile in order to satisfy himself that they were undertaken in the interests of the Polish State. This seemed to me a reasonable attitude because of the controversies that have existed between the two groups. Bierut and all the Poles show the keenest desire to obtain at the earliest moment the assets of the Polish State abroad and economic assistance from the US in their vast task of reconstruction.

. . .
HARRIMAN

¹ Not printed.

No. 495

860c.01/6-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State ad interim

TOP SECRET

CASERTA, June 30, 1945—8 p. m.

2826. We were informed by Broad this morning that he lunched with Anders at latter's HQ yesterday and talked to him along lines of his instructions from FonOff as briefly set forth in our 2795, June 28.¹

Our Brit colleague stated Anders listened most politely to what he, Broad, had to say and expressed his appreciation for latter's kindness in taking trouble to call on him. Polish Commander then requested Broad to forgive him in advance if he spoke to him frankly. He went on to say neither he nor his troops could possibly accept as genuine Polish Govt so-called govt recently set up in Moscow. They

¹ Document No. 491.

had no illusions about Russian game. In his opinion only responsible, honest Pole in that group was Grabski, who was 80 years of age. He personally felt settlement made was part of present Russian policy to make concessions at this time in order better to advance their cause at later date. He said he expected Russians to cooperate with western powers to limited extent until Amer and Brit troops were withdrawn from continent Europe and until substantial Brit and Amer credits and assistance were obtained. In his opinion Russians were fully aware of eagerness of Brit and Amer capitalists to accept large orders from USSR. He added Russians would amaze world with speed with which they would be able rebuild destroyed industries and rehabilitate their country in general, thanks to Brit and Amer aid. They would also squeeze heavy price from US and Great Brit for proper behavior in Far East. Anders said he could not in all honesty advise any decent Pole to return Poland at this time. He himself was convinced that Stalin desired control whole of Europe and he thought Red Army would be on march in eight or ten years against western powers. He himself preferred keep his excellent army of 100,000 men together in Italy and wait and see. He commented he hoped US and Great Brit would eventually abandon wishful thinking which was now controlling their policies with regard to USSR and would recognize reality that Stalin like Hitler would not stop, but could only be stopped.

Anders requested Broad inform Alexander and Brit Govt that he would, of course, hold his army in good order in spite recent agreement in Moscow on Polish Govt so long as no agents of newly formed Polish Govt were sent to Italy to propagandize among his troops or to Mid-East to agitate among families of members his army.

KIRK

No. 496

860c.01/7-245

The Secretary of State ad interim to the President

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Formalities of Recognition of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

There is enclosed for your approval a suggested reply to the Polish Prime Minister announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations with the new Government. There is also enclosed a suggested public

[No. 496]

statement for you to issue at 7:00 p. m., Eastern War Time, on the day chosen for recognition.¹

For technical and legal reasons, it is essential to fix an exact hour for the establishment of diplomatic relations. It is proposed, therefore, if you approve the attached drafts, to telegraph them ahead of time to Ambassador Harriman with instructions that he inform the Polish Ambassador in Moscow confidentially in advance of the action to be taken by you and of the exact hour of recognition. This step is necessary in order to make sure that the Polish Government is apprised beforehand of the exact hour on which recognition is to take place.

If you approve the attached drafts,² I will see that the mechanics are worked out.

JOSEPH C. GREW

[Enclosure 1]

SUGGESTED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE POLISH PRIME MINISTER REGARDING RECOGNITION OF THE NEW POLISH GOVERNMENT³

I am gratified to learn from your message⁴ to me transmitted through your Ambassador at Moscow that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity was established on June 28, 1945 in conformity with the Crimea decision. I am pleased to note that Your Excellency's Government has recognized in their entirety the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question thereby confirming the intention of Your Excellency's Government to proceed with the holding of elections in Poland in conformity with the provisions of the Crimea decisions. The Government of the United States of America therefore on the basis of its assurances given at the Crimea Conference hereby establishes diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. I have chosen as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Poland Mr. Arthur Bliss Lane, whom I have instructed to proceed to Warsaw as soon as possible.

Accept [etc.]

HARRY S TRUMAN

¹ This enclosure bears the following manuscript endorsement by Truman: "OK HST". The suggested statement was issued on July 5 with only minor editorial changes. See document No. 501.

² The original of Grew's memorandum bears the following manuscript endorsement by Truman: "Approved HST".

³ Truman signed the draft as submitted and it was dispatched for delivery to Osóbka-Morawski on July 5. The text of this message was issued as a White House press release on the same date. See Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XIII, p. 48.

⁴ See *ibid.*, vol. XIII, p. 47.

No. 497

Leahy Papers : Telegram

President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill ¹

[WASHINGTON,] 2 July 1945.

83. Ambassador Harriman has informed me ² and I concur that the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been established in conformity with the Crimea Decision. As you know, the new government has addressed parallel communications to us requesting that we accord recognition.

On the basis of the assurances given by the New Government and on the recommendations of Ambassador Harriman, I plan to accord recognition to the New Government to become effective at 7 p. m. Eastern War Time on July 3.

I feel that now the matter has moved this far forward any further delay would serve no useful purpose and might even prove embarrassing to both of us. I hope, therefore, you will agree to accord recognition simultaneously with us.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² See document No. 493.

No. 498

Truman Papers : Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman ¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 3 July 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Number 101. Personal and top secret.

1. I was surprised by your number 83, ² giving me only a few hours' notice of your decision to recognize the new Polish Government. Our position is different from yours. The old Polish Government is seated here in London, with officials and very large staffs. It administers a Polish army of 170,000 men, whose attitude has to be carefully considered. It is, of course, our intention to recognize the new government, but we should hope that some consideration could be shown to us in meeting difficulties which you, in no way, share. We had been hoping to give the London Poles at least twenty-four hours' notice, which seems only reasonable, as they have to tell all their employees about their immediate future, and that three months' salary will be paid, etc.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² Document No. 497.

2. I would, therefore, ask you whether you would not substitute 7:00 p. m. Eastern War Time, July 4th for July 3rd. If you feel unable to do this, I fear there can be no synchronization.

No. 499

Truman Papers : Telegram

*President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 3 July 1945.

85. I have just received your message No. 101² and in view of the reasons given by you I concur with your suggestion that we delay temporarily the recognition of the new Polish Government.

The twenty-four hour delay suggested by you would mean that we would accord recognition on Independence Day. I, therefore, suggest and hope you will concur that we postpone recognition for forty-eight hours; that is, until 7 p. m. Eastern War Time, July 5.

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Document No. 498.

No. 500

860c.01/7-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 4, 1945—noon.

US URGENT

6714. Warner has expressed to us FonOff's deep appreciation of agreement to postpone temporarily recognition of new Polish Govt. (Dept's 5385 July 3, 4 p. m.¹) This gives FonOff, Warner said, some much needed additional time to complete as far as possible arrangements for meeting problems arising from withdrawal of recognition from London Poles. Warner mentioned specifically in this connection the servicing of Polish troops and refugees. Up to now, he said, this has been done by Polish Govt agencies in London "with our money". This activity can now be only partially liquidated. To work out a plan to carry on under proper safeguards what remains of it is a complicated matter. FonOff is very anxious, Warner added, to ensure such a measure of control so that representatives of new

¹ Not printed.

Polish Govt in London cannot complain that means remain here through which old Polish group can disseminate "propaganda".

Sent Dept as 6714; rptd Moscow as 233.

WINANT

No. 501

*White House Press Release*¹

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

It is with great satisfaction that I announce that effective today as of 7 p. m., Eastern War Time, the Government of the United States has established diplomatic relations with the newly formed Polish Provisional Government of National Unity now established at Warsaw. The establishment of this Government is an important and positive step in fulfilling the decisions regarding Poland reached at Yalta and signed on February 11, 1945.

The new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has informed me in a written communication² that it has recognized in their entirety the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question. The new Government has thereby confirmed its intention to carry out the provisions of the Crimea decision with respect to the holding of elections.

Mr. Arthur Bliss Lane, whom I have chosen as United States Ambassador to Poland, will proceed to Warsaw as soon as possible, accompanied by his staff.

¹ Issued July 5; reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XIII, p. 47.

² Text printed *ibid.*

No. 502

860c.01/7-545: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, July 5, 1945—9 p. m.

US URGENT

2419. I delivered this evening to the Polish Amb the texts of the President's message to Osóbka-Morawski and of the public statement re the recognition of the Polish Provisional Govt of National Unity (ReDeptel 1505, July 3, 4 p. m.¹) the Polish Amb expressed his appreciation for being provided with these texts and stated that he would

¹ Not printed. For the texts referred to, see documents Nos. 496 and 501.

transmit them to his govt immediately and that the announcement of recognition would appear in tomorrow's morning papers in Poland.

The Brit Amb is also sending a communication to the Polish Amb this evening.

HARRIMAN

No. 503

860c.01/7-545

The Chargé Near the Polish Government-in-Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

LONDON, July 5, 1945.

No. 778

Subject: Termination of Mission of The American Embassy near the Polish Government in exile in London.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in compliance with your telegram No. 25 of July 4, 10 p. m.,¹ I called on Mr. Adam Tarnowski, Polish Foreign Minister, this evening at 6.45 and delivered to him a note (copy of which is enclosed) notifying him of the United States Government's recognition of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity as the Government of the Republic of Poland, and the termination of the Mission of the American Embassy near the Polish Government in exile established in London.

After reading the note, Mr. Tarnowski said that the action of the United States Government was of course not unexpected but he regretted its decision none the less. He said he could not understand why the United States and Great Britain were pushing Poland into the arms of the Bolsheviks. The Polish Government established in London had no illusions about Soviet policy toward Poland. The United States and British Governments seemed still to nourish such illusions. He thought they would later have regrets. What hurt the Poles most, he said, was the claim that the arrangements arrived at at Yalta and at Moscow were fair and just. He could not believe that they were so. Poland, he continued, had suffered 150 years of enslavement and had in the end recovered its freedom and independence. It would continue to struggle for its freedom and independence and he felt confident it would eventually secure them.

I told Mr. Tarnowski, who had spoken with evident feeling but with quiet courtesy, that the policy of the United States Government had been directed toward assuring a free and independent Poland. I said that he would recall that President Wilson had been the exponent of the idea of a free and independent Poland after the last war.

¹ Not printed.

I had no doubt that this continued to be the aim of the United States Government.

I added that I desired to thank him for his consistent courtesy toward me personally and to express my appreciation of the cooperation which this Mission had received from his Government in the past. Mr. Tarnowski replied that he wished in turn to express his appreciation of the agreeable relations which the Polish Government had had with this Mission.

Respectfully yours,

RUDOLF E. SCHOENFELD

[Enclosure]

The Chargé Near the Polish Government-in-Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tarnowski)

No. 266

LONDON, July 5, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: Since the Government of the United States of America has, in conformity with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, decided to recognize effective at 7:00 p. m. Eastern War Time July 5, 1945 the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity as the Government of the Republic of Poland, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Mission of the American Embassy near the Polish Government in exile in London will terminate as of that time.²

Accept [etc.]

RUDOLF E. SCHOENFELD

² Similar notice was given to the Polish Embassy at Washington and to the Embassy of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity at Moscow.

No. 504

860c.01/7-545

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour, on instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,¹ to inform him that the Foreign Office has telegraphed instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow to concert with the Ambassador of the United States in addressing to the Polish Ambassador, some five hours in advance of the agreed time of release (7 p. m. Eastern War Time, Thursday, July 5th), a communication, in the terms of the text handed to the State Department yesterday,² according formal recognition to the newly established Polish Provisional Government of

¹ Anthony Eden.

² Not printed.

National Unity. This communication will be in the form of a message from the Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill[,] to the Polish Premier, M. Osóbka-Morawski, which Sir Archibald Clark Kerr will request the Polish Ambassador in Moscow to forward immediately to his government in Warsaw to become effective at the time agreed.

In addition to the foregoing, Lord Halifax is further instructed to inform Mr. Byrnes that, although His Majesty's Government is proceeding to recognize the new Polish Government of National Unity, the Foreign Office is by no means satisfied with the assurances that have so far been forthcoming from the Polish Ambassador in Moscow regarding the participation of the recognized Polish political parties in the elections which the government is pledged to hold. His Majesty's Ambassador has accordingly been instructed to address immediately in this sense, a note to the Soviet Government stating that the Prime Minister reserves the right to raise this matter at the forthcoming meeting of the three heads of State as a point that affects the implementation of the Crimean decisions. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr is instructed to explain that a similar communication is being made to the United States Government. He is furthermore instructed when making the communication to the Polish Ambassador referred to above, to inform him of the nature of the note which he is handing to the Soviet Government and to add that a similar communication is being made to the United States Government.

WASHINGTON, July 5th, 1945.

No. 505

860c.01/7-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET

LONDON, July 5, 1945—noon.

6749. . . .

Same [British] official ¹ said that FonOff had concluded yesterday with Polish Govt in London agreement whereby all leases, including lease on Polish Emb property, would be taken over by Brit Govt. Most leases are of short duration but Brit Govt will turn them over to new Polish Govt if it so desires or will continue them on own account.

WINANT

¹ Not identified.

No. 506

860c.01/7-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 6, 1945—7 p. m.

US URGENT

6836. We were told today by FO official directly concerned Polish affairs that Hankey will leave for Warsaw July 10.

Same official said that Interim Treasury Committee for Polish Questions which will be appointed to liquidate Polish civilian ministries will consist of one Pole for each of ministries to be liquidated acting under Brit supervision. The list of Poles finally approved contains alterations made at request of Mikołajczyk supporters. (Sent to Dept as 6836; rptd to Paris for Lane as 441) FO official emphasized, however, that Poles on committee have no official representative status but will act merely as advisors to Brit on liquidation. Some Polish Ministries, particularly Ministry of Information, are considered already to have been liquidated. Work to be done by committee will include payment of pension to Polish ex-soldiers, social security benefits to civilians, grants to students and discharge of similar continuing obligations, pending agreement for assumption of such obligations by new Polish Govt.

We were also told that like arrangements are being negotiated by service ministries with Polish armed forces. Brit intention is to keep Polish units in organized status for time being but to liquidate or at least reduce Polish General Staff and higher command echelons as soon as possible.

The foregoing arrangements have been effected mostly by oral agreements. Emb is attempting to secure text of agreement re assumption by Brit Govt of Polish leases in London,¹ however, and will forward if released by FO.

WINANT

¹ Not printed.

No. 507

860c.01/7-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 9, 1945—6 p. m.

6900. FonOff official directly concerned Polish affairs gave us following information this afternoon.

Re establishment Brit Emb, Warsaw. Hankey has postponed date departure for Warsaw until July 12 and may not leave until July 15. . . . Brit are now negotiating in Moscow for direct air service UK to Warsaw, but Hankey may have to go via Brit plane to Berlin and via Russian plane from Berlin to Warsaw.

Re status Polish troops in UK and western Europe. Brit War Office has issued circular to all Brit Commanders of Polish detachments directing them to assure Poles in units under their command that no Pole will be returned to Poland against his will. (Sent to Dept as 6900 rptd to Paris for Lane as 447) Brit hope to abolish Polish Ministry of Defence in immediate future. They have already introduced Brit Liaison Mission into Polish General Staff and in time hope also to reduce General Staff and to limit its functions to purely administrative matters.

Re Brit control Polish assets in UK. We were shown a copy of the agreement which Brit Treasury concluded with former Polish Govt in London whereby it obtained control of its assets. Agreement is in form of power of attorney and assignment of assets. It assigns Polish assets listed in an annex to Brit Govt for six months and conveys full power of attorney to Brit Govt acting through interim Treasury committee to utilize or dispose of assets. Since document is of a private character copy could not be made available to Emb, but if further information re contents is desired FonOff probably would be willing to allow us re-examine it.

Re first Brit contacts with members Polish Commission to secure property of Polish State. Two members of Commission to secure property of Polish State, Droźniak and Kołodziejewski, arrived in London July 7. Officials of FonOff had informal meeting with them this morning. They found that Poles expected to take over all assets former London Polish Govt immediately and without reservations. They were told that Brit could not deal officially with them until FonOff had received an official communication from Polish Govt setting out their terms of reference and powers to negotiate.

Brit stressed desirability of Poles sending fully accredited Amb to London as soon as possible and informed Polish reps that telegram had been sent to Brit Emb Moscow for transmission to Polish Amb pointing out that it would be impossible for Brit Govt to undertake formal conversations with Polish reps in London unless foregoing conditions were met. Brit also pointed out to Polish reps and in telegram that question of surrendering to [*sic*] Polish assets in UK would have to be linked with repayment of advances to former Polish Govt in London and that surrender of assets could not be made unconditionally, since some agreement would have to be reached for protecting pensioners and for meeting other continuing obligations of former Polish Govt. Brit also suggested to Polish reps that, after they were formally accredited, negotiations should be undertaken between Polish reps and interim Treasury Committee.

WINANT

No. 508

740.0011 EW/7-1545

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Thompson)
to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)*¹

SECRET

[BABELSBERG,] July 15, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Poland (Outstanding Questions)

MR. DUNN: The British apparently contemplate asking for some assurance of the right of Polish political parties to take part in elections in Poland.

In view of the fact that our Ambassador is expected to arrive in Warsaw shortly, it is suggested that the question of Polish elections not be raised at this meeting. Upon the basis of Mr. Lane's reports we may wish at a later date to make some concrete proposals on this subject to the Soviets but any attempt to raise the matter here in general terms would almost certainly result in a strong Soviet rebuff and would probably unduly arouse Soviet suspicions.

One step which we might profitably take would be to press for the early establishment of consulates in Poland which would put us in a better position to observe conditions in Poland and to exert our influence for free elections.

¹ Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned.

FRONTIERS AND AREAS OF ADMINISTRATION

No. 509

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹[Extract²]

TOP SECRET

EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENTS

I. GERMANY

In general all territories seized by Germany either before or during the course of the war will automatically return to their rightful owners. Major territorial claims against Germany are treated below. On Polish claims against Germany this Government agrees that east Prussia (except for the Koenigsberg district), the former Free City of Danzig, German Upper Silesia and a portion of eastern Pomerania should be ceded to Poland. The American Government would prefer that other German territory east of the Oder should remain German. However, the British have agreed to the cession to Poland of all territory east of the Oder³ and this Government would probably not wish to stand out alone if the Russians insist on this point.⁴

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

¹ Annex 13 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² For other extracts from this paper, see documents Nos. 259 and 398.

³ See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 203. Cf. Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee, eds., *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: The Realignment of Europe* (London, 1955), pp. 184, 186; Edward J. Rozek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland* (New York, 1958), pp. 275, 277, 287.

⁴ Another version of this paper in the Department of State files, also dated June 29 (file No. 740.00119 Council/6-3045), has the following sentence added at this point: "It is believed that this Government should refuse to sanction, at this conference, the transfer to Poland of the territory between the Oder and the Neisse."

No. 510

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper[Extract ¹]

TOP SECRET

SUGGESTED UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING POLAND

Frontier Question

The Crimea Conference² settled the problem of Poland's Eastern frontier by adopting a slightly modified Curzon Line³ as forming the Polish-Soviet boundary. The Conference also recognized that Poland should receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West and that the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be consulted with regard to their extent by [*but?*] the Conference declared that the final delimitation of the Polish-German frontiers should await the peace conference. With the rapid liberation of Polish territory which was accompanied by a large scale withdrawal of the German population therein, the Lublin Government took over almost immediately all the territory of pre-1939 Poland. Later, it likewise took over with the consent and the assistance of the Soviet authorities the territory of the Free City of Danzig and extensive areas in East Prussia and Western [*Eastern*] Germany stretching approximately to the Oder Neisse Line. Both the British Government and ourselves protested vigorously to Moscow against the formal transfer by the Soviet Government of this territory to Poland and its incorporation into the Polish State by Warsaw.⁴ We felt that this transfer was an

¹ For other sections of this briefing paper, see documents Nos. 483 and 521.

² For the decisions of the Yalta Conference, see vol. II, documents Nos. 1416 and 1417.

³ For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, pp. 793-794. See also the map facing p. 748, *post*.

⁴ These protests were referred to by Stalin at the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Berlin Conference, July 21 (see vol. II, p. 209). Following is a summary of the protests in question:

Harriman wrote to Molotov on April 8, 1945 (Moscow Embassy Files—715 Boundaries—Poland):

"I have been instructed to inform the Soviet Government that my Government has received a number of press and radio reports attributed to responsible officials of the Provisional Polish Government now established in Warsaw to the effect that certain territories in the Soviet military zone, including the Free City of Danzig and several districts in Lower and Upper Silesia which were a part of pre-1937 Germany, have been formally incorporated into Poland. Apparent confirmation of these reports appears in the TASS report of Mr. Osóbka-Morawski's speech which was published in *Pravda* for April 2, 1945.

"I am instructed to request on behalf of my Government information as to the facts underlying these reports. I should be grateful if you would send me this information at an early date."

Kennan reported to the Secretary of State on April 18 that Vyshinsky had replied, in part, as follows (file No. 862.014/4-1845):

infringement both of the Crimea Decision and of the general tripartite understandings regarding the disposal of occupied German territory, and saw in it an effort by the Soviets and the Soviet-dominated Poles to confront us with another "*fait accompli*". While the motivation for these excessive territorial demands is not clear, it is possible that the following factors figured in the Soviet, if not the Polish calculations:

1. By including a large section of German territory in Poland and the probable transfer of some eight to ten million Germans, the future Polish state would in all probability be forced to depend completely on Moscow for protection against German Irredentists' demands and in fact might become a full-fledged Soviet satellite.

(Footnote 4—continued)

"It is well known that the German population of Silesia is leaving with the withdrawing German troops and that only the Polish population remains behind. The greater part of the German civilian population has also evacuated from Danzig to Germany. In these circumstances the urgent necessity of a base [*the urgent necessity arose*] for the creation of a civil administration from Poles who constitute the basic population of above mentioned areas. The direction of civil affairs in Silesia and Danzig has also been transformed to the competence of this Polish civil administration, all of which has no relation to the question of boundaries."

On May 8 Grew instructed Kennan to deliver to Vyshinsky a memorandum substantially as follows (file No. 862.014/5-845):

"The United States Government fails to understand the statement in Mr. Vishinsky's letter to the effect that the establishment and competence of the Polish civil administrations set up in the Free City of Danzig and certain Soviet occupied German territory have no relation to the question of the future boundaries of Poland. This statement and other statements in Vishinsky's communication give rise to the impression that the Free City of Danzig and occupied German areas so administered remain effectively under Soviet military occupation with the local administration thereof entrusted only as a matter of convenience to indigenous Polish officials who are in no way the agents of or responsible to the Provisional Polish Government now functioning in Warsaw. The United States Government is unable to reconcile the assertions of the Soviet Government with the numerous reports and public statements made to the effect that the Polish Provisional Government now functioning in Warsaw has by decree formally incorporated into its state system certain enemy territory occupied by the Red Army and has appointed Poles from Poland proper as municipal and provincial officials to administer such enemy territory as integral parts of Poland. Moreover, additional reports from Poland ascribed to official sources there indicate among other things that the Provisional Polish Government now functioning in Warsaw is (1) setting up its complete state apparatus and enforcing its laws in these areas, (2) engaged already in a large scale transfer of Poles from other areas to this enemy territory and (3) planning the extension of its administration over additional enemy territory now under Soviet military occupation. Such reports declare that these and similar acts attributed to the Provisional Polish Government now functioning in Warsaw have been effected with the full knowledge and approval of the Soviet occupation authorities.

"In the above circumstances, the United States Government informs the Soviet Government that changes such as these in the status of occupied enemy territory arising from the unilateral action of the occupying power without prior consultation and agreement between the several United Nations concerned disregard the principles upon which the agreements setting up the control machinery for Germany and the Protocols on the occupation were based. The Government of the United States wishes to make it clear that the Free City of Danzig and occupied German territory now subjected to Polish administration, as well as all other enemy territory held by the Red Army, remain in fact enemy territory under Soviet military occupation, and must be held as such pending the conclusion

2. If it should not in the end prove possible to establish a workable world security organization and the Soviet Union should elect to rely on its own resources for its security, the advantages are obvious of having the Polish frontier as far West as possible, particularly if the future Polish Government should be more or less under the domination of Moscow.

3. By giving the future Polish state maximum compensation in the West, it may be the hope of the Soviet authorities that the Polish people would more willingly accept the loss of 42 percent of former Polish territory in the East.

While it appears that the Soviet Government is now sponsoring "compensation" for Poland from Germany, up to the so-called Oder-Neisse River Line (line (a) on attached map⁵) which would include the cities of Stettin and Breslau in Poland and make it necessary to transfer from eight to ten million Germans from these areas, and while the British Government may not object to "compensation" for Poland up to the Oder Line (line (b) on attached map), the United States Government should use its influence to obtain the less radical solution outlined below which it is felt would, from a long range point of view, contribute materially to the future peace and tranquillity of Europe. Moreover, the suggested solution would in

of such agreements and understandings as may be reached after full and complete consultation and deliberation between the Allied powers concerned."

Kennan was also instructed to state that the United States Government was "naturally prepared to recognize the Western frontier of Poland when delimited in accordance with the applicable decisions of the Crimea Conference" but that it "must until such time insist that no transfer be made of enemy territory under Soviet occupation to the Polish Provisional Government now functioning in Poland." Kennan reported to the Acting Secretary of State on May 11 (file No. 862.014/5-1145) that he had carried out these instructions on that date. Kennan reported further on May 15 (file No. 862.014/5-1545) that Roberts, the British Chargé at Moscow, had sent to Vyshinsky a protest which followed "in general a parallel line".

Kennan reported on May 17 (file No. 862.014/5-1745) that Vyshinsky had replied the day before to the United States protest of May 11.

"In his reply, which refers only to the establishment of a Polish civil administration in Danzig, Vyshinski states that it is quite natural that the Polish civil administration acting under the direction of the provisional Govt is functioning according to Polish law. He denies that this circumstance can be considered to disregard the principles on which the agreements for establishing control machinery for Germany and the protocols on German occupation were based. In justification of this position he cites the military necessity which he advanced in his letter of April 15 He insists that it is necessary to keep this fact in mind since the Crimea decision recognized that Poland must receive substantial additional territory to the north and west which, he says, thus not only does not exclude but presupposes the possibility of a Polish administration functioning in this territory. He again emphasizes as self-evident that the final determination of Poland's western boundary will be made at the peace settlement as envisaged in the Crimea decision."

⁵ No map is attached to this paper in any copy of the Briefing Book which has been found. The various lines mentioned in the text appear, however, on a Department of State map dated January 10, 1945, which was annexed to the Briefing Book paper entitled "Suggested United States Policy Regarding Poland" prepared for the Yalta Conference. A reproduction of this map is here reprinted (facing p. 748) from *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, insert facing p. 233.

all probability be much more acceptable to world opinion and increase the prospects of [*that?*] completely wholehearted American acceptance of membership in a world [organization would?] not be jeopardized from the start by having to accept untenable settlements such as that suggested by and already put into effect in certain respects by unilateral action on the part of the Lublin Poles.

Our policy regarding the unsettled frontier shall be as follows:

In the North, Poland should receive the Free City of Danzig and the bulk of East Prussia and in the West, the only rectification of 1939 Polish-German frontier should be to include in Poland a small strip of German Pomerania west of the so-called Polish Corridor in order to eliminate the German salient in this area and to give Poland additional sea coast and Upper Silesia which is predominantly Polish in population and is particularly important from the industrial point of view.

While this solution would reduce considerably the size of Poland compared to its prewar frontiers, it would include only areas which are predominantly Polish, would make for a viable Polish state from an economic point of view and would reduce to a minimum the problem of the transfer of populations (these boundaries are indicated on the attached map).

In regard to the British attitude, Mr. Churchill has already indicated that he favors compensation for Poland in the West which would stretch broadly along the Baltic Sea on a front of two hundred miles. This statement would indicate that the British Government's plan for compensation from Germany would correspond roughly with line (c) on the attached map (which approximates the suggested American solution outlined above.)

Since the British Ambassador at Moscow⁶ has recommended to Bierut and other members of the Polish Government that the question of Poland's western boundaries be taken up with the "Big Three" immediately after the formation of the New Government of National Unity, it might be well to make an effort to attain tentative concurrence with [*by?*] the British on our proposed solution. Thus when the consultations on this matter provided in the Crimea Decision take place, it would be ensured that the British and ourselves do not work at cross purposes in face of apparent agreement on the part of the Poles and the Soviets to face us with a "*fait accompli*" in this matter.

If our full and determined efforts to attain this solution fail, we should then concentrate on obtaining a solution of the Polish frontier which would minimize the possibility of irredentism and population transfers and should only with reluctance accept the Oder Line (line *b*) and should resist to the utmost acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line (line *a*).

⁶ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

In connection with any final frontier settlement agreed upon, we should insofar as practicable and in collaboration with the other United Nations be prepared to assist in the orderly transfer of minority groups provided the Polish Government so desires.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

No. 511

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

EASTERN POLAND BETWEEN THE RIGA LINE AND CURZON LINE RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States Government, in the agreement of the Big Three at the Crimea Conference (February 11, 1945),¹ approved the Curzon Line² (with Extension A³) as the boundary between Poland and the U. S. S. R. Deviations from the Line in some regions of five to eight kilometers are to be allowed in favor of Poland.

BASIC DATA

The area between the Riga⁴ and Curzon Lines includes pre-1914 Austrian and Russian territory. Eastern Galicia was renounced by Austria in the Treaty of St. Germain, September 10, 1919,⁵ and was awarded to Poland on March 15, 1923 by the Principal Allied Powers,⁶ acting under Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles.⁷ The former Russian territory was acquired by Poland through the Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921.

¹ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section VI.

² For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see *Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. XIII, pp. 793-794. See also the map facing p. 748, *post*.

³ "Extension A" begins at the southern point of the Curzon Line on the River Bug and runs west of Lvov to the Czechoslovak frontier. See Toynbee and Toynbee, eds., *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: The Realignment of Europe*, p. 151, footnote 4.

⁴ The Riga Line is the boundary established by the Treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, between Poland and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (acting on its own behalf and with the authorization of the Soviet Socialist Republics of White Ruthenia and the Ukraine). Text in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. VI, p. 123.

⁵ Text in *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the United States of America and Other Powers* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1910-1938), vol. III, p. 3149. The renunciation referred to was effected by article 91.

⁶ By a decision of the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris. Text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXVIII, p. 960.

⁷ Signed June 28, 1919. Annotated text in *Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. XIII, p. 57.

In the partition of Poland in September 1939, the Soviet Union occupied both the formerly Russian and the formerly Austria[n] territory east of the Curzon Line, as well as some territory west of that line, principally the province of Bialystok, only to lose it temporarily (summer 1941 to spring 1944) to the Germans.

The Soviet Government on January 11, 1944 first proposed to the Polish Government-in-Exile, that the Curzon Line should be the future Polish-Soviet frontier. Subsequent discussions, at Teheran ⁸ and with Churchill and Mikołajczyk at Moscow in October 1944,⁹ made clear that the Soviet Government understood Extension A to be the Curzon Line through Galicia. Churchill's speech to the House of Commons on December 15, 1944 ¹⁰ specified Extension A. The agreement of the Big Three at the Crimea Conference stated:

The heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line, with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland.

The Provisional Government at Warsaw has publicly endorsed the Yalta agreement as it applies to Poland.

The part of former Poland east of the Curzon Line has an area of 70,049 square miles. Its total population, according to the Polish census of 1931, was 10,574,785, of whom 3,841,908 were Polish-speaking, 3,925,108 were Ukrainian-speaking, 910,462 were White Russian-speaking, 10,737 were Russian-speaking, 707,088 were listed as "local" inhabitants of the Province of Polesie, 889,225 were Yiddish-speaking, 79,385 were German-speaking, and 75,917 were Lithuanian-speaking.

On September 9, 1944 the Polish Committee of National Liberation signed at Lublin agreements ¹¹ with Ukrainian S. S. R. and the White Russian S. S. R. providing for the voluntary evacuation of Ukrainian and White Russian population from the territory of Poland and Polish population from the territory of the Ukrainian S. S. R. and the White Russian S. S. R. This exchange is in the process of being carried out. In principle the United States Government has approved such transfers (v. statement of the Secretary of State to the press, December 18, 1944 ¹²).

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1945.

⁸ The records of the Tehran Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume in this series. See Winston S. Churchill, *Closing the Ring* (vol. v of *The Second World War*) (Boston, 1951), pp. 395-397; Feis, *Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin*, pp. 285-287.


⁹ See Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, book 1, chapter 15.

¹⁰ See *Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report*, 5th series, vol. 406, col. 1480.

¹¹ Not printed. For a summary of the provisions, see *New York Times*, September 15, 1944, p. 5.

¹² See Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. xi, p. 836.

GERMANY - POLAND : PROPOSED TERRITORIAL CHANGES



Population 1939 census	Percentage of Germans	Area in sq. mi.
2,488,122	93.8 (1925)	14,282
391,000	92.8 (1923)	754
835,884	ca. 99.0 (1925)	6,812

Area north of dotted line
Pop.: ca. 1,000,000
Area: 4,000 sq. miles

Population 1939 census	Percentage of Germans	Area in sq. mi.
2,104,553	100	10,473
2,721,512	100	8,106

Population 1931 census	Area in sq. mi.
21,467,000	94,734

Population 1931 census	Area in sq. mi.
10,640,000	70,049


Population 1939 census	Percentage of Germans	Area in sq. mi.
1,527,491	57.0 (1914)	3,750

PROPOSED CESSION OF TERRITORY BY GERMANY	AREA IN SQ. MILES	POPULATION 1939 CENSUS
Territory east of Line D	18,032	4,015,613
Territory added by Line C	6,812	835,884
Total east of Line C	24,844	4,851,497
Territory added by Line B	10,473	2,104,553
Total east of Line B	35,317	6,956,050
Territory added by Line A	8,106	2,721,512
Total east of Line A	43,423	9,677,562

PROPOSED ANNEXATIONS BY POLAND	AREA IN SQ. MILES (Cumulative Totals)	POPULATION 1939 CENSUS
East of Line D	14,766	3,406,613
East of Line C	21,578	4,242,497
East of Line B	32,051	6,347,050
East of Line A	40,157	9,068,562

NOTE: The former Free City of Danzig is not included in the above tables.

NOTE: Tables include Danzig and exclude East Prussia north of dotted line (probable minimum annexation by USSR).



No. 512

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

POLISH TERRITORY ANNEXED BY GERMANY IN 1939

RECOMMENDATION

The territory of pre-war Poland annexed by Germany in 1939 should be returned to Poland.

BASIC DATA

Poland acquired the so-called "Corridor", the Poznań [*Posen*] area, and the major part of the Upper Silesian industrial area from Germany after the first World War, in the Treaty of Versailles.¹ Although President Wilson had played a prominent role in establishing an independent Poland and in acquiring for it the Corridor outlet to the sea, the United States in the separate treaty which it signed with Germany, August 21 [25], 1921,² disclaimed (Article II, paragraph 3) any obligation for the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.

Poland's possession of this territory formerly a part of the German Empire was the source of much friction between Poland and Germany from 1919 to 1939. This territory was re-incorporated into Germany after the military defeat of Poland in September 1939. It, along with Danzig and additional territory which had not been a part of pre-1914 Germany, was organized into two *Reichsgau*, Westpreussen-Danzig and Wartheland.

At the time of the conquest the American Secretary of State³ issued this statement (October 2, 1939):

More than twenty years ago the United States recognized and has since maintained diplomatic relations with the Polish Government. Poland is now the victim of force used as an instrument of national policy. Its territory has been taken over and its Government has had to seek refuge abroad. Mere seizure of territory, however, does not extinguish the legal existence of a government. The United States therefore continues to recognize the Government of Poland as in existence. . . .⁴

The population of the annexed territory (excluding Danzig), which comprises the richest agricultural and industrial parts of pre-war Poland, was in 1939 about 10,000,000 of which only 680,000 were Germans. After the German conquest, many Germans, approximately

¹ See document No. 513 (and attachments), *infra*.

² Treaty Series No. 658; 42 Stat. (2) 1939.

³ Cordell Hull.

⁴ Ellipsis in the original. For full text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. 1, p. 342.

500,000 *Volksdeutsche* from the Baltic states and Eastern Europe and another 500,000 Reich Germans, were settled in the area in accordance with the Nazi plan to Germanize the annexed territories. There is no reliable data as to how many Germans remain there now, but it is presumed that a substantial majority of them fled before the advancing Red Armies. Nor is there as yet any reliable information as to whether the Poles plan to expel all Germans, as their pre-liberation statements indicated, or whether the Germans will be retained in order to make use of their labor.

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1945.

No. 513

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT CONCERNING GERMANY'S EASTERN FRONTIER

The Inter-Divisional Committees on Germany and on Russia and Poland¹ have recommended that Germany should be required to cede Upper Silesia, East Prussia and the portion of Pomerania east of the Kreuz-Dramburg line and that the remainder of German territory east of the Oder, and the territory between the Oder and the Neisse, should remain in German possession.

For the purposes of this present series of summary recommendations the eastern frontier of Germany has been divided into the six segments discussed on the following pages.

Two underlying documents (H-160 and CAC-341)² have attempted to analyze the character of this whole frontier problem and to make as reasonable a recommendation for settlement as could be devised, given the complexity of the factors which need to be taken into consideration.

It has been recognized, however, that these recommendations represent a judgment of what appears to be the most desirable solution and not as an unbending resolution on the part of this Government. Patently it would be out of the question for us to say that we would accept only the frontier line here suggested and would have nothing to do with a frontier moved farther to the West. The position here taken rests on the thought that this Government should counsel

¹ Regarding these two interdivisional committees, see Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945*, p. 177.

² Not printed. These memoranda, prepared in the Department of State and dated, respectively, January 1 and January 4, 1945, were not included in the Briefing Book.

against, and express grave reluctance to approve, a line west of the one recommended. If the Polish and Soviet Governments press insistently, and if they are supported by the British Government, we shall have no recourse but to agree to the cession of the area east of the Oder. It is believed, however, that this Government should refuse to sanction at this Conference the transfer to Poland of the territory between the Oder and the Neisse.

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

[Attachment 1]

TOP SECRET

EAST PRUSSIA

a. Recommendation:—East Prussia (except for the Koenigsberg district, which presumably will go to the Soviet Union) should be ceded to Poland.

b. Basic Data:—East Prussia remained under German sovereignty, although physically separated from the rest of Germany, after the “Corridor” was transferred to Poland by the Treaty of Versailles.³ The western and part of the southern boundaries of East Prussia were fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, August 16, 1920, following a plebiscite in the Marienwerder and Allenstein districts,⁴ held in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles. Under the final settlement, Poland received a narrow riparian strip along the east bank of the Vistula, varying in width from a few feet to a half mile.

The area of East Prussia under the 1920 boundaries was 14,283 square miles, its population (May, 1939) was 2,496,017. According to the census of 1925—the most reliable index of linguistic distribution—the Polish population of East Prussia was 40,502, to which might be added the 62,596 Masurians, Slavs who speak a dialect akin to Polish, residing in the district of Allenstein. Polish sources estimate the Polish population of East Prussia at over 400,000. The whole of East Prussia is claimed by the Warsaw Polish Government. The Soviet Union favors Polish acquisition of East Prussia or all of the province except for the northeastern sector, including the chief city and part [*port*] of Koenigsberg which it intends to annex. The Polish Government insists on the deportation of all Germans from the area to be annexed, to Germany.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

³ See articles 27 (paragraph 7), 28, and 87 of the Treaty of Versailles, in *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, pp. 127–128, 132, 208.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 231.

[Attachment 2]

TOP SECRET

DANZIG

a. Recommendation:—The former Free City of Danzig should be ceded to Poland.

b. Basic Data:—The Danzig area was renounced by Germany in the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, and proclaimed a Free City with a High Commissioner appointed by the League of Nations on November 9, 1920, in accordance with the terms of this treaty.⁵ It was re-incorporated in Germany on September 1, 1939.⁶ It is claimed by Poland as a port essential to Polish economy. In the post-war disposition of the former Free City, whose legal status is quite complex, the League of Nations and Danzig itself, as well as Poland and Germany, are interested parties. The question is closely connected with that of East Prussia.

The total area of the Free City of Danzig was 731 square miles. The population in 1936 numbered 412,000. According to the Danzig census of 1923, out of a total of 366,730, there were 12,027 persons speaking Polish or Kashub; the remainder were German-speaking. The Polish Government apparently intends to expel to Germany the German population of the Danzig area.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

[Attachment 3]

TOP SECRET

GERMAN UPPER SILESIA

a. Recommendation:—German Upper Silesia (Oppeln district) should be ceded to Poland.

b. Basic Data:—The area in question is the former German *Regierungsbezirk* of Oppeln, which included the territory awarded to Germany by the Conference of Ambassadors, October 19, 1921,⁷ following a plebiscite held in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, plus several local districts to the west of the plebiscite area. Its area is 3,750 square miles, its population about 1,500,000. It is a highly industrialized region closely affiliated economically with the larger complex of heavy industries in southwestern Poland. The greatest concentration of industry is in the extreme east, covering about one-tenth of this total area and including one-third of the population. In addition to coal, iron and steel production, the area

⁵ See articles 100 and 102 of the Treaty of Versailles, *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, pp. 251, 253.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 250.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 212–215.

was responsible (in 1937) for about two-thirds of Germany's zinc ore output and over a quarter of its lead ore.

In 1925 the exclusively German-speaking element made up 57 percent of the total population in the territory which formed part of the plebiscite zone, 72 percent in the industrial district. The western districts outside of the plebiscite zone, with a population of about 323,000, are almost wholly German-speaking. The Warsaw Polish Government demands the deportation to Germany of the German population of this area.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

[Attachment 4]

TOP SECRET

EASTERN POMERANIA

a. Recommendation:—That portion of Pomerania which lies east of the Kreuz-Dramburg line should be ceded to Poland.

b. Basic Data:—The area in question is that part of Pomerania which lies east of a line drawn from the confluence of the Netze and Draga rivers just west of Kreuz, thence to Neuwedell, from there to Dramburg, and west of Belgard to the sea. It comprises an area of 6,812 square miles with a population of 835,000, almost entirely German. It is among the poorer agricultural sections of Germany, with many large estates of low value per hectare. Its cession to Poland would represent no serious economic loss to Germany; together with East Prussia it comprises most of the region of the larger Junker estates. For Poland it would mean a greatly extended sea frontage on the Baltic and an improved strategic position in relation to Germany. This territory is claimed by the Warsaw Polish Government.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

[Attachment 5]

GERMAN TERRITORY EAST OF THE ODER (Excluding East Prussia, Upper Silesia and Eastern Pomerania)

a. Recommendation:—The American Government would prefer a solution under which the territory would remain part of Germany. However, the British have agreed that all territory east of the Oder shall be ceded to Poland⁸ and this Government is not prepared to

⁸ During Churchill's conversations at Moscow in October 1944. See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 203; Toynbee and Toynbee, eds., *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: The Realignment of Europe*, pp. 184, 186; Rozek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy*, pp. 275, 277, 287.

make an issue of the matter if, as is certain, it is pressed by the Russians.

b. Basic Data:—This territory consists of parts of the Prussian provinces of Pomerania, Brandenburg and Silesia. Its area is 10,473 square miles; its population in 1939 was 2,104,553, almost entirely German. Cession to Poland would establish as a frontier the most prominent geographic feature available as a line of demarcation in this area, but would destroy the natural unity of the Oder basin. If the river line were strictly adhered to it would divide the important metropolitan areas of Stettin, Frankfort and Breslau. The area is mainly agricultural and, in Silesia, of considerable value.

The Warsaw Polish Government has laid claim to this territory and also to the major cities lying on the west bank of the Oder. It has also hinted at the need of a further belt of territory west of the Oder, perhaps 30 kilometers in width, to strengthen the strategic frontier. The German population presumably, would be deported from the entire area annexed.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

[Attachment 6]

TOP SECRET

TERRITORY BETWEEN THE ODER AND LOWER NEISSE RIVERS

a. Recommendations:—This territory should remain part of Germany. There is no historic or ethnic justification for the cession of this area (as well as of the trans-Oder region referred to immediately above) to Poland. Such action would doubtless create economic and population difficulties of the greatest magnitude for Germany and arouse an intense spirit of irredentism. Maintenance of the Oder-Neisse frontier might well become the most critical security problem in Europe during the coming years.

b. Basic Data:—This area includes parts of the Prussian provinces of Silesia and Brandenburg. It is a rich agricultural area of 8,106 square miles and a population of 2,700,000, almost entirely German. It is claimed by the Warsaw Polish Government; its annexation would, as in other similar instances, involve the deportation of its German population to Germany.

Cession of this area to Poland, in addition to East Prussia, Upper Silesia and other German territory east of the Oder, would reduce the Polish-German frontier to 250 miles and provide Poland with its most defensible frontier in the west. It would facilitate Polish-Czech communications and afford Poland primary railroad lines from the Baltic southward through Liegnitz and Breslau.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

No. 514

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹[Extract²]

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

Since the political orientation of Poland with respect to either the Eastern or Western European powers cannot be foreseen, this Committee is reluctant to recommend extension of the western boundary of Poland to the Oder River. However, from the military point of view, it would appear impracticable to offer serious objections to this transfer of territory from Germany if the U. S. S. R. insists upon it. The bargaining possibilities of this issue, however, should be recognized.

¹ This memorandum was prepared in response to a request from Leahy (document No. 155) for recommendations which would be "useful to the President in preparing himself for the [Berlin] conference". It was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.

² For another extract from this memorandum, see document No. 332.

No. 515

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-745 : Telegram

*The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹[Extracts²]

SECRET

HOECHST, July 7, 1945—8 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

130. There was a second meeting of the Berlin *Kommandatura* this afternoon in Berlin at Marshal Zhukov's headquarters attended by Zhukov and his staff, General Clay, General Weeks representing the American and British control groups, Sobolev and myself. . . .

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 11 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1045).

² For other portions of this message, see document No. 429.

Discussion of the *fuel supply* elicited some illuminating comments from Zhukov. . . . Zhukov said that as the Silesian coal deposits were now in another jurisdiction, i. e. Poland, they were not available. I expressed surprise, stating that it was my understanding that Silesia formed part of the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany. Zhukov corrected me, saying that Germany did not exist and that everyone knew that the Crimea Conference established the Polish frontier along the Oder and Neisse rivers. I replied that I had been laboring under the impression that for the purpose of the Control Council for Germany the territory whose resources would be available was as described in the agreement on zones of occupation recommended by EAC and approved by the govts.³ Zhukov left no doubt in our minds that any resources east of the Oder Neisse line are not available in the joint administration of German territory. *I would appreciate the Dept's immediate advice on this point.*

MURPHY

³ i. e., the protocol signed at London, September 12, 1944. For text, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071*; *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2078; *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 118.

No. 516

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-945 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Germany
(Murphy)*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1945—6 p. m.

U. S. URGENT

85. With respect to Marshal Zhukov's statement² that the Crimea Conference established the Polish frontier along the Oder and Neisse rivers, we can only comment that he has been misinformed. It was there agreed that at a subsequent time Poland should receive an increase of territory in the west but this Govt has not accepted any specific line and has not agreed to a date for the transfer of German territory to Poland. Our understanding that delineation of new Polish-German frontier is a matter for later understanding is unqualifiedly confirmed by Vyshinski's letter of May 16 to Harriman³ in which the deputy commissar emphasizes as self-evident that the

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 12 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1045).

² See document No. 515.

³ See document No. 510, footnote 4.

final determination of Poland's western boundary will be made at the peace settlement as envisaged by the Crimea agreement.

Until that understanding has been reached we can only adhere to the protocol of Sep 12, 1944 which, in describing the zones of occupation, defined the Germany to be occupied as that "within her frontiers as they were on the 31st Dec, 1937".

The US position has been made abundantly clear to the Sov Govt in a communication to SovFonOff based on Dept tel May 8.⁴

Specific comments on Berlin food and coal problem will follow.⁵

GREW

J[ohn] D H[ickerson]

⁴ See document No. 510, footnote 4.

⁵ See document No. 431.

No. 517

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1045

*The Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Modzelewski) to the
Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*¹

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: On the commission of my government I have the honour to send you herewith a memorandum with enclosures concerning the Polish postulates as regards the Western frontiers of the Polish Republic.

I would be very grateful if you were as good as to convey to your Government the enclosed material so that it might be used when those questions are possibly examined at the forthcoming Big Three Powers Conference.

Yours sincerely

Z MODZELEWSKI

Moscow, July 10th, 1945.

[Enclosure]

THE STATEMENT OF POLAND'S POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE PROBLEM OF HER WESTERN FRONTIER

What the world wants is peace, a durable peace capable of safeguarding at least the next few generations from the horrors of a new war. The guarantee for this durability has to be sought in such a solution of territorial problems as may ensure possibilities of existence and development to all nations and states.

The new European settlement should tend to having international problems decided not on the strength of titles of possession acquired in the course of long historical processes, as these titles are often

¹ This paper bears the following manuscript notation: "Read on trip".

based on force and injustice, but with regard to the present needs of the nations and their capacity for development.

The free and democratic Poland has the right to be a state sufficiently powerful to shape her political and economic life independently, strengthened by her relations with the three Allied Powers, and thus ensure an adequate standard of existence and chances of further development to her population. These rights of Poland have been endorsed by the decisions of the Crimean Conference. The three great Allies were quite clear as to this that a free and strong Poland will be an element positively working for European peace, and so registered their common desire to see a strong, free, and democratic Poland established, agreeing that Poland should receive appreciable territorial compensations in the North and in the West. As to the extent of these compensations, in due time the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity was to be consulted.

As the Provisional Government of National Unity was constituted in Warsaw on June 29th, 1945, the Government's decision is to make Poland's position with regard to her Western frontier quite clear:

To be independent and strong Poland must be a state with an adequate territory. As her Eastern frontier has been fixed by the Crimean Conference along the so-called Curzon Line, Poland wants to fix her Western frontier on the Odra (Oder) and the Lusatian Nisa (Lausitz Neisse), including Stettin.

The political situation of the world has radically changed. Poland wants to suit her policy to the changes, and at the same time to contribute to the consolidation of peace in Europe. This is possible only if Poland is going to have a territory corresponding to the demographic and economic needs of the nation. The Polish territory ought to form a natural and compact geographical unit, as she did at the time of the reign of the Piast dynasty (X.-XIV. centuries), when she was a homogeneous state spreading over the systems of the Odra and the Vistula. Poland ought to have enough arable land to feed her people, and natural riches, making industrialization possible. Before this war, Poland was unduly agricultural, a country with undeveloped industries, a low standard of life, a very limited capacity for consumption. This economic backwardness was the result of unsuitable territorial settlement. Silesia, Pomerania and East Brandenburg remained severed from Poland, the Odra was cut off from Silesia, the Warta [*Warthe*] from the Poznania. Vistula was corked by the Danzig Free State, while Poland was also cut off from the Baltic Sea by the political barrier of East Prussia. Insufficient and insufficiently varied raw materials, as well as the economic backwardness, the result of 150 years of foreign domination, made industrialization difficult. As a consequence, the surplus of the agricultural population had to emi-

grate. Between 1918 and 1939 about 2,5 millions, that is about 10% of Poland's population, emigrated. In the last years before the war many countries became closed to emigration, so that the demographic pressure increased dangerously. Polish farm hands were compelled to look for seasonal work in Germany, tilling land above all in the Odra basin and East Prussia. Their work was increasing the economic potentialities of Germany, and Poland's economic dependence.

The New Poland must seek to avoid all these handicaps, to be a healthy state, with an adequate territorial basis. Poland was the first country to make a stand against the Germans, and by her resistance facilitated the process of the armament of her Allies. It is only fair that Poland, after having suffered the heaviest losses, and made the greatest sacrifices, should emerge out of this war with a territory corresponding to her needs, the result of her contribution to war effort and to victory.

The following are the arguments in favour of Poland's position:

1. *The Moral Basis.*

Throughout the war, Poland was unwavering in her loyalty to the Allies, and, through her consistently anti-German stand, was setting an example to other nations. The community, as well as the individual citizens steadily rejected all offers of cooperation with the Germans. By continuing to fight at home and abroad, on many fronts, irrespective of sacrifices, the Poles have, in the measure of their possibilities, contributed to the Allied success. For this Poland ought to obtain moral and material compensation, in proportion to her demographic and economic needs.

Steady in the pursuit of their own policy, the Germans were preparing the extermination of the Poles. Hence the systematic "liquidation" of the Polish nation, the attitude of denigration and contempt for Polish culture, the practice of turning people out and compelling them to work in Germany, etc. This policy was pursued consistently, and was bent, by the recourse to cruelty and violence, on achieving the total extirpation of the Polish element, thus removing the most serious obstacle in the way of imperialistic expansion. And all this time Polish culture and Polish property were exposed to devastation and pillage.

This is the foundation of the Polish right to reparation. Moral reparation for the revolting and criminal treatment of the Polish community, and material reparation for the destruction and pillage of the nation's property. Poland, the faithful ally of the victorious powers, has a right, as a matter of human justice, for her perseverance, her sacrifices and losses, to be indemnified *in natura*, by getting workshops, i. e. land, works, mines, buildings, and also objects of culture

value, and, above all, a territory corresponding to the needs of the nation.

2. *The Territory of the New Poland.*

All the three Allies have recorded their desire that Poland should be strong. She can be strong only if she is going to have a sufficiently large territory.

According to the Crimean decisions, Poland is about to lose in the East an area of about 184.000 sq. km, or about 47,5% of her former Territory. This piece of land was inhabited in 1931 by some 11 million people, that is to say, about 35% of the total population. As the number of Poles in this equalled some 4.000.000, and as these will be able to settle in the West, the effective loss of population to Poland will equal some 7.000.000, or 20%.

As the Western and Central Poland has been much more densely populated than the East, then, in case of inadequate territorial compensations, Poland will be threatened with overpopulation and compelled to send emigrants abroad. By having her Western frontiers fixed on the Odra and the Nisa, Poland would gain no more than some 105.000 sq. km (Eastern Prussia included).

Poland, within her new frontiers, would have an area of some 309.000 sq. km, smaller by some 80.000 sq. km (22%), than that she had in 1939. Poland's claim[s] are, therefore moderate.

3. *Poland's Demographic Needs.*

a. The number of Poles, according to the latest computations (see map Nr. 1²) is, in 1945, some 25 millions. Together with the returning emigrants and Polish citizens of other nationalities, this total may rise to 26 millions:[]

The density of population is an indication of the degree to which economic exploitation of the land has advanced. As the average density of population in Poland before the war was 83 to 1 sq. km, her new area should comprise at least 314.000 sq. km.

A territory of 309.000 sq. km is a minimum territory for a nation with such a vitality as that of Poles to-day.

b. By natural processes, the Polish population, in the years 1921-1931, has increased by some 5 millions people. Poland has, therefore, to reckon with a yearly increase of some 200-250 thousand people, who have to be fed and employed.

The Polish nation can lead no normal existence under circumstances compelling it to steady emigration. In view of: 1) the huge natural growth of the population, 2) the desirability of putting an end to emigration, 3) the necessity of admitting re-emigrants to the country—

² Not printed.

it is absolutely essential for Poland to possess an area adequate to the needs of her population.

Transferring the frontier line to the Odra and the Nisa will make the satisfaction of the most pressing demographic needs of the nation possible.

c. Poland, as is well known, was agriculturally the most overpopulated country in Europe. As a consequence of transfers of territory, the problem for Poland may become less acute in case the territories East of the Odra and the Nisa should be made parts of Poland.

Before the war, the number of the unemployed among the farming population was about 4 millions. These men ought to be given work on the land of their own country, so as to be free from the necessity of seeking seasonal work in Germany.

The Western territories, bounded in by the Odra and the Nisa, will yield to Poland some 5,5 million hectares of arable land, where some 2 million men might settle.

4. *Poland's Historical Rights.*

Prehistorical records have shown that since about the year 2000 B. C. the basins of the Odra and the Vistula were inhabited by peoples belonging to the Pre-Lusatian, Lusatian (see map Nr. 1³) and Vend (see map Nr. 2³) cultures.

On the strength of certain resemblances and of their geographical basis these peoples show traits in common with the Slavonic races. They have formed the demographic foundation of the Polish nation. Thus the lands between the Odra and the Vistula may be considered as the primordial territories of the Polish State.

The historical records since the X. century of the Christian era show that Poland's position on the Odra was a firm one (see map Nr. 3³), and that at certain periods Poland was extending considerably further westwards.

Only since the XIII. century Poland was beginning, under the German pressure, to give way and to recede towards the East.

Since the middle of the XIII. century the Teutonic Knights were the active exponents of German imperialism. For two centuries they were attempting the extermination of Slavonic peoples living on the shores of the Baltic Sea.

United in a common effort, under the leadership of Poland, Slavonic and Lithuanian forces finally succeeded in breaking down the Teutonic might in the battle of Grünwald-Tannenberg, in 1410. After a period of internal weakness, caused by religious strife, the re-awakened

³ Not printed.

German imperialism achieved in the XVIII. century the downfall of Poland.

Poland's history shows the need for Poland's return to the Odra territories, out of which she had been ousted by force and subterfuge and to which she has rights well grounded, in history.

Her present policy must be a consistent continuation of that of the Piasts, for deep political reasons and out of consideration for the future of the State.

5. *Polish Character of the Western Lands.*

Fairly large territories with a preponderating Polish element were not included within the boundaries of Poland in the years 1918–1939. One of these was East Prussia's Southern part with a Polish population of some 300–400 thousand.

Even the German census of 1933, particularly tendentious, none the less had registered some 250,000 Poles there. In the 7 Southern districts the Poles were decidedly in the majority (see map Nr. 4a, 4b, 4c⁴).

Another province with a Polish majority is that of the Silesian Opole (Oppeln) region. The German statistics for the years 1905–1910 were registering 1,213,265 (resp. 1,258,138) Poles, constituting 60,0%, resp. 57,3% of the total population. In the district of Syców, Namysłów and Brzeg, there were living, at that time, some 150 thousand Poles (see map Nr. 5⁴).

6. *Geographical Position of the Western Territories and their Geopolitical Connection with Poland.*

The geographical situation is of necessity the main basis of every state's policy. The same is true of Poland. Poland lies at the Eastern outskirts of Western Europe, forms part of the transcontinental bridges between the Adriatic and the Baltic, and the Baltic and the Black Seas. Commercial routes of old have tended to cross the Continent along these, and these tendencies remain unchanged even today. Two other trans-continental routes: that across Central European plains, and the Sub-Carpathian one, also cross Poland, linking capitals and industrial centres of many European states. The geographical position predestines Poland to play the part of an intermediary between the West and the East, and between the North and the South.

For ages, Poland has been the meeting ground of Latin and Byzantine cultures. Poland ought to form again a link between the two cultures. Poland's future, therefore, is bound up with her rôle as an intermediary in the widest sense of the word, and [an?] intermediary in

⁴ Not printed.

exchange, transit and communication. Only a strong and independent state can fulfil this mission.

Poland is striving to attain her natural boundaries. These are: in the South—the Sudetes and the Carpathians; in the North—the Baltic shore; in the West—the Odra and the Nisa. The area thus delimited forms a compact geographic entity, based on the systems of the Vistula and the Odra, pointing Poland's natural way to the Baltic.

The Odra was a stake for which Poles and Germans gave fight [*sic*] fiercely. Its loss was the beginning of Poland's decline. To make a successful stand against the Germans, Poland must regain her boundary on the Odra. The river forms one of Europe's essential dividing lines, a natural boundary between the Slavonic and the German world. The system of the Odra is much better developed towards the East; its tributaries reach deep into the Vistula basin, while it is practically disconnected from the Elbe.

Thus the conception of Poland as a country forming itself along the lines of the Piast tradition, makes it possible to utilize its geographical position fully.

The New Poland will have for her framework the systems of the Vistula and the Odra, of the Warta and the Nisa. Not a piece of this territory should be allowed to remain in German hands, and this is most particularly important with regard to the left bank of the Central and Lower Odra, to the Stettin hinterland, and to the islands in the Stettin Bay. This claim is a minimum one, supported by the public opinion of the whole country. In formulating it, Poland is as moderate as she is likely to be firm in her insistence on points which she regards as indispensable conditions of free national existence and free state policy.

7. Economic Links between Western Provinces and Poland.

Since the beginning of the second half of the XIX. century, the Eastern provinces of Germany, with their Polish majority, were unable to support their own population. Practically, the whole surplus population had to emigrate to Western Germany, and to other countries. The Polish element was growing stronger every year, without, however, increasing its economic strength, as the hostile policy of Prussia was effectively preventing this. The Eastern Prussia and the Silesia, artificially severed from Poland, their natural hinterland, were unable to develop normally. After 1918, the Silesia, the Odra and Stettin, cut off from Poznan and Pomerania, also were unable to develop successfully. This was felt, above all, in Silesia, as there was no access to Polish markets in the East. As a consequence of all this, practically the whole area of Eastern Germany was a land with much emigration.

The most symptomatic of all are the data for the years 1933–1939, the years of Hitler's régime, when no effort was neglected to strengthen Germanism in the Eastern marches, and to weaken the Polish element as much as possible. The results were, however, disappointing, and the process of emigration was going on in spite of everything.

The following are the figures concerning emigration in the years 1933–1939:

	<i>Emigrants</i>
East Prussia.....	117. 214
Frankfurt Reg.....	31. 945
Stettin Reg.....	16. 314
Köslin (Koszalin).....	54. 121
Marches of Poznanian.....	46. 996
Silesia (Opole).....	82. 883
Breslau Reg.....	70. 000
Liegnitz Reg.....	28. 884
Total.....	448. 357

As a consequence of expanding to the West, Poland will have to face certain losses in agricultural production. According to provisional computation, in spite of the inclusion of Western territories with the Odra as the frontier-line, the yearly wheat harvest will decrease by 300.000 tons (14%), compared with that before the war. A slight decrease will be shown by the production of barley (3%), hay (1%), rape-seed (1%), agrimony (1%); much more appreciable will be the falling away in the seed production (flax: 44%, hemp (68%), buckwheat (66%), millet (55%), maize (94%), hops (71%), and tobacco (48%).

At the same time Poland will obtain certain surpluses: in the production of rye (2%), oats (6%), potatoes (4%), clover (4%); also (more appreciable ones) of sugar-beet (90%), of siliquose plants (23%), of flax-fibre (73%), and hemp-fibre (13%).

Altogether then, with her Western boundary fixed on the Odra and the Nisa, Poland will be in a fairly satisfactory situation regarding foodstuffs.

The industrial situation will be radically changed. The former Polish Eastern provinces harboured 20% of Polish industries, 29% of Polish trade, and 22% of artisans' workshops. These, however, were mostly small businesses. Not only will the number of factories etc. after the inclusion of Western territories increase, but also the industrial output. In industry, trade, and handicrafts the unemployed peasants will have chances of finding work. Poland will remain an agricultural country, much more highly industrialized than before.

Expansion to the West will do much to further Poland's industrialization and to facilitate economic recovery. The incorporation

of these lands will on the one hand absorb the surplus of the farming population, and, on the other hand, will ensure a convenient and ample market. Within the Reich, these lands were a non-paying borderland and had no chances of normal development. Their industrial production was meant chiefly for export abroad (see Annex Nr. 4). Whereas within the framework of the Polish State the industries will be working under favourable conditions, their chief market being the internal one.

The Odra and the Vistula connected in Silesia by a canal (Gliwice-Przemsza), form a ring, out of which routes emanate in all directions. Among the water-ways the most important is the Odra itself, supplying the shortest connection between the Silesian district and the Baltic Sea.

By the Versailles Treaty, Poland was cut off from the Baltic by a German barrier, facilitating further German expansion eastwards. Thus handicapped, she managed to maintain herself firmly on her small strip of the sea-shore, and there to build the port of Gdynia, which in a few years became the foremost harbour in the Baltic.

At present Poland wants to dominate a long strip of the sea-shore between the Odra and the Pregola (Pregel), with the ports of Stettin, Gdynia, Gdańsk and Elbing, so as to put an end to the former German hegemony on the Baltic. The importance of ports as trading centres lies in their being attached through politics and communications to their natural hinterland. Only under such conditions can ports, the sea-shore and the hinterland enjoy common prosperity.

Poland is the natural hinterland of the Baltic ports between the Odra and the Pregel. Not only Gdynia, but also Gdańsk (Danzig), in spite of its abnormal political situation, could thrive, in the years preceding 1939, thanks to Polish imports and exports:

	<i>Gdynia</i>			<i>Gdańsk</i>		
	1928	1937	1938	1928	1937	1938
	(thousands of tons)					
imports.	193	1718	1527	1234	1516	1564
exports.	1765	7288	7647	878	5685	5363

Stettin has a chance to be much more important as exporting centre for goods from the Odra Lands, and as entrance port for goods that these lands need, when the political frontier obstacle is removed. At first, Poland will be compelled to import large quantities of industrial products necessary for the rebuilding of the country, thus becoming a fairly capacious market for foreign goods.

The possession of Baltic ports will much facilitate Poland's international commercial relations. The industries, when rebuilt, will, after satisfying the needs of the internal market, be able to export the small surpluses of their production abroad. Polish goods which

already have been introduced to world markets, will be able to make their appearance there again. Poland will need many raw materials and industrial products, and thanks to ports, will manage the transport much more easily. Such being the situation, Poland will tend to harmonize her economy with the planned economy of the world.

The creation of barriers and political "corks", such as Gdańsk and the East Prussia were, was a political and economic nonsense, and should not be allowed to happen again. Just as Gdańsk cannot exist without the Vistula, nor London without the Thames, so Stettin is unthinkable without the Odra and the Warta. For economic reasons and in view of its situation Stettin ought to be incorporated into Poland (see Annex Nr. 5.)

Conclusion

The trend of modern history is to make ever plainer the growing inevitable solidarity of fate between the European nations. That is why in present-day politics the independence of Poland is not only her own concern, but the concern of all other states as well.

Out of regard for this truth, world affairs are being regulated on a grand historical scale. When the whole Eastern chapter is being crossed out of Polish history, with equal justice the Eastern chapter ought to be crossed out of German history, the chapter telling the story of German rapacity. So far, no German generation has renounced the idea of conquering the East. An end must, therefore, finally be put to the German danger, the *place d'armes* must be taken away from the Germans. Poland must dominate the Odra. This is to the interest of all peace-loving nations of the world.

The Odra-Nisa frontier, the doing away with the nest of the Junker tradition in East Prussia, will mean the liquidation of a convenient *place d'armes*, making possible German aggression against Poland. Putting an end to East Prussia and making the frontier line of 1912 considerably shorter (about 350 km) will greatly facilitate defence. The Odra-Nisa frontier is a natural one, the easiest to defend. It will mean the removal of the German wedge that existed between Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1939. Thus it may serve not only with regard to Poland, but also to the Soviet Union, and the whole Slavonic world, as the best rampart against the ever-possible German aggression.

Poland has to be an independent state, she has to return to her primordial lands, and to continue the old political tradition of her Piast rulers as a national state, in harmony with the modern democratic ideas. Such Poland will be a symbol of victory of the Allied Democracies over Hitler's fascistic régime.

[Annex 1]

POLAND'S DEMOGRAPHIC NEEDS

The census of 1931 fixed the number of the population at 32,348.000. The Poles numbered 21,993.000 or 68/9%.

In 1939 the population of Poland was estimated at 35 mil. of persons. On the supposition, that in the period of 9 years the percentage of Poles remained unchanged, their number, in 1939, amounted to some 24,2 mil. This is also confirmed by the statistics of the natural increase. In 1931-1935 the yearly natural increase of Poles amounted to some 280.000, (1,31%); in 1936-1938 the yearly natural increase dropped to 255.000, (1,15%). During the war the increase dropped remarkably, but not more so than in Germany, where it oscillated between 0,5 and 0,7%. Supposing that in Poland it decreased by one half, we may put tentatively the yearly increase of Polish population in war-years at 120.000.

The results may be tabulated as follows:

a) number of Poles according to the census of 1931	21,993.000
b) natural increase 1931-35 at the rate of 280.000	1,440.000
c) natural increase 1936-38 at the rate of 255.000	765.000
	24,138.000
	together

According to the above results the number of Poles in 1939 amounted to about 24 mil. persons. To this number must be added the natural increase for the period of 7 years at the rate of 120.000 mil. [*sic*] a year, or 840.000; this would make altogether a total of about 25 mil. From this number, however, we must subtract the losses during the war which may be computed at about 2,5 mil, exclusive of citizens of other nationalities. As a consequence of this the total number of the population may be estimated at 22,5 mil.

Nevertheless the Polish element will be considerably reinforced by the return of Polish emigrants from Western and Eastern Europe (about 500.000) and by the return of Poles resident in Germany. The German census of 1925 showed that in Germany were living 902.112 persons of Polish speech (including the bi-lingual). Polish students estimate the number of Poles, who were resident in Germany in the years preceding the war, at 1,2 to 1,5 million. If we add to this the population wishing re-polonisation, we can suppose that with this the population will increase by 1,5 to 2 mil. persons. Adding to this the representatives of other Slavonic nations and the Jewish population, united in loyalty to the democratic Poland, we shall finally fix the figures of Poland's population in 1945 at about 26 mil.

The density of population is an indication of the degree to which economic exploitation of the land has advanced.

Supposing that in post-war years Poland should be able to make a start under conditions not more difficult than those obtaining before the war, then, with the density of population also maintaining its pre-war standard (83 per sq. km), the area of the New Poland should not be less than 314.000 sq. km.

The inclusion of territories east of the Odra and the Nisa will make Poland a country extending over 309.000 sq. km, a minimum territory for a nation with such a vitality as that of Poles to-day.

By natural processes, the Polish population, in the years 1921-1931, has increased by some 5 million people.

In the years 1922-1931 the yearly natural increase amounted to more than 300.000, while in the following years it slightly decreased.

Relatively, the increase oscillated between 11 and 15 *pro mille*.

There is ground for supposing that, immediately after the war, the rate of the increase is likely to show again a growing tendency. Poland has, therefore, to reckon with a yearly increase of some 200-250 thousand people, who have to be fed and employed. The population of Poland will quickly increase, and after three generations, will reach the maximum density compatible in Europe with an economic structure of a mixed, agricultural-industrial, character. The surplus population should not be compelled to emigration because of want of land, as was the case before the war.

Between 1919-1925, 577.800 people migrated from Poland; between 1926-1930, 964.000; between 1931-1935, 229.000; in the succeeding years the number of emigrants was oscillating between 50 and 100 thousand a year (1937-102.400; 1938-129.100).

By this process of compulsory emigration, the effective loss of population to Poland, between 1921-1931, amounted to more than 2,5 mil. inhabitants (10% of the total population).

About 60% of Poland's population live on the soil. There is no reason to think that this percentage may, within the next few years, appreciably decrease. As farmers will continue to be the preponderant element, Poland ought to secure for them the land on which to work. Before the war, the number of the unemployed among the farming population was about some 4,000.000. These men ought to be given work on the land of their own country, so as to be free from the necessity of seeking seasonal work in Germany. Poland's only chance is to get for them land in the West, where Polish peasants used to toil in large numbers before the war.

The Western territories, bounded in by the Odra and Nisa, will yield to Poland some 5,5 mil. hectares of arable land where some 2,000.000 men may be able to settle.

[Annex 2]

POLISH HISTORIC RIGHTS

Prehistory has made it plain that peoples inhabiting the basins of the Odra and the Vistula since about the year 2000 B. C. can be considered as Pre-Slavonic. During the bronze epoch in the years 1350–1200 B. C., there emerged a population of the Pre-Lusatian type of culture, which in the years 1200–1000 B. C. formed the Lusatian culture proper.

Many Slavonic scholars identify it with the Pre-Slavonic culture and call it accordingly. This culture had two main centres: the West one on the Odra and the east, in Pomerania proper.

In the beginning, the Lusatian culture was limited only to Lusatia proper, Bohemia, Silesia, and the so called "Great Poland", but in the period of its greatest development, in the years 700–400 B. C., it covered a considerable part of middle Europe (see map Nr. 1).

The people of Lusatian culture dwelt in fortified strongholds. During the second century B. C., owing to the invasion of the Gotho-Gepids from Scandinavia, the Vend culture made its appearance.

In the period of the migration of nations, between 400–600 A. D., the Vend culture transformed itself into the Slavonic culture. In this epoch, it showed a strong tendency to expand and, once more, it secured the territories along the river Elbe (see map Nr. 2). The Slavs were again spreading far to the west, beyond the Elbe.

In the years 600–1000 A. D. there emerged in the Polish territories the so called "Old Polish" culture. The representatives of this culture lived in fortified settlements (e. g. Szczecin, Wolin); in Pomerania itself there has been recorded the existence of 200 such strongholds.

On the strength of resemblances between all these cultures (viz. Pre-Lusatian, Lusatian, Vend, Old Polish) and their analogous distribution, historians have pointed out a closer connection between them.

Thus it has been established that the whole of the basin of the Odra, as also that of the Vistula, had had, without intermission, a Slavonic population, which became the demographic substratum of the Polish nation. Taking all that into consideration, we have to look upon the territories between the Odra and the Vistula as the cradle of the Polish state.

Towards the end of the first millennium A. D., the Slav nations became politically organized entities, and in the second half of the tenth century Poland started the course of her historical life.

From the middle of the XII century, however, the situation began to change. Poland lost her resiliency and power of resistance. Internal disputes weakened her and were taken advantage of by the

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Germans. First West Pomerania, (Stettin, Kamień, Kołobrzeg-Kolberg) fell away. The frontier was pushed back to Słupsk (Stolp). Then, the Germans occupied the sea coast up to the mouth of the Vistula. The Knights of the Cross entered on their career of expansion, and achieved the conquest of East Prussia. Then, in the beginning of the XIV century, they captured Gdańsk (Danzig) thus putting an end to the connection of Poland with the sea through the Vistula.

The loss of Gdańsk had a detrimental effect on the economic life of the whole basin of the Vistula. The German pressure caused a change in Polish policies. The Odra ceased to be one of Poland's boundaries, and the Poland of the Piast dynasty gave place to that of the Jagiellons (end of XIV century).

The centre of political interest moved further to the east. A new Jagiellon Poland embraced Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Lithuanian lands, as a consequence of the Union with Lithuania (end of XIV century). The culminating point of this policy was the Lublin Act of Union (1569).

The Polish Empire with an Eastern orientation lasted for four centuries. This policy has, however, finally contributed to the downfall of this state. For a century and a half there continued political captivity.

The First World War restored its liberty to Poland. As delimited by the Versailles and Riga treaties, Poland was a compromise between Eastern and Western orientation.

With regard to Germany there was, subsequently, oscillation between a customs war and a pact of friendship. In the years 1939-1945 war again was passing over Poland, with all its unspeakable cruelties, bent on the destruction of everything that was Polish.

Circumstances now have changed radically. Poland's situation is clear. Its only mortal enemies are the Germans.

The Poland of to-day has to revive the old Piast policies, and to return to its ancient territory on the Odra, from which she had been ousted by force and subterfuge. This is dictated by the present international situation. Security against possible German aggression being the chief aim, a common defence-line along the shortest line connecting the Baltic and the Sudetes, the maintenance of an Alliance and of friendly relations with the U. S. S. R. and the democracies of the West, follow as consequences.

[Annex 3]

THE EBBING OF POPULATION FROM THE GERMAN EAST

From the German Eastern provinces the population was ebbing steadily to the Western and the central parts of Germany.

The decline in the natural increase of population, due to emigration processes, within the period: 1841–1910, amounted in East Prussia to 729,4 thousand, in Pomerania to 744,2 thousand. After the war, during the years 1910–1925, the decline in East Prussia was 178,1 thousand, in the Borderland 9,2 thousand.*

On the other hand, a small rise occurred in Pomerania (36,9 thousand). This, however, was caused largely by the employment of different methods in the census of 1925 than in that of 1910, and, above all, by the outflow of Germans from the former Prussian provinces, returning then to Poland. But already in the years 1925–1933, 72,000 people emigrated from Pomerania, and 19 thousand from the Borderland.† Jointly there emigrated from Pomerania in the last years (up to 1933) 848,000 persons, from Silesia 980,000 persons, and from East Prussia 914,000 persons.

The most characteristic are the data for the years 1933–1939,‡ that is for the period of the Hitler régime, when everything possible was being done to strengthen the German elements in the east, and at the same time to weaken Poland. In spite of this desired results were not attained; the emigration ebb was going on.

In East Prussia, within those years, 117,214 people left the country (9% of the total population), whereas the total natural increase amounted scarcely to 102,324.

Similar was the situation in the Frankfurt regency, from which 31,945 people had departed, and in the Stettin (Szczecin) regency (emigration 16,314). Much greater was the emigration from the Köslin (Koszalin) regency, as it affected not only the rural population (33,993), but at the same time the urban one (20,728). The same regards the so called "Poznania Borderland" where the decrease of the rural population amounted to 26,753 persons, and that of the urban to 20,243 persons.

From all Pomerania a continuous ebbing of the population was going on. It was at its intensest in Silesia. From the Oppeln (Opole) region 82,883 persons emigrated, 46,370 of which came from the countryside, the rest from towns and mostly from large towns, with a population of over 100,000 inhabitants (20,537 persons). The same thing happened in the Breslau (Wrocław) regency (70 thousand emigrants), and in the Liegnitz (Legnica) regency (28,884).

On the whole over 160,000 people migrated from Silesia to the interior of Germany.

*Burgdörfer: ["Bevölkerungsentwicklung, Wirtschaftsstruktur und landwirtschaftlicher Absatz", in] *Deutsche Agrarpolitik*. Berlin 1932. +II [vol. I]. S. 93/99. [All footnotes in this annex and the following annexes appear in the original.]

†F. Cornelsen. *Deutsche Siedlung im Osten*. Langensalza. 1932 [1934?]. S. 23.

‡*Wirtschaft und Statistik*. Berlin 1942.

These figures are very eloquent. Despite unsparing efforts made by the Hitler government to raise the eastern provinces economically and to attach them more closely to the state, the increase of population could not be sustained, because these territories had been torn away from their natural hinterland.

As a result of this the population in the provinces on the eastern bank of the Odra was increasing since the year 1871 at a much slower rate than it did in the remaining parts of the Reich, reversing the situation in the preceding period.

Growth of the population in %:

	<i>from 1816 to 1871</i>	<i>from 1871 to 1910</i>
East Prussia.....	125	12, 5
East Pomerania.....	100	20
Lower Silesia.....	70	25§
East Brandenburg.....	83	42
Upper Silesia.....	125	55
whereas the remaining Reich.....	55	68

The most typical items are East Prussia and Pomerania, both agricultural provinces. Silesia, being industrial, does not show so great a decline, for the population migrating from the country was for the most part finding employment in the local industries.

The analogous fact of an increase of population faster in the West of Germany than in the East has been noticeable after the war. Thus e. g. the population of the whole Reich rose in the years 1918–1933 by 13,4%, whereas to the east of the river Odra it increased only by 10,4%.||

It was owing to the process of emigration that the increase of population in the districts of eastern Germany was so small. The average for the years 1925–1933 was:

The regency of:

Köslin (Koszalin).....	0, 09
Frankfurt (Stubice).....	0, 18
Schneidemühl (Piła).....	0, 19
Liegnitz (Legnica).....	0, 20
Stettin (Szczecin).....	0, 39

This increase is extremely low if compared to that in the Polish voivodship of Pomerania, where the yearly increase of population was 18 times higher than in the adjacent German Köslin (Koszalin) regency.¶ The density of population in the eastern German provinces is, generally, rather small. In the following regencies of the

§K. Olbricht. *Die Bevölkerungsentwicklung der Gross- u[nd] Mittelstädte der Ostmark*. Berlin. 1936. S. 15.

||P. V. Grégoire: *La colonisation agricole en Allemagne*. Paris 1938. S. 18.

¶F. Ross. *Stadt- und Landbevölkerung im Ostdeutschland[,] West u[nd] Mittel Polen*. Breslau. 1940. S. 30/42.

German Pomerania (having regard to the new administrative boundaries of 1938), it amounted to:

	<i>Percent per sq. km</i>
the Borderland.....	41, 1
the Köslin (Koszalin).....	51, 4
the Stettin (Szczecin) with the town of Stettin.....	80, 5

In the entire provinces of Pomerania the average was that of 59 inhabitants per one sq. km, whereas the neighbouring Polish voivodships, differing neither as to their geographical nor economic conditions, had:

Pomerania.....	66 inhabitants per 1 sq. km**
the Poznań voivodship.....	79 inhabitants per 1 sq. km

[Annex 4]

THE ECONOMIC DECAY OF EAST GERMANY

The most important product of Silesia is coal.

Before the war, in 1910, nearly 30% of the output of the Upper Silesian coal was directed to the nearest provinces of Poland and Bohemia, as well as to Austria, while the remaining 70% were sold to Germany. The 50%, however, of the remainder was sent to the Upper and Lower Silesia, and also to Eastern German provinces: to Pomerania and to East and West Prussia. Altogether the amount of coal sold to Poland and to the provinces East of the Odra and Nisa, reached 60% of the whole Upper Silesian coal output, while 15% went to Central and West Germany, mainly to Berlin and to Brandenburg, but 25%—to Bohemia and Austria.††

It was the same with coke. In 1910, 80% of the output was sold to the former Polish provinces and to the lands East of the Odra and Nisa, 11% went to Austria and Bohemia, and 9%—to Berlin and other German markets.††

Likewise, the market for the Lower Silesian coal suited itself to the natural geographical factors: 43% of the output went to Lower Silesia, 40%—to Bohemia and Austria, and only 17% to West and Central Germany, chiefly to Berlin.§§

The very little share of Western and Central Germany in the purchase of Silesian coal is explained (according to the German economist Kulmiz)||| by the competition of Westphalian coal, forwarded by cheap water ways, and also by the competition of bituminous coal.

**F. Ross. *Stadt- und Landbevölkerung im Ostdeutschland*[,] *West u[nd] Mittel Polen*. Breslau. 1940. S. 20.

††P. H. v. Kulmiz: *Das Absatzgebiet der schlesischen Kohle*. Jena 1914. S. 7.

‡‡Kulmiz *l. c.* S. 9.

§§*Ibid.* S. 12.

|||*Ibid.* S. 18/17.

Why, however, was the Silesian coal unable to stand this competition?—For the Silesian mines were the richest in Germany; there were no special technical difficulties, and the cost of production was lower than in West Germany. The main handicap was the outlying geographical situation of Silesia, at the outskirts of Germany: “*am Ende des Reiches*”, as Goethe has put it[.]

For in its natural markets, suited to geographical conditions, the Silesian coal was emerging victorious out of the competition.

And these natural markets were not situated in the distant, not easily accessible provinces of Central and West Germany, but in the East and South, in the nearest neighbouring countries, too, where it could penetrate in spite of the customs duties.

The Silesian production, however, did not reach the high standard of development, characteristic of the other German mines, mainly because of the competition of Polish and Bohemian mines, that were defending themselves against the Silesian coal with barriers of customs duties, and also because it was losing the fight against the West German competition in the more distant German markets.

In 1840 the production of the Upper Silesia had amounted to 60% of the Ruhr production, and in 1870 it was reduced down to 58%, in 1900—to 42% and in 1913—to 40%.¶¶

The shrinking of the amount of coal sold can be observed with regard to one of the most important customers, namely that of Berlin. In 1900, 61% of the general consumption of coal by Berlin fell to the share of Silesian coal and coke, 11% to the Ruhr mines. In 1928, however, the share of the Ruhr increased to 46% and that of Silesia sank to 40%.

The reduction of the Silesian coal import to the Berlin market became particularly striking during the years of the economic crisis, proving the superiority of West German mines in competition.

The export figures of coal, coke and briquettes to Great Berlin were the following (thousands of tons):

	1925	1929	1932
from Upper Silesia	1, 665. 0	3, 199. 2	1, 526. 6*
from Westphalia	963. 7	1, 719. 1	1, 718. 7

“The building of the ‘Mittellands Canal’” are [*in?*] the words of a German economist† “will remove the equilibrium centre still more to advantage of the Ruhr coal.”

Iron also illustrates how Silesia was being ousted by the West German industry. The production of iron in Silesia, although increasing, was relatively declining with regard to the production of

¶¶K. Olbricht: *Schlesien*. Breslau 1938 [1933?] l. c. S. 77.

*R. Kloss: *Seehandlungsstellung der deutschen Ostseehäfen*. Köln 1935.

†*Ibid.* S. 18/17.

Germany as a whole. While the production of iron ore in Upper Silesia increased from 231 thousand tons in 1871 to 1,048 t.t., in 1912, that is more than fourfold; that of the whole Reich increased in the same time from 1563 t.t. to 17,617 t.t., that is twelvefold. Silesia's share in the production of the whole Germany sank in the same time from 14,8% to 5,9%.

The same is true of steel. In 1900 the production of Upper Silesia amounted to 905 t.t., in 1904 it increased to 1,400 t.t., that is 164%. In the same time the production of steel of the whole Germany increased from 8.928 t.t. to 17.321 t.t. (194%).‡

The coal mines and the foundries of Upper Silesia were thus unable to export to the neighbouring countries, economically gravitating to Silesia, as they were separated from them by customs barriers. Out of the German market they were being ousted by other German industries. They defended themselves by consuming coal and iron ore in their own works, or by attempting production of more precious goods. In this way Silesia was growing independent of the Reich, and becoming more compact as an economic organism. This has been proved by the statistics of railway transports, too. In 1928 one third of the general output of Upper Silesia was forwarded to Lower Silesia, another one third to other parts of Eastern Germany. Altogether, then, two thirds of the total output were consumed by Eastern Germany.

The economic decline of the Eastern provinces of the Reich affected agriculture, too. The tendency of the population was to migrate from the country to the towns. The percentage of the population employed in agriculture was steadily declining: in the years 1925–1933 it fell in Pomerania from 41,2% to 38,1%, and in the Borderlands from 47,5% to 44%.

In the Köslin (Koszalin) regency the peasant population declined within nine years (1925–1933) by 4%, in the Stettin (Szczecin) regency by 2,9%. The farm hands were the first to emigrate, and as a consequence, the big landowners (45% of the landed property in Pomerania) were the first to suffer. To remedy this, farm hands were being hired for seasonal work, chiefly from Poland. Their number used to attain 600.000 in a season.

Since 1932, hiring Polish farm hands for work become [*sic*] prohibited in lands situated East of the Odra.

The measure was a purely political one, damaging to the interests of agriculture.

‡ *Ibid.* S. 99/100.

[Annex 5]

STETTIN'S CONNECTION WITH POLAND

Stettin is the harbour of Pomerania and Silesia, especially of the Upper Silesia, but only in small degree that of Brandenburg, Lusatia and Saxony, although the geographical situation would seem to suggest that also these provinces should belong to its hinterland. § In 1913, 74% of goods forwarded from, and 58% of goods transported to Stettin by railways, came from Pomerania, Silesia, Poznan, East and West Prussia, 20% and 34% respectively fell to the share of Brandenburg with Berlin, Saxony and Thuringia, 2% and 7% fell to the share of foreign countries, particularly of Czechoslovakia and Austria. || The situation was similar with regard to waterways. These, before the first Great War, were very important, as more than half of all the cargoes went to Stettin by water. ¶ Of all the goods transported over the Odra, 66,4% were imported, and 71% exported by Stettin; 10% and 4,5% respectively went by the rivers Warta and Noteć [*Netze*]. This made totals of 76,4 and 75,4%. The rest fell to the share of the Brandenburg waterways and the Elbe. **

After the war 80% of goods forwarded by railways from Stettin went to Pomerania and Upper Silesia, while 61% of railway transports to Stettin came from the same provinces. †† Of water-transported goods 53% of the import and 50% of the export went by the Odra. If we add the Warta transports (17% in import and export), we arrive at the following results: 70% of cargoes transported to and 67% of cargoes forwarded from Stettin fell to the share of Odra and its tributaries. †††

If we compare the percentage of goods transported to and forwarded from Stettin to its principal hinterland, particularly to Pomerania and Silesia, before the first Great War (1913) and afterwards (1933), we shall find an increase in goods transported to (from 58% to 61%) as well as forwarded from (from 74% to 80%) Stettin, by railways. On the other hand, the share of Silesia and Pomerania in water transport decreased (from 76,4% to 70% in cargoes transported to, and 75,4% to 67% in cargoes forwarded from Stettin). This was caused by the opening to navigation of the canal joining the Odra to the Havel and the intensifying of commercial relations between Berlin and Stettin. Stettin's commercial hinterland, however, continued to be limited to the areas covered by the system of the river

§ P. H. Seraphim: *Die Ostseehäfen und der Ostseeverkehr*, Berlin, 1937. S. 96.

|| R. Kloss: *Die Seehandelsstellung der deutschen Ostseehäfen*, Köln, 1935, S. 34.

¶ *Ibid.* S. 95.

** *Ibid.* S. 96.

†† P. H. Seraphim: *l. c.* S. 153.

††† R. Kloss: *l. c.* Tabelle.

Odra, i. e. to Pomerania and Silesia. Out of these markets, and, still more remarkably, out of other parts of its geographical hinterland, such as Brandenburg and a part of Saxony, Stettin was being superseded by the rising competition of Hamburg. Stettin's participation in the turnover of both ports in the year 1913 and 1929 is shown in the following figures (in %):§§

	1913	1929
Pomerania.....	97	93
Upper Silesia.....	91	87
Brandenburg.....	57	56
Lower Silesia.....	55	53
Berlin.....	21	32
Bavaria and Württemberg.....	14	6
Saxony (<i>Land</i>).....	7	7
Saxony (province).....	5	3

The figures reflect the diminishing participation of the port of Stettin not only in the commerce of Western and Central Germany, but also of the Upper Silesia and of Pomerania, which by reason of their situation gravitate strongly to Stettin.

§§R. Kloss, *l. c.* Tabelle.

No. 518

760c.6215/7-1345

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs
(Durbrow)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: British Proposal to Settle Western Frontier of Poland

Participants: Mr. George Middleton, British Embassy
Elbridge Durbrow, Chief, Eastern European Division

Mr. Middleton called today and left the attached *aide-mémoire* outlining the British Government's proposal to settle the western and northern frontiers of Poland at the Berlin Conference.

The *aide-mémoire* states that the British Government is of the opinion that it is advisable to settle the northern and western frontiers of Poland as soon as possible since any delay will only mean that the Soviet Government and the Polish Government will consolidate their position along the Oder-Neisse Line which would mean the incorporation into Poland by unilateral action of approximately one-fifth of pre-war German territory. The British Government suggests that efforts be made at the Berlin meeting to fix the Polish-German frontier

[No. 518]

as follows: The Free City of Danzig, East Prussia east [*south*] and west of Koenigsberg, Oppeln, Silesia (German Upper Silesia) and most of the eastern portions of German Pomerania. The *aide-mémoire* states that if it proves impossible to reach an agreement as outlined above the Soviet Government should (1) be informed that the British and ourselves would give our formal consent to the transfer to the administration of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity [of] only such territories as all four controlling powers are prepared to grant to Poland, (2) if the Soviet Government insists on turning over German territory up to the Oder-Neisse Line the British and American Governments should insist upon a proportionate reduction in the Soviet share of reparations from Germany since the turning over of this large section of Germany to Poland would reduce German capacity to pay reparations. The *aide-mémoire* adds that the British Government would, if necessary, be prepared to inform the Soviet Government that they will not allow it any reparations deliveries from the American and British zones in Germany unless this territorial question is settled satisfactorily.

I informed Mr. Middleton that the territorial proposals suggested by the British almost coincided completely with the recommendations the Department proposed to the President.¹ I explained that we had given very careful study to this question and felt that the proposal was the only just one which could be made. Mr. Middleton explained that the British delegation would discuss this matter with the American delegation at Berlin. . . .

E[LBRIDGE] D[URBROW]

[Attachment]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to Sir A. Clark Kerr's arguments in favour of reaching a provisional Agreement among the three major Allies in regard to Poland's Western frontiers, at the forthcoming meeting of heads of Governments. His Majesty's Government agree with him that the Poles and the Russians appear now to have committed themselves regarding the line of the Oder-Western Neisse as the Western frontier of Poland and that the passage of time will only assist the Poles, with Russian support, in consolidating their hold over all territory to the East of this line. If the British and United States Governments allow the permanent settlement of the frontier to be postponed indefinitely, only putting their views on record for the present, the difficulties of settlement at a later date

¹ See document No. 510.

will be aggravated; and meanwhile they will be permitting the Soviet Government to flout the authority of the Allied Control Council over Germany, and hence to establish a precedent for creating all manner of difficulties at a later date.

2. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government see serious objection to accepting the Oder-Neisse Line here and now as the frontier between Poland and Germany. To precipitate a concession of the maximum Soviet Russian claims might be regarded as a sign of weakness and provoke other excessive demands elsewhere. His Majesty's Government have always doubted whether British public opinion would lastingly support a settlement involving the amputation of about one-fifth of the total area of Germany normally inhabited by over ten million persons of undisputably German stock, and such a settlement might prove a formidable obstacle to the maintenance of European peace. Moreover, the immediate transfer of these territories to Poland would withdraw them from the authority of the Allied Control Council in Germany, and also from the fields of German reparation and supply and from the total area from which the British and United States authorities might hope to obtain food supplies for the feeding of Western Germany, thus giving a proportionate advantage to Russia and Poland in excess of their fair share. In this connection, His Majesty's Government note that at the Tripartite Military Meeting to discuss the Military Government of Berlin held at Marshal Zhukov[']s Headquarters on the 7th July, Marshal Zhukov stated, when the question of food supplies was under discussion, that territory East of the Oder and the Neisse was under Polish control and not in his zone, and again, in regard to fuel supplies, that Silesia was not available to him as the Eastern frontier of his zone was the Oder and the Neisse "as agreed at the Crimea Conference."²

3. In these circumstances the assurance given by M. Vyshinsky³ to the effect that the presence of Polish Administration does not prejudice the fate of German territory, which is for discussion at the Peace Conference, is of little practical value. That assurance is in any case rendered nugatory by the preceding passages in M. Vyshinsky's letter, the effect of which is to place the territories in question completely in the hands of the Polish authorities without supervision by, or responsibility to the Soviet Government, and without the agreement of any other of the Allied Governments represented on the Control Council for Germany. While His Majesty's Government agree that there are certain matters in each zone in Germany in which the Allied authority in that zone may act independently, they can neither accept the claim made in M. Vyshinsky's letter that the

² See document No. 515.

³ See document No. 510, footnote 4.

Supreme Authority of the Allies in Germany extends over the separate zones only in respect of questions common to the whole of Germany, nor admit the right of the Soviet Government to place a part of their zone outside the authority not only of the Control Council but also of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in that zone. The Soviet Government would indeed certainly object were His Majesty's Government and the United States Government to hand over the Ruhr or the Rhineland to the French on similar conditions.

4. His Majesty's Government therefore consider that, if the United States Government agree, it should be made plain at TERMINAL that His Majesty's Government and the United States Government cannot acquiesce in the Soviet Government's interpretation of the situation. For the reasons stated in para 1 above, His Majesty's Government are of the opinion, however, that the two Governments should not be content with merely going on record as withholding their consent to the present situation. His Majesty's Government therefore propose that the two Governments indicate their willingness (i) to reach an understanding with the Soviet Government on a reasonable Western Frontier for Poland (which will necessarily be well short of her present claims and should in the view of His Majesty's Government not exceed the Free City of Danzig, East Prussia south and west of Koenigsberg, Oppeln, Silesia and the most eastern portion of Pomerania) and; (ii) to agree, subject to the necessary concurrence of the French Provisional Government to the transfer of the territories to the East of such a frontier to permanent Polish Administration, subject to ratification when the final Peace settlement on this question is made.

5. His Majesty's Government further propose that if it is not possible to reach agreement with the Soviet Government on an acceptable compromise on these lines, the two Governments should indicate:

(i) That they will be willing to give their formal consent to the transfer to the Administration of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity only of such German territories as all Four Controlling Powers are prepared to allow Poland to acquire permanently;

(ii) That if the Soviet Government insist nevertheless upon handing over parts of Germany to Poland without the consent of the other Governments principally concerned, thus reducing the capacity of Germany as a whole to pay reparations, His Majesty's Government and the United States Government will be obliged to insist upon the proportionate reduction in Russia's share of reparations from Germany.

His Majesty's Government would, if necessary be prepared to inform the Soviet Government that they will not allow them any reparations deliveries from the American and British zones in Germany, unless these issues are settled to the satisfaction of the Governments concerned. His Majesty's Government propose to seek the concurrence of the United States Delegation in acting on the above lines upon arrival at TERMINAL.

WASHINGTON, July 13th, 1945.

No. 519

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹

[Extracts²]

SECRET

POTSDAM, July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, called this afternoon and discussed for two hours in a preliminary way a number of matters on the agenda of the Conference.³

4. *German-Polish Frontier.*

Sir Alexander referred to the great economic problems raised by the Poles' territorial claims, particularly with regard to supplying food from Eastern Germany and coal from Silesia, and handed me a statement of the British view regarding Poland's western frontier (see attachment). The British are willing to see East Prussia, Danzig, the most eastern part of Pomerania (not as far as the Oder River) and Upper Silesia placed under permanent Polish administration now; if Russia insisted upon a larger area going to Poland, she should accept a proportionate reduction in her share of German reparation. Sir Alexander maintained that his government had never approved any cessions to Poland beyond those listed above, and expressed opposition to the Oder-Neisse line, which would raise to between ten and twelve million the number of Germans subject to transfer. . . .

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 140, 218, 234, 258, 319, 351, 379, 404, 470, 635, 645, 678, and 708.

³ For a list of persons present at this meeting, see document No. 234, footnote 3.

[Attachment]

[BABELSBERG, July 14, 1945.⁴]

POLAND'S WESTERN FRONTIER

We should make it plain that we cannot acquiesce in the Soviet Government's interpretation of the situation. We should not be content with merely going on record as withholding our consent to the present situation. It is therefore proposed that we indicate our willingness

(i) to reach an understanding with the Soviet Government on a reasonable Western Frontier for Poland (which will necessarily be well short of her present claims and should in my view not exceed the free city of Danzig, East Prussia South and West of Koenigsberg, Oppeln Silesia and the most Eastern portion of Pomerania) and;

(ii) to agree, subject to the necessary concurrence of the French Provisional Government, to the transfer of the territories to the East of such a frontier to permanent Polish administration, subject to ratification when the final peace settlement on this question is made.

It is further proposed that if we fail to reach agreement with the Soviet Government on an acceptable compromise on these lines, we should indicate

(i) that we shall be willing to give our formal consent to the transfer to the administration of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity only of such German territories as all four controlling powers are prepared to allow Poland to acquire permanently.

(ii) that if the Soviet Government insist nevertheless upon handing over parts of Germany to Poland without our consent, thus reducing the capacity of Germany as a whole to pay reparations, we shall be obliged to insist upon the proportionate reduction in Russia's share of reparations from Germany. His Majesty's Government would, if necessary be prepared to inform the Soviet Government that we shall not allow them any reparations deliveries from the American and British zones in Germany, unless these issues are settled to our satisfaction.

⁴ This document bears the following typed notation: "(Handed to Mr. Dunn by Sir Alexander Cadogan, July 14, 1945)".

No. 520

740.00119 EW/7-1545

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹

[BABELSBERG,] July 15, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

POLAND'S CLAIMS TO GERMAN TERRITORY AND THEIR EFFECT ON ALLIED CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES IN GERMANY

At present Marshal Zhukov claims that he has no control over the areas of Eastern Germany which have been unilaterally placed under Polish administration.² These areas contain the mining resources of Upper Silesia and a large part of the food surpluses of Germany. Before a joint economic policy for the treatment [of Germany³] can be agreed, either in the field of reparation or in respect to the responsibilities of the Control Council, it is necessary to know *what* is the Germany to which those policies relate.

This Government approves in principle territorial adjustment for Poland's benefit but opposes unilateral action in this as in other territorial settlements. In the case of German territories this opposition is reinforced by our joint responsibility as one of the four occupying powers. Unilateral detachment from Germany of areas of great economic importance and arbitrary transfer to the rest of Germany of some ten to twelve million Germans will have great repercussions throughout Germany, including the American zone, and will have important indirect effects on our war effort.

When questions arise concerning the status of the areas of Eastern Germany which the Soviet Command has placed under Polish administration the following questions might be raised:

1. Is a unilateral transfer of authority over German territory compatible with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany,⁴ which provides that while other United Nations may contribute auxiliary contingents, the four powers will control Germany within her 1937 boundaries?

2. Are the resources thus removed from Allied control in Germany to be made good either by Poland or by the Soviet Union? The United States is unable and unwilling to make good deficits, particularly in foodstuffs and fuel, thus created in the rest of Germany and in

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² See document No. 515.

³ Manuscript interpolation by Philip E. Mosely.

⁴ i. e., the protocol regarding the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of Greater Berlin, signed at London, September 12, 1944. For text, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071*; *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2078; *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 118. The reference is to articles 1 and 4 of this protocol.

liberated countries which expected to meet some of their urgent needs from German resources.

3. Are Russia's reparation claims based on the resources of Germany in her 1937 boundaries or in the new boundaries thus created through unilateral action?

4. Will the ten to twelve million Germans displaced from the East be accommodated and resettled in the Soviet zone?

5. Will not the four controlling powers in Germany need to enter into agreements with Poland and Czechoslovakia regulating the orderly removal of Germans from their territories and their resettlement in the rest of Germany?

Questions along these lines will help to bring out Russia's intentions and plans in regard to the determination of Poland's Western frontier in relation to the joint economic policies of the four powers in Germany, without displaying either complacency or hostility toward the Soviet desire to secure the Oder-Neisse line for Poland.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES

No. 521

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

[Extract ¹]

TOP SECRET

SUGGESTED UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING POLAND

Reconstruction

In order to implement our policy of establishing a truly independent democratic Polish state, we should be prepared, subject to legislative authority, to assist through credits or otherwise in the reconstruction of Polish agriculture and industry. Immediate action on our part to facilitate by credits and otherwise the supplying to Poland of urgently needed equipment and relief materials will promote in a far-reaching and enduring manner a healthy American influence in Poland, especially in regard to the holding of free elections, the final step in the Yalta program. Our efforts in this regard should be on a national rather than international basis. While the Soviet attitude towards United States economic activities in Poland is uncertain, the present situation in Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe is not promising. We should, therefore, insist, in order to

¹ For other sections of this briefing paper, see documents Nos. 483 and 510.

guarantee the effectiveness of our efforts and to reap the benefits thereof, that American aid be accorded directly and not through the intermediary of either the Soviet Union or some international organization, such as UNRRA. We should strive to obtain from the New Polish Government of National Unity a promise that it will follow a policy of equal opportunity for American interests in trade, investments and access to information. The rapid establishment of normal friendly relations and contacts between our two countries is particularly important, since the large populations of Polish extraction in our country might otherwise seek to make a domestic American political issue of conditions inside Poland.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

No. 522

860c.01/6-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, June 26, 1945—7 p. m.

2274. In conversation with Bierut, Osóbka-Morawski and Mikołajczyk at lunch on June 23 I referred to a previous conversation with the first two at which they had emphasized their hope for economic assistance from the US and I suggested that it might be useful to have an informal discussion of what they visualized in this connection which I could report to my govt. (POLCO, supplementing Moscow's 2249, June 24, 3 p. m.,¹ sent to Dept as 2274, rptd to London as 324.) I explained that relief and rehabilitation would be dealt with by UNRRA and in the medical field to some extent by the Amer Red Cross. When it came to reconstruction I said that this must be dealt with on a business basis.

Bierut readily recognized this principle and said that the new Polish Govt would wish to make a commercial treaty with the US in order that trade in both directions could be reestablished. He recognized that only through exports could Poland repay the US for goods purchased on credit. They explained in general their requirements for equipment emphasizing particularly the grave shortage of transportation, both railway equipment and, particularly, trucks and motor vehicles. They hoped to get from Germany the return of the 40 to 60 thousand trucks that had been taken from Poland and in other directions showed a keen desire to obtain at the earliest moment

¹ Not printed.

restitution and reparations from Germany. On the other hand, they hoped that some equipment could be obtained as quickly as possible from the US.

In addition to transportation requirements port equipment is urgently needed and machinery for the reestablishment of their industry, both within the boundaries of old Poland and in the new territory which they counted on obtaining in the west at the expense of Germany.

I explained the prior call on our industry for the war in the Pacific for certain types of equipment and the present legal limitations on the Export and Import Bank to extend credits. On the other hand, I encouraged them in the thought that immediate analysis of their requirements would be useful in order to be prepared for prompt action if and when credits could be extended and equipment was available. I also explained that in consideration of the size of any credit it would be necessary to analyze the Polish Govt's plans for exports and particularly to the US, in order that we might be satisfied as to the capacity of Poland to repay any credits that might be granted. I also mentioned the possibility of obtaining a credit from the world bank when and if it was established.

They are extremely anxious to obtain a credit from the US as soon as possible after the new gov't of national unity is set up and recognized by the US. Aside from the humanitarian aspects and the value in connection with developing future markets for Amer equipment, I believe it is of inestimable importance from a political standpoint to begin negotiations at once with a view of granting promptly a small credit, at least to permit purchases and shipment to Poland of equipment most urgently needed for reconstruction. This might be expanded at a later date when the Export-Import Bank obtains additional appropriations from Congress. There can be no doubt that prompt action to supply urgently-needed Amer equipment will have a far-reaching and permanent effect on the influence of the US in the political scene in Poland and particularly on our influence in connection with the carrying out of the final step in the Crimea decision, namely the holding of truly free elections. I cannot urge too strongly that Amb Lane be authorized before his departure from Wash to initiate negotiations for a credit to purchase Amer equipment and that the new gov't be encouraged to send representatives to Wash

to work out the details. The most dramatic gesture that we could make to show our interest in assisting Poland would be to dispatch several hundred used trucks from our army on the continent. This gesture would, I am satisfied, contribute substantially to strengthening the prestige and position of the new members of the govt.

On the other hand, if we delay taking any concrete action for a protracted period the hopes of assistance from America that all Poles have, including the Lublin group, will be dampened and our influence cannot fail to be adversely affected. In other words, I feel that a small gesture made quickly will be of even greater political as well as practical value than substantially larger transactions made at a later date. I hope also that our rep on the UNRRA Board will encourage UNRRA to increase promptly its shipments as far as possible using the port of Danzig; also that the UNRRA mission be dispatched to Warsaw without delay. I further hope that the AmCross will find it possible to increase its appropriation of a million dollars for medical supplies. From the reports of AmCross reps who have recently been in Poland there can be no doubt that Poland is desperately short of medical supplies in all categories and from standpoint of human values I know of no country in Europe where aid given can be more useful.

Although on Amb Lane's arrival in Warsaw I will be dropping out of my direct relations with Poland, I would personally greatly appreciate the Dept's reaction to the above recommendations.

I discussed with Bierut specifically the points raised in Dept's 1382, June 22, 7 p. m.² He showed great interest in obtaining Amer technical aid in their reconstruction problems. He is anxious to send at the proper time Polish engineers to the US to study particular problems and stated Amer engineers would be welcome in Poland to assist them. He expressed the hope that there will be attached to our Embassy competent experts in industry and agriculture who could not only analyze Poland's requirements from the US but informally advise the Polish Govt ministries involved. . . .³

HARRIMAN

² See document No. 485.

³ For the second section of this message, omitted here, see document No. 490.

No. 523

860c.50/7-1245 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Appointed Ambassador to Poland (Lane)*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1945—5 p. m.

3234. For Lane.

As a result of Department discussion in which you participated regarding possible economic assistance for Poland from the U. S. the following points have been generally agreed upon:

1. The U. S. will give full support to UNRRA in fulfilling the contemplated Polish program. The tentative program for Poland is substantial, calling for almost half a million tons of supplies for the third quarter and a similar quantity for the fourth quarter of this year. Even if more aid were available for Poland it is doubtful whether there would be either the shipping or port facilities to increase any supply program beyond this target: real difficulties may even be encountered in delivering the supplies which UNRRA will have ready to send with our support.

It is understood that UNRRA plans to appoint as permanent chief of the UNRRA Polish Mission an American, and that the Mission will include specialists who can promptly revise the proposed import program on the basis of logical priorities with cooperation from the local government officials. . . .

2. The Export-Import Bank is prevented from lending to Poland by a statutory prohibition² against loans to governments in default to the United States Government similar to the prohibitions of the Johnson Act³ against private loans to such governments. Proposed legislation to expand the Bank's lending power eliminates this provision. Bills are also before Congress providing for outright repeal of the Johnson Act. It is not known how soon these legal barriers will be removed, but we are endeavoring to get the Bank legislation enacted before Congress recesses.

In the meantime Poland should prepare promptly a statement of requirements setting forth the types of goods needed, quantities, specific projects, and supporting data, as well as present financial resources, trade prospects and other relevant material. This would facilitate conclusion of loan arrangements in the event that and as soon as the law permits.

3. The U. S. would consider favorably proposals designed to facilitate payments in dollar exchange for exports, especially of coal.

4. Plans are being made to provide Poland promptly with one thousand Army surplus trucks to be supplied on dollar credit terms. The proposal has been approved by the Surplus Property Board and the Office of Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner has an under-

¹ Sent to the American Embassy, Paris.

² By an Act of March 2, 1940, to provide for increasing the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank; 54 Stat. 38.

³ i. e., the Act of April 13, 1934, to prohibit financial transactions with any foreign government in default on its obligations to the United States; 48 Stat. 574.

standing with the Army that the trucks will be available. Details as to types of trucks and point of delivery will be sent you later.

5. With respect to the Polish desire to receive restitution and reparations from Germany, the question of restitution is closely interrelated with that of reparations and, hence, must be subject to the decisions to be arrived at respecting general reparations policy. Such policy is the subject of discussions to be held by the Allied Reparations Commission at Moscow.

6. Reestablishment of private trade between the U. S. and Poland is desired as soon as mechanical limitations and facilities permit. The Department regards the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between Poland and the United States, signed June 15, 1931,⁴ as still in effect. The Department, however, would welcome the opportunity of negotiating an improved treaty with Poland.

7. A mission of Polish requirements specialists to this country will be welcomed. It is contemplated that our Embassy staff will include technical, requirements and economic specialists. We hope the Poles will cooperate with them.

8. The matter of a possible increase in Red Cross assistance to Poland is being pursued and the indications are that an increase may be available provided the distribution of supplies in Poland can take place in accordance with Red Cross principles.

The following for Harriman. The above is for your information urtel 2274 June 26.⁵ Lane has been instructed to give above information to Polish officials in Warsaw. It is believed he can convince them that U. S. is making every effort to meet their urgent needs. Please show this telegram to Bergson.

Repeated to London and Moscow.

GREW

J[ohn] P[arke] Y[oung]

⁴ Treaty Series No. 862; 48 Stat. (2) 1507.

⁵ Document No. 522.

SOVIET UNION
PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS

No. 524

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹

TOP SECRET

SOVIET COOPERATION IN SOLVING IMMEDIATE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS

RECOMMENDATION

That the Soviet Union be urged and encouraged to participate actively with the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries in combined endeavors to solve the critical problems of European relief and reconstruction. The following steps seem particularly important:

1. *Russian Participation in European Economic Organizations.*

It is recommended that we endeavor to secure agreement from the Soviet Government to participate fully in the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe (EECE), European Coal Organization (ECO), the European Central Inland Transport Organization (ECITO), and the United Maritime Authority (UMA), including designation of representatives to cooperate in the day-to-day activities of these organizations.²

2. *UNRRA.*

It is recommended that Soviet agreement be sought on the following steps, now proposed by the United States to strengthen UNRRA: (1) that UNRRA countries must maximize local production of relief supplies, that UNRRA should have first call on any surpluses developing in the countries it is assisting for use elsewhere, that UNRRA should have a claim equal to all others on using surpluses available in territories adjacent to UNRRA countries, that UNRRA countries must assume responsibility for their own food needs beginning with 1946 harvests, and that the operations of UNRRA field personnel must be facilitated in every way; (2) UNRRA needs more effective organization,

¹ Annex 7 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² For information on the establishment and functions of these agencies, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XI, pp. 358-361; vol. XII, p. 910; vol. XIII, pp. 55-57, 305-306, 879-882.

and US, UK and USSR should make available competent administrative personnel in substantial numbers, and (3) additional contributions to UNRRA should be sought from such possible sources as non-member United Nations, European neutrals who might make a contribution on a non-member basis, and UNRRA members now contributing only to administrative expenses.

3. *American and Russian Economic Relationship in Countries of Eastern Europe.*

It is recommended that the President request the USSR to agree: (1) to stop removals from the countries of Eastern Europe of capital equipment, wholly or substantially owned by American nationals; to return capital equipment previously removed; and to insure that these countries make adequate, effective and prompt compensation to American nationals for such equipment which cannot be returned and for current output delivered on reparations account; (2) to permit American nationals to enter, move about freely and carry on commercial and government operations unmolested in these countries; and (3) not to conclude treaties, agreements or arrangements which give to the USSR an exclusive or monopolistic position in the trade, raw materials or industry of these countries, or which deny to American nationals access on equal terms to such trade, raw materials or industry, and to modify any existing arrangements to that effect.

DISCUSSION

It is vital to the maintenance of good relations among the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom that measures taken with respect to and in conjunction with the other countries of Europe be combined undertakings as among the three principal countries. The alternative is rivalry. Such rivalry would not only retard the reconstruction of Europe, but would tend to weaken the bonds of friendship and mutual respect which now unite the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.

Early restoration of the economic life of the countries of Europe is vital to the establishment of a durable peace. The foreign economic policies of the United States are designed to help other nations establish quickly the basis for their economic life. In the absence of close cooperation among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, the revival of European production will be retarded; food, coal, and other essential goods will be maldistributed; and the transportation system will be inadequate. It is hoped, consequently, that the Soviet Union will join with the United States and the United Kingdom in a concerted effort to solve the wide range of emergency economic problems which now confront them in Europe.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

[No. 524]

No. 525

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that we endeavor to obtain agreement from the Soviet Government to participate fully in the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe (EECE), European Coal Organization (ECO), the European Central Inland Transport Organization (ECITO), and the United Maritime Authority (UMA), including designation of representatives to cooperate in the day-to-day activities of these organizations.

DISCUSSION

The Soviet Union has declined to participate in three temporary advisory organizations established to meet urgent economic problems in Continental Europe, namely, EECE, ECO, and ECITO. Negotiations leading to the establishment of these agencies were undertaken in the fall of 1944. Every effort was made to obtain Soviet participation. Failing this, the three bodies were finally set up during May 1945. Likewise, the Soviet Government has indicated an unfavorable attitude toward UMA.

The normal economic relationships of the liberated areas have been disrupted by the war. Provision of the minimum essentials of life and the beginning of industrial reconstruction require cooperation among the Allies and the control authorities in enemy countries. Indigenous resources must be developed and utilized. Coal must be mined and shipped to start the wheels of industry turning. If goods are to move in necessary quantities, the transport system of the whole continent must be coordinated. The new agencies have an essential task to perform. But without Soviet participation, their effectiveness will be limited. For if the Soviet Union does not join in these organizations, it is unlikely that Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia will participate. Furthermore, the absence of nonparticipating governments will make it extremely difficult to deal with problems relating to Germany and Austria, and no consideration of European economic problems, particularly coal and transportation, can ignore the enemy countries.

The United Maritime Authority is an interim organization established to assure the orderly employment of available shipping to the maximum common benefit during the period following the fall of

Germany and not more than six months after the general termination of hostilities. Accession to the Authority carries no long-range post-war implication or obligations. Neutral (Sweden) as well as United Nations have joined. The Soviet Union has not hitherto been invited to join, but has manifested indications of an unfavorable attitude. However, it would appear to be of general advantage for the Soviet Union to accede to the Agreement ¹ since this will facilitate the handling of Soviet requirements for shipping space in excess of the capacity of the Soviet fleet (a substantial part of which consists of vessels transferred under Lend-Lease), and will also simplify the handling of several related problems, particularly with respect to the immediate use of vessels falling into United Nations' hands through the events leading up to and including the surrender of Germany. Even if the Soviet Union decides not to join the UMA, it is most desirable that an effort be made to remove the evidently unfavorable attitude toward that Authority held in Moscow by an explanation of its real nature and purposes.

The reasons given by Russia for her nonparticipation in these various organizations have varied in each case. With respect to the EECE, she took the position that no economic group, even of a temporary emergency nature, should be set up until after the conclusion of the discussions at San Francisco on the Economic and Social Council. With respect to the ECO, she insisted that reparation deliveries should have priority over any discussion of other uses of German coal. Objection was also made to a proposal that members should furnish the ECO with essential information and that their representatives should be authorized to act for them without delay. Principally due to disagreement on the issue of Polish representation, the Soviets have not participated in recent discussions concerning the ECITO. Their delegation in London, however, has informally indicated that the present agreement ² has substantially met the objections which they had to earlier drafts. In respect to UMA, the unfavorable attitude of the Soviets apparently has been due to concern that they might not be able to maintain their position in negotiations relating to problems with which they have had little experience, and also due to the fact that the Polish Government-in-Exile was one of the original signatories of the Agreement on Principles by which UMA was established.

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1945.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1722; 61 Stat. (4) 3784.

² For the text of the agreement, as signed on September 27, 1945, see Executive Agreement Series No. 494; 59 Stat. (2) 1740.

REPATRIATION OF ALLEGED SOVIET NATIONALS

No. 526

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

DISPLACED PERSONS

Baltic Nationals

Article 1 of the Yalta Agreement¹ provides that:

“All Soviet citizens liberated by the forces operating under United States command” . . . “will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet” . . . “authorities” . . . “at places agreed upon”²

The United States Government has not recognized the Soviet Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,³ nor has it recognized Soviet action in respect to the territory of Poland east of the Curzon Line.⁴ The position of the United States has been that the Yalta Agreement applies only to persons who were recognized by the United States as Soviet citizens at the time of the Agreement. Consequently citizens of the three Baltic Republics are not considered Soviet citizens from the United States point of view, and have not been repatriated to the Soviet zone. It is possible therefore that the Soviet representatives at the conference may claim that Baltic nationals are Soviet citizens and should be repatriated by the United States forces. They may take the position that the Baltic Republics have by plebi-

¹ i. e., the “Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by Forces Operating Under Soviet Command and Forces Operating Under United States of America Command”, signed at Yalta by Major General John R. Deane and Lieutenant General Anatoly Alexeyevich Gryzlov, February 11, 1945. For text, see Executive Agreement Series No. 505; 59 Stat. (2) 1874; *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 985.

² Ellipses in the source copy.

³ The refusal of the United States Government to recognize the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union as “Soviet Republics” was announced by Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles in a statement of July 23, 1940. See Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. III, p. 48.

⁴ See the map facing p. 748. For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see *Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. XIII, pp. 793-794.

scite joined the Soviet Union and consequently that citizens of these Republics now under control of United States forces in Germany should be repatriated to the Soviet Union. There are estimated to be 200,000 to 300,000 such Baltic nationals in the SHAEF area of Germany and Austria. However, they have not yet appeared in such numbers in SHAEF statistics of persons awaiting repatriation. In the SHAEF report of June 4, 1945,⁵ Baltic nationals are included in a miscellaneous group of Scandinavians, Bulgars, Greeks, Hungarians, Albanians, etc., which totals 62,000. It is possible that the Baltic nationals are avoiding identification for political reasons or larger numbers than expected may have been caught in the Russian zone of occupation.

At a conference early in June at Oslo, between representatives of the Soviet and Swedish Governments and the SHAEF mission to Norway,⁶ the 1939 borders of Russia were taken as the basis of determining what Russians in Norway should be compulsorily returned across Sweden to the Soviet Union. Poles coming from areas of Poland east of the Curzon Line and Baltic nationals were listed as "disputed persons" and not included in the arrangements for the repatriation of Soviet citizens from Norway. This conference may have brought United States policy with respect to the repatriation of Baltic nationals pointedly to the attention of Soviet authorities for the first time.

The Government of Sweden, which, it is understood, has already recognized the incorporation of the Baltic Republics into the Soviet Union, has faced the problem of repatriating some 30,000 Baltic nationals from Sweden. After months of discussion the decision has been to accept the offer of the Soviet Government of free transportation for such Baltic nationals and to urge their return. There has been no decision, however, to force the return of those unwilling to go.

The policy already in effect of refusing to arrange for the involuntary repatriation of Baltic nationals should be continued and supported at the conference, if the question is raised, on the grounds that the United States Government does not recognize Baltic nationals as Soviet citizens.

[WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1945.

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ See Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command* (Washington, Department of the Army, 1954), pp. 510-511.

No. 527

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Joint Civil Affairs Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

HANDLING OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

DISCUSSION

1. One of the most difficult and delicate problems arising in the military government of Germany is the care and repatriation of displaced persons. Nearly four million of these people have been uncovered in British and American-controlled areas. The numbers of such persons uncovered by the Russians are not known. Approximately one and three-quarters million displaced persons have been repatriated by the British and Americans, including in excess of five hundred thousand Russians.

3. Problems which have arisen in connection with the care of displaced persons which for their solution require agreement at the governmental level are as follows:

a. On 11 February 1945 the United States and United Kingdom each executed agreements with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics providing for the repatriation of "Soviet citizens" uncovered in Germany.² The term "Soviet citizens" is undefined in the agreements. The present United States policy is that Poles whose homes were east of the 1939 Line of Demarkation or of the Curzon Line (Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians) will not be repatriated unless they affirmatively claim Soviet citizenship. Although informal indication has been received that the British Government concurs in this view, no formal concurrence therein has been received from the British and no concurrence, formal or informal, has been indicated by the Soviets.

d. Although the Soviets have observers accredited to the combined United States/United Kingdom military authorities responsible for the care of displaced persons and are therefore fully informed with

¹ This memorandum was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.

² For the text of the Soviet-American agreement referred to, see Executive Agreement Series No. 505; 59 Stat. (2) 1874; *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 985. The final text of the parallel Anglo-Soviet agreement is not printed, but for a draft text thereof, see *ibid.*, p. 417.

respect to such care, no reciprocal privilege has been afforded to the British and American military with respect to the care of displaced persons uncovered in Soviet-controlled areas.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. *a.* That at the proposed meeting of the heads of State agreement be sought that Poles whose homes are east of the 1939 Line of Demarkation or of the Curzon Line (Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians) need not be repatriated to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics unless they affirmatively claim Soviet citizenship, but rather that they shall be treated as stateless persons.

d. That agreement of the Soviets be sought to a full exchange of information between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with respect to the care, treatment, identity, and location of displaced persons in their respective custody, including the free exchange of observers between zones of United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet control.

No. 528

800.4016 DP/7-545: Airgram

The Assistant to the President's Personal Representative at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

VATICAN CITY, July 5, 1945.

A-17. Referring to my Airgram 12 of June 29, 1945,¹ the following is translation of Note received from Holy See dated July 5, 1945: ²

"Several thousand Ukrainians are in Germany and fear that they may be sent to Galicia.

"On their behalf the Holy See has been requested to use its good offices in order that these poor refugees may soon be allowed to leave Germany and to take refuge in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, or any other country rather than being obliged to go to territories under Russian domination."

TITTMANN

¹ Not printed.

² A similar communication of May 22 with respect to Lithuanians in Germany and Italy, and Latvians and Estonians in Germany, was transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State by Myron C. Taylor, the Personal Representative of the President at Vatican City, in telegram No. 118 of May 22 (file No. 800.4016 D. P./5-2245).

No. 529

J. C. S. Files

Report by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 8 July 1945.

C. C. S. 861/1

RUSSIAN OBSERVATIONS REGARDING INSTRUMENT OF LOCAL
SURRENDER IN ITALY

- References: a. C. C. S. 861 ¹
b. C. C. S. 200/4/D ¹
c. C. C. S. 706/2 & 706/7 ²

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider the enclosure to C. C. S. 861 and make recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. In the enclosure to C. C. S. 861 the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMed),³ transmitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a copy of a letter from the Soviet representative, Allied Commission, referring to the surrender orders given to the German Commander in Chief Southwest and a copy of a partial reply thereto by the Supreme Allied Commander. The Soviet representative requested the return of all Soviet citizens who had fallen into German hands and of all war material of Soviet origin which had been captured by the Germans. The Supreme Allied Commander's interim reply to these requests was that they were under further examination, and that in the meantime the disposal of Soviet citizens will continue to be regulated in accordance with the present agreement between the U. S., British and Soviet Governments. Direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was requested as to the answer to be made to the Soviet representative in regard to the disposal of Soviet citizens and of captured war material of Soviet origin.

3. The Instrument of Local Surrender in Italy covered German troops in Italy and part of Austria.

DISCUSSION

4. The disposal of Soviet citizens is covered by U. S.-U. S. S. R. and British-U. S. S. R. Agreements executed at Yalta on 11 February

¹ Not printed.

² Neither printed.

³ Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander.

1945. These agreements do not define the term "Soviet citizens," nor does the note of the Soviet representative indicate clearly whether the term is intended to include Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians and Poles whose homes are east of the 1939 line of demarcation or of the Curzon line. On 24 March 1945 the Secretary of State informed the British Embassy ⁴ that the U. S. Government construes the Yalta Agreement as requiring the following action by the United States: "d. Since up to the present the U. S. Government has not formally recognized any territorial changes brought about by the present war in Europe, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians and Poles whose homes are east of the 1939 line of demarcation or of the Curzon line could not be repatriated to the Soviet Union unless they affirmatively claim Soviet citizenship." It is understood that the British Embassy has informally concurred in this view. This is also present Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEP) policy, as indicated by CM-IN-2397 of 3 June 1945 (Appendix "B"). It is considered, therefore, that persons from the foregoing areas should not be repatriated to the Soviet Union unless they affirmatively claim Soviet citizenship.

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CONCLUSIONS

10. Soviet citizens should be disposed of in accordance with the Yalta agreements. However, Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians and Poles whose homes are east of the 1939 line of demarcation or the Curzon line should not be repatriated to the Soviet Union unless they affirmatively claim Soviet citizenship.

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RECOMMENDATION

12. That the draft cable in Appendix "A" be dispatched to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

[Appendix A—Paraphrase]

SECRET

DRAFT

CABLE TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN ⁵

You should inform the Soviet representative as follows: Disposal of Soviet citizens will continue to be handled in conformity with the

⁴ Note not printed.

⁵ The Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff circulated a note (C. C. S. 861/2) on July 15 stating that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had approved the recommendation in C. C. S. 861/1 and that the message in appendix A thereto had been dispatched to Alexander.

agreement reached at Yalta between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom and the agreement at Yalta between the Soviet Union and the United States. The foregoing is the direction which you requested in your letter of May 16, 1945 (paragraph 2).

The following is for your own guidance and information, but is not to be communicated to the Soviet authorities: Poles, Estonians, Lithuanians, and Latvians whose homes are east of the Curzon Line or east of the line of demarcation as of 1939, unless they affirmatively claim to be citizens of the Soviet Union, will not be repatriated to the U. S. S. R.

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[Appendix B—Paraphrase]

*The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower)
to the War Department*

SECRET

[SHAEF,] 2 June 1945.

FWD 23168. Action addressee is AGWar, for delivery to McClure. Repeated for information to SHAEF Main for G-5.

The present policy of this headquarters is that displaced persons will be returned to the Soviet Union if they claim to be citizens of the Soviet Union and if, further, that claim is accepted by the repatriation representatives of the U. S. S. R.

We have instructed Army groups to evacuate displaced persons of United Nations nationality other than citizens of the Soviet Union from that part of the zone of occupation assigned to the U. S. S. R. which is now occupied by forces of the Allied Expeditionary Force, in so far as this is possible. We have also informed Army groups that we will not return to districts of origin eastern Europeans (other than citizens of the Soviet Union) whose districts of origin may become a part of the Soviet Union as the result of territorial changes, unless they desire to be returned.

This message refers to your cable No. W-87519 of May 26, 1945,⁶ cite SHGE (SHAEF, G-5).

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EISENHOWER

⁶ Not printed.

No. 530

800.4016 DP/6-2945: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant to the President's Personal Representative at Vatican City (Tittmann)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1945—7 p. m.

89. Under terms of Yalta Agreement US policy is to repatriate to Soviet Union all claimants of Soviet citizenship whose claims are accepted by Soviet authorities. In practice this means (urtel 119 May 23 ¹) that Soviet citizens originating from within 1939 boundaries of Soviet Union are repatriated irrespective of individual wishes. US Govt has not recognized incorporation Baltic States into Soviet Union—Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians are not considered Soviet citizens by this Govt. It is contrary to US policy to facilitate the involuntary repatriation of Baltic nationals (urtel 118 May 22 ²) Poles, Croats and Slovenes (urtel 116 May 19 ¹) and Slovaks (Your A-7 June 16 ¹).

In answer to inquiries you are authorized to state that in principle it is contrary to US Govt policy to facilitate the involuntary repatriation of displaced persons other than Germans not covered by the Yalta Agreement.

GREW
G[eorge] L W[arren]

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed. Cf. document No. 528, footnote 2.

AIR TRAFFIC BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
SOVIET UNION

No. 531

Moscow Embassy Files—879.6 Berlin Route

Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union
(Page)

[Moscow,] June 29, 1945.

MEMORANDUM [OF] CONVERSATION

Present: W. A. Harriman, American Ambassador
Edward Page, First Secretary of Embassy
A. Ya. Vyshinski, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign
Affairs
Postoyev, Soviet Interpreter

Subject: Air Communications.

The Ambassador inquired whether there had been any developments in connection with opening new routes to Moscow.

Mr. Vyshinski replied that he had been too busy with the Czechs, the Poles, and the Berlin conference to have given any time to this question. However, planes were flying back and forth to Berlin and communications were much better than previously. He said that events had overtaken themselves and indicated that the Moscow-Berlin service would be open to American passengers.

The Ambassador expressed the hope that the United States-Soviet line could be opened shortly, once the American zone of occupation was taken over in Berlin. He explained the great need for this service in view of the curtailment of the Tehran route and the present delays in mail reaching the Embassy. He emphasized the need of the Reparations Commission to receive expeditiously documents from Washington.

Mr. Vyshinski again stated that the Moscow-Berlin route, and thence onward to the United States, was the best system. He said that once technical details had been worked out on a military level this route could be promptly opened.

The Ambassador said that his Government did not believe that he had been pressing hard enough for the opening of such a route and asked whether he could report that Mr. Vyshinski was in favor of a quick establishment of a United States-Soviet route via Berlin. Mr. Vyshinski replied that the Ambassador had been constantly "on his neck" with respect to the opening of a more expeditious air route out of Moscow and said that he certainly could report to his Government that he was in favor of the Berlin route and that there was no reason

why it should not be opened up as soon as the technical details had been worked out.

No. 532

811.79661/6-3045: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State ad interim

RESTRICTED

Moscow, June 30, 1945—6 p. m.

2353. Vyshinski and I discussed yesterday our air communications with Moscow. He stated that Soviet planes were now flying daily between Moscow and Berlin and agreed that as soon as our army had taken over Tempelhof Airdrome and was flying transport planes regularly to Berlin from the west there was no reason why a connection should not be made to take our passengers and mail to and from Moscow. As a matter of fact members of the Reparations Commission have already been accorded Soviet air facilities from Berlin connecting with an Amer plane. Vyshinski suggested that the technical and adm details could be worked out promptly. Gen Deane has telegraphed Gen Eisenhower's staff to approach the Russians in Berlin in this connection and the MilMis here is attempting to discuss the matter with the Soviet air authorities.

The Dept may wish to keep the foregoing in mind in order to be prepared to abandon immediately the long and slow Tehran courier service as soon as this new route is open.

HARRIMAN

No. 533

Moscow Embassy Files—879.6 Berlin Route

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Soviet Assistant Foreign Commissar (Vyshinsky)

No. 383

Moscow, July 7, 1945.

DEAR MR. VYSHINSKI: I have informed General Eisenhower of our last conversation with regard to the opening up of a civil air lines connection at Berlin between Soviet and American planes. I have suggested that General Eisenhower or his representative discuss this matter with Marshal Zhukov or his representative. I hope that Marshal Zhukov will be informed of the desirability of this connection and authorized to work out the technical details.

I trust that this connection can be established promptly as every day adds to the inconvenience and difficulties of our communications with the United States and other United States Missions in Western

[No. 533]

Europe. I therefore request your cooperation in the speedy conclusion of arrangements for this service.

Sincerely yours,

W. A. HARRIMAN

No. 534

Moscow Embassy Files—897.6 Berlin Route

The Soviet Assistant Foreign Commissar (Vyshinsky) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

[Translation]

Moscow, July 11, 1945.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Acknowledging receipt of your letter of July 7¹ concerning the establishment in Berlin of a civil airlines connection served by American and Soviet airplanes, I must remind you that in our conversation of June 15 [sic] I called your attention to the fact that practically speaking there has already been considerable improvement in air communications over the given route and that I recognize the importance of this matter, but I do not believe that at the present time this question is sufficiently prepared for discussion in substance. As to the future, I can inform you only upon receipt of instructions from the Soviet Government.

Please accept [etc.]

A. VYSHINSKI

¹ Document No. 533.

No. 535

124.916/7-1145: Airgram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State

TEHRAN, July 11, 1945.

A-98. Reference Department's A-119, December 23, 1944.¹

The following figures represent the amount of mail dispatched from the American Embassy, Tehran, Iran to the American Embassy, Moscow, U. S. S. R. during the month of June, 1945.

	June 9 lbs.	June 25 lbs.	June 30 lbs.	Total
Total weight of Courier Mail	52	729	230	1011
Weight of Navy Courier Mail	6	432	210	648
Total weight of Non-Courier Mail	1348	1350	501	3199
Weight of Navy Non-Courier Mail	84	167	none	251

MURRAY

¹ Not printed.

UNITED KINGDOM

LEND-LEASE; NEED FOR ANGLO-AMERICAN FINANCIAL DISCUSSIONS

No. 536

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

A 3 (c) AGREEMENT ON LEND-LEASE WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM

No 3 (c) Agreement¹ for post-war deliveries of lend-lease has been made with the British, principally because the British, when approached informally in 1944 indicated that they were unwilling to enter into any commitment to make post-war financial settlement for lend-lease goods. This position was taken because the United Kingdom will emerge from the war in a difficult financial position, and with limited supplies of gold and dollar exchange.

The British should, however, be asked to reconsider their position, particularly in view of the present policy of the United States that lend-lease is not to be used for post-war purposes. Under this policy lend-lease transfers to the British of items in inventory or under contract would be interrupted on, or shortly after, V-J Day, unless some provision were made for financial settlement. Disruption of supply arrangements for such items as petroleum, foodstuffs, and raw materials would be disadvantageous both to the United Kingdom and to the United States. A 3 (c) Agreement, providing an orderly and efficient interim plan of agreed deliveries on known terms of payment of items contracted for by the United States, or in inventory in the United States, offers a better alternative.

Since the British are not now receiving any appreciable quantities of long-life industrial equipment, a 3 (c) Agreement with them would be relatively simple, (covering only such items as petroleum products, foodstuffs, and raw materials), and it would not need to cover transfers beyond a relatively short period—approximately six months. A rough estimate of the transfers for such a period would be approximately \$500-700 million. The terms of payment to be offered the

¹ i. e., an agreement under section 3 (c) of the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941 (55 Stat. 31), as amended April 16, 1945 (59 Stat. 52).

British should be approximately the same as those in the French,² Belgian,³ and Dutch⁴ 3 (c) Agreements.

A draft *aide-mémoire* proposing such a 3 (c) arrangement has been prepared in the Department of State, and after clearance with FEA, it is intended to present this to the Government of the United Kingdom.

² Executive Agreement Series No. 455; 59 Stat. (2) 1304.

³ Executive Agreement Series No. 481; 59 Stat. (2) 1642.

⁴ Executive Agreement Series No. 480; 59 Stat. (2) 1627.

No. 537

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

PHASE II¹ COMMITMENTS TO THE BRITISH

In the meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in Quebec in September 1944 the President agreed to the Prime Minister's proposal that the U. K. should continue to receive lend-lease assistance following the defeat of Germany on a basis that would permit some reconversion in the United Kingdom from munitions to civilian production.² The memorandum of November 25, 1944,³ from the American committee of Mr. Morgenthau, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Crowley, reporting to President Roosevelt on the Phase II discussions, stated that the recommended program for the British Commonwealth of \$2.7 billions for munitions and \$2.8 billions for non-munitions "will make it possible for Britain and the United States, to release some manpower and resources for reconversion, easement of living standards, and a partial revival of exports", and the press release of November 30⁴ of the American committee spoke of the "partial and equitable reconversion" that would be likely in both the United States and the U. K. in Phase II.

¹ "Phase II" as applied to lend-lease signifies the period between the defeat of Germany and the surrender of Japan.

² The records of the Second Quebec Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume in this series. Concerning the lend-lease discussions which took place at Quebec, see H. Duncan Hall, *North American Supply* (London, 1955), p. 443.

³ Not printed. Concerning the Anglo-American lend-lease discussions which took place in Washington in October–November 1944, see Leahy, *I Was There*, pp. 279–280; Hall, *North American Supply*, pp. 443–447; Roy F. Harrod, *The Life of John Maynard Keynes* (New York, 1951), pp. 586–591; William H. McNeill, *Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1946: America, Britain, and Russia, Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941–1946* (London, 1953), pp. 511–513; W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, *British War Economy* (London, 1949), pp. 528–532; and the press release cited in footnote 4, *infra*.

⁴ Text in Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1944–June 1945* (Princeton, 1947), p. 140.

It was made clear in the discussions with the British and also pointed out in this memorandum of November 25 that the program was not a commitment and was "subject to the changing demands of strategy as well as to supply considerations and the usual considerations of procurement and allocation".

Two issues have arisen recently as to the nature of these commitments. The War Department objected to furnishing certain munitions items on the ground that the British could produce them, either by maintaining present output in these lines or by reconverting to these lines rather than to civilian production. This question was the subject of extended discussions between the British military representatives and the War Department, and on May 28 the Prime Minister cabled to you on the matter.⁵ At a meeting in Judge Vinson's office on June 4 the decision was reached that the War Department's position was not in line with the understanding between President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister, and with the Phase II discussions. A letter to that effect has been sent to Secretary Stimson by Judge Vinson on June 13⁶ and a cable from you to the Prime Minister is being cleared with the interested agencies of the U. S. Government. This cable will reassure the Prime Minister that the Phase II commitments about which he expressed concern would be carried out.⁷

⁵ The Churchill-Truman message referred to, as sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels, was as follows (Truman Papers):

"Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret. Number 57.

"I am distressed to have to bother you with this telegram when so many other graver matters are pending. But the machine has come to a standstill on the subject and it is felt on all sides here that the matter should be referred by me to you.

"2. When I met President Roosevelt at Quebec in September 1944, we both initialled an agreement about Lend-Lease after the defeat of Germany. In accordance with that agreement a detailed plan was worked out with your Administration by the Keynes-Sinclair Mission. It is on this basis that our production plans have been laid.

"3. I now hear that your War Department has told our people in Washington that they are expecting so large a cut in their forthcoming appropriations for the U. S. Air Corps that supplies to us must be drastically curtailed below the schedule of our requirements as agreed last autumn. These requirements were, of course, subject to subsequent modification in the light of changes in the strategic situation. I am hopeful that our requirements as agreed last autumn can now be reduced, but the details of the reduction depend upon discussions between our respective Chiefs of Staff, which will not have been completed before 31 May. Meanwhile I hope that your people can be told that the principles your predecessor and I agreed at Quebec still stand, and in particular that the appropriations given to your War Department will be enough to provide for our needs as finally worked out between us."

A variant text of this message was transmitted to the Department of State by the British Embassy on May 29 (file No. 841.24/5-2945).

⁶ Enclosure to document No. 540.

⁷ See document No. 540, footnote 2. For the reply which Truman finally made to Churchill's message, see vol. II, document No. 1181.

A second question is whether the Phase II program discussed last fall referred to the deliveries that, subject to the reservations indicated above, would be made to the British in the first year of Phase II, or to the requisitions that would be accepted in the first year of Phase II. The first basis would, in view of the fact that the pipeline of supplies will decrease with a shift to a Phase II program much smaller than the Phase I program, call for the clearing of new requisitions in the first year of Phase II to a substantially smaller amount than the deliveries in that period. On the first basis the needed funds to take care of the "program" would be less by several hundred million dollars than the deliveries. The question whether the \$2 billion for the British Commonwealth asked for in the FEA budget for 1946 is adequate to take care of the program hence hinges in large part on the point whether the Phase II program was intended to be on a requisition or a delivery basis. It is the position of the British that the program was on a requisition basis, and many officials in FEA hold to the same view, and in meetings and correspondence in early May 1945 FEA officials made statements to the British Supply Council that indicate FEA's acceptance of the view that the program was intended to be on a requisition basis, and not on a delivery basis.

Regardless of that fact, however, recent developments in the British gold and dollar position are such that a program on a delivery basis is fully in accord with the spirit of the understandings in the Phase II discussions. The British at that time assumed that their net gold and dollar holdings, at \$1,748 million on August 30, 1944, would decline by \$265 million in the remaining four months of 1944, and by \$620 million by the end of 1945. As a matter of fact, holdings as of April 30, 1945, were \$1,795 million, an increase of nearly \$50 million as compared with an estimated decrease of about \$400 million. As a primary basis for the liberal policy of the United States in the Roosevelt-Churchill understanding and the Phase II discussions was the difficult financial position of the British, the failure of the gloomy British prophecies to materialize might have been regarded by the United States, had we wished, as a basis for reviewing the entire Phase II discussions.

If the Prime Minister claims that we are not carrying out the Phase II understanding, you may wish to call to his attention these developments in the British gold and dollar position.

No. 538

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

LEND-LEASE DURING THE SECOND YEAR OF PHASE II

It is possible that Mr. Churchill may seek a commitment, at least in principle, as to the amount of lend-lease to be furnished to the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth during the second year of Phase II (the existing agreement covering the first year of Phase II is being applied to the calendar year 1945).

At the Quebec Conference in 1944 Mr. Churchill sought and obtained President Roosevelt's agreement in principle to the provision of \$6.5 billion of lend-lease during the first year of Phase II, although the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff did not consider that the strategic requirements of the Pacific war called for anything approaching that amount.¹ No corresponding benefit to the United States was requested in return. In subsequent discussions in Washington agreement was reached to furnish a total of 5.5 billion dollars (\$2.7 billions for munitions and \$2.8 billions for non-munitions) in the first year of Phase II.

If Mr. Churchill makes any proposal concerning lend-lease during the second year of Phase II it is suggested that the President make no commitment whatsoever, that he suggest that the subject be discussed in Washington by representatives of the armed services and appropriate civilian departments of the two Governments, and that he further suggest that this Government's willingness to extend lend-lease aid during the second year of Phase II in excess of the strategic requirements of the Pacific war will be determined largely by the steps undertaken in the next few months by the British Government to adopt a more liberal post-war commercial policy along the lines contemplated in Article VII.²

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

¹ The Department of Defense has supplied the information that no evidence has been found in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to substantiate this statement.

² Of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement with the United Kingdom, signed at Washington, February 23, 1942 (Executive Agreement Series No. 241; 56 Stat. (2) 1433).

No. 539

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

THE NEED FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRITISH ON POST V-J DAY
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

SUMMARY

1. It is important to come very soon to definite understandings with the British on post-war financial questions. There is serious danger that otherwise Britain may not ultimately go along with our program to restore world-wide multilateralism in finance and trade.

2. It is suggested that the Prime Minister be asked to designate representatives to meet with U. S. representatives this summer to discuss lend-lease settlement policy, post-lend-lease credits, and post-V-J Day monetary and exchange policies. These discussions would be related to the conversations already under way regarding foreign trade policies, with a view to comprehensive post-war arrangements carrying out the objectives of Article VII of the British Master Lend-Lease Agreement.¹

3. For the reasons which will appear below, it is probable that the British will be reluctant to discuss financial questions, particularly post-lend-lease credits. At the same time such credits will, in our opinion, be essential if we are to obtain satisfactory arrangements with them on trade and commercial policy. In order to get the financial discussions started we are convinced that it will be necessary for the President to bring his personal influence to bear on the Prime Minister with a view to persuading him of their urgency and importance.

4. The beginning of discussions might well coincide with the planned high-level mission to the August UNRRA meeting in London.

[THE NEED FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRITISH ON POST V-J DAY
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS]

I.

There is serious danger that the financial devices of exchange control, "exchange pooling", and bilateral financial dealings which the British have built up of necessity during the war may become permanently imbedded in British economic practice. These financial practices lend themselves naturally to bilateral or regional trade deal-

¹ Signed at Washington, February 23, 1942 (Executive Agreement Series No. 241; 56 Stat. (2) 1433).

ings and State Trading, and can easily be used to discriminate permanently against economically strong countries such as the U. S. They therefore represent a most serious threat to our post-war foreign economic program.

While British officials generally profess intention to abandon these financial practices after a "post-war transition period" of five years or so, as is provided in the Bretton Woods Agreements,² the issue is far from decided. There has been much criticism of Bretton Woods from both Left and Right on the grounds that it might prevent bilateral and regional arrangements. Lord Keynes, speaking for the British Treasury, has felt forced to state in Parliament that Bretton Woods is not necessarily incompatible with bilateral trade arrangements. Although the late coalition government supported Bretton Woods and spoke of their "promise" to the U. S. to rebuild a multilateral world economy, Mr. Bevin of the Labor Party has recently expressed his doubt that Bretton Woods sufficiently protects Britain against external fluctuations of trade that might threaten prosperity and full employment at home, and Mr. Churchill's current platform cautiously states that while everything will be done to promote international trade, Britain will not give up its right "to safeguard our balance of payments by whatever means are necessary".

Even if British intentions to revert to multilateralism at the end of the transition period are unquestioned, however, there remains the danger that during that period strong vested interests might grow up to defend successfully these war-conceived and transition-nurtured financial and trade practices, as strong interests quickly grew up behind the British tariff and Empire preferences in the thirties. Fully as serious is the danger that even temporary formation of a "sterling area trade bloc" in peacetime might weaken support for leadership by this country in trade barrier reduction and multilateral trade expansion. There is already a rising tide of complaint that the Sterling Area dollar pool and associated exchange controls are being used to foster bilateralism and discrimination against U. S. interests.

II.

It is appropriate that we should make exploratory lend-lease settlement discussions, now timely in any case, a part of interrelated financial and trade discussions aimed at scotching these dangers and accelerating Britain's return towards multilateralism. The Department of State has always held that Article VII of the U. K. Master Lend-Lease Agreement, (a copy of which is attached for ready reference³) constitutes a basic "charter" for action by the two Governments

² Text in *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference*, vol. I, p. 927.

³ Not printed herein.

to reduce trade barriers and expand trade. Discussions relative to implementing Article VII have taken place from time to time beginning in 1943. A representative of this Government is now in London carrying on discussions at the expert level on proposed multilateral trade arrangements to implement this Article.

The British were very reluctant to commit themselves to Article VII in the first place, and they have shown themselves equally reluctant to proceed with discussions looking towards its implementation. It was only by the last minute intercession of President Roosevelt with Mr. Churchill that the Article was originally agreed to by a plainly divided British Cabinet.⁴ Subsequent discussions were twice held up by basic policy disagreements at the Cabinet level, but are continuing.

It has become increasingly clear that the foremost valid obstacle to the conclusion of satisfactory agreements on trade is the financial difficulty in which Britain finds herself as a result of the war. It is probable that the British will take the position that even Bretton Woods and the strengthened Trade Agreements Act⁵ will be insufficient to permit them appreciably to relax wartime financial controls at an early date, in view of Britain's post-war transition financial predicament.

It must be admitted that the post-war transition will be very difficult for the British. To add to their present heavy short-term international indebtedness, the British contemplate a trade deficit of \$4 to \$5 billion during the three years or so following hostilities. During this period the British feel they cannot afford to let those selling goods to Britain convert the resulting sterling into dollars at will, much less offer conversion to the holders of the huge mass of accumulated sterling. Yet until at least currently earned sterling is convertible into dollars for trade purposes the basis for multilateral trade is lacking and bilateral and regional dealings must perforce continue.

The obvious solution, which we should press upon the British, is for the U. S. to supply Britain with the necessary dollar credits to permit the "unfreezing" of sterling proceeds from current trade. It might be possible to go even further, in some cases, and supply dollars to permit the free conversion of a part of existing sterling balances. Such arrangements would permit contemporaneous liberalization of trade and exchange policies throughout the sterling area.

British inability to maintain multilateral financial and trading arrangements without financial aid from the U. S. is transitional only. While Britain has lost heavily from the war, her financial plight consists more in very heavy short-term indebtedness than in a badly

⁴ See Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 506-507; *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. II, p. 1153.

⁵ Approved July 5, 1945; 59 Stat. 410.

balanced over-all debtor-creditor position. It is estimated that Britain will end the Japanese war with net short-term sterling liabilities of perhaps \$14-\$15 billion, and gold and dollar obligations, aside from lend-lease, in the neighborhood of \$1 billion. To this might be added \$3-4 billion of trade deficit during the transition years, making a total of, say, something less than \$20 billion. The British avowedly expect to scale down their sterling indebtedness substantially, on the grounds that much of it represents war debt and not a commercial obligation. A reduction of as much as 40%-50% in the aggregate amount payable in sterling is not impossible.

Against this short-term indebtedness, Britain will probably possess at the war's end about \$1.5 to \$2 billion in gold and dollar balances. Her net long-term assets will probably amount to roughly \$10 billion, a cut of about one-third below pre-war levels but still a very substantial figure compared with her probable total indebtedness. Whatever may be the final balance of overseas assets and liabilities, it is generally agreed that Britain will still have a substantial net income on foreign investment account, probably more than half of the approximate \$800 million per year she enjoyed before the war.

In short, Britain should be well able, given prosperous and reasonably stable world economic conditions, and assuming the reduction of foreign trade barriers against British exports, to carry on multilateral payments in a multilateral trading world, if her industries, especially her export industries, are reasonably efficient.

The nub of the problem is the British reluctance to incur large dollar obligations, based in large part on fears of future inability to earn the dollar exchange required to service the debt. This fear is based in turn on scepticism of our intentions and ability to maintain liberal trade policies, high steady employment and large import demand in this country. Along with these understandable qualms undoubtedly goes the realization that Britain can much more easily repay obligations expressed in her own currency, and in the process expand and solidify her export markets.

III.

It will not be easy to devise arrangements satisfactory to Britain and yet economically and politically sound from our standpoint, but we believe it can be done. Apart from the assurance of U. S. participation in Bretton Woods and in a general program of trade barrier reduction, we have much to offer Britain: settlement of lend-lease obligations; the possibility that by holding out at least partial conversion of sterling into dollars, Britain may be able to secure a more substantial reduction of her sterling obligations; badly needed supplies to aid in her domestic reconstruction; and the opportunity to re-

establish Britain's financial position and prestige. We on our side would be asking simply that Britain enter a worldwide financial and trading system which, from the long run standpoint, will be beneficial to her as well as to us. Any suggestion that the British "cannot afford" to embrace our ultimate objectives must be rejected as false. The crucial problem is to arrest the British tendency toward exclusiveness and restrictionism before it grows strong. A reasonably generous lend-lease settlement, the requisite credits on appropriate terms—and above all U. S. friendship and cooperation—should be sufficient to induce the Britain [*British*] to accept our program. But action should be prompt.

No. 540

Department of the Army Files

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 19 June 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This acknowledges receipt of [a] letter of 9 June 1945 from Mr. James A. Maxwell to General E. S. Greenbaum ¹ inclosing a draft of the proposed cable from the President to the Prime Minister ² in response to the Prime Minister's cable of May 28,³ and requesting comment on this draft.

Yesterday I received from the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion a letter dated 13 June 1945, copy of which is attached. The proposed cable appears to the War Department to be consistent

¹ Not printed.

² The draft referred to reads as follows (Department of the Army Files):

"I have gone into the question that you raise in your message of May 28 in regard to lend-lease during the Japanese War. We intend to furnish lend-lease during the Japanese War in accordance with the understanding reached between you and President Roosevelt at Quebec on September 14, 1944, and that was the basis for the discussions between American and British representatives in Washington in October and November 1944 in regard to lend-lease requirements for the first year following the defeat of Germany. In the light of the anticipated war strategy lend-lease will be furnished on the [a?] basis that will permit a partial and equitable reconversion in the United Kingdom, and plans for reconversion [*sic*] have been worked out here for your representatives on the CPRB to make available full information on the British reconversion program to American officials responsible for the administration of lend-lease.

"You, of course, realize that the policy I have indicated does not necessarily mean that either the military or the non-military program for the coming year will be equal to the lend-lease requirements as estimated in the meetings of last October and November. Those estimates were subject to changing strategic demands as well as to supply considerations and considerations of procurement and allocation, and to the provision of the necessary funds by Congress. I have requested Congress to appropriate funds that will make possible lend-lease deliveries to the British Commonwealth in accord with the spirit of these earlier understandings, and I am confident that lend-lease will continue to be a powerful weapon in bringing the war to a speedy and victorious conclusion."

³ See document No. 537, footnote 5.

with the direction contained in that letter. If the cable is to be sent, it is believed that its accuracy would be improved by making the second sentence read as follows:

"We intend to furnish lend-lease during the Japanese War in accordance with the general policy discussed between you and President Roosevelt at Quebec on September 14, 1944, and that was the basis for the discussions between American and British representatives in Washington in October and November 1944 in regard to lend-lease requirements for the first year following the defeat of Germany."

It should be noted, however, that the War Department's requests for appropriations for military lend-lease were arrived at, and have been presented to the Congress, under policies considered appropriate by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which contemplate, among other things, the furnishing by the War Department of only those materials which are not available to, and cannot otherwise be provided by, the British Empire on the premise that the Empire will maintain its forces for the war against Japan to the fullest possible extent from its own stocks and production.

This policy is not in accord with the implications of the proposed cable. It may be necessary, therefore, for the War Department to request the Congress for funds for the specific purpose of carrying out the direction contained in the letter of 13 June 1945.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

[Enclosure]

The Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion (Vinson) to the Secretary of War (Stimson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Your letter of May 15, 1945,⁴ with reference to the requirements of the British Empire for war matériel for the period following VE-Day, was the subject of a discussion held in my office on June 4, 1945, with Under Secretary Patterson, Mr. Crowley, Mr. Clayton and me.

It was agreed that the tentative principles enunciated in your letter⁵ were not broad enough to cover the understanding reached between the late President and the Prime Minister at Quebec.

⁴ Not printed as a whole. Cf. footnote 5, *infra*.

⁵ The reference is to the following passage in Stimson's letter of May 15 (Department of the Army Files): ". . . it appears to me desirable that matériel already in the possession or control of the British Empire be employed to the maximum possible extent in satisfaction of its requirements and that remaining requirements which may be referred to the War Department be considered for supply from combat serviceable stocks or new production only if such requirements (1) appear necessary in order to carry out our agreed strategy, (2) are beyond the supply capabilities of the British Empire, and (3) can be obtained only from United States sources."

In general, it was agreed that, in accordance with those understandings, lend-lease should be furnished on a basis which would permit proportional and equitable reconversion in the United Kingdom. It was further agreed that the requirements estimated in the meetings held in October and November 1944 should be accepted as the basis for present requirements. Such estimates, however, are always subject to change in the light of strategic demands and supply considerations.

I assume, of course, that the War Department's budget requests appropriations adequate to fulfill these commitments.

Sincerely yours,

FRED M. VINSON

No. 541

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 2 July 1945.

C. C. S. 888

LEND-LEASE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff will be aware that agreements were reached between our two governments last autumn regarding Lend-Lease to the United Kingdom after the end of the German war. These agreements have, we understand, recently been affirmed by the United States administration.

2. The attached (Enclosure) is a restatement in summary form of the understandings which were reached between our two governments on this matter. We recommend that this statement be communicated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate agencies and staffs who are now concerned in handling Lend-Lease to the United Kingdom.

3. The assignment of certain Lend-Lease material which is urgently required for operational purposes has been held up while the recent policy discussions have been proceeding, and from the combined military point of view it has become urgent that any obstacle caused by misunderstanding of these agreements should be removed without delay. We therefore recommend that action to communicate the attached document to all interested agencies be taken at the earliest possible moment.

[Enclosure]

ASSIGNMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES TO THE UNITED KINGDOM UNDER LEND-LEASE IN STAGE II

1. The following is a restatement in summary form of the understandings reached between the U. S. Administration and the Government of the United Kingdom regarding the supply of military Lend-Lease in Stage II.

2. In October and November, 1944, programs of U. K. military requirements for the first year in Stage II were agreed on the basis of certain principles and subject to certain conditions. The departments concerned undertook to make all practicable efforts to produce the specified quantities. At that time it was accepted as a working hypothesis that the European war would terminate on 31st December 1944. Except in the case of the naval program, which went into operation on the 1st of January 1945, it has been necessary to revise the actual programs agreed in November 1944 in the light of changed conditions. Such revision was provided for in the agreement and new requirements are being drawn up in relation to the commitments set forth in C. C. S. 887.¹

3. The same principles and conditions mentioned above as operative in November 1944 apply with equal force to the revised programs which will be processed through normal channels. These revised programs represent that proportion of U. K. essential military requirements in Stage II for which the U. S. Government accepted it as reasonable that the U. K. should look to the U. S. as a source of supply.

4. The main principles and conditions underlying the agreement are listed below:

Principles

5. The United States Government recognised that in the United Kingdom as in the United States, there would during Stage II be a partial reconversion of industry to meet essential civilian needs. Measures have been taken, through the organised exchange of information through the Combined Production and Resources Board, which enable the United States Government to satisfy itself that the rate of reconversion in the United Kingdom is not disproportionate to that in the United States, and that the United Kingdom is devoting an appropriate share of its resources to the war effort.

6. The United States Government accepted the need for the recovery of Britain's export trade and has agreed measures with the United Kingdom Government to ensure that there is no misuse of Lend-Lease articles in export.

¹ Not printed.

Conditions

7. The agreement reached, so far as United States departments are concerned, fell within and would be subject to the established procedures of the Munitions Assignments Board.

8. In certain limited cases where it was seen last November that production would fall short of combined requirements it was stipulated that items accepted as a requirement would be subject to the understanding that the British should bid for these items before the Munitions Assignments Board on the basis of operation urgencies.

No. 542

851.24/7-545

The President to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 5 July 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Replying to your memorandum dated June 28, 1945,¹ on the subject: "Removal of Ban on Supplies to French Troops," I have this date issued the following directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which will permit the issue of military equipment, etc., for use in the war against Japan:

"To The Joint Chiefs of Staff[:]

Now that the war in Europe has terminated with the surrender of the Axis powers in Europe, and in order to follow accurately the letter and spirit of the Lend-Lease Act, the following policy is established for the issue to foreign governments of lend-lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment.

Approval of the issue to Allied Governments of Lend-Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment will be limited to that which is to be used in the war against Japan, and it will not be issued for any other purpose."

HARRY S TRUMAN

¹ Not printed.

No. 543

811.24/7-1145: Telegram

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State

[ON BOARD THE U. S. S. "BRAZIL"],

TOP SECRET

11 July 1945.

95. President's directive¹ limiting military Lend-Lease to use in war against Japan has been forwarded to me on U. S. Army transport

¹ See document No. 542.

Brazil. This directive has been likewise sent to Theater Commanders in Europe for action. McCloy and I are troubled because as the directive now reads, it is necessarily being interpreted by the War Department to forbid:

- a. Rations and gasoline for French Army of Occupation.
- b. All maintenance and military items for British and French Occupation Forces.

These forces are making possible redeployment of much larger American forces against Japan. Concern is also felt lest it be construed by British and French as reversal of previous commitments. I am sending you this message to inquire whether interpretation placed on directive by War Department is correct.

STIMSON

No. 544

Truman Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson)*¹

[ON BOARD THE U. S. S. "AUGUSTA",]
12 July 1945.

I have received your No. 95² and discussed it with the President. As the question is a complicated one, I suggest we talk it over at TERMINAL.

BYRNES

¹ It has not been determined whether this message was dispatched first and then superseded by document No. 545, or whether document No. 545 was dispatched first and then superseded by this message.

² Document No. 543.

No. 545

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1245 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson)

ABOARD USS "AUGUSTA", July 12, 1945.

(Your Number 95.¹)

The President agrees that his directive should be liberally interpreted so as to permit the furnishing of supplies and equipment within the limits of previous commitments to forces which make possible the redeployment of American forces from other theatres to participate in the war against Japan.

¹ Document No. 543.

No. 546

841.24/7-1345: Telegram

The Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion (Vinson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 13 July 1945.

107. In March Stimson asked President Roosevelt for a policy directive for planning military lend-lease during Phase II.

In reply the President referred Stimson to me, and on May 15, Stimson addressed certain inquiries to me.

I held conference with Clayton, Patterson and Crowley at which it was agreed that Quebec conversations had committed us to principle of allowing sufficient military lend-lease to permit proportional and equitable reconversion of United Kingdom economy. Public announcement of this policy had been made by Morgenthau, Stettinius and Crowley in November 1944.

On June 13th, I issued a directive¹ to Stimson along line of Quebec agreement as universally understood.

Meanwhile on May 28th, the Prime Minister cabled the President expressing anxiety as to our policy.² Clayton drafted reply,³ which was cleared with all departments except Treasury. I submitted it to the President. You will recall it was delayed at Admiral Leahy's suggestion.⁴

Admiral Leahy discussed his views with Crowley, Clayton, Patterson, Rosenman and me. We all agreed his fears were unfounded.

Meanwhile, I presume at Admiral Leahy's suggestion, the President issued through Joint Chiefs his directive of July 5th,⁵ as to which Stimson has cabled you.⁶

Patterson and all others affected are utterly confused and urgently desire clarification of July 5 directive, feeling it may interfere with redeployment of American forces in Pacific war.

I should appreciate your advice in the premises.

VINSON

¹ Enclosure to document No. 540.

² See document No. 537, footnote 5.

³ Cf. document No. 540, footnote 2.

⁴ See Leahy, *I Was There*, pp. 376-377.

⁵ See document No. 542.

⁶ See document No. 543.

CIVIL AVIATION POLICY

No. 547

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

CIVIL AVIATION MATTERS—GREAT BRITAIN

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—In this Briefing Book paper the Department of State recommended that the President discuss the following questions with the British Prime Minister with a view to reaching an agreement with the United Kingdom concerning them: (a) British efforts to prevent the development of American international air transport in Europe and the Near and Middle East; (b) British efforts to prevent the sale of American aircraft in sterling areas; (c) United States readiness to negotiate with the United Kingdom a bilateral air-transport agreement which would permit the aircraft of each nation to serve the territory of the other on mutually satisfactory terms; and (d) the civil aviation provisions of the peace treaties for Germany, Italy, and Japan.

With respect to the first of these questions, the Department called the President's attention to a note of April 18, 1945, to the British Embassy at Washington¹ (to which the Embassy had not yet made a final reply²), in which it had been stated that the United States Government "would welcome assurances that the British Government will not oppose the efforts of the United States to acquire landing rights at this time in the Near and Middle East for United States commercial air services."

The Department's Briefing Book paper reaffirmed support for the "five freedoms" agreement signed on December 7, 1944, at the International Civil Aviation Conference held at Chicago,³ and defined the "five freedoms" as follows: "(1) right to fly non-stop over another country; (2) right to land for non-traffic purposes; (3) right to carry traffic from homeland to other countries; (4) right to bring back such traffic to the homeland; (5) right to carry 'pick-up' traffic between intermediate countries." It was pointed out to the President that the United Kingdom had accepted only the "two freedoms" agreement,⁴ involving the first two freedoms enumerated above, and that

¹ Not printed.

² See document No. 548, *infra*.

³ Executive Agreement Series No. 488; 59 Stat. (2) 1701.

⁴ Opened for signature at Chicago on December 7, 1944, and signed on that date by representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom (Executive Agreement Series No. 487; 59 Stat. (2) 1693).

the British Government had used its influence with other nations, particularly in the Near East, to persuade them to adopt the British position.]

No. 548

800.796/6-2145

*The British Minister (Balfour) to the Assistant Secretary of State
(Clayton)*

Ref: 779/-/45
No. 312

WASHINGTON, 21st June 1945.

SIR, I have the honour to refer to your Note of April 18th¹ concerning the negotiations being conducted by the United States Government for landing rights for United States commercial air services in the Near and Middle East, and in reply to inform you, on the instructions of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,² that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have no intention of opposing the United States Government or any other Government in the acquisition of landing rights for civil aircraft in any country. In negotiating with Governments for civil aviation landing rights, His Majesty's Government are bound by the agreements reached at Chicago³ and would of course follow the practice there contemplated and they assume that the United States Government would propose to follow the same procedure.

2. It will be recalled that Article VIII Section 9 of the Interim Agreement on Civil Aviation⁴ provides that each member state may: (i) designate the route to be followed within its territory by any international air service and the airports which any such service may use, and (ii) impose on any such service just and reasonable charges for the use of such airports and other facilities; these charges not to be higher than would be paid for the use of such airports and facilities by its national aircraft engaged in similar international services. His Majesty's Government conceive the intention of this article to be that each member state should provide, in its territory, the airfields

¹ Not printed. Cf. document No. 547.

² Anthony Eden.

³ The reference is to the International Air Services Transit Agreement (the so-called "two freedoms" agreement), which the United States and the United Kingdom, *inter alia*, signed at Chicago, December 7, 1944, and which entered into force as between the United States and the United Kingdom on May 31, 1945 (Executive Agreement Series No. 487; 59 Stat. (2) 1693).

⁴ Signed by the United States and the United Kingdom, *inter alia*, at Chicago on December 7, 1944; entered into force, June 6, 1945 (Executive Agreement Series No. 469; 59 Stat. (2) 1516).

required for international air services (with the right to apply to the Interim Council if it requires assistance) and that all states entitled to operate air services to, or through, such states, would use the national airfields designated by the member states.

I have the honour [etc.]

JOHN BALFOUR

ALLOCATION OF SHIPPING

No. 549

Truman Papers

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 7 July 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General MacArthur's needs for troops have greatly increased our requirements for troop shipping in the Pacific.

In spite of every possible adjustment in U. S. resources, there will remain serious deficits during the critical last half of this year.

A survey of passenger vessels captured in European ports reveals seven ships, including the *Europa*, which are suitable for conversion to troop carriers with a total potential capacity of 37,500 troops. All of the vessels, with the exception of the *Europa*, would be usable in the Pacific.

Admiral Land currently is negotiating with Lord Leathers of the British Ministry of War Transport regarding the immediate allocation of these ships. Partial agreement has been reached placing some under U. S. control and some under British control.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that in view of our urgent and strictly military need for troopships, a U. S. claim for the allocation of all these ships for the movement of U. S. personnel is justified.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that you approach the Prime Minister with a view to securing agreement on the employment of all seven vessels for the carriage of U. S. troops. The question of ultimate disposition and title should not be made a matter of issue at this time but deferred to a later date.

A proposed letter to the Prime Minister is attached.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

G C MARSHALL

Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

[No. 549]

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

DRAFT

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

I have been advised that a survey of the ex-enemy passenger vessels that have fallen into our hands in European ports reveals seven ships suitable for conversion to troop carriers. They are:

	<i>Potential Troop Capacity</i>
Europa	10, 000
Pretoria	4, 000
Patria	5, 000
Caribia	3, 500
Potsdam	5, 000
Milwaukee	5, 000
Vulcania	5, 000
	<hr/>
Total	37, 500

Negotiations currently are in progress in the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board regarding the distribution of these vessels as between the Ministry of War Transport and the War Shipping Administration. My shipping advisers tell me that most of these ships can be put into service more promptly if steamed immediately to the east coast of the United States and placed in the fast working repair yards there and converted as a matter of number 1 priority.

As you know, the first stage of our major effort against the Japanese homeland is rapidly approaching. My Chiefs of Staff advise me that in spite of drastic efforts to increase our troop lift in the Pacific, including cutting down on the rate of withdrawals from Europe, there still will remain serious deficits in meeting the requirements for moving necessary troops into the Western Pacific.

The major untapped resource that can alleviate this situation is the troop capacity represented by the seven vessels. Under the circumstances I consider that all of these vessels should be employed for the carriage of U. S. troops until our Pacific deficits have reached manageable proportions.

I earnestly hope that you can agree with my views in this matter, and that you will appreciate that I would not press for the full amount were I not convinced that the need is urgent.

It is to be understood, of course, that the agreement I propose in no way prejudices ultimate disposition of these vessels, which matter can be handled by appropriate agencies at a later date.¹

¹ There is the following manuscript notation, dated August 5, at the end of this draft letter: "Note:—This question was settled by JCS-BCOS discussions, with U. S. getting the use of the ships, & the President never raised the issue with the Prime Minister. G. M. Elsey". Cf. vol. II, p. 293.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF MACHINERY

No. 550

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[BABELSBERG,] 15 July 1945.

C. C. S. 891

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF MACHINERY

AFTER THE WAR WITH JAPAN

1. We should like at TERMINAL to discuss with our United States colleagues the question of the continuation of machinery for combined United States/British collaboration in the military sphere after the defeat of Japan.

2. Since 1941 the machinery of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and its associated committees has worked smoothly and effectively. For the reasons which follow, we consider that it would be a retrograde step to allow this machinery to fall into disuse merely because Germany and Japan have been defeated and there are no supreme allied commanders to receive the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

3. As we see it, the world, all too unfortunately, is likely to remain in a troubled state for many years to come. Major problems will constantly arise affecting both American and British interests. In many cases these interests may well be closely identified, and in many cases also they will have important military implications.

4. For these reasons we consider that some machinery for the continuation of joint and combined United States/British collaboration is desirable. For example, it may be to the great advantage both of the United States and ourselves that some machinery should exist for the mutual exchange of information. Some measure of uniformity in the design of weapons and in training may also be mutually beneficial.

5. It is not our intention in this paper to attempt to fashion the form or the structure of the machinery which may be found necessary for the above purpose after hostilities have ended. All that we suggest at this stage is that we should now recommend to our respective governments that they should approve the maintenance of the framework of the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization after the war with Japan, and the principle of consultation on matters of mutual interest.

6. We do not think that the maintenance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff machinery after the end of hostilities need in any way cut across or impinge upon the Military Staff Committee of the World Security Organization. There is plenty of room and work for both.

¹ Noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 196th Meeting, July 19. See vol. II, p. 113. The subject matter of this memorandum had previously been discussed by Truman and Churchill. See vol. II, p. 80.

YUGOSLAVIA
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE YALTA DECLARATION ON YUGOSLAVIA
No. 551

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

APPLICATION OF CRIMEA DECLARATION ON YUGOSLAVIA

We recommend that consideration be given to the fact that Marshal Tito has not carried out the recommendations contained in the Crimea Declaration on Yugoslavia¹ and we further recommend that a declaration be made of the continued adherence of the Three Powers to those recommendations and their readiness to consult with a view to assisting the Yugoslav people to enjoy the free exercise of democratic processes.

In March 1945 the Šubašić-Tito agreement² was implemented by the appointment of a Regency Council and the formation of a National Provisional Government. However, the extension of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AVNOJ) by the inclusion of members of the last legislature (Skupština) has not taken place and it has been announced that the former will be enlarged by the addition of some 250 new members, 200 of which are to be designated by the Federal Governments (see below) and 50 by the praesidium of AVNOJ. At present AVNOJ comprises 350 members.

Meanwhile, six "federal" states³ have been set up in all of which the Governments are partisan-controlled and in no case does it appear that democratic procedure was followed. It is also reported that the decisions taken by the exclusively partisan Congress which met at Jajce in November 1943⁴ are regarded as constituting the basic and inalterable law of the land and will shortly be recognized as a "constitution".

In brief, it appears that the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia is not being carried out. Unimpeachable sources cite the extermination

¹ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section VII.

² See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 251-254.

³ i. e., Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro.

⁴ See Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee, eds., *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: Hitler's Europe* (London, 1954), p. 664.

of democratic political opponents of the Partisans, the confiscation of property without justification, the persecution of the clergy, etc., as indicative that elements in control there are endeavoring to thwart the exercise of democratic processes.

In the field of economics industry is being nationalized. A state film monopoly has been established and decrees assimilating productive industry to state control through the installation of "commissars" and "workmen's" managerial boards have been promulgated. Foreign properties, for example, the American Corn Products Refining Corporation at Jabuka, the American-Yugoslav Electric Company at Novi Sad and the Socony Vacuum at Brod, have been brought under state operation. In the case of the Corn Products Corporation the American manager has been expelled from Yugoslavia.

The United States Government believes that American interests are entitled to non-discriminatory economic and commercial treatment. We impressed on Dr. Šubašić during his recent visit in Washington⁵ the unlikelihood of our extending economic assistance to Yugoslavia so long as this unsatisfactory political and economic situation continues to exist there.

[WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1945.

⁵ See Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 252.

No. 552

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

YUGOSLAVIA—COMMENT ON BRITISH AGENDA

a. The principles of the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe and the specific provisions of the Yalta Declaration regarding Yugoslavia are being ignored and apparently wilfully nullified by the administration of Marshal Tito. As regards the latter, the National Provisional Government of Yugoslavia contains only six non-members of the Partisan organization of whom only three have independent views and these three are in positions where they exercise little authority or influence. The Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AVNOJ) has not been extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament to form a temporary Parliament and it has been stated that the conclusions of the Partisan Congress at Jajce in November 1943 are now to be accepted as the "Constitution" of Yugoslavia.

We believe that Marshal Tito should have firmly impressed upon him that the specific recommendations of the Soviet, British, and United States Governments contained in the Yalta Declaration on

Yugoslavia must be realistically followed if his regime is to enjoy the support of the three powers.

As regards the application to Yugoslavia of the principles of the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe,¹ Marshal Tito's regime is apparently deliberately thwarting the exercise of democratic processes. Information reaching this Government is conclusive that all democratic non-Partisan expression of opinion is being ruthlessly suppressed by Partisan organizations. Preparations for forthcoming elections indicate that, while some outward form of freedom will be given them, arrangements are being made to ensure effective control by the small governing faction of the National Liberation Front.

We believe that, in fulfillment of our Yalta pledge, the Soviet, British and American Governments should impress upon Marshal Tito the absolute essentiality that truly free and democratic elections be held in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Crimea Declaration and that the three governments should consider taking effective concerted action in the event Marshal Tito's regime continues on its present intolerant course.

¹ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

No. 553

860h.00/7-745: Telegram

*The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

BELGRADE, July 7, 1945—2 p. m.

247. Internal political conditions in Yugo are unchanged. There is no freedom of press nor of political activity, and since the secret police appear to operate as they please freedom from fear is conspicuously lacking.

Dr. Šubašić has been greatly encouraged by the establishment of "regular" civil courts which is beginning. However, he told Brit Amb Stevenson this week that he is disturbed by internal conditions and that while the leaders are doing their best they have little control over subordinates and have "unleashed forces that are in danger of getting out of hand".

He said he had not seen Tito lately but had asked Kardelj to tell Tito he is dissatisfied that no real attempt has been made to carry out the Tito Šubašić agreement on which the present regime is founded; and that he considers himself responsible both to the people and to the three great powers to make agreement effective.

Šubašić expressed hope that Big Three meeting will make a public reference to this and remind Yugo Govt that agreement must be

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 11 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1045).

carried out. He thinks this would strengthen hands of moderate groups.

Stevenson and I believe such action desirable.

SHANTZ

No. 554

860h.01/7-1045 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

BELGRADE, July 10, 1945—2 p. m.

255. When Read of OWI paid farewell call on Milan Grol July 7, Grol asked him to repeat to me his remarks, substance of which follows:

Grol has been talking frankly to the Communist leaders and 10 days ago gave Tito a memo concluding with statement that he will remain in govt only if prompt agreement is reached on all of following related matters:

1. Enlargement of AVNOJ.
2. Basic law covering freedom of press and speech, elections, civil security, etc., to be enacted by new parliament.
3. Character of new regime.

Grol considers this formula of major importance and is sure from daily talks with Šutej, Prodanović, Kosanović and others that he has united support of all non-Communist parties. Should the govt enlarge AVNOJ without accepting his formula Grol and the others will resign.

Grol then said Communists were preparing great popular front congress for late July (Embtel 252, July 9²) and that Šubašić, Kosanović and Branko Cubrilović were nominated as steering committee. First two have not accepted or rejected nomination. Šubašić was astounded at his nomination. Grol thinks it vital that Šubašić reject it, otherwise Stalin would have fine weapon to use in discussion on Yugo, and Šubašić will betray his party, his liberal friends, and himself.

Grol said that after his return from US Šubašić confessed that his policy had been tragic failure and upon returning from Zagreb said he could see that his policies had betrayed all Croatia.

Grol said that Tito decided to recall Martinović from Cairo and that Šubašić in this case has defied Tito by refusing to sign the order which has been on his desk for a week.

¹ The gist of this message was included in an unnumbered communication of July 13 sent by Grew to Byrnes by pouch (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1345).

² Not printed.

Grol also said that the Russians have several groups going about Yugo to survey public opinion and determine strength of Communist sentiment. He feels that Russia may learn that the roots of Communism are real low and "may be willing to accept a compromise".

Grol hoped US newspapers would begin asking why AVNOJ has not been enlarged and would let attitude of opposition become known without revealing source of information or precise formula, emphasizing political parties and govt's failure to deal with national leaders. (Sent Dept; rptd Caserta).

Read reported Grol in far better spirits than formerly. He spoke of the Communists with greatest contempt. His attitude was that of a man who has finally made his decision and begun to act. He repeatedly said he was no longer alone.

SHANTZ

No. 555

860h.00/7-1045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, July 10, 1945—7 p. m.

4134. Following is substance of remarks made to Lane today by Maček, president of Croatian Peasant Party:

Yugo today is Communist dictatorship. No democracy in Anglo-Saxon sense of word. Of eleven members comprising Croatian Federal Government at Zagreb only two are of Croatian Peasant Party, remaining nine all Communists. As Peasant Parties are strongest bulwark against Communism they are being liquidated in Yugo, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Poland. Compares future position of Mikołajczyk in Poland to present position of Šubašić who has no power. Little by little prestige of Mik[o]łajczyk will be diminished by Communists. Maček has not been allowed to see Šubašić nor is he aware of details of agreement between Tito and Šubašić. Believes that if Yugo which never Communist inclined has been dominated it will be far easier for Communists to dominate Italy and France both of which are ripe for Communism. Considers European situation desperate but still willing cooperate with Tito provided a real democracy based on free elections were restored.

Anxious to proceed to London to consult King Peter and Krnjević but British obstructing his trip.

CAFFERY

No. 556

860h.00/7-1145

The Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Huston) to Mr. Walworth Barbour, of the Division of Southern European Affairs

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON,] July 11, 1945.

Frangješ called yesterday and brought up the following:

1. A memorandum which he said CWC¹ had asked for. I have sent a copy to CWC.

C[LOYCE] K H[USTON]

[Attachment]

MEMORANDUM²

I.

DEVELOPMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA SINCE THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

In the communiqué on the Crimea Conference specific provisions were made concerning Yugoslavia and Poland.³ Both countries are facing an extremely difficult political problem which is fundamentally the same.

Although historically, the developments in Poland have been different from those in Yugoslavia, the issue is the same in Poland as in Yugoslavia. As a matter of fact, it is the same everywhere in Central and in Southeastern Europe. Each of these countries like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria are predominantly agrarian countries. By different means in each case, these countries have been provided with a government which is completely under the influence of Soviet Russia. In each of these countries the governments are actively engaged in creating, by various means which are not at all disguised, a situation which must ultimately bring a change of the present social structure and establish a social structure identical to the one now existing in Soviet Russia.

In the case of Yugoslavia, the provisions of the Crimea Conference are as follows:

a. That the Agreement made between Marshal Tito and Dr. Šubašić⁴ be put into effect immediately;

¹ Cavendish W. Cannon, a member of the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference.

² This memorandum bears the following manuscript notation: "Secret for CWC from Yugoslav Chargé in Washington".

³ See vol. II, document No. 1417, sections VII and VI, respectively.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 251-254.

b. That the new government be formed on the basis of that Agreement;

c. That the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament, those forming the body to be known as a Temporary Parliament;

d. Legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.

In addition to these specific stipulations concerning Yugoslavia, there is a previous paragraph in the communiqué on the Crimea Conference entitled, "Declaration on Liberated Europe"⁵ where the principles of the Atlantic Charter,⁶ the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live, are reaffirmed. It is further stated in this paragraph that the Government[s] of the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Russia will immediately concert together on measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration, if in their opinion conditions in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe makes such action necessary in order to foster conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise their right:

- a) to establish conditions of international peace;
- b) to carry out emergency measures for relief;
- c) to form government authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population, pledged to the earliest possible establishment, through free elections, of governments responsive to the will of the people;
- d) to facilitate when necessary the holding of such elections.

It is common knowledge that in Yugoslavia not one of these provisions have been carried out until now.

In the Agreement between Marshal Tito and Dr. Šubašić of November 1, 1944, there is a paragraph which reads as follows:

"The new government will publish a declaration proclaiming the fundamental principles of democratic liberties and guaranteeing their application. Personal freedom, freedom from fear, freedom of worship, liberty of conscience, freedom of speech, liberty of the press, freedom of assembly and association will be specially emphasized and guaranteed; and in the same way the right of property and private initiative."

According to all reports received up to now from Yugoslavia, there is no indication that any of these provisions have been carried out. They read today as a farce and a mockery.

⁵ See vol. II, document No. 1417, section v.

⁶ Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603.

The part of the Agreement between Marshal Tito and Dr. Šubašić which concerns specifically "Elections for the Constituent Assembly" reads as follows:

"Elections for the Constituent Assembly will be decided upon within three months of the liberation of the whole country. The elections will be held in accordance with the Law on Elections for the Constituent Assembly which will be enacted in good time. This law will guarantee complete freedom of elections, freedom of assembly and speech, liberty of the press, franchise for all and a secret ballot, as well as the right of independent or united political parties, corporations, groups or individuals—who have not collaborated with the enemy—to present lists of candidates for the election. All those whose collaboration with the enemy will have been proved, will be deprived of both the right to elect and to be elected."

The situation in Yugoslavia since the formation of the new government on March 7th, which is less than four months, has nothing but rapidly deteriorated, measured by any standards commonly used in the Western Hemisphere. The entire administration has been taken over by National Liberation Committees. These Committees are organized for the cities as well as for the smallest communities and villages, which in turn elect among themselves representatives for the county Liberation Committee and from there on for the district and the provincial Liberation Committee, exactly according to the pattern of elections practiced in Soviet Russia. All committees exercise full power in matters concerning the administration. They also have full powers in handling juridical cases and sit as a court on [or?] tribunal and they pronounce decrees and regulations entrusted usually to a legislative body. National Liberation Committees acting as courts of justice do not apply the civil code or the criminal code. Those laws have been put out of force by the Central Committee of National Liberation. They pass their judgement "according to their conscience". The prevailing conditions can hardly be called conditions of internal peace, as the action of these committees is mainly aimed at breaking down any resistance to the newly introduced organization and terrorizing the population and declaring everyone who is not in accordance with their procedure to be a Fascist and a reactionary. Fascists and reactionaries have to be exterminated and their resistance broken.

It is further evident that this newly established administrative organization in Yugoslavia can hardly carry out any emergency measures for relief because all these emergency measures have to be arranged so that it suits this new administration with sharp and purposely made discrimination as to party followers and those who do not follow the party line, Partisans or not Partisans. They have even established three kinds of ration cards: one for Partisans and fighters;

another for heavy-working laborers and the third for the rest of the population. The amount of rationing obtained being in the ratio of 1:2:3, the Partisan obtaining three times as much as the regular citizen. Urgent projects for solving relief problems can not be fulfilled for lack of organization. Only one-third of the land usually cultivated, has been cultivated this year, and the coming winter will be the worst yet during this entire period since 1940.

There is no government authority broadly representative of all the democratic elements in the population, nor have any preparations been made for holding elections on a basis where all democratic elements could be freely admitted to the polls.

The fundamental principles of democratic liberties mentioned in the Agreement between Marshal Tito and Prime Minister Šubašić of November 1, 1944, are completely ignored. There is no personal freedom, freedom from fear and liberty of conscience under a regime of a political police known as the "OZNA" which strikes out incessantly to destroy the reactionaries and Fascists. There is no liberty of the press, as the press is entirely government controlled, and foreign press representatives are not admitted. There is no question of the right of property and private initiative, as all enterprises are, directly or indirectly, under government control, and even the few owned by American citizens have been put under the control of Yugoslav Government authorities in spite of the fact that American management was available for these enterprises.

On March 9th the new Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Marshal Josip Broz Tito broadcast from Belgrade a declaration of the policy which the new government of Federal Democratic Yugoslavia will follow, where it is stated that the new Government will try to rally all those not compromised by collaboration with the invader and their servants. Later on in his speech the Prime Minister said: "Those democratic rights won by the masses of our people during the war of National Liberation, as basically outlined in the structure of the peoples' administration, must be safeguarded and extended as far as possible". This refers to the administration as described above and consisting in the functioning of the Liberation Committees.

In his speech he further stresses that "The economic destruction caused by the war is so great that a planned intervention of the state in organizing and carrying out of economic reconstruction, including the regulation of the entire economic life of the country, imposes itself as an interconditional law" [*sic*]. This is being fulfilled. A government's guarantee for complete freedom of private initiative mentioned in the same speech is completely out of question.

Recently the Prime Minister delivered an address to the first congress of Anti-Fascist women of Yugoslavia which was held in Belgrade on June 17th. The Prime Minister speaks of the great tasks which face them, the most important of which is "the consolidation of our peoples' authority," meaning evidently the functioning of the National Liberation Committees. He said further: "We have in our country not a few friends who in various ways seek to hamper the development of our political life, not only to hamper, but also to threaten the achievements of the great struggle which has cost our nation so many sacrifices. Unfortunately these, our internal enemies, also have help abroad: they are helped in foreign countries by people of their ilk". He urges the women of Yugoslavia to bestow all their attention and all their power upon the question of the consolidation of the government[']s authorities. "It is necessary that these authorities work as those who perished for the cause would wish them to work. There are many people who commit faults out of ignorance but there are also people who do mischief and are a nuisance. These people must be mercilessly cleared out. They cannot be bearers of the peoples' authority". He is asking the Yugoslav women to be "vigilant" thus helping to consolidate the government[']s authority by clearing out those who hamper their consolidation and by helping those who commit faults out of ignorance. "I must admit"[,] says the Prime Minister, "to you openly here that the great achievement won by this bloody strife is in danger if we permit jingoism to develop". At the same time he calls [to] the attention of the Yugoslav women that there were enemies of the peoples' authorities, Chetniks in Serbia and Ustashi in Croatia, and fanatical guardists in Slovenia, and admonishes them that they should not think that they have reconciled themselves with fate. Finishing his speech after emphasizing different aspects of equality, silencing the Fascists, fight for unity, etc., etc., he said: "Long live our new Federal Democratic Yugoslavia which was born from so much blood and sacrifice of our people. Long live our great Ally, the Soviet Union with its leader, our genius Stalin. Long live the heroic Soviet women. Long live the brotherhood and unity of the Balkan nations and of all the Slavs. Long live our Allies, England, America, Bulgaria, Albania and all who wish to live in peace and peaceful cooperation of [*sic*] our country."

This speech was delivered on the 17th of June. The next day the Marshal went to visit several towns in Serbia accompanied by the Soviet Ambassador to Belgrade.⁷ In the town of Mladenovac a gathering of more than 10,000 people cheered him. Speaking first of the country divided in federal states, the Marshal continued to say: "Our country is faced with great difficulties. First the greater part

⁷ Ivan Vasilyevich Sadchikov.

of our most able brothers and sisters are still in the army. But what can we do? We cannot send them home yet because they must keep guard." Further, he continued, "In 1941 we entered the struggle in order to preserve our honor. Our great Ally the Soviet people and the invincible Red Army fought against the greatest power in Europe and defeated it. We however, armed more with our firm will and spirit than with weapons, fought because we believed that victory would be on our side because we had an Ally like the USSR. The USSR, headed by great leader Stalin gave us moral and material support and is still giving it today in full measure so that we can be assured that we shall carry out our duty in completely settling and reconstructing our country." No mention has been made throughout the speech of any help coming during or after the war from any of the Western Allies. The Marshal continued further to admit the unfavorable results of his new administration by telling, "Our new Federal Yugoslavia has not yet been able to give anything to the peasant, not because it did not wish to do so, but because it has not yet had time, because it has not yet been able to do so."

But if nothing specially was done to the peasant, things have been done to agitate the peasant. The Overseas News Agency has a telegram from Belgrade dated June 14th which is as follows:

"ONA 2 Belgrade reform Belgrade, Yugoslavia, June 14 (ONA)—The Yugoslav National Liberation Front, the ruling political movement in this country, demands that the government subject certain private properties to agrarian reform so they may be divided among poor farmers unable now to own any land of their own.

"At mass meetings held throughout the country, the Liberation Front has asked the Government to turn over to these farmers the lands of monasteries and of all estates belonging to persons who are not cultivating the land, suggesting their owners divide the crops with the peasants, or that these uncultivated estates be leased to them."

II.

CON[SE]QUENCES OF THE RUSSIAN POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE, CENTRAL EUROPE AND ON THE BALKAN PENINSULA

A.

CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA

It is evident that all efforts have been made to improve relations and stabilize relations between the United States and Russia. In spite of all efforts in this respect: economic assistance to Russia, sacrifice of principles of policy, influence on press and publications—this goal will not be achieved if Russia does not consent to changing its attitude toward the nations in Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe.

The national states in this region are predominantly agrarian in their population. Nothing less than what was being done to the agrarian population in Russia, will have to be done to the agrarian population of these states. This means extermination of whole classes of the population and establishment by force of a new social structure. To do this, it will take 20–30 years. It can not be done sooner because the resistance of the population to adapt itself to the new ways will be extremely strong.

During this long period of time, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union will remain tense in spite of all efforts of the United States Government. This for the simple reason that in the population of the United States, there are many millions of Poles, Czechoslovaks, Yugoslavs, Rumanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Lithuanians, Latvians, Finns, who—although they have proved to be loyal citizens of the United States—cannot see with complete indifference what is going on with their brothers, cousins, parents or other relatives, in their home country. They will, even without wanting it, move public opinion in the United States and make it sensitive toward the policy of Soviet Russia in their National States. There will be no way of preventing this. It will be too human and too spontaneous. It will be a constant cause of tension just as well as if Soviet Russia would try to impose by force a communistic social structure on Ireland and expect to have at the same time a good press and good relations with the United States.

Furthermore, there is no need for Soviet Russia to enforce such policy in the States of Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe. The security of Soviet Russia will never be threatened by those States, individually or collectively. Germany is under Allied occupation. The United Nations Charter has been signed in San Francisco. In none of the States of Eastern, Central or Southeastern Europe can there ever be formed a government which would be in opposition to the legitimate foreign political aims of Russia. Consequently, there is not the slightest necessity for Russia to continue her present foreign policy toward these National States if consolidation, peace, security and prosperity are the aims of Russian foreign policy.

If Russia insists on the continuation of their present policy, it is inevitably [*inevitable*] to reach the conclusion that Russia must have different political intentions: breaking down the social structure of the States of Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe, which is difficult because the population of these States is predominantly agrarian and clinches [*clings?*] to private property of farmland; after this has been done and these States are transformed into communistic States, the next and much more easy step is to introduce communism in the remaining parts of Europe—Western and Northern Europe. The

population of Western and Northern Europe is predominantly industrial. If the barrier of agrarian States of Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe falls, there will be nothing to stop the advance of communism in the rest of Europe. No financial assistance, no economic concession, no measure to improve the social standard can help, because communism will be imposed on the population and not desired and wanted by the population. Communism spreads by force and violence and fear.

B.

CONCERNING FUTURE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF UNITED STATES

The fact that the agrarian population of the Eastern, Central and Southeastern European States will put up a strong resistance against Bolshevism should not bring too much comfort. It will be crushed in due course of events. When this is achieved, the future of Europe will be dark indeed. There will be no natural barrier to check it. The rest of Europe will follow inevitably.

There is no reason to believe that Russia will not shape its policy in the Far East on the same line. China will offer a good ground for it, as well as a completely defeated Japan. India may be successfully approached. Iran, Iraq, the Arabian States, have already felt the Soviet influence.

Europe without Russia has over 350,000,000 inhabitants. China has 400,000,000, India 300,000,000 inhabitants. Should Russia be allowed to control ultimately the Continents of Europe and Asia, the accumulated strength in manpower and resources will be such that it will outnumber the American and British resources in manpower at a rate [*ratio?*] of 1:10 and in natural resources it will also be vastly superior. Furthermore, there are no questions of wages, living standards and personal hardships to be considered in a totalitarian state or agglomeration of totalitarian states, problems to be coped with seriously in a democracy.

It is so much easier now to stop the expansion of communism backed by force than it will be ever again in history. If it cannot be stopped now when the resistance of the population in the agrarian States of Europe is strong, it will never be stopped in the future.

It is inconceivable that the United States should follow a policy of unconditional appeasement to Russia at the moment when the United States are at the peak of their strength, with the largest army, strongest navy, best air forces in the world; a policy of appeasement and sacrifice of the principles of democracy for which this war was fought; a policy which will ultimately and inevitably bring Russia into a dominating position with an enforced totalitarian system of government under her control and leadership which will constantly more and

more endanger the very existence of whatever is left of democracy in the world.

III.

WHAT REQUESTS SHOULD BE MADE AT MEETING IN BERLIN

The fulfillment of the Yalta Agreements, concerning democratic elections and representative government is the basis of any solid political development in Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe.

This is also the only realistic basis for future good relations between the United States and Russia. If this condition is not fulfilled, there is no prospect of good relations in the future in spite of every possible effort of the American Government.

Effective control by American Government in regard to how elections are being prepared and supervision of elections. This request to be based on Yalta agreement: . . .⁸ "to concert together on measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities . . . to form governments . . . through free elections . . . responsive to the will of the people . . . to facilitate when necessary the holding of such elections." Only if the responsibility for free elections is shared by American Government will the United States be able to engage in large scale economic assistance. Economic assistance can be granted only to countries which have reached a reasonable degree of political stability through democratic free elections.

In countries like Yugoslavia the present government is discredited in the population to such extent, that control of elections by the Allied Governments is imperative.

Broadcast this line of policy over short wave radio to Yugoslavia. Have BBC in London broadcast on the same lines.

⁸ Ellipses in this paragraph are in the original.

No. 557

860h.01/7-1445 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

SECRET

BELGRADE, July 14, 1945—6 p. m.

278. Dr. Šubašić told me today he will not be member Steering Committee of JNOF [AVNOJ] Congress. (See Embtel 275 to-day.)² He has had long talks about this new front with Tito, Kardelj and others all week. Tito told him it will form neither one party nor coalition of parties but will control political life. Persons

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 35 of July 16 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1645).

² Not printed.

in front can belong to any party, and parties may exist legally outside front but govt members must belong to front.

I said this explanation was confusing and Šubašić said it was to him also. He thought new front would have same powers as liberation front had during war, but once its control is established, he said hopefully, it will be possible to extend area of freedom. He expressed intention of staying in govt since he would be powerless to influence regime outside. He realizes that Communist dominance will continue. He counts on Big Three to take helpful action.

I am convinced there is no hope of free democracy here and that new laws will be window dressing for totalitarian Communist regime.

SHANTZ

ATTITUDE ON CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN VENEZIA GIULIA

No. 558

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper ¹

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

YUGOSLAVIA

2. *Venezia Giulia*

Stalin in his latest communication to the President² emphatically supports the Yugoslavs, criticizes Marshal Alexander, and deplors the tone of our June 2 "ultimatum."³ This strong note significantly coincides with the Yugoslav determination that Article 3 of the June 9 agreement (copy attached)⁴ shall be interpreted to guarantee the continuation of the pattern of local administration which they have suc-

¹ Annex 10 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² Document No. 562.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Attachment not included in the Briefing Book. For the text of the agreement referred to, an Anglo-American-Yugoslav agreement "respecting the provisional administration of Venezia Giulia" signed at Belgrade, see Executive Agreement Series No. 501; 59 Stat. (2) 1855. Article 3 reads as follows:

"3. Using an Allied Military Government, the Supreme Allied Commander will govern the areas west of the line on the attached map, Pola and such other areas on the west coast of Istria as he may deem necessary. A small Yugoslav Mission may be attached to the Headquarters of the Eighth Army as observers. Use will be made of any Yugoslav civil administration which is already set up and which in the view of the Supreme Allied Commander is working satisfactorily. The Allied Military Government will, however, be empowered to use whatever civil authorities they deem best in any particular place and to change administrative personnel at their discretion."

ceeded in setting up throughout the area during the period of negotiations. Their object is to retain this committee form of government through which their propaganda and control can work effectively even under AMG. It is obvious that to accept this imposition of the Yugoslav administrative pattern in our area of occupation would (a) cause serious administrative and political difficulties for our authorities, (b) tend to prejudice final disposition, and (c) if the area is ultimately assigned to Italy, leave within that country a small but powerful start toward a general system of local government subservient to foreign dictates.

We have already conceded to Tito as much of [as] Yugoslavia's rightful claims, our principles, and perhaps long-range European interests can possibly justify. The Yugoslavs are in full control of Italian centers west of the line;⁵ there have been no guarantees or supervision on our part. The disputed area west of the line is, in fact, already prejudiced by Yugoslav occupation. Moreover we have not provided for the predominantly Italian areas of the western Istrian coastal strip, which in the final settlement should remain Italian. We have not given the Italians any representation of any kind in the occupation, nor have we sent a token force into the Yugoslav area; but we have agreed to a Yugoslav contingent in our area.

We must, then, at least demand that the June 9 agreement be respected in every detail. No further concessions should be made. To do so would be disastrous to our prestige, our interests, and future peace.

Stalin may also press for final settlement of Yugoslavia's claims now. No piecemeal settlements of the various Italian territorial questions should be accepted; the final disposition of Venezia Giulia must await the negotiation of a definitive peace treaty with Italy, presumably at an early date. Cession to Yugoslavia now of any part of the disputed territory would mean the triumph of force over the principles we have upheld.

Our recommendations on the final settlement are discussed in a separate memorandum (territorial series).⁶

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1945.

⁵ i. e., the Morgan Line, shown on the map attached to the Belgrade agreement of June 9 (Executive Agreement Series No. 501). This map is also reproduced in *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 59, pt. 2 (inside back cover). A map showing the Morgan Line in less detail is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. xvi, p. 1264.

⁶ Not printed.

No. 559

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-1945: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CASERTA, June 19, 1945—1 p. m.

2673. Gen Morgan has reported from 13 Corps ¹ (our 2647, June 16, 11 p. m.²) that Velebit[,] Jovanović, and Avšić were in Belgrade for consultation and were expected to return noon June 18. Meeting not expected to be resumed until June 19. Maintenance of civil administration system set up since Yugos have been in Venezia Giulia is point which most perturbs them. This system follows Russian model and operates by committees whereas Italian system with modifications as considered advisable by AMG is system we are determined to use. . . .

KIRK

¹ i. e., from Monfalcone, where Morgan, representing the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, was quartered while negotiating with Yugoslav military representatives an agreement on the implementation of the Belgrade agreement of June 9.

² Not printed

No. 560

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2045: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

CASERTA, June 20, 1945—7 p. m.

US URGENT

2695. Our 2693, June 20.¹

Gen Morgan just telephoned from Monfalcone that agreement ² with Yugos was signed at 9 o'clock this morning.

KIRK

¹ Not printed.

² For the text (in English and Serbo-Croatian) of the "Agreement Between the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, and the Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Army" signed at Duino on June 20, 1945, and of appendices C-J thereto, see *Међународни Уговори Федеративне Народне Републике Југославије*, 1945, No. 3 (Belgrade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no date). The maps which comprise appendices A and B to this agreement are not printed. For the "Note on Civil Administration of Zone of Venezia Giulia Coming Under Allied Military Government" signed at the same time, see document No. 561.

No. 561

J. C. S. Files

*Agreed Note by the Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Army (Tito) and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (Alexander)*¹

NOTE ON CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF ZONE OF VENEZIA GIULIA COMING UNDER ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

1. With reference to Article 3 of the agreement signed in BELGRADE on 9th June 1945, a Memorandum was submitted by the Yugoslav Delegation setting out proposals with regard to the civil administration of the territory coming under Allied Military Government.

2. The Delegation representing the Supreme Allied Commander were unable to accept these proposals and presented the Yugoslav Delegation with an Aide Memoire showing how it was intended that Allied Military Government should operate.

3. The Yugoslav Delegation are unable to regard this Aide Memoire as satisfactory and reserve the right to raise this matter through diplomatic channels.

АРСО Р. ЈОВАНОВИЋ²
For Marshal Josip Broz Tito,
*Supreme Commander of the
Yugoslav Army.*

W. D. MORGAN.
Lt. Genl[.]
For Field Marshal The Honourable
Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander,
*Supreme Allied Commander of the
Mediterranean Theatre of Operations.*

Signed at DUINO
20th June 1945
[blank] hours.

[Enclosure 1³]

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE BY JUGOSLAVS ON ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

1. In connection with point 3 of BELGRADE agreement and in regard of fact that the population of that territory has compactly organized an armed resistance movement on the Allied side against the Italian army and authorities before the capitulation of ITALY, and

¹ Printed from a photostatic copy, in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the signed original. Although this note was signed on June 20, its precise terms were not known to the Department of State until the afternoon of June 23, by which time the Department had received a full telegraphic text from Kirk.

² Arso R. Jovanović.

³ Enclosures 1 and 2 are printed from mimeographed texts prepared in Alexander's headquarters.

has built up and maintained until today its own civil administration, and in regard of the national composition of the population on [in] that area, the old system of the Italian civil administration will not be renewed. Instead of that, the new organs of the already existing civil administration will be accepted, if they are working satisfactorily according to the opinion of the Supreme Allied Commander.

2. In case that A. M. G. is not satisfied with work of the administrative personnel or any organs of the civil administration, the Regional National Committee as the first subordinated organ of the civil administration to the A. M. G. is obliged on request and to the satisfaction of A. M. G. to carry out immediately necessary replacements.

3. The Italian Government as well as the organs subordinated to it, will have no influence on the civil administration of this area.

4. The Slovene and Italian nationalities are equal in regard to A. M. G. Both languages are equal in official relations. In inscriptions, proclamations and other official statements, both languages will be used.

5. To avoid provocative activities of Fascist elements and to safeguard impartiality of the civil administration, the Regional National Committee will hand over to the A. M. G. commented [annotated?] lists of persons who have been in the service of the enemies of the United Nations during the war or have perpetrated violence and crimes against the local Slovene and Italian population.

Enclosure 2]

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMENTS ON DRAFT PAPER ON "CIVIL ADMINISTRATION"

16 JUNE 1945.

The draft paper on civil administration which you submitted yesterday raised several important points of principle which we discussed quite fully. In order that there may be no misunderstanding, however, I wish to comment briefly on the four important questions presented.

First, you stress again the fact that this territory is liberated in character, in part through the struggle of the civilian population itself over a long period. The liberated character of the area is fully recognised. In friendly territory, which we consider this to be, AMG will conduct its relations with the civilian population accordingly and anticipates close cooperation with those elements which have proved their sympathy for and support of the Allied cause during the war.

Second, you ask adoption of the principle of equality as between persons of Italian and Slovene origin, particularly as regards language.

As we have made clear to you all persons, of whatever national origin, enjoy equality before AMG. As to language, we have already taken measures to have proclamations and other papers published in the Slovene language where appropriate, that is, in areas in which the Slovene population is concentrated in numbers sufficient to warrant it.

Third, you have asked us to give you assurance that the Italian Government will have no influence on the civil administration of this area. I do not think it necessary, in this connection, to lay down any principles beyond those which ordinarily govern our military administration of occupied territory. I call your attention to the fact that Article No. 1 of Proclamation No. 1⁴ states that all powers of government and jurisdiction in those parts of VENEZIA GIULIA occupied by the Allied Forces and over its inhabitants, and final administrative responsibility are vested solely in the Supreme Allied Commander as Military Governor. This formally denies to the Italian Government, as it does to all other authorities other than the Allied Military Command, any power in our military administration.

In connection with the general question of relations with the Italians, you should have in mind two points. As set forth in the proclamations, the laws applicable in the territory during our period of trusteeship will be Italian laws, purged of all fascist measures and supplemented by our AMG proclamations and orders. This follows inevitably from the fact that the territory belongs legally to Italy unless and until it is transferred to another power under the orderly procedures of international law. If, as you indicated yesterday, you interpret this fact as implying the reintroduction of fascism in any form, you show very little understanding of the intentions of Britain and the United States with regard to this area and, in fact, of their objectives and accomplishments during this war. Both Britain and the United States have fought a long, bitter and costly war to destroy fascism and it would be as intolerable to us as to you to permit its rebirth in any area for which we are responsible.

You must also bear in mind that there are large numbers of Italians in the territory which we will administer. It will be our duty to protect their rights as vigorously as we shall the rights of Slovenes or any other groups who may be subject to our orders.

Finally, in your draft you ask us, in effect, to recognise certain committees of liberation as the sole agencies through which we will conduct the civil administration. This we cannot do. In the proper discharge of his responsibilities to the two governments, the Supreme Allied Commander cannot so limit his authority. You, as a soldier,

⁴ Text in *The Allied Military Government Gazette* (published in Trieste by Allied Military Government, 13 Corps, Venezia Giulia), No. 1, September 15, 1945, p. 3, and in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. xvi, p. 1265.

should understand this principle. Even if he were free to do so, the Supreme Allied Commander would not now agree to accept any person or group of persons as the instruments through which he will govern the territory without satisfying himself as to their efficiency and loyalty to the purposes of his administration. You have the undertaking of our two governments in the BELGRADE agreement. I am not empowered to add to or further define that undertaking.

In closing this subject, I should like to venture a final suggestion. The degree to which Allied Military Government and the groups whose interests you have been representing will be able to cooperate will depend, I believe, in large measure upon the willingness and ability of these groups to assist us in maintaining order and conducting civil administration in this area during a difficult period. I trust you will make this clear to all concerned. If you and they will have confidence in our desire and ability to insure a just and impartial regime you will make a great contribution toward the solution of the problem.

No. 562

Truman Papers

*Marshal Stalin to President Truman*¹

[Translation]

Personal and secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to President H. S. Truman.

In spite of the fact that the Yugoslav Government has accepted the proposal of the American and British Governments² regarding the region of Istria-Trieste, negotiations in Trieste,³ as it is evident, have reached a dead end. This can be explained, principally, by the fact that representatives of the Allied Command on the Mediterranean Sea do not want to take into consideration even the slightest suggestions of the Yugoslavs, who should be credited with the liberation of this territory from German invaders where, in addition to that, prevails a Yugoslav population. Such a situation cannot be considered satisfactory from the point of view of the Allies.

Not wishing to aggravate relations I have not mentioned until now in our correspondence about the behavior of Field Marshal Alexander, but now it is necessary to stress that it is impossible to agree that in these negotiations should be used the arrogant tone which is sometimes

¹ Russian original, accompanied by this translation, transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington. Stalin sent a parallel message on the same date to Churchill. See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 368.

² The reference is apparently to the Belgrade agreement of June 9.

³ i. e., the negotiations with Morgan referred to in document No. 559, footnote 1.

used by Field Marshal Alexander in respect to the Yugoslavs. It is impossible to agree that Field Marshal Alexander in an official public address allowed a comparison of Marshal Tito to Hitler and Mussolini. Such a comparison is unjust and insulting for Yugoslavia.

The tone of the ultimatum of the declaration which was presented to the Yugoslav Government by Anglo-American representatives on June 2,⁴ was also unexpected for the Soviet Government. How is it possible to believe that such methods will provide strong positive results?

All this makes me draw your attention to this situation. I, as before, hope that in respect to Trieste-Istria the just Yugoslav interests will be satisfied, especially bearing in mind the circumstance that in the principal question the Yugoslavs met the Allies half way.

[Moscow,] June 21, 1945.

⁴ Not printed.

No. 563

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2145 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State

PLAIN

BELGRADE, June 21, 1945.

177. AMPOLAD 104, 21st.¹

Following is translation of TANYUG release in today's *Politika* headlined "by the new agreement the Allied Military Delegation has not accepted in full the agreement signed in Belgrade"[. The] article reads[.]

"Today a partial agreement has been signed between the Yugoslav and Allied Military Delegation covering the demarcation line and other technical and economic questions.

The Allied military delegation has not accepted the propositions of the Yugoslav Delegation in connection with the recognition of the existing civil authorities which was guaranteed by paragraph 3 of the Belgrade Agreement.

The Allied Military Administration, by a proclamation of Field Marshal Alexander,² again introduced the Italian-Fascist legislature [*legislation?*] and administration which was in existence previous to September 8, 1943.

This places in serious hazard the interests and rights of the people in Venezia Giulia who have been fighting on the side of the Allies against Fascist Italy and Germany.

By these measures it seems that the Allied Military Administration annexes to Italy the zone in dispute and by unilateral action prejudices

¹ Not printed.

² i. e., Alexander's proclamation No. 1. Text in *The Allied Military Government Gazette*, No. 1, September 15, 1945, p. 3, and in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. xvi, p. 1265.

the decision of the International Peace Conference in regard to the zone in dispute temporarily occupied by Allied troops.

Therefore, although an agreement has been reached and signed covering the above mentioned items, the Yugoslav Delegation, relying upon the agreement signed in Belgrade, could in no way agree to the attitude of the Allied Delegation concerning the question of civil authority, so that this item is not included in the new agreement.['']

SHANTZ

No. 564

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2145 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

BELGRADE, June 21, 1945—4 p. m.

178. Message from Brit Col. Clarke reports military agreements signed [at Duino] less article 3 of Belgrade agreement which Yugos state their govt will take up again on govt level. Clarke thinks Yugos left article 3 unsigned in belief they can now operate underground without directly breaking terms of agreement. Col. Lindsay reports that Yugos intend to appeal through diplomatic channels our refusal to recognize their National Liberation Committee as sole agency under AMG.

Yugo press released [*sic*] quoted in my tel 177 today ¹ entirely misrepresents our position. Yugos can easily do this since they have not published text of Belgrade agreement. I suggest Dept and British issue statement of facts and broadcast it to Yugoslavia.

SHANTZ

¹ Document No. 563.

No. 565

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2045 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Kirk)

SECRET
U. S. URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1945—7 p. m.

607. Dept understood from your 2693 ¹ and 2695 ² June 20 that agreement had been reached and signed on all appendices. However, Belgrade's 178, June 21 ³ reports military agreements signed "less article 3 of Belgrade agreement" and that Yugos intend to raise ques-

¹ Not printed.

² Document No. 560.

³ Document No. 564.

tion again on govt level with view to having National Liberation Committee recognized sole agency under AMG. (Sent Caserta as 607, rptd Belgrade as 151) Dept assumes above reference to Article 3 may indicate additional appendix reported in your 2658, June 17,⁴ which presumably was presented by Yugos and rejected by Morgan. Please clarify urgently endeavoring to send us full text agreement and appendices, preferably by courier. Report also to what extent revised draft agreement presented to Yugos (your 2659, June 17⁴) met your objections (your 2644, June 16, and 2656, June 17⁵) and whether full text agreement as concluded was referred to AFHQ before signing.

Article 3 of the Belgrade agreement of June 9 leaves to SAC's⁶ discretion the use or otherwise of existing civil administrations. There can be no limitation of his complete authority west of the line,⁷ and any Yugo failure promptly to submit to his orders in that area would constitute a breach of the agreement.

Dept feels strongly that pattern of administration west of line must conform to previous general pattern, both for practical administrative reasons and because establishment of purely Yugo system would prejudice final settlement even in Allied occupied territory.

GREW

H F[reeman] M[atthews]

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ Neither printed.

⁶ Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander.

⁷ i. e., the Morgan Line.

No. 566

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extracts]

SECRET

CASERTA, June 22, 1945—midnight.

2725. Gen Morgan (our 2656, June 17, your 597 of June 18 and our 2715 of June 22¹) returned from Monfalcone with signed copy of agreement with Yugos. On his arrival here we asked for a copy of the accord and he stated that he hoped we would not mind if he did [not] grant our request until he could call together a meeting in order to "explain" the text. The Chief of Staff presided over a meeting at 11:30 this morning at which time he went into some detail to explain how difficult it had been to negotiate with the Yugos and how it was necessary to give and take in order to "persuade" Gen Jovanović to sign the document. . . .

¹ None printed.

We have not hesitated to inform Morgan (and will do likewise with SAC on his return next week) that the agreement as he signed it will not have a good reception in Washington. We said that we regretted that he could not have negotiated a better document. We added that we could hardly recommend the accord he had signed as a satisfactory one and would point out to our government that it was our view that nothing to which he had agreed in this document should be permitted to emasculate in any way the Belgrade agreement. We informed Morgan that frankly we were most apprehensive as to the future situation in Trieste and V G and foresaw only trouble. We hoped that he would realize that the only way to deal with the Yugos was to be firm with them. Surely he could not fail to recognize that it was only because the US and Great Britain had put up a firm front that Tito agreed to sign the Belgrade accord. We deplored all the more, therefore, that he had not continued this policy in his negotiations with Jovanović. He surely had no illusions as to Partisan activities in our area of V G and he certainly must know that the Yugos Communists had established a firm hold in Trieste. They would undoubtedly be most active and we could expect incessant political chicanery there. We said that in our opinion not only should we send our best AMG people at once to this area but we should also spare no effort to increase our security forces there. And the sooner we let the Yugos know that we would not tolerate any interference from them in our zone the better it would be for all concerned. The only way to make them understand this would be to crack down on them on each and every occasion they deserved it.

The Chief of Staff who seemed a bit disturbed because of our attitude promised that he would see to it that "the Yugos are kept in their place."

We then asked Morgan whether there had been any discussion with the Yugo Chief of Staff on the publication of the document which he had signed and he stated that he felt certain there was no intention on the part of the Yugos to publish it and that it would be regarded on both sides as a secret military accord.

For Dept's information appendices A B² are maps related to article 3 of the main agreement.

KIRK

² Neither printed.

No. 567

860h.9111 R. R./6-2245 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract]

PLAIN

BELGRADE, June 22, 1945.

188. . . .

Speaking yesterday to a delegation from Trieste who were here to attend anti-Fascist Women's Congress Marshal Tito said in part "tell the people of Istria and the Slovene Littoral that we have done everything in our power and that there was nothing else that we could do. We were forced to submit to this great sacrifice with heavy heart. The problem of civil government is still open, but we will fight for the rights of the people of Trieste, the Slovene Littoral, and other places. There exists a tendency to reinstate the former Italian Government, Fascist courts which existed up to the capitulation of Italy. It is evident that Slovene and Italian anti-Fascists have a full moral right to resist whether by protests, petitions, or any other lawful means."

SHANTZ

No. 568

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2345 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

BELGRADE, June 23, 1945—8 p. m.

197. Referring to Tito's published remark that problem of civil govt of Venezia Giulia is still open (Embtel 109 [188], June 22¹) I suggest that US and UK govts instruct Belgrade Embassies to remind Yugo Govt that question was settled by Article 3 of Belgrade Agreements and that attempts to stir up trouble in area under AMG is unlikely to benefit Yugos position.

SHANTZ

¹ Document No. 567.

No. 569

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET
US URGENTCASERTA, June 24, 1945—7 p. m^{*}

2749. Re our immediately preceding tel ¹ and your 607, June 22.² When Gen Morgan reported to AFHQ signature of agreement with Yugos he made no ref to exception re Art. 3 and Belgrade learned of it before ourselves because Col Clarke Brit Mil Attaché Belgrade was present during negotiations and kept Brit Ambass[ador] Belgrade ³ fully informed. On Morgan's return to AFHQ when we asked for text as set forth in our 2725, June 22 ⁴ he withheld copy until he could "explain" text. He did not mention reservation re Art 3 of Belgrade agreement until he held meeting referred to in our 2725. Text of Yugo reservation has already been sent to Dept ⁵ . . .

.

KIRK

¹ Not printed.
² Document No. 565.
³ R. C. Skrine Stevenson.
⁴ Document No. 566.
⁵ See document No. 561.

No. 570

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2345 : Telegram

President Truman to Marshal Stalin ¹

TOP SECRET

[OLYMPIA, WASHINGTON,] 25 June 1945.

304. Since the receipt of your message of 21 June,² in regard to the negotiations at Trieste, I have received word from the Supreme Allied

¹ Presumably sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via the White House Map Room and Navy channels. This message had been drafted in the Department of State and submitted by Grew to the White House for approval under cover of a memorandum of June 23 (file No. 740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2345). It was telegraphed to Truman, who approved the draft, with minor changes, on June 25. For Churchill's reply to Stalin's message of June 21, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. 1, p. 370.

² Document No. 562.

Commander that these discussions in Trieste have been concluded and a supplementary military accord signed. These discussions were intended solely for the purpose of implementing the military aspects of the political agreement reached between the United States, British and Yugoslav Governments on June 9. The June 9 agreement embodied the principle that the future disposition of the Venezia Giulia territory should be reserved for orderly adjustment as a part of the eventual peace settlement, and that nothing in the agreement would prejudice or affect the ultimate disposal of the area.

Having reached agreement on this point, it was then conceded that Yugoslav administration could be established in the disputed area up to the limit of the territory necessary to meet Allied military requirements. Throughout the discussions, both on the government and military level, due regard has been given to legitimate interests of both Yugoslav and Italian populations as well as to the Yugoslav contribution to the elimination of German military power.

As I said in my previous message to you on this subject,³ the Allied Commander must have adequate authority in the area entrusted to him to enable him to carry out his task and to safeguard the interests of all concerned. In a like fashion responsibility of the Yugoslav Commander has been recognized and there has been no effort to interfere with the exercise of his responsibility in the region of Venezia Giulia entrusted to him east of the agreed line. The Allied Governments must therefore insist that there be no interference with the exercise of their responsibility west of the line, particularly since both commanders have agreed that they will refrain from any action prejudicing the final settlement.

It is true difficulties arose during the conversations at Trieste since it appeared that the Yugoslav authorities did not fully appreciate that the fundamental principle of the agreement of June 9 was that no action could be permitted which would prejudice the ultimate disposal of the area. The Yugoslav Military Commander at first declined to recognize the Allied Commander's authority which was established by Article 3 of the Belgrade agreement over administration west of the line. This and other acts on the part of local commanders subsequent to June 9 have given rise to the impression that these local commanders had not yet been informed of the full extent of the agreement reached with Marshal Tito and the Belgrade Government.

Should there be any further aspect of the agreement which you feel should be considered, we shall have an opportunity to discuss this at our early meeting.

³ The reference is to a message received by Stalin on May 31. Text in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 240.

No. 571

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1945—6 p. m.

158. Tito's statement that VG civil govt problem is still pending (your 197, June 23 ¹) is incomprehensible in view of clear stipulations Art. 3 of Belgrade agreement. (Sent Belgrade as 158, rptd. Caserta as 617.) In your discussions with Yugo officials you should present this view (see para 2 our 151, June 23 [22]; 607 to Caserta ²). Keep before Yugo govt the thought that sympathy in this country for just Yugo claims will largely depend on strict fulfillment of signed commitments.

GREW

W[illiam] P[hillips]

¹ Document No. 568.² Document No. 565.

No. 572

Leahy Papers : Telegram

*The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (Alexander) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*¹

[Paraphrase]

SECRET

CASERTA, 25 June 1945.

PRIORITY

NAF 1023, FX 12507. Cite FHGGG. Sent to the Special Signals Office of the Air Ministry for the British Chiefs of Staff, and to the Adjutant General, War Department, for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Repeated for information to SHAEF Main.

In the course of the conferences concerning Trieste, a difference arose with the Yugoslavs with respect to the interpretation of the Belgrade agreement, paragraph 3, relating to the continuance of civil administration. The memorandum submitted by the Yugoslavs (which contained proposals unacceptable to us) and our comments thereon were attached to the agreement which was forwarded to you.² I request confirmation of our interpretation, to serve as a basis for possible future action or discussion, in view of (a) radio broadcasts

¹ Kirk called Grew's attention to this message in telegram No. 2767 of June 26 (file No. 740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2645). The substance of paragraphs 3-5 had previously been communicated to Grew by Kirk in telegram No. 2682 of June 19 (file No. 740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-1945).

² For the memorandum and comments referred to, see the enclosures to document No. 561.

during the past few days, (b) the attitude expressed by the Yugoslavs, and (c) declaration by local Slovene groups. I also request any further guidance which you may wish to send.

The following is generally the present situation in our area with respect to civil administration: In part, Italian administration is functioning, but in part it has been suspended by action taken by the Yugoslavs during the time of their occupation. Organizations such as the *Consorzio*, *Sepral*, and the Office of the Civil Engineer are still functioning executively under chiefs appointed by the Yugoslavs. The prefecture staff continues to be paid, but it has been relieved of all executive responsibility; instead, committees of liberation have been established by the Yugoslavs. These committees have subcommittees (with jurisdiction in various administrative fields) which have been exercising executive powers up to now. The regional committee has exercised executive control over the whole area, with the above pattern being followed down through the district and communal level.

This committee structure established by the Yugoslavs is obviously not finally or completely organized, but it constituted the machinery which was in operation when our occupation began. The Yugoslavs take the position that we are committed, under the Belgrade agreement, to adopt this committee structure as the "existing administration".

The agreement signed at Belgrade provides, in paragraph 3: "Use will be made of any Yugoslav civil administration which is already set up and which in the view of the Supreme Allied Commander is working satisfactorily." We have maintained that this agreement intended that the commitment on our part to continue the existing administration pertained not to the system of administration itself but rather to personnel. We have also maintained (a) that the Italian system of administration must be continued in its essentials since the basic law of this area is Italian and must continue to be so, and (b) that we cannot recognize the system of committees as an executive instrument of local government, although we will use committees in an advisory capacity, where they are useful, as we do in other parts of Italy.

The wording of paragraph 3 of the Belgrade agreement may give some colour to the Yugoslav claim. We submitted a draft, you will remember, which used the word "administrators" instead of the term "administration". The position would have been entirely clear if our draft wording had been adopted in the final text of the agreement. We are bearing in mind, of course, the qualification that, in the Supreme Allied Commander's opinion, the administration must be working satisfactorily. We do not feel, however, that we should depend on this qualification, as this might result in a totally anomalous situation in which we would have the Italian system of government

operating in one locality and a committee system functioning in the neighboring one. Obviously, in practice this would be unworkable.

We are convinced that our position, as described above, is the correct one and, as a practical matter, the only position which we could adopt.

ALEXANDER

No. 573

740.00119 Control (Italy)/6-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

CASERTA, June 27, 1945—midnight.

2794. . . .

.
 When we asked SAC his view as to Yugo reservation on art 3 of Belg[rade] Agreement he expressed concurrence with our view that on this point [we] must stand. He then commented: "Please do not worry about civil admin in our area. As you know the Bel Agreement gives me final author in the matter and I shall see to it that the interpretation is such as to represent our views".

KIRK

FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS

CHINA: NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

EDITOR'S NOTE.—The agreement signed by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill at Yalta on February 11, 1945, regarding entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan¹ contained provisions relating to Outer Mongolia, Dairen, Port Arthur, the Chinese Eastern Railroad, and the South Manchurian Railroad. The agreement provided that these provisions would require the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and that President Roosevelt would take measures to obtain that concurrence. In the agreement the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to conclude a pact of friendship and alliance with the National Government of the Republic of China. The Sino-Soviet negotiations leading to the conclusion of this "pact of friendship and alliance" were begun at Moscow on June 30, with Prime Minister T. V. Soong as the principal Chinese participant. They were interrupted by Stalin's departure for the Berlin Conference, were then resumed following Stalin's return to Moscow, and were concluded on August 14, 1945.²

The documentation on this subject printed in this compilation is limited to (a) papers describing the status of these Sino-Soviet negotiations immediately upon the eve of the Berlin Conference and (b) papers prepared specifically for the Berlin Conference or at the Conference itself, where the Moscow negotiations were discussed between the United States and Soviet Delegations. See volume II, pages 45-46, 476.³

¹ Executive Agreement Series No. 498; 59 Stat. (2) 1823. Text also in *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.

² For translations of the Sino-Soviet treaty of August 14, 1945, and of related notes and agreements, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. xiv, p. 201; *United States Relations With China, With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949; Department of State publication No. 3573), p. 585.

³ Concerning aspects of the Sino-Soviet negotiations not covered by the documents printed in this compilation, and for information on related Soviet-American negotiations, see *United States Relations With China*, pp. 116-120; Feis, *The China Tangle*, pp. 316-321, 342-350.

No. 574

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹[Extract²]

TOP SECRET

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF JAPAN AND POLICY TOWARD LIBERATED AREAS IN THE FAR EAST IN RELATION TO UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

III. POLICY TOWARD CHINESE LIBERATED AREAS AND CHINA
GENERALLY

With regard to policy in liberated areas of China, we stand for: (1) Full recognition of China's sovereignty in those areas and their restoration to Chinese control as soon as circumstances will permit termination of military administration of civil affairs; (2) abstention from interference in internal political affairs during, as well as of course after, the period of military occupation and administration of civil affairs; and (3) in relation generally to areas restored to China, as in relation to China as a whole, adherence to the principles of the Nine Power Treaty³ committing the signatories to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial [and] administrative integrity of China, to provide the fullest opportunity to China to develop and maintain an effective and stable government, to safeguard the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China, and to refrain from seeking special rights and privileges in China.

We advocate agreement among the principally interested powers (U. S. S. R., United Kingdom, and United States) to support the foregoing principles of conduct with regard to China.

Liberation of Chinese territory, including Manchuria, will inevitably accentuate the present political difficulties between the Chinese Government and the Communist regime in as much as the latter control extensive areas in North China contiguous to areas to be liberated. It is of the utmost importance that the principally interested powers agree to refrain in areas liberated by their military forces from activity which would foster discord and disunity in China. Conversely, those powers should agree upon measures to encourage national unity in China and the formation of a broadly representative Chinese Government cooperative with all its friendly neighbors.

¹ Annex 3 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² For other extracts from this paper, see documents Nos. 589 and 607.

³ Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922 (Treaty Series No. 723; 44 Stat. (3) 2113).

Furthermore, those powers might agree upon non-competitive measures to assist China towards recovery from the ravages of war and toward economic reconstruction along lines to improve the livelihood of all the Chinese people.

It is of the utmost importance that the situation in China, now and as it may develop in the future, not be permitted to become a source of irritation and possible friction between the three principally interested powers. Efforts to bring about political and military unity in China have so far not met with success. It is believed that only through the coordinated efforts of the U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, and the United States can conditions making for unity and stability be created.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

No. 575

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper ¹

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL MANCHURIAN PROBLEMS

A. FREE PORT, DAIREN

In 1898 Russia obtained from China a 25-year lease of the Kwantung Leased Territory in South Manchuria ² in which is situated Dairen, a large modern ice-free port, and Port Arthur, a naval base. Dairen is connected with Siberia by rail through Manchuria. In 1905, following the Russo-Japanese war, the lease was transferred to Japan with the consent of China.³ The period of the lease was extended to 99 years by the terms of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915 ⁴ (one of the so-called "21 Demands"), the validity of which China has contested. The United States Government has never recognized the validity of that Treaty.

Should the USSR enter the war against Japan, it is probable that the USSR will desire that Dairen retain the status of a "free port".

So long as there is upheld the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations, there would be no reason for the United States to oppose any Russian proposal that Dairen remain a "free port". At the same time, however, the United States should support China's sovereignty over the Kwantung Leased Territory,

¹ Cf. document No. 579, *post*, and vol. II, document No. 1215.

² See John V. A. MacMurray, ed., *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894-1919* (New York, 1921), vol. I, p. 119.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 522.

⁴ Text printed *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 1220.

including Dairen, as that territory has been regarded as forming a part of Manchuria, and the Cairo Declaration⁵ provides that Manchuria is to be returned to the Republic of China.

B. TRAFFIC ARRANGEMENTS ON MANCHURIAN RAILWAYS

In 1896 China granted Russia the right to construct a railway known as the Chinese Eastern across Northern Manchuria to shorten the route across Siberia to Vladivostok. This railway, with all its appurtenances, was to revert to China free of charge 80 years after being placed in operation and China possessed the right to purchase the railway after 36 years.⁶ In 1898 Russia obtained, under similar terms, rights under which a connecting line was built southward from Harbin to Dairen and Port Arthur in the Kwantung Leased Territory.⁷ The lines were opened to traffic in 1901 and 1903, respectively.

The railway zone usually consisted of a narrow ribbon of land varying from 50 to 300 feet on either side of the right of way, except in special areas, principally railway towns, where it was widened to include sizeable settlements.

In 1905, as a result of the Russo-Japanese war, the rights pertaining to the southern half of the connecting line were transferred to Japan with the consent of China. This Japanese-held southern section was known as the South Manchuria Railway. The period of Japan's lease on this line was extended to 99 years by the terms of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915, the validity of which China has contested. The United States Government has never recognized the validity of that Treaty. In 1935 Soviet Russia sold the Chinese Eastern Railway (including the northern half of the connecting line to Dairen) to "Manchukuo".⁸ The USSR, which has no completely ice-free port in the Far East, has both economic and historical reasons for wanting free use of and access to Dairen after the war.

So long as it is the intention of the Soviet Government to effect these purposes through amicable negotiations with China, there would appear to be no reason why the Government of the United States should offer opposition, provided that any arrangements made will not operate to establish in favor of the interests of the Soviet Union any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial and economic development in the area concerned.

Since the original trunk lines were built, there have been constructed both by Chinese and Japanese interests a considerable mileage of connecting lines. It is less likely that the Soviet Government will

⁵ Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 393.

⁶ See MacMurray, ed., *Treaties and Agreements*, vol. I, p. 81.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 119.

⁸ See Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1934* (London, 1935), p. 672.

have an interest in any of these lines, her chief interest being in through traffic on the line between Manchuli and Vladivostok and between a point on that line (Harbin) and the ice-free port of Dairen.

Foreign traffic moving through Manchuria should have the unhampered right of duty-free transit by rail between Dairen and the international borders of Manchuria if Dairen is to be of maximum use as a free port.

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1945.

No. 576

761.93/7-1045

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The following message to the President from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has been transmitted by Ambassador Hurley in a telegram No. 1140 of July 10, 2 p. m.:

"I wish to thank you for your telegram of June the 15th,¹ containing an outline of a proposed agreement between the National Government of China and the Soviet Government. I am especially grateful to you for the keen interest you have taken in this connection. In accordance with arrangements I have already sent to [sic] Dr. T. V. Soong to Moscow to negotiate with the Soviet Government, and I shall keep you constantly informed of the progress of these negotiations through Ambassador Hurley. As this is a matter of grave concern not only between China and Russia but also to the interests of peace and security of the world at large, I earnestly request you to continue to bestow your great attention on it and enlighten me with your views from time to time."

As we have been requested by the Map Room² to limit telegraphic communications to you to those of an urgent character this message has not been repeated by telegraph but is being forwarded by pouch so that it may be available to you for transmission to the President.

JOSEPH C. GREW

¹ Not printed herein. See Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 268-269. Hurley had delivered to Chiang on June 15 a message from Truman which included the terms of the agreement regarding the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan which had been concluded at the Yalta Conference.

² The communications center at the White House.

No. 577

761.93/7-1245 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President and the Secretary of State*TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[Moscow,] 12 July 1945.

Personal and top secret for the President and the Secretary of State from Harriman.

Soong had another talk with Stalin tonight.¹ He tells me that he has come to an understanding on all matters along the general lines previously reported except for some points as to the railroads and the ports. After long argument Stalin agreed that the guards should be Chinese and that there should be no rights to move Soviet troops in Manchuria. The forces going to Port Arthur would be moved by sea. The final point *not* agreed to regarding the railroads is control of the management. Stalin still insists on a majority of the directors which Soong has resisted. Soong has offered joint operation with equal participation in the board and the management.

As to the ports Stalin still insists that the military zone under Russian control should include Dairen as well as Port Arthur and that there should be a naval base within Dairen. Soong offers Port Arthur and the area south of Dairen as a military zone. Dairen however should be a free port under Chinese management with certain docks and storage yards leased on a commercial basis to the Soviets for their through shipments.

Soong suggested to Stalin that he return to Chungking to consult the Generalissimo over the points still at issue. Stalin however said that it was better to come to agreement before he met you at Berlin as he wished to decide with you date of his entry into the war. Another meeting has been arranged therefore for the night of the 12th. Soong intends to outline in detail the maximum concessions he is authorized to make along the above lines. If no agreement is reached he will return to Chungking to consult the Generalissimo and will give me to report to you the position of the negotiations—the matters on which agreement has been reached and the points remaining at issue.

Soong asks me to tell you that he feels that in order to meet Stalin's demands he has gone beyond the Yalta Agreement in agreeing to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia after the war and has fully met any reasonable interpretation of the Yalta Agreement in his proposals regarding the railroads and ports. On the other hand Stalin has offered him satisfactory conditions for the Treaty of

¹ i. e., July 11.

Friendship and the Civil Affairs Agreement during the military period in Manchuria, also assurances that he would withhold support from the insurgents in Sinkiang and the Chinese Communist Party.

No. 578

761.93/7-1345 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President and the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 13 July 1945.

PRIORITY

(Personal and top secret for the President and Secretary of State from Harriman.)

Soong saw Stalin and Molotov again last night (Thursday) and outlined the maximum concessions he was authorized to make along the lines of my last message (numbers 120015 and 120755, July 11-12²)[.]

As to the management of the railroads he proposed equal number of directors with Chinese to be Chairman without administrative authority as a courtesy to China; the Manager of the Chinese Eastern to be Russian and the Assistant Manager Chinese; the Manager of the South Manchurian to be Chinese with a Russian as Assistant Manager. He proposed that the Port of Dairen should be a free port under Chinese management, but offered the Soviets docks and storage areas under commercial lease for their through traffic. He explained that for obvious reasons he could not agree to the Port of Dairen or the connecting railroad to be in a Soviet military zone or to be used as a Soviet naval base. Soong offered Port Arthur as a naval base for joint use but under Soviet control. There does not appear to [be?] any differences regarding Port Arthur but Stalin told Soong that his proposals regarding the Port of Dairen and the railroads were unsatisfactory. Stalin did not offer any further concessions in his demands for the control of the railroads and for the inclusion of Dairen in the military zone substantially under Soviet control. Soong then said that he felt he should return to Chungking to consult with Chiang, but would be prepared to come to Moscow again at any time Stalin wished. The meeting parted, according to Soong, in a friendly atmosphere and he expressed satisfaction with the frankness of discussion and confidence that he had gained of the friendly attitude of the Soviet Government toward the Chinese Government.

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

² See document No. 577.

Soong told me that he did not press Stalin further on any points as he was anxious to leave the subjects open in order to obtain your views. He is hopeful that you will be able to get Stalin to accept the Chinese position at the forthcoming conference or that you will be able to work out a compromise which the Generalissimo can accept. He did not, however, say this to Stalin, although from a political standpoint he feels that China has made a serious concession in agreeing to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia. He feels that the discussions here have made important progress in the establishment of friendly relations between his government and the Kremlin and is satisfied with the understandings reached on questions other than those still at issue.

He is leaving for Chungking tomorrow (Saturday) morning in the plane which you placed at his disposal and hopes that it may remain there to bring him back to Moscow as soon as possible. He asked me to present this request to you.

I am leaving for Berlin with General Deane and Admiral Maples this afternoon.

No. 579

Truman Papers

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: U. S. Interpretation of the Yalta Agreement and Terms Which China Might Appropriately Accept in Regard to Outer Mongolia and Manchuria

The attached memorandum entitled "U. S. Interpretation of the Yalta Agreement² and Terms Which China Might Appropriately Accept in Regard to Outer Mongolia and Manchuria", has been prepared in pursuance to the suggestion contained in Ambassador Harriman's 081800 and your request sent through Admiral Leahy (MR-IN-19).³

There is in the Department no copy of the Yalta Agreement or of any records of conversations relating thereto. The attached memorandum has therefore been prepared on the basis of our recollection of its contents.

¹ The presence of the signed original of this memorandum in the Truman Papers suggests the probability that Byrnes passed it on to Truman.

² i. e., the agreement regarding entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan signed by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill at Yalta, February 11, 1945.

³ Documents Nos. 203 and 204, respectively.

You may wish to give special attention to the portions of the memorandum which have been marked in red.⁴

JOSEPH C. GREW

[Attachment]

TOP SECRET

U. S. INTERPRETATION OF THE YALTA AGREEMENT AND TERMS WHICH CHINA MIGHT APPROPRIATELY ACCEPT IN REGARD TO OUTER MONGOLIA AND MANCHURIA

Outer Mongolia. With regard to the interpretation of this Government of the term "*status quo*" as applied to Outer Mongolia the following facts are pertinent.

The Chinese Government claims all of Mongolia, including the area occupied by the Mongolian People's Republic, as part of the Republic of China. The present Chinese Provisional Constitution for the Period of Political Tutelage (1931) states that the territory of the Republic consists of the several provinces and Mongolia and Tibet. Although China lost control over Outer Mongolia in 1911, the Chinese Government has never ceased to claim it as an integral part of the Republic, and in the treaties which it concluded with imperial Russia respecting Outer Mongolia and with Outer Mongolia itself China gained from both of them recognition of this claim. (See the note attached to the Sino-Russian Declaration, November 5, 1913;⁵ Article II of the Tri-Partite Treaty of Kiakhta, June 7, 1915,⁶ and Article V of the Sino-Soviet Agreement on General Principles of May 31, 1924.⁷)

China, having gained recognition of its claim to sovereignty from the U. S. S. R., contends that it is the sole government legally competent to regulate the affairs of Outer Mongolia, and it has protested against any agreements made by the U. S. S. R., with or concerning Outer Mongolia. Thus when the Soviet-Mongolian Mutual Assistance Pact of March 12, 1936⁸ was signed, the Chinese Government protested to the Soviet Union that Outer Mongolia was an integral part of the Republic, and that no foreign state might conclude treaties or agreements with it. The Soviet Foreign Office in reply reaffirmed the Soviet Union's recognition of Chinese sovereignty.

⁴ The marked portions of the attachment are here printed in italics.

⁵ Text in MacMurray, ed., *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894-1919*, vol. II, p. 1066.

⁶ Text printed *ibid.*, p. 1243.

⁷ Text in *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919-1929* (Washington, 1929), p. 133.

⁸ Text in Stephen Heald and John W. Wheeler-Bennett, eds., *Documents on International Affairs, 1936* (London, 1937), p. 472.

[No. 579]

China also protested against the Declaration attached to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941⁹ which stated in part:

“. . . the U. S. S. R. pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo, and Japan pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian People's Republic.”

The following day the Chinese Foreign Minister¹⁰ issued a statement in which he declared:

“The four Northeastern Provinces and Outer Mongolia are an integral part of the Republic and will always remain Chinese territory. The Chinese Government and people cannot recognize any engagements entered into between third parties which are derogatory to China's territorial and administrative integrity.”*

The substance of this statement was communicated to the Soviet Foreign Office in the form of a protest to which the latter answered that the Soviet-Japanese Pact was solely to insure the security of the Soviet Union and had no bearing on Soviet relations with China.

The U. S. S. R. has not claimed the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic, and it has repeatedly informed the Chinese that it respects Chinese sovereignty therein. In statements by Soviet officials the view is held that the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic is autonomous, and able to enter into independent treaty relations. *Izvestia*, the semi-official Soviet newspaper, in its issue of March 6, 1925 quoted Chicherin, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, as declaring: “(the U. S. S. R.) recognizes Mongolia as [a] part of the whole Republic of China, enjoying, however, autonomy so far-reaching as to preclude Chinese interference with its internal affairs and to permit the establishment of independent relations by Mongolia”. (Quoted by Louis Nemzer, “The Status of Outer Mongolia in International Law”, *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 33, 1939, p. 461.) Statements by other Soviet officials so far as they are available all emphasize the autonomy of the region.

The representative of the Mongolian People's Republic in Moscow¹¹ does not bear one of the usual diplomatic titles but is called a “Delegate Plenipotentiary and Commercial Representative”, indicating that the Mongolian People's Republic is not regarded as a fully independent state. When Vice President Wallace visited Ulan Bator

⁹ Text in S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1940-June 1941* (Boston, 1941), p. 291, and in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLIV, p. 839.

¹⁰ Quo T'ai-ch'i.

* Telegram No. 135, from Embassy, Chungking, April 15, 1941 (761.9411/87). [Footnote in the original. The document cited is not printed.]

¹¹ Zhamsurun Sambu.

in the summer of 1944 no Mongol visa or other Mongol, Chinese or Soviet document was necessary, although the visit was made with the advance knowledge of the U. S. S. R. and China. Notwithstanding the special consideration doubtless shown to the Vice President of the United States, this is nevertheless an indication of the anomalous status of the Mongolian People's Republic *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union and China.

In connection with the conclusion of the Soviet-Mongolian Mutual Assistance Pact, the British Prime Minister¹² was asked in Parliament whether Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic) was an independent state or a part of China. He declared that: "His Majesty's Government continue to regard Outer Mongolia as under Chinese sovereignty; and since the conclusion of the Protocol of the 12th of March, the Soviet Government have declared that in their view the Sino-Soviet Treaty of May 1924 in which Outer Mongolia was recognized as an integral part of the Chinese Republic, is not infringed by the Protocol and retains its force." (*Parliamentary Debates—House of Commons Official Report*, Vol. 312, p. 5, May 11, 1936.)

No statement has been issued by the United States Government in regard to Mongolia, or the Mongolian People's Republic. By the terms of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922¹³ to which it is a signatory, the United States has agreed to respect the territorial and administrative integrity of China (Article I) and it has been at pains to refrain from any indication that it considered the outlying dependencies of China such as Mongolia in a different status from the remainder of China.

It would thus appear that while de jure China has sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, de facto sovereignty has not been exercised since 1911.

If the future status of Outer Mongolia is decided on the basis of the principle of sub-determination [self-determination?] of peoples, then there is little doubt that that territory would separate itself from China, and as an independent nation or otherwise, enter the Soviet orbit. Mongolians have been traditionally antipathetic to the Chinese and, so far as can be judged, have been willing adherents to Soviet ideologies and influence. In the light of realities of the situation it is believed that the Chinese Government would be well advised to give formal recognition to a situation which has long existed in fact and at the same time endeavor to capitalize upon the good-will of the Soviet [Union] thereby gained to obtain firm commitments from the Soviet Government which will confirm and strengthen the Chinese position in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria.

¹² Stanley Baldwin.

¹³ Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922 (Treaty Series No. 723; 44 Stat. (3) [2113]).

Such a disposition would not materially affect any substantial American interest.

Manchuria. The Yalta Agreement contains a general provision for the reversion to the Soviet Union of rights in Manchuria formerly possessed by Czarist Russia prior to the Russo-Japanese War. Under sub-headings to this main provision there are certain specific provisions dealing *inter alia* with the "internationalization" of Dairen and joint Sino-Soviet operation of Manchurian railroads. It is not clear to what extent the specific provisions are to be construed as explanatory to the main provision and to what extent they represent modifications of or limitations on the main provision.

The principal rights enjoyed by Russia in Manchuria prior to the Russo-Japanese War may be summarized as follows:

Leases of Port Arthur and Talienwan (Dairen) (Russo-Chinese Convention of March 27, 1898.¹⁴) Lease for 25 years (expiring in 1923), subject to renewal by mutual consent, to the Russian Government of Port Arthur and Dairen. The lease "in no way to violate the sovereign rights of the Chinese Emperor to the leased territory". Russia to have complete and exclusive enjoyment of the whole area, including the entire military command and supreme civil administration with no Chinese land forces permitted in the leased area. Port Arthur to be used solely by Chinese and Russian vessels. Dairen, with the exception of one of the river bays set apart for the use of Russian and Chinese fleets, to be open to foreign commerce with free entry granted to the merchant vessels of all countries. The Russian Government at its own expense to erect fortification buildings and lighthouses, to maintain garrisons and take steps for defense.

Railways. The Chinese Eastern Railway, constructed in 1897-1901, by the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, was nominally a Russo-Chinese institution but actually almost exclusively, if not entirely Russian, which Company was granted by the Chinese Government exclusive rights of operation. It was provided that 80 years from the date of completion the line would pass free of charge to the Chinese Government, and further that after 36 years from the date of completion the Chinese Government would have the right to buy it back.

The Chinese Eastern Railway extended from Manchuli Station in the west across Manchuria to Pogradichnaya on the Ussuri Railway, with a southern branch extending from Harbin to Dairen (Dalny) and Port Arthur. That portion of the southern branch from Changchun (Hsinking) southward was transferred to Japan by the Russo-Japa-

¹⁴ Text in MacMurray, ed., *Treaties and Agreements*, vol. I, p. 119.

nese Treaty of Peace of 1905.¹⁵ The remainder of the Chinese Eastern Railway was transferred to "Manchukuo" in 1936.

The Russians assumed civil administration of the railway zone until 1920. Under the agreement of September 8, 1896, between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank,¹⁶ lands necessary to the construction, operation and protection of the railway were ceded to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, and, according to the Russian (French) text, the company was given *le droit absolu et exclusif de l'administration* (the absolute and exclusive right of administration or management). The Chinese text of the treaty, however, does not contain this stipulation. On the basis of the French text, interpreting *administration* to mean administration in the full English sense rather than mere management, the Russians organized within the railway zone, (an irregular strip of land extending for some distance on either side of the railway and embracing Harbin and other cities which developed along the railway), their own civil administration, including courts of justice, police, schools, etc. The Government of the United States has considered that this procedure was an encroachment upon Chinese sovereignty and impaired the extraterritorial rights of American citizens.

The statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company¹⁷ provide for a board of management (or board of directors), to consist of nine members elected by the shareholders. The chairman of the board was appointed by the Chinese Government. The vice chairman was chosen by the members of the board from among themselves. Shareholding was limited to Russian and Chinese subjects. It is understood that nearly all of the shares were purchased by the Russian Government. The Chinese were, at the most, allowed an amount of stock sufficient only to afford a right to participate in the election of the directorate. Prior to 1917 the board of directors sat in St. Petersburg. The actual operation of the railway was confided to a manager, who was assisted, and to an extent controlled with respect to important matters, by a council of administration consisting of the manager and his principal assistants. The manager was also civil governor of the railway zone and as such possessed the most extended powers.

The provisions of the proposed agreements in regard to the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur and in regard to railways, as described in Moscow's 081750Z,¹⁸ are clearly more advantageous to China than would

¹⁵ Signed at Portsmouth, September 5, 1905. Text in *Foreign Relations*, 1905, p. 824.

¹⁶ Text in MacMurray, ed., *Treaties and Agreements*, vol. 1, p. 74.

¹⁷ Text printed *ibid.*, p. 84.

¹⁸ Not printed. Cf. document No. 578.

be terms calling for the complete restoration of the rights possessed by Russia in Manchuria prior to the Russo-Japanese war.

On the other hand, the provisions of the proposed agreements are less advantageous to China than would be terms based upon a normal construction, taken by themselves, of the somewhat ambiguous and vaguely worded terms of the specific sub-headings of the main provision calling for the recovery by the Soviet Union of its former rights in Manchuria. For example, the term "internationalization" of Dairen could not of itself warrant the interpretation placed upon it by the Soviet Government in the draft agreement, calling for Soviet predominance in administration, nor would the provisions in regard to the joint Sino-Soviet operation of the railways call for an implementation whereby Russia would have sole ownership and superiority of authority over the Chinese in the management of the railway.

There is an undoubted inconsistency between a Soviet commitment to respect Chinese sovereignty and proposals under which for even a limited period of years Russia would exercise virtual control over the main railways of Manchuria and enjoy predominant administrative rights in Dairen and exclusive administrative rights in Port Arthur. For reasons set forth below, it is believed that there are less disadvantages to be seen in the proposal in regard to Port Arthur than in the rest of the draft agreements which, if carried out in full, would represent a reversion to a situation which was one of the most pernicious foci of imperialism and which we had hoped might be eliminated once and for all, and is therefore disappointing from the point of view of American interests, policy and ideals. Accordingly, if it should be possible for this Government, either singly or in conjunction with Great Britain, to influence the Soviet Government toward a modification in favor of China (and of other countries) of the terms relating to Dairen and the railways, it is believed that we should make the effort. There would seem warrant for such an approach to the Soviet Government on the ground that it was not our understanding of the Yalta Agreement that "internationalization" of Dairen meant transfer of predominant administrative rights to the Soviet Union or that joint operation of the railways called for transfer of exclusive ownership to the Soviet Union and for vesting Russia with a predominant position in management. If through such an approach the Soviet Union could be influenced to make substantial modification in these proposals it would be very welcome from our point of view. At the same time the fact cannot be lost sight of that the National Government of China stands to gain much by Russian participation in the war against Japan and by Russian agreement not to support the Chinese Communists. For these benefits China must be prepared to make reasonable concessions and we should not support Chinese objections to such otherwise reasonable concessions

vs are not inimical to American interests or in contradiction of American policy.

The United States has, of course, an important practical interest in trade and commerce in Manchuria which should be safeguarded. In respect to any arrangements which may be made between the Soviet and Chinese Governments regarding Manchuria we should obtain explicit commitments from both governments that the principle of non-discrimination in international intercourse will be respected in all areas and operations which may be the subject of agreement. We should expect that application of this principle would cover the right of equality of access by the United States to the port facilities of Dairen, the privilege of leasing and purchasing land there for business and residential purposes (a right which was generally denied in practice during the Japanese regime) and the right of free and full use of traffic facilities of the railways.

With regard to the proposed arrangement for Port Arthur, it is believed that the Chinese could afford and would be well advised to grant to the Russians privileges at least no less liberal than those granted to us by Great Britain in connection with the lease of certain naval and air bases in British territory in the Western Hemisphere. For example, in the master agreement comprised in an exchange of notes between the British Embassy and the Department of September 2, 1940,¹⁹ it is provided that:

“His Majesty’s Government, in the leases to be agreed upon, will grant to the United States for the period of the leases all the rights, power, and authority within the bases leased, and within the limits of the territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to or in the vicinity of such bases, necessary to provide access to and defense of such bases, and appropriate provisions for their control.”

In the Anglo-American Agreement of March 27, 1941²⁰ for the lease of air bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Antigua, Trinidad and British Guiana Article IV specifically grants jurisdiction to United States courts over members of the United States forces, United States nationals, persons not British subjects, and British subjects charged with having committed, either within or without the leased areas, offenses of a military nature punishable under American law including but not restricted to treason, offenses relating to sabotage or espionage, and any other offenses relating to the security and protection of United States bases, establishments, equipment or other property or to operations of the Government of the United States in the territory. While the proposed arrangement for Port Arthur envisages that the port will be under “Soviet administration”,

¹⁹ Executive Agreement Series No. 181; 54 Stat. (2) 2405.

²⁰ Executive Agreement Series No. 235; 55 Stat. (2) 1560.

there would not, in the light of all the circumstances, seem to be ground for putting forth objection on our part if the Chinese grant the Soviet Government exclusive jurisdiction within the port area of Port Arthur, whereas the proposals relating to Dairen and the railways as they now stand are open to legitimate objection on the part of the United States and other of the United Nations.

JAPAN

PEACE FEELERS THROUGH THE SOVIET UNION

EDITOR'S NOTE.—It has not been possible to establish the precise extent to which the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference was aware of the contents of the papers of Japanese origin printed in this section and in volume II, pages 1248–1264 and 1291–1298. The contents of certain of these papers were known to United States officials in Washington, however, as early as July 13 (see Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), page 74; cf. pages 75–76) and information on Japanese peace maneuvers was received by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson at Babelsberg on July 16 (see volume II, document No. 1236, footnote 4). It has also been determined that a series of messages of Japanese origin on this subject was received by the United States Delegation during the course of the Berlin Conference and that these messages were circulated at Babelsberg to some members of the President's party. Furthermore, in a conference on January 24, 1956, between Truman and members of his staff and Department of State historians, Truman supplied the information that he was familiar with the contents of the first Japanese peace feeler (i. e., the proposal contained in document No. 582) before Stalin mentioned it to him at Babelsberg (see volume II, page 87) and that he was familiar with the contents of the second Japanese peace feeler (i. e., the approach reported in document No. 1234) before Stalin brought it to the attention of Truman and Attlee at the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Berlin Conference on July 28 (see volume II, page 460).

The texts of the documents in this section are translations prepared for these volumes by the Division of Language Services, Department of State, from microfilm copies, now deposited in the Library of Congress, of portions of the archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They are all drawn from the reel of microfilm catalogued as follows by the Library of Congress: "S 1.7.0.0–55 Documents relating to negotiations between Japan, and the U. S. S. R. concerning the termination of the War including the Soviet declaration of war against Japan Reel S586." For a published collection of Japanese documents on this subject in the original language, see *Shusen shiroku* (Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1952).

No. 580

761.94/7-2145 : Telegram

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato)

[Translation]

VERY SECRET

[Tokyo,] July 11, 1945—3 p. m.

URGENT

890. Re my telegram No. 884.¹

The foreign and domestic situation for the Empire is very serious, and even the termination of the war is now being considered privately. Therefore the conversations² mentioned in my telegram No. 852¹ are not being limited solely to the objective of closer relations between Japan and the U. S. S. R., but we are also sounding out the extent to which we might employ the U. S. S. R. in connection with the termination of the war.

Our readiness to promise long-term mutual support for the maintenance of peace, as mentioned in our proposal, was also intended for the purpose of sounding out the Soviet attitude toward Japan with reference to the above. The Soviet Union should be interested in, and probably will greet with much satisfaction, an abandonment of our fishery rights as an amendment to the Treaty of Portsmouth.³ With reference to the other items, the manner of answering the arguments would be to meet fully the demands of the Soviets according to my telegram No. 885.¹ Therefore, although we of course wish the completion of an agreement from the Malik-Hirota negotiations, on the other hand, sounding out the Soviets as to the manner in which they might be used to terminate the war is also desired. We would like to learn quickly the intentions of the Soviet Government regarding the above. As this point is a matter with which the Imperial Court is also greatly concerned, meet with Molotov immediately whether or not T. V. Soong is present in the U. S. S. R.⁴ With the circumstances of the earlier part of this telegram in mind, ascertain as best you can their intentions and please answer by telegram immediately.

¹ Not printed.

² i. e., the Hirota-Malik conversations concerning a new Soviet-Japanese agreement. See Robert J. C. Butow, *Japan's Decision To Surrender* (Stanford, 1954), pp. 121-123, and Toshikazu Kase, *Journey to the "Missouri"* (New Haven, 1950), pp. 170-171, 187-188. Sato had received instructions to try to expedite a Soviet reply to the Japanese proposals for such an agreement and to explain Japan's intentions in this connection.

³ Signed September 5, 1905. Text in *Foreign Relations*, 1905, p. 824.

⁴ Concerning Soong's negotiations in Moscow, see *ante*, pp. 857, 862-864.

As you are skilled in matters such as this, I need not mention this, but in your meetings with the Soviets on this matter please bear in mind not to give them the impression that we wish to use the Soviet Union to terminate the war.

No. 581

761.94/7-2145 : Telegram

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato)

[Translation]

SECRET
URGENT

[Tokyo,] July 11, 1945—7 p. m.

891. As it has been recognized as appropriate to make clear to Russia our general attitude concerning the termination of the international war despite the last paragraph in my telegram No. 890,¹ please explain our attitude as follows, together with the substance of the above telegram, and let me know of your progress with Molotov by telegram as soon as possible:

“We consider the maintenance of peace in Asia as one aspect of maintaining world peace. We have no intention of annexing or taking possession of the areas which we have been occupying as a result of the war; we hope to terminate the war with a view to establishing and maintaining lasting world peace.”

Please confer with Mr. M. within a day or two.

¹ Document No. 580.

No. 582

761.94/7-2145 : Telegram

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato)

[Translation]

SECRET
URGENT

[Tokyo,] July 12, 1945—8:50 p. m.

893. Re telegram No. 891¹ and others.

Not having seen the telegram² regarding the meeting with Molotov, I feel as though I am sending troops out without sufficient reconnaissance. Much as I dislike doing so, I find that I must proceed at this time and would like to have you convey to the Soviet side before the Three-Power Conference begins the matter concerning the

¹ Document No. 581.

² Not printed.

Imperial wishes for the termination of the war. The substance of the following should be borne in mind as appropriate in your direct explanation to Molotov:

“His Majesty the Emperor is greatly concerned over the daily increasing calamities and sacrifices faced by the citizens of the various belligerent countries in this present war, and it is His Majesty’s heart’s desire to see the swift termination of the war. In the Greater East Asia War, however, as long as America and England insist on unconditional surrender, our country has no alternative but to see it through in an all-out effort for the sake of survival and the honor of the homeland. The resulting enormous bloodshed of the citizens of the belligerent powers would indeed be contrary to His Majesty’s desires, and so it is His Majesty’s earnest hope that peace may be restored as speedily as possible for the welfare of mankind.

“The above Imperial wishes are rooted not only in His Majesty’s benevolence toward his subjects but in his sincere desire for the happiness of mankind, and he intends to dispatch Prince Fumimaro Konoye as special envoy to the Soviet Union, bearing his personal letter. You are directed, therefore, to convey this to Molotov, and promptly obtain from the Soviet Government admission into that country for the special envoy and his suite. (The list of members of the special envoy’s suite will be cabled later.) Furthermore, though it is not possible for the special envoy to reach Moscow before the Russian authorities leave there for the Three-Power Conference, arrangements must be made so that the special envoy may meet them as soon as they return to Moscow. It is desired, therefore, that the special envoy and his suite make the trip by plane. You will request the Soviet Government to send an airplane for them as far as Manchouli or Tsitsihar.”

No. 583

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato)

[Translation]

VERY SECRET
URGENT

[Tokyo,] July 12, 1945—2:20 a. m. [sic]

894. Re my telegram No. 893.¹

When you convey this matter to them, please make it understood that the subject should be treated as absolutely secret. I realize that I am being presumptuous in saying this; I mention it merely to be sure.

¹ Document No. 582.

No. 584

761.94/7-2145 : Telegram

*The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)*

[Translation]

VERY SECRET
URGENT

Moscow, July 12, 1945—11:25 p. m.

1382. 1. Your telegrams No. 890 and 891¹ were received on the 12th immediately after my reply No. 1381² was sent. I take it that the purpose of your telegram was to sound out the possibilities of utilizing the Soviet Union in connection with the termination of the war.

In the unreserved opinion of this envoy and on the basis of your telegram No. 885,² I believe it no exaggeration to say that the possibility of getting the Soviet Union to join our side and go along with our reasoning is next to nothing. That would run directly counter to the foreign policy of this country as explained in my frequent telegrams to you. It goes without saying that the objectives cannot be successfully attained by sounding out the possibilities of using the Soviet Union to terminate the war on the above basis. This is clearly indicated in the progress of the conferences as reported in my telegram No. 1379.²

Moreover, the manner of your explanation in your telegram No. 891—"We consider the maintenance of peace in Asia as one aspect of maintaining world peace"—is nothing but academic theory. For England and America are planning to take the right of maintaining peace in East Asia away from Japan, and the actual situation is now such that the mainland of Japan itself is in peril. Japan is no longer in a position to be responsible for the maintenance of peace in all of East Asia, no matter how you look at it.

2. Although the Empire and its commanders have said, "We have no intention of annexing or taking possession of the areas which we have been occupying," what kind of reaction can we expect when in fact we have already lost or are about to lose Burma, the Philippines, and even a portion of our mainland in the form of Okinawa?

As you already know, the thinking of the Soviet authorities is realistic. It is difficult to move them with abstractions, to say nothing about the futility of trying to get them to consent to persuasion with phrases beautiful but somewhat remote from the facts and empty in content. In fact, with reference to your proposal in telegram

¹ Documents Nos. 580 and 581, respectively.

² Not printed.

No. 853,³ Molotov does not show the least interest. And again, in his refusal he gave a very similar answer. If indeed our country is pressed by the necessity of terminating the war, we ourselves must first of all firmly resolve to terminate the war. Without this resolution, an attempt to sound out the intentions of the Soviet Union will result in no benefit. In these days, with the enemy air raids accelerated and intensified, is there any meaning in showing that our country has reserve strength for a war of resistance, or in sacrificing the lives of hundreds of thousands of conscripts and millions of other innocent residents of cities and metropolitan areas?

3. Concerning these important matters, we here do not have appropriate or accurate information relative to our present armament production and therefore are not in a position to judge matters correctly. To say nothing about the fact that it was only by chance hearsay that we learned of the Imperial Conference which began in early June,⁴ at which it was resolved to take positive steps. And, if worse comes to worst and the progress of the war following the conference turns extremely disadvantageous for our side, it would behoove the Government in this situation to carry out that important resolution. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Government might be moved, and the desire to have it mediate will not be an impossibility. However, in the above situation, the immediate result facing us would be that there will be no room for doubt that it will very closely approximate unconditional surrender.

I have expressed my extremely unreserved opinion in the foregoing and I beg your pardon for such frank statements at this time. I have also heard that at the Imperial Court His Majesty is greatly concerned. I find these dreadful and heartbreaking thoughts unbearable. However, in international relations there is no mercy, and facing reality is unavoidable. I have transmitted the foregoing to you in all frankness, just as I see it, for I firmly believe it to be my primary responsibility to put an end to any loose thinking which gets away from reality. I beg for your understanding.

³ Not printed.

⁴ The reference is apparently to the imperial conference of June 8. See Butow, *Japan's Decision To Surrender*, pp. 99-101.

No. 585

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato)

[Translation]

SECRET

[Tokyo,] July 13, 1945—7:30 p. m.

URGENT

898. Re my telegram No. 893.¹

It was considered proper that I should receive Ambassador Malik and convey the intended dispatch of the special envoy, but as Malik was sick in bed, I sent Ando, Director of the Bureau of Political Affairs, to communicate to the Ambassador that His Majesty desired to dispatch Prince Konoye as special envoy, carrying with him the personal letter of His Majesty stating the Imperial wish to end the war; that you were to communicate the same to the Soviet Government; and that the Ambassador should concurrently accord facilities in this connection. Ambassador Malik promised to telegraph promptly about the matter to his Government.

¹ Document No. 582.

No. 586

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)

[Translation]

VERY URGENT

Moscow, July 13, 1945—10:40 p. m.

1385. Re my telegram No. 1383.¹

I immediately requested an interview with Molotov but was told that he was simply not able to accommodate my request and I was asked whether I would convey my message to Lozovsky. Therefore, I met Lozovsky at 5 p. m. on the 13th and conveyed His Majesty's wishes contained in your telegram No. 893,² translated into Russian, addressed to Molotov, and accompanied by my confidential note. I requested further that he immediately transmit this message to Molotov after reading it. The above note included the Imperial wish to dispatch Prince Konoye, mentioned in your telegram, and the request for agreement from the Soviet Government concerning the Prince's visit. Furthermore, in the event of approval, provisions for an airplane and other conveniences were also requested.

¹ Not printed.

² Document No. 582.

Moreover, I mentioned that the special mission on this occasion was absolutely different in nature from those special missions previously proposed to Molotov, as this envoy was being sent in response to His Majesty's personal wish and we would like to have the matter treated accordingly. I further expressed the desire of the Japanese Government to obtain an early answer on this matter, if only a consent in principle, and if at all possible before Molotov's departure, so that the above-mentioned special envoy might be able to meet the Soviet authorities soon after their return from Berlin.

In answer to Lozovsky's question as to which member of the Soviet Government the message was intended for, I said that since it conveyed the Imperial wishes of His Majesty no addressee was designated but that we wished to have it transmitted to Kalinin, Head of the Soviet Government, Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and Molotov. Lozovsky thereupon stated that he could understand the Japanese Government's hurry for an answer and would try to expedite an answer in accordance with our desires, but he also expressed doubts as to the possibility of an answer before departure time, for one government group was scheduled to depart that very evening. Accordingly, I replied that in the event that an answer was not possible prior to Molotov's departure, we would like him to establish communications directly with Berlin by telephone or other means for their answer, as the special envoy and his suite will require preparations and arrangements. Lozovsky answered that he would naturally handle the matter as above requested and promised to turn my note over to Molotov without delay. I hasten to telegraph the foregoing.

No. 587

761.94/7-2145 : Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)

[Translation]

VERY SECRET
URGENT

Moscow, July 13, 1945—10:40 p. m.

1386. Re my telegram No. 1385.¹

Although it may be presumed that the Soviet side this time will agree to the dispatch of a special envoy, it is still difficult to say before receiving the actual reply. In the event that the Soviets agree

¹ Document No. 586.

but the duties of the special envoy are in accordance with your telegram No. 890,² where the purpose was to sound out the limits to which the Soviets may be utilized in terminating the war, or in the event that his duties go no further than abstract explanations as indicated in your telegram No. 891,³ they will simply not consider it. It appears from your telegram No. 893⁴ that His Majesty is deeply concerned about the restoration of peace. Even if we are overawed by the fact that the dispatch of a special envoy is the Imperial wish, if the Japanese Government's proposal brought by him is limited to an enumeration of previous abstractions, lacking in concreteness, you would not only be disappointing the authorities of this country and causing a feeling of great dissatisfaction with the insincere attitude of Japan but would also be provoking trouble for the Imperial Household. I have great apprehensions on this point.

In my humble opinion, as long as the dispatch of an important special mission from afar has been determined, I believe that its purpose should be nothing other than a proposal for peace and termination of hostilities. The Soviets can understand the Imperial wish for peace as reported by this envoy, but they may not find the appointed task of the mission clear and may very well request a supplementary statement. Consequently, although I have no doubt that the special envoy will report the details in person on his arrival, it may become necessary to give a preliminary explanation of the gist of the special envoy's mission in the event that the Soviets request it. At any rate, I would appreciate your answer by telegram. In fact, after ascertaining this point, I believe it is possible to carry out the instructions contained in your telegram No. 893. Nevertheless, as Molotov's departure time is so near, I have not had time to telegraph information to you and I have handled the matter in the manner indicated in the opening paragraph of my reply. However, reflecting on the extremely serious nature of the outline of the proposal which the special envoy would be bringing, I am also thinking of sending a supplementary telegram of my humble opinion for your information after carefully considering the matter.

² Document No. 580.

³ Document No. 581.

⁴ Document No. 582.

No. 588

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)

[Translation]

VERY SECRET

Moscow, July 15, 1945.

1392. Re my telegram No. 1386.¹

Stalin and Molotov departed from here on the night of the 14th, apparently heading for Berlin. In my opinion this left at least more than half a day to spare before departure, but despite this the Soviets answered that there would be a delay in their reply to my request concerning the dispatch of the special envoy. In view of the fact that a definite answer was not given, it may be assumed that in a matter such as this, which can bring about grave results, the Soviets are avoiding a hasty reply and giving the matter full deliberation. Or it may be that they feel that we are not expecting an urgent reply, which I doubt.

Some reasons which may be thought of for the Soviets' hesitation:

(1) Although they understand the Imperial wish concerning the termination of the war, they lack clarification with regard to the actual mission of the special envoy or with regard to whether or not concrete proposals for the termination of the war are to be presented.

(2) That Japan is proposing unconditional surrender or a peace approximating unconditional surrender would be surprising. But if Japan is thinking of a so-called negotiated peace, there would be apprehension that she is hoping for the good offices of the Soviets for mediation. In that case, it would be difficult for the Soviet Union to accept.

(3) To avoid disturbing the relations between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union for the sake of Japan at a delicate time when harmony between the three countries is so strongly required.

(4) The need to ascertain the attitudes of England and America before giving Japan a definite reply concerning the matter of the special envoy, as Far Eastern problems are inevitably going to come up in the talks either inside or outside the meetings at the coming Big Three Conference. Or Stalin is ascertaining the intentions of the American and British leaders first, by informing them of Japan's recent request, before replying. If this is so, the attitude of the Soviets will be difficult to determine.

¹ Document No. 587.

The foregoing are some possible conjectures. Of these, No. 2, with regard to negotiated peace—to conclude a treaty terminating the war by peace negotiations, including the Greater East Asia War—is something which has been strongly rejected from the very beginning by America and Britain and particularly by the former. The Soviet Union was also hesitant regarding such a peace earlier in connection with the unconditional surrender of Germany and even urged Britain and the United States to open a second front, and with this cooperation knocked out Germany. Judging from these circumstances, a peace treaty by negotiation is something which cannot win the support of the Soviet Union. In the final analysis, if our country truly desires to terminate the war, we have no alternative but to accept unconditional surrender or something very close to it.

On the other hand, concerning the developments up to the time I read the Imperial wish, your successive telegrams had not clarified the situation. The intentions of the government and the military were not clear either regarding the termination of the war. Furthermore, in a situation where it is finally decided to settle the matter, it should be considered proper at an Imperial conference to pass a new resolution adequate to reverse the decision of the previous conference of June 8th.² However, this has not been done, and in connection with notification of the Imperial wish to dispatch the special envoy immediately I feel that the scheduled special mission does not yet have the concrete conditions mentioned in point (1) above.

Even if the approval of the Soviet Union is obtained and the special envoy's visit takes place, I cannot bear to think of the very grave results to which it may lead.

In this regard, after very carefully examining this telegram, my telegrams No. 1382³ and No. 1386, should you finally decide to dispatch the special envoy, I earnestly request that the Cabinet Council resolve to have the envoy bring along a concrete proposal for the termination of the war.

² See Butow, *Japan's Decision To Surrender*, pp. 99–101. Sato seems to have been unaware of the imperial conference of June 22 (see *ibid.*, pp. 118–120).

³ Document No. 584.

ISSUANCE OF A PROCLAMATION CALLING FOR THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN

No. 589

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹[Extract²]

TOP SECRET

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF JAPAN AND POLICY TOWARD LIBERATED AREAS IN THE FAR EAST IN RELATION TO UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

I. PROPOSED STATEMENT OF UNITED NATIONS AIMS

It is proposed that the principal United Nations at war with Japan issue a joint statement or parallel statements presenting in general terms the salient features of our program for the treatment of defeated Japan, in expectation that the Japanese people will be more inclined to accept unconditional surrender if reassured in regard to their future, hard though that future may be, than they now are when facing the unknown. (A draft statement is now being prepared by the State and War Departments.³)

Without abandoning our formula of "unconditional surrender", it is believed that the Japanese people could be informed in more precise terms than have been employed in the past of the treatment which they can expect to receive upon unconditional surrender and of our intention to permit them to retain their political institutions, in so far as they are not inimicable to peaceful international relations. Such a statement of aims would tend (1) to dissipate the present Japanese fear of the unknown, (2) to combat the Japanese domestic propaganda to the effect that unconditional surrender means the extinction of the Japanese state and the enslavement of the people, (3) to create a conflict in Japan between the die-hard militarists and those who wish to end the war before all of Japan is destroyed, (4) to eliminate the most serious single obstacle to Japanese unconditional surrender, namely, concern over the fate of the throne, and (5) to satisfy a growing body of opinion in United States which is demanding that we endeavor to hasten the end of the war in the Pacific by stating definitely our war aims.

: : : : . . .

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

¹ Annex 3 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² For other extracts from this paper, see documents Nos. 574 and 607.

³ See enclosure 2 to document No. 592.

No. 590

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE EMPEROR

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States Government has approved the establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission to make recommendations to the participating governments:

“On the instruments to carry out the terms imposed upon Japan as a result of its unconditional surrender or total defeat; and

“On the terms and provisions to be imposed on Japan, including the measures necessary to ensure the complete disarmament and subsequent effective control of Japan.”¹

As the attitude of military government toward the Emperor is a problem directly concerned with “the instruments to carry out the terms imposed upon Japan”, it is suggested that if this question is raised, discussion on the matter be referred to the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

The attitude to be taken by military government toward the Emperor has been formulated and approved by the Department of State and is submitted in general outline in the attached appendix.

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1945.

[Appendix]

TOP SECRET

[THE POSITION OF THE EMPEROR IN JAPAN]

I. APPREHENSION OF THE EMPEROR

The Department of State has recommended that immediately upon the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan, the constitutional powers of the Emperor should be suspended. It has further recommended that if it is politically practicable and physically possible the Emperor and his immediate family should be placed under protective custody in a detached palace outside of Tokyo. He should be kept in seclusion, but his personal advisers should be allowed to have access to him under reasonable conditions.

¹ See George H. Blakeslee, *The Far Eastern Commission: A Study in International Cooperation, 1945 to 1952* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1953; Department of State publication No. 5138), pp. 2-3.

II. THE EMPEROR AND INSTRUMENT OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

The Department of State has also recommended, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have tentatively concurred,² that:

(1) The Emperor should proclaim that Japan has surrendered unconditionally to the United Nations at war with Japan and should command the armed forces and people of Japan to cease hostilities forthwith and to comply with all requirements imposed by the designated commander for Japan.

(2) The Emperor should also command all civil and military officials to obey and enforce all orders and directives issued by the designated commander for Japan and direct them to remain at their posts and to perform their duties until specifically relieved by the designated commander.

(3) The Emperor, as well as the highest available representative of the Japanese High Command, should sign and seal the instrument of unconditional surrender.

(4) If the several requirements as to the acknowledgment of unconditional surrender by the Emperor are not fulfilled, the designated commander may receive the unconditional surrender of Japan by the highest military authorities of Japan or he may by proclamation take over supreme authority of Japan.

III. REMOVAL OF EMPEROR FROM JAPAN

The Department of State believes that the occupation forces should not threaten to remove the Emperor from Japan, but if for any reason they feel that his removal is advisable, the Department of State should be given an opportunity to express its opinion before such action is taken.

IV. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE EMPEROR

If the Emperor escapes from Japan or cannot be found, the occupation authorities should:

(a) Notify the Japanese people that, so long as these conditions obtain, the occupation authorities will consider any action of the Emperor without validity.

(b) Make no statement that the Emperor has abdicated unless the Emperor himself makes such an announcement or a regency is set up.

(c) Take no initiative in choosing a successor to the throne.

V. INSTITUTION OF THE EMPEROR

Since the Japanese at present show an almost fanatical devotion to their sovereign, an attempt from the outside to abolish the institution of the Emperor, would, so long as the present attitude of the Japanese continues, probably be ineffective. The mere dethronement of the Emperor against the will of the Japanese people would not accomplish the abolition of the emperorship nor could it probably be

² The Department of Defense has supplied the information that there is no evidence in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to indicate that the Joint Chiefs of Staff either approved or disapproved these recommendations.

effectively legislated out of existence so long as the Japanese believed in it and were determined to maintain it. Under these circumstances the indefinite occupation of Japan might be necessary if the United Nations wished to prevent the revival of the institution of the Emperor.

To assure that the treatment of the Emperor by the occupation authorities does not prejudice the continuance of the institution of the Emperor against the will of the Japanese people, the occupation authorities should in all their treatment of and their contacts with the Emperor refrain from any action which would imply recognition of or support for the Japanese concept that the Japanese Emperor is different from and superior to other temporal rulers, that he is of divine origin and that he is indispensable. They should permit absolute freedom of discussion, except where there may be incitement to breaches of the peace, of political as well as other subjects.

VI. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EMPERORSHIP

There are indications that the Chinese may favor the abolition of the institution of the Emperor and public opinion in the United States increasingly seems to prefer this solution. On the other hand, it is questionable whether the British would support such a policy. As for the Soviet Union, their attitude on the matter is not known.

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1945.

No. 591

Department of the Army Files

Minutes¹ of a Meeting of the Committee of Three²

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF THREE HELD TUESDAY,
JUNE 26, 1945, AT 9:30 AM

Present: Messrs. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War
James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy
Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State
Mr. John J. McCloy was present as Recorder.
Major M. F. Correa was present at the invitation of the
Committee.

The discussion continued on the subject of [a] warning to Japan and the Secretary of War read a draft of memorandum he had pre-

¹ By John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War.

² i. e., the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, or their representatives.

pared for the President.³ A discussion of the effect of the proposed warning on world and domestic opinion followed. There was general agreement, however, that the tone of the proposed letter was about right and that though following the program suggested in the letter might not achieve the capitulation desired, it might do so, and it was thought that no harm would result from trying. It was pointed out that it might very well consolidate opinion for an out and out struggle if the Japanese did not respond and it might check in the U. S. a deterioration of will to complete the defeat of Japan, as it would make clear the necessity for fullest efforts if the Japanese did not accede.

It was left that a subcommittee of the State, War, and Navy Departments would attempt to draft the actual warning⁴ as well as any other papers that would be incidental to the delivery of such a warning.

Major Correa was designated by the Secretary of the Navy as the Navy representative, Mr. McCloy was appointed representative for the War Department, and Mr. Grew said that Mr. Dooman and Mr. Ballantine would act for the State Department.

³ Not printed. For the text of the memorandum on this subject which Stimson sent to Truman on July 2, see document No. 592 and enclosure 1 to that document.

⁴ For the text of the draft warning which Stimson submitted to Truman following study by the subcommittee, see enclosure 2 to document No. 592.

No. 592

Department of the Army Files

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1945.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am enclosing herewith a memorandum to you on the matter of the proposed warning to Japan, a subject which I have heretofore discussed with you. I have tried to state as succinctly as possible how the matter lies in my mind, and in the course of preparing the memorandum, I have consulted with the Secretary of the Navy and the Acting Secretary of State, each of whom has approved the tenor of the memorandum and has subscribed to the recommendations contained in it.

I have also had prepared a proposed form of proclamation which has been discussed with representatives of the State Department and the Navy Department, as well as with officers of the General Staff but which has not been placed in final form or in any sense approved as a

¹ This paper bears the following manuscript notation: "Handed to the President by Sec. War July 2/45".

final document by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Navy or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has been drafted merely to put on paper something which would give us some idea of how a warning of the character we have in mind might appear. You will note that it is written without specific relation to the employment of any new weapon. Of course it would have to be revamped to conform to the efficacy of such a weapon if the warning were to be delivered, as would almost certainly be the case, in conjunction with its use.²

As these papers were primarily prepared as a possible background for some of your discussions at the forthcoming conference, this added element was not included, but a suitable provision could be readily added at the appropriate time.

I shall continue to discuss this matter with the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Navy, as well as with the representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and will of course keep you currently informed of any further suggestions we may have.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L STIMSON

[Enclosure 1]

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR JAPAN

1. The plans of operation up to and including the first landing have been authorized and the preparations for the operation are now actually

² According to John J. McCloy, at a meeting with Truman at the White House in June 1945 (which McCloy attended as Assistant Secretary of War) the suggestion had been made that the Japanese should be warned, before an atomic bomb was dropped on Japan, that the United States had such a weapon. Summarizing the discussion some years later, McCloy stated that neither Secretary of War Stimson nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff had thought well of such a specific warning, one reason against it being the possibility that the work on the bomb might be unsuccessful. See John J. McCloy, *The Challenge to American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 42-43. Louis Morton, in "The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 35, pp. 341, 348, definitely identifies the meeting referred to as the one which took place on June 18. While the discussion of this subject was not recorded in the minutes of that meeting prepared by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see document No. 598), it may have constituted the "certain other matters" referred to in those minutes (see *ibid.*, footnote 8). Cf. Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 70-71. Concerning earlier recommendations on the use of the atomic bomb against Japan without prior warning of the nature of the weapon, see Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb", *Harper's Magazine*, vol. 194, pp. 100-101; Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 419; Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 261-262; Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime*, p. 285; "A Report to the Secretary of War, June 1945", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May 1, 1946, p. 2.

going on. This situation was accepted by all members of your conference on Monday, June 18th.³

2. There is reason to believe that the operation for the occupation of Japan following the landing may be a very long, costly and arduous struggle on our part. The terrain, much of which I have visited several times, has left the impression on my memory of being one which would be susceptible to a last ditch defense such as has been made on Iwo Jima and Okinawa and which of course is very much larger than either of those two areas. According to my recollection it will be much more unfavorable with regard to tank maneuvering than either the Philippines or Germany.

3. If we once land on one of the main islands and begin a forceful occupation of Japan, we shall probably have cast the die of last ditch resistance. The Japanese are highly patriotic and certainly susceptible to calls for fanatical resistance to repel an invasion. Once started in actual invasion, we shall in my opinion have to go through with an even more bitter finish fight than in Germany. We shall incur the losses incident to such a war and we shall have to leave the Japanese islands even more thoroughly destroyed than was the case with Germany. This would be due both to the difference in the Japanese and German personal character and the differences in the size and character of the terrain through which the operations will take place.

4. A question then comes: Is there any alternative to such a forceful occupation of Japan which will secure for us the equivalent of an unconditional surrender of her forces and a permanent destruction of her power again to strike an aggressive blow at the "peace of the Pacific"? I am inclined to think that there is enough such chance to make it well worthwhile our giving them a warning of what is to come and a definite opportunity to capitulate. As above suggested, it should be tried before the actual forceful occupation of the homeland islands is begun and furthermore the warning should be given in ample time to permit a national reaction to set in.

We have the following enormously favorable factors on our side—factors much weightier than those we had against Germany:

Japan has no allies.

Her navy is nearly destroyed and she is vulnerable to a surface and underwater blockade which can deprive her of sufficient food and supplies for her population.

She is terribly vulnerable to our concentrated air attack upon her crowded cities, industrial and food resources.

She has against her not only the Anglo-American forces but the rising forces of China and the ominous threat of Russia.

We have inexhaustible and untouched industrial resources to bring to bear against her diminishing potential.

³ See document No. 598.

We have great moral superiority through being the victim of her first sneak attack.

The problem is to translate these advantages into prompt and economical achievement of our objectives. I believe Japan is susceptible to reason in such a crisis to a much greater extent than is indicated by our current press and other current comment. Japan is not a nation composed wholly of mad fanatics of an entirely different mentality from ours. On the contrary, she has within the past century shown herself to possess extremely intelligent people, capable in an unprecedentedly short time of adopting not only the complicated technique of Occidental civilization but to a substantial extent their culture and their political and social ideas. Her advance in all these respects during the short period of sixty or seventy years has been one of the most astounding feats of national progress in history—a leap from the isolated feudalism of centuries into the position of one of the six or seven great powers of the world. She has not only built up powerful armies and navies. She has maintained an honest and effective national finance and respected position in many of the sciences in which we pride ourselves. Prior to the forcible seizure of power over her government by the fanatical military group in 1931, she had for ten years lived a reasonably responsible and respectable international life.

My own opinion is in her favor on the two points involved in this question.

a. I think the Japanese nation has the mental intelligence and versatile capacity in such a crisis to recognize the folly of a fight to the finish and to accept the proffer of what will amount to an unconditional surrender; and

b. I think she has within her population enough liberal leaders (although now submerged by the terrorists) to be depended upon for her reconstruction as a responsible member of the family of nations. I think she is better in this last respect than Germany was. Her liberals yielded only at the point of the pistol and, so far as I am aware, their liberal attitude has not been personally subverted in the way which was so general in Germany.

On the other hand, I think that the attempt to exterminate her armies and her population by gunfire or other means will tend to produce a fusion of race solidity and antipathy which had no analogy in the case of Germany. We have a national interest in creating, if possible, a condition wherein the Japanese nation may live as a peaceful and useful member of the future Pacific community.

5. It is therefore my conclusion that a carefully timed warning be given to Japan by the chief representatives of the United States, Great Britain, China and, if then a belligerent, Russia, calling upon

Japan to surrender and permit the occupation of her country in order to insure its complete demilitarization for the sake of the future peace.

This warning should contain the following elements:

The varied and overwhelming character of the force we are about to bring to bear on the islands.

The inevitability and completeness of the destruction which the full application of this force will entail.

The determination of the allies to destroy permanently all authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the country into embarking on world conquest.

The determination of the allies to limit Japanese sovereignty to her main islands and to render them powerless to mount and support another war.

The disavowal of any attempt to extirpate the Japanese as a race or to destroy them as a nation.

A statement of our readiness, once her economy is purged of its militaristic influences, to permit the Japanese to maintain such industries, particularly of a light consumer character, as offer no threat of aggression against their neighbors, but which can produce a sustaining economy, and provide a reasonable standard of living. The statement should indicate our willingness, for this purpose, to give Japan trade access to external raw materials, but no longer any control over, the sources of supply outside her main islands. It should also indicate our willingness, in accordance with our now established foreign trade policy, in due course to enter into mutually advantageous trade relations with her.

The withdrawal from their country as soon as the above objectives of the allies are accomplished, and as soon as there has been established a peacefully inclined government, of a character representative of the masses of the Japanese people. I personally think that if in saying this we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty, it would substantially add to the chances of acceptance.

6. Success of course will depend on the potency of the warning which we give her. She has an extremely sensitive national pride and, as we are now seeing every day, when actually locked with the enemy will fight to the very death. For that reason the warning must be tendered before the actual invasion has occurred and while the impending destruction, though clear beyond peradventure, has not yet reduced her to fanatical despair. If Russia is a part of the threat, the Russian attack, if actual, must not have progressed too far. Our own bombing should be confined to military objectives as far as possible.

[Enclosure 2 ⁴]

TOP SECRET

PROCLAMATION BY THE HEADS OF STATE

U. S.—U. K.—[U. S. S. R.]⁵—CHINA

[Delete matters inside brackets if U. S. S. R. not in war]

(1) We,—the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, [the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union] and the President of the Republic of China, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to surrender on the terms we state herein.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west [have now been joined by the vast military might of the Soviet Union and] are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until her unconditional capitulation.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example before Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power backed by our resolve means the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) Is Japan so lacking in reason that it will continue blindly to follow the leadership of those ridiculous militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation? The time has come to decide whether to continue on to destruction or to follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. They may be accepted or not. There are no alternatives. We shall not tarry on our way.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the country into embarking

⁴ The text of this enclosure was sent to the Department of State by the War Department on July 2. On July 3 the Department of State transmitted to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War by telephone the following suggestion for revising the second sentence of paragraph 12 (file No. 740.00119 PW/7-245): "This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if completely satisfactory evidence convinces the peace-loving nations of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies which will render impossible for all future time the development of aggressive militarism in Japan." Cf. *post*, p. 899.

⁵ Brackets throughout this document appear in the original.

on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established Japanese lands must be occupied and the exercise of our authority shall continue until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration⁶ shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such adjacent minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces shall be completely disarmed and returned to their homes and peaceful and productive lives.

(10) The Japanese shall not be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice will be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. Democratic tendencies found among the Japanese peoples [*sic*] shall be supported and strengthened. Freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain only such industries as will not enable her to rearm herself for war but which can produce a sustaining economy. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual⁷ Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as our objectives are accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if it be shown to the complete satisfaction of the world that such a government will never again aspire to aggression.

(13) We call upon those in authority in Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces under the authority of the Japanese Government and High Command, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action.

⁶ Released December 1, 1943. Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 393.

No. 593

740.00119 PW/7-645

The Assistant Secretary of State (MacLeish) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

Subject: Interpretation of Japanese Unconditional Surrender.

Mr. Acheson pointed out at the Staff Committee meeting on July 4 that there are two views about this matter in the Department.¹ Since I hold one of these views rather strongly, and since it will be impossible to discuss the matter in full prior to your departure, I should like to submit several points for consideration.

(1) *What is it precisely we propose to do?* The proposed public statement² is couched in terms of clarification or interpretation of our announced unconditional surrender policy. The assumption is that we continue to demand unconditional surrender but that we propose to state what unconditional surrender will mean. Is this assumption correct? In our June 13 "Analysis of Memorandum Presented by Mr. Hoover",³ we used this sentence: "Every evidence, without exception, that we are able to obtain of the views of the Japanese with regard to the institution of the throne indicates that the nonmolestation of the person of the present emperor and the preservation of the institution of the throne *comprise irreducible Japanese terms.*" The memorandum proceeds to state that the Japanese would be ready to undergo most drastic privations "so long as these irreducible Japanese terms were met" and are prepared for prolonged resistance if we propose to abolish the imperial institution and to try the emperor. If these are the considerations which move us to support the proposed public statement, can we describe that statement as a clarification of [or] interpretation of unconditional surrender? Surrender *on terms*, even irreducible terms, is not unconditional surrender. I am not here raising the question whether we should accept the irreducible Japanese terms. I am raising the question whether, if we do, we should not state explicitly what it is we are doing. If we are modifying the announced policy of unconditional surrender to a new policy of surrender on irreducible Japanese terms, the American people have a right to know it.

(2) *Is the proposed public statement on surrender policy for Japan consistent with surrender policy for Germany?* The purpose of the proposed statement, as I understand it, is to announce that the Japanese may retain their characteristic political institution and that

¹ The minutes of this meeting of the Secretary's Staff Committee do not describe the discussion referred to by MacLeish.

² See document No. 594.

³ Not printed.

the person of the present incumbent of that institution will not be molested. IPCOG 1/4 of May 11, 1945,⁴ directs the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Forces of Occupation in Germany to enforce a policy by which the dominant and characteristic institution of German political life is to be stamped out and the person for whom, and in whom, that institution existed is to be arrested and imprisoned. Furthermore, the restoration of this characteristic German political institution is prohibited. And, finally, German life is to be reconstructed on a democratic basis. There are, of course, historical differences between the National Socialist Party in Germany and the imperial throne in Japan. There are also differences between the *Führer* and the emperor, though the *Führer* also demanded, and was accorded, a respect which approached reverence. In spite of these differences, however, the question presents itself whether the application of these rigorous measures to Germany and their non-application to Japan will not create an obvious inconsistency which will certainly be observed and which will undoubtedly be resented by a majority of the American people.

(3) *Is the proposed policy sound in fact?* This is a question as to which the opinions and advice of experts are entitled to the greatest possible respect. Nevertheless, certain disturbing questions present themselves even to a non-expert like myself whose knowledge of Japan is limited to a study of a few months duration. What has made Japan dangerous in the past and will make her dangerous in the future if we permit it, is, in large part, the Japanese cult of emperor worship which gives the ruling groups in Japan—the *Gumbatsu*—the current coalition of militarists, industrialists, large land owners and office holders—their control over the Japanese people. As Mr. Acheson pointed out in the Staff Committee, the institution of the throne is an anachronistic, feudal institution, perfectly adapted to the manipulation and use of anachronistic, feudal-minded groups within the country. To leave that institution intact is to run the grave risk that it will be used in the future as it has been used in the past. The argument most frequently advanced for the preservation of the throne is the argument that only the emperor can surrender. This is a powerful argument for the immediate future. It must be balanced against the longer-range consideration that however useful the emperor may be to us now, he may be a source of the greatest danger a generation from now. The same consideration applied to the argument that lives will be saved now if the Japanese are allowed to keep their emperor. The lives already spent will have been sacrificed in vain, and lives will be

⁴ This paper circulated the text (approved by Truman on May 11, 1945) of a "Directive to Commander in Chief of U. S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany". A slightly modified version of this text is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XIII, p. 596.

lost again in the future in a new war, if the throne is employed in the future as it has been employed in the past by the Japanese Jingos and industrial expansionists.

Recommendation. For these various reasons, I urgently recommend that no public statement be issued until there has been a real opportunity to determine the policy of the Department of State on this matter. The question has not yet been debated to conclusion in the Secretary's Staff Committee. Secondly, I should like to record my own earnest conviction that any such statement issued on this vitally important subject should be clear and precise and subject to no possibility of misinterpretation:—that if what we propose is to replace the policy of unconditional surrender with a policy of surrender on irreducible Japanese terms, we should say so, and say so in words which no one in the United States will misunderstand.

A[RCHIBALD] MACL[EISH]

No. 594

740.00119 Control (Japan)/7-945

*United States Delegation Working Paper*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

DRAFT PROCLAMATION BY THE HEADS OF STATE

U. S.—U. K.—[U. S. S. R.]²—CHINA

[Delete matters inside brackets if U. S. S. R. not in war]

This draft has been approved by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Acting Secretary of State.

(1) We,—The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, [the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union] and the President of the Republic of China, representing the hundreds of mil-

¹ It has not definitely been established that this is the draft given to Byrnes on July 6 (see document No. 595). It is, however, a revision of the draft which Stimson submitted to Truman on July 2 (enclosure 2 to document No. 592) and the text here printed was attached to Hackworth's memorandum of July 9 (document No. 596).

A variant text, identical with this document except for paragraph 11, has been erroneously identified as a draft prepared in the Department of State in May 1945. See Grew, *Turbulent Era*, vol. II, p. 1431; *Institute of Pacific Relations*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951-1953), pt. 3, pp. 728-734. The Department of State draft statement of May 1945 (file No. 740.0011 EW/5-3145) is, however, quite different, and the draft proclamation printed here is clearly derived from the text which Stimson had submitted to Truman on July 2 (enclosure 2 to document No. 592), which in turn was based on the material which Stimson had placed before the Committee of Three on June 26 (see document No. 591).

² Brackets throughout this document appear in the original.

[No. 594]

lions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that the Japanese people shall be given an opportunity to end this war on the terms we state herein.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west [have now been joined by the vast military might of the Soviet Union and] are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until her capitulation.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power backed by our resolve *will*³ mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) Are the Japanese so lacking in reason that they will continue blindly to follow the leadership of those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation? The time has come *for the Japanese people* to decide whether to continue on to destruction or to follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established *and* until there is convincing proof that Japan's war making power is destroyed, Japanese territory shall be occupied to the extent necessary to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

³ The words printed in italics throughout this draft were underscored in the source copy, apparently to call attention to changes from an earlier draft (see enclosure 2 to document No. 592), and this emphasis was inadvertently carried over into later drafts and into the final text. Cf. documents Nos. 1244, 1249, and 1382, printed in vol. II.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. Democratic tendencies among the Japanese people shall be supported and strengthened. Freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.⁴

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be convinced of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies of peace which will render impossible the future development of aggressive militarism in Japan.

(13) We call upon the Japanese people and those in authority in Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

⁴The following typed memorandum, of unidentified authorship, is stapled to the file copy of this document:

“It is suggested that there be added at the end of paragraph numbered (11):
“Questions such as reparations will be taken up at the proper time.””

No. 595

Staff Committee Files

Minutes¹ of the 133d Meeting of the Secretary's Staff Committee

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

MINUTES SECRETARY'S STAFF COMMITTEE SATURDAY MORNING,
JULY 7, 1945 AT 9:15 A. M., IN THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Present: The Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew (presiding)

Messrs. Acheson
Dunn
Hackworth
General Holmes
Messrs. MacLeish
Pasvolsky
Rockefeller
Thorp (for Mr. Clayton)

Benninghoff
Lewis
YostAbsent: The Secretary
Mr. Clayton

The Committee met at 9:15 a. m.

URGENT BUSINESS

TERMS OF JAPANESE SURRENDER

MR. MACLEISH discussed a memorandum which he had submitted to the Secretary on July 6,² setting forth his point of view regarding the proposed statement to clarify the meaning of unconditional surrender as it applies to Japan.

THE ACTING SECRETARY explained that the proposed joint statement was one which he had been charged by the President to work out with the Secretaries of War and the Navy. The statement (in the form of a proclamation by the United States, Great Britain, China and possibly the Soviet Union) had been completed on July 6 in time for the Secretary to take with him to Berlin. He said it had been approved by Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal, Admiral King, and probably General Marshall. THE ACTING SECRETARY then read to the Committee the draft statement.³

¹ By James H. Lewis, Foreign Affairs Specialist, Central Secretariat.

² Document No. 593.

³ See document No. 594.

THE COMMITTEE discussed the arguments for and against the issuance of such a statement, particularly those relating to the question whether this Government should be placed in a position of supporting the retention of the institution of the Emperor. THE ACTING SECRETARY reviewed his arguments in favor of such a statement, including his belief that it is absolutely impossible to abolish the institution; that it is the military element and not the Emperor which has been responsible for the war; and that what is most important is to eliminate the military machine and the big industrial families of Japan. He emphasized again that such a statement could in no way be interpreted to be a modification of the terms of unconditional surrender.

MR. MACLEISH referred again to his feeling that the institution of the Emperor was an implement which the military machine had found useful in controlling the Japanese people. MR. ACHESON said he could not understand why, if the Emperor had no importance in Japanese war-making capacity, the military element in Japan should be so insistent on retaining the Emperor. He said there must be some reason why the people now in control consider the institution to be vital to them.

MR. PASVOLSKY raised the question how large an army would be needed to control the Japanese people if the throne were abolished. MR. MACLEISH pointed out that the political institutions of Germany had been abolished and we were proposing to control the situation there. MR. DUNN asked whether it was necessary to go beyond a statement that the Japanese would be permitted to form a government which would be peaceful. MR. HACKWORTH asked why the statement could not merely say (1) that we propose to get rid of the military control of Japan, and (2) we will give the Japanese people the opportunity to develop a government of their own choosing. THE ACTING SECRETARY asked Mr. Hackworth to write out this suggested formula and to present it at the next meeting of the Committee.⁴ He suggested also that Mr. Dunn might bear in mind the Committee's discussion when he goes to the forthcoming Berlin meeting.

MR. ACHESON said he hoped there was nothing in the record of this Committee to indicate that the Committee had approved the proposed statement. THE ACTING SECRETARY said there was not, and that the Committee was not involved or responsible in any way for the statement which had been submitted to the Secretary on July 6.

⁴ See document No. 596.

No. 596

740.00119 Control (Japan)/7-945

*Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Hackworth)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1945.

The present system of military control in Japan must be uprooted and not allowed again to assert itself.

The people of Japan shall be given an opportunity to control their destinies along peaceful lines.²

¹ Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. This memorandum constitutes a redraft of two sentences of document No. 594, to which this paper is attached.

² The second paragraph has been revised by hand by Dunn to read: "When the people of Japan have convinced the peace loving nations that they are going to follow peaceful lives [*lines?*] they shall be given an opportunity to control their destinies along peaceful lines."

No. 597

740.00119 P. W./7-1345

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am enclosing the text of the statement ¹ which I made to the press on July 10 regarding Japanese peace feelers so that you may know just how the land lies. My purpose in doing this was twofold. First, to put a stop to the growing speculation in this country, as indicated in speeches, editorials, et cetera, as to whether the Japanese Government had or had not made a bona fide peace offer. This trend of public thinking seemed to me to be dangerous, as tending to weaken the war morale of the country and also to create in Japan the belief that the American people are getting ready for a compromise peace and all the Japanese have to do is to continue to fight. Secondly, I believe that my statement will have created in Japan a situation where anything that the President may say as to what unconditional surrender will mean and what it will not mean will have maximum effect. In other words, my statement will not have contributed to creating in the Japanese mind any belief as to what, if anything, they can hope for, and if the President, either individually or jointly with others, now conveys the impression that unconditional surrender may not be as bad a matter as they had first believed, the door may well be opened to an early surrender. This of course is guesswork but it seems to us to be sound guesswork. I may say that my statement was unanimously approved by the

¹ Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XIII, p. 84.

Secretary's Staff Committee, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Office of War Information.

I hope that early action may be taken on the proposed statement by the President which I gave you before your departure² spelling out a little more definitely what unconditional surrender will mean.

With the very best of wishes to the President and yourself in the great job which you are about to undertake at TERMINAL, I am [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

² See document No. 594.

**BASIC MILITARY OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND POLICIES IN THE
WAR AGAINST JAPAN**

No. 598

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McFarland)

TOP SECRET

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON MONDAY,
18 JUNE 1945 AT 1530¹

Present[:] The President
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy
General of the Army G. C. Marshall
Fleet Admiral E. J. King
Lieut. General I. C. Eaker (Representing
General of the Army H. H. Arnold)
The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson
The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal
The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy

Secretary

Brig. General A. J. McFarland

1. DETAILS OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST JAPAN

THE PRESIDENT stated that he had called the meeting for the purpose of informing himself with respect to the details of the campaign against Japan set out in Admiral Leahy's memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 14 June.² He asked General Marshall if he would express his opinion.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the present situation with respect to operations against Japan was practically identical with

¹ i. e., 3:30 p. m.

² Not printed herein. Text in "The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945" (Washington, Department of Defense, processed, 1955), p. 76.

the situation which had existed in connection with the operations proposed against Normandy. He then read, as an expression of his views, the following digest of a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the President (J. C. S. 1388):³

Our air and sea power has already greatly reduced movement of Jap shipping south of Korea and should in the next few months cut it to a trickle if not choke it off entirely. Hence, there is no need for seizing further positions in order to block Japanese communications south of Korea.

General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz are in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff in selecting 1 November as the target date to go into Kyushu because by that time:

- a. If we press preparations we can be ready.
- b. Our estimates are that our air action will have smashed practically every industrial target worth hitting in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in the Jap cities.
- c. The Japanese Navy, if any still exists, will be completely powerless.
- d. Our sea action and air power will have cut Jap reinforcement capabilities from the mainland to negligible proportions.

Important considerations bearing on the 1 November date rather than a later one are the weather and cutting to a minimum Jap time for preparation of defenses. If we delay much after the beginning of November the weather situation in the succeeding months may be such that the invasion of Japan, and hence the end of the war, will be delayed for up to 6 months.

An outstanding military point about attacking Korea is the difficult terrain and beach conditions which appear to make the only acceptable assault areas Fusan [*Pusan*] in the southeast corner and Keijo [*Seoul*], well up the western side. To get to Fusan, which is a strongly fortified area, we must move large and vulnerable assault forces past heavily fortified Japanese areas. The operation appears more difficult and costly than assault on Kyushu. Keijo appears an equally difficult and costly operation. After we have undertaken either one of them we still will not be as far forward as going into Kyushu.

The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of strangulation and appears to be the least costly worthwhile operation following Okinawa. The basic point is that a lodgement in Kyushu is essential, both to tightening our strangle hold of blockade and bombardment on Japan, and to forcing capitulation by invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations. It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan

³ Memorandum not printed. Apparently it was never presented to the President.

indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.

With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country.

Casualties. Our experience in the Pacific War is so diverse as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers. Using various combinations of Pacific experience, the War Department staff reaches the conclusion that the cost of securing a worthwhile position in Korea would almost certainly be greater than the cost of the Kyushu operation. Points on the optimistic side of the Kyushu operation are that: General MacArthur has not yet accepted responsibility for going ashore where there would be disproportionate casualties. The nature of the objective area gives room for maneuver, both on the land and by sea. As to any discussion of specific operations, the following data are pertinent:

<i>Campaign</i>	<i>U. S. Casualties Killed, wounded, missing</i>	<i>Jap Casualties Killed and Prisoners (Not including wounded)</i>	<i>Ratio U. S. to Jap</i>
Leyte	17, 000	78, 000	1:4.6
Luzon	31, 000	156, 000	1:5.0
Iwo Jima	20, 000	25, 000	1:1.25
Okinawa	34, 000 (Ground) 7, 700 (Navy)	81, 000 (not a complete count)	1:2
Normandy (1st 30 days)	42, 000	—	—

The record of General MacArthur's operations from 1 March 1944 through 1 May 1945 shows 13,742 U. S. killed compared to 310,165 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 to 1.

There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon. It is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war and it is the thankless task of the leaders to maintain their firm outward front which holds the resolution of their subordinates. Any irresolution in the leaders may result in costly weakening and indecision in the subordinates. . . .

An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.

In considering the matter of command and control in the Pacific war which the British wish to raise at the next conference,⁴ we must bear in mind the point that anything smacking of combined command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China. Furthermore the obvious inefficiencies of combined command may directly result in increased cost in resources and American lives.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 174, and *post*, p. 921.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had asked General MacArthur's opinion on the proposed operation and had received from him the following telegram, which General Marshall then read:

"I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating wasteful operations of non-decisive character. I regard the operation as the most economical one in effort and lives that is possible. In this respect it must be remembered that the several preceding months will involve practically no losses in ground troops and that sooner or later a decisive ground attack must be made. The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat. I most earnestly recommend no change in OLYMPIC. Additional subsidiary attacks will simply build up our final total casualties."

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was his personal view that the operation against Kyushu was the only course to pursue. He felt that air power alone was not sufficient to put the Japanese out of the war. It was unable alone to put the Germans out. General Eaker and General Eisenhower both agreed to this. Against the Japanese, scattered through mountainous country, the problem would be much more difficult than it had been in Germany. He felt that this plan offered the only way the Japanese could be forced into a feeling of utter helplessness. The operation would be difficult but not more so than the assault in Normandy. He was convinced that every individual moving to the Pacific should be indoctrinated with a firm determination to see it through.

ADMIRAL KING agreed with General Marshall's views and said that the more he studied the matter, the more he was impressed with the strategic location of Kyushu, which he considered the key to the success of any siege operations. He pointed out that within three months the effects of air power based on Okinawa will begin to be felt strongly in Japan. It seemed to him that Kyushu followed logically after Okinawa. It was a natural setup. It was his opinion that we should do Kyushu now, after which there would be time to judge the effect of possible operations by the Russians and the Chinese. The weather constituted quite a factor. So far as preparation was concerned, we must aim now for Tokyo Plain; otherwise we will never be able to accomplish it. If preparations do not go forward now, they cannot be arranged for later. Once started, however, they can always be stopped if desired.⁵

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that Kyushu was a necessity and pointed out that it constituted a landing in the Japanese homeland.

⁵ Cf. Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record* (New York, 1952), p. 605, footnote 2.

Kyushu having been arranged for, the decision as to further action could be made later.

THE PRESIDENT inquired if a later decision would not depend on what the Russians agree to do. It was agreed that this would have considerable influence.

THE PRESIDENT then asked Admiral Leahy for his views of the situation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY recalled that the President had been interested in knowing what the price in casualties for Kyushu would be and whether or not that price could be paid. He pointed out that the troops on Okinawa had lost 35 percent in casualties. If this percentage were applied to the number of troops to be employed in Kyushu, he thought from the similarity of the fighting to be expected that this would give a good estimate of the casualties to be expected. He was interested therefore in finding out how many troops are to be used in Kyushu.

ADMIRAL KING called attention to what he considered an important difference in Okinawa and Kyushu. There had been only one way to go on Okinawa. This meant a straight frontal attack against a highly fortified position. On Kyushu, however, landings would be made on three fronts simultaneously and there would be much more room for maneuver. It was his opinion that a realistic casualty figure for Kyushu would lie somewhere between the number experienced by General MacArthur in the operations on Luzon and the Okinawa casualties.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the total assault troops for the Kyushu campaign were shown in the memorandum prepared for the President as 766,700. He said, in answer to the President's question as to what opposition could be expected on Kyushu, that it was estimated at eight Japanese divisions or about 350,000 troops. He said that divisions were still being raised in Japan and that reinforcement from other areas was possible but it was becoming increasingly difficult and painful.

THE PRESIDENT asked about the possibility of reinforcements for Kyushu moving south from the other Japanese islands.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was expected that all communications with Kyushu would be destroyed.

ADMIRAL KING described in some detail the land communications between the other Japanese islands and Kyushu and stated that as a result of operations already planned, the Japanese would have to depend on sea shipping for any reinforcement.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stressed the fact that Kyushu was an island. It was crossed by a mountain range, which would be difficult for either the Japanese or the Americans to cross. The Kyushu opera-

tion, in effect, contemplated the taking of another island from which to bring increased air power against Japan.

THE PRESIDENT expressed the view that it was practically creating another Okinawa closer to Japan, to which the Chiefs of Staff agreed.

THE PRESIDENT then asked General Eaker for his opinion of the operation as an air man.

GENERAL EAKER said that he agreed completely with the statements made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared for the President. He had just received a cable ⁶ in which General Arnold also expressed complete agreement. He stated that any blockade of Honshu was dependent upon airdromes on Kyushu; that the air plan contemplated employment of 40 groups of heavy bombers against Japan and that these could not be deployed without the use of airfields on Kyushu. He said that those who advocated the use against Japan of air power alone overlooked the very impressive fact that air casualties are always much heavier when the air faces the enemy alone and that these casualties never fail to drop as soon as the ground forces come in. Present air casualties are averaging 2 percent per mission, about 30 percent per month. He wished to point out and to emphasize that delay favored only the enemy and he urged that there be no delay.

THE PRESIDENT said that as he understood it the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after weighing all the possibilities of the situation and considering all possible alternative plans were still of the unanimous opinion that the Kyushu operation was the best solution under the circumstances.

The Chiefs of Staff agreed that this was so.

THE PRESIDENT then asked the Secretary of War for his opinion.

MR. STIMSON agreed with the Chiefs of Staff that there was no other choice. He felt that he was personally responsible to the President more for political than for military considerations. It was his opinion that there was a large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence had never yet been felt. He felt sure that this submerged class would fight and fight tenaciously if attacked on their own ground. He was concerned that something should be done to arouse them and to develop any possible influence they might have before it became necessary to come to grips with them.

THE PRESIDENT stated that this possibility was being worked on all the time. He asked if the invasion of Japan by white men would not have the effect of more closely uniting the Japanese.

MR. STIMSON thought there was every prospect of this. He agreed with the plan proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being the best

⁶ Not printed.

thing to do, but he still hoped for some fruitful accomplishment through other means.

THE PRESIDENT then asked for the views of the Secretary of the Navy.

MR. FORRESTAL pointed out that even if we wished to besiege Japan for a year or a year and a half, the capture of Kyushu would still be essential. Therefore, the sound decision is to proceed with the operation against Kyushu. There will still be time thereafter to consider the main decision in the light of subsequent events.

MR. McCLOY said he felt that the time was propitious now to study closely all possible means of bringing out the influence of the submerged group in Japan which had been referred to by Mr. Stimson.

THE PRESIDENT stated that one of his objectives in connection with the coming conference would be to get from Russia all the assistance in the war that was possible.⁷ To this end he wanted to know all the decisions that he would have to make in advance in order to occupy the strongest possible position in the discussions.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he could not agree with those who said to him that unless we obtain the unconditional surrender of the Japanese that we will have lost the war. He feared no menace from Japan in the foreseeable future, even if we were unsuccessful in forcing unconditional surrender. What he did fear was that our insistence on unconditional surrender would result only in making the Japanese desperate and thereby increase our casualty lists. He did not think that this was at all necessary.

THE PRESIDENT stated that it was with that thought in mind that he had left the door open for Congress to take appropriate action with reference to unconditional surrender. However, he did not feel that he could take any action at this time to change public opinion on the matter.

THE PRESIDENT said he considered the Kyushu plan all right from the military standpoint and, so far as he was concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could go ahead with it; that we can do this operation and then decide as to the final action later.

THE PRESIDENT reiterated that his main reason for this conference with the Chiefs of Staff was his desire to know definitely how far we could afford to go in the Japanese campaign. He had hoped that there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other. He was clear on the situation now and was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should proceed with the Kyushu operation.

⁷ Cf. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 314-315, 322-323, 411.

With reference to operations in China, GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the opinion that we should not seek an over-all commander in China. The present situation in which the Generalissimo was supporting General Wedemeyer, acting as his Chief of Staff, was entirely satisfactory. The suggestion of the appointment of an over-all commander might cause some difficulty.

ADMIRAL KING said he wished to emphasize the point that, regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, they were not indispensable and he did not think we should go so far as to beg them to come in. While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater, there was no question in his mind but that we could handle it alone. He thought that the realization of this fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand in the forthcoming conference.

THE PRESIDENT and the Chiefs of Staff then discussed certain other matters.⁸

⁸ This paragraph may refer to discussion of a suggestion that the Japanese should be warned, before an atomic bomb was dropped on Japan, that the United States had such a weapon. See document No. 592, footnote 2.

No. 599

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 29 June 1945.

C. C. S. 880/4

DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC

1. In conformity with the over-all objective to bring about the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible date, the United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific:—

a. From bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Marianas, and the Philippines to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to:

b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to:

¹ Noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 193d Meeting, July 16. See vol. II, p. 38. Cf. appendix A to document No. 1381, printed in vol. II.

c. The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain.

2. We have curtailed our projected expansion in the Ryukyus by deferring indefinitely the seizure of Miyako Jima and Kikai Jima. Using the resources originally provided for Miyako and Kikai, we have accelerated the development of Okinawa. By doing this, a greater weight of effort will more promptly be brought to bear against Japan and the risk of becoming involved in operations which might delay the seizure of southern Kyushu is avoided.

3. In furtherance of the accomplishment of the over-all objectives, we have directed:—

a. The invasion of Kyushu, target date 1 November 1945.

b. The continuation of operations for securing and maintaining control of sea communications to and in the Western Pacific as are required for the accomplishment of the over-all objective.

c. The defeat of the remaining Japanese in the Philippines by such operations as can be executed without prejudice to the over-all objective.

d. The seizure of Balikpapan, target date 1 July 1945.

e. The continuance of strategic air operations to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective.

4. Planning and preparation for the campaign in Japan subsequent to the invasion of Kyushu is continuing on the basis of meeting a target date of 1 March 1946 for the invasion of the Tokyo Plain. This planning is premised on the belief that defeat of the enemy's armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to unconditional surrender, and that such a defeat will establish the optimum prospect of capitulation by Japanese forces outside the main Japanese islands. We recognize the possibility also that our success in the main islands may not obviate the necessity of defeating Japanese forces elsewhere; decision as to steps to be taken in this eventuality must await further developments.

5. We are keeping under continuing review the possibility of capitalizing at small cost, without delaying the supreme operations, upon Japanese military deterioration and withdrawals in the China Theater.

6. We have directed the preparation of plans for the following:—

a. Keeping open a sea route to Russian Pacific ports.

b. Operations to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational purposes in order to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances such as a sudden enemy collapse or surrender.

No. 600

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 30 June 1945.

C. C. S. 877/1

BASIC OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND POLICIES

References: CCS 877¹CCS 824/5²CCS 746/10 & 746/24³

1. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to propose three amendments to the memorandum put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 877).

2. First, at the end of paragraph 4 *a*. they would like to change the words "British Isles" to read "British Commonwealth." As at present phrased, the wording would not safeguard Imperial requirements, e. g., for India and Australia.

3. Second, for the reasons already given in paragraph 5, C. C. S. 824/4,⁴ the British Chiefs of Staff would still prefer to delete the words "or delay" in the last line of paragraph 5.

¹ The United States Chiefs of Staff had made the following recommendation in C. C. S. 877, dated June 14 (J. C. S. Files):

"The agreed summary of broad principles regarding the prosecution of the war, set forth in C. C. S. 776/3 [see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 827], was based upon the agreed concept that Germany was the principal enemy. The unconditional surrender of Germany, and the vital importance of rapidly reorienting strength so that the maximum possible effort may now be brought to bear against Japan, make it desirable that this summary of broad principles be revised in consonance with the changed situation. Acceptance now of these principles will establish appropriate emphasis on the war against Japan, while taking cognizance of the changed situation in the European Theater. Accordingly, the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the following statements of basic objectives, strategy, and policies."

For paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of the draft statements referred to, see the left-hand column of the enclosure to document No. 1263, printed in vol. II. Paragraph 4 read as follows:

"4. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the prosecution of the war:—

"*a*. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

"*b*. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas with first priority given to those forces in combat areas.

"*c*. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication."

² Not printed.

³ Neither printed.

⁴ The reasons referred to are stated as follows in C. C. S. 824/4, a memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff dated May 3, 1945: "They [the British Chiefs of Staff] would also like to omit the words 'or delays' . . . as these words could be interpreted very widely and this might lead to subsequent misunderstandings."

4. Third, the British Chiefs of Staff point out that since discussions regarding the formula for priorities began, the cargo shipping review has been completed and formal approval to it should be given shortly. This review will cover all present foreseen requirements, but it remains to safeguard approved military operations against additional civil requirements not now covered in the cargo shipping review. For this reason, therefore, the British Chiefs of Staff would like to suggest that a paragraph should be added to the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff as follows:—

“7. The above formulae relate to cargo shipping, only in so far as additional requirements arise. Schedules of proposed military and civil allocations for the period 1 July 1945 to 30 June 1946 have been agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 746/24). The combined shipping authorities have given assurances (C. C. S. 746/10) that no civil allocations additional to the above, which might prejudice approved operational requirements, will be accepted without prior consultation with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff.”

5. Subject to the above remarks the British Chiefs of Staff are in full agreement with the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 877), and would not propose to submit any separate formula on priorities. If the United States Chiefs of Staff feel able to accept the amendments proposed above, the British Chiefs of Staff suggest that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should adopt the formula in C. C. S. 877, as amended by this paper, at once and incorporate it in the final report of the TERMINAL Conference.

No. 601

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
C. C. S. 877/2

[WASHINGTON,] 10 July 1945.

BASIC OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND POLICIES

1. With reference to the amendment proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff¹ to paragraph 4 *a.*, “Basic Undertakings and Policies for the Prosecution of the War,” of C. C. S. 877,² the United States Chiefs of Staff had not proposed to change the wording of this paragraph, even though it does not fit the present situation. Now that the point has been raised, however, it is considered that the paragraph should recognize that, at this stage in the war, there is no longer any particular connection between “security” and “war-making capacity” in so

¹ See document No. 600.

² See document No. 600, footnote 1.

far as the completion of the war against Japan is concerned. They agree to the inclusion of the term "British Commonwealth" in the statement in so far as "security" is concerned, even though the entire Commonwealth is not at war with Japan.

2. It is the view of the United States Chiefs of Staff that with the end of the war with Germany, justification does not exist for expanding the basic undertaking concerning "war-making capacity" which has been agreed during the period of a two-front war. Rather, now that our entire productive capacity is no longer being devoted to an all-out war, the wording should clearly restrict to this war the commitment in the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

3. Since the British Chiefs of Staff do not wish to continue the original wording, the United States Chiefs of Staff consider that paragraph 4 *a.* of the statement proposed in C. C. S. 877 should be deleted, the following substituted therefor, and paragraphs 4 *b.* and *c.* re-lettered accordingly:—

"4. *a.* Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth.

b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the U. S. and the British Isles in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of this war."

4. As to the proposal to delete the words "or delay" from the sentence, "No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, *or delay*, these main operations.", such deletion would make it meaningless in so far as establishing a priority for operations is concerned. The United States Chiefs of Staff see reasons for inclusion of the phrase and see no reason even for considering its deletion unless the British Chiefs of Staff intend to propose an operation which might delay the main operations.

5. As to the proposal that a paragraph be added relating to cargo shipping, the intent of the memorandum proposed by C. C. S. 877 was to establish broad principles for the prosecution of the war. The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that interpretation of these principles to apply to specific cases should be considered as separate matters. The statements of broad policy contained in C. C. S. 877 will serve as guides to resolve problems in allocation of forces and resources. However, after meeting requirements for the supreme operations against Japan, there may remain matters of logistical and operational priorities which will require resolution by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will have to be considered on their merits as they arise. It is therefore suggested that priorities for cargo shipping be excluded from the statement of basic policies and remain under consideration in the C. C. S. 746 series.

**PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE BY
JAPAN**

No. 602

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 7 July 1945.

C. C. S. 880/8

**PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE BY JAPAN
(For the Purpose of Planning Production and the Allocation of
Manpower)**

With reference to item (9), "Planning date for the end of the war against Japan," of the proposed agenda for United States-British military staff conferences (C. C. S. 880),² the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend agreement to the following:—

a. That for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower, the planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan be 15 November 1946; that this date be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

b. The United States Chiefs of Staff desire to avoid use of the term "end of the war" in the sense proposed in the agenda, in view of the fact that certain United States laws, which should remain in effect during the period of occupation of Japan, will automatically lapse at stated periods after "the end of the war."

¹ Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 196th Meeting, July 19. See vol. II, p. 115.

² Document No. 154.

CONTROL AND COMMAND IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

No. 603

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Elsey)*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

INDO-CHINA

Indo-China first became a subject in Presidential messages in November 1944. General Wedemeyer, Commanding General of U. S. Forces in China, on 15 November reported² that British, Dutch and French interests were making an intensive effort to ensure recovery of their prewar political and economic positions in the Far East. One example of this effort was the establishment of a French

¹ Submitted to Leahy July 1 and subsequently forwarded to Truman.

² Report not printed.

military mission in India which was preparing to infiltrate into Indo-China. For his guidance, Wedemeyer asked for U. S. policy regarding Indo-China which, by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is in the Chinese Theater.

President Roosevelt instructed Ambassador Hurley the next day³ to inform Wedemeyer that "United States policy with regard to French Indo-China cannot be formulated until after consultation with Allies at a forthcoming Combined Staff conference."

The President also asked Hurley to keep him posted on British, French and Dutch activities in southeastern Asia. Hurley had no information on Indo-China to pass to the President at the time, but on 26 November he sent a short diatribe⁴ against the policies of our three Allies which, he said, were directed to the "repossession of their colonial empires and the reestablishment therein of imperial governments." On New Year's Day 1945, Hurley sent the President a long and unfavorable analysis of British, Dutch and French policies with respect to China⁵ but he still had no information regarding Indo-China.

Nor did the Joint Chiefs of Staff know what our Allies proposed to do there. On 21 November, [1944,] by direction of the President, they had informed the Commanding Generals of U. S. Forces in India, Burma and China that: "This Government has made no final decisions on the future of Indo-China, and it expects to be consulted in advance with regard to any arrangements applicable to the future of southeast Asia."⁶ The Joint Chiefs were not consulted by the British or the French, however, and when President Roosevelt arrived at Yalta he had no official information on their intentions with respect to Indo-China except that de Gaulle had spoken in a general way about sending French troops there.⁷

On 8 February, while explaining his views on trusteeships, President Roosevelt told Stalin he had in mind a trusteeship for Indo-China. He said the British did not approve and wanted to give it back to the French because they feared that the implications of a trusteeship might affect Burma. He added that the French had done nothing to improve the natives since obtaining the colony. When President

³ See *Military Situation in the Far East*, Hearings Before the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951), pt. 4, p. 2889.

⁴ See *ibid.*, and Don Lohbeck, *Patrick J. Hurley* (Chicago, 1956), p. 322.

⁵ See Lohbeck, *Patrick J. Hurley*, pp. 323-324.

⁶ Full text not printed.

⁷ This paragraph does not take account of Anglo-American consultations affecting Indochina, in which both the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were involved, which had been proceeding for almost a year. The President had been informed of the status of these consultations by the Department of State in December 1944, more than a month before the Yalta Conference, and Indochina continued to receive the attention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the early months of 1945.

Roosevelt said that de Gaulle had asked for ships to transport French forces to Indo-China, Stalin asked where de Gaulle would get the troops. The President replied that de Gaulle had said he would find the troops when the President found the ships; so far there were no ships.⁸

In March, Wedemeyer and Hurley were both in Washington. President Roosevelt told Wedemeyer that he must watch carefully to prevent British and French political activities in the area and that he should give only such support to the British and French as would be required in direct operations against the Japanese.

On 24 March, President Roosevelt and Hurley had a long discussion on Indo-China. Hurley reported this conversation to President Truman on 28 [29] May as follows:⁹

"In my last conference with President Roosevelt, I informed him fully on the Indo-China situation. I told him that the French, British and Dutch were cooperating to prevent the establishment of a United Nations trusteeship for Indo-China. The imperialist leaders believe that such a trusteeship would be a bad precedent for the other imperialistic areas in southeast Asia. I told the President also that the British would attempt, with the use of our Lend-Lease supplies and if possible our manpower, to occupy Indo-China and reestablish their former imperial control. I suggested to the President that for my own guidance and in order to clarify Wedemeyer's position I thought we should have a written directive on Indo-China. The President said that in the coming San Francisco Conference¹⁰ there would be set up a United Nations Trusteeship that would make effective the right of colonial people to choose the form of government under which they will live as soon as in the opinion of the United Nations they are qualified for independence."

While Wedemeyer and Hurley were in Washington, Churchill wired¹¹ that he understood there had been occasional difficulties between Wedemeyer and Lord [Louis] Mountbatten, British Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater, about activities in Indo-China, and he proposed that he and President Roosevelt direct the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make arrangements for "full and frank exchange of intentions, plans and intelligence between Wedemeyer and Mountbatten as regards all matters of mutual concern."

The President replied on 22 March^{11a} that he understood both commanders were independently conducting air operations and intelligence missions in Indo-China. This was wasteful and apt to

⁸ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 770.

⁹ For another extract from this message, see *post*, p. 920. For further extracts, see *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt. 4, pp. 2890-2892; Lohbeck, *Patrick J. Hurley*, pp. 409-411, 413-414.

¹⁰ i. e., the United Nations Conference on International Organization.

¹¹ Message not printed.

^{11a} Full text not printed.

produce dangerous confusion, and President Roosevelt suggested a solution:

“It seems to me the best solution at present is for you and me to agree that all Anglo-American-Chinese military operations in Indo-China, regardless of their nature, be coordinated by General Wedemeyer as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo.¹² . . .¹³ If you agree to this proposal, I suggest that you direct Mountbatten to coordinate his activities in Indo-China with Wedemeyer.”

Churchill did not reply to the President's suggestion until 11 April, after Wedemeyer had stopped at Mountbatten's headquarters on his return to China from Washington. The two theater commanders had discussed operations in Indo-China. Wedemeyer was guided by President Roosevelt's verbal directive to support only British and French operations directed against the Japanese, and he left Mountbatten's headquarters believing he had reached an agreement whereby the British Commander would not carry out operations in Indo-China until they had been approved by him.

Mountbatten had another understanding of the agreement, however, and the British conception of it was voiced by Churchill to President Roosevelt on 11 April.¹⁴ It was apparent that political motives inspired British operations in Indo-China, as the Prime Minister wrote:

“Now that the Japanese have taken over Indo-China and that substantial resistance is being offered by French patriots, it is essential not only that we should support the French by all the means in our power, but also that we should associate them with our operations into their country. It would look very bad in history if we failed to support isolated French forces in their resistance to the Japanese to the best of our ability, or, if we excluded the French from participation in our councils as regards Indo-China.”

It was also apparent that the British did not consider the Wedemeyer-Mountbatten agreement as calling for anything more than an interchange of information, for Churchill quoted his proposed directive to Mountbatten as follows:

“You may conduct from whatsoever base appears most suitable the minimum pre-occupational activities in Indo-China which local emergency and the advance of your forces require. It is essential, however, that you should keep General Wedemeyer . . . continually informed of your operations. . . .”

President Truman answered Churchill's message on 14 April.¹⁴ He did not make an issue with Churchill, but he carefully stated the

¹² Chiang Kai-shek.

¹³ Ellipses and brackets throughout this document appear in the original.

¹⁴ Full text not printed.

American understanding of the Wedemeyer–Mountbatten agreement, as follows:

“General Wedemeyer reports that his conference with Admiral Mountbatten resulted in an agreement that the latter would notify Wedemeyer when he desired to conduct an operation in Indo-China and that the operation would not be conducted until approval was given by the Generalissimo. Wedemeyer’s understanding is that the procedure will be for Mountbatten to notify General Carton De Wiart, who would inform Wedemeyer in his capacity as chief of staff to the Generalissimo. If the proposed operation from SEAC could not be integrated with China Theater plans, then Mountbatten agreed he would not undertake it.”

Following different policies and without an understanding on operations in Indo-China, Wedemeyer and Mountbatten came into open disagreement in May. Mountbatten informed Wedemeyer he intended to fly 26 sorties into Indo-China in support of French guerrilla groups.

Wedemeyer asked for more information because, he said, the French Government had placed all French guerrilla groups in Indo-China under the Generalissimo (Wedemeyer is Chiang’s Chief of Staff) and not under Mountbatten. He asked the specific question, “What arrangements have been made to insure that the equipment furnished guerrilla units is employed against the Japanese?”¹⁵

Mountbatten did not answer this question, and after a quick exchange of messages¹⁶ in which he gave Wedemeyer neither the numbers nor the locations of the guerrilla units which he intended to supply, Mountbatten abruptly ordered his planes to carry out the sorties without waiting for the consent or approval of Wedemeyer or Chiang Kai-shek. Wedemeyer on 25 May protested vigorously:¹⁵

“It had never occurred to me that you would presume that you have authority to operate in an area contiguous to your own without cognizance and full authority of the Commander of that area. . . . Your decision to conduct these operations without the Generalissimo’s approval is a direct violation of the intent of our respective directives.”

Wedemeyer informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the circumstances, as he saw them, of his misunderstanding with Mountbatten. He reported his conclusions:¹⁵

“I have not sufficient information available to coordinate or evaluate the operations Mountbatten is now undertaking and I cannot carry out the explicit instructions of the President. . . . If lend-lease materials are being made available by United States to British in

¹⁵ Full text of message not printed.

¹⁶ Not printed.

support of French Indo-China operations, I believe that these materials should be turned over . . . [to the China Theater] so that our country at least gets credit for such support and further so that I can carry out my directive in screening the nature of operations in the area."

Ambassador Hurley summarized his own view of the conflict in British and American policies which underlay the Wedemeyer-Mountbatten dispute in a long message to President Truman on 28 [29] May: ¹⁷

"I had been definitely directed verbally by President Roosevelt in regard to his policy in Indo-China," he wrote, "but we in this theater have never received a written directive on the political policy of the United States in Indo-China.

"It is in this situation we find ourselves when Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Supreme British Commander in Southeast Asia, informed Wedemeyer by cable that he is flying British sorties into Indo-China, which is not in his theater, without the consent of the Theater Commander, the Generalissimo, and without the consent or cooperation of General Wedemeyer. This military phase of the situation is being submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Wedemeyer. Lord Louis is using American lend-lease supplies and other American resources to invade Indo-China to defeat what we believe to be the American policy and to reestablish French imperialism.

"Attention is called to the fact that Lord Louis very recently requested General Sultan, United States India-Burma Commander, for a large increase in lend-lease supplies that will enable him to defeat the Roosevelt policy in Indo-China and reestablish imperialism in that area. If you, sir, are opposed to Lord Louis['] political objectives in Indo-China, I suggest that our Government stop giving him lend-lease supplies and deny him the use of American Air Forces and other American resources.

"The move of the imperialistic powers to use American resources to enable them to move with force into Indo-China is not for the purpose of participating in the main battle against Japan. Such a move would have two political objectives: (1) The reestablishment of imperialism in Indo-China and (2) The placing of British forces in a position where they could occupy Hong Kong and prevent the return of Hong Kong to China.

"It would clarify the situation in Asia for all of us if we could be given: (1) A definite Indo-China policy, and (2) A definite policy on Hong Kong or if we could be directed to follow the Roosevelt policy in both areas."

On 31 May, in a personal message to General Marshall,¹⁸ Wedemeyer endorsed Hurley's interpretation of British intentions in the Far East. He reported that his information pointed to an increase of British political and economic operations in Indo-China for the purpose of recovering British pre-war prestige and economic preferment in Southeast Asia; and that it was probable the British would

¹⁷ For another extract from this message, see *ante*, p. 917. For further extracts, see *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt. 4, pp. 2890-2892; Lohbeck, *Patrick J. Hurley*, pp. 409-411, 413-414.

¹⁸ Not printed.

propose, at the next Big Three meeting, extending the boundaries of Mountbatten's command to include all former British, French and Dutch colonial possessions.

There have been no Presidential messages on Indo-China within the past month. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken no action on inter-theater disputes in Asia, pending a meeting of the Combined Chiefs; Churchill has maintained a careful silence; and President Truman has told Hurley that this question will probably be discussed at the forthcoming Berlin Conference.¹⁹

G. M. ELSEY

¹⁹ See document No. 149.

No. 604

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 9 July 1945.

C. C. S. 890

CONTROL AND COMMAND IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

1. We have been instructed to present the attached memorandum on command and control in the war against Japan which the British Chiefs of Staff have prepared for discussion at the next conference.

2. The views of the Australian and New Zealand Governments on the proposals formulated have been requested but have not yet been received.¹

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

CONTROL AND COMMAND IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MEMORANDUM BY THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. In considering the proposals made by the United States Chiefs of Staff on the transfer of command in the Southwest Pacific Area,² we have reviewed the whole question of command and control in the war against Japan under the following headings:—

I. Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) and Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA)

- (a) Boundaries of command
- (b) Chain of command
- (c) Date of transfer

II. Higher Strategic Control of the War against Japan

¹ Concerning the Australian views on the enclosed memorandum and on document No. 615, see John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, vol. VI (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), p. 268. The New Zealand views were not received prior to the conclusion of the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held in connection with the Berlin Conference. See *ibid.*, p. 269.

² Not printed.

I. SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

2. We agree with the United States Chiefs of Staff that there should shortly be some alteration in the responsibility for SWPA. In our view, the transfer of this responsibility will involve alterations in the boundaries of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia's (SACSEA) command.³ We make the following proposals:—

Boundaries of Command

3. SACSEA's boundaries should be extended as follows:—

Beginning at the junction of the Sino-Burmese frontier and the Sino-Indo-China frontier, along the frontier between Indo-China and China to the coast; thence down the coast of Indo-China to a point 15 degrees N; thence through the Balabac Strait along the 1939 boundary line between the Philippines and Borneo to latitude 05 degrees N; thence eastward to 05 degrees N, 128 degrees E; thence southwestward to 02 degrees S, 123 degrees E; thence southeastward to 08 degrees S, 125 degrees E; thence southwestward to 18 degrees S, 110 degrees E.

The main difference from the proposal so far made to us by the United States Chiefs of Staff is the inclusion of Indo-China, as well as Siam, in SEAC. This we consider important so that there may be unity of control of the major operations in this area when they develop and of previous subversive and paramilitary operations.

This line of demarcation would add Borneo, Java, and the Celebes to SEAC.

4. Boundaries of Australian command should now be defined as follows:—

05 degrees N, 128 degrees E; thence to 05 degrees N, 130 degrees E; thence south to the Equator; thence to the International Date Line.

The main difference between this line of demarcation and that proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff is that all Australian mandated territories are now included in the area. This is naturally the desire of the Australian Government, with which we are in sympathy. It would, of course, be possible for United States forces to make use of the facilities in Manus and Guadalcanal.

Chain of Command

5. We propose that the chain of command and responsibility should then be as follows:—

a. SEAC—no change.

b. Australian command—in this area there should be an Australian commander under the Australian Chiefs of Staff. The British Chiefs

³ Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten was Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia.

of Staff should be the link between the Australian and Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Date of Transfer

6. In our view SACSEA may not be ready to assume his additional responsibilities until after the recapture of Singapore. We, therefore, propose that, subject to further examination with the United States Chiefs of Staff, the transfer of command should take place shortly after that time. This need not preclude the gradual turnover in the meantime of bases, ports, or airfields by agreement between the Australians and General MacArthur.

II. HIGHER STRATEGIC CONTROL IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

7. The present arrangements for the higher strategic control in the war against Japan are:—

a. SEAC (C. C. S. 319/5⁴):

Under the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the British Chiefs of Staff acting as their agents.

b. Pacific and Southwest Pacific Areas:

In these areas the Combined Chiefs of Staff exercise jurisdiction over grand strategic policy and over the allocation of forces and war materials but the United States Chiefs of Staff are responsible for all matters appertaining to operational strategy.

8. We feel that the time has now come when we should take upon ourselves a greater share of the burden of strategic decisions which will be required before Japan is defeated. Although our contribution in the Pacific must always remain small in comparison with that of the United States, it is natural that our interest and concern should grow as more of our forces begin to be deployed in the Pacific area. Moreover, when the Straits of Malacca have been opened, there will no longer be the same natural geographical division between SEAC and the Pacific. All operations in the war against the Japanese would then form one strategic concept.

9. We therefore propose for consideration that the control of the different theatres in the war against Japan should now be organised as follows:—

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise general jurisdiction over strategic policy and the proper coordination of the Allied efforts in all theatres engaged against the Japanese.

b. The United States Chiefs of Staff acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations in the Pacific Ocean area and China.

c. The British Chiefs of Staff acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations in SEAC and SWPA.

⁴ Not printed.

d. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over allocation of forces and war materials as between all theatres engaged against the Japanese.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

No. 605

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

FORM OF SOVIET MILITARY PARTICIPATION

(1) OPERATIONAL ZONES

(a) *Japanese Islands*

This Government has adopted the policy that, for purposes of prosecuting the war and for military government, the Central Pacific Area and Japan come under the jurisdiction of the United States. Moreover, the military operations against the islands of Japan must be largely amphibious in character, requiring special equipment and familiarity with a special technique. The United States forces have developed this equipment and technique to a much higher degree than have the forces of any of the other nations at war with Japan. For these reasons, the Japanese islands should be primarily, but not exclusively, the American zone of operations. For political reasons it seems advisable that units from those countries actively at war with Japan, including Asiatic countries, participate in the combat operations, provided such participation is not prejudicial to the effectiveness of military operations.

(b) *Manchuria, Mongolia and North China*

It would appear that operations against the Japanese on the Asiatic mainland, exclusive of Korea, will be primarily land operations with air support—a type of warfare with which the Soviet forces are thoroughly familiar and for which they are well equipped. Moreover, geographical and logistic reasons would indicate that operations against the Japanese armies in the areas mentioned will be carried out principally by Russian forces, unless the Chinese are able to bring their forces into the areas. This part of the Asiatic mainland should therefore be considered as primarily a Russian zone of operations, although for political reasons it appears advisable that contingents from other Allied nations at war with Japan participate in the combat operations.¹

¹ With reference to this paragraph and paragraph (c) on p. 925, cf. the section on "international implications" of a paper of July 5, 1945, entitled "The Chinese Communist Movement", prepared in the War Department and circulated to the White House and the Department of State, among other recipients. Text in *Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings Before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st Session, pt. 7A, pp. 2308-2310.*

(c) *Korea*

Military operations in Korea may combine landings from the sea and overland invasion from Siberia. For this, and for political reasons, it would appear desirable that Korea be considered a combined zone of operations, probably under a single Allied command.

(2) MIXED CONTINGENTS UNDER ALLIED COMMAND, ESPECIALLY
IN JAPAN(a) *Japanese Islands*

Politically it appears advisable to demonstrate to the Japanese people (1) that their aggression has brought down on them the armed and active opposition of the greater part of the world; (2) that the solidarity of the United Nations is a fact; and (3) that the Pacific war is not a racial war. For these reasons it seems desirable that units from those United Nations actively at war with Japan, including Asiatic countries, participate in the combat operations against Japan, provided such participation is not prejudicial to the effectiveness of military operations, and further participate in the occupation of Japan following unconditional surrender or total defeat. Such participation may be by token forces or effective combat units, but should not be so large as [not?] to operate under the command of the American theater commander.

Soviet approval of this general plan and agreement to participate therein are desirable.

(b) *Manchuria, Mongolia and North China*

While the areas listed will undoubtedly fall within the Soviet zone of operations, to remove any possible source of suspicion and distrust it would seem advisable that the Soviet commander of the theater of operations invite the participation in combat operations of American and other Allied contingents, on much the same basis as the suggested Soviet participation in the American zone of operations.

(c) *Korea*

Various countries, especially China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, have an interest in Korea, either because of common frontiers or because of Korea's strategic position, which vitally influences the peace and security of the Far East. No one of these countries would wish to see any one nation acquire a predominant position in Korea. Moreover, three of the countries, the United States, Great Britain and China, are committed to the principal [*principle*] that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent"² and therefore cannot consent to conditions which would prejudice Korea's development toward freedom and independence.

² See document No. 606.

Furthermore, the Koreans themselves, having been once conquered and enslaved, are extremely suspicious of the intentions of other nations and probably would be hostile to the forces of any single country operating within Korea. For these reasons it is considered politically inadvisable for any one of the interested countries alone to invade Korea for the purpose of driving out the Japanese. If it is militarily feasible, therefore, it is believed advisable that the invading forces be composed of units from the various interested countries, under a single over-all Allied command.

No. 606

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

SOVIET SUPPORT OF THE CAIRO DECLARATION

I. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CAIRO DECLARATION

The Cairo Declaration (see Appendix for the text)¹ was issued on December 1, 1943, by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill. Marshal Stalin was not a party to it. The Declaration contains the following territorial commitments:

Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores shall be restored to China, Korea in due course shall become free and independent, Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914 (the Japanese Mandated Islands and the Spratly Islands), and "Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed".

II. IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET SUPPORT OF THE DECLARATION

A Soviet engagement to adhere to the Cairo Declaration would strengthen United States policy in the Far East and should tend to closer cooperation between the Soviet Union and the three Great Allies which issued the Declaration.

¹ Not printed herein. Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 393.

III. CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET SUPPORT

1. *Manchuria*: A Soviet engagement to support the commitment that Manchuria shall be restored to China would be important in that it would bar the Soviet Union from making any territorial demands in Manchuria. It would not of itself, however, prevent Soviet attempts, as in Eastern Europe, to set up a "friendly" government in Manchuria.

2. *Formosa and the Pescadores*: It is assumed that the Soviet Government has no direct interest in Formosa and the Pescadores and that it would not oppose the restoration of these territories to China.

3. *Korea*: The Soviet Government should not object to the commitment that Korea in due course shall become free and independent. The Soviets, however, may attempt to set up a "friendly" government.

4. *The Japanese Mandated Islands and the Spratly Islands*: The Soviet Government should be willing to have these islands stripped from Japan. The Declaration makes no provision as to their disposition.

5. *Other Territories Taken by Violence and Greed*: It is to be assumed that the Soviet Government will be willing to support this commitment, and that it will interpret it as an obligation that Southern Sakhalin should be restored to the Soviet Union.

From this analysis, it appears that the chief advantage which the United States would gain from an undertaking by the Soviet Government to adhere to the Cairo Declaration would be a virtual pledge that the Soviets would attempt no territorial acquisitions in Manchuria. Soviet support of the Declaration, however, would not of itself stand in the way of Soviet efforts to set up "friendly" governments in Manchuria and Korea.

IV. CONCLUSION

A commitment by the Soviet Government to adhere to the Cairo Declaration would need to be supplemented by a detailed understanding as to the course of action to be taken in the Far East and the Pacific by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States. Such an understanding would appear necessary to guard against possible Soviet attempts to set up "friendly" governments in Manchuria, possibly China as a whole, and Korea.

No. 607

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹[Extract²]

TOP SECRET

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF JAPAN AND POLICY TOWARD LIBERATED AREAS IN THE FAR EAST IN RELATION TO UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

II. SOVIET SUPPORT OF THE CAIRO DECLARATION³

A. *Minimum objective*: To obtain (1) the adherence of the Soviet Government to the Cairo Declaration, and (2) an agreement among the three powers represented at the coming Conference that they will consult in advance among themselves and China on all matters relating to the implementation of the territorial dispositions provided for under that Declaration.

The adherence of the Soviet Government would give the support of that Government to the important provisions in the Declaration that Manchuria and Formosa shall be restored to China and that Korea in due course shall be free and independent.

¹ Annex 3 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² For other extracts from this paper, see documents Nos. 574 and 589.

³ In another version of this paper (undated) in the Department of State files (file No. 740.00119 Council/6-3045), the following language has been substituted for this entire section:

“II. SOVIET ADHERENCE TO THE CAIRO DECLARATION AND CONSULTATION THEREUNDER

“It is proposed that the Soviet Government be invited to announce at an appropriate time its adherence to the Cairo Declaration. Such a Soviet engagement would strengthen the commitments made by the three Allies which issued the Declaration and should tend to develop closer cooperation between these Allies and the Soviet Union in settling some of the outstanding territorial problems resulting from the coming victory over Japan. It would especially give the support of the Soviet Government to the important provisions in the Declaration that Manchuria and Formosa shall be restored to the Republic of China and that Korea in due course shall be free and independent.

“It is also proposed that [the] three powers enter into an agreement that they will consult in advance among themselves and with China on all matters relating to the implementation of the territorial dispositions provided under that Declaration. Such an agreement would be especially important in reaching a successful solution of the post-war problems of Korea. The interest of the three powers and China in Korea, the probable inability of the Koreans themselves to establish a satisfactory government immediately following liberation, and the commitment as to Korea in the Cairo Declaration make it evident that it would be to the interest of each of the states concerned that they consult among themselves as to the measures which may need to be taken, such as the possible creation of an interim administration in Korea, to assist the Korean people in the early establishment of a free and independent state.”

The agreement would prevent unilateral action by any of the three states to establish a "friendly" government in any of the territories under consideration.

B. *Maximum objective*: To obtain an agreement among the three powers that, with China's anticipated cooperation, they will jointly support whatever measures appear best adapted to develop in Korea a strong, democratic, independent nation.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

No. 608

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McFarland)

[Extracts]

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—The statements recorded below were made in the context of a full discussion of plans for the invasion of Kyushu and of the casualties anticipated in such an invasion. For a much more complete record of the discussion, in that context, see document No. 598.]

TOP SECRET

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON MONDAY,
18 JUNE 1945 AT 1530 ¹

Present[:] The President
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy
General of the Army G. C. Marshall
Fleet Admiral E. J. King
Lieut. General I. C. Eaker (Representing
General of the Army H. H. Arnold)
The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson
The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal
The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy

Secretary

Brig. General A. J. McFarland

1. DETAILS OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST JAPAN

... He [GENERAL MARSHALL] then read, as an expression of his views, the following digest of a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the President (J. C. S. 1388):²

¹ i. e., 3:30 p. m.

² Not printed. The memorandum referred to was apparently never presented to the President.

We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations. It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.

With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country.

An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had asked General MacArthur's opinion on the proposed operation and had received from him the following telegram, which General Marshall then read:

"I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested. . . . The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat. . . ."

ADMIRAL KING agreed with General Marshall's views. . . .

GENERAL EAKER said that he agreed completely with the statements made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared for the President. He had just received a cable³ in which General Arnold also expressed complete agreement. . . .

THE PRESIDENT stated that one of his objectives in connection with the coming conference would be to get from Russia all the assistance in the war that was possible.⁴ To this end he wanted to know all the decisions that he would have to make in advance in order to occupy the strongest possible position in the discussions.

ADMIRAL KING said he wished to emphasize the point that, regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, they were not indispensable and he did not think we should go so far as to beg

³ Not printed.

⁴ Cf. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 314-315, 322-323, 411.

them to come in. While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater there was no question in his mind but that we could handle it alone. He thought that the realization of this fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand in the forthcoming conference.

No. 609

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 22 June 1945.

C. C. S. 884

INFORMATION FOR THE RUSSIANS CONCERNING THE JAPANESE WAR

1. The Head of the British Military Mission in Moscow, General Gammell, has asked the British Chiefs of Staff to inform him, in the event of Russia declaring war on Japan, what information he should pass to the Russians on Japanese dispositions and estimated intentions, and on British dispositions and operational plans.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff feel that it is desirable for the policy adopted by them in imparting information to the Russians on these subjects to be coordinated with the policy of the United States Chiefs of Staff.

3. The British Chiefs of Staff suggest that General Gammell and General Deane should be empowered to hand over information on Japanese dispositions and intentions, and also on Allied dispositions only if it is asked for, and then only on a basis of reciprocity. The British Chiefs of Staff as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff would provide General Gammell with the necessary information on Southeast Asia Command, and they assume that the United States Chiefs of Staff would provide General Deane with information about the Pacific, Southwest Pacific, and China Theatres. Coordination between General Gammell and General Deane would however be necessary in order to ensure that information is passed on American forces in a theatre under the operational control of the British Chiefs of Staff, and vice versa.

4. So far as Allied intentions in all theatres are concerned, the British Chiefs of Staff consider that information should be passed to the Russians only on the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on each occasion.

5. We should be glad to have the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on this matter.

¹ Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 196th Meeting, July 19. See vol. II, pp. 113-115.

No. 610

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff[Extract ¹]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 30 June 1945.

C. C. S. 877/1

BASIC OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND POLICIES

5. Subject to the above remarks ² the British Chiefs of Staff are in full agreement with the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 877),³

¹ For the full text of this memorandum, see document No. 600.

² None of the remarks referred to concerned paragraph 6a of C. C. S. 877, quoted in footnote 3, *infra*.

³ Concerning the text of this memorandum, see document No. 600, *ante*, footnote 1, and document No. 1263, printed in vol. II. The passage here pertinent reads as follows:

"6. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept:—

"a. Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith."

No. 611

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff ¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 8 July 1945.

C. C. S. 884/1

INFORMATION FOR THE RUSSIANS CONCERNING THE JAPANESE WAR

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 884 ² concerning the information which should be given to the Russians on intelligence, dispositions, and plans in the war against Japan.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff consider this matter is not an appropriate one for combined agreement. However, they will not, without prior agreement of the appropriate British authorities, pass to the Russians any information on dispositions or operational plans of Allied forces in areas of British strategic responsibility or any information that has been obtained from a British source.

¹ Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 196th Meeting, July 19. See vol. II, pp. 113-115.

² Document No. 609.

No. 612

761.93/7-1245: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President and the Secretary of State

[Extract¹]TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[Moscow,] 12 July 1945.

Personal and top secret for the President and the Secretary of State from Harriman.

Soong suggested to Stalin that he return to Chungking to consult the Generalissimo over the points still at issue.² Stalin however said that it was better to come to agreement before he met you at Berlin as he wished to decide with you date of his entry into the war. . . .

¹ For the full text of this message, see document No. 577.

² In the Sino-Soviet negotiations being conducted at Moscow. See document No. 577.

No. 613

740.00119 Control (Japan)/7-1545

*Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dooman)*¹

TOP SECRET

JAPAN: OCCUPATION AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT

I. The United States has adopted the policy that for the purposes of prosecuting the war and for military government, Japan comes under the jurisdiction of the United States. Prime Minister Churchill is understood to have given tacit consent to this policy by certain statements made by him at the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944.²

II. The State, War and Navy Departments have provisionally agreed upon the following position with regard to the occupation and military government of Japan in the post-defeat period. It is now before the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval or comment before

¹ The file copy is unsigned, but bears a manuscript notation indicating that it was drafted by Dooman.

² The records of the Second Quebec Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume in this series.

being presented to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy for final action:

1. This Government is committed to the principle of united action for the prosecution of the war in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of Japan.

2. The United Kingdom, China and (if she enters the war) the Soviet Union, have a responsibility to participate with the United States in the occupation and military government of Japan and the obligation to assume a share in the burden thereof.

3. While the establishment of policies for the control of Japan is a matter to be entered into by the major Allies in harmony with other United Nations, the United States should insist on control over the implementation of these policies.

4. The major share of the responsibility for military government and the preponderance of forces used in occupation should be American, and the designated Commander of all occupational forces (the Military Governor), and the principal subordinate Commanders should be American.

5. The military government of Japan should be organized on the principle of centralized administration, avoiding the division of the country into national zones of independent responsibility administered separately.

III. If the foregoing should be adopted as the final United States position, it would call for a cordial acceptance of any Soviet expression of intention to despatch an armed contingent to collaborate in the assault on, and occupation of Japan. On the other hand, if and if [*sic*] there should be initiated a state of war between the Soviet Union and Japan, [and if] there were offered no such collaboration, the United States position would require the giving of a reminder to the Soviet Government of its commitment, under the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943,³ to the principle of united action for the prosecution of the war against Japan.

IV. The United States position would call for insistence upon

(a) a unified, and not zonal, military government of Japan; and
(b) the controlling voice of the United States in the determination of policies of military government; [.]

With regard to (a) above, the unified character of Japan from administrative, economic, social and ethnic points of view, along with the fact that the United States will have assumed the major share of the burden in accomplishing Japan's defeat and will therefore have acquired warrantable grounds for claiming a controlling voice in the post-defeat treatment of Japan, makes desirable a unified military government.

³ Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, p. 308.

Allied participation in military government of Japan would be effected by contingents of our Allies serving in the occupation forces directly under the designated Allied Commander, who will be an American, and representation on a council, advisory to the Commander, made up of ranking officers of the respective contingents.

V. In view of the undertakings given the Soviet Government with regard to Southern Saghalian [*Sakhalin*] and the Kurile Islands,⁴ an exception to the principle of unified administration might well be entertained in respect of these areas if any proposal to that effect were made by the Soviet Government. The areas mentioned are sparsely populated and relatively unimportant, and their administration as a separate unit would not materially affect the administration of Japan proper.

BERLIN CONFERENCE, July 15, 1945.

⁴i. e., the agreement regarding entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, signed at Yalta, February 11, 1945. For text, see Executive Agreement Series No. 498; 59 Stat. (2) 1823; *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.

No. 614

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET
C. C. S. 884/2

[BABELSBERG,] 15 July 1945.

INFORMATION FOR THE RUSSIANS CONCERNING THE JAPANESE WAR

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have considered the reply by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 884/1)² to their memorandum (C. C. S. 884)³ concerning the information which should be given to the Russians if they enter the war against Japan.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff cannot agree that this is an inappropriate matter for combined agreement.

3. Hitherto throughout the war against Germany, it has been customary, although not obligatory, for the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to consult together as to the measure and means of our dealings with the Russians. The British Chiefs of Staff consider that on the whole this policy has been wise and profitable, and they see no reason, now that Germany has been defeated and Russia is not yet at war with Japan, to depart from it. They are not aware that it has aroused resentment on the part of the Russians, who nevertheless must have been aware of our joint collaboration.

¹ Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 196th Meeting, July 19. See vol. II, pp. 113-115.

² Document No. 611.

³ Document No. 609.

4. If the British and American staffs now take an independent and quite possibly divergent line as regards passing information to the Russians, it seems possible that the Russians will be tempted to play one of us off against the other.

5. For the above reasons the British Chiefs of Staff would be grateful for an opportunity of discussing this matter further with the United States Chiefs of Staff at TERMINAL.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

No. 615

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 6 July 1945.

C. C. S. 889

BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE FINAL PHASE OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

References: CCS 452 Series
CCS 619 Series
CCS 691 Series

1. We have been instructed to present the attached memorandum on the British contribution to the final phase of the war against Japan, which the British Chiefs of Staff have prepared for discussion at the next conference.

2. The views of the Australian and New Zealand Governments on the proposals formulated have been requested but have not yet been received.²

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE FINAL PHASE OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

MEMORANDUM BY THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. It has been agreed that the over-all objective for the war against Japan is to force the unconditional surrender of the Japanese by:—

a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese naval and air strength.

¹ Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 194th Meeting, July 17. See vol. II, pp. 48–51.

² For the substance of the Australian views, see Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, vol. VI, p. 268. The New Zealand views were not received prior to the conclusion of the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held in connection with the Berlin Conference. See *ibid.*, p. 269.

b. Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

2. It is agreed that the invasion of Japan is the supreme operation of the war. The prospect of the recapture of Singapore in November 1945, together with the opening of the Malacca Straits, enables us to offer, in addition to the British Pacific Fleet and the very long range (VLR) bomber force, a British, Dominion, and Indian land force to take part in this invasion. Owing to limitations of shipping, however, such a project will only absorb a part of the forces at present deployed in Southeast Asia Command. We have therefore planned that British forces should continue operations in the Outer Zone as far as limitations of other resources allow.

3. We propose, therefore, that British participation in the final phase of the war against Japan should take the following form:—

a. The British Pacific Fleet as at present planned.

b. A VLR bomber force of 10 squadrons increasing to 20 squadrons at a later date when more airfields become available.

c. A British Commonwealth force to participate in CORONET under American command, of three to five divisions, all to be carried in British shipping and provided with the necessary assault lift. This force would be supported by the East Indies Fleet, augmented by the British Pacific Fleet as necessary, and by a tactical air component of some 15 squadrons. The exact size, composition, and role of this force can only be determined by consultation between British and United States staffs in the light of United States operational plans, the target date of CORONET, and its relation to the date of the capture of Singapore. Our preliminary investigations show that it might take one of the following forms:—

(i) A force of one or possibly two divisions in the assault together with two or three divisions in the build-up, administratively largely self-supporting.

(ii) A force of three divisions in the assault and immediate follow-up and one or possibly two divisions in the build-up, relying, to a considerable degree, on American administrative assistance.

(iii) A force of up to five divisions in the build-up administratively largely self-supporting. We should naturally prefer a course which allowed us to take part in the assault.

d. Operations in the Outer Zone to maintain pressure against the Japanese across the Burma–Siam frontier. In addition, plans for operations against Siam, for the establishment of bridgeheads in Java or Sumatra, and for the recapture of Hong Kong will be studied. A decision will be made at a later date as to whether, and if so when, any of these operations will be undertaken.

4. We therefore propose that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve the British contribution to the final phase of the war against Japan, as set out in this memorandum.

**FRENCH AND NETHERLAND PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST
JAPAN**

No. 616

740.00119 E. W./6-2545

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[Extracts ¹]

[WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: United States-French Relations

Participants: The French Ambassador, Mr. Henri Bonnet;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew.

The Ambassador then said that while he had no instruction from his Government he wished in his capacity as Ambassador responsible for the good relations between our two countries to express to me his concern at the present unfortunate trend of these relations. He said that it was the earnest desire of General de Gaulle and, as I well knew, of himself to bring France and the United States steadily closer together and he felt that the present trend is unfortunately in the other direction. This arises from a number of issues in which France has been given little satisfaction and public opinion in his country, knowing of these issues, is at present developing in a way not conducive to the improvement of our relations.

The third point is the fact that although an understanding was reached in the talks which Mr. Bidault, when he was in Washington, had had with President Truman and myself ² that a French Army Corps should be permitted to proceed to the Far East to participate in the war against Japan, nothing further had been heard about the matter.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

¹ For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 99, 357, and 637.

² With respect to the scope of the Truman-Bidault conversations of May 1945, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XII, p. 927.

No. 617

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*¹TOP SECRET
C. C. S. 842/1

[WASHINGTON,] 10 July 1945.

FRENCH AND DUTCH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposals put forward by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 842² and agree in principle that the Combined Chiefs of Staff might now state a general over-all policy with regard to French and Dutch participation in the war against Japan. They consider that such a policy should be stated as follows:—

a. While it is at present impossible for French or Netherlands armed forces to play a major part in Far Eastern operations, the desire of the French/Dutch to join with us in the war against Japan and the possible provision of such assistance in the struggle in the Pacific which may be synchronized with operations already planned or under way will be taken into account by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. No French or Netherlands forces will be accepted for operations unless it has been previously agreed that complete control of such forces will be vested in the commander in chief concerned and their actual employment will be determined by him solely on military grounds. The actual use of any force must depend solely on military considerations.

b. In implementing this policy the Combined Chiefs of Staff undertake to give the French/Netherlands representatives timely information of their intentions in respect of any operations that will directly affect French/Netherlands territories or armed forces in the Far East.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that the draft letter in the Enclosure to C. C. S. 842 should be amended accordingly.

3. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

- a.* Accept the policy stated in paragraph 1 above.
b. Dispatch the attached memorandum (Enclosure) to the French/Netherlands representatives.

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM TO THE FRENCH AND NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVES TO THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have given consideration to the question of French/Netherlands participation in the war against Japan and wish to inform you of their views which are as follows:—

[Here follow paragraphs 1*a* and 1*b* of the covering memorandum.]

¹ Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 195th Meeting, July 18. See vol. II, p. 83.

² Of April 25. Not printed.

No. 618

740.0011 PW/7-1345

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Participation of Dutch Troops in Eventual Invasion of Netherlands East Indies

Participants: Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. A. Loudon;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew

The Netherlands Ambassador called on me today and said that he desired to talk to me on his own initiative and without instructions regarding the very difficult situation in which his country is placed owing to the fact that no steps have been taken to enable Dutch troops to be transported to Australia, where they could train for the eventual occupation of the Netherlands East Indies. He said that even Dutch ships which were now used in the allied pool were not being made available for this purpose. The Netherlands Government had a great deal at stake in this matter and if the eventual invasion, occupation and mopping up of the Netherlands East Indies should be undertaken by American and Australian forces with no Dutch forces present the loss of face which Holland would undergo in the opinion of the natives would never be overcome.

I once again explained to the Ambassador the difficulties which must be faced in this situation arising from the fact that all our efforts, forces and shipping must be directed to the primary purpose of defeating Japan. If we are able to obtain Japanese unconditional surrender this would no doubt apply also to Japanese forces in the Netherlands East Indies. The occupation might then take place without combat. The Ambassador said that even in such a case unless Dutch troops participated in the occupation, there would be the same loss of face. He also doubted whether the Japanese forces in the Netherlands East Indies would surrender on an order from Tokyo. Many of them, especially in New Guinea, had settled down to the cultivation of their farms and had apparently no desire to return to Japan. The Ambassador spoke about this matter with great emphasis and emotion and indicated his profound regret, even indignation, that nothing was being done to arrange the transport of Dutch troops to Australia in order to train for the eventual occupation.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

No. 619

S/AE Files

*Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee*¹

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET

MINUTES OF COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING HELD AT THE
PENTAGON ON JULY 4TH, 1945—9:30 A. M.

Present:

Members: The Secretary of War,² Chairman
Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson
The Hon. C. D. Howe
Dr. Vannevar Bush

By Invitation: The Right Hon. The Earl of Halifax
Sir James Chadwick
Major General L. R. Groves
Mr. George Harrison

Joint Secretaries: Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
Mr. Roger Makins

3. USE OF WEAPON AGAINST THIRD PARTIES

FIELD MARSHAL WILSON stated that the British Government concurred in the use of the T. A. weapon against Japan.³ He added that the Prime Minister might wish to discuss this matter with the President at the forthcoming meeting in Berlin.

THE COMMITTEE:—Took note that the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States had agreed that T. A. weapons should be used by the United States against Japan, the agreement of the

¹ This Committee was established under the terms of the Roosevelt-Churchill "Articles of Agreement governing collaboration between the authorities of the U. S. A. and the U. K. in the matter of TUBE ALLOYS" (i. e., atomic energy research and development) signed at Quebec, August 19, 1943 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 2993; *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, pt. 1, p. 1114).

² Henry L. Stimson.

³ British concurrence was required under the following paragraph of the Quebec agreement (see footnote 1, *ante*):

"Secondly, that we will not use it [an atomic weapon] against third parties without each other's consent." Concerning British concurrence, see Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, vol. vi, pp. 275-276, 296-298.

Earlier recommendations to Truman and Stimson concerning the use of the atomic bomb against Japan are summarized in Morton, "The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 35, pp. 336-339. Cf. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 419; Stimson, "The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb", *Harper's Magazine*, vol. 194, p. 101; Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 261-262; "A Report to the Secretary of War, June 1945", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May 1, 1946, p. 2.

British Government having been communicated by Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.

4. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE
USE OF THE WEAPON

THE CHAIRMAN said he was thinking of an earlier period, viz., the forthcoming meeting with Stalin. His own opinion had been very much influenced by the probable use within a few weeks after the meeting. If nothing was said at this meeting about the T. A. weapon, its subsequent early use might have a serious effect on the relations of frankness between the three great Allies. He had therefore advised the President to watch the atmosphere at the meeting. If mutual frankness on other questions was found to be real and satisfactory, then the President might say that work was being done on the development of atomic fission for war purposes; that good progress had been made; and that an attempt to use a weapon would be made shortly, though it was not certain that it would succeed. If it did succeed, it would be necessary for a discussion to be held on the best method of handling the development in the interests of world peace and not for destruction. If Stalin pressed for immediate disclosure the President might say that he was not prepared to take the matter further at the present time. . . .

HARVEY H BUNDY
ROGER MAKINS
Joint Secretaries

RELEASE OF TANKERS FOR THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN THROUGH
ALTERED DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN OIL SUPPLIES

No. 620

740.00119 EW/6-2445 : Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)
to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, June 24, 1945—4 p. m.

2250. Top sec from Pauley for the Secretary.

I am informed that the US has in effect waived any claim to reparation (other than compensation for damages to Amer property) from both Rumania and Hungary and that similar action is contemplated on the part of the Allied powers in the case of Austria. However,

¹ Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Harriman.

surplus of certain commodities available for export from Rumania, Hungary and Austria such as oils and agricultural products are presently being supplied Amer occupation forces in Germany from the US. If these supplies could be made available to such forces by reverse Lend-Lease from the Soviet Union which has just announced it is expecting to receive some of these commodities from Hungary and Rumania as reparations it would both greatly assist in waging war against Japan and increase the net amount of reparations which we may be able to secure from Germany. I shall appreciate anything you may be able to do along these lines and I shall be glad to assist here in our dealings with the Soviet Union in any way which you may suggest.²

² The Department was informed by the United States Delegation at Babelsberg on July 21 (telegram VICTORY 181, file No. 740.00119 EW/7-2145) that, in view of a United States proposal made to the Berlin Conference (see vol. II, document No. 1320), no further action on Pauley's telegram No. 2250 was necessary, and that the reverse lend-lease issue had been dropped.

No. 621

800.6363/6-2945: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
ad interim*

[Extracts]

SECRET

Moscow, June 29, 1945—1 p. m.

2320. Urtel 1120, May 22; Emtel 1974, June 8.¹

Soviet output of crude oil without natural gas is estimated to have fallen from 31.1 million metric tons in 1940 to approximately 21.5 million in 1945. Chief factors in drop were sharp fall off in Baku output due to almost complete lack of new drilling there during war, German devastation of Maikop Field and large part of Grozny Field, and drop in output of largest non-Caucasus Field in Bashkiria.

Because of fall off in domestic production as compared with prewar level, it is concluded that USSR will not be in a position to export petroleum in immediate postwar period except in limited quantities, for specific purposes, and at some sacrifice to internal economic programs. In addition USSR will probably endeavor to maintain control of petroleum production in Soviet occupied areas of eastern Europe.

HARRIMAN

¹ Neither printed.

No. 622

740.00119 EW/6-3045 : Telegram

*The Washington Liaison Representative for the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Wolf) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1945—2 p. m.

1473. For Pauley from Wolf.

Ralph Davies PAW advises from best information available his Program Division indicated 1946 surplus petroleum supplies in eastern European areas under Russian occupation will be approximately 60,000 BD over local requirements. Romania accounts [for] 47,000 BD this figure. At same time he advises imports from Anglo-American sources to meet requirements western and Mediterranean Europe will average approximately 292,000 BD last half [19]45 and 226,000 BD [19]46. Any utilization apparent surplus eastern Europe not only eases critical petroleum supply condition world wide but effects material transportation saving if movement to western and Mediterranean Europe overland or from Constanța by tanker initiated promptly. Sending under separate cover Davies letter and supporting tables.²

¹ Sent over the signature of Grew.

² Not printed. Cf. document No. 626, *post*, and annex I to document No. 1321, printed in vol. II.

No. 623

740.00119 EW/6-3045 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State ad interim

SECRET

HOECHST, June 30, 1945—noon.

80. Re Moscow's tel. No. 1 from Pauley dated June 24, 3 p. m., which was reptd. to Dept.,¹ following information furnished my staff informally by Col. Vissering, Deputy Chief, current operations, G-4, SHAEF.

Present indications are that strictly military needs in the American zone (Germany) will by December 1, 1945, be approximately 200,000 tons of gasoline and related products (not including high octane aviation gasoline) per month. Under static conditions with 400,000 troops in our zone, need will drop to about 50,000 tons per month. With rehabilitation of German refinery on Danube, Austrian crude could be used as 70 octane is sufficient where combat conditions do

¹ As telegram No. 2250 of June 24, 4 p. m. See document No. 620.

not prevail. These estimates are for our mil. needs only and do not include German minimum civil requirements. Accordingly SHAEF is anxious to obtain any oil supplies available Austria, Hungary, or Rumania.

Sent Dept., reptd to Moscow as 8, for Harriman from [for] Pauley.
MURPHY

No. 624

840.6363/7-645

The Secretary of State to the Petroleum Administrator for War (Ickes)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. ICKES: Various reports have come to my attention regarding the interest of your administration in the matter of obtaining petroleum supplies from Eastern Europe to assist the deficiencies of Western European countries. I am therefore taking this opportunity to inform you regarding recent developments of the oil situation in Eastern Europe.

I am enclosing for your information three documents which I believe will be of interest to you in this regard:

1. The Department's airgram to Moscow, dated June 29, 1945.¹
2. Policy document under the subject "Use of American Property by Satellite Countries for Reparation".²
3. Agreement captioned "Concerning the Reciprocal Delivery of Goods between Roumania and the USSR".³

It will be noted from the above-mentioned airgram that the American Ambassador in Moscow is fully apprised of the important aspects of the oil situation in Eastern Europe and of the inseparable relation between the rapid rehabilitation of the petroleum industry and maintenance of maximum production in these countries and the global production required to meet the enormously expanded military and essential civilian needs.

The reparations document sets forth the policy of the United States Government and provides for the protection of American property in its relation to reparation payments in satellite countries. This document is being forwarded to the American diplomatic representatives in the various countries of Eastern Europe with instructions that it be used as a guide in all matters relating to this subject.

The USSR-Rumanian agreement in effect provides that virtually Rumania's entire petroleum exports be delivered to the Soviet Union, that extensive new petroleum concessions be placed under Soviet

¹ Document No. 323.

² Enclosure to document No. 324.

³ Not printed.

control, and that a Soviet controlled petroleum monopoly be established. The information in this document may be used in studies or reports classified as confidential, secret, or top secret provided that reference is not made to the use of the text of this agreement and the material is not directly quoted.

The Department has prepared, *inter alia*, appropriate recommendations for the President in his forthcoming conversations with the heads of other governments under the caption of "American and Russian Economic Relationship in Countries of Eastern Europe"⁴ and dealing with such matters as removals of American properties, entry and freedom of movement of United States nationals in countries of Eastern Europe, and economic interests of the United States in these countries.

I suggest that specific phases of the over-all petroleum situation in Eastern Europe in which you may be interested be discussed on an informal basis between members of our respective staffs at some future date mutually agreed upon. I believe this to be appropriate expedient [*sic*] pending the outcome of the conference among certain chiefs of states and the subsequent development of full information by the American diplomatic representatives in the countries concerned.

I am addressing similar letters to the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration.⁵

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
WILLIAM L. CLAYTON
Assistant Secretary

⁴ Document No. 322.

⁵ Henry L. Stimson, James Forrestal, and Leo T. Crowley, respectively.

No. 625

840.6363/7-1045 : Telegram

*The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)
to the Deputy Petroleum Administrator for War (Davies)*¹

SECRET
URGENT

Moscow, July 10, 1945—11 p. m.

2503. From Pauley to Davies, Petroleum Admin for War; copy to Wolf, White House.

Reference your letter June 29² subject western and Mediterranean Europe oil requirements from Anglo-American sources. Please rush info tanker requirements for this supply and approximate tanker saving in case Austrian, Hungarian and Rumanian sources could be used fully according to figures submitted.

¹ Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Harriman.

² Not printed. For a telegraphic summary, see document No. 622.

No. 626

Pauley Files

The Deputy Petroleum Administrator for War (Davies) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. PAULEY: I have just been talking with Colonel Fogelson about the tightness of our United Nations oil program for the next year or eighteen months and have mentioned, in particular, the disappointment we feel over not having made available for United Nations use the production and refining capacities of Rumania, Austria and Hungary.

I cannot understand why the oil resources of these countries should be monopolized by the Russians, particularly in the light of the fact that American and British companies have an actual ownership of substantial proportions in the oil and the plants in these countries and the further fact that the U. S. A. is continuing to export a large volume of petroleum products to Russia.

The figures in the memorandum attached ¹ will give you some idea of the volumes involved. The figures themselves do not look so large in relation to the supply and demand volumes world-wide, but we are operating practically without margin today and every barrel counts. Further, the location of this petroleum is such as to make for important transportation savings, as well, if it were made available in the program. Beyond this, there is the very pertinent point of the equities involved; the American public would have difficulty in understanding why American oil should be withheld by Russia from United Nations use while, at the same time, this country goes on exporting to Russia.

I do not know to what extent this situation is properly related to reparations, but I hope you will see some opportunity to advance our interests by one means or another.

With best personal regards [etc.]

R. K. DAVIES

¹ No such memorandum is attached to the original of Davies' letter. Cf. annex 1 to document No. 1321, printed in vol. II.

No. 627

840.8363/7-1445 : Telegram

*The Washington Liaison Representative for the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Wolf) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1945—11 a. m.

1610. For Pauley from Wolf.

Reurtel 2503 [July] 10th² Davies PAW requests you be advised as follows: "Regarding eastern European oil supplies for western Europe it is emphasized that prime consideration is urgent need for oil supplies as such rather than as means of saving transportation. However resultant tanker savings would be corollary advantage. Estimated that to extent supplies delivered by rail or barge to western Europe from Austria, Hungary, or Roumania saving would be eleven class B tankers of twelve thousand deadweight tons for fifteen thousand barrels daily of supplies. For supplies at Constanța for Mediterranean estimated net savings of seven class B tankers for fifteen thousand barrels daily. For different rates savings approximately proportional."

¹ Sent over the signature of Grew.

² Document No. 625.

NEAR EASTERN AND AFRICAN QUESTIONS

IRAN: WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES

No. 628

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹

TOP SECRET

WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM IRAN

I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is that of the attitude to be adopted towards the question of withdrawal of Allied forces from Iran, which was raised formally by the Iranian Government in identical notes addressed to the British, Soviet, and United States Governments on May 19, 1945.² It is understood that representatives of the British Government intend to raise this question at the Conference.

II. BACKGROUND

British and Russian forces invaded Iran August 25, 1941, after the failure of Reza Shah Pahlevi to respond satisfactorily to Anglo-Russian demands for expulsion of German fifth columnists. The presence of Russian and British troops in Iran, and their use of Iranian communications, were legalized by the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of January 29, 1942.³ Under its terms, withdrawal of Russian and British forces will take place not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been concluded. (The treaty defines the term "associates" of Germany as "all other Powers which have engaged or may in the future engage in hostilities against either of the Allied Powers.")

The presence of American forces in Iran is based on an Anglo-American agreement formalized in a directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated September 22, 1942,⁴ under which the American Army (Persian Gulf Command) was charged with operation of the southern section of the Trans-Iranian Railway for supply to Russia. Assump-

¹ Annex 11 to the attachment to document No. 177.

² Not printed.

³ Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. VI, p. 249.

⁴ Summarized in T. H. Vail Motter, *The Middle East Theater: The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 192.

tion of operational responsibility by the PGC was approved by the Soviet and Iranian Governments.

The Commanding General, Persian Gulf Command,⁵ publicly announced the termination of the PGC mission, effective June 1, 1945. American forces have been in process of withdrawal for several months prior to that date, and redeployment is continuing. The United States Government has responded⁶ to that effect to the Iranian note, giving formal assurances that withdrawal will continue as rapidly as military exigencies permit. After the completion of all contemplated redeployment movements, however, the War Department plans to leave in Iran some 3000 troops who will act as caretakers for American military installations pending disposal, and about 1500 Air Transport Command troops in southwest Iran, to service the military airport in Abadan, which is essential to the line of communications to the Far East. Neither of these units consists of combat troops.

The British Government has informed the Iranian Government,⁶ in reply to the latter's note, that it is prepared to consider sympathetically the Iranian Government's request that withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran begin before the final date fixed by the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty. The British Government has informed the Soviet Government⁶ that it wishes formally to propose that Allied troops should begin withdrawing from Iran *pari passu* and in stages before the final Treaty date and that military talks on this subject be initiated. In strictest confidence, however, the Department has been informed orally by the British Embassy that British withdrawal will take place only *pari passu* with the Russians, and that the British will insist upon maintaining in southwestern Iran a garrison for the protection of their petroleum installations and vital communications, which they consider indispensable to the successful prosecution of the Far Eastern war.

The official Russian attitude has not been made known, but it seems probable that the USSR will adopt one of two alternatives: in view of the continued presence in Iran of certain British and American units, the Russians may insist upon keeping certain of their troops in Iran; or they may effect an immediate and complete withdrawal, in order to acquire political credit in Iran vis-à-vis the British and United States Governments.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

In the interests of facilitating restoration of Iranian administrative control and economy, which have been affected adversely by the

⁵ Brigadier General Donald P. Booth.

⁶ Communication not printed.

presence of foreign forces, and in order to reduce the dangers of Allied friction over Iran, it is recommended that representatives of the United States Government adopt a sympathetic attitude towards the Iranian request for withdrawal of Allied troops, and favor the withdrawal of all forces whose presence in Iran is not required for the prosecution of the Far Eastern war.

In the event of Russian unwillingness to agree to withdraw its own forces in view of the continued presence of certain American and British forces in connection with the war effort, it is recommended that the United States representatives propose to the British and Russian representatives that both Governments agree to the progressive reduction of their forces *pari passu* on the basis of (1) numerical reduction and (2) reduction of areas occupied.

[WASHINGTON,] June 23, 1945.

No. 629

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

ANGLO-SOVIET RIVALRY IN IRAN

I *The Problem* The problem is that of the attitude to be adopted towards the intensification of Anglo-Soviet rivalry in Iran, and towards the rapid deterioration of Iranian administration and economy. It is considered desirable that representatives of the United States Government initiate discussion of this problem.

It should be recognized that, while withdrawal of Allied forces from Iran would contribute to the solution of the Iranian problem, it would not constitute a total solution. Although the Iranian problem is only one aspect of the larger problem of Anglo-Soviet-American cooperation, it contains potentialities which, if permitted to develop, will assume proportions as disturbing to world peace as the problem of the Dardanelles in the last century and as disturbing to Allied cooperation as the Polish problem.

II *Background* Anglo-Russian rivalry, largely covert in character, is producing a far-reaching and rapidly developing political and social cleavage in Iran, in which it appears that the Russians are supporting the leftist, socialist, and labor elements of the population, and the British are supporting the conservative, land-owning, and feudal elements. The development of this cleavage is contributing to the administrative and economic chaos which has resulted from the occupation, from Anglo-Soviet rivalry, and from the irresponsibility and ineffectiveness of the present Iranian ruling classes. The Iranian

[No. 629]

Government is no longer able to perform its functions, and no cabinet is able to remain in office more than a few weeks. If these conditions are permitted to continue, they will result in the fragmentation of Iran, more active political or even military intervention by the Great Powers, and a corresponding intensification of the present Anglo-Russian conflict.

III *Recommendation* In the interests of international security, therefore, it is recommended that the United States representatives indicate that this Government is aware of extensive foreign interference in Iranian internal politics, and that it cannot condone such interference in the affairs of a sovereign nation. It would be desirable to seek assurances from Great Britain and the Soviet Union that Iran's sovereignty and independence will be recognized and respected in spirit as well as in public declarations, and that both governments will adopt a policy of rigid non-interference in the internal affairs of Iran. It is earnestly hoped, moreover, that these representations by the United States Government will not result in adoption by either power of an attitude of negation towards Iran and its problems, but will serve to create an atmosphere conducive to constructive Allied cooperation directed towards the reconstitution of Iran as a strong nation.

It is further recommended that the Iranian Government be notified by the three powers jointly of the necessity of assuming the responsibilities and functions of a sovereign state, and of establishing a legitimate and strong government which will be representative of the population and effectively responsive to its needs. It would be desirable to make clear to the Iranian Government that the supplies and technical assistance required to facilitate Iran's reconstruction and stabilization will be made available from the combined resources of Great Britain, Russia and the United States to the extent that Iran gives evidence of its desire and ability to fulfill these requirements.

No. 630

800.24591/6-1845

Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Minor)

[WASHINGTON,] June 18, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Iran.

Participants: The Iranian Minister ¹

Mr. Loy Henderson

Mr. Harold Minor

The Iranian Minister called today at his request to discuss the question of the withdrawal of allied forces from Iran. The Minister began by giving a résumé of a telegram he had just received from his foreign office instructing him to take this matter up again with the Department of State. The Foreign Minister ² described the unfortunate situation of Iran, a condition of confusion and disruption in which there was no tenure of Government and in which he, himself, did not know how long he would remain Foreign Minister. He was therefore speaking as an Iranian citizen and expressing the viewpoint of Iranians. The Foreign Minister attributed this unfortunate condition of Iran to the presence of foreign troops on Iranian soil and stated that Iran's situation cannot improve until these forces are withdrawn.

The Iranian Minister elaborated on this theme and urged that the Department do everything possible to bring about the withdrawal of these forces. He further stated that the Iranians are not worried about the presence of American troops on Iranian soil but are very much concerned about the presence of the British and Russians. He believed that the first step must be a declaration, on the part of the British, that they are now ready to depart and suggesting that the Russians take the same course. His view was that as long as there is one British soldier left on Iranian soil, the Russians will not withdraw. In reply to the Minister's question, Mr. Henderson said that the British have not approached us formally on the subject of withdrawal so that we have no official knowledge of their viewpoint. Mr. Henderson, however, conjectured that the British might desire to remain in Southwestern Iran for the protection of the oil fields and the refinery at Abadan which are essential to the allied war effort. The Minister replied that keeping these troops there is not necessary because the British need have no fear of the Iranians and because the

¹ Mohammed Shayesteh.

² Anoshiravan Sepahbodi.

British have troops very near by in Iraq and have their battleships in the Persian Gulf. Mr. Henderson remarked that the American Army continues to operate the air field at Abadan, a vital link in communications to the Far East, and inquired what view the Iranians might take of this operation. The Minister replied that there would be no difficulty on this score and that "one way or another" this matter can be arranged.

The Minister inquired pointedly in closing as to what attitude the Department would take in this matter which, he understood, will be brought up at the next Big Three meeting. Mr. Henderson replied that we are not yet in a position to speak for the Department or for the United States Government in this matter. However, we can state that we view the Iranian request with the greatest of sympathy and wish to do whatever we can to alleviate the situation in Iran.

H[AROLD] B M[UNOR]

No. 631

811.24591/6-1945: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, June 19, 1945—3 p. m.

412. Question of accelerated withdrawal American troops from Iran (Deptstel 296, June 15¹) has been discussed with General Booth and carefully considered by Embassy.

I judge Dept has two objectives in mind: To encourage early withdrawal British and Soviet forces and to avoid Iranian criticism.

It appears, however, that British are even more anxious than we are to see foreign troops leave. Therefore they need no encouragement from us. But military situation requires that they maintain force in southwestern Iran to protect oil fields and Abadan refinery which are vital to Japanese war.

Similarly we must keep estimated 1,500 men at Abadan airfield so long as that is needed for transit of military aircraft to and from Far East.

Consequently neither British nor ourselves can effect complete evacuation of Iran for some time to come.

So far as Russians are concerned it remains to be seen whether they will insist upon retaining troops in force in Iran. I think it within bounds of possibility they might decide to steal a march on us and having no further military ends to serve here withdraw all troops overnight. This would enable them to gain political credit by pointing out contrast of their action with that of British and

¹ Not printed.

Americans. Their political and strategic position is such that they would still be able to exert pressure on Iran whenever desired.

If they do not adopt this policy I think it doubtful any steps on our part short of complete withdrawal British and American forces would influence Soviet action. Gen Booth concurs in this. Russians could argue that quantity of our troops is immaterial, fact of their presence in Iran being important point; and they may be expected to ignore military necessity governing continued stay our troops. Soviet treaty position, of course, is unassailable. Most we could hope for in my opinion is *pari passu* withdrawal of Soviet troops along with British and American down to point at which Russian forces in north would roughly balance Anglo-American in south. This raises question our detachments guarding fixed installations and movable equipment for which 3,000 men believed required. Both Gen Booth and I agree it would be disastrous to entrust custody of American property to Iranians, whether Army[,] *gendarmierie* or civilian, who could not be expected to protect it properly and might further use fact of physical possession to reinforce their arguments for gratis delivery of installations. Neither Booth nor I feel Iranians have grounds for insisting on their ability to undertake custodial responsibility in light of their poor record during war in preventing theft of Allied property.

Only way I can see to expedite departure of American custodial detachments is to work for early disposal of all installations and equipment. Negotiations for this are being held up by failure Treasury to reply to Glendinning telegram reported Embstel 343, May 24 ² regarding text of agreement to be negotiated with Iran Govt on terms of payment. It would be most helpful if Dept would press for quick action. Early decision on quantity and types of railroad equipment to be sold to Iran would also be of great assistance. (Embstel 381, June 6 ²). Another question needing settlement is British desire for certain American camps (Deptstel 294, June 13 ²) regarding which separate telegram ² will be sent.

Certain amount irresponsible Iranian criticism may be inevitable if stay of American troops is prolonged. In view of military needs, however, I fail to see how this can be avoided. Any complaints by Iran Govt can be met both by referring to informal Iranian request that we remain until British and Russians leave (this request was orally reiterated to me by MinFonAff on June 16 when I delivered note contained in Deptstel 293, June 12 ²) and by pointing out that

² Not printed.

Iran has declared war on Japan and should be willing to make some contribution to the war effort.

Booth and I are agreed it would be inadvisable to seek formal Iranian consent to continuance American troops in Iran. They have been here nearly three years on informal basis which we can always assert to rest upon British treaty rights and it might well weaken our position to give Iranians idea we think it necessary now to obtain renewed consent. In any case I am convinced that however much Iranians may desire continued presence of our troops pending withdrawal of British and Russians it is impossible to believe they would dare put such a request in writing.

In light of foregoing analysis of situation I hardly think it worth while to urge War at this time to accelerate withdrawal. Results to be anticipated do not in my judgment warrant disruption of plans and extra effort involved.

MURRAY

No. 632

800.24591/6-1945

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of 13 June 1945¹ (ME) with reference to the Iranian Government's request for the withdrawal of American forces from Iran, and note that you will welcome the views of the War Department on this subject.

The supply and transport operations of the Persian Gulf Command have been successively reduced until the primary mission of the command was declared completed as of 1 June 1945. The withdrawal of troops not needed in the operations of the command has been under way continually since January as each successive cut in the scale of operations was made. The withdrawal of the remainder of the operating service troops will continue as rapidly as the exigencies of the military situation permit. The bulk of the troops still in Iran at present will fall in this category.

It will, however, be necessary for certain United States troops to remain in Iran for an indefinite period, probably not less than the duration of the Japanese War plus six months. These troops fall into two categories. The first category includes the caretaking troops at United States installations throughout Iran, and troops necessary for their maintenance, totaling about 3000, which will be withdrawn as soon as satisfactory arrangements for the liquidation of United

¹ Not printed.

States assets are made. The War Department has no desire to keep these troops in Iran any longer than is necessary for the protection of United States interests. The second category is composed of the service troops, numbering about 1500 for the support of the Air Transport Command air base at Abadan. These troops are required for staging combat aircraft to China, and for Air Transport Command traffic in support of United States Forces in the India-Burma and China theaters. They are directly contributing in the war against Japan and will be required until that war is successfully completed.

In any reply to the Iranian Government it should be pointed out that there are no United States combat troops in Iran, and that it is essential that the two categories of troops referred to in the foregoing paragraph remain until their missions are completed.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L STIMSON

No. 633

811.24591/6-1945

The Secretary of State ad interim to the Secretary of War (Stimson)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter dated June 19, 1945,¹ presenting the War Department's views concerning the withdrawal of American forces from Iran.

The Department appreciates the military considerations which you have outlined. You are assured that they will be borne closely in mind in any discussions or negotiations with the Iranian Government on the subject of withdrawal of American forces from Iran.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

¹ Document No. 632.

No. 634

891.00/7-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, July 5, 1945—9 a. m.

459. On instructions of Cabinet MinFonAff has expressed to me strong Iran Govt hope that at Big Three meeting US Govt would work to stop foreign interference in internal Iranian affairs with special reference to parliamentary elections to be held next fall or winter. (Embstel 416, June 20¹) In effect he reiterated Prime Minister's² statement to me of June 19 but this time with full Cabinet

¹ Not printed.

² Mohsen Sadr is the Iranian Prime Minister referred to.

sanction. (Sent to Dept as 459, repeated to London as 35 and Moscow as 146)

MinFonAff also again spoke of Iran Govt desire for early withdrawal of British and Soviet troops.

MURRAY

No. 635

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹

[Extracts²]

SECRET

POTSDAM, July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, called this afternoon and discussed for two hours in a preliminary way a number of matters on the agenda of the Conference.³

13. *Iran.*

Sir Alexander reviewed the British desire to get out of Persia and the proposal for a concerted withdrawal of British and Soviet forces by separate stages, beginning with the evacuation of Tehran. While the UK military authorities wished to leave a small force to guard the oil fields, Mr. Eden would insist with the military that all troops be withdrawn, leaving behind only a well-trained police force, provided the Russians could thereby be persuaded to withdraw their entire force. Sir Alexander agrees heartily with the U. S. suggestion of a gradual withdrawal of all three forces from Iran.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 140, 218, 234, 258, 319, 351, 379, 404, 470, 519, 645, 678, and 708.

³ For a list of persons present at this meeting, see document No. 234, footnote 3.

LEBANON AND SYRIA: THE CRISIS IN FRANCO- LEVANTINE RELATIONS

No. 636

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

SYRIA AND LEBANON

It is clear that both the British and the French earnestly wish to dispose of the troublesome Levant States problem, which has clouded relations between the two countries and is blocking progress toward a general Franco-British treaty of alliance.¹ As this Government has publicly supported the British military intervention in Syria,² Mr. Churchill may seek our assent to proposals which his Government may make to the French for a solution of the Levant crisis.

¹ The development of the problem referred to is summarized as follows in another briefing paper prepared at about the same time but not included in the Briefing Book for the Berlin Conference (file No. 800.00/7-345):

"The immediate origin of the dispute was the despatch of approximately two battalions of French reinforcements to the Levant States early in May. Resident General Beynet had just returned to Beirut from Paris to resume the long-suspended negotiation of a treaty regulating Franco-Levantine relations. Simultaneous arrival of new French forces was profoundly resented by the Syrians and Lebanese, who took it, probably correctly, to be intended as a show of force. In the tense atmosphere which ensued, an inevitable incident provoked widespread fighting between the French and the local populations.

"Acting as trustees of security in the Middle East for all the Allies, the British, with our backing, stepped into the situation, obliged the French to cease fire and restored order. There had already occurred, however, sufficient casualties and destruction to make the French highly unwelcome throughout the area."

² In a press conference on May 31, Grew informed the press that the British Government had consulted the United States with respect to British action in the Levant and that Truman had approved the British intention to "take action necessary to avoid further bloodshed".

On May 30 Churchill, in message No. 59 to Truman, had stated (paraphrase transmitted to the Department of State by the British Embassy, file No. 890d.01/5-3045):

"... Continuance of the present situation both in Damascus and elsewhere in Syria will, I am convinced, cause the most grave trouble throughout the Middle East and upon our joint lines of communication via Egypt and Canal with the Far East.

"We should therefore be prepared to order Commander-in-Chief of Middle East to intervene with British troops in order to stop fighting. Before doing so I feel I ought to know that we should have your approval and support. . . ."

Churchill included in this message a draft telegram to de Gaulle very similar in its terms to the message actually dispatched on May 31 (see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 564). Truman notified Churchill in telegram No. 50 of May 31 (Leahy Papers) that this draft telegram to de Gaulle met with his approval.

The British proposed to this Government on June 5³ that a solution to the Franco-Levant problem be sought in conversations among British, French, American, Syrian, and Lebanese representatives. In our reply of June 6⁴ we indicated our accord, but suggested that in working out the details, preference be given to reasonable suggestions of the French.

On June 7 the French Government expressed to us the opinion³ that a settlement could not be sought in exclusively Franco-British conversations, and proposed that the Levant problem should be discussed at a conference on general Near Eastern questions which would be attended by the five Major Powers. On June 8 we informed the French Government³ that we did not believe that an international conference on Near Eastern questions as a whole would be appropriate or helpful at this time, but we would welcome any further suggestions.

The Soviet Government's attitude has been made known only to the limited extent of its note of June 1 to this Government,⁴ expressing the opinion that "urgent measures should be taken for the cessation of military actions in Syria and Lebanon and settlement of the conflict by peaceful means." The Soviet Union has as yet indicated no express desire to participate in a settlement of the dispute.

The newly-formed League of Arab Nations informed this Government through the Egyptian Legation on June 6³ of its desire to be represented at any conference convened to settle the Franco-Syrian dispute. Our reply⁴ was limited to a friendly acknowledgment of receipt of the message.

The present French attitude is indicated in instructions sent to the French Ambassador in London.⁵ The French desire: (1) Franco-British negotiations on the immediate aspects of the problem, conducted through ordinary diplomatic channels; (2) Later, discussions limited to France on the one hand and Syria and Lebanon on the other to define a basis for relations; (3) Finally, a five-Power conference on Near Eastern problems as a whole. The British reaction to these proposals is not yet known.

In our discussions of these matters with the British we should emphasize the position to which we have steadfastly adhered; we cannot give our approval to any agreement regarding Syria and Lebanon that would be incompatible with the independence or

³ Communication not printed.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ René Massigli. Instructions not printed.

sovereignty of those countries or that would discriminate against the United States in the Levant. We should also stress to the British our view that a solution of the Levant problem should encompass both Syria and Lebanon, and that we would regard as particularly unfortunate any solution that might seek to placate the French by concessions in Lebanon in compensation for failure to obtain a special position in Syria. The opportunity might well be taken to urge the British to follow up Minister Resident Grigg's proposal whereby British and French troops in both countries would be withdrawn progressively and simultaneously from Syria and Lebanon without further delay.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

No. 637

740.00119 E. W./6-2545

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract ¹]

[WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: United States-French Relations

Participants: The French Ambassador, Mr. Henri Bonnet;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew.

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The Ambassador then said that while he had no instruction from his Government he wished in his capacity as Ambassador responsible for the good relations between our two countries to express to me his concern at the present unfortunate trend of these relations. He said that it was the earnest desire of General de Gaulle and, as I well knew, of himself to bring France and the United States steadily closer together and he felt that the present trend is unfortunately in the other direction. This arises from a number of issues in which France has been given little satisfaction and public opinion in his country, knowing of these issues, is at present developing in a way not conducive to the improvement of our relations.

The Ambassador said, first, that there was the unfortunate situation in the Levant in which we are supporting the British position. I interrupted to say that our attitude was based in no respect on the British position but that we were following our own view of the

¹ For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 99, 357, and 616.

matter and that the Ambassador knows very well what that view is, namely, our desire to see an end to the disturbances in Syria and Lebanon. The Ambassador assented to this observation.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

No. 638

890d.01/6-3045 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State ad interim

CONFIDENTIAL

BEIRUT, June 30, 1945—4 p. m.

205. Following reply to Deptel 184, June 25,¹ re *Troupes Spéciales*² is based on consultations with Leb and Syrian FonMins³ and with Chief of Staff and Staff Intelligence Officer Ninth Army. Latter outlined present status of problem substantially as follows:

Careful check of actual numbers (previous higher Brit estimates having been based on French declared ration strength) shows that before May troubles *Troupes Spéciales* numbered very close to 20,000 with approx 5,000 stationed in Lebanon and 15,000 in Syria. Among Lebanese there have been practically no desertions, among Syrians some 5,500 and score of Syrian officers in Leb units have been permitted to resign.

Remaining 9,000 of Syrian units still under French officers but subject to close overall Brit control are concentrated roughly as follows: 3,500 in specially prepared camps in Leb[anon in El] Bekaa; 1,500 in Hasssethe region Northeastern Syria; 1,500 at usual stations in Alaouite region; 1,000 confined to outlying barracks Aleppo; 1,000 at Yarfur camp near Damascus; 500 at Mezze Airport.

(NOTE: Of approx 2,000 regular French troops previously stationed in Syria approx 1,000 have been confined to camps in Bekaa and 300 returned to Tripoli base; 200 are confined to Aleppo barracks and 400 remain at stations in Alaouite region. Small HQ detachment remains in Damascus with Gen Gross for liaison service with Brit).

Brit mil authorities would welcome early orderly transfer of these remaining units to Syrian command their viewpoint being dictated primarily by general security considerations; otherwise disintegration thru further desertions would continue even French command having recently been brought to recognize this factor and having agreed to dismiss (without arms and equipment) those troops in north Syria requesting release.

¹ Not printed.

² Troops in the Levant, largely of Lebanese and Syrian origin, but under French command.

³ Henri Pharaon and Jamil Mardam Bey, respectively.

Syrian FonMin Mardam insisted problem must be settled urgently or new manifestations would result; transfer of *Troupes Spéciales* has always been considered independently from and prerequisite to political settlement; today it was unthinkable that these Syrian nationals be permitted longer to serve under French officers or French flag.

He saw no difficulty in their assimilation: Some 5,000 would be converted into Syrian Army of one brigade with auxiliary services; equal number would be taken into *Gendarmerie*; perhaps half of remaining third would be needed for police and frontier customs control; remainder would be pensioned off.

Mardam then mentioned armament and equipment aspect of problem especially if [*in?*] view of telegram recd from Syrian Min in Paris ⁴ communicating report that Ostrorog (see Deptel 187, June 26 ⁵) would propose the immediate transfer of half *Troupes Spéciales* and second half following reaching of agreement as to ownership of armament.

He said that total force numbering somewhat more than half present strength had been taken over by French Army with all armaments, munitions, equipment, and transport shortly following outbreak of war; previously all this (except certain artillery pieces) and all pay and upkeep expenses had been met by "common interests" budget; hence it was only fair that at least equal number should be returned fully equipped.

(NOTE: My despatch 307, March 1, 1944 ⁵ shows that during 1928-39 annual average of 4,700,000 Syrian pounds, 46% of common interests budget, was spent on *Troupes Spéciales*).

Mardam then reiterated Chief Syrian Desiderata in following priority order: Transfer of *Troupes Spéciales*, withdrawal of French troops, then political settlement. For the latter he preferred International Conference; in any event Syria could not negotiate with French except within international framework.

Minister Sharabati joined us at this juncture. He has much influence among younger Extremist leaders. He and Mardam agreed that if orderly settlement of question be not found promptly Extremists, especially those in Aleppo region, would take direct action not only to induce mass desertions but to take over armament and equipment as well.

(NOTE: Carleton reports from Aleppo that situation there is politically tense practically "undeclared war" with open hostilities threatening; bombardment of Damascus has had same effect on Syrians as Pearl Harbor had on Americans).

⁴ Khalid al-Azm.

⁵ Not printed.

Leb FonMin took slightly different tack especially in view of return of Ostrorog whom he had declined to receive in his office but would see personally in his home. He seemed to believe that at least in case of Lebanon transfer of *Troupes Spéciales* might be negotiated within teamwork [*framework?*] of political issues involved. Referring to Brit Govt's statement of June 23 [22] ⁶ he argued that all *Troupes Spéciales* now depended juridically on Brit command.

Consequently he urged that Brit mil authorities arrange orderly transfer to Lebanese command of the 5,000 troops of Leb origin stationed in Lebanon. He envisaged that 3,000 would be converted into Leb Army and remainder assimilated into *Gendarmerie* and police.

Following additional aspects of security situation as it has developed since sending my 191, June 19,⁷ may also be of interest. Details are reported in Mil Att's reports ⁸ based largely on Ninth Army sources.

Brit mil authorities have taken over responsibility for desert control, Brit liaison officer exercises substantial authority over Druse units which rallied to Syrian cause. And several Brit officers have been detailed as "training team" to assist Syrian *Gendarmerie*.

In Aleppo where French barracks are at city edge there has been considerable firing chiefly at night for most part by French allegedly at Syrian deserters. On June 26 such firing appeared to Syrians to be directed intentionally at nearby home of Syrian Governor and grenades have since been thrown without serious effect at French Delegate's home and automobile. Increased arms traffic from Turkey is reliably reported.

In Latakia region stationing of Brit detachments, change of Syrian Governor and effective Brit and Syrian approach to Murshid and other Alaouite chieftains have resulted in marked lessening of tension.

All but four easternmost of eleven northern frontier posts have under Brit protection been practically disbanded following desertions and clashes. Remaining *Troupes Spéciales* in this region are being concentrated.

Practically all French civilians have been evacuated from Syria except group of some 300 in protective internment at Aleppo. Group of 200 chiefly from Damascus region were repatriated aboard SS *Marigot* which sailed for Marseilles June 23. Others await repatriation in Beirut.

Generally speaking all French schools and cultural institutions in Syria (except in Alaouite region) have been closed those of religious

⁶ Text in George Kirk, *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: The Middle East in the War* (London, 1952), p. 302.

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Not printed. Lieutenant Colonel Virgil A. Jackson is the Military Attaché referred to.

character being under care of non-French religious personnel. Typical of Syrian boycott sentiment was ceremonial burning of French textbooks by group of students in Damascus June 24.

Fifty odd French officials employed by Syrian and Leb Govts and in joint "common interests" administration (notably customs service) have been dismissed with indemnities. Except for mixed courts, judges, none are left in Syrian service and remaining half dozen in Leb service are to be dismissed.

(Rptd to Paris as 74 with request to rpt to London; sent Dept as 205; paraphrases to Arab caps).

My personal view requested by Dept is that transfer of *Troupes Spéciales* to Syrian and Lebanese command would go far towards relieving local tensions and creating atmosphere favorable to international consideration of Levant relationships. Basically more constructive, however, would be meeting of Second Syrian Desideratum namely withdrawal of French troops.

You will recall that Gen Paget has recommended that before international conference meets there be withdrawal of all combatant troops both Brit and French from both Syria and Lebanon whose Govts would thenceforth be solely charged with responsibility for maintenance of internal security. This would presumably involve conversion of present Brit and French HQ into "service" commands for eventual liquidation of all Allied mil establishments, stores etc. in the Levant.

WADSWORTH⁹

⁹ Wadsworth, who maintained his residence at Beirut as Minister to Lebanon, was accredited also as Minister to Syria.

No. 639

890d.01/7-145: Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State ad interim

CONFIDENTIAL

BEIRUT, July 1, 1945—11 a. m.

206. Lebanese FonMin Pharaon informed me yesterday that Ostorog's "conciliatory" proposal (Deptel 187, June 26¹) as communicated to him "*officieusement*" on June 28 was that *Troupes Spéciales* be transferred and that French troops withdraw from Levant simultaneously with Brit troops, thus ending tension created by recent incidents and permitting France and Levant states "in atmosphere of restored good will to work out their common problems". Nature of ensuing discussion suggests that by this *démarche* French hope to by-pass Brit proposal for London conference with Amer participation.

¹ Not printed.

Pharaon's answer made clear that while transfer of *Troupes Spéciales* and withdrawal of French troops were among main Syrian and Leb desiderata and while minor outstanding questions (such as French-retained "common interests", see penultimate pgh my 173, June 1²) might be made subject of bilateral discussion, Syrian and Leb Govts' firmly-shared conviction was that basic issue of future Franco-Levant treaty relations could be effectively settled only within framework of international discussion.

As, however, Ostrorog's offer was not conditioned on any commitment in this latter regard, Pharaon, after consultation with Syrian FonMin Mardam, replied orally in second conversation had yesterday that informal reaction of Syrian as well as Leb Govt to this informal *démarche* "might well be taken as being on the whole favorable" and that consequently Ostrorog "could so inform his govt and request authorization to put his offer formally". Ostrorog had answered that he would arrange with Beynet to telegraph immediately to Paris in this sense.

Concluding our conversation (of which memo² is being forwarded in next pouch) Pharaon voiced some apprehension lest this French *démarche* be simply another maneuver designed "to isolate us" and to postpone a showdown until after Big Three had met this month.

I will report more fully as to Syrian reaction after seeing Mardam later this week. Pharaon tells me Mardam's initial reaction was "that they could place no confidence in Ostrorog or in sincerity of his proposal". (Sent Dept as 206, rptd Paris as 75 with request to rpt to London; paraphrases to Arab caps.) I doubt that it will modify basic position of Syrian leaders, e. g. as voiced by Chamber President Jabri last week in Aleppo Mosque: "We have one present aim, to force France to quit our country."

WADSWORTH

² Not printed.

No. 640

890d.01/7-545: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, July 5, 1945—9 p. m.

4035. The Lebanese Minister¹ tells me that he had an optimistic conversation this morning with Bidault who told him that French have definitely decided to turn over the "*Troupes Spéciales*" to his Govt and to evacuate all French forces from the Levant as soon as the Brit evacuate theirs. They have abandoned for the time being

¹ Ahmad Da'uq Bey.

the plan for a naval base and will only take it up again if they are authorized to do so by the recently created world organization.

Bidault said that he was pleased with the contact made yesterday by his representatives with Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and he insisted that Count Ostrorog has very "liberal" instructions in regard to reaching full agreement with the Lebanese Govt.

The Minister went on to say that his Govt works with Syrian Govt in regard to relations with France in complete accord and that an early meeting will be held between the respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs to discuss the most recent French proposals. He observed that in Syria feeling was much higher than in the Lebanon and he remarked that not a single Frenchman remained in Syria except in a few outposts in the Alaouite and adjacent regions; all other Frenchmen have been evacuated from Syria to Lebanon.

The Minister then referred to conversations which he has under way with Quai d'Orsay with regard to negotiating some sort of a consular convention. His immediate objective is to send a Lebanese Consul to Dakar. The French have promised to comply with their wishes but have been delaying the matter. His Govt now threatens to turn Lebanese interests abroad over to "a third power" unless the French Govt acts favorably (Sent Dept; repeated to London 494 Beirut 42) in the very near future in regard to the sending of a Consul to Dakar.

CAFFERY

No. 641

890d.01/7-745 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

BEIRUT, July 7, 1945—3 p. m.

208. Ostrorog tells me that following further discussion with Pharaon and Syro-Lebanese consultation it was decided last night (Pharaon speaking for both Levant Govts) that official French declaration will be issued this evening to effect that *Troupes Spéciales* will be transferred to Lebanon and Syria in accordance with terms (*modalités*) to be agreed upon within maximum of 45 days.

He was most hopeful this step would relieve general tension and remove essential cause for continuing disturbance of internal security such as July 5-6 incidents at Latakia (see Military Attaché's telegram 84521 July 7¹).

He expected no thanks from Syrian Govt but hoped press comment

¹ Not printed.

would become less chauvinistic; Pharaon was appreciative but would naturally have to adapt his attitude to that of Damascus.

He foresaw no difficulty as to arrangements for transfer, except perhaps in connection with small number (notably Armenians) who had enrolled under regular French Army terms and might wish eventually to leave country with French forces. But see my despatch 677, March 1² for complexity of problem.

No proposal had been made for withdrawal of French and Brit troops, altho he had assured Pharaon his govt was agreeable thereto in principle. He felt any specific proposal to this end could best be made by Brit who had taken over military control and whose troops would, after transfer of *Troupes Spéciales*, far outnumber those of French.

Sent Dept 208; rptd to Paris with request to rept to London; paraphrases to Arab caps.

He saw no need for early international or bilateral consideration of political aspects of problem and was noncommittal when I recalled Paget's suggestion that favorable atmosphere for proposed London conference could best be created by early withdrawal of Brit and French combatant troops and consequent charging of local govts with sole responsibility for maintaining internal law and order, with Paget himself retaining responsibility only for overall Middle East security.

WADSWORTH

² Not printed.

No. 642

890d.01/7-945 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Acting Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

BEIRUT, July 9, 1945—2 a. m.

211. Following a translation of the text of French *Délégation Générale* official communiqué promulgated as of yesterday's date:

“The Provisional Government of the French Republic, wishing to meet the request made by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments concerning the transfer of the military units recruited locally:

Desirous of manifesting to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments its good will by giving them full satisfaction concerning these units:

Considering that in view of the end of hostilities in Europe there is no longer any objection to the legitimate desire of Syria and Lebanon to form their own national armies:

And happy to see Syria and Lebanon invested with all the prerogatives of sovereignty and able to play the role which is due to them in the concert of the United Nations,

Declares that these troops are transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments according to formalities which will be defined within a maximum delay of 45 days".

Copies mailed to Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

No. 643

S90d.01/7-945 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

BEIRUT, July 9, 1945—7 p. m.

213. In informal conversation with Gen Pilleau re transfer of *Troupes Spéciales* (ReLegtels 208, July 7¹ and 211, July 9²) he stressed desirability of prompt consideration of Ninth Army memorandum of Feb 26 dealing with "administrative considerations" (see my despatch 677, March 1³).

Unless higher political considerations (e. g. in connection with holding of international conference) dictated otherwise he could see advantage from local security angle of completing such transfer prior to undertaking withdrawal of Brit forces and consequently French forces as well; for latter, altho potentially source of further disorder, could hardly be asked to withdraw except simultaneously with Brit.

He took particular note of Ostrorog's comment to me that any specific proposal for joint withdrawal might best be made by Brit. He did not, however, venture any opinion thereon.

I should welcome brief indication of Dept's views on this latter point for I envisage possibility that unless French and Brit make some move Syrian Govt will reiterate this second of its chief desiderata and that if some satisfaction thereof not be assured security situation will remain troubled and build up to new crisis.

Pilleau repeated Paget's comment that withdrawal of combatant troops could be effected in few weeks as they are largely self-contained. For liquidation of other military commitments (including installations, supplies and contracts) very considerable administrative work would be required.

(Sent Dept as 213, rptd to Paris as 78 with request to rpt to London, paraphrases to Arab caps.)

He suggested desirability of early careful administrative analysis of latter problem which could probably best be solved in two phases; first general disposals and withdrawal of "service" troops under direct supervision of present Brit and French commands and second,

¹ Document No. 641.

² Document No. 642.

³ Not printed.

final liquidation of installations and contracts by special military commissions under general supervision of diplomatic mission.

WADSWORTH

No. 644

890d.01/7-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 9, 1945—8 p. m.

6908. FonOff official today made following remarks about situation in Levant States:

French offer of handing over *Troupes Spéciales* has come too late to be of any benefit to French. Had this been done earlier French probably would have been able to arrange a *quid pro quo*, but Syrians look on French offer as only partial reparation for recent damage done to Damascus. Fact that method of transfer of *Troupes Spéciales* must be worked out in 45 days is "useful" (providing there are no further serious disturbances) for such delays may permit an easing of situation, particularly with regard to de Gaulle. Latter, as time for French elections draws near, may well become more conciliatory.

Regarding withdrawal of Brit and French troops from the Levant States, Ostrorog suggested that this might be possible but said that he did not have authority definitely to open the matter. Such action could be taken only by some sort of conference, and the longer this was put off the better, for the same reasons as mentioned above regarding de Gaulle.

FonOff believes that Ostrorog's arrival in Levant States with offers may have been due particularly to fact that French got cold feet over their previously made suggestion that Russia be invited to a conference on middle eastern matters. (Sent Dept; rptd Paris 448).

Syrian populace remains in a dangerous mood, as evidenced by recent incident at Latakia. Furthermore, Lebanese are becoming restive because of influx of large numbers of troops from Syria.

Support of the French by Palestinian Jewish press seems most ill advised from the Jewish point of view as it only can result in further cementing of feeling of Arab world against Jews.

Eden returns to work tomorrow and has sent word that no policy decisions regarding Levant States shall be taken until he himself has studied the question.

WINANT

No. 645

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹[Extracts²]

SECRET

POTSDAM, July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, called this afternoon and discussed for two hours in a preliminary way a number of matters on the agenda of the Conference.³

16. *Levant.*

Sir Alexander stated his Delegation was prepared to answer questions about the Levant problem if the Russians raised them. He stated that Bidault had declined an invitation to discuss the question in London and had asked that they [*the discussions*] be held in Paris and that his government was encouraging the French and Syrians to settle the question directly. With regard to the transfer of the special forces to local control, the only question left to settle was that of the time limit. Apparently France would be satisfied to conclude consular and commercial conventions with Syria and the Lebanon, leaving aside the question of bases.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 140, 218, 234, 258, 319, 351, 379, 404, 470, 519, 635, 678, and 708.

³ For a list of persons present at this meeting, see document No. 234, footnote 3.

PALESTINE: JEWISH IMMIGRATION

No. 646

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

PALESTINE

The President may wish to discuss the Palestine question in general terms with Mr. Churchill and to stress our interest in learning what plans the British Government may have for the future of that country, with regard both to a long-term settlement and the immediate problem of Jewish immigration.

The fact that the quota for Jewish immigration under the 1939 White Paper ¹ will probably be completely exhausted by summer or early fall will presumably make it necessary for the British Government to reach a decision in the near future regarding this key issue in the Palestine controversy. The British are understandably reluctant to do so, however, since the present situation in Palestine is so explosive that any decision on immigration is almost certain to provoke serious disorders, and even bloodshed. Zionist Jews are becoming increasingly suspicious of the delays in a settlement of the Palestine question in a manner agreeable to themselves, and are growing restless. There is real danger that the more moderate Zionist leaders would not be able to restrain the extremists in Palestine, who are well armed, in the event that the British should decide to maintain the White Paper policy of no further Jewish immigration. American Zionists are also becoming increasingly belligerent and apparently are determined to force a decision on Palestine this summer.

The Arabs, on the other hand, are also thoroughly aroused and have given every evidence that they will oppose, by force of arms if necessary, any change in the White Paper policy. The Arab countries in the Near East have made it clear that they consider the attitude of the American Government towards Palestine as a test of the sincerity of American statements of interest in and friendliness for the Arab people and of American intentions to live up to the principles of the United Nations.

¹ *Palestine: Statement of Policy* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1939; Cmd. 6019).

In these circumstances it is probable (1) that the British will make some concessions to the Jews on immigration and (2) that if the question comes up for discussion, Mr. Churchill will seek the President's support for some proposal of this nature. Although it is well known that Mr. Churchill's personal sympathies are pro-Zionist, the British Cabinet is reported to be split on the question. It is reported that Mr. Churchill has intimated to the Zionists that it is difficult for him to swing the Cabinet around to his position without definite assurances of official American support. We have good reason to suspect that in the past certain British officials have attempted to pass the blame to the United States for various policies pursued by them in Palestine that have been unpopular with the Arabs, by indicating to the Arabs that they have acted under American pressure.

In view of the foregoing, should Mr. Churchill attempt to secure the President's backing for any given proposals regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine, the President may feel it preferable at this time to confine his remarks on the subject to expressing the hope that the British Government keep us fully and currently informed. This would be in keeping with the Department's traditional position that Palestine is primarily a responsibility of the British, who administer Palestine under the mandate and are responsible for military security in the area. By not pressing the Zionist point of view in his talks with Mr. Churchill, the President might incur sharp criticism from certain pro-Zionist groups in this country and abroad, but on the other hand by following a pro-Zionist course, he would run the risk of creating hatred for the United States throughout the entire Arab world and of causing millions of Arabs and Moslems to lose confidence in American leadership in world affairs.

Should Mr. Churchill press the point and insist on learning the President's views on the immigration question, it should first be made clear to him that any proposals which the British Government may subsequently announce in this connection must be clearly identified as the proposals of the British Government only. Once it is fully agreed that the British Government has no intention of attributing any feature of these proposals to pressure from the United States, the President might inform Mr. Churchill that he would be glad to receive the proposals in question so that he could have them subjected to a careful examination.

As regards a long-term settlement of the Palestine question, it is recommended that this subject be discussed at the meeting in the most general terms only, because:

1. This is one of the issues which could appropriately be considered through the machinery of the United Nations Organization. Shortly before his death, President Roosevelt expressed the view that it

should be handled in this way, and as one of the present mandates Palestine will come under the trusteeship arrangements which are being set up at San Francisco and which will subsequently be applied to specific territories. The Department of State has been making studies looking toward a post war settlement for Palestine. The matter is also being examined by the experts of the British Foreign Office. The British are committed (notably in a statement by Lord Cranborne, Colonial Secretary, in 1942²) to consult interested parties, including both Arabs and Jews, before reaching a decision regarding the future of Palestine. Our position, as made known to the heads of the different Near Eastern governments by President Roosevelt³ and as reiterated by President Truman, is likewise that there should be consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

2. The continued tension in the Near East makes it highly important that every effort be made to avoid any interference with the flow of war materials through that area to the Pacific war, or any deterioration in the situation which would undoubtedly result from any concrete proposal for a general settlement at this time.

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1945.

² Made in the House of Lords, May 6, 1942. See *Parliamentary Debates: House of Lords Official Report*, 5th Series, vol. 122, col. 943.

³ Cf. the letter of April 5, 1945, from Roosevelt to King Ibn Saud, in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XIII, p. 623.

No. 647

867n.01/6-2845

*Memorandum by the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs
(Henderson)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Rabbi Wise, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Mr. Chaim Greenberg, Mr. Shulman,
Mr. Grew
Mr. Henderson

Mr. Grew received this afternoon a group of Zionists including Rabbi Wise, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Mr. Chaim Greenberg, and Mr. Shulman. Mr. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, was also present.

. . . Mr. Grew stated that he [had] read with care a memorandum¹ setting forth in detail the statements made several days previously by Dr. Goldmann to Mr. Henderson regarding the problems which the Zionists were facing and regarding the views of Dr. Goldmann as

¹ Not printed.

to what the attitude of the British and American Governments with regard to Palestine should be. He said that it would appear from the statements which Dr. Goldmann had made that there was a growing demand on the part of Zionists in the United States that decisive steps with regard to the future of Palestine should be taken in the near future.

Dr. Goldmann said that since Mr. Grew was already acquainted with the nature of his statements to Mr. Henderson and since in his talk with Mr. Henderson he had expressed the views of the Zionist leaders represented by the visiting delegation, there appeared to be no use in taking up the valuable time of Mr. Grew by repeating all of the remarks which he had made to Mr. Henderson. He would, however, like to summarize the situation briefly.

Dr. Goldmann said that by the end of the summer, all certificates issued in accordance with the British White Paper for the immigration of Jews into Palestine would be exhausted and that unless steps were taken to denounce the White Paper or to alter its terms no additional Jews could legally be admitted to Palestine. Since there were thousands of homeless Jews in Europe who were looking to Palestine as their haven of refuge and thousands of other Jews interned in camps in various parts of the world waiting permission to go to Palestine, the situation was becoming unbearable. In spite of the efforts of the moderate Zionist leaders to prevent the outbreak of violence, it was almost certain that there would be Jewish uprisings in Palestine in the near future if attempts should be made to cut off Jewish immigration altogether. Hundreds of thousands of Jews during the last 25 years, relying upon assurances given them by the British and American Governments, had gone to Palestine and had worked there in a self-sacrificing manner in order to lay the foundations for a Jewish national home. These Jews could not countenance restrictions which would now stop Jewish immigration into Palestine. If necessary, they would resort to force in order to assure that Palestine does in fact become a Jewish national home.

. . . [Mr. Shulman said that he] felt that it was a mistaken policy for the United States to show a friendly attitude towards the Arab League or to encourage the making of any concessions, as in the case of Syria and Lebanon, to the so-called Arab States under present circumstances. Only after Palestine has become a Jewish commonwealth should Arab cooperation be treated in a friendly manner or should the Arab States be given any encouragement. Friendly treatment of the Arabs just now might strengthen their unity and crystallize their opposition to Zionism.

Mr. Grew said that he wondered if, on the other hand, it might not be helpful to the cause of world peace and in the long run to the Jews in Palestine, for the United States to endeavor to promote friendly and close relations with all peoples of the Near East. If the United States had the confidence and friendship of the Arabs, the latter might be more inclined to accept American suggestions with regard to the solution of certain problems in the Near East. Mr. Shulman expressed the view that the Arabs would be inclined to misconstrue friendliness on the part of the United States as evidence of American weakness and Arab strength. He said that following the conclusion of the war there was no valid reason for further delay in the disposition of the problem of Palestine; thousands of Jews were suffering because of their inability to obtain admittance to Palestine and the Arabs were consolidating their strength in order to combat the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine.

Mr. Grew remarked that we were still at war; that it was important so long as we were fighting Japan, that there should be tranquility in the Near East. The Zionists themselves undoubtedly realize that the outbreak of hostilities in the Near East resulting from decisions made affecting Palestine would not be in the interest of the United States, or for that matter in the interest of the Zionists.

Great Britain had been made responsible during the period of the war for the maintenance of peace in the Near East and was maintaining armed forces there for that purpose. Since British forces were certain to become involved in case of uprisings, the United States was not in a position to insist that decisions relating to as delicate a question as Palestine be taken against the advice of the British officials responsible for Near Eastern security.

Mr. Shulman and Dr. Goldmann replied that in their opinion a decision to open the doors of Palestine to orderly Jewish immigration would not result in any extensive violence if the Arabs were given to understand that Great Britain and the United States had taken a firm stand and would not be swayed by force or threats of force. In any event, the Jews in Palestine were fully able to protect Palestine and themselves from any Arab attacks. Mr. Shulman added that the Jews desired to be on friendly terms with the Arabs in Palestine and he was sure that such friendship would develop when it finally became clear that Arabs outside of Palestine were not to be allowed to intervene in Palestinian affairs.

Mr. Grew said that there was a possibility that the problem of Palestine might come up during the forthcoming conversations between the President and Mr. Churchill. Rabbi Wise said that Churchill had long been a friend of the Zionists but that there were other members of the British Government who had been holding him

back. It was hoped, following the election, that Mr. Churchill would no longer permit himself to be restrained in the matter of Palestine. Many Conservatives and most of the Laborites would be with him.

Mr. Grew said that he understood that certain elements among the Zionists were dissatisfied because the attitude of the Zionist leaders was not sufficiently aggressive. Rabbi Wise replied that he and other Zionist leaders had been under fire many times for their refusal to resort to radical methods to attain their ends. A continued postponement of decisions with regard to the problem of Palestine would of course weaken the position of the more moderate Zionists.

L[OY] W H[ENDERSON]

No. 648

867n.01/7-845 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

LONDON, July 8, 1945—4 p. m.

US URGENT—NIACT

6876. Personal and secret to the Secretary from Winant.

There is a problem that gives me considerable concern. It is the Palestine situation. On Friday Dr. Weizmann came in to see me. He went out to Palestine immediately following Lord Moyne's assassination and I think did much good. The two months he has been back here he has been ill. Before leaving for Palestine and before Moyne's death he told me he had had a friendly and constructive conversation with the Prime Minister. The only recent word however he tells me he has had from the latter was a brief note stating that the problem of settlement would have to be considered at a peace conference. The world conference of the Zionist organization is scheduled to meet in London the last day of this month. Weizmann told me that if there had been no advance toward solving the issues involved he would feel obligated to resign his office in the Zionist movement. I am sure he did not say this as a threat. The man is tired and ill and completely discouraged because of the tragedies that have befallen his people but he is also aware that a more militant policy would undoubtedly follow his retirement. The Levant incidents as they relate to the Arab League, the cruel and brutal treatment of the Jews by the Nazi regime, and the now known extent of the extermination policy carried out under Hitler's orders, and even the defeat of Germany all tend to create emotional pressures that might

¹ Sent to Washington; relayed to Byrnes, then at sea, in telegram No. 7 of July 9 (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8-645).

lead to serious trouble in the Middle East with inevitable outside repercussions. I am sure you will agree with me that we do not want that kind of controversy to cut across the acceptance of the great constructive measures that have been so ably advanced by our own Govt or to intrude itself on the timing of the Three Power meeting or President Truman's friendly visit to Great Britain. It might be possible to work out some acceptable formula through your proposal of a Council of Foreign Ministers.² It occurred to me that you might want Ben Cohen to come over here later this month to formulate a constructive program to deal with this subject.

I am sorry to trouble you with this message when I know you are pressed for time prior to your departure for Berlin.

WINANT

² See document No. 228.

No. 649

867n.01/7-1045 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, July 10, 1945—6 p. m.

116. Inspector General of Police¹ does not predict widespread disorders or general Jewish uprising if British decision immigration is unfavorable, altho present agency leadership may be endangered thereby (Dept's 129, July 5, 7 p. m.²) He does predict large scale illegal immigration which he says has started from nearby countries and for which preparations have been made in Balkans. He says this will prove very embarrassing. Terrorism by Stern group and Irgun Zwai Leumi³ is expected and this will probably be directed against British and may include assassination and destruction of property. Seriousness of this terror will depend (1) upon attitude of local population to it, (2) action taken by Jewish agency to combat it and (3) possible retaliation by Arabs.

Information indicates many elements of both Jewish and Arab communities are well prepared in arms for uprising and some Jewish elements are well trained for that purpose. Largest group is Hagana⁴ which is well disciplined and will go into action as group only if ordered to do so by Jewish agency leaders if Arabs attack after provocation by terrorists [*sic*]⁵ groups.

¹ Captain John Murray Rymer-Jones.

² Not printed.

³ With respect to these two organizations, see *Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, Lausanne, Switzerland, April 20, 1946* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946; Department of State publication No. 2536), pp. 46-47.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 45.

Inspector General is convinced his force will be able to combat terrorism and handle any situation except major uprising which would require military intervention and which is not expected. Acting High Commissioner ⁵ points out however that force is under strength by 2,000 British police and military would have to be called in earlier than if force were up to strength. Necessary military force is available and security is regarded as reasonably good. Sporadic uprisings may be expected, their extent depending upon developments and they cannot be avoided so long as present racial hatred and clash of nationalisms continue. So far religion has not been major factor and Arabs, Moslems and Christians are united against Zionism.

Future security is difficult to predict because tension shows no sign of easing and minor incident such as Jerusalem mayoralty may easily develop into major issue involving widespread revolts and possibly other Arab countries. Neither side gives any indication of willingness to compromise and strong security measures will have to be continued indefinitely.

Sent to Dept and repeated London.

PINKERTON

⁵ J. V. W. Shaw.

No. 650

867n.01/7-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 14, 1945—3 p. m.

7126. In discussing Palestine situation head of Eastern Dept of FonOff ¹ observed that there are two outstanding points:

(1) It had always been understood that nothing definite would be done about Palestine until the end of the war in Europe. That point has now been reached and it is being asked what the next step is to be.

(2) Immigration quotas are running out and will be completely exhausted by November. Before that date the Brit Govt will consequently have to make "a very important decision" and regardless of what is done trouble will almost certainly follow since it will be extremely difficult to avoid arousing either the Jews or the Arabs. No such decision has yet been taken and it is not even clear whether it will be of a long or short term nature. The probabilities are, however, that it will be a short term plan designed principally to meet the immigration problem and that decision will be deferred until the post election Govt has had time to consider that matter.

Sent to Dept as 7126 repeated to Jerusalem as 2.

WINANT

¹ Charles William Baxter.

TANGIER: FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ZONE;
SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE PARIS CONVERSA-
TIONS ON TANGIER

No. 651

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

FUTURE STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ZONE OF TANGIER

At the invitation of the French and British Governments we are about to begin informal conversations in Paris with representatives of those two powers regarding the future status of the International Zone of Tangier which was occupied on June 14, 1940, by Spanish military forces in pursuance of a unilateral decision of the Spanish Government. The Spanish Government's justification of this act, as notified to the interested powers, was stated to be its desire to preserve the neutrality of the Tangier Zone during the war. The Spanish Government has now indicated that it is desirous of regularizing the situation in the Zone and, accordingly, the immediate problem to be discussed is the form which the provisional regime will take, following the departure of the Spanish forces and administration and pending the establishment of a permanent regime for the future. It is expected that an international conference of all the interested powers will be called at some future date to consider the permanent regime of the Zone.

The international regime at Tangier was formulated in the Tangier Statute of 1923¹ to which the following powers adhered: France, Spain, Great Britain, Portugal[,] the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden. In 1928 the Statute was amended² to include Italy as a party. The United States, though invited to do so, did not become a party to the 1923 Statute and has never participated in the administration of the Tangier Zone, in as much as this Government did not feel that the limited representation assigned to the United States was commensurate with the responsibility which it would be forced to assume in

¹ Signed at Paris, December 18, 1923. Text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxvii, p. 499.

² By an agreement signed at Paris, July 25, 1928. Text printed *ibid.*, vol. cxxviii, p. 449.

connection with the administration of the Zone. However, the leading role which the United States has assumed in world affairs as a result of the war as well as its long continued interest in Morocco and its special position there deriving from a series of treaties to which it is a party,³ makes it logical that we should assume responsibilities in respect of the International Zone of Tangier commensurate with our position as a world Power. Moreover, Tangier's strategic position on the Straits of Gibraltar makes it an important post-war security problem which cannot fail to be of interest to the United States as a great maritime power.

Soviet Russia has never manifested any interest in the Tangier Zone, and has never had a representative stationed at Tangier, although the Russian Imperial Government prior to 1917 had taken an active part in the formulation of various treaties and conventions concerning Morocco, including the Act of Algeciras of 1906.⁴

Regardless of its position in the past, however, this Government considers it desirable to notify the Soviet Government concerning the conversations between Great Britain, France and the United States and to keep the Soviet Government informed of developments. If, upon notification of our intention to hold these preliminary conversations with regard to the International regime for Tangier, Russia should express a desire to participate, it should be our policy to admit that country into the discussions on an equal basis. The British Government appears to favor this view also, but there is some hesitation on the part of the French to admit Soviet Russia to the conversations and to active participation in the administration of the Zone, apparently for fear that Russia's admission will operate to weaken the predominant position that France held prior to the Spanish occupation, and which it hopes to regain. The Spanish Government, in the tradition of the Franco regime, has already voiced its unconditional opposition to Soviet participation in the organization of the International Zone.

The conclusions reached during these conversations will be communicated to the Spanish Government at an early date, when appropriate steps can be taken to effect the transition to a provisional international regime.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

³ See the Convention for the Establishment of the Right of Protection in Morocco, signed at Madrid, July 3, 1880 (Treaty Series No. 246; 22 Stat. 817), and the General Act of the International Conference at Algeciras and Additional Protocol, signed at Algeciras, April 7, 1906 (Treaty Series No. 456; 34 Stat. (3) 2905). Text of the Act of Algeciras also in *Foreign Relations*, 1906, pt. 2, p. 1495.

⁴ See footnote 3, *supra*.

No. 652

881.00/6-2045

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Villard)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 20, 1945.

SIR: Supplementing oral instructions which you have received in the Department regarding negotiations to be undertaken shortly with respect to the status of the International Zone of Tangier, there are set forth below certain directives by which you and your American colleagues are to be guided during the course of those negotiations. It is understood that you will be permitted certain latitude in conducting negotiations but that any drastic departure from these directives, particularly any departure involving the legal position of this Government, will be taken up with the Department.

The leading role which the United States has assumed in world affairs as a result of the war, as well as its long continued interest in Morocco, makes it logical that we should assume a position in respect to the International Zone of Tangier commensurate with our power and prestige. The military and naval authorities of this Government are in agreement with the State Department that it is desirable that the United States take an active part in the reestablishment of the Tangier Zone and in the interim administration thereof following withdrawal of the Spanish forces which occupied the Zone unilaterally and illegally in 1940.

The British and French Governments are in agreement that the Spanish occupation should cease and that a temporary regime should be established pending an agreement as to the permanent future status of the Zone. The British and American Governments favor the calling of an international conference for this purpose. The Spanish Government has already approached the British Government offering to withdraw its military forces from Tangier and to work out a solution for the administration of the Zone. In the opinion of the American Government, the simplest solution for the interim period would be a joint military occupation and administration on an equal basis by the four powers, namely, United States, Great Britain, France and Spain. The intricate problems of governing the Zone could thus be handled simply and directly by military government personnel of the four countries.

It is evident, however, that none of the other three powers are in favor of military occupation of the Zone following the removal of Spanish forces. The British have expressed themselves as reluctant to employ military personnel for administrative purposes and have stated that they favor a civilian provisional administration. Military

administration of the Zone is likewise not favored by either the Spanish or the French, although the latter would probably be willing to establish such a regime provided it was in the hands of French or Shereefian troops. For various reasons also there is some American sentiment against the use of military forces in Tangier, particularly since the war in Europe is over and the Tangier Zone is not a liberated area. In view of the strong feelings of the other nations on this subject, the Department would be prepared to recognize the desirability of a civilian administration, with military forces to be employed solely for police purposes in order to insure tranquillity in the transitional period.

The question then arises as to what form such a civilian administration could take which would enable the United States to participate without adhering to the Tangier Statute of 1923. This Statute is still legally in force and it would be a simple matter to revive it, but the United States was not a party to this instrument and neither could nor would adhere to it now. A solution which would avoid this difficulty and at the same time secure for us our desired position in the Zone would be to permit the reinstatement of a regime functioning under the provisions of the Tangier Statute, with such modification as may be necessary, by proclamation of Great Britain, France and Spain, on condition that

a. The United States should be invited by those three powers or by the Sultan of Morocco, to become associated in the administration of the International Zone on a *de facto* basis guaranteeing equal rights with all other signatories of the Statute, and that

b. The United States should not be considered in any way as an adherent to the Statute and should assume no obligations whatever thereunder, and

c. The above terms would be incorporated in notes exchanged between the United States on the one hand and Great Britain, France and Spain on the other;

d. It will be understood that the United States Government will in no way relinquish its treaty rights in Tangier during the interim regime.

e. This temporary regime shall remain in force pending the calling of an international conference of the interested powers.

American responsibilities in the interim administration of the Zone would consist of (1) Supplying a small military force to be used in conjunction with similar forces of the other powers for police purposes only, preferably not under French or Spanish command, and (2) furnishing as financial or other officials non-governmental personnel from the United States to be employed and paid directly by the Tangier administration, the amounts and methods of payment to be discussed during the conversations.

Questions relating to the position of the other signatory Powers of the 1923 Statute (Portugal, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium) and their participation in the interim regime should be left for determination by Great Britain, France and Spain. The Department considers that, in any case, Great Britain, France and Spain should make a declaration to the other signatory powers to the effect that the rights of the latter under the Statute will be safeguarded. The role of the United States in this interim period should be that primarily of an equal participant in the Administration and an actively interested observer with respect to the Statute, claiming equal rights with the signatories of the Tangier Statute but not adhering to that document, and assuming none of the obligations imposed on the signatories thereunder.

If, upon notification of our intention to hold these preliminary conversations with regard to the International regime for Tangier, Russia should express a desire to participate, it should be our policy to admit that country into the discussions on an equal basis.

In entering into negotiations with the interested powers on the subject of the status of the International Zone of Tangier the representatives of the United States should be guided by the principle that the extent of American participation in the permanent regime to be established and its rights and privileges under this regime should under no circumstances be less than those of any other Power.

Very truly yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

No. 653

881.00/6-2045

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Ref: 1351/ /45

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The United States Embassy in London have informed the Foreign Office that the State Department consider that the Soviet Government should now be informed that conversations are about to take place with the French on the subject of Tangier, and that an assurance should be given to the Soviet Government that they will be kept informed of progress made. It has always been the intention of His Majesty's Government that the Soviet Government should be informed at the appropriate moment. His Majesty's Government agree that the moment has now arrived, particularly in view of the attention which Tangier has recently received in the

press. In the view of His Majesty's Government, however, the French Government should be associated with any such communication to the Soviet Government, and His Majesty's Government would propose if the State Department agree that the British and United States Embassies in Paris should approach the Ministry for Foreign Affairs accordingly. The attached draft telegram sets out the lines on which His Majesty's Government suggest that the communication to the Soviet Government should be made.

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1945.

[Attachment]

TEXT OF TELEGRAM FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO LORD HALIFAX,
DATED JUNE 18, 1945

His Majesty's Government, the United States Government and the French Government are of the opinion now the war in Europe is over that the Spanish Government should be called upon as soon as possible to withdraw their troops and administration from the international zone of Tangier and make way for the reestablishment of an international regime. The Spanish Government have moreover intimated that they themselves are now ready to agree to the reestablishment of such a regime. His Majesty's Government, the United States Government and the French Government are accordingly preparing to hold conversations in the near future over wording an approach to [the] Spanish Government and determining details of the provisional regime which would replace the present Spanish administration pending the conclusion of a new Tangier Convention.

No. 654

881.00/6-2345: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1945—3 p. m.

MOST IMMEDIATE

2909. News of proposed conversations with Brit and French re Tangier has recd so much attention in the press that it will prove extremely embarrassing if Department cannot issue official press release on the subject very soon.

It is important that a decision be reached at earliest possible moment re place where conversations are to be held. USSR should be informed as soon as choice of place is made to the effect that "informal conversations are being held between Brit, French and American Govts and USSR will be kept fully informed". We feel that the

[No. 654]

Govt in the country in which the conversations are to be held might properly take the initiative in this respect.

Please bring this matter to attention of FonOff immediately and report developments.

GREW
L[oy] W H[enderson]

No. 655

881.00/6-2545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, June 25, 1945—7 p. m.

MOST IMMEDIATE

3826. Bidault agrees entirely that a decision should be reached at earliest possible moment as to where Tangier conversations are to be held. (Your 2909, June 23¹). He alleges that he receives practically no communications of importance from Brit Govt at this juncture. "Churchill" he added "is too busy electioneering and trying to kick us out of the Levant".

Bidault insists that French will not go to London to discuss Tangier (rptd London 464; sent Dept 3826).

He agrees that USSR should be informed as suggested by Dept and that govt of country where conversations are to be held might properly take initiative in that respect.

CAFFERY

¹ Document No. 654.

No. 656

881.00/6-2145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1945—6 p. m.

5145. The Department is inclined to believe that failure on the part of Great Britain and France to invite the USSR to participate in Tangier conversations can be justified by the fact that the Soviet Government has never demonstrated any interest in the Tangier Zone. (Urtel 6270, June 21, 6 p. m.¹) It has never maintained a representative of any kind in Tangier and has never taken any step which would indicate that it considers itself to be a party to the Treaty of Algeciras even though the Russian Imperial Government was a party to that Treaty. The Government of the United States,

¹ Not printed.

on the other hand, while not a party to the 1923 Statute has constantly maintained representation in Tangier, has continued to exercise its capitulatory rights, and has made it clear that it bases its interest in Tangier on the Algeciras Treaty.

GREW
L[oy] W H[enderson]

No. 657

881.00/6-2545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET
US URGENT

LONDON, June 25, 1945—8 p. m.

6403. French Govt being informed by British Embassy Paris that British Govt agreeable to Paris meeting re Tangier. Details of communication to USSR expected to be concerted Paris at once and we will be promptly informed when communications made.

WINANT

No. 658

881.00/6-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, June 26, 1945—5 p. m.

6429. Informal discussions at the FO yesterday re Tangier showed considerable similarity in Amer and Brit viewpoints. The Brit intend to present the French Emb tomorrow with a copy of their draft agreement for an interim regime and proposed amendments to the statute in order that these documents may be considered by the French Govt before opening of conversations in Paris July 2. (See Embtel 6189, June 19 and despatch 23896, June 25¹).

The Brit propose an addition to Article 2 of the draft agreement to the effect that a copy of the agreement would be communicated to the Govt of the US (probably by the French Govt), with the request that the US state whether it is willing to participate under the terms of the agreement in the administration of the Tangier zone. The Amer reply could embody any desired stipulations or reservations. In this way the negotiation of separate notes would be avoided and time would be saved. Please instruct if this method of associating ourselves with the provisional regime meets with the Dept's approval.

¹ Neither printed.

Info is desired as to the possibility of financing an Amer contribution to the proposed temporary credit under Article 7 through the President's emergency fund or other sources.

The Italian Emb has approached the FO on the Tangier question. (Sent to Dept as 6429; rptd to Paris as 402). The Brit position is that the interim agreement shall be open to accession by the Italian Govt at such time as may be agreed upon by the other parties, but it is not desired that Italy become a party to this or any similar international agreement until the treaty of peace with Italy has been signed. It is suggested that this might likewise be the attitude of the US Govt.

WINANT

No. 659

881.00/6-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, June 27, 1945—midnight.

3882. The following is the text which will be communicated to the Soviet Govt by the Brit Amb in Moscow ¹ on Saturday, June 30, and in translation by the French Chargé d'Affaires ² on the same date: (Sent Dept as 3882 rptd London as 476 and Moscow as 152)

"Now that the war in Europe is over it is desirable that the Spanish Govt should be called upon to withdraw their troops and administration from the international zone of Tangier and make way for the reestablishment of an international regime.

"His Majesty's Govt and the French Govt are accordingly preparing to hold conversations in Paris in conjunction with the United States Govt with a view to concerting an approach to the Spanish Govt and to determining details for the reestablishment of an international regime on a provisional basis, pending the negotiation of a new Tangier convention. The Soviet Govt will be kept informed of developments."

CAFFERY

¹ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

² Pierre Charpentier.

No. 660

881.00/6-2645 : Telegram

The Secretary of State ad interim to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1945—7 p. m.

US URGENT

5306. In reply to request of nature referred to in second paragraph you may state that Amer Govt is willing to participate in administration and that subject to certain stipulations and reservations which you may consider appropriate you are prepared to recommend that it participate under the terms of the proposed agreement. (Urtel 6429 June 26 ¹).

While prelim inquiries indicate financing of Amer contribution from emergency funds is possible in principle an estimate of Amer share will be required before final decision is made. If possible therefore suggest Villard submit such estimate earliest oppor[tunity] after consultation Brit and French representatives Paris.

Rptd to Paris as no. 3020.

GREW

L[oy] W H[enderson]

¹ Document No. 658.

No. 661

881.00/7-245 : Telegram

The Secretary of State ad interim to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) ¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1945—7 p. m.

US URGENT

5371. The Soviet Ambassador ² told me this morning that he had been instructed by his Government to inform the American Government that:

1. The Soviet Government had been informed by the British and French Embassies in Moscow that following an exchange of opinions among the British, French, and American Governments, a meeting of experts of those three Governments was to take place in Paris on July 3 in order to discuss Tangier.

2. The Soviet Government was interested in Tangier and was surprised that its opinion had not been asked for and that it had not been invited to send experts to participate in the discussions.

¹ The same message was sent at the same hour to the Ambassador in France (Caffery) as telegram No. 3049.

² Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

3. The Soviet Government requested that the meeting of experts be postponed until arrangements could be made for a Soviet expert to attend.

It was pointed out to the Ambassador that the American Government was not a signatory of the 1923 Statute and had not participated in the administration of Tangier based on that Statute; that nevertheless, in view of the interest which the United States had displayed in Tangier as expressed in its maintenance there of a Diplomatic Agent, the British and French Governments had asked the American Government to participate in the discussions; that it was understood that the Soviet Government had not been invited because it had not, since its establishment, displayed any interest whatsoever in Tangier; that nevertheless the American Government had consented to participate in the discussions on the condition that the Soviet Government be informed that they were to take place and be kept fully advised of decisions taken; that although the American Government would welcome the participation of Soviet representatives in the discussions, it was in a sense a guest at the meeting and the decision with regard to the Soviet request would rest primarily with the British and French Governments; that in view of the urgency of replacing the present Spanish regime in Tangier with a regime under Allied control, it was hoped that the Soviet Government would not press for any extensive postponement of the conversations; that it was the understanding of this Government that the discussions in Paris were for the purpose merely of arranging for the Spanish regime to be replaced by a temporary regime pending a subsequent agreement among all interested powers with regard to the future administration of Tangier.

The Soviet Ambassador was also informed that the United States Government would instruct its Ambassadors in London and Paris to communicate its views to the British and French Governments.

Please therefore inform the appropriate authorities of the Government to which you are accredited that your Government hopes that in view of the interest expressed by the Soviet Government in Tangier, favorable consideration will be given to the Soviet request that Soviet representatives be permitted to participate in the conversations.

Sent to Paris as No. 3049; repeated to Moscow as No. 1493.

GREW

No. 662

881.00/7-245 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State
ad interim*

SECRET

PARIS, July 2, 1945—6 p. m.

3981. FonOff rec'd this morning note from Russian Embassy referring to notification regarding Tangier conversations delivered in Moscow Saturday¹ and expressing astonishment that such conversations should be called with so little advance notice to Soviet Union. Note then expressed Russian interest in matter of Tangier and requested that opening of conversations be postponed until consultations could be held to arrange for 4 power discussions.

Meyrier of FonOff, who conveyed above information to Abbott and Holman of Brit Embassy said that Russian action had been rendered inevitable by Brit and Amer desire for temporary regime to replace Spanish administration rather than acceptance of French desire to reestablish status existing in 1939. Meyrier stated he did not see how Russian request to take part in conversations could be refused unless French thesis was adopted. Russians could then be informed that no changes in Tangier administration were contemplated at this time and that Soviet Govt together with other interested powers would naturally be invited to take part in a subsequent conference for revision of Tangier convention. Meyrier added that this [*the?*] chief objection to admitting Soviets at this time would be endless delays which would follow with result that Spaniards would remain in Tangier for months and years.

Holman while obviously reluctant to envisage Soviet participation in talks to be held in Paris stated he had not [*no*] information as to his gov't's attitude and would have to request instructions.

The above ground was gone over again this afternoon at a meeting in Meyrier's office with members of Amer and Brit delegations. Amer position was stated in accordance with instructions to Villard,² namely that we favored admission of Russia to discussions on an equal basis. Brit delegation stated they would have to ask instructions from London and added that owing to the elections and the dispersal of cabinet ministers it would be difficult to obtain a decision for several days. Privately Peake informed us the Brit delegation had received instructions based on a decision taken by the cabinet to oppose the admission of Russia to the conversations. Peake explained also to us that he would not communicate this to the French at this stage inasmuch as since our instructions were different he considered it

¹ See document No. 659.

² Document No. 652.

inadvisable for the Brit delegation to take the onus of opposing Russian participation and in his view the question would have to be reexamined at the top level.

Meyrier stated that the French Govt prepared to say no to the Russians but it was not prepared to take this stand unless the decision was unanimous on the part of the 3 powers namely the US, France and Great Brit. Likewise in a conversation this morning with the Russian Ambassador³ Bidault took the position that any reply to the Russian request for participation in the discussions could not be made by France alone but was a matter which called for a decision representing the views of all 3 powers.

Meyrier stated that there were several alternatives: (1) that the Russians be informed the question of Tangier solely concerned the French and Brit Govts as signatories of the statute of 1923, and that they proposed to restore integrally the 1923 three [*sic*] statute provisionally, and that both the USSR and the US would be invited to participate in the drawing up of a definitive regime; (2) a refusal of the Russian request and the continuance of the present plans for a provisional regime to be followed by the drawing up of a new statute and (3) acceptance of the Russian request, in which case he saw no reason why other interested powers including Belgium the Netherlands Portugal Sweden and Spain should not be invited to participate in the conversations.

The Brit delegation has expressed itself to us as entirely opposed to the reintegration of the 1923 statute, and they do not wish to see us stand aside. The French stated this afternoon that the Brit draft agreement⁴ involved fundamental changes in the statute and would therefore involve extended discussions.

Brit have informed Amer delegation privately that if favorable decision should be made to admit Russians they would favor inclusion of the smaller powers in the discussions so that the task may well assume that of drawing up the final statute for Tangier rather than a provisional regime.

Inasmuch as we were careful not to associate ourselves with the Brit and French Govts in the notification to Moscow Villard and Childs feel strongly we should be most careful not to be drawn into associating ourselves with any negative decision by the Brit Govt in respect of the Russian request.

CAFFERY

³ Alexander Efremovich Bogomolov.

⁴ Not printed.

No. 663

881.00/7-345: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, July 3, 1945—5 p. m.

6686. FonOff tells us Gousev called yesterday on Cadogan and left with him a note requesting that talks in Paris on Tangier be held in abeyance until arrangements can be made for Soviet expert to attend.

Gannon [*Garran?*] and Beckett, members of Brit delegation which went to Paris for the talks, returned to London this afternoon to discuss this development with FonOff officials.

We were told that first reaction of FonOff to this Soviet move is that if Soviets are brought into the discussions difficulties with the Spaniards will arise causing delay in settlement, a situation from which only Franco can profit. (Sent Dept as 6686, rptd Paris as 429 rptd Tangier as 39.)

WINANT

No. 664

881.00/7-445: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, July 4, 1945—3 p. m.

4005. Peake, head of Brit delegation to the Tangier conversations, has conferred with members of the American delegation when he read a private letter that he had sent to the ForOff regarding Russian request for admittance to the Tangier conversations.

Peake suggested in his letter that behind the Russian request was most probably the desire to embarrass by every possible means the Franco regime in Spain and to gain at Tangier a means of carrying on an active subversive campaign against Franco Spain. The Amer delegation believes this interpretation of the Russian motive is plausible but considers the issue should be regarded in the larger frame of an expanding Russian interest in the Mediterranean.

The Amer delegation suggested to Peake that as the most practical way out of the present impasse, the suggestion should be made to the French who will have the burden of replying to the Russian request that the USSR Govt detail from Moscow or better still from the Embassy in Paris an observer who would follow the Amer, French Brit conversations concerning the formulation of a provisional regime for Tangier. Such a Russian observer would fulfill the undertaking

[No. 664]

given to the USSR to be kept informed of the discussions and the French Govt might inform the Soviet Govt that this procedure was suggested pending final decision concerning the participation of the USSR actively in the discussions, (Sent Dept as 4005, rptd London 487, Madrid 242, Tangier 14). Peake has made this recommendation today to his Govt.

CAFFERY

No. 665

881.00/7-445: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, July 4, 1945—4 p. m.

4012. Contents of Dept's 3049, July 2, 7 p. m.¹ regarding Soviet approach on Tangier conversations were communicated by Villard yesterday to Meyrier of French Foreign Office who took exception to statement that Amer Govt had been requested to participate in discussions by British and French Govts and had consented to do so on condition that Soviet Govt be informed. Meyrier pointed out that meeting had been joint arrangement on Brit and Amer initiative and stated that any other description placed French Govt in an embarrassing position.

In an extended conversation which then followed Meyrier told Villard that if the Soviet Govt was admitted to the conversations it would be necessary to invite all the other powers interested in Tangier Statute. He said that the Belgian Govt had already asked that it be allowed to participate. Meyrier went on to declare that the Brit draft proposal² was entirely unacceptable to the French and that it was out of the question to use it as a basis of discussions. He said privately that he had prepared a French proposal under which the US would be admitted temporarily to participate in committee of control and legislative assembly by *Dahir* of the Sultan with all American rights safeguarded pending formal revision of the statute. Meyrier said that rather than discuss the fundamental changes in the statute embodied in the Brit draft agreement he would prefer to have the whole question of Spanish occupation and interim regime for Tangier left to permanent court of international justice. He even intimated as one solution that France should be allowed to deal directly with the Spanish Govt and settle the interim problem between themselves.

It is the belief of the Amer delegation that the French Govt will be willing to accede to Soviet request for participation provided that

¹ See document No. 661, footnote 1.

² Not printed.

the decision be a joint Amer Brit and French affair. It is evident that the answer by [to?] the Soviets depends wholly on Brit decision. Meyrier believes that if an invitation is extended the Soviet Govt could be given say eight days to send a representative to the meeting and that discussions could commence promptly on the date set whether or not Soviet representative is present. He would anticipate no difficulty with other interested powers except Spain and Italy, but believes that Soviet participation might drag out discussions for a period of several months.

CAFFERY

No. 666

881.00/7-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 5, 1945—1 p. m.

6756. FonOff informed substance Dept's 5371, July 2¹ and offhand reaction was that USSR probably would have to be brought into Tangier's [sic] discussions.

An awkward feature about this is that other signatories to GCT of 1923 (Dutch, Belgians and Portuguese) have not been invited.

WINANT

¹ Document No. 661.

No. 667

881.00/7-245 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1945—7 p. m.

US URGENT

3112. Your no. 3981, July 2, 6:00 p. m.²

1. It is our feeling that the Russians should be invited at once to send delegates to participate in the conversations. We see no reason why the small nations should wish to be invited at this time since the present conversations should be limited to preparing plans for the speedy replacement of Spanish control in Tangier by a temporary provisional regime pending a conference of all interested powers which would determine the future of the Zone.

¹ The same message was sent at the same hour to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) as telegram No. 5478.

² Document No. 662.

2. In case the other great nations insist, we would of course have no serious objection to the participation of small nations in these conversations although their participation would unnecessarily complicate matters and result in further delay. It should be clearly understood that no attempt is to be made during the present conversations to draw plans for the permanent government of Tangier.

3. We do not see why Soviet Russia could not be given a position similar to that which we contemplated for ourselves.

Sent to London as no. 5478; repeated to Moscow as no. 1529, to Madrid as no. 1140.

BYRNES
J[oseph] C. G[rew]

No. 668

881.00/7-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

MADRID, July 5, 1945—5 p. m.

1452. Under Secy of FonAffs yesterday spoke to me of the Ministry's receipt of official reports concerning the Soviet *démarche* demanding representation at the tripartite conversations on Tangier now in progress at Paris. Del Castillo strongly denounced this development and said that the Ministry had telegraphed Span Emb at London instructing that Brit FonOff be informed that whereas Spain would welcome conversations with Americans Brit and French looking to reestablishment of an international regime at Tangier the matter would not be discussed by Spain with any other power. While the instruction to London may not have named Russia his conversational emphasis left no doubt as to his meaning[.]

Deptel 1116, July 3.¹

The Brit Chargé d'Affaires² later had a similar conversation and is reporting to his Govt.

Rptd to London as 433, Paris as 366, Tangier as 79.

Span position remains as reported that return to Tangier statute as amended is undesirable (principally as opening way to Russian participation in administration and as restoring French to dominating position; secondarily as returning Italy to participation) and that the new international administration should be restricted to Great Brit, France, Spain and the US.

ARMOUR

¹ Not printed.

² Reginald James Bowker.

No. 669

881.00/5-945

*Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of African Affairs
(Wasson)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: International Zone of Tangier.

Participants: Mr. Henderson, NEA

M. Lacoste, Counselor of the French Embassy

Mr. Wasson, AF

M. Lacoste, Counselor of the French Embassy, called upon Mr. Henderson to discuss matters relating to Tangier. . . .

M. Lacoste then raised the question of the participation of representatives of the USSR in the conversations. Mr. Henderson stated that he was aware of this development and that, as a matter of fact, Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador, had called upon the Acting Secretary of State on the morning of July 2 in this regard. Mr. Gromyko had informed Mr. Grew that his government had instructed him to express surprise that the Soviet Government had not been invited to exchange views with the three other interested governments with respect to Tangier; that the Soviet Government was interested in the future of the International Zone; and that the Soviet Government had requested that the talks in Paris be postponed so that the Soviet Government could arrange to have one of its experts participate in the conversations. Mr. Grew had informed Mr. Gromyko that we would welcome the participation of the Soviet Government in the conversations provided that France and the United Kingdom had no objections. A general conversation ensued with regard to the expanding interest of the USSR in the Mediterranean.

M. Lacoste stated that his government felt that if the Soviet Government were admitted to the conversations it would be necessary to invite all the other powers interested in Tangier. The difficulties of bringing the smaller countries into the talks were discussed and the point was made that the principal object of driving Spain out and establishing a temporary government would be postponed as a result of the delays which would follow. The suggestion was then made by M. Lacoste that a purely Franco-British conference might be held looking to the termination of the illegal Spanish occupation of the Zone and that the United States and the Soviet Government would be kept informed. Meeting with silence, M. Lacoste then suggested that the 1923 regime might be restored integrally pending the calling of a conference of the interested powers to discuss the future status

of the International Zone. He went on to say that the British draft proposal for an interim regime was entirely unacceptable to the French and could not possibly be used as a basis for discussion.

Mr. Henderson informed M. Lacoste that our Government has from the beginning made clear our interest in the Zone and that we have taken the stand that the restoration of the 1923 Statute to which we do not and cannot adhere would render our participation in the administration of the Zone difficult. However, there would be no objection to the establishment of a temporary regime similar in some respects to that provided for in 1923, but with features which would permit us to participate in the committee of control and the legislative assembly and [if] all American rights were safeguarded pending a formal revision of the Statute. The French might care to consider such a regime as the restoration of the 1923 Statute, but we could not regard it as other than a temporary government. Mr. Henderson then informed M. Lacoste that we could see no reason why the small nations should wish to be invited at this time since the present conversations would be limited to preparing plans for the speedy replacement of Spanish control in Tangier by a provisional interim regime pending a conference of all interested countries to determine the future of the International Zone. We would of course have no serious objection to the participation of the adherents of the Statute in these conversations although their presence would unnecessarily complicate matters and result in further delay. Mr. Henderson pointed out that no attempt would be made during the present talks to set up a permanent government for Tangier.

M. Lacoste remarked that, in connection with the present trend for the United States to take an active interest in everything that was taking place, he had noted that at recent graduating exercises at Annapolis the candidates had dipped their rings in a vase of water from the seven seas, whereas previously the water for this ritual had come from the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Caribbean. The change symbolized that the United States had assumed the role of a world power. He added that the Soviets' sphere of influence likewise embraced the whole world.

Mr. Henderson reiterated that he preferred that only the four countries should take part in the talks, but that our Government would not resist the participation of the small nations if they insisted upon being represented. French responsibility for the maintenance of the Sultan's sovereignty in Tangier, Mr. Henderson continued, was understood and appreciated. It was felt, however, that a temporary regime, similar to that set up by the Convention of 1923, could be established without the adherence of the United States to the Statute. He drew attention to the fact that misunderstandings might arise if

we endeavored to discuss these questions while our representatives were conversing about them in Paris. Since Paris was the seat of the conversations the remarks made here on this subject must be considered to be of a distinctly informal nature. Mr. Henderson said that he fully understood the point of view of the French Government and felt sure that we could find a way, acceptable to all of us, to effect the withdrawal of the illegal Spanish administration and the establishment of a temporary government pending an international conference to decide upon the future administration of the Zone.

T_[HOMAS] C. W_[ASSON]

No. 670

881.00/7-645: Telegram

*The Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Villard) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, July 6, 1945—6 p. m.

4061. From Villard.

(1) Meyrier of the Foreign Office handed to us yesterday evening a note (in translation below) setting forth the present French position in respect to the conversations on Tangier. It states that in view of the Russian request for participation in the discussions the necessity arises of defining as precisely as possible the terms on which the conversations are to be held and it seeks to obtain agreement on those terms before an answer is given to the Soviet Government. A similar note was handed to the British.

(2) After referring to the fundamental changes in the statute implied by the British draft proposals,² the note describes the French objectives as follows:

(3) [“]By letters dated May 25 and June 12,³ the Ministry has had the honor to inform the Embassy that the French Government considers that the factual and juridical conditions existing at Tangier in 1940, prior to the military intrusion of the Spanish, must be reestablished and that it is the statute of 1923 which must be brought back into force and substituted for the Spanish regime. In the view of the Ministry the purposes of the conversations which are to take place in Paris are to define the procedure of the joint action to be taken towards the Spanish Government in order to obtain its evacuation of the zone, to determine the practical measures by which the international administration shall be reestablished, and to define adjustments in detail which, in view of the circumstances, may be found necessary to permit the harmonious functioning of this regime. Inasmuch therefore as the object is to lay down the conditions of political, and

¹ Sent over the signature of Caffery.

² Not printed.

³ Neither printed.

eventually of military action to be pursued for the purpose of securing the reestablishment of a position of international legality in Tangier, it is normal that the conversations destined to prepare such action, and to determine the modalities to be adopted in this connection, should be held between representatives of the great powers. It is with this view in mind that the French Government has agreed to a meeting which shall include the representatives of the British, American and French Governments, if the British and American Governments are similarly disposed, it will raise no objection to the association of the USSR in the conversations."

(4) An interesting addition which, Meyrier observed, did not refer to Tangier but involved France's desire to be represented on such bodies as the reparations commission, states that:

(5) "However, the French Government expects that, in the same spirit, the Governments of the USSR, of Great Britain and of the United States will admit that the French Government shall itself be invited to participate in all international conferences in which matters of interest to it will be raised."

(6) The note adds that following the establishment of a provisional regime the French Government is not opposed to undertaking a new examination of the Tangier questions "looking to provide the city with a definitive statute such as will conciliate the sovereign rights of the Sultan with all international interests concerned" and remarks that "it considers that all powers signatories of the Act of Algeciras (with the exception of those who have ceased to be in a position to invoke this convention) must be associated in such an examination".

(7) Finally it is asked that the position of the American Government on the points above set forth be communicated within [*sic*] the briefest possible delay.

(8) French objection to the British plan appears to be based on the mistaken impression that it seeks to undermine the French position in Tangier and Morocco and in particular to threaten the authority of the Mendoub⁴ by appointment of an assistant administrator for native affairs. Our feeling was that the latter provision would actually enhance French prestige since the post would be under French control, but the French profess to see in this and in other parts of the British draft a deliberate attempt to reduce French influence. This may be a reflection of General de Gaulle's personal attitude in the matter[.]

(9) Meyrier proposes that if the American and British delegations are in agreement with the above stated purposes of the conversations and concur in the admission of Russia, the French Government will accede to the Soviet request and set a date eight or ten days ahead

⁴ The Mendoub represented the Sultan of Morocco at Tangier and was responsible, among other things, for the administration of native affairs.

for the start of conversations. Meanwhile, informal discussions could continue at the Foreign Office with a view to reaching a common understanding between French, British and American representatives before opening the subject with the Russians. The British are now seeking instructions and state that the question of Russian participation has been referred to the Cabinet, with the possibility that it may go to the "Big Three" meeting for final decision.

(10) The French seem to believe that the background of our objectives at Tangier is the desire to obtain an international security base in accordance with plans worked out at San Francisco for the World Security Council. This the French Government would be willing to discuss, according to Meyrier, but only in its proper setting of the international organization and not in relation to the Tangier statute.

No. 671

881.00/7-945 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

MADRID, July 9, 1945—7 p. m.

US URGENT

1475. Although I well understand and thoroughly agree that Soviet Govt should not be permitted to obtain impression that western powers are acting in unilateral manner with regard to Tangier, fail to see how invitation to that govt actively to participate in Tangier conversations at this stage can be justified so long as small powers having legitimate interest [as?] parties to Tangier statute are excluded. (Your 1140, July 5²) Dept's statement that it sees "no reason why the small nations should wish to be invited at this time" to participate in conversations I find difficult to understand in light of inescapable interest of such nations in any change in status of a zone in administration of which they were active participants prior to Span occupation, an interest which would moreover be considerably enhanced should it become apparent to them that in their absence conversations would be conducted *inter alia* by great powers having little or no direct interest in Tangier.

Numbered paragraph 3 of ref teleg would seem to indicate it is Dept's view Russians should participate as well in proposed interim occupation of Tangier zone. If this is in fact the case I feel strongly Dept should be fully aware of possible consequences of such participation on position of Span Govt vis-à-vis Tangier settlement and on our relations with Spain. Although as Dept is well aware I hold no brief for present Span regime I consider it unrealistic to overlook fact

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 15 of July 11 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1145).

² See document No. 667.

that Spain is country with preponderant natural interest in Tangier and that without Span cooperation no solution of Tangier question can be enduring. While Span Govt is willing to terminate its unilateral occupation of Tangier under circumstances which would avoid embarrassment to it, Soviet participation in proposed reoccupation would arouse non-Partisan popular resentment in Spain and preclude possibility of voluntary Span withdrawal, alternative to which might well be serious incident resulting in rapid deterioration of relations between occupying powers (including US) and Spain and strengthening of hand of Falange Extremist elements. In view of increasing tendency on part of our Govt to use Spain as source of supply and base for ATC and other related operations and in view also of importance of Span cooperation in attainment of SAFEHAVEN objectives, I assume that neither drastic deterioration of our relations with Spain nor serious internal disorders in this country would be considered to be in our interest.

Although I am hardly in position to pass judgment on Span Govt's fearful contention that Russia's entry into Tangier would be opening wedge in campaign to establish Soviet influence in North Africa and western Mediterranean and to replace other foreign spheres of influence in Morocco by means of Communist penetration and unscrupulous use of Moroccan nationalist sentiment, I do consider it entirely probable that as suggested by head of Brit delegation (Paris 4005, July 4 to Dept ³) Russians would take advantage of presence in Tangier at least to carry on activities designed to embarrass and weaken Franco regime. Regardless of dismal view we may take of latter such activities would inevitably contribute to world instability at time when stability is at a premium.

I realize importance of our relations with Russia outweighs that of our relations with Spain but I do not see that that justifies our working to bring about a situation which might in the end place both in jeopardy. I appreciate also that Russia's vast contribution to victory in Europe entitles her to a major voice in reorganization of liberated Europe but feel it might well be pointed out that Tangier, an integral part of Shereefian Empire, is in no sense a prize of war and is not therefore subject to disposition as such. Should Soviet Govt persist in demanding active participation in interim Tangier regime I believe it would be in our ultimate interest to offer to renounce our own right to such participation in return for similar action on part of Russia, thus leaving actual reoccupation of zone to those powers most directly concerned as parties to Tangier statute.

Rptd London 440, Paris 381, Tangier 81.

ARMOUR

³ Document No. 664.

No. 672

881.00/7-945 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

PARIS, July 9, 1945—8 p. m.

4117. Note delivered this afternoon by Brit Emb to FonOff states that Soviet request to participate in Paris talks created a new situation in that it involves Russian participation in Tangier admin. It is further stated that Brit Govt will probably need some time before it can express any definite views and that in meanwhile it is suggested Soviet Govt be informed that no meetings will be held in Paris until decision is reached re Soviet request. French Govt is asked for it[s] views on above proposed reply to Soviets and is informed that Brit Emb Wash is forwarding a similar communication to Amer Govt.²

CAFFERY

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 12 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1045).

² Not printed.

No. 673

881.00/7-1145 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

LONDON, July 11, 1945—6 p. m.

6984. Hoyer Millar said to us today that he did not see how talks on Tangier, now that Russians have asked to participate, could be opened unless Russians were brought in. Bringing the Russians into the talks immediately raised the question of how far they were to take part in any plan which might be agreed upon for the future administration of the zone. That point, it seemed to him, had to be decided first and it was one that could not be decided "on the minute". It might be best, therefore, to go into it at the Big Three meeting and not think of starting discussions on Tangier until after the Big Three meeting. (Sent Dept as 6984; rptd to Tangier as 42; rptd to Paris as 449; rptd to Moscow as 245).

WINANT

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 19 of July 12 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1245).

[No. 673]

No. 674

881.00/7-1245 : Telegram

*The Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Villard) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

PARIS, July 12, 1945—6 p. m.

4191. From Villard.

American delegation met with Peake and Meyrier for another informal conference.

Meyrier handed Peake a note in reply to British note of July 9² in which it was stated that proposed adjournment of conference to an indeterminate date would gravely prejudice French and Sherifian interests. It added that no question of principle could be opposed to participation in conversations either of USSR or USA as the convention of 1923 envisaged the adherence of all the powers signatories of the Act of Algeciras. Accordingly the sole difficulty would arise from one or the other of those powers considering the participation reserved to it by the 1923 statute as insufficient. French Govt proposed therefore to undertake without delay to obtain views of American and Soviet Govts and suggested July 16 as an official date for opening of conference between representatives of four powers. Should British Govt persist in thinking conference should be postponed, it would then be necessary for the French Govt to seek through diplomatic channels the views of American and Soviet Govts concerning USSR participation of [*in*] Tangier administration, British Govt being kept informed. Should the four powers encounter in their eventual representations at Madrid a rejection of them on [*or?*] dilatory maneuvers "the French Govt would envisage with a view to reaching a rapid solution either coercive action by four powers or recourse to Article 54 of convention of 1923".

Peake stated his Govt was prepared to accept inclusion of the Russians in the discussions[,] that it had no opposition to French making a communication to that effect without delay to USSR but British Govt desired on its side to make a communication on subject to Russians at Big Three meeting in Berlin. He explained British desired at such a time to indicate to USSR certain conferences to which the British and French had not been invited in which it considered British and French participation desirable. As no communication of this character could be made until Eden had seen Churchill, the British Govt desired to postpone Tangier conference until the first week in August when discussions could be resumed with inclusion of USSR. Peake assured Meyrier there would be no discus-

¹ Sent over the signature of Caffery.

² See document No. 672.

sion by British with Russians at Berlin of Tangier other than question of their participation.

Meyrier stated that if British Ambassador ³ could make verbally to Bidault the assurances given him (Meyrier) by Peake, he thought the French Govt would be agreeable to postponement suggested. French Govt would then be enable[d] to make an appropriate official statement which would relieve it from the great pressure of public opinion both in France and Morocco where the demand particularly on the part of the Sultan for quick settlement was very insistent. Peake thought there would be no difficulty in this and further developments are expected today.

Peake also gave Meyrier official assurances that it was no part of British purposes to diminish prestige or authority of the Sultan of [or?] Sherifian interests in Tangier. Peake said he did not believe the British and French viewpoints were very far apart. Meyrier seemed very much encouraged and expressed a like viewpoint stating he did not anticipate any serious difficulties in the reaching of an agreement between American, French and British representatives. We all agreed that real stumbling block might arise from the as-yet-undisclosed Russian attitude toward Spanish participation in the administration.

If we can continue to make progress here as we have done by informal contact with the French and British we propose to remain in Paris for time being. If it appears that nothing can be accomplished until early in August, I would then proceed to London for talks with the Colonial Office and go from there to Morocco. Dempster might return to Tangier until August. The Dept might find (sent Dept 4191, rptd Tangier 18, London 514, Madrid 261) it desirable in that case to have Childs proceed to Washington for consultation and for him to return in time for resumption of discussions.

³ Alfred Duff Cooper.

No. 675

881.00/7-645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1945—6 p. m.

3271. 1) With regard to the French proposals our ideas are as follows: (Urtel 4061 July 6 six p. m.¹ from Villard).

a. The American Government can agree to the purposes of the conversations as set forth in paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference. The term "international administration" as used in that

¹ Document No. 670.

paragraph should not, however, be construed, so far as this Government is concerned, as the particular administration set up by the Statute of 1923. This Government has not adhered to and cannot adhere to that statute. A temporary administration in many respects similar to that set up under that statute would be agreeable to this Government provided American nationals and, if desired by the Soviet Union, Soviet nationals would have an appropriate participation in it. We would have no objection if the French on their part would consider the statute of 1923 as the legal basis for this temporary administration.

b. The American Government suggests that any agreement arrived at during the conversations shall contain an undertaking entered into by the Governments participating; that within a period of twelve months after the establishment of the provisional administration there shall be convened a conference of all parties still possessing rights arising from the Act of Algeciras in order to decide upon a permanent administration for Tangier; that an announcement setting forth this undertaking shall be made upon the termination of the present conversations; and that this announcement shall also contain statements to the effect that the powers participating in the conversations are fully mindful of the rights of the other parties to the Act of Algeciras and of the sovereign rights of the Sultan of Morocco.

2) We are giving consideration to suggesting to those participating in the conversations the following proposal: In case the powers possessing rights based on the Act of Algeciras have been unable to arrive at an agreement with regard to the permanent status of Tangier within eighteen months following the establishment of the temporary administration, they should give full and active support to inviting the United Nations Organization to administer the International Zone of Tangier on behalf of the Sultan of Morocco under the Trusteeship arrangements provided in Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations.²

3) We have examined the tentative British proposals enclosed with London's despatch no. 23896 of June 25.³ We believe that they represent a satisfactory basis for negotiations and shall leave to you and your experts the task of altering them in so far as is necessary to protect our special interests and rights and of making necessary technical drafting changes. We note that they contemplate including in the agreement for the temporary regime the signatories of the 1923 Statute. We do not object but we do not consider the inclusion of all these countries necessary, regardless of the legal niceties involved, in order to set up a merely temporary regime to replace the present Spanish administration. We do not, however, approve of the

² Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031.

³ Not printed. Enclosed with this despatch were (1) a detailed British draft of an agreement on a temporary administration for Tangier and (2) British proposals for amending the Statute of 1923 to provide for a permanent administration for Tangier.

provision in Article 1 to the effect that the temporary regime remain in force until it is replaced by a convention "accepted by all the parties" to the Statute of 1923. Do you consider it advisable that a single country, such as for instance Spain, should have the power to block the setting up of a new permanent regime while signatories of the Act of Algeciras such as Russia and ourselves would not have powers of a similar nature? We feel strongly that a situation should not be allowed to develop in which one or more Powers by refusing to agree to the type of a permanent regime agreeable to others could convert the temporary regime into a permanent regime. Therefore some formula should be devised to prevent such a development. The suggestions contained in Paragraph 2 above may be helpful in this connection.

We also believe that, if the Soviet Union insists, participation of the Soviet Union in the temporary administration of a character similar to that contemplated for the United States should be arranged. We are opposed to an indefinite postponement of the conversations. We do not object, however, to the postponement for a period of perhaps a week pending the arrival of Soviet representatives.

Repeated to London as no. 5754; to Madrid as no. 1191; to Tangier as no. 152.

GREW

No. 676

881.00/7-1345: Telegram

*The Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Villard) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

[Extract]

SECRET

PARIS, July 13, 1945—9 p. m.

4225. From Villard.

. . . With reference London's 6984 July 11 to Dept.,² Peake reaffirms intention of British government not to raise at Berlin any question concerning extent of Russian participation which is accepted in principle role [*sic*] subject of any discussion concerning Tangier between British and Russians being envisaged as limited to deal by which British would obtain something in exchange for Russian admission to conversations. British believe French will accept postponement of conversations until first week August.

¹ Sent over the signature of Caffery. The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 35 of July 16 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1645).

² Document No. 673.

No. 677

881.00/7-1445 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

LONDON, July 14, 1945—11 a. m.

US URGENT

7114. Hoyer Millar discussing Tangier today said Dutch have now drawn attention with some force to their interest, while Portuguese and Belgians have registered interest. He added Churchill now interesting himself from Hendaye² and that position British Government is nothing can be done until after Big Three meeting. In Paris he said Meyrier now talks of French preliminary conversations with British, Russian, American Governments separately attempting reconcile views and contemplates early meeting thereafter. British probably will discourage this and consider early meeting out of question. They think of meeting some time in August.

Possibility withdrawal Spanish and occupation by Shereefian troops during this delay was discussed as unlikely but Millar surmised such situation if followed by a tactful French approach to the interested powers would not be received too badly. Such coup might relieve Spanish embarrassment resulting from Soviet request and simultaneously improve relations with France. Millar evidently has some thought of meeting [of] all statutory powers to discuss means bringing United States and Russia into Tangier settlement.

This largely conjecture and personal opinion but two certain facts are British cannot visualize meeting before Big Three Conference and consider using Tangier as bargaining counter with Russia.

Sent to Department as 7114, repeated to Paris as 456 Madrid as 185 and Tangier as 43.

WINANT

¹ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 35 of July 16 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1645).

² Where Churchill was vacationing before the Berlin Conference.

No. 678

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹[Extracts²]

SECRET

POTSDAM, July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, called this afternoon and discussed for two hours in a preliminary way a number of matters on the agenda of the Conference.³

17. *Tangier.*

Sir Alexander reported that [the] Paris discussions on Tangier had been suspended. His government has not yet answered the Russians' request to join in the talks and, he feels, cannot refuse their request as the United States has already joined in them. To my comment that I saw no basis for keeping Russia out of the talks, Sir Alexander suggested that, if Russia were included, all the interested powers should be invited, including the Belgians, Dutch and Swedes, but presumably not the Spaniards.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 140, 218, 234, 258, 319, 351, 379, 404, 470, 519, 635, 645, and 708.

³ For a list of persons present at this meeting, see document No. 234, footnote 3.

[No. 678]

TURKEY: THE STRAITS QUESTION; RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

No. 679

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Elsey)*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

THE DARDANELLES

When Churchill was in Moscow in October 1944, Stalin opened discussions on the revision of the Montreux Convention.² This Convention, signed in July 1936 by Russia, Great Britain, Turkey, France, Japan and four Balkan nations,³ established rules for the passage of commercial vessels and warships through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Stalin said he wanted the Convention modified to allow free passage at all times of Russian warships. It was agreed by Stalin and Churchill that the Soviet Government would present notes through diplomatic channels to the U. S. and Great Britain setting forth detailed proposals. Churchill informed President Roosevelt of Stalin's views and said that he had not contested the Soviet proposal because "revision is clearly necessary as Japan is a signatory."⁴

The Soviet Government did not send diplomatic notes, however, and the Montreux Convention did not come up again until 10 February 1945 at Yalta.⁵ Soviet desires were then stated as follows:

"Marshal Stalin then said that he would like to say a few words about the Montreux Convention regarding the Dardanelles. He said the treaty was now outmoded. As he recalled, the Japanese Emperor played a big part in the treaty, even greater than that of the Soviet Union. The treaty was linked with the League which does not exist just as the Japanese Emperor was not present at this

¹ Submitted to Leahy July 1 and subsequently forwarded to Truman.

² For the text of this convention regarding the regime of the Straits, which was signed at Montreux, July 20, 1936, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213. Text of the substantive provisions also in Harry N. Howard, *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947; Department of State publication No. 2752), p. 25. For a tabular comparison of the provisions of conventions regulating the Straits from 1840 to 1936, see *ibid.*, pp. 29-33.

³ i. e., Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 328.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 903-905. Cf. pp. 909-910, 916-917.

Conference. Under the Montreux Convention the Turks have the right to close the Straits not only in time of war but if they feel that there is a threat of war. He said that the treaty was made at a time when the relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union were not perfect, but he did not think now that Great Britain would wish to strangle Russia with the help of the Japanese. The treaty needed revision. He thought that there would be no objection to a consideration of the revision of that treaty. He said in what manner the treaty should be revised he did not know and he did not wish to pre-judge any decisions, but he felt that the interests of Russia should be considered. He said that it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia's throat. He added, however, that it should be done in such a manner as not to harm the legitimate interests of Turkey."

Churchill agreed with Stalin that the treaty needed revision and, although President Roosevelt made no specific remarks about the Montreux Convention, he too appeared to agree that revision was desirable.

After a brief discussion, Churchill and Stalin agreed that the Soviet Government would put forward proposals relating to the Montreux Convention at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries in London and that the Turkish Government should be informed. This agreement was approved by the President.

There has been no reference to the Montreux Convention in Presidential dispatches since the Yalta Conference. There has not been a meeting as planned of the three Foreign Secretaries in London and the Soviet Government can be expected to make its proposals concerning the Dardanelles at the forthcoming Berlin Conference.

G. M. ELSEY

No. 680

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

*Briefing Book Paper*¹

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE MONTREUX CONVENTION

The U. S. S. R. indicated at Yalta briefly, without stating its desiderata, that it was not satisfied with the existing Convention, and it was agreed by the Big Three that the U. S. S. R. would make known its wishes at a later date to the American and British Governments for discussion at the prospective "Meeting of Foreign Ministers."² In a memorandum handed to the British Embassy June 23³ the De-

¹ Annex 12 to the attachment to document No. 177. In Truman's copy of the Briefing Book, this paper has been marked for deletion and document No. 681 has been inserted as a substitute.

² See vol. II, document No. 1416, section XIV.

³ Document No. 688.

partment stated that: "this Government stands ready to discuss the question of the Straits at the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of Government when, presumably, the Soviet Government will present its desiderata in this connection".

Thus this Government, which is not a signatory to the Montreux Convention (signed July 20, 1936 by Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Rumania, Turkey, the U. S. S. R. and Yugoslavia) has been brought fully into this picture by Britain and the U. S. S. R. without consultation with Turkey, although the latter would undoubtedly be pleased to know that the United States is interested in the future of the Straits.

U. S. Interest

The chief United States interests in this problem are (a) freedom of commerce and (b) a regime of the Straits which would appear most effectively to promote the cause of world peace in accordance with the principles of the International Security Organization to which this Government is pledged.

Minimum Changes to be Hoped For

There would not appear to be any real justification for the U. S. S. R. to propose radical changes in the Montreux Convention at the Heads of Government meeting because:

1. The Montreux Convention has in general proven satisfactory in application. Non-use of the Straits as a supply route to Russia was due to Axis command of neighboring regions and not to any shortcomings in the Convention.

2. Any *major* changes in the regime of the Straits without the free consent of Turkey would violate Turkish sovereignty and might well affect adversely the strategic and political position of Turkey.

3. The Convention was drafted originally to fit into the League of Nations' collective security system and consequently can be adapted easily to the International Security Organization.

No valid claim can be made for altering the Convention so far as merchant vessels are concerned, because, under its provisions, unarmed or defensively armed merchant vessels of any flag, with any cargo, are free to transit the Straits subject to certain Turkish security provisions.

Although the British and American Governments have agreed to discuss the Russian desiderata at the meeting of the Heads of Government, it should be remembered that the Montreux Convention is an international undertaking signed by all the nations who subscribed to the Lausanne Treaty of July 24, 1923⁴ except Italy. Under its terms (Article 29) any signatory of the Convention may communicate

⁴ League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxviii, p. 115. Text of the substantive provisions also in Howard, *The Problem of the Turkish Straits*, p. 21.

any revisions it desires to the other signatories three months prior to the end of each five-year period of the Convention's existence (in this case August 1946) and if agreement on the proposed revisions cannot be reached through diplomatic channels, the signatories agree to be represented at a specially convened conference of signatories. With such time-tested international machinery already in existence, it might be preferable to allow desirable changes to be made within the framework of the Convention itself, although, if considered urgent, the date for reconsideration could be advanced by a unanimous decision of the signatories.

This Government is [*in?*] expressing its views beyond the principles of the I. S. O. would be justified in insisting that Japan, a signatory, has no longer any proper place in the Convention and should be formally excluded therefrom.

This Government might not object to *minor* changes in the Convention suggested by the U. S. S. R. (the Great Power primarily at interest) with respect to the transit and navigation of warships in the Straits and their right of sojourn in the Black Sea because there seems to be some validity to the Russian trend of thought that the Convention recognizes to an insufficient degree the special importance of the Straits to the Black Sea powers. Suggested changes of this sort should, of course, be considered carefully by the Navy and War Departments.

If asked whether the United States would be willing to participate in a revised Montreux Convention or some other regime of the Straits within the I. S. O., the reply might be that we would be prepared to participate in the event that it appears that the participation of the United States would serve the ends of world peace.

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1945.

No. 681

Truman Papers

*Revised Briefing Book Paper*¹

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE MONTREUX CONVENTION²

The U. S. S. R. indicated at Yalta briefly, without stating its desiderata, that it was not satisfied with the existing Convention,

¹ In Truman's copy of the Briefing Book this paper has been substituted for document No. 680.

² In another version of this revised Briefing Book paper (file No. 740.00119 Council/6-3045), also dated June 30, the parenthetical phrase "(For Use If This Question Arises)" has been added to this heading. This variant paper was in Dunn's copy of the Briefing Book together with documents Nos. 680 and 681. Another copy of this variant text bears the following manuscript notations: "for Big 3 Meeting" and "as revised 4:00 PM 6-30".

and it was agreed by the Big Three that the U. S. S. R. would make known its wishes at a later date to the American and British Governments for discussion at the prospective "Meeting of Foreign Ministers".³ In a memorandum handed to the British Embassy June 23⁴ the Department stated that: "this Government stands ready to discuss the question of the Straits at the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of Government when, presumably, the Soviet Government will present its desiderata in this connection".

Thus this Government, which is not a signatory to the Montreux Convention (signed July 20, 1936 by Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Rumania, Turkey, the U. S. S. R. and Yugoslavia) has been brought fully into this picture by Britain and the U. S. S. R. without consultation with Turkey, although the latter would undoubtedly be pleased to know that the United States is interested in the future of the Straits.

U. S. Interests

The chief United States interests in this problem are (a) to prevent the Dardanelles from becoming an area of international dispute and a potential threat to world peace and (b) to ensure the unrestricted use of the Dardanelles for peaceful commerce.

U. S. Attitude Towards Possible Changes in the Montreux Convention.

The Government of the United States believes that following the present war the Montreux Convention to some extent will be outmoded, and agrees that certain changes might be advisable. The United States would therefore not oppose a revision of the Convention along lines which would make it possible that:

1. In time of peace the Straits would be open to commercial vessels of all nations.
2. In time of peace the Straits would be open for ingress or egress of war vessels of Black Sea riparian powers.
3. In time of peace there should be certain restrictions upon the aggregate strength in the Black Sea at any one time of the war vessels of non-riparian Black Sea powers.
4. During a war in which one or more of the Black Sea riparian powers is involved, no war ships of any non-riparian power shall be admitted into the Black Sea without the consent of the riparian power or powers at war, unless they are moving under the direction of the United Nations Organization.
5. During time of war, regardless of whether one or more of the Black Sea powers is involved, the war vessels of the Black Sea riparian powers shall have free ingress and egress through the Straits in the absence of contrary directions of the United Nations Organization.

³ See vol. II, document No. 1416, section XIV.

⁴ Document No. 688.

6. No power other than Turkey shall be granted the right to have a fortification on the Dardanelles or to maintain any bases in the Dardanelles without the free consent of Turkey.⁵

7. Regardless of the points above, if Turkey is at war or threatened with imminent danger of war the passage of warships shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government unless the course taken by Turkey under this provision is interdicted by the United Nations Organization.

8. Foregoing points represent only a rough outline for a revised regime of the Straits which would be satisfactory to this Government. These points would require general refinement and expansion before they could be incorporated into a formal document. The preliminary advice of the War and Navy Departments should be obtained in connection with the drafting of such a document.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

⁵ In the version referred to in footnote 2, *ante*, paragraph 6, which is the final paragraph of the paper, reads as follows: "6. The American Government would have no objection to the establishment by the Soviet Union of fortifications on the Dardanelles, or to the maintenance by the Soviet Union of bases on the Dardanelles, provided these fortifications and bases are established with the free consent of Turkey."

No. 682

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD TURKEY

Since the time of Admiral Bristol, relations between the United States and Turkey have been friendly and profitable. We have no special objectives with regard to Turkey itself beyond those normal to peaceful intercourse. Our attitude so far as Turkish-American relations are concerned is "live and let live" within the following basic policy principles (see Policy Committee Paper No. 8, dated October 23, 1944¹).

1. The right of peoples to choose for themselves without outside interference the type of political, social, and economic systems they desire.

2. Equality of opportunity, as against the setting up of a policy of exclusion, in commerce, transit and trade; and freedom to negotiate, either through government agencies or private enterprise, irrespective of the type of economic system in operation.

3. The right of access to all countries on an equal and unrestricted basis of bona fide representatives of the recognized press and information agencies of other nations engaged in disseminating information to the public in their own countries; and the right to transmit information gathered by them to points outside such territories without hindrance or discrimination.

4. Freedom, on a non-discriminatory basis, for American phil-

¹ Not printed.

anthropic and educational organizations to carry on their activities in the respective countries.

5. General protection of American citizens and the protection and furtherance of legitimate American economic rights, existing or potential (investments, concessions, licenses, etc.)

6. Willingness to participate through recommendations in territorial settlements of questions involving general security.

The geographical position of Turkey is such that historically both Great Britain and the USSR have watched jealously the course of Turkey's relations with the other powers. Potentially Turkey is an area of diplomatic, economic and military conflict between the USSR and Great Britain. It seems probable that in the main British policy will be to strengthen and to encourage Turkey in order that Turkey may resist more successfully Soviet moves to draw Turkey into the Soviet orbit.

. . . If the Turks are convinced that they enjoy unconditional British backing in dealing with the Soviet Union, they might assume an attitude toward the Soviet Union which the latter might interpret as provocative. It is thus of importance that this Government, always ready to assist in the just and peaceful solution of problems involving peace, should retain a detached but watchful attitude in viewing the interplay of British and Soviet policies on the Turkish stage so long as neither party resorts to practices not in keeping with the principles of the I. S. O. This Government, as a friend to all concerned and pledged sincerely to the cause of peace, can thus make its weight felt at any crucial period.

Turkey's foreign policy has been swinging in a slow arc from East to West. From 1921 to 1936 when both the Turkish Republic and the Soviet Union were new, uncertain and almost friendless, they had many problems in common, and Turkey diplomatically leaned towards the USSR. From 1936 to 1939 Turkey was encouraged by its success at Montreux to take a more or less independent stand vis-à-vis the larger powers. In 1939 Turkey became frightened by the phenomenon of German-Soviet cordiality and turned her policy definitely westward by signing Alliances with England and France.² Although theoretically the German attack on the USSR put Turkey on the same side of the fence as Russia, actually, as success came to Soviet arms and Turkey maintained her pro-Allied armed neutrality, Moscow assumed a cold and detached attitude toward the Turks, thus causing the Turks to lean even more heavily upon Great Britain for support.

There are already clear indications that the Soviet Union has in mind a number of serious issues involving Turkey and the Turks, as much as any other people, hope fervently that their independence

² i. e., the Franco-Turkish declaration of mutual assistance issued at Paris, June 23, 1939 (text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLIII, p. 476), and the mutual assistance treaty signed by the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey at Ankara, October 19, 1939 (text printed *ibid.*, vol. CLI, p. 213).

and integrity will be preserved by the principles of the I. S. O. The Turks believe that they will be safe if the anti-aggression doctrines enshrined in the I. S. O. are honored and implemented by the members of the Security Council.

If the I. S. O. should fail (and the Turks are inclined to be pessimistic), they anticipate a difficult period of pressure politics from both East and West. In this event it would seem preferable from the point of view of this Government's interest in world peace for Turkey either to have special alliances in both directions or no alliances at all.

This Government should make it abundantly clear at the meeting of the Heads of Government that it can not and will not remain silent if any country takes steps which threaten the independence and integrity of Turkey in violation of the principles of the I. S. O. Furthermore, at an appropriate time this Government should make the foregoing stand clear to Turkey and to any other interested powers.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

No. 683

761.6711/6-1845

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 18, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Soviet-Turkish Relations

Participants: British Chargé d'Affaires [*Minister*], Mr. John Balfour;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew.

Mr. Balfour of the British Embassy called on me this afternoon and left with me the appended text of a telegram ¹ from the British Minister at Istanbul to the Foreign Office of June 13 and an *aide-mémoire* from the British Embassy to the Department of June 18 setting forth a conversation between Mr. Molotov and the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow ² in which the former stated that before proceeding to the negotiation of a new Soviet-Turkish Treaty ³ it would

¹ The telegram referred to (not printed) contained a report from the British Ambassador in Turkey, Sir Maurice Drummond Peterson, then at Istanbul (see documents Nos. 684 and 685), concerning the Soviet-Turkish conversation described below. For the report on the same subject of the American Ambassador at Ankara, Edwin C. Wilson, see document No. 684.

² Selim Sarper.

³ To replace the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality concluded by the Soviet Union and Turkey at Paris, December 17, 1925, as revised and extended. Text of the treaty of 1925 in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLVII, p. 353 (where the treaty text is followed by the texts of related documents), and in Leonard Shapiro, ed., *Soviet Treaty Series: A Collection of Bilateral Treaties, Agreements and Conventions, etc., Concluded Between the Soviet Union and Foreign Powers* (Washington, 1950-), vol. I, p. 313. This treaty was to expire in 1945, the Soviet Union having given the required notice on March 19, 1945, to prevent its automatic extension for another term. See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLV, p. 1175.

be best to solve outstanding questions between Turkey and Russia as follows:

(a) Russo-Turkish treaty of 1921.⁴ Molotov stated that cessions of territory made by Russia to Turkey under this treaty were made under duress and required revision,

(b) The cession of bases by Turkey to Russia in the Straits,

(c) An agreement between Turkey and Russia as to the revision of Montreux Convention.

The Turkish Ambassador stated to Mr. Molotov in reply that his Government was not prepared to reopen the question of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of 1921 which they considered to have been freely negotiated nor could they even consider granting Russia bases in the Straits. As regards the Montreux Convention the Turkish Ambassador repeated that this was not a matter which could be discussed between the two Governments alone. The Turkish Government has approved its Ambassador's attitude.

The British Government, especially in view of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty,⁵ proposes to support the Turkish position particularly as the position taken by Mr. Molotov appears to be in direct conflict with statements made by Marshal Stalin at Yalta.⁶ The British Government hopes that the United States Government will agree to a joint Anglo-American approach along the lines of its *aide-mémoire* and that this approach be made to the Soviet Government prior to the meeting of the Big Three at which it may well be necessary to discuss this whole question.

I said to Mr. Balfour that I would give immediate attention to the British Government's proposal but that I could make no commitment until this whole subject had been given careful study here. In any case, I said I thought it would be preferable to withhold action until the end of the San Francisco Conference⁷ which it was now hoped might be brought to a close on or about June 23 and that if action were to be taken there would presumably be plenty of time between the close of the San Francisco Conference and the meeting of the Big Three. Mr. Balfour said he agreed with me and as he understood that the Big Three meeting would not take place before July 15 he

⁴ i. e., the Treaty of Kars, concluded October 13, 1921, between the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, on the one hand, and the Governments of the Soviet Socialist Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, on the other (with the participation of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic). Text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxx, p. 906, and in Shapiro, ed., *Soviet Treaty Series*, vol. 1, p. 136.

⁵ i. e., the Treaty of Mutual Assistance concluded by the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey, signed at Ankara, October 19, 1939. Text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxi, p. 213.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 328. Cf. document No. 705.

⁷ i. e., the United Nations Conference on International Organization.

also thought that it would be well to delay action until after the San Francisco Conference had been concluded. He said he was further asked to say to me that even if we should not feel in a position to make a joint approach with the British Government, his Government hoped that we would at least support the British action with some step of our own.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

[Attachment]

SECRET

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Representative at Istanbul in a telegram dated the 13th June reported that the Turkish Government, from conversations between their Ambassador in Moscow and M. Molotov, had recently received indications of the sweeping demands that the Soviet Government were likely to make on Turkey in regard to the conclusion of a new treaty between the two countries which would in particular affect the future status of the Dardanelles. A copy of this telegram is attached.⁸

In view of this information from Istanbul His Majesty's Government think it desirable that representations to the Soviet Government should be on the following lines.

The Soviet Government should be plainly told that His Majesty's Government and the United States Government are at a loss to understand M. Molotov's action. Even if the revision of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of 1921 (paragraph 3a of attached telegram) is the primary concern of the Soviet and Turkish Governments alone and, although this is open to doubt, the question of the cession of bases by Turkey to Soviet Russia in the Straits (paragraph 3b of attached telegram) is possibly also a Soviet-Turkish matter, both points nevertheless also concern the powers responsible for the World Organisation. This is the case alike from the general standpoint of the principles enunciated by President Truman in connection with the settlement of the Venezia Giulia problem—namely that the fundamental principles of territorial settlement by orderly process must be upheld against force, intimidation or blackmail⁹—and, in particular, because of the explicit assurances given by Marshal Stalin at Yalta. Marshal Stalin then stated that he readily agreed that “appropriate assurances should be given to Turkey regarding the maintenance of her independence and integrity”, and that in particular she should be reassured as a preliminary to the revision of the Montreux Convention.¹⁰ The third point made by M. Molotov in his conversation with the

⁸ Not printed.

⁹ See Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 247.

¹⁰ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 903-904, 982.

Turkish Ambassador in Moscow is in direct conflict with Marshal Stalin's statement at Yalta. It is also surprising that M. Molotov should have proposed a Turkish-Soviet understanding about the Straits at a time when His Majesty's Government and the United States Government are still awaiting the views of the Soviet Government which the latter promised to communicate at the Crimea Conference.¹¹

If the Turkish Government have no objection to such an approach, His Majesty's Government hope that the United States Government will agree that a joint Anglo-American approach on the above lines should be made to the Soviet Government in firm language and soon, that is, before the Big Three meeting at which it may well be necessary subsequently to discuss the whole question.

WASHINGTON, 18th June, 1945.

¹¹ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 982.

No. 684

761.6711/6-1845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

ANKARA, June 18, 1945—3 p. m.

817. The Acting FonMin ¹ informed me this morning as follows:

The Turk Amb at Moscow ² called on Molotov at the latter's [*former's*] request on June 7. At the outset of the conversation Molotov said that before it would be possible to conclude a new treaty with Turkey it would be necessary to settle all outstanding questions between the two countries. Embs 786, June 12.³ Molotov then raised three specific questions:

1. The situation which he said was created for Russia by the treaty of 1921 which had ceded certain territories in the east to Turkey. Molotov said that the Soviet Union desired to have these territories returned. The Turk Amb said he must refuse to discuss any question affecting Turkey's territorial integrity. Molotov then said that they would lay the question aside for the time being but the Ambassador should understand that it remained unsettled.

2. The question of the Straits. Molotov said the Soviet Govt recognized the Turks had acted with goodwill during this war and had conducted themselves satisfactorily as regards the defense of the Straits. However Turk goodwill was not enough to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union. A people of 200,000,000 inhabitants could not depend solely on the goodwill of Turkey in this matter but must also consider what are Turkey's possibilities of defending the

¹ Nurullah Esat Sumer.

² Selim Sarper.

³ Not printed.

Straits. The Turk Amb asked what this meant: Did it mean bluntly that Russia wished bases in Turk territory? Molotov replied affirmatively. The Ambassador said he regretted he could not discuss such a demand. There was then a long and inconclusive discussion on the question of what effective guarantees Turks could give the Soviet Union re the defense of the Straits.

3. The Montreux Convention. Molotov said he wanted an agreement in principle between Russia and Turkey as to changes to be made in the Montreux Convention. In other words according to the Ambassador Molotov wanted a prior agreement between Russia and Turkey that at any future international conference for the revision of the Montreux Convention the two countries would stand together regardless of the views of other parties. The Turk Amb reported he had stated to Molotov that in his opinion this approach to the problem would not be helpful since there were other parties to the Montreux Convention and the interests of such countries should be taken into consideration. Furthermore he felt any such prior agreement could only give rise to mistrust on the part of other govts. Molotov replied that Russia and Turkey were independent countries and it was not necessary for them to ask the views of other powers on this matter. The Amb added that in the discussion of this question he felt that Molotov was trying to convey the impression that if Turkey would break away from her alliance with Britain then the Soviet Govt would not feel it necessary to insist on the three points which Molotov had raised.

The Acting FonMin said that immediately on receipt of the foregoing report from Moscow the Cabinet had met with the President⁴ and that same day, June 12, he had sent a telegram to the Turk Amb stating that [he approved?]⁵ the attitude he had taken in his conversation with Molotov and instructing him that the Turk Govt could not discuss questions of ceding Turk territories as bases nor could it agree to the proposal that it make a private agreement with Russia re the Straits prior to holding an international conference. The Amb had been informed the Turk Govt was always ready to talk with Russia on the basis which had been put forward by Russia at the time of the latter's denunciation of the treaty of friendship, namely an effort to modify and improve the treaty.

The Acting Min said he had informed the Brit Amb⁶ of the foregoing (he went to Istanbul for that purpose) and the latter had requested the views of his Govt.

The Acting FonMin asked me to report what he had told me to my Govt and to say the Turk Govt would greatly appreciate receiving the views of the US Govt re this matter which the Turk Govt regards as very grave. He repeated his request for the views of the US Govt.

⁴ Ismet İnönü.

⁵ The words in brackets appear on the file copy as a possible substitution for a garble in the text as received.

⁶ Sir Maurice Drummond Peterson.

He then asked for my personal opinion. I said I could well understand Turkey would not be prepared to discuss matters affecting Turkey's sovereignty and independence. He remarked that recently there had been some encouraging developments as regards relations between Russia and other countries in such questions as the voting formula at San Fran[cisco] and the consultations with Polish leaders. The Soviet Union had finally made concessions and adopted an attitude which facilitated agreement. I said I believed the Soviet Union felt the need of cooperation and goodwill on the part of other countri[es] and having this in mind I was hopeful that with careful handling of what was undoubtedly a delicate and serious problem this question of Turkey's relations with Russia could be worked out satisfactorily.

The Acting Min said that what troubled him was that Russia was taking this attitude towards Turkey during the closing days of the conference,⁷ an attitude which was utterly irreconcilable with the principles governing world organization as discussed and agreed at San Fran. He said he thought it likely that when Molotov is informed of the position of the Turk Govt, Russia may provoke a break in relations or at least there will again be a new and violent Soviet radio and press campaign against Turkey. He said however that Turkey was ready to take all the consequences and there was no other way open to her than to stand firm on the position she had taken.

Sent to Dept rptd to Moscow as 40.

⁷ i. e., the United Nations Conference on International Organization, then meeting at San Francisco.

No. 685

761.67/6-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

ANKARA, June 20, 1945—8 p. m.

822. I just talked with the Brit Amb who came here this morning from Istanbul. (Embs 817, June 18¹) He had seen the Acting FonMin and given him the views of the Brit Govt along the following lines: The Brit Govt felt the Turks had taken the only position open to them in refusing to discuss Molotov's proposals. At the same time

¹ Document No. 684.

it would be wise for the Turks not to be entirely negative and they should consider going back at the Russians with a proposal for a discussion of the revision of the Montreux Convention among four or five states instead of only Russia and Turkey: For instance Britain, Greece and the US if willing might participate. Brit Govt felt strongly that it would be advisable for Britain to intervene at Moscow without delay and it was hoped that the US would join in such intervention. The Amb had inquired if the Turk Govt would object to such intervention and the Acting FonMin had replied that on the contrary Turkey would welcome it and hoped the US would take similar action.

The Acting FonMin had said there were reports of Russian troop movements towards Turkey's eastern frontier and the Turk Govt was considering calling two classes of reserves, about 180,000 men[,] back to the army. Peterson said that his Mil Attaché² reported there was no confirmation the Russians were increasing their troops near the frontier but the mechanization of Russian units in that area had undoubtedly increased the mobility of their forces there. Peterson said he felt it unwise for the Turks to call up these reserves as this would make them look jumpy and as if they were feeling the effects of the Russian war of nerves which is just what the Russians want. He thought it unlikely that the Russians would make a move to grab these territories by force and he was considering whether he ought to advise the Turks not to call up these reserves.

Peterson said his govt had informed the US Govt fully of their views in this matter and had expressed the hope the US would join in intervention at Moscow.

I recommend strongly that we express an interest in this matter at Moscow. The Russian proposals to Turkey are wholly incompatible with the spirit and principles on which we are seeking with the participation of the Soviet Union to set up a new world organization. While I doubt if the Russians are likely to take military action against Turkey at this time, on the eve of the Big Three Meeting I believe that prompt and firm expression of our views at Moscow will be of the greatest importance in keeping this situation from getting out of hand and in contributing to the possibilities of an ultimate solution.

Sent to Dept, rptd to Moscow as 41.

² Major-General Allan C. Arnold.

No. 686

761.6711/6-2245: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, June 22, 1945—6 p. m.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

844. Acting FonMin has informed me as follows:

A second conference took place between the Turk Amb at Moscow and Molotov on June 18 (Embs 817, June 18¹). Turk Amb said to Molotov that he had been instructed to state the Turk Govt could not accept as a basis for discussion the three points proposed. There was then a lengthy discussion not acrimonious, in the course of which Molotov indicated the Soviet Govt was prepared to envisage the negotiation of a treaty of "collaboration and alliance" between the Soviet Union and Turkey.

Molotov then brought out a new point. He stated the Soviet Govt might desire to present to Turkey the point of view of the Balkan States re certain questions affecting those states and Turkey. (Re this point the Acting FonMin said Molotov had not indicated what these questions might relate to, whether territorial, economic or other matters. In any case there were no questions pending between the Balkan States and Turkey. The Balkan States had been belligerents, they were at present under the authority of ACC's and the Turk Govt could not agree to receive any claims on their behalf put forward by the Soviet Union).

At the end of the conversation between the Turk Amb and Molotov, the latter had stated "Think it over; let us see if we cannot work out something useful on these points".

Acting FonMin said he had a "negative impression" of this interview and felt it had "gotten nowhere".

Acting FonMin then said that on the day when the report of the foregoing conference reached him, the Soviet Amb in Ankara² had come in to present the Soviet note requesting access to the German archives in Turkey. After a brief discussion of this matter, the Soviet Amb had inquired if there were any news from Moscow and whether the second conversation there had taken place. Sumer replied a report had been received re this conversation and he had gained a "negative impression" concerning it. They had then talked for an hour and a half in the course of which the Soviet Amb had gone over the points raised by Molotov. Sumer said he had made it clear to the Soviet Amb that any new treaty of friendship between the two

¹ Document No. 684.

² Sergey Alexandrovich Vinogradov.

countries could not be based on questions such as those put forwarded [*sic*] by Molotov but only on "mutual respect and esteem". He had said that if the Soviet Union continued to make such proposals, it would lead in his opinion instead of towards a better understanding between the two countries, towards their drawing further apart. Therefore such questions should be eliminated from any future discussion. The Soviet Amb stated Molotov had "put aside" the territorial question. The Acting FonMin had replied there were two ways of putting aside matters: First, to put them aside with the intention of taking them up again; and second, to put them aside definitely with no intention of taking them up again. He had inquired of the Amb whether the Soviet Union which possesses a respectable portion of the earth's surface really needed any additional territory. The Amb had replied the Soviet Union did not need additional territory but the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic was very small and needed additional territory. The Acting FonMin had replied he, of course, could not accept such a statement.

At the end of this talk, the Soviet Amb had indicated he might wish to discuss further in Ankara this question of a new treaty. Sumer had replied he would be glad to do so at any time[;] the Turk Govt attached value to a new treaty of friendship with Russia provided all territorial and other objectionable questions were left aside.

Sumer told me that instructions were telegraphed yesterday to the Turk Amb in Moscow to the effect that in any further conversations with Molotov, he was authorized to say that Turkey would attach value to a new treaty of friendship drawn up on a proper basis. Also he was to say as regards the question of revision of the Montreux Convention that Turkey would like to know what the views of the Soviet Govt are concerning such revision and that once in possession of these views, the Turk Govt would be glad to consider them and discuss them with other interested Govts in order to determine whether it would be helpful to hold a conference for the revision of the convention.

Sumer said the Turk Govt was annoyed by the fact that Molotov in this second conversation had referred frequently to Poland. He had stated that after the First World War Poland and the Soviet Union, when the latter was weak, had negotiated a treaty which was "unjust" to the Soviet Union. Poland had now repaired this injustice and the basis was laid for a lasting entente between the two countries. Sumer said it was not at all the conception of the Turk Govt that Turkey should be placed in the same boat and painted with the same color as Poland, Yugo and Rumania.

Sumer said the Brit Amb had informed him concerning the conversation at Washington between Halifax [*sic*] and Acting Secy

Grew in which the British had proposed that the US join in a *démarche* at Moscow.

Grew had replied that while this matter would require consideration, he personally viewed the proposal with sympathy.³ (Peterson told me of this yesterday) Sumer said the Turk Govt appreciated this very much and sincerely hoped that the US Govt would agree to take some action in Moscow as the Turk Govt considered that this would be of the greatest assistance.

Sumer then referred to the report of certain Soviet troop movements on the eastern frontier. He said the Turk Govt had info which it considered reliable that Russian garrisons near the frontier had in fact recently been increased. He said the Turk Govt was not giving undue importance to this but that it was, of course, obliged to take "certain precautions". I inquired whether they were in fact calling up additional classes. He said no that they would not call additional classes prior to the meeting of the Big Three but they had taken steps so that additional reserves could in fact be mobilized very quietly (I understand this decision not to call the classes now was taken by the Prime Min⁴ on his own initiative without any suggestion having been made by the Brit Amb).

Sent to Dept: rptd to Moscow as 45.

³ Cf. documents Nos. 696 and 703.

⁴ Şükrü Saracoğlu.

No. 687

761.6711/6-1845

*The Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1945.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

In handing the attached reply² to a representative of the British Embassy, you may wish to indicate verbally that the officers of the Department present at the Yalta conversation concerned do not recall Marshal Stalin as having taken at that time, with regard to Turkey's independence and *integrity*, a position so definite as that indicated by the British Government in its *aide-mémoire* of June 18.³

L[OY] W H[ENDERSON]

¹ This memorandum bears the following manuscript notation by Matthews:

"There was no mention of Turkey's 'integrity' at Yalta. HFM[.]"

² Document No. 688.

³ Attachment to document No. 683.

No. 688

761.6711/6-1845

The Department of State to the British Embassy

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of June 18¹ regarding the conversation at Turkish initiative between the Turkish Ambassador and Mr. Molotov on June 7, 1945, and the Russian desires expressed in the course of this conversation with regard to concessions from Turkey, has been studied carefully by the Department of State. The Department has noted that the British Government is inclined toward an early approach to the Soviet Government in firm language, pointing out that Mr. Molotov's statements to the Turkish Ambassador are contrary to the explicit assurances given at Yalta by Marshal Stalin. The British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* indicates that on this occasion Marshal Stalin stated that he readily agreed that "appropriate assurances should be given to Turkey regarding the maintenance of her independence and integrity" and that in particular Turkey should be reassured as a preliminary to the revision of the Montreux Convention.

In accordance with the understanding reached at Yalta,² this Government stands ready to discuss the question of the Straits at the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of Government when, presumably, the Soviet Government will present its desiderata in this connection. So far as the Department can ascertain, the conversation between Mr. Molotov and the Turkish Ambassador took place in a friendly atmosphere and was of an exploratory character. If this is the case, the Department considers it premature to protest what amounts to a preliminary exchange of views. The Department is not aware that any formal demands have been presented by the Russians to the Turks and is inclined to feel that a protest in firm language on the part of either the United States Government or the British Government might overemphasize the importance of the conversation on June 7, 1945, with the result that an unfortunate background might be created for the prospective Heads of Government talks regarding the Straits.

The Department believes that the best tactics under the circumstances as they are now understood would be to treat the conversation between Mr. Molotov and the Turkish Ambassador as a matter not calling for special action because the forthcoming meeting of the

¹ Attachment to document No. 683.

² See vol. II, document No. 1416, section XIV.

Heads of Government is so close at hand. In any case, this Government would not wish to appear as having reached any decision on this question prior to the Heads of Government meeting.

The Turkish Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs has also outlined the general situation to the American Ambassador at Ankara and has requested the view of this Government. In its reply to the Turkish Government, the Department will express the hope that future conversations between the Russian and Turkish authorities will be conducted in accordance with the principles of the International Security Organization, to which this Government is pledged, and will continue in a friendly atmosphere.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1945.³

³ The file copy bears the following manuscript notation: "Handed in at British Embassy by G L[ewis] J[ones] at 7:35 PM June 23."

No. 689

767.68119/6-1845 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1945—8 p. m.

649. 1. In June 18 *aide-mémoire*¹ substantially along lines Embs 822 June 20 rpt Moscow as Ankara's 41² Brit Govt suggested that USG join Brit in firm representations to USSR re Molotov-Sarper conversation June 7 undertaken latter's initiative on grounds that Russian desiderata concerned powers responsible for World Security Organization and that Molotov's action is contrary explicit assurances given by Marshal Stalin at Yalta to effect that appropriate assurances should be given to Turkey re the maintenance of Turk independence and integrity.

2. Dept representatives present Yalta do not recall Stalin to have taken a position so definite as that indicated by Brits[.] The telegram from Brit Min at Istanbul dated June 13 to FO reports Turk Amb sought interview Molotov under instructions from Turk Govt. Moreover conversation appears to have been conducted amicably in atmosphere unclouded by threats.

3. Dept in reply Brit Embs *aide-mémoire* made following points[:]

(a) Conversation between Molotov and Sarper took place at latter's request in friendly atmosphere and was exploratory[.] Consequently it would be premature to protest what amounts to a preliminary exchange of views

(b) Dept not aware any formal demands presented by Russians in threatening atmosphere

¹ Attachment to document No. 683.

² Document No. 685.

(c) Dept believes Brit protest in firm language might over-emphasize June 7 conversation with result that unfortunate background might be created for prospective Straits talks at Big Three meeting

(d) Dept does not desire at this time either to join Brit in protest or express interest Moscow

(e) Dept makes clear that in any event it does not wish to appear to have reached a decision this question prior Big Three meeting[.]

4. Depts reply³ Brit *aide-mémoire* concludes with brief outline following para[:]

5. Replying FonMins request views USG (Embs 817 June 18 rpt Moscow as Ankara's 40⁴) you are authorized to inform FonMin that USG appreciates Turkish courtesy in informing it re Molotov-Sarper conversation and hopes Turk Govt will continue to keep it informed; that USG is pleased to note exploratory conversation took place in friendly atmosphere unclouded by threats; that USG hopes sincerely both parties will find it possible to conduct further conversations in similar circumstances with due respect each other's points of view; and that USG is confident neither party will follow course incompatible with principles of International Security Organization which USG has pledged itself to uphold. If pressed for further comment you may indicate that on threshold Big Three meeting we feel overemphasis should not be placed on June 7 conversation[.]

Sent Ankara repeated London as Depts 5101 and to Moscow as Depts 1404[.]

GREW

³ Document No. 688.

⁴ Document No. 684.

No. 690

761.67/6-2545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, June 25, 1945—9 p. m.

2263. Member of my staff yesterday talked with Turkish Amb about Soviet demands made on Turkey (Ankara's 40, June 18 and 45, June 22¹). Amb Sarper said there were no new developments. (Rptd Ankara 31.)

Sarper remarked that unequivocal Turkish replies seem to have given Soviet Govt pause. Had these demands been accepted he believed that Turkish Govt would soon have been confronted with

¹ These are the numbers under which the messages referred to were repeated to the American Embassy at Moscow. See documents Nos. 684 and 686.

second step—demands regarding Turkish internal matters designed to bring Turkey “like Poland” under direct Soviet influence.

Amb thought that Turkish rebuff had only postponed joining of issue. “Russians are not bluffing,” he said. Sarper went on to explain that Turkey was obviously in Soviet security zone now taking shape from Finland to China. USSR may therefore be expected to continue efforts to bring Turkey under its control. Sarper considers the Soviets may have two further objectives directly affecting Turkey.

One is the desire to close the Black Sea to states not in the Soviet bloc and at the same time to have free access through the Straits to the Mediterranean. Hence demand for bases. (Amb stated Molotov asked for Bosphorus bases but did not specifically name any.)

A second possible objective mentioned by Sarper is expansion from Caucasus in two prongs: (a) Through eastern Turkey to Alexandretta and the Medit and (b) through Iran and Iraq to Persian Gulf. Hence demand for return of ceded territories in eastern Turkey.

The Soviet Govt, in Sarper’s opinion may be expected to resume pressure on Turks either within the next few weeks or after we and Brit have demobilized, perhaps two or three years hence.

Amb said he had heard reports of possibly ominous Soviet military movements in Bulgaria and Caucasus. “We are used to wars of nerves. I have lumbago but no nerves.”

HARRIMAN

No. 691

761.6711/6-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

RESTRICTED
US URGENT

ANKARA, June 26, 1945—3 p. m.

858. I informed Acting ForMin this morning in sense final para Dept’s 649, June 23.¹ He expressed appreciation for interest US Govt and promised keep me fully informed[.] He said, of course, Turkey could hardly be expected have “respect” for Soviet point of view that Turkish territory and bases should be ceded to Russia. Also he could assure me that Turkey will not pursue course opposed to principles of International Security Organization.

He then pressed for our reaction to Brit proposals for *démarche* at Moscow. I informed him in sense your telegram. He said he understood our point of view and expressed hope that when question is discussed at Big Three meeting, we will take position supporting respect for equal sovereignty and independence all states.

¹ Document No. 689.

He said Turk Govt had trustworthy info Soviet Army units withdrawing from Poland and Hungary and moving into Bulgaria. While true that in June 7 conversation Molotov made no threats, Soviet military movements look like threats. I asked if he really thought Russia would take military action against Turkey on eve Big Three meeting. He said frankly he doubted it but Turkey could not be caught unprepared.

I then said that as matter of interest, I wanted ask why Turk Govt had taken initiative of seeking June 7 conversation. He replied not entirely correct say Turk Govt had taken initiative. When Sarper returned Ankara after Soviet denunciation friendship treaty, Sarper and Soviet Amb here had several informal personal conversations. These conversations, of course, took place with knowledge of Turk Govt. They were general in nature and concerned with security of Black Sea and revision [Straits] convention. When Sarper on point returning Moscow Vinogradov encouraged him seek interview with Molotov soon as latter returned from San Francisco expressing belief such interview would lead to satisfactory basis for discussion. Sarper, therefore, sought interview and at opening thereof inquired whether Molotov had received report from Vinogradov on their recent conversations. Molotov said yes but report had covered only points of view of Turkey and that Soviet Govt had points of view to express and then launched into statement of three points.

(To Dept, rptd Moscow as 48 and London as 62.) Sumer said that as matter of fact, Turk Govt had welcomed encouragement from Russian Amb to seek interview with Molotov since it was USSR which had taken initiative denouncing treaty of friendship and Turk Govt was desirous of knowing Soviet point of view re improvements sought in new treaty. Also Turk Govt is glad that Molotov proposals have been made in advance of Big Three meeting so that Britain and US are informed and in position to take helpful action in support principles international fair dealing.

No. 692

761.6711/6-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State ad interim

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, June 29, 1945—7 p. m.

876. After dinner last night with Soviet Amb I asked him what was taking place between USSR and Turkey. He said Molotov told Sarper that if Turkey was interested in new treaty of friendship certain questions would have to be settled first and these include return of Kars and Ardahan and measures to insure security of Black Sea.

[No. 692]

I asked if there had been a request for bases. He said Molotov had not mentioned bases specifically but had insisted upon measures necessary for Black Sea security.

I said I wondered what world opinion would be concerning territorial request. Amb said it was not for Soviet Union but for Armenian Republic which lacked sufficient territory. I asked if there were any Armenians in eastern provinces. He said only a few because Turks had massacred most of Armenians there. (In this and other conversations he has been critical of Turk Govt and people).

He said important matter from Soviet point of view was adequate security Black Sea. Under present regime Straits Turkey in time war can close Straits to USSR and open them to Russia's enemies. USSR cannot permit continuation this situation. He indicated that regime [which] would be regarded as satisfactory for security would be one under which USSR would at all times have freedom of passage for war vessels while retaining right to close Straits to others. I asked whether such regime would not affect existing Turco-Brit alliance. He became excited at this point and said there was nothing Soviet attitude directed against Britain.

I asked whether he expected further developments immediate future re Turk Soviet conversations. He said he did not know. Turks were now aware of questions that would have to be settled and next move was up to them. He did not know whether USSR would present its view re Straits at next Big Three meeting but said laughingly he was quite sure Brit would raise question there. He said "I hear Turks have asked Brit and you for help against us". I said that Turks had not asked us for help. I had asked Turks for info which they had given me. Sent Dept rptd to Moscow as 51.

I taxed him with existing situation in eastern Europe which he took in good part admitting that it would "perhaps" be more accurate to refer to the control commissions as being more Soviet than tripartite. He insisted however that situation in that area made this necessary and in any case USSR was "only doing what Brit have done in Italy".

No. 693

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/6-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State ad interim[Extracts ¹]

TOP SECRET

CASERTA, June 29, 1945—5 p. m.

2814. Gen Oxley head Brit delegation ACC Bulgaria . . . has just returned from tour Sofia to Varna. . . .

Oxley found that everyone he met spoke freely of Russian aspirations in Dardanelles. As illustration of this widespread opinion Oxley mentioned meeting drunken Russian corporal who expressed greatest delight at meeting Brit party and said he has just been told English had agreed to Russians having Dardanelles in return for free hand in Austria. Bulgarian civilians cannot understand why Bulgarian Army is not being demobilized; in fact officers cadre is being increased.

Oxley's summary impression was that Russian forces are massing in depth north from Greek and Turk frontiers.²

KIRK

¹ For the portions of this message omitted here, see document No. 456.

² Cf. document No. 457.

No. 694

761.6711/7-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State ad interim

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, July 2, 1945—noon.

US URGENT

893. I submit herewith some reflections on recent developments between Turkey and USSR:

1. Questions raised by Molotov are opening move in campaign on broad front extending far beyond Turkey. Perhaps most significant aspect of Molotov conversation was his remark that USSR may wish to present points of view of Balkan states. Some indication of nature of these points of view may be revealed in recent reports here of beginning Bulgarian movement for outlet on Aegean; stepping up of Moscow radio attacks on "Fascist" Greek Govt; and Belgrade and Sofia radio protests that Slavs in Macedonia are being persecuted. It is entire Balkan question which is being raised.

2. Request for return of Kars and Ardahan must be taken seriously. It is matter of prestige for present Soviet Govt to recover what Czarist regime formerly held. Furthermore these territories have

[No. 694]

high strategic value covering approaches to northern Iran and eastern Anatolia.

3. Requests re Black Sea security and revision Montreux Convention carry interesting implications. If Soviet security requires freedom of passage through Straits it is obvious that such freedom of passage cannot be guaranteed either by bases in Turkey or by revision of Straits convention. This war has demonstrated that Straits can be closed by airpower based on Crete. It may therefore be expected that claims relating to Soviet security will be extended to Aegean. If this succeeds whole debate can be transposed from Black Sea Dardanelles to Mediterranean-Suez-Gibraltar.

4. In August 1941 USSR gave assurances to Turkey of fidelity to Montreux Convention and respect for Turkish territorial integrity. Less than four years later USSR denounced treaty of friendship with Turkey and informed latter that new treaty would require as previous condition agreement on revision Montreux Convention and cession of Turkish territory. This is procedure with which world became only too familiar in years after March 1936. It would seem to be in interest of peace and cooperation for US to leave Soviet Delegation at Big Three meeting in no doubt as to our conviction that such procedure is contrary to spirit and principles of world organization which both Govts are pledged to support.

Sent to Dept rptd to Moscow as 53.

No. 695

761.6711/7-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

ANKARA, July 3, 1945—noon.

898. I went to see PriMin Saracoğlu yesterday. He said he would be less than frank if he failed to say that Turk Govt had been disappointed at our reply to Turk request for expression our views re Molotov-Sarper conversations. (Your 649, June 23, and my 858, June 26¹) He could not understand our hope that both parties would conduct "further conversations" with "respect [for] each other's points of view". He could not believe that we wanted Turkey to carry on further conversations with USSR on matters relating to cession of Turkish bases and territory. He found some consolation in statement we were confident that neither party would do anything incompatible with principles of new int security organization. We could be quite sure Turkey would respect these princi-

¹ Documents Nos. 689 and 691, respectively.

ples. I told him he should keep in mind what I had said to Sumer, namely, that feeling in Wash was that on eve of Big Three meeting June 7 conversation should not be over emphasized.

He said, "You and Brit have many problems. We Turks have single problem but it is one of life or death for us. If Soviets make attempt against our independence we shall fight. It may be hopeless or it may not be but we shall fight in any case". He went on to say that it was US and Brit and US even more than Brit, that will decide how world goes. "The Soviets have gone mad; they dream of world domination. They are crossing you and Brit at many points; Bornholm, Trieste, Albania, Greece, Turkey, Iran. When they find a weak spot they exploit it. They have nothing to lose. If you resist at one point they drop it for moment. But question has been raised and they will come back to it. It is impossible for a country to have orderly life under such conditions. All Turkey wants is to be let alone to work out our social and economic questions. We are no danger to anyone. We ardently wish friendly relations with Russia and have done everything possible to bring this about. We are fully prepared to discuss revision of Straits Convention. Matter of passage through Straits is of more interest to maritime powers than to us. Our concern is safeguard our territory. We will not accept Soviet domination."

He went on to say, "You and Brit are trying in good faith to restore order and economic stability in world. Soviets are doing just contrary. They are promoting disorder and suspicion everywhere. They are trying to create chaos out of which they hope to profit."

He said only hope he saw was if US and British stand firmly together and say to Soviets "This cannot go on any longer." If US and Britain mean this and convince Soviets of it, then world will have some years of peace.

He feels Big Three meeting may determine future Near East and Middle East for many years to come. If US and Britain fail to take firm stand, if after meeting USSR feels it can again press territorial questions on Turkey, then other nations in Near and Middle East will feel Stalin has again been able to win his point and they will begin to scramble to make best terms they can with him and this whole region will come under Soviet domination.

He said, "Situation can still be saved if at Big Three meeting you and British refuse any compromise on principles". As regards specific Turk situation he said that Molotov had been careful to leave door open in conversations with Sarper so that he could retreat if necessary. It was not Molotov who specifically mentioned bases first. After he had talked all around question of security Sarper had bluntly asked, "Do you mean bases?" and Molotov replied, "Yes". When

Sarper refused discuss bases Molotov talked about possibility Russia having use of bases in time of war which Molotov said would be another matter from occupying bases in peacetime. Also Molotov did not mention specifically names of provinces Kars and Ardahan; he insisted upon "rectification" of 1921 treaty negotiated when USSR was "weak". In other words, door was left open so that if USSR finds adamant opposition to territorial demands of [on] Turkey then it could accept a "rectification" of frontier under which a "few stones" could be given to USSR in return for a few stones which they would give Turkey. The irreparable would be if after Big Three meeting Soviet Union had (sent to Dept, rptd to Moscow as 54) feeling they were free to confront Turkey alone face to face with continued demands affecting Turk independence.

WILSON

No. 696

761.6711/6-2245 : Telegram

*The Under Secretary of State (Grew) to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1945—4 p. m.

673. Personal for the Ambassador from Grew.

In order to clear up any misunderstanding which might result from the statement of the Acting Turkish Foreign Minister as reported in your 844 of June 22, 6 p. m.² to the effect that I had indicated to Halifax that I personally viewed with sympathy British proposal to have the United States join the British in a *démarche* at Moscow I want you to know that when the British Chargé [*Minister*] spoke to me about the matter on June 18³ I said I would give immediate attention to the British Government's proposal but that I could make no commitment until this whole subject had been given careful study here.

¹ Sent over the signature of Byrnes.

² Document No. 686.

³ See document No. 683.

No. 697

767.68119/7-445

*Memorandum by the Chairman of the President's War Relief Control Board (Davies)*¹

[Undated.]

RUSSIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS AND THE STRAITS

Ever since Peter the Great visited Germany, Holland, and England in 1697, Russian leaders have recognized the need for ice-free ports. Russia has tried to control the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, doors to the Black Sea, and to acquire Constantinople because of significance to the Greek Orthodox Faith.

Turkish rulers, since the days of Sultan Ibrahim I in 1640 when a famine was caused by Venetian ships closing the Dardanelles for the first time, have manoeuvred by wars and alliances to prevent Russia from achieving her aims. This "Eastern Question" which occupied so much of the political history of the 19th century can be summed up as the result of the conflict of the following desires: Russia's and Austria's desire to have access by water to the Mediterranean; the British desire to prevent Turkey from obstructing the route to India; the desire of the non-Muslim Christians in Turkey for independence.

Nineteenth century differences began in 1798. Napoleon attacked Egypt as a move against England's route to India. Russia joined Turkey and England. Napoleon was defeated in Syria. The French fleet was destroyed by Nelson at Aboukir. The Russian and Turkish fleets captured the Ionian Island[s]. Peace was concluded in 1802.²

The hospodars of Walachia and Moldavia, two instruments of Russia, caused risings against the Porte. Turkey dismissed them without Russia's consent, thus violating an agreement made in 1802. Russia and England protested. The two were replaced. But, encouraged by the French, Turkey declared war on Russia, although the British Ambassador³ threat[en]ed to join Russia against Turkey on 6 Nov. 1806. The British fleet passed the Straits, anchored off Istanbul, and delivered an ultimatum to Turkey, ordering her to

¹ Submitted to Byrnes under cover of a personal note dated July 4.

² Peace between France and the United Kingdom was restored by the Treaty of Amiens, signed March 27, 1802; text in Georg Friedrich von Martens, comp., *Recueil des principaux traités d'alliance, de paix, de trêve, de neutralité, de commerce, de limites, d'échange, etc., conclus par les puissances de l'Europe*, 2d edition (Göttingen, 1817-1835), vol. vii, p. 404. Peace between France and the Ottoman Empire was restored by the Treaty of Paris, signed June 25, 1802; text *ibid.*, p. 416, and in Gabriel Noradounghian, comp., *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'empire ottoman* (Paris, 1897-1903), vol. ii, p. 51. The substantive portions of the Treaty of Paris and of most of the agreements mentioned below are also printed in J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record* (Princeton, 1956).

³ Charles Arbuthnot.

dismiss the French Ambassador ⁴ within 24 hours and to make peace with Russia. The Porte, encouraged by the French and by popular indignation at the presence of the ships, resisted. The entire population of Constantinople ranged 1000 guns along both sides of the Bosphorus in one day and fired on the British fleet which retired, considerably damaged. Turkey concluded a peace with Russia 28 [16] May 1812 at Bucharest.⁵ The Black Sea was opened to Russian ships.

At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 a European guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish Empire was proposed. The Porte deemed the proposal a humiliating foreign intervention and refused.

In 1826 [George] Canning persuaded Nicholas I to call a conference in St. Petersburg. As a result of this conference England was empowered to offer Turkey a settlement of the Greek question based on the establishment of Greece as a vassal and tributary State. The Porte, though it resented new demands, was unable to resist and signed the Convention of Ackermann ⁶ accepting the Russian demands which were: confirmation of the Treaty of Bucharest; opening of the navigation of the Black Sea to Russian ships; 7 years' term of office for the hospodars of Walachia and Moldavia, as well as the consent of the Russian Ambassador in Constantinople before their dismissal.

Despite the settlements made by the Convention of Ackermann differences between Turkey and Greece still existed. The Treaty of London, signed July 6, 1827 ⁷ secured the autonomy of Greece under the suzerainty of the sultan without any breach of friendly relations with Turkey. By additional secret articles it was agreed that in the event of the Porte not accepted [*sic*] the offered mediation, consuls should be established in Greece and an armistice proposed to both belligerents and enforced by the Powers. Turkey refused to accept the terms and continued to fight. The Russian and French fleets joined the British fleet at Navarino and attacked and [d]estroyed the Turkish and Egyptian fleets. The terms of peace were finally signed at Adrianople, 14 Sept. 1829[.] The Treaty of Adrianople ⁸ between Turkey and Russia provided that the Danubian principalities were to become practically independent; that the districts of Anapa and Poti were to be ceded to Russia; and the Greek question was to be settled according to the terms of the London Protocol. But in order that Russia might not enjoy the prestige of having emancipated Greece unaided, the other Powers decided to give further concessions to Greece, and this was expanded into the Treaty of London of 7 May

⁴ General of Division Horace-François-Bastien Sébastiani.

⁵ Text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XIII, p. 908.

⁶ Text printed *ibid.*, p. 899.

⁷ Text printed *ibid.*, vol. XIV, p. 632.

⁸ Text of the provisions relating to the Straits in Howard, *The Problem of the Turkish Straits*, p. 15.

1832,⁹ by which Greece became an independent kingdom under Prince Otto of Bavaria.

Egypt, supported by France, invaded Syria in 1833. Turkey was unable to obtain British support since Palmerston refused in spite of the efforts of Stratford Canning. In desperation Turkey asked for Russian aid. The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was signed 8 July 1833.¹⁰ The Russians marched to the Bosphorus. Britain and France were suspicious of a Russian army at the gates of Constantinople. They forced the Egyptians to withdraw. The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi included clauses which permitted Russian warships to pass through the Straits, to land troops if necessary, and closed the Straits to warships of all other powers. Britain desired these clauses removed and called a conference in London. In order to break the entente between England and France, Russia signed the "*protocol des détroits*" of this conference on 13 July 1840 [1841]¹¹ by which the sultan was to close the Straits to warships of all the Powers and the Black Sea to Russian warships.

The Westernization of Turkey began seriously in 1840. The possibility of a strong and reformed Turkey made Russia uneasy. She had always considered herself the rightful heir to the declining Turkish State. In 1844 the Tsar went to London to propose the partition of Turkey. Britain, suspicious of Russian designs, refused to solve the Eastern Question by so drastic a measure.

The Turkish problems drew new attention in 1856 when Catholic and Orthodox monks quarrelled about the Holy Places in Palestine. This was settled partially, but the sultan refused Russian protection for Christians, so on 22 June 1853, Russia attacked the Danubian principalities, explaining by a circular that this was not with the purpose of attacking Turkey but in order to obtain material guarantees for the enforcement of the existing treaties. In August a conference was held in Vienna, but no settlement was reached. Turkey declared war on Russia in October.

The French and British fleets passed the Dardanelles, declaring war on Russia 27 March 1854. The threatened intervention of Austria forced Russia to accept terms which were ultimately embodied in the Treaty of Paris, 30 March 1856,¹² bringing to a close the Crimean War. Russia abandoned her pretensions to protect the Christians in Turkey, renounced her right of exclusive interference in the Danubian principalities, and the Black Sea was to be open to commercial ships of all

⁹ Text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xix, p. 33.

¹⁰ Text of the pertinent provisions in Howard, *The Problem of the Turkish Straits*, p. 16.

¹¹ Text of the pertinent provisions printed *ibid.*, p. 17. A similar provision had been included in the Convention of London of July 15, 1840; see *ibid.*, p. 16.

¹² Text of the provisions concerning the Black Sea and the Straits printed *ibid.*, pp. 17, 18.

countries and closed to all warships except a limited number of small warships belonging to Turkey and Russia.

Alexander II made use of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 to repudiate the provisions of the Paris Treaty forbidding her to construct naval arsenals and to keep a fleet in the Black Sea. An International Conference in London in 1871 recognized the right of Russia and Turkey to abrogate the restrictions of the Paris Treaty, but the passage of the Straits could not be used by warships.¹³

A conference of the delegates of the great Powers gathered in 1877 to discuss the Bosnian, Serbian and Bulgarian questions in Constantinople. Its final proposals were that an international commission of investigation should be formed and that a governor general, elected by the sultan, and approved by the Powers, should be appointed over the provinces in question. This proposition the Porte rejected and Russia declared war on 24 April 1877. The Turks were defeated and the Treaty of San Stefano was signed 5 [3] March 1878.¹⁴ It was somewhat modified by the Congress of Berlin the following July.¹⁵ The most important clause was the formal engagement of Turkey to introduce reforms in the provinces having Armenian minorities. The independence of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro was recognized.

Bismarck concluded his famous "re-insurance" treaty with Russia in 1884 [1887].¹⁶ This secured Russia against the opening of the Straits to Britain and permitted her, by a secret protocol, the military occupation of them in case of necessity. In 1890 a Russian proposal to prolong this treaty was rejected by Germany who was courting Britain. Thus Russia formed a *rapprochement* with France.

In 1894, Lord Rosebery, British Foreign Minister soon to become Prime Minister, told the Austrian Ambassador, Count Deym, that any attempt by Russia to change existing understandings regarding the Straits would be looked upon by Britain as affording a *casus belli*.

The agreement of Edward VII and Nicholas II at Reval in 1907 [1908] was widely rumored to be a new plan for the partition of Turkey. The following year the Russian and Austrian foreign ministers met at Buchlau, 15 Sept. 1908, and agreed on a partition program by which the Straits were to be in the Russian Zone and Bulgaria a Russian sphere of Influence. On 5 Oct. Austria annexed Hercegovina, and Bulgaria declared her complete independence. For Turkey's recognition of this independence, Russia cancelled 20 million pounds of Turkey's indemnity.

In 1915 Sir Edward Grey reversed Britain's traditional policy and concluded the Straits Agreements by which Russia was promised the

¹³ See Howard, *The Problem of the Turkish Straits*, p. 18.

¹⁴ Text of the pertinent provisions printed *ibid.*, p. 18.

¹⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 18, 19.

¹⁶ Signed at Berlin, June 18, 1887. Text in Heinrich Triepel, ed., *Nouveau recueil général de traités et autres actes relatifs aux rapports de droit international*, 3d series (Leipzig and Greifswald, 1908-1944), vol. x, p. 37.

opening of the Straits after the war.¹⁷ The Straits Convention of 24 July 1923¹⁸ imposed this settlement.

At the Lausanne Conference, at which this Convention was drawn up, Russia opposed the opening of the Straits, because of her weakened position. Britain advocated it to enable her warships to intervene in the civil war in Russia.

Turkey was allowed a fleet, a garrison in Constantinople, and the demilitarized zones on either side of the Straits were reduced. Freedom of navigation was guaranteed by the 3 Great Powers and Japan, and Turkey granted restricted right of passage for warships. While protesting, Russia became a party to this Convention on 4 August 1923.

In April 1936, Turkey requested permission to refortify the Straits. In July, the Montreux Conference granted this permission to Turkey.¹⁹

¹⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. 1, pp. 494–497. Cf. E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939* (London, 1946–), 1st series, vol. iv, pp. 635–638; Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, vol. ii, pp. 7–11.

¹⁸ Text of the substantive provisions in Howard, *The Problem of the Turkish Straits*, p. 21; full text in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxviii, p. 115.

¹⁹ Text of the substantive provisions of the Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936, in Howard, *The Problem of the Turkish Straits*, p. 25; full text in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii, p. 213.

No. 698

761.6711/7-545: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Under Secretary of State (Grew)*¹

SECRET

ANKARA, July 5, 1945—4 p. m.

PRIORITY

916. Personal for Under Secy Grew.

You may recall that when you presented to President Truman on April 25 a group of us who were going to the field, in ensuing conversation when the President asked me questions about Turkey I said in part the following: that a month previously Soviet Union had denounced treaty of friendship with Turkey and there were indications that a possibly serious situation might arise between the two countries. I said that from such info as I had gathered it would seem that if USSR desired modification of convention governing passage of Straits Turkey would take a cooperative and reasonable attitude. On other hand, if Soviet Union should make demands affecting Turkish independence then Turkey would resist. I said that it seemed to me that in view of fact eastern Europe had been lost to USSR, our interests in Middle East as well as our general interest

¹ Sent to the Secretary of State.

in world cooperation and security should lead us to support Turkey in resisting demands affecting independence, in the event such demands should be made.

The President replied that he agreed and thought that we should do this.

I hope that in view present menacing situation as regards Turkey, you will think it wise to bring all relevant aspects of this situation to attention of President before Big Three meeting.

WILSON

No. 699

761.677-545: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CASERTA, July 5, 1945—5 p. m.

2866. Air Vice Marshal Stevenson (head Brit deleg ACC Rumania) has reported that his information indicates Rumanian Army peacetime strength will be 15 or 16 infantry divisions and one armored div, arms and equipment to be supplied by Russia. Although terms of the Soviet Rumanian military treaty, recently discussed between Rașcanu and Stalin are probably now in preparatory stage above figures may be considered firm.

There are now four pontoon bridges across Danube at Calafat, Bechet (south of Craiova)[,] Calărăși and Harșova (northwest of Constanța). Scant info on troop movements south across Danube but certain that any movements will be made under cover of darkness including moderate truck movement over bridge at Harșova directed toward Constanța area.

Center of Constanța has been evacuated to provide quarters for Russian troops. Advance guard including high ranking officers has arrived there. Most municipal buildings and hotels have been commandeered. At Eforie, south of Constanța, hotels and buildings are being prepared for HQ staffs. Now almost certain that Tolbukhin's HQ will be Constanța.

Based on above info plus reports from Hungary, Bulgaria and AFHQ Stevenson commented that future set up may well be as follows; Tolbukhin's army will eventually be concentrated in Yugo and Bulgaria with HQ in Constanța; Malinovsky's army will be concentrated in zones delineated in Rumania with HQ in Bucharest; both Marshals likely to live in Bucharest.

Gen Oxley (head Brit deleg ACC Bulgaria) after learning of above info reported substance to Brit WarOff with comment that he (Oxley) is convinced there can be no other reason for concentration of Russian

troops in Rumania and Bulgaria other than browbeating the Turks into accepting Russian proposals for the Straits.

KIRK

No. 700

761.67/7-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 5, 1945—7 p. m.

6778. FonOff believes that reports of large increase of Soviet troops in Bulgaria is part of a war of nerves on Turkey, fitting in conveniently with recent infiltration of Russian Military into Rumania and Bulgaria because of necessity of feeding these men and resting them before their return home.

FonOff does not think there will be further Soviet diplomatic maneuvers against Turkey before Big Three meeting.

(Sent to Dept; rptd to Moscow as 2355; to Ankara as 65)

WINANT

No. 701

761.67/7-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, July 7, 1945—noon.

926. Secy General of FonOff ¹ asked me to call on him yesterday. He referred to info given me previously re second Molotov-Sarper conversation on June 18 in which a statement was reported as having been made by Molotov that he might wish to present point of view of Balkan States (my 844, June 22 ²).

Açikalin said that on receipt foregoing report Turk Govt cabled Sarper instructing not to discuss proposals which Soviet Union might put forward on behalf of Balkan States. A reply had been received from Sarper from which it appeared there had been a garble in his cable reporting June 18 conversation and there had in fact been no mention of Balkan States in conversation. Sarper made it clear that what Molotov had said was that if there should be any question of concluding a treaty of alliance with Turkey it would be necessary for Turk Govt to examine [apparent omission] as well as the demands which Molotov had presented "certain considerations" which Soviet Govt would wish to formulate.

¹ Cvat M. Açikalin.

² Document No. 686.

Açikalin said there was no info regarding nature of these "considerations" which Soviet Govt would in the case contemplated wish to present. It was possible they might relate to Balkan questions or they might not. Sent to Dept rptd to Moscow as 57. In any case he wished to clear up this point and to explain that it had been due to garbled telegram.

WILSON

No. 702

761.67/7-745

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Soviet-Turkish Relations

Participants: Turkish Ambassador, Mr. Hüseyin Rağip Baydur;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew

The Turkish Ambassador called on me this morning with his secretary, who acted as interpreter, and, after some preliminary talk concerning the success of the San Francisco Conference, the Ambassador said that the Turkish Foreign Minister ¹ wished him to express to me his great regret that, owing to the early sailing from Boston on a ship on which he had found accommodations, he had been unable to stop in Washington and this had been a great disappointment to him as he had looked forward to his visit here. I thanked the Ambassador for his message and said that I fully understood the reasons which had obliged his Foreign Minister to abandon his plans to stop in Washington.

The Ambassador then turned to the conversation which had taken place in Moscow some three weeks ago between Mr. Molotov and the Turkish Ambassador in which the former had stated the Soviet demand for (1) a rectification of the Turco-Soviet frontier, (2) a demand for bases on the Dardanelles, and (3) a bilateral modification of the Montreux Treaty. Subsequently Mr. Molotov had added that there might be also certain requirements from the Balkan states, which the Ambassador interpreted as some sort of a territorial demand from Bulgaria.

The Ambassador said that he had come to see me for the purpose of ascertaining the attitude of the American Government towards this situation.

¹ Hasan Saka.

I said to the Ambassador that this Government is very definitely concerned with any threat to the peace which might fall within the purview of the United Nations organization. For the present we understood that the conversations had been a friendly exchange of views and that no concrete threats had been made. The Ambassador asked me whether, if the Soviet Government should demand that we cede to the Soviet Union the cities of Boston and San Francisco, we would not consider such a demand as a threat, and he also asked whether we felt that such a demand could be a matter for negotiation. I replied definitely in the negative but I asked the Ambassador whether the Soviet Government had specified the nature of the frontier rectification which it desired and whether the demands were yet of such a concrete nature as to be regarded as open threats. The Ambassador replied that Mr. Molotov had stated that the Treaty of 1921 had been negotiated at a time when Soviet Russia was weak and he had added, "Now we are strong." The obvious implication was that Soviet Russia desired the return of the Vilayets of Kars and Ardahan.

The Ambassador then said he wished me to know—and he felt sure that in the light of my own friendship for and knowledge of the Turkish Republic I would know this myself—that Turkey would not cede one inch of territory and that if Soviet Russia should appropriate such Turkish territory Turkey would immediately fight. A situation would thus be created which was totally contrary to the spirit and letter of all that had been achieved at San Francisco.

The Ambassador then went on to say that the Turkish Government felt very strongly that strong representations by the United States in advance of possible trouble would have a powerful effect on the Soviet Government. He understood that I had told Lord Halifax that the American Government would support the proposed *démarche* of the British Government in Moscow but that later Ambassador Wilson at Ankara had informed the Turkish Foreign Office that the matter would be further studied and had implied that I had made no such statement.

I immediately told the Ambassador that Mr. Wilson was quite right; I had had no conversation on this subject with Lord Halifax, whom I had not seen officially since his return from San Francisco. (The Ambassador was clearly referring to my conversation with Mr. Balfour in which I had said that we would prefer to delay action on this matter until after the San Francisco Conference and that if action were to be taken there would presumably be plenty of time between the close of the San Francisco Conference and the meeting of the Big Three. Mr. Balfour, however, said that his Government hoped that we would at least support the British action with some

step of our own.² Mr. Balfour happened to call on me a few moments after my conversation with the Turkish Ambassador and definitely corroborated my understanding of what I had said to him. He said he had reported my position accurately to his Government and that no indication had been given of any commitment whatever on my part.)

I then said to the Ambassador that he must know very well himself that we have been following this situation with concern; that I hoped that the subject might be discussed at the coming meeting of heads of government and that, for that purpose, the President had been fully briefed on all the information in our possession. I personally believed that much more could be accomplished by a direct talk between the President and Marshal Stalin than could be accomplished by any formal representations made to Moscow. In any case, I thought that the matter could better be left without action on our part until we could learn whether it will have been discussed at the Berlin meeting, and the results. I said that this Government, as a friend both of Turkey and the Soviet Union, would naturally be glad to be of assistance in arriving at a peaceful solution of the problem. The Ambassador must understand that this was in no respect an offer of mediation but merely a statement of our general attitude in all such situations. The Ambassador said that he understood my position perfectly but he wished to repeat with all possible emphasis that Turkey would cede no territory and was prepared to fight if necessary.

My attitude in the conversation clearly indicated my sympathy with Turkey's position but no commitment of any kind was made or implied.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

² See document No. 683.

No. 703

761.6711/7-745

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Turco-Soviet relations

Participants: British Minister, Mr. John Balfour;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew

Mr. Balfour called on me this morning immediately after my talk with the Turkish Ambassador, recorded in a separate memorandum,¹

¹ Document No. 702.

and left with me a memorandum ² covering instructions to the British Ambassador at Moscow to make representations to the Soviet Government concerning the recent Turco-Soviet conversations in which Mr. Molotov had made certain demands of Turkey. Mr. Balfour understood that this subject would be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of heads of government but his own Government felt that the ground would be helpfully prepared for such talks by the preliminary *démarche* which Sir A. Clark Kerr had been instructed to make in Moscow. I said to Mr. Balfour that we would immediately give careful consideration to the British memorandum.

I then told Mr. Balfour of the reports, one of which had come to me from the Turkish Ambassador direct, that in a recent conversation with Lord Halifax I had assured him that the United States would support Great Britain in such representations to the Soviet Government, but I pointed out to Mr. Balfour that not only had I given no such assurances but that I had not even seen Lord Halifax officially since his return from San Francisco. The reference was no doubt to my conversation on this subject with Mr. Balfour himself.³ Mr. Balfour said that I was quite right and that in my talk with him I had given no such assurances and he had correctly reported our conversation to London to the effect that we thought it would be preferable to withhold action until the end of the San Francisco Conference and that if action were to be taken there would presumably be plenty of time between the close of the San Francisco Conference and the meeting of the Big Three. Mr. Balfour, however, said that his Government hoped that we would at least support the British action with some step of our own.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

² Document No. 704.

³ See document No. 683.

No. 704

761.6711/7-745

The British Embassy to the Department of State ¹

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

With reference to the State Department's memorandum of June 23rd ² concerning recent conversations between the Soviet and Turkish Governments, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have now instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Mos-

¹ This memorandum bears the following manuscript notation by Henderson: "No Reply in writing necessary. It was orally explained to Mr. Balfour why we preferred not to approach the Russians before the Big Three meeting. L. W. H[.]" The gist of the memorandum was included in telegram No. 11 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-1045).

² Document No. 688.

cow to approach the Soviet Government in general terms on the following lines. His Majesty's Government have decided in favour of such action only after most careful consideration of all the factors in the case, including the second conversation between the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow and M. Molotov.³ In particular His Majesty's Government think it is better that the Soviet Government should be informed of their views in advance of TERMINAL rather than to give the Soviet Government the impression that His Majesty's Government are indifferent and then to spring it on them for the first time at the Conference.

Sir A. Clark Kerr has accordingly been instructed to point out to the Soviet Government that, as they are aware, the Turkish Government have consulted His Majesty's Government about the recent Turco-Soviet conversations. His Majesty's Government have been very much surprised by the Soviet Government's territorial claims and demands for bases in the Straits, since these activities cannot be regarded as exclusively Turco-Soviet matters. The former falls to be considered in the light of the World Organisation, and the latter affects the multilateral Montreux Convention. Moreover, it was agreed at Yalta that the Soviet Government should consult the United States Government and His Majesty's Government before approaching the Turkish Government on matters affecting the Montreux Convention. Marshal Stalin also agreed to take no action affecting the independence and integrity of Turkey and to adopt a reassuring attitude to the Turkish Government. In connection with this last undertaking His Majesty's Government have also been very much surprised at the recent Soviet press and radio campaign against Turkey. They wish the Soviet Government to be aware of their views on these recent developments as they consider the whole question will have to be discussed at TERMINAL.

WASHINGTON, 7th July, 1945.

³ See document No. 686.

No. 705

767.68119/7-945

The British Minister (Balfour) to the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 9th July, 1945.

MY DEAR HENDERSON, In answer to your enquiry to-day, I send you the following telegraphic record which we received from London of what took place at a plenary session at Yalta on the 10th February.¹

¹ For the United States record of the proceedings of this meeting, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 897.

You will see that in the earlier part of the record there are one or two points which arrived here corrupt. The general tenour of Stalin's remarks is, however, clear enough.

Yours ever

JOHN BALFOUR

[Enclosure]

SECRET

TEXT OF A MESSAGE SENT BY FOREIGN OFFICE TO ANKARA
DATED 27TH FEBRUARY

At plenary session February 10th Stalin raised the question of the Japanese and the Montreux Convention. He claimed it was now out of date, referring to the fact that Japan plays a more prominent part under it than the U. S. S. R. and that it was closely connected with the League of Nations which was no longer a reality. Turkey could close the Straits not only in the event of war but if she considered the situation to be threatened. The Convention had been signed when Soviet relations with Great Britain were not perfect but this was now changed. Stalin was sure that there would be no objections on [garble] whatever. He did not wish to prejudge any future [garble] but he thought the Soviet interests should be taken into account without infringing the legitimate interests of Turkey. He suggested revision of the Montreux Convention should be discussed at the first meeting of the Foreign Secretaries who should then report to their governments, and this was agreed.

The Prime Minister said that when Stalin had raised the subject in Moscow in October last he had said that we viewed with sympathy the proposal to revise the Convention. We had asked the Soviet Government to give us a note of their proposals but they had not hitherto done so. He thought Stalin's proposed course of action was wise and we agreed that present position, under which one exit from the Black Sea could be closed, was not satisfactory. We had promised the Turkish Government to keep them informed if any such project was under consideration and I had therefore informed the Turkish Ambassador in London in very general terms of what had passed in Moscow. The Prime Minister thought however that consideration should be given to the desirability of accompanying any proposal for changes in the regime of the Straits to meet Russian needs and wishes by appropriate assurances to Turkey regarding maintenance of her independence and integrity. Stalin said that he had nothing to hide and readily agreed that such assurances should be given.

[No. 705]

No. 706

761.67/7-1245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 12, 1945—8 p. m.

7050. Turkish FonMin Saka called on Eden yesterday. (Sent Dept as 7050; repeated Ankara as 66; repeated Moscow as 247.) Today at FonOff we were shown a record of talk.

Saka, according to record characterized recent Sovie[t] approaches to Turks as "sinister". With reference to the June 7 conversation between Molotov and the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow Saka said that he believed that fourth but unspecified matter mentioned by Molotov was nothing less than a Soviet desire to bring Turkey economically and politically into the Russian orbit.

Saka was told that in judging recent Soviet moves one should not lose sight of the tactics usually resorted to by Soviets. For bargaining purposes requests were often expressed by them in extreme terms. Saka was also reminded that following June 7 talks between Molotov and Turkish Ambassador British Govt had entered a "caveat" at Moscow Gerroi [*FonOff?*].

Saka asked whether revision of Montreux Convention and related matters would be discussed at Big Three meeting. He was told that it was planned to discuss these matters. It could not be foreseen how these discussions would develop. It was felt, however that the question of revision of the Montreux Convention and the question of bases and territorial changes should be kept separately and be dealt with separately.

WINANT

No. 707

761.67/7-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 13, 1945—7 p. m.

7088. Turkish Foreign Minister Saka called on me yesterday with Turkish Ambassador.¹ After expressing satisfaction with results of San Francisco Conference and speaking in complimentary terms of Under Secretary Grew and Ambassador Wilson he said he desired to

¹ Rusen Esref Unaydin.

acquaint me with recent developments in Turco-Soviet relations. Following is summary of his remarks:

Despite assurances in respect of Turkey supposed to have been given by Stalin at Yalta recent developments had been such as to cause the Turks to entertain grave apprehensions regarding Soviet intentions. Turkey had been quite willing to admit that a revision of its treaty of friendship with Russia was in order and had asked the Russians what they had to suggest as a basis for a new treaty. No reply had been received until Molotov's return from San Francisco when to the surprise of Turks he had stipulated that as a preliminary to considering revised treaty Russia would expect (1) the cessation [cession] to Russia of the eastern Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan (2) Soviet bases on the Straits and (3) an understanding regarding the revision of the Montreux Convention covering navigation of the Straits. Certain suggestions had also been made indicating that a political reorientation in Turkey would be expected.

Saka said that the Turkish Govt could not discuss giving up part of its territory nor accept Russian demands for bases. Regarding latter Russians had said they could not be placed in position of leaving their defence to a weak country like Turkey. Reply of Turks was that it was precisely to meet such situations that a world security organization was being set up. Regarding revision of Montreux Convention Turkish position was that it was an international agreement and could only be changed by negotiation on an international basis. In speaking of Molotov's suggestion regarding Turkey's political reorientation Saka first described Molotov's approach as "vague" but in subsequent development of this point he said it was obvious that it was intended to bring Turkey into the sphere of immediate Soviet influence and that Molotov had actually used the position of Poland as an example of what was expected of Turkey. Becoming even more animated Saka concluded that what the Russians apparently had in mind was Turkey's virtual "annexation".

Turkish Ambassador entered conversation at this point and with Saka indicating approval said that matter resolved itself into a question of the political, economic and social integrity of Turkey. With its very existence thus at stake Turkey would have no recourse but to resist to the utmost of its ability.

That however was only one aspect of the matter because with Turkey's integrity lost the sphere of difficulty would widen still further and world peace would once again become in danger.

Such being the case Turkey looked to its ally Britain and to its friend the US to support her and was convinced that with such support the ominous character of the situation might be attenuated. Saka expressed the hope however that this matter would not be made a subject of discussion by the Big Three without affording Turkey an opportunity to be heard.

I thanked the Foreign Minister for his call.

WINANT

[No. 707]

No. 708

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹
[Extracts²]

SECRET

POTSDAM, July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, called this afternoon and discussed for two hours in a preliminary way a number of matters on the agenda of the Conference.³

12. *Turkey.*

I told Sir Alexander that we had liked his message to Clark Kerr regarding Turkey;⁴ that we had not sent a message of our own since we were not a signatory to the Montreux Convention and also because the Turks had not approached us. Sir Alexander assumes that Stalin in [*is?*] seeking freedom of passage of warships through the Straits in time of war and felt that the main Russian objection was to the right of the Turks to close the Straits under conditions of "threat of war." He asked whether the bases which the Soviet Government is expected to demand, should be placed under the International Organization.⁵

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

¹ Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature.

² For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 140, 218, 234, 258, 319, 351, 379, 404, 470, 519, 635, 645, and 678.

³ For a list of persons present at this meeting, see document No. 234, footnote 3.

⁴ See document No. 704.

⁵ i. e., the United Nations.

No. 709

767.68119/7-1545

*The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs
(Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)*

[BABELSBERG,] July 15, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

Montreux Convention

The British regard as reasonable the Russian demand for the right to send Russian warships through the Dardanelles in time of war as well as in peace.

The Turkish attitude on this point has always been that in time of war, Turkey must have the right to exclude all warships from the Dardanelles, in order to prevent Turkish waters from becoming the scene of hostilities and to prevent Turkey from becoming involved in the war. However, the Suez Canal is open to the passage of warships in time of war, and we permit belligerent warships to pass through the Panama Canal while the United States is neutral. Russian desire for free passage of her warships through the Dardanelles at all times is fully understandable, and it seems to me that the United States Delegation should express concurrence in this Russian desire. We might even agree to inform Turkey that we consider this Russian desire a reasonable one.

It would be more logical, however, to extend the privilege to all Black Sea riparian powers and not merely to Russia. This would have the advantage of avoiding the appearance of great power pressure on Turkey, and would make easier the inclusion of another provision which seems to me desirable. Provision should be made, in any revision of the Montreux Convention, that Turkey may be called on by the Security Council of the United Nations Organization to restrict the passage, in either direction, of the warships of a state branded as an aggressor.

In brief, I suggest concurrence in the British proposal¹ with the addition of two provisions: (1) that the right of passage of warships be extended to all Black Sea riparian powers, and (2) a provision be included to envisage action by Turkey under the direction of the Security Council.

Bases

The British position in this matter is of particular interest. The British consider not only that Russian bases are unnecessary, but add

¹ Not printed.

that, *from Britain's own strategic point of view*, the Russian demand must be resisted strongly. This is a return to Britain's traditional position regarding the Straits and is quite contrary to the British-Russian secret agreement of 1915.²

The British . . . [indicate] that if Russia persists in a demand for bases, Britain will insist that the question be discussed by the "Four Great Powers" or by the United Nations Organization. I am unable to understand the reason for suggesting a reference of the matter to "the Four Great Powers", which presumably includes China, although France may be intended as the fourth. (The British may count on a vote of 3 to 1 against Russia, in any Big Four decision on this point.) China has no particular interest in or concern with the matter and I see no point in including France. I would suggest our concurrence in the second British alternative (i. e. reference to the United Nations), particularly in view of the Turkish Foreign Minister's recent statement that if Russia persists in a demand for bases, Turkey will appeal to the United Nations anyway.

The British also wish to specify that the question of bases is not a matter for bilateral settlement between Russia and Turkey. It would be difficult for the United States to concur with this British position, in view of our bilateral negotiations for bases with Brazil, Ecuador, Portugal, etc. I think we will have to admit that if Russia and Turkey are able to reach an amicable agreement on this question, we will interpose no objection. I am confident that no such amicable agreement can be reached, but it would be awkward for us to attempt to prevent Russia from negotiating directly with Turkey on this subject.

We should insist however that the negotiations be conducted in a friendly manner without the use or threat of force, and we should attempt to obtain assurance from Russia that any bilateral negotiations with Turkey will be conducted in this manner, in my view. We might let the Russians know now, in all frankness, that we consider that Turkey would be justified, under the provisions of the Charter,³ in referring the matter to the United Nations and that the latter organization should take cognizance of the question in view of the important bearing of the Straits on international security.

GEO. V. ALLEN

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. I, pp. 494-497; Woodward and Butler, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, 1st series, vol. IV, pp. 635-638; Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, vol. II, pp. 7-11.

³ Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031.

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EDITOR'S NOTE.—In indexing persons the intention has been to include references to persons of significance for an understanding of the record. References to persons in the following categories have been omitted: historic personages; persons appearing only as recipients or as transmitting agents of documents or information; Secret Service agents; authors and journalists, unless mentioned in some other capacity; civilian clerical personnel; enlisted personnel of the armed services; and other persons having only a slight substantive connection with the record to whom only passing reference is made in the documents.

For identification of persons mentioned in this volume, see the List of Persons Mentioned, *ante*, pages xxv-xlix.

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