ETHICAL HORIZONS AT "HOME" FOR GERMAN-TURKISH RETURN MIGRANTS

By

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a study of ethics in motion for German-Turkish return migrants. I argue that migration and return prompt ethical reflection, ethical change, and ethical work. Drawing from 25 months of ethnographic fieldwork, I examine the ethical dilemmas migrants confront in their quest to demonstrate care for themselves and to (re)establish "home" in Turkey. Specifically, I analyze predicaments surrounding finances and care in families, debates about "order" with neighbors, struggles over Muslim self-education, and efforts to assert cosmopolitan "world" citizenship. I use this analysis to provide an in-depth portrait of migrants' attempts to negotiate belonging in families, neighborhoods, religious groups, and transnational migrant communities.

This thesis expands a burgeoning anthropology of ethics by integrating Aristotelian and Foucauldian frameworks for studying ethics with an attention to the significance of narratives and intersubjectivity (Ricoeur 1992). Employing a dual focus on discourses and interpersonal interactions, this research addresses concern that Foucauldian approaches over emphasize individualism and aesthetics. Further, by focusing on ethical change and multiple ethical paradigms, I enhance the anthropology of ethics by providing a picture of the dynamism and diversity of ethical ideals. This thesis also enriches studies of diasporic return that largely analyze belonging in terms of class, ethno-nationalism and binary evaluations of success or failure at "home." I contend that negotiations surrounding ethics are negotiations of belonging and that we cannot understand belonging without paying attention to ethical life. Specifying how migrants forge belonging through pragmatic ethical negotiations enables me to account for the richness of identification and belonging for return migrants. Finally, this dissertation reveals the contours of on-going debates about the European-ness and modernity of Turkey, Turks' integration into Germany, and Turkey's integration into Europe. As German-Turks—who are seen as Turkey's European citizens—craft new ways of being modern, Turkish, Muslim, and European, I show that they become avatars of Turkey's past challenges and potential future as a member of the European community. The moments when returnees are embraced or rejected in their communities become windows through which we can view the complex stakes involved in negotiating modernity and ethics at Europe's margins.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

ETHICAL HORIZONS AT "HOME" FOR GERMAN-TURKISH RETURN MIGRANTS

"Attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany have utterly failed," German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced recently. She explained that the so-called "multikulti" concept where people would "live side-by-side happily" did not work, and immigrants needed to do more to integrate, including learn German (*BBC News* 2010). Her comments came soon after those of Horst Seehofer, a prominent German political leader who spoke about immigrant integration and claimed, it is "obvious that immigrants from different cultures like Turkey and Arab countries, all in all, find [integration] harder" (*BBC News* 2010). Apparent in the highest levels of political administration, anxieties surrounding national identity and Islam are prompting fierce debates about immigrant integration, cultural diversity and Muslim citizenship in Europe.

These anxieties also permeate Turkish politics where leaders worry both about Turkey's acceptance in Europe and also about whether Turkish migrants are losing their religious and cultural identity. As Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently proclaimed, Turks in Germany "must learn German, but first they must learn good Turkish. No one has the right to deprive us of our culture and our identity" (Ley 2011). Commentators commonly express worries about return migrants' "cultural corruption" or "excessive traditionalism." The Turkish newspaper, *Hürriyet,* reports that "Just as German-Turks have integration problems in Germany, those who return to Turkey also have integration problems" (İnceoğlu 2007).

In this dissertation, I examine "return home" for German-Turks, who are at the center of controversies over Muslim integration in Europe and modernity and "European-ness" in Turkey. Through a nuanced ethnographic account, I provide a window onto the complex stakes involved in negotiating belonging, modernity, ethics, and the meaning of "Europe" at its margins. Turks first migrated to Germany as guest workers in the 1960s and now number almost 3 million. Recently, growing numbers of migrants—approximately 39,000 yearly—are returning to Turkey for such reasons as retirement, education, marriage, employment, and what they hope will be a better quality of life.

I found that returning home is extremely difficult for many German-Turks, because migration disrupts shared understandings of ethical aims between migrants and non-migrants. To establish belonging, migrants must negotiate ethical ideals and obligations, which are embroiled with concerns about Turkey's position in Europe and Muslim citizenship in Turkey and Germany. In the following chapters, I analyze the key ethical dilemmas that return migrants face as they move through time and geographic space. For example, I found that ideas about familial reciprocity change over time, resulting in conflicts between migrants and their relatives over the appropriate provision of finances and care. Interestingly, I found that many returnees claim to practice new ethical aims: they cultivate new kinds of "orderliness" for themselves and their neighborhoods, and they assert that their new approaches to religious self-education make them "better Muslims." Some migrants develop new self-conceptions of themselves as cosmopolitan citizens and express concerns about respect for citizens in Turkey and Germany.

Migrants draw on their experiences in both Europe and Turkey to innovate ways of being modern and educated and to redefine what it means to be good family members, neighbors, Muslims, and citizens. Against a backdrop of unease about the impact of living abroad on Turkish and Muslim identities, many of their relatives and neighbors perceive their ethical actions negatively, calling them 'German-ized' (*Almanlaşmış, Almancı*), 'anti-social' (*asosyal*), ‘crazy’ (*deli*), and ‘sinful’ (*günahkar*). Neither uniformly accepted nor rejected, returnees engage in ongoing struggles to establish a place at home. In exploring these ethical negotiations, I seek to contribute a more thorough account of ethical change and negotiation and of the complexities of identification and belonging that return migrants navigate. My research provides an innovative look at how individuals poised on the threshold of Europe and the Middle East are shaping current debates about national and transnational membership and Muslim religiosity. I make three broad arguments:

1. *Migration and return prompt ethical reflection, ethical change, and ethical work.*[1]

Like all of us, return migrants seek a good and ethical life. But, when migrants return home, they find they must convince their family members, friends, neighbors and co-citizens that this is the case. Border-crossing, confronting difference abroad, and distance in time and space from one’s “home” lead to new ideas about what constitutes ethical actions and ethical communities. In short, migration opens up new relationships to the self and new horizons of belonging within communities. Each chapter of this dissertation examines a unique realm in which returnees confront aims and norms for what constitutes correct conduct and then explores how migration has affected returnees’ ideas of what it means to be ethical. Chapter 4 examines evolving notions of reciprocity and duty and conflicts surrounding family relationships; Chapter 5 analyzes novel ideas about hospitality, neighborly “order,” and what constitutes a good community; Chapter 6 explores returnees’ new ideas about Muslim self-education and religious discussion; and Chapter 7 examines returnees’ cosmopolitan belonging in Istanbul and their ideas about justice and the ethics of citizenship.

My focus on ethics for return migrants will shed light on pressing theoretical concerns within the anthropology of ethics. I fuse recent anthropological attention to Aristotelian and Foucauldian frameworks for studying ethics (George 2010; Lambek 2010a; Laidlaw 2002; Mahmood 2005; Zigon 2008) with Paul Ricoeur's (1992) insights about the significance of narratives, intersubjectivity, and mutuality in the construction of ethics and subjectivity (cf. George 2010). In particular, I bring Aristotle's interest in virtues and the 'the good life' and Michel Foucault's interest in freedom together with Ricoeur's discussions of character, keeping one's word, solicitude and justice. My dual examination of discourses and interpersonal interactions speaks to concern that Foucauldian approaches over emphasize individualism and aesthetics (Fraser 1989; Hadot 1995: 211; Wolin 1986) and do not adequately account for the ways that interpersonal relationships shape ethical practice (Lambek 2010b: 25). My focus on change over time and on multiple ethical paradigms, contributes to the anthropology of ethics by highlighting the dynamism and diversity of ethical ideals. In this way, I address criticism that scholars have not sufficiently attended to conflicting moral registers and contradictory ethical aims (e.g. Osella and Osella 2009; Schielke 2009).

2. *Negotiations surrounding ethics are negotiations of belonging. We can't understand belonging—what I would call a sense of being at home—without paying attention to ethical life.*

At the heart of my dissertation is the premise that ethical aims are aims for belonging, as ethics and belonging each imply processes of negotiating borders between self and other(s). Thus, struggles over belonging are struggles over ethics and vice versa. My attention to ethics allows me to contribute to the study of diaspora and return migration (Al-Ali and Koser 2002; Brettell 2003: 49; Christou 2008; Chu 2006; Constable 1999; Dalakoglou 2010; Reynolds 2010;

Stefansson and Markowitz 2004) a more thorough account of the complexity of processes of identification and belonging. Existing studies on returnees typically focus on class, consumption, and display (Çağlar 1995; 2002; Salih 2002) or on ethno-national identifications (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Reynolds 2009). Further, researchers often characterize belonging in strictly positive or negative terms: return migrants gain prestige and acceptance at home through gift-giving, displaying new wealth, or utilizing social capital (Potter et al. 2005: 14; Stefansson 2004: 3); or they face tensions, ruptures, and discontinuities when establishing home (Huseby-Darvas 2004: 86; Tsuda 2003). The binary categorizations in these studies rarely specify what home and belonging actually mean to returnees or how belonging is produced and experienced in daily life. My research insists that home and belonging comprise more than consumption patterns, ethno-national identities and feelings of delight or dismay—they are ethical projects. Specifying how migrants forge belonging at home through pragmatic ethical negotiations takes my work beyond limited accounts of return migration as a celebratory or disappointing experience, and beyond an excessive focus on migrants' changed class or ethno-national identities. In other words, my research enhances the literature on migration and return migration by capturing an account of the richness of processes of identification and belonging.

3. *Debates about Turkey's modernity and European-ness have key ethical dimensions, and German-Turks are a focal point for Turkish citizens' aspirations and uncertainties concerning Turkey's belonging in Europe. In this milieu, ethical negotiations between return migrants and non-migrants become debates about modernity, Muslim identities, "Turkish-ness" and "European-ness."*

Throughout this dissertation, I show that for German-Turkish return migrants, home is embedded in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field, a "set of multiple, interlocking, networks of social relationships" that connect Germany and Turkey (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 1009). This social field is both a concrete set of economic, political and social relationships, but also a space of imaginations of Germany and Turkey, where citizens' hopes and anxieties about Turkey's modernity and belonging in Europe are produced, reproduced, and challenged. The social field is also an ethical field. In several chapters, I explore how ethical comportment and ethno-national identity are significant concerns in debates about Turkey's European-ness. Political actors and citizens alike mobilize stereotypes about "German", "European" and "Turkish" ethical ideals to support their points of view and to foster "cultural intimacy" (Herzfeld 2005)—to assert their identity and their belonging in local, national, and transnational communities. I further argue that German-Turks are representatives of historical and contemporary relationships between Turkey and Germany and therefore become a flash point for debating Turks' ethical aims, modernity and European-ness. I show that returnees themselves often attempt to display their idea of the modern "European Turk." By describing the daily dramas of return migrants, this dissertation reveals the contours of on-going debates about Turks' integration into Germany and Turkey's integration into Europe. The moments when returnees' ideas and actions are embraced or rejected by their community members become windows onto the complex stakes involved in negotiating modernity and ethics at Europe's border.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

This research draws from and contributes to the anthropology of ethics and to studies of return migration. In the following section, I review approaches to the study of ethics in anthropology and introduce my own approach. Drawing from a range of scholars to define ethics, my work on return migrants will provide crucial insights about processes of ethical change and debate. I also take up the nascent question of the relationship between migration and ethics and propose that my study of return migrants will contribute to theorizing how migration affects ethics. After this, I move on to a discussion of return migration and the concepts of "home" and "belonging," outlining my contributions to specifying the meaning of these concepts and to providing a more nuanced picture of return migration.

ANTHROPOLOGY OF ETHICS

"Returnees think: 'I am free. I can do what I want.' Some might call this immorality and excessive freedom… Return migrants take advantage of both German and Turkish freedoms."

-Deniz, a 30-year old non-migrant

When I discussed my research with Deniz, an engineer with two return migrant aunts, he told me that he has "negative ideas about return migrants." He thinks, "They build excessively unique houses just to be different." He believes that "with their lack of manners in public, they show that they do not care about their neighbors in Turkey." As Deniz's sentiments indicate, non-migrants are troubled by returnees' ethical comportment, feeling that they are "immoral" and somehow take advantage of their experiences in German and Turkish national contexts to justify acting inappropriately in Turkey. Given the prevalence of such ideas among non-migrants, I found that an analysis of ethics for returnees was essential for understanding their experiences when they return to Turkey.

Individual anthropologists have offered brilliant discussions of ethics and morality (Brandt 1954; Edel and Edel 1959; Evans-Pritchard 1937 [1991]; Howell et al. 1997; Malinowski 1926 [1962]). However, until recently, ethics remained an undeveloped field within anthropology (Laidlaw 2002; Robbins 2007; Zigon 2008; 2009). Laidlaw (2002) speculates that Durkheim-ian notions of society in which morality is everywhere and (paradoxically) nowhere may be to blame for the lack of a "sustained field of enquiry and debate" within anthropology (311). However, he and others note that anthropologists are becoming increasingly interested in morality and ethics for a number of reasons. In the first place, the ethics of anthropological research itself has received serious consideration over the last few decades, with scholars questioning the role of anthropologists abroad (as part of colonial, military or even village power relations) as well as the processes through which anthropological knowledge is obtained, presented, and shared (Fine 1993; Robben and Sluka 2007).

In a related trend, an increased interest in human rights and in activist or public anthropology has called for a consideration of the ethics of scholarship and the nature of cultural or moral relativism (see for example, www.publicanthropology.org; Scheper-Hughes 1995). Some scholars connect a growing interest in morality in anthropology to the decreasing importance of the culture concept (Zigon 2008), which has been criticized practically to death, and to a desire for fresh interpretive and methodological approaches (Howell 1997). Others suggest that, paradoxically, "the decentering of the subject" in literary studies, philosophy and political theory "has brought about a recentering of the ethical" (Garber et al 2000: ix).

The emerging field of anthropology of ethics encompasses broad research interests, including work on moral economies,[2] religiosity, language, biotechnology, globalization, and neo-liberalism.[3] My approach to the anthropology of ethics draws from what Jarrett Zigon (2009) refers to as Neo-Aristotelian-Foucauldian approaches to studying ethics. This approach is captured in Michael Lambek's (2010a) edited volume, *Ordinary Ethics: Anthropology, Language and Action* and Zigon's (2008) *Morality: An Anthropological Perspective*. Taking inspiration from Lambek et al., Zigon and a broad array of anthropological and philosophical work on ethics, I view ethics as "a modality of social action or being in the world" (Lambek 2010b: 10). I define ethics as*: ideas, actions and dispositions, which are concerned with ideals and obligations for oneself and others. Thus, what is ethical emerges through negotiations of relationships between self and other and determinations of what is right or wrong and good or bad in relationships in order to ensure 'the good life.'* Ethical negotiations are an "ordinary" part of daily life (Das 2010a; 2010b; Lambek 2010b), which both create and reflect experiences of home and belonging. Like Lambek et al., I am interested in linking ethics to hope: "ordinary ethics recognizes human finitude but also hope" (2010b: 4). Despite unsolvable ethical paradoxes and unspeakable suffering, the everyday is a site where ethical relationships and human perseverance and striving to be good—to be ethical—emerge (see also Das 2010a; 2010b). This dissertation is an effort towards capturing this emergence.

Yet, while ethics is an ordinary part of everyone's daily life, I argue that migration prompts ethical reflections and leads to an increased pressure to examine ethical questions. Drawing from Lambek et al. and others' (Howell 2009; Robbins 2007; Zigon 2008) interest in how "ordinary ethical sensibilities are coarsened or heightened with respect to broad social forces" (2010b: 3), my research addresses how migration, which I consider to be a "broad social force," transforms ethics. I argue that movement in time and geographical space affects ethical horizons and that the experience of return migration provides an ideal stage for observing ethical "work." By examining returnees' ethical projects and the challenges they face establishing belonging in Turkey, this research illuminates the necessities and conditions—the challenges and comforts—of ethical relationships.

I further conceptualize ethics by drawing from the work of Aristotle, Michel Foucault and Paul Ricoeur. Like most anthropologists, I am not a formally trained philosopher or classicist. Thus, I borrow Lambek's (2000) disclaimer that my discussions of these authors function "as vehicles for an argument about anthropology," rather than as considerations of the "full complexity of their work or the traditions they initiated" (310).

At its root, this dissertation draws from Aristotle's framework for ethics—concern with thriving, happiness, striving after virtues and the attainment of the good life (Faubion 2001; Lambek 2000; 2010). Aristotelian frameworks are useful because they emphasize practice and action as opposed to Kantian reason and norms and the habituation of virtues thought to constitute the 'good life' (Faubion 2001; Lambek 2010b: 7). Anthropologists have found this emphasis particularly useful for examining the cultivation of ethical religious dispositions. For example, several anthropologists have recently explored how individuals comport themselves to achieve adherence to particular Islamic religious codes in daily life (Hirschkind 2006, Mahmood 2005; Işik 2008). I find Aristotle's conception of ethics valuable because he is not interested in determining absolute virtues, but rather argues that a good life requires the use of practical wisdom (*phronesis*) in order to find a balance between competing virtues (Lambek 2010b: 23). While finding a balance between competing virtues is universally difficult, I found that a heightened sense of the need to negotiate competing virtues or ethical aims is at the crux of return migrants' experience. Thus, this research often focuses on negotiations of competing ethical aims. For example, in Chapter 5, I explore conflicting views about community ethics and the virtues of neighbors, while in Chapter 6, I examine conflicting views about Muslim practice.

Like many other anthropologists, I have found that Aristotle and Foucault dovetail nicely with each other, as each is concerned with projects aimed at attaining goodness or happiness (Faubion 2001; Lambek 2010a; Zigon 2008). According to James Faubion (2001), Foucault effects "an anthropological renovation of the Aristotelian enterprise" (85). What Foucault adds to Aristotle's theory is an emphasis on production and self-making. "Reflection in Aristotle's ethics is a matter of judgment, of judging what to do. In Foucault's apparatus, it might also be a matter of self-intervention, of autopoiesis, of the self's production of itself (Faubion 2011: 48). For Foucault, ethics emerges in spaces of freedom that allow for self-reflection. He writes, "What is ethics if not the practice of freedom…. Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection" (Foucault 1997: 284). With freedom, individuals can reflect on "the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself;" they can determine how to constitute themselves as "moral subject[s] of [their] own actions" (1997: 263). 'Technologies of the self' and 'care of the self' are important concepts in this regard, comprising ethical efforts that

> permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality (Foucault 1997: 225).[4]

This is an individual and aesthetic project for Foucault, as he says that "from the idea that the self is not given to us, there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art" (1997: 262). Ethics emerges through free reflection on the self and the achievement of “the release of oneself from oneself” (Faubion 2001: 87). This self-crafting through reflection could be considered the striving after virtues that Aristotle discusses.[5] My debt to Foucault’s (1997) emphasis on the importance of freedom for ethical reflection is clear in several chapters, where I focus on how migration and return produce a freedom to reflect on ethical aims and ethical relationships.

In contrast to Lambek et al. (2010a), who give equal weight to Aristotle and Foucault and use the terms ethics and morality interchangeably, Zigon emphasizes Foucault more strongly and argues that moments of moral breakdown prompt ethical reflection. While Zigon is appreciative of work that uses an Aristotelian approach, he questions whether informants conceive of or perform their moral lives in order to be virtuous in an Aristotelian sense at all times. Instead, Zigon suggests that, at particular moments, individuals experience a Foucauldian freedom to ethically reflect on their embodied moral dispositions, while at other times, these moral dispositions are unconscious. According to Zigon, individuals have a moral *habitus*, but at particular moments, ethics emerges as a reflective stance towards morality (2008: 17-18). Drawing strongly from Foucault, morality is thus unconscious, embodied dispositions, whereas ethics is conscious reflection on morality for him (2008: 119). My own approach is closer to that adopted by Lambek et al. than to that of Zigon. Rather than focusing on moments of moral breakdown like Zigon, I explore how ethical reflection ebbs and flows during daily interactions.

Though useful, Foucault’s work on ethics does not take interaction with others into account (Lambek 2010b: 25), emphasizing individualism and aesthetics rather than intersubjectivity (Fraser 1989; Hadot 1995: 211; Wolin 1986; cf. Longford 2001). Some scholars also argue that a Foucauldian perspective reduces selfhood to a hegemonic and sociolinguistic site of power, which prevents the examination of the intermingling of ethics and subjectivity (Wall et al 2002).[6] Ricoeur's work provides a useful corrective on all these fronts, and in several chapters, I show how Ricoeur's insights about ethics, subjectivity, and narrative are useful for an anthropology of ethics. Kenneth M. George (2010) undertakes a similar project arguing that "the study of ethics may skew toward the self and self-fashioning, or toward responsibility and the well-being of others, without producing opposed theoretical camps" (145). I likewise attempt to combine the Aristotelian-Foucauldian approach with Ricoeur's emphasis on narratives and his focus on the self-other relationships. In this way, I seek to enhance Aristotle and Foucault's focus on virtues and freedom.[7]

Rather than focusing on individuals' expression of ethics or morality in isolation, Ricoeur is concerned with how subjects explain or present themselves to others and the ethical implications for such accounts. He departs from most scholarly accounts of subjectivity and ethics in which subjects are first defined and then the terms of ethics are determined. Ricoeur argues that self and other are not points of comparison, but are implicated—there is equivalence between "the esteem of the *other as a oneself*, and the esteem of *oneself as another*" (1992: 194). Thus, subjectivity is determined through the establishment of ethical terms. Ricoeur views ethics as a project of "aiming at the "good life" with and for others, in just institutions" (1992: 172).

Unlike Aristotle and Foucault, Ricoeur separates ethics from morality: Ethics are narratives and actions related to what is "considered to be good," while morality has to do with what is "imposed as obligatory" (Ricoeur 1992: 170). Thus, ethics is linked to aims and ideals, while morality is linked to norms and obligations. While both are necessary for a good life, for Ricoeur, ethics is the more transcendent concept. Ethics are above norms—a telos, such that, in "undecidable matters of conscience," we can consult ethics and will find that solicitude for others is above any obligation to obey a moral norm (1992: 190). Throughout this dissertation, I follow Ricoeur and Lambek (2010b) in viewing ethics as the telos that encompasses moral practices.

In addition to casting ethics as intersubjective negotiations of self-other relationships, Ricoeur's theory of ethics emphasizes the problems of time and change for subjects and the role of narratives in mediating the accounts that subjects give. He illustrates the working of temporality and narrative with a discussion of "keeping one's word" and "character."[8] I discuss these concepts explicitly in Chapter 4, when I analyze returnees' narratives about the ethics of reciprocity. Ricoeur is also concerned with ethical aims for neighbors and the justice of institutions, which I explore in Chapters 5 and 7. He argues that neighborly relations should be governed by the principle of solicitude, which he defines as a "benevolent spontaneity, intimately related to self-esteem within the framework of the aim of the "good" life" (1992: 190). The concept of solicitude takes into account that each self must feel self-esteem and some measure of autonomy, but that selves are also indebted to others and intermingle with others.[9] In Chapter 5, I explore how returnees negotiate a solicitude for neighbors that reflects their own esteem of themselves as neighbors—as "Turks" and as "Europeans"—and their desire to refashion ethical communities in Turkey in terms of what they understand as "German order."

While Ricoeur emphasizes one-on-one intersubjective interactions and solicitude towards neighbors as a foundation of ethical life, he argues that just institutions are equally important for the attainment of the good life (1992: 180; 194-195). To discuss justice, Ricoeur borrows from Hannah Arendt the idea that power-in-common is potentially positive and beneficial rather than oppressive. The democratic project for Ricoeur involves an attempt to have the "horizontal bond of wanting to live together" prevail "over the irreducibly hierarchical bond of command and authority" (Dauenhauer 2002: 237). Importantly, for Ricoeur, it is not simply rules and laws that ensure justice, but the institutionalization of shared ethical aims. By institutionalization, he refers not only to conventional sociological institutions, but also to the broader structures of "living together as this belongs to a historical community—people, nation, region, and so forth—a structure irreducible to interpersonal relations" (1992: 194).

Just institutions are clearly important in large-scale societies, because we do not always engage in one-on-intersubjective encounters with people we know where the principle of solicitude towards neighbors can govern interactions. In the absence of solicitude, equality ensured by justice becomes vitally necessary. According to Ricoeur, justice "presents ethical features that are not contained in solicitude, essentially, a requirement of *equality*" (1992: 194). "Equality is to life in institutions what solicitude is to interpersonal relations" (1992: 202). Our intermingling with others and the necessity of giving an account of ourselves to others who may be strangers to us, paradoxically form the bases for justice. In Chapter 7, I reflect on Ricoeur's notions of justice and explore how a unique group of second generation returnees' negotiate belonging with one another around shared perceptions of the importance of equality, respect, and justice for citizens in Turkey and Germany.

George (2010) provides an apt model for working with Foucault's and Ricoeur's theories and my debt to his work is clear throughout this dissertation. He draws from Foucault's emphasis on freedom and self-cultivation and Ricoeur's insights about the intermingling of subjectivity and ethics to examine how an Indonesian artist, A.D. Pirous, self-fashions in concert with others. As George writes, “Pirous’s paintings and his stories about them” are

> points of human encounter. As he makes his way in his lifeworld, his works and ideas belong not just to him, but to others as well. They are the places where he is in expressive dialogue with predecessors and peers, with his nation, with ideas about art, and with God. These paintings and stories thus give us a glimpse of Pirous caring and accounting for himself in relation to others, showing us how making art is an ethical venture too (5).

George analyzes how art objects become spiritual notes and reflect belonging in Islamic and ethno-national spheres. He also demonstrates how critical events, such as national regime changes, travel abroad, and interactions with others prompt Pirous’s ethical reflection and transform his ethical aims. I engage in a similar project here, exploring the interplay between ethical aims, interactions and religious and ethno-national belonging for a group of migrants.

Having laid out my framework for conceptualizing ethics, I now discuss what my approach contributes to the anthropology of ethics: a focus on contradiction and change, an expansion of the neo-Aristotelian-Foucauldian approach, and a novel focus on how migration transforms ethical aims.

Contradiction and Ethical Change

By focusing on how migration transforms ethics, I demonstrate that ethics are a contradictory and changing field of experience. Many existing studies in the anthropology of ethics overemphasize coherence and fail to address competing moral registers in society (Osella and Osella 2009; Shielke 2009). For example, Shamuli Shielke (2009) criticizes Saba Mahmood’s (2005) well-respected work on Islamic practice in Egypt for its failure to examine competing religious, gender, community, and familial moral systems. He points out that in Egypt there are several key moral registers in addition to religion, including social justice, community, family obligations, good character, romance and love, and self-realization. Rather than coherence, there may be fragmentation in individuals’ understanding and practice of morality (2009: 30). There may even be amoral registers, including money, sex and desire, fun and excitement, and alcohol and drugs, with which individuals may engage simultaneously, even as they cultivate religious virtues (2009: 31). Taking my cue from this work (Osella and Osella 2009; Shielke 2009), I juxtapose consideration of religious ethics in Chapter 6 with considerations of different ethical horizons in other chapters. I further demonstrate that religious ethics are themselves contested and contradictory by focusing on migrants' and non-migrants' struggles over what constitutes ethical Muslim practice.

Anthropological work on ethics has largely focused on the cultivation of ethical virtues (e.g. Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005) or examined how fleeting cultural crises, large-scale societal upheaval, or personal breakdowns prompt ethical change (e.g. Howell 2009; Robbins 2007; Zigon 2008). By highlighting singular events of crisis as the primary conditions of ethical change, anthropologists depict ethics as relatively stable systems. Return migration provides an ideal case through which to examine ethics in motion. Though ethics are always fraught with contradictions and change, migration heightens migrants' appreciation of multiple ethical stances as it thrusts them into different lifeworlds and different modes of ethical comportment. In several chapters, I show how migration and return change ethics as they give return migrants new resources with which to negotiate belonging. For instance, in Chapter 6, I demonstrate that Muslim religious ethics are a contested field in Turkey, but return migrants draw not only on experience in Turkey, but also on experiences with German lifeworlds, their knowledge of the German public sphere and Christian practices to make claims about Muslim ethics. Similarly, in Chapter 7, migrants draw on knowledge of the German state and citizens' rights in Germany to criticize the Turkish state. By focusing on change over time and multiple ethical paradigms

(German, Turkish, familial, community, etc.) in several chapters, this research addresses criticism that scholars fail to focus sufficiently on conflicting moral registers, on the presence of contradictory ethical aims and on ethical change (e.g. Osella and Osella 2009; Schielke 2009).

In addition to exploring how returnees negotiate changing ethical ideals, I also examine how returnees deal with ethical change in their narratives during the course of interacting with others. In other words, I interrogate how they describe their sense of being ethical over time, despite changes wrought by migration. This is an explicit focus of Chapter 4, where I look at how returnees discuss memories of their time in Germany—their sacrifice and generosity—as a way of accounting for what they've done for their families and themselves. I show that their narratives about their word and character become strategies for portraying themselves as ethical subjects, which paradoxically reveal how their ideas about family ethics have changed over time.

Expanding upon the Aristotelian-Foucauldian Approach

Each chapter of this dissertation offers an empirical exploration of some aspect of the Aristotelian-Foucauldian approach, while highlighting the importance of Ricoeur and other's insights about ethics. For example, Chapter 4 examines how migration affects kinship relationships and produces a freedom for ethical reflection. It also examines how subjects maintain a sense of themselves as ethical over time, using Ricoeur's (1992) concepts of character and keeping one's word. Chapter 5 explores how returnees and non-migrants discuss "the good life" through an examination of their ideas about the roles of neighbors. Specifically, it examines the merits of Ricoeur's (1992) theory of solicitude and returnees' and neighbors' divergent views about neighborly comportment. Chapter 6 looks at the "technologies of self" that migrants cultivate to improve Muslim practice and how they mobilize these technologies as part of an effort of both self-cultivation and also of shaping their neighbors into better Muslims. Finally, Chapter 7 examines migrants' reflections on freedom and justice as related to their experiences as citizens of Germany, Turkey and "the world."

While emphasizing freedom and reflection, each chapter also shows how intersubjective interactions prompt ethical reflections along with solitary self-crafting and care. In some cases, my research provides an empirical exploration and confirmation of previous work, while, in other cases, it suggests ways that some theories must be reworked in light of my findings with migrants. In particular, in Chapter 5, I examine how Ricoeur's theory of solicitude does not account for the diversity of ideas about possible roles for neighbors that may arise in contexts of migration.

Migration and Ethics

This dissertation will significantly contribute to anthropological theorization of how migration affects ethics. Lambek and Zigon share a conviction that ethics can be studied in broadly diverse realms. For example, Lambek suggests that ethics can be studied in terms of:

> The indexical qualities of language; the entailments of speaking, speech acts, and ritual performances; the establishment and recognition of criteria as well as the angst, anomie, vertigo, and possibly, freedom incurred in their failure or absence; the means of attribution and acknowledgement—public and private, tacit and explicit—of intention, responsibility, and reasons for action; the exercise of practical judgment; the forms of sustained attention and labor subsumed under the concept or practice of "care;" the virtues embedded in or constitutive of any given set of cultural practices and local depictions of character; the socialization or cultivation of ethical persons; and the confrontation with paradox, chasm, guilt, rupture, otherness, violence, the intractable, destiny, and evil (2010b: 11-12).[10]

Zigon surveys anthropological engagement with ethics across several domains, including religion and law, sexuality, gender and health, illness and medicine, and language, discourse and narrative.[11] However, migration is not mentioned as a major realm of interest in either volume, despite the fact that existing research indicates that migration strongly affects ethics (cf.

Armbruster 2002; Carling 2008; Gowricharn 2004; Hage 2002; Olwig 1999; 2011). Additionally, numbers of migrants are growing—there are 30% more migrants today than there were in 2000 (214 million versus 150 million people)—so understanding migrants' experience is more important than ever.[12]

Most importantly, perhaps, the study of migration and ethics is essential, because it is clear that migrants are prompting a moral panic in many European countries, as well as the United States, where migration is seen as major social and political problem. Migrants' very presence is frequently perceived as disrupting to a country's ethno-national and ethical identity. For example, Muslim migrants in Germany are perceived as threatening to German ideals for women's rights, freedom and even democracy (Ewing 2003; 2008; Mandel 2008; Özyürek 2009). Return migrants may similarly prompt debates about national identity and ethics, and this is clearly the case for German-Turks. In Chapter 3, I explore in-depth how German-Turks come to symbolize diverse notions of German and Turkish ethics and ethno-national identity in Germany and Turkey. Following this, in Chapters 4-7, I trace how Turks' anxieties about Turkish-ness, European-ness and ethics affect German-Turks' negotiations of belonging. Given migrants' critical symbolic social position abroad and at "home," it is essential to examine how migration affects ethics for them and how they negotiate competing ethical aims at "home," as I do throughout this thesis.

Scholars are just beginning to study the relationship between migration and ethics, examining how migrants participate in moral economies and how migrants perceive ethical obligations towards their families and nations. For example, in their review of transnational migration studies, Peggy Levitt and B. Nadya Jaworsky (2007) note that there may be a transnational moral economy of kin in many contexts, which involves "putting family first" (137). Similarly, Ghassan Hage (2002) and Ruben Gowricharn (2004) use the concept of moral economy to explore ethical relationships between returnees and non-migrants. Hage (2002) notes that leaving can induce feelings of guilt for migrants within the "moral economy of social belonging" (201). Gowricharn (2004) claims that Surinamese migrants participate in a moral economy in which they are morally obligated to send money and goods to relatives in Suriname. The purpose of migrants' participation is not to achieve balanced relationships or to redistribute resources, but to achieve moral capital, that is, "an accepted obligation or commitment between people who consider themselves socially close to each other" (2004: 618). He calls this an "unexplored moral order in the transnational world" (2004: 619).

Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Eugene Fouron (2001) examine how obligations towards migrants' families are "a form of morality that links individuals not only to their families but also to the nation" (77). Similar to ideas of debt that I encountered with German-Turkish returnees, these scholars found that, for Haitians, "family ties express, re-create, legitimate and are sanctioned by a morality" that demands an exchange of wealth. Likewise, Jorgen Carling (2005) claims that migrants and non-migrants "are differently positioned within the moralities of transnationalism," and that, for example, "the experiences of leaving, being left, and (thinking about) returning appear to have inherent moral dimensions" (1457). Scholars also point to connections between home and ethics for migrants. Karen Fog Olwig (1999) found that for Caribbean migrants to Western countries, building homes in the Caribbean becomes a tangible reflection of children's filial piety and is key for the creation of respectability for their families (80-81). Through their homes, children establish belonging in the moral community of their parents and their society. Heidi Armbruster (2002) found that for Syrian Orthodox Christian returnees from Germany to Turkey, home is “a moral place, a reminder of undisputed religious and social relationships” (24). The morality of Turkey is idealized and compared against that of Germany, which stands for “the quest for money” (2002: 24). For her interlocutors, home was felt to be in Turkey, and they frequently compared the morality of this home with the morality of ‘away’—of Germany.[13]

Each of these scholars points to the importance of carefully studying interactions between migrants and non-migrants in the country of origin, as these relationships are morally charged and strongly connected to feelings of belonging. Building on this work, I make attention to interactions between return migrants and non-migrants in Turkey central to my analysis. What these scholars hint at, but do not examine directly, is how migrants’ ideas change over time—particularly, how their ideas about ethics are transformed by migration, which is one of the major interests of this research. Migration and return involve two confrontations with “others” that prompt ethical reflection: confrontations with “others” abroad and with “others” at home. A confrontation with others abroad is central to the experience of migration, provoking a “double consciousness” (Gilroy 1993; see also Hall 1996; Anderson 1998) or “plurality of vision” (Said 1984 [2001]: 172), which arises as migrants see two cultures—from the inside and the outside. I argue that this provokes a re-evaluation of ethical ideas and stances for migrants. I found, for example, that returnees develop new ideas about community ethics and new thoughts about “good” Muslim practices as a result of interacting with Germans and observing German society. The way in which this experience abroad affects migrants’ ethical horizons comes to light strongly when migrants return home.

When returning home, returnees' confrontation with otherness continues, as returnees face a paradoxical feeling of belonging and not belonging, of "you are one of us and, yet, you are NOT one of us." Returnees often realize for the first time how much migration has changed them—they are, in fact, more integrated and "at home" abroad than they thought, and they are now strangers "at home." This experience of multiple confrontations with otherness leads to self-questioning and ethical reflection, as returnees realize that what seems common sense to them marks them as strangers at home, and what seems common sense to those at home may now be strange to them. In this environment, conflict surrounding ethics with others at home arises, and returnees feel spurred towards beginning new ethical projects. I discuss their projects in several chapters. In particular, in Chapters 5 and 6, I analyze returnees' desires to reform Turkish communities—neighborly behavior in Chapter 5 and Muslim religious practice in Chapter 6.

Returnees' ethical reform projects are a key part of my overall examination of relationships between migration, ethics, and belonging. In the next sections, I outline how this dissertation will illuminate many of the predicaments of migration and return that interest scholars studying return migration. I specify how my approach to home and belonging will contribute to a more nuanced understanding of these concepts, as I seek to move beyond presentations of return as either concerned with celebration or disappointment or with conflicts surrounding class and ethno-national identity. My focus on ethics illuminates the stakes of belonging, which encompass roles within families and duties of neighbors and citizens.

RETURN MIGRATION

As we talked about the fine silver serving set and China plate and tea sets that Lale brought back from Germany, she told me, "I do not know why I brought back so much stuff!" She continued by quoting a well-known Turkish proverb, "It is not where you are born; it is where you are fed (filled).[14] *You always have your homeland, but this does not mean that you always live there. There can be many different places, Ankara, Germany or Turkey for you Susan. People think the place where you are born is important, but no. You do not have to stay where you are born."*



Figure 1. Lale's Cabinet filled with silver and china from Germany

Lale asserts that it is often necessary to leave a homeland to earn a living—just like the anthropologist who conducts research abroad. Her statements indicate that for her home is mobile and that when migrants return to Turkey, home is constituted both through the objects they bring back and their reflections on experiences abroad.

Recently, more and more scholars are becoming interested in return migration, as indicated by the publication of such volumes as Dennis Conway and Robert B. Potter's *Return*

Migration of the Next Generations: Transnational Migration and Development in the 21st Century (2009), Takeyuki Tsuda's *Diasporic Homecomings: Ethnic Return Migration in Comparative Perspective* (2009) Anders H. Stefansson and Fran Markowitz's *Homecomings* (2004), Lynellyn D. Long and Ellen Oxfeld's *Coming Home? Refugees, Migrants and Those Who Stayed Behind* (2004), Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser's *New Approaches to Migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home* (2002) and special journal issues dedicated to the subject, such as *The Conditions of Modern Return Migrants* in the International Journal of Multicultural Societies (2008). Other recent studies include examination of "long distance nationalism" for Haitian-Americans (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001), Bulgarian-Turks' return migration (Parla 2005; 2006; 2009), Mexican-Americans' involvement with hometown politics and development in Mexico (Fitzgerald 2004; Smith 1998), and New Economics of Labour Migration scholarship, which seeks to explain economic motivations for return migration (Constant and Massey 2002). Refugee repatriation and what has variously been called "ancestral return, ethnic return migration or post-colonial return" are two subsets within this literature (Stefansson 2004: 7).[15]

The concepts of home and belonging have emerged as critically important categories for scholars studying return migration because of their symbolic linkage to membership in families, communities and nations (cf. Al-Ali and Koser 2002; Brettell 2003: 49; Christou 2008; Chu 2006; Constable 1999; Dalakoglou 2010; Reynolds 2010; Stefansson and Markowitz 2004).[16] Yet, though studies of return migration highlight the importance of the concepts of home and belonging for migrants, they do not often specify how these concepts are given meaning in everyday life. These studies rarely interrogate how ideas about belonging at home change over time as relationships are established, cultivated, and occasionally severed. My attention to ethics contributes to illuminating the meaning of these concepts and, in particular, reveals why establishing home and finding belonging is often a struggle for returnees.

Scholars usually study home in terms of the concrete creation of home through consumption and display (Dalakoglou 2010; Salih 2002), in terms of the feelings of belonging and lack of belonging that may arise at home (Constable 1999), or in terms of how home is experienced as ethno-national identity (Reynolds 2009). Though highlighting the importance of home for returnees, the actual meaning of "being at home" remains vague. For example, in her study of British Caribbean returnees, Tracey Reynolds (2009) never defines home, but the concept seems to refer to "a collective identity based on notions of the Caribbean Diaspora." She focuses exclusively on connections to ethno-national belonging within a specific country or region. While almost all scholars of return migration and transnationalism mention the importance of belonging, few define what they mean by this term, often equating belonging with membership in ethno-national categories. For instance, in a recent article by Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller (2004), they suggest that we distinguish between "transnational ways of being" and "transnational ways of belonging." Ways of being refers to "the actual social relations and practices that individuals engage in, rather that to the identities associated with their actions." Ways of belonging refers to "practices that signal or enact an identity which demonstrates a conscious connection to a particular group" (2004: 1010). While much existing research has been directed towards understanding transnational ways of being, transnational ways of belonging remains a vague concept, referring to static identities and group memberships in the analysis of Levitt and Glick Schiller.

Belonging is often studied in terms of the politics of immigration policies and citizenship (e.g. Getrich 2008; Yuval-Davis et al 2006) or ethno-national identity (Antonsich 2010; Brettell 2006; Dragojlovic 2008; Warriner 2007). But, even studies concerned with how citizenship is experienced in daily life (e.g. Secor 2004) rarely describe the experience of belonging itself and how it emerges over time during everyday interactions. For example, Anastasia Christou (2008) is interested in how Greek and Greek-Danish migrants and return migrants forge "a sense of self and belonging," yet she never defines belonging. Throughout her article, however, it becomes clear that belonging is linked to identification with ethno-national or transnational spaces and places. By contrast, June de Bree et al. (2010) define belonging as "emotional attachment, feeling at home and feeling safe." But they similarly focus exclusively on ethno-national and transnational belonging: "We focus on belonging to a place or country. Transnational belonging then refers to feelings of being at home that cross the borders of nation-states (cf. Vertovec 1999)."

Defining Home and Belonging

I argue that home and belonging are more than consumption patterns, ethno-national identities and reflections on feelings—they are ethical projects and must be studied through attention to ethics. Drawing from Armbruster (2002) and Olwig's (1999) definitions of home, I define home as: *an affective and physical space of identification and belonging produced by interpersonal relationships that are grounded in shared understandings of ethical conduc*t. According to Armbruster, home is "a state of imagination and identification, a state of being and experience, and state of agency or the lack thereof" that is "mediated in interpersonal relationships" (2002: 32). While Armbruster stresses the personal and relational nature of home, Olwig specifies the character of interpersonal relationships at home: "home [is] associated with very specific and concrete interpersonal relationships of rights and obligations" and "feelings of belonging, which are grounded in notions of personal loyalty and responsibility" (1999). Without mentioning ethics explicitly, Olwig signals the significance of ethical aims for producing feelings of being at home, including rights, obligations, loyalty and responsibility.

Combining Armbruster's emphasis on identification and relationships with Olwig's emphasis on rights and obligations, this dissertation considers home as an ethical relationship. I argue that interpersonal relationships of identification and belonging are ethical relationships, that theorizing home thus requires attention to the ethical ideals and obligations inherent in relationships. My thesis is an extended examination of how German-Turks experience home and the ethical actions through which they establish their place at home. Like establishing home, finding belonging means negotiating ethical ideals and obligations in families, communities, and religious and social groups. I define belonging as: *an affective and practical experience of mutual recognition and acceptance as a group member that arises during and is revealed through intersubjective negotiations surrounding ethics*. Belonging is manifest in narratives and actions, which create and reflect feelings of comfortable-ness, closeness, safety and intimacy (Antonsich 2010 Lovell (ed.) 1998; Yuval-Davis et al. 2006). A feeling of belonging presumes shared ethical aims necessary for the attainment of a 'good life' and personal happiness. As Marco Antonsich (2010) writes, a feeling of belonging is what leads "an individual to lead a life that is meaningful, a life worth living." The absence of belongingness leads to "a sense of loneliness, isolation, alienation, and dis-placement" (649). Defining belonging as mutual recognition of membership leading to a 'meaningful life' links belonging to an ethical entailment. As Ricoeur (1992) would say, it presumes seeing the other as a oneself. And as Ricoeur eloquently points out, these are also the moments when ethical concern arises—when we see the other as a oneself, we are able to aim for 'the good life.'

The moments when group membership and belonging is withheld or refused are the moments when ethics breaks down—when the "other" is seen as an "other," not as a oneself (Ricoeur 1992). Belonging involves political struggle, and confrontations with powerful and unwelcoming individuals and groups may result in rejection. In these cases, belonging may be associated with a sense of longing and a desire for something, which can never fully be attained (Prins 2006; Probyn 1996). In some sense, belonging is always just out of reach: Belonging emerges during dynamic, contested processes, and thus, we cannot speak of belonging as a static or essentialized state of being. At the same time, returnees often identify moments of belonging and describe feeling belonging with particular groups. Thus, this thesis balances an analytical understanding of belonging as a dynamic, unstable process with attention to returnees' experiences in which belonging happens concretely at particular moments.

In the chapters that follow, I examine how striving for belonging at "home" brings migrants to seek inclusion in diverse communities. Establishing belonging requires that migrants mobilize a variety of objects, narratives, and practices at different times and in diverse ways in order to establish—or sometimes hinder—relationships of belonging. They refer to ethical ideals concerning what makes a person a good family member, neighbor, Muslim and citizen. Non-migrants demonstrate mutual recognition and acceptance by indicating their agreement and praise, and offering invitations, exchanges, and help. Of course, non-migrants do not always agree with the ideals migrants express or their actions, and many times returnees experience lack of belonging, rejection and feelings of exclusion. For example, in Chapter 4, I analyze how returnees discuss their generosity towards family as a way of asserting their belonging in their families. Yet, during intersubjective negotiations surrounding the ethics of reciprocity, returnees experience rejection from family members who believe that returnees are not aware of the family's needs and are individualistic and snobby. Some migrants claim to sever ties and, consequently, belonging with family, while others insist on on-going relationships of belonging. In Chapter 6, I show how discussions of correct Muslim practice facilitate inclusion with certain religious groups and exclusion from others, who may label returnees "European-ized" and "sinful." The chapter explores how discussions of ethics are projects of belonging in which recognition is sought from certain groups and not others.

Throughout the thesis, I follow Anders Stefansson's (2004) recommendation that return migrant homecomings be analyzed as "future oriented social projects," rather than nostalgic attempts to recapture a lost *past.* The latter is a prevalent perspective in studies of return migration (cf. Anteby-Yemeni 2004; Pattie 2004; Zetter 1999). While scholars have noted a past-oriented "return mythology" (*Rückkermythos*) for Turks in Germany (Wolbert 1995: 26), I found that return migrants are not aiming to recapture a lost earlier time period, but are engaged in hopeful projects of establishing belonging, some of which are successful or partially successful and some of which are not. In some cases, migrants aspire to reform others in their communities and to fashion what they consider to be a more desirable future for their co-citizens and country. In others, returnees are simply seeking acceptance and comfort in intimate relationships.

Having described my approach to conceptualizing home and belonging, in the next section, I expand on the contribution that this study makes to scholarship on migration and return. I argue that this research will enrich our understanding of the complexity of identity and belonging for migrants.

A More Holistic Portrayal of Return

Scholars typically describe relationships of belonging in either positive or negative terms that ultimately fail to capture the dynamic processes of belonging. They tend to emphasize that return migrants gain prestige and acceptance at home through gift-giving and displaying new wealth, or they focus on the tensions, ruptures, discontinuities and challenges inherent in establishing home. For example, Stefansson (2004) notes that returning home can be a way for migrants to begin new social projects (3). Glick Schiller and Fouron (2001) claim that returning is a "voyage of affirmation and renewal" (39). Potter (2005) believes, "return migrants are best viewed as people endowed with social capital, potential and realized" (14). By contrast, several scholars emphasize that return migration is fraught with "rupture, surprise, and perhaps disillusionment" and that "de-diasporization" can lead to rediasporization" (Stefansson 2004: 4; Tsuda 1999; 2003). Return is said to be characterized by "ambivalence" and "ambiguity" (Stefansson 2004: 8), as migrants must frequently confront the animosity of those left behind (Gmelch 1980: 143; Tsuda 2003). According to Eva V. Huseby-Darvas, "there is little, if any, mutual understanding, but considerable aggregate, yet unshared, resentment" between returning migrants and those who stayed at home (2004: 86). Constable discusses how returning Filipina migrants experience home in the Philippines as "ambivalent" and an often difficult space, as their selves are now "fractured" (1999: 215). Their experiences at home contrast with the freedom and new sense of self that they associate with their lives abroad (1999: 213; 221). In Gmelch's (1980) review of return migration literature, he discusses problems arising from the fact that returnees and their communities have changed. Returnees have many complaints about their former homes, they face economic difficulties, and women, in particular, may have to adjust to different gender roles.

In addition to portraying returning in either a positive or negative light, many scholars explicate returnees' experiences in terms of their new ethno-national identities and class positions. They equate the experience of return with negotiating belonging in ethnic, national or class groups, while giving other experiences of belonging less weight. Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Eugene Fouron's (2001) *Georges Woke up Laughing: Long Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home* is an example of an exclusive focus on ethno-nationalism, while Ayşe Çağlar's (1995; 2002) articles about German-Turkish return migrants is an example of an exclusive focus on class. Glick Schiller and Fouron (2001) claim that migrants are connected with those in their sending country through "long distance nationalism" that "binds together immigrants, their descendants, and those who have remained in their homeland into a single transborder citizenry" (2001: 20). Sentiments about wanting to improve their country and actions that migrants take at home, (such as voting, financial contributions, and helping relatives) are examples of long distance nationalism. Returning to Haiti for migrants is a way of seeking "spiritual and emotional renewal," a way to carve out a Haitian identity, which contrasts with their identity as poor and black in the United States (2001: 58-59).

Without questioning the validity of their analysis or the richness of the ethnography, I suggest that by privileging nationalism above other forms of affiliation within families, neighborhoods, and religious groups, Glick Schiller and Fouron neglect other forms of belonging for returnees. They note that tensions between the Haitian diaspora and Haitians in Haiti are "exacerbated by divisions of class, gender and generation" (2001: 15), but their focus on nationalism eclipses these other categories of membership and leaves unexplored how these and other social divisions produce conflict. Though they mention morality when discussing obligations towards family, this becomes secondary to their analysis of how family fits into the nation. If, instead, morality were the central object of analysis in this and other chapters, the links between family, nation and class and how these categories emerge during interactions between migrants and non-migrants would become clearer.

Rather than ethno-national identity, Çağlar (1995; 2002) explains German-Turkish returnees' difficulties after returning by reference to their class status and negative stigma directed against them. She argues that returnees' consumption practices are a means of finding belonging in Turkish middle classes and gaining symbolic capital in Turkey, unavailable to them in Germany. By purchasing particular goods—such as a glass-topped coffee table in her account—they "try to forge relations with the Turkish middle class" (2002: 303). However, she argues that they are overwhelmingly rejected by the middle classes for being "*nouveau riche*" and uncultured, attributes summed up in the negative ethno-national label "*Almancı*" (German-er or German-like), which is commonly applied to returnees. Çağlar's perspective is not incorrect—many German-Turks are searching for acceptance within middle classes in Turkey and negative labels can reflect rejection by these classes. However, by focusing on diverse ethical realms, I seek to broaden Çağlar's scope, showing how consumption practices and displays of wealth signal inclusion and exclusion in diverse groups, not only aspirations toward a middle-class. I argue that experiences in Germany and the lack of symbolic capital available to migrants there are not necessarily return migrants' primary motivators for their actions in Turkey.[17] Attaining prestige, respect, and power within their extended families, providing a good life for their children, or seeking to recreate German orderliness in Turkey after they return may be equally important for understanding return migrants' consumption practices.[18]

As in previous studies, I am concerned with the fact that returnees find both joy and difficulty, and acceptance and rejection among ethno-national and class groups as they navigate relationships at home. Yet, I am interested in belonging broadly: By focusing on ethics, I highlight key questions about relationships between self and other that are crucial for negotiating a place at home.[19] While ethno-national experiences of home and belonging are not to be discounted, I also view belonging in terms of desires to participate in a cosmopolitan modernity that need not be associated with a nation (Chu 2006: 398). Returnees seek to make themselves European-Turkish subjects, but also to be ethical family members, ethical neighbors, ethical Muslims, and cosmopolitans. This research provides a nuanced understanding of the meaning of home and belonging that moves beyond migrants' longing for ethno-national and class belonging posited by many researchers.

Having laid out my theoretical frameworks, the next section provides a brief summary of the chapters that follow.

DISSERTATION CHAPTERS

The following two chapters, Chapters 2 and 3, offer a framework for understanding the national and transnational contexts of German-Turkish return migration and the research described here. Chapter 2 focuses closely on the history of German-Turkish migration, on migrants' contemporary conditions in Germany, on German-Turkish return migration and on my research methods. Chapter 3 also provides a background for understanding this research and highlights the broader transnational context of relationships between Germany and Turkey, ethno-national identities and ethics. Chapters 4-7 each examine a distinct realm of ethics and returnees' negotiations of belonging—in families, neighborhoods, religious groups, and in national spheres and a return migrant group. These chapters have many overlaps, but they also have unique aims for exploring ethics and belonging: Chapter 4 begins with a focus on ethical conflict, exploring ethical changes and the narrative strategies that returnees mobilize during negotiations of belonging with family members. Chapters 5 and 6 examine returnees' self-cultivation as neighbors and religious practitioners and their efforts towards reforming their neighbors and religious communities, respectively. While Chapter 4 focuses heavily on returnees' responses to ethical conflict, Chapters 5 and 6 explore ethical conflicts between return migrants and non-migrants in order to examine how broader debates about Turkey's belonging in Europe affect returnees' projects of belonging. Finally, Chapter 7 examines how returnees establish a network of return migrants based around shared ethical concerns as Turkish, German and "world" citizens. Departing from the preceding chapters, which focus on negotiations between returnees and non-migrants, this chapter offers a unique focus on migrants' negotiations of belonging with one another.

Chapter 2: Research Parameters and Biographical Portraits of Major Narrators

In the next chapter, I provide detailed background on German Turkish migration, including a brief history of guest worker migration and information about German-Turks' lives in Germany today. I then discuss the phenomena of German-Turkish return migration and my research methods of participant observation, interviews, and Internet and media research. I end this chapter with brief biographical portraits of the return migrants who appear most commonly throughout the dissertation so that the reader has a point of reference for understanding the personal circumstances and identities of the major narrators.

Chapter 3: Ethical Horizons in the Germany-Turkey Transnational Social Field

In Chapter 3, I lay out an argument that I carry throughout the dissertation: There is a Germany-Turkey transnational social field, which provides a backdrop through which Turkish citizens understand German-Turkish lives and attitudes. I describe how the social field is made up of concrete economic, political and social networks that connect the two countries. I also explain that it is a space in which Turkish relationships with Germany and Europe are produced, displayed and challenged. I argue that Turkish and German relationships are geo-political and economic, but are also patently linked to stereotypes about “German” and “Turkish” ethics and ethno-national identities. Actors mobilize stereotypes as part of social performances that establish their local, national and transnational identities and belonging (Herzfeld 2005). German-Turks are prominent figures in the transnational social field, stigmatized as “backwards,” “uncultured” and paradoxically also excessively modern people who have lost their cultural and religious roots. As Turkey’s symbolic “European citizens,” German-Turks find themselves at the center of anxieties about Turkey's modernity and European-ness. In this environment, I argue that returnees’ ethical comportment comes under scrutiny, giving rise to and shaping the ethical negotiations that I discuss in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 4: Predicaments of Reciprocity and Horizons of Family Belonging

This chapter examines how return migrants negotiate ethical ideals for family members and explores their dilemmas surrounding material and non-material exchanges with family. Unlike other chapters, in this chapter, I focus exclusively on first generation migrant women, as it is they who bear the most significant burdens for reciprocal obligation and most often discussed these burdens with me. Taking my cue from Ricoeur, I examine their discussions of “keeping their word” and their “character.” As women face predicaments of reciprocity within their families, I show that they assert that they have kept their word—fulfilled their duty to family—and maintained their ‘good’ character (they discuss their obedience, suffering, sacrifice, and generosity, and “being hardworking”). These are strategies with which they insist that they have not changed and with which they reject accusations of escape from their families, individualism, and snobbishness. At the same time, it is clear that women have developed new self-conceptions as “women workers,” that their material conditions have improved after migration, and that their ideas about family relationships have changed and are continuing to change. I thus show that discussions of word and character allow returnees to insist on an unchanging ethical self and care for others in the midst of changing ideas about ethics and belonging. This chapter illustrates the utility of exploring word and character within narratives for an anthropology of ethics that is dominated by Foucauldian approaches and is just beginning to address ethical change over time.

Chapter 5: Order, Community and Horizons of Neighborliness

The focus of Chapter 5 is return migrants’ discussion of “German order” and how migration engenders new ways of imagining ethical aims for neighbors and community belonging. I show that migrants seek to demonstrate that they have successfully integrated into

Germany and have become “educated,” “cultured,” “European-Turks,” by discussing and cultivating orderly houses and orderly public spaces, and by following rules and laws. I examine the role of freedom in migrants’ projects of self-fashioning and also how Ricoeur’s theory of solicitude for neighbors sheds light on returnees’ aims and negotiations of belonging in neighborhoods, networks of migrants and a broader Turkish-European space. I show that by modeling neighborly “order,” returnees demonstrate their care for themselves, their communities and their country. In this chapter, my goal is to explore ethics as a site of contradiction and conflict (Osella and Osella 2009; Robbins 2007; Schielke 2009), and thus I examine at length how non-migrants receive migrants’ ideas. Ultimately, I show that debates about “order” become a platform for debating freedom, hospitality and care, “European individualism,” “Turkish sociality” and, ultimately, for debating Turkey’s modernity and European-ness.

Chapter 6: Religious Education and Muslim Horizons Of Belonging

In this chapter, I explore how returnees navigate a Turkish national-religious space polarized between Islamic and secular identifications, negative stereotypes about German-Turks’ religiosity in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field and their co-citizens’ anxieties about the effect of time in Europe on Muslim practice. Focusing on returnees who engage in projects of religious self-cultivation after returning to Turkey, I explore how migrants seek to fashion themselves, their children and their neighbors into “better Muslims” through technologies of education. As in other chapters, I highlight that migration and return foster freedom and reflection for migrants, and focus on returnees’ intersubjective negotiations of ethics and belonging. I found that time in Germany, which includes exposure to Christian religious education in schools and observations of Germans in daily life, along with confrontations with non-migrants in Turkey fosters a freedom for reflection on Muslim religious aims and practices for migrants. Returnees seek to craft themselves into ethical Muslims through what Foucault would call "technologies of the self," specifically, technologies of education, which include expanded reading practices and more open religious discussions. At the same time, I also explore how returnees' religious struggles are part of relational projects of fashioning the self and others into better Muslims, parents and neighbors. I show that with their ideas and actions, migrants forge belonging in the Islamist Gülen group, whose members seem to accept many of their ideas about self-education and religious discussion, but they face rejection from other neighbors who call them "Germanized" and "sinful." Exploring religious ethical dilemmas, this chapter, is a portrait of the complexities of negotiating Muslim and ethno-national belonging in Turkish and European spheres.

Chapter 7: Cosmopolitan, Turkish and German Horizons of Citizenship

This chapter examines citizenship for returnees in terms of shared ethical aims that are manifest in institutions. Unlike other chapters, in this chapter, I focus exclusively on upper-class attendees of the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* (Returner's Meeting), a unique group of second-generation return migrants living in Istanbul. While reflecting on Foucault's theories of freedom and Ricoeur's discussion of justice, I show that *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meeting attendees are flexible citizens with exceptional liberty to voyage across borders and establish belonging within and beyond nations. They consider themselves "world citizens" (*dünya vatandaşı*) and "Istanbul-ites" (*İstanbullu*).

But, they are not unconcerned with national citizenship. They come together to establish a network with other returnees because they are troubled by a lack of institutionalized justice for

Turkish citizens in both Turkey and Germany. While attendees express concerns about disrespect for individuals in schools and in daily life, Turkish state corruption, lack of rights for women, and the necessity of relying on informal networks based on hierarchy and authority in Turkey, they also complain about Turks' exclusion from German society, racism and a lack of opportunity even for highly educated Turks in Germany. They feel that citizens are not treated as equals in Turkish and German national spheres, and are only respected according to their position in a network or their religious, ethnic or national background. They join the meetings in the hopes of finding support as they negotiate Turkish and German landscapes of citizenship. This chapter therefore explores how mutual belonging as elite return migrants is negotiated out of feelings of lack of belonging in national spheres with citizenship regimes that returnees perceive as unethical.

Chapter 8: Conclusion: An Anthropology Of Hope?

I conclude the dissertation by reviewing my findings and exploring the broader implications of this research for theorizing ethical change, freedom, migration and return, home and belonging and Turkish-European relationships. I also consider the extent to which this research might contribute to an "Anthropology of Hope."

Before ending this chapter, I want to caution the reader that this dissertation is a partial portrait of ethics and belonging in motion. It depicts the points of friction where migration seems to be prompting reflection, self-fashioning, negotiations and transformations. But, it is *not* a complete picture of all German-Turkish ethical aims and returnees' innumerable ethical discussions and actions. To provide a complete picture of "ethics for German-Turks" would necessitate a much larger project than a single dissertation. I have chosen to examine specific ethical debates and spheres of belonging, based upon what I found to be among the most significant struggles for these returnees. I consider them to be significant because I observed them repeatedly while living with returnee families and because returnees often discussed them with me during interviews. But, ethical projects and projects of belonging are of course multi-faceted and encompass many more efforts than I am able to describe in the pages to come.

CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH PARAMETERS AND BIOGRAPHICAL PORTRAITS OF MAJOR NARRATORS

Who exactly are German-Turkish return migrants? In this chapter, I explain the parameters of the research that forms the basis for this dissertation. In the first section, I provide a brief background to German-Turkish migration, beginning with Turkish guest worker migration in the 1960s, and touching on the economic, social and legal conditions that German-Turks face today. Then, I sketch out the phenomenon of return migration, noting that the number of German-Turks returning to Turkey now exceeds the number of Turks migrating to Germany. After this description of German-Turkish migration and return, I describe my research methods—the sites where I conducted research, how I define "return migrant," and the methods I used to gather data about returnees. Finally, I provide short biographical sketches of the returnees whose voices appear most prominently throughout the following chapters. The goal of these portraits is to characterize returnees' migration trajectories and their familial, religious, and employment backgrounds in order to provide a reference point for readers.

GERMAN-TURKISH MIGRATION 1961-PRESENT

Germany initially invited Turks to Germany as *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) after World War II, during a period when the German government signed work recruitment treaties with foreign governments (Akgünduz 2008).[1] Germany signed an agreement with Turkey in 1961 and, throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the Turkish state sent a large contingent of Turkish workers to Germany in order to rebuild the German economy, an effort so successful it has been famously called "an economic miracle" (*Wirtschaftswunder*). The majority of recruited workers were unemployed poor laborers with little or no formal education past elementary school. Most return migrants of this generation told me they went to Germany to improve their own and their family's quality of life. They usually described their jobs in Germany as "difficult." For example, one returnee, Seda Gül, related how she felt on her first day on the job. As she entered the workroom, she was overwhelmed by the sight of a machine towering over her head all the way up to the ceiling. She thought, "How am I going to do this?" It was a sewing machine that made curtains. "For the first 2 weeks, my fingers bled every day, because I hurt them on the machine. Eventually, I got used to it, and after 3 or 4 months, I had no problems." Many workers lost their hearing or sight; others developed lung diseases, stomach problems and numerous other physical disabilities as a result of their jobs.

Around 1973, the German economy declined in the wake of the oil embargo, unemployment grew, and recruitment of foreign workers stopped. The German government initially hoped that migrants would return to Turkey after completing their work contracts and even provided financial incentives to returnees in the mid-1980s that led to the return of over 200,000 Turks (Wolbert 1996: 186). "Under the "*Rückkehrförderunsgesetz*" of 28 November 1983, a federal bill supporting return migration, migrants could apply until 30 July 1984 for special facilities for return" (Wolbert 1991: 182). Unemployed persons were given "10,000 marks to encourage a decision to return," and others could get back their pension and insurance deposits without the hassle of the normal 2-year waiting period (1991: 182). In order to take advantage of these incentives, migrants had to cancel residence and work permits. However, rather than return home (since conditions were worse in Turkey), many workers brought their families to join them in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. Today, German official figures show

1,629,480 Turkish citizens living in Germany.[2] But, other recent estimates indicate that there are as many as 2,812,000 Turks in Germany when people of Turkish descent who currently have German citizenship are included (Berlin-Institute 2009: 26).

Many scholars describe the social, economic, legal and political difficulties that German-Turks face in Germany today (Blaschke and Sabonovic 2004; Ewing 2000; 2008; Fetzer and Soper 2005; Mandel 1989; 2008). Racial and anti-Muslim discrimination is widespread, and Turks may even compare themselves to Jews, claiming, "we are the new Jews of Germany" (Mandel 2008: 129). Mandel identifies a German ambivalence that applies to both historical views of Jews and current views of Turks: they "are seen simultaneously as wrongful insiders" if they assimilate and become "too German," but they are also believed to be "unintegratable outsiders…. Thus nationalist populist rhetoric complains that, like Jews before them, Turks are potentially disloyal to Germany" (2008: 131). Religious instruction is a legally mandated part of public school instruction in Germany for (Lutheran) Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. But, when Muslims have sought to "attain an analogous privilege in public schools and equivalent support for their own schools and organizations… they have met with considerable resistance from various segments of the German government" (Ewing 2000: 37).

Turkish immigrants in Germany still live largely in "inner-city ghettos, often in slum dwellings," and they remain in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs (Stowasser 2002: 58-59). When the steel and coal industries of the Ruhr collapsed in the face of foreign competition after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, and the German government withdrew its subsidies to them, the result was mass firings for Turks. The current unemployment rate among foreigners is more than double the overall German rate of 7.8% (*The Economist* 2008). Few Turks attain middle class status in Germany (Helicke 2002: 181). Turkish children rarely attain the highest levels of education; just 14.8% of German children, but 45.4% of Turks end up in *Hauptschulen* (the lowest level of high school in Germany) (*The Economist* 2008).

It remains very difficult for Turkish immigrants in Germany to attain German citizenship, and dual citizenship is forbidden. Many scholars have referred to Germany as a country with a "*volk*-centered national identity," meaning that belonging in the German nation is dependent on having a certain quantity of German blood and knowledge of German customs and traditions. "Politicians of various parties…argue that a "commitment to Germany" or evidence of involvement in everyday German life are important prerequisites for membership in German society" (Klopp 2002: 45).[3] In the early 2000s, some signs indicated that Germany might be moving away from such ideas of citizenship. A new law passed in 1999 that went into effect on January 1st, 2000 reduced the required residency of new citizens to eight years and granted limited dual citizenship to foreign children born in Germany, under certain conditions (Klopp 2002: 50-51).[4] But, recently enacted legislation now mandates proven knowledge of German language and culture in order to attain citizenship. Beginning in 2006, those seeking citizenship must attend 600 hours of language training and 30 hours of instruction about German culture to "foster identification with German society and its basic values" (ICMPD 2005: 25-26 Joppke 2007: 12-14).[5] Many Germans wish that Turks would "assimilate" and stop speaking Turkish. German neighborhood residents frequently portray "the use of the Turkish language as a form of intentional opposition to German society" (Ehrkamp 2006: 1681).

In contrast to Germany, Turkey began allowing dual citizenship in the 1980s, and after 1996, began allowing people of Turkish descent to inherit property even if they did not possess

Turkish citizenship (İçduygu 2005; Klopp 2002: 43). Additionally, the Turkish state has devised a system whereby it recognizes its former citizens by giving them a “pink card” (formerly a “blue card”) (Çağlar 2004). The card resembles an identification card and can be picked up at Turkish consulates in Germany. It allows former Turkish citizens who are now German citizens to come and go as they please in Turkey and to maintain residency there, without the need for a visa or residence permit. However, Turks with German citizenship cannot vote in Turkey or complete military service and are denied certain other rights and privileges associated with Turkish citizenship.

Despite the difficulties that migrants face in Germany, much research points out that migrants are deeply engaged with German society and integrated within their local communities. They participate fully in German social, political, and economic life and actively maintain transnational ties to Turkey (Çağlar 2001; Ehrkamp 2005; 2006; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; 2003b; L. Soysal 2002; 2003).

GERMAN-TURKISH RETURN MIGRATION

A great deal of research has been conducted with German-Turks in Germany (e.g. Çağlar 2001; Ehrkamp 2005; 2006; Ewing 2000; 2003; 2006; 2008; Kaya 2002a; 2002b; Mandel 1989; 1996; 2008; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; 2003b; L. Soysal 2002; 2003; Y. Soysal 1994 and White 1997). Research with German-Turkish return migrants has been limited to studies of their views of healthcare systems (Razum et al. 2005), business investment (Dişbudak 2004), children’s school performance (Hesapçıoğlu 1991), class, consumption, and remittances (Çağlar 1995; 2002; 2006), social and political problems (Güven 1994), transnational ties (Gerdes et al. 2012) and readjustment in the 1980s (Wolbert 1991; 1995; 1996). Since the 1980s, there have been no long-term ethnographic studies of returnees and, to date, no studies of ethics for returnees. This research provides a holistic portrait of German-Turks' ethical dilemmas and their struggles to (re)establish home and belonging in Turkey after long years in Germany.

An estimated 38,889 Turks return home to Turkey each year, with more than a quarter of these, around 10,000, re-settling permanently in Turkey (Migrationsbericht 2008: 21). The number of Turks returning home is now greater than the number of Turks migrating to Germany (28,741 people in 2008).[6] These estimates of returnee numbers come from the German government. Unfortunately, the Turkish government does not keep statistics regarding how many return migrants enter Turkey after living in Germany (Akgünduz 2008: 84-85). While the German government numbers are probably quite accurate, it is important to note that these statistics do not include Turks who have become German citizens nor those who may be leaving Germany for countries other than Turkey (the latter is probably a low number). Nevertheless, it clearly demonstrates the extensive movement of people between Germany and Turkey. Though anecdotal, the legendary stories about the summer traffic at the *Kapıkule* gate in Edirne, which marks the northern border entrance to Turkey, also shows the extent of return migration to Turkey. The number of persons traveling by plane between Germany and Turkey has also risen from half a million in 1980 to 4.3 million in 2000. Of course, this figure also includes ethnic Germans, who increasingly visit Turkey, as it seems more familiar and accessible (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 35).

By returning to Turkey, migrants are fulfilling German leaders' historical expectations (and hopes) that German-Turks would be temporary "guests" in Germany. However, increasingly, the loss of these migrants is seen as a problem in Germany, with German media outlets reporting that the loss of Turkish workers coupled with the low birth-rate for ethnic Germans may soon prompt an economic crisis. As I show in the chapters that follow, migrants' return should not be considered the simplistic fulfillment of historical expectations that "guest workers" would return. Rather, migrants return to engage in a variety of projects aimed at creating a desired future for themselves, their communities and their country.

Unfortunately, as the Turkish government does not maintain statistics on returnees, we do not have data about the locations to which migrants return in Turkey. I found that many first generation returnees settle back into their natal villages and hometowns, including Istanbul. Some returnees divide their time among three locations: their natal villages, Istanbul, and luxurious retirement communities along the coast of Turkey. Second generation returnees seem to be divided equally between those who return to their parents' villages and those who pursue employment and other opportunities in Istanbul. Most returnees receive frequent visits from friends and relatives in Germany and often travel to Germany themselves.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

I conducted research over the course of 25 months in three sites in northwestern Turkey: İlçe (a pseudonym),[7] a town of about 15,000; Tekirdağ, a small city with a population of about 100,000; and Istanbul, the largest city in Turkey, estimated to have a population of between 12-16 million. Place, however, did not turn out to be a significant factor for delineating my research findings. While I do focus exclusively on Istanbul in one chapter (Chapter 7), largely, I did not observe significant differences in returnees' lifestyles and ethno-national identifications that could be attributed to their location. For instance, I observed no significant differences with regard to lifestyle among the original migrants (those who left Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s) who returned to Turkey as retirees to any of the three sites. Nor were there significant differences among second-generation housewives in İlçe, Tekirdağ or Istanbul, despite the fact that these places are significantly different from each other. On the other hand, I only met transnational businesspeople and working women in Istanbul. For the most part, the differences in the sites did not affect my findings enough to warrant individual treatment as sites throughout my dissertation (i.e. treating returnees to İlçe as a separate group from returnees to Istanbul). However, when I think that it may be relevant, I have noted in each chapter the geographic location of the people being described.

By "return migration," I refer not only to permanent long-term resettlement in Turkey, but also to a variety of types of returning, such as for summer vacation, business investment, marriage, retirement, and education. I also include as "returnees" second and third generations born and raised in Germany who travel to Turkey, as they often consider themselves to be "returning home," even though they may be living permanently in Turkey for the first time. I define a "German-Turk" as a person of Turkish heritage who has lived in Germany for at least 5 years. Thus, German-Turk is shorthand for an otherwise unwieldy sentence, but it should not be taken to mean that there is an essentialized identity that all migrants share. I prefer "German-Turk" to "Turkish-German," even though some feel it emphasizes German identity, because it is currently the term most commonly used by analysts (Mandel 2008: 181). I also prefer to use German-Turk rather than certain Turkish words, which some people find derogatory, such as "*Almanyalı*," "*Alamancı*," or "*Almancı*" (German-like, German-ish) (Mandel 2008: 57). The Turkish word for German is "*Alman*," and "*Almanyalı*," "*Alamancı*," or "*Almancı*" are each modifications of the word "*Alman*" that are only used to refer to German-Turks. "*Alamancı*" and

"*Almancı*" have particularly negative connotations as the "*cı*" ending in Turkish is usually used to indicate one's profession. (For example, someone who publishes or writes for a newspaper, which is called a *gazete,* is a *gazeteci*.) Thus, "*Alamancı*" and "*Almancı*" almost connote becoming a "professional German" and thus faking or putting-on German-ness.

In fact, some returnees embrace these words, while some reject them outright. "Being an *Almancı* is an advantage here in Turkey," Başak, a wealthy bank manager living in Istanbul, told me. "I use the difference. It is a positive difference. I am happy to say that I am an *Almancı*." By contrast, Timur, a wealthy retiree in İlçe, viewed the word *Almancı* negatively, telling me, "They call us *Almancı*. When I enter a market for shopping, they know I am an *Almancı*. And what they sell to people here for 5 liras, because you're an *Almancı,* they sell for 10 liras." His niece interjected with the well-known phrase "A foreigner in Germany, an *Almancı* in Turkey" (*Almanya'da yabancı, Türkiye'de Almancı*). "Yes," Timur complained, "even though there are many returnees in this village, there are still prejudices against us." As Başak and Timur's divergent feelings and experiences with the word "*Almancı*" demonstrate, returnees do not agree about what this word means and, even more, about the impact of being a German-Turk, and whether or not it is desirable or difficult to be German-Turkish. In several chapters, I point out how the word "*Almancı*" and similar words are used by both returnees and non-migrants. But, as these words are most often negative in meaning, I do not use them in this dissertation to refer to return migrants generally.

While conducting fieldwork, I usually told people that I was studying "Turks who returned to Turkey from Germany" (*Almanya'dan Türkiye'ye dönen Türkler*), since despite its popularity in English, "*Alman-Türk*" (the Turkish word for "German-Turk") is not a well-known term in Turkish. One woman told me that she thinks “German-Turk” refers to Turks who have German citizenship. Others told me that it just did not sound “right.” In fact, usually after I said that I wanted to talk to Turks who returned to Turkey from Germany, most people would say, “Oh, you want to talk to “*Almancı*s.”” Most of the migrants who I spoke with wanted to be accepted or known as “Turks,” though some also described themselves as “world citizens” or “cosmopolitans.” One woman said, “When I still went to Germany, I believe I was an ‘*Almanyalı*,’ but now that I do not go to Germany any more, I am a ‘Turk.’” I explore these issues of labeling, identification and belonging in greater depth throughout the dissertation.

To refer to German-Turks in Turkey at the time of my research, I also use the terms “migrant,” “returnee,” “return migrant” and “transnational migrant.” When I use the terms “returnee” and “return migrant,” however, I do not mean to imply a particular permanency of return, as do some researchers. For me, the term “return migrant” accurately describes the many returnees who travel back and forth between countries as transnational migrants. While they may also be transnational migrants, I think they can still be considered return migrants in Turkey. Ultimately, individuals often change their mind about moving between countries and the meanings of being at home and being transnational can change throughout their life times. As Karen Fog Olwig (2003) points out, “It is difficult to capture such changeability with terms such as “emigrant,” “immigrant” or “transmigrant,” that have movement between places, rather than movement through life as a frame of reference” (800). I use the term “return migrant” more often than the term “transnational migrant,” because I want to emphasize the importance of people’s experiences in the spaces of Turkey for the purposes of my research—in a sense, while under *my gaze,* they are return migrants, even if they might self-identify or be perceived by others as Turks, Turkish-Germans, *Almancı*s, transnational migrants, etc. Some children of guest worker migrants told me that, since they were born in Germany and came to Turkey for the first time as adults, they could not be considered “returnees.” At the same time, most emphasized a desire to find belonging and establish a home in Turkey, and their concerns seem more similar to those of other return migrants than to first generation labor migrants.

Though I do not bind my definition of German-Turk to guest worker migration in the 1960s and 1970s, for the most part, I sought returnees who were in some way connected to this migration stream. Thus, there are two main groups of return migrants in my study: 1. Turks who went to Germany as unskilled workers (and very few skilled workers) in the 1960s and 1970s and are now generally retirees. 2. The children of these workers. Though these divisions are logical and necessary for some types of analyses, Levent Soysal (2002) points out that divisions into generations may be guided by researcher’s ideologies about national identity and assimilation, rather than empirical evidence. Scholars have problematically emphasized generational differences in their desire to portray a progression of integration with the second or third generations finally assimilated and the first generation never truly belonging to their host county. Similarly, Peggy Levitt (2002) notes that second generations may be just as involved with their home-countries as first generations, and suggests that a person’s age or life stage when they confront questions of national belonging may be most relevant.

With this in mind, I largely make families, neighbors and friends the basic unit of my analysis—not generations or social classes. I focused on interactions among family members as much as among migrants of a particular classes or generation. That said, I do disaggregate generations, when it seems necessary. For example, in Chapter 4, I focus on the views of first generations, since predicaments surrounding money and family seem much more important for them than for second generations. In this chapter, age and life stage matter. In Chapter 7, I focus exclusively on the views of second generations, who are the primary attendees of *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meetings, a social and networking organization for German-Turks. However, in Chapters 5 and 6, I examine views of diverse first and second generations without separating them by generation or class, because such distinctions did not seem significant.

Though I found many shared characteristics among returnees, they displayed noteworthy differences with regard to class status and educational attainment: Most initial workers were poor when they left Turkey and returned as middle class or wealthy in comparison to their families. But, not all became rich in Germany. In Chapter 4, I discuss how returnees confront perceptions of their wealth and demands for money from family members. Some of the children of the original guest workers return as housewives or as workers in unskilled jobs in Turkey. Others attained a very high level of education in Germany and return as part of transnational business networks. The latter become an explicit focus in Chapter 7. In Chapters 5 and 6, I found no need to differentiate returnees with regard to class or education.

While conducting the research, I confronted a number of complexities related to time: Migrants whom I studied spent highly variable amounts of time in Germany (between 5 and 40 years) and returned to Turkey over a period of 33 years (between 1978 and 2011). Migrants who stayed less than 10 years in Germany perceived fewer changes in their ideas, while those who had stayed for 20 or 30 years tended to claim that they were profoundly changed by their experiences in Germany. The time period of a migrants' return and the time-elapsed since their return also influenced how migrants felt about their time in Germany and their lives since returning to Turkey. Returning seems to be a process which is strongly conditioned by the life stage of a migrant at the time of return—whether they return as a student, a wife or a husband, a parent, a worker or a retiree. Additionally, returning may be difficult at first, but over time, it can become less and less a determining factor in relationships and personal happiness. While my goal is not to depict a model of the process of returning, in several chapters, I refer to migrants' changing ideas about their time in Germany and Turkey, because it is relevant to returnees' negotiating ethics and belonging over time.

The overwhelming hospitality and helpfulness of people in Turkey meant that it was not difficult to find returnees. I initially made contacts with German-Turks through my Turkish friends and teachers at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and Boğaziçi University. From these contacts, I met additional migrants who were extended family members, neighbors and friends. In Istanbul, I also met returnees at a Return Migrant's Group (the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch*), the Goethe Institute, and a German-Turkish telemarketing center. Sometimes I discovered contacts by just talking to people in the course of my daily life, such as the proprietor of my local pirated DVD store and several taxi drivers. I was frequently surprised by how many people seemed to have a relative or neighbor who could be considered a German-Turk. It seemed that the majority of people I asked knew someone either currently or formerly living in Germany. This belies that fact that migration numbers for Turks in Germany are low when compared to the total population of Turkey. (The population of Turkey is approximately 74 million and there are less than 3 million Turks in Germany).

To understand returnees' experiences, I lived with 4 families for weeks or months at a time, and made observations of daily conversations, activities, and use of household objects when relevant. I attended weddings, circumcision ceremonies, a funeral, *gün*s (visiting days), *sohbet*s (religious discussions), *kermes* (yard sales to benefit the poor), political party meetings, mosque services, Return Migrant's Meetings, and was able to spend the Ramadan and Kurban religious holidays and Republican Day (a national holiday) with German-Turkish families. I also accompanied people on shopping trips, to workplaces, and on neighborhood and family visits. Living with families and attending these events yielded the most revealing data regarding interactions surrounding ethics.

I also conducted in-depth, formal interviews with 57 German-Turks and 6 interviews with friends and relatives of migrants.[8] I conducted 10 informal interviews in Tekirdağ, 20 in İlçe and 40 in Istanbul. All of my interviewees self-identified as ethnically Turkish (not Kurdish) and as having a Muslim background. I interviewed several *Alevi*s (members of a minority Muslim community), but my research focuses chiefly on *Sunni* Muslim return migrants, who are the largest group of returnees. I was able to formally interview slightly more women than men—I interviewed 33 women and 24 men—but, for the most part, I deal with men and women's experiences and ideas simultaneously in the following chapters. Chapter 4, where I focus on women exclusively, is the exception. Given that I was a foreigner, I was able to get access to men as interviewees without straining the bounds of what would normally be appropriate for interactions between men and women, however, it is safe to say that I formed more and closer relationships with returnee women than men. As a fluent speaker of German and Turkish, I allowed interviewees to choose the language of our interviews. Ultimately, I conducted 90% of the interviews and conversations in Turkish, but some interviewees mixed in a bit of German, and others used our interviews or time together as an opportunity for them to practice their English. Initial interviews were conducted either in people's homes or in a public location of their choosing (often a café). Usually after an initial interview with a migrant, it was easier to expand my participation in their lives.

Despite varying degrees of curiosity, admiration or scorn for the United States and occasional concern or pity for me as an unmarried woman in my 30s, I found people to be fairly comfortable talking with me. In fact, I was often overwhelmed by (and grateful for) the speed with which returnees accepted me into their families or social groups. After just 15 minutes of meeting someone, I was usually told that I could come back and visit them at any time. In addition to returnees' desire to help me with my research, they also sought my friendship, financial support, the promise of hospitality in America in the future, and help with their English, with getting a job, with household chores, and with babysitting. I frequently offered these things quite willingly, and I think that I gained much more from them than I gave, sometimes more than they even knew. To protect the privacy of my research participants, I have elected to use pseudonyms for all returnees, to change non-essential identifying personal details, and to not identify the name of some research locations.

While I prepared questions to elicit information from returnees' about their experiences in Germany and Turkey, interviews were open-ended. Discussions of home and belonging arose both during and outside of interviews as part of descriptions of interactions with Germans, Turkish neighbors, state institutions, and many other topics. While the Turkish word for home is *ev*, home is also captured by words with emotional qualities such as homeland (*memleket*), which has strong associations with the town or region of one's birth, and motherland (*vatan*), which is associated with ethno-national sentiments of belonging as 'Turkish.' However, I do not limit home to ethno-national identifications. Home may also be indicated by the use of adjectives referring to where one feels comfortable (*rahat*), at peace (*huzurlu*), or happy (*mutlu*). When returnees talk about their relationships of belonging, they express feelings of acceptance—comfort (*rahat*), closeness and trust (*samimiyet*) and understanding (*anlaşmak*).

While I could ask returnees directly about details of their migration experience, my exploration of ethics for returnees was often indirect. Most Turks do not know the precise meaning of the direct translation of ethics (*etik*) in Turkish. This word is derived from English and seems to connote the Western philosophical tradition and the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and others—authors that only the most educated Turks would have studied in-depth. In daily life, the word for morality, *ahlak,* comes closer to describing morality in the same sense as we use it in English. However, this meaning is also different in Turkish, where it typically refers to religious or gender matters. A moral person behaves appropriately for a pious Muslim and for their gender. In some cases, *ahlak* can also refer to a broader sense of morality having to do with family values or not lying, or stealing or doing drugs, but, in most cases, this word is used in conversations concerning religion and gender.

While returnees only sometimes use the Turkish word *ahlak*, they do talk about "the right and good" using concepts such as manners (*terbiyeli*), honor (*şeref, namus*) discipline (*disiplin*), order (*düzen*; *düzgün*), rules (*kural*), respect (*saygı*), rights (*haklar*), honesty (*dürüstlük*), sharing (*paylaşmak*), helpful (*yardım sever*), and friendly (*canı yakın, dostça*), among others. They discuss "the wrong and bad" using concepts such as shame (*ayıp, utanma*), anti-social (*asosyal*), stingy (*cimri*), like a man (applied to a woman) (*erkek gibisin*), know-it-all (*çok bilmiş*, *hocalığı tuttu*), corrupt (*dejenere*), snobby (*ukala*), show-off (*hava yapıyor*, *hava atıyor*), two-faced (*iki *yüzlü*), lying (*yalancı*), and gossipy (*dedikoducu*). They also discuss virtues, such as quietness, not littering and obedience, among others. Several words having to do with comportment and knowledge also have strong ethical implications, including cultured (*görgülü*) and uncultured (*görgüsüz; Almancı*), educated (*eğitimli, kendini yetiştirmiş*), modern (*modern*), backwards (*geri kalmış*), conservative (*tutucu, muhafazakar*), and insane (*deli, siniri bozuk*). Additionally, certain words having to do with cultural or ethnic behaviors often have ethical implications. Some examples include: Germanized (*Almancı, Almanyalı, Almanlaşmış*), Europeanized (*Avrupalı; Avrupalılaşmış*), between two cultures (*arada kalmış*), loss of Turkish-ness (*Türklügünü kaybetmek*), and loss of children (*çocuklarını kaybetmek*),

Actions also have ethical meanings, and I was able to observe these by spending time with returnees. For example, actions such as greeting, calling, inviting someone to one's house or to a group's meeting, not littering, being quiet, praising, hugging, helping with childcare or housework, and exchanging food, gifts, money, information, and emotional support can all be ethical actions. As I discuss in Chapter 5, migrants claim that by such actions as not littering or not being noisy they are ethical neighbors, while non-migrants criticize returnees for their refusal share food with their neighbors. They claim that returnees' actions are individualistic and anti-social. Unethical actions can include not greeting, snubbing, ignoring, complaining and gossiping about a person, not inviting, not helping and not exchanging food, gifts, money, information, and emotional support. In Chapter 6, I discuss how returnees' views about self-education may lead to inclusion—invitations to visits and friendship—or exclusion—in the form of gossip and negative labeling, such as being accused of having become 'Europeanized.' I examine ethical negotiations and belonging for German-Turks' by exploring the moments when these words and actions arise. Naturally, my focus leans towards examinations of ethical ideas, which reflect returnees' migration and return experiences. While I also discuss ways that German-Turks' ethical ideas have not changed (for instance, their discussions of their aims as family members and the worth of "Turkish hospitality"), as I note above, it is beyond the scope of a dissertation to discuss the entirety of German-Turks' ethical aims.

In addition to observations and interviews with returnees, I also watched film and television programs and conducted research on the Internet to understand more about returnees' lives and how non-migrants perceive them. I followed news stories concerning German-Turks, return migrants, and Turkey's relationships with Germany and Europe on the *Hürriyet, Radikal, Zaman, Milliyet* and *NTVMSNBC* websites. These are media sources, which represent a spectrum of political views. Through these varied activities, as well as through talking with non-migrants, I discovered that returnees' experiences are conditioned by what I call the Germany-Turkey transnational social field and which I describe in Chapter 3.

BIOGRAPHICAL PORTRAITS OF MAJOR NARRATORS

In this section, I provide brief biographical portraits of 19 major narrators in this dissertation, including information about their migration trajectory, education, employment, religiosity and family life. These descriptions are meant to provide a point of reference for readers wanting more information about the people who appear in later chapters. They are of necessity partial accounts, including essentializations of complex identities and affiliations. All names are pseudonyms, and I have also modified or omitted information if I thought it would compromise a person's confidentiality.

Ali Sezgin.

Ali was born in 1953 in the small town of İlçe. After completing high school, he began working at a nearby mine. He travelled to Berlin with his wife Derya in 1971, and began working in an appliance factory. The couple sent their children to Turkey, so that Derya could work. After 6 years as a factory worker, Ali worked in road construction for several years until finally taking a job in a plastic factory where he continued to work for 27 years. As a consequence of his jobs, Ali lost several toes and developed serious stomach problems. He now collects a comfortable disability and retirement salary from Germany, which enabled him to retire in 2006. He and Derya returned semi-permanently to Turkey in 2007, but they still make frequent trips to Germany. Like Derya, he is a strong supporter of the ruling AK Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,* a center-right or Islamic party). He considers himself very religious; he attends mosque services regularly and was involved in helping to organize services at a mosque in Germany. He also prays five times daily and fasts during Ramadan.

Berk Akın.

Berk travelled to Germany in the 1970s at age 22 in order to study. He married a Turkish woman in Germany and had two children. He remained in Germany for more than 30 years, working in a variety of white-collar jobs, including one in the insurance industry. He eventually got German citizenship and says that he "does not see Germany as a foreign country." He returned to Turkey to manage the German and EU-funded *Ön Uyum Projesi* (Pre-Integration Project) in 2009 and is living in a nice apartment on the outskirts of Istanbul. He plans to return to Germany to be with his wife and children in the near future. In Germany, he supports the Green party, but he is cynical about leftist parties in Turkey. He believes that they "only defend secularism, but do not support workers' rights." Berk considers himself to be a "*laik*" or "secular Muslim" and an *Alevi* (*Alevi*s are a minority Muslim group in Turkey).

Berrin Kurt.

Berrin was born in a small village in Northwestern Turkey in 1942. She migrated to Istanbul in 1961 and then to a small village in Germany with her husband in 1970. She began working in a factory two years later. Like many migrants, she and her husband originally planned to stay only a short time. But, they eventually ended up living in Germany for 39 years. They bought houses in Germany and Turkey and got German citizenship so as to avoid waiting in lines at the Turkish consulate. Berrin proudly uses a "pink card" in Turkey. When her husband got cancer in the 1990s the couple considered returning to Turkey, but decided that medical care was superior in Germany. In 1995, Berrin stopped working and began collecting unemployment. She officially retired after turning 62. Now, she comes to Turkey for 6 months out of the year to visit family, including her two sons who were never taken to Germany with her. Berrin has become increasingly religious over time. When she first went to Germany, she did not wear a headscarf and was not religious, but she now considers herself religious, wears a headscarf, fasts during Ramadan and prays five times daily. She completed the *hajj* with her husband before he died, and she teaches young girls in Germany how to read the Qur'an. She is a strong supporter of the ruling AK Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,* a center-right or Islamic party).

Burcu Korkmaz.

Burcu was born in a small village near Konya, and she completed elementary school there. After marrying at age 16 and giving birth to 2 children, Burcu traveled to Germany with her husband in 1973. She initially left her children behind with her mother-in-law in Turkey so she could work in Germany, but after fours years, brought her children to Germany where they finished school. She gave birth to her third child in 1980, and the couple moved from a small village in Germany to Munich that year. She worked at a BMW factory and in a bakery. After several years, she and her husband got divorced. She "officially" returned to Istanbul in 1984, but since two of her children still live in Germany, she frequently travels there. Upon returning to Istanbul, she moved in with one of her sons. Burcu worked temporarily as a realtor, but is now mostly retired. She is active in the local chapter of the *Demokrat Parti* (a small centrist political party). She does not consider herself religious and she neither wears a headscarf nor prays regularly.

Bülent Yılmaz.

Born in 1946, Bülent grew up and completed high school in a small village near Tekirdağ. He traveled to Germany in 1969 with his wife, and they worked together in a textile factory. One year later, he began working in a metal factory. The couple had three children together, but later divorced. None of Bülent's children with his first wife are interested in returning to Turkey, he says. He returned to Turkey in 2001 with a comfortable retirement income, and he remarried to a much younger woman. He has one daughter with his new wife, and now spends his time caring for his large house and buying and selling property. While in Germany, Bülent was politically active. He was the director of a German-Turkish association with a membership of 150, through which he tried to ensure rights for Turks in Germany. He considers himself to be a "*laik*" or "secular Muslim," an *Alevi* (*Alevi*s are a minority Muslim group in Turkey), and a social democrat. He is actively involved in the CHP political party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi,* a leftist political party currently in opposition to the ruling AK Party).

Derya Sezgin.

Derya was born in 1956 near the small town of İlçe, one of 5 children from a large, poor family. She completed elementary school and began working at a factory in her teens. At age 17, in 1973, she married and travelled to Berlin with her husband Ali. When her children were toddlers, she began working to support her husband's family in Turkey. She sent her children back to Turkey to live with her mother-in-law and go to school there. Her children returned to Germany later, but have since returned to Turkey. Derya describes her first job in a textile factory as "enjoyable." When workers were laid off from this factory, she began working in an appliance factory before retiring in the 1990s. Working in Germany allowed her and her husband to purchase several houses and cars in Turkey. After 34 years in Germany, the couple returned to their natal village in Turkey in 2007, but they still make frequent trips to Germany. Derya currently supports the ruling AK Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,* a center-right or Islamic party) and was proud to vote for them for the first time in 2007. She considers herself very religious; she wears a headscarf, prays five times daily, and fasts during Ramadan.

Dilek Muhtar.

Dilek was born in Gelsenkirchen in Germany in 1976. When she was 6 years old, her parents sent her to live with her aunt and uncle (her father's brother) in Turkey. Her father was known by his relatives as "*Almanyalı* Ali," and she remembers looking at photographs of her parents and crying every night. She swears, "I would never be away from my own child, like I was from my parents." Dilek studied education at Turkey's prestigious Boğaziçi University and graduated in 1998. She married another Boğaziçi graduate who runs his own business in Istanbul. Since that time, she has been a housewife. She is raising two children and is actively involved in helping the poor. Dilek is extremely religious and a member of the Gülen religious movement.

Elif Çelik.

Elif's father went to Germany as a guest worker in 1962, and she was born near Köln in 1973. She remembers loving Germany. Most of her friends were Germans, and she "never felt singled out for being a Turk." When her father retired, she returned to Turkey in 1984 at age 11. She was very upset about returning and cried a lot. She faced many difficulties in school, where she was placed in a group with other "*Almancı* children." Yet, she was able to attend a top university in Turkey and to complete a masters thesis on German-Turks for a European Studies program. She now teaches English at a private university in Istanbul. She had a long-term boyfriend, but recently started dating someone new. She says she does not plan to marry and have children. Elif does not consider herself to be a Muslim. She is a follower of the Indian mystic Osho and meditates daily. She is not following politics and does not believe in voting because she feels that "Turkey is not a free country, so voting does not matter."

Esra Özdemir.

Esra was born in İlçe in 1971 and completed high school there. She joined Yavuz in Germany as his wife at age 20 in 1991, and they spent the following 15 years in Germany together. She has many family members in Germany, including a brother. Esra has been a housewife her entire life. Her children were born prematurely, so she felt that it was important for her to be home with them when they were young, so for this reason, she says she never worked. One reason for returning to Turkey was the concern she and her husband had for their children who were exposed to Christian education in schools in Germany. They also wanted to be near their relatives. They returned permanently to İlçe in 2006, and since returning, their children have been very successful in school. In her youth, Esra did not wear a headscarf, but after marrying and completing the *hajj* with her husband, she has become very religious. She wears a headscarf, prays five times daily, and fasts during Ramadan. She maintains ties to the Gülen religious movement and supports the ruling AK Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,* a center-right or Islamic party).

Filiz Şahin.

Filiz was born in 1956 to a poor family in a small town in central Turkey. She was largely raised by her grandmother and never received formal education. In 1969, at the age of thirteen, Filiz married. Her husband was already working in Germany when they married, and she immediately went there to live with him. In the first five years of her marriage, she gave birth to three children and did not work, but when she turned 18, she began working at a Nivea factory. Rather than sending her children back to Turkey like many other migrants, Filiz brought her mother-in-law to Germany to watch her children. She returned to Istanbul in 1987, to live as a housewife near her husband's family. Two of her children remained in Germany, one returned to Istanbul, and she tries to see them all as much as possible. Filiz considers herself to be a "*laik*" or secular Muslim, and does not believe that Muslim women are required to wear a headscarf, but she does pray regularly, and she fasts during Ramadan. She is a strong supporter of the CHP party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi,* a leftist political party currently in opposition to the ruling AK Party).

Ipek Ortaç.

Ipek, Dilek's mother, was born near Konya and received only an elementary school education. After marrying, she went to Germany with her husband in 1974, where she says she never adjusted to life in Germany. She was a housewife there and rarely left the house on her own. After 10 years, the couple returned to Konya in 1984 when the German government offered incentives for Turks to return to Turkey. She decided to send Dilek and her other children back to Turkey before they started school in Germany, because she worried about their education and was fearful of stories she heard about "the German government taking children away from their mothers." She now lives in Istanbul in order to help her daughters raise their children. She has remained a very religious person her entire life, wearing a headscarf, praying five times daily, and fasting during Ramadan.

Lale Erdinç.

Lale was born in a poor neighborhood in Istanbul in 1968. She traveled to Esslingen near Stuttgart in Germany after marrying her husband. She did not expect that she would have to work there, but, as soon as she arrived, her mother-in-law told her that her husband's family expected her to work and earn money for their family. She worked in a factory making refrigerators, washing machines and other household goods. She and her husband were poor and lived in a house with three other families, including Berrin's family. Her husband was an alcoholic, but worked 17 hours a day—a shift in a factory by day followed by a stint as a taxi driver at night. With this hard work, the couple were able to buy several houses in Turkey. Like other migrants, she sent her children to live with relatives in Turkey, because she feared what would happen to them if they stayed in Germany. After 10 years, the couple returned to Turkey in 1978 and ran a small clothing manufacturing business. Her husband died several years ago, and Lale now takes on small textile piecework projects to make extra money. Lale considers herself "*laik*" or a "secular Muslim" and does not wear a headscarf outside of her house. But she prays regularly and fasts during Ramadan. She supports the CHP political party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi,* a leftist political party currently inopposition to the ruling AK Party).

Mehmet Aksu.

Mehmet was born in Istanbul in 1970 and travelled to Germany with his parents at age 2. His father was a surgeon and his mother could speak German before going to Germany, because she had attended the prestigious Austrian school in Istanbul. He was the first foreigner to attend the highest level of high school (*gymnasium*) where they lived in Germany. He went on to earn a PhD in economics, to work as a university research assistant and as a banker. He claims that he "always wanted to return to Turkey, and at age 30, I finally did so." His parents and siblings remained in Germany, and still have not returned. Mehmet married a Turkish woman with whom he has one daughter, but they have subsequently divorced. His daughter is 9 now, and he sees her regularly. He is currently running his own consulting business, a company, which advises German businesses that are planning to relocate to Turkey. He does not consider himself religious, but he is supporting the ruling AK Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)* whom many view as an Islamic party, because he feels "they will make positive changes in Turkey."

Meltem Koç.

Meltem was born in a small town along the Black Sea in 1970. Her parents divorced, and at age 4, her father took her to live with him and his new wife in a small town near Nuremburg, Germany. He was physically and sexually abusive to her and her stepmother. She finished the lowest level of high school in Germany and returned to Turkey to meet her birth mother again at age 18. She worked for two years as an executive secretary and accounting secretary before marrying a truck driver. The couple moved to a poor neighborhood on the outskirts of Istanbul, and Meltem gave birth to 6 children, who are today between the ages of 11-20. Two children (twins) suffered from birth defects and one died at 5 years old. Today, Meltem works at a German-Turkish call center. Meltem's relationship to religious practice has changed over time: during her youth in Germany, she claims she did not know anything about Islam. After her daughter died, she began wearing a headscarf, praying five times daily and fasting during Ramadan. Five years later, when she sought employment due to poor financial circumstances, she felt forced to remove her headscarf. But, she still considers herself religious and maintains ties to the Gülen movement. Meltem is currently supporting the ruling AK Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,* a center-right or Islamic party).

Ömür Kervan.

Ömür was born in 1975 in Dortmund, Germany, where she says she grew up speaking perfect German and had many German friends. Her father was a coal miner and then a truck driver, and her mother was a housewife; neither had formal education. After high school, Ömür did not attend university, but she studied economics, English, and Spanish at a private school. She lived with her parents until she was 20 and then moved out on her own. She lived in Köln for 10 years, eventually returning to Turkey in 2006. She began to dislike life in Germany and decided that "Istanbul would be more fun." She now works for a company that distributes Turkish films in Europe. Her boss speaks German, and she uses German and English every day at work. She is dating a German man who is planning to move to Turkey. Her boyfriend is an atheist, but she considers herself a Muslim, even though she is not practicing.

Selin Demir.

Selin was born into an extremely poor family living near Tekirdağ in 1952. She received little education in her youth. In 1971, when she was 19 years old, she went to Germany in order to improve her "life standards" ("*yaşam şartları*"). She spent her first three months in Germany working as one of 80 women in a canning factory in Branchweig, which is near Duisburg and Köln. Later, she worked as an assembler of toasters and coffee machines and in quality control. One year after arriving in Germany, she married a man that her aunt knew and brought her new husband to Germany. As a couple, they moved from a factory dormitory into an apartment. She had one daughter in Germany, who finished Hauptschule (the lowest level of school) in Germany and started a job as a hairstylist. But, her daughter has since returned to Turkey and is currently unemployed. After getting laid off in the early 1990s when her factory moved from Germany to Hungary, Selin collected unemployment benefits and looked for work, but she eventually returned to Turkey in 1995. She credits working in Germany with her and her husband's lovely house and car. Selin considers herself "*laik*" (secular) and does not wear a headscarf or pray regularly.

Sinan Kasap.

Sinan was born in Germany shortly after his parents migrated to a small village in Southern Germany in the early 1970s. Prior to migrating, his parents had run several bakeries in Istanbul, but went bankrupt due to a financial crisis. Sinan was one of few Turks to attend the highest level of high school (gymnasium) in Germany and eventually went onto university where he earned a PhD. While in Germany, he was active in a Turkish student association and was heavily involved in fighting for the rights of Turks in Germany. His parents started a travel business, and after they died in the 1990s, Sinan ran their business for several years before beginning his PhD program. After earning his PhD in 2007, he felt that he could not get a job in Germany and decided to return to Istanbul. He quickly secured employment with a Turkish public university. In 2009, he married a woman he met in Istanbul. Sinan considers himself be a non-practicing, "*laik*" or "secular Muslim," and a "leftist."

Yavuz Özdemir.

Yavuz went to Germany in 1973 with his father, and considers himself to be a second-generation migrant, because he was 14 years old at the time of his migration. He claims, "I had 1-2 years of childhood, and then I started my work-life." After leaving high school early, Yavuz worked in a machine repair shop and in a factory making pots and pans. In 1980, he married his first wife with whom he had one child. They later divorced, and in 1991 he married his second wife, Esra, with whom he has two children. He returned permanently to İlçe in 2006 to live in a 4-story house on the outskirts of town, where he and his wife Esra are retired and can live comfortably by collecting Yavuz's retirement money. Yavuz is very religious; he completed the *hajj*, attends mosque services regularly, prays five times daily and fasts during Ramadan. He is an ardent supporter of the ruling AK Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,* a center-right or Islamic party).

Zehra Seven.

Zehra's parents migrated from Istanbul to Germany and Zehra was born there in 1967. She went to the highest level of high school (gymnasium) in Germany, and she said it was not difficult, because she “felt German and had many German friends.” At this time, she “began to develop a feminist consciousness and became concerned about the position of Turkish women in Turkey.” Zehra returned from Germany to Turkey in 1984 with her parents and finished her last year of high school in Istanbul in a classroom with several other German-Turks. At university, she studied linguistics and “was recognized as smart by her German Studies professor” who facilitated her becoming a reporter for the Turkish television station TRT. She also became involved in *Kader,* a Turkish non-profit that works to increase Turkish women’s participation in politics. She married a wealthy businessman and has no children. She does not consider herself religious.

CHAPTER 3
ETHICAL HORIZONS IN THE GERMANY-TURKEY TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD

German-Turks find home and belonging embedded in what I call the Germany-Turkey transnational social field—the "set of multiple, interlocking, networks of social relationships" that connect Germany and Turkey (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 1009). These networks are both concrete and imagined. They include human movements of labor and leisure, cultural and artistic exchanges, media representations, and economic and political connections and frictions. The transnational social field forms the basis for Turks' perceptions of Germany and provides reference points for their evaluation of Turkey's belonging in Europe. Finally, this social field is also an ethical field—a space in which ideas about German and Turkish ethical aims and ethno-national identities are produced and contested.

The transnational social field reflects and shapes Turks' hopes and anxieties about their country's modernity and European-ness. The historical and contemporary political aspirations of Turkey's leaders to fashion Turkey into a European country are the starting point of these hopes and anxieties. But, they are also strongly influenced by the history of migrations between Germany and Turkey and on-going debates about Turkey's European Union membership and human rights for Muslims in Europe. Though often cast as issues of geo-politics or economics, political actors and citizens debating these issues often discuss ethics. During everyday conversations, they mobilize popular stereotypes about the ethical aims of Germans, Europeans and Turks to debate the merits of Turkish belonging in Europe. For example, people may debate the advantages and disadvantages of perceived German "individualism" and "orderliness" versus

Turkish "closeness within families," and "hospitality." These conceptions of ethical aims and ethno-national identities are not objective truths; they are rooted in troubling Orientalist discourses, which often position "the West" as superior to "the Non-West." For Turkish citizens considering Turkey's place in Europe, particular "Turkish," "German" or "European" ethics can seem either desirable or dangerous.

German-Turks—Turkey's "European citizens"—are seen as symbols of Turks' past failure and future potential to become a "modern" and "European" country. For both Europeans and Turks, German-Turks' perceived integration or lack thereof in Germany forms the basis for arguments about Turkey's place in Europe. Their class background as poor laborers who many Turks view as "backward," coupled with a prevalence of negative media stereotypes about them, places them in a stigmatized and suspicious social position in Turkey. In the transnational social field, German-Turks are often portrayed negatively as either "not modern enough" with "backwards ethical values" or as "too modern" with "insufficient ethical values." As people whose ethical position has been disrupted by moving between German and Turkish national poles, German-Turks face dire struggles when they return home. Finding belonging at home becomes a process of justifying an ethical position that migrants describe as Turkish, European, modern and ethical. In many cases, like other Turkish citizens, returnees make recourse to troubling stereotypes about Turkish and German ethics, which fosters a "cultural intimacy" and their local, national and transnational belonging.

In the sections that follow, I attempt to flesh out the social space that demands this accounting of migrants' ethical position(s). First, I describe the contours of the Germany-Turkey transnational social field in terms of the concrete economic and cultural networks of relationships through which the field comes to life, highlighting the particular role of German-Turks in shaping the field. Then, I look at the historical roots of Turkish striving for modernity and belonging in Europe, which also shapes the transnational social field between Germany and Turkey. Next, I examine the transnational social field as an ethical field. I explore how anxieties about Turkish modernity are essentially anxieties about ethics. In this milieu, return migrants and non-migrants mobilize stereotypes about ethical aims and ethno-national identities during negotiations of belonging. Finally, I examine the position of the stigmatized "*Almancı*"—the German-Turk, who is often called a foreigner in both Germany and Turkey. I show that German-Turks are figures who both shape and are shaped by the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. Return migrants' struggles over ethics and belonging at "home" are struggles against negative stereotypes about their "backwardness" and are ultimately struggles over Turkey's modernity, European-ness, and ethical aims.

THE GERMANY-TURKEY TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD

The term "transnational social field" is a recent one, arising out of scholarship on transnationalism in the 1990s (Basch et. al. 1994; Faist 2004; 2000; Foner 1997; Glick Schiller et al. 1995; 1992; Kearney 1995; 2005; Kivisto 2001; Levitt 2001). Scholars initially used the term "transnationalism" in many ways, but they usually applied it to migrants to describe "a social process whereby migrants operate in social fields that transgress geographic, political and cultural borders" (Brettell 2003: 48).[1] But, this use of the concept of transnationalism failed to take into account the creation of an actual transnational space that includes broader economic and cultural connections and includes both migrants and non-migrants.[2] This is better described by the concept of a "transnational social field," a concept that allows analysts to examine both migrants and non-migrants within the same frame of reference. Following the work of Pierre Bourdieu and the Manchester school, Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller (2004) define a transnational social field as "a set of multiple, interlocking, networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices and resources are unequally exchanged, organized and transformed" (1009). In each migration context, a researcher must seek to understand how migrants and non-migrants perceive the transnational social field of which they are a part.[3]

German-Turks must establish belonging amidst the ideas, practices, networks and resources of the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. This social field holds great significance for them given their status as migrants between the two countries. But, social, cultural, economic, and political networks between Turkey and Germany are accessible to both migrants and non-migrants. Even Turks who do not migrate regularly between Turkey and Germany (and could not be called transnational migrants) may participate in the transnational social field by thinking about and interacting with people and ideas from Germany. Germany is widely understood as an important political and economic partner for Turkey, and Turks learn about Germany through news reports, websites, movies and television; through German political, cultural and economic institutions in Turkey; and through their interactions with return migrants.

Discussions of political and economic events in Germany and the European Union are ubiquitous in Turkey, and most Turks are very aware of events in Europe. For example, German parliamentary elections and the recent European financial crisis and Germany's treatment of Greece were constant topics of daily conversation in Turkey. Turkish attendance at G20 meetings and leader's visits with European politicians are widely publicized and discussed in Turkey. Since Turkey is a member of NATO with the largest standing army in Europe, Turks readily observe that Europe's military engagements directly affect them. Turkey also shares European cultural space: Istanbul was a European Capital of Cultural in 2010, and many events were planned to highlight and celebrate the "European-ness" of Istanbul. Turks eagerly follow their country's annual contestant in the Eurovision song contest in which all European countries compete. They can name many Turkish soccer players who play for European teams and German-Turkish players are especially well known. For many people in Turkey, their country is part of a transnational German and European political, economic, and cultural space.

Turks also learn about the Germany-Turkey transnational social field by watching German language television stations, which broadcast reality shows, sitcoms and German news programs. There are many centers that teach and promote German language and culture in Turkey; German is a common second language taught in Turkish high schools, and many people take additional German classes to enhance professional opportunities. Turkey is the home to many German businesses that produce products for sale both domestically and in Europe, such as Mercedes, Siemens, Bosch, and Lufthansa. The actions of the Turkish Airline, *Sun Express,* exemplify the strong economic connections between the two countries. In their January 2012 in-flight magazine, *SunTimes*, the company alerted their passengers that they are creating "a new and stronger flight plan for international flights [they] operate from German speaking geographies to Turkey." Many of their articles were written in both German and Turkish and featured information about German destinations. When reading the magazine, no matter a passenger's destination within Turkey, he or she must take notice of the economic and cultural importance of Germany.

German-Turks are themselves critical players in forming the transnational social field as exemplified by the numerous and widespread media, artistic and cultural representations of their lives. Unfortunately, German-Turks' experiences and actions are often presented negatively in this media. For example, popular German-Turkish musicians often sing about Turks' difficulties in Germany.[4] There is even a plaintive song called "I am not an *Almancı*," in which the singer, Şebnem Kısaparmak, laments the stigma directed against German-Turks. She sings about her desire to "die on her motherland's soil." Films about German-Turks contribute strongly to the sense that Germany and Turkey share a single social space. A plethora of films about German-Turks have been shown in Turkey over the past 40 years, including *Gurbet Kuşları* (1964), *Almanya Acı Vatan* (1979), *Gurbetçi Şaban* (1985), *Alamancının karısı* (1987), "*Fikrimin İnce Gülü" Sarı Mercedes, Mercedes Mon Amour* (1987), *Polizei* (1988), *Mein Vater, der Gastarbeiter* (1994), *Yurtdışı Turnesi* (1999), *Im Juli* (2000), *Gegen die Wand* (2004), *Almanya Rüyası* (2005), *Kebap Connection* (2005), *Auf der anderen Seite* (2007), *Based Down South* (2010), *Die Fremde* (2010), *Almanya'ya Hoşgeldiniz* (2011) and *Berlin Kaplanı* (2012). In these films, migrants are often portrayed as unworldly villagers, who are easily cheated, and/or as people suffering without family and even committing crimes like theft and murder. I further explore these negative images of German-Turks below and discuss two films in detail (*Yellow Mercedes* (1987) and *The Edge of Heaven* (2007)), because they have been critically important in shaping Turks' ideas about migrants.

Media reports about German-Turks are another important way in which the transnational social field is constructed. Like films of German-Turks, news stories are often disturbingly negative depictions of migrants' backwardness, ignorance and lack of integration into Germany.

For example, one notable news story during my time in Turkey was the *Deniz Feneri* (Lighthouse) charity scandal, in which German-Turks' donations for the needy were mismanaged and channeled into private companies with AK Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,* the current ruling party) connections in Turkey. According to the Turkish newspaper, *Hürriyet*, it is "the biggest charity scandal in German history."[5] For months in 2008 and 2009, the question of the Turkish state's response to the German condemnation and legal decision in the *Deniz Feneri* case dominated the Turkish press, with leftist political parties and columnists criticizing AK Party silence and inaction.[6] While the focus of the Lighthouse news stories is on the perpetrators, the stories present an image of German-Turks as people ripe for exploitation.

The Lighthouse case is one of many stories describing how German-Turks have been swindled out of money sent back to Turkey. In the 1990s, German-Turks were encouraged to invest in Yimpaş Holding, a department store company, which would adhere to Islamic financial rules and promised a high return on investors' money. However, with the exception of a small number of initial investors, no investment return was ever actually intended by company managers, and eventually, the company went out of business.[7] These stories about German-Turks being cheated out of their money contribute to their negative image as "backwards villagers" in the eyes of non-migrants.

Other news stories focus on perceived problems that German-Turks have in Germany. For example, in January 2009, Turkish newspapers reported that a new study showed Turks to be the "least integrated immigrant group in Germany." In addition to substandard education and employment, the study indicated that

> Fewer than a third of Turks born in Germany have chosen to obtain German citizenship and 93 percent have married within the Turkish community. On a scale of one (poorly integrated) to

> eight (well integrated), Turks were rated at the bottom of the table with 2.4, behind immigrants from the former Yugoslavia and Africa (3.2), the Middle East (4.1), southern Europe (4.4) and the Far East (4.6) (*Hürriyet Daily News 2009b*).[8]

The notion of scales of integration is troubling because it portrays the host society as a welcoming place to all immigrants. The benchmark of integration is largely determined by the host society's criteria (in this case, citizenship and inter-marriage were key criteria) and racism directed towards particular immigrant groups (such as Turks in this study) is not taken into account. Additionally, the concept of integration is itself problematic, as it presumes that "blending in" is the only acceptable migrant behavior and that immigrants are obligated to integrate. Other studies have shown that German-Turks are actually quite well-integrated into Germany (Ewing 2008: 18)

Yet, most Turks are not critical of studies that claim that German-Turks are not integrated in Germany. One non-migrant, Deniz, talked about this study with me and said "Look Susan, my aunts lived in Germany for 30 years and did not learn German; no wonder Germans do not like Turks. They did not even try to be a part of their society." For him, the study demonstrates Turkish migrants' "backwardness" in Germans' eyes, but also in his own eyes. He claimed that if he had migrated to Germany, he would have tried to integrate. As I note in the introduction, German-Turks' lack of integration made the news again in March 2011, when Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan said in a speech in Germany, "Our children must learn German, but first they must learn good Turkish. No one has the right to deprive us of our culture and our identity."[9] Erdoğan's controversial remarks sought to justify Turks' supposed lack of integration as part of an effort to preserve their culture and identity.

Favorable news stories about German-Turks are usually about their success as entrepreneurs and politicians in Germany. For example, the Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet* did a story on a German-Turkish businessman, Bünyamin Türksoy, who is developing a beer for Turks in Germany called “Bey” (Mr.). The article noted, “He is targeting the beer toward young Turks in Germany, betting they are German enough to enjoy a few pilsners, but Turkish enough to appreciate an ethnic brand.”[10] Newspapers also discuss German-Turkish entrepreneurship in Turkey. For example, one newspaper reported, “A Turk living in Germany has plans to produce small airplanes by investing 30 million Euros in Turkey” (Baysal 2010a; in Turkish: Baysal 2010b). The success of German-Turks in politics in Germany also makes the Turkish news. A German-Turkish politician named Cem Özdemir, first elected to parliament in Germany as a Green party member in 1994, has been compared to Obama and given the slogan “Yes We Cem!”[11] News media portray German-Turks as largely ignorant, easily swindled and un-integrated in Germany, but occasionally able to become successful entrepreneurs in Turkey or political figures in Germany.

Entertainment and news stories featuring German-Turks go a long way in creating a feeling that Germany and Turkey are connected into a single space. Additionally, they give non-migrants numerous ideas about German-Turks, even if they have never met a return migrant personally. When they meet a returnee for the first time, non-migrants may evaluate him or her against the images of German-Turks that they have seen in musical acts, films and news stories. Non-migrants may wonder: was this return migrant successful or unsuccessful in Germany? Did this person represent Turks well in Germany?

Some people have significant firsthand experience with returnees through which they experience the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. In certain small towns, which have significant numbers of return migrants, in addition to media influences, people may observe and interact directly with returnees. For example, in the small town of İlçe where I conducted several months of research, everyone can see the German-style houses with pointed and sloped gables that have been built by returnees. These houses stand out among the square box-style houses common there. As I rode in a car in a village near to İlçe, my fellow passengers made sure to point out to me the house with three gables in the picture below. They exclaimed, "Look—an *Almanyalı* (German-Turk) house."



Figure 2. An "*Almanyalı* house"

Many German-Turks in İlçe have brought back material goods from Germany that are readily apparent to non-migrants, such as Mercedes cars, foreign name-brand clothes, and German appliances, cookbooks, and mustard. When walking down the street in İlçe with a German-Turkish couple, we passed a Mercedes, and I commented, "This must be a German-Turk's." They laughed and replied, "Yes, it is. We know them." Non-migrants receive things from relatives in Germany, like *Nussbeisser* chocolate, cappuccino drink mix, and *Waldbeer* tea.

One family I knew made sure to have a German cookbook prominently displayed in their living room where guests would be sure to see it. Another family had a tray with German writing on it and a large glass sugar bowl on their dinner table, which they told me was from Germany. Many returnees have display cases in their living rooms filled with items from Germany, such as German silver or glass. One woman explained, "In Turkey, you cannot find glass as nice as German glass."

Some people claim to be able to tell German-Turks by the clothes they wear. For example, Kiraz said that her neighbor, a return migrant who has long hair and wears a leather jacket and tall black boots, does not dress like a 40-year-old man from Turkey. Occasionally, German-Turks speak German to each other in front of non-migrants. One family that I stayed with often said "*tschüss*" (good bye in German) and "*danke schön*" (thank you in German). Other times, I heard "*nein*" (no), "*willkommen*" (welcome), "*guten Morgen*" (good morning), and "*Frühstuck*" (breakfast). Some returnees seem to use German words mostly within their own families, while others use German at any time.

Important events in İlçe may often be planned to accommodate the schedules of German-Turks, contributing to a sense that Germany and Turkey are strongly connected, nearly a single social space. Wedding announcements and ceremony times are coordinated around the religious Ramadan (*Eid ul-Fitr*) and Sacrifice (*Eid ul-Adha*) holidays in İlçe, since returnees may take off from work in Germany and return home during these times. Funerals may also be arranged to accommodate relatives in Germany. One time, I observed that a funeral was nearly postponed in order to wait for the deceased's daughter, who was flying back to Turkey from Germany. Relatives were contemplating whether the funeral would happen the next day if the daughter did not make it in time. In the end, her brother was able to pick her up from the Izmir airport and the funeral proceeded as planned. It is very important for Muslims that a body is buried as soon as possible after death, usually within 24 hours, so the very idea that a funeral might be postponed gives some indication of the effect that migrants may be having on religious practices in their natal villages. This event prompted relatives to comment that the state should build an airport nearby, because there are so many people from the area who go to Germany and could use the airport.

Ideas about Germany and Germans circulate widely in İlçe as German-Turks express their views in front of friends and relatives that streets were cleaner in Germany, the educational system is better there, and Germany is more "orderly" (*düzgün*)—views which I discuss in-depth in later chapters. Even small differences may become the subject of comparison between Turkey and Germany. For example, one day, when a mixed social group of returnees and non-migrants were visiting each other, one return migrant woman noted, "the colors of the towels in Germany never come out in the wash, whereas, any towel from Turkey will ruin a whole wash. I bought a yellow towel in Turkey, and when I washed it, my whole wash became yellow." Food is also the subject of comparison between the two countries. Returnees talking with non-migrants were quick to point out that Turks have brought Turkish-style long, thin green peppers to Germany and that Germans love mustard. They also noted that Turkish meat sandwiches (*döner*) are popular in Germany, though one woman mentioned that some Germans use pork rather than beef to make the sandwiches, something that would be unheard of in Turkey. Such innocuous discussions about everyday life in Germany give non-migrants a wealth of ideas about Germany.

Even if they never travel there, non-migrants may be exposed to many of the relationships and ideas that constitute the transnational social field.

In summary, the transnational social field is the product of a plethora of political, economic and cultural connections that both migrants and non-migrants can access and experience. Even if a person has never met a return migrant, he or she is likely aware that Angela Merkel is the prime minister of Germany, that a European financial crisis is affecting Turkish companies, and that there are many Turks living in Germany. Representations of German-Turks in music, film and news media make it seem that Germany and Turkey are irrevocably connected, such that even someone who has never lived in Germany can have many ideas about Germans and life in Germany. German-Turks play a highly significant role in shaping the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. If non-migrants are able to observe and interact with return migrants they gain even more experience in the transnational social field and may come to consciously or unconsciously see themselves as enveloped in a transnational space. For some migrants and non-migrants, the result is what we could call a transnational identity.

Imagining, living within and interacting with networks that are part of a transnational social field do not presuppose a transnational identity. Levitt and Glick Schiller attempt to specify transnational identities by suggesting that we distinguish between “transnational ways of being” and “transnational ways of belonging” (2004).[12] Ways of being refers to “the actual social relations and practices that individuals engage in” (2004: 1010). Ways of belonging refers to “practices that signal or enact an identity which demonstrates a conscious connection to a particular group” (2004: 1010). I found that many migrants and non-migrants have a transnational way of being—whether they want to or not, many are enveloped by the German-

Turkey transnational social field. This means that they have personal and professional relationships with people in Germany that require transnational actions (calling, e-mailing, visiting, etc.). They may frequently interact with ideas about Germany in their daily life as they flip the channels of their television, read the newspaper, or observe and talk to their German or German-Turkish neighbors. These ways of being are not the same as ways of belonging and do not indicate that they have a "transnational identity" or "transnational way of belonging."

In fact, I found that fewer than half of the migrants I met express transnational ways of belonging in which they asserted that they were transnational or world citizens and cosmopolitans. In the chapters that follow, I take transnationalism into account as I explore belonging, interrogating markers of transnationalism, narratives about being transnational, and actions, which reflect transnational ties. I found that some people do claim to be "using the best of both cultures," to be "between cultures," or to have a "*dünya görüşü*" (open world view). People who claim a type of cosmopolitan, "world" or flexible citizenship are a particular focus of Chapter 7. However, most migrants claim that their national and ethnic background is "Turkish" and define their belonging in terms of their family, class, educational or employment background, their relationships to particular religious groups or ideas, and their heritage in a particular region of Turkey. Engaging in transnational actions does not necessarily make one into a transnational migrant whose ethno-national identity is fundamentally changed.

It is important to recognize that participation in transnational social fields is variable and not dependent on having been a migrant. Some people are more involved in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field than others. For example, Sertaç is a young man living in Istanbul who went to Germany to learn German in his 20s due to personal interest. He always buys German goods (like German brand telephones), and he is actively following events there, to the point where he could even explain a German CDU political victory to me in detail. In some ways, he may be participating more in the transnational social field than a German-Turkish returnee like Ipek. Ipek also lives in Istanbul, and she seems to have put Germany and everything associated with it behind her. She spends her time visiting her daughters and said, "I never adjusted to Germany, and I have no desire to go there again." Even though Ipek is a return migrant and Sertaç is not, she is less involved in transnational ways of being than he is. Neither would likely profess a transnational form of belonging. In sum, living within a transnational social field can involve a myriad ways of being and belonging transnationally. The presence of a social field means a complex, dynamic, transnational space that includes many diverse actions and identities.

I have thus far described the Germany-Turkey transnational social field as a concrete set of social relationships and economic and cultural networks. In the next section, I explore how the Germany-Turkey transnational social field is constructed out of imaginations about relationships between Turkey and Germany that have their historical and contemporary roots in Turkish leaders' and citizens' efforts to fashion Turkey into a "modern" and "European" country.

IMAGINING TURKEY'S EUROPEAN-NESS

The "origin" of the Germany-Turkey transnational social field lies in Turkey's historical, political and economic connections to Europe and in its desire to find acceptance as a "modern European" country. Turkey's interaction with Europe extends back to Ottoman times before the founding of the Turkish republic (Meeker 2002; B. Silverstein 2003). "Turks, like Arabs and Jews, have been Europe's internal and not external others. The Ottoman Empire was central to

European history, intrinsically related to and informed by Byzantine forms of governance, and rivaling the Hapsburgs" (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 9). However, making Turkey "European" became an explicit project at the time of the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, when leaders aimed to synthesize Turkish nationalism with Western capitalism and what some authors refer to as "European modernity" (Irem 2004) or "modernity as Westernization" (Kahraman 2005).[13] Modernity was linked with progress and the "dissemination of Western reason and rationality into what was regarded as traditional and backward social relations" (Keyman 1995: 97).

Atatürk, the leader of the only political party at the time, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP)), began a series of legal reforms. In November of 1925, a law was passed that all male Turks must abandon the fez and wear instead a Western-style hat with a brim. Shortly thereafter, dervish religious orders were shut down, the Caliphate was abolished, wearing the headscarf in public places was banned, and a new Gregorian calendar was introduced on January 1, 1926 to replace the previous Islamic one. Nine years later, Sunday was made the weekly holiday in Turkey, as it is in European countries. *Sharia* law was replaced with the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Penal Code and a Commercial Code based largely on those of Germany and Italy (Ahmad 1993: 79-80; Natali 2005: 77-82). Creating a national language was an essential part of building the "modern" Turkish nation. Arabic and Persian words were replaced by "pure Turkish" (*öz Türkçe*) words between 1933-1935, and the Turkish script was changed from Arabic to Latin (Çolak 2004; Lewis 1999). Each of these changes was designed to position Turkey closer to European countries.

Turkey's European Union membership bid is highly representative of its long quest for acceptance as a European country. Turkey applied for associate membership to the European Community (the former name of the European Union) in 1959, received approval in 1963, and applied for full membership on April 14th, 1987. It was officially recognized as a candidate country on December 10th 1999 at the Helsinki summit of the European Council (Erdemli 2003: 6). Since 1999, Turkish leaders have instituted a plethora of democratic changes (Kubiçek 2005b: 70).[14] Yet, accession negotiations are currently stalled over disagreements about trade links with Cyprus and freedom of expression and rights for Turkey's minorities, such as Kurds. Additionally, although the Turkish government is rapidly changing laws to comply with EU demands, popular support for joining Europe through EU membership has not remained stable in Turkey, fluctuating greatly between 55 and 75 percent in the short time period of 1996-2003 (Çarkoğlu 2004: 23). Currently, support of Turkey's EU membership in Turkey is hovering at around 42% (*Eurobarometer 74* 2011).

Despite its leaders' efforts, Turkey has faced numerous symbolic rejections from European countries regarding its potential EU membership. According to a recent survey, more than half of Europeans oppose Turkey's EU membership (59%), while only about 30% are in favor of membership (*Eurobarometer 74* 2011). Europeans view Turkey as "too big, too poor, too agricultural, too authoritarian and perhaps, above all, too Muslim" (Kubiçek 2005b: 67).[15] Some leaders, such as Nicolas Sarkozy of France, have suggested "privileged partnership" rather than full membership for Turkey. Fears of future Turkish labor migration are often cited as reasons for not offering Turkey full EU membership (Martin et al. 2001). Many Turks now feel that Europeans are laughing at Turkey while it desperately attempts to assert its belonging in Europe.



[16]

The above cartoon shows a man with a Turkish flag for a hat walking through a revolving door, which represents the European Union (AB are the initials for the EU in Turkish). European leaders look on pointing and laughing. Turkey's perceived lack of acceptance in Europe, as indicated by Europeans' skepticism about offering full EU membership to Turkey, has led to a deep sense of anxiety in Turkey about the country's European belonging and identity (Canefe and Uğur 2004: 7; Özyürek 2009; B. Silverstein 2003: 511). According to Canefe and Uğur (2004), "as Turks tend to see their relations with Europe—in particular with the EU—as constitutive of their own identity, they perceive the treatment of their potential membership by the EU as an indication of how others see them and will treat them in the future. As such, Turkish-EU relations give rise to great strain in Turkish society" (7). Some Turks fear domination by Europe through the EU. As one interviewee put it in a study regarding Turks' perceptions of the EU: the important thing is “our dignity—we can’t sacrifice our own values and culture in our relations. We would prefer dignity rather than wealth” (Fokas 2004: 157).

Europeans’ wary appraisal of Turkey’s potential EU membership bid can be understood at least in part by noting that it comes at a time when Europeans are searching for “organizing principles which could unify Europe, often focusing around the elusive concept of ‘European civilization’” (Lutz 1997: 94; see also Kubiçek 2005a; 2005b; Küçük 2009). Discussions over the intrinsic features of Europe have become intermeshed with discourses of nation and home, which are frequently presented as under threat from outsiders. Fears of immigrant foreigners have created a “moral panic” in many European societies (Lutz 1997: 100), including Germany (Ewing 2008: 2). Muslims are a particular focus of anxieties (Ewing 2000; 2003; 2008; Mamdani 2004; Özyürek 2009; P. Silverstein 2005: 375) with Muslim women’s headscarves fomenting fierce debates about national identity and migrants’ belonging in Germany and other European countries (Bowen 2007; 2008; Mandel 1989; Rottmann and Ferree 2008; Weber 2004). According to Paul Silverstein (2005), European governmental concerns with immigrant cultural assimilation “have been translated into larger fears over the transnationality of European Muslims, over the nature of Euro-Islam (whether it is an Islam of Europe or simply an Islam in Europe) and its implications for the future of national loyalty and participatory citizenship in European national polities” (375). As numerous studies of nation-making have shown, creating a shared identity requires distinguishing an Other, who acts as a basis for imagining the Self (Borneman 2004; Ewing 2008). In the case of Europe, Islam is seen as this Other, an internal threat to European nations that simultaneously constructs broader European identities. Katherine Pratt Ewing (2008) shows in her recent book, *Stolen Honor: Stigmatizing Muslim Men in Berlin*, how the Muslim man holds this position as "stigmatized other" in Germany (3). Muslim men are perceived as both a threat to German-ness and also the "other" through which Germans construct their own identity.

Despite its leaders' attempts, Turkey's European modernity is not and never has been "obvious" for Turks. In fact, Turks view Turkish modernity as "an explicit, public project, a work in progress" (B. Silverstein 2003: 510). Their active quest for European modernity has resulted in anxiety for many Turks about what constitutes the "backward" and "traditional." Turkish leaders' projects of modernity have created a binary in the very foundation of Turkey between modern-urban-European-Western and traditional-rural-peripheral-Oriental (Ewing 2008: 44-50; Helvacıoğlu 1996: 506; Keyman 1995: 97; Potuoğlu-Cook 2006; Stokes 2000). "The efforts of the Turkish state to modernize have included negative depictions of the village, its inhabitants, and the backwardness of "traditional" practices" (Ewing 2008: 45). Turkish citizens find themselves required to establish a place within the ideology of the modern "European" state (Navaro-Yashin 2002; Özyürek 2006), or they are made to feel peripheral and backward and, in fact, "un-Turkish" (Hart 2009). We can see parallel processes of "othering" in Europe and Turkey: Turkey and Muslims are the "other" for Europe through which Europe can constitute itself as "modern." Within Turkey, "villagers" and their "traditional cultural practices" are posited as the other against which a "modern European" Turkey can define itself.

In sum, many Turks fiercely desire that their country find belonging in Europe. At the same time, they feel that Turkey can never quite find the acceptance in Europe that it seeks. Despite years of intense effort, Turks wonder if Turkey is capable of becoming "modern enough" to transcend "Turkish traditional culture" and become a "European" country. In recent years, Turks are also starting to question this project of modernity. In the face of numerous European rejections of Turkey in EU accession negotiations, Turks are beginning to wonder if they actually want to become European. They are questioning what they may gain or lose if their country becomes an EU member and whether or not they should instead appreciate their independence and difference. For individual German-Turks, negotiating home and belonging is played out against this landscape when they return to Turkey. At the heart of questions about Turkey's European-ness are questions about ethics. And, when Turks (both non-migrants and migrants) debate their own and their country's European-ness, they often use stereotypes about ethical aims and ethno-national identities to do so.

ETHICS AND STEREOTYPES IN THE GERMANY-TURKEY TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD

Processes of "othering" are ultimately negotiations of ethical horizons. In delineating these categories of the "modern" and "un-modern," Turkish political actors and citizens often make claims about "appropriate" ethical comportment. In particular, people discuss Islamic, gender and class moralities as signifying certain relationships to modernity and Turkish-ness (Ewing 2008: 44-50; Hart 2009; Öncu 1999; Potuoğlu-Cook 2006).[17] For example, Kimberly Hart (2009) describes how some villagers in Turkey seek an alternative Islamic modernity, which places them within the Turkish state's ideology of modernity and progress. They reject traditional musical practices that they say are sinful in order to assert that they are "good Muslims" and "modern Turks." Öykü Potuoğlu-Cook (2006) explores class, gender, modernity, and morality with regard to the "traditional" practice of belly dancing in the city of Istanbul. As Istanbul positions itself as a cosmopolitan tourist destination for Europeans, lower class women who belly dance for a living are portrayed as immoral, while upper class women who take belly dancing lessons "for fun" are portrayed as modern and moral. Similarly, Ayşe Öncu (1999) analyzes how poor, rural migrants to Istanbul become an unwanted "other" through whom Istanbul's middle classes may define their own cosmopolitan distinction and morality.

> On the one hand, the immigrant operates as the repository of negative attributes, through which the refinements and distinctions of being an Istanbulite is reflexively understood. On the other hand, the immigrant operates as the invading outsider, whose unjustified presences in the city establishes, by extension, a seamless chronology for Istanbulites as the basis of their authenticity and moral superiority (97).

In a milieu of anxiety about Turkey's European-ness, Turks of all social classes and political persuasions are reflecting on the nature of European and Turkish ethics and ethno-national identity. Clearly, the transnational social field is also an ethical field.

For example, whether or not they have experience in Germany or with Germany Turks, many Turkish citizens have ideas about differences between their own and German ethics, which they have learned from films, television, and news reports. They assert that "Turkish family members are loving, caring, close and sacrificial," while "Germans are individualistic" or "free from familial constraints." They declare that "Turks, and particularly Turkish women, are honorable and chaste," while "Germans do not uphold women's sexual honor because couples live together before marriage and engage in premarital sex." While Turks are considered to be "disorderly, friendly, and hospitable," Germans are said to be "orderly, rule-abiding, and cold." Some claim that "Turks are admirable and religious Muslims, while Germans are immoral and irreligious atheists, though also highly educated." Equality and rights are said to be attributes of German citizenship that are lacking in Turkey, but racism is also believed to be a prominent characteristic of Germans. All of these claims are stereotypes—they are not objective analytical truths about Germany or Turkey. At different moments for different actors, fulfilling a particular stereotype may be positive or negative, desirable or undesirable. For example, “German individualism” is sometimes celebrated and sometimes criticized, depending on the context and the individuals involved.

Stereotypes about Germany and Turkey like those described above are present in Turkish popular culture and can often be heard in daily life. They are part of the fabric of the transnational social field, so a person need not have firsthand knowledge of Germany or Germans to make claims about German and Turkish ethics and national identities. Many of these stereotypes have long histories in Orientalist modes of interaction between Europe and the Middle East, Germany and Turkey, and Christianity and Islam (see for example, Ewing 2008: Chapter 1). Non-migrants and German-Turks have not invented these stereotypes, even though they use them and help to shape them.

To engage with these stereotypes in the chapters which follow, I take inspiration from Michael Herzfeld (2005) who argues that, “It is not necessary to endorse stereotypes in order to study them with a measure of pained self-recognition; and doing so may be a better assurance of good faith than all the antiracist declarations in the world” (2005: 201). Rather, “to deprive others of the capacity for stereotyping, to refuse to recognize such on-the-ground essentializing strategies in which all human groups engage, is a condescending reversion to the otherness of the noble savage” (2005: 209). Like Herzfeld, I find it necessary to examine the sometimes incendiary comments of good people in order to understand the broader national, historical and political processes that shape their ideas and experiences. Doing so paints a fully human portrait of their lives, instead of a partial tableau of exotic nobility.

We must strive to understand why return migrants and others are using stereotypes about Turkish and German ethics when describing their ethical ideas and actions. Herzfeld provides one explanation. Many of the disturbing stereotypes in this dissertation can be interpreted as constructing what he calls "cultural intimacy." Cultural intimacy "can be understood as the sharing of known and recognizable traits that not only define insiderhood but are also felt to be disapproved by powerful outsiders" (2005: 132). National identities and culturally coded roles are produced, reproduced, and sometimes modified through recourse to stereotypes and performances which demonstrate that one does or does not fulfill a desired or undesired stereotype. Herzfeld calls discussions and actions surrounding stereotypes a "social poetics" that links "everyday interaction with the grand dramas of official pomp and historiography" (2005: 26). He argues that "the agents of powerful state entities and the humblest of local social actors engage in the strategy of essentialism to an equal degree…social poetics can be precisely defined as the analysis of essentialism in everyday life" (2005: 32). Both migrants and non-migrants traffic in stereotypes about Germans and Turks, which can be seen as the performance of a social poetics through which their national identities and their places in local communities are made and unmade.

Extending beyond ethno-national identities in this dissertation, I also examine the social poetics of ethical negotiations of belonging in families, neighborhoods and religious groups. In the chapters that follow, as we look at how return migrants and non-migrants discuss German-ness and Turkish-ness, their essentializations should not be taken as analytic "proof" of cultural or ethnic traits or ethical virtues. Rather, people are essentializing as they struggle to define their own identity and belonging. This process can lead to troubling ethical and political consequences, as people often face exclusion, rejection, and stigma based on their perceived ethical and ethno-national characters. For both migrants and non-migrants, essentializations are a tactical way of asserting their belonging within the ethical horizons of the Germany-Turkey transnational social field.

But, though both migrants and non-migrants discuss German and Turkish ethics and modernity, I found that German-Turks' movement into and out of Europe places their ethical comportment and modernity under severe scrutiny. Negative depictions of German-Turks in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field strongly shape how Turks perceive them, and this leads to negative judgments of their ethical comportment. As I explore in the next section, return migrants' "European-ness" comes to stand in for Turkey's "European-ness," so perceptions of their modernity and morality carry significant weight during their interactions with non-migrants.

***ALMANCI* STIGMA**

> A man from Europe. What he said was like sentences cast in concrete. A Turk who had studied in Europe got the top seat at a table, and everyone hung on his lips. If a couple of people were discussing something at a table and a European was present, one said to the other: 'Man, even the European believes me, so how can you dare not believe me, you blockhead.' Europe was a club with which we smashed each other's heads. "We are too much *a la turc*,' said the Turks, and didn't know that even this expression came from Europe. 'Don't be so *a la turc*.' 'Don't behave *a la turc*.' European aspirin cured heart disease. With European cloth one could tell from a distance of forty yards that it was good. European shoes never wore out. European dogs had all studied at European dog schools. European women were natural blondes. European cars didn't cause any accidents (193).
>
> -From Emine Sevgi Özdamer's (1998) *The Bridge of the Golden Horn*.
> (The original German title is: *Die Brücke vom Goldenen Horn*).

Turkish guest worker migration to Germany is a key phenomenon that shaped and continues to shape the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. Özdamer's *The Bridge of the Golden Horn* is a lyrical portrait of how Turks viewed their relationship with Europe at the time of guest worker migration in the 1960s and 1970s. Displaying what Venkat Mani (2007) calls "difficult affiliations" (95), the novel is a semi-autobiographical narrative account of a young Turkish woman who migrates to Germany in 1966. She works in a factory and eventually returns to Turkey several years later and becomes involved in theatrical pursuits and political movements in Istanbul. At the end of the book, political events in Turkey prompt the young woman to move back to Germany. In the above passage, the narrator describes the wonder with which Turks in Istanbul viewed Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. Turks admired Europeans and European goods and criticized themselves for not being European enough, even as they did not realize how much Europe was penetrating their daily lives and even their language.

When Turks began migrating to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, such praise and admiration for all things European was much more common than it is today. At that time, Turkey was a very different country economically, politically, and technologically. For example, in small villages, many people did not have a telephone or a television. Indoor plumbing was not ubiquitous, and cars were rare and expensive. Western goods like chocolate and *Levis* jeans were exotic and special. Consequently, migrants returning from Germany with cars and chocolate were bringing something really unique back to their families. In the 1970s, the image of the *Almancı* emerged—the formerly poor, but now rich returnee, who has become a conspicuous consumer, able to build large and unusual houses and to purchase Mercedes and other Western goods. Unfortunately, this image remains today, but it is now also coupled with concerns (and even embarrassment) about migrants' supposed lack of integration in Germany.

Politicians, media pundits and scholars alike often express concerns about "the problems" of German-Turkish integration (Ewing 2008: 18), and these concerns are widely publicized in Turkey. Many European politicians commenting on Turkey's EU candidacy deploy arguments about migrants' inability to assimilate in Germany as an indication that Turkey will not "fit-in" to the EU (Ehrkamp 2006). Commentators much less frequently note the struggles that migrants face in Germany or the racial and anti-Muslim discrimination to which they are subjected (Blaschke and Sabonovic 2004; Fetzer and Soper 2005).[18] Consequently, many non-migrants conclude that returnees were either unable or unwilling to "fit-in" to Germany. They believe that the "backward *Almancı*" gives Europeans "a bad impression" of Turks.

The Germany-Turkey transnational social field is very different today than it was when migrants first migrated to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. After 1980, Turkey's borders were open to foreign investment bringing in floods of change—new goods, new wealth, and new ideas. Today, Turkey is a member of the G20, an economic power in Europe, a source and recipient of media from around the globe, and an important military ally of Europe and the United States. Interconnections between Turkey and Germany are strong and common today. However, the transnational social field is strongly conditioned by ideas about early periods of Turkish migration to Germany and return migrants' actions. Turks commonly believe that German-Turks are still predominantly poor and uneducated labor migrants who are conspicuous consumers in Turkey, but still have not integrated into Germany. When faced with such stigma, it is not surprising that return migrants claim to be ethical, modern, European, and still Turkish.

From "Foreigner" to "German-er"

Negative views of "*Almancı*s" are commonly expressed by non-migrants in daily life having been shaped by representations in the broader Germany-Turkey transnational social field. The cartoon below plays on a well-known rhyme of the Turkish word for "foreigner" (*yabancı*) and the Turkish word for “German-er or German-like” (*Almancı*). It reads: “Foreigner in Germany, German-er in Turkey.”


ALMANYA'DA YABANCI
TÜRKİYE VE ALMANYA'DAN İLGİNÇ YORUMLAR
TÜRKİYE'DE ALMANCI
DEUTSCHLAND
TÜRKEI
Merhaba
YAYINLARI

[19]

A sweating man walking towards Turkey carries a satchel of Turkey on his back and a shoeprint of Germany on his backside. His experiences in these two national places mean a journey of toil back to Turkey. In fact, this cartoon is a charitable portrayal of the *Yabancı/Almancı* who does not belong in either Germany or Turkey. Many Turks with whom I spoke are quick to stereotype German-Turks in the following negative ways: as “ignorant,” “uncultured,” “backward,” “overly traditional,” and “too religious,” or as degenerates who have “lost their religion,” and become “like Germans,” “criminals,” “divorcees,” and “drug addicts.” Many expressed the view that German-Turkish women have lost or do not care about their sexual honor.

When discussing my research with returnees and non-migrants, it was not uncommon for the same person to express seemingly opposite stereotypic views in quick succession. For example, Deniz stated,

> In the middle of Germany, German-Turks do things that are un-modern (*çağ dışı*) and are no longer happening in Turkish villages. For example, they kill their sisters for honor (*namus*). They sell drugs. They do very stupid, out-dated, not modern things, which cannot EVEN occur in the small villages of Turkey. But, they also commit bad crimes like selling drugs, rape, and theft. Maybe I cannot say 'they are less modern, than Turkish villagers.' But they are definitely not more modern than Turkish villagers. But, you know, people expect you to be more modern if you are living in the middle of Germany."

Other times, people imagine that the first generation is "not modern enough" or "too attached to traditional culture" while the second or third generation is "too modern" and "has lost their ties to traditional culture." For example, observing his relatives led Savaş to develop the following analysis about German-Turks:

> The first generation went to Germany and lived with other Turks and did not change. They did not even learn German because they were ignorant and uneducated. The second generations were able to become entrepreneurs and start their own businesses, but they are caught between two cultures. The third generation are like Germans; they speak German and have completely lost their Turkish culture."

Savaş identifies a progression by generation for German-Turks' from supposed ignorance and traditionalism, to entrapment between cultures, and finally, to the "loss of Turkish culture."

An important dynamic related to the stereotyping of German-Turks is that non-migrants (and many migrants) view first and second generations as at opposite poles along a continuum between failure to attain modernity and excessive modernity. Like Turks who convert to Christianity and represent a "mixed category" (Özyürek 2009), German-Turks are both European and Turkish in Turks' minds. Thus, ironically, returnees may simultaneously represent Turkey's failure to become sufficiently European *and* the dangers of European domination. Many non-migrants think that either returnees cling too strongly to un-modern ethical aims or that they have shed essential ethical aims in their search for modernity.

The inter-linkage of modernity and ethics becomes clear when we examine these stereotypes in more detail. Many non-migrants told me apocryphal stories that illustrate returnees' ignorance and unfamiliarity with modernity and urban life. For example, I heard that when German-Turks first went to Germany, they thought bananas were yellow eggplants and were surprised by their sliminess. People told me about migrants who didn't know how to use toilets with seats, and who took their shoes off when entering apartment buildings (rather than at the doors of their apartments, because they presumably had never before seen an apartment building).

German-Turks are also widely said to be "uncultured," a criticism closely associated with the negative label "*Almancı*" and ideas of migrants' backwardness and lack of modernity. As Ayşe Çağlar (1995) puts it, whatever returning German-Turks "do and achieve, they are always *Almancıs* or *Almanyalıs*, words which evoke connotations of being nouveau riche, backward, uncivilized, etc." (316). I can provide a nice example of how "uncultured-ness" is constructed and linked to ethical aims by examining discussions on the popular television cooking competition show, *Yemekteyiz* (We Are at Dinner). The premise of the show is that one of five contestants hosts the others in each episode, and is then judged on both the preparation of a meal and hospitality.

When the show was filmed in Köln, Germany for one week and featured German-Turkish contestants, Erkan (one of the contestants) asserted, "Turks in Turkey are more cultured than German-Turks." Erkan's comments were provoked by his discovery that the drinking glasses used by one of his competitors still had stickers on them displaying a high quality brand name. The competitor, Hülya, did not want to take off the brand name sticker, explaining, "I always use good brands." Erkan said, "In Turkey people call us *Almancı*. Why? This is why! People don't remove brand names. They try to show what they bought, how much money they have." He continued, “In Turkey, people are raised with an understanding of being cultured better. In an Anatolian village, if a guest visits a woman, and gives the villager woman a glass with the brand name on it, the woman will remove the brand sticker and put the glass in front of the guest.” Clearly, an attempt to show one’s wealth by displaying a particular expensive brand name is an attempt to assert a high (or higher) class status, and German-Turks are undoubtedly keen to show that they are no longer lower class guest workers, but members of a burgeoning middle class. However, Erkan does not criticize migrants for being middle class. He is making an argument about the ethical comportment of German-Turks: their “uncultured-ness” is linked to an unethical lack of modesty regarding one’s wealth and a consequent lack of hospitality, which is widely considered an important Turkish ethical aim.

Many non-migrants essentialize German-Turks as “doing un-modern things,” and they often link migrants’ ethical aims to their inability to become modern. For example, several non-migrants informed me that “German-Turks are living in Germany like people did in Turkey 30 years ago.” Discounting the existence of on-going honor-killing in Turkey, they asserted, “German-Turks are killing their sisters for honor.” One man said, “They are so concerned with protecting their culture, they are more Turkish than Turks.” Migrants are also believed to be extremely religious and excessively focused on overly strict religious virtues. News reports about the Kaplan community, an extremist Turkish Islamic group in Germany, strongly contribute to this impression (Yükleyen 2012). Several people told me that migrants should have removed their headscarves to “fit in” to Germany. One non-migrant related that a relative of hers in Germany wears a black sheet with only her eyes showing through narrow holes. She said, “Even in Turkey we do not like that kind of covering—no wonder they do not like Turks in

Germany!" She believes that her relative's religious practices cause Germans' to reject Turks. But, she asserts that Turks in Turkey also do not approve of such religious practices. Thus, for her, some migrants practice religion in a way that is rejected both in "modern Germany" and also in "modern Turkey."

On the other hand, migrants are also said to have lost their own culture, religion, and "moral compasses," and to have become criminals and drug addicts. For example, non-migrants told me "the children of Turks do not learn enough about their religion in Germany and grow up to be atheists." Many say that their "friends in Germany have lost their children to drugs." Once I had a brief conversation with a man while travelling in Cappadocia, and after I told him that I was studying German-Turks, he said to me, "If I had been born in Germany, I would probably be a drug addict today."

In the 1960s and 1970s, migration and work in Germany represented a potential danger to women's honor, and ideas about the lost honor of German-Turkish women remain prominent today. According to Parla, "sexual honor (*namus*), which is directly linked to women's chastity and is an index of personal or group prestige, continues to be a local and national preoccupation in Turkey" (2005: 146). Rather than a remnant of traditionalism, Parla traces honor codes to the foundation of and the surveillance mechanisms of the modern Turkish state (2005: 147; see also Parla 2001). When Turkish women first went to Germany in the 1950-70s, it was not common for women in Turkey to work, and, even today, women's employment rates in Turkey are low compared to other countries, just 22.2% (ILO 2008). Women are relegated to particular types of jobs, which are deemed socially appropriate for women, and working outside the home may mean facing social stigma (Işık 2008: 528).[20] Paul Magnarella (1998) reports that in 1965 when men first migrated to Germany from the village in which he conducted research, they said, "What business do our wives have there among infidels? Isn't it enough that we go away to work? Our wives will stay at home where they belong" (165). Yet, many women did work in Germany. In Magnarella's study, he notes that migrant men's perspective eventually changed, and they brought their wives to Germany, where they began to work (166).

Many returnee women described feelings of fear of Turkish men in Germany during the 1960s and 1970s. Selin related:

> I was never scared of Germans, but I was scared of Turkish men because they were more likely to try to take advantage of the Turkish women. Sometimes men would enter the factory dormitories saying that they just wanted to find their relatives or wives, but they had bad intentions. Or, they acted like they were single guys wanting to help us, but they were married. I asked one guy, 'Do you have a wife? Give me her address!' since I could tell that he was married to a woman in Turkey, and was just trying to have sex with women in Germany. In the end, my problems ended when my husband moved to Germany, and we got our own apartment.

In Selin's account, Turkish men were a danger to Turkish women's honor, as they looked for "easy sex," even though they were married. Presumably, Turkish men saw Turkish women breaking taboos of working and wondered whether sexual taboos could be broken.

Some German-Turks describe at length perceived differences between Turks and Germans in terms of ethical virtues for women. For example, one man who had spent some time in Germany told me that "a girl's virginity is important to Turks like me." If he sees his sister walking with a stranger on the street, he will be very angry. However, he thinks that "the third generation of German-Turks does not even care about a woman's sexual honor (*namus*)." Other returnees discussed how living with a boyfriend before marriage is normal for Germans, but it is immoral for Turks. Selin said that her daughter experienced difficulties in Germany "because the life there is more free, and women are under pressure to wear miniskirts and make-up; and if they don't do so, other kids say you're ugly." Non-migrants hold similar conceptions of the "freedom" of German women and of the prevalence of premarital sex in Germany. Such perceptions lead them to view German-Turkish women suspiciously. Some non-migrants said they think that German-Turkish women are "easy" (*hafif meşrep, kolay kadın*) or "immoral" (*ahlaksız*).

In all of these images of German-Turks presented by non-migrants—refusing to let go of negative ethical aims or losing all positive ethical aims—a "correct" relationship to modernity is absent. German-Turks, who have been both symbolically present and absent from Turkey through many years of its development, are poised on this binary between notions of Turkey's traditionalism and modernity. Thus, they become a symbolic focus for Turks' fears about Western modernity and fears about their potential failure to achieve it.

This negative conception of return migrants' modernity and ethical comportment is further demonstrated in two films about German-Turks: *Yellow Mercedes* (*"Fikrimin İnce Gülü," Sarı Mercedes, Mercedes Mon Amour*) and *The Edge of Heaven* (*Auf der anderen Seite, Yaşamın Kıyısında*). Films like these are a critically important part of the transnational social field that produces and reflects understandings about German-Turks' morality and modernity. In the first film, *Yellow Mercedes*, a first generation return migrant is portrayed as "backwards" and "uncultured," sacrificing his ethical values in a fruitless quest for modernity. In the latter film, *The Edge of Heaven,* first and second generation returnees are portrayed as immersed in modern problems, such as prostitution, crime and drugs. Women's sexuality is represented prominently and negatively in both films. In the first film, a Turkish woman has sex with a Turkish man in exchange for a ride to Turkey that is eventually not given, while another Turkish woman is molested after getting into a man's Mercedes. In the second film, a prostitute is killed by her lover after sleeping with his son, and a young Turkish woman who travels to Germany uses drugs and has a lesbian relationship with a German woman before eventually winding up in a Turkish prison. In these films, Germany and associating with German-Turks seems to be dangerous for women, representing sexuality outside of heterosexual marriage and a loss of sexual honor that may even end in death.

Both films are haunting and uncanny portrayals of German-Turkish homelessness. As Deniz Bayrakdar (2009) points out, in *The Edge of Heaven*, we have the "uncanny" or "*unheimlich*." By uncanny, she means scenes of "prisons, undefined hotel rooms, little shops of bordellos, the frames of dark windows" (122). While *Yellow Mercedes* is not uncanny like *The Edge of Heaven,* there seems to be a subtle uncanny-ness in this film too, as the main character meets continued disappointments with a forced cheerfulness that ultimately masks his loss, loneliness and failure. The ideas about returnees in these films parallel Turks' own fears about maintaining and/or attaining ethical aims associated with Turkish and European modernities. Understanding how returnees are portrayed in such films provides insight into why return migrants feel prompted to account for their ethical comportment and in some cases their ethical character.

Adalet Ağaoğlu'nun Aynı Adlı Romanından
"FİKRİMİN İNCE GÜLÜ"
Sarı Mercedes
MERCEDES MON AMOUR
29.Antalya Altın Portakal Film Festivali "EN İYİ YÖNETMEN"
"EN İYİ KURGU" "EN İYİ 2.FİLM"
5. Ankara Film Festivali "EN İYİ ERKEK OYUNCU"
1992 Kültür Bakanlığı "SİNEMA BAŞARI" Ödülü
7. Adana Altın Koza Kültür Sanat Festivali
"EN İYİ MÜZİK"
SİYAD "EN İYİ GÖRÜNTÜ YÖNETMENİ"
İLYAS SALMAN
DVD
bir TUNÇ OKAN filmi

Yellow Mercedes

Many non-migrants claim that their ideas about German-Turks come from a series of films made about return migrants in the 1970s and 1980s, and I often heard about the film *Yellow Mercedes.* Based on a novel by the well-known Turkish author, Adalet Ağaoğlu, this movie is striking for its portrayal of a German-Turk returning to Turkey, who has seemingly lost all morality in his attempt (and failure) to attain Western modernity. The film opens with Bayram (played by Ilyas Salman) working for the trash department in Germany. In the next scene, after showing off his brand new yellow Mercedes to a Turkish woman, he has sex with her in the back seat of the car in exchange for his promise that he will drive her back to Turkey. But, later Bayram does not keep his promise, and we see her waiting on the curb in Germany surrounded by her suitcases. She has had sex with him without receiving the promised ride.

Throughout his journey back to Turkey, he calls his Mercedes "*balkız*" (honey girl), and he frequently elevates the car in importance over the other people that he meets. For example, he says to several older men, “Sorry I parked my Mercedes in front of you, but I’m leaving soon.” Shortly thereafter, when he stops for food, the symbolic Mercedes star is stolen off the front hood of the car, and Bayram immediately accuses everyone in the area of being a thief. Later, he refuses to buy gas from a gas station with donkeys grazing out front, but waits for “quality” gasoline. In the next scene, he is stopped by a policeman for speeding, and, rather than remorse, he thinks, “he is a policeman, but he cannot buy a Mercedes.” In each case, the material object of the Mercedes and the wealth that it symbolizes is a means for him to place himself above others.

A clear example of his unethical actions, comes when he sees that his good friend from Germany and the woman that he had sex with in Germany (whom he was supposed to drive back to Turkey) have gotten into a car accident. He decides not to stop to help them, even though they try to flag him down. Later, he tries to pick up an attractive blond woman by lying to her, telling her that he works in a factory in Germany, not in trash collection. She ignores him until she learns that he drives a Mercedes. She gets into the car with him, but he aggressively grabs her and kisses her. In her anger and fear, she flees, scratching the door when opening it. Eventually, he has a serious car accident, and his Mercedes is dented and nearly destroyed, though still drivable. Although he has bought the car in order to show-off to his fellow villagers, he seems not to value his family, friends, or potential wife in his village. Through a series of flashbacks we see that as a child Bayram pushed his childhood love (Kezban) aside to chase after a car. We also see Kezban trying to convince him not to go to Germany, and she calls him “character-less” (*karaktersiz*), a strong insult in Turkey. We learn that he took his friend Ibrahim’s opportunity to go to Germany by falsifying a report and that he had promised that he would eventually let Ibrahim come to Germany, a promise he hasn't kept. He places no value on friendship.

Finally, he is about to return to his village, and he prepares by putting on a shirt printed with the Mercedes logo. This is one of several actions (along with announcing loudly to a group of men that he will move his Mercedes soon), that could be considered "uncultured." At this point, a local shepherd boy passes by and tells Bayram that his uncle, his friend Ibrahim, and even Kezban have suffered because of his actions. As a final blow, he learns that his village has been declared an archeological site. Bayram arrives to see a tie-dye painted minivan pulling up to his village, and Americans doing an archeological dig there. The final scene of the movie is Bayram's battered Mercedes at the newly paved crossroads of his former village, which is no longer there. The Turkey that Bayram hoped to return to has changed beyond recognition in his absence—in fact, Western modernity in the form of American archeologists has penetrated Turkey in his absence.

Overall, the movie is an extreme portrayal of a German-Turk's experiences: the German-Turk returning from Germany loses absolutely everything—his family, his love, his village, and even the symbolic German car, which is dented and barely running by the movie's end. It is also an extreme portrayal of a German-Turks' attitudes. Bayram has rejected his family, his friends and his fellow Turks in his desire for prestige, respect, and recognition (ultimately symbolized by his Mercedes). His love, Kezban's, assertion that he is "characterless" sums it up. In addition to rejecting her, he takes advantage of one woman in Germany and tries to take advantage of another while travelling back to Turkey. Aside from Kezban who maintains her honor by staying with her family in Turkey, the women in the film are portrayed negatively, as eagerly interested in exchanging sex for the possibility of riding in a Mercedes. Though Bayram loves his "honey girl," this Mercedes does not bring him lasting happiness in love or success or prestige in Turkey. Even the Mercedes ends up a ruined and barely drivable piece of metal at the end of the movie. Bayram has adopted a symbol of Western wealth and modernity, the Mercedes car, but even that symbol is lost at the end

It seems Bayram has lost his ethical values and also failed to attain Western modernity. While the portrait of the German-Turk in the movie is an exaggeration, for many non-migrants, Bayram displays the "character" expected of German-Turks. Such ideas come up in several chapters of my thesis, as I describe non-migrants' complaints about returnees' conspicuous consumption, "snobbishness" and "individualistic actions." The prominence of these ideas about German-Turks is one reason why returnees and particularly women feel a need to account for their character. I explore this directly in the following chapter, when I discuss returnees' assertions that they have maintained "good characters" in Germany—in particular, by fulfilling the duties of daughters to be obedient and to send money to relatives in Turkey. These assertions of character can be understood in part as attempts to combat negative stereotypes that presume they have lost their honor as women during migration. They assert an ethical belonging in their families in order to show that they have not become "character-less" like Bayram and some of the women with whom he interacts in the film.

Questions of ethical character and modernity are also at stake in *The Edge of Heaven,* where the present-day, seemingly tortured lives of German-Turks are brought to life.

"EXTRAORDINARY!"
THE
EDGE
FROM THE ACCLAIMED DIRECTOR OF
HEAD-ON
FATIH AKIN
OF
HEAVEN

The Edge of Heaven

The recent Fatih Akin film, *The Edge of Heaven (Yaşamın Kıyısında; Auf der anderen Seite),* which won the Prix du scenario at the 2007 Cannes Film Festival, is a gritty portrayal of the plagues of modernity for German-Turks and was widely shown in Turkey. Akin's films and, in fact, his own identity as a German-Turkish film-maker are very important for shaping ideas about German-Turks in Turkey. Turkish film and media critics examine Akin's background to determine whether his films belong to Germany or to Turkey and what it means that one of the most well known Turkish filmmakers is a German-Turk (Erdoğan 2009). Bayrakdar (2009) connects Akin's status as a representative of German-Turkish identity to Turkey's desire for European belonging. She claims, "Fatih Akin who has lived in Europe since his childhood, has not finished his journey yet. I think this is parallel to Turkey's journey in Europe…the idea of being part of it, but the difficulty in belonging to it or being accepted by it" (2009: 127). Neither Akin nor Turkey have yet found belonging and acceptance in Europe. In *The Edge of Heaven,* this difficulty of belonging to Europe is on display as the characters lead troubled and often tragic lives.

There are four main German-Turkish characters in the film, each of whom becomes a return migrant at some point: a father and son, Ali and Nejat, and a mother and daughter, Yeter and Ayten. Yeter is a middle-aged prostitute working in Bremen, Germany, and Ali is an aging, alcoholic widower who engages her services. After agreeing to pay her what she makes monthly as a prostitute, Ali invites her to move in with him. A few scenes later, Ali has a heart attack and is hospitalized, during which time his son Nejat who is a professor of German Studies at a German university, sleeps with Yeter. When Ali discovers this, he is angry; he fights with Yeter and hits her. She falls and is accidentally killed, and thus after a life of prostitution in Germany, she returns to Turkey in a coffin. Since Ali has committed a murder, he returns to Turkey as a forced deportee, and heads back to his village on the Black sea coast. The cinematic portrayal of older migrants is one involving prostitution, alcoholism, violence, and even murder.

This story is followed by a focus on the second generation. Before Yeter's death, she tells Nejat that she has a daughter, Ayten, in Turkey whom she has not recently spoken with and whom she misses. After her death, Nejat returns to Turkey and tries unsuccessfully to find Ayten. Nejat eventually gives up the search for Ayten and purchases a German bookstore. He appears to be a German living in Turkey: selling German books and speaking German daily, and he eventually takes in two German roommates. Ayten has meanwhile been involved in leftist political activities in Turkey. She flees Turkey for Germany, begins dating a German woman, smokes marijuana, and tries to attain asylum in Germany. After her request is denied, she is sent back to Turkey and placed in a prison. In this filmic portrayal, we see the younger generation of

German-Turks either having sex with their father's girlfriends and living with (and like) Germans after returning to Turkey, or experimenting with lesbianism and marijuana in Germany, and subsequently ending up in a Turkish prison. They are portrayed as "Germanized," drug abusers, and criminal.

The German-Turkish characters in this film are troubled by the social ills that many Turks imagine German-Turks confront: alcoholism, violence, drug use, and what they consider immoral sexuality (prostitution and lesbianism), but which they believe are not significant problems in Turkey. We could say this film shows German-Turks having become "modern" in all of the "wrong ways" and with all of the negative consequences, including crime and death. As in *Yellow Mercedes*, this depiction of German-Turkish lives is an extreme one, emphasizing difficulties and painting German-Turks as engaging in ethically questionable activities, rather than as people who live similarly to many Turks in Turkey. To many Turks, while *Yellow Mercedes* is a film about a migrant sacrificing ethical virtues while failing to attain modernity, *The Edge of Heaven* is about German-Turks sacrificing ethical virtues to attain a bleak, painful modernity.

Thanks to these and similar films as well as other representations of migrants in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field, non-migrants imagine that German-Turks are caught between two poles of modernity and ethics. The Germany-Turkey transnational social field places returnees in a suspicious position in which they become representatives of Turks' hopes and anxieties about their European-ness, modernity and ethics. In this milieu, returnees struggle to assert their maintenance of Turkish ethical aims and their adoption of positive European ethical aims and a European-Turkish modernity.

PARADOXES OF LACK OF BELONGING

In this chapter, I have attempted to describe the tangible and imagined set of relationships that constitute the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. Historical and contemporary German and Turkish economic and cultural networks, media images of German-Turks and the real world actions of return migrants are essential elements that produce an idea of a shared Germany-Turkey space. Ultimately, the social field is a space where ideas about ethics and ethno-national identities are produced, reproduced and challenged. Return migrants both shape and are shaped by a social field of stereotypes about Germans and Turks. Unfortunately, most representations of German-Turks in the transnational social field are portrayals of their “lack of modernity” or “excessive modernity” or their “backward ethics” or “lack of ethics.” In the upcoming chapters, I build off of the material I include here about the Germany-Turkey transnational social field to show how returnees engage with these ideas about themselves during negotiations of belonging. They use stereotypes about ethical comportment and ethno-national identities to justify their current and past whereabouts. Through recourse to stereotypes, they assert that they are “ethical Europeans,” “modern Muslims” and “good Turkish citizens.” Return migrants negotiate a place in a transnational field that is simultaneously an ethical field.

CHAPTER 4
PREDICAMENTS OF RECIPROCITY AND HORIZONS OF FAMILY BELONGING

"The first generation of migrants worked like donkeys. They worked a lot. The Deutschmark was very valuable, and they worked in factories. Turks did the worst jobs. After their factory shifts, they worked by the hour cleaning houses. And the relatives in Turkey thought: 'Oh, in Germany they print Deutschmarks.' And the person returned to Turkey and bought fields and came with a car. And the relatives said, 'I need this much money.' The one in Germany, said 'okay,' and sent money. Then, there are more and more requests for money. And then the ones here in Turkey said: 'Why should I work?'

The first generation did the worst jobs and then came back to Turkey and spent a lot of money. This was very damaging for them: They brought shampoo and chocolate, which people loved because it came from Germany, and people got used to this. This happened to me, when I came back to Turkey. My stepmother was in Germany, and my mother here in Turkey wanted money from my stepmother and her relatives in Germany. They said that I should call them and get money. My stepmother refused to send money. She did not have to send money. Only one time she sent 50 marks. This was a mistake. I was embarrassed to ask her for this money, but there is pressure here. People in Turkey always think 'they are rich,' but it is hard to work there. I know."

-Meltem, a returnee to Istanbul

Reciprocal exchanges of money, goods, and physical and emotional support both demonstrate and also sustain belonging in Turkish families (White 1994). Therefore, migrants and their relatives shared the expectation that those moving to Germany would send remissions home. Yet, German-Turks experience significant conflicts surrounding expectations for reciprocity with family members. Of course all Turks (and all of us for that matter) occasionally experience conflict with our families, but I observed significant dilemmas for return migrants that often ended in the complete cessation of communication between family members. Every returnee that I met insisted that relationships with relatives were extremely important and often a major reason for returning to Turkey. But, they often complained about their parents', in-laws', siblings' and extended family members' greediness, thanklessness and insensitivity. When I spoke with returnees' parents, in-laws, siblings and extended family members, I often heard that German-Turks evade family obligations and are overly concerned with money, snobby, and excessively individualistic. Given that returnees and their relatives both place a high value on family relationships, how can we explain the pervasiveness and seriousness of predicaments between German-Turks and their family members? Further, what does this tell us about the affect of migration on family ethics and belonging?

In this chapter, I explore return migrants' predicaments of reciprocity, how they and their families negotiate the meaning of ethical ideals for family members and thus belonging. My focus is on first generation migrant women, their narratives about reciprocity and my observations of their interactions with their relatives. (First generation women refers to those who migrated from Turkey to Germany between 1961 and 1973.) I focus exclusively on women's narratives here, because although men have significant family obligations, many ideals of reciprocity, such as caring for children or the elderly, are linked to women's performance of their roles in their families. Also, women spoke more often about their familial obligations than men.

I found that conflicts between women and their family members arise for several reasons. First, migration changes family relationships because it exacerbates the dialectic between ethical ideals for reciprocity and the realities of distance and separation. Specifically, families of German-Turks and even German-Turks themselves often view migrants as family money-makers, and in place of the ideal of frequent, everyday and non-material exchanges, reciprocity between migrants and kin is reduced to financial exchange. Secondly, in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field, migrants are often portrayed negatively as rich, conspicuous consumers, overly concerned with wealth and unconcerned with family ties. Images of migrant women often link work in Germany to a loss of honor. All of this can foster the impression that returnee women care more about material goods than their duties as family members. Finally, return migrants' actions, including building unconventional and expensive houses in Turkey, displaying German luxury goods, and refusing to care for elderly relatives also contribute to this perception that migrants are not concerned with fostering family relationships. In fact, women's ethical aims for themselves and their relationships do change in part during the course of migration. Even though women insist on the importance of relationships with extended family, they develop new self-conceptions as "women workers" liberated from "traditional Turkish" familial roles, and they place increased importance on spending time with their husbands and German-Turkish friends. All of this casts suspicion on their ethical comportment and affects their family belonging at "home."

I found that this milieu of suspicion about the ethical comportment of returnees and the ensuing predicaments with relatives that they face leads migrants to frequently speak about their ethical aims as family members and to assert their on-going family belonging. In this chapter and throughout this dissertation, I address an anthropology of ethics, which has heretofore been dominated by Foucauldian approaches and attention to self-crafting (Laidlaw 2002; Mahmood 2005; Zigon 2008). While individual reflection and work on the self, which Foucault strongly emphasizes, are significant elements of ethical projects for return migrants, I take my cue from Ricoeur who highlights the importance of narratives and self-other relationships for negotiating ethical ideals. I focus on how interactions with family members and neighbors generate ethical reflections and negotiations for returnees. In contrast to the chapters that follow, this chapter offers a unique focus on ethical changes to family relationships for return migrants and on how migrants account for their changing selves. Ricoeur suggests that references to word and character in narratives allow individuals to maintain self-conceptions as ethical people and to maintain ethical relationships with others in the face of changes over time. Keeping one's word demonstrates an unchanging, constant self and is related to an ethics of friendship, faithfulness and promises. Character "designates the set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized" (1992: 121). Character traits are the set of signs that show who a person is and what makes that person good and moral.

In this chapter, I show how returnees' discussions of their word and character when faced with predicaments of reciprocity are a part of how they negotiate their own changing ethical aims and the challenges posed by migration to ideals for family relationships over time. When talking with their family members, neighbors and me, returnees assert that they have kept their word to their relatives by fulfilling their familial duties (*görev*) and that they have maintained their ‘good’ character (*karakter*). Specifically, they refer to their obedience, suffering, sacrifice, and generosity, and to being hardworking and “good” daughters, sisters, mothers and in-laws. With these discussions, returnees reject accusations of having become “bad women” in Germany, of trying to escape their families, and of excessive individualism and snobbishness. Women aim to reposition themselves—not as “donkeys” working for their families, but—as enlightened, hard-working individuals, responsible for their own destinies, but still engaged and concerned with family.

Each thesis chapter addresses an anthropology of return migration focused on home and belonging (e.g. Al-Ali and Koser 2002; Brettell 2003: 49; Christou 2008; Chu 2006; Constable 1999; Dalakoglou 2010; Reynolds 2010; Stefansson and Markowitz 2004), but only this chapter focuses explicitly on how these narratives of word and character become strategies for negotiating belonging. I show that migration leads returnees to develop new ideas about women’s familial roles and significantly changes their personal, financial, and social circumstances. But, migrants assert that family ethics and belonging have not changed for them—that they have kept their word and are still “good” daughters and daughters-in-law. Looking at returnees’ narratives of word and character sheds light on their inter-linked projects of ethics and family belonging and illuminates how migrants account for changing selves and changing relationships over time.

In the next section, I begin by discussing the high value that most Turks place on family relationships and outlining the roles and expectations of male and female family members. Then, I look closely at ideals of reciprocity for family relationships in Turkey, which are critically important to migrants and their family members. Having described Turkish kinship and reciprocity in detail, I discuss how migration may affect relationships of reciprocity, as distance in time and space limits the varieties of reciprocity that are possible for migrants. I also examine how migration may change returnees' ideas about relationships with others and how the broader landscape of the Germany-Turkey transnational social field affects non-migrants' perceptions of the actions of return migrants. Finally, I share returnees' narratives and examine the predicaments of reciprocity that one returnee, Derya, confronts after returning to Turkey. In the midst of her predicaments, Derya and returnees like her insist on their execution of duty and their good character. They insist that they fulfill familial ethical ideals, ideals for themselves as women, and in this way they seek to (re)establish their belonging in their families and communities.

TURKISH KINSHIP

Rapid economic and social changes and differences between lower and upper classes and rural and urban dwellers mean that there are very diverse family forms in Turkey. Nevertheless, some broad generalizations are possible. "The family," in some form, is important in almost every culture, but in Turkey, families are an absolutely critical source of identity, belonging, and emotional and practical support. This becomes obvious after only a brief amount of time in Turkey and some simple observations: When Turks first meet in small villages, they often discuss their family ties as a way of finding some blood or marriage link between them that will strengthen their relationship. Even in big cities, people call strangers by familiar family names, like "big brother," "big sister," "aunty," or "uncle." Within Turkish families, rather than relying on personal names, people often refer to each other with terms that describe their familial relationship such as “mother’s brother” (*dayı*), “father’s sister” (*hala*), “groom” (*damat*), or “son” (*oğul*). Most Turks believe that they place a higher value on familial closeness than members of most other cultures, but especially when compared to Europeans or “Westerners,” who they stereotype as “individualistic.”

In today’s Turkey, people usually live as nuclear families (a mother, a father, and children), though they often care for elderly relatives in their homes and sometimes live patrilocally—with or near the man’s family. Close extended family relationships with grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins are highly valued. Grandmothers and grandfathers are treated as wise and deserving of respect, and the elderly are expected to provide practical and emotional support to younger family members (children, nieces, and nephews) if they can. Elderly people usually live close to their children and are often cared for by their children when they can no longer care for themselves. Nursing homes are few and far between, and most people consider it shameful to send an elderly relative to a nursing home. Children are also very highly valued; people who do not marry or start families, and particularly women who do not marry by age 30, or couples with no children are likely to face severe stigma. Unmarried women are referred to with the negative label “left at home” (*evde kalmış*), alluding to the belief that no one was willing to take them in marriage from their parents’ home.

Today, marriages are rarely “arranged marriages” strictly speaking, though parents and other relatives will often play a significant role in finding suitable spouses for their children and will pressure their children to marry particular individuals.[1] Most people prefer their children to marry the children of family friends or people they know from their natal village. In the 1960s and 1970s, during the time of guest worker migration to Germany, many migrants’ marriages were arranged marriages, and many of the returnees that I met described marrying people whom they barely knew, but who were well-known to relatives. They usually married between the ages of 13 and 20. Several prominent anthropologists describe Turkish marriage relationships as grounded only in economic cooperation and sexual intimacy and lacking companionship (Delaney 1991; Stirling 1965), but Kimberly Hart (2007) disputes their findings, arguing that people today seek out loving, romantic relationships. She writes, "Researchers in Turkey have not paid attention to how rural people are agents of their intimate and emotional lives" (2007: 350). Indeed, I found that romantic love is important to most Turkish young people today regardless of social class.

As in many societies in the world, Turkish family relationships can generally be described as patriarchal (Abadan-Unat 1982a; 1982b; Beller-Hann and Hann 2001; Önder 2007; White 1994). Nevertheless, in actual practice, there is often a great range of action for women and significant space for negotiation of their roles in their families. As they age, some women become matriarchs, making significant choices about family relationships and activities, household purchases, and many other decisions.

Within Turkish families, women and men usually have different roles. Women are typically responsible for caring for the children and the house—cooking, cleaning, and hosting—while men are usually responsible for providing material support and security for their wives and children. This is gradually changing as more and more Turkish women are working outside the home and improved economic conditions enable women in cities to hire people to help them with housework. For the most part, however, women are still expected to take on the majority of household responsibilities, while men provide the majority of material support. In their youth, daughters spend significant time socializing with their mothers and her sisters, while sons socialize more with their fathers and his brothers. In some families, sons are extremely treasured: they may receive advanced education while daughters may not, and they may take on the role of protecting and sometimes controlling their sisters. When a son grows up and marries, it important for him to show care and concern for his mother, as a means of repaying his debt to her for raising him—a debt which is called a "milk debt" in Turkey (White 1994). A woman's relationship with her son is the most important relationship for her, as it will eventually be his (and his wife's) responsibility to care for her in old age.

Before marriage, women owe a debt of labor to their own mothers, and after marriage they owe their labor to their husband's family and particularly to his mother. The Turkish word for bride is "*gelin*," which means, "to come" and people literally say, "We took a bride." If the couple lives near or with the husband's parents, this can create severe burdens for daughters-in-law, who sometimes are expected to obey the wishes of both their husbands and their mothers-in-law. Some women feel very lonely and isolated from their own families and are not able to set-up an autonomous social life while under the control of their husbands' family. However, women still seek to maintain close relationships with their own parents, aunts and cousins and are expected to continue to visit and help these family members even after marriage. As Jenny White notes, "a mother has a moral and emotional claim to her married daughter's labor, especially if she has no grown sons…[Their] bond of affection and caring leads to the expectation of assistance from daughter and a sense of obligation of daughters to their mothers" (1994: 49). In practice, women may feel torn between those competing claims on their labor (1994: 48). As I explore below, claims on women's labor and expectations of financial support from daughters and nieces create predicaments for German-Turks. To understand these predicaments, I discuss in the next section how family relationships are formed and strengthened through exchanges.

RECIPROCITY IN TURKEY

Anthropologists have been interested in reciprocity almost from the founding of the discipline (Malinowski 1922; 1962 [1926]; Mauss 1954 (English) [1990]; Sahlins 1972; 1988; Wiener 1980) and have shown that reciprocity allows recognition of "social worth" (Herzfeld 1987), enables belonging and status in social networks (Forte 2001; Hetherington 2001), and creates and expresses moral obligations (Mauss 1954 (English) [1990]; Widlok 2004).[2] Reciprocity is a particularly important area of study for return migration scholars, who demonstrate that participation in exchange is an important tool for establishing belonging in families (e.g. Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Salih 2002). Since reciprocity is concerned with the self-other relationship and with ideals for 'good' actions, I consider it to be an ethical practice. Fusing extensive anthropological literature on reciprocity with my framework for exploring ethics, I define reciprocity as a system of actions involving material and non-material exchanges, which reflect ethical ideals for the cultivation of relationships.

In Turkey, reciprocity is crucial for establishing familial relationships and provides a means of showing care and concern for social bonds. White (1994) offers a comprehensive account of reciprocity and kinship in Turkey in which she argues that reciprocity involves the exchange of debts. Each family member has open-ended debts toward other family members. In meeting the requirements of one's role (for example as wife, daughter, or mother), individuals participate in the "web of reciprocal obligations on which group stability and security (and therefore the security of the individual) rests" (White 1994: 61). They also gain respect and acceptance. For example, by caring for her husband and his mother, a woman can be considered a "good woman" (1994: 7).

Most reciprocal exchanges of indebtedness take everyday forms: cooking food and bringing it to a relative, babysitting a child, or helping to find a suitable marriage partner as one makes one's rounds of visiting and hosting. Help and support in extraordinary circumstances is also expected. Financial exchange plays an important role within reciprocity, as individuals are ideally expected to make financial sacrifices for their immediate and extended families, and generosity with money is an extremely important ethical value.[3] I often heard people discussing their own wealth as their family's wealth and conversely discussing their family's wealth as their own.

Ricoeur's concepts of word and character are useful for illuminating how Turks discuss and think about relationships of reciprocity. Turkish family members engage in reciprocity to keep their word and demonstrate their 'good' character to other members of their families. But, the concepts of word and character take on a slightly different meaning in the Turkish context. Rather than thinking of keeping one's word strictly in the sense of an individual verbal promise, as Ricoeur does, in Turkey, keeping one's word is related to an idea of duty (*görev*). People fulfill their duties to others, such as their family members, and thereby show that they are reliable, responsible, loving, and good—capable of keeping a promise. Character or acting with character (*karekterli*) is very important for most Turks; in fact, to say that someone is "characterless" (*karektersiz*) is a strong insult. People evaluate character by referring to traits, like honesty, obedience, and generosity. But, again, as with the notion of duty, character is often connected to fulfilling one's role in a group and to concepts of loyalty and responsibility. In addition to considering personal character *traits*, Turks are likely to consider a person's character in relation to whether or not he or she is a good husband, mother, sister, etc.—fulfilling expected duties of care and concern—and therefore demonstrating his or her good character.

German-Turks, like all Turks, place great importance on reciprocal relationships, fulfilling their duties towards family, and cultivating a "good" character. However, in the next section, I discuss some of the ways that migration affects German-Turks' kinship relationships. Understanding how migration affects kinship helps to explain the serious conflicts that arise for returnees, even though they insist on their deep and abiding care for their in-laws and extended families in Turkey.

KINSHIP, MIGRATION, AND THE GERMANY-TURKEY TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD

Several scholars have shown that migration changes moral economies of kinship (Gowricharn 2004; Hage 2002; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007: 137) and that new moralities may emerge between migrants and non-migrants in contexts of transnationalism (Carling 2005; Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2001: 71). Indeed, I found that migration affects kinship for German-Turks by exacerbating the dialectic between ideals and realities for kinship relationships, by changing migrants' ideas about themselves and their relationships of belonging, and by placing migrants in a stigmatized social position in the eyes of their co-citizens. I discuss in turn each of these influences on family relationships for German-Turks in this section.

To explain the prevalence of conflicts between migrants and their family members, Daniel Miller (2007) argues that migration intensifies an ever-present dialectic between the ideals and realities of kinship relationships. He draws from an examination of Rhacel Parreñas' (2005a; 2005b) work with Filipina migrants and contends that the separation of Filipina mothers from their children "exacerbates the distinction between the idealized norms represented by mother and child and their actual relationship, which here is significantly diminished" (542). In other words, migration exacerbates a distinction between the ideal for ethical actions towards family and the reality of limited actions available to a migrant. For German-Turks, this leads directly to what I call predicaments of reciprocity. While in Germany, in place of an ideal of frequent material and non-material reciprocal exchanges, German-Turks can only exchange financial wealth. They cannot care for sick and elderly relatives, assist with wedding planning, or exchange food, labor, etc. Of course, this situation is the result of geographic distance and not migrants' fault per se, but many non-migrants left behind in Turkey believe that migrants evade family obligations while in Germany. For instance, I often heard that migrants had "escaped" their responsibilities to family and that they are irresponsible (*sorumsuz*), German-ized (*Almanlaşmak*) and overly individualistic (*bireyci*, *bireysel*). In İlçe, rumors often circulated about migrants who heartlessly brought elderly relatives to Germany or who abandoned them in Turkey, both of which are demonstrations of evading care obligations.

Relatives sometimes feel that German-Turks are burdening them and are unaware of their needs. For example, Esra is a return migrant who has one brother in Germany. Her brother is currently building a house in Turkey, but he only checks on the project in short visits during the summer. In the meantime, Esra and her husband must coordinate the project. As we toured her brother's house construction site, Esra complained to her husband that while her brother is in Germany, she and her husband must manage all of the arrangements for the house. "Muammer must come to Turkey for several weeks and oversee this project. We cannot manage everything ourselves," she said. In addition to the difficulties caused by migrants' absence, I found that returnees had no awareness of how much extra work even their sporadic visits mean for their relatives. Esra complained to a neighbor that, when her brother returns, "his wife is so busy visiting people that my mother is burdened with watching their children the entire time, which makes me mad."

This lack of awareness on the part of German-Turks of their non-migrant family members' needs is often attributed to their wealth and supposed newly learned individualism. For example, Melek, a middle-aged non-migrant woman in Istanbul, described her German-Turkish neighbors as follows: "Each family member has their own money to spend, and they do their shopping separately. They are individualistic." Similarly, Serpil, a middle-aged non-migrant woman in İlçe, observes, "In Germany, there is a lot of divorce, and people are cold and individualistic. Some German-Turks do not want to return to Turkey, because they do not want to give up their individualism." She links individualism to broken family relationships—divorce—and an uncaring, "cold" demeanor.

Even returnees describe German-Turks as more individualistic. For example, Sinan explains why German-Turks seem to be "less willing to care for their families:"

> I have learned to be more egoistic because of the individualistic nature of life in Germany. In Germany, there was the social state, and it was caring for everything, but here there is no state, and we have not learned that. As German-Turks worked in Germany, they worked as a core family, a nuclear family. You only learn to care for two factors beside yourself. You are not thinking about helping anyone, because the other families are getting help from the state, or have enough money. But, here in Turkey, you have a lack of money and family members need to help one another.

Melek, Serpil and Sinan are mobilizing common stereotypes about Germans—that they are individualistic and cold in comparison to warm and loving Turks. We can interpret this as fostering a cultural intimacy through which they cultivate their own sense of Turkish ethno-national identity. But, for Sinan at least, ideas about individualism and family also seem to be influenced by varying ideas about the role of the state. He observes that an institutional milieu in Germany, a strong state, takes over the "traditional" role of the Turkish family.

Rather than attributing migrants' ideas and actions surrounding family relationships to migrants' supposed individualism, I would argue that, for some migrants, migration changes certain family relationships and leads to new relationships of belonging. For example, after migrating to Germany, relationships between German-Turkish women and their husbands may involve more open communication and may be more important to them than their relationships with other women and extended family. Barbara Wolbert (1996), who researched German-Turkish return migrants in the 1980s and early 1990s, found that, indeed, German-Turkish couples discuss more topics more openly than non-migrant couples and that this can create strains between women and their relatives and neighbors in Turkey who do not trust returnee women to keep personal information private from their husbands. Similarly, I found that migration seems to foster closer relationships between husbands and wives and that when migrants return to Turkey, relatives' demands for providing care to family and other expectations for reciprocal exchanges may conflict with migrants' desires to spend quality time with their spouses. These conflicts between relatives' demands and returnees' desires can cause migrants to feel that relationships with extended family members are burdensome. I also found that migrants develop close relationships with their fellow migrants in Germany, which seems to displace traditional relationships of closeness primarily with extended family members, in-laws and neighbors. If return migrants seek to nurture these relationships after returning to Turkey—

which many do—then relationships with their extended family members and neighbors may be fraught with disappointment and tension. (In the following chapter, Chapter 5, I touch on returnees' friendships with German-Turks in more depth than I do in this chapter).

Having said this, it is important to note that changing ideas about family relationships and changes to reciprocal relations do not necessarily mean that return migrants place less value on extended family than do their relatives and co-citizens. While conducting research with return migrants, they told me repeatedly that family was extremely important to them, and they often compared their perceptions of Turkish families with their negative perceptions of German families. They use the same stereotypes that non-migrants use to discuss the perceived "closeness of Turkish families" and "the coldness" or "individuality of Germans" and German family members. For example, according to Kemal, an elderly returnee, "Germans don't know about morality (*ahlak*), and unlike Turks, they don't work for their kids." He said,

> As long as families are connected you will carry some burdens in life. However, if those connections are broken, then you are free. Germans are not connected to their families and therefore they have no burdens. But, this is not something good, since your family is the most important thing in your life.

Many migrants said that they returned to Turkey so that they and their children could be near family. For example, Esra, a German-Turk, notes, "When people move away, you don't know them or their kids. And my kids wouldn't know their relatives if we had stayed in Germany, which would have been a great loss for them." Migrants also return to Turkey to care for family. Aylin told me about watching her aging mother: "It is hard to watch a sick person. When my mother got sick, I was forced to return. Let Allah give you health; that is the most important thing." Aylin claimed that her brothers' wives watched her mother while she was in Germany, and she says she knows that it is "my turn now."

In sum, for many German-Turks, returning to Turkey is an ethical act showing their care, concern, and desire to be close to extended family members. But, they frequently find that family relationships are difficult, and they face accusations of individualism. Changes to relationships of reciprocity, new relationships between husbands and wives and new feelings of belonging in a community of German-Turks are possible explanations for the difficulties returnees encounter with family after returning to Turkey. Difficulties are also impacted by a Germany-Turkish transnational social field characterized by anxieties surrounding Turkey's modernity and European-ness and stigma about migrants' lack of culture and backwardness. Migrants find that relatives wonder how time in Germany—a place people think is characterized by individualism, not family closeness—has changed returnees. Migrant women confront particular difficulties in their families because, as several scholars have shown, women are intimately involved in nation-making processes and become a focus for concerns about ethnic identity and morality (Gal and Kligman 2000; Yuval-Davis 1997). This can particularly negatively affect migrant women who may be forced to navigate "an ideological tightrope—struggling to take advantage of their new resources but also to protect the structure and sanctity of the traditional family system" (Kibria 1993: 109).

As I discuss in Chapter 3, German-Turkish women must face negative stigma directed towards working women and portrayals of women's lost honor in Germany, common themes in such films as *Yellow Mercedes* and *The Edge of Heaven*. When German-Turks first went to Germany in the 1950-70s, it was uncommon for women in Turkey to work, and in many cases morally unacceptable (Magnarella 1998). As Berrin told me, when she went to Germany,

> There was no work for women in Turkey besides in the fields. Then, when I had a child, my father-in-law said, 'you cannot work.' As it is, I had no friends who worked. It would have been embarrassing. Therefore, the thought of working in Germany was good.

Many women told me that their husbands or fathers did not want them to go to Germany, especially because they did not want them to work in Germany. They believed that migration represented a potentially dangerous cultural corruption and could have a negative impact on a woman's image and honor.

In her work with Bulgarian-Turks who returned to Turkey, Ayşe Parla (2005) found that women and work become contentious markers of difference for return migrants. As Parla writes, "though highly variable according to social class and region, for many segments of Turkish society, the codes of honor and modesty do not easily accommodate women working outside of the home to supplement family income" (2005: 141). Though 22.2% of women do work in today's Turkey (ILO 2008), German-Turkish return migrants sometimes confront disapproval from relatives and neighbors for having worked in Germany, and this is likely to have a strong impact on their negotiations of family belonging. For some non-migrants, the fact that women worked in Germany provides an explanation for returnees' wealth. For example, when I told one man about my research with German-Turks, he said, "People went to Germany to earn money, and the difference there is that everyone in the family worked—even the women and children—which is taboo in Turkey. But, no one could see them there, so the whole family could earn money." The implication in his statement is that German-Turks became wealthy by being freed from a taboo on women's employment in Turkey.

Women also confront negative ideas about German-Turks, which are shaped by images in popular media and by return migrants' own actions. One of the most common ideas about

German-Turks is that they are wealthy. While all family members might expect to receive money in times of need, family members of German-Turks have particularly high expectations of financial support from migrants because of their perceived wealth. They may therefore question returnees who spend money on things other than family support. Throughout my interactions with non-migrants, returnees' wealth was a constant topic of conversation. Migrants were often described as "someone who spends a lot." One woman summed it up like this: "In Germany they were cleaning ladies. When they come back to Turkey, they can hire cleaning ladies." Another told me, "The poorest people went to Germany. The rich people stayed in İlçe. Now, the poor people come back from Germany and they are rich, and the former rich people are poor." Berrin related an incident where someone called her and her husband "*Almancı*." She said, "Why do you call us that? Aren't we Turks? The person said, 'Sorry, *Almancı* means you have money.'"

Objectively, even if returnees are not rich, they often have more money than their relatives. Elif, a second-generation return migrant, related, "Money is the biggest difference between migrants and others." Impressions of migrants' wealth do not only stem from images in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field, but are also based on observations of returnees' actions. Returnees are eager to display their luxurious Mercedes cars and other expensive goods they have purchased, such as German appliances or gold jewelry. They frequently buy or build numerous houses that are different from their non-migrant neighbors' houses, using architectural features not often seen in Turkey.

Several scholars have pointed out that returnees' consumption practices are understandable when viewed in light of the extended time they have spent in Germany. For many migrants, time in Germany was characterized by a lack of attention to their own desires, sacrificing their own enjoyment, living in simple homes and working extremely hard. "For some, the eleven months of the year working in Europe are endured only to "really live" during the twelfth month" of vacation in Turkey (Mandel 2008: 237).

But, when they return to Turkey, migrants often become conspicuous consumers (Abadan-Unat 1986; Çağlar 1995; 2002),[4] and their excessive consumption leads non-migrants to criticize returnees for their displays of wealth, accusing them of snobbishness (*ukala*) and showing off (*hava atmak*). Even returnees' children accuse them of showing off. Elif claimed,

> My father showed off, always saying, 'there is this in Germany.' They act snobbish and arrogant, so they ask to be abused financially, and they deserve prejudice. Because they worked very hard there, they want to impress people here. They come back with a Mercedes, because it is German car and very expensive here. Have you seen the movie *Sarı Mercedes*? It is wonderful, the guy has no problems until he enters Turkey and that hard-earned Mercedes causes him problems.

In sum, while in Germany, returnees' relationships with their families are largely reduced to financial reciprocity, as they are unable to participate in most other reciprocal exchanges, such as caring for elderly relatives. Spatial and temporal distance from their families creates a form of reciprocity based on money, far removed from the ideal of frequent and nonmaterial exchanges. At the same time, women cultivate close relationships with nuclear family members, especially with their husbands, and with other German-Turks who are a critical support system for them during migration. Their problems are compounded by negative images of women, in particular, and of German-Turks, in general, in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. Given that migrants are perceived as wealthy, even to the extent of showing off their wealth, relatives have high expectations for the money they feel they should receive from returnees. If returnees refuse to give expected money to relatives and at the same time spend what is perceived as excessive money on themselves, relatives feel that migrants are not acting ethically. They accuse returnees of having a bad character, behaving arrogantly and snobbishly. In other words, with their conspicuous consumption, returnees call into question "the permanence in time" of their sacrificial and generous characters and a "self-constancy" that is demonstrated by keeping one's word to send money to family (Ricoeur 1992: 166). Given that returnees' family membership is linked to the capacity to exchange with family, a refusal to give money coupled with conspicuous consumption calls their family belonging into question.

In the next section, I explore how migrants negotiate family belonging and expectations of reciprocity by focusing closely on Derya's story.[5]

RECIPROCITY AND FAMILY BELONGING

Derya's story is illustrative of many predicaments of reciprocity that I observed for return migrants. Conflict with family begins for Derya because she insists that her financial reciprocity while in Germany should compensate for other forms of reciprocity after returning to Turkey. Yet, her husband, Ali's, relatives feel that Derya should share in the task of caring for her husband's now elderly mother, Gamze. When Derya resists caring for Gamze, a severe conflict between her and Ali's family erupts, which leads to Ali's family snubbing the couple and accusing Derya of German-ization and insanity. As we shall see, this predicament of reciprocity serves as a productive arena through which Derya describes herself as an ethical daughter, daughter-in-law, and woman and thus negotiates her belonging in her family and neighborhood.

To explore how returnees like Derya respond to predicaments of reciprocity, it is necessary to examine her actions over time, before and after her migration to Germany and return to Turkey. Therefore, I begin by describing her experiences as a young bride, obediently marrying and migrating according to her family's wishes and later facing difficulties in

Germany, but still continuing to send large sums of money back to Turkey. Though I point out that migrants like Derya face challenges in Germany, difficulties are not the whole story of German-Turkish migration for first generation migrant women. Like others, Derya also describes an appreciation of being a "working woman," the formation of close relationships with her husband and other German-Turks, and a liberation from relationships with extended family while in Germany, even though she emphasizes her on-going financial exchange with relatives in Turkey. When Derya returns to Turkey, a major quarrel emerges between her and Ali's extended family members that Derya confronts by insisting on her word and character—she insists that she has fulfilled her familial duties as an obedient daughter and wife and a generous, hard working, caring daughter-in-law. Ultimately, in the face of changing ideals for herself and others and changing ideas about relationships, Derya asserts an unchanging, ethical self and an enduring familial belonging.

Marriage and Migration: Obedience and Sacrifice

Derya grew up in the 1960s in a poor family in İlçe, one of five children. Today, she is a slim woman, with thick brown hair, visible when she removes her headscarf. Strong and tireless, I never saw her sitting still, except perhaps during prayer, five times daily. She was always on the move, scrubbing her floors on her hands and knees, weeding her garden or fields, or collecting thyme (*kekik)* in the hills. Like many return migrants of her generation, she was married young to an almost complete stranger, Ali. Discussing her marriage, she explained, "I was married within one week of Ali coming to my parents' house to ask for my hand in marriage, because he had received permission to go to Germany. My family was poor and knew that my husband could provide for the family." When I asked her how she felt about her marriage, she said, “I was 17. I did not think anything. I did what my parents told me to do.” Like most other women with whom I spoke, she emphasizes an obedience that reflects fulfillment of familial duty and an obedient character—she fulfilled the role of a “good daughter” by marrying according to her parent’s wishes. Some women describe their early marriage and their family’s wish to send them to Germany as familial “sacrifice.” Putting it bluntly in a conversation with another return migrant and me, Selin said, “We were sacrificed (*kurban olduk*)... You are working for the whole family in Germany.”

Derya worked in several different factories while in Germany, including a textile factory and an appliance factory. Like many women, she described work in Germany as enjoyable. It may seem surprising that many migrants describe factory work as enjoyable considering the harsh conditions that they faced in factories, such as working long hours, performing dangerous tasks, and confronting occasional racism. However, migrants’ sentiments are understandable when considering how working liberated many women from sometimes difficult traditional roles in their families and led them to develop positive new self-conceptions as workers. For instance, Derya declared, “I enjoyed working in Germany. It was easier than dealing with relatives in Turkey.” By laboring in Germany, women like Derya not only improved their class status, but also developed a middle-class appreciation for leisure time. As she explained, “Everything in Germany had a planned time, and I like that everything was planned. The workday in Germany was divided into working and time for yourself at home, which is easier than women’s work in Turkey.” Many migrants similarly discuss freedom from women’s traditional roles while working in Germany. Berrin claimed,

> Working is great. It is healthy. On Mondays you want to go to work to see your friends. I really like working. If you have to work, you take better care of your house and yourself. German-

> Turkish women do not want to return to their villages, as they have to work very hard cleaning their houses, making food, and taking care of the gardens and fields.

Filiz told me that working provided an enjoyable independence and freedom from an unhappy home life with an alcoholic husband. "Working was sometimes difficult," she said, "But working was an escape from my husband. I relaxed while working."

In contrast to Filiz's experience, some migrants develop new relationships of closeness with their husbands and fellow return migrants in Germany that seem to displace traditional relationships of closeness with extended family members and in-laws, which are common in Turkey. In fact, although Derya emphasizes her on-going concern with family, I noticed that she places a high importance on her nuclear family and specifically on maintaining a close relationship with her husband. Like many first generation German-Turks studied by Wolbert (1996) who emphasize "working towards a common goal" (198) as a couple while in Germany, Derya and Ali described themselves as a husband-wife team, working together for their family in Germany. They even once told me that they thought that it was unfortunate that couples do not act as a team, and Ali even used the German word "*Mannschaft*" (team) for emphasis. Derya frequently related that she enjoyed spending quality time with her husband in Germany, and as I discuss further below, she would often complain to me and her neighbors that after returning to Turkey, she and her husband "don't have any time to ourselves." She lamented that people show up at her house without calling and planning ahead in Turkey, which prevents her from enjoying a private life with her husband.

In addition to desiring more one-on-one time with Ali, I noticed that Derya maintained strong connections to Germany after returning by maintaining close relationships with other German-Turks. She often juxtaposed the burdens of family expectations with the helpfulness and friendliness of German-Turks, with whom she claimed to feel closeness and trust (*samimiyet*). When speaking about the Sacrifice holiday, for example, she said, “I didn’t learn how to cut up all of the parts of the animal and all of its organs from my own mother, because my mother would do it herself when I was a child, but I learned from my friends in Germany. I had so many great friendships with people in Germany.” I noticed that Derya and Ali would drive miles and miles to visit German-Turkish friends and visit with them for days at their summerhouse. They seemed to feel at “home” in these relationships, more so than with family and neighbors.

In sum, working in Germany leads migrant women to re-imagine their identities as “women workers,” and it also represents an escape from women’s work in Turkey, from their extended families, and sometimes from difficult husbands. Some women claim that working outside of the home actually gives a woman more time for her house and her family, which makes her a “better woman.” Additionally, time in Germany can foster closer relationships between husband and wife and with fellow German-Turkish migrants. In this sense, migration changes women’s ideas about themselves and their relationships. Nevertheless, most migrants are still constant in their commitment to family belonging and to the fulfillment of their roles in their extended families. Migrants continuously refer to significant financial exchanges with family members in Turkey that they feel show their abiding care for relatives.

Reciprocity Over Time

Over the years, Derya and Ali bought several houses in İlçe, a summerhouse on the Aegean coast, a Mercedes and many other German goods that they brought to Turkey. They also sent money to many of Ali’s family members to pay for expensive circumcision and wedding ceremonies. Derya describes financial reciprocity with her in-laws and her own family as "burdensome," but claims that she never shirked her responsibilities. She says that sending large sums of money to Ali's relatives meant that she was forced her to send her children back to Turkey when they were toddlers to live with her husband's mother, Gamze. Doing so allowed Derya and Ali to work in Germany and to earn more money for the family. The couple sent money to Gamze to support their children financially, but also to support Gamze. "This was really hard for me. Sometimes I regret this. I worked, and I was separated from my children. But we helped Gamze and other relatives," Derya said. As I describe in more detail in the next section, Derya told me about this financial reciprocity in the midst of Ali's relative's criticism of her for not caring for Gamze when she returned to Turkey. Thus, her discussion of her reciprocity and her assertion of having a "generous character" arose in direct response to predicaments of reciprocity that she faced with Ali's relatives.

Like Derya, other returnees emphasize their financial generosity while in Germany. One time, while talking with her neighbors, Filiz discussed sending money to her mother,

> My family always saw me as the black sheep, but I was a good daughter. I sent my mother money every month…. She would write me a letter saying, 'I need money.' My sister was also in Germany and one month my sister sent money, one month me, to help her.

By referencing being a "good daughter," Filiz claims to have fulfilled a kinship ideal for daughters to share financial wealth with relatives in need. Instead of primarily sending money to in-laws like Derya, she sent money to her own mother. In addition to financial exchanges, returnees described bringing presents to those in Turkey when they returned for vacations. Elif said, "When we came back during vacations, our relatives were blessed with presents. We had four suitcases and two would be presents, like chewing gum or jeans. They ordered presents from us, but we never got money from them."

Many women discuss the difficulties of life in Germany as a way of making their sacrifice and the "debt of reciprocity" they paid to relatives even more significant. Berrin told me,

> When we first went, we stayed in just one room. Even that was hard to find. They said, 'we do not give rooms to foreigners.' …We stayed for one year in one room. After that, we shared a house with a family. We shared a bathroom and everything. It was hard, but it was nice to be able to work and earn money that I sent to people in Turkey.

They stress the generosity of their characters, despite the personal sacrifices and the suffering they experienced in Germany. By discussing the large sums of money and goods that they sent to relatives in Turkey, they emphasize what Ricoeur would describe as "the permanence in time of character and that of self-constancy" (1992: 166).

As these migrants claim, empirical research shows that migrants in Germany have indeed sent large sums of money to Turkey (Çağlar 2006). In fact, White (1997) argues that participation in "generalized reciprocity" has become the primary measure by which Turks in Germany can identify someone as ethnically "Turkish." Exchanging money and goods is a critically important way that German-Turks show that they care about their nuclear and extended family members in Germany and Turkey. But, migrants may be more focused on monetary exchange than non-migrants, who are accustomed to a greater variety of non-material exchanges in their daily interactions with each other. In fact, White asserts that Turkish and German-Turkish norms of reciprocity may conflict, since for German-Turks, "reciprocity has become much more oriented toward money and consumer goods than in Turkey" (1997: 758). In part, migrants' focus on financial exchange is due to the nature of being migrants separated from "home"—an experience that naturally exacerbates the dialectic between the ideal and the reality for kinship relationships and reciprocity. But, for some migrants' a focus on monetary reciprocity is coupled with a reduced willingness to engage in other forms of exchange upon returning home, such as caring for elderly relatives. And, for a variety of reasons, many migrants pull back from financial exchanges eventually. All of these factors contribute to predicaments of reciprocity for return migrants. Refusals to exchange care and money are the major causes of family conflicts, which I analyze in the next section.

Predicaments of Reciprocity

Derya and Ali returned to Turkey permanently in 2007, but still travel frequently to Germany. A couple of days before the Ramadan Holiday in 2008, when I arrived at Derya and Ali's primary residence—a five-story apartment building in which they occupied two floors—Derya told me: "Ali is sick. He is very stressed." I later learned that a conflict with Ali's family over where Gamze, his mother, should live had led to a dispute between the couple and Ali's relatives. Many family members blamed that dispute for Ali's worsening health.

At this time, Gamze was living with Ali's brother, Ender, and his wife, Fidan. I visited Fidan with one of Ali's cousins and the two discussed the fact that Gamze would like to stay at Ali and Derya's house because Fidan's house has no heat and, with the coming winter, it would be uncomfortable for a woman in her 70s to live without heat. Fidan also felt burdened caring for her four young children. She felt that Ali and Derya should share in the burden of caring for Gamze and that their large multi-story house could easily accommodate her.

Derya's worry for her husband and listening to this conversation were my first intimations of a conflict that would soon erupt within the family, but I was already aware that there were problems between Derya, Gamze, and Ali's family. Derya told me that in the first year after she returned to Turkey, struggles with Ali's relatives made her "very depressed." She described this period of her life as "like trying to swim through difficult waters." Many people told me that Gamze was not nice to Derya when Derya was a new bride. Esra's mother (who is about the same age as Gamze and a friend of hers) told me that Gamze tried to control Derya and tell her how to cook and do housework when she and Ali first married. "I can understand that Derya might have bad feelings towards her today," she said. In fact, from what I could gather, Gamze's actions towards her daughter-in-law, Derya, were not uncommon or necessarily inappropriate for mother/daughter-in-law relations. Daughters-in-law are expected to act subservient towards their mothers-in-law, and mothers-in-law commonly advise and sometimes control their daughters-in-law. Of course, this does not mean that daughters-in-law don't resent this control and harbor bad feelings towards their mothers-in-law, and this was certainly the case for Derya.

The conflict between Derya, Ali and Ali's family came to a head on *Ramazan Bayramı* (*Eid ul-Fitr;* Ramadan Holiday). In Turkey, the Muslim religious holiday of Ramadan lasts for 4 days and is generally a time when family members travel great distances to spend time together, hosting and receiving guests. In preparation for the holiday, people clean their houses, prepare baklava, and purchase candies to distribute to visitors. Commonly, on the first and second day people visit their close family members, with younger family members typically going to the homes of their older family members. On the third or fourth days, people typically visit more distant relatives, friends and neighbors. On this holiday, many of Ali's relatives refused to visit Ali and Derya, or, if they visited them, they waited until the third or fourth day and treated them very coldly. For example, Gamze's sister, Ilknur's, children visited Ali and Derya late in the day on the third day. After they left, everyone commented that they had been very cold. For my part, I found the conversation outwardly friendly, although somewhat stilted, consisting of all of the usual polite inquiries about various family members, but never passing beyond this stage.

Ali and Derya were offended by the coldness they perceived in the conversation, but even more by the fact that they were visited so late on the holiday, since they considered themselves "elders" to Gamze's sister's children. As they discussed this visit with their own children, other sympathetic listeners and me, they also said that they felt that Ilknur's children behaved thanklessly, since they had been sending money back to various family members in Turkey for years, most of which had not been invested in profitable enterprises. Obviously, they equated their financial generosity while in Germany with care for their family, and when they perceived family members snubbing them, they began to discuss the significance of the money they had been sending over the course of many years.

In response to this conflict, Derya repeatedly discussed her financial reciprocity with Ali's family, her fulfillment of her familial duty and her 'good' character as a means of negotiating belonging in her family and neighborhood. For example, as I describe in the previous section, Derya spoke with her neighbors, her children and me of her sacrifice in sending her children to Turkey, working to support Gamze and the large sums of money she and Ali sent to Ali's family. One time, when visiting Esra, a fellow return migrant, Derya complained about Gamze to Esra and me, saying that she prevents Derya from enjoying time with her husband and that she is not a 'good,' helpful mother-in-law.

> I want to go to our summerhouse, but can't go because of Ali's mother. Gamze can take care of herself, but she acts like she cannot. Look at other people's mothers-in-law—like my friend Arzu.

> Last night, Susan, you saw how Arzu's mother-in-law gave Arzu homemade tomato paste that she had made. My mother-in-law never did anything like that for me. If she had anything she gave it to Ender, Ali's brother. It is not right! (*haksızlık*).

In responding to her predicament of reciprocity, Derya discusses her mother-in-law's lack of reciprocity and her mother-in-law's 'bad' character. She implies that her mother-in-law does not have a good character, because she acts helpless, favors one son over the other, and does not help Derya by preparing food for her, like other mothers-in-law help their daughters-in-law. Gamze's unjust actions, in part, justify Derya's refusal to fulfill a daughter-in-law's care obligations and prompt Derya to discussions of character. Derya also listed all of the support she gave to Ali's family, funding marriage and circumcision ceremonies for family members and then said, "After all I did for them, they are so thankless." She emphasized her hard work in Germany and her generous and obedient character and thereby asserts her unchanging ethical self and on-going familial belonging.

With this discussion, Derya is negotiating her belonging with her neighbor, Esra, and attempting to explain her actions regarding family duty (not caring for Gamze) by noting that she is responding to an unjust situation and a 'bad' mother-in-law. Esra seemed to be sympathetic to Derya and her own background as a return migrant might be one reason. But, other neighbors and relatives might be less sympathetic to Derya's argument, as it is clear that she emphasizes a desire for one-on-one time with her husband at a summerhouse, rather than a willingness to provide care for her mother-in-law, which is a departure from traditional notions of a daughter-in-law's familial obligations in Turkey.

At another time during this conflict, I noticed that Derya did seem to receive less sympathy from a neighbor when she discussed her refusal to provide care for Gamze. While visiting with her next-door neighbor, Yasemin, Derya contrasted her own character and Gamze's character, saying,

> Ali's family is very thankless (*nankör*), and it makes me really mad. I don't want to help them or even speak to them anymore. Gamze was always poor and lazy and that is why she stayed poor, unlike my own mother, who worked hard all her life. If you work hard, Allah provides. We worked 7 days a week in Germany.

The predicament with Ali's family spurred Derya to contrast her own and her family's hardworking character with Gamze and Ali's family's thanklessness and laziness. Yasemin sympathized, but also suggested that perhaps Derya should let Gamze come to stay with her, that Gamze would probably not be too much of "a bother." Derya dropped the topic. Yasemin viewed the care of a mother-in-law as an unconditional duty, not affected by character or past actions, while Derya evaluated her own and other's characters when considering her obligations. With this discussion of character, Derya attempted to justify her behavior, to show that she is in fact a 'good' person and family member, and thus to negotiate her belonging with her neighbor, Yasemin. But, Yasemin seemed not to agree with Derya's interpretation of familial duty. And, in fact familial pressure eventually forced the couple to relent and allow Gamze to stay with them.

Although Derya spoke positively about returning to Turkey and visiting relatives at some moments, during this conflict, she strongly emphasized regret about sending her children to live with Gamze while she was in Germany.

> I wish that I had worked for 10 more years in Germany and that we had bought a house there and had our children go to university there, but Ali never wanted to. He always wanted to come back to İlçe so that's why I stopped working, and we never bought a house in Germany. It is too late now, because our children are in Turkey now. I wish we had never sent them to Turkey.

The fact that Derya's children are in Turkey seemed to provide an ethical obligation for her as a parent to be there as well. But, at the same time she also felt responsible for the fact that they are in Turkey. She could have encouraged them to stay in Germany and pursue education there, but she obeyed her husband who urged the family members to return to Turkey. Though she regrets her decision, Derya is also highlighting her obedient character as a good wife who obeyed her husband.

During this struggle, Derya told her children, neighbors and me that she felt a comfort in Germany—what I would call a belonging—that strained family relations like these inhibited in Turkey.

> Germany felt more comfortable than Turkey because there is no family, no relatives. It is calmer. It is more crowded here. I am more comfortable in Germany. It is not comfortable here. There are older relatives, many children…. In thinking about the comfort of others, I cannot think of my own comfort.

Another time, while visiting with several relatives and neighbors, Derya said,

> Working in Germany was preferable to the need to constantly visit people and do things for others in Turkey. In Germany, you call people before you come to their house, instead of just showing up. But, guests can arrive any time here. Then, there is work on the fields, work at the summerhouse, work in İlçe…. Ali and I don't have any time to ourselves, but we are planning to make some time.

Derya placed an importance on her own comfort and leading a private life with her husband that many relatives and neighbors found unusual and individualistic. As I describe below, they often commented on Derya's "adjusting to Germany" and what they perceived as her psychological problems evidenced by her desire for time alone and time with her husband.

Several times when considering her desire for time to herself and thinking about her enjoyment of working, I even heard Derya say to me and others that she had "adapted (*uyum sağladım*) to Germany," by which she seemed to imply that she enjoyed her working life there and her removal from her obligations of spending time with and providing assistance to in-laws. Yet, at the same time, she also discussed her financial reciprocity, generosity, hard work, and on-going care of family in Turkey while in Germany, and even said that “the holidays are better in Turkey, because there are more relatives to visit.” Thus, discussions of her character traits (generosity and hard work) and her fulfillment of familial duty allowed Derya to mediate a coherent ethical self in the face of changes to her ideals for herself as a woman and her understanding of familial roles and relationships. Additionally, it is clear that ideas about word and character emerged during interactions, whereby Derya’s sense of her own character was shaped by discussions with sympathetic and less sympathetic others—neighbors like Esra and Yasemin, her children, and Ali’s relatives.

Ultimately, migration to Germany reduced the relationship between Derya and her in-laws to primarily financial reciprocity. This dovetailed nicely with her sense of enjoyment as a working woman pursuing her own comfort and a close relationship with her husband and other German-Turks. But, when Derya returned to Turkey, Ali’s relatives demanded other forms of nonmaterial reciprocity, namely, hands-on care for elderly relatives. When I visited some of Ali’s family members, many discussed the conflict between Derya, Ali and the rest of Ali’s family. While drinking Nescafe with Ali’s maternal uncle, Hasan (Gamze’s brother) and his wife, Seda, Hasan asked me about Derya, “How is she?” I said, “She is fine.” He began complaining that Gamze is sick, and in a frustrated, exasperated tone, he chided, “Derya won’t take care of her…that woman, Derya, Derya.” A day later, I visited Ali’s maternal aunt, Ilknur, with a cousin of Derya’s. Ilknur said, “Derya has psychological problems and needs help.” Ilknur’s daughter said, “Why is this such a big problem for Derya? Just put Gamze in the upstairs apartment. She can take care of herself. The fair solution would be for her to stay 6 months with Ali’s family and 6 months with his sister-in-law, Fidan.” Many people suggested that part of Derya's Turkish identity was lost when she "adjusted (*alıştı*) to Germany." They drew on stereotypes about German individualism and lack of care for family to explain Derya's actions, which they felt were unusual. Similarly, at a visit with some of Derya's relatives in her absence, they gossiped that she had "broken nerves" (*sinirleri bozuldu*) and that she got "used to spending time by herself." While having broken nerves might not be a person's fault, getting used to spending time by oneself seems to imply not keeping one's word to spend time with others or having a 'bad' character. Relatives felt that Derya cared more about herself and her own comfort, rather than her duty to family.

I noticed, that Ali, as a man, was never subjected to the same labeling as having adjusted to Germany or as "crazy" like Derya. Although he was also shunned on the holidays, it was perceived as primarily Derya's burden as a woman to care for Ali's mother, and when she did not do so, she was the one who was labeled as "Germanized" and "insane." Likewise, as a woman, Derya felt that her life was easier in Germany, where she was free of relatives' demands. Clearly, migrant women like Derya bear a significant burden when compared to migrant men—they face pressure to maintain traditional familial structures and roles or face accusations of losing their ethnic identity. In contrast, while relatives also place expectations on male migrants for financial reciprocity, migrant men like Ali face fewer demands for care. Additionally, it is customary for men to leave home to work as migrants do. Thus, their honor is not at stake, if they work in Germany and spend less time caring for extended family when they return home.

Eventually the couple relented and allowed Gamze to come live with them. However, in response to the conflict, Ali and Derya decided on the following *Kurban Bayram* (*Eid ul-Adha*; Sacrifice holiday) not to visit some relatives that they normally would have. Before the holiday, I heard Derya tell one of her children that she thinks, "Some of Ali's family members will not visit us until the fourth day of the holiday, so I am not going to their house at all." But, since Gamze was now living with Ali and Derya, the majority of their relatives did visit them on the first or second days, so from one perspective the conflict was over. Of course, relatives may have made the decision to visit them out of respect for Gamze, who was one of the oldest family members, not necessarily out of respect for Derya and Ali.

Clearly, it seems that family members felt that Derya was not acting ethically when she refused to care for Gamze, but when she eventually fulfills their expectations, they treat her as a valued family member. This predicament spurred a struggle over character and keeping one's word, both of which are understood in relation to the fulfillment of familial duty. Migrants like Derya feel that they've fulfilled their familial duties by going off to Germany, earning money, and supporting their family as expected. Derya describes herself as obediently and passively agreeing to marriage, migration and financial reciprocity. But, when Derya refuses to provide care for the elderly after her return to Turkey, family members question whether Derya has a good character, if she has become Germanized or crazy. For her relatives, her emphasis on financial reciprocity cannot replace the need for participation in reciprocities of care with relatives. They question her sense of duty towards family and character and ultimately, whether someone so "adapted" to Germany still belongs in her family—or in Turkey for that matter.

Though Derya viewed Germany as a comfortable escape from relatives' demands, she never admits to shirking her responsibilities to her family. In fact, during this conflict, she often discussed with me and others the large sums of money she sent to relatives, sending her children to Turkey so that she could work and support family members, her mother-in-law's bad character as “she never helped me,” and in general the importance of family. Despite conflicts with relatives, she claimed that she enjoyed the holidays more in Turkey than Germany because of the opportunity to visit relatives. When thinking about character, we can see that Derya’s “character” is determined by how she fulfills her role in family relationships, not only according to intrinsic qualities of her personhood. Similarly, she keeps her word by obeying and fulfilling a difficult duty (*görev*), not necessarily through a verbal promise to family, as Ricoeur invites us to see “keeping one’s word.” Derya does not talk about her character as part of an isolated and individualistic self-fashioning, but as part of forming, shaping and negotiating relationships with others. We can also see that these discussions of word and character both deny and justify changes as they reflect Derya’s construction of an ethical self. Even though reciprocal relations have changed and Derya has discovered an enjoyable independence and a working life in Germany, she insists that her financial reciprocity demonstrates a generous character and her actions as a responsible daughter in-law concerned with family belonging.

Each predicament of reciprocity is unique, but they all seem to include moments when family members snub migrants or cease communication with them, which spurs migrants to point out their financial generosity during and after migration to Germany, their hard work and suffering in Germany, and their relatives’ thanklessness, selfishness or greediness. For example, when Filiz returned to Turkey, she cut off financial support to her mother, explaining that her own children were older and needed her money and that her family’s income was reduced. “This caused a breakdown in communication with my mother,” she explained. “My mother is still alive. There is such a serious communication breakdown with her. I never speak with my mother today and do not care about her.” When asked how this “communication breakdown” could happen after all of the money she sent to her mother from Germany, she said, “When I sent money, we talked. When I stopped sending money; that is when my communication finished with my mother. Our communication is finished. People are selfish. It is very painful. She was never a mother to me.” In claiming that her mother is selfish and a “bad mother,” Filiz contrasts her own behavior with that of her mother. She thereby contradicts the impression commonly displayed in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field that migrants (unlike relatives) are selfish and individualistic. Filiz keeps her word by fulfilling a daughter’s duty, saying, “I was a good daughter. I sent my mother money every month.” Her participation in financial exchange could thus be considered a challenge to time—a denial that family belonging changes in a migrant’s absence.

Migration reduced the relationship between Derya and her in-laws and Filiz and her mother to financial reciprocity in which being a “good daughter” meant frequently sending money while in Germany. Other everyday forms of reciprocity, such as sharing food, helping with housework, caring for the elderly and providing emotional support are not possible while migrants are in Germany. This exacerbates the dialectic between the “idealized norms” of varieties of reciprocity and “their actual relationship” in which connections to relatives are maintained solely by financial means during time in Germany. It is not only relatives who view migrants as family money-makers, but migrants themselves also portray themselves as money-makers. They view this as a positive role within their families and giving money becomes their pathway for showing their care and love. Over time, this becomes part of the criteria for their acceptance as daughters-in-law and daughters who belong in their families. If migrants refuse to give the kind of reciprocity required, like refuse further money as Filiz does or refuse care for the elderly as Derya does, relatives may cut off all communication and hence all forms of reciprocity. Their relationship ends.

Rather than facing relatives' rejection, some migrants make the decision to sever ties with relatives who they perceive as greedy. Selin expected some appreciation for all of the money she sent while in Germany from her relatives when she returned to Turkey. Instead, as she related to a return migrant neighbor and me, she felt valued only for the financial wealth that she represented. She claimed that she was milked for money by her relatives "like a cow" (*inek gibi*) and that they never appreciated her. Presumably, thanks to images of migrants in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field and possibly Selin's own actions, Selin's relatives perceived Selin as rich and capable of providing large amounts of money. Selin related,

> Relationships with relatives are very bad, and we cut off all help to them. While in Germany, my husband and I always sent money and tried to help our relatives, but since we returned to Turkey, we do not give money to family members anymore. Relatives want money from us, but they do not understand how hard we had to work.

By way of explanation, she described the harsh conditions she faced in Germany; she has rheumatism now, and she and her husband each have had two operations. Selin feels that as a young woman, she willingly "sacrificed" herself "working for the family in Germany." But over time, the difficulties and dangers she faced in Germany, evidenced by her illnesses and surgeries, exalt her sacrifice for family and lead her to feel that she has paid off any debt of reciprocity owed to them. The ideal of a generous daughter and the reality of the difficulties of earning money to fulfill this ideal in the face of relatives' continued neediness prompted Selin to eventually refuse further financial reciprocity.

Selin's narratives about word and character, like Derya's, emerge when she reflects on predicaments of reciprocity—when criticizing others' behavior and justifying her own actions in the presence of others. Selin's discussion of her hardworking character emerges as she complains about relatives' greed and selfishness in "milking her like a cow" to a fellow return migrant and an ethnographer. In this way, Selin defends her actions; she asserts that she is a hard working family member who gave relatives substantial money, but relatives' greed forced her to "cut off all help to them." Her discussion implies an intersubjective process, where her sense of her own character is shaped by interactions and discussions with others. Her ideas about character also emerge during interactions with her neighbors and appear to be a way of asserting that she is an ethical person, thus establishing her good character and strengthening her relationships—and her belonging—with her neighbors. In the face of a dialectic between ideals and realities and the ensuing predicaments, returnees assert that relatives have bad characters, not that migration has changed returnees or diminished their desire for family belonging. Discussions of character allow them to mediate coherent ethical selves in the face of change.

In addition to facing relatives' insensitivity to their difficulties, some migrants found themselves much less wealthy than their relatives assumed, which further exacerbated predicaments of reciprocity. Ipek described feeling pressure to give money to her husband's family. Even though she did not have very much money, people would say, "you went to Germany, what did you do? They would say: this German-er (*Almanyalı*) has money." However, she claims that relatives did not understand:

> My husband's siblings said to us, for example, you get 1000 marks income, what are you doing with this? You can use 200 marks and give us the rest. But 200 marks are not enough. The living conditions are different there. In Turkey, you could live on 200 marks, but not there, not in Germany. The families do not think of this.

In addition to the alienation from relatives in Turkey and also German society that many migrants experience, Ipek was confronted with the prospect of poverty because of the financial reciprocity demanded of her. Stripped of any other means of establishing and maintaining familial relations, the recourse to monetary exchange puts migrants in an ethical predicament in which the only way to uphold kinship ideals would mean sinking further into economic struggle. With numerous images of wealthy migrants in movies, television programs and newspaper articles, family members often do not understand migrants' sometimes-tenuous financial situations.

After listening to her mother's predicaments of reciprocity, Ipek's daughter, Dilek, told me about her relatives' character and claimed that these relatives behaved lazily and irresponsibly. "They all lived well in Turkey without working. My father continuously sent money and other goods back to them. Like my parents brought powdered laundry detergent and clothes to them. But they did not work. They also made bad investments with the wrong people and lost a lot of money." Dilek laments that her parents were sent to Germany to earn money for their family, while those in Turkey expected to reap the benefits of the migrants' hard work. As this example shows, discussions of character emerge during interactions and reflections on interactions. These interactions both shape and reflect returnees' and relatives' ideas about ethical comportment and their feelings about their relationships with one another.

Many returnees discuss the selfishness of relatives who demanded excessive money from returnees, instead of responding to reciprocity with appreciation and gratefulness. Elif lamented, "Relatives want to use us. My father always gave to them. They see you as an opportunity to rip-off, like beggars on the street. My dad was always seen as a constant resource for family profit." Like Selin who felt milked like a cow, Elif's father eventually had to stop giving money to relatives who acted like "beggars on the street." Returnees accuse relatives of having thankless, greedy and irresponsible characters, which they contrast with their own ideal and generous characters. They can thereby justify withdrawing from reciprocal relations, while still insisting they are ethical and that they care about family.

In order to keep their promises to family that they will participate in reciprocity, returnees must overlook the difficulty of life in Germany—their suffering, hard work, and sometimes insufficient earnings. Migrants feel that they have already fulfilled familial duties as hardworking women who provided for relatives that they later found to be thankless, selfish and lazy. Different returnees have different ways of confronting these predicaments. A common response is to refuse further financial reciprocity to relatives or to refuse to care for relatives after returning to Turkey. But, many relatives do not accept that financial exchange can compensate for the need to provide care to elderly relatives. Additionally, inasmuch as migration produced a dialectic in which returnees' familial relationships were reduced to financial exchange, severing financial support threatens to dissolve all ties to family.

In the face of these predicaments of family belonging, migrants insist that they have maintained their word and character, and thus their ethical selves. Returnees argue that they never faltered as ideal relatives, and continued to send money back to relatives in Turkey, until they discovered the selfishness and greed of their family members. Thus, it is the relatives, not the returnees, who have changed, who have demonstrated bad character and who are not fulfilling ideals of reciprocity. In the face of their relatives' negative characters, returnees assert a positive set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized—their willing sacrifice, hard work, and generosity. In sum, faced with changes to family relationships caused by migration, returnees discuss their maintenance of ethical ideals for themselves and others.

Interactions with others are the scenes where subjectivity and ethics are constituted and which then prompt discussions of word and character.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I showed that migration changes the ethics of reciprocity that govern family relationships and leads to predicaments of reciprocity between returnees and family members. Migrants are separated from their extended families in time and space while in Germany, and they earn money that makes them more affluent than their family members in Turkey. Varieties of daily non-material reciprocal exchanges between migrants and non-migrants are reduced to monetary transactions while migrants are in Germany. Migrant women begin to think of themselves positively as workers and discuss liberation from their extended families and from gender roles in Turkey. They may also develop close relationships with their husbands and with other migrants. Thanks in part to images of German-Turks in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field and returnees' consumption practices, many relatives of returnees believe that returnees lose awareness of their family's needs during the course of migration and become individualistic, show-offs.

When they return home, returnees must negotiate changed ideals for themselves and changed kinship relationships, while establishing belonging in their families. Their negotiations are often characterized by misunderstanding on both sides: of the debts of reciprocity returnees have paid through suffering and hard work in Germany and of the needs of their relatives for money, help, care and concern. Faced with relatives' suspicion about their concern for their families, returnees assert that they have fulfilled ideals for reciprocity among family members by discussing their character and word.

This chapter demonstrated the usefulness of exploring word and character within narratives for an anthropology of ethics that is dominated by Foucauldian approaches and is just beginning to address ethical change. According to Foucault, "Care for others should not be put before the care of oneself. The care of the self is ethically prior in that the relationship with oneself is ontologically prior" (1997: 287). Ethics is an individual and aesthetic project for Foucault, and relationships with the self come before relationships with others. In contrast to Foucault's formulation of ethics as reflections on subjectivity, like Ricoeur (1992), I view ethics and subjectivity as mutually constituting—the self and others intermingle in the constitution of both subjectivity and ethics. Thus, I explored how women fashion ethical ideals during interactions with others as they negotiate belonging at home. Rather than stressing individuals' conscious ethical reflections, I focused on how returning home generates discussions, conflicts and negotiations surrounding familial ethics. New ethical ideals intermesh with pre-existing ideals of comportment that relate to belonging in a family and are negotiated intersubjectively.

Ricoeur's (1992) concepts of keeping one's word and character illuminate how subjects maintain coherent conceptions of themselves as ethical, despite changes caused by migration. German-Turks relate word and character to familial duty and, in the face of conflicts surrounding reciprocity, migrants assert that they have good characters and that they have fulfilled their duties to participate in reciprocity with family. They discuss being "good daughters" who "sacrificed for family" and talk extensively about the money and presents they have sent to Turkey. A focus on migrants' discussions of word and character provides a window onto how they assert that they are ethical through their narratives—how they both deny having changed and justify changes to their ideals for themselves and others. For example, returnees claim to have sacrificed and suffered for their family and discuss their good character—hard work, honesty, communication with family and financial generosity. These discussions are the means by which returnees assert their good character and self-constancy—stable and unchanging ethical selves throughout time.

But, these narratives are also windows onto the ways that returnees have changed—they seem to be defensive assertions of sameness in the face of a changed reality. In fact, migration does change migrants: they are viewed as resources for family wealth and valued for their financial wealth, and they place lessened importance on other forms of reciprocity with family. Some migrants even cut-off all ties to their families. Migrants also describe new ideals for themselves—happiness as "working women," independence from their families and liberation from women's traditional familial roles, and an appreciation of spending time with their husbands and other German-Turks. Their narratives about their word and character become ways of insisting on constancy and an ethical self. Returnees claim to value and maintain ethical ideals of reciprocity in the face of broken family relationships and changes stemming from their separation from their families and their time in Germany. In part, migrants' discussions of hard work, suffering, and generosity are ways of compensating for accusations of escape, showing-off, and individualism. They accuse their relatives of not living up to the ideals that they have fulfilled. Thus, it is not migrants who have changed, but relatives who do not fulfill ideals and, therefore, are responsible for the broken family relationships. Returnees insist on the importance of reciprocity and belonging in their families, even as we can observe their changed horizons of belonging and new ethical aims for themselves and others.

CHAPTER 5
ORDER, COMMUNITY AND HORIZONS OF NEIGHBORLINESS

While sipping tea with her neighbors, Esra, a housewife living in İlçe, explains that she has adjusted to the "German system." After having lived in Northern Germany for 15 years, she says she has learned to share Germans' respect for *düzen* (order). When discussing her return to Turkey, Esra concludes, "Turkey is our homeland. What can you do? You are forced to adjust to life here. There are uneducated people. There are no rules or laws…. To be honest, this seems difficult to us now." During fieldwork with return migrants like Esra, I heard many complain that Turks do not uphold a standard for public order that they think is common to German society, because of their lack of education, discipline, or cultured-ness. Migrants and non-migrants are both appreciative of "Turkish" hospitality, which includes the frequent hosting of neighbors in one's home and exchanges of food and assistance. But, German-Turks emphasize that "order" is also critical for creating a 'good' community. By maintaining aesthetically pleasing homes and gardens, keeping public spaces clean, being quiet, and obeying rules and laws in public, migrants feel they model respect for others, acting as a 'good neighbor' and a 'good Turk.' German-Turks aim to show care towards a community of strangers who might be disturbed by public disorder, and they thereby expand the parameters of Turkish hospitality beyond known neighbors that one entertains in one's home. Migrants also foster close friendships with other return migrants, which also directs the hospitality of frequent hosting away from their local communities.

These novel notions of community ethics and belonging are my focus in this chapter. I analyze how transnational migration and return engenders new ways of imagining ethical aims for neighbors and the constitution of neighborly communities. As I do throughout this dissertation, I also examine ethics for return migrants as work on belonging, and here I focus on how returnees' projects of ethical "order" are projects of homecoming in their communities. Migrants' ideas about order stem in part from experiences in Germany, where "*Ordnung*" (order) is an important, though contested, ethical aim.[1] Many returnees discussed "German order" by relating incidents when they were sanctioned: they received a citation for inappropriately disposing of their trash in Germany or were yelled at by German neighbors for "being too noisy." But, returnees' desire to see a more orderly community in Turkey is not only the result of appreciating what they have observed of German society, but also a response to returning "home" to Turkey. Returnees advocate for and display an *idea* of German-ness as a means of both asserting their enlightenment and distinction from others and also of negotiating their belonging with their neighbors and with other return migrants. Through their cultivation of "order," returnees demonstrate their esteem of themselves, their neighbors and their country. By showing that they are "orderly like Germans," they seek to combat negative stereotypes about German-Turks' "backwardness" and troubling media accounts that report that Turks are not well integrated into Germany. In contrast to images of migrants in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field, they demonstrate that they have successfully integrated into Germany, and have become "educated," "cultured," "European-Turks."

However, neighbors at times accept and at times reject returnees' ethical aims. In the latter portion of this chapter, I follow scholarly calls to explore contradictory ethical aims (e.g. Osella and Osella 2009; Schielke 2009) and examine how returnees' struggle to establish belonging in their communities. While some non-migrants appreciate returnees' ideas and actions, others are troubled by returnee attitudes that they feel demonstrate hypocrisy, individualism and excessive “German” freedom. They criticize returnees for behaving anti-socially by not visiting, not greeting, and not sharing food and time with neighbors. Non-migrants discuss how being a hospitable and social member of the community is more important than demonstrating one’s education or “cultured-ness.” Ideas about “neighborly order,” which may seem to be the antithesis of freedom, come to represent a freedom to refigure Turkish communities in terms of a perceived European individualism. In sum, I explore how neighborly actions become a platform for debating the parameters of freedom, hospitality and care, the merits of stereotyped “European individualism,” and “Turkish sociality,” and Turkey’s modernity and “European-ness.”

While examining how migration and return spur controversial projects surrounding community ethics for return migrants, I reflect on theories of freedom, neighborliness and ‘the good life.’ Foucault calls our attention to freedom as a necessary precondition for ethical reflection. Indeed, I found that for German-Turks, migration and return leads to the freedom to craft an ethical “German-like,” but still “Turkish,” neighbor and citizen. They cultivate ethical neighborliness through what Foucault would call “technologies of the self,” specifically, technologies of “order,” which include practices of cleanliness and quiet, among others. But, returnees’ ethical projects are not only individualistic projects of self-fashioning—returnees are also attempting to fashion novel ethical communities in Turkey and to form relationships with others. Ricoeur (1992) points to the importance of relationships with neighbors for an ethical life. According to Ricoeur, ‘the good life’ is ensured through the concern of neighbors for each other—solicitude—as they live together in an institutional system that is “just.” Ricoeur defines solicitude as a “benevolent spontaneity, intimately related to self-esteem within the framework of the aim of the “good” life” (190). The concept of solicitude takes into account that each self must feel self-esteem and some measure of autonomy, but that selves are also beholden to others who also contribute to their feelings of self-worth.

I found that returnees and non-migrants both feel that close community relationships and hospitality are absolutely essential for their sense of being a ‘good’ neighbor and achieving ‘the good life.’ But, Ricoeur’s theory does not take into account conflicting views about community belonging and the duties of neighbors in effecting the good life. Unlike non-migrants, returnees also link hospitality to neighbor’s “orderly” comportment. Additionally, migrants want to show hospitality to other return migrants along with their local community members. With these new ethical aims for hospitality and new notions of neighborly community, German-Turks face challenges when negotiating belonging in their neighborhoods, return migrant networks and a broader Turkish-European space.

I introduce this exploration of migrants’ community belonging in the next section, by describing commonly held ideas about neighborliness and hospitality in Turkey, widely valued neighborly actions, and how ideas about neighborliness are contested and changing. Next, I discuss how German-Turks and community in Germany and Turkey are portrayed in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. I argue that ideas about “German individualism” and “Turkish sociality” strongly influence returnees’ negotiations of community belonging. After providing this background, I give a detailed view of “order” for returnees by focusing closely on one couple, Esra and Yavuz, and their ideas about orderly houses, orderly public spaces, and following rules and laws. Then, I examine how returnees’ narratives and actions surrounding community ethics become part of projects aimed at community belonging with neighbors and other return migrants. While many returnees forge strong relationships with neighbors and their fellow migrants, they often face conflicts with their neighbors. Community members debate the extent to which hospitality is shown through acting orderly and whether or not "order" is social or anti-social, beneficial or dangerous for Turkey.

NEIGHBORLINESS IN TURKEY

Most migrants and non-migrants consider a community with close-knit neighbors who show "neighborliness" (*komşu muamelesi*, *komşuluk,* or *komşuluk ilişkisi*) towards one another to be a good community and a necessary condition for "the good life." One indication of the importance of neighbors in Turkish society is the large number of traditional proverbs about neighbors, including: "Don't buy a house, buy a neighbor (*Ev alma komşu al*), which means that having good neighbors is more important than having a good house; "A neighbor can even use his neighbors' ash" (*Komşu komşunun külüne muhtaçtır*), which refers to the fact that neighbors can help one another in even the smallest of matters; and "Even the hungry wolf will not bite his neighbor" (*Aç kurt bile komşusunu dalamaz*), which refers to the fact that one should never harm a neighbor. These proverbs are commonly uttered in daily life when individuals reflect on their positive and negative interactions with their neighbors.

In addition to proverbs, there are also many traditional stories that illustrate the necessity of acting hospitably towards neighbors. For example, children learn funny and pedagogical "Nasreddin Hoca stories" in school. Nasreddin Hoca is a wise and at times foolish legendary figure, and one story describes how he shamed a neighbor for acting stingy: One day while sitting in the market, he observes his neighbor buying fish and declares that he would like to come to his neighbor's house for dinner. Later that evening, as he approaches his neighbor's house, he notices that his neighbor is hiding the largest fish in a closet. When Nasreddin Hoca is seated for dinner, his neighbor serves him a much smaller fish. Observing this, Nasreddin Hoca grabs the fish placed before him and begins whispering into its ear. Upon seeing this, his neighbor asks Nasreddin Hoca, "Hoca, what are you saying to that fish?" Nasreddin Hoca responds, "I asked him where he was during Noah's flood. The fish replied, 'I don't know, ask my elders.' 'Where are they?' I asked him. 'They are in the closet,' he said."[2] Though humorous, such stories instruct children about the importance of the hospitality and generosity that should be shown towards neighbors.

As in other Mediterranean societies (Herzfeld 1987), hospitality (*misafirperverlik* or *konukseverlik*) is arguably one of the most highly valued Turkish ethical aims, and most Turks think that they are more hospitable than people from other cultures. Acting as a hospitable neighbor is part of showing that one is well mannered (*terbiyeli*), comes from a 'good' family and is a 'good' Muslim. There are many ideas that make-up Turkish neighborliness and hospitality, but the key traits of a hospitable person are friendliness (*cana yakın*, *sıcakkanlı, dost canlısı*), helpfulness (*yardımsever, yardımcı*), warmth (*sıcaklık*, *candan, sevgi dolu*), generosity (*cömertlik, eli açık, ikram*), respect (*saygı, hürmet*) and acting careful, thoughtful (*özen göstermek*) and welcoming (*iyi* or *hoş karşılamak, nezaket göstermek, özen göstermek*). The boundary between neighbor and relative frequently overlaps as relatives may also be neighbors and expect similar hospitable treatment. In short, a "good relative" acts as a "good neighbor" and a "good neighbor" also acts as a "good relative." Many ideas about family relationships and reciprocity that I discussed in Chapter 4 are applicable to my discussion of neighborly relationships in this chapter, but here I describe neighborly actions in greater detail.

There are numerous commonly appreciated neighborly activities, including daily home visits among women with nearby female neighbors and relatives, daily visits among men in coffee houses, and formal visits between two or more families to discuss issues like their children's potential engagement. Neighbors may also interact with each through larger and more formal groups, which include: *gün*s: prearranged weekly or monthly meetings among approximately 10 women; *sohbet*s: religious discussions usually, but not always, among women; and *kermes:* women's preparation and sale of food and handcrafts to benefit the poor. Finally, neighbors commonly provide assistance to one another at significant family events, such as births, marriages, illnesses, deaths, and during financial hard times, customarily, preparing food, helping with childcare or other household tasks, and lending money.

An ideal neighbor greets his or her neighbors warmly at all times, especially when they come to visit. It is almost always women who act as hosts attending to guests; by showing hospitality, a woman can also show that she is a "good woman." In many families, male and female guests are seated in separate rooms. If the visitors are all women, a woman's husband will typically leave the house out of courtesy and consideration for their privacy. At visits, the hostess offers her guests cologne to refresh and cleanse their hands and, if available, a chocolate or sweet, such as Turkish delight. Conversations always begin with exchanges of pleasantries and inquiries about the guest and their family, and visits always end with insistence that the guest is always welcome at the house and must return at their earliest convenience.

After greeting and seating her guests, the hostess (and her daughters and female relatives, if they are present) serves tea and snacks. Depending on what she has prepared, this can include cookies or savory pastries called *börek*. On holidays, baklava and stuffed grapes leaves (*sarma*) are customary, and on the Sacrifice Holiday (*Kurban Bayramı*) people also serve meat cooked in its own fat (*kavurma*). Longer visits may also include a service of Turkish coffee, fruit and sunflower seeds or nuts following the tea service. Hostesses are expected to continuously offer additional food and drink to guests or sometimes to provide this without being asked. Polite guests sample at least a little of everything offered and praise the host by saying, “Health to your hands” (*Elinize sağlık*). During meetings among women who are close friends, guests and hosts may sew embroidery while chatting about their lives and sometimes watching soap operas.

In most cases, it is perfectly acceptable to just show up at a neighbor’s house, —not to pre-arrange visits—an action, which is called “*çat kapı*,” meaning literally “bang door” or “sudden door.” People are typically honored when guests choose to visit them, seeing this as an opportunity to demonstrate their hospitality, and they rarely say that entertaining visitors is a burden. In her study of a Turkish village, Carol Delaney (1991) found, “Hospitality is not as altruistic as it may sound, for having guests and being known as a hospitable person or household is also self-serving. A visit sheds honor on the host and raises his status in the eyes of other villagers” (194-195). Neighbors also expect visits to be reciprocal: if a neighbor visits a family, then that family will then feel that they owe that neighbor a visit. However, younger neighbors may feel more obligations to visit elder neighbors than elder neighbors may feel to visit their younger neighbors. Reciprocity is also expected when considering the important life events of a neighbor’s children—those invited to weddings or circumcision ceremonies of their neighbor's children must reciprocate with invitations to events for their own children. In fact, they may be eager to reciprocate invitations, as they have given a gift to their neighbor's child (usually gold or money) and expect their child to receive a gift of equal value in return. While hosts must treat guests kindly, guests are also expected to be thoughtful, polite, and respectful towards hosts by not overstaying their welcome, not bringing up rude or unwanted conversation topics, and occasionally helping with the serving of food.

Ricoeur's thoughts on the relationship between self-esteem and solicitude are relevant to evaluating Turkish neighborliness. He writes, "To self-esteem, understood as a reflexive moment of the wish for the "good life," solicitude adds essentially the dimension of *lack*, the fact that we *need* friends; as a reaction to the effect of solicitude on self-esteem, the self perceives itself as another among others" (1992: 192). Esteeming oneself is not enough; one must also esteem others, as one perceives oneself as dependent on others. In Turkey, hosts and guests show their care for one another through their hospitality and politeness, and, in doing so, they both gain self-esteem. During reciprocal visits, neighbors in Turkey treat each other as they would want to be treated, thereby enacting an ethical care of the self and of the other.

German-Turks care deeply about what they feel are Turkish ideals for participation in a community with close-knit neighbors, and they often speak about themselves fulfilling or maintaining Turkish ethical aims for hospitality. Many returnees shared stories of interactions between themselves and Germans that demonstrate how they tried to change or improve Germans by helping them become more neighborly. Berrin said, "Germans are cold, but they have learned neighborliness from Turks like me." She explained that she taught neighborliness to her German neighbors by sharing food with them and saying "hi" to them. She believes that they liked this, and gradually became friendlier over time. "Even when I met people who did not greet me at first, I said 'Greetings' to them. They were unsure whether to say anything. They slowly began to say '*Gruss Gott*' (Greetings); then they talked with me for hours." I found that most returnees have at least one story about a very kind, helpful and accepting German neighbor and at least one story about a cruel, racist neighbor.

Most returnees place a high value on what they essentialize as "Turkish hospitality," although they hope to reform their neighbors in some ways after returning to Turkey. As I explore in detail below, in fact, they seek to expand hospitality beyond just the neighbors that one knows well through daily activities of hosting. They seek to show hospitality to unknown neighbors in public spaces and to strangers passing by them or their house as they go about their daily lives. They also orient hospitality towards communities of German-Turkish friends, as well as towards their immediate next-door neighbors. Doing so sometimes results in non-migrants' feelings that returnees are "anti-social," but to German-Turks, it does not necessarily mean that they are showing less "Turkish-style" neighborly hospitality in Turkey.

Though most Turks care very deeply about their relationships with neighbors, I often heard people complain about reduced neighborliness in Turkish society and how neighbors in fact no longer know or care for one another. Particularly in Istanbul, I was frequently told that neighbors do not greet one another in the hallways of apartment buildings and are "selfishly" concerned with their own lives. Returnees also lament a lessened neighborliness in Turkish society. For instance, Meltem, a returnee to Istanbul, told me, "We are losing our culture. Neighbors don't know each other or help each other. When I was a kid, if a window broke, the neighbors would oversee the repair, but now you cannot even ask them to do that." Lale, another returnee, began to cry when talking about the changes she has seen in Istanbul.

> Before I went to Germany, every house had a garden and everyone knew everyone. When there were holidays, we cleaned for visitors. We set up a big table, with sweets and stuffed grape leaves. It was so delicious, the meat of the sacrifice…. I miss it, but my children don't even know this. Now, there is not any of this in Turkey. Now, people go on vacation. They don't visit their relatives. They just make telephone calls. I don't even know the people who moved in across from me. They are strangers….

In urban centers in Turkey, and especially in families where both husband and wife work, people may not have time to get to know or visit their neighbors. However, White (2002) finds that there are new forms of neighborly interaction in Istanbul. She describes political party work, piecework and classes for women, through which women can foster strong bonds with each other—bonds that are not dissimilar from bonds women establish with each other through rounds of visiting in small villages.

While some Turks feel changes to "Turkish neighborliness" as a keen loss, others appreciate the freedom and anonymity of city life and would prefer not to know their neighbors. In addition to discussing diminished or lost neighborliness, it is also common to grumble about negative neighborly social control, what is called "neighborhood pressure" (*mahalle baskısı*). Individuals complain that neighbors will gossip about them if they are observed doing an activity that is frowned upon, which could include drinking alcohol, dressing inappropriately, talking to a member of the opposite sex, eating or smoking during the daylight hours during Ramadan, and many other actions. Some people feel that "Turkish hospitality" is a negative strategy for asserting control over others by gleaning personal information that can later become gossip. For example, Zehra said that she does not think that Turks are really interested in knowing and helping their neighbors like they claim. "People are not really hospitable (*misafirperverlik*).

They just like to gossip and find out things about a person." White (1994) claims that reciprocal relations, such as those among family members and neighbors in Turkey, are exploitative, because they are based on symbolic violence. She quotes Pierre Bourdieu's definition of symbolic violence, as "the gentle, invisible form of violence, which is never recognized as such, and is not so much undergone as chosen, the violence of credit, confidence, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, gratitude, piety—in short, all the virtues honored by the code of honor" (192). For some, neighbors' hospitality can feel like violence, more like social control than warmth and friendliness.

Though all Turks complain about neighbors' social pressure from time to time, I found that returnees are more frequently the targets of neighbors' gossip due to their unfamiliar ideas and actions. As an example of gossip and social control, Meltem spoke at length about her love of reading and her interest in theatre. She said that when she talks about theatre with her neighbors, however, "they respond by saying, 'that is European and Western' and that I am 'crazy' (*deli*). If you do not have an official certificate, then you are not supposed to be interested in such things as a housewife. They would rather spend time gossiping." I'm not sure what Meltem means by an "official certificate," but I gather that she is referring to a university degree or some other educational document that most housewives do not possess. One time, Meltem and I went to a museum together, and I was able to observe *mahalle baskısı* in operation. While we were there, she received a phone call from her neighbor. When she told her neighbor that we were at the museum, the neighbor made a sound of disapproval and asked Meltem where her children were. I could see Meltem's face drop. But, afterward she told me about her neighbor’s disapproval with a forced laugh, saying, “I get so frustrated with her limited worldview.”

The censure that returnees face for their unusual ideas and actions is compounded by negative images of German-Turks and stereotypes about German and Turkish communities in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. I elaborate on these images and stereotypes in the next section.

GERMAN-TURKS, COMMUNITY AND THE GERMANY-TURKEY TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD

Taking my cue from Anders Stefansson (2004), I analyze returnees’ “homecomings as future oriented social projects.” I view German-Turks as engaging in social projects with an idealized ethical future as their goal. Returning home is difficult for returnees because of what Brian Silverstein (2003) calls Turks’ “anxieties about their country’s modern, European status” (511). As I describe in Chapter 3, German-Turks find themselves embodying Turkey’s ambivalent vision of its future, symbolizing either Turks’ failure to become modern and European or Turks’ dangerous, too eager embrace of European modernity. The stigmatized representations of German-Turks’ within Turkey as “ignorant” and “uncultured” villagers further compound these uncertainties.

German-Turks stereotyped “uncultured-ness” is frequently related to their wealth and lack of hospitality, evidenced for example by showing more concern for the display of wealth, than for a guest’s comfort. As an example, in Chapter 3, I described the episode of the popular show *Yemekteyiz* that was filmed in Köln and related how one contestant claimed that his fellow contestants’ action of intentionally displaying an expensive brand marked her lack of culture and hospitality. In Chapter 4, I again explored perceptions of returnees' wealth and argued that for non-migrants, return migrants' conspicuous consumption casts suspicion on their concern for family. In this chapter, I build on these insights to explore further how non-migrants' perceive returnees' wealth and, specifically, how their care for their home may cast suspicion on their hospitality. Non-migrants fear that German-Turks may not know how to become "modern" and "European," while also remaining "Turkish" and maintaining valued essentialized Turkish ethical aims. Their cultivation of a certain type of home—having an unusual design, color or garden—sometimes represents snobbishness and arrogance to non-migrants. Migrants' neighbors fear the loss of "Turkish" care for neighbors and hospitality resulting from exposure to what they perceive as "individualistic" European lifeworlds.

Many Turks believe that Germans are "individualistic" (*bireysel, bireyci*) and do not value neighbors like Turks do. Both non-migrants and migrants told me that "Germans are not smiling-faced (*güler yüzlü*)" or "warm-hearted/blooded (*sıcak kanlı*)." These are both qualities they think Turks possess and which connote friendliness and acting lovingly towards one's family and neighbors. Many people told me that Turks are known for their closeness and hospitality, that Turks "love guests," and that Turks are "friendlier than Europeans." I heard repeatedly from non-migrants and migrants that in Germany children could move out of their parents' house when they turn 18 and that even very young people live independently and don't care about their families or neighbors. Deniz opined, "Germans are less generous and helpful. Each person only thinks about themselves in Germany." One returnee, Esra, explained that she never learned German because, "Germans are not that friendly and never invite you to their house for tea and conversation. Therefore, I didn't even have a chance to practice the German words I knew." The well-known Turkish phrase "*Alman usulü*" also demonstrates Turks' views of Germans. The phrase literally means "the German method" and refers to the practice of friends paying separately in a restaurant for a shared meal, which is widely frowned upon. If Turks meet in a café or restaurant, friends usually alternate paying for each other, rather than each person paying separately, and sometimes people will even argue with each other about who should pay as a way of showing their honor, their affluence and also their care for their friend. Suggesting the usage of "the German method" implies that one does not know or care for others or that one is stingy, selfish or individualistic.

Most Turks, especially older generations, place a high value on hosting a guest in their home rather than meeting in a public place. One returnee, Selin observed, "I would see Germans getting dressed up and meeting their neighbors for coffee in a café in the center of my town in Germany. At the end of their meetings with each other, each person would pay separately and then return to their homes." She related, "One time a German neighbor praised me and Turks in general by saying, 'you Turks are so close and connected.' I responded, 'You Germans have no friends. Why don't you invite each other over?'" She feels that Germans would be closer if they shared experiences of closeness with their neighbors in their homes.

Confronting stereotypes about Turkish closeness and hospitality and German individualism and lack of friendliness towards neighbors in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field, non-migrants wonder how time in Germany has changed German-Turks' ethical aims for neighborliness. In discussing these stereotypes, I do not wish to promote well-known dichotomies, which present "modern" Western or Christian "individualism" as the opposite of the primitive, "communal," and Eastern "Other" (cf. Giddens 1990: Chapter 4). These theories have been rightly criticized for their patent inaccuracy and Eurocentrism (Abu-Lughod 1991; Langford 2002; Lipset 2004; Pandian 2010). Yet, I believe that returnees and their neighbors cast conflicts in their communities in relation to conceptions of "European individualism" and "Turkish sociality."[3]

Non-migrants fear that returnees' ideas and actions surrounding "order" threaten a "Turkish sociality" and "hospitality" based around helpfulness and closeness with neighbors. Return migrants do not think that they are less interested in hospitality or in nurturing community relationships than their neighbors—they simply feel that they have some new and positive ethical aims for neighbors. Observing German communities has prompted some returnees to consider the importance of neighbors' orderly comportment, such things as maintaining tidy houses and gardens, following rules and laws, and being more clean and quiet in public. While they still want to host and share with neighbors, they also care about relationships with other migrants. In practice, this means reduced time for visiting and hosting neighbors in their communities, which, for their neighbors, can lead to the impression that they are anti-social. We could say that migrants assert that they are social, hospitable, "European-Turks," but to non-migrants they seem to have become "individualistic like Germans," and to no longer be hospitable and "caring like Turks."

Before turning to these conflicts between returnees and their neighbors, I provide a detailed description of returnees' notions of "order" in the next section. A close examination of returnees' ethical aims demonstrates their keen desires to establish belonging at "home" even as they also seek to improve their communities and reform their neighbors.

ETHICAL ORDER

While returnees highly value "Turkish hospitality," they also link neighbors' solicitude to personal and public comportment and maintenance of "order." Throughout my research, I found that returnees frequently spoke about the importance of "orderliness" (*düzgün, düzenli*), a quality that they perceived as German, and which they repeatedly used to describe homes, neighborhoods and cities in Germany. Returnees told others and me that they would like their neighbors to maintain tasteful and clean houses, clean and quiet public spaces, and to follow rules and laws. By modeling orderly neighborliness, returnees show their education and cultured-ness, respect towards neighbors, and love for their country.

To illustrate how returnees' ideas about order are played out, I focus on Esra and Yavuz, a returnee couple in İlçe. Yavuz went to Germany in 1973 with his father and considers himself to be a second-generation migrant, because he was 14 years old at the time of his migration.[4] Esra joined Yavuz in Germany as his wife at age 20 in 1991, and they spent the following 15 years in Germany together. They returned permanently to Turkey in 2006 to retire and to live in their 4-story house on the outskirts of İlçe. Both describe returning as difficult, even though they say they desired to return to their "homeland" (*memleket*) to be near relatives. Yavuz told me, "I stayed in Germany for 33 years. Therefore, it is not easy to readjust. Germany and Turkey are, of course, very different. I am not putting down my country. In the end, this is my motherland (*vatanım*), but there are difficulties."

Orderly Houses

Returnees feel that neighborly order begins with the maintenance of one's own home, which should be tastefully designed and well maintained so that those passing by on the street find it pleasing to look at. For Esra and Yavuz, this even encompasses the correct color of houses. One night while looking at pictures of her house in Germany, a two-storey white house surrounded by fields with rolling hills, Esra told me she "misses the order (*düzgün*) of Germany." She feels at times like her old house in Germany is really her house, "where everything is orderly." She believes that using appropriate taste in the design of one's house is important for creating a good community. Esra often criticizes her neighbors' houses and compares them to her own house and German houses. For instance, one night when sitting on her balcony and drinking tea, Esra complained about all of the different colors that Turks paint their houses, such as pink, green, blue, and orange. She said, "Would it not be nice if Turks just painted their houses white like German houses?" (and presumably like her own house). She continued, "Then the houses would look good with green plants. But, unfortunately, Turks aren't like that. All the colors that they use are clashing (*cırt*) and contrary/opposite" (*zıt*).



Figure 3. A Green House in İlçe



Figure 4. Pink and Orange Houses in İlçe

Esra and Yavuz also show concern for order by maintaining cleanliness outside of their house, and they believe that their neighbors should do the same. One time Esra was talking with a mixed group of return migrants and non-migrants about the differences between people who have been to Germany and those who have not. She said, "There is a difference, of course. People who have seen and lived in Europe, like Derya, she goes out her front door and cleans her step. We also sweep ours. We live like that." Esra claims to have learned how to properly care for a house by observing a German neighbor. She explained, "We had this German neighbor. The woman got up early in the morning. She tidied the house and garden, and now we try to do the same thing with our house. But it cannot only be you. This is related to education."

Like Esra, Yavuz was similarly frustrated by Turk's "dirtiness" surrounding their houses. Picking up trash from the sidewalk outside of his house seemed to be an obsession for him. One time, we arrived home late at night, and Yavuz noticed that a cardboard drink cup and a discarded newspaper had blown up against his garden fence. He immediately began picking them up and complaining that “dirty people” (*pis insanlar*) live in Turkey. Previously, Yavuz had explained,

> We could not integrate with our neighbors. My views are different from those of people here, very different. Because we saw a European country, Turkey seems different to us. Even small things, like I hate trash in front of my house. For example, in the morning, I get up. I put on gloves. I sweep outside. Nobody here does this. That bothers me about my neighbors.

Yavuz and Esra are disturbed that their neighbors do not demonstrate solicitude for each other by maintaining what they feel are clean and orderly homes. They believe that their house is, in fact, a symbol of solicitude—its aesthetic beauty gives them self-esteem, while their emphasis on maintaining cleanliness around the outside of the house demonstrates their concern for others. Neighborliness for them encompasses not only hospitality within the home, but also thoughtfulness regarding how one’s house does or does not beautify one’s community. By caring for their own house, Esra and Yavuz feel that they model the behavior of “educated Turks,” who have learned from Germans the components that create an ethical community for themselves and others.

Order in Public Spaces

The notion of order that returnees espouse is much more encompassing than simply the physical cultivation of one’s own home. It also extends to public spaces, where being a good neighbor in a community is connected to keeping these spaces clean through considerate and thoughtful individual actions. Return migrants thus extend hospitality beyond the boundaries of the home to the entire community. Esra and Yavuz often spoke about this with me and their non-migrant relatives and neighbors. For example, one night after a delicious meal of stuffed grape leaves, garlicky yogurt noodles and fresh green beans, while we were sitting on the balcony eating sunflower seeds and drinking Nescafe with the whole family, Esra began talking about a beautiful new outdoor theatre and park recently built by the İlçe municipality. Although she felt that the park was very nice, she complained that people threw a lot of sunflower seeds on the ground, and she felt annoyed with how this made the park look dirty. "Turks are like that though," she said. "They are dirty (*pis*), which I now realize after having lived in Germany. Why can't they just put the seeds in a bag or something and then throw them out later?" she asked.

Eating sunflower seeds is a popular social activity in Turkey—hosts serve them to neighbors in their homes or neighbors share them with one another if they meet in a park or outdoor coffee shop. The consumption of sunflower seeds also symbolizes Turkish-ness in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field in İlçe. I often heard that "Germans think Turks are like birds for eating sunflower seeds." This perceived association between Turks and birds did not seem to be extremely negative—most often it was discussed with a rueful smile, which seemed to reflect a cultural intimacy, a moment when community members reflect upon their shared ethnic identification as Turks. But, it seems relevant that Esra is specifically concerned about the littering of sunflower seeds, because eating sunflower seeds is a social activity that people in İlçe believe Germans identify as quintessentially Turkish. What struck me about Esra's comments was the assertion that Turks are "dirty" and too lazy to clean up after themselves, a perceived failure of character that shows a lack of respect towards others and also themselves.

By ruining the beauty and cleanliness of public areas with litter, Esra feels that Turks show a lack of care for others and their country. She explained,

> Germans are very nationalistic (*milliyetçi*). I wish that we had this. They are educated, and, if you love your country, you will keep it clean. Sometimes we get mad. We see trash thrown

> everywhere. Why are we not like them? Maybe if we had not gone to Germany, we would not have been different from these people. Now, Yavuz gets mad that people smoke and just throw out the cigarette packets anywhere. They do not throw the cigarette packets into a trash can, but onto the street.

Agreeing with Esra's statements, Derya (a return migrant neighbor) chimed in, "Put it in your pocket and throw it out when you see a trash can." Esra continued, "If people love their country, they will want to stay in a clean place. But, Turks do not do this. They just throw trash in the street. This is because their education is low. I mean, in our homeland (*memleketimiz*) there are beautiful places, but...." Esra posits that her way of showing love for her country—maintaining cleanliness by not littering—marks her distinction as an educated community member. But, she also wants other community members to similarly show their care for their community and thus their nationalism.

By relating love of one's nation to individual orderly action, Esra also links neighborly behavior to self-esteem, in this case, the esteem that comes from belonging as a citizen. Ricoeur's (1992) concept of solicitude calls our attention to the fact that each self is autonomous and must feel self-esteem personally, but that selves are also beholden to others for shaping their subjectivity and an ethical life. Solicitude and elf-esteem arise out of the understanding of the self "as another among others" (Ricoeur 1992: 192). By not littering, Esra shows her esteem for her country, which is simultaneously esteem for herself as a Turkish citizen and esteem for others—her fellow Turkish citizens.

Rather than discussing education and nationalism as Esra does, Yavuz emphasizes a lack of cultured-ness. He complained,

> Neighbors will throw cigarette butts on the street. When I see that, I get annoyed and think 'why did you throw that on the ground?' Then, I saw someone eating a mandarin orange and throwing the peel on the ground in front of our house. I got mad and said 'why?' But people are only *this* cultured (*görgüsü, bilgisi bu kadar*). You can't say or do too much. But, every day or every 2-3

> days, I get up and clean outside. Some things bother me, but what can you do? This is our motherland (*vatanımız*). There is not too much you can do.

Esra and Yavuz strive for belonging in a community where hospitality is shown through maintaining an ethical cleanliness in public spaces.

While both Esra and Yavuz claim belonging in their homeland or motherland, they believe that their cleanliness marks them as superior to non-migrant Turks. In discussing such seemingly minor acts as littering sunflower seeds, cigarette packets, cigarette butts and orange peels, they refer to cultured-ness and patriotism, polarizing issues in ongoing debates about Turkish migration to Europe, Turks' integration in Germany, and Turkey's belonging in Europe. As noted earlier, migrants are often portrayed as "uncultured" and by extension inhospitable in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. Through discussions of order when they return home, returnees can combat these negative stereotypes about German-Turks' "uncultured-ness." Esra signals that she is "educated" and Yavuz that he is "cultured," and they thereby distance themselves from the stigma of being stereotypical German-Turks. They believe that they act "cultured" and "educated" and at the same time like "hospitable" (*misafirperverlik*), ethical members of their community.

I frequently heard other return migrants claim that cleanliness is a sign of their superiority to others in their community and that they wish to reform their neighbors so that they will not litter. For example, Yusuf, a returnee to Istanbul, claimed that non-migrants "call me *Almancı*, but unlike them, I do not throw trash on the street." Like Yavuz, he combats a perceived accusation of uncultured-ness associated with the *Almancı* label with an accusation that his neighbors who litter are the ones who are uncultured. Similarly, Lale, also a returnee to Istanbul, told me, "In Germany, people do not throw trash on the street; you cannot. In Turkey, people just do it. They are not disciplined. Sometimes I say to people, 'why are you throwing trash on the street? It is disrespectful.'" Lale highlights the relationships between ethical actions and character, discipline and respect. By acting with discipline, she feels individuals show both an individual self-control and also a neighbor's care for her fellow neighbors.

Migrants can use these discussions of cleanliness as strategies for asserting that they are in fact "cultured," because while many Turks freely throw trash on the street, cleanliness is an important Turkish and Muslim ethical aim. For example, Turks always remove their shoes before entering homes, and the interiors of Turkish houses are usually spotless. A clean home shows a hostess' concern for her guests' comfort, and most hostesses will spend significant time cleaning if they know that guests are coming to visit. Cleanliness is a key ethical aim for Muslims, evident for example, in the fact that before praying, practitioners always perform an ablution (*abdest*), a ritual act of cleaning and purification. In Turkey, entire families will clean for hours before the major Muslim holidays when they know that guests will be coming to visit. As Adil Özdemir and Kenneth Frank write, for religious Muslims "the state of many of Turkey's public areas is scandalous and a chronic topic of public debate" (178). Rather than introducing completely new ideas about cleanliness, return migrants are actually adding their voices to already existing debates in Turkey about dirtiness in public areas.

Interestingly, I also noticed that returnees assert a superiority in terms of the interior cleanliness of homes when comparing themselves (and Turks) to Germans. For example, Yusuf told a story about a German friend who came and stayed with him in Turkey and did not take off his shoes upon entering his home. At first, Yusuf didn't say anything, but he subsequently became angry. "Didn't he notice that everyone else removed their shoes?" He thought, "He should have been smarter, but he is not as well mannered (*terbiyeli*) as Turks." Yusuf thinks that Turks' clean households demonstrate their superiority to Germans, and that helping to maintain a clean home is an action that demonstrates 'good' manners. Similarly, Derya told me, "In Germany, the outsides of houses are more clean, but the insides are more dirty than Turkish houses. German houses smell bad." With this statement, Derya is perhaps countering commonly known German claims that Turkish food (using onions and garlic) smells bad, and by extension that Turks are not clean. She may also be asserting that Turkish women are more hardworking and able housekeepers.

At any rate, returnees like Esra, Yavuz, Yusuf, and Lale praise German norms of cleanliness for the exterior of houses and public spaces, which they believe are superior to Turkish norms. In fact, return migrants are attempting to direct the ethic of cleanliness that Turks apply to the interior of their homes outward. They feel that hospitality and Islamic piety should be manifested externally—in the maintenance of a home's exterior and a community's public spaces. Through actions, such as picking up trash and abhorring littering, returnees show solicitude not only to their guests who visit inside their homes, but to their entire community. They feel that they show respect towards neighbors and demonstrate their education and love for their country.

In addition to litter, Esra, Yavuz, and other returnees assert that Turks' noisiness—auditory litter, we might say—also makes them bad neighbors. Many returnees note that both Turks and Germans perceive Turks as noisier than Germans and that they think this noisiness evidences a lack of manners. Lale says,

> When we were loud, neighbors in Germany would call the police on us, and say 'Foreigners Out!' (*Auslander raus*!) After 10 o'clock at night, Germans do not like guests.... One time a landlord

> told a Turkish woman to move the place where she put a table so that her noise would not bother neighbors. I heard many stories like this. German neighbors would ask, 'Why are there visitors?' We Turks are loud, shouting. Actually, this is not a good thing.

Though she laments that Turks are louder than Germans, Lale nevertheless links a propensity to entertain guests to Turks' noisiness. As I note, an interest in hospitality is a highly valued ethical action in Turkey. For some returnees, who ruefully say, "Our Turks are like this," loudness could even be considered a sensory aspect of home (Brah 1996): Germany is quiet while Turkey is noisy. Noisiness is thus a sign of Turks' friendliness and warmth and their ethical aim of welcoming and hosting neighbors.

However, returnees like Esra and Yavuz seem actively concerned with reforming and improving Turks, and Turks' noisiness is one area that they would like to see changed. One morning at breakfast, Yavuz complained to Esra "Turks are noisy." He frequently has insomnia, and when he has trouble sleeping, the noise of people on the street disturbs him. "They do not think of their neighbors, only themselves, unlike Germans," he said. In contrast, "if there is the slightest sound at night, Germans will immediately call the police. In Turkey, on the other hand, 5 guys will walk by a house in the middle of the night and talk very loudly disturbing everyone's sleep, but they don't care, and nobody tries to stop them."[5] Other returnees also complained about similar issues. For example, Zehra told me that when she first returned, she found Istanbul to be "very dirty, noisy, lacking peace!" Though she seems to feel comfortable in Istanbul now, she described to me how difficult this noisiness and dirtiness seemed to her at first. Through such discussions, Yavuz, Zehra and others assert belonging in a neighborhood that they think is superior and more ethical—a community system similar to what they have seen in Germany. This community requires self-esteem—a love of country and work on the self in terms of education. However, this self-care is oriented towards others. The self-esteem generated through correct neighborly comportment demonstrates a solicitude, where each neighbor is responsible for making sure that their individual actions are respectful towards others.

Returnees' complaints about littering and noise seem to reflect a feeling of impingement of the other on the self. For Ricoeur, solicitude involves an equal esteem of the self and the other. But, returnees do not always seem to emphasize equality between themselves and neighbors. Emmanuel Levinas' (2009) thoughts on responsibility are germane here. Unlike Ricoeur, who emphasizes the mutuality and equality of self and other, Levinas emphasizes the self's obligation to the other. He argues that an infinite responsibility is born out of the demand of the other on the self, which he calls "the face." "The other becomes my neighbour precisely through the way the face summons me, calls for me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility, and calls me into question" (2009: 83). It is through the experience of "the other," which is unwilled, unwanted and is even called a persecution that the self comes into existence and is confronted with an ethical responsibility. Judith Butler (2005) summarizes Levinas' thoughts on responsibility to others like this: "My capacity to be *acted upon* implicates me in a relation of responsibility" (Butler 2005: 88). Returnees' sentiments sometimes seem to reflect this negative interpretation of the effect of others on the self. By controlling their own comportment—refraining from littering and making noise—they seek to ensure that their actions will not be an unwanted imposition on others, so they can enjoy their community without confronting visual or auditory disturbances. For returnees, ethical orderly actions may be part of belonging in a community where care for others sharply circumscribes individual actions.

However, M. Jamie Ferreira (2001) suggests another interpretation of Levinas' writings that more closely approximates Ricoeur's manner of discussing solicitude. Ferreira argues that

Levinas equates the self with “host” and emphasizes an “ethics of welcome” (2001: 445). He thinks that Levinas is concerned with neighbors who demand an acting self to respond with a sense of responsibility. In this sense, Levinas’ thoughts are not dissimilar to Ricoeur’s. It is possible to read this interpretation of Levinas’ thoughts on responsibility in returnees’ discussions about neighborly comportment as well. In insisting on not littering in public and refraining from being too loud, returnees seem to communicate their wish to provide and receive a host’s welcome in public spaces. Such an intention seems similar to Ricoeur’s manner of discussing ethics as seeing the other as a oneself—doing unto others as you would have them do unto you.

Following Rules and Laws

In addition to maintaining cleanliness and refraining from being too loud, returnees feel that obeying rules and laws, whether these are customary modes of behavior or laws enforced by the state, is also key for creating an orderly community. For example, in not following everyday rules like queuing in line, Esra believes that neighbors do not take responsibility for each other and members of their community. She gave me the following examples:

> There are no rules here. For example, if you go to a bank in Germany, you get in line. Actually, we Muslims should do this, but no. We do exactly the opposite. There, you get in line; everyone follows rules, but not here. If you go to the post office, people just get in front of you. In Germany, if it snows in a small town, neighbors put down salt on their walkways and clean their doorstep. If you do not clean your step and the postman comes or someone else comes, falls and breaks their leg, you are responsible. Here, there are no rules. You can do anything.

Of course, Esra’s neighbors in İlçe are in fact “following rules.” They are obeying the norms for action Turkey, where people customarily do not wait in straight lines as they do in Germany. But, Esra feels that they are not caring for their neighbors when they fail to form orderly lines or to keep walkways clean and safe. She feels they are therefore increasing danger for everyone, and additionally, they are also not acting piously, like good Muslims, who care about others.

This notion of danger stemming from neighbors' neglect also surfaced when I spoke with one of Yavuz's aunts, Meryam, while Esra was present. I asked Meryam if she felt living in Germany changes German-Turks. She replied that she had changed, but that she had given up trying to change Turks. "We adjusted to Germany. When I returned and saw people throwing trash, I just decided to do it; nevermind." Esra interjected, "We still want the streets to be clean. I do not know, maybe we will give up in a few years." Meryem replied, "We got used to things. We always said to people, 'do not throw trash on the streets.' Children come out of a store, eat a chocolate and throw it on the ground. But what can you tell them? If they made a penalty (*ceza*), then maybe it would change, but they do not." Esra interrupted by saying that in Germany there is a penalty for such things, and she appreciates that everything is more regulated there.

> There are a lot of such things—like, in a garden, if there is something sharp and the children could get hurt, there will be complaints. Someone will write a ticket. Some of this discipline is very good, and we are still looking for this. We wish our homeland was like this, but one or two people cannot change this. This must be changed with laws.

Observing Germany's police force and legal system, returnees call for the state to enforce neighborly behavior.

Other returnees also complain that Turks do not follow rules and laws. Mehmet, a returnee to Istanbul, described Turks failure to follow rules as a characteristic of "the Orient" and a "lack of civilization."

> We returnees all have the same kinds of problems here. Especially the chaos in life, missing order, missing discipline. I'm not talking about standing at a red light when no cars are coming, the situation you can have in Germany—everybody is standing, but no car is coming. But, it is about a civilizational minimum. You do not park your car in such a way that nobody can pass through. When the metro is coming, you do not stand in front of the doors before they have

> opened and people have stepped out of the metro. If you are standing at an automatic teller machine, you do not look what the one in front of you is doing. These kinds of things have to do with the fact that you are in the Orient. People stand closer here. They stand closer in the line or they do not follow the line. That has to do with Orient and Occident, but then it also has to do with lack of education, lack of civilizational background.

Evaluations of cultured-ness and education pervade returnees' discourses on neighborly comportment in both rural and urban settings. Mehmet refers to aspects of following rules for comportment in cities: when parking a car, when getting onto a subway, and when waiting to use an ATM machine. Yet, in a similar manner to the way Esra and Yavuz link lack of order and neighborly behavior to a lack of education and cultured-ness, Mehmet associates these qualities with being uncivilized and part of "the Orient," rather than "the West." By discussing civilization, Mehmet ties himself into Turkish nationalist discourses going back to the founding of the republic, where leaders discussed the need for Turkey to become "civilized" (Kuzmanovic 2008). Doing so is also a strategy for distancing himself from negative ideas about German-Turks' "backwardness" in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field.

Like returnees in other places, Mehmet claims to miss the order of Germany, which made him feel safe. He told me, "Maybe Germany is exaggerating with orderliness, but this you miss: that to know when I go out on the street, I will be able to walk 20 meters without falling over a hole that was dug up 20 minutes ago. These are the problems we all share, it gets on my nerves as well." Mehmet has no regrets about returning to Turkey, but he claims to feel frustrated with the lack of order manifested both in citizen's behavior and in the fact that the state does not adequately maintain roads and ensure citizen's safety. By allowing others to pass on the street and subway, Mehmet believes that he is participating in a modern, "civilized," "Western" order. Like other returnees, he aims to demonstrate that he is taking responsibility for his individual actions, that his individual comportment reflects solicitude for neighbors. He therefore shows his respect and care—his hospitality—towards strangers that he confronts in daily life.

Returnees communicate their vision for an ethical community through these discussions and actions surrounding order. As I explore in the next section, this is a future-oriented strategy for establishing both their distinction from others and their belonging with others.

NEGOTIATING HORIZONS OF NEIGHBORLY RESPONSIBILITY

Given their difficult social position, returnees attempt to establish an alternative for themselves and Turkey: a modern, cultured Turkish *and* European neighbor and citizen. They seek to establish relationships with people who support this project. Some non-migrants accept and appreciate returnees' views and agree that neighbors in Turkey should be educated to adopt new models of neighborly order. They appreciate returnees' desire for cleanliness and quiet and their efforts towards following rules and laws in daily life. Returnees may find acceptance with these neighbors. But, in other situations, returnees' views lead to estrangement from neighbors and increased closeness with other returnees. Some non-migrants feel that returnees' views evidence a stereotypical excessive "German individualism," threatening to "Turkish sociality," reciprocity, warmth, and close relationships with neighbors. Some returnees account for a lack of belonging in their local communities by asserting their distinction as German-Turks—their superior "European-ness" and their belonging in Europe and with other returnees. By examining returnees' relationships with their neighbors and how non-migrants' criticize what they consider returnees' individualism and anti-sociality, the next section examines how actors construct Turkey and Europe as different communities of belonging, with divergent ethical aims for neighbors. I show that as returnees negotiate belonging, they and their neighbors debate the parameters of freedom and hospitality and the modernity and “European-ness” of Turkey.

Reforming and Performing Neighborliness

It’s early in the morning, but we have already finished breakfast, and Esra is preparing a meal for several guests who she will host in her house this afternoon. After tying back her hair loosely with a flowered headscarf, she begins by laying out a pale blue and white striped cloth on the kitchen floor. Then, she places a low, round wooden table on top of the cloth and readies a thin, pine rolling pin. She is making small pizza doughs, which will eventually become *lahmacun*—a delicious, but time-consuming, Turkish dish in which thin flour crusts are topped by a mixture of meat, tomatoes, parsley and spices. After a few minutes, Esra’s mother sits down to help her knead the mixture of flour and water, which is the dough, and then helps her to form it into small, flat 5-inch round pizza crusts. These are later topped with the meat mixture and cooked on a unique stove that resembles an inverted wok. After preparing the *lahmacun*, Esra makes a garlic-infused string bean dish, two cakes, and homemade *ayran* (a salty yoghurt drink). Her guests arrive mid-afternoon: her husband’s aunt with her husband (who are also return migrants from Germany like herself), and her sister-in-law, niece and nephew. After greetings and offers of cologne, everyone moves to the table to eat. Like an ideal hostess, Esra continuously encourages us to eat, piles more food onto our plates and refills our *ayran*. Afterwards, we move to the living room for tea, sunflower seeds, and cakes, which are followed by a coffee and fruit service. Occasionally, guests wander out to the balcony to watch passersby, tractors, stray dogs and the golden sun setting over the tomato field next to Esra and Yavuz’s house.

Throughout the visit, Esra tirelessly manages to serve all of her guests, while also cheerfully participating in conversations ranging across topics from a woman who cheated on her husband and was recently killed by him, to the importance of parents always knowing where their children are, to the neighbor across the street who is a German-Turk, rich, and looking for a wife. By any standard, and particularly by Turkish standards, Esra is welcoming and hospitable. Yavuz claimed to have difficulties integrating with neighbors, but I found that Esra seemed to be included and well liked by her neighbors. She was often invited to *sohbet*s, circumcision celebrations and weddings in her neighborhood, which she frequently attended.

Many neighbors also accepted Esra's views about how neighbors can become more ethical and "orderly." As an example of how Esra's discussion of neighborliness aided in establishing her belonging in her community, I can relate a conversation that I observed between Esra and several migrants and non-migrants in which Esra discussed "Turks who never adjusted to Germany." She claimed that you could tell who these "not adjusted Turks" are by how they plant their gardens inappropriately.

> Sometimes you can see a woman shopping and then going into her house, and you know it is a Turkish house. Why? There are things strewn about outside. The garden in front of the house has garlic and onions planted in it. Germans plant these things in back, so that no one sees them. They always plant flowers in front.

In Esra's opinion, it is important to plant visually pleasing flowers in front of one's house, rather than garlic and onions, in order to maintain a tidy appearance from the street. Esra and Yavuz's garden, like their house, is in their view a symbol of solicitude, a demonstration of their self-cultivation and their concern for others who may pass by on the street.

At this point, Derya, another returnee, interjected, "you always see shoes outside of Turkish houses. This seems wrong to Germans." Derya concurs that the exterior of a house should be kept clean of clutter, such as shoes. Esra and Derya emphasize that solicitude is aesthetic—demonstrated by appearances as much as by actions. After Esra and Derya's comments, a non-migrant who listened to this exchange agreed with their complaints about the exteriors of Turkish houses and their praise for the "orderliness" of German houses. She said she felt that Turks should be taught to care for their houses like Germans. "We are not educated. We are missing education in this country." As this exchange demonstrates, for some community members, returnees' discussions and actions regarding the maintenance of order demonstrate their educated comportment and concern for creating a superior community of neighbors. Discussing and cultivating the cleanliness of one's house and the aesthetic beauty of one's garden can become a means by which return migrants like Esra negotiate belonging as respected and enlightened neighbors in their local communities. Such claims to superiority on the part of return migrants like Esra are clearly directed at asserting a higher status in comparison to many of their neighbors and to claiming a middle class belonging. Indeed, existing research shows that returnees do seek symbolic capital in Turkey (Çağlar 2002). However, returnees are also making ethical claims. They are judging among competing virtues of neighborliness and choosing to discuss and to display their orderly comportment for their neighbors.

However, neighbors sometimes reject returnees' views, receiving their ideas defensively and accusing them of being hypocritical, even if they agree with the content of returnees' ideas. I explore this rejection of returnees' ideas and ultimately of returnees' community belonging in the next section.

Struggles over Neighborliness and Belonging

Many returnees struggle to establish belonging with their neighbors and face accusations of hypocrisy, anti-sociality and individualism. Some neighbors argue that Turkey is "already sufficiently modern and European," and they do not accept that returnees really want to improve Turkey with their discussions of "German order." Instead, they think returnees are just "showing off" and trying to make themselves look superior to others. I even observed a moment when Esra was accused of hypocrisy. One night, I went with her and several of her relatives to the official opening of the new outdoor theater and park.[6]



Figure 5. Celebrating the Opening of the New Theatre and Park

After about 20 minutes of watching the performance, we moved over to a nearby pavilion, sat on some benches, and began eating sunflower seeds. We all (including Esra) threw the empty seed shells on the ground under our seats, and Esra's daughter teased her mom about being so mad when other people did that. She implied that Esra should not complain about Turk's dirtiness if she herself was also going to be littering. Esra defended her actions by saying, "Since everyone does it, what is the point of not doing it?" However she did seem a bit embarrassed.

Instead of praising the fact that migrants abhor littering, many non-migrants with whom I spoke actually find these discourses hypocritical exaggerations, which in fact contribute to the labeling of returnees as "*Almancı.*" Deniz told me that "German-Turks continuously talk about how dirty Turkish streets are, and they say that the streets are so clean in Europe, you can even lick honey off of them. But, I have been to Europe, and it is not that much cleaner than Turkey. They exaggerate." For non-migrants, there is also a perception that German-Turks act differently in Germany than they do in Turkey, and that their discourses do not reflect their actual practices. For example, there is a well-known saying that "a German-Turk will never throw trash on the street in Germany, but as soon as they cross the border at Edirne into Turkey, they begin to litter." Rather than seeing returnees as participating in a "European modernity," where neighbors do not litter and the state punishes infractions, non-migrants believe that returnees are behaving hypocritically.

Instead of appreciating migrants' ideas about order, these non-migrants criticize returnees for behaving arrogantly. Cemil feels that, "Some humanistic rules are very good. Rules made for people, but in order to educate people, putting people down is not good. Returnees look down on people and do not adjust to Turkey." Rather than trying to improve Turkey or neighbors' behavior, Cemil thinks that returnees simply want to show that they are better than others. "Some returnees exaggerate, and you notice them when they exaggerate about things. Like they start saying, 'when I was in Germany…' or 'we are newly arrived in Turkey, therefore….'" Similarly, Elif said that her father, like other return migrants that she knows, "tries to show off (*çok hava atıyorlar*) and say 'there is this in Germany' (*Almanya'da bunlar bunlar var*)." She said, "Return migrants act snobbish and arrogant, so they ask to be abused financially, and they deserve prejudice." To some neighbors, return migrants' attempts to show their modernity only show their lack of cultured-ness. Rather than escaping the stigma directed at German-Turks for their backgrounds as uneducated and rural guest worker migrants, returnees are critiqued for remaining uncultured, and further for having become hypocritical and snobbish. Some non-migrants feel that returnees either do not accept that Turkey is already "modern" and "European" or that they only discuss modernizing Turkey to make themselves look better, not because they are truly patriotic. Rather than a solicitude based on mutual self-esteem, returnees seem to have excessive self-esteem—what non-migrants call arrogance.

In addition to hypocrisy, non-migrants also accuse return migrants of being anti-social, which is ultimately representative of returnees' lack of or insufficient hospitality. Even Esra who was well liked by her neighbors was not spared critiques of returnees' neighborliness, as she was present while non-migrants discussed German-Turks' anti-sociality. During a visit Esra and I made to a neighbor's house, Melike commented that "German-Turks are less interested in knowing their neighbors." According to Melike,

> Before Turks went to Germany, neighbors in İlçe used to mix more and know each other more. Everyone would come together and bring bulgur salad (*kısır*) and tea, and all the neighbors were friends with each other. Then, when people started to go to Germany, everything changed. They would come back for their vacations and act coldly. We seemed simple or ill bred (*basit*) to them. Now, neighborliness is not like it was.

Melike added that she does not even know her neighbor's children. Several people listening agreed with her.

Melike's complaints add up to a feeling that returnees have become less concerned with actions that foster relationships—actions like spending time together, acting warmly towards others, and sharing food. When I later asked Esra what she thought, she said she agreed, but added, "Only some German-Turks are bad neighbors." Yet, another time Esra commented that her German-Turkish neighbors who live next door to her "are not very neighborly, and when they return from Germany, they just go directly to their summer homes." Esra, like Melike, complains that returnees may be less interested in spending time with neighbors.

I also heard similar views from others in İlçe. Arzu told a mixed group of returnees and non-migrants that returnees are anti-social, refusing to visit and greet neighbors. "When someone returns from Germany, first they have to visit those who are sick. You must greet them, but then you can go other places." However, returnees do not do this.

> They sometimes do not even greet people that they know. There is a *hoca* [religious teacher] who returned to Turkey from Germany in 1984. Now, when he sees us, he does not say '*Selamün Aleyküm*' ['Pease be upon you,' a common religious greeting]. I ask other people if he saw us. When his daughter's wedding happened, someone brought us sweets [a traditional wedding favor that hosts provide to guests], but they should come in person and tell us about the wedding. But, they did nothing. At least do something! The relationship is broken. I love having guests. In our house, we have places for many visitors. That is my personality. I feed people and give them drinks, and I want to be treated that way when I go places.

Like Melike, Arzu criticizes returnees for a diminished interest in hosting and exchanging food with neighbors—for "breaking relationships" by not visiting, not greeting, and not sharing news of family events. In this formulation, to belong in a community and to maintain relationships, it is not sufficient to have others bring sweets, you must imbibe together. Non-migrants' echo the claims of family members, discussed earlier in Chapter 4—claims that returnees are overly concerned with material reciprocity and do not spend sufficient time with family. Similarly, neighbors think that returnees go through the motions so-to-speak of being neighborly, but do not really care for their neighbors, do not really want to spend time with them, and do not show true hospitality.

Fatih, an older man from a village near İlçe, explicitly linked returnees' wealth and perceived anti-sociality. He bragged to me about how wealthy German-Turks have built nice houses in his village, and therefore his village is one of the nicest and cleanest. However, German-Turks are “crazy and anti-social” (*deli ve asosyal*), he declared.

> They were ignorant before they went to Germany, and then they went to Germany and made a lot of money. When they return to Turkey, they can build nice houses, and everyone asks them for money. Soon they have no money left, and they go crazy and forget how to sit around and drink tea with other people. When you invite them over to drink tea with you, they just sit in a corner looking mistrustful.

He humorously imitated a person with both hands stiff and extended on their lap looking around in a scared manner. He believes a mistrust of others indicates being crazy and anti-social—the result of migrants’ wealth and a lack of neighborliness. Non-migrants claim that neighbors should know and help one another, even simply drink tea together, rather than behaving individualistically through shutting themselves up in large, expensive houses. They complain that returnees like Esra and Yavuz spend too much time caring for houses and gardens, but have become less concerned with actions that foster relationships—actions like spending time together, acting warmly towards others, and sharing food.

Some non-migrants interpret returnees’ “anti-social” actions as excessive freedom and individualism stemming from experience in Germany. For example, when I discussed returnees’ unusual German-style houses with Deniz, he quoted a well-known Turkish proverb to explain that being unique and different is not valued in Turkish society: “The sheep that is separated from the flock will be eaten by the wolves. (*Sürüden ayrılanı (ayrılan kuzuyu, koyunu) kurt kapar*.)” By building unusual houses Deniz feels that “returnees are excessively free and Germanized (*Almanlaşmış*).” To him,

> This idea of freedom means that they think: ‘we are now European citizens, different from Turks. Therefore, we can do anything we want.’ They can act like foreigners in Turkey, with the freedom to act and move however they want, without caring about their neighbors. They think, ‘I am free, I can do what I want.’ Some might call this immorality (*ahlaksız*) and excessive freedom (*fazla özgürlük*).

When I asked him why he felt that returnees had more freedom than others, he said, “They are more free because Germany is a freer society. People are individualistic. For instance, you can do what you want on the sidewalk more easily there, but also return migrants take advantage of both German and Turkish freedoms.”

To Deniz, returnees express a freedom of not being beholden to norms of action and neighborliness in Turkey, which brings their morality (*ahlak*) into question. Deniz’s sentiments imply that migration has led to a Foucauldian freedom to question previously shared norms of behavior in Turkey. But, rather than a freedom that produces positive ethical self-fashioning, Deniz thinks returnees act selfishly and immorally. In Deniz’s opinion, returnees are also freer “because German society is itself freer and more individualistic than Turkish society.” Thus, freedom is connected to what he perceives as an “individualistic” and “European-style” of community belonging. For him, individualism is not associated with a positive European modernity, but with an immoral freedom, a potential threaten to communities in Turkey.

Though returnees’ actions and attitudes certainly prompt accusations of individualism and anti-sociality, another reason for the prevalence of these accusations towards returnees may be that some migrants spend significant amounts of time with other return migrants. In this regard, the orientation of neighborliness for them has shifted from their local communities towards communities of migrants. It is logical that returnees strive to maintain close relationships with other migrants when considering that many migrants were removed from familial networks while in Germany and faced similar difficult social and economic conditions. While in Germany, other German-Turks were an essential support system for migrants, and not surprisingly, they wish to maintain these ties after returning to Turkey. Associating primarily with other German-Turks is also possibly a reaction to the fact that neighbors often reject returnees' ideas about neighborly order, accusing returnees of hypocrisy, a lack of neighborliness, and excessive individualism and freedom. Whatever the reason, those returnees who do associate frequently with German-Turks often have fewer relationships with members of their local communities.

For example, Derya associated as much with German-Turks who lived in different towns or visited her at her summerhouse as she did with her next-door neighbors, and she claimed to appreciate her German-Turkish friends more than her neighbors. She explained, "My German-Turkish friends are more helpful (*yardım sever*) than my neighbors in İlçe." She related that she has frequently asked her neighbors to help her pack her car for the 3-day trip to Germany, but nobody ever came to help her. She said, "Neighbors and relatives always expect help, but they never give help."[7] The idea of the "helpfulness" of German-Turks came up again when Arzu, one of Derya's German-Turkish friends, came to visit her. After hearing about my research, Arzu began telling me that, although she has serious illnesses, she enjoys working as a manager for a cleaning service in Germany, because it gives her the opportunity to help other Turks. She especially tries to help those who have alcoholic husbands or who have a lot of kids, and she will even drive people in her own car to places that they need to go. "I love helping people," she said, and both she and Derya agreed, "German-Turks help each other more than people around here."

These assertions of the "friendliness" and "helpfulness" of German-Turks could be seen as ways of asserting that migrants have maintained valued character traits, which are recognized by migrants and non-migrants as "Turkish." They claim to have preserved "Turkish neighborliness" in Germany, while true neighborliness has been lost in Turkey, where they say neighbors are neither helpful nor friendly. With such statements they can combat representations of migrants in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field, such as images in the film *The Edge of Heaven*, that depict German-Turks as criminals who have lost their cultural bearings.

Discussions of neighborly order are also a means for returnees to assert their belonging with other returnees. Burcu, explained her feelings of closeness with fellow German-Turks.

> We experienced Europe and, of course, it is more orderly. People who live there see more than people who live here. At least, they see a difference. For instance, if you travel between Istanbul and a village you see a difference. It is the same with if you go there....I have more German-Turkish friends. We can more easily understand each other. We can be open with each other.

Burcu refers to a dichotomy often discussed in scholarly work on Turkey between the perceived opposition of urban centers and rural villages. As Kevin Robins and Asu Aksoy (1995) write, "There is a great cultural divide between those who consider themselves to be 'Western' and 'civilized,' and consequently true Istanbulians, and those whom they look down upon as 'Anatolian,' 'rural,' 'ignorant,' and 'other'" (229). Burcu distances herself from her own background in a village and her next-door neighbors by asserting the importance of "seeing" "European order" and thus her connection to Istanbulians and other migrants. She also dissociates herself from negative stigma directed against German-Turks for their rural backgrounds—tying herself into belonging with her idea of "modern" city-dwellers.

Returnees' desire to interact with other German-Turks is perceived as "being a good friend" by them and by other German-Turks. However, spending time with German-Turkish friends often results in returnees spending less time with neighbors or family. Ethical aims for solicitude towards neighbors—hospitality towards guests, warmth, reciprocity, helpfulness and friendliness, which returnees and others consider "Turkish"—remain important for migrants.

But, for some returnees, orientations have shifted to showing this form of solicitude to other German-Turkish friends more often than to neighbors or family members. Anthony Giddens (1990) claims that placing an emphasis on friendship rather than on kin or neighborly relations is a requirement for—or an effect of—becoming modern. He argues that relations of friendship and trust become more important with the rise of modernity (118-119). Modernity means that

> Trust in persons is not focused by personalized connections with the local community and kinship networks. Trust on a personal level becomes a project, to be "worked at" by the parties involved, and demands the *opening out of the individual to the other*…trust has to be *won* and the means of doing this is demonstrable warmth and openness (1990: 121).

While we should certainly be wary of simplistically connecting friendship to modernity as Giddens does, after time in Germany, migrants do seem to place an increased value on friendship. Non-migrants can perceive this as evidence of returnees' lack of concern with their neighbors and thus an increased individualism, a negative modernity that they label Western. In addition to a negatively perceived individualism, non-migrants feel that returnees have excessive self-esteem, evidenced by their snobbish arrogance, which eclipses solicitude towards neighbors, the welcome and responsibility they owe towards others in Turkey. To some, returnees seem to be concerned with displaying their achievement of a supposed European modernity, not with forming relationships with others in their communities and with really improving Turkey.

Conflicts between returnees and non-migrants reflect different orientations for belonging and conflicting ideas about the key ethical aims for community members. While both value "Turkish hospitality," returnees are interested in reforming Turkish communities by discussing "order" and in spending significant time with other migrants. Many non-migrants perceive their ideas about order as an unwarranted criticism of Turkey and Turks. They think that returnees who frequently associate with other returnees, maintain unusual houses and complain about littering, noise, and rules care little for their neighbors and the actions of hospitality that demonstrate true neighborliness.

CONCLUSION

This chapter shows that migration and return prompt reflection on neighborly ethics and transform ideas about community belonging. Though returnees place a high value on “Turkish” hospitality, migration and return foster a freedom for returnees to reflect on new ethical ideals of order and to undertake projects of crafting themselves into “orderly” neighbors. From one perspective, this chapter presents a paradox in which an interest in structure and orderliness is presented as a consequence of freedom. What type of freedom is it that desires orderliness and also seeks enforcement of it? In fact, this is not paradoxical if we take Foucault’s (1997) conception of ethics in freedom as a starting point, in which case, the cultivation of order can be interpreted as an exercise in freedom. In this way, returnees’ discussions of order seem similar to Saba Mahmood’s (2005) description of Egyptian women’s interest in the strict performance of Islamic discipline. Both actions stem from conditions of freedom that allow work on the self. Non-migrants likewise view returnees’ actions as an effect of freedom. To non-migrants, ideas about neighborly order, which may seem to be the opposite of freedom, actually represent a freedom to transform Turkish communities in terms of a perceived European individualism. So, for returnees’ neighbors, freedom is, in fact, not the opposite of order, but the condition that allows the pursuit of unique and undesirable virtues—being different and an individual. For them, fashioning oneself as an orderly neighbor represents an excessive and immoral freedom, threatening to Turkish neighborliness constructed as relational.

Returnees' neighborly order is heavily concerned with aesthetics or ethical appearances—tidiness, cleanliness, garden design, even standing in straight lines. We could say they strive to make their actions reflective of a life that is a "work of art" (Foucault 1997: 262). Foucauldian frameworks for understanding ethics have been accused of excessively emphasizing aesthetics. Pierre Hadot (1995) believes that Foucault is "propounding a culture of the self which is *too* aesthetic. In other words, this may be a new form of Dandyism, late twentieth century style" (211). However, I have shown that discussions of ethical aims are not only projects of individual aesthetics, but are also involved in negotiations of belonging, as a way of correcting for what Lambek calls Foucault's insufficient attention to "responsibility or cohabitation that respond in the first instance to the call of the other" (2010b: 25). Returnees' discussions of neighborly order are part of self-cultivation *and* cultivations of relationships with others and community belonging. They seek to expand hospitality beyond the boundaries of an interior of a house—to extend neighborliness to unknown community members. They feel that the sphere of a neighbor's care should include not only the hosting of friends and neighbors, but also thoughtfulness demonstrated by being clean and quiet, and standing in straight lines in public places.

Returnees' ideas are clearly part of struggles over national belonging as "Turks" and "Europeans." From one perspective, their ideas about neighborliness seem linked to an idea of citizenship in a modern secular state that involves what Talal Asad calls a "personal ethics," which is "closely linked to a personally chosen style of life—that is, to an aesthetic" (2003: 255). They want the Turkish state to enforce a public order like the German state does, and they want their neighbors to demonstrate self-control, discipline and respect as their "personal ethics" when in the public sphere. Returnees could also be seen to share Turkish state and capitalists' interests in creating what Öykü Potuoğlu-Cook (2006) calls, a "facade" of "moral orderliness." Potuoğlu-Cook explores how the city of Istanbul is seeking to enforce an aesthetic order of cleanliness and wealth while pushing poorer residents outside of the city limits. These culture-makers project "a Western-oriented and morally steadfast visual order" onto Istanbul (650). Returnees likewise seem to advocate for an order that will make their cities and communities visually pleasing to "Western" eyes.

Returnees' actions could also be interpreted as a performance of middle or upper-class belonging, where class is associated with the ability to maintain a particular lifestyle.[8] Several scholars argue that German-Turks' are desirous of improving their class status and point to return migrants' conspicuous consumption in Turkey as evidence of desires to belong to middle classes or to attain symbolic capital (Abadan-Unat 1986; Çağlar 1995; 2002; Wolbert 1995). I likewise see discussions of neighborly order as attempts to assert a higher class status and middle class belonging. In addition to class, migrants' material practices might also be understood as evidence of transnationalism. Indeed, Esra and Yavuz's house style and even garden could be considered evidence of their "transnational being"—they are displays that represent the couple's connection to the national and cultural space of Germany. Yet, while returnees' homes certainly reflect desires to demonstrate new class statuses and transnational experiences, I argue that returnees' interests in orderly houses are not only expressions of class identifications, transnationalism and ethno-nationalism. The creation of a home is also an ethical aim, a form of ethical self-care centered on a desire to model neighbors' orderliness and thereby also to show care for others. By focusing on returnees' ethical aims rather than their class aspirations, I emphasize how returnees make choices between competing ideals of goodness, rather than how they cleverly assert superiority or dominance over others.

But, returnees are not always successful in establishing relationships in their local communities, because they must negotiate belonging amidst unease about what may be gained or lost for Turkish communities in the course of exchange with Europe. Debates about community ethics become debates about what type of community people want to belong to and whether these communities are claimed as European, Turkish, both or neither for different actors. Returnees feel that their views and "educated," "cultured," and "disciplined" actions mark their becoming "good Europeans," while non-migrants believe that returnees are not aware of the already attained European-ness of Turkey and are just hypocritically performing the trappings of a European-ness they do not embody or an anti-social individualism. They discuss how being a social member of the community is more important than demonstrating one's education or culture or pursuing one's individual happiness (in this case, characterized by maintaining an unusual house and garden and behaving anti-socially by not engaging sufficiently in visiting, greeting, and sharing food and time with neighbors). Returnees who spend significant time entertaining their fellow return migrants may seem inhospitable to their neighbors, even though they feel they are remaining helpful and friendly. Stereotypes of "German individualism" and "Turkish sociality" come into play as returnees and non-migrants negotiate positions in a Germany-Turkish transnational social field characterized by anxieties surrounding Turkey's modernity and "European-ness."

Returnees link solicitude for neighbors to self-esteem—to love of one's country and care of oneself and others. Ricoeur (1992) emphasizes that the origin of ethics is the moment when the other is viewed as oneself, and thus care for the self is also a care of the other. In some sense, Ricoeur's formulation attempts to transcend the opposition between sociality and individualism that are part of stereotypes about Turkey and Germany. Solicitude for a neighbor involves the simultaneous recognition of one's own frailty and fallibility and one's own self-esteem. This understanding of solicitude coheres with Ricoeur's conceptualization of self and other as not only related, but also mutually co-created and in some sense co-nurtured. Ethics is thus intersubjectively created, debated, and transformed. Returnees and non-migrants clearly link care for neighbors to care for the self, which means both an individual self and a community or nation that one fashions though ethical actions. In Ricoeur's account, self-other relationships are equal and almost always positive. Levinas' (2009) writings on the "summons" of "the other" accounts somewhat for the possibility that there is inequality and negative aspect to self-other relationships—that others may seem to persecute the self. We could also interpret returnees' ideas and actions in this light, as many times they express the feeling that non-migrant neighbors are inhibiting their enjoyment of daily life by not acting "orderly." Returnees' ideas about neighborly order could be interpreted as an attempt to alleviate this persecution on the part of the other by advocating an ethics of welcome that should be part of relationships in communities. They seek to offer and receive a welcome based on an orderly comportment of neighbors.

In sum, this research shows that though Ricoeur and Levinas are right to point to the fact that 'the good life' depends on both solicitude and welcoming of neighbors, in actual communities there may be disagreement about the nature of solicitude. Returnees want to expand hospitality to include orderly comportment and relationships with other migrants, but for their neighbors, returnees' perceived excessive freedom and individualism represent the opposite of the "spontaneous generosity" of solicitude. Even if they agree with returnees' ideas, non-migrants believe that returnees' discussions indicate not ethical hospitality, but excessive individualism, snobbishness and anti-sociality. Ultimately both migrants and non-migrants are struggling to determine the meaning of hospitality and community in a modern, European Turkey.

Though I have focused on returnees' desires to change their neighbors in this chapter, before closing, I want to emphasize migrants' deep love for their communities by sharing Mehmet's sentiments about his "homeland:"

> Germany is a declining place. Turkey is a rising place. The other side of the order issue is flexibility and life. In Germany, you have order and security; in Turkey, you have flexibility and life. When you return from Germany to Turkey, you miss the security and order, but you don't want to leave the flexibility that you have here and the constant changes. The moment I go back to Germany, I like the order, but you go into the streets in Germany and no cars are coming. It is quiet everywhere. I say to myself: 'When is my flight back?'

CHAPTER 6
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND MUSLIM HORIZONS OF BELONGING

"People talk badly about my neighbors, the Öztürks," Meltem explained as we walked from their house to hers along the muddy streets in her neighborhood. "They say, 'The Öztürks think that they are better than other people.' But, just because people are educated about religion like me and them, and men and women sit together and discuss important issues, does not mean that I am an *Almancı* and they are trying to show-off. We just educated ourselves." Meltem stresses the importance of religious self-education and discussion for Muslims, which some of her neighbors, like the Öztürks, appreciate, but which others feel evidences "showing- off" and "German-ization." Focusing on return migrants like Meltem whose religious aims and actions have been affected by migration to Germany and subsequent return to Turkey, this chapter examines the interweaving of projects of religious ethics and projects of belonging.

Many migrants choose to return to Turkey because they hope to lead a Muslim life there. They say that they found it hard to be good Muslims in Germany because of discrimination, the pervasiveness of Christian religious education in schools, and the sheer difficulty of living in a society where alcohol and pork are prevalent and where one cannot hear the call to prayer. But, migrants return to a country riven with religious divides—a place where citizens assert opposing religious and secular ("*laik*") identities; where the ruling moderate Islamic party and the so-called "guardians of secularism," the military, are at each other's throats daily; and where members of an Islamic revival movement and a powerful secular elite are jockeying for control of cultural production. Amidst this complex of religious, cultural and institutional affiliations, returnees must also confront negative images of German-Turks in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. They are perceived by many as both "backward" and "excessively traditional" and also, paradoxically, as "excessively modern" and having "lost their religious moorings." Their Turkish co-citizens are unsure how time in Europe affects Muslim identities and what Turkey's possible future as an EU member country may mean for Muslim practice, and they look at returnees to get some clues.

In this environment, some returnees stress that they are identical to others in their communities and underscore that their religious beliefs and practices were not affected by their time in Germany. For these returnees, return home could be considered a return to a comfortable religious milieu that they missed while in Germany. However, in this chapter, I focus on returnees who seem deeply affected by migration to Germany and return "home." For them, return to Turkey does not mean a nostalgic return to a familiar religious environment, but instead an opportunity to engage in projects of religious self-cultivation: to craft an idealized future and to fashion themselves and their neighbors into "better Muslims." Distance from other Muslims, encounters with cultural difference in Germany, and interactions with neighbors at "home" in Turkey lead these return migrants to reflect on ethical aims of education. Many of the return migrants that I worked with urge Muslims to educate themselves by reading the Qur'an in Turkish as well as Arabic and by reading widely about Islam and other religions. They also want neighbors, parents and children, and men and women to engage in open discussions on religious topics. We could view these practices as "technologies of the self" through which returnees cultivate good parenting, neighborliness and Muslim comportment. Discussing and displaying self-education is also a strategy for negotiating belonging with like-minded relatives and neighbors in their communities.

When discussing their ideas, returnees sometimes describe them as "German" or "Christian" ideas or claim that their observations of Germans or Christians led them to develop these ideas. One possible point of origin for migrants' ideas about German Christians is their exposure to Christian religious education in German schools, where they observed Christians learning about religion and praying. Drawing from these observations, they claim, for example, "Christians appreciate self-education," and "Turks are ignorant about their religion." These stereotypes about Christians and Turks have troubling roots in colonial and Orientalist discourses about the superiority of Europe or "the West" to the Middle East or "East," and unfortunately such stereotypes circulate prominently in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. Though these stereotypes are deeply troubling, they shed light on returnees' struggles to assert an ethical and an ethno-national place after returning home. Returnees strive for belonging as ethical Turkish Muslims who can also find acceptance among European Christians, a struggle that parallels Turkey's struggle for acceptance in Europe.

In actuality, most returnees have only a cursory understanding of Christian beliefs, and many of their ideas are not accurate. Most Germans are only marginally active Christians. While Germany can arguably be called a "Christian country," 30% of Germans are not affiliated with any religion, and less than 10% of German Christians attend church on Sundays.[1] Although many returnees have had only a few close personal relationships with Germans, returnees imagine the German public sphere not as a secular and democratic sphere, but as a Christian sphere. Though they praise certain aspects of what they have seen of Christianity in Germany, returnees are not seeking to convert Muslims to Christianity or to become Christians themselves. Nor are they praising their practice of Islam in Germany, which most migrants feel is hard due to discrimination and the inherent difficulty of trying to practice Islam while living in a non-Muslim society. Rather, they are seeking to improve Turkish Muslim practice, and they draw on their experience in Germany and their perceptions of Germans to do so.

In fact, returnees' ideas about education are neither uniquely "German" nor "Christian" ideas. Notions of education and discussion are very important to many Turkish Muslims, in particular, to those active in the Islamic revival movement in Turkey, such as the Gülen religious movement.[2] Members of the Gülen movement see self-education, reading widely about religion, and engaging in inter-religious dialogue as strategies for improving Muslim practice and for forging relationships across religious and cultural divides. They are eager to foster strong relationships between Turkey and Europe and the world. Returnees who discuss similar ideas find ready acceptance in the Gülen movement. But, some neighbors reject returnees' ideas and actions. Many neighbors believe that reciting the Qur'an in Arabic is more important than reading it in Turkish and that having religious discussions with mixed gender and age groups violates Turkish familial norms. They feel that returnees without formal religious training should not "lecture" their neighbors about religious topics. They label returnees "Europeanized," "German-ized" or "sinful" for attempting to change their communities. These neighbors do not object to the *idea* of religious education and discussion per se, but they disagree about how such discussions should be undertaken and by whom.

In sum, faced with a fraught national and transnational sphere and their own uncertain ethical and ethno-national positions, return migrants must give an account of their Muslim comportment. While some deny that migration has changed their beliefs and practices, others return to Turkey and begin an informal Muslim reform project. By displaying what they think is ethical Turkish, Muslim *and* European comportment, they engage in both individualistic projects of self-crafting and also forge relationships with others—they forge belonging in their communities. Examining how migrants and their neighbors negotiate Muslim ethics, this chapter sheds light on the complexities of their religious and ethno-national belonging in Turkish and European spheres.

In the next section, I situate this discussion within the larger context of debates in the Turkish national sphere. As Turkish leaders ponder potential EU membership and increased exchanges with Europe, both politicians and citizens are deeply concerned about their country's Islamic identity, modernity and European-ness. Then, I provide a brief overview of Muslim practice in Turkey and sketch out returnees' journey between Islamic practice in Germany and Turkey. I point out that the Germany-Turkey transnational social field is the backdrop for understanding not only returnees' discussions of their religious aims, but also their neighbors' interpretations of their ideas and actions. Finally, I illustrate returnees' religious aims for education and struggles over belonging by focusing closely on the ideas and actions of Meltem, a deeply religious returnee to Istanbul. Though Meltem emphasizes her difference from neighbors and is rejected by some, she establishes relationships with other neighbors who are active in the Gülen movement. As we shall see, Meltem's ethical aims and actions are simultaneously aimed at her own self-improvement and at her belonging in her community.

CRAFTING A EUROPEAN, MUSLIM, AND SECULAR TURKEY

Religion has often become a touch point for those debating modernity in Turkey. Islam came under extreme scrutiny when Turkey was founded in 1923, and leaders aspired to fashion the country into a "modern" and "European" nation. This project of modernity was "a total project, embracing and internalizing all the cultural dimensions that made Europe modern" (Keyder 1997: 37).[3] Leaders sought to imitate Europe by developing a strictly defined ethno-national identity (Ahmad 1993; Anderson 1983 [1991]: 45),[4] and they identified *laiklik* (laicism—the Turkish version of secularism) as an important cornerstone of becoming "modern" and "Western." In fact, there is no intrinsic incompatibility or opposition between Islam, European-ness and modernity. Scholars have shown that there is not one definitive form of secularism or modernity (Asad 2003; Knauft 2002; Piot 1999), nor is Islam "un-modern" or "un-Western" (Deeb 2006; Eickelman 2000; Navaro-Yashin 2002: 9; Pak 2004: 332; Rudnyckyj 2009: 198; B. Silverstein 2003). But, the equation of secularism and modernity, and the corresponding goal of containing and controlling Islam has been a prominent feature of Turkish political life since Turkey's founding (Keyman 1995; Zürcher 2004).

Turkish lawmakers believed secularism, *laiklik* as they called it, to be *the* progressive, scientific and modern state model. Islam was blamed for the "perpetuation of the backwardness of Turkey" (Keyman 1995: 102).[5] Led by the Republic's charismatic founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, lawmakers shut down dervish religious orders, abolished the Caliphate, discouraged wearing the headscarf in public places, and introduced a new Gregorian calendar in place of the Islamic one (Ahmad 1993; Zürcher 2004). Islam was institutionalized as the primary religious identity, but it came under strict state control, with the Directory of Religious Affairs, a Turkish state institution, staffing and regulating mosques (Mardin 1982: 191; Parla and Davison 2008). In later periods of Turkish history, this trend towards state control of Islam continued in a different form, with the state actively attempting to increase the significance of Islam. After the military coup in 1980, the military government used Islam to create a moral foundation for the new state and to "heal" the country (Keyman 1995; White 2002). This period marks the beginning of an explicitly Muslim economy, an increasingly strong Islamic revival movement (Heper 1991; Keyder 1987), and an aggravation of ideological cleavages between Islamists and the formerly powerful "secular community" (Henkel 2004: 970). Legislators and cultural influencers nurtured a synthesis between religious and ethnic identity—between Islam and Turkish-ness—which has been called the "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" (Akin and Karasapan 1988).

In the 1990s, politicians and citizens began to perceive Turkey's Muslim identity as a barrier to its belonging in Europe, and the perceived tension between Turkish-ness and Islam shifted again. Events like the "Danish cartoon controversy" in 2005 and 2006,[6] negative statements made by the pope about Muslims at his Regensburg lecture in 2006,[7] and the on-going German "*Leitkultur*" controversy[8] are well known in Turkey. Just recently (April 2012), the Turkish news website, ntvmsnbc.com reported the comments of Germany's ruling CDU party general secretary Volker Kauder, who said that "Islam does not belong in Germany."[9] To many Turks, these comments and events seem to indicate Europeans' dislike for Muslims and their skepticism about accepting Muslims "as Europeans." As I discuss in Chapter 3, EU reluctance about offering full EU membership to Turkey further contributes to a deep sense of unease in Turkey about its European and Muslim identity (Özyürek 2009). Despite current government efforts to comply with EU membership demands (Erdemli 2003), the country's future EU membership is increasingly controversial, and the 'European-ness' of Turkey is a source of anxiety for the general public in Turkey. This feeling that Europeans look down on Muslims and view European-ness and Islam as incompatible has strongly contributed to the polarization of Turkish society into groups which identify themselves as either "secular" or "Islamic" (cf. Navaro-Yashin 2002; Özyürek 2006; White 2002).

Today, although approximately 96% of Turks are Muslims, one senses a moral panic about the meaning of an Islamic and European Turkey. Mosque construction, religious education, Muslim broadcasting, and the "secularity" of political parties and the Turkish military are all touch points for fierce debates about Islam, secularism and Turkey's belonging in Europe. Headscarves, in particular, are seen as potent religious and political symbols, representing "political Islam," "modern Muslim womanhood," "Turkish villagers," "modesty," and many other ideas depending on a person's perspective (Ertürk 2006; Göle 1997; Secor 2002; White 1999). The religious landscape in Turkey is fraught with such myriad anxieties that citizens often feel a need to explicitly assert affinities or differences between themselves and other religious practitioners.

BEING MUSLIM IN TURKEY

Before knowing a person for very long, many Turks will tell you that they identify as either a "secular Muslim" (using the words "*laik*" (laic), "*solcu*" (leftist), or "*Atatürkçü*" (Kemalist or Atatürk-ist)) or a "religious Muslim" (using the words "*İslamcı*" (Islamist), "*sağcı*" (rightist), or "*dindar*" (religious)). Though scholars caution against reifying secular and Islamic communities, they are often forced to refer to the people they study as "my secularist and Islamist informants" (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 15). But, the presence of these polarized identities does not mean that Turkish society is somehow divided spatially and practically. Individuals engage with secular state institutions and religious and "*laik*" family members, neighbors, and colleagues in their daily life (Henkel 2007). Also, religiosity can change over time, as a person may become more or less religious when he or she marries, divorces, loses a loved one or ages. In different contexts—at work or at school, with family or with neighbors—people may claim that they are religious, "*laik*" or sometimes neither. They often indicate that they wish to remain outside of the "Islam-secularism wars" by saying, "I am not political," or "We are all Muslim, and we all believe in God." It is important to note that people who self-identify as "*laik* Muslims" or "not religious" usually still consider themselves to be Muslims and often use "we" when celebrating or criticizing Muslim beliefs and practices.

The majority of Turks are *Sunni* Muslims, but an estimated 30% are *Alevi*, a sect within Islam with historical connections to Shi'ia Islam. Though not officially recognized as a religious sect by the Turkish government, historically, *Alevi*s have been associated with secularity and leftist politics in Turkey.[10] Many *Alevi*s fled from Turkey to Germany during the military coup in 1980 and afterward, but my research focuses largely on Sunni return migrants, who are the largest group of returnees. Whether or not a person considers himself or herself to be religious or *laik* in Turkey, all Muslims are connected by having made the confession of faith: "There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah." Sunni Muslims believe that the Qur'an (in Turkish: *Kur'an*) as written in Arabic is the untranslatable word of god and "to write the Kur'an, read it, study it, memorize it, decorate it and care for it, are all forms of witness to the divine truth, and each is an art and a business" (Özdemir and Frank 2000: 46). There is an essential core of Muslim practice in Turkey and elsewhere, which includes prayer five times daily (in Turkish: *namaz*), fasting during the month of Ramadan (in Turkish: *Ramazan*), almsgiving (in Turkish: *zekat*), and the pilgrimage to Mecca once in one's lifetime (in Turkish: *hac*). Sacrificing an animal on the sacrifice holiday (in Turkish: *Kurban Bayramı*), male attendance at mosques on Fridays, maintaining cleanliness and purity, and female modesty (including a range of head and body coverings) are also common pious practices in Turkey and elsewhere. Some non-canonical or folk practices, which are common in Turkey, include praying and petitioning at the graves of saints, reciting a poem about the birth of the prophet Muhammad, and using Qur'anic charms.

Some people who identify as "*laik*" engage in little or no religious practice—they do not pray, fast or attend mosque services and do not believe that women should wear headscarves in daily life. However, others who perform almost all religious duties (such as praying daily, fasting, sacrificing an animal, and giving alms) may also consider themselves "*laik*" Muslims. Being a "*laik*" Muslim in the Turkish context does not mean that a person does not engage in any religious practice. For people who call themselves "*laik*," not wearing a headscarf in daily life, supporting the CHP political party,[11] drinking alcohol and expressing praise and love for Ataturk may define the meaning of secularity for them more than any failure to engage in religious practices (Özyürek 2006). "*Laik*" is a multivalent label that people apply to themselves and others to describe diverse relationships to state organization, political power and ideas about particular religious practices, such as covering one's head.

In addition to distinctions between religious and "*laik*" identities, within Muslim practice in Turkey, there is an additional distinction having to do with whether or not one can be considered an "Islamist" or a "traditionalist," an "orthodox," a "mainline," or a "majority" Muslim (Önder 2007; Özdemir and Frank 2000). Though there is not an essential "Islamist" identity, we can broadly define Islamist identification in terms of "conscious self-identification with an international Islamic front, which has political and economic as well as religious concerns" (Önder 2007: 129). The Islamist movement in Turkey arose out of several informal revival movements beginning in the late 1980s and is led by diverse groups and individuals broadly affiliated with the Nakşibendi and Nurcu religious sects.

The Gülen movement, part of the Nurcu sect, is the largest and most prominent of Islamist groups in Turkey, both in terms of numbers of adherents (with an estimated membership of millions) and in terms political and economic power. While conducting my research, I met many return migrants who could be considered members of the Gülen movement. The group owns numerous businesses, including radio and television stations, newspapers, and charity organizations, and they run hundreds of schools inside and outside of Turkey. Founded by Fethullah Gülen and gaining prominence in the late 1980s, followers claim, "to reconcile Islamic faith and ways of life with a secular institutional milieu" (Turam 2004: 261). The group focuses on

> Personal and social transformation by utilizing new liberal economic political conditions. As a combined ulema-intellectual persona, Gülen not only preaches inner mobilization of new social and cultural actors, but also introduces a new liberative map of action. His goals are to sharpen Muslim self-consciousness, to deepen the meaning of the shared idioms and practices of society, to empower excluded social groups through education and networks, and to bring just and peaceful solutions to the social and psychological problems of society" (Yavuz 2003: 19).

Though Gülen denies that the group can be considered a neo-Sufi religious order, he strongly praises Sufis in Islamic history and "asserts that to condemn Sufism, the spiritual dimension of Islam, is tantamount to opposing the essence of Islam" (Michel 2003: 83). Members of the Gülen movement emphasize interfaith and inter-ethnic dialogue within a strongly pro-Turkish ethnic discourse, and highly value education, which is "seen as a means to ensure one's own salvation and the salvation of others" (Agai 2003: 68). They emphasize that understanding the Qur'an is of equal importance to Qur'anic recitation (Yükleyen 2012: 84). Religious groups (*tarikat*s) are legally banned in Turkey, and as a consequence, Fethullah Gülen, the movement's leader, lives in the United States today. Despite the legal ban on such religious groups, many people question the extent to which members of the Turkish ruling AK Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*; Justice and Development Party) or the Turkish police may have connections to the Gülen movement.[12]

It is difficult to define "Islamist religious ideals," as a great variety of religious beliefs and practices could be considered "Islamist," and their ideas and practices overlap with "mainline" or "orthodox" Muslim practice. One important practice for the Gülen movement is the organization of *sohbet*s (religious discussions). For women, attending *sohbet*s is an especially important religious practice, since women do not usually attend mosque services in Turkey. At *sohbet*s, adherents can improve their ability to recite and understand the Qur'an, learn about Islamic belief and practice, and form relationships with like-minded members of their communities. The Gülen group also strongly emphasizes reading religious books written by Said Nursi (a major spiritual "inspiration" for the Gülen group), Gülen himself and other respected religious leaders. Though we may identify particular groups and individuals as "Islamists," it is important to remember that they do not necessarily have strict membership rosters, and "Islamist" practices may be varied and informal. There are many varieties of Islamist belief and practice, just as there are many varieties of belief and practice among Muslims (and practitioners of any religion for that matter).

Having briefly reviewed the national and historical context of religion and the varieties of Muslim practice in Turkey, I now focus specifically on German-Turks. I examine their religious experiences in Germany and how their religious comportment is portrayed in the Germany-

Turkey transnational social field to provide a context for understanding their religious aims and actions.

BEING MUSLIM IN GERMANY AND GERMAN-TURKISH IN TURKEY

Many German-Turks describe Germany as a difficult place to practice Islam, and they identify this as a key reason for desiring to return to Turkey. Numerous scholars have noted that Muslims face significant discrimination in European countries (Bowen 2005; 2008; Ehrkamp 2006; Fetzer and Soper 2005; Helicke 2002), and Turks' Islamic identity is a particular source of unease for Germans (Blaschke and Sabonovic 2004; Ewing 2000; 2003; 2008; Mandel 2008). There is considerable fear "that the Muslim has supplanted the Jew as the threatening Other within" in Germany (Ewing 2000: 40). Turkish Muslims in Germany are "often associated with fanaticism, backwardness and terrorism" (Helicke 2002:183; see also Özyürek 2009). While some returnees claim that they never faced difficulties in Germany, most return migrants shared stories about the difficulty of practicing Islam there.

Many said that they were taught about Christianity in school, but not about Islam. Meral, who was born in Germany and finished high school there, related, "It is hard to raise children in Germany, because it is a different religion and culture, and there you hear the sound of churches and there is no sound of mosques and no call to prayer." Berra said, "My teachers told me my family should not force me to wear a headscarf." Apparently, her teachers assumed that family members were forcing her to dress in an "oppressed" manner. Many returnees said that they chose to return to Turkey for their children's religious and moral education. They also said that it is easier to practice Islam in Turkey, where pork and alcohol, which are forbidden for Muslims, are less prevalent.

When they return to Turkey, return migrants must manage perceptions about their association with the German and Christian national-religious context. Ideas about German and Christian ethics and Turkish and German relationships are produced, reflected, enacted and challenged in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field, which is made up of innumerable cultural, political and economic networks. In the mediascapes of the Germany-Turkey transnational social field—in films, television shows, newspapers, and Internet sites—German-Turks are portrayed as either failing to become modern and European or as dangerously embracing European modernity. German-Turks' own stigmatized position within Turkey as "ignorant" villagers who do not represent Turks well to Europeans exacerbates these negative impressions. In this environment of anxiety about modernity, German-Turks' religious practices come under particular scrutiny. As Turkey's long-term European residents, German-Turks are often seen as symbols of Turkey's cultural and religious future.

Many Turks feel that migrants are extremely religious and excessively focused on overly strict religious values. Referring to practices such as full-body and face covering, Sevgi told me, "Even in Turkey we do not like that kind of covering—no wonder they do not like Turks in Germany!" She believes that such German-Turkish religious practices lead to Germans' rejection of Turks. But, she asserts further that most Turks themselves do not approve of such religious practices. Thus, she thinks German-Turks' religious practices are not appropriate for a "modern Germany" or a "modern Turkey." Incidentally, Sevgi's comments must be interpreted in light of the fact that the facial and body covering of Muslim women often becomes a touch point for debating Turkey's modernity (Ertürk 2006; Göle 1996; White 1999) and Muslim belonging in Germany (Mandel 1989; Rottmann and Ferree 2008; Weber 2004). As her sentiments indicate, migrant women become a particular focus for anxieties about modernity, tradition and religiosity as their bodies “symbolize and threaten transgressions of social boundaries” (Ong and Peletz 1995: 6). News stories about German-Turks’ supposed lack of integration or sometimes their “refusal to integrate” into German society further contribute to the perception that German-Turks cling to “out-dated” religious and cultural practices.

On the other hand, migrants are also frequently accused of having lost their own culture, religion, and moral compasses. Such images of German-Turks are prominent in recent films, like Fatih Akin’s *Against the Wall* (2004) and *Edge of Heaven* (2007), which depict migrants drinking heavily and committing crimes. Many non-migrants told me that the children of Turks in Germany do not learn enough about their religion and grow up to be atheists. They say that their friends in Germany have “lost their children to drugs.” Not surprisingly, in this milieu, many returnees seek to establish belonging as good Muslims, parents, relatives and neighbors upon return to Turkey by insisting that they have not changed while in Germany and that they are practicing Islam just like their neighbors.

However, other returnees assert that living in Germany deeply influenced their religious ideas, and they are actively engaged in projects to improve themselves and others since their return to Turkey. How one such returnee, Meltem, understands and acts on her religious aims while establishing belonging at home is my focus in the remainder of the chapter.

CULTIVATING AN ETHIC OF EDUCATION AND BELONGING

As I discuss in several chapters, though migration is not a pre-condition for ethical reflection, I found that distance, time away from “home,” exposure to difference abroad, and ethical dilemmas “at home” often prompt this reflection for return migrants and leads to a strong desire to work on the self. Migration provides Meltem and returnees like her with a charter for ethical projects having to do with education and fostering a positive religious future for Turkey. Meltem attempts to craft herself into a “self-educated Muslim” and a good woman and mother, and she hopes that others in her community will do the same.

Meltem’s story provides an excellent illustration of return migrants’ notions of education and struggles over belonging. I begin with a brief characterization of her religious background and practices. After this, I examine her concern with her son Recep’s religious education. She extols the virtues of self-education, and she places great importance on religious discussions between parents and children and among relatives and neighbors. Then, I examine her struggles to establish belonging with her neighbors. Her words and deeds bring her closeness to some and into conflict with others in her community. Meltem finds belonging with members of the Gülen movement who seem to accept many of her ideas about self-education and religious discussion. But, other neighbors do not accept Meltem’s ideas, and she laments their ability to exercise constraining social control through their use of gossip and negative labeling of her as “German-ized,” “sinful” and “European-ized.” Clearly, Meltem’s time in Germany strongly affects her acceptance and rejection among her fellow Muslims in Turkey.

Foucault’s and Ricoeur’s insights about ethical life are useful for understanding Meltem’s religious projects. Foucault describes ethics as a condition of freedom; with ethical freedom, individuals constitute themselves as “moral subject[s] of [their] own actions” (1997: 263). Ethical reflection leads to care of the self and ultimately fosters one’s ability to shape one’s life into a “work of art.” For returnees like Meltem, time in Germany, which includes exposure to Christian religious education in schools and observations of Germans in daily life, prompts reflection on Muslim practices. When German-Turks return to Turkey, they encounter neighbors who view them suspiciously as figures who may be “too religious” or “not religious enough” and are prompted to further reflection on ethical religious comportment. These experiences lead to an active striving to craft themselves into ethical Muslims through what Foucault would call “technologies of the self,” specifically, technologies of education, which include expanded reading practices and more open religious discussions.

Yet, as I point out in several places in this thesis, Meltem and other returnees are not only concerned with the crafting of an individual virtuous self in the sense that Foucault discusses. Returnees are also deeply concerned with their relationships with others, a facet of ‘the good life’ that Ricoeur (1992) strongly emphasizes in his writings on ethics. Returnees aim to improve others in their communities through religious discussions that help educate them, and they also strive to forge belonging with neighbors and religious and non-religious groups in Turkey. Sometimes German-Turks complain about Turkish Muslims, but their complaints are aimed not at achieving isolation from others, but rather at reforming their neighborhoods and communities. They want Muslims in their communities to reflect on Islamic practices and to improve themselves and their ethical conduct. They feel that doing so will ultimately bring Turks closer to Europeans and Muslims closer to Christians. Returnees like Meltem are thus concerned with their own belonging in Turkey and also with Turkey’s belonging in Europe.

Meltem’s Religious Background and Religious Practice

Meltem had a very difficult childhood. She was born near the Black Sea in 1970, and her parents divorced when she was 4-years-old. She travelled to a small town near Nuremburg, Germany with her father and his new wife. Her father was abusive to Meltem and her stepmother during the next 14 years that she spent there. After finishing high school, Meltem wanted to meet her birth mother again, so she returned to Turkey in 1988. She now lives in a plainly furnished apartment on the outskirts of Istanbul in a lower-class neighborhood. Many of her mother's and father's relatives have migrated from their natal village and live nearby, and Meltem receives frequent visits from those relatives who are still living in Germany. She talks weekly to her half-sister in Germany on the phone, and she plans to schedule the circumcision ceremony for her second son so that her brother and sister in Germany will be able to attend when they come to Turkey during the summer.

Meltem's Muslim identity is extremely important to her and has been strongly influenced by having lived in Germany and being a return migrant. As her life circumstances and her economic conditions have changed over time, her religious beliefs and practices have also changed. Though Meltem took some Islamic religious classes in Germany, she claims that she "was mostly ignorant of Muslim practice." She did, however, make numerous observations of Christian religious education and prayer in her public school. After returning to Turkey, Meltem did not immediately begin learning about Islam. Her German and English language skills were in demand in the work place, and she worked as an executive secretary for a few years before marrying. After marrying a truck driver in 1991, she stopped working to raise 6 children as a housewife. Her family is poor, they heat their house with a single electric heater, and to keep warm in the winter, they all sleep together around the living room heater. When one of her daughters died at age 5, Meltem dedicated herself to learning about Islam and started wearing a headscarf. But today, Meltem no longer wears a headscarf. When the family fell on even harder financial times a few years ago, she was forced to seek employment again, and she found it impossible to find a job while wearing a headscarf. She made the difficult decision to remove it, concluding, “You cannot get a job with a headscarf, even though the Turkish president’s wife has a covered head. Unfortunately, people think that covered people are ignorant (*cahil*), but uncovered (*açık*) people are modern.”

After removing her headscarf, her German language ability and her knowledge of German culture eventually enabled her to find employment at three different German language call centers in Istanbul. From 10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. daily, she pretends to be a German woman, Claudia, calling from Germany in order to sell cellular phone packages and illegal lottery and insurance scams to Germans. She feels guilty that lying is a part of her work, because lying is strongly forbidden for Muslims. “What I do as a job is actually religiously forbidden (*haram*), but I have no choice,” she explained sadly.

Though she feels she is acting as a ‘bad’ Muslim in this regard, Meltem does attempt to fulfill many other religious duties: she prays regularly, fasts during Ramadan and sacrifices an animal if she can afford it on the *Kurban* (Sacrifice) Holiday. She also educates herself through reading and watching television programs about Islam, and she discusses religion frequently with relatives and neighbors. She believes that these latter practices, in particular, make her unique among her neighbors and an especially good Muslim. In the following sections, I focus on how Meltem deploys these ideas and practices when confronted with her son Recep’s potential loss of religious faith.

Recep’s Religious Education

Shortly before Recep departed to attend university in a small town near Trabzon on the Black Sea, Meltem overheard him mutter in an offhand way that he did not believe in God.

Hearing this made her extremely worried, so she arranged for him to live at a Gülen movement *cemaat evi* at college, where he would be exposed to a religious environment. "*Cemaat*" means "congregation" or "assembly" and "*ev*" means "house." In this case, a "*cemaat evi*" is a house associated with the Gülen religious movement, which provides room and board and religious instruction to university students. Each house is overseen by an "older brother" (*abi*), who instructs the residents in Muslim belief and prayer and in ethics, such as not drinking alcohol and abstaining from sex before marriage.[13] Meltem felt, "Recep would be able to learn about Islam at the *cemaat evi*, which was important, because he seemed to have lost his faith." There were also economic and practical advantages: he would be able to stay there for very little money, and it would be a safe environment where "someone would be watching over him, and he would not be able to get into trouble."

Several months after beginning university, when Recep returned for the *Kurban* religious holidays, he and three friends came over to Meltem's house. The boys seated themselves on yellow couches in Meltem's living room and began smoking cigarettes, with their arms and legs outstretched, a jumble of gangly limbs amidst the rising cigarette smoke. Meltem served them tea and homemade baklava, (baklava is a traditional treat on the *Ramazan* and *Kurban* holidays), and Meltem and I seated ourselves perpendicularly to them on the remaining couch. After exchanging pleasantries with Meltem in which Recep's friends received greetings and sent greetings from their families, Recep and his friend Ferhan complained about the conditions at their *cemaat evi*s. Ferhan was living at a *cemaat evi* at a different university from Recep, but he had similar complaints. The other two boys and I listened attentively as Recep and Ferhan shared their unhappiness with Meltem. Recep and Ferhan said that students were threatened with punishment if they refused to pray as a group at the *cemaat evi*. Ferhan said, "One boy who refused to pray was hit by the older brother at my *cemaat evi*." Recep also complained, "We are not allowed to wear jeans, and the instructors are one-sided and against the Turkish military." Recep also felt forced to give money to charity projects of the Gülen group directed towards the sacrifice of an animal for poor families on the Sacrifice Holiday. He felt uncomfortable because he did not have much money and could not provide the money the group requested. Ferhan said that at his *cemaat evi* he was forced to purchase the Gülen newspaper, *Zaman*.

Up to this point, the boys' complaints seemed focused on their discomfort with the Gülen movement. They did not like being forced to participate in the movement practically and financially. Additionally, Recep's complaints about not being allowed to wear jeans or express support for the Turkish military seem to indicate discomfort with being forced to take a side in the "Islamic-secular wars." While many Muslims in Turkey are able to negotiate a deeply religious identity and to support the military and dress as they wish, for some Islamists (and apparently these leaders of the Gülen group), the military and jeans are symbolic of a secular milieu anathema to religiosity. Meltem was surprised and dismayed with what the boys told her. "I will gather more information about *cemaat evi*s, and I can call someone to report the bad conditions," she said. As I found out later, she planned to ask her friend, Sami Öztürk, who was a member of the Gülen group, for information about practices at *cemaat evi*s.

At this point, the conversation turned to broader religious concerns that the boys shared. They began expressing doubts about the importance of praying five times daily. "Why does it matter?" Recep asked. Meltem said, "The leaders of the *cemaat evi* are trying to instill a positive daily prayer ritual in the students, and this is important." Additionally, she pointed out that at the *cemaat evi*, the boys are living in an environment where people do not consume alcohol. The boys continued to complain that they felt forced into praying and becoming involved in the Gülen movement. At this point, Meltem emphasized that it was important for the boys to educate themselves about Islam. Gesturing to a nearby bookcase stacked with religious texts, she suggested that they read the Qur'an in Turkish as well as Arabic. As she had on several previous occasions when talking with her neighbors and me, she said, "A major tenet of the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad's first order from God is to read." Meltem also told Recep and his friends, "Read books about your religion written by many different people. Also, you should talk with other people. Talk to your parents. Talk to other adults." Recep and his friends began talking openly and at length about their religious beliefs. "We are Muslim and want to be good Muslims," they said several times, but Recep and Ferhan do not like the pressure they feel to practice Islam at the *cemaat evi* the way their "older brothers" want them to practice it.

Self-Education and Religious Discussion

After the boys left, Meltem turned to me and said, "I'm so proud that those boys felt comfortable coming to me and talking to me about religion." The boys did appear extremely relaxed and comfortable discussing their ideas with Meltem. I noticed that they lounged comfortably on Meltem's couches and smoked cigarettes in front of her, which is somewhat unusual—younger people are often reticent to smoke in front of older people in Turkey, as a sign of respect and formal distance between generations. Young men having such an open conversation with an older woman is also unusual in Turkey (and I would say, even in America). Meltem felt proud that she could have this conversation with Recep and his friends, both as a parent and also as a Muslim. She explained,

> Other people's children are not comfortable talking with their parents about religion, but those boys want to talk to me. Thank god, they came to me and I can help them! They can trust me and can talk comfortably in front of me, and educating children by talking to them is important. Some people may gossip about my talking to them, but it is more important to educate a child than to worry about gossip. People would rather gossip than have educated discussions with each other!

Meltem was also happy that the boys came and talked with her from a religious perspective, because she was able to provide them with what she felt was critically necessary information and advice. She believes that, "the teenagers probably had nowhere else to go for information about Islam. In Germany, self-education is important, but most Turks are ignorant about their own religion. I am glad that I could explain the importance of prayer and that I could urge them to educate themselves."

In her comments, Meltem uses some troubling stereotypes, referring to German "self-education" and Turkish "ignorance." Though such ideas exist in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field—in media images of Germans and Turks that partially make up the field—I do not know where or when Meltem first developed these ideas. I suspect that it goes back to her school years in Germany and observations of Christian religious education and practices. Christian education is legally mandated in German schools, and Turks have had great difficulties getting analogous Muslim instruction instituted (Ewing 2000). Meltem explained, "As a child, I could not educate (*kendimi yetiştiremedim*) myself about Islam sufficiently." She believes that her inadequate religious training was the result of a lack of knowledge and practice among Turks in Germany. "Even when I tried to educate myself, I made mistakes. For example, I went to a Qur'anic course at a nearby mosque in order to learn how to pray. However, I wore pants, rather than a skirt into the mosque." While relating this, she burst out laughing at her own ignorance that she, as a Turkish woman, did not know to wear a skirt to enter a mosque and no one told her otherwise. She thinks that adults in the Turkish community in Germany had little interest in properly educating their children. But, her ideas are based not only on evaluations of Turks, but also on observations of Christians in the context of her schooling.

Meltem told a neighbor, Mehtap, and me that she observed that "Christians pray more frequently than Muslims in Germany." Given the low rates of Christian religious practice in Germany, her idea did not seem accurate to me. But, she went on to explain her assertion with reference to her experience as a fifth grader:

> One time, the Christian children in my class were taken to a church where they all prayed together, but the Muslim children, including me, were just milling about outside of the church. We were saying to ourselves, 'What business do we have here?' Eventually, some Christian children began saying bad things about the Turkish children and a fight started. At this point, a German teacher came over to us and asked the Muslim children: 'Don't you have a place to pray? What is wrong with you? Why don't you practice your religion?' The Turkish children said with indignation, 'We do have a place to pray!' The teacher then replied, 'Why don't you go there?'

Rather than questioning the fact that religious education is mandated as part of state schooling and that the teacher did not take the Muslim children to a mosque in the first place, Meltem feels that that the teacher was right to question the students in this way. She explained,

> Turks in Germany do not know how to practice their religion and live as Muslims. The Christian children who were praying set a good example for the Muslim children. It is because Turks don't live like good Muslims that the European Union does not want to accept Turkey. We do not live like good Christians or Muslims.

Meltem is not aware that Muslims in Germany have had severe difficulties getting Muslim religious education instituted in schools. Rather than blaming her school for not bringing her to a mosque, she blames Turks for not pro-actively and independently educating themselves and practicing Islam.

As she does in the previous quote, Meltem often claims that "Turks don't live like good Muslims," and she links this to EU rejection of Turkey. There is ample evidence, however, that many Europeans are uncomfortable with Muslim migrants in their midst and that Turkish migrants in Germany experience severe discrimination for their Muslim practices and identities

(Blaschke and Sabonovic 2004; Ewing 2000; 2003; 2008; Fetzer and Soper 2005; Mandel 2008). So, Meltem's assertion that the European Union would accept Turkey if Turks lived like good Muslims might be ill-informed. Meltem's use of stereotypic descriptions of religious comportment involving ideas about education, frequent prayer and ignorance are also not accurate portraits of Christians, Germans, Europeans, Muslims or Turks. These stereotypes have long histories in European colonial and Orientalist endeavors in which the East, Orient, and the Middle East were discursively constructed as inferior opposites to the West, Occident and Europe. There is no standard measure of "religious education," and Muslims and Turks are no more or less "educated" than members of any other religious or ethnic group.

It is important to remember that Meltem and other returnees are not inventing these stereotypes, even though they are reproducing them. They already exist in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. If you ask many Turks, they will tell you that they think, "Europeans are more educated than Turks" or that "Unlike Europeans, Turks don't read books very much." However, unlike Meltem, most Turks think that they are more religious than Germans and thus more educated about their religion than Germans. Nevertheless, for Meltem, using these stereotypes facilitates her belonging work, as part of projects to assert that she is a self-educated, good Muslim and that Turkish Muslims can and should find belonging in Europe. She declares that Muslims should self-educate and actively practice their religion like she thinks Christians do in order to be better Muslims and to facilitate Turkish belonging in Europe.

In part, Meltem's views of Christian religious education and practice stem from the time period of her migration (1974-1988), when Turkish Islamic practice was less institutionalized in Germany than it is today. Her location in a small town near Nuremburg with few other Turks and her own family circumstances involving neglect and abuse are also likely to have contributed to her perceptions and judgments. But, other migrants who attended school in the 1990s and 2000s in Germany also complain about their exposure to Christian religious education. For example, Meral, who attended school between 1983 and 1997, explains, “When you are in Germany, you learn about their culture. You learn about Santa Claus in school, and from childhood you do not know as much about your own culture. Nobody paid attention to the fact that I was a Muslim girl, and maybe Santa Claus would not bring presents to my house.” Meral claims that she wants her own children to grow up with a strong understanding of their religion, and she does not want them to learn about Christianity in school. This is a key reason for her return to Turkey. Esra and Yavuz, who returned to Turkey in 2006, also claimed that they were deeply disturbed by Christian religious education in German schools. Yavuz said, “we wanted to return to Turkey in large part for our children’s religious up-bringing.” When I lived with them, I often saw Esra and Yavuz instructing their children in Islamic beliefs and prayer.

Though Meltem blames Turks for not educating themselves sufficiently in Germany, like Meral, Esra and Yavuz, she also thinks that Muslim religious education is easier to undertake in Turkey. Though she believes Christians may be more religiously educated and active, Meltem does not mean that she literally learned about religion from Christians. It is only when she returns to Turkey that Meltem is able to begin learning about Islam by reading books in Turkish. What Meltem feels she learned from Christians is a technology of education—self-education through reading. She observed that, “For Christians, self-education is important” (*kendini yetiştirmek önemli*). She feels her observations of Christians and experience in Germany helped her to become a better Muslim. While Meltem relies on some alarming stereotypes, she does not necessarily want to place Christians in an intrinsically superior position to Muslims, but, rather, she wants Muslims to also educate themselves. She wants to position herself as a self-educated Muslim who is able to act as a good parent and to educate other Muslims in her community.

We could view Meltem's advocacy of self-education and more open religious discussion as efforts of self-crafting. But, we should not view this self-crafting as a solely individual and isolating ethical project. Ethics is about work on the self, as Foucault characterizes it, but it is also about self-other relationships. Indeed, several scholars point out that Foucault's theory of technologies of the self does not take into account the ways that interpersonal relationships shape ethical practice (Lambek 2010b: 25) and that his theory overly emphasizes individualism and aesthetics (Fraser 1989; Hadot 1995: 211; Wolin 1986). Ricoeur provides a nice counterpoint, because he stresses that the ethical is intimately connected to the mutuality—the interpenetration—of self and other and that people assert ethical selves through narrative engagement with each other. If we examine Meltem's experiences, we can see that she is clearly concerned with ethically shaping others in her community and with finding acceptance and belonging as an ethical Muslim.

Meltem is deeply concerned about her neighbors' Muslim practices. She observes,

> My neighbors read the Qur'an only in Arabic, but they do not understand what they are reading, and they do not read any other books about their own religion. People think that you should not read anything outside of the Qur'an. However, the Bible includes God's words too and should be read, but people do not know about their own religion.

Although the Bible is considered a religious book for Muslims, most Muslims in Turkey do not read it. Though not discounting the importance of reading the Qur'an in Arabic, Meltem urges Muslims to expand their religious education by independently reading books written in Turkish.

> I read books about Christianity, and Judaism too. I go to a *gün* (a women's visiting day) with neighborhood women, and none of the women are educated. If they read anything, they only read

> Islamic books. But, they should also read Ahmet Altan. He is an atheist. One must read him to understand the other side. Otherwise, you cannot discuss with them. I read all kinds of religious books and am ready to discuss religion with anyone. A good Muslim can have educated discussions.

Meltem's views about the importance of studying one's religion in a vernacular language are clearly similar to those of German Protestants, who read the Bible in German and stress self-education and independent thinking. But, we must recall that half of Germany is Catholic. By stressing reading the Qur'an in Turkish, Meltem is advocating a very particular language ideology—that Muslims will become better Muslims by understanding what they read. In fact, many Muslims would argue that the Prophet Muhammad received the order "to recite," not "to read," so Meltem is advocating a practice that many Muslims would justifiably feel departs from ethical Muslim practice. As in all Muslim communities, reciting the Qur'an in Arabic is strongly emphasized in Turkey. As Özdemir and Frank (2000) note, this is a formal practice institutionalized in Arabic instruction for children in mosques, schools and community groups and also an informal practice where people in everyday life frequently express themselves using pious Arabic phrases, such as the hopeful "*inşallah*" (God willing) or the thankful "*maşallah*!" (God willed it). But, Meltem is not advocating that Muslims abandon reading the Qur'an in Arabic entirely. Rather, she insists on the importance of adding a specific type of self-education, of learning about Islam by reading in Turkish.

Many returnees share Meltem's belief in the importance of education and reading religious books, though few would go as far as she does in suggesting reading an atheist's writings. For example, Aslı, a returnee to İlçe, told me that in İlçe, people have only recently become interested in education. The Gülen movement began increasing in popularity about 10 years ago, and since that time, numerous *sohbet*s (religious discussions) among women have started. As she put it, “Before the Gülen movement came to İlçe, people didn’t know much about their own religion. Now, they are reading books about Islam and learning about their religion. This is important.” Another time, Aslı told me, “I wanted to come back to Turkey to learn about my religion.” Unlike Meltem, Aslı strongly emphasized reading the Qur’an in Arabic, but I often observed her reading other books about Islam and running her own *sohbet*. Like Meltem, Aslı has made a conscious decision to pursue an ethical Muslim life that involves significant self-education and discussion.

No matter what Meltem or other returnees may say, education is not a “Christian” or “German” idea, but an extremely important idea for many Turkish Muslims. In particular, education is an important aspect of the Islamic revival movement in Turkey and fundamental for members of the Gülen movement. Therefore, we should not assume that returnees’ ideas about education are necessarily a “foreign” import that is wholly different from ideas already circulating in Turkey. Returnees are not necessarily starting a new religious movement; though they certainly give new ideas and energy to the movements or organizations they join. The fact that their ideas tie into ideas already present in Turkey facilitates their belonging. And, it is very possible that returnees’ ideas stem from conversations and experiences that they have had in Turkey, not only Germany. In Meltem’s case, she began learning about Islam several years after returning from Germany to Turkey. But, it is clear that remembering her experiences in Germany and reflecting on her own cultural and religious milieu also prompts Meltem, as it does other returnees, to reflect on religious ideas and on the kind of relationship they want to have with themselves. No matter where Meltem’s and others’ ideas originate, they often attribute them to time in Germany and draw conclusions about religious education from observations of Germans and Turks.

In the next section, I examine how Meltem's religious aims concerning Muslim education bring her both acceptance and rejection in her community. As we will see, her background as a German-Turkish return migrant affects how others perceive her religious ideas and actions. Some neighbors see her as an "educated," "European-Turkish Muslim," but others, find her "uneducated," "negatively European-ized" and even "sinful."

Establishing Community Belonging

Meltem's self-education and engagement with religious discussion are aimed at self-improvement, improvement of others, and community belonging. She is very interested in connecting with her neighbors, with trying to educate them and with discussing religious matters with them. I observed several occasions when religious discussion seemed to bring closeness between Meltem and her neighbors. One time, when sitting with her next-door neighbor, Mehtap, a younger woman in her mid-30s, Meltem commented that, "Most Muslims, in my opinion, are ignorant. The Qur'an tells people to cover themselves, but it does not say to wear a black sheet, and it does not say that you cannot wear pants. It recommends the covering for women for protection from men and protection from rape."

Meltem continued, "I do not think that some Muslims know what is sinful." She said, "If Muslims are self-educated, they will not fall prey to false beliefs, superstitions and gossip." Elaborating, she explained,

> Some people believe that cutting nails and chewing gum at night are sins (*günah*). Although there are logical reasons for these prohibitions—because you could injure yourself if you cut your nails at night with low lighting, and it is anti-social to chew gum when you are sitting around with other people in the evening—these are merely "*sünnet*" (good practices). People would rather gossip about each other's brides or what is for dinner than educate themselves.

When Meltem left the room to bring us refreshments, Mehtap told me that she agreed with Meltem. She explained, “When I first married, I wore a head scarf, but it was expensive and difficult to always buy special *tesettür* (Muslim style) cloths. I decided to uncover myself. My husband did not mind, but initially my family was angry. Now they accept my choice,” she said. “They see that I am still a good Muslim.” Despite initial opposition, Mehtap was eventually able to find acceptance among her relatives.

Ricoeur (1992) points out that the ethical emerges during negotiations of self-other relationships. Meltem seemed to share her ideas about ethical Muslim practice with Mehtap as a means of discussing both her own self-crafting and to form relationships with Mehtap based around their presumed like-minded ideas. Returning to Meltem’s ideas and actions surrounding her son’s religious education, I can further illustrate her negotiations of belonging with her neighbors by describing her interactions with Sami Öztürk.

Directly after her discussion with Recep and his friends at her house, I accompanied Meltem to the Öztürks’ house. Meltem wanted to gauge Sami Öztürk’s reaction to what had transpired between her and her son and his friends, since Sami is active in the Gülen movement and lived in a *cemaat evi* himself while at university. Sami is a few years younger than Meltem, in his mid-30s, a married man with two children. Under most circumstances in Turkey, it would be unusual for a middle-aged, married woman to seek advice about religious matters from an unrelated middle-aged, married man, especially if the man is not officially a religious teacher or an *imam* (Muslim religious leader). Men usually seek religious guidance from an *imam* and women from a woman who has attended a religious school, which is called an *imam-hatip* school in Turkey. But, Meltem told me that Sami’s family is “different,” and therefore she feels comfortable asking him questions. “In their family, men and women sit together. And I know that whatever I tell them, they will take to their graves and not gossip and tell other people. I can trust them and feel comfortable with them.” It seems the Öztürks are “different” because they allow mixed gender religious discussion and do not gossip. Meltem feels that the Öztürks are eager to discuss religious topics with her, and though she does not consider herself a member of the Gülen group like they do, she likes that “Gülen’s writings attempt to combine scientific knowledge (*ilim*) with religious belief (*inanç*).” This is in line with her own philosophy about religion, which emphasizes the importance of education. Meltem believes that “as scientific knowledge advances, we will come to see that it supports religious understandings.”

At Sami’s house, his mother, wife, younger brother, uncle and I all sat on blue couches in the living room and sipped tea. Meltem told them all about her conversation with Recep and his friends. The others listened attentively while Sami advised Meltem that it was important for her son to never feel “forced” into any religious practice, even if the practices are required for Muslims. The actions of the person running her son’s *cemaat evi* are completely against Gülen’s teachings, he assured her. “You should try to talk with the superior of the “older brother” at Recep’s *cemaat evi*, because the “older brother” is ignorant, and what he is doing is against Gülen’s thoughts and writings.” The others listened and nodded their agreement. Sami also agreed with Meltem that her son should educate himself about Islam by reading the Qur’an in both Turkish as well as Arabic and by reading other religious books. “That’s what I thought you would say,” Meltem exclaimed. “Be patient with Recep,” Sami said. “*Cemaat evi*s are very positive institutions, which will ultimately give him a good religious understanding and keep him from going down a bad road.”

As we walked back to her house, Meltem shared with me how comfortable she feels with the Öztürks.

> They try to combine scientific understanding with religious belief like I do. People talk badly about my neighbors, the Öztürks. They say, 'They think that they are better than other people.' But, just because people are educated about religion like me and them, and men and women sit together and discuss important issues, does not mean that I am an *Almancı* and they are trying to show-off. We just educated ourselves.

Clearly, Meltem feels a sense of belonging with the Öztürks, stemming from their mutual difficulties with neighbors and their shared convictions about ethical Muslim practices.

I don't know for sure how the Öztürks feel about Meltem, but I did observe Sami's wife, Havva, seeming to praise Meltem's aims regarding religious education and discussion. Havva is several years younger than Meltem, a housewife with a high school education who wears a headscarf daily. One afternoon, Meltem and I were sharing tea with Havva, and conversation turned to a parent's role in their child's education. Meltem said, "If you want your children to be well-mannered, you must look at yourself. Look at your behavior first; then you can correct your child." Havva agreed and said,

> You know Meltem, I will always remember something that you said to me once. Sometimes I still think of it. I was in your kitchen, and all of the chairs were taken, so I asked you if I could sit on the counter. You said, 'sure.' But, after I was sitting, you said to me—and I'll never forget this—you said, 'do you realize what you've just done Havva? The counter is a place for blessings sent from god (*nimet*). We cut bread there. And now you are sitting there.' I realized that I just didn't think, but you were right. I shouldn't have done that.

Turkish Muslims believe that bread is almost sacred, a God-sent religious blessing. People will avoid throwing bread away, and, if it is absolutely necessary to do so, they seek to at least feed the bread to street dogs and cats, who are also considered "God's creatures." I do not think that all Turks would see the kitchen counter as a sacred space, but most do seem to avoid sitting on counters (I never saw someone doing so), even preferring to sit on the floor.

Meltem said to Havva that she didn't specifically remember that conversation with her, but "yes, it's true, you shouldn't sit on a counter. That is a place for blessings sent from god (*nimet*). You have to look at your actions and make sure you are doing the right thing. Then, you can tell your children what to do." It seemed that Havva praised Meltem for attempting to educate her and also for pointing to the need for self-education. As the conversation continued, the importance of self-education for making someone a good parent and a good Muslim came up repeatedly.

Later, Meltem's cousin, Rahime, arrived. Rahime, a young woman in her mid-30s, joined our conversation and asked Meltem for advice about her 13-year old son's education and career prospects. Meltem said, "I will help you. I've always wanted to help you, but I did not want to interfere in your family life. People listen to me, because I have seen Europe. My uncle [Rahime's father] always used to say: 'Meltem, you know about education because you've seen Europe.'" The other women nodded their agreement and asked her numerous questions.

Meltem's emphasis on self-education and openly discussing religious matters led her to form particularly strong friendships with members of the Gülen religious group, like the Öztürk family. I found that other religious returnees were also eager and able to establish connections with the Gülen group, emphasizing that the Gülen movement exhorts Muslims to educate themselves. Meral, who currently considers herself to be a deeply religious Muslim, told me that her parents wanted her and her sister to "try to blend into Germany and to not be seen as different. They did not want their children to be too religious." Therefore, she says she and her sister were not taught certain Muslim practices, like the prohibition on pork and the importance of fasting for Ramadan. Her parents also encouraged her not to wear a headscarf while she was in Germany. Her father always said, “First get a job, then you can wear a headscarf.” She feels that being raised without explicit discussion of religious matters was unfortunate, and she is now sending her own children to a private religious school run by the Gülen movement to ensure their religious education in Turkey.

Aslı is another returnee heavily involved in the Gülen movement. She claimed that, “before the Gülen movement came to İlçe, people didn’t know much about their own religion.” I was able to observe Aslı running a *sohbet* consisting of three young women. They gathered in one woman’s small living room, and each woman read part of the Qur’an, and Aslı corrected their Arabic pronunciation. She then assigned them passages to read for the following week and exhorted them to practice reciting before their next meeting. The Qur’anic recitation was followed by about 5 minutes of silent prayer, in which the women placed their hands open-faced on their laps and then touched their face as they finished (a typical way of praying outside of the five required daily prayers in Turkey). Then, Aslı opened a book of writings by Said Nursi and spoke to the women about “God’s love.” She explained that this referred to God’s love for humanity, as well as each individuals’ moral obligations to others and even animals, given God’s love for all creation. The women nodded and shared stories about caring for street animals. By attending the *sohbet*, they educate themselves and discuss religious ideas with each other.

In sum, many returnees like Meltem, Aslı and Meral are drawn to members of the Gülen movement (or are drawn to become members of the movement themselves) because they seem to value the educated Turkish-Islamic modernity they espouse. Anders Stefansson’s (2004) recommends that all return migrant homecomings be analyzed as “future oriented social projects,” not only as nostalgic longings for a lost *past,* prevalent in studies of return migration (cf. Anteby-Yemeni 2004; Pattie 2004; Zetter 1999). While some returnees are clearly interested in resuming past relationships and returning to an idealized past, many returnees, like Meltem, are engaging in social projects with an idealized future as their goal. Their efforts in terms of self-education and religious discussion can be seen as part of a future-oriented project of Muslim reform and community belonging.

Struggles Over Belonging

All returnees do not become active in the Gülen group, however, and some face severe difficulties with their neighbors who criticize them for being "Europeanized" and "sinful." Though Meltem was very pleased about her interaction with her son and his friends and the Öztürks, she later heard that some of her neighbors gossiped about her hosting young men in her home. They said that she had behaved improperly for a mother living with two teenage daughters. In fact, her daughters never greeted Recep's friends or entered the room in which Meltem talked with them, but some neighbors perceived the fact that they were in the house while the boys were there as inappropriate.

In addition, there were neighbors who told Meltem they do not believe that there is any religious benefit to reading the Qur'an in Turkish and that doing so constitutes a "sinful" practice. Meltem heard that her neighbor, Feriha, said to her aunt, "Meltem saw that type of thing in Germany, so she does not know that it is wrong." In fact, Meltem told me that neighbors have often accused her of being like a "European or committing a *günah* (sin). Neighbors will say, 'Oh, she does that because she's an *Almanyalı.*'"

Neighbors also criticize Meltem for discussing religion without appropriate qualifications and for inappropriate gender behaviors. For example, some neighbors say "*hocalığı tuttu*" (you are acting like a religious teacher or know-it-all) and call her an "*imam*" (male religious leader), which in this case takes on a negative connotation, since it implies assuming an inappropriate male and religious role that one does not deserve. In Meltem's opinion, these labels stem from the fact that she is knowledgeable about Islam and does not shy away from discussing her religious views with anyone. Some neighbors see Meltem unfavorably as "Europeanized" or behaving inappropriately for someone who they feel is an "uneducated" Turkish woman. Meltem thinks she is educated, because she has read many books on her own, but she did not graduate from a religious school or study with a well-known religious teacher. She does not even have a university degree. Her education is self-education, which for some neighbors is not a sufficient platform from which to educate others. Expressing dismay with her neighbors' ignorance and their efforts at social control by use of gossip, Meltem told me, "Unfortunately, in Germany, you live for yourself. In Turkey, you live for society."

Given our friendship and a need that neighbors probably felt to be polite to Meltem in my presence, I was not able to directly observe a moment when a neighbor said something negative to her about her religious ideas. However, I did notice a few times when Meltem's discussion of self-education seemed to provoke an uncomfortable silence. At one *gün* (women's visiting day) that I attended with Meltem and 12 neighborhood women, she attempted to discuss an idea she had about Friday prayer bringing additional religious merits. She was met with polite nods and silence by the women in attendance. At another gathering, a woman asked those in attendance if they could read Arabic. Meltem replied, "I pray in Arabic, but cannot read it. I read the Qur'an in Turkish every night." The woman responded, "We will teach you Arabic." One woman inquired, "What? You read in Turkish?" Meltem said, "Yes," and the woman responded with a luke-warm "*olsun*," which literally means "okay," but could also be interpreted as, "At least it is something," or "If that is all you can do, that's ok."

Meltem also expressed her opinion to this group that women should be able to wear pants in daily life. She told the women that when she first returned to Turkey from Germany, her mother (who had never left Turkey) chastised for her dress-code ignorance. "I had 5 skirts and 31 pairs of pants, and my mother immediately began throwing out my pants, telling me that they could not be worn in Turkey and telling me to buy skirts. But, there's nothing wrong with pants." To her mother, Meltem may have appeared Europeanized; she failed to uphold both appropriate gender and religious norms by insisting on wearing pants. In the current group, Meltem's comments were greeted with mixed sentiments. Many of the women who were wearing skirts were silent, but several who were wearing pants agreed with Meltem that women should be able to wear pants. I also observed neighbors saying jokingly that Meltem "is very talkative" and "not afraid to express her views," and several women said, "I am not able to be this forceful." This seemed to be a subtle was of asserting that Meltem is different and does not quite belong in their group, as most women do not express their ideas so strongly. It appeared that Meltem's discussion of some of her religious ideas was unwelcome.

Other returnees also complain about neighbors' scrutinizing and judging their religious actions. Ali, a religious returnee to the small town of İlçe put it like this: "From one perspective, our religious life (*dini yaşantımız*) was better in Germany than in Turkey. No one interfered there or asked, 'Why are you praying so much? Why are you doing that?'" Ali prays in his mosque several times weekly, and he feels judged by some neighbors in Turkey for praying too much. He felt freer from judgment about his religious practice in Germany. Similarly, Bahar told me, "Last year, we went to the beach wearing *tesettür* [Muslim-style] bathing suits in which your head is covered. When we entered the water, an old lady wearing a bathing suit—but she was a Turk—looked at us and said, 'Why did you enter the water dressed like this?' She is a Turk, but she says this.'" Her mother, Aylin interjected, "There is that type of thing in Germany too, but more in Turkey, perhaps." Bahar responded, "I think Turks do it more than Germans. They are CHPs[14] or *Atatürkçü*s (Ataturk-ists) more correctly. We also love Atatürk, but everyone has a different view in terms of Islam."

As in other studies of return migrants, it seems that many German-Turks have difficulties finding belonging in their home communities, religious and otherwise (e.g. Gmelch 1980: 143; Huseby-Darvas 2004: 86; King 2000: 19; Tsuda 2003). Some returnees' fear of neighbors' judgment makes them feel isolated in Turkey. Ali, in particular, spent most of his time with other return migrants, who he said understood him. Focusing on transformations of ethical ideals sheds light on some of the disjunctures and un-met expectations so well described in the return migration literature. But Meltem, Aslı, Meral, Bahar and others found neighbors and groups, like the Gülen group, who accept them and their views. Thus, focusing on returnees' ethical aims also highlights their successful future-oriented projects of belonging.

CONCLUSION

Meltem's story exemplifies many of the ideas about Muslim education and discussion that returnees share and many of the struggles returnees face over belonging among their neighbors. Like other returnees, Meltem must negotiate belonging in the Turkish national-religious space, which is polarized between Islamic and secular identifications and in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field, which is characterized by negative stereotypes about

German-Turks and negative ideas about the effect of time in Europe on Muslim practice. Some returnees assert that migration did not change them, but returnees like Meltem, emphasize their difference from many of their neighbors and their desires to improve Muslim practice in Turkey. Meltem strategically mobilizes discussions of religious ethics to overcome negative impressions of German-Turks on the one hand and to negotiate belonging in Turkey's charged ethno-national and religious space on the other.

The importance that Meltem places on education, and especially self-education, and discussion is clear when we examine her struggles to ensure that her son Recep is a good Muslim and that she is acting as a good parent and Muslim by advising him as she does. She strongly emphasizes reading the Qur'an in Turkish and reading other religious books, and she advocates religious discussions that include mixed genders and ages. She models the latter with her son and his friends, and her relatives and neighbors. By cultivating religious self-education and discussion, Meltem believes that she models an ethical, Turkish, Muslim comportment. Discussions of these "education technologies" are not strategies with which Meltem and others argue that Turks learned a lot about Islam in Germany and have it easy in terms of religious practice there—far from it. In fact, many return migrants chose to return to Turkey precisely because they felt inadequately informed about Islam, wanted to learn more, and found Muslim practice difficult in Germany. Many returned for their own and/or their children's religious education and development. The act of consciously choosing to return might itself be considered an ethical act, part of a sincere attempt by returnees to reconnect with their religious heritage and to live as better Muslims. If they engage in projects that are aimed at reforming Muslims, it is because they truly care deeply about being good Muslims and feel compelled to act on their deeply held ethical beliefs.

With their discussions of ethical aims, returnees are striving for belonging among desired groups in Turkey. Meltem makes connections to groups in Turkey who share her notions of self-education and open religious discussion. For example, the Öztürks appreciate Meltem's discussion of religion, and she feels closer to them as a result. As she says, "I know that whatever I tell them, they will take to their graves and not gossip and tell other people. I can trust them and feel comfortable with them." Meltem asserts similarities between her own experiences and the Öztürks' experiences because neighbors label both of them negatively at times. But, it is important to note that Meltem and the Öztürks face different moral sanctioning. Meltem says she is called an "*Almancı*," a pejorative reference to an uncultured attempt to act like a German. The accusation of "trying to show off" which the Öztürks face refers instead to disagreement about the role of religious discussion in Islamic practice, but there is no ethno-national association for them, as there is for Meltem. Some neighbors see Meltem as a foreign, "Europeanized Turk," while they just see the Öztürks as "snobby people." Meltem faces significant stigma as a "Europeanized Muslim" and has heard her neighbors say that she does not know right from wrong because she supposedly saw such things in Germany. Some neighbors think that hosting her son and his friends for example, and discussing religion with them was inappropriate for a Turkish woman, mother and Muslim and represented an unwelcome incursion of "Europeanized practices" into religious communities in Turkey.

As Turks negotiate their own ambivalent vision of their present and future in Europe, returnees like Meltem get castigated, both for their inability to attain European modernity as well as for their dangerous excess of European modernity. On the one hand, some neighbors see her as “ignorant” for not knowing about what they think is correct Turkish religious practice (such as, reciting the Qur’an in Arabic, not reading in Turkish). On the other hand, other neighbors see her as “too modern,” the changed “European Turk,” who has become a “bad Muslim” and a “bad woman” for attempting to engage in religious teaching without appropriate qualifications.

Meltem’s own ideas about her experience in Europe and her knowledge of Christianity must be understood in this context, as part of her desire to assert a third possibility. She seeks to assert a Muslim Turkish modernity compatible with Turkey’s belonging in Europe, and she signals belonging and experience in both Turkey and Europe to do so. Signaling what she perceives as valuable religious practices (education and open and active religious discussion) actually links her to belonging within the national sphere of Turkey, and indeed, she does find belonging. By sometimes characterizing these practices as “German” or “Christian,” Meltem ties herself and her practices into a discourse about Turkey’s belonging in Europe.

In sum, we can see that migration, reflection and difference prompt returnees to novel projects of religious self-crafting. But, it would be insufficient to view these individual “technologies” as solely projects of modern individual self-improvement. What I have demonstrated here is that returnees are also deeply concerned with belonging and community, a finding that is borne out in numerous studies of return migration (Al-Ali and Koser 2002; Brettell 2003: 49; Christou 2008; Chu 2006; Constable 1999; Dalakoglou 2010; Reynolds 2010; Stefansson and Markowitz 2004). To further understand processes of establishing belonging, I have looked at returnees’ negotiations of religious aims with their neighbors. It is clearly useful to study belonging for migrants in terms of ethical negotiations. I find Paul Ricoeur’s (1992) insights about the significance of narratives, intersubjectivity, and mutuality in the construction of ethics and subjectivity extremely useful in this regard. Returnees' complaints about Turkish Muslims are aimed not at ensuring their own independence from others, but at reforming their neighborhoods and communities for mutual self-improvement. They want Muslims in their communities to reflect on Islamic practices and to improve their ethical conduct and themselves. While returnees are occasionally critical of Turkish Muslims, they are also seeking to establish belonging with Muslim groups in Turkey, and they use ethical ideas and actions to do so. Ultimately, they are also interested in Turkish belonging in Europe, in fostering a Muslim practice that they think will also be acceptable to Europeans. This is an ethical religious practice that they hope makes them good Muslims, Turks and Europeans.

CHAPTER 7

COSMOPOLITAN, TURKISH AND GERMAN HORIZONS OF CITIZENSHIP

"In Germany, there is a system, and everybody is safe in the system—but the system mainly only works for Germans. Here in Turkey, there is no system. You are safe if you are an insider and have a network. Many German-Turks are excluded in Germany and have no insider information in Turkey. In Germany, human rights exist for everybody. Here, we are in the Middle East, Eurasia, and we do not have enough of a tradition in this. Here, your rights are only under guarantee if your network helps you."

-Sinan, a returnee to Istanbul

Sinan's comments are typical for German-Turks who participate in the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* (Returner's Meeting), a return migrants' group that meets monthly in Istanbul. Attendees are elites who frequently traverse European and Turkish borders. They come together at the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* to meet like-minded cosmopolitans, to network socially and professionally, and to share their experiences navigating belonging in Germany and Turkey. In this chapter, I explore how this unique group of mobile returnees negotiates citizenship in national and transnational realms. There are numerous ways of conceptualizing citizenship—in terms of the legal rights and duties conferred by states (Brubaker 1992; 1996; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Marshall 1950), in terms of how states subjectify citizens (Ong 1996), or in terms of citizens' civic engagement and citizenship practices (Reed-Danahay and Brettell 2008; Ong 2003; 1999). Here, I examine citizenship in terms of shared ethical aims that are manifest in institutions, and I explore how these returnees understand ethical ideals for citizens and thus their belonging within and beyond nations.

I found that *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meeting attendees are flexible citizens with exceptional freedoms of mobility and affiliation. They consider themselves "world citizens" (*dünya vatandaşı*) and "Istanbul-ites" (*Istanbullu*) and attend the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* in order to meet others like themselves. But, they also come together because they are troubled by a lack of institutionalized justice for Turkish citizens in both Turkey and Germany. They express concerns about disrespect for individuals in schools and in daily life, Turkish state corruption, lack of rights for women, and the necessity of relying on informal networks based on hierarchy and authority in Turkey. As Sinan says, in Turkey, "your rights are only under guarantee if your network helps you." At the same time, attendees also complain about Turks' exclusion from German society, racism and a lack of opportunity even for highly educated Turks in Germany. According to Sinan, "In Germany, there is a system, and everybody is safe in the system—but the system mainly only works for Germans." Ultimately, I found that attendees of the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* want to be treated as respected equals in Turkish and German national spheres, regardless of their position in a network or their religious, ethnic or national background. They join the meetings in the hopes of establishing a network that will help them to negotiate Turkish and German terrains of citizenship and belonging.

When discussing Turkish and German citizenship, attendees draw on stereotypes about ethical aims and ethno-nationalism that are ubiquitous in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. For example, they claim that their novel experiences lead them to think independently like "Europeans" and to act disciplined like "Germans," while remaining hospitable and welcoming to others like "Turks." As I've noted in several chapters, these stereotypes are disconcerting and should not be interpreted as accurate cultural and ethnic labels. But, we should try to understand why these returnees use such essentializations: they use these stereotypes to foster a cultural intimacy and belonging with each other and within the German and Turkish nations.

Throughout the thesis, I look at how struggles over ethics and belonging are interwoven, and this chapter is no exception. I examine ethical aims for citizenship and belonging in the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* and in Turkey and Germany as inter-linked projects. As I consider returnees' aims and actions, I also reflect on freedom and justice as ethical aims for citizenship. Foucault (1997) places freedom at the center of ethical pursuits, finding freedom to be the pre-condition for self-fashioning and shaping one's life into a "work of art." *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* attendees' class status and transnational experience fosters a freedom to fashion lives that they deem good and to manipulate citizenship regimes, which is unavailable to many other returnees and to many other people living in Turkey. They are "flexible citizens" (Ong 1999) and self-consciously cosmopolitan (Cheah and Robbins et al. 1998; Vertovec and Cohen 2002), not bound to a single national or cultural system (Molz 2005; Nussbaum 1996). Experience abroad, which involves confrontation with cultural difference and return "home" can also create a freedom that fosters their reflection on the nature of citizenship in Turkey and Germany.

But, like all of us who live in large-scale societies, the returnees I discuss here do not live as wholly autonomous and isolated individuals, but with others whom they do not know personally. Ricoeur (1992) argues that "just institutions" are necessary for crafting an ethical life in such contexts, because they ensure equality among people who do not know each other through intimate, daily interactions and one-on-one ethical negotiations. Justice "holds persons to be irreplaceable" and "adds to solicitude to the extent that the field of application of equality is all of humanity" (1992: 202). For return migrants, justice in this sense is particularly important, because they often feel like strangers amidst strangers—citizens who do not belong abroad *or* when they return home. Ricoeur understands justice as both the institutional enforcement of discipline and also as the concrete manifestation of shared ethical aims. Thus, institutionalized rights and laws shape and reflect citizens' ethical aims and vice versa. As I analyze returnees' discussions of Turkish and German citizenship, I look at their ideas in this light—in terms of ethical aims for citizenship. I found that meeting attendees are concerned with respect and equality, which they feel should govern state institutions and citizens' interactions. As they navigate public and private institutions in Turkey and Germany, returnees want to be valued for their individual worth rather than for their belonging in religious, ethnic or national networks. Attending *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meetings comprises a key aspect of their struggles to achieve these goals, which are simultaneously ethical aims and aims for belonging.

I begin my exploration of returnees' ethics and belonging in the next section by introducing a typical *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meeting, the structure and purpose of the meetings, and some of the characteristics of attendees. I look at how attendees think about freedom, cultural and religious diversity, "world citizenship," and their belonging as Istanbul-ites. Then, I describe two *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meetings in detail, drawing on observations of discussions among attendees and interviews with several participants. These descriptions highlight migrants' terrains of belonging in Turkish and German national spheres. In my first description of a *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meeting, I focus on returnees' fears and uncertainties about belonging in

Turkey, particularly their sense that respect and equality for citizens are lacking. In the second, I look at a paradoxical situation, in which returnees' appreciation of flexible citizenship, elite status, and ability to participate in a global milieu exists alongside feelings of rejection as "second-class citizens"—strangers—in Germany. These portraits suggest that returnees' desire for belonging as *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* attendees emerges out of troubling discomforts in Turkish and German ethno-national terrains. They share an ethic of cosmopolitan appreciation for diversity and "world citizenship," while simultaneously longing for just state institutions to ensure respect and equality among citizens.

THE *RÜCKKEHRER STAMMTISCH*

As I enter the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* around 7:45p.m, almost every table is filled and the room is abuzz with flirtatious squeals of laughter, German toasts of "*Prost*!" or Turkish toasts of "*Şerefe*!" along with polite discussions about business and mutual acquaintances. I see an empty chair between a slim, friendly looking young woman with bright, brown eyes and a round faced man with glasses and sit down. We exchange names and talk about who we are and why came tonight. On my right is Ömür, who has come to the meeting alone. She works as a distributer of Turkish films in Europe, speaks German and Turkish every day at work, and has a passion for Bollywood. She came to the meeting because her German boyfriend is planning to move to Turkey to be with her in the next year and will need a job, and she wanted to network a bit on his behalf.

On my left side is Sinan. He is a sociology professor teaching at a Turkish university outside of Istanbul. His family used to run a lucrative travel business between Germany and Turkey, but his parents have since passed away and the business is no longer in operation. A

German friend is visiting him, and Sinan decided to take him to the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* to see people "who are like Germans in Turkey." Hearing this prompts Ömür to reflect on the fact that the meeting is not only for return migrants and that many attendees may not even be return migrants. In fact, she says she is new to Turkey, so she does "not really feel like a return migrant. I am discovering Turkey for the first time." Sinan agrees, saying that he feels "more comfortable speaking German or English than Turkish." Indeed, he chose to speak to me in very fluent English throughout most of my subsequent interactions with him. Ömür claims that she speaks Turkish with an accent, and I can hear that she does seem to exaggerate the vowels of certain words. "During my childhood, I always felt German and thought of Germany as my home, and I feel like that even today. I think like a German," Ömür says.

Ömür and Sinan are typical attendees of the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meetings, a social milieu in which the Germany-Turkey transnational social field is almost palpable. In response to an e-mail announcement decorated with a comic image of German sausages in a jar, approximately 40-50 people like Ömür and Sinan dress in business casual and gather in Istanbul for gregarious German and Turkish conversation on one Wednesday or Thursday night per month.



Figure 6. Image from an E-mail Announcement for the Rückkehrer Stammtisch

In 2009, meetings were held at a German restaurant (run by a German and serving German food, including pork) in the trendy Tünel area. This restaurant eventually closed, and the meeting is now held in a fashionable and expensive restaurant on the top floor of a building overlooking the Golden Horn. At its current location, returnees choose from an array of Turkish and international dishes like Penne Arrabiatta and Sirloin Steak with Asparagus. Many attendees appreciate the restaurant's substantial wine list, and most have an alcoholic drink in hand throughout the night.

When meetings were held at the German restaurant, I often heard exclamations of delight at being able to order German foods like pork sausage, *Jägerschnitzel*, and *Maultaschen*. I was initially surprised to hear return migrants openly discussing eating pork, since most returnees would not do so in light of the prohibition on eating pork for Muslims. Most return migrants told me that they could not bring themselves to eat pork in Germany, even if they do not believe in the religious sanction against eating pork. However, attendees of the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* both order pork and also discuss ordering and eating it frequently. For instance, I once heard two returnees loudly discussing when they thought the pork sausages they had ordered would arrive and how good they expected them to be. Another time, I heard several attendees discussing a planned trip to Greece, and one woman said that she wanted to go because, "my stocks of pork are getting low." Everyone laughed. It is clear that for this group of returnees, openly appreciating pork is just one part of their negotiation of German-Turkish-ness.

When I asked Hatice, the founder of the group, why she started the meetings, she told me that she started the group after she came to know several returnees over the course of working together. They began sharing their experiences with each other and realized that they had a lot in common. At first, they just met by themselves informally, but over time each knew someone they wanted to invite, and their group grew. Soon it was a big group with new people constantly coming and going. Now, Hatice says that so many people have come and gone, she cannot even remember all of them. She originally advertized the group on XING (a business-oriented social networking website), and it now includes its own e-mail list. In addition to providing a social gathering, Hatice also uses the group for professional networking. People give her their CVs, and when companies are looking to hire people, they ask her for recommendations. She currently has a formal database of potential employees and German companies looking for German and Turkish speakers, such as Lufthansa, frequently contact her. She also found one of her own employees through the group.

The group meetings are informal; there is no attendance taken or order of business posted. At nearly every meeting a speaker or performer is introduced between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. After the speaker or performer finishes, usually after half an hour, many people begin to leave, but a core group of 20-30 usually continues to chat, drink and sometimes even sing until late into the night. At the meetings I attended, the speakers included several authors and musicians, including a jazz singer and actress, a feminist political activist, someone who did name and personality analysis, a newspaper reporter, a professor, a charity worker, an employee of the German consulate and representatives of the German government. The speakers were usually German-Turks themselves or speaking about a topic related to Germany and Turkey.



Figure 7. ***Rückkehrer Stammtisch*** **Meeting Attendees**

The presentations at the meetings often emphasize appreciation for Istanbul's cultural and religious diversity and the importance of cultural exchange. Both during and after the meetings attendees often discuss their feeling that they are "world citizens" and their feeling that they belong in Istanbul more than they belong in Germany or Turkey. For example, one memorable speaker was a German-Turk who worked as a tour guide in Istanbul. At the time, I found his presentation surprising, because, rather than discussing the history and beauty of the most well known tourist attractions in Istanbul (such as, the Ayasofya and Sultan Ahmet mosques, Topkapı Palace and the Grand Bazaar), he spoke about the diverse historical religious and ethnic communities of Istanbul. He discussed notable German settlements along the Bosphorus, beautiful Armenian churches, and Jewish synagogues that attendees might like to visit. Attendees asked him many questions and appreciated the depth of his knowledge. For example, someone asked about a building that is labeled as belonging to *Alevi*s (a Muslim religious minority) in Üsküdar, a neighborhood on the Asian side of Istanbul. "It appears to be very old. Is this something that the public can visit?" the questioner wondered. "Yes it is worth visiting, but you must call ahead before going," the tour guide responded. His talk emphasized Istanbul's "secret" cultural and religious wonders, sites that he thinks most people overlook, but which he thought would interest meeting attendees.

Such presentations are moments for returnees to reflect upon and express their shared appreciation for cultural and religious diversity. For example, Ömür was extremely enthusiastic about this presentation and told those at our table that she would like to ask him for a personal and private tour of some of these neighborhoods. Later, when I met her for dinner and drinks at the fashionable Café Ara on *Istiklal* Street, she claimed,

> I and the other people who go to *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meetings are world citizens (*dünya vatandaşı*). We love to travel and appreciate different cultures, and that is why I liked learning about all of the different cultures and religions that are part of Istanbul at the meeting a few nights ago. World citizenship means being able to live comfortably in any country or culture.

Mehmet, another typical meeting attendee, discussed a similar appreciation of cultural diversity and how this has led him to seek to date a multilingual person:

> I almost married a Lebanese Christian girl from Beirut who spoke three languages as mother-tongue languages—French, Arabic and English. She had seen the world. She was Christian. But I, as a German-Turk have more in common with people like her who are Levantine than with my neighbors from Sivas [a city in Eastern Turkey] or religious or Anatolian [Turkish] people.

For Ömür, Mehmet and other returnees, "world citizenship" seems to be a rather standard cosmopolitanism: an ideal that diverse ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic lifeworlds are valuable and that cosmopolitans can respect, understand and live comfortably with those who are different. Scholars have discussed this variously as "allegiance" to the "worldwide community of human beings" (Nussbaum 1996), an "orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other" (Hannerz 1990: 239) and a "cosmopolitan disposition" (Tomlinson 1999: 184). But, a cosmopolitan appreciation for religious and cultural diversity does not necessarily mean acceptance of *all* diversity for these migrants. For attendees like Mehmet, asserting a cosmopolitan appreciation of diversity is connected to claiming differences between themselves and the "traditional Turk" or the person from Eastern Turkey who many Europeans and upper class Turks perceive as poor, "backwards," and "too Muslim." Craig Calhoun (2002) points out that many cosmopolitans have a "Western view of the world," which includes "a problematic denigration of tradition, including ethnicity and religion" (91).

Though Mehmet's use of stereotypes might be troubling, when evaluating his statements, we must recall that return migrants like Mehmet are not inventing the ideas they express or making arguments that are somehow uniquely "German-Turkish"—one can easily hear such views when talking with non-migrant residents in wealthy areas of Istanbul. Mehmet's ideas must also be interpreted as a strategy for navigating belonging amidst negative images of German-Turks in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. By using stereotypes about Eastern Turkey or Turk's religiosity, return migrants like Mehmet seek to distance themselves from negative perceptions of migrants' "backwardness," lack of education, and culture.

Though many scholars argue that cosmopolitanism can co-exist with a sense of being rooted to national homelands (e.g. Appiah 1998; Cheah 1998; Delanty 2000; Robbins 1998), others argue that cosmopolitans are detached from their nations. For example, Jennie Germann Molz (2005) writes:

> Cosmopolitan citizenship is forged through networks and spaces that do not fall within the geographical scope or political sovereignty of the nation-state. Instead, the rights, risks and responsibilities that compose cosmopolitan citizenship are derived through corporeal and virtual mobilities, transnational affiliations and a global perspective. Arguably, contemporary forms of citizenship are now defined more by mobilities than by places (518).

In addition to notions of mobility, scholars have pointed out the significance of cosmopolitans' identification with cities, rather than nations (Sennett 2002). And, interestingly, research with German-Turks has shown that migrants identify strongly with the city of Berlin, rather than with Germany (Çağlar 2001; Ewing 2008: 215-216).[1]

I similarly found that *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* attendees often reject belonging in ethno-national spheres in favor of identifying with the city of Istanbul. For example, when talking with Elif and her friend Gül, two returnees in their mid-thirties, Elif explained,

> I am comfortable in Turkey, but it is not because it is in Turkey... I like this chaos of Istanbul. Of course I complain about it, but I like it. It is dynamic… Istanbul is lively. There are different people. It is a beautiful city. There is a charisma here. Istanbul is a very charismatic city.

At this point, she and Gül shared how they are "in love" (*aşığız*) with Istanbul and began listing their favorite places. When I pointed out that some people complain about Istanbul's crowds and traffic, they said that those people "don't live Istanbul. They don't get the taste. We live Istanbul." They related how a friend who returned to Germany regrets her decision, adding, "no place can be like Istanbul." Many returnees assert that they feel a freedom in Istanbul that is impossible in Germany. Elif says,

> I have no desire to return to Germany because life there seems boring and overly rule-oriented. In Germany, at 10:00 p.m. stores close, and everyone goes home. Everyone follows rules. In Istanbul, life is an adventure, and you never know if you're going to make it home tonight.

In addition to appreciating Istanbul for its history and diversity, belonging in Istanbul is also characterized by a sense of adventure that returnees say cannot be found elsewhere in Turkey or Germany. As I explore below, returnees' discuss discomfort in both Turkey and Germany, which may contribute to their sense of belonging in Istanbul.

We could interpret *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meeting attendees' cosmopolitanism as stemming from the freedom that their wealth and upper class status grants them. It is also very much an aesthetic pursuit of particular tastes and lifestyles. Clearly, these returnees' high education, class status, and well-paid employment make world citizenship possible and life in Istanbul enjoyable in ways that are not available for all of the city's residents. Ömür, Sinan, Mehmet, Elif, Gül and most meeting attendees are the adult children of middle and upper class guest workers, but some went to Germany in their teens and twenties for education and employment and lived in the country for many years afterward. I also met German-Turkish students at the meeting who were studying abroad in Turkey through the esteemed European Erasmus program. Attendees are highly educated and typically employed by prestigious German or Turkish companies or institutions, including Mercedes, Siemens, the German government, German and Turkish universities, and German and Turkish newspapers, such as such as *der Spiegel, Süddeutsches Zeitung, Cumhuriyet* and *Hürriyet*.

According to Mehmet, "the people that go to the meeting are successful and very well-educated." He explained his own and other attendees' class status, saying,

> People at the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* are not like the original migrants who went as workers, because they are well-educated and of a different class. Class used to be an important issue for German-Turkish workers, but now it is not, because you can get everything in Turkey that you can get in Germany. You can even get a Mercedes cheaper and more easily in Turkey than in Germany. And, Turkey's economy is growing, so going to Europe doesn't mean anything like it used to.

In Mehmet's description of a typical attendee, he distances himself and other attendees from the negative image of the poor, "unworldly" migrant worker represented in media in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field. At the same time, he asserts that migrants' improved class status is no longer a marker for identifying return migrants—Turkey's burgeoning economy has eliminated differences between European and Turkish markers of wealth. Thus, his own and other attendees' wealth are not signs of being successful migrants, but rather indicates their cosmopolitan membership in a world where national differences between Turkey and Germany are eclipsed by global capitalist connections.

Migrants attend the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* for many reasons. Most obviously, meetings provide an opportunity to network professionally and personally with other cosmopolitans. I observed Mehmet engaging in both of these activities. He would often discuss his business with other attendees, hand out business cards to potential clients, and get referrals from Hatice, the founder and organizer of the meetings. Mehmet also used the meeting to scout out attractive single women and even asked me if I had any single American friends who I could bring to the next meeting. Though returnees attend the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meetings in part to meet people who share their appreciation of cultural and religious diversity as “world citizens” and who enjoy “charismatic” Istanbul, I also found that the meetings provide attendees with a source of identity and belonging, and become a place where they discuss their frustrations as citizens of Turkey and Germany with like-minded individuals. In the remainder of the chapter, I examine how returnees negotiate ethical aims for respect and equality while negotiating Turkish citizenship in Turkey and German-Turkish citizenship in Germany.

NEGOTIATING CITIZENSHIP IN TURKEY

It is 7:30 p.m., the sun is just setting over the Golden Horn, and few people have arrived at the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch*. I see two men in their 50s, dressed in old-fashioned brown suits with ties, sitting at a table in the corner. They smile in a friendly way from behind the white tablecloth, and I sit down opposite them. They introduce themselves as Berk and Hikmet. With bushy black hair and a stocky frame, Berk bears a striking resemblance to Ilyas Salman, who played the lead character in the popular film *Yellow Mercedes.* With his bald head and gray beard, Hikmet looks like a kindly grandfather. This is their first time at the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch*, and they seem eager to meet new people. After a few minutes, Necla, a smiling young woman in her late twenties with long, curly brown hair sits down next to me. As is customary at these meetings, Berk, Hikmet and Necla begin discussing their experiences as return migrants and why they decided to come to the meeting. Necla explains that she is a lawyer and had difficulty finding work in Germany. Additionally, she says that she never felt at home in Germany, even though she has German citizenship.

> I got German citizenship for egoistic reasons. It made it easier to attend university, and I can now travel wherever I want to in the European Union. But, Turkey is my homeland (*Heimat*). I made the decision to come back and told my boyfriend, who is American, 'You can come to Istanbul if you want to or don't come if you don't want to, but I have decided that I have to be here. I love it here.' I miss my friends in Germany, but not Germany. I like the chaos of Istanbul.

Everyone smiles. Like many attendees, Necla code-switches, speaking a mixture of Turkish and German and frequently switching between languages depending on the topic and with whom she speaks. In the above passage, she uses the German word "*Heimat*," although she otherwise speaks Turkish. Later, she told me in German that her Turkish is not fluent and that she forgot the word for this in Turkish. However, she otherwise speaks mostly Turkish at the meeting.

Berk and Hikmet tell Necla and me about their jobs. They both work for the "*Vorintegrationsprojekt: Meine neue Heimat*" (Pre-Integration Project: My New Home). The project is EU-funded and supported by the German government. Out of an office along the busy Istiklal Street, they provide information about visa procedures and daily life and culture in Germany to Turks planning to migrate in order to marry German-Turks. Each year, 10,000 Turks are migrating to Germany for marriage, and many of them are "uneducated people from Eastern Turkey," they explain.[2] One reason for the development of their project is recent changes to German law, which require proficiency in German in order to obtain a marriage migrant visa, but they are also interested in helping to educate their fellow German-Turks and especially women about their rights.

When I later meet Hikmet in his office, he explains,

> We try to explain to women the importance of the rights that women have in Germany. Many women from Eastern Turkey marry German-Turks and are locked in closets in Germany by their husbands. This is not something that comes from living in Germany, but something that happens in Turkey too, and the girls have seen this with their mothers and aunts, so they don't question it. They never learn German so they cannot get any help in Germany. Now, they have to learn German before they can even go to Germany, which is good for them.

Significantly, the notion that female Turkish marriage migrants are "locked in closets" by their Turkish husbands is quite prominent in German media representations of German-Turks. In these problematic discourses, the supposed oppression of German-Turkish women comes to symbolize the "other-ness" of Turks whose patriarchal family structures mark them as "less modern" than Germans. Rather than challenging these discourses by pointing out the prevalence of domestic abuse among ethnic Germans in Germany or the difficulties that Turkish migrants face there, I found that Hikmet and Berk seemed to view Turkish family structures as the source of the problem. They believe that by educating Turkish women about "modern" German rights, they will have better opportunities in Germany.

After hearing about the German government's new language requirements for Turkish visa applicants, Necla exclaims that she thinks it is great that the German government requires knowledge of German before they give marriage migrant visas to Turks. "Migrants should have to learn the language in order to travel to Germany," she exclaims. Berk replies that "it shows respect (*saygı)* to learn another country's language." He then points to me as a demonstration of a respectful person who has learned Turkish in order to live in Turkey. Rather than questioning a

German language ideology, which is applied exclusively (and I would argue unfairly) to Turks, they see this law as enforcing Turkish citizens' respect towards the German nation.

This discussion of respect prompts further discussions among Berk, Hikmet and Necla about the lack of respect they find in Turkey. Hikmet begins talking about difficulties that he faces as a German-Turk in Turkey. "When making purchases like houses or cars, they will sell things for a much higher price to an *Almancı* than they do to other people," he complains. Necla and Berk nod with understanding. Berk discussed unhappiness due to a lack of respect among citizens in daily life. He was born in Turkey, migrated to Germany in his 20s and returned to Istanbul 3 months ago, after twenty years in Germany. He explained,

> Daily life is a constant torture. The busses are too crowded, but still the drivers tell people to push back to let more people onto the bus, and everyone is just quiet and does not say anything. Or, the bus does not come to a complete stop to let people off. Or, when you buy something, like cigarettes, the person working there just throws the thing that you bought at you without looking at you. All of this is disrespectful (*saygısızlık*)! In Turkey, there is no respect for people, no rights, no law. Whoever is powerful is right. This is scary and uncomfortable when compared to life in Europe.

Hikmet and Necla agreed.

When I met Berk in his office, he expanded on the topic of disrespect in the public sphere in Turkey, which he linked to a lack of human rights.

> It is really hard to live in Istanbul. It has been 7 months, and it is very hard for me. I love Istanbul. I can say I am in love. But, after experiencing this, you feel tired, really. Life is really hard, like a torture. Sometimes I have to get on a bus, I have no other choice, and they push people together. For someone who has lived in Germany, you find this against human rights. Something like this is impossible, pressed together, impossible! But, unfortunately, life here is like this.

What particularly bothers Berk is that Turkish people do not complain on crowded buses.

> Many people have gotten accustomed to this and say nothing. For example, a few times I raised my voice on a bus. The doors would not even close. The driver said 'move to the back.' I said, 'what are you doing? Are you moving animals or people? This is impossible.' But the other people just looked at me. But, they should say something.

He speculated that lack of knowledge of alternatives and fear prevents fellow passengers from joining him in deploring such conditions. “They are afraid. Maybe they have no consciousness. They think it is normal. If they see another life, they will not think this is normal.” Berk’s comments brought to my mind other returnees’ discussions of “orderly” neighborhoods, which I describe in Chapter 5. He wants “orderly buses” and neighbors to show their solicitude for one another by raising their voices on buses to increase their own and other’s comfort. Instead of blaming economic differences between the wealthy German state and the poorer Turkish state for differences in bus service in the two countries, he sees the treatment of Turkish citizens on buses as unethical.

Most of us would not consider un-crowded buses to be a human right, and indeed, Berk’s complaints are more substantial than this. For him, disorderly buses are just one symptom of a disorderly public sphere and a state that does not provide rights to citizens. As I talked with him further, he expanded on his feelings of discomfort in Turkey:

> In Germany and Europe, politics are more orderly (*düzgün*). In Turkey, everything is very primitive. There are a lot of dangers and nothing happens here by the rules. There are no norms. Someone used to the norms and standard of Europe, cannot stand this environment in Turkey. Political parties are not settled here. Turkey’s political parties are like tsunamis always coming and going. There are coups. Political parties close and new parties are formed everyday. And, therefore, there is not a true democracy here. Only religious, nationalist and racist parties can rise to the top. Modern parties concerned with human rights are needed. This is a big hole in Turkey.

In an environment of unstable political parties and a lack of democracy as Berk perceives it, it is perhaps not surprising that people are scared to get involved in politics or even to raise their voices against bus conditions in daily life. Considering that there have been four coups in the last 60 years and that several political parties have been shut down just in the last few years, there does seem to be some merit to Berk’s ideas about the instability of the Turkish political context. Scholars also point to a lack of democracy and a weakness of civil society in Turkey

(Keyman 2009), which can be contrasted with citizen-state relations in Germany, which are characterized by expectations of services and rights from the state (Heper 1992). Complaining about Turkey's political instability does not make returnees like Berk different from their fellow Turkish citizens. Many Turks complain about the frequent legal disbanding of political parties and are cynical about the political process in Turkey. But, unlike German-Turks, they rarely compare the Turkish context to their knowledge of Europe.

In addition to discussions among meeting attendees about respect and rights for citizens, speakers at the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* also speak about these issues. At one *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meeting, Zehra, a middle aged return migrant who works for an NGO that runs campaigns to increase Turkish women's participation in politics, presented. She discussed how Turkish women are underrepresented in Turkish society, in political office, and even within private companies. In 2007, her organization created campaign posters depicting women wearing mustaches. Beside the women's pictures, they printed the question: "Is this a requirement for being elected to parliament?"


Meclise girmek için
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ka-der.org.tr

Toplumun yarısını kadınlar oluşturuyor. Ancak kadınların, 1935 yılından bugüne TBMM'de temsil oranı ortalama % 2.2.

Türkiye, parlamentoda kadın temsilinde 167 ülke arasında 163. sırada.

Kadınların eksik temsil edildiği meclisler demokratik çözümler üretemiyor.

Demokrasi için; gerçek ve eşit temsil için siyasette kadınları destekleyin.

Kadın Adayları Destekleme ve Eğitme Derneği

[3]

Figure 8. Image of the Poster discussed and shown at the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch.*

Later, a similar campaign included prominent political party leaders and the quote, "We all agree that women should be included and represented in politics." But underneath their pictures, the poster displayed the politicians' hypocrisy, with statistics showing the low number of women involved in their parties. "This is like a sarcastic joke," she said, "because they do nothing to include women in politics." When I interviewed her later, Zehra explained her interest in women's rights and feminism as stemming from experience in Germany. When growing up, several German women introduced her to feminism, and she explained, "I was often asked by Germans how they could improve the situation of Turkish women." For example, several classmates heard of a young girl who was sent to Turkey by her parents to marry an older man, and they wanted to help the girl, but did not know how.

> I felt helpless at the time, because there was not much that they or I could do to help oppressed Turkish women. When I returned to Turkey at 18-years-old to become a journalist, I travelled the Turkish countryside for the first time and saw the reality of conditions in Turkey.

Zehra's presentation prompted a lively and friendly discussion, though I later spoke with several returnees who felt that her portrayal of the position of women in Turkish society was overly negative.

Respect and Equality

The discussions and interactions I relate above encapsulate many of returnees' concerns with respect (*saygı*) and equality (*eşitlik*) for citizens in Turkey—a need for adequate public services, increased women's rights, and stable political parties. In addition to expressing dismay about these aspects of life in Turkey, returnees also complained about schools, government corruption, and informal networks, which do not operate according to respect and equality of all citizens.

For example, Elif complains about the Turkish educational system, which demands that student's show respect towards teachers but does not treat individual students with respect. She entered a deep depression after returning to Turkey due to difficulties in high school, where she was labeled an "*Almancı*" and segregated from her classmates by her teachers. "I cried when I returned to Turkey even though it was my motherland (*vatan*), I cried so much…. Apparently, I've adjusted now." Explaining her feelings, she related, "Young people are not respected at all in Turkey. Students are not people in Turkey, just things (*eşya*)."

As in other returnees' discussions of the public sphere, Elif describes a lack of respect and a lack of rules in Turkey. She says "There were rules in Germany, and everyone followed the rules; whereas, in Turkey, it is not like this. Students and teachers have different rules, like honesty (*dürüst*) and respect (*saygı*) applies to teachers, not students." Elif feels respect is allocated according to hierarchy (teachers are respected, students are not) in Turkey. When considering her feelings about life in Istanbul, she claims that Germany is "overly rule oriented," but when considering relationships among citizens, she wants rules for respect like she found in Germany. She thinks that respect should be based on the equality of individuals—the equality of students and teachers in this case—not applied differentially based on authority or position.

Other returnees discussed Turkish state ineptitude and corruption, which they felt was pervasive. After a *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meeting, Zehra offered to give Mesut (another returnee) and me a ride home, and I observed their conversations while driving from Tünel to Beşiktaş and up towards the Bosphorus Bridge. Zehra complained that the Turkish state is incapable of maintaining public spaces. She pointed to an uneven sidewalk and said, "Look at that! They probably spent millions on this and did a bad job." Directly thereafter, she linked the state's ineffectiveness in maintaining public spaces to the corruption reported to permeate the committee planning European Capital of Cultures 2010 events in Istanbul. Mesut is working for the Istanbul Capital of Cultures 2010 Programming Committee and agreed that there is a lot of corruption related to how funds were allocated. Zehra claimed, "Corruption is inherent in any project in which the Turkish state is involved. All German-Turkish return migrants are frustrated for this reason when they return to Turkey." Mesut agreed that he feels frustrated.

Lamenting state corruption or Turkey's unstable political system is actually a common modality of discussing the political in Turkey (and other states). Several studies of the Turkish state have shown that complaints about corruption constitute the political language of daily life that actually act to construct the state (Kuzmanovic 2011; Navaro-Yashin 2002). Cynicism about the state forms a central "structure of feeling" which manages "existence in a realm of state power" (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 5). In this way, returnees' criticisms of the state could be interpreted as related to a sort of belonging in the Turkish nation. However, returnees' discussions are different from non-migrants' discussions, as they become ways for returnees to demonstrate their awareness of conditions in Germany and to assert their distinction from other Turks. For instance, returnees believe they have what Berk calls a "consciousness" of human rights or what Zehra calls knowledge of "the reality of conditions," which their fellow Turks lack and which stem from their experience in Germany.

Meeting attendees' discussions of the need for rights and respect in Turkey can also be interpreted as expressions of the importance they place on ethical aims of justice and equality, and such discussions are part of their efforts towards cultivating a sense of belonging with one another. Ricoeur invites us to see the necessity of just institutions for 'the good life,' because they ensure equality among individuals who might otherwise be strangers to one another (1992: 202). Though Berk, Hikmet, Necla, Elif, Zehra, Mesut and other returnees discuss their love for Istanbul—identifying as Istanbul-ites and even being *in love* with Istanbul—they also feel discomfort when interacting with their fellow citizens and navigating Turkish institutions. While living in a system where they feel political parties and schools are not run humanely, the state is inept and corrupt, and citizens do not know their rights and behave with respectful comportment, returnees feel ill at ease. As Berk says, he feels a lack of security and safety that makes life a "torture" in an otherwise beloved Istanbul. Elif claims to have felt depressed, and Mesut and Zehra describe frustration. They forge belonging in part by expressing their shared longing for respect to govern citizen-to-state and citizen-to-citizen interactions in Turkey.

For some returnees, the lack of justice they feel in Turkey is not only discomforting, but also a cause of deep fear. Returnees say that informal networks of relatives and neighbors can be essential for navigating institutions and the public sphere in Turkey. They feel that respect stems from one's age, wealth, profession, authority and connections to others in a group (a clan, network or religious group), rather than from an equality and autonomy of all citizens as human beings. For example, Sinan shared many of Berk's concerns about Turkish politics. He was very involved in organizing for immigrants' rights in Germany, but has pulled back from political activism in Turkey due to fear of the police and of losing his job. Involvement in politics "is more risky, I think, in Turkey…I cannot be as active here as I was in Germany. There is more social control in Turkey." Rather than a working system of rules, rights and laws, Sinan feels that informal networks are essential for navigating daily life in Turkey. He told me that he has two friends who returned to Germany because they "could not make it in Turkey, could not get used to life here." He said,

> Many people return to Turkey because of problems in Germany, but they have idealized this country. Many people think that because they are well-educated they will succeed, but the rationality is different here: it depends on who sent you, if you do what other people want you to do. The main job is to stay in the game, not to win the game.

He thinks success is not based on objective standards, like education or professional experience, but depends more on your connections within networks. "Networks are making your image and your image is what is appreciated. You are appreciated by your image because of your network, who has sent you and who is protecting you," he explained. For Sinan, returnees' exclusion from networks and their lack of knowledge of how networks work in Turkey leads to feelings of discomfort.

> People who are born here know the rules. In other countries, you are taught that rules or the law can protect you, but laws are only written here. You are protected if you a member of powerful networks. When they return, German-Turks sometimes rely on other facts or other people. Then they are frustrated. They think 'It couldn't be true. We have signed some contracts.' But the signature is not important here. There is always an opting out. You can opt out even if there is an official rule. If people rely on this, they are disappointed.

He contrasts this system in Turkey with his experience in Germany.

> In Germany, people are acting on rules, which everyone knows in every situation. You know your rights. Your enemy knows your rights too, and the system controls everybody, so there is balance. Here, nobody knows their rights, and sometimes the official rights are not enforced.

Sinan claimed to have seen how informal networks function in his workplace, and he discussed this vaguely, leaving me feeling that he was reticent to say too much, as he does not feel safe. He said,

> I don't trust anyone anymore. The system is not so good that everybody can be in solidarity, everyone maximizes his own thing, and nobody trusts anybody. If you are enough in the game and established, then you've got security; you have only to work to maintain it. I learn the system more and more. People who bring names, you know you can trust them. There are gatekeepers; they only want to know who sent you. If you are a person who cannot work well, but were sent by a very powerful group, that is what matters. The system is made up of people, who are not capable, and the system cannot protect itself, it is not a rational system.

> Many German-Turks should know that before they come, and they should have a plan B or plan C. Outside of German institutions and firms, you are not secure; some German-Turks don't know this. They idolize the country of their parents. They think with a doctoral degree they will get a job—but no, or they are fired. The system does not want successful people, only people in the network or what the boss wants. The gatekeepers are not looking for rational success, only individual egoism, only the manager or stakeholder asks: 'Can I work with this person?' In Germany, the diploma is important.

Sinan ended our conversation by discussing fear and paranoia. "Paranoia is sometimes better than to be relaxed. If I was too lazy, I do not know if I would be successful, but I cannot mention anything here in case people are listening." Sinan laments an absence of laws, contracts, rights and other systems that would provide him with a sense of comfort and safety in Turkey.

Of course, when interpreting Sinan's comments, we should not assume that Turkey is a "lawless" place, where no one can count on anyone to get their needs met in daily life. There is a functioning legal system in Turkey. But more importantly, informal networks are, in fact, highly effective systems, and many Turks feel that their needs are met perfectly well by calling on relatives, neighbors and friends in times of need. However, return migrants who sometimes do not have these necessary networks lament a system that they feel does not work well for them. In fact, the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meetings are themselves an attempt to set up an informal network that returnees can utilize to navigate life in Turkey. At the meetings, returnees discuss difficulties in their personal or professional lives and make connections to others who are similarly hoping to be treated as equals, regardless of their positions in certain networks.

For example, at one meeting, I heard Mehmet explaining to Nazım, an aspiring art producer that he must never enter into verbal agreements in Turkey; he must always have a written contract. However, even if he has a contract, he should not trust that the contract would be upheld. He explained that it is your membership in a network, not who you are as an individual that matters in Turkey. “Turks still live in clans. They are Beşiktaş or Fenerbahçe.[4] Or *laik*[5] or *Fethullahçı*.[6] Or they are *Ismail Ağa Cemiyeti'nin takipçisi*.[7] And they exclude each other because they compete for the same thing. I am outside of this…. Being Europeanized means trying to leave clans and become an individual.” Mehmet asserts an ethics of independent thought and not simply adopting the views of a particular clan, and he claims that this is a demonstration of his “European-ness.” In Mehmet's case, this independent thinking took a surprising turn: he strongly supported the ruling AK Party in Turkey despite the opposition of his entire family (and most *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* attendees) who consider themselves Kemalists and CHP Party supporters (i.e. supporters of the leftist opposition party). As he told me and others seated at our table at a *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meeting, Mehmet believes that his views show his desire to do what is best for Turkey, while his relatives are only interested in “clan membership” and jockeying for power. He believes that he models an ethical independent thinking that reflects his interest in a positive power-in-common that trumps differences and affiliations of clan.

I found that time spent complaining about the Turkish state and citizens often become moments when returnees signal a feeling of being partially German or European, like Mehmet does, and refer to stereotypes about ethnical and ethno-national identities. For example, when Zehra discussed the reasons for the state's ineffectiveness and corruption with Mesut, she said, “This is a remnant of Turkey's Ottoman past, when Turks became lazy. They never worked during Ottoman times. They always made someone else work, and now they don't know how. They have no sense of duty.” In mentioning “laziness” and “duty,” Zehra reproduces stereotypes about Ottoman laziness that are present in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field.

Notions of "laziness" or "unwillingness to work" were prominent Orientalist discourses on the Ottoman Empire in the 19^{th} century and were said to be a major reason for the Empire's decline (Ewing 2008: 37). These views are also present in anthropological work on Turkey and in post World War II German discourses (2008: 38-39). I found that return migrants often discussed "Ottoman laziness."[8]

By claiming to abhor supposed "Ottoman" and "Turkish" laziness, Zehra asserts her distinction from her fellow citizens, her sense of duty and hard work. These are qualities that attendees of the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* believe they share, and I noticed that people at the meetings occasionally praised Zehra for her positive "German discipline." One time, she was describing to Hatice the presentation that she had prepared for the meeting, and Hatice commented, "I feel like I'm talking to a German. A Turk would not have prepared so much." Zehra responded that she is "very disciplined like a German." Attendees mobilize stereotypes about German discipline to assert their distinction from other Turks and their belonging with each other at the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch*. They compress ethical aims and ethno-national identities—thinking independently like "Europeans" and being disciplined like "Germans"—during the course of their projects of belonging.

Rückkehrer Stammtisch meeting attendees complain that an ethical aim of treating citizens as respected equals is not institutionalized in Turkey. Without a just power-in-common and equality in the public sphere, returnees feel they are treated as less than human beings—as "animals," as Berk says, as "things," as Elif says, as "clan members" as Mehmet says, or according to "image," as Sinan says. Though all Turks might complain about their state, there do seem to be real differences between returnees and non-migrants in terms of expectations about the role of the state. As I discussed in Chapter 5, non-migrants place importance on networks of neighbors who know and depend on one another. They are less interested than returnees in what the state can or should do for them, in the rights they do or do not have, or in the qualities of European states. They tend to depend on neighbors to meet their needs for care and are less concerned with institutions. For non-migrants, informal networks of neighbors can ensure a type of justice. But, return migrants often do not know their neighbors well and are disconnected from personal and professional networks. For them, a just state seems like an ethical requirement for life in a system where neighbors do not know each other well and are dependent on the state to enforce rules and provide care.

While returnees discuss the difficulties they face in Turkey, they do not paint a rosy picture of their lives in Germany. In the next section, I explore returnees' feelings about how Turks are treated in Germany and why they ultimately choose flexible citizenship. They describe feeling excluded from belonging in Germany due to prejudice against Turks, and they appreciate having the freedom to seek out opportunities in a globally interconnected capitalist milieu.

NEGOTIATING FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP AND TURKISH-NESS IN GERMANY

Tonight, I sit down for dinner with Fırat, Serkan and Fırat's wife Natasha. Fırat, a computing consultant, returned to Turkey from Germany two years ago with his Russian wife Natasha. He explains a bit about his background to me. "I returned to Turkey because my family wanted me to return. Unfortunately, Natasha is unhappy in Turkey. I decided to come to the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* to help Natasha to make friends." His friend, Serkan, works for a German bank and is only in Turkey temporarily to complete a work project and to finish 21 days of military service. Military service is required of all Turkish male citizens, but only those living outside of Turkey for several years and paying large sums of money may complete a service of just 21 days. Serkan came to the meeting to spend time with his friends, Fırat and Natasha, and explained, “I would like to stay in Turkey, but I cannot find a job that will pay me what I am worth.” Sipping a beer, Natasha interjects, “I love Germany and miss it there so much!” Fırat frowns and begins talking with Serkan about the negative sides of life in Germany for Turks.

Despite financial and professional success and Serkan’s on-going employment with a German company, both Fırat and Serkan have had negative experiences in Germany. “Turks are never accepted in Germany” Serkan says. “I feel like an alien because I can see the good and bad sides of both countries, but I don’t know what to do to improve or change them. Germany is a nice place, except that it is filled with Germans.” Seeming uncomfortable, Fırat corrected him to say, “It is a nice place, but everyone speaks German.” He added, “People like me do not have problems in Germany, because I am well-educated and successful in terms of my career.”

However, he went on to share stories with the table about troubling experiences in Germany. He described uncomfortable situations where Germans made jokes about Turks, but turned to him and said, “I’m not talking about you; you’re not like those other Turks.” He also described times when he experienced discomfort in public. “Germans will yell at you very quickly if you do something wrong, like a German schoolchild will even yell at you for trying to get on a bus before others have gotten off.” He also told a story about going into a restaurant in Germany with 6 of his friends when they did not want to eat dinner, only to have a few drinks. The waiter told them to leave. He thinks this would be unheard of in Turkey, where hospitality is highly valued. Such stories could be considered a contrast to the praise of “order” that one also hears from returnees when discussing Germans or Germany, such as Berk's ideas about orderly German buses. When talking about a stereotyped Turkish hospitality, returnees assert their own and others' possession of a valued "Turkish" ethical aim. This seems to be an attempt to foster a type of cultural intimacy; they assert that they share admirable Turkish ethnic traits and identities.

In addition to racist jokes and complaints about a lack of hospitality in Germany, many attendees described their feeling that having a Turkish name was a liability for employment success in Germany. Başak, a returnee working for a Turkish bank, claimed, "I know that a Turk will never run a German bank like Deutsche Bank or a German company like Mercedes." He believed that despite his university education and years of banking experience, his career prospects were severely limited in Germany. However, in Turkey, his education and German language ability have made him a bank manager, in his opinion. At one *Rückkehrer Stammtisch*, Prof. Maria Böhmer, a representative of the German government's Ministry for Immigration, Refugees and Integration (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration*) spoke about the 50th anniversary of German-Turkish migration (in 2011). She claimed,

> Germany and Turkey are two worlds, but they are joined together as one. These worlds are not really separate and opposite. Germans want to include and accept Turks and value their contribution towards creating a multicultural German society. I want to write new German histories out of migrants' stories.

In response to her presentation, attendees asked her questions that demonstrated their concerns about both German legal citizenship and also about whether Turks are accepted as respected equals in Germany. Başak said, "I lived in Germany for 30 years, and finished high school and university there, but now, I cannot even go back, because I do not have German citizenship. Can you make it easier for people who have lived in Germany extensively to get visas?" In response to this comment, Hatice told a story about a friend who has tried to get a visa to travel to Germany for 10 years. "His mother is sick and cannot leave the hospital in Germany, and he only wants to go to see her before she dies. His story really touched me. Can you help someone like him?" Other returnees asked: "what do you think about the issue of dual citizenship, shouldn't Germany allow this for Turks?" "Do any foreigners work in your office or only Germans?" "I'm a college student who grew up in Germany. I came to Turkey for an internship with a German company. But, what are my chances of being hired by this company in Germany? As a German-Turk, can I only work at a German company here in Turkey?"

I asked Mehmet what he thought about Dr. Böhmer's presentation, and he told me, "I appreciate her seemingly heartfelt sentiments about including Turks in Germany, but I know that her views do not represent the views of most Germans, who do not want Turks in Germany. The average German wants Germany for Germans. They do not want multiculturalism. All you have to do is read the newspaper to see that." When I spoke with him over coffee at Starbucks another time, Mehmet explained further,

> Europeans are…I won't call it fascist or racist, but they are very limited in their view of the world, and especially the Germans. Europe as a civilization has no understanding and respect for other civilizations. They cannot understand what it means to live multi-culturally. In the U.S., things are maybe different. In the Levantine countries, like Lebanon and Turkey where you have mosque, synagogue and church together in good times, this co-existence functioned. My family had to flee from Spain in the 15th century. They came to the Ottoman Empire and could co-exist with Greeks and Jews. This never happened in Europe, and so Europeans don't accept different cultures.

As in returnees' discussions of feelings about Turkey, when critiquing German and European nationalisms, Mehmet uses the concept of respect. He claims states must demonstrate respect for cultural and religious diversity. In Istanbul, with its Ottoman past and Levantine location, returnees like Mehmet feel they can access this positive cultural and religious diversity. Mehmet is also asserting an ethical and ethnic superiority—he thinks that Turks know more about multiculturalism and accepting and celebrating difference than Europeans.

Most attendees of the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* said that they felt that even with an advanced education, career experience and excellent German, a Turkish ethnic background was a liability for professional success in Germany and that daily life as a German-Turk in Germany was often uncomfortable. But, even as they complain about Germany, returnees are keenly aware of the advantages of maintaining professional and personal ties to Germany. Many attendees have German (and thus EU) citizenship, but even those with only Turkish citizenship typically have extended German residence permits and wealth that allows them to travel freely in Europe. Like the flexible citizens described by Aihwa Ong (1999) who seek to escape "British disciplinary racism,"[9] many attendees complain about a German racism that has prompted them to seek opportunities in Turkey.

At they same time, they benefit from German capitalist enterprises in Turkey and economic connections between the two countries. Serkan will not return to Turkey without a job that "pays him what he is worth." Instead, he takes advantage of a rule that allows Turkish expatriates to complete very little military service. Fırat said that he considered, but decided against getting German citizenship, which would have required staying in Germany an additional 3 years. However, he travels to Germany every 6 months to maintain his work permit there. As far as the German authorities are concerned, he is officially living with his friend Serkan. Serkan and Fırat are both Turkish citizens, but they are also clearly flexible citizens. Like many of the returnees who attend the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch*, despite their high education and professional qualifications, they said that they do not feel accepted as fully equal members of German society because of their ethnic background as Turks. But, they seek an elastic legal belonging in multiple national spheres that allows them to leverage personal and professional advantages.

Other returnees discussed similar concerns with German racism, but also an interest in continuing to maintain personal and professional ties to Germany. For example, at one *Rückkehrer Stammtisch*, Dr. Hakkı Keskin, a Turkish member of the German parliament and a Professor of Political Science spoke about his recently published book, *Göçün 50. yılında Almanya'daki Türkler: Uyum ve Kuşku* (*The 50th Anniversary of Turkish Migration to Germany: Adaptation and Suspicion).* He feels that despite Turkish integration into Germany, Turks are not fully accepted by Germans and that he can never fully belong in Germany. During the question and answer period following his presentation, Bilge spoke in strong terms about her feeling that she was "a 2nd class citizen in Germany." She said,

> I was not treated as an equal person (*Mensch*) to Germans. I always felt that I had to represent Turks to Germans when I was in Germany, and I was always compared with the negative examples of Turks who cause problems in German society.

Interestingly, when discussing equality, Bilge used the German word for human, "*Mensch*." She stayed in Germany for 25 years because, "My husband wanted to stay, and I thought it would be good for my children, but I am relieved to be back in Turkey now." Yet, despite these strong criticisms of how Germans treat Turks, she works for the German government in Turkey, helping to foster business development by Turkish companies in Germany. Lamenting the fact that she was compared to the "negative examples of Turks," Bilge asserts her superiority to Turks who don't integrate and thus cause problems for Germans. But, she also complains about an ultimately exclusionary ethno-national regime that did not treat her as an equal human and has prompted her to return to Turkey in search of "relief."

Discussions of "immigrant integration" are inherently problematic and often disturbingly racist, as I discuss in Chapter 3. But, most commonly used German measures of integration would designate many *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* attendees as extremely integrated into Germany: they speak fluent German, have completed the highest levels of German high schools and universities, and work for the largest German companies. Most describe "feeling German" or having a "German side" and having many German friends or sometimes *only* German friends. But, they also describe painful feelings of rejection, feelings that as Turks—an identity they can never fully shed in their own and Germans' eyes—they will always be foreigners in Germany. Legal German citizenship does not confer belonging in the German nation, and at the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* they share these feelings with others who feel likewise.

Meeting attendees choose to leave Germany to move where capitalism sends them for economic advantage. In this sense, they are free to fashion their lives as flexible citizens, and they certainly appreciate an economic freedom that allows the often-exciting pursuit of cosmopolitan tastes and lifestyles. At the same time, they are keenly aware that their ethnic background also bounds and determines their freedom, and that being a Turk can prevent success and happiness in Germany. Ultimately, returnees do not feel respected as equal individuals, despite an institutional system of rights in Germany, even if they have German citizenship. Returnees feel that Turks in Germany are treated as unwanted "others," not as equal and irreplaceable members of society. Similarly, in Turkey, they find themselves frustrated by the fact that rules, rights, and laws do not ensure equality among Turkish citizens, who must rely on belonging in networks to meet their needs. They are strangers in both countries and long to be respected as equal members of Turkey and Germany.

CONCLUSION

Amidst discomfort in both Turkey and Germany, these returnees locate themselves in a cosmopolitan milieu at the *Rückkehrer Stammtisch*. They seek out like-minded cosmopolitans, world citizens and "Istanbul-ites," who appreciate cultural and religious diversity and seek a belonging beyond ethno-national spheres. At the same time, they share concerns about citizenship in Turkey and Germany. In Turkey, they want more respect in daily life, better public services, more rights for women, more stability in the political system and less state corruption. Additionally, they do not want advantages or disadvantages to be conferred according to a position in a network based on hierarchy and authority, instead of merit. In Germany, they feel that their success was limited by their Turkish ethno-national identity. Education, wealth and employment experience could not ultimately compensate for a national regime in which German ethnicity is the final test of belonging. They choose to remain mobile, moving back and forth according to their personal and professional callings, not totally committed to either Turkey or Germany. They gather at *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meetings to make connections to others like them, to share advice, and to lend support.

In previous chapters, I showed how the Germany-Turkey transnational social field is an ethical and ethno-national field that governs returnees' interactions with each other and with non-migrants. In this chapter, I explored how the field influences returnees' thoughts about cosmopolitanism and citizenship. Disturbingly, they assert that their cosmopolitanism is impossible for their fellow Turks who they think are "too religious" to understand or appreciate cultural and religious diversity. They seek to assert their "European-ness" (*Avrupalı*), "cultured-ness" (*görgü*) and distinction from their co-citizens. When they criticize what they call "the

Turkish system" or "the German system," they discuss their possession of stereotyped German and Turkish ethical and ethno-national traits—thinking independently like "Europeans," being disciplined like "Germans," and acting hospitable and welcoming to others, like "Turks." With these claims, returnees foster disturbing oppositions between West and East, Europe and Turkey, cosmopolitan and backwards. Though troubling from an analytical perspective, mobilizing such claims fosters a cultural intimacy and belonging with each other and within ethno-national spheres.

Yet, though these returnees are certainly elites, their cosmopolitanism is not *just* elite, aesthetic and detached; returnees are deeply concerned about a lack of rights and respect in Turkey and Germany. In fact, one could argue that returnees mobilize what Mani (2007) calls "cosmopolitical claims." Mani examines German-Turkish writers' "cosmopolitan moorings" and finds that German-Turks claim transnational alliances even as ethno-national, cultural and legal milieus also prompt affiliations. He interrogates multiple attachments and the "constant and conscious problematization of the immediately identifiable national, linguistic, ethnic and cultural affiliations" (2007: 6). *Rückkehrer Stammtisch* meeting attendees similarly register cosmopolitical claims amidst the fraught terrains of belonging and identity—they claim alliances across distances and diverse affiliations of home and citizenship.

Freedom is at the center of ethical pursuits for Foucault, while Ricoeur calls our attention to the importance of just institutions that ensure equality among strangers. No matter how we determine the meaning of freedom, these returnees are clearly very free: their high education and high class status confer economic freedom, and they are free from citizenship regimes as flexible "world citizens." They freely imagine combining different cultural and religious tastes and interests into the creation of a cosmopolitan lifestyle. They possess great leeway for fashioning an ethical life, and they come together to meet others with a similar interest in maintaining and growing transnational ties. But, they also come together because they share concerns about citizenship in Turkey and Germany. Regardless of their legal citizenship, without a respect and equality to govern state-to-citizen and citizen-to-citizen interactions, they do not feel comfortable in either country. Regardless of their personal professional success—and even if they themselves model the "ideal citizen"—they are concerned about institutional structures that do not justly set the terms of interactions among strangers.

Focusing on the ethics of citizenship highlights components of national belonging often overlooked if we only examine legal systems, state power and citizens' duties. For these returnees, it is not only important that Turkey and Germany have sufficient or appropriate laws, rules and rights. It is also important that these nations feature an ethical aim of respectful equality of citizens that ultimately confers humanity on the members of the nation. If such just institutions are absent, then these migrants find national belonging difficult or impossible.

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF HOPE?



Figure 9. Former Turkish guest workers undertaking an historic train ride between Turkey and Germany to commemorate the 50th anniversary of German-Turkish migration[1]

The 50th anniversary of Turkish guest worker migration in 2011 was marked with numerous speeches by Turkish and German politicians and even a nostalgic reenactment of the historic train rides that carried workers from Turkey to Germany. Speaking to a crowd of 10,000 gathered in Düsseldorf, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took the opportunity to implore Germany's Turks, "Don't assimilate yourselves!" He continued, "They call you guest workers, foreigners, or German-Turks. It doesn't matter what they all call you: You are my fellow citizens, you are my people, you are my friends, you are my brothers and sisters!" (Gezer and Reimann 2011). German and European politicians responded with condemnation. His speech is "a slap in the face to people who are working for integration," said the mayor of Neukölln, a district in Berlin that is home to a large number of foreigners. Martin Schulz, chairman of the Socialist group in the European Parliament, claimed, it is "scandalous that this man is now presenting his pan-Turkish world view in Germany" (Gezer et al. 2011). As this war of words reveals, the German-Turkish community is at the center of debates about national and transnational belonging and cultural diversity in Europe.

In Turkey, German-Turkish return migrants are also at the center of debates about national identity and "European-ness," where their fellow Turks' express uncertainties about migrants' ethical comportment and about how migration to Europe affects them. For example, in an article titled, "Unsuccessful Migration Stories," appearing in the leftist Turkish newspaper *Radikal*, Kerem Çalışkan cynically discusses the 50th anniversary celebrations. He argues that neither Turkish nor German politicians are discussing "the reality" of German-Turkish migration, which he thinks is migrants' poverty, inadequate education and high unemployment. Further, first generation return migrants have not benefitted Turkey, he claims, because they were swindled out of their hard-earned money by crooked "Islamist companies." Meanwhile, today's third generation migrants "grew up on the streets and use drugs widely" or "join radical Islamist groups like *Milli Görüş* and the *Süleymancılar*" (Çalışkan 2011). In Turks' eyes, migrants are paradoxically both naïve and also criminal, both culturally corrupted and also excessively religious and traditional. What hope is there for German-Turks to find acceptance at "home" when they must confront these troubling ideas about their ethical comportment and belonging in Germany and Turkey?

In this dissertation, I have shown that returnees face severe difficulties, but also that there is hope for them—that they do establish belonging at "home." I offered an on-the-ground examination of how migration and return put ethics in motion for return migrants and how they negotiated ethical dilemmas in their quest to demonstrate care for themselves and their communities. I used this analysis to provide an in-depth portrait of their efforts to forge belonging in families, neighborhoods, religious groups, and communities of return migrants at "home." Several significant findings can be drawn from this research.

First, migration and return prompt ethical reflection, ethical change and ethical work. For example, I found that returnees reflect on "world citizenship" and on equality and respect for citizens, they struggle with changes to reciprocal relationships within families, and they undertake ethical work to improve themselves and their fellow neighbors and Muslims. As a theoretical approach for illuminating returnees' ethical aims, I combined Foucault's attention to freedom and reflection and Ricoeur's attention to the construction of ethics through self-other relationships. This integrative theoretical approach made it possible to explore ethics as an individual project of self-cultivation and a social project of shaping others and life with others. The framework also allowed me to address critiques that Foucauldian approaches focus too heavily on aesthetics and neglect interpersonal ethical negotiations. Examining how migration changed returnees' ethical ideals and how interpersonal negotiations further transformed ethics allowed me to add an important temporal dimension to anthropological investigations of ethics. This analysis showed that individuals' ethical ideals are dynamic and at times contradictory.

Second, I found that ethical projects for returnees are projects of belonging. I showed that the conflicts, misunderstandings, and difficulties highlighted in scholarship on return migration stem from ethical dilemmas. I also provided increased specificity to the concepts of belonging and home and suggested that that we must go beyond ethno-national and class identities as foci for understanding migrants' belonging. For German-Turks, belonging—a feeling of being at home—emerges through everyday pragmatic ethical negotiations of reciprocity, order, Muslim education, and respect and equality for citizens.

Finally, I demonstrated that Turkish citizens' anxieties about the European-ness and modernity of Turkey have critical ethical dimensions, and, further, these anxieties govern return migrants' negotiations of belonging in Turkey. Instead of considering ethics solely in terms of individuals' abstract determinations of 'the good life,' I considered how migrants' ethical projects arise from a political and social environment that demands particular forms of ethical accountability. In other words, I showed how the Germany-Turkey transnational social field impacts migrants' ethical work. I found that concerns about Muslim citizenship in Europe, the meaning of modernity, and Turkey's present and future "European-ness" all shape the ethical accounts that return migrants give and their ensuing negotiations of belonging as modern "European Turks."

In the remainder of this chapter, I explore the broader implications of my findings for theorizing ethical change, freedom, migration and return, home and belonging and for understanding current and future Turkish-European relationships. I end by considering further the extent to which this research might contribute to an "Anthropology of Hope."

MIGRATION AND ETHICAL CHANGE

"So to its King Ithaca showed an unaccustomed face, the pathways stretching far into the distance, the quiet bays, the crags and precipices, the leafy trees. He rose to his feet and stood staring at what was his own land, then sighed and clapped his two palms downward upon his thighs, crying mournfully, "Alas! and now where on earth am I? Shall I be spurned and savaged

by the people of this place, or find them pious, hospitable creatures? Why do I lade all this wealth about? Come to that, what do I here myself?"

-Odysseus, from *The Odyssey of Homer* (1965)

German-Turks return home and build houses that appear German-like to their fellow Turks. They praise "German order" and governmental protection for the rights of citizens. And, they spend much of their time with their nuclear families and other return migrants, at the expense of time spent with their extended families and neighbors. Return migrants' novel ideas and actions raise concerns for non-migrants about their identities and intentions. Their co-citizens wonder: Are return migrants still family members, neighbors and Turks like us—"a oneself" as Ricoeur would say? How has time in Germany changed them? And, more significantly, do returnees bring European ways of life home with them? For their part, like Odysseus, returnees question: Is my own land still home, a homeland? Are my co-citizens pious and hospitable, and how should I show them that I am likewise?

This study is one of the first to directly address ethics for return migrants (cf. Armbruster 2002), making it an important contribution to research on how migration changes ethics (cf. Carling 2008; Gowricharn 2004; Hage 2002; Olwig 1999; 2011). Each chapter examined how ethical transformations come to light as a result of returnees' interactions at "home," and how subsequent interactions in turn spur further transformations. Though philosophers of ethics have long been concerned with the relationships between ethics and time (e.g. Dyke 2003; Heidegger 1962; Levinas 2009; Ricoeur 1992), anthropologists have tended either to maintain a synchronic focus on the cultivation of ethical virtues (e.g. Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005) or to examine how ephemeral cultural crises, large-scale societal interventions, or personal breakdowns prompt ethical change (e.g. Howell 2009; Robbins 2007; Zigon 2008). Highlighting isolated events of crisis as the primary conditions of ethical change, anthropologists have painted a picture of relatively stable ethical systems.

My fine-grained study of return migrants' ethical projects illustrated the gradual, incremental process of change caused by exposure to cultural difference, the passage of time, separation from family and friends, and struggles to (re)establish belonging "at home." I found that ethical change is a fundamental source of conflict between migrants and their family members, neighbors and co-citizens, and I showed that ethical confrontations give rise to narratives about ethical change, specifically narratives about character and "word." However, I maintain that we should not view migrants' changing ideas as distinct progressions from one ethical paradigm to the next; rather, migrants often hold conflicting ideas about 'the good life' that co-exist uneasily. For example, German-Turks want to cultivate close relationships with their families, but they want the freedom to enjoy their retirement at seaside resorts; they want to maintain Turkish aims of neighborliness and hospitality, but also friendships with far-flung return migrants; they want freedom as "world citizens," but they also care deeply about how Turks are treated in Turkey and Germany.

Migrants live with contradictions. Despite the difficulties of living abroad—which are many for German-Turks considering their legal, economic and social conditions in Germany—migration can also be a joyful exposure to new ideas and identities. Nicole Constable describes how Filipina migrants in Hong Kong experience:

> A contradiction between the self-sacrifice and duty of working abroad to support family and the fact that for many women, Hong Kong is not necessarily experienced as a total selfless sacrifice. Despite the hardships, there are also many pleasurable aspects to life in Hong Kong. For some, life in Hong Kong is a source of independence, new pleasures, and a new sense of personhood (1999: 213).

German-Turks deal with similar contradictions. For instance, many women develop a positive sense of themselves as “working women,” which contradicts their narratives of suffering and selfless sacrifice in support of their families. These contradictions, no doubt, contribute in part to the predicaments of reciprocity discussed in Chapter 4. Similarly, I showed that ethical aims for neighborly hospitality may conflict with ethical aims for friendship.

In sum, ethical change can be gradual and partial, and an individual may strive for contradictory ethical ideals. This situation produces both internal struggles for migrants as they seek to craft ‘the good life,’ and inter-personal conflicts as they negotiate ethical relationships with others in their communities. Though there are many causes of ethical transformation, I argue that migration and return are particularly strong engines of change, because they promote a freedom for ethical reflection. In the next section, I expand upon the relationship I see between freedom, migration, and return.

FREEDOM, MIGRATION, RETURN

“To be European means to live free like a European. But there is freedom here in Turkey too. If you have a problem and no money, people here will take you home and feed you. But, Europeans will not do that. In Europe, if you say you are dying, no one will help you….”

-Burcu, a returnee to Istanbul

Using stereotypes about Europe and Turkey, Burcu reflects on the role of freedom in ensuring an ethical life: freedom can be found in being self-reliant “like a European,” but mutual care attributed to “Turkish” generosity also provides liberating comfort. To explore ethics for returnees like Burcu, I combined Aristotelian and Foucauldian frameworks for studying ethics (George 2010; Laidlaw 2002; Lambek 2010a; Mahmood 2005; Zigon 2008) with Paul Ricoeur’s

(1992) insights about the significance of narratives, intersubjectivity, and mutuality in the construction of ethics and subjectivity (cf. George 2010). With this innovative framework, I examined how the freedom to reflect on ethical aims is tempered and shaped by intersubjective encounters.

As I discuss in several places throughout this dissertation, Foucault points out that freedom is at the heart of ethical reflection. We could say that he views freedom as the precondition for questioning the regimes of knowledge and power that condition our subjectivities. I view migration as a quintessential experience of freedom for these return migrants and argue that migration and return put ethical reflection into action. During the course of migration, German-Turks are freed from the regimes that condition subjectivities in Turkey (i.e. regimes of state power, family expectations, neighborhood norms, etc.). They also observe German ways of life and make their way in a different culture, which requires that they make sense of ethical difference both personally and with others. Migration also leads to new wealth for migrants, which increases opportunities for shaping and re-shaping the self when they return "home."[2] By discussing freedom in this way, I do not mean that migrants are *literally* freer to act according to their hearts' desires or that they do not face severe economic, political and social challenges in Germany and Turkey. Of course, even though migrants leave some "Turkish" regimes of power behind, they face new regimes of power in Germany. They confront formidable struggles to maintain relationships with those in Turkey and to foster relationships with the German-Turkish community, while making their way in a foreign and sometimes hostile milieu. When they return home, many face severe social stigma, negative gossip, and sometimes the complete breakdown of relationships with family or neighbors. When considered in this light, they hardly seem free. Indeed, what I mean by pointing to migration and return as experiences of freedom in this context is that exposure to difference and separation from home open up new horizons that can be negotiated in diverse ways.

I found that self-fashioning and an interest in aesthetics are key parts of returnees' future-oriented projects of return. For example, migrants fashion themselves into clean and quiet neighbors, discuss technologies of Muslim education that they feel will improve their own and others' religious practice, and pursue cosmopolitan interests that are both aesthetic and also political. Freedom and modernity are closely linked in German-Turks' ethical projects. Foucault believes ethical self-creation is a modern project because, "to be modern is not to accept oneself as one is in the flux of passing moments; it is to take oneself as the object of a complex and difficult elaboration" (1997: 311).[3] By keeping the exteriors of their houses clean, reading diverse religious books, learning about Istanbul's assorted ethnic communities and many other such actions when they return to Turkey, returnees show that they feel free to craft new selves, new ways of being modern, Turkish, Muslim, and European.

In arguing that migration and return promote freedom, I do not mean to imply that returnees are free in the sense of being isolated from others. In fact, return migrants, like all of us, seek to maintain connections with others. They self-fashion to establish relationships and belonging. By exploring migrants' attempts to forge community relationships while crafting ethical selves, I sought to address criticism of Foucault's work for not taking into account the ways that interpersonal relationships shape ethical practice (Lambek 2010b: 25) and for overly emphasizing individualism and aesthetics (Fraser 1989; Hadot 1995: 211; Wolin 1986). However, despite migrants' relational concerns, as documented in several chapters, they do not always fully succeed in establishing relationships of comfort and belonging when they return "home." Migrants confront social hierarchies and political struggles in their families, neighborhoods and other groups. Non-migrants may perceive the freedom to reflect and self-fashion as dangerous, because it allows a person to go beyond established national and ethical locations. German-Turks are already in a stigmatized social position in the Germany-Turkey transnational social field, where uncertainties about Turkish-European relationships are represented and debated. As a result, non-migrants sometimes see returnees' ideas and actions as a suspect and disturbing freedom threatening to Turkish families, neighborly relations, and religious communities.

HOME AND BELONGING

> *"It is not where you are born; it is where you are fed (filled)."*[4]
>
> -A Turkish saying

With this quote, many return migrants sought to explain to me that they are still connected to their homeland despite their extended absence from it. However, I found that they and their co-citizens frequently wrestled with how time in Germany alters what it means to belong—the meaning of being an ethical family member, neighbor, Muslim, and citizen. Return migration scholars often employ the concepts of home and belonging (e.g. Al-Ali and Koser 2002; Brettell 2003: 49; Christou 2008; Chu 2006; Constable 1999; Dalakoglou 2010; Reynolds 2010; Stefansson and Markowitz 2004) without actually specifying what they mean by these concepts. In this dissertation, I demonstrated that feeling at home emerges through relationships of ethical recognition. That is, belonging turns on ethical questions.

Following Ricoeur's suggestion to look at the intersection between ethics and interpersonal relationships, I analyzed ethics and belonging as interlinked projects. Specifically, I found that discussions of financial exchange and familial duty are assertions of belonging in families and with neighbors. I found that debates and actions surrounding "order" are projects of hospitality and belonging in communities of neighbors and migrants. Similarly, the religious technologies of the self that return migrants mobilize are projects of belonging with neighbors and in diverse Muslim communities. And, finally, assertions of cosmopolitan sensibilities and demands for justice are assertions of citizenship (both flexible and national) and of belonging with other elite return migrants. I found that work on the self is not only an isolating and individualistic pursuit, but also part of work on relationships and communities. For example, by modeling "German order" in their neighborhoods and open religious discussions between parents and children returnees are self-crafting *and* transforming their fellow neighbors and fellow Muslims.

Belonging involves complex affiliations and myriad registers of inclusion and exclusion and cannot be considered simplistically in terms of "success" or "failure." As much previous work on return migration shows (e.g. Gmelch 1980: 143; Huseby-Darvas 2004: 86; King 2000: 19; Tsuda 2003), returnees experience disappointment, difficulty and conflict at home. German-Turks are no exception. Focusing on ethical dilemmas, I showed that ethical changes are a major cause of disjunctures between German-Turks and non-migrants, who often disagree about the moral actions that demonstrate ethical aims. I also showed the significance of local political circumstances, broader national contexts, and transnational social fields for producing conflicts. For German-Turks, belonging is strongly inflected by processes of essentialization of German and Turkish ethics and ethno-national identities and by the existence of troubling stereotypes about migrants. Return migrants face accusations of being 'German-ized' (*Almanlaşmış; Almancı*), 'anti-social' (*asosyal*), 'crazy' (*deli*), and 'sinful' (*günahkar*). Migrants respond to this environment with ethical projects that aim to demonstrate that they are ethical, modern, "European Turks."

While Ricoeur invites us to see the mutual construction of subjectivity and ethics, his discussion of self-other relationships does not fully address the thorny and emotionally charged aspects of relationships—the conflicts, politics, losses, hurts, and misunderstandings that are part of ethical negotiations. I have tried to capture some of this here—to show that returnees' ethical negotiations are fraught with disappointments, obstacles, frustrations, and misinterpretations of intentions. In sum, though I argue that ethical projects are projects of belonging, I do not mean that return migrants always and fully victoriously reinsert themselves into their communities. They often strive for a belonging just out of reach in some realms, while experiencing closeness and comfort in others.

Much literature on return migration examines migrants' ethno-national identities and class status (e.g. Çağlar 1995; 2002; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Salih 2002; Reynolds 2009). Ethno-nationalism and class are understandably important concerns when considering that migrants cross national borders and often rise in class status when compared to non-migrants. But, though I accounted for the key importance of the Germany-Turkey transnational social field—an ethical and ethno-national field—each chapter examines belonging beyond simply ethno-national and class identities. For example, I showed that the building or maintaining of a particular type of home is not only a reflection of migrants' class aspirations, but is also connected to ethical aims of neighborly "orderliness." I showed that it is necessary to look at ideas about family, neighborliness and systems for allocating justice, not only at how migrants signal their ethno-national identities. Taking my cue from several seminal studies of migration (e.g. Çağlar 2001; Glick Schiller, Çağlar and Guldbrandsen 2006; Olwig 2003), this research is thus a contribution towards moving beyond ethno-national frames for conceptualizing migrants' identities.

RETURNING TO EUROPEAN AND TURKISH FUTURES

"Among the great struggles of man—good/evil, reason/unreason, etc.—there is also this mighty conflict between the fantasy of Home and the fantasy of Away, the dream of roots and the mirage of the journey" (55).

-Salmon Rushdie (2000)

For Turks, Europe is key source of material for constructing "the fantasy of Home and the fantasy of Away." Turkish citizens wonder: Is Europe to be admired or spurned? And, if admired, what are the ethical modes required of European citizens? In the wake of German political leaders' expressions of concern about German-Turks' "lack of integration" into Germany, should we consider Europeans to be unwelcoming to Muslims and Turks? Considering Turkish leaders' worries about German-Turks' preservation of their cultural identity, should we also be concerned about the "Europeanization of Turks"? My attention to everyday ethics for returnees is not just a micro-political turn, but also a strategy for addressing these pervasive concerns in Turkey. In particular, this research explored Turkish citizens' qualms about the European-ness and modernity of Turkey (Özyürek 2009; B. Silverstein 2003:

511) and their worries about future Turkish-EU membership and European integration (Kubiçek 2005; Küçük 2009).

Throughout the dissertation, I demonstrated that these national and international political issues have important ethical dimensions. In Chapter 3, I explained how the symbolic binary between modern-urban-European and traditional-rural-peripheral (Hart 2009; Helvacıoğlu 1996: 506; Keyman 1995: 97; Potuoğlu-Cook 2006) that divides Turkey is tied up with conceptions of Turkish and European ethical ideals for family members, neighbors, religious practitioners, and citizens. In the chapters that followed, I showed that the identity and belonging of German-Turks in their own and others' eyes are symbolic of Turkey's European identity and European belonging. Thus, ethical debates between returnees and non-migrants reflect broader tensions surrounding Turkey's European integration and its ambivalent quest for European modernity. I highlighted the points of friction where returnees' ethical ideas and actions are rejected by their community members and thus opened a window onto the complexities of negotiating modernity and belonging at Europe's margins. For example, I showed that German-Turks spur debates in their communities about the potentially positive influences of "German cleanliness" and "self-education" and the perceived negative influences of "German individualism." I also suggested that many of returnees' ethical projects should be viewed as attempts to model a modern, "European-Turkish" identity. Migrants draw on their past experiences in Germany and aim to fashion a desired Turkish-European future for themselves and Turkey. In this way, they also model Turks' integration into Germany. Though this is not precisely a study of human rights and pluralism, it is an examination of the ways that a marginalized but critical social group negotiates acceptance, rights and diversity at the border of Europe, where Muslim and European identities are hotly debated. Marginalized in Germany and in Turkey, return migrants struggle to fashion an ethical self, ethical Turks and an ethical Turkey.

Anthropologists are becoming increasingly interested in the future (cf. Fischer 2009; Rabinow 2007). In conversation with this nascent scholarship, I provide here a portrait of return migrants' attempts to establish a hoped for future amidst anticipations and anxieties about Turkey's trajectory. I think there are important theoretical reasons for focusing on return migration as a future-oriented project (cf. Stefansson 2004), but I also believe there is something specific to research on Turkey, which invites a critical examination of ideologies of the future. A careful examination of contentious debates about Islam and secularism in Turkey and arguments about "Turkey's European-ness" in Turkish and European media reveals a persistent emphasis on "Turkey's future." For example, commentators question how Turkey's Islamic leanings and uncertain secularism will prevent "beneficial Western developments" and acceptance in Europe in the next decade; or they discuss how human rights will be safeguarded in Turkey if it becomes a member of Europe in the future; or, conversely, how Turkey's belonging in Europe will be unnecessary in the years to come because of the country's burgeoning economic expansion and military strength. Observing return migrants' interactions with non-migrants, I found that German-Turks become representatives of this uncertain future for Turkish citizens in an enlarged Europe and Turkish Muslims amidst European Christians.

AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF HOPE

Religion, language, and race do not matter. There should be brotherliness (kardeşlik). If we look at the situation in Turkey, people are scared of each other on the street. At the time of the war for Turkish independence, there was no Kurd or Turk. People came from outside of

Turkey to attack us and everyone rose up. Everyone fought together. Why is there this division now? I don't understand.... We are all people. If you are Kurd, Turk, Alevi, Sunni, or another religion, Christian, Muslim, it is not important. Are we not siblings? Do we not live under the Turkish flag? I'm not interested in your religion. You are not interested in my religion, but we are siblings.

-Filiz, a returnee to Istanbul

Many returnees lament the polarization of Turkish society. I close this dissertation by reflecting on the meaning of an "anthropology of hope" and on whether or not this study of ethics and migration can be considered a contribution to the anthropological study of hope. When defining "ordinary ethics," Lambek (2010b) discusses hope as an ethical object. He suggests that the terrain for the anthropological study of hope is an exploration of how people "inhabit and persevere in light of uncertainty, suffering, injustice, incompleteness, inconsistency, the unsayable, the unforgiveable, the irresolvable, and the limits of voice and reason" (4). By linking ethics to hope in this way, Lambek's project could be interpreted as a Foucauldian effort to locate ethical work within the spaces that power does not colonize and to depict the agency of subjects more fully. But, I would argue that an anthropology of hope as Lambek describes it does more than call on anthropologists to portray actor's agency more fully.

A focus on ethics and hope shows interlocutors engaged with work on self-other relationships, sometimes succeeding, sometimes failing and most often falling somewhere in between in their efforts to establish connection, understanding, and belonging. This is the picture of returnees' lives that I have sought to provide in this dissertation. I have tried to depict their perseverance in the face of a fragmented religious, national and transnational milieu; to portray their struggles to assert that they are good daughters, neighbors, Muslims, Turks and citizens amidst societal stigma directed against German-Turks; and to show how they succeed and fail when confronting conditions of political instability or the injustice of gossiping relatives and neighbors. But, returnees' hopes extend beyond just working through their individual, local ethical challenges. Returnees also hope to improve Turkish society, and specifically, they hope for increased freedom, democracy and justice for Turkish citizens.

Though returnees are an extremely diverse group, I found that almost all returnees want the freedom to craft ethical lives without their neighbors' judgment and discrimination, they want to be treated with respect and fairness when seeking jobs and state services, and they want to be able to educate themselves and form religious and non-religious associations without facing scorn. Among religious, non-religious, urban, rural and educated and uneducated returnees, there is a striking similarity in complaints about neighbors' discrimination in the public sphere and a lack of rights for citizens in Turkey. Ultimately, I think return migrants and others in Turkey would like to be treated as moral and political equals, despite differences of class, family background and religious affiliation. In other words, they want a democracy of the type described by Seyla Benhabib (2002). She defines democracy as follows:

> A model for organizing the collective and public exercise of power in the major institutions of a society on the basis of the principle that decisions affecting the well-being of a collectivity can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned deliberation among individuals considered moral and political equals (105).

Benhabib goes on to discuss the need for impartial institutions in civil society, where deliberation following a model of "discourse ethics" can take place. Ricoeur similarly sees a positive, important role for democracy and discourse ethics (Kaplan 2003: 122). For example, he believes that determining ethical aims for justice requires the inclusion of as many citizens' viewpoints as possible, and he advocates for an Aristotelian notion of “practical wisdom” to determine how societal institutions are constructed.

It is clear that return migrants would very much like an opportunity to deliberate about the meaning of national and religious identities and ethical practices and to be treated with respect and appreciation for their differences (and similarities!) While on the surface they discuss “German” ethics or “Turkish” ethics, migrants are in fact desirous of an ethical freedom in a just and democratic system that will allow them and others to cultivate better selves. Turkish society is highly fragmented along religious and class lines, but examining the shared ideals of diverse returnees shows that Turkish society is united as well, that shared goals for freedom, democracy and justice tie Turks together. Thus, this research contributes to the study of “hope as an ethical object” (Lambek 2010: 36), representing the hopeful possibility that social tension and mistrust can little by little be overcome.

What does this study of hope have to do with those of us who are neither German-Turks nor return migrants? By focusing on return migrants negotiating a place for themselves in a little corner of Europe and the Middle East, this study illuminates pervasive issues about the human condition and modernity. In an increasingly interconnected world, confrontations with other lifeworlds and with unfamiliar ethical paradigms confront many of us on a daily basis. By examining how German-Turks navigate the challenges posed by moving among diverse ethical paradigms, this research provides insights into processes of negotiating ethical difference. Many scholars have said that the central condition of modern life is homelessness, where, instead of belonging, we feel unmoored from roots (e.g. Rapport and Dawson 1999; Said 1984 [2001]: 159-160). In this sense, “migration becomes a mechanism for theorizing how identity itself is predicated on movement or loss" (Ahmed 1999: 332). For some, ironically, homelessness can become a basis for a sense of home—community may be found through sharing a lack of home (cf. Seaman 1996). But, while some find home in rootless-ness or in a rooted cosmopolitanism (e.g. Appiah 1998; 2006), others feel adrift, struggle for recognition of their identity, and lament a troubling lack of democratic solidarity in cosmopolitan projects (e.g. Calhoun 2002: 86-87). This research examines this conundrum of our era: embracing the rootless cosmopolitan sphere, but longing for roots, for solidarity and for democratic belonging. In examining how return migrants negotiate their ethical horizons at home, this dissertation provides insight into how we all might find comfort and hope as we negotiate our own ethical horizons.

ENDNOTES

Chapter 1 (pages 1-41)

[1] I define ethics as ideas, actions and dispositions, which are concerned with ideals and obligations for self and other. Thus, what is ethical emerges through negotiations of relationships between self and other and determinations of what is right or wrong and good or bad in relationships in order to ensure 'the good life.' Throughout this dissertation, I refer to ethics rather than morality, as I consider ethics to be the more encompassing term. A comprehensive definition of ethics follows below.

[2] Originally coined by E.P Thompson (1961) and further developed by James Scott (1976), David Cheal (1996) and others, moral economy refers to social norms and obligations defining rights vis a vis economic production relations (see also Zigon 2008: 71-75). Within anthropology, the term moral economy quickly expanded beyond production relations to encompass kinship and other relationships, which are governed by economics. Below, I discuss such theories in relation to migration contexts (Gowricharn 2004; Hage 2002). While German-Turks were mainly economic migrants, moral economy is an overly narrow frame for examining returnees' experiences when they return to Turkey, so does not appear in other chapters of my dissertation.

[3] Ethics are receiving significant attention in anthropological studies of biotechnology and medicine (e.g. Lakoff and Collier 2004) and globalization and neo-liberalism (e.g. Ong and Collier 2004). In *Ethics and the Anthropology of Modern Reason*, Andrew Lakoff and Stephen J. Collier coin the term "regimes of living," which are "congeries of moral reasoning and practice that emerge in situations that present ethical problems—that is, in situations in which the question of how to live is at stake" (2004: 420). In the edited volume, *Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems*, authors explore how "ethical problems related to biological life (health and disease, malnutrition and water) and to social life (access to goods and services, abstract freedoms to organization and belief) may also assume a global form" (2004: 12). They call these global assemblages and claim that they prompt ethical challenges and reflection, which are increasingly important objects of study for anthropologists. As my research is not focused on biotechnology and only peripherally concerned with neo-liberalism, this work is less relevant to my own.

[4] Foucault argues that knowledge and truth are conditioned by four technologies: production technologies, sign system technologies, power technologies and technologies of the self (1997: 147). Although Foucault believes that techniques of the self, "can be found in all cultures in different forms" (1997: 277), he theorizes technologies of the self with reference to Greco-Roman philosophy in the first two centuries A.D of the early Roman Empire and Christian spirituality and the monastic principles developed in the fourth and fifth centuries of the late Roman empire. For these Greeks and early Christians, care of the self was "one of the main

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rules for social and personal conduct" (Foucault 1997: 147) and thus one of the main techniques or technologies of the self. Care of the self "does not mean simply being interested in oneself, nor does it mean having a certain tendency to self-attachment or self-fascination." Instead, it has to do with ""working on" or "being concerned with" something" (1997: 269). "Concern with the self and care of the self were required for right conduct and the proper practice of freedom, in order to know oneself…as well as to form oneself, to surpass oneself, to master the appetites that threaten to overwhelm one" (1997: 285).

[5] Foucault argues that research on ethics must take up four questions (1997: 263-265): 1. What is the substance of the ethical project? 2. What mode of subjectification accompanies the project? 3. What work does an ethical project demand? And, finally, 4. What telos, what end does the project hold out for attainment? (See also Faubion 2001: 90-91). I explore these questions indirectly in numerous chapters, but do not specifically adopt Foucault's genealogical method to explore ethics for returnees.

[6] In his defense, Foucault writes that care of the self implies relationships with others "insofar as the care of the self enables one to occupy his rightful position in the city, the community, or interpersonal relationships, whether as a magistrate or a friend" (Foucault 1997: 287). However, intersubjectivity and engagement with the other is strongly underemphasized in Foucault's work.

[7] Charles Hallisey (2010) argues that Ricoeur and Foucault should be read together and in light of each other in order to answer the primary ethical question: "how ought one to live?" Ricoeur answers that we should think about how to "live well with and for others," while Foucault suggests "thinking about the self's relationship to the self" (142).

[8] Ricoeur begins his analysis of time and subjectivity by discussing the concepts of *ipse* and *idem*. *Ipse* refers to a sense of selfhood that is permanent throughout time, while *idem* refers to identity as a sameness through time. To understand *ipse* we do not need a concept of an unchanging personality, only the understanding that there is always a "me" that can answer the question: "who are you?" By contrast, *idem* refers to an unchanging identity, a sense of "I am…" which could easily answer the question: "what are you?" "Keeping one's word," emphasizes *ipse* and it assumes that even if *idem* has changed, *ipse* will triumph in narrative accounts (1992: 123). "Character" emphasizes *idem* by ultimately collapsing *ipse* and *idem*, assuming that what is true now about the self has always been true through time (1992: 121).

[9] "To self-esteem, understood as a reflexive moment of the wish for the "good life," solicitude adds essentially the dimension of *lack*, the fact that we *need* friends; as a reaction to the effect of solicitude on self-esteem, the self perceives itself as another among others" (Ricoeur 1992: 192).

[10] Each chapter in the volume investigates some aspect of these approaches to ethics: punishment, the giving of reasons, responsibility, moments of activism, ethical work, legal battles, recuperation, neighborliness and religious divides, the submersion of ethics, multiplicity of voices, and evil, among others.

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[11] In his own work, he explores how experiences of moral breakdown (that happen during religious conversion, drug use and even volunteer work) shape morality (Zigon 2009a) and how people in Russia articulate their moral consciousness by drawing on Russian religious philosophy, Russian Orthodox Christianity and Soviet ideology (Zigon 2009b).

[12] These figures are from the International Organization for Migration website and can be reached here: http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/facts-and-figures/lang/en. Accessed March 1, 2012.

[13] In my own work with German-Turks, I also find that the morality of Germany and Turkey are often held in comparison for returnees. However, rather than a simple opposition between the morality of 'home' (Turkey) and 'away' (Germany), I have found a more complex picture in which aspects of both Turkish and German ethical values are praised and challenged at different times as returnees establish diverse forms of belonging and 'home.'

[14] "Doğduğun yer değil, doyduğun yer."

[15] Other studies of return migration include: Bree et al (2010); Hammond 2004; Koven 2004; Lorenzo-Hernandez 1999; Pessar (ed). 1997; Potter et al. 2005; Tsuda 1999; 2003; Yngvesson 2006.

[16] To some extent, one could argue that scholars studying transnationalism are also interested in home, but use different terms, such as the "transnational village" (Levitt 2001) or the "transnational social field" (Basch et al 1994). Yet, as scholars studying return migration tend to focus on rooting in one place rather than movement, home develops a primary importance in their work.

[17] For example, I found that in addition to discourses about middle class lifestyles that are possible for returnees in Turkey, many migrants greatly emphasize the importance of family in their reasons for returning and in affecting their happiness after returning, even if family becomes a source of conflict. Additionally, the scorn and sanctioning that migrants receive for display of wealth and use of money may frequently come from within their own families, not only from their middle class neighbors.

[18] I almost never observed that a glass-topped coffee table was an important symbol for German-Turkish wealth as Çağlar did, though I presume that this reflects the difference in fashion in the time in which we each did our research. Mercedes cars, German appliances and large, German-style houses and gardens were more important symbols in my research.

[19] Recently, scholars have pointed to an over-emphasis on national frames for understanding migrant identities (Olwig 2003; Çağlar 2001; Glick Schiller et al 2006), and this research could be considered as part of an attempt to move beyond a focus on migrants' national identity.

Chapter 2 (pages 42-71)

[1] For comprehensive accounts of German Turkish migration see Akgünduz (2008) and Mandel (2008).

[2] These figures are from the German government statistical bureau, the *Statistisches Bundesamt* and can be accessed here: http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Statistiken/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/AuslaendischeBevoelkerung/Tabellen/Content75/Geschlecht,templateId=renderPrint.psml.

[3] Germany lacks an “assimilationist, unifying ideal that would make diversity itself a source of national identity and unity” (Klopp 2002: 41), and “the concept of racism has hardly been recognized in dominant German discourses” (Erel 2003: 160).

[4] Basically, it “opened the door to citizenship for…900,000 Turks” (Stowasser 2002: 56). However, according to Erel, “the practical effects” of the changed citizenship law were “limited” (2003: 163), because the change only benefited a small number of migrants, and since dual citizenship was not allowed after age 23, many Turks would not choose to change their citizenship (Erel 2003: 173). “Germany is the only major immigrant receiving state in Europe that still refuses to tolerate double citizenship, and in this refusal,” according to Christain Joppke (1999), “hangs the whole legacy of ethnocultural nationhood” (638).

[5] Initially, participation in the course was a right, but was not obligatory. However, “in May 2006, after intense debates on so-called ‘honour killings’ in the Turkish immigrant milieu and shocking separatism and ethnic violence in a Berlin public school, the German interior ministers agreed on making the attendance of civic integration courses and the passing of standard language tests a prerequisite for naturalization” (Joppke 2007: 14).

[6] The number of Turkish citizens in Germany has fallen from 2,110,000 in 1998 to 1,629,480 in 2010, which includes both return migrants and Turks who have adopted German citizenship. These figures are from the German government’s statistical bureau, the *Statistisches Bundesamt* and can be accessed here: http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Statistiken/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/AuslaendischeBevoelkerung/Tabellen/Content75/Geschlecht,templateId=renderPrint.psml.

[7] “İlçe” (a Turkish word that literally means “township” or “district”) is a pseudonym that I have chosen to use in order to maintain the confidentiality of the people with whom I conducted research.

[8] I conducted 32 formal interviews with German-Turks in Istanbul, 4 formal interviews with German-Turks in Tekirdağ, and 21 formal interviews with German-Turks in İlçe.

Chapter 3 (pages 72-114)

[1] According to Glick Schiller, “Transmigrants are people who claim and are claimed by two or more nation-states into which they are incorporated as social actors, one of which is widely acknowledged to be their state of origin” (1999: 96). They then “forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Glick Schiller et al 1995: 48). Migrants’ national identity or multiple national identities were often central to studies of transnationalism leading to concepts of “post nationalism.”

[2] We might also say that they failed to appreciate the role of imagination in creating globalized spaces, which have also been called ethnoscapes, ideoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, and financescapes (Appadurai 1991). Even those who do not plan to move themselves must deal with the “realities of having to move or the fantasies of wanting to move” (Appadurai 1991: 192).

[3] They suggest that each researcher “operationalize the parameters of the field they are studying and the scope of the networks embedded within it” (2004: 1009).

[4] These musicians include Ismail YK, Tarkan, Yurtseven Kardeşler, Ünlü, Ahmet (ah canım, vah canım), Raga Oktay, Rafet El Roman, Aylın Aslım, Güler Duman, Cankan, and the rap band Islamic Force and Cartel.

[5] Deniz Feneri claimed to collect donations from German-Turks to provide disaster relief assistance. It organized fund-raising campaigns and prominent musicians and politicians showed their support. The donated funds were then sent to Turkey, however, funds were spent funding wealthy individuals’ salaries, rather than providing disaster relief. A court in Frankfurt jailed three managers from the charity's local branch for directing 14.5 million euro ($20.6 million) of donated funds collected from the Turkish community in Germany into private companies in Turkey. “Several people based in Turkey, including the head of Turkey's radio and television watchdog, Zahid Akman, were implicated as the masterminds amid claims that the charity, whose founders are close to the ruling government, might have funneled funds into the prime minister's Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP)” (*Hürriyet Daily News* 2009a). Examples of Turkish language articles about the Deniz Feneri scandal include: Sarp 2008; Varli 2008; DHA 2008; *Hürriyet* 2009a; *Radikal* 2011; *Zaman* 2011.

[6] In an editorial in Hürriyet, Yusuf Kanlı writes,

> Obviously developments regarding the Lighthouse scandal case testifies to the reluctance of the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, to act on that issue. Why? Because what will be at stake might not be just the head of the Television High Board, or RTÜK, chairman but the very existence of the AKP as well. Why? Well, what if an investigation proves that some of the siphoned charity fund landed in the coffers of the AKP or somewhere at the Prime Ministry? Turkish laws say that Constitutional Court may close down a political party if it is proved that it received foreign financial assistance (Kanlı 2009).

Like other leftist columnists, Kanlı is suspicious of the apparent inaction of the AK Party. One returnee couple that I spoke with felt that they had their money swindled by the Lighthouse charity. They expressed their deep sadness and anger since they intended the money to help people, and it also had a religious meaning for them constituting their yearly *zekat* (donation to charity, a requirement of religious Muslims). Other migrants claimed that they always gave money directly to mosques in Germany, and so were not affected by the scandal. One non-religious man mentioned the *Deniz Feneri* scandal as an example of the “twisting of religion by people trying to cheat others.”

[7] Since 2005, Germany has had an international arrest warrant out for Yimpaş' managing director Dursun Uyar. However, the arrest warrant has not been officially acknowledged in Turkey (Quantara.de 2006). Articles in Turkish about the Yimpaş scandal include: Cihan (2006) and Sardan (2006). For an article connecting the Deniz Feneri scandal and the Yimpaş scandal, see *Hürriyet* (2009b).

[8] English version. For the Turkish language article about this study, see *Hürriyet* (2009c).

[9] Zaman.com reported, “Erdoğan’s comment that children should learn Turkish first earned him a decisive rebuke by government politicians, such as German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle of the Free Democratic Party, who claimed that “children who grow up in Germany first of all have to learn German.” His statement was echoed by Germany’s federal commissioner for integration, Maria Böhmer of the conservative Christian Democratic Union. “The language of the country in which one remains over time must be given precedence,” she told the Passauer Neue Presse newspaper” (Ley 2011).

[10] The article reported “A photograph hanging in Bünyamin Türksoy's corner office shows the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, with a broad smile on his face—and a glass of cloudy white Rakı, Turkey's unofficial "national drink," in his hand.” Türksoy claims that the poster, which is rare, since it shows Ataturk drinking alcohol, is an inspiration for him. The beer’s label references both Turkey and Germany: it “features the Genoese Galata Tower, a landmark of Istanbul's cosmopolitan Beyoğlu district.” However, “It is also brewed according to the 16th-century Bavarian purity law mandating that beer include just malted grain, hops, yeast and water” (*Hürriyet Daily News* 2009c). It is truly a German-Turkish beer. (I have sited the English language article; for a Turkish language treatment of this subject, see *Hürriyet* 2008).

[11] The newspaper *Hürriyet* published an article shortly after Obama’s U.S. victory quoting former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder as saying that “Germans should see a “role model” in Obama as the first African-American U.S. president. “After the general election in [September] 2009, it will hopefully be the time [for a minister of Turkish origin] and allow me to say, it should be a Social Democrat” (*Hürriyet Daily News* 2009d). In fact, the Social Democrats suffered great election losses in 2009 and Cem Özdemir was unseated. (For Turkish language articles about Cem Özdemir, see: *Milliyet* (2008); Seplin (2009)).

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[12] In early studies of transnationalism scholars discussed "creolized" (Gilroy 1993), "hybrid" (Bhabha 1994) "rhizomic" (Kearney 1995) or "cosmopolitan" (Malkki 1995 [1992]) identities for transnational migrants.

[13] I discuss the Turkish state's founder's views, not my own views, here. Scholars have pointed out that analysts should not presume the existence of a unified Europe or a single European essence (see for example Chakrabarty 2000).

[14] On October 3, 2001, the Turkish parliament adopted 34 amendments to the constitution allowing Turkey to meet the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership. These included partial abolition of the death penalty and allowed the greater use of languages other than Turkish in public life (Erdemli 2003: 7). In January and March of 2002, amendments to the Penal Code and other legislation allowed greater freedom of expression, the press, associations and political parties, and prevented torture (Erdemli 2003: 7). In August of 2003, Turkey passed an EU Adaptation Law (*Avrupa Birliği Uyum Yasası*), which allowed it to fulfill the remaining EU requirements in the field of human rights, including total abolition of the death penalty and allowance of broadcasting and teaching of languages besides Kurdish (Erdemli 2003: 7).

[15] With a population of almost 70 million, Turkey is twice as large as Poland, the EU's largest state to date; its GDP per capita is a quarter of the EU's average; and 35.4 percent of employment is in agriculture (compared to 19 percent in Poland which had the largest agricultural section of the 10 new states which joined in 2004) (Kubiçek 2005b: 75-76).

[16] Retrieved from: http://www.bilgiyum.tr.gg/Avrupa-Birligi.htm. Accessed April 12, 2012.

[17] Similar links between modernity and morality may also be found in other contexts (for example, Pandian 2009).

[18] Turks' Islamic identity is a particular source of unease for Germans (Ewing 2000; 2008). Turkish Muslims are "often associated with fanaticism, backwardness and terrorism" (Helicke 2002: 183). There is considerable fear "that the Muslim has supplanted the Jew as the threatening Other within" (Ewing 2000: 40).

[19] http://yerelfikralar.blogspot.com/2009_01_01_archive.html

[20] For example, Meltem, a returnee to Istanbul started cleaning a house to make some extra money. I asked her if she would prefer a job cleaning in a hotel (which I offered help her to get) and she said, no because "you have to be careful because in hotels only loose women work. They will be friendly to the male customers who get the wrong idea. Turkish men always think with what is below their waist."

Chapter 4 (pages 115-159)

[1] For more on love and marriage in Turkey, see Hart (2007).

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[2] In Marcel Mauss' (1954 (English) [1990]) original formulation of the gift economy, he argued that exchanges of material objects were morally conditioned ways of mediating social interactions and maintaining social bonds. More recently, Thomas Widlok (2004) argues that anthropologists should differentiate the "goods, goals and benefits" of sharing and exchange "as different aspects relating to virtuous practice" (66).

[3] From one perspective, relationships between money, kinship, and reciprocity can be viewed as exploitative. For example, White (1994) chronicles how individuals' labor may be exploited for capitalist enterprises through the use of kinship bonds and corresponding expectations.

[4] As Nermin Abadan-Unat (1986) writes "the most visible effect in Turkey of external migration is the high value placed on conspicuous consumption. Migrants and their families are extremely anxious to acquire an image of affluence and prestige in their communities" (364).

[5] Due to the sensitive nature of the family conflict that I describe here, I have changed or omitted identifying details.

Chapter 5 (pages 160-208)

[1] In fact, the concept of '*Ordnung*' is deeply problematic in Germany, evoking the horrors of Nazi fascism. One German reader of a version of this chapter said that he felt that the return migrants I describe sound like "Little Eichmanns."

[2] I found this story on this website (the English transnational is my own): http://www.geyikoloji.com/fikralar/nasrettin_hoca_fikralari-3/uyanik_komsu-224.html. Accessed March 28, 2012.

[3] Thomas Widlok (2004) and Joel Robbins (2007) describe ethical tensions between relational and individual concerns in other cultural contexts.

[4] However, I find that his childhood in Turkey and lack of education in Germany makes him quite similar to many first generation guest worker migrants. The difficulty of categorizing Yavuz in terms of migrant generation in fact points to the problematic nature of the categories of first, second, and third generations themselves (see Mandel 2008: 19; L. Soysal 2002).

[5] I was surprised that Yavuz mentioned that Germans would call the police to complain in a positive way, since several German-Turks complained to me about Germans' tendency to immediately call the police at the sign of any problem. In this case, Yavuz claimed to appreciate that order and quiet are expected and enforced in Germany, whereas in Turkey nobody takes action against people who disturb others.

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[6] The event involved loud pop music to which scantily clad women danced on a stage. I found it quite strange to watch older women sitting sedately in the audience, while rowdy young men hooted at the women whose bare midriffs and wild hair flew around the stage.

[7] I asked her why she thinks this is, and she said that she does not know; she just thinks that people from İlçe are like that. I wondered if perhaps they are simply not aware of how much help a person might need to prepare for a multi-day journey.

[8] For example, see many of the articles collected in Kandiyoti and Saktanber (2002).

Chapter 6 (pages 209-251)

[1] Exact figures and additional information can be found at: http://www.eurel.info/EN/index.php?pais=20&rubrique=135; http://www.dbk.de/zahlen-fakten/kirchliche-statistik/; and http://www.ekd.de/english/4329-service_workship_holy_communion.html. Accessed February 2, 2011.

[2] The Gülen social movement is an Islamist religious movement that was founded in Turkey in the 1980s by Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish man currently living in the United States. With millions of adherents, the Gülen group runs numerous businesses and schools in Turkey and around the world. Followers claim, "to reconcile Islamic faith and ways of life with a secular institutional milieu" (Turam 2004: 261). For more on the Gülen social movement, see Yavuz and Esposito (2003).

[3] Brian Silverstein (2003) points out that we should not overlook European-Ottoman relations in understanding Turkish modernity, and further, that we should interrogate the relationships between the emergence of modern techniques, the historiography of Europe, and the position of Muslim polities.

[4] Minority ethnic and religious groups such as Armenians, Greeks, Suryanis, Jews, and Muslim minorities such as Kurds and Alevis faced the curtailing of their legal and cultural rights (Aktar 2000; Ari 1995; Bali 1999; Neyzi 2002).

[5] Please note, that I am presenting the views of Turkish republican reformers, not my own. I do not believe that there is any incompatibility between Islam and modernity or Islam and Europe.

[6] For more information on the Danish Cartoon Controversy, see: http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/d/danish_cartoon_controversy/index.html. Accessed March 1, 2012.

[7] For more information on the Pope's speech, see: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/19/world/europe/19pope.html?scp=19&sq=pope+benedict&st=nyt&gwh=123132D121A9623D6A71F4703061909E. Accessed March 1, 2012.

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[8] For more information on the “*Leitkultur*” controversy, see: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/opinion/29Habermas.html?pagewanted=all. Accessed March 1, 2012.

[9] From the article: 'İslam Almanya'ya ait değil.' *NTVMSNBC*. April 19, 2012. http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25341676/. Accessed April 19, 2012.

[10] For more information on Turkish Alevis, see David Shankland’s *The Alevis in Turkey* (2003).

[11] CHP refers to the *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP) (Republican People’s Party). This is a leftist-secularist political party in opposition to the ruling AK Party.

[12] For example, the journalist, Ahmet Şık, recently wrote a book called The Imam’s Army (2011) in which he claims that the Gülen movement has infiltrated the Turkish police. His arrest before he could publish the book seemed to confirm his claim to some onlookers. For more information see: http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/-imamin-ordusu-nda-neler-var-/gundem/gundemdetay/29.03.2011/1370420/default.htm. Accessed April 5, 2012.

[13] Houses for women are overseen by a female “older sister” (*abla*).

[14] CHPs refers to supporters of the *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP) (Republican People’s Party). This is a leftist-secularist political party in opposition to the ruling AK Party.

Chapter 7 (pages 252-288)

[1] Second generation German Turks “define belongingness in relation to one’s city of residence rather than to Germanness, Turkishness, or a mixture of the two” (Çağlar 2001: 608). Çağlar examines the large number of bars, cafes, clubs and discos in Berlin, which cater to Turkish youth, and she sees them as “sites and stages where taken-for-granted scripts of (ethnic, national, etc.) belonging are challenged, and alternative forms of belonging and participation in German social life are imagined and negotiated” (2001: 609).

[2] According to Gaby Strassburger (2004), over half of second generation German-Turks choose to import marriage partners from Turkey (see also Ferrer 2005).

[3] Retrieved from http://www.ka-der.org.tr/tr/index.php March 26, 2012.

[4] These are the names of two rival Turkish soccer teams.

[5] The Turkish word for “secular.” (See my discussion in Chapter 6).

[6] Members of the Fethullah Gülen religious sect. (See my discussion in Chapter 6).

[7] An Islamic religious order.

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[8] For instance, Esra claimed that “the 3rd generation of migrants to Germany are lazy and do not want to work if they do not feel that the job is good enough or for enough money. They prefer to live in houses their parents built them and drive cars, but do not work.” Ironically, despite their upbringing in Germany, she claims that “their laziness comes from the effect of the Ottoman Empire on Turks.”

[9] “Many Hong Kongers opted to work in China while seeking citizenship elsewhere. Caught between British disciplinary racism and China’s opportunistic claims of racial loyalty, between declining economic power in Britain and surging capitalism in Asia, they sought a flexible position among the myriad possibilities (and problems) found in the global economy” (Ong 1999: 123).

Chapter 8 (pages 289-307)

[1] Photo credited to Yasemin Ergin (2011) by *der Spiegel Online International*. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-74677-7.html. Accessed April 9, 2012.

[2] Georg Simmel noted “If modern man is free—free because he can sell everything, and free because he can buy everything—then he now seeks…in the objects themselves that vigor, stability, and inner unity which he has lost because of the changed money-conditioned relationships that he has with them. (404)” (quoted in Hutchinson 1996: 294). In the free conditions created by modernity, money and goods gain greater significance as a field of self-expression.

[3] Although Foucault primarily explores ethical practices with reference to ancient Greek philosophers and early Christians, he also believes that these ethical projects comprise part of becoming modern.

[4] “Doğduğun yer değil, doyduğun yer.”

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