THE WEIGHT OF WORDS: DELIBERATION AND POLICYMAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

by

Katelyn C. Jones

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

(Political Science)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

2017

Date of final oral examination: 12/19/2016

The dissertation is approved by the following members of the Final Oral Committee:
Helen Mary Kinsella, Associate Professor, Political Science
Daniel Kapust, Associate Professor, Political Science
Jon Pevehouse, Professor, Political Science
John Zumbrunnen, Professor, Political Science
Christina Ewig, Professor, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota

AMDG

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without the support of many people. My advisor, Helen M. Kinsella, has been an excellent mentor whose endless optimism and encouragement balanced out my pessimism and exhaustion. Her guidance and support have made this journey not only bearable, but also rewarding. I am most grateful to Helen for her generosity, time, and concern, and I aspire to motivate colleagues in the same way Helen has inspired me. I would also like to thank my dissertation committee of Christina Ewig, Daniel Kapust, Jon C.W. Pevehouse, and John Zumbrunnen for their patience, support, and detailed feedback as I wrote (and rewrote) parts of this project.

My graduate studies and this dissertation have also benefited from many other professors' insights. I am grateful to Lisa Martin, Jonathan Renshon, Geneviève Rousselière, Jessica L.P. Weeks, and especially Mark Copelovitch, who knew that I found my dissertation topic before I knew it myself. I thank these professors, and many others, for their time, generosity, and unending support. Thanks also to the many graduate students in my program who were excellent sources of encouragement throughout the writing process. In particular, Maayan Mor, Susanne Mueller, Camilla Reuterswaerd, Benjamin Toff, and Brianne Wolf provided advice and camaraderie without which I am quite certain this project (and I) would have withered away.

I am also grateful to many people outside of my academic program who supported me throughout the dissertation process, including: Annie Cruickshank, Katie Fallon, Sarah Fowler, Laura Green, David Gregory, Nancy Henderson, Sheena Jacobi, Kevin Kuehl, Kelli Miller, Becky Otte-Ford, Clinton Otte-Ford, Carlos Reyes, Gloria Shim, Symon Shim, Kara Slaughter, Julia Slotnick, Ann Sojka, Amy Tegeler, Ruth Trumble, Katie Vadella, and Kenneth Younger. Their prayers and encouragement were tremendously helpful.

Over the past five years, I was also honored to spend time with many children in the Madison area whose joy and humor brightened many of the most challenging days. Thanks especially to Aharon, Ava, Carl, Claire, Dafna, David, Ezra, Lily, Matthew, Micah, and Rafi, and to their parents who trusted me to watch them.

Finally, I am particularly indebted to Eileen Shannon and Shannon Younger. Eileen's ceaseless optimism, friendship, and support were more helpful than she will ever know. Likewise, Shannon's faith, camaraderie, and generosity have meant the world to me. Both Eileen's and Shannon's encouragement inspired me to complete this project, and they continue to inspire me to tackle whatever challenge comes next.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AI	Amnesty International
BPFA	Beijing Platform for Action
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CRSV	Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EU	European Union
GA	General Assembly
HAP	Hague Appeal for Peace
IA	International Alert
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organization
IR	International Relations
NAP	National Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NGOWG	Non-Governmental Organization Working Group
P5	Permanent members of the UNSC
PROP	Provisional Rules of Procedure
SCR	Security Council Resolution
SVC	Sexual Violence in Conflict
UN	United Nations
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
WCRWC	Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
WPS	Women, Peace, and Security

ABSTRACT

This project creates and utilizes a practical theory of deliberation to examine the ways that individuals' identities and power dynamics shape policymaking in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). While theories of communicative behavior have been used to analyze deliberation in formal institutions, I maintain that these theories are inadequate for examining deliberations within the Council because they necessitate that deliberation is formal and rationalistic. Recognizing the need for a theory of deliberation that is suited to examine both formal and informal deliberations, as well as the roles of power and identity in deliberation, I draw from Michel Foucault's theories of subjectivity and power to develop a practical theory of deliberation.

The practical theory of deliberation posits that existent power affects how the individual presents him or herself, and the ways that an individual presents him or herself—whether through conduct or counter conduct—in turn shapes the way that power evidences itself in the institution. I then utilize this theory to examine the development of an increasingly important issue in the UNSC: the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. There are two key reasons to study the WPS agenda: First, the WPS agenda is representative of a significant trend among IOs to address the specific needs of women. Second, the UNSC is a significant IO, and the WPS agenda is of great import in the UNSC. To analyze the WPS agenda, I turn to UNSC meeting transcripts and original interviews with participants in the UNSC and WPS work.

My project is the first to examine the actual meeting transcripts of the WPS agenda and is one of few that employs interviews to gain a more full understanding of the Council. In my analysis, I clearly delineate the ways that individuals have affected the WPS agenda's development. For example, one of my key findings is that an individuals' personal knowledge about WPS matters deeply impacts the shape of deliberations on gender and security issues. My project contributes to debates on democratic theory by confronting questions of power and identity in an international-deliberative context. Moreover, it contributes to conventional and feminist IR scholarship, as I critique conventional IR theories of communicative behavior for relying on ideal, and ultimately apolitical, theories to study deliberation.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

"Resolution 1325 was one of the crowing achievements of the global women's movement and one of the most inspired decisions of the United Nations Security Council…And yet there remains a crippling gap between the ambition of our commitments and actual political and financial support. We struggle to bridge the declared intent of international policymaking and the reality of domestic action in the many corners of the world where resolution 1325 is most needed."
—PHUMZILE MLAMBO-NGCUKA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF UN WOMEN[1]

"When people ask me, 'What does gender mainstreaming mean?' I'll ask, 'give me a context.' It's not, mainstreaming is, you can mainstream anything, but gender should be mainstreamed with a point. There's got to be an end goal in mind, there's got to be a practical ramification that needs to occur, and while I think that mainstreaming occurs on many different thematic issues, with gender we forget what we're trying to achieve in the end, and it ends up being, 'let's add more women,' or, 'let's make sure a woman comes to this meeting,' the optics of it or whatever it is, rather than, 'I want to make sure that the voices and opinions of women on the ground are actually transferred to the Security Council.'"
—INTERVIEW, UN OFFICER, JULY 2015

"Gender is one of those things that people….Their eyes roll when they hear it. It feels very abstract. Because it's sort of very general, people even with good intentions do not understand what they're supposed to do with that term."
—INTERVIEW, FORMER NGOWG EXECUTIVE, MAY 2015

The above statements represent policymakers' reflections on the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda's impact since its creation in 2000. The WPS agenda was instituted via the unanimous passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, which marked the first formal acknowledgement that armed conflict affects women differently from men, underscoring the importance of women's participation and the need to include gender perspectives in negotiations, humanitarian planning, peacekeeping efforts, and peacebuilding and governance. UNSCR 1325 provides a normative framework for addressing the impact of conflict on women, promoting women's participation, and supporting women's

[1] Quoted in Coomaraswamy, et. al, 2015, 5.

involvement in the prevention of conflict. Prior to UNSCR 1325's passage, there had been no explicit consideration of women's needs and roles in international policymaking at the UN. And since 2000, the WPS agenda "has provided the impetus and mechanisms for including gender as a factor in international peace and security" (Guerrina and Wright 2016, 293). However, as the above policymakers' reflections clearly indicate, the agenda's impetus for change has not necessarily translated to what many would consider sufficient policy developments, perhaps an unsurprising assessment as "good intentions do not always make their way into actual practice" (Bessis 2004, 634).

The reality of the WPS agenda, and of addressing women's issues in international cooperation more broadly, is that their inclusion and incorporation remain precarious. Despite the UN's growing dedication of resources and time to the WPS agenda over the past 15 years, the agenda's implementation continues to be met with noteworthy challenges, including inadequate funding, misunderstandings, and outright dismissal of its inclusion. Recognizing these challenges, the WPS agenda's very existence becomes puzzling: Why does the WPS agenda continue to exist? How and why does it continue to take up valuable time in the Council even though there are so many mixed signals about its importance?

One might think that the agenda's continuation is a relatively low-cost for the Council. After all, it is a continually under-funded agenda item. *However*, the Council's use of time is indeed costly. Time is particularly valuable in the UNSC, as diplomats have myriad obligations, meetings, and job duties. Moreover, the Council as a UN organ has numerous topics to address regularly, and any one agenda item requires extensive preparation, briefings, and organizational efforts to plan and prepare for meetings. Relatedly, the Council's use of resources—especially those that supported the 2015 Global Study of WPS (Coomaraswamy,

et al. 2015)—demonstrates that continuing to address the WPS agenda is a costly, and not costless, endeavor. One could also potentially explain the agenda's persistence as arising from individual states that push for the agenda's inclusion, whereby the Council serves as an agent acting on behalf of state-agent interests (Hurd 2002). However, the WPS agenda's historical development suggests that civil society and NGOs have played an equally, if not more, important role than states in the agenda's trajectory (Shepherd 2008a, 2008b; Tryggestad 2009; Basu 2012). Additionally, the Council can be understood to have institutional autonomy with goals and aims that are determined by the Council as an entity and not necessarily by individual state interests (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Another explanation might be that the agenda continues to take up valuable time and space in the Council because it would be bad optics to *stop* including the agenda. However, if this were the case, the Council would merely continue to include the agenda in regular meeting topics and *not* invest money and time in UN Women and the 2015 High-Level Review of the WPS agenda. With these explanations proving unsatisfactory, what explains the agenda's persistence?

While some IR scholars, like Torun Tryggestad (2009), have turned to answer these questions by analyzing the WPS agenda's historical development, arguing that the agenda is a "new norm in the making" that faces similar challenges to other norms-in-progress (Tryggestad 2009, 542, 552), I maintain that a general historical analysis doesn't provide adequate insight into the agenda's unfolding. Responding to Soumita Basu's (2016) call for a "deeper feminist analysis of the Council as a deliberative institution" (271), this project answers the above-mentioned questions by analyzing Council debates on WPS as a particular site of practice in, and also through, which the WPS agenda has developed.

To comprehend the WPS agenda's "postdesign"[2] existence in the face of myriad difficulties, I argue that it is crucial to analyze the day-to-day practices of the WPS policy community through a feminist lens (cf. Cook 2016). These daily interactions and communications capture the contours—challenges and triumphs alike—of the agenda's unfolding. Turning to these quotidian practices is especially important, as the WPS agenda has emerged from daily practices and interactions of state and non-state parties, specifically interactions among multiple stakeholders: NGOs, UN entities, member states, and individual advocates (cf. Tryggestad 2009). Further, understanding these practices and interactions as related to gender regimes—the ways that gender affects *who* does *what*, and *how* power is distributed—provides new insights into the power dynamics of international institutions (cf. Mackay 2014, 602). And in the case of deliberation, attention to the role of gender regimes provides insight into the ways that gender norms play a part in quotidian interactions evident in Council deliberations.

In this project, I understand gender as performative, which is to say that

> …. [gender] is a certain kind of enactment; the "appearance" of gender is often mistaken as a sign of its internal or inherent truth; gender is prompted by obligatory norms that demand that we become one gender or the other (usually within a strictly binary frame); the reproduction of gender is thus always a negotiation with power, and finally, there is no gender without this reproduction of norms that in the course of its repeated enactments risks undoing or redoing the norms in unexpected ways, opening up the possibility of remaking gendered reality along new lines (Butler 2015, 32).

Gender can be (re)enacted by individuals *and* by institutions. In the case of the Council, for instance, one can understand gender as created and reproduced through institutional norms and procedures that typically operate within a binary frame, focusing on individuals as

---

[2] "Postdesign" refers the process of transition after the initial creation of an institution. In this project, postdating refers to the post-2000 (creation of UNSCR 1325) transition process (cf. Mackay 2014). The idea of postdesign especially factors into the second of this manuscript.

masculine/feminine or male/female. One can also understand gender in the Council as enacted by individual delegates speaking before the Council as people who reproduce gender in their own appearance and enactment of gender, typically in line with the binary framework that dominates the institution.

I am also cognizant of the category of gender as never separate from other facets of identity—the category of woman or man is "intersected by class, race, age, and a number of other vectors of power" (Butler 2015, 140). Consequently, I define and understand identity as inherently intersectional. My approach to identity is firmly rooted in feminist theorists' study of identity, following Kimberlé Crenshaw's (1989) introduction of the concept of intersectionality. Feminist scholarship on intersectionality contests single-axis discussions of identity and asserts that identity is dynamically informed by multiple experiences (cf. Cho, et al., 2013). As a result, in my analysis of the Council, I examine how other vectors of power intersect with the category of gender. I consider how variables such as race, class, age, and national identity intersect with gender to influence the ways that WPS policymakers participate in the day-to-day practice of deliberation, with especial attention to how these categories influence the performance of gender in deliberation and Resolutions. By being attentive "to the development of gendered subjectivities," which emerge from various intersecting vectors of power, I maintain that we can gain a better understanding of the UNSC as a deliberative body generally, as well as of the WPS agenda as a particular product of deliberation (Shepherd 2008a, 5).

The central goal of this manuscript is to create and utilize a practical theory of deliberation to examine the WPS agenda's persistence in the face of numerous challenges. As I explain in greater detail below, a practical theory of deliberation uniquely acknowledges

politics in practice *and* aims to transform the politics it studies. Thus, a practical theory of deliberation illuminates the actual contours of UNSC deliberations—including factors of power, gender regimes, and institutional norms—on WPS matters, *and* helps make suggestions for how the Council's practice of deliberation could be transformed to alleviate the dissonance between the agenda's impetus and the agenda's accomplishments. Through my analysis of UNSC open debates on WPS issues from 2000 to 2013, I demonstrate that the WPS agenda is not a stagnant entity, but rather something that continues to evolve depending on the people involved in the conversation. Studying the practice of deliberation surrounding the WPS agenda reveals that the agenda's shape is deeply impacted by institutional norms, as well as the individuals and member-states participating in deliberation. I conclude that the agenda continues to exist in large part because its very meaning and goals are continually changing and responding to these factors. Moreover, examining the Council's practices surrounding the WPS agenda reveals the ways that informal and formal rules and norms of the Council generally affect thematic issues' trajectory in the UNSC.

Why WPS?

As UN Under-Secretary General, and Executive Director of UN Women (the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women), Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka's states in this chapter's opening epigraph, the WPS agenda is at the forefront of conversations and policy regarding international peace and security. Nevertheless, the use of resources and time to address WPS in debate and create National Action Plans (NAPs), documents that lay out domestic plans for implementing the goals of UNSCR 1325 and the subsequent resolutions on WPS, are *not* matched by sufficient funding or an accurate

understanding of the WPS agenda among member states. This is why Mlambo-Ngcuka tempers her reflection on 1325 as "one of the most inspired decisions of the United Nations Security Council," with the fact that speeches praising the WPS agenda are not matched by adequate policy implementation and financing. Further, as the UN Officer, also quoted at the chapter's start, notes, increased attention to WPS in NAPs, UN agencies, and Council debates does not indicate that individuals completely understand the WPS agenda. Although people increasingly talk about the WPS agenda, there is not necessarily an increased understanding of the WPS agenda's main tenets. As a result, while people may use the agenda's lexicon in speech and policy, this vocabulary is not necessarily met with a complete understanding of the words' implications (Interview, UN Officer, May 2015). And, oftentimes, the WPS agenda's legitimacy is dismissed outright as something irrelevant to the Council's concerns. This stance is most evident in China's and the Russian Federation's frequent statements that some WPS polices reach beyond the scope of the Council's assigned role in global governance (cf. Achuthan and Black 2009, Raven-Roberts 2005, Basu 2012).

Considering these reflections alone, one would conclude that the WPS agenda has failed to accomplish anything significant. But, this depends on the measure. While it is undeniable that the agenda has *not* met many of its goals as laid out in UNSCR 1325, the agenda has transformed policymaking in both the UN and international institutions more broadly. With respect to the Council, Soumita Basu (2016) asserts that the WPS agenda's establishment has had one very important implication: "namely, member states, especially those that seek to engage in the Council's deliberations, need to devise positions on WPS issues" (262). Similarly, writing about the WPS agenda's historical development, Torunn L. Tryggestad (2009) explains that the WPS agenda "has appeared as a normative issue that is

increasingly difficult for member states to shun" (542). The WPS agenda's significance is especially impressive as WPS is a thematic issue in the Council, which means that it is non-coercive and carries only a normative imperative intended to influence behavior in both the short and long run. Thus, the increasing unavoidability of WPS for UN member-states is remarkable, given the historical relegation of "soft" issues as unimportant to the Council (Tryggestad 2009 542-44; Shepherd 2008b).

The WPS agenda's importance to the UN is evident in increasing attention to WPS matters by individual member states and UN policies. 63 UN member states[3] have adopted National Action Plans (NAPs) on WPS, providing domestic political plans for implementing the goals of UNSCR 1325 and the subsequent resolutions on WPS. The WPS agenda is regularly discussed twice a year—with Council meetings in both April and October dedicated to questions concerning WPS. Further, since UNSCR 1325's passage, gender has become a focal point of the United Nations as evident in the passage of seven subsequent SC resolutions on WPS (1820 in 2008, 1888 in 2009, 1889 in 2009, 1960 in 2010, 2106 in 2013, 2122 in 2013, and 2242 in 2015); the creation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SVC) via UNSCR 1888 in 2009;[4] the establishment of UN organs dedicated to addressing gender issues explicitly, including UN Women, the NGO Working Group on WPS (hereafter referred to as NGOWG), and the Free and Equal Campaign; and the extensive incorporation of gender perspectives in pre-existent bodies' mandates, notably in the work of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the

---

[3] This number was accurate at the time this was written. The number may have increased. https://actionplans.inclusivesecurity.org

[4] For more on the creation of the Special Representative's post, see: http://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/about-us/about-the-office/

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The WPS agenda's critical importance to the UN has been most recently marked by the UN's 2015 Global Study on UNSCR 1325 (see: Coomaraswamy, et. al, 2015).

Sophie Bessis (2004) further illustrates that the UN's increasing focus on gender has had significant ramifications for *all* international organizations (IOs). Bessis (2004) asserts, "Not a single international organization has failed to introduce the concept of gender into its stated mission and publications…." (634). Bessis attributes the integral nature of women's to international cooperation to efforts of the United Nations: "Whatever criticism might be leveled at the United Nations, we must first recognize that the organization and its agency have played a crucial role over the past quarter century in the global unveiling of women's issues. Thanks in part to its work, women's issues can no longer be buried without causing a universal outcry" (646). The UN's efforts to address women's issues have had an immense impact on international politics.

While many praise the agenda for providing an important impetus for thoroughly and specifically considering women in international policy, these praises are moderated with the reality that the agenda has been unable to achieve the lofty goals it set out in SCR 1325. NAPs constitute a key site at which scholars critically assess the agenda's development and implementation. NAPs have been increasingly instituted (cf. Paffenholz, et al. 2016), but many researchers have found their creation to fall short of attaining the goals of the WPS agenda. For example, while there are currently 63 NAPs in place, the vast majority lack adequate funding and specific procedures to be *put* into practice (Coomaraswamy, et. al, 2015, 14). In-depth analyses of NAPs' rhetoric reveals that they often lack a sufficient architecture to ensure that WPS goals are consistently sought after (see, for example: Lee-Koo 2016;

Basini and Ryan 2016). Further, Laura Shepherd (2016) argues that majority countries' NAPs problematically perceive of conflict as "away" or "abroad," therefore limiting the scope of NAPs to only *international* conflict and making it so that their NAPs are outward, rather than inward, looking. Shepherd moreover asserts that these outward-looking NAPs situate their respective states as providers of security, thereby "perpetuating the very dynamics of militarism and elite-centric security governance that the WPS agenda seeks to challenge" (333). Although the very creation of NAPs is praiseworthy, many NAPs' rhetorical inadequacies, especially the perpetuation of dynamics the WPS agenda seeks to challenge, illuminate that the WPS agenda's institution still has room for improvement. Notwithstanding the fact that the WPS agenda has gained increasing attention and time in the UN, it suffers from inadequate understanding of the agenda and from failing support.

Acknowledging the WPS agenda's challenges, one may ask: Why is it even important to study the WPS agenda? One important reason to study WPS is the fact that the WPS agenda is representative of a significant trend among IOs to address the specific needs of women (cf. Basu 2016, Tryggestad 2009, Bessis 2004). Understanding how the WPS agenda has developed in the Council therefore provides insights into how concerns with gender and security have increased in all IOs. I suggest that by examining the deliberative practices of the UN on WPS matters, we can illuminate the challenges that the WPS agenda has faced and better understand the challenges that women's issues' inclusion have faced in international cooperation more broadly. Second, it is important to study the WPS agenda because the UNSC is a significant IO, and the WPS agenda is of great import in the UNSC. In fact, as "the 'executive organ' of the UN, the Security Council has maintained its pre-eminent position in international politics, demonstrated every year in the intense campaigns of member states

seeking non-permanent membership of the Council" (Basu 2016, 259). Studying the Council's practices through which the WPS agenda has developed provides insights into how the Council more generally handles normative, thematic issues.

Why a Practical Theory of Deliberation

To study the WPS policy community's practices, I create and utilize what I call a practical theory of deliberation; this is distinct from a "practice theory," as I explicate later. I suggest that a novel theory of deliberation is necessary because extant theories of deliberation do not grapple with the complexities of power regimes and gender—two factors that I maintain are critical to understanding the WPS agenda, or for that matter any political practice. While conventional IR scholarship would point one toward examining Council debates through theories of communicative action or rhetorical action, I maintain that these approaches are inadequate to address the complexities of these debates. Both theoretical lenses focus predominantly on formal and institutionalized norms of political communication such that the very contested and agonistic nature of politics is marginalized, or even worse, unacknowledged. As of yet, IR scholars of communicative behavior have not reflected on what their theories include or exclude, or the very limits of their theoretical lenses.

By not addressing the complex realities of power in politics generally, and international politics more specifically, these approaches are simply unable to illuminate the roles of gender regimes, power dynamics, and individual identities in communication. As I explain subsequently, these approaches to the study of political communication rest on ideal understandings of deliberation, exemplified by Habermasian and Rawlsian interpretations of deliberation, that make them ill-suited for the analysis of day-to-day practices in international

politics. In this project, I develop and utilize a practical theory of deliberation that avoids the shortcomings of conventional theories of communicative behavior; is attentive to the ways that gender regimes, performativity, and power dynamics are present in daily practices; and reveals factors that have molded the WPS agenda's development.

Understanding my reasoning for calling the theory a "practical theory of deliberation" clarifies why this alternative is the lens best suited to examine the day-to-day practices of the WPS policy community. The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines practical as "of, relating to practice or action, as opposed to speculation….," where practice is "the habitual doing or carrying on of something; usual, customary, or constant action or performance; conduct" (OED). Logically, then, a practical theory can be defined as a theory—where theory is defined as a system of ideas intended to explain something (in this project, deliberation is the "something")—that is related to action or conduct. But how exactly does a practical theory *relate* to practice or action? To answer this question, I first explain what a practical theory is broadly and then explicate what a practical theory of deliberation is more specifically.

One can imagine a practical theory as relating to practice insofar as the theory is *based on* observed actions. This is what grounded, realist, and non-ideal theories do. Grounded theories are systematically developed from data—they emerge as the scholar studies and analyzes information (Glaser 1978, 2). For example, in international relations scholarship, Peter Wilson (2012) describes a grounded theory of international institutions as a theory that is fundamentally rooted in the language and experiences of practitioners (580, 585). By rooting the theory in observed actions and practices within an institution, grounded theories are intended to be more reflective of participants' conduct.

In political theory, scholars have similarly advocated for a turn toward the actual or the "real." Political theorists' turn toward realism is distinct from IR theories of realism, which emphasize the conflictual and competitive nature of international politics and understand states as motivated by national interest (e.g., Morgenthau 1951, Aron 1966). Theorists who advocate realism stress that political theory should address real-world phenomena and not reduce politics to ethics, or ignore the roles of emotions, passions, and conflict in practical politics (Finlayson 2015, 4; Galston 2010). Political realists "challenge wishful thinking and condemn the liberalism of analytic political philosophy as abstract, incoherent, remote from the realities of politics and premised on a misunderstanding of the true nature of power" (Forrester 2012, 2). Somewhat similarly, non-ideal theories, as explained by Charles Mills (2005) and Jacob Levy (2015), are theories that are based on the actualities of the world rather than abstractions from reality. They respond to the neo-Kantian liberal theorizing inspired by John Rawls, positing the inappropriateness of liberal theories for understanding and improving actual politics (Levy 2015; Mills 2005). Non-ideal theorists stress the importance of recognizing the ideal as a motivating changes and in practices.

It is important to note that while all realist theories can be classified as non-ideal, not all non-ideal theories can be classified as realist.[5] This is because non-ideal theories do not

---

[5] Matt Sleat (2014) explains the distinction between non-ideal and realist theories: "For non-ideal theory, the problem with contemporary liberal theory is that its insufficient regard for the facts has impeded its ability to fulfil its normative ambition of providing guidance for political action and reform. Greater concern for the facts, either in relation to implementing the recommendations of ideal theory in the real (non-ideal) world or through incorporating those facts into normative theorising itself, will produce a theory more suited to guiding action here and now. The more salient facts one incorporates, the more realistic the theory will be. Realist thought on the other hand argues that much contemporary liberal theory has assumed a flawed conception of the political — one in which the conflict that is constitutive of the political is overcome through appealing either to moral values that have antecedent over politics or through the use of reason to identify principles of co-existence that all persons should rationally endorse. A more realistic theory accepts the fact that conflict is ubiquitous in human life and that it can never be permanently overcome, though it is the role of politics to provide an authoritative order that prevents such conflict from descending into chaos and anarchy" (9).

necessarily challenge liberal assumptions about politics, but rather recognize ideal politics as non-conflictual. Non-ideal theories stress the need for theories to better reflect practical politics. Realist theories stress *both* the need for theories to better reflect practical politics and the need to recognize politics as inherently conflictual and agonistic. On this point, Matt Sleat (2014) writes, "It is not enough for a theory to simply accept the fact of conflict in politics in order to count as realist. It must recognise that such conflict is a constitutive element of politics which, once acknowledged, undermines the conception of politics that the ideal/non-ideal theory debate assumes" (10). While non-ideal theories are situated in dialogue with liberal political traditions, realist theories challenge liberal assumptions about politics by stressing politics as fundamentally and necessarily conflictual.

One can also imagine a practical theory as relating to practice insofar as the theory is intended to *influence* practices. Practical theories, in this sense, are instrumental. This vision of practical theory is akin to John Dewey's (1931), as well as other pragmatists', vision of "knowledge for action." In the realm of IR scholarship, critical theories of international relations are similarly instrumental insofar as they challenge and disagree with accepted norms and the status quo to enable an upheaval of regnant practices. Critical theory is oriented toward critiquing and changing norms, questioning and critiquing modern society and political life (Davies 2014). As Richard Devetak (2009) explains, "Critical theory not only challenges and dismantles traditional forms of theorizing, it also problematizes and seeks to dismantle entrenched forms of social life that constrain human freedom" (162). Critical theory aims to disrupt norms of social life for an emancipatory end.

Outside of political science scholarship, and fundamentally rooted in the pragmatist tradition, Communications scholars have also defined practical theory in these terms. Vernon

Cronen (1995), a pioneer of practical theory in Communications research, describes practical theories: "They are developed in order to make human life better. They provide ways of joining in social action so as to promote (a) socially useful description, explanation, critique, and change in situated human action; and (b) emergence of new abilities for all parties involved" (231). Moreover, Cronen (2001), stresses that practical theories should illuminate actions that one might not otherwise notice (30). Thus, Communications scholars maintain that practical theories are theories that impact action and influence change when used.

So, which of these two relationships to practice does a practical theory entail? I suggest that a practical theory embodies *both* of these relationships: It is grounded in observed actions, and it is intended to influence practice. This twofold relationship to practice also explains why a practical theory differs from other theoretical approaches. While non-ideal, realist, and grounded theories recognize politics in practice, a practical theory is distinctive because it acknowledges politics in practice *and* aims to transform the politics it studies.

A practical theory's transformative component makes it especially appropriate for political science scholarship. As a political scientist, I feel compelled to not only do critical work, but also to strive to make this critical work impactful. Agreeing with Robert Cox's (1981) assertion that a "theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose" (128), the goal of a practical theory is to have an impact on the practices it investigates. Further, a practical theory's explicit concern with affecting politics reflects my belief that political science scholarship should be relevant to politics. As Jeffrey Isaac (2009) stated, "We political scientists can and should do a better job of making the public relevance of our work clearer and of doing more relevant work."[6] I maintain that providing a practical theory is politically

[6] As quoted in Cohen (2009). It is this same sentiment that motivates the realist push in political theory literature (see: Sleat 2014)

and publicly relevant in two ways: The theory created is rooted in actual political processes, and the theory speaks directly to, and ultimately influences, the very political processes it explains and analyzes. This means that a practical theory not only represents the phenomena it makes sense of, but also shapes and impacts the very phenomena it studies.

As a result, a practical theory of deliberation is transformative dually. It is transformative insofar as its horizons are shaped by emerging information from deliberative practices, *and* insofar as it actively strives to influence the practices it helps one analyze. It is based on action and has the potential consequence of affecting actions; it impacts actual processes, as well as the ways that scholars study practices. This is akin to what practical theories do in Communications scholarship: they bring scholars' attention to things that might otherwise go unnoticed (Cronen 2001, 30; Goldkuhl 2006). And once these components are noticed, they are reflected in the empirically grounded theory, which in turn aids the scholar's efforts to transform the practice studied. A practical theory entails a feminist self-reflective practice insofar as it demands that the scholar to reflect on what s/he has learned in order to effect change in the practice they study.

A *practical* theory's dual relationship to practice makes it distinct from practice theoretical approaches. Practice theories have gained increasing attention among international relations scholars, with myriad approaches included under the umbrella of practice theory (Bueger and Gadinger 2015, 2014). Despite various approaches being considered practice theories, *all* practice theories arguably encompass six criteria: "Practice theory implies emphasizing process, developing an account of knowledge as action, appreciating the collectivity of knowledge, recognizing the materiality of practice, embracing the multiplicity of orders, and working with a performative understanding of the world" (Bueger and Gadinger

2015, 449-50).[7] First, in practice theory, scholars focus on activities as procedural; instead of focusing on the static concepts of "knowledge" or "order," for instance, practice theory focuses on "knowing" and "ordering." Practice theory also unites knowing and doing so that knowledge is not essentialized to either thought or action, but rather spatiotemporally situated, i.e., across both time and space, depending on the actor, her environment, her beliefs, and the environment (450). Third, practices are understood to develop through repeated interactions with people and materials. For instance, one can develop a particular practice through repeated interactions with a computer program. Relatedly, practice theories focus on practices as involving human and non-human materiality. Practice theoretical approaches understand the world to be shaped by bodies and by objects. Fifth, practice theory assumes that there are multiple and overlapping orders in the world that are not naturally present but rather continually developing (Schatzki 2002). Finally, practice theory understands the world as performative, meaning that the world is the product of ongoing action and relations among actors—it is continually constructed.

These six criteria, although rooted in an arguably non-ideal interpretation of the world, do not demonstrate the theory to be transformative. Practice theories do not necessarily respond to the practices they are intended to explain and analyze, nor do they necessarily shape the practices they study. While practice theories are cognizant of non-ideal systems, orders, domination, and interactions, this awareness is not rooted in empirical observations. Rather, practice theories can, and often do, base their approaches on what *other* theorists have posited broadly about interactions in a material and performative world. As Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger (2014) explain, practice theorists use "sensitizing concepts," i.e., ideas

[7] Other leading scholars in practice theory concur with these six criteria. For instance, see: Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2015, Adler-Nissen and Kropp 2014.

that lack any precise empirical reference. This means that practice theory is a non-empirically grounded heuristic device, making the theory based on thought rather than observation (Reckwitz 2002, 257).

Practice theorists predominantly rely upon existing practice theories, such as those of Bourdieu (e.g., Adler-Nissen 2013, 2014; Berling 2012; Guzzini 2000) and Luc Boltanski (e.g., Gadinger 2015; Gadinger and Yildiz 2012, Borghi 2011), tweaking these approaches slightly for their particular concerns but relying predominantly on foci of these existent theories and not as much on observations of a practice. Consequently, most practice theories lack construct validity, which "refers to the faithfulness of a research design to the theory that is under investigation" (Gerring 2012, 95). By not closely aligning the theory with the phenomena it is used to analyze, it becomes difficult to translate a practice theory into a viable empirical test (96).

A practical theory, in contrast, is grounded in empirical evidence about a *particular* practice, and is continually shaped by revelations about that practice. In the case of the practical theory of deliberation I develop here, it is rooted in the practice of deliberation. It also entails construct validity insofar as the theory and research design are closely aligned (Gerring 2012, 96). Further, while practice theories are not oriented towards transforming or altering the practices they are used to study, a practical theory is. Practice theory misses the changes that happen within the practice it analyzes, whereas a practical theory does not. Overall, a practical theory shares the orientation toward practice that international practice theory does, but a practical theory's transformative components make it distinct from practice theory.

The reflective and impactful features of a practical theory make demands on the scholar to effect change in the practices studied. As the theory continually evolves depending on emergent observations, the theoretical work can never be "complete." The scholar assesses whether the theory accommodates new information from practice, and/or she is working to use insights gained from the theoretical analysis to encourage change in practice.

To comprehend the evolution and impact of a practical theory, it is helpful to consider Aristotle's understanding of the relationship between *praxis* and *phronesis*. In *Nichomachean Ethics* (Books I and VI), Aristotle presents *praxis* as practical human activity in spheres of life, including politics and friendship. The wisdom associated with the individual's engagement in practical situations like politics is labeled *phronesis*—prudence, or practical reason. *Phronesis* is a "reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods" (1140b20-25). Knowledge of *phronesis* comes from individuals having experiences within particular contexts, which means that it develops as one ages (1142a10ff). Further, *phronesis* is highly contextual. Aristotle maintains that *phronesis* allows one to determine "what is suitable is . . . relative to the person, the circumstances, and the object" (1122a25-6). Thus, *phronesis* emerges from myriad practical experiences in politics and friendships that ultimately impact the ways that one acts in politics and relationships. A practical theory, like *phronesis*, is grounded in actual, practical, and contextual experiences. And the insights gained from a practical theory, like *phronesis*, can shape political practices, or *praxis*.

Key Components of a Practical Theory of Deliberation

Having established that a practical theory is a theory that relates to practice because it is determined by practices, and influences practices, the question arises as to what a practical

theory *of deliberation* entails. To determine what constitutes this particular practical theory, it is helpful to consider what is meant by "deliberation." In this project, I define deliberation quite broadly: **deliberation is the practice of sharing of ideas**. This definition is broader than predominate conceptions of deliberation in political theory, which define deliberation in terms of formal institutions and rules of conversation (cf. Krause 2008).[8]

Since Immanuel Kant (1996[1787]), scholars of liberal democratic theory have often addressed deliberation as excessively rationalistic and formal (cf. Barker 2015). Two of the most widely embraced theories of democratic deliberation are those of contemporary political theorists Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls. Both theories are ideal, insofar as they provide recommendations for deliberative settings to lead to consensus or just policy decisions, and both theories focus extensively on deliberation as a formal and rational exchange of ideas. Consequently, Habermas and Rawls de-contextualize deliberation because they set aside the specific norms, individuals, and practices of deliberation that are evident in a particular deliberative context. They provide theories of deliberation that are intended to be ideal points of comparison to practices of deliberation. As Stephen K. White (2016) explains, Habermas's theory provides a paradigm intended to help "democratic publics get a clearer grasp of specific topics" and "better sort policy alternatives" (202). Both Habermas and Rawls define deliberation ideally and within liberal paradigms, assuming that "true" deliberation can only happen when very specific expectations about procedures, rules, institutions, rationality, and end-goals are in place. Both theorists focus on deliberation as political communication that is "more integrative than adversarial struggles for power" (Barker 2015, 3).

---

[8] This broader approach to deliberation, recognizing the roles of emotion and non-rational beliefs, has also been considered by recent political theory. For more on this, see Barker 2015, Dryzek's *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*, and Bickford's "Emotion Talk and Political Judgment."

For example, Habermas's understanding of deliberation emerges in his theory of communicative action. Habermas (1984) explains that communicative action, or cooperation in conversation, can only come about when four requirements are met (89): First, no one who can contribute to the conversation has been excluded; Second, all participants have equal voice; Third, all participants are free to speak their honest opinions; Fourth, there is no coercion built into the process of discourse. Habermas admits that these conditions are counterfactual insofar as they can rarely, if ever, be realized in practice, but Habermas maintains that the degree to which these conditions are met helps us understand whether the outcomes of a given discourse are reasonable, i.e., consensual or non-consensual. Thus, these four counterfactuals function as "*standards* for a self-correcting learning process" (1984, 91). Habermas's theory of communicative action is fundamentally concerned with ensuring equality and rationality among participants—if the aforementioned four conditions are not met, Habermas maintains that communities will be unable to rationally decide on, or even deliberate about, a communal course of action.

Like Habermas, Rawls is fundamentally concerned with deliberation as a rational and formal process. In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls (1971) explains that conceptions of justice should be ranked and critiqued based on the principles that structure a society in the initial moment of contract and subsequently guide and ground deliberation over matters post-contract (11, 17). Rawls defines a just society as one in which "everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, and (2) the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these principles" (5). In particular, Rawls maintains that justice can only be achieved if rules are initially implemented, and deliberation later happens, behind a veil of ignorance, a veil behind which the individual does not know the specifics of one's

identity (race, gender, socioeconomic status, etc.) or of one's society (12, 136). In his later work, *Political Liberalism* (1993), Rawls addresses matters of difference and diversity that were not fully considered in *A Theory of Justice*. He especially explains how unity among different persons can be attained despite the enduring diversity that liberal institutions allow. Rawls (1993) maintains that deliberation ultimately happens when views and perspectives are taken as equal in value and reasonableness, which thereby allows decisions to be made through the acceptance and realization of an overlapping consensus among community members (144-5). Decisions are therefore made through the equal sharing of ideas in a public space among reasonable persons.

Both Habermas and Rawls focus on deliberation as occurring among equal and rational actors within a formal and communal environment for a particular end: communicative action for Habermas, and a just society for Rawls. These ideal ends are intended to be generalizable goals for any form of deliberation, as they are presented as universalizable goods for institutions and the lives they impact. In imagining these common goods, both Rawls and Habermas make questions of rules and procedures their predominant concerns, thereby marginalizing questions of character and identity (Barker 2015, 7). In the words of Sharon Krause (2008), Rawls' and Habermas' approaches to deliberation reflect a kind of "motivational deficit," wherein individuals are asked to marginalize identity and affect while deliberating. Consequently, the very motivational sources of human agency, located in affect, desires, and identity, are not present in procedural and rationalistic accounts of deliberation (cf. Krause 2008, 2). As such, predominant understandings of deliberation are not rooted in deliberation in practice, but rather in the ideal, and therefore lack construct validity just as

practice theories in IR do. To study deliberation as a practice, then, I find it necessary to understand and define deliberation as it is observed in day-to-day situations.

By defining deliberation without particular procedural or end-goal expectations, the definition I posit—**deliberation as the sharing of ideas**—is non-ideal and realistic. Deliberation as the sharing of ideas is non-ideal because it reflects the practice of deliberation broadly. While some forms of deliberation may, indeed, be void of power influences and involve the procedural norms that many scholars envision, actual deliberation is quite different. To suggest that power, identity and non-rational opinions do *not* influence deliberation is, in general, entirely unrealistic. This is especially true in international institutions like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) where both formal and informal power dynamics shape everything that happens, from the rules of discussion, the strength of votes, and the degree to which a delegation is viewed as authoritative in the institution. Even though the rules of discussion may suggest equality, power's pathologies remain ever-present in the institution (cf. Barnett and Finnemore 1999). Further, defining deliberation as the sharing of ideas is realistic because it does not impose liberal end goals on deliberation. Whereas Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (2004), for instance, present deliberation as having an "aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future" (7), my definition imposes no such goals on the practice of deliberation. It reflects the reality that in many conversations that one would intuitively identify as deliberative, ideas may be shared and have no consequence at all, or they may have negative consequences. For example, many UNSC meetings involve delegates sharing ideas without any settlement or consensus being reached. By not restricting deliberation in terms of ideal goals or procedures, deliberation as the sharing of ideas reflects

the political practice of deliberation.

A practical theory of deliberation is a theory that is shaped by the practice of sharing ideas, and in turn effects the ways ideas are shared. Because it is rooted in the *actual* practices of people, it is attentive to myriad factors that shape practices, including factors such as gender, race, and power. This project proceeds by explicating what a practical theory of deliberation is, the light a practical theory sheds on existent practices of deliberation in the Council, and the ways that these insights can transform the very practice of deliberation it analyzes.

Chapter Overview

In Chapter 2, I examine the "nested newness" of the WPS agenda postdesign, i.e., since UNSCR 1325, to understand how institutional rules and norms have shaped the day-to-day practices of WPS policymakers. In feminist institutional scholarship, "nested newness" is a concept that illuminates the complexities of creating new institutions, especially the complexities "for feminist reformers for whom their 'new' seeks to disrupt old certainties and to challenge rather than conform to the wider status quo" (Mackay 2014, 552). I maintain that recognizing the WPS agenda's newness as nested helps us understand that the agenda's path has been, and continues to be, "profoundly shaped by its institutional environment no matter how seemingly dramatic the rupture with the past" (Mackay 2014, 552). Understanding the Council's daily practices with WPS as contextually rooted, I analyze the quotidian deliberations regarding WPS as situated in the Council's much broader historical context of deliberation. For readers' reference, the complete text of SCR 1325 is included in Appendix A.

Drawing from formal documents, feminist IR scholarship, and my own interviews with policymakers, I analyze the Council's rules, procedures, and norms with attention to the ways that they have produced gender regimes. I also examine how these rules, procedures, and norms have, and have not, impacted the WPS agenda's trajectory in day-to-day practices. By explaining the ways that day-to-day policy communication on WPS matters have happened in the postdesign phase, I describe the practice of deliberation in the Council, which serves as the basis for developing a practical theory of deliberation. I illuminate how the Council, as a gendered institution, has been enacted in the WPS agenda's postdesign phase by gendered actors—WPS policymakers—whose roles in deliberation are shaped by formal and informal, old and new, rules and norms (cf. Mackay 2014, 554; Gibbings 2011). I moreover foil the assumption that the agenda has linearly progressed by explicating the complex nest in which the agenda continues to reside.

Having established a description of deliberative practices in the UNSC, in the third chapter I construct a practical theory of deliberation. In the first part, I justify the need for a practical theory of deliberation to make sense of the WPS agenda's development by critically reviewing IR scholarship on communicative behavior and illustrating how their theories do not account for the *actual* practice of deliberation that I provided in the Chapter 2. I critique theories of rhetorical action (e.g., Schimmelfennig 2001, 2003) and communicative action (e.g., Risse 2000, Müller 2004, Deitelhoff 2009), as both are used to study facets of deliberation. Beyond simply noting advantages and disadvantages of each approach, I focus on each theory's reliance on ideals, rather than actual events and practices.

To evaluate the degree to which each theory entails ideal and nonideal components, I draw from Charles Mills' (2005) typology of ideal theory characteristics. Using Mills'

typology as a heuristic device, I criticize each approach's focus on the ideal, rather than the actual, and explain that an over-reliance on the ideal not only makes the theory inapplicable to events that actually happen, but also makes the theory apolitical. Moreover, I consider the elements of deliberation in the Council that each theoretical approach can account for. I find that neither theory can account for the dynamics of power and identity that are present throughout deliberations in the Council. Both theories marginalize, or ignore, the realities of power and identity, pointing to the need for a new theory of deliberation.

In the second part of Chapter 3, I create a practical theory of deliberation. Against extant theories of deliberation in IR scholarship, I provide a theory of deliberation that is grounded in the actual practice of deliberation, rather than an ideal speech situation. As a practical theory, it is grounded in observations of the practice of deliberation in the Council that I described in Chapter 2. As such, a practical theory of deliberation accommodates considerations of power and identity that theories of rhetorical action and communicative behavior exclude or marginalize entirely. I posit that both formal and informal power dynamics shape the ways that individuals participate, and that individuals in turn influence institutional dynamics. To elucidate the roles of power and individuals in deliberation, I make explicit use of Michel Foucault's theory of productive power. I explain how power dynamics and individuals affect each other and deliberative outcomes. Finally, I consider what a practical theory of deliberation could be expected to reveal about UNSC deliberations on WPS. For example, we can expect that applying a practical theory of deliberation would reveal the ways that historic norms of not addressing women's issues have continued to shape UNSC WPS-deliberations. It would also shed light on the ways that individuals' identities and histories affect the ways they participate in deliberations.

In Chapter 4, I utilize my practical theory of deliberation to analyze deliberations on WPS. I use two main sources of data: transcripts from Council meetings on the WPS agenda between 2000 and 2013, and interviews. Throughout my analysis, I am particularly attentive to one component of deliberations: the ways that delegates' language constructs women subjects, or in Foucauldian terms the subjectifications of women in deliberations (Foucault *TL* , 97). As Laura Shepherd's (2008a) research on security discourses in the Council has demonstrated, the representations of subjects in language enable certain ways of thinking about and acting on these constructions. In this chapter's first part, I utilize my practical theory of deliberation to unpack how changing power dynamics in the Council have influenced how deliberations subjectify women. I study deliberations in 2000, 2006, and 2013. I conclude that Council deliberations have increasingly recognized multiple roles of women because of increased information about women's experiences on the ground, *as well as* the instrumentalization of more subjectifications to achieve policy goals.

While the strategic use of women's experiences to achieve policy goals is not surprising (cf. Aoláin 2016, 289; Cook 2016, 355; Kirby and Shepherd 2016, 378), the reasons for this instrumentalization are not immediately apparent. Using my practical theory of deliberation, I explain moments at which the Council is more or less responsive to women's experiences on the ground. Doing so, I illuminate that the Council is *not* as impermeable and resistant to change as one might think (cf. Backer 2012); the Council is more reflective of women's myriad experiences at certain times. I ultimately demonstrate that although multiple subjectifications of women have become increasingly frequent in Council meetings over time, these subjectifications do not signal linear progress.

In Chapter 4's second part, I examine how specific topics of deliberation within the WPS agenda—specifically civilians and indicators, or measures of the implementation of UNSCR 1325—affect how women are subjectified. I find that deliberations focused on civilians reinforce the Council's identity as a masculine institution, insofar as these deliberations equate civilians with women, thereby painting civilians/women as needing saving and the UN as the body to do this saving. I also conclude that deliberations regarding indicators further demonstrate the ways that subjectifications of women affirm the Council's dominance. I argue that the use of indicators represents an attempt of the Council to make the world exist as the "picture," in Heideggerian terms, that they desire. Efforts to make this picture, via achieving target levels in indicators, consequently conceal women's experiences that do not fit into the subjectivities that the Council acknowledges and measures.

Overall, I explain the ways that power dynamics and individuals' identities intersect and inform how and why different subjectifications emerge across time and meeting focus in the UNSC. I ultimately argue that the agenda's continued existence in the Council is a consequence of the agenda's essence. The WPS agenda is not defined by fossilized meanings and goals, but rather exists as a continual debate or dialogue about what the agenda entails. This intrinsic tension produces the WPS agenda's challenges, moments of triumph, and continued integration in the Council.

In Chapter 5, I conclude by summarizing my key findings and explaining how my practical theory of deliberation is transformed by the practices it has illuminated. In particular, I examine how my findings point to the need to reconstruct the definition of deliberation so that deliberation is understood not as a "sharing of ideas," but rather as an *ordering* or *dominating* of ideas. Moreover, I consider the ways that my findings in Chapter 4

can transform the practice of deliberation in the Council. I examine how the historical deliberations on the WPS agenda provide insight into future UNSC discussions on not only the WPS agenda, but also, and relatedly, discussions about LGBT persons. Additionally, I explicate my findings' potential feedback effects. I consider how acting on this project's findings could restructure subsequent political processes in the UNSC specifically, or regarding gender and security matters more broadly. This project ultimately demonstrates the value of a practical theory of deliberation for the study of the Council and IOs more broadly, as well as for policy practice.

Chapter 1: Works Cited

Aoláin, Fionnuala Ní. "The 'war on terror'and extremism: assessing the relevance of the Women, Peace and Security agenda." *International Affairs* 92.2 (2016): 275-291.

Achuthan, Mahima, and Renee Black. *United Nations Resolution 1820: A Preliminary Assessment of the Challenges and Opportunities.* International Women's Tribune Center. New York, September 2009.

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca. "European Diplomats: State nobility and the Invention of a New Social Group." Transnational Power Elites: The New Professionals of Governance, Law and Security. Eds. N Kauppi & M Rask Madsen. New York: Routledge, 2013: 65-80.

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca. "Power in practice: Negotiating the international intervention in Libya." *European Journal of International Relations,* 20.4 (2014): 889-911.

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, and Kristoffer Kropp. "A Sociology of Knowledge Approach to European Integration: Four Analytical Principles." *Journal of European Integration* 37.2 (2015): 155-173.

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, and Vincent Pouliot. "Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya." *European Journal of International Relations* 20.4 (2014): 889–911.

Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics.* Trans. Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000.

Aron, Raymond, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, trans. Richard Howard and Anette Baker Fox, Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966.

Backer, Larry Catá. "The structural characteristics of global law for the 21st century: fracture, fluidity, permeability, and polycentricity." In *Reflections on Global Law*. New York: Brill, 2013. 45-67.

Barker, Derek WM. "Deliberative Justice and Collective Identity A Virtues-Centered Perspective." *Political Theory* (2015): 1-21.

Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2004.

Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. "The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations." *International organization* 53.04 (1999): 699-732.

Basini, Helen and Caitlin Ryan. "National Action Plans as an obstacle to meaningful local ownership of UNSCR 1325 in Liberia and Sierra Leone." In *International Political Science Review* June 2016 37: 390-403.

Basu, Soumita, "Permanent Security Council Members and Resolutions on Women, peace, and Security," in *E-International Relations.* 31 October 2012. Available at e-ir.info. Accessed 20 November 2015.

Basu, Soumita,"Gender as national interest at the UN Security Council." *International Affairs*, 92 (2016): 255–273. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12548

Berling, Trine Villumsen. "Bourdieu, international relations, and European security." *Theory and Society* 41.5 (2012): 451-478.

Bessis, Sophie. "International organizations and gender: New paradigms and old habits." *Signs* 29.2 (2004): 633-647.

Bickford, Susan. "Emotion talk and political judgment." *The Journal of Politics* 73.04 (2011): 1025-1037.

Borghi, Vando. "One-way Europe? Institutional guidelines, emerging regimes of justification, and paradoxical turns in European welfare capitalism." *European Journal of Social Theory* 14.3 (2011): 321-341.

Bueger, Christian, and Frank Gadinger. *International Practice Theory: New Perspectives*. New York: Springer, 2014.

Bueger, Christian, and Frank Gadinger. "The play of international practice." *International Studies Quarterly* 59.3 (2015): 449-460.

Butler, Judith. *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2015.

Cho, Sumi, Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, and Leslie McCall. "Toward a field of intersectionality studies: Theory, applications, and praxis." Signs 38.4 (2013): pp. 785-810.

Cohen, Patricia. "Just How Relevant is Political Science?" In *The New York Times*. 19 October 2009. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/20/books/20poli.html?_r=0. Accessed 3 September 2016.

Cook, Sam. "The 'woman-in-conflict'at the UN Security Council: a subject of practice." *International Affairs* 92.2 (2016): 353-372.

Coomaraswamy, Radhika, et al., *Preventing conflict, transforming peace, securing the peace: a global study on the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*. New York: UN Women, 2015.

Cox, J. Robert. "Argument and the "definition of the situation"." *Communication Studies* 32.3 (1981): 197-205.

Crenshaw, Kimberle. "Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics." *U. Chi. Legal Forum* (1989): 139-167.

Cronen, Vernon E. "Practical theory and the tasks ahead for social approaches to communication." *Social approaches to communication* (1995): 217-242.

Cronen, Vernon E. "Practical theory, practical art, and the pragmatic-systemic account of inquiry." *Communication Theory* 11.1 (2001): 14-35.

Davies, Matt. "IR Theory: Problem-Solving Theory Versus Critical Theory?" *E-International Relations* September 2014. Available at: http://www.e-ir.info. Accessed 3 September 2016.

Deitelhoff, Nicole. "The discursive process of legalization: charting islands of persuasion in the ICC case." *International organization* 63.01 (2009): 33-65.

Devetak, Richard. "Post-structuralism." In *Theories of International Relations*, New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2009: 187-216.

Dewey, John. *Philosophy and Civilization*. New York: G.P. Putnam's, 1931.

Dryzek, John S. *Deliberative democracy and beyond: Liberals, critics, contestations*. New York: Oxford UP, 2000.

Glaser, Barney. *Theoretical Sensitivity: Advances in the Methodology of Grounded Theory*. Mill Valley, CA: The Sociology Press, 1978.

Finlayson, Lorna. "With radicals like these, who needs conservatives? Doom, gloom, and realism in political theory." *European Journal of Political Theory* (2015): 1-19.

Forrester, Katrina. "Judith Shklar, Bernard Williams and Political Realism." *European Journal of Political Theory* 11.3 (2012): 247-272.

Gadinger, Frank. "Rechtfertigung und Kritik im "Krieg gegen den Terror". Die Legitimitätskrise der US-Außenpolitik," 2015.

Gadinger, Frank, and Taylan Yildiz. *Unruhige Legitimität. Die Finanzkrise aus Sicht der pragmatischen Soziologie der Kritik*. Nomos eLibrary, 2012. Available at nomos-elibrary.de.

Galston, William A. "Realism in political theory." *European journal of political theory* 9.4 (2010): 385-411.

Gerring, John. *Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework*. New York: Cambridge, 2012.

Gibbings, Sheri. "No Angry Women at the United Nations: Political dreams and the cultural politics of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 13.4 (2011): 522–538.

Goldkuhl, Göran. "Practice theory vs practical theory: Combining referential and functional pragmatism." *Information Systems (ALOIS)* 1 (2006).

Guerrina, Roberta, and Katharine AM Wright. "Gendering normative power Europe: lessons of the Women, Peace and Security agenda." *International Affairs* 92.2 (2016): 293-312.

Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson. *Why Deliberative Democracy.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2004.

Guzzini, Stefano. "A reconstruction of constructivism in international relations." *European Journal of International Relations* 6.2 (2000): 147-182.

Habermas, Jürgen. *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Boston: Beacon, 1984.

Hurd, Ian. "Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council." *Global Governance* 8.1 (2002): 35-51.

Krause, Sharon R. *Civil passions: Moral sentiment and democratic deliberation*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2008.

Lee-Koo, Katrina. "Engaging UNSCR 1325 through Australia's National Action Plan." *International Political Science Review* June (2016) 37: 336-349.

Levy, Jacob T. "There's No Such Thing as Ideal Theory." *Available at SSRN 2420125* (2015).

Mackay, Fiona. "Nested newness, institutional innovation, and the gendered limits of change." *Politics & Gender* 10.04 (2014): 549-571.

Mills, Charles W. "'Ideal theory' as ideology." *Hypatia* 20.3 (2005): 165-183.

Morgenthau, Hans J. *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy,* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.

Müller, Harald. "Arguing, bargaining and all that: communicative action, rationalist theory and the logic of appropriateness in international relations." *European Journal of International Relations* 10.3 (2004): 395-435.

Paffenholz, Thania, Nick Ross, Steven Dixon, Anna-Lena Schluchter, and Jacqui True. "Making Women Count—Not just counting women: Assessing Women's Inclusion and Influence on Peace Negotiations." Report by Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative, and UN Women. Geneva: The Graduate Institute Geneva. 2016.

Raven-Roberts, Angela. "Gender Mainstreaming in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Talking the Talk, Tripping over the Walk." *Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping.* Boulder, CO*: Rowman & Littlefield* (2005): 43-63.

Rawls, John. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1971.

Rawls, John. *Political Liberalism.* New York: Columbia UP, 1993.

Reckwitz, Andreas. "Toward a theory of social practices a development in culturalist theorizing." *European Journal of Social Theory* 5.2 (2002): 243-263.

Risse, Thomas. "“Let's argue!”: communicative action in world politics." *International Organization* 54.01 (2000): 1-39.

Schatzki, Theodore. *The site of the social: A philosophical exploration of the constitution of social life and change*. University Park, PA: U. Pennsylvania, 2002.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. "The community trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the Eastern enlargement of the European Union." *International Organization* 55.01 (2001): 47-80.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. *The EU, NATO and the integration of Europe: Rules and rhetoric*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003.

Shepherd, Laura J. *Gender, violence and security: Discourse as practice*. New York: Zed Books, 2008a.

Shepherd, Laura J. "Making war safe for women? National Action Plans and the militarisation of the women, peace and security agenda." *International Political Science Review* 37 (June 2016): 324-335.

Shepherd, Laura J. "Power and authority in the production of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325." *International Studies Quarterly* 52.2 (2008b): 383-404.

Sleat, Matt. “Legitimacy in Realist Thought: Between Moralism and *Realpolitik.” Political Theory* 42 (June 2014): 314-337.

Tryggestad, Torunn L. "Trick or Treat? The UN and Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security." *Global Governance: a review of multilateralism and international organizations* 15.4 (2009): 539-557.

UN Officer. Personal Interview. July 2015.

White, Stephen K. "Continental and Analytic lenses in relation to the communicative action paradigm: Reconstructive thoughts." *European Journal of Political Theory* 15.2 (2016): 189-204.

Wilson, Peter. "The English School Meets the Chicago School: The Case for a Grounded Theory of International Institutions1." *International Studies Review* 14.4 (2012): 567-590.

CHAPTER 2: THE PRACTICE OF DELIBERATION IN THE UNSC

To understand the contours of WPS policymakers' day-to-day deliberative practices, it is essential to recognize how institutional rules and norms have shaped the WPS agenda's design. Although UNSCR 1325 introduced a specific concern with women's issues, this resolution emerged within a particular context—the new agenda was created, and continues to exist, in a complicated organization with a history and an array of formal and informal norms. As such, I maintain that it is important to recognize the WPS agenda's "nested newness." Fiona Mackay (2014) explains the concept of nested newness as "….a metaphor used to capture the ways in which the new is embedded in time, sequence, and its institutional environment" (553). The spatiotemporal dimensions surrounding a new concept, rule, norm, or idea, constitutes the nest in which the novelty resides. Analyzing institutions with attention "nested newness" sheds light on the ways that context can help and/or hinder a new policy's introduction.

I argue that the WPS agenda's novelty lies in its goals for gender reform, but this newness is embedded—or as feminist institutionalists would say, "stuck"— in the particular context of the Council. Being attentive to nested newness allows us to understand the ways that "….*gendered* institutions are enacted and instantiated in the postdating phase by *gendered* actors using formal and informal rules and norms and to how the new and the old play out and with what effect for gender reform agendas" (Mackay 2014, 551). Gender relations configure institutions, making it so that all norms, rules, and practices have gendered aspects. Moreover, gendered actors working within institutions enact these norms, rules, and practices. Thus, gender resides both in the institutions and the actors in these institutions. By recognizing the WPS agenda as embedded, I interpret the Council as a gendered institution,

the WPS agenda as a gendered institution, and the very WPS policymakers as gendered actors.

I assert that both formal and informal rules of the Council's deliberative practices are gendered. Drawing on feminist institutionalist scholarship, I too also maintain that rules are gendered in three ways:

> There are identifiable *rules about gender*—these may be formal or informal and they shape how male and female actors behave. Rules—whether formal or informal—also have *gendered effects*, largely because of their interaction with other rule sets. For instance, seemingly "neutral" formal rules about the timing of meetings have gendered effects because of informal rules about women's caring responsibilities. And the actors who *work with rules*—whether as rule-makers, breakers, or shapers—are also gendered. They embody various constructions of masculinity that impact on the ways in which they create, interpret, communicate, enforce, shape, and comply with rules (Chappell and Waylen 2013, 606).

This means that in my explanation of the Council's practice of deliberation, I am acutely aware of the ways that these practices constitute rules about gender, have gendered effects, and are carried out by gendered actors. These gendered rules impact the shape and influence of WPS policymakers' practices, constituting an important component of these practices' embedment in preexisting rules and norms.

As deliberations on the WPS agenda are embedded within multiple layers of rules and norms—namely the Council's intended purpose, the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure, and the history of addressing gender in the UN—it is important to consider each layer of nestedness, that is, each contextual component relevant to the WPS agenda's introduction and implementation. I suggest that it is necessary to comprehend the multiple factors that form the WPS agenda's institutional context in order to understand the day-to-day practices of WPS policymakers. I first review Chapter V of the UN Charter, which lays out the basic role, functions, and procedures of the UNSC. I go on to explain the more specific formal rules of

procedure, as delineated in the "Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council" (hereafter referred to as PROP), first adopted by the Council in April 1946 and last revised in December 1982. Reviewing both the UN Charter and the PROP, I unpack the formal rules that shape the trajectory of *all* Council meetings. Further, I explore how these seemingly neutral, formal rules are gendered. After explaining the rules of procedure in the Council, I go on to describe the *informal* rules of the Council, evident in the habitual practices of Council members in open debates. Here, I understand informal norms to be any kind of legislative norm that is *not* codified (cf. Chappell 2016; Chappell and Waylen 2013). As in my consideration of formal rules in the Council, I also address how these informal norms are gendered.

Having established the nest of the UN Charter, PROP, and informal norms into which the WPS agenda was introduced, I explore how the WPS agenda from UNSCR 1325's inception onward has been embedded in this institutional environment. I explain how these rules and norms impact, and are even present in, UNSCR 1325's adoption as well as in Council deliberations and resolutions post-1325. I especially highlight the ways that these rules and norms have gendered effects that are discernible in WPS agenda. Ultimately, I delineate the practices that shape the day-to-day deliberations of WPS policymakers with particular attention to the ways that these practices are gendered. I demonstrate that while SCR 1325's embedment has had many benefits—most notably the resolution's passage and acceptance in the UN system—its nestedness also has drawbacks insofar as the WPS agenda remains rooted in an institution that upholds many problematic rules about gender.

The WPS Agenda's Nest: Chapter V and PROP

There are two key documents that make up the formal norms in which any UNSC agenda topic exists: The UN Charter, and the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure (PROP). As laid out in Chapter V of the UN Charter, the Security Council consists of 15 UN member-states in total, five of whom hold permanent seats on the Council (collectively referred to as the "P5" states): The Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. The remaining ten seats are filled by elected members of the UN, each of which is elected for a two-year term. Among the ten elected seats, the distribution is as follows: Western countries have two elected seats; Eastern European have 1 seat; Latin American and Caribbean countries have two elected seats; Africa and Asia form one group with five seats. "The reason that Africa and Asia form a single group is to take account of the 'Arab swing seat.' There is an informal agreement that one of the five seats for Africa and Asia will always be taken by an Arab country," and two of the remaining seats will go to Africa and the other two to Asia (Staur 2013, 79).

The primary responsibility of the Council is to maintain peace and security (UN Charter, Article 24). Council decisions are made by voting, and each member has one vote. With respect to procedural matters, decisions are made by nine members voting affirmatively. On all other, i.e., non-procedural, matters, are made by an "affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members" (Article 27). While only elected or permanent members may vote on Council decisions, any member of the United Nations may participate "in any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected" (Article 31). Further, "Any Member

of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute" (Article 32).

These very basic procedures of the Council indicate the control the Council has over matters of peace and security. More specifically, they demonstrate the immense control the *permanent* Council members have over these issues. Council members not only dictate the shape of debates and decisions made—which members of the UN are obligated to agree to and carry out (Article 25)—but also *which* non-Council members can join in discussions and *when* they can do so. Permanent Council members have even more control over what happens in the Council, as any one permanent member can singlehandedly prevent the passage of any Council decision or resolution. While all voices matter equally in matters of Council procedures, the P5 have the most important voices in matters of Council resolutions bearing significant impact, insofar as all UN member states must subsequently agree to them. Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, a former ambassador to the UN reflects,

> The usual practice, at least during my association with the Council, was for the US and UK to prepare the first draft which was then shared with either France or/and Russia; China was often the last among the permanent members to be taken into confidence. Depending on the issue, fellow western members would also be informed, rather than consulted ahead of others. Once the P-5 had taken care of one another's concerns, the draft would be made available to the second-class members (Gharekhan 2006, 27).

The P5, and even more specifically the *Western* representatives in the P5, effectively determine the resolutions produced in the Council.

The Council's daily practices are codified in the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure (PROP). The PROP includes 61 rules, divided among eleven chapters: Meetings; Agenda; Representation and Credentials; Presidency; Secretariat; Conduct of Business;

Voting; Languages; Publicity of Meetings, Records; Admission of New Members; and Relations with other United Nations Organs. The PROP constitutes the formal rules of decorum that dictate the ways that Council meetings proceed and how information is shared among UN bodies.

Individual Security Council meetings are held at the discretion of the elected SC President (PROP, Chapter I). Meeting agendas are to be determined at least three days prior to the meeting (Chapter II, Rule 8), except in urgent cases. Further, each meeting necessarily begins with the formal adoption of the agenda (Chapter II, Rule 9). Any representative speaking before the Security Council, whether on behalf of a Council member-nation or on behalf of an invited party, must have credentials approved by the Security-General at least twenty-four hours in advance of their appearance. These credentials are presented before the Security Council, which then decides whether the individual is approved (Chapter III, Rules 14-17).

The Council's president is a rotating position. It is held in turn by members in the English alphabetical order of names, by one month periods (Chapter IV). In conducting meetings, the President calls "upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak" (Chapter VI, Rule 27). All public meetings of the Council are to have verbatim records made available to all representatives of the Council in all six of the Council's official languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish (Chapter IX, Rule 49). Private meeting records are to only have *one, single* verbatim record on file, accessible in the office of the Secretary-General (Rule 51).

The PROP further lay out how the Council makes decisions regarding applications to join the UN. The power to decide whether an application is successful or not further solidifies

the Council's control within the UN. Chapter X, Rule 60 states: "The Security Council shall decide whether in its judgment the applicant is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter and, accordingly, whether to recommend the applicant State for membership." Beyond the Council having the ability to determine whether non-members can or cannot participate in debates, the Council has a prominent role in determining whether a state can be a member of the United Nations in the first place.

Throughout the rules regarding the Council presidency, the PROP refer to the president with masculine pronouns. For example, Rule 20 states: "Whenever the President of the Security Council deems that for the proper fulfillment of the responsibilities of the presidency he should not provide over the Council during the consideration of a particular question with which the member he represents is directly connected, he shall indicate his decision to the Council" (Chapter V, Rule 20). This explicit granting of power to men in the Council exemplifies *rules about gender*: This rule represents not only conventional grammar rules that make masculine pronouns gender-neutral, but also the systematic marginalization of women's voices in Council meetings; I explain this marginalization in greater detail in the next section on informal norms. In the Council's PROP, men are explicitly the power holders, and women are implicitly powerless (cf. Shepherd 2008b, 396). Recognizing the Council's PROP as containing *rules about gender* demonstrates that the Council is a formally gendered institution. Moreover, the masculine pronoun highlights the fact that the Council's work is carried out by *gendered actors*—individual delegates making decisions, and not just states. The Council's very rules highlight the institution as formally gendered, and gendered masculine at that.

What does it mean for the Council to be gendered as masculine? Laura Sjoberg (2011) explains the gendering of institutions, states, and people:

> Being 'female' is not a (or the) indicator of gender, instead, masculinities and femininities are genders and produce genderings. Individuals can be 'gendered,' but so can institutions, organizations, and even states. Gendering is about the distribution of power and regard based on *perceived association* with sex-based characteristics, rather than possession of certain sex organs a priori. (110)

In the case of the Council, it is gendered masculine because of its perceived association with sex-based characteristics, including the Council's apparent rationality, concerns with militarism, and internal competition among member-states. These perceived traits align with characteristics typical of dominant, Western conceptions of masculinity (Sjoberg 2011, 113). This is not to say that feminine traits are non-existent, but rather that masculine traits are *more* evident insofar as they are seen as necessary to attain power in world politics (117). I argue that the Council is gendered masculine because of the institution's perceived association with male, sex-based characteristics, present not only in the Council's historical actions and aims, but also in the Council's PROP.

The Council's PROP lays out very basic rules of engagement with individuals and nongovernmental bodies in the Appendix. The Appendix notes:

> A. A list of all communications form private individuals and non-governmental bodies relating to matters of which the Security Council is seized shall be circulated to all representatives on the Security Council.
> B. A copy of any communication on the list shall be given by the Secretariat to any representative on the Security Council at his request. (PROP 1983, Appendix)

The formal parameters of the Council's relationship to NGOs have developed in more recent years, especially after the Cold War. In 1996, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) passed Resolution 1996/31, which lays out rules and guidelines for NGOs providing

consultation to UN bodies (ECOSOC 1996). Since the passage of this resolution, NGOs have been increasingly present in the UN broadly and the Council specifically (cf. Shepherd 2008ab, Hill 2004).

Also following the Cold War, the Council became increasingly concerned with protecting civilians in mandates of peacekeeping forces. In the 1990s, the Council's resolutions on issues in Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, and Sierra Leone "show reasonably clear movement toward privileging the individual and his or her security over that of the state and its security" (MacFarlane and Khong, 2006, 169). The transition to be more concerned with civilians in the 1990s represents a significant part of the WPS agenda's acceptance in the Council, as I explain below in the Council's reception of UNSCR 1325. Becoming increasingly concerned with questions of human, and not just *state*, security, meant that the Council was more open to adopting a policy centered on the rights of women civilians.

The UN Charter, the Council's PROP, and resolutions addressing human security issues make up the formal norms surrounding the WPS agenda's introduction and eventual adoption. They also continue to shape discussions and resolutions about WPS matters, as I explain in more detail later. In addition to understanding formal norms' part in the WPS agenda's context, it is also important to note the ways that the WPS agenda has been embedded in non-codified, or informal, norms of the Council.

The Rest of the Nest: Informal Norms

Informal norms, with respect to the Council's deliberative procedures and the Council's policy concerns, also constitute an important part of the WPS agenda's context. Several informal rules exist in every Council meeting. For instance, there is an informal norm that each delegation begins its statement with an expression of gratitude to the Council

president for selecting the topic, as well as an acknowledgment of any special speakers' contributions to the day's conversation. A less innocuous informal norm is that individual ambassadors in the Council are men. In fact, when a record number of women—six—had seats on the Council, it constituted "breaking news" for the UN News Centre (2014). The norm in the UN is that a minority of Council ambassadors are women. This informal norm reinforces the formal norm, via the PROP, of men holding the power in Council meetings. With fewer women participating on the Council, it means that the formal norm of men holding power in the Council is very often realized in practice. Men are more often the Council president, and more men cast votes on Security Council resolutions. This is a reminder of the fact that the individuals making decisions in the Council are *gendered actors*. They operate among both formal and informal norms that create rules about gender—for example, giving men power in the Council via the PROP—and affect how they perform their own genders in the Council.

The norm in the Council of men holding positions of power is in line with norms across the UN; the vast majority of upper-level positions in the UN are held by men rather than women. In the 2014 "Improvement in the status of women in the United Nations system: Report of the Secretary-General," UN Women (2014) reported that the P-4 to D-2 levels reached historic highs in their representation of women in 2013. The percentage of women at each level was as follows: P-4, mid-level professionals who have at least 7 years work experience (40.5 per cent); P-5, mid-level professionals who have at least 10 years work experience (34.2 per cent); D-1, senior-level professionals who have at least 15 years work experience (32.4 per cent); D-2, senior-level professionals who have *more* than 15 years work experience (30.1 per cent). Women continue to struggle to attain positions in the UN's senior

leadership, and gender parity among upper-level positions is marked for 2036 (Haack 2014, 43). The lack of parity is often a consequence of the inability of women to meet the requirements to attain higher positions, typically because these requirements have *gendered effects*. For instance, to attain a D-1 or D-2 position, an officer must have had 15 years of experience and are often asked to take posts abroad, frequently in locations that do not allow families to join. Many women who have worked in the UN system for 15 years are at an age where they have children and families, and thus the formal requirements for these senior level positions have *gendered effects* because they become near-impossible for many women to take on. Just as the formal PROP are ultimately rules about gender, these same informal norms about gender makeup in the Council specifically, and the UN broadly, reveal that rules about gender are tacitly in place in the ways that the UN operates.

Another relevant informal norm is the marginalization of questions about gender in the UN. While the WPS agenda introduced an imperative to address the needs of women *and* men, this imperative emerged in a historical context of 55 years of Council deliberations unconcerned with gender differences. As I explain in more detail in the next section, this historical norm of marginalizing women's issues continues to shape the WPS agenda's reception in the Council. This norm's influence is present most notably in the relegation of women's issues to *only* meetings specifically on WPS, despite the agenda's explicit call for including women's perspectives in *all* policy issues.

The WPS agenda, therefore, is embedded in an institutional context where the PROP formally grants masculine voices more power, and the Council's historic lack of gender parity informally gives men more influence in matters of peace and security. The WPS agenda's development has emerged amidst these norms, which inform how the WPS agenda is

discussed, who discusses it, and when discussions happen. To fully grasp the ways that these norms have impacted the WPS agenda's development, I turn to now explicitly consider the ways that the context of informal and formal norms I explicated have influenced the WPS agenda's design via UNSCR 1325, as well as its continuation in the post-design phase.

The WPS Agenda's Nested Newness in Design

As I explained in Chapter 1, UNSCR 1325 on WPS was unanimously passed on 31 October 2000. The resolution marked the first formal acknowledgement that armed conflict affects women differently from men, underscoring the importance of women's participation and the need to include gender perspectives in negotiations, humanitarian planning, peacekeeping efforts, and peacebuilding and governance. Unlike most policies adopted by the Council, the inclusion of WPS concerns resulted from a concerted effort of individuals, Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), non-permanent member states, and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) to drive the UNSC to add gender to its portfolio (PeaceWomen 2016). While the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda's inclusion was groundbreaking, its creation emerged from years of buildup and conversations, among NGOs and member-country delegations alike, and was rooted in numerous resolutions and conventions. The agenda was successfully created because of the ways that social movements' new ideas strategically interacted with the established rules and norms of the UNSC. I, therefore, suggest that advocates of SCR 1325 effectively "nested" 1325 in accepted norms and rules. By sticking the WPS agenda in the context of the Council's historical norms and policy concerns, WPS advocates ensured that the agenda was adopted. At the same time, though, this embedment has limited the agenda's scope, as I explain in detail below.

It is important to note that the WPS agenda's introduction in the Council, while undeniably groundbreaking in the course of USNC policy, was tied to growing international attention to matters of gender and security leading up to 2000. SCR 1325 was situated in an international political environment where women's issues were becoming increasingly important. Heightened concerns with women's issues, for instance, were indicated by increasing attendance at the UN World Conferences on Women, which happened every five years since 1975, even before 1325's establishment (Steans 2003). At the largest Conference on Women yet in 1995, participants in the forum created the Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA)—a key document for women's rights in international politics (Shepherd 2008b, 387; Naraghi-Anderlini and El-Bushra 2004, 13). In May 2000, following the BPFA's creation, the Women and Armed Conflict caucus and Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) met and discussed obstacles to successful implementation of the BPFA (Shepherd 2008b, 387; Hill, Aboitiz, and Poehlman-Doumbouya 2003, 1256). After this meeting, the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security (NGOWG) was created by, and emerged from, NGOs that participated in the caucus (Hill, Aboitiz, and Poehlman-Doumbouya 2003, 1257-8). Pre-1325 members of the NGOWG included Amnesty International (AI), the Hague Appeal for Peace (HAP), International Alert (IA), Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (WCRWC), and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).[9]

Once established, the NGOWG had the goal of advocating for a UNSCR addressing WPS issues, consequently lobbying and debating with SC members to encourage the passage of an SC resolution on WPS (Shepherd 2008, 388). In a "Letter to National Women's

[9] For a complete list of NGOWG members, please see the NGWOG website: http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/about/

Machineries Prior to the Adoption of 1325," the NGOWG laid out three goals for the 24 October 2000 Open Council Session:

- Gender issues being fully mainstreamed into the actions and operations resulting from the Council's decisions,
- Concrete measures to ensure that women play a greater role, at all levels, in peace support operations, conflict prevention and peace building; and
- Immediate steps, by the Security Council, to afford women and girls greater protection and assistance in situations of armed conflict (NGOWG 2000, 1)

These three goals were achieved via the adoption and subsequent implementation of SCR 1325 (cf. Shepherd 2008, 389). The NGOWG's success has also been due to NGOs' increasing presence in the UN system, which has been formally encouraged since the 1996 adoption of ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, as I explained above.

While civil society, represented by the NGOWG, certainly played a crucial role in the successful creation of SCR 1325, UNSC member states were also key in the resolution's passage. Numerous member states championed the WPS agenda. First, Bangladesh—the Council's President at the time SCR 1325 was adopted—advocated for WPS, bringing the issue to the Council's attention in March 2000. Then, Jamaica, Canada, and Namibia joined with Bangladesh, advocating for WPS matters as a key UNSC policy concern.[10] The primary parties advocating for WPS matters, therefore, were members of civil society, especially the NGOWG, and non-permanent members of the UNSC.

It is important to note that the ultimate success of the WPS agenda was not only because Council members pushed for the WPS agenda to be added to the Council's portfolio, but also because of shifts in the Council's concerns leading up to 2000. Soumita Basu (2016) explains that SCR 1325 was adopted "along with resolutions on children and armed conflict,

[10] http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Gender/What_the_Women_Say.pdf

protection of civilians in armed conflict, and HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations, also passed during the period 1999-2001" (261). SCR 1325's introduction was tied to the Security Council's concern with *human* security matters by 1999 (Shepherd 2008, 392; Macfarlane, et al., 2006; Golberg and Hubert 2001, 224). Thus, the WPS agenda's novel acceptance in the Council was *nested* in an institutional environment that increasingly welcomed human security concerns following the Cold War. The concurrent evolution of UNSC policy concerns made the newness of 1325 more acceptable. One interviewee noted, for instance, that the "institutional architecture was already in place" prior to 2000, with many delegations having capacities to address gender concerns before 1325's adoption (Interview, UNSC diplomat, May 2015). With the architecture to address human security concerns already constructed, it was easier to add WPS concerns to the Council's portfolio.

Understanding the context surrounding, and the subsequent passage of, UNSCR 1325, it is clear that the WPS agenda was temporally situated in a unique global and institutional environment. The international policy environment was becoming more and more concerned with women's issues leading up to 2000, and the Council was simultaneously addressing more and more question regarding human security. The WPS agenda did not suddenly appear, but rather resulted from years of efforts on the parts of women's social movements and advocates for women's issues. For example, the NGOWG's creation was directly tied the regular World Conference on Women and years of growing attention to women's issues. While SCR 1325 introduced a new concern with women in the specific context of the Council, it represented a general and growing concern with women in the broader context of international politics.

Advocates' Intentional Nesting of SCR 1325

Although SCR 1325 initiated a new concern with WPS issues, the creators of SCR 1325 were careful to contextualize the resolution in the broader governance of the UN and other IGOs. By situating the WPS agenda within the Council's prior work, WPS advocates were able to provide legitimacy to the agenda. This contextualization made the "novelty of the new" less suspect to non-reformers by signaling the WPS agenda's appropriateness within the history of Council resolutions (cf. Mackay 2014, 555). SCR 1325 emerged from a balancing of the new and the old; its innovation was strategically nested in the Council's existing practices and policies.

For example, SCR 1325's situation in the broader UN context is evident in the way that the final resolution's utility and need were carefully grounded in prior UNSC resolutions; international conventions and declarations; and statements, statutes, and reports (cf. Shepherd 2008a, 108). UNSCR 1325 references Resolution 1261 (1999), which addresses children in armed conflict; Resolution 1265 (1999), which addresses the protection of civilians in armed conflict; Resolution 1296 (2000), which addresses the protection of civilians in armed conflict; and Resolution 1314 (2000), which both addresses the issue of children in armed conflict and expresses the need to help African states maintain security and peace in refugee camps. SCR 1325, then, marks an expanded consideration of those who suffer from increased militarism by specifically acknowledging the needs of women, an expansion that is undeniably tied to expanded concerns with civilian populations amidst rising militarism in the aforementioned SCRs (cf. Shepherd 2008, 109; Otto 2004, 8-9).

SCR 1325 also cites numerous international conventions. In Article 9, it specifically mentions the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Refugee Convention of 1951, and the 1979

Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). SCR 1325's Preamble also mentions the BPFA, demonstrating the resolution's intention to build on the Beijing Platform's goals, especially with respect to empowering women. Together, referencing these existing conventions, the UNSC situates 1325 in the context of a history of addressing gender and security in some form, and also poises 1325 to address the shortcomings of these extant resources for thinking about matters of gender and security in world politics. For example, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) noted that while the Fourth Geneva Convention establishes that women should be protected, the Convention does *not* develop an institutional obligation to convict perpetrators and adjudicate violations—something that the WPS agenda aspires to do (UNIFEM 2000). SCR 1325's introduction of the WPS agenda builds on, and responds to, existing institutions. The resolution introduces new concerns, yet remains grounded in existing practices.

The nested newness of the WPS agenda is further evident in SCR 1325's aims and conception of women. SCR 1325 fundamentally reaffirms the role of women in conflict resolution and peace-building. SCR 1325 has three central areas of focus in addressing the needs of women in conflict, as well as the roles of women in international politics: institutional representation, domestic representation, and protection in armed conflict (cf. Tryggesdtad 2009; Shepherd 2008). It also calls for institutional arrangements to guarantee women's participation in these processes (UNSCR 1325, Preamble). Beyond just mandating institutional arrangements be made in the UN to incorporate gender perspectives—or 'gender mainstreaming' (Article 5)—in policymaking and implementation, the resolution builds on concerns in the BPFA by calling on member-states to increase women's representation domestically (UNSCR 1325, Articles 1 and 3). Other than representation, SCR 1325 focuses

on protection, particularly in Articles 8-10. It calls on parties of armed conflict to work especially to protect women and girls from gender-based violence (Article 10).

The novelty of reaffirming women's roles, however, remains embedded in the Council's historic practice of marginalizing women's issues. Examining SCR 1325 reveals that the goal of making women more active participants is counteracted by language that portrays women as passive. For instance, while SCR 1325 novelly addresses the needs of women, the Resolution repeatedly groups women with girls. This leads to a continual cementing of women as passive or unimportant to international relations—a realm in which the masculine dominates, and "womenandchildren" play a little part. SCR 1325 implicitly perpetuates women's roles as subjects, rather than actors in international relations.

Because the resolution inherently makes women passive, it reinforces the world system's "dependence on feminizing women" (Enloe 1989, 17). While SCR 1325 aims to affirm the role of women in conflict resolution and peace-building, the resolution tacitly feminizes women by grouping them with girls throughout. The resolution feminizes women by using language that assigns women stereotypically female characteristics, such as docility, innocence, or passivity. This means that the resolution's language counteracts its goal of encouraging women's active participation, as well as its goal of recognizing women's multiple roles in matters of security. SCR 1325's grouping of "womenandgirls" has gendered effects by characterizing women as childlike and passive (Shepherd 2008a).

Moreover, SCR 1325 continually conflates "women" with "gender." When the resolution calls for *gender* perspectives, the intention is actually incorporate more *women's* perspectives. As Jamie J. Hagen (2016) explains, this conflation of gender and women is problematic: "It must be noted that reports which use the words 'woman' and 'gender'

interchangeably neglect to consider gender as it is experienced beyond the stereotype of heteronormative women, erasing many experiences" (326). Conflating women and gender, SCR 1325 perpetuates historic and heteronormative understandings of women. This results in the marginalization of non-heteronormative women's experiences, thereby demonstrating that the agenda represents only a very limited perceptions of women's experiences. Although SCR 1325 focuses on women in a groundbreaking way, it problematically and implicitly excludes many women's experiences. Thus, the resolution has the gendered effect of only representing, and being concerned with, *some* women's perspectives and experiences. SCR 1325's conception of women expressed in its goals and aims demonstrates how the agenda is nested within the Council's norms.

In sum, the creation of UNSCR 1325 was successful for an array of reasons: the Council's rising concerns with matters of human security in the 1990s, growing concerns with women's issues in international politics, the increasing acceptance of NGOs' involvement in UN bodies, and the Resolution's firm grounding in past Council resolutions and practices. The context in which UNSCR 1325 was passed, and the WPS agenda initiated, made its novel consideration of women acceptable to the Council. While the effective situation of the WPS agenda in the Council's historical concerns undoubtedly contributed to the agenda's unanimous passage, it also means that the agenda is stuck in the Council's norms. The agenda's placement in relation to Council norms is therefore a double-edged sword; it helped the agenda come to fruition, but it also means that the agenda often perpetuates problematic rules about gender.

The WPS Agenda's Nested Newness Postdesign

As the Council's preexisting norms are embedded in SCR 1325, subsequent deliberations and WPS resolutions are likewise stuck in the Council's historical institutional context. However, subsequent Council meetings were also transformed by the introduction of the WPS agenda in 2000. While the UN lacked any kind of norm of addressing women or gender, the norm has indeed shifted in the postdesign period for the WPS agenda. One UN Officer noted, "1325 has become one of those integral things that you must mention for most countries—I'd say 85%—to get on the Security Council. It's such a central part of their mandate, you have to know what you're talking about on this, as well. So, I feel like it's being understood as the foundation to many, many other things" (Interview, UN Officer, July 2015). This statement indicates that 1325 has altered the norms of policymaking and collaboration in the UN system.

The WPS agenda's introduction created a political landscape in which women's issues could be addressed by the Council (albeit imperfectly). As a thematic agenda item, not concerned directly with regional or interstate concerns, the WPS agenda is *noncoercive* and does not legally obligate member states to act on WPS resolutions. Rather, WPS SCRs present norms and behaviors that the Council encourages member states to move towards in both the short and the long term. The WPS agenda is formally discussed in UNSC open debate twice a year: once in April, and once in October. There are typically two meetings each month dedicated to the WPS agenda.

The legitimacy and acceptability of the WPS agenda is particularly evident in the passage of six subsequent SC resolutions on WPS (1820 in 2008, 1888 in 2009, 1889 in 2009, 1960 in 2010, 2106 in 2013, 2122 in 2013, and 2422 in 2015); the creation of the Special

Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SVC) via UNSCR 1888 in 2009 (Office of the Special Representative 2016); the establishment of UN organs dedicated to addressing gender issues explicitly, including UN Women, the NGOWG, and the Free and Equal Campaign; and the extensive incorporation of gender perspectives in pre-existent bodies' mandates, notably in the work of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The eight WPS resolutions can be summarized as follows[11]:

TABLE 2.1: SUMMARY OF WPS RESOLUTIONS

Resolution (year)	*Key issues and core provisions*
1325 (2000)	-Women's representation and participation in governance of peace and security -Protection of women's rights and bodies in during, and after, conflict
1820 (2008)	-Protection of women from sexualized violence during conflict -Established zero tolerance for UN DPKO personnel sexually abusing and/or exploiting women
1888 (2009)	-Created Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) -Created UN Action as organization addressing CRSV-related issues
1889 (2009)	-Expressed need to increase women's participation in peace and security governance at all levels -Created global indicators to measure implementation of SCR 1325
1960 (2010)	-Developed CRSV monitoring -Integrated Women's Protection Advisors (WPAs) in missions alongside Gender Advisers
2106 (2013)	-Challenged impunity and lack of accountability for CRSV
2122 (2013)	-UN Women identified as key UN entity for advising on matters of WPS governance -Stressed importance of civil society's inclusion in Council -Called for 2015 High-level Review of SCR 1325 implementation
2242 (2015)	-Integrated WPS in all UNSC country situations -Established Informal Experts Group on WPS -Linked WPS to countering terrorism and extremism

[11] Adapted from Table 1 in Kirby and Shepherd 2016, 251.

Further, UNSCR 1325 remains the most translated SCR ever, and 63 UN member states[12] have adopted National Action plans (NAPs) on WPS, providing domestic political plans for implementing the goals of UNSCR 1325 and the subsequent resolutions.[13]

Recognizing the ways that informal and formal norms have impacted UNSCR 1325 and later policymaking on the WPS agenda, it is clear that the agenda's novelty—for better and for worse—is nested in the Council's context. While incorporating numerous prior Council resolutions in SCR 1325's text undoubtedly gave the WPS agenda legitimacy, the same kind of rootedness in typical Council practices has led to confusion of "women" and "gender" in resolutions. Likewise, while the Council's increasing concerns with human security in the 1990s contributed to 1325's passage, the Council's consistent privileging of militaristic matters contributes to the agenda being ignored or marginalized at points. Thus, nesting the newness of the WPS agenda in the Council's existent practices has helped make the WPS agenda part of the Council's portfolio, but this nestedness has also limited the agenda's scope and transformative capacity.

WPS Concerns' Incorporation Across the UNSC's Portfolio

Although WPS resolutions repeatedly compel policymakers to recognize addressing gender as key to *all* policy decisions, these calls have not translated to diplomats actually integrating WPS concerns in *all* matters of peace and security the Council discusses. In fact, the majority of Council meetings *not* specifically on the WPS agenda do not consider women. The below scatter plot depicts the total number of times women and men were mentioned in

[12] This number was accurate at the time this was written. The number may have increased.

[13] For the most current number of NAPs, see: https://actionplans.inclusivesecurity.org

each UNSC meeting *not* specifically on the WPS agenda between January 1994 and December 2013.[14] This data set was generated using a unique PERL program that scraped UNSC meeting transcripts for mentions of specific words, sorting mentions by meeting number, as well as by individual speaker. The vertical red line indicates the meeting during which UNSCR 1325 was officially adopted, providing a visual marker that separates the Council's language before and after the WPS agenda was adopted.

GRAPH 2.1



As Graph 2.1 demonstrates, the vast majority of meetings *not* specifically on the WPS agenda include no, or very few mentions of women (the mode for "mentions of women" is 0). Between January 1994 and December 2013, the mean number of times women were

[14] 1994 is the earliest year that Council records are made readily, publicly available.

mentioned is 2.285, and the mean number of times men were mentioned is 2.404. Interestingly, the above graph indicates that women are sometimes mentioned more frequently than men. Why is this? Hypothesizing that it had something to do with the passage of UNSCR 1325, I conducted a single-sample t-test to compare mentions of women in meetings before and after SCR 1325's creation. Assuming an alpha-level of .05, I can reject the null hypothesis that there is *not* a significant difference in the mean mentions of women during meetings before SCR 1325 (M=1.331, SD=5.657) and meetings after SCR 1325's creation (M=2.619, SD=8.180); t=-4.2605, p=0.000. Following UNSCR 1325, there was therefore a noteworthy change in the mean number of times women were mentioned.

Relatedly, I conducted a single-sample t-test to compare mentions of men in Council meetings before and after SCR 1325's creation. Assuming an alpha-level of .05, I can reject the null hypothesis that there is *not* a significant difference in the mean mentions of men during meetings before 1325 (M=1.961, SD=4.125) and meetings after 1325 (M=2.560, SD=4.434); t=, p=0.0003. Again, following UNSCR 1325, there was a notable change in the mean number of times men were mentioned.

Recognizing that both mean mentions of women *and* mean mentions of men statistically significantly increased after 1325, one might wonder what exactly caused this shift. It is unlikely, but nonetheless possible, that UNSCR 1325 motivated increased mentions of women and men in meetings. One potential explanation is that there were simply more SC meetings between January 2000 and December 2013 than there were between January 1994 and January 2000, and if a larger sample size of meetings prior to SCR 1325's creation would show similar trends to the post-1325 meetings. Another explanation is that the Council's concern with human security developed most rapidly in the years after 2000. As I explained

earlier, the Council became increasingly concerned with human security in 1999. Thus, it makes sense that the Council would be talking about people as "men" and "women," and not broadly referring to them as "civilians," in the years after 1999. The increase in references to men and women from 2000 onward is likely a consequence of more humanistic security concerns.

To better understand what has motivated the Council to address women in the postdesign phase, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at the meetings with notably frequent mentions of women. Exploring these meetings with higher counts can help us understand the context for considering women more frequently. It can also help us understand how these mentions of women either challenge or perpetuate dominant norms of addressing and considering women in the United Nations.

Between 1994 and 2013, there were four meetings with extremely high counts of mentions of women. First, there is a spike during meeting 4124 on 7 April 2000, which is the only spike prior to UNSCR 1325's passage. UNSC meeting 4124 was on the topic of "The Situation in Afghanistan," and women were mentioned 124 times. 42 of those 124 times were mentions not of just women, but rather "women and girls." The Council's focus on women during the meeting on Afghanistan was motivated by the Report of the Secretary-General (S/2000/205) on Afghanistan, which addressed extensively the plight of women and girls in Afghanistan. Diplomats' concerns with women centered on their victimization and ways to help them in times of crisis.

The second spike occurs during meeting 6396, which took place on 13 October 2010, and was on the topic of "Post-conflict peacebuilding." Women were mentioned 176 times—the greatest mentions of women in any non-WPS SC meeting. Moreover, unlike the 2000 meeting

on Afghanistan, women were only grouped with girls in a "women and girls" construction in 4 of the 176 mentions. Thus, in the 2010 meeting on peacebuilding, women were discussed as more active participants in political processes than they were in meeting 4124. The impetus for considering women so extensively in meeting 6396 was the Council's consideration of Secretary-General's Report on women's participation in peacebuilding (S/2010/466).

Likewise, the third spike (at meeting 6897) was a meeting on the topic of "Post-conflict peacebuilding," held on 20 December 2012. As during meeting 6396, delegates were responding to, and commenting on, a recent Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding processes (S/2012/746), which emphasized the role of women in peacebuilding processes. Women are mentioned 99 times in total, and only 3 of these times are they grouped with girls. Like meeting 6396, women were discussed as more active participants in political processes.

The fourth and final spike at meeting 6907 was a meeting on the topic of "Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict," held on 24 January 2013. Women were mentioned 97 times in total. Women are discussed throughout the meeting in a variety of roles: as victims, agents, individuals, peacekeepers, etc. Unlike the earlier three meetings where women are frequently mentioned, mentions of women in meeting 6907 are not overwhelmingly focused on women as either victims *or* active participants. It is also different from earlier meetings heavily focused on women because there was no report from the Secretary-General that focused on women and was the center of discussion. Rather, the focus on women appears to be motivated entirely by delegations and the Secretariat.

Based on this simple analysis of count data on mentions of women and men, it cannot be ignored that women *are* often mentioned in Council meetings. In fact, women are mentioned

with more frequency than men in some SC meetings. However, the above scatter plot also makes it abundantly clear that discussions of women, or WPS matters, are relegated to specific topics of discussion—especially discussions on *protection*—or, more often, not discussed at all. It is interesting to note that the vast majority of meetings (12 out of 18) that had between 40 and 90 mentions of women were meetings on the "Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict." The other 6 were on the situation in the Middle East (1 in 2006); post-conflict peacebuilding (1 in 2011); UN peacekeeping operations (1 in 2013); and the situation in Afghanistan (3 in 2013). Since meetings that have the greatest references to women often focus on women as being victims who need protection, women are infantilized and not represented or discussed as active political participants. Merely mentioning women with more frequency does not indicate that Council members are addressing women or WPS matters with the breadth and depth that the WPS agenda intends women to be considered. In fact, the meetings with frequent references to women very often focus on women as childlike and inactive, thereby perpetuating extant norms in the UN and international relations more broadly of infantilizing women.

Moreover, the failure to consider women *at all* in the vast majority of Council meetings postdesign indicates that the WPS agenda is not valued by many UNSC members. Fiona Mackay (2014) explains, "Tacit knowledge about what is valued, credible, authoritative, and strategic remain coded masculine and is widely shared among horizontal and vertical networks of power holders" (556).[15] By *not* addressing the needs of women regularly in deliberations on matters of peace and security, the WPS agenda is tacitly coded as feminine, whereas other topics of discussion are given more value and coded as masculine.

---

[15] For more on this idea of tacit knowledge as masculine, please see Duerst-Lahti 2002, 2008.

The lack of credibility and value assigned to the WPS agenda is also informally represented in the norm of UN organs addressing women's issues being underfunded, as documented in the 2015 Global Study (Coomaraswamy 2015). Jamie J. Hagen (2016) explains that the precariousness of organizations like UN Women can be understood when one ascribes masculine and feminine characteristics to institutions: "Women's organizations continue to be characterized as weak and to suffer from substantially limited funding when compared with the amount of money devoted to the military-based operations perceived as masculine" (319). Thus, the very issue of WPS is gendered in the UN: it is perceived as feminine insofar as it is tacitly interpreted as *not* critical to the Council's explicit task of working toward peace and security. There is an informal norm of relegating conversations about women, or gender, to the biannual formal sessions dedicated to WPS in April and October. In contrast, conversations about more militaristic topics such as terrorism and counterterrorism are not relegated to meetings dedicated to these specific topics, but are rather addressed at all times and amidst any meeting topic, including designated WPS meetings.[16]

By continuing to marginalize questions concerning women, the Council effectively upholds the norm of *not* addressing women. As evident in the lack of mentions of women in most Council meetings, the WPS agenda is coded as feminine and perceived as nonessential to policymaking in the UNSC. This reveals that the WPS agenda's existence is embedded in the Council's historic norm of excluding women's issues from debate.

---

[16] For more on the strategic integration of (counter)terrorism policy with the WPS agenda, see Aoláin (2016).

The WPS Agenda's Progression within WPS Meetings Specifically

Recognizing that the WPS agenda has not resulted in expanded considerations of women across the Council's portfolio, one might ask: How has the WPS agenda itself progressed over time? How has the agenda's increasing importance changed the ways that delegates discuss women, gender, and WPS matters? These questions are especially relevant to my project, which, as I explained in Chapter 1, is particularly concerned with the ways that deliberations construct women subjects. One can hypothesize that the WPS agenda can be interpreted as progressing over time *if* delegates increasingly describe women as actors with myriad experiences, meaning that women are understood as actors with myriad experiences that fall outside of the victim-agent binary that feminist IR scholars have shown to dominate the early WPS meetings (Engle 2014, Cohn 2014).

To assess the constitutions of women's identities in WPS meetings, and therefore whether the agenda has progressed or not, I turn to examine descriptors of women that have been used in Council meetings on WPS. Consider the following scatterplot, showing the number of times women were described as agentic (keepagent), vulnerable (keepvulnerable), having diverse roles (keepdiverse), participants (keepparticipant), actors (keepactor), contributors (kepcontributor), victims (keepvictim), targets (keeptarget), combatants (keepcombatant) and survivors (keepsurvivor), in each Council meeting between November 2000 and December 2013:

GRAPH 2.2



These frequencies were calculated using counts of the descriptive words ("vulnerable," "agent," "participant," "combatant," "diverse roles," "actor," "target," "contributor," and "victim") that were less than 5 words away from the word "women" in transcripts. The distance of less than 5 words indicates that the description is within *at most* one sentence's distance from the speaker's mention of women/woman (See Appendix B for a table of these descriptor counts).

As Graph 2.2. illustrates, women are subjectified in multiple ways throughout Council meetings—no one particular descriptor tends to dominate the course of a Council meeting.[17] It is also interesting to note that the *least* frequent descriptor of women in Council meetings on the WPS agenda is actually that of "victim," which happens on average 69 times in a given

[17] These meetings exclude meetings S/PV.4213, S/PV.4402, S/PV.4641, S/PV.5636, S/PV.6515, S/PV.6759, and S/PV.6852, all of which consisted of *one* presidential statement (with only one person speaking). While these meetings are not compared quantitatively, I do include them in my application of the practical theory to analyze the WPS agenda's trajectory in Council deliberations.

session. Overall, the latest Council meetings on WPS (in 2013) have consistently high frequencies of *all* the common descriptors of women. Thus, we see women more frequently being subjectified as these categories over time.

One could, therefore, assume that the WPS agenda itself has made strides over time—with delegates more often considering women in multiple ways, and therefore acknowledging women's different experiences and needs. While Graph 2.2 illustrates that UNSC delegates increasingly used diverse descriptors of women over time, quantitative data alone does not fully explain why or how these subjectifications came about. A quantitative representation of women's subjectifications does not reflect the day-to-day practices of Council members and WPS advocates. Nor does a quantitative representation consider the array of norms, both formal and informal, that deeply impact the agenda.

To understand the WPS agenda's arc, I assert that we must not only note the presence of different subject constitutions, but also examine how and why these very subjectifications are made possible and constituted in the first place. As I explain in greater detail in the next chapter, there are two predominant theories used to study deliberations in IR: communicative action (e.g., Risse 2000) and rhetorical action (e.g., Schimmelfennig 2003). Looking at the apparently linear progress in subjectifications in Graph 2.2, Thomas Risse would likely say that the recognition of multiple experiences indicates an evolution in shared understandings among deliberative participants, making it rationally accurate and factually true to describe women in myriad ways. And Frank Schimmelfenning would likely say that this progression demonstrates the strategic victory of new subjects over others—individuals who argued for multiple women's experiences' inclusion presented stronger arguments than those who argued for understanding women as only victims and/or agents, for example.

However, I maintain this apparently linear progress does not tell the whole story and cannot be explained by persuasion or shared understandings alone. As I explain in Chapter 3 , studying these deliberative shifts through the lens of rhetorical action or communicative action results in the marginalization, and even exclusion, of factors of identity and power that deeply influence the course of deliberations. Further, these theories problematically focus on emphasize components of deliberation, thereby ignoring the many informal components that are integral to the practice of deliberation.

I suggest, therefore, that we need a theory of deliberation that is suited to incorporate, rather than exclude, facets of identity and power. To fully grasp these subjectifications' emergence within, and consequences for, the WPS agenda, we have to carefully consider the ways that formal *and* informal norms have informed the ways that the WPS agenda is discussed. We need to consider questions such as: How have the Council's PROP impacted the course of deliberations on WPS? How has the norm of *not* discussing women impacted deliberations specifically on the WPS agenda? How has increasing attention to WPS matters in the UN system altered the course of deliberations on WPS matters?[18] To answer these questions, the next chapter proposes that a practical theory of deliberation must be used to examine policymakers' day-to-day deliberations. Then, utilizing my practical theory of deliberation in Chapter 4, I ultimately foil the agenda's seemingly linear progress. I illuminate that subjectifications that signal progress are often rooted in problematic, nested norms within the Council.

---

[18] These questions are especially valuable to consider, as those who have inherited the WPS agenda are likely to have different aims from the agenda's designers, and are operating in a different institutional environment (Chappell 2016, 14; Lowndes and Roberts 2013; March and Olsen 1989; Pierson 2004, 110-111).

CHAPTER 2: WORKS CITED

Anderlini, Sanam Naraghi, and Judy El-Bushra. "Post-Conflict Reconstruction." *Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: a toolkit for advocacy and action* (2004): 51-68.

Aoláin, Fionnuala Ní. "The 'war on terror'and extremism: assessing the relevance of the Women, Peace and Security agenda." *International Affairs* 92.2 (2016): 275-291.

Basu, Soumita,"Gender as national interest at the UN Security Council." *International Affairs*, 92 (2016): 255–273. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12548

Chappell, Louise. *The Politics of Gender Justice at the International Criminal Court: Legacies and Legitimacy*. New York: Oxford UP, 2016.

Chappell, Louise, and Georgina Waylen. "Gender and the hidden life of institutions." *Public Administration* 91.3 (2013): 599-615.

Cohn, Carol. ""Maternal thinking" and the concept of "vulnerability" in security paradigms, policies, and practices." *Journal of International Political Theory* 10.1 (2014): 46-69.

Coomaraswamy, Radhika, et al., *Preventing conflict, transforming peace, securing the peace: a global study on the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*. New York: UN Women, 2015.

Duerst-Lahti, Georgia. "Knowing Congress as a Gendered Institution: Manliness and the Implications of Women in Congress." In *Women Transforming Congress*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002: 20-49.

Duerst-Lahti, Georgia. "Gender ideology: masculinism and feminism." In *Politics, Gender, and Concepts*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008: 159-192.

Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), "Consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental organizations." 1996/31. 25 July 1996. Available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/eres1996-31.htm. Accessed 3 September 2016.

Engle, Karen. "The Grip of Sexual Violence: Reading UN Security Council Resolutions on Human Security." *Rethinking Peacekeeping, Gender Equality and Collective Security*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. 23-47.

Enloe, Cynthia. *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*. London: Pandora Press, 1989.

Gharekhan, Chinmaya R. *The Horseshoe Table: an inside view of the UN Security Council*. New Delhi: Pearson, 2006.

Haack, Kirsten. "Breaking barriers? Women's representation and leadership at the United Nations." *Global Governance* 20.1 (2014): 37-54.

Hagen, Jamie J. "Queering women, peace and security." *International Affairs* 92.2 (2016): 313-332.

Hill, Felicity, Mikele Aboitiz, and Sara Poehlman-Doumbouya. "Nongovernmental organizations' role in the buildup and implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325." *Signs* 28.4 (2003): 1255-1269.

Hill, Tony "Three Generations of UN– Civil society Relations: A Quick sketch." Global Policy Forum, 2004, www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/ngo-un/gen/2004/0404generation.htm. Accessed 3 September 2016.

Kirby, Paul, and Laura J. Shepherd. "Reintroducing women, peace and security." *International Affairs* 92.2 (2016): 249-254.

Lowndes, Vivien and Mark Roberts. *Why Institutions Matter: The New Institutionalism in Political Science*. New York: Palsgrave Macmillan, 2013.

MacFarlane, S. Neil, and Yuen Foong Khong. *Human security and the UN: A critical history*. Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 2006.

Mackay, Fiona. "Nested newness, institutional innovation, and the gendered limits of change." *Politics & Gender* 10.04 (2014): 549-571.

March, James G, and Olsen Johan P. *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York: The Free Press, 1989.

Naraghi Anderlini, Sanam, and Judy El-Bushra. "Post-Conflict Reconstruction." *Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: a toolkit for advocacy and action* (2004): 51-68.

NGOWG (NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security) "Letter to Ambassadors of the Security Council on the United Nations Security Council Open Session on Women, Peace and Security," www.peacewomen.org/un/ngo/ngoletters/excellence.html (accessed 12 January 2016).

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict, "About Us: About the Office." 2016. Available at: http://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/about-us/about-the-office/ Accessed 3 September 2016.

Otto, Dianne. "A Sign of "Weakness"? Disrupting Gender Certainties in the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325'(2006)." *Michigan Journal of Gender and Law* 13: 113-174.

PeaceWomen, "Solutions: Innovative WPS Agenda." Available at: http://www.peacewomen.org/why-WPS/solutions. Accessed 3 September 2016.

Pierson Paul. *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Risse, Thomas. "'Let's argue!' Communicative action in world politics." *International Organization* 54(1) 2000: 1–39.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. *The EU, NATO and the integration of Europe: Rules and rhetoric*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Shepherd, Laura J. Gender, violence and security: Discourse as practice. New York: Zed Books, 2008a.

Shepherd, Laura J. "Power and authority in the production of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325." *International Studies Quarterly* 52.2 (2008b): 383-404.

Sjoberg, Laura. "Gender, the State, and War Redux Feminist International Relations across the 'Levels of Analysis'." *International Relations* 25.1 (2011): 108-134.

Staur, Carsten. *Shared Responsibility: the United Nations in the age of globalization*. McGil: Queens UP, 2013.

Tryggestad, Torunn L. "Trick or Treat? The UN and Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security." *Global Governance: a review of multilateralism and international organizations* 15.4 (2009): 539-557.

UN (United Nations) (1983) 'Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council', s/96/Rev.7, *www.un.org/docs/sc/scrules.htm*. Accessed 10 June 2016.

UN (United Nations) (1945) 'Charter of the United Nations', www.un.org/ aboutun/charter Accessed 10 June 2016.

UN News Centre, "FEATURE: Record number of women makes history at UN Security Council." 15 September 2014. Accessible at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48711#.V8uA4GXudcZ. Accessed 3 September 2016

UN Officer. Personal Interview. July 2015.
UNSC diplomat. Personal Interview. May 2015.
UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2005) 'Report of the secretaryGeneral on Women, Peace and security', s/2005/636, http://daccess dds. un.org/doc/UNdoC/GeN/N05/534/82/PdF/N0553482.pdf ?open element (Accessed 3 September 2016).
UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2004a) 'Women, Peace and security: Report of the secretary-General', s/2004/814, http://daccessdds.un.org/ doc/UNdoC/GeN/N04/534/14/PdF/N0453414.pdf ?openelement (Accessed 3 September 2016).
UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2004b) 'statement by the President of the Security Council', s/PRsT/2004/40, http://daccessdds.un.org/ doc/UNdoC/GeN/N04/578/09/PdF/N0457809.pdf ?openelement (Accessed 3 September 2016).
UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2002a) 'Report of the secretary General on Women, Peace and security', s/2002/1154, http://daccess dds. un.org/doc/UNdoC/GeN/N02/634/68/PdF/N0263468.pdf ?open element (Accessed 3 September 2016).
UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2002b) 'statement by the President of the Security Council', s/PRsT/2002/32, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNdoC/GeN/N02/671/80/PdF/N0267180.pdf ?openelement (Accessed 3 September 2016).
UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2001) 'statement by the President of the Security Council', s/PRsT/2001/31, http://daccessdds.un.org/ doc/UNdoC/GeN/N01/612/25/PdF/N0161225.pdf ?openelement (Accessed 3 September 2016).
UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2000a) 'Resolution 1325', s/ Res/1325, UNSC (United Nations Security Council), 2000a, 'Resolution 1325', s/Res/1325, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNdoC/GeN/N00 /720/18/PdF/N0072018.pdf ?openelement (Accessed 3 September 2016).
UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2000b) 'Resolution 1296', s/ Res/1296, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNdoC/GeN/N00/399/03/ PdF/N0039903.pdf ?openelement (accessed 8 November 2005). UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2000c) 'Peace Inextricably Linked with equality between Women and Men says Security Council, in International Women's day statement', Press Release sC/6816, www.un.org/ news/Press/docs/2000/20000308.sc6816.doc.html (Accessed 3 September 2016).
UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2000d) 'Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the secretary-General', A/55/163– s/2000/712, http:// daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNdoC/GeN/N00/529/46/PdF/N0052946. pdf ?openelement (Accessed 3 September 2016).
UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2000e) 'The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel in disarmament, demobilization and Reintegration: Report of the secretary-General' s/2000/101, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNdoC/GeN/N00/291/43/PdF/N0029143. pdf ?openelement (Accessed 3 September 2016).
UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2000f) 'statement by the President of the Security Council' s/PRsT/2000/7, http://daccessdds.un.org/ doc/UNdoC/GeN/N00/340/73/PdF/N0034073.pdf ?openelement (Accessed 3 September 2016).
UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (1999) 'Resolution 1261', s/ Res/1261, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNdoC/GeN/N99/248/59/ PdF/N9924859.pdf ?openelement (Accessed 3 September 2016).

UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (1998) 'Resolution 1208', s/ Res/1208, http:// daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNdoC/GeN/N98/362/90/ PdF/N9836290.pdf ?openelement (Accessed 3 September 2016).

UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (1992) 'statement by the President of the Security Council Pursuant to their 1992 summit Meeting', www.un.org/ french/docs/cs/ repertoire/89– 92/chapter%208/general%20issues/Item

UN Women, "Improvement in the status of women in the United Nations system: Report of the Secretary-General (2014)." Available at: http://www.unwomen.org/digital-library/publications/2014/8/improvement-of-the-status-of-women-in-the-un-system-2014#sthash.qZSZaIkT.dpuf. Accessed 3 September 2014.

CHAPTER 3: A PRACTICAL THEORY OF DELIBERATION

While a historical overview of the WPS agenda illuminates how the agenda is embedded in Council norms and rules, such a general analysis leaves one wondering how the agenda's embedment plays out in the Council's day-to-day practices broadly, and influences the subjectifications of women more specifically. How do the PROP and UN Charter shape daily deliberations on WPS matters? How do norms of marginalizing questions concerning women play out in deliberations *specifically* on the topic of WPS? How does the context of any given SC meeting impact the shape of WPS deliberations and how women are described? To answer these questions and gain a better understanding of the Council as a deliberative body more generally, I argue that it is necessary to construct and utilize a new theoretical lens: a practical theory of deliberation.

Now you may wonder: Why do we need a new approach to study the practice of deliberation? As I noted at the end of Chapter 2, there are numerous existent, and often-used, theories that could potentially answer the above questions about day-to-day deliberations. In fact, IR scholars have become increasingly concerned with questions regarding communicative behavior, that is, the exchange of information among state actors (e.g., Stephen 2015; Deitelhoff and Müller 2005; Müller 2004; Powell 2002; Fearon 2003; Payne 2001; Risse 2000, 1999). However, as I explain in this chapter's first part, these approaches problematically rely on ideal, normative theories of communicative behavior (cf. Stephen 2015). And because these theories are so reliant on the ideal, I maintain that they are ultimately ill-suited for the examination of *any* quotidian practice.

What makes a theory "ideal" is not just the use of ideals, but rather the exclusion or marginalization of the actual, understood as the reality of human experiences, to such a degree

that practicality and plausibility are not addressed (cf. Mills 2005, 168). Although IR scholars apply their theories of communicative action to make sense of politics, most have not contemplated the consequences of relying on ideal theories of communicative behavior to study communicative behavior in practice. This raises questions: What are the advantages and disadvantages of using ideal theories to analyze practical communications? What do these ideal theories reveal about communicative behavior? And, perhaps more importantly, what do they conceal? IR scholars of communicative behavior have yet to grapple with the very limits of the theories they employ.

In the first part of this chapter, I critique the two predominant theories of communicative behavior in international relations: communicative action and rhetorical action. To analyze these theories, I consider them through the lens of Charles Mills' (2005) typology and examination of ideal theory. Drawing from Mills' distinctions between ideal models—ideal-as-descriptive models and ideal-as-idealized models—I explicate the degrees of the ideal and the actual in IR models of communicative behavior. It is important to note that I, like both Mills (2005) and Jacob Levy (2015), acknowledge that there are varying degrees to which theories are rooted in the ideal and/or the actual. Plausible theories, as Levy notes, "necessarily smuggle non-ideal premises in order to justify the need for politics and justice altogether" (2015, 2). Here, I do not make a normative claim about ideal and nonideal theories, but rather use Mills' framework as a heuristic to draw out comparisons between IR theories of communicative action and rhetorical action. In particular, I compare and contrast which elements of deliberation are concealed and revealed by each theory.

I argue that IR scholarship on deliberation inadequately recognizes the degree to which the theories from which they draw are grounded in the ideal versus the actual. I explain

that this shortcoming is problematic for two reasons. First, because when theoretical assumptions about the world are completely abstracted from the present and the historical context, the theory is no longer political. And second, because scholars do not consider the limits of the ideal theories they employ, there is a concerning disconnect between their findings and observable phenomena. I highlight these concerns by explaining the ways that both theories of rhetorical action and communicative action marginalize key elements that constitute the practice of deliberation in the UNSC, especially the roles of power and identity. Doing so, I demonstrate the ways that extant theories of communicative behavior (in IR) inadequately consider the contours of deliberative practices in the Council.

Having established that extant approaches to study deliberation in IOs are not suitable for studying deliberation in practice, I turn in the second part of this chapter to create a practical theory of deliberation. In accordance with the explanation of practical theory provided in this manuscript's introduction, the practical theory of deliberation that I present is grounded in observations regarding the practice of deliberation in the Council and intended to influence practice. As such, my practical theory of deliberation accommodates considerations of power and identity that theories of rhetorical action and communicative behavior exclude or marginalize entirely. My theory shares practice theory's orientation toward practice, concern with process and evolution, and adherence to a performative ontology (Bueger and Gadinger 2014, 20). However, it differs from practice theory insofar as it has an explicit goal of influencing policy *and* is transformed by the practices it analyzes, as I detail in this project's conclusion. It is this dually transformative character that distinguishes a *practical* theory from *practice* theory.

I argue that the process of deliberation, and its outcomes (or lack thereof), are determined predominantly by institutional rules and norms, as well as by individual perspectives. This differs from theories of rhetorical action and communicative action, which focus extensively on formal rules as shaping the course of deliberations and marginalize questions regarding individual people's identities. A practical theory of deliberation recognizes the influence of informal rules, as well as of individual peoples' identities, in deliberation. In a practical theory of deliberation, I posit that both formal and informal power dynamics shape the ways that individuals participate, and that individuals in turn influence institutional dynamics. To elucidate the roles of power and individuals in deliberation, I make explicit use of Michel Foucault's theory of power. I explain how power dynamics and individuals impact each other and deliberation. Finally, I explain what we might find in applying a practical theory of deliberation to analyze UNSC deliberations on WPS. For example, we can expect that applying a practical theory of deliberation would reveal the ways that historic norms of not addressing women's issues have continued to shape UNSC WPS-deliberations. It would also shed light on the ways that individuals' identities and histories affect how they participate in deliberations.

Deliberation in IR: Ideal vs. Nonideal

Differentiating Ideal and Nonideal Theories

To evaluate extant IR theories of communicative behavior, it is first essential to establish a basis for the critique. In this section, I explicate the different ways that ideal models operate, drawing from Charles Mills' (2005) explanation of ideal theory. Mills (2005) explains that two kinds of models are used in any theory: "ideal-as-descriptive-models" and "ideal-as-idealized-

models." Mills explains that ideal-as-descriptive-models portray how something (P) actually works, but in a simplified way (2005, 166). These models are constructed to reflect the actuality of what one empirically observes or experiences. Mills explains that ideal-as-idealized-models portray what the ideal object (P) should be like (167). Ideal-as-idealized-models present the supreme version of P that has yet to be observed empirically, but is nonetheless imagined by the theorist.

"Ideal-as" models either depict empirical actualities or unsubstantiated abstractions. The ideal-as-descriptive model therefore represents the nonideal, whereas the ideal-as-idealized model conveys the ideal. As Mills (2005) notes, then, the object of scholarship concerned with plausibility (which should be the vast majority of scholars concerned with the study of politics) is to consider the relationship between the nonideal P and the ideal P so as to "identify and understand the peculiar features that explain P's dynamic and prevent it from attaining ideality" (167). This concern with the separation between the ideal and the nonideal is what constitutes nonideal theory in Mills' terms—nonideal theory focuses on the actual and adequately considers why and how the actual is *not* ideal. Mills explains that what constitutes ideal theory is not merely the use of ideals and ideal models, but rather the exclusion or marginalization of the actual to such an extent that plausibility and practicality are not considerations. Ideal theories focus so extensively on the ideal-as-idealized model that they preclude contemplation of the actual (168). Mills stresses that this shortcoming is especially problematic, and morally concerning, as it makes achieving the ideal more difficult:

> In modeling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and human society on ideal-as-idealized models, in never exploring how deeply different this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized model will never be achieved. (170)

How can one recognize a theory as ideal, rather than nonideal, though? To answer this question, it is helpful to consider concepts that are prevalent among ideal theories. Mills (2005) enumerates six concepts or assumptions, which interact with each other, that ideal theory uses as a basic apparatus. First, Mills explains that ideal theory use an *idealized social ontology*, abstracting away from relations of "structural domination, exploitation, coercion and oppression, which in reality, of course, will profoundly shape the ontology of those same individuals, locating them in superior and inferior positions in social hierarchies of various kinds" (168). Ideal theories marginalize questions concerning any kind of difference or power dynamics among groups of people, thereby failing to consider factors such as race, gender, or socioeconomic status. The second apparatus Mills identifies is *idealized capacities*, which he explains as the provision of unrealistic capacities to human agents (168). Mills notes that the unrealistic attributes are given to both privileged individuals and subordinated persons, who in actuality would *not* have equal opportunity for their natural capacities to develop and would be disabled in notable ways (168). For example, an ideal theory might assume equal ability to participate in politics, or an equal ability to live above the poverty level. Third, Mills identifies ideal theories as being *silent on oppression*. This means that ideal theories say little or nothing regarding actual historic oppression and its legacy; they are also silent on ongoing oppression (168). "Correspondingly, the ways in which systematic oppression is likely to shape the basic social institutions (as well as the humans in those institutions) will not be part of the theory's concern, and this will manifest itself in the absence of ideal-as-descriptive-model concepts that would provide the necessary macro- and micro-mapping of that oppression, and that are requisite for understanding reproductive dynamics" (169).

Mills identifies *ideal social institutions* as the fourth apparatus of ideal theories. He explains that social institutions, such as the family, the economy, and the legal system, are presented in ideal-as-idealized-model terms, therefore not considering how these systems can systematically disadvantage groups such as the poor, racial minorities, and women (169). Fifth, Mills explains that ideal theories posit *an idealized cognitive sphere* wherein individuals' cognition are not affected by biases such as self-interest or general difficulties understanding the world. Individuals are presented as rational persons, whose perceptions of the world and of social order are either minimally, or not at all, affected by hegemonic ideologies or group-specific experiences (169). Finally, the sixth apparatus Mills identifies is *strict compliance*. This is the assumption that individuals are presumed to always act as expected. For example, in Rawls' theory of justice, everyone is presumed to act justly and do his/her part in upholding just actions; there is no consideration of how or why people might act otherwise (Mills 2000, 169).

A synopsis of these six characteristics follows:

TABLE 3.1: SYNOPSIS OF IDEAL THEORY ASSUMPTIONS

Assumption	**Explanation**
Idealized social ontology	marginalize questions concerning any kind of difference or power dynamics among groups of people, thereby failing to consider factors such as race, gender, or socioeconomic status
Idealized capacities	unrealistic attributes are given to both privileged individuals and subordinated persons
Silent on oppression	say little or nothing on actual historic oppression and its legacy; they are also silent on ongoing oppression
Ideal social institutions	Social institutions presented in ideal-as-idealized-model terms, therefore not considering how these systems can systematically disadvantage groups such as the poor, racial minorities, and women
Idealized cognitive sphere	individuals' cognition are not affected by biases such as self-interest or general difficulties understanding the world
Strict compliance	individuals are presumed to always act as expected

Understanding these characteristics as traits of ideal theories, it becomes possible to identify these elements in existent theories of communicative behavior. I now turn to analyze the ways that each of these assumptions are IR theories of communicative behavior.

Conventional theories of communicative behavior in international relations can be grouped into two general categories: theories of argumentation and theories of rhetorical action.[19] Each theoretical category is grounded in a specific, normative approach to speech, where a speech act is understood as a communicative symbol (e.g, words) that conveys a particular meaning as well as a particular action (cf. Stephen 2015, 771).[20] Theories focused on *arguing* (e.g. Risse 2000, Müller 2004, Deitelhoff 2009) understand speech acts as sincere communications shared in a deliberative process to determine what is normatively and universally valid among deliberators—what Habermas (1984) would refer to as communicative action. Theories focused on *rhetorical action* (e.g., Schimmelfennig 2001, 2003) understand speech as strategically driven claims that, as Ian Hurd (2005) explains, constitute a "strategic use of norms" to convince other actors of one's claims' legitimacy. Through such a strategic use of norms, theories of rhetorical action assume that all speaking actors be persuaded that they can convince others of their claims' validity.[21]

Carefully critiquing both theories using the above-listed characteristics of ideal theories, it becomes clear that both are rooted in the ideal more so than the actual. I am not

---

[19] More extensive comparisons of these forms of communication can be found in Müller (2004), Risse (2000) and Seymour (2014). Most scholars also include bargaining theory as a theory of communicative behavior. I have elected to exclude theories of bargaining from my critique here because theories of bargaining are concerned broadly with actions and *not* with exchange of words in deliberative settings. Theories of rhetorical action and communicative action are explicitly concerned with words exchanged among participants.

[20] For more on speech acts, see Austin 1962, Skinner 2002, Searle 1964.

[21] This assumption has faced significant criticism from advocates of theories of arguing (e.g., Risse 2000: 8-9) because if all participants held this belief, nothing would occur as no one would ever alter beliefs to accommodate others.

the first to question the limits of these theories or their potential to marginalize the actual. In his theory of indirect speech, Matthew D. Stephen (2015) challenges the assumptions about speech made across *all* of the aforementioned theories of communicative behavior by presenting indirect speech as problematically excluded from each of the approaches to communicative behavior. Theories of arguing limit speech to sincere communications, and theories of rhetorical action limit speech to strategic claims to persuade others of their validity. Stephen's theory of *indirect speech* (2015) posits an understanding of speech in which "legitimacy" speech can have a double roll, "embodying both a surface illocutionary act and an implicit message" (785). In Stephen's research, communicative behavior's meaning is not as overtly obvious as theories of bargaining, arguing, and rhetorical action suppose. Stephen argues that while speech intended to garner legitimacy overtly reflects the logics of appropriateness that exist within a particular context, such as an IO, these polite and appropriate communications can also convey strategic goals, albeit indirectly. Complicating assumptions that one can make about communicative behavior, Stephen (2015) introduces complexities to deliberative assumptions made in conventional theories of bargaining in IR. If one understands speech to be sincere and truthful, Stephen explains that IR scholars fail to analyze important and relevant moments of communicative action. He concludes,

> What is often simply understood on an intuitive level as 'diplomatic language' provides a fertile ground on which to elaborate the notion of indirect speech, politeness theory and other theoretical resources of pragmatic linguistics. In the same way that language can provide a window into human nature (Pinker, 2007b), it can provide a window into the nature of international politics too. (Stephen 2015, 786)

Stephen points to the value of scrutinizing even polite, seemingly inconsequential, communicative behavior in international relations.

Doing so, Stephen suggests that we can gain purchase on not only the process of deliberation and communication, but also international politics more broadly. Stephen's argument is significant, as he establishes the problem of exclusion among *all* theories of communicative behavior in IR: All theories exclude considerations of "diplomatic talk," as this talk is typically perceived of as having no meaning beyond the surface pleasantries such communication entails. This argument leads one to ask: What else might theories of communicative behavior marginalize or exclude? To answer this question, I use Mills' characterization of ideal theory to illuminate exclusions and marginalization inherent in theories of argumentation and theories of rhetorical action.[22] I maintain that these approaches to analyze communicative behavior are inappropriate for studying political deliberation because they are rooted in ideal aspirations rather than the actualities—the nonideal politics—that constitute the empirical world of international politics. To highlight these theories' inappropriateness for studying political deliberations, I outline the key components of WPS deliberative practices that each theory fails to consider. Ultimately, I suggest that while these theoretical approaches acknowledge the role of decorum, i.e., formal rules of procedure, in shaping communicative behavior, they marginalize, or even exclude entirely, the roles of individuals and power in deliberations.

Ideal Components of Rhetorical Action and Argumentation

Risse's Theory of Argumentation

Before critiquing existent theories of deliberation in IR, it is important to understand the theories and their primary assumptions. Theories of argumentation are concerned with sincere communication exchanges for the purpose of realizing what is normatively and

[22] More extensive comparisons of these forms of communication can be found in Müller (2004), Risse (2000) and Seymour (2014).

universally valid among the deliberators. These theories are squarely rooted in Habermas's theory of argument and communicative action, which, as I note below, is an overtly ideal theory of communication. In comparison, theories of rhetorical action are concerned with speech as strategically driven claims to convince actors of one's claims' legitimacy. Frank Schimmelfennig (2003) explains that a theory of rhetorical action "draws on a strategic conception of rules that combines a social, ideational ontology with the assumption of rational action; it postulates that social actors use and exchange arguments based" (193). Theories of rhetorical action stress that arguments exchanged are based on identities and norms that are institutionalized into their organizational environment, rather than on consensual, shared aims. This understanding goes against theories of arguing, or communicative action, which understand arguments to be grounded in consensual, shared aims.

Because theories of argumentation respond to Habermas's theory of communicative action, it is first important to grasp Habermas's theory of communicative action. In the theory of communicative action, argument is defined as the exchange of reason by participants who are oriented to reaching consensus and who remain open to changing their mind if convinced by better reasons. Communicative action is connected to argumentation in Habermas's theory insofar as communicative action is the promise that the consensus resulting from arguments will be reached for the right reasons—for the good of all, and not merely the good of the most powerful (cf. Mitzen 2005). Habermas (1984) explains that communicative action, or cooperation in conversation, can only come about when four requirements are met (89): First, no one who can contribute to the conversation has been excluded. Second, all participants have equal voice. Third, all participants are free to speak their honest opinions. Fourth, there is no coercion built into the process of discourse. Habermas admits that these conditions are

counterfactual insofar as they can rarely, if ever, be realized in practice, but Habermas maintains that the degree to which these conditions are met helps us understand whether the outcomes of a given discourse are reasonable, i.e., consensual or non-consensual. These four counterfactuals function as "*ɔtanƌardɔ* for a self-correcting learning process" (91). Habermas's theory of communicative action is fundamentally concerned with ensuring equality and rationality among participants—if the aforementioned four conditions are not met, Habermas maintains that communities will be unable to rationally decide on, or even deliberate about, a communal course of action.

Thomas Risse (2000) examines how Habermas' theory of communicative action can help illuminate the logic of arguing in world politics and help shed light on empirical questions regarding communicative behavior in international relations (2). Drawing from Habermas, Risse constructs a theory of argumentation for the study of international relations. He examines the roles of arguing both in negotiations and in the public sphere, or public debates that are more open to nonstate actors (22).

Risse (2000) first explains the theory of communicative action and its fundamental premises and presuppositions, and he then goes on to unpack the ways that this theory can illuminate processes of argumentation in international relations. Risse notes that in argumentation, argumentative rationality prevails, making it so that actors are concerned with seeking a reasoned consensus rather than with maximizing or satisfying their preferences (7). Actors engaged in arguing do not have fixed preferences, as assumed in theories of bargaining, but rather are prepared to change their interests and/or views of the world given a persuasive argument. Risse explains that there are preconditions for argumentative rationality to exist in communication: an ability to empathize and a common lifeworld (essentially a

shared culture among actors). These preconditions ensure that actors have collective understandings to which they can refer when arguing and makes it such that all actors are treated equally in argumentation (11). As a result, relationships of power, force, and coercion are presumed to be absent when argumentative consensus is the goal (11). Risse notes the idealistic, and arguably imaginative, nature of this situation: "Communicative processes oriented toward achieving mutual understanding counterfactually presuppose an 'ideal speech situation' whereby nothing but the better arguments count and where actors try to persuade each other and are themselves open to being convinced" (10).

Risse (2000) then goes on to address the transferability of Habermasian communicative action to international relations. He confronts two noteworthy arguments against the claim that arguing plays an important role in world politics. The first argument is that there is no "common lifeworld" in international relations, as actors do not share a common language, history, or culture. Risse responds to this concern, positing that Habermas himself is vague on the degree to which individuals need to share a common lifeworld. Moreover, he suggests that anarchy itself could be understood as a common lifeworld, insofar as it constitutes a shared cultural background within which actors communicate (14).[23] From this "thin" lifeworld of anarchy, Risse suggests that actors can develop common experiences that contribute to shared understandings of history and perhaps even a collective culture that would be constitute a common lifeworld in the Habermasian sense (15-16).

The second argument to which Risse responds follows: Relationships of power are always present in international relations, making it absurd to suggest that truth-seeking

---

[23] For more on anarchy in relation to Habermas's idea of the public sphere and communicative action, see Jennifer Mitzen (2005).

dialogue is possible in interstate communications (2000, 14). Risse acknowledges that power and hierarchy can affect arguing. He writes,

> Power as a relationship of influencing an actor's behavior against the actor's will might affect arguing in at least two ways: First, power relations might define who has legitimate access to a discourse. The UN Security Council is a perfect example of how some states are more equal than others in terms of having permanent access to deliberations. Second, they might affect what counts as a "good argument." It makes a difference in the UN Security Council whether the United States or Cameroon pushes a certain argument (16).

Risse also acknowledges a Foucauldian critique of the "ideal speech situation," i.e., the presence of power insofar as power is a social structure that innately resides within discourses. A Foucauldian interpretation of power asserts that the social context of international discourses establishes "clear boundaries of what can be legitimately argued," making it so that communicative action's theoretical assumption that *any* argument can be used in discourse is chimeric (17). To address Foucault's concerns with power, Risse ultimately suggests that power may be a part of *some* communication, but not argumentative communication. If power, or hierarchy, plays a part in deliberation, Risse maintains that one is observing persuasion and not argumentation (18).

In addition, Risse (2000) responds to this critique of chimerism by noting that Habermas himself recognizes the ideal speech situation as completely counterfactual in construction (17-18).[24] Risse recognizes that the condition of "equal access" is not met in international relations. However, Risse notes that the assumption of "equal access" can be relaxed as long as nonhierarchy among discursive participants exists. Regarding the UNSC, for instance, Risse notes that scholars should not be as concerned with the differences among permanent and nonpermanent members so long as this status does not effect what constitutes

---

[24] For more on the counterfactual nature of the ideal speech situation, see Habermas 1995, p. 553

a "good argument." Acknowledging that power relations shape discourse, Risse maintains that the question becomes the degree to which power relations explain the argumentative outcome of deliberation (18). Further, Risse recognizes that arguing is not always possible, and that actors may at moments be bargaining or using strategic interaction (rhetorical action), requiring scholars to study the context of deliberations to determine what kind of communications are happening at a given moment.

He explains that the following indicators can be used to determine whether a communicative situation is argumentative or not (Risse 2000, 18-19):

TABLE 3.2: HOW TO DETERMINE IF SITUATION IS ARGUMENTATIVE

Indicator	**Explanation**
Nonhierarchy	When actors use their rank or status to make an "argument," this communication does not constitute argumentative discourse. The condition of nonhierarchy can be assessed via examination of speakers' language.
Discursive rationality	If actors change their arguments depending on audience rather than based on being persuaded by another's argument, they are engaging in rhetoric rather than argumentation.
Equal access	An arguing situation will not disproportionately empower those participants with more material power. Evidence of a weaker country convincing a more powerful country of their argument suggests that arguing has happened.
Argumentative rationality	When an argument wins over a country, despite the fact that their instrumental interests would suggest they would not be persuaded by the argument, argumentative rationality can be assumed to exist.
Norms of appropriate behavior	If an actor in communication violates norms of behavior to which they agreed earlier, they will either justify their behavior or apologize if it is argumentative communication. It the actor dismisses the accusation, it is *not* argumentation.

These indicators serve as a relaxation of the ideal speech situation to help scholars identity when, and if, communicative action occurs in world politics. Risse posits that four conditions facilitate argumentative behavior: a high degree of international institutionalization, constituting a common lifeworld of sorts; a conscious effort among actors to construct a common lifeworld via narratives if institutions are absent; actors being uncertain about their

interests; and international institutions not being based on nonhierarchical relations (20). Without these conditions in place, Risse maintains that rhetorical—and not communicative—action is more likely to happen.

Schimmelfennig's Theory of Rhetorical Action

As I mentioned earlier, rhetorical action is concerned with actors making arguments to persuade others, not necessarily to appeal to any kind of common or universal goal. In his theory of rhetorical action, Frank Schimmelfennig (2003) acknowledges that actors, or what he calls "performers," use and manipulate formal rules to influence their audience's impressions. Drawing from the work of Erving Goffman (1959), Schimmelfennig (2003) maintains that the context of interstate interaction and communication is not a true consensus, as in theories of communicative action (195). Moreover, Schimmelfennig acknowledges that actors are not fully in control of rules, as not all rules or factors that shape behavior are formal. He notes that cultural, processual, and social constraints shape the ways that actors present arguments (196). These constraints shape the ways that actors argue in deliberation, and rhetorical action can be defined as follows: "[I]t is the strategic use and exchange of arguments based on ideas shared in the environments of the proponents and intended to persuade the audience and the opponents to accept the proponents' claims and act accordingly" (199). The persuasiveness of an argument depends on three things, not just validity (as in communicative action): The persuasiveness depends on whether the actor's claim is right (*logos*), the audience's emotional state (*pathos*), and the context of the argumentation creating the aforementioned social, cultural, and processual constraints of

communication.[25] As such, to persuade an audience, actors keep in mind their claims, their audience, and their context.

Schimmelfennig (2003) differentiates this understanding of rhetorical action from communicative action further, noting:

> Whereas the dialectical paradigm assumes a "universal audience" and an "ideal speech situation" to establish the conditions of legitimate consensus, and asserts that practical debates are capable of producing general, universalizable truths, rhetorical argumentation is oriented towards the time- and context-dependent beliefs of a particular audience and denies the "truth-capability" of practical claims (202).

Successful rhetorical action, then, is not the victory of the *better* argument, but of the more persuasive argument—the result of social pressure rather than of legitimate consensus (206). Arguments that lead to an actor achieving its preference are those that persuade others because of an understanding of the audience's *pathos* and the context of the organization, where grasping context especially entails knowledge of arguments that have historically proven to most successfully persuade other actors. Theories of rhetorical action posit interstate communications as inherently performative processes, whereas theories of communicative action posit interstate communications as altruistic.

---

[25] It is interesting to note here that Schimmelfennig makes no mention of ethos—the third of Aristotle's modes of persuasion—in his writing on rhetorical action. I explain the importance of this absence in more detail below, in my critique of his theory's ideal components.

The basic premises of each theory can be summarized as follows:[26]

TABLE 3.3: SUMMARY OF THEORIES OF COMMUNICATIVE AND RHETORICAL ACTION

	Communicative Action	Rhetorical Action
Common assumptions	conflict about validity claims, actors exist in common lifeworld	each actor has different goals, decision-making through argument
Rationality	communicative	strategic
Goals of the actors	consensus, improve other actors' understanding	to influence, to persuade, to win the argument
Argumentative behavior	rule-based, approaching an ideal speech situation	arguments made each actors' interests
Form of argument	exclusively verbal arguments	including expressive acts and emotive appeals
Audience	universal	particular
Truth capability of argumentation	what is collectively valid is rational	what is collectively valid is arbitrary, and contextually based
Consensus	legitimate, objective	factual, subjective

Both the theory of communicative action and the theory of rhetorical action present themselves as models that best illuminate the way that communication unfolds in international politics. This leads one to ask: Does argumentation or rhetorical action serve as the dominant form of communicative behavior in international relations? And, more specifically for the purpose of this manuscript, which theory is best-suited to analyze deliberations in the UNSC?

Theories of Communicative Behavior's Ideal Components

Although Risse recognizes that conditions for communicative action do not *always* exist, I maintain that the conditions for communicative action *never* exist. Further, I suggest that neither the theory of argumentation or the theory of rhetorical action accurately depicts communication in international relations. I argue that *both* theories' explanatory capacities are

[26] Table adopted from Schimmelfennig (2003, page 206)

ultimately undermined by their ideal components. Neither theory, as I illustrate below, can accommodate key parts of deliberation in the UNSC because they ignore the complex roles and identities of people who argue, and because they marginalize informal constraints on deliberation. To critique each theory with attention to their ideal components, I return to the six characteristics that classify an ideal theory (cf. Mills 2005): idealized social ontology, idealized capacities, silence on oppression, ideal social institutions, idealized cognitive sphere, and strict compliance.

Idealized Social Ontology

Risse's (2000) understanding of communicative action includes an *idealized social ontology* insofar as it assumes nonhierarchy can functionally exist. Risse identifies that non hierarchy is evident as long as actors do not use their rank or status to validate their arguments (18-19). This interpretation of rank or status as only evident in language represents a significant idealization, as structural domination exists both within and without words (especially in international politics). When the United States makes a statement before the UNSC, that statement implicitly entails an appeal to rank and status, regardless of whether the United States' rank is overtly declared. In fact, any P-5 member's statement before the Council entails an inherent appeal to rank and status because the Council's rules and procedures grant permanent members explicit and implicit power, including veto power and the key voices in SCRs. In addition to these state-centric informal power relations, individual-level power relations exist in the UN, as evident in the privileging of masculine voices in the Council. By suggesting that nonhierarchy is even remotely possible, Risse abstracts from relations of structural domination, exploitation, coercion, and oppression that are intrinsic components of

any communicative exchange in world politics. In the case of the Council, Risse's theory would not account for or recognize the ways that these relations shape all communication in the Council, at both the state and individual levels. It is also important to recognize the role of experts.

In comparison, Schimmelfennig's (2003) theory of rhetorical action posits a **less** *idealized social ontology.* Schimmelfennig's theory recognizes how culture shapes deliberative contexts. His theory would acknowledge, where Risse's theory ignores, the social, cultural, and processual constraints of the Council. The theory of rhetorical action would recognize the particularities of the Council as an institution, including its unique rules and power dynamics. That being said, as I explain in greater detail in the section on *ideal social institutions*, Schimmelfennig's theory does *not* address the ways that these constraints impact individuals. Schimmelfennig's theory, like Risse's, remains focused on states, rather than individual people. Whereas Risse's theory problematically abstracts from relations of domination at both the state and individual levels, Schimmelfennig's theory acknowledges that they can exist and indeed impact the way that communication happens in the institution but does not adequately consider how relations of domination shape individuals involved in deliberation.

Idealized Capacities

Both theories put forward *idealized capacities.* Risse's theory of communicative action presents individuals as having *idealized capacities* in its assumption that an individual can separate her argument's logic from her audience. In Risse's presumption of discursive rationality, Risse maintains that an actor is engaging in rhetoric rather than argumentation if the argument changes depending on audience rather than on being persuaded by another's

argument. This assumes an unrealistic duality in any international actor and her claims: that one's statement is either based on another actor's argument *or* on the audience. Consider statements made before the UNSC, where delegates very often "echo" or "iterate" what others have said. For example, in a 2002 statement before the UNSC, the Colombian delegate, Mr. Franco, said the following:

> I want to conclude with two concrete suggestions for the report. First, something very brief on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes. Here I just want to echo what was stated by our colleague from Jamaica. In other words, it is vital that women be empowered, bearing in mind their multiple roles as ex-combatants, as mothers, as providers of information, as widows, as victims, so that we can best document what the concrete contribution of women is in the DDR processes, and what can be done so that there can be greater participation of women in these processes. (S/PV.4589, 17)

How can one determine if Colombia's point was really shaped by what the Jamaican delegation said before? Or, if the reference to Jamaica is serving some ulterior motive, some behind-the-scenes power play in which Franco is trying to gain favor with other member-states? The answer is quite simple: The analyst *cannot* determine what is happening, and neither can the individual actors being analyzed most likely. Actors' statements may do *two* things: appeal to an audience, and be based on logic. Given that much of what happens in the Council happens behind closed doors, it is quite possible that nods to other countries represent ways of gaining favor that outsiders simply cannot detect through observation alone.

The theory of rhetorical action posits *idealized capacities* among actors insofar as it assumes that all actors in communication have equal abilities to develop arguments—it does not fully acknowledge the limits that a country's diplomatic capabilities and histories might have on the ability to learn how to persuade most effectively. For instance, one might expect that South Sudan, which joined the UN in 2011, would *not* be as able to effectively identify

what appeals to an audience, or historical examples of successful persuasion in the context of the UN, as a member state, such as the United Kingdom, which has been a member of the UN since 1945. South Sudan's ability to persuade in the context of the UN is notably different from that of the United Kingdom. Because the theory of rhetorical action marginalizes questions regarding these capacities, it does not illuminate fully the ways that power relations affect the course of argumentation. While the theory of rhetorical action grapples with broader institutional constraints, it does not provide a robust consideration of individual participants' constraints. As a result, neither the theory of rhetorical action, nor the theory of argumentation, avoids the presentation of *idealized capacities* in their theories.

Silent on Oppression

Just as both theories assume *idealized capacities*, both theories are *silent on oppression*. Risse's (2000) adaptation of Habermasian communicative action is *silent on oppression*, both historic and present. Insofar as Risse's adaptation of the common lifeworld does not consider the ways that systems can systematically oppress particular actors, he unrealistically assumes the common lifeworld to be a normative good for its inhabitants. Whether the common lifeworld is created via a high degree of international institutionalization or via narratives if institutions are absent, the lifeworld posited by Risse remains idealized because it does not grapple with oppression that is a part of all economic, social, and political systems (Mills 2005). For instance, Risse's theory would neither recognize nor evaluate the oppression latent in the Council, and UN bodies more broadly, insofar as women's voices have been, and continue to be, marginalized. As explained in the last chapter, women are significantly under-represented across UN bodies, an indicator of oppression within the UN system. Risse's

theory would focus on the UN as a common lifeworld but not address the ways that this lifeworld benefits some while hurting others.

Likewise, Schimmelfennig's theory of rhetorical action is *silent on oppression* insofar as it marginalizes questions of historic or ongoing oppression within institutions where rhetorical action happens. This marginalization occurs because the theory of rhetorical action ignores the pathologies present in institutions, and instead unrealistically idealizes institutions. As a result, using a theory of rhetorical action to study an institution such as the UNSC would not grapple with the ways that institutional power dynamics have affected the institution's policies and functionality. For example, one would not consider how the Council's historic marginalization of questions concerning gender prior to 2000 influenced, and continues to influence, UNSC debates and resolutions. Through the lenses of Risse and Schimmelfennig, the Council would be idealized insofar as its history of oppression and imperfect capacities would be deemed irrelevant to understanding UNSC deliberations. Both would focus more on the formal rules of the institution as beacons of equality and fairness, thereby ignoring the tacit power differentials in place.

Ideal Social Institutions

Related to both theories' silences on oppression, they both present *ideal social institutions*. Risse's idealized vision of lifeworlds also reveals his theory's understanding of international institutions to be idealized; consequently, his theory rest on an apparatus of *ideal social institutions*. Risse does not adequately consider how international institutions can systematically disadvantage groups of actors—whether these actors are states, or even the individuals who constitute IO bureaucracies. For example, using the modified theory of

communicative action to understand the UNSC would make distinctions between non-permanent and permanent member-states irrelevant, when we all know these distinctions are *extremely* important. As Ian Hurd (2002) notes, the Permanent Five are the only Council members that wield *real* power (44). Further, Risse's theory ignores institutional pathologies (cf. Barnett and Finnemore 1999) that impact how IOs function. In the case of the Council, for instance, Risse's theory would not consider the Council's historical marginalization of women's voices to be relevant to Council deliberations. By idealizing the institution, Risse misses the ways that bureaucratic culture, and its pathologies, impact the shape of institutions and the kinds of policies and agreements that emerge from deliberations within them.

The theory of rhetorical action's *silence on oppression* is connected to its assumption of *ideal social institutions*. By not addressing the ways that the economic, social, and political systems can systematically affect actors, Schimmelfennig's theory of rhetorical action does not sufficiently interrogate the context of deliberations, thereby making his theory more ideal than it is nonideal. While Schimmelfennig's theory acknowledges two modes of persuasion—*pathos* (the audience's emotional state) and *logos* (the proof in words of speech)—his theory marginalizes the role of the third mode: *ethos* (the character of the speaker).[27] Schimmelfennig would not consider how an individual actor's character has been shaped by systems of oppression, in and out of the Council. Like the theory of argumentation, the theory of rhetorical acton would not account for the Council's historic and present masculinity. It would not address how relations of power impact the ways that an individual presents herself in the

---

[27] Aristotle explains the modes of persuasion as follows: "Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker [ethos]; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind [pathos]; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself [logos]. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible" (Aristotle 1356a 2,3).

Council—how her *ethos* is perceived and received in deliberation. Likewise, it would not address how individual country's histories and context impact the ways they participate in deliberation. Both Schimmelfennig's and Risse's theories would present the Council as an ideal social institution, ignoring pathologies that shape the institution's practices.

Idealized Cognitive Sphere

While Risse's theory posits an idealized cognitive sphere, Schimmelfennig's does not. As Risse focuses most extensively on states as actors and marginalizes considerations of individuals involved in institutions or within a particular deliberation, his theory posits an *idealized cognitive sphere*. This idealization is particularly evident in his assumption of discursive rationality, which suggests that in argumentation individuals do not pay attention to audience. If the justifications for an actors' argument change depending on audience, Risse maintains that the communication constitutes persuasion rather than argumentation. The theoretical, and supposedly practical, difference/division between the sphere of persuasion and the sphere of argumentation is problematic, as actors are consistently concerned with audience, especially in international institutions—it is precisely this concern that motivates Schimmelfennig to construct a theory of rhetorical action. Indeed, to suggest that argumentation requires a lack of concern with audience is to suggest that argumentation can never happen at all in practice, therefore making argumentation entirely ideal. A UNSC diplomat, for example, is constantly concerned with his/her audience. The statements they make in the UNSC are meant to speak to Council members, as well as to domestic audiences, therefore shaping the way that arguments are put forward (Interview, UNSC diplomat, May 2015).

In contrast, Schimmelfennig openly acknowledges that biases such as self-interest and limited understandings of the world affect arguments at the state-level. Using a theory of rhetorical action to understand how deliberations unfold in the Council, one would address the ways that states' self-interests and subjective understandings affect what they do in deliberations. In the case of the UNSC, the theory of rhetorical action would investigate how subjective self-interests impact deliberations. One would also consider how national, rather than *universal*, goals shape how each state participates in deliberations. As a result, the theory of rhetorical action does **not** assume an *idealized cognitive sphere*, whereas the theory of argumentation does.

Strict Compliance

Finally, Risse's theory of argumentation uses *strict compliance* as an apparatus, while Schimmelfennig's theory of rhetorical action does not. The apparatus of *strict compliance* is evident in a theory of communicative action insofar as it assumes all actors to be equally consensus-motivated. Actors are not permitted selfish or self-interested actions or arguments, but are rather to be equally concerned with achieving the common good as defined by institutional rules. While in the UNSC, actors are all concerned with maintaining peace and security, as outlined in the UN Charter. However, the reality is that actors are first and foremost concerned with their respective countries' well-being. Although the US may stand before the Council and justify an argument in terms of international goods, the US—or any member-state, for that matter—is fundamentally concerned with their own nation's good. As international institutions are plagued by pathologies, the assumption of any kind of consensus-driven or altruistic argument is unrealistic and abstracted from reality.

In comparison, the theory of rhetorical action expects that what an actor argues will vary significantly and unexpectedly depending on audience, preferences, and context. Using the theory of rhetorical action to examine deliberations in the Council, one would consider the ways that different topics, contexts, and audiences affect the ways that deliberations happen. It would address the ways that individual countries' subjective interests impact, and are present in, statements made before the Council, whereas a theory of communicative action would not question the formal goal of altruism.

In sum, both the theory of argumentation and the theory of rhetorical action contain idealistic apparatuses. However, the theory of rhetorical action is ultimately *less* ideal than the theory of argumentation because it contains fewer idealistic apparatuses. The following table outlines each theory's degree of idealism:

TABLE 3.4: IDEALISM IN COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND RHETORICAL ACTION

Assumption	Theory of Communicative Action	Theory of Rhetorical Action
Idealized social ontology	Yes	Yes (but less so than argumentation)
Idealized capacities	Yes	Yes
Silent on oppression	Yes	Yes
Ideal social institutions	Yes	Yes
Idealized cognitive sphere	Yes	No
Strict compliance	Yes	No

While the theory of rhetorical action is admittedly less ideal than the theory of communicative action, it is nonetheless abstracted from reality because it upholds idealized capacities, presents a social ontology, remains silent on oppression, and assumes ideal social institutions.

You may think: Well, isn't only having half of the idealistic apparatuses in the theory *good* enough? Won't the theory of rhetorical action suffice for understanding the Council? I suggest that it will not. To understand why a "less ideal" theory will not suffice, it is helpful to consider Charles Mills' thoughts on the limits of ideal theories.

After Mills lists the six characteristics of ideal theories, he goes on to question ideal theory's appropriateness for doing ethics, asking: "*How in God's name could anybody think that this is the appropriate way to do ethics?.*"[28] As my concern is with politics, I instead look at Mills' list and question ideal theory's appropriateness for studying politics, asking: *How in God's name could anybody think that this is the appropriate way to do political science?* I contend, alongside Levy (2015), that it is *not* an appropriate way to do political science broadly, or political theory specifically. Moreover, I agree with Mills' (2005) assertion that ideal theory as characterized above is really an *ideology*, a "distortional complex of ideas, values, norms, and beliefs that reflects the non representative interests and experiences of a small minority of the national population—middle-to-upper-class white males—who are hugely *over-represented* in the professional philosophical population" (171-2). The experiences of middle-to-upper-class white males are closest to the ideal, and therefore there is the least difference between the ideal-as-idealized and ideal-as-descriptive models.[29] By failing to critically engage with the

---

[28] Mills writes, "Now look at this list, and try to see it with the eyes of somebody coming to formal academic ethical theory and political philosophy for the first time…. Perform an operation of Brechtian defamiliarization, estrangement, on your cognition. Wouldn't your spontaneous reaction be: *How in God's name could anybody think that this is the appropriate way to do ethics?" (169).*

[29] Admittedly, the focus of this project—the space of elite deliberations in IOs—is a realm created by middle-to-upper-class white males. This is why in the second chapter, I explicitly addressed the inherently masculine nature of the institution I focus on (the UNSC) and how this factors into my analysis of Council deliberations. I explain the ways that the masculine-ideal of Council deliberations has been called into question, and adjusted, through developments in the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. Because I acknowledge the disjuncture between the ideal and what has happened in the UNSC, I avoid an analysis that is what Levy (2015) would call "speculative fiction."

cognitive dissonance between the idealized and descriptive "ideal-as" models for the majority of people (i.e., non-middle-to-upper-class white men), ideal theory becomes almost entirely irrelevant to the study of politics. In the case of the theory of rhetorical action, it is *more* relevant to the study of politics than the theory of communicative action. However, I maintain that a *more* appropriate and suitable theory to study deliberation would contain even fewer ideal components by grappling with relations of power and systematic oppression that characterize all politics.

To comprehend the importance of using empirical realities to shape a theory, it is worthwhile to consider how lived experiences shape Adam Smith's and Cicero's theories of morality and decorum, respectively. Smith (1979 [1790]) explains that one's understanding of morality, i.e., the theory of moral sentiments, is formed via observation rather than from abstract visions of what *might* or *could* be:

> It is thus that the general rules of morality are formed. They are ultimately founded upon experience of what, in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and propriety, approve, or disapprove of. We do not originally approve or condemn particular actions; because, upon examination, they appear to be agreeable or inconsistent with a certain general rule. The general rule, on the contrary, is formed, by finding from experience, that all actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced in a certain manner, are approved or disapproved of. (159, III.4.8)

A theory of morality for Smith consists in contemplative movement between empirical experiences of particular rights or wrongs and then general principles of right- and wrong-ness. What is deemed appropriate—what is moral or immoral—is grounded in affect, one's emotional or guttural reactions to behaviors. And the resultant theory of morality consequently remains attentive to the emotions that form the foundation of broader schemes of what is right and wrong.

Smith's approach to developing theory is, therefore, very attentive to human practices rather than abstract rules about what those practices should be. To further explicate this value of basing a theory in observed practices, it is helpful to note that Smith's concept of propriety is similar to that of decorum for Cicero. For both Cicero and Smith, appropriate action embodies a harmony between internal and external factors, where appropriate action is "decorum" for Cicero and "propriety" for Smith (cf. Kapust and Schwarze 2016, 106). Likewise, neither decorum nor propriety is primarily determined by rules. As Daniel Kapust (2011) explains regarding decorum for Cicero, decorum is matter of judgment rather than rules, and is primarily determined by context (98). Therefore, to base a theory on abstracted rules rather than on empirical experiences and context would be to remove any attention to injustices, or what Mills (2005) would call systems of oppression.

Understanding Smith's theory of morality and Cicero's theory of decorum as theories of practice that involve judgment and attention to injustices, we learn that when judgment is not a part of a theory, then the theory is not contextual or practical. And because the theory is not based on practice, it becomes, as Mills (2005) argues, apolitical, as it marginalizes injustice entirely. Cicero, Smith, Mills, and Levy all acknowledge nonideal theory—theory that grapples with the cognitive dissonance between the actual and the ideal—as undoubtedly preferable to ideal theory. By recognizing how people's unique and contextual perspectives shape what they do in the world, nonideal theory is the most acceptable type of theory for political science because it is the best way to ensure that the theory is political. If theoretical assumptions about the world are completely abstracted from the present and the historical context, then the theory is no longer political. To develop a theory of deliberation that is indeed political and recognizes judgment, then, I assert that the theory *must* begin from an

empirical starting point. It must emerge from particular observations about deliberation in practice.

A Practical Theory of Deliberation

As idealism prevails in the two predominant theories of communicative behavior, the question arises as to whether it is at all possible to posit a theory of deliberation that is not problematically rooted in the ideal, rather than the actual. I argue that it *is* possible to do so. I now turn to develop a theory that is *less* ideal than the theory of rhetorical action. It must be a theory that does not posit idealized capacities, is not silent on oppression, and does not assume ideal social institutions. Further, it should not assume an idealized social ontology, an idealized cognitive sphere, or strict compliance.

To create this alternative, nonideal theory—what I call a practical theory of deliberation—I draw from the practice of deliberation in the Council that I outlined in Chapter 2, and I define deliberation as the sharing of ideas among participants—participants who are not necessarily equal—within an institutional context that is not ideal and entails mechanisms of oppression. I construct the theory so that it accommodates the roles of individuals, as well as of informal rules and norms, in shaping deliberations. The theory I create acknowledges the context of any deliberation by being attentive to relations of power and systems of oppression. Like any practical theory, as I explained in Chapter 1, a practical theory of deliberation is shaped by the practice it examines. Because it is rooted in the *actual* practices of people, it is attentive to myriad factors that shape practices, including variables such as gender, race, and power. A practical theory addresses elements that existent IR theories of deliberation marginalize or exclude entirely.

Practical Theory of Deliberation

Theories of communicative action and rhetorical action marginalize the actual to such an extent that the informal relations of power that exist in the Council would be unaddressed. Further, neither approach provides a means of grappling with the ways that systems of oppression impact individuals, which is especially important considering the fact that participants in Council deliberations (or any deliberation, for that matter) are, indeed, gendered actors. The practical theory of deliberation that I develop here accounts for the roles of nonhierarchical power dynamics and individuals that existent theories do not.

I propose that deliberation is shaped by formal rules and norms, informal rules and norms, and individual (not just *state*) perspectives and experiences. While communicative action proposes an end goal of consensus, and rhetorical action proposes an end goal of making the argument that "wins," in a practical theory, the end goal is merely to share ideas. The result of ideas being shared is entirely open—it could be the success of one participant's persuasion, or it could be consensus, or it could be no result whatsoever. The very open definition of deliberation reflects the reality of communications in international politics. For example, sometimes (albeit rarely) Council meetings result in consensus, but more often then not, exchanges of ideas result in no change or resolution. Many Council meetings do *not* result in an SCR being produced. And even if a formal deliberation yields a resolution, the formalized consensus does not mean that actors abide by the consensus—states can undermine or ignore the agreements reached in the Council. In a practical theory of deliberation, the process of deliberation, as well as deliberation's outcomes, are determined predominantly by institutional rules and norms (formal and informal alike), and individual perspectives.

A practical theory further acknowledges deliberations as determined by past and present contexts, meaning that each deliberation is situated in relation to past deliberations, institutional history, and broader political events. A practical theory recognizes the historical context of institutions, and the ways that systems of oppression and relations of power explicitly *and* implicitly shape deliberations. This, of course, is different from theories of communicative action and rhetorical action, which avoid considering injustices latent in institutions. In the case of the UNSC's deliberative practices, the institution's historical practices and norms constitute the context in which any deliberation happens. As a result, all deliberations in the Council occur in a context where masculine voices are privileged, feminine voices are marginalized, and countries with more economic power have more say. Even though formal rules may purport to eradicate these systems of oppression and relations of power, these norms continue to exist, as I explained in Chapter 2.

Individuals' Identities and Deliberation

The practical theory of deliberation's explicit acknowledgment of individuals' roles in deliberation is distinct from extant theories of communicative behavior, which focus predominantly on states as the actors involved in deliberation and marginalize the fact that deliberators are actually people. My practical theory of deliberation's attention to individuals also differentiates it from practice theoretical approaches to power. For example, Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot's (2014) theory of power in practice focuses solely on *state* displays of competency in international institutions as determining relative power, thereby excluding considerations of individual people as well as non-state characteristics of identity (e.g., gender, race, and sexual orientation) entirely. In contrast, a practical theory of

deliberation acknowledges that power dynamics can be observed not only at the state level, but also at the level of individual persons.

Stressing the importance of individuals in international deliberation is in line with scholarship critical of conventional, state-centric theories of security (cf. Gasper 2010, Saleh 2010, Aoláin 2009, Shepherd 2008a, Bilgin 2003). This critical scholarship challenges conventional, realist approaches to security by pointing out realism's inadequacies, especially insofar as it serves only the interests of dominant groups (cf. Sheehan 2005, 45). Advocates for individual and societal approaches to security argue, "By giving more priority to individual and societal dimensions of security, we begin to render visible the practices of both state and nonstate actors as they reflect upon the present and potential consequences of their own actions for international security" (Bilgin 2003, 219-20). Just as these critical approaches posit that individual and societal approaches to security can shed light on the causes of conflict and violence, I suggest that a practical theory of deliberation's consideration of individual identities' roles in deliberation can give greater insight into international institutions.

Building on feminist scholarship, I consider identity to be intersectional insofar as multiple axes of difference constitute an individual's identity. Addressing intersectionality further differentiates a practical theory of deliberation from the theory of rhetorical action, as the theory of rhetorical action does not sufficiently consider the multifaceted and connected components of individuals' identities. Christina Ewig explains, "'Intersectionality' refers to the ways in which social positions such as gender, race, and class intersect, making the experiences, of women of color, for example, qualitatively different from either white women or men of color" (Ewig 2010, 2). Recognizing identity as intersectional is distinct from unitary

and multiple analytical approaches to studying identity. A unitary approach focuses on a single category of identity; a multiple approach focuses on the roles of several categories (e.g., race and gender, or race and class); and a unitary approach moves beyond a multiple approach by challenging the relationship between categories of investigation to consider the interaction of these dynamically informed categories, thereby understanding various facets of identity to be mutually constitutive (cf. Hancock 2007, 67). Consequently, "intersectional effects are qualitatively different from independent or additive effects" (Weldon 2006, 243). I maintain that power's influence on individuals, and individuals' conducts' effects on deliberative norms, are revealed in multiple axes of difference.

Like many ideas, "intersectionality" is an "essentially contested concept" insofar as its use and meaning are continually reevaluated by feminist scholars (cf. Cho, et al. 2013; Davis 2008; Nash 2008; Yuval-Davis 2006; McCall 2005). Within the idea of "intersectionality," multiple concerns and emphases are brought together, making the concept itself inherently contested. As such, "intersectionality" is a complex idea with myriad meanings and interpretations. Rather than understanding contestation to be a conceptual weakness of "intersectionality," I maintain that its contested nature—its ambiguity and its meaning's dependence on context—makes it a beneficial concept for scholarship generally, and feminist inquiry specifically (cf. Davis 2008). Writing on intersectionality as a contested and ambiguous concept, Kathy Davis (2008) asserts,

> Its [Intersectionality's] lack of clear-cut definition or even specific parameters has enabled it to be drawn upon in nearly any context of inquiry. The infinite regress built into the concept – which categories to use and when to stop – makes it vague, yet also allows endless constellations of intersecting lines of difference to be explored. With each new intersection, new connections emerge and previously hidden exclusions come to light (77).

Intersectionality as an ambitious (or ambiguous) concept, therefore, has endless applications and uses for scholarly inquiry. As such, I maintain that using the concept of intersectionality in any interrogation can lend critical insights into politics.

Considering intersectionality in terms of the Council's deliberation is imperative, as the recent High-Level Review of Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) specifically mentions the need to be attentive to intersectionality and intersectional discrimination (Coomaraswamy 2015, 34, 303, 362). Further, one interviewee explained that intersectionality is the next concept to be added to the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda's trajectory (interview, NGOWG officer, July 2015). Given the movement in the WPS agenda to acknowledge the importance of intersectionality, it is a crucial concept to keep in mind when analyzing deliberations about WPS issues.

In this project, I understand intersectionality's meaning in terms of the ways it is conditioned by the particular context of the United Nations Security Council (cf. Dietz 1989, 180).[30] I recognize that intersectionality's conceptual meaning and significance depends on historical and material contexts, and for this project intersectionality's meaning is tied to the deliberative context of the UN Security Council. Ultimately, my use of the term intersectionality serves two purposes: clarifying the myriad and intersecting ways that power influences individuals' roles in deliberation, and utilizing concepts currently used to discuss the agenda I evaluate in this project.

In a practical theory of deliberation, each deliberator's intersectional identity molds, and is molded by, power dynamics. I assert that the relationship between the individual and

---

[30] Dietz writes, "As is so often the case in the history of conceptual change, the usage of the word is in part conditioned by the material conditions of the time." In: Ball, Terence, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson. *Political innovation and conceptual change*. Vol. 11. Cambridge University Press, 1989.

institutional power, as revealed in the study of deliberative texts, is akin to a Möbius strip. What constitutes the individual is shaped not only by the individual's "internal" or "inside" identity, but also by the "outside" world in which the individual participates.[31] One cannot understand the individual without understanding power, as each shapes and responds to the other. Hence, I propose that deliberation is inherently dynamic, and the integration of concerns with power and identity yields a practical theory of deliberation.

Power Dynamics, Subjects, and Deliberation

Power Dynamics

To understand the relationship between power and identity in deliberations, it is necessary to explain what power is, as well as what power does. I subscribe to Michel Foucault's theory of power, as his theory helps us problematize conventional assumptions about IR broadly. Foucault's theory also provides a more sophisticated account of IR because it addresses the relationship between power and subjects. I agree with Foucault's understanding of power as "the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the processes which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them.…thus forming a chain or system" (Foucault 1978, 92). As such, power consists of processes and

---

[31] This understanding of the individual as a Möbius strip is similar to that of Christina Grosz, who borrows the image of the Möbius strip from Lacan. Grosz writes: "The Möbius strip has the advantage of showing the inflection of mind into body and body into mind, the ways in which, through a kind of twisting or inversion, one is becomes another. This model also provides a way of problematizing and rethinking the relations between the inside and the outside of the subject, its psychical interior and its corporeal exterior, by showing not their fundamental identity or reducibility but the torsion of the one into the other, the passage vector, or uncontrollable drift of the inside into the outside and the outside into the inside" (xii). Unlike Grosz, I am not focusing on the Möbius strip as a symbol for understanding the individual's embodied existence, in terms of internal and external corporeality and psyche. Rather, I focus on the Möbius strip as a means of grasping how the individual's participation in deliberation is affected both by identity and by institutional power dynamics.

internal mechanisms that organize what people do and how they do it; power influences individuals' relationships with others and the world around them. For Foucault, power is inherently diffusive and constitutive. This is why Iris Marion Young (1990), following Foucault (1980), asserts that power is not static and instead exists in relations—in ongoing processes and interactions. Power is dispersed and diffused, yet revealed in domination and oppression evident in societies (cf. Young 1990, 33). Formal institutions and organizations are particular repositories for power, however power influences all human processes and interactions, formal or informal (cf. Foucault 2003, 49). In the specific case of deliberation, the institution in which deliberations happen constitutes a repository for power, but power is present and influential in *all* areas of life outside the institution.

Feminist international relations scholars have often turned to Foucault to understand power dynamics in relation to gender and security. However, none have used Foucault's insights into power to consider how institutional power shapes daily deliberations and the individual people deliberating, or how deliberations impact institutional dynamics and political events. In *Gender, Violence, and Security* (2008), Laura Shepherd unpacks the discourses —what she understands as systems of meaning production—present within UNSCR 1325, and she problematizes the meanings created through the document. Shepherd ultimately unpacks these problems to make practical policy suggestions so that similar issues might be avoided in the future. Similarly, Mona Lena Krook and Jacqui True (2012) use discourse analysis to understand the development of gender-balanced decision-making and gender mainstreaming. Focusing predominantly on policy history and UN norms, rather than on particular language in policies, they argue that political discourses are dynamic processes that shape norms, making norms ideationally and practically dynamic processes that depend

heavily on power relations (110). Natalie Florea Hudson likewise situates her investigation of the securitization of gender within the context of discourse scholarship. Her work, *Gender, Human Security and the United Nations* (2009), demonstrates how a particular approach to women's issues, that of securitization, has affected developments on the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda post-SCR 1325. While Hudson, Shepherd, Krook, and True all use Foucault to evaluate power dynamics in the Council, none evaluates power's role in deliberative policymaking. Further, none considers the ways that power affects individuals participating in deliberative processes. While I, too, follow Foucault's theory of productive power, my theory, unlike Hudson's, Shepherd's, and Krook and True's, recognizes the roles of power *and* individual in shaping deliberations.

Subjects

As numerous feminist scholars have noted, Foucault is a sophisticated theorist of subjectivity *and* power.[32] Understanding the relationship between subjectivity and power, I suggest that we can gain insight into deliberation's dynamics. Judith Butler (1990) explains Foucault's presentation of the intricate relationship between subjection and power, writing,

> Foucault points out that juridical systems of power produce the subjects they subsequently come to represent. Juridical notions of power appear to regulate political life in purely negative terms…..But the subjects regulated by such structures are, by virtue of being subjected to them, formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of those structures. (2)

Recognizing power's productive and reproductive capacities, Butler maintains that Foucault illuminates the ways that subjects analyzed by scholars are themselves constituted through

---

[32] Please see, for example: Bartky 1990, Bordo and Heywood 2004, Butler 1990, 1997, Diamond and Quinby (eds) 1988, Fraser 1989, Hekman (ed) 1996, Heyes 2007, McLaren 2002, McNay 1992, McWhorter 1999, Sawicki 1990, and Young 1990.

and in relations of power. Butler (1990), therefore, maintains that Foucault's insights into subjectification ought to compel feminist critique "to understand how the category of 'women', the subject of feminism, is produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which emancipation is sought" (2). As Butler presents the Foucauldian conception of power as drawing our attention to the subjection of individuals, I maintain that the Foucauldian understanding of power sheds light on the ways that power produces and subjects individuals in deliberative processes.

Foucault defines power as inherently relational and productive: "Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up" (Foucault 1975, 202). Power subjects individuals in two senses of the word "subject." In the first sense, power constructs what people do. Foucault explains, "power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth" (1977, 194). Power, in other words, shapes the world and structures in which people live. It produces the systems and norms through, and in, which people interact. As a result, power impacts what people do and how they do it; individuals are subjected to power. In the second sense, power actually constructs the individual, making one a subject. Foucault explains that power produces individuals, noting, "the individual is not the vis-à-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects" (1980, 98). The individual, then, is created via the same systems of power that produce reality and rituals of truth. The individual's identity as an individual comes about only through power—there is no individual subject prior to relations of power. Judith Butler (1990) notes, for example, that according to Foucault the individual is not "sexed" before entering the social world in which it is introduced to the "idea" of sex: "The

body gains meaning within discourse only in the context of power relations" (125). Thereby, the individual's body is constituted as a subject through power relations. The individual does not merely "have" a sex, but rather *is* a sex (cf. Ahmed 2006, 69).[33] The body is subjected to power, and through this subjection is created as a subject.

For Foucault, power both constitutes the individual as subject, and is also that which the subject resists. Judith Butler (1997) addresses this complex relationship of individual to power: "if, following Foucault, we understand power as forming the subject as well, as providing the very condition of its existence and the trajectory of its desire, then power is not simply what we oppose but also, in a strong sense, what we depend on for our existence and what we harbor and preserve in the beings that we are" (2). Similarly, Jacques Rancière (2010) notes that people's desire for sexual liberation and to speak out about sex, against the norms of silence and sexual repression, are effects of the power machine (65). Both Rancière and Mouffe (2005) point to Foucauldian modern power as determining who individuals *are* in two ways: power provides them a sense of identity *and* a subjection to resist. Power shapes the multiple axes of difference that constitute an individual's identity, and it is this very assignment of identity that individuals can in turn challenge by means of counter-conduct, as I explain below.

It is important to note that power rewards subjects for abiding by norms and distributions. In the instance of the bourgeoisie's medicalization of madness and sexuality, Foucault explains:

> And I think we could easily succeed in demonstrating—and this is, after all, what I have tried to do on a number of occasions in the past—that, basically what the bourgeoisie needed, and the reason why the system ultimately proved to work to its

[33] For more on the idea of sexual orientation as a mode of "being" rather than "having," see Weeks 1985 and Halperin 1990.

> advantage, was not that the mad had to be excluded or that childhood masturbation had to be controlled or forbidden—the bourgeois system can, I repeat, quite easily tolerate the opposite of this. What did prove to be in its interest, and what it did invest, was not the fact that they were exclude, but the technique and procedures of their exclusion. It was the mechanisms of exclusion, the surveillance apparatus, the medicalization of sexuality, madness, and delinquency, it was all that, or in other words, the micromechanics of power that came at a certain moment to represent, to constitute the interest of the bourgeoisie (Foucault 2003, 35).

Foucault demonstrates that power is not only reinforced because of strength that it wields over others, but also because of rewards or benefits that some people reap from its organizational mechanisms. In the instance of sexuality and madness, power's micromechanics —the work of doctors and the work of schools—encouraged the bourgeoisie to uphold the regulation of madness and sexuality. Power's micromechanics can yield significant economic and political benefits: "In other words, the bourgeoisie doesn't give a damn about the mad, but from the nineteenth century onward and subject to certain transformations, the procedures used to exclude the mad produced or generated a political profit, or even a certain economic utility" (Foucault 2003, 33). The system of power, located in institutions that employ individuals, financially rewards the bourgeoisie who participate in and uphold these institutions. As such, power encourages individuals to uphold systems of exclusion insofar as they reap economic and political benefits from the mechanics of exclusion. Power also rewards those affected by these institutions by making it so that society includes those who abide by institutional norms, and excludes those who do not (Foucault 2003, 32).

Power and Subjects in Deliberation

By acknowledging that power produces, tantalizes, and rewards individuals, I maintain that we can see the ways that power's micromechanics—via the dual-subjection of individuals —affect deliberation. That is, in being attentive to power's productive and remunerative

capacities, the micromechanics of power evident in institutional dynamics are illuminated in how people deliberate, how they communicate. Internal micromechanisms, whether they are bureaucratic pathologies that Barnett and Finnemore (1999) explicate, regulatory norms within individual country's diplomatic bodies, or individual experiences of regulation (e.g., via schools, families, legal restrictions, social pressures, and medical evaluations) impact the ways that people live and act. Micromechanisms operating behind overt, hierarchical power structures, are products of power that shape deliberation and the ways that individuals participate in deliberation. I suggest that being aware of these factors, which are concealed in existent theories of deliberation, illuminates the ways that covert mechanisms of power operating in deliberative settings arrange, produce, reward, tantalize, and repress individuals' identities.

Foucault's discussion of truth clarifies the way that power relates to individuals. He describes power as interrogating the subject: "Power constantly asks questions and questions us; it constantly investigates and records; it institutionalizes the search for the truth, professionalizes it, and rewards it" (25). Foucault indicates that power's presence is continually evident in the quest for truth by means of institutionalizing, professionalizing, and rewarding the truth, where the truth is a perspectival assertion of a claim's universality. As such, power asserts a particular truth to distribute and arrange relationships in a desired fashion. Foucault explains that a particular claim to universality "can be deployed only from its combat position, from the perspective of the sought-for victory and ultimately, so to speak, of the survival of the speaking subject himself" (2003, 52). Truth claims, then, are asserted not for the advantage of humanity as a whole, but rather for the advantage of the singular speaking subject declaring the truth. This means that truth claims made by any individual, or

by an institution exercising power, are violent insofar as truth claims combat against, rather than engage with, alternative perspectives.

As truth claims are made combatively, Foucault understands the truth to be forceful. He states, "Truth is an additional force, and it can be deployed only on the basis of a relationship of force. The fact that truth is essentially a part of a relationship of force, of dissymmetry, decentering, combat, and war is described in this type of discourse" (2003, 53). Truth claims arise from and reinforce dissymmetries present in all relations of power. This is why Foucault describes war in the same terms as claims to truth: parties in war *and* truth claims both aim to impose a so-called universal good, which is actually one particular perspective, on others.

With respect to deliberative settings, then, Foucault illuminates deliberations as repositories of power that can include truth claims. These truth claims will inevitably be shaped by the speaking subject's desire for victory, as well as the speaking subject's understanding of self, which as I described above, is determined by relations of power. Furthermore, the very institution of the UN can assert truth claims, because the UN as a repository for power "institutionalizes the search for the truth, professionalizes it, and rewards it" (Foucault 2003, 25).

In the case of UNSC deliberations, we can understand that individual diplomats' statements that assert truths are shaped by multiple factors. Consider a statement by the US Ambassador Samantha Power in an 11 May 2016 meeting on threats to international peace and security:

> As we consider the task of countering violent ideologies, we all must recognize that the common goal of countering terrorist ideologies should never be used as an excuse to suppress political dissent. Many countries recognize narrow, clearly delineated exceptions to the right of the freedom of expression, such as incitement to imminent violence, which is an exception to that right in the United States. (S/PV.7690, 11)

The above statement asserts a particular truth—"that the common goal of countering terrorist ideologies should never be used as an excuse to suppress political dissent"—but the claim is also made to achieve a victory of the US's goals. This aim of victory is implicit in the second sentence, in which Power presents freedom of expression in the United States as an example of how these freedoms should be handled in other countries. Her statement is further shaped by personal experiences, as this statement comes after numerous mentions of Power's encounters with people in Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria. Her personal experiences and her representation of US interests come together in this truth claim on counterterrorism.

While truth claims can indeed be asserted by particular individuals, they can also be asserted by institutions. Truth claims, Foucault explains, are institutionalized by means of governmentality. Foucault identifies governmentality as a modern phenomenon by which a field of power relations establishes the "conduct of conduct" (Foucault 2007, 389). Governmentality entails three things: First, the "ensemble formed by institutions, procedures analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics" that allow power to be exercised; second, the tendency of power to rely on sovereignty and discipline to be exercised; and third, the process by which the administrative state was governmentalized (Foucault 2007, 108-9). Foucault's theory of governmentality illuminates the institutionalization of certain goals, truth claims, and norms via policies and laws as part of the process of calculating the best way to arrange people to achieve a particular end—institutional rules and goals aim to conduct relationships among both people and states. In the case of the United Nations, the institution's numerous rules and procedures, as well as its rewarding of participants who abide by these rules and procedures (and complementary punishing of those who do not), signal that governmentality contributes to the reproduction of institutional norms. Truth claims asserted

during policy deliberations are produced by, and reproductive of, broader institutional norms and goals.

In Foucault's words, we can understand truth claims within governmentality to serve a conductive function. He explains conduct: "Conduct is the activity of conducting (conduire), of conduction (la conduction) if you like, but it is equally the way in which one conducts oneself (se conduit), lets oneself be conducted (se laisse conduire), and finally, in which one behaves (se comporter) under the influence of a conduct as the action of conducting or of conduction (conduction)" (Foucault 2007, 193). The conduct of conduct concerns the ways that individuals are governed, the ways that relations between individuals are governed, as well as the ways that individuals govern themselves. Through expressions of governmentality, such as informal and formal procedural rules, the UN then conducts individuals, relations between individuals, and the ways that individuals conduct themselves. For example, the Council's PROP, the UN Charter, and the norm of marginalizing women's issues all shape UNSC deliberations.

UN objectives and norms continually constitute deliberators as subjects *and* conduct their subjects' behaviors, by encouraging people to abide by norms. As I explained in Chapter 2, the influence of institutional norms on deliberations is evident, for example, in the marginalization of gender concerns. Even though gender was added to the Council's portfolio in 2000, the historic norm of *not* addressing gender continues to affect individuals' engagement with gender. Many individuals working in the UN have been subjected as individuals who do not see gender as integral to the pursuit of world peace. Those who resist this subjection serve as examples of what Foucault would call counter-conduct, going against the reproduced norms by maintaining gender is an integral concern to policymaking (Foucault 2007, 201).

Counter-conduct is resistance to modes of conduct—these ways that individuals are subjected. Foucault explains counter-conduct as a refusal to be the subjects we have been created to be: "Probably the principal objective today is not to discover but to refuse what we are….We have to promote new forms of subjectivity while refusing the type of individuality that has been imposed on us for several centuries" (Foucault 2001, 1051).

Government and counter-conduct are mutually constitutive (Foucault 2007). Relations of power simultaneously encourage subjects to uphold norms and rules of the organization, and these same relations of power encourage subjects to *resist* norms and assert alternative truths in deliberation, as advocates for the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda have done; I address this counter-conduct more extensively in Chapter 4. Foucault gives us purchase on the ways that power's subjection of individuals impacts the claims they make in deliberation. Institutional relations of power and norms inform individuals' deliberative claims —both what they say and how they say it. Likewise, these relations of power and norms shape the ways that deliberative claims are received.

Using a Foucauldian conception of power, we are drawn to consider the ways that formal rules produce gendered effects and informal norms that constitute relations of power. For instance, analyzing Council deliberations on WPS matters while keeping the concept of power in mind, one would be attentive to the ways that deliberative processes are formed by formal and informal structures of power—whether they be the PROP, the UN Charter, or the exclusion of women's issues from most UNSC meetings. Following Foucault, I maintain that to fully understand power's influence on deliberations, we must be attentive to complex networks and relationships that exist behind formal arrangements and the ways that these networks produce individuals as subjects. While it would be impossible to identify every facet

of power's expanse, as the series of relations is too vast, it ώ possible to interpret, analyze, and acknowledge their presence in, and influence on, deliberation. To ensure that deliberation is theorized in actuality, rather than ideally, it is necessary to consider power in this way. If one limits power's influence to evidence in formal rules and norms, the theory presents the same limitations as extant theories of communicative behavior and becomes apolitical.

The practical theory of deliberation that I have presented posits that existent power affects how the individual presents him or herself, and the ways that an individual presents him or herself—whether through conduct or counter conduct—in turn shapes the way that power evidences itself in the institution. For example, in the UNSC, a delegate's deliberative statement is shaped by his or her goals and personal perspective on the issue as well as by the UN's rules of speech-writing, what their capitol wants them to say, as well as the formalities of Council deliberation. Moreover, what individuals say in UNSC deliberations have the potential to alter the way that power is made evident within the Council and the UN, as well as their home countries. In fact, the statements made by delegates in the Council become domestic and/or foreign policy once proclaimed—they have direct impact on their home country's laws and stances (Interview, UNSC diplomat, May 2015). Their statements also directly impact world politics, shaping diplomatic relationships between and among countries, and affecting the implementation of UN efforts on the ground. It is for this reason that news media so carefully pay attention to how statements made in the Council reflect relationships and indicate changes in power relations among member-states.

For example, on 30 September 2015, *The New York Times* provided detailed coverage of the Palestinian Authority's President Mahmoud Abbas' statement in the UNSC. Abbas declared that Palestinians were no longer bound by mutual agreements with Israel, and the

Times article provides analysis of Abbas' formal declaration. Some interviews who analyzed the declaration found the statement to entail "very tortured language;" others found the statement to be saying nothing new and therefore of little consequence; and yet others took the language and statement very seriously indicating a likely scenario (Gladstone and Rudoren 2015). This *Times* reporting on this Council events reflects the idea that insight into world politics can be gained from analyzing and interpreting statements made in deliberation.

Conclusion

Given my critique of extant theories of deliberation, the question arises as to whether this practical theory of deliberation, which recognizes deliberation as molded by individuals and by power, is "guilty" of employing the same idealized apparatuses as theories of bargaining, rhetorical action, and argumentation. My practical theory of deliberation does not employ an *idealized social ontology* because it acknowledges power as continually shaping both the individual deliberator and the deliberative context, nor does it *idealize capacities* because each individual is recognized to be continually formed by multiple axes of difference—people do not have fixed identities and are not assumed to be equal. Correspondingly, this theory does not postulate *an idealized cognitive sphere*, as individuals' experiences are fundamentally shaped by social orders and local experiences. Further, a practical theory of deliberation is not *silent on oppression,* as it acknowledges how systems of power operate to exclude some and include others. Relatedly, this theory does not posit *ideal social institutions* because institutions are understood to fundamentally and systematically disadvantage groups such as the poor, racial minorities, and women. And finally, because practical theory of deliberation recognizes deliberation itself to constantly change and depend on the individuals deliberating as well as

shifting power dynamics, it does not posit *strict compliance*. In sum, using Mills' (2005) criteria, this theory is **not** ideal.

The practical theory of deliberation can be compared to theories of communicative behavior and rhetorical action:

TABLE 3.5: PRACTICAL THEORY VS. THEORIES OF COMMUNICATIVE AND RHETORICAL ACTION

	Communicative Action	**Rhetorical Action**	**Practical Theory of Deliberation**
Common assumptions	conflict about validity claims, actors exist in common lifeworld	each actor has different goals, decision-making through argument	Actors have some shared, and some distinct, goals; impossible to separate/determine the kinds of goals an actor has; Institution in which deliberation happens has informal and formal norms that affect what happens; identity is intersectional
Rationality	communicative	strategic	Varies(sometimes rational, sometimes not); always shaped by relations of power
Goals of the actors	consensus, improve other actors' understanding	to influence, to persuade, to win the argument	to influence/persuade, to improve other actors' understanding, consensus
Argumentative behavior	rule-based, approaching an ideal speech situation	arguments made in support of each actor's interests	ideas are shared (deliberation), no restriction on being argumentative or not
Form of argument	exclusively verbal arguments	including expressive acts and emotive appeals	verbal and nonverbal expressions of ideas
Audience	universal	particular	particular
Consensus	legitimate, objective	factual, subjective	Irrelevant—the theory imposes no end goal on deliberations

To utilize a practical theory of deliberation and analyze the influences of individuals, formal/informal rules and norms, and institutional context, I maintain that we must turn to the very texts of deliberations—observing meetings, studying transcripts, and reviewing video footage. Examining the contours of deliberations' texts can illuminate the ways that these factors

emerge, and are present in, the statements deliberators present. Here, I subscribe to Pierre Bourdieu's theory of linguistic habitus—defined as the individual's regular linguistic practices (Bourdieu 1991, 86). Bourdieu stresses that when studying language, one must pay attention not only to the words themselves, but the entirety of individual's lived experiences. He writes, "I think that one cannot fully understand language without placing linguistic practices within the full universe of compossible practices: eating and drinking habits, cultural consumptions, taste in matters of arts, sports, dress, furniture, politics, etc." (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 149). The linguistic habitus can, therefore, only be understood with attention to the entirety of one's life and how each component therein relates to the others. More broadly, one can only understand the linguistic habitus by carefully studying the multiple spaces of existence that orient and shape the individual and her language. The words that one uses emerge from, and respond to, multiple axes of difference—gender, race, socioeconomic status, etc.—for each person.

Following Bourdieu, I contend that an individual's participation in deliberation is informed by myriad experiences that give one a unique perspective and position, as revealed in the very language one uses in deliberation. Studying the texts of deliberations can therefore reveal the multiple ways that individuals are affected by, and in turn affect, the institution in which they deliberate. An analysis that utilizes a practical theory of deliberation demands careful analysis of deliberative texts, reading with attention to the ways that individuals' statements reflect the myriad experiences—personal, institutional, historical, etc.— that shape deliberations.

Interpreting deliberations using a practical theory of deliberation, one would expect to find that participants' statements vary in the form of argumentative behavior, end goals, and

degree of rationality. Depending on the particular institutional and global context, the very aims of deliberation will differ for each deliberator. Each deliberators' aims will also depend on his/her own biases and self-interest, by his/her position in the word. Factors such as power dynamics and relations of power will also continually shape what is said and what happens in a deliberative setting. Further, historic and present systems of oppression—explicit or silent—will affect the course of deliberations.

I expect that using a practical theory of deliberation to analyze UNSC WPS-deliberations would reveal that a member-state's position in the Council will impact the way that delegates address WPS issues. I would also expect the theory to illuminate that an individual delegate's own *personal* and multifaceted history and background impacts how s/he engages in debates on WPS matters. Similarly, we could expect that the ways individuals engage in Council meetings may depend on the *other* individuals present and what others contribute to deliberations. We could also expect that counter-conductive statements in deliberations could alter the norms and rules in the Council.

With respect to the broader institutional environment, I would expect the historic context of the Council to deeply impact the contours of WPS deliberations. For instance, I expect that we would see deliberations on the WPS agenda to increase in complexity and understanding of the WPS agenda's goals over time, as delegates and the UN system becoming more familiar with the aims laid out in SCR 1325. That being said, because a practical theory recognizes that historic practices often silently shape present practices, I also expect that it would reveal the Council's deliberations to often remain "stuck" in the historic norms of *not* addressing women's issues—even in meetings dedicated to the WPS agenda. I moreover expect that we would see deliberations' course, and the ways individuals engage in

them, to vary depending on current events. As the practical theory of deliberation stresses the importance of context and relations of power, it would illustrate that UNSC deliberations' contours shift with changes in international relations. The theory can also help us recognize dynamics of power that could shift, thereby changing the course of future deliberations in the Council. The practical theory's ability to transform deliberations will be explained more in the manuscript's final chapter, as suggestions for change can only be made after the theory has been applied.

Deliberations in the Council are not rational exchanges of preferences within the bounds of decorum, but rather dynamic communications of ideas that are continually affected by individuals' identities and institutional power dynamics. I have now developed a practical theory of deliberation that gives us tools for analyzing and evaluating deliberation in the Council as it happens in practice. Acknowledging power and intersectionality as inherently and expansively present in the Council provides a means of studying the practice of deliberation in the Council, instead of imposing an imperialistic and idealistic vision for how deliberation should, or could, unfold in the Council. Interpreting deliberations in the Council with attention to power and identity helps us evaluate actual deliberations and not merely suggest external-ideal alternatives.

As Jacob Levy (2015) notes, theories that are constructed or used without any reference to human limitations—what Charles Mills (2005) would call the actual or the nonideal— are not theories of politics, but rather "a branch of speculative fiction" (Levy 2015, 18). A practical theory of deliberation provides a theory of *political* deliberation because it recognizes the complex relations of power and contributions of individuals in deliberations. It

openly acknowledges how human limitations impact the course of deliberations. I turn in the next chapter to apply this theory to examine postdesign WPS deliberations in the UNSC.

Chapter 3: Works Cited

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, and Vincent Pouliot. "Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya." *European Journal of International Relations* 20.4 (2014): 889–911.

Ahmed, Sara. *Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, objects, other*s. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2006.

Aoláin, Fionnuala Ní. "Women, security, and the patriarchy of internationalized transitional justice." *Human Rights Quarterly* 31.4 (2009): 1055-1085.

Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans. Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000.

Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. "The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations." *International organization* 53.04 (1999): 699-732.

Bartky, Sandra Lee. *Femininity and domination: studies in the phenomenology of oppression*. New York: Routledge, 1990.

Bilgin, Pinar. "Individual and societal dimensions of security." *International Studies Review* 5.2 (2003): 203-222.

Bordo, Susan, and Leslie Heywood. *Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body*. Berkeley, CA: U California Press, 2004.

Bourdieu, Pierre. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson, Ed. John B. Thompson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991.

Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loïc JD Wacquant. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity*. New York: Routledge, 1990.

Butler, Judith. *The psychic life of power: Theories in subjection*. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1997.

Cho, Sumi, Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, and Leslie McCall. "Toward a field of intersectionality studies: Theory, applications, and praxis." Signs 38.4 (2013): pp. 785-810.

Coomaraswamy, Radhika, et al., *Preventing conflict, transforming peace, securing the peace: a global study on the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*. New York: UN Women, 2015.

Davis, Kathy. "Intersectionality as buzzword: A sociology of science perspective on what makes a feminist theory successful." In *Feminist Theory*. 2008, 9(1): 67-85.

Deitelhoff, Nicole "The discursive process of legalization: Charting islands of persuasion in the ICC case". In *International Organization* 63(1) 2009: 33–65.

Deitelhoff, Nicole and Harald Müller "Theoretical paradise — empirically lost? Arguing with Habermas." *Review of International Studies* 31(1) 2005: 167–179.

Diamond, Irene, and Lee Quinby. *Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance*. Lebanon, NH: Northeastern UP, 1988.

Dietz, Mary G. "Patriotism." in *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change,* Ed. Ball, Terrence, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson. New York: Cambridge UP,1989: 177-193.

Ewig, Christina. *Second-wave neoliberalism: Gender, race, and health sector reform in Peru*. Penn State Press, 2010.

Fearon, James D. "Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation." *International Organization* 52(2) 2003: 269–305.

Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books, 1995 (1975).

Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality.* Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Penguin Books, 1978.

Foucault, Michel. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978.* Ed. Michel Senellart. Trans. Graham Burchell. New York: Picador, 2007.

Foucault, Michel. *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976.* Eds. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana. Trans. David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003.

Foucault, Michel. "Truth and Power," in *Foucault Reader*, Ed. Paul Rabinow, pp. 51-75. New York: Random House, 1984.

Fraser, Nancy. *Unruly practices: Power, discourse, and gender in contemporary social theory*. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1989.

Gasper, Des. *The idea of human security*. Avebury, UK: Ashgate, 2010.

Gladstone, Rick and Jodi Rudoren. "Mahmoud Abbas, at U.N., Says Palestinians Are No Longer Bound by Oslo Accords." *The New York Times*. 30 September 2015.

Goffman, Erving. *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life*. New York: Doubleday, 1959.

Grosz, Elizabeth A. *Volatile bodies: Toward a corporeal feminism*. Indiana University Press, 1994.

Habermas, Jürgen. *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Boston: Beacon, 1984.

Halperin, David M. *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality.* New York: Routledge, 1990.

Hancock, Ange-Marie. "When multiplication doesn't equal quick addition: Examining intersectionality as a research paradigm." *Perspectives on politics* 5.01 (2007): 63-79.

Hekman, Susan J., ed. *Feminist Interpretations of Michel Foucault*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996.

Heyes, Cressida J. *Self-transformations: Foucault, ethics, and normalized bodies*. New York: Oxford UP, 2007.

Hudson, Natalie Florea. *Gender, human security and the United Nations: security language as a political framework for women*. Routledge, 2009.

Hurd, Ian. "Legitimacy, power, and the symbolic life of the UN Security Council." *Global Governance* 8 (2002): 35.

Hurd, Ian "The strategic use of liberal internationalism: Libya and the UN sanctions, 1992–2003." *In International Organization* 59(03) 2005: 495–526.

Kapust, Daniel. "Cicero on decorum and the morality of rhetoric." *European Journal of Political Theory* 10.1 (2011): 92-112.

Kapust, Daniel J., and Michelle A. Schwarze. "The Rhetoric of Sincerity: Cicero and Smith on Propriety and Political Context." *American Political Science Review* 110.01 (2016): 100-111.

Krook, Mona Lena, and Jacqui True. "Rethinking the life cycles of international norms: The United Nations and the global promotion of gender equality." *European Journal of International Relations* 18.1 (2012): 103-127.

Levy, Jacob T. "There's No Such Thing as Ideal Theory." Available at SSRN 2420125 (2015).

McCall, Leslie. "The complexity of intersectionality." *Signs* 40.1 (2014).

Mclaren, M. A. "Foucault and the body: A feminist reappraisal." *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity* (2002): 81-116.

McNay, Lois. *Feminism and Foucault.* Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1992.

McWhorter, Ladelle. *Bodies and pleasures: Foucault and the politics of sexual normalization*. Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1999.

Mills, Charles W. "'Ideal theory' as ideology." *Hypatia* 20.3 (2005): 165-183.

Mills, Charles W. "Race and the social contract tradition." *Social Identities* 6.4 (2000): 441-462.

Mitzen, Jennifer. "Reading Habermas in anarchy: multilateral diplomacy and global public spheres." *American Political Science Review* 99.03 (2005): 401-417.

Mouffe, Chantal. *The Democratic Paradox*. Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2005.

Müller, Harald. "Arguing, bargaining and all that: communicative action, rationalist theory and the logic of appropriateness in international relations." *European journal of international relations* 10.3 (2004): 395-435.

Nash, Jennifer C. "Re-thinking intersectionality." *Feminist review* 89.1 (2008): 1-15.

NGOWG Official. Personal Interview. July 2015.

Payne, Rodger A. "Persuasion, frames and norm construction." *European Journal of International Relations* 7(1) 2001: 37–61.

Powell, Robert. "Bargaining theory and international conflict." *Annual Review of Political Science* 5(1) 2002: 1–30.

Rancière, Jacques. *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics*. Trans. Steven Corcoran. New York: Bloomsbury, 2010.

Risse, Thomas. "International norms and domestic change: Arguing and communicative behavior in the human rights area." *Politics & Society* 27(4) 1999: 529–559.

Risse, Thomas. "'Let's argue!' Communicative action in world politics." *International Organization* 54(1) 2000: 1–39.

Saleh, Alam. "Broadening the concept of security: identity and societal security." *Geopolitics Quarterly* 6.04 (2010): 228-241.

Sawicki, Jana. "The Final Foucault." *Teaching Philosophy* 13.1 (1990): 66-69.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. "The community trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the Eastern enlargement of the European Union." *International organization* 55.01 (2001): 47-80.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. *The EU, NATO and the integration of Europe: Rules and rhetoric*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Shepherd, Laura J. *Gender, violence and security: Discourse as practice*. New York: Zed Books, 2008a.

Smith, Adam. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. University Park, IL: Liberty Fund, 1979[1790].

Stephen, Matthew D. "'Can you pass the salt?'The legitimacy of international institutions and indirect speech." *European Journal of International Relations* 21.4 (2015): 768-792.

United Nations Security Council. Meeting S/PV.4589. 25 July 2002. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/records/2002.shtml. Accessed 3 September 2016.

United Nations Security Council. Meeting S/PV.7690. 11 May 2016. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/records/2016.shtml. Accessed 3 September 2016.

UNSC Diplomat. Personal Interview. July 2015.

Weeks, Jeffrey. *Sexuality and Its Discontents: Meanings, Myths, and Modern Sexualities*. London: Routledge, 1985.

Weldon, S. Laurel. "The structure of intersectionality: A comparative politics of gender." *Politics & Gender* 2.02 (2006): 235-248.

Young, Iris Marion. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1990.

Yuval-Davis, Nira. "Intersectionality and feminist politics." *European Journal of Women's Studies* 13.3 (2006): 193-209.

CHAPTER 4: DELIBERATIVE INSIGHTS INTO WPS

Having now explained the WPS agenda's simultaneous precariousness and significance, as well as my practical theory of deliberation, I return to my initial questions: Why does the WPS agenda continue to persist? How and why does it continue to take up valuable time in the Council, even though there are so many mixed signals about its importance? I suggest that we can understand how and why the agenda has persisted by examining deliberations on WPS matters. More specifically, I maintain that we can gain insight into the agenda's persistence through careful attention to the ways that different subjectifications of women have been constituted throughout Council deliberations.

Utilizing my practical theory of deliberation, I explain how and why different subjectifications emerge throughout the WPS agenda's trajectory. I demonstrate that emergent subjectifications very often instrumentalize women and their needs. Although the strategic use of women's experiences to achieve policy goals is not surprising (cf. Aoláin 2016, 289; Cook 2016, 355; Kirby and Shepherd 2016, 378), my practical theory of deliberation importantly helps us understand *why* these instrumentalizations come about. Utilizing my theory, I analyze different subjectifications and explicate moments at which the Council is more or less responsive to women's experiences on the ground. By examining subject constitutions through UNSC deliberations, we can see how the agenda has simultaneously progressed and remained stuck in the problematic norms that I uncovered in Chapter 2. Despite quantitative data's indication that the agenda has progressed linearly over time with respect to descriptions of women (see Graph 2.2 in Chapter 2, page 62), evaluating WPS deliberations with my practical theory of deliberation demonstrates that the agenda's advancements are intermittent rather than continuous.

Method of Analysis

To study deliberation on WPS—here considered to be all statements shared in formal Council meetings, UNSC presidential statements, and UNSC resolutions—I use two sources of data. First, I use all meeting transcripts and resolutions pertaining to the WPS agenda from 2000 to 2013, consisting of approximately 1700 pages of statements and agreements. I analyze Council meetings on WPS matters during this time period because it contains all WPS meetings from the agenda's inception until the last WPS UNSCR (SCR 2122, in 2013) before the agenda's 15-year anniversary, and consequent Global Study, in 2015. Studying these thirteen years reveals a significant arc of the agenda, giving us purchase on how Council deliberations contributed to, and affected, the High-Level Review of WPS released in 2015. This project is the first to analyze transcripts from WPS specifically, as well as from any one thematic topic in the UNSC. My second source is interviews conducted with 10 elite policymakers working on the WPS agenda, consisting of approximately 15 hours of conversations as well as follow-up discussions. I interviewed a range of people, from UNSC diplomats, to officers in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), to employees of NGOs such as the NGO Working Group on 1325 (hereafter referred to as NGOWG). Interviews are crucial for studying the Council, as they impart valuable insight into informal Council deliberations and provide knowledge about the agenda's trajectory that transcripts alone cannot supply.

As I make use of a practical theory of deliberation to analyze WPS deliberations, I evaluate statements from interviews and meeting transcripts with especial attention to the ways that identity and power shape what is said. I am also attentive to the ways that what is said affects power dynamics and identity. I especially focus on how power and identity

influence different subjectifications of women in UNSC deliberations, as well as how these constituted subjectifications affect power and identity in turn. To grasp the power dynamics present in these subjectifications, I draw from my analysis of the WPS agenda's nested newness in Chapter 2. And to ascertain how identity shapes deliberations, I note how individuals' statements reflect the myriad experiences—personal, institutional, historical, etc. —that influence deliberations.

I am aware that the reflection of lived experiences in words, as well as my assessment of them, will never be complete. I recognize, like Pierre Bourdieu (1977), that the individual's worldview, reflected in all that a person says and does, is *endless* in its "….capacity to engender products—thoughts, perceptions, expressions, actions—whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production" (95). Thus, what an individual says in the Council constitutes one particular representation engendered by the individual's intersectional identity. I am able to approximate the factors that affect an individual's statement—whether it be gender, age, nationality, education, etc.—but I cannot gain a complete picture of the individual's identity. The individual's identity is "….beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate transformation, cannot even be made explicit" (94). I acknowledge that the entirety of one's lived experience cannot be made explicit, but I posit that one can approximate these worldviews by noting language and delegates' publicly available personal histories. As such, I suggest that we can see discourses that constitute individuals as subjects to emerge in statements (cf. Povinelli 2002, 48).

The UNSC is a particular repository for power and, as such, formal statements are for the most part scripted and shaped by dominant norms and dynamics within the UN, which I explained in Chapter 2. While I recognize that these formal statements are scripted, I borrow

the idea from Foucault that they are neither hegemonic nor closed (cf. Deleuze 2006 [1988], 10). I suggest, therefore, that deliberations provide valuable insight into the power dynamics, processes, and interactions that determine the Council and the UN more broadly.

Because I recognize the array of factors that are connected to deliberations, I am attentive to how deliberative language entails habits of thought to which the language-user is very often not attuned (cf. Foucault 1970, 297). Although statements are scripted, they are consciously influenced by a variety of factors, including (but not limited to) what prior speakers have said, the topic of debate, the rules of speechmaking in the UN, external political events, points that capitals find important, and what diplomats themselves feel is important to state. Through studying deliberations, then, I maintain that we can understand how memory, both individual (e.g., past experiences, personal opinions) and institutional (e.g., debate topic, rules of speechmaking, political events), shape individuals' participation in deliberations and, consequently, deliberations' trajectories.

As Foucault (1970) writes about language: "Expressing their thoughts in words of which they are not the masters, enclosing them in verbal forms whose historical dimensions they are unaware of, men believe that their speech is their servant and do not realize that they are submitting themselves to its demands" (297). Language, therefore, is not merely a reflection of the individual's choice of words, but rather a way in which historical dimensions —often unbeknownst to the speaker—emerge. Recognizing that language is embedded in historical dimensions, I am cognizant of the ways that institutional and world histories implicitly inform what participants say. As I acknowledge that statements made in formal Council meetings are not hegemonic or closed off from broader dynamics within and without the Council Chambers, I am also interested in the interplay between these scripted and

unscripted statements. I analyze statements from interviews to provide insight into formal Council meetings, and to illuminate the myriad factors that affect UNSC deliberations regarding WPS issues.

Situating my Analytic Focus: Subjectifications of Women

Throughout my analysis, I am particularly attentive to one component of deliberations: the ways that delegates' language constructs women subjects, or in Foucauldian terms the *subjectfications* of women in deliberations (Foucault 1980, 97). As Laura Shepherd's (2008a) research on security discourses in the Council has demonstrated, the representations of subjects in language enable certain ways of thinking about and acting on these constructions. Understanding how different subjects have been constituted in deliberations, I argue that we can grasp the ways that different subjectifications make certain actions and ways of thinking possible in the Council's policymaking. Consequently, tracing the emergence of different subjectifications illuminates the agenda's trajectory and helps us understand why the WPS agenda has continued to take up valuable time in the Council, even though there are so many mixed signals about its importance.

Focusing on subjectifications not only allows me to highlight the influence of, and interactions between, power and identity in deliberations, but also allows me to engage with current feminist IR research on the WPS agenda. Feminist IR scholars have been concerned with the UN's depiction of women as dichotomous: women are either agents (and therefore active) or victims (and therefore passive) (e.g., Engle 2014, Cohn 2014; Shepherd 2016). Tracing the UNSC's attention to sexual violence in war over time, Karen Engle (2014) argues that the UNSC separates people as violators or violated, as actors or victims, thereby

projecting a Victorian idea of a loss of honor onto women insofar as women are perceived as experiencing violations during conflict that make it nearly, if not entirely, impossible for them to be reintegrated into society once conflict has ceased (33). Engle leaves her readers with a series of questions challenging the dichotomies evident in UNSC Resolutions and UN Secretary General statements:

> Could we imagine categories beyond violated or peacemaking women and violated and violating men? Could we open ourselves to the multiple desires of women and men—economic, social, sexual and political—without reinforcing assumptions about shame and even about peace? Women's and men's lives, including their security issues, do not (need to) revolve around such dichotomies (Engle 2014, 38)

Likewise, Carol Cohn (2014) presents the gendered victim-agent dichotomy in the UNSC as inherently problematic, insofar as the dichotomy diminishes vulnerability from a general, human concern to a limited, feminine concern that only applies to victims. Cohn (2014) explains that the gendered victim-agent dichotomy is akin to the gendered dichotomy of 'vulnerable groups' and the implicitly 'not-vulnerable' Other (62). She further writes that this dichotomy "not only distorts the 'vulnerable victim' by erasing her agency but also distorts the "not-vulnerable agent" by making his vulnerabilities invisible" (62). Cohn ultimately illustrates the same point as Engle: UNSC representatives dichotomize human subjects so that their needs are more easily identifiable, but consequently, these identified needs do not adequately reflect the lived experiences of the people these policies impact. Identified needs are problematically based on distortions of people's identities and experiences, distortions around which people's lives and security issues do not revolve.

Interestingly, though, while feminist scholars such as Cohn and Engle have pointed to the prevalence of the victim-agent dichotomy, they have not fully considered why or how this dichotomy came about or fully explored the possibility of *other* frames shaping the course of

policymaking and discussions in the Council. In particular, both Cohn and Engle evaluate the use of these victim-agent descriptions in final resolutions and documents, but do not address these subjects' constitutions in the very meetings surrounding these resolutions. My project fills this lacuna by carefully examining subjectifications of women in Council deliberations. I examine deliberations to understand how and why the Council deliberations produce women as certain types of subjects, while excluding or marginalizing others (cf. Åhäll 2012, 105). Like Jamie J. Hagen (2016), I am concerned with the "spectrum of identities that do not fit neatly" into the categories and subjectifications of "women" that are constituted via Council practices, especially experiences that do not align with the cissexist and heteronormative subjectifications of women in Council meetings (313).

In this chapter, I explore how UNSC power dynamics and deliberative participants' lived experiences influence the subjectification of women in WPS deliberations. While current scholarship regarding women's portrayals in UNSC resolutions focus on women as victims or agents (e.g., Shepherd 2016, Engle 2014, Cohn 2014), or as requiring protection or more integrated participation (e.g., Kirby and Shepherd 2016, 379-83), this research does not engage with the ways that these portrayals emerge, disappear, or even change through quotidian practices in the Council. Extant scholarship assumes that these categories are fixed and constantly present in UNSC practices. For example, Karen Engle (2014) only introduces these categories' potential impossibilities at the very end of her paper (38), and Carol Cohn (2014) suggests that it is almost unimaginable for the SC to consider women outside of the victim-agent dichotomy (62). Current research on women subjects in the UNSC, therefore, does not consider these categories as *possibilities*. Instead, it presumes the Council's concerns

with women as either agents or victims to be ever-present due to "cognitive distortions produced by implicit and unexamined gendered assumptions" (Cohn 2014, 50).

In contrast, I argue, agreeing with Judith Butler, that the "subject is neither a ground nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process" (Butler 1992, 13). This means that I recognize that the subjects of women agents, or women victims, do not exist a priori. Rather, I understand these subjects as possibilities, and that their constitutions are signified through deliberative processes. Thus, while extant scholarship on the construction of women subjects in the WPS agenda focuses on subjects as products of UNSC documents and resolutions, I recognize that subjects' existences depend on how these subjects are (or are not) resignified through UNSC deliberative processes. This is why I argue that it is crucial to analyze the day-to-day practices of the WPS policy community, i.e., regular UNSC meetings on WPS matters to understand the ways that women are subjectified and produced again and again (cf. Butler 1992, 13).

Chapter Overview

I explore two factors that influence how women are subjectified: changing norms, and thematic topics in meetings. In this chapter's first part, I utilize my practical theory of deliberation to unpack how changing power dynamics in the Council have influenced how deliberations subjectify women. I examine deliberations in 2000, 2006, and 2013. Studying these years' deliberations allows me to review the shape of the WPS agenda, with 2000 being the first year, 2006 being the approximate midpoint, and 2013 being the latest year considered in my analysis. I demonstrate that Council deliberations have increasingly recognized multiple

roles of women because of increased information about women's experiences on the ground, *as well as* the instrumentalization of more subjectifications to achieve policy goals.

While the strategic use of women's experiences to achieve policy goals is not surprising (cf. Aoláin 2016, 289; Cook 2016, 355; Kirby and Shepherd 2016, 378), my practical theory helps us interpret moments at which the Council is more or less responsive to women's experiences on the ground. Using my theory illuminates that the Council is *not* as impermeable and resistant to change as one might think (cf. Backer 2012), insofar as the Council is more reflective of women's experiences at certain times. The practical theory of deliberation ultimately gives us purchase on how and why different subjectifications are made possible, and ultimately emerge, over the course of WPS deliberations. I explain that more women's experiences have been revealed in Council deliberations over time due to changing norms, increased information, and strategic goals. In 2000, I demonstrate that women's agency comes to the forefront of conversation because it is causally linked to women's victimization, which more clearly aligns with the historic-institutional practice of understanding women as victims. In 2006, I establish that women become more agentic subjects, but only insofar as their actions are perceived to be peaceful and contribute to Council aims. And in 2013, I find that women are described as having myriad roles because of increasing information about women's experiences *and* because these roles often align (for better and for worse) with strategic goals of member-states and NGOs alike. Overall, I foil the agenda's apparent linear progress by explicating how and why different subjectifications have become increasingly prominent over time.

In this chapter's second part, I examine how specific topics of deliberation within the WPS agenda—specifically civilians and indicators, or measures of the implementation of

UNSCR 1325—affect how women are subjectified. In this section, I use my practical theory of deliberation to explain how and why different topics of conversation result in different subjectifications of women. While the subjectifications themselves are not necessarily surprising (e.g., women being implicitly feminized, or civilians being perceived as women), understanding why these subjectifications come about is of significant interest. First, I find that WPS deliberations focused on civilians equate civilians with women, thereby rendering civilians/women as needing saving and the UN as the body to do this saving. Through the lens of my practical theory of deliberation, I determine that these subjectifications reinforce the Council's identity as a masculine institution and exemplify the power dissymmetry between elite politicians and the people their policies affect.

Second, I demonstrate that indicators represent an attempt of the Council to construct the world to be as delegates imagine, or want, it to be. Utilizing my theory, I explain that deliberations regarding indicators exemplify how subjectifications of women affirm the Council's dominance. I further assert that deliberations regarding indicators illuminate the extent to which the Council understands women as instrumental to their aims in the dual-use of the word "target" to describe Council goals as well as the plight of women in conflict situations. By making women's experiences targets of the Council's policies, deliberative statements demonstrate that the Council and member-states are often more concerned with affirming their identities and power than they are with acknowledging women's myriad experiences. Thus, while indicators have been praised as giving a framework to assess and progress the WPS agenda, these same indicators, as well as deliberations *about* indicators, highlight continued challenges to the WPS agenda's original aims being met.

In conclusion, I argue that the essential contestability of the agenda's meaning and subjects contribute to the agenda's continued existence in the Council's portfolio. I explain that women, peace, and security is not a "monolithic thing" encompassed by SC resolutions, but rather a living deliberation among intersectional people, about intersectional people, that is dynamically informed by various vectors of power. Studying deliberation in the UNSC elucidates the WPS agenda as it exists in practice, i.e., as actual conversations that aim to realize the WPS agenda's continually progressing goals. And this progress is not linear, as count data about UNSC-WPS deliberations suggests. Rather, the agenda is constantly pulled between moving towards realizing its aims and being stuck in the problematic norms that it seeks to disrupt, and it is this constant movement that helps it remain part of the UNSC.

General Trends in UNSC Deliberations on the WPS Agenda

To grasp overarching developments in WPS deliberations, I asses how women have been subjectified in meetings, focusing especially on meetings in 2000, 2006, and 2013. Using my practical theory of deliberation, I find that increased awareness about women's varying roles in conflict resulted in deliberations and resolutions that exemplify a variety of ways of describing and addressing women subjects. I unearth that delegates' approaches to the WPS agenda have evolved as new information, as well as new venues for sharing information, about women's various roles in conflict and post-conflict situations have been brought to light. However, the inclusion of a broader spectrum of women's subjectivities does not mean that *all* women's experiences are included or recognized by the Council. I explain how and why subjectifications of women reveal some, and exclude other, experiences.

Inaugural Meetings on WPS: 2000

In the first Council meetings dedicated to WPS issues, the main task was to establish and reify the goals of the agenda. Emerging out of the collaborative efforts of UNSC member-states and NGO-WPS advocates, the key tasks of WPS were to more comprehensively address women's needs and roles in conflict and peacemaking, especially ensuring that, as the NGOWG laid out, women play a greater role in peace support operations, conflict prevention and peace building (NGOWG 2000, 1). In the inaugural Council meetings, we see a push for women to be recognized as agents who should play a greater role in these settings throughout deliberative statements.

Women are specifically addressed as people who are not only suffers, but also agents who can resolve conflict and persuade "their menfolk to accept peace" (UNSG Kofi Anan, S/PV 4028, 3). Delegates stressed that women should not only be perceived as victims—that women are active participants in peace and security, as well. Statements highlighted that it was new and noteworthy to discuss women as active agents of peace, diplomacy, and/or democracy (King, S/PV 4028, 3). UNSC delegates focused primarily on women as victims or victimized and as "agents of peace," as the entire WPS agenda is motivated by the goal of more actively considering and incorporating women in foreign policy. Statements like Mr. Grainger's (UK) are present in most speeches: "My third point is that we should not fall into the trap of seeing women and girls only as the victims of armed conflict. They can also play key roles in unlocking the door to peace" (S/PV 4028, 19). Or, as Mr. Widodo (Indonesia) stated: "My delegation underlines that this issue should be addressed not only from the perspective of treating women as victims of armed conflicts, but also as makers of peace" (S/PV 4028 R1, 24). Addressing women as victims *and* agents also signifies a broad shift in the

Council, reflecting a new orientation to address and consider women. Delegates' statements explicitly subjectify women as agents in these deliberations.

While the subject of agent was possible prior to 2000, its possibility only becomes constituted as subject in these first WPS meetings, a novelty that delegates repeatedly note. By vocally identifying women as agents, and subsequently noting their agency in resolutions, these statements make possible women's formal involvement in conflict resolution and peace processes. Judith Butler (1992) asserts, and I, too, maintain, that because individuals' identities are profoundly shaped by dynamics of power, agency is not an "a priori guarantee." Rather, agency's existence depends on configurations of discourse and power. Recognizing agency's possible *non*-existence, then, we are called to question the conditions of agency's possibility, as well as to analyze the conditions that lead to the constitution of, or impossibility of, agency (Butler 1992, 13). What led to the possibility of women's agency?

Delegates frequently described women's victimization as having a causal link to women's agency—that their victimization is what makes them agents. For example, Mr. Bhattarai (Nepal) said, "In conflict situations women become the victims of outrage and violence….They frequently witness horrendous abuse meted out to their children…Women are more likely to shun violence more consistently. For those reasons, and more, women are likely to be more committed to resolving disputes more peacefully than men are" (S/PV 4028 R2, 11). Similarly, Mr. Mwakawago (United Republic of Tanzania) stated, "Being direct victims of violence and discrimination, women have gained a great understanding of the need to address peace comprehensively" (S/PV.4208 R1, 26). Mr. Gurriab, the Council President and representative of Namibia, likewise claimed, "….it has taken the international community many decades to recognize that women are among the principal victims of war, conflict and

insecurity. They must thus be treated as indispensable partners in the maintenance of international peace and security" (S/PV.4208 R2, 12). The subjectification of women as agents that emerges in the 2000 WPS deliberations is made possible by prior subjectifications of women as passive and requiring protection.

This causal relationship is especially evident in a statement made by Miss Durant (Jamaica) in the same meeting:

> Yesterday, members of the Council had an opportunity, during an Arria-formula meeting, to exchange views with representatives of civil society. We heard from representatives of non-governmental organizations, working at the grass-roots level in many countries, about the need for sustained attention to the plight of women victims of violent conflict and their crucial role in fostering a culture of peace in their communities. The recommendations that emanated from that meeting deserve the attention of the Council, particularly because they came directly from women who are victims, as well as participants in seeking peace (S/PV.4208, 10).

While Miss Durant encouraged the Council to acknowledge the value of information shared about women's roles in peace and conflict, she justified these recommendations' mobilization "because they came directly from women who are victims." Miss Durant implicitly puts forward that a woman's classification as a victim is what makes her voice and action valuable to the Council. Identifying, or being identified, as a victim is what gives the woman some limited agency in matters of peace and security. Even though SCR 1325 focuses especially on women's agency, it is squarely situated in a discourse that covertly upholds the primacy of victimization. Studying these 2000 deliberation reveals that the newly constituted subjectification of women as agents is made possible by women's initial subjectification as victims.

Although these acknowledgments of women as active participants suggests a new approach to women's role in peace and security, the grounding of agency in victimization reveals that these initial deliberations are not quite as groundbreaking as WPS advocates had

hoped for. Recall that one of the NGOWG's goals for the WPS agenda was to implement "Concrete measures to ensure that women play a greater role, at all levels, in peace support operations, conflict prevention and peace building" (NGOWG 2000, 1). By rooting women's agency in their victimization, the concealed message is that victimhood remains the primary category that subjectifies women. Although women may *seem* to have oppositional subjectifications—agent and victim—women remain fundamentally subjectified as victims. The woman subject's intelligibility as agent depends on her first being subjectified as victim.

I argue that critically examining power's influence on, and presence in, these subjectifications, we see how language clears and conceals people's identities (cf. Heidegger, 1999[1946], 249). In the case of UNSC descriptions of women, we can ascertain that women's agency becomes clear and recognized insofar as the possibility of agency is simultaneously and tacitly concealed because of its ties to victimization. I suggest that the implicit identification of women as victims is a consequence of power's micromechanisms in the Council. As Foucault (2003) explains, "the micromechanics of power….constitute the interest of the bourgeoisie" (35). In the case of claims that root women's agency in their victimization, the implicit victimization constitutes a mechanism of exclusion, as the claim conceals the possibility of women being defined primarily by a category *other* than victim. With this in mind, we can ascertain that these claims perpetuate an institutional norm wherein women are predominantly understood as passive, even if statements and actions suggest otherwise.

While the resultant concealment of women's agentic capacities is, indeed, problematic, it is important to note that there is a reason for the continued focus on women as victims. Beyond the historic norm of focusing on women as victims, the language of victim stresses the need to attend to the WPS agenda's goal of protecting women in armed conflict (cf.

Tryggestad 2009, Shepherd 2008). UNSCR 1325, for example, calls on parties of armed conflict to work especially to protect women and girls from gender-based violence (Article 10). The goal of protection is further emphasized in later WPS SCRs, including SCR 1820 (2008), which specifically address the protection of women from sexualized violence during conflict, and SCR 1960 (2010), which integrated Women's Protection Advisors in missions alongside Gender Advisers. While women's agency is seemingly revealed, but ultimately concealed, women's suffering (and the need to address and remedy this suffering) is made clear in both the subjects of agents and victims. The casual connection between victim and agent in 2000 UNSC meetings makes it so that the deliberative subjectifications of both victim and agent illuminate the importance of addressing women's needs for protection in conflict.

It is also worthwhile to note that some delegates do *not* draw a causal link between victimization and agency (e.g., Egypt S/PV.4028R1; Pakistan S/PV.4028R1). Statements subjectify women not only as victims of conflict or agents of peace, as the above-described statements do, but also subjectify women as targets and combatants (e.g., Noeleen Heyzer, representative for UNIFEM, S/PV.4028, 7-8). These subjects, while related to the subjects of agents and victims constituted by other delegates, are slightly different. The category of "target" indicates women as not only inadvertent sufferers of conflict, but rather stresses that women are sometimes directly attacked because of their identities as women. The category of "survivor" presents an alternative to "victim." While "victim" conveys passivity during suffering, advocates for "survivor" assigns women empowerment (cf. Mardorossian 2002). Likewise, the category of "combatants" indicates that women are not only active as "agents of peace," pursuing the goals of the UNSC, but also active as militants in conflict situations.

The most prominent example of these subjects is evident not in a UNSC diplomat's statement, but rather in Noeleen Heyzer's statement (S/PV.4028) as the representative of the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). In her statement, Ms. Heyzer describes women as victims, active in peace negotiations (6), combatants (9), survivors (7, 8), and targets of war (7). Heyzer does not use the language of "victim" and "agent" that most delegates do. The fact that different subjects emerge in a non-member-state's descriptions of women suggests that internal UN discussions on women are more open to describing women outside the victim/agent binary than country delegations are. This, of course, is unsurprising, as the WPS agenda was pushed for not by member-states, especially not by permanent Council members. Rather, the WPS agenda's strongest advocates were civil society groups and experts on gender and security matters, like UNIFEM.

Interpreting Noeleen Heyzer's statement in terms of identity and power helps explain her deliberative statement's differences from most Council diplomats' statements, which subjectify women as victims. As an individual who works *with*, rather than with*in* the Council, Heyzer has an intersectional identity distinct from diplomats. While Heyzer is undoubtedly subject to the broader power constraints of the Council, as her work is to advocate for women, and not a particular country or for global security, she is exempt from many normative constraints from which diplomats cannot escape. Working on the periphery of the Council, Heyzer's statements can more easily be counter-conductive, expanding the horizon for describing women from a limited binary to a spectrum.

Heyzer is, arguably, speaking a truth that has yet to be ascertained by the majority of Council members. The language Heyzer uses to describe women, and consequently constitute women subjects, makes clear the spectrum of women's experiences that are concealed in most

speakers' focus on women's agency and victimization. Thus, while most delegates' speeches only constitute two subjects—victims and agents—Heyzer's statement constitutes *myriad* women subjects. In making clear these multiple subjects, I suggest that Heyzer brings into question that which made "this discourse of truth possible," wherein the "discourse of truth" for Heyzer in the context of the Council is the repeated victim-agent subjectification of women (Foucault *Courage,* 11-12). By challenging the normal discussion of women as victims and agents, Heyzer implicitly challenges the validity of the constitution of women subjects in most UNSC statements.

Heyzer's separation from the Council is one of the reasons she is able to challenge deliberative norms: Her words do not have the weight of domestic policy, as Council diplomats' words do, nor do her words have immediate consequences for international relations. Her role as part of UNIFEM is to push the WPS agenda forward and to take risks that allow the agenda to move beyond perspectival truth claims, such as statements that uphold the binary subjects of victim and agent. Heyzer's ability to challenge these norms is also tied to her individual experiences dealing with gender and security issues. Whereas the consideration of women in conflict is generally new for most Council diplomats, Heyzer's work has long-centered on addressing the concerns of women in conflict situations. She served as UNIFEM's executive director from 1994 to 2007; her extensive personal experience addressing women's needs likewise contributes to the women subjects constituted in her statement. Heyzer's memory—her habits of thought, as Foucault would say—make it possible for her to constitute more women subjects than most diplomats can. She has different experiences and different expertise from most USNC diplomats, and her statement therefore reveals different elements of women's experiences.

Delegates' statements reflect the institutional memory of women being understood primarily as victims, while Heyzer's statement represents the new knowledge about women's experiences in conflict situations. That being said, both delegates' and Heyzer's subjectifications of women ultimately exclude experiences that might not fit into the narratives of victim, agent, target, combatant, survivor, etc., that these subjectifications represent. While Heyzer's statement clears, or reveals, *more* experiences, it also conceals experiences that do not map onto the descriptions she uses. By being attentive to the roles of individual identities and power dynamics in these deliberations, we can see that statements, and the subjectifications of women within these statements, are profoundly impacted by norms and individuals' (in)abilities to resist these norms. Further, we can see how these dynamics shape the clearing and concealing of women's different experiences via the linguistic constitutions of subjects.

2006 WPS Meetings

Between 2000 and 2006, no new WPS SCRs were passed. Nonetheless, I maintain that there are notable changes shifts in the subjectifications of women in Council deliberations. In the 2006 Council meetings on WPS (S/PV.5556 and S/PV.5556R1), delegates described women in multiple ways, more so than in earlier meetings on WPS. Delegates predominantly focused on women as participants, actors, and agents, with fewer mentions of women as victims than in 2000. Notable exceptions to this focus on women as active or agentic include Slovakia, Germany, the UK, the Congo, Uganda, Bangladesh, El Salvador, and Sudan, which portray women as victims, targets and vulnerable persons (see: S/PV.5556 and S/PV.5556R1). The general move towards emphasizing women as agents indicates a shift

in women's subjectification in deliberations. Rather than defining women as agents *because* of their victimization, as in 2000, Council members instead focused on women as active in their own right in 2006, but only insofar as women's action is geared towards peace and achieving the Council's goals.

In 2006 statements, agency is defined and recognized without reference to victimization, unlike the 2000 meeting, marking a significant transformation in the practice of deliberation in the Council. The norm of implicitly marginalizing women, or relegating them to passive roles, no longer dominates. Whereas such claims to agency were counter-conductive in 2000, they had become conductive by 2006. We see a different kind of woman subject constituted through deliberations in 2006: a woman who is subjectified as agent because of her inherent capacity for peace, or her perceived capacity to help the Council achieve its goals.

For instance, Mr. Kirn (Slovenia) stated, "The role and contribution of women are critical to the promotion of the human security agenda, shifting the traditional emphasis from inter-State security to people-centered security" (S/PV.5556, 22). Likewise, Ms. Rehn (Finland, on behalf of the EU) stated, "The European Union believes that it is crucial to move from marginalization to action. We encourage increased attention to the dual participation of women from the first stages of negotiating peace through reconstruction and political participation" (S/PV.5556, 27). These statements portray women's agency as valuable in its own right, without any reference to women's experience or classification as victims in conflict. Rather, women's action is important for the broader goals of security.

It is important to note that although women are explicitly constituted as agentic subjects in their own right, these statements also restrict this agency to a particular aim: peace.

Women are constituted as agentic subjects in these statements not because of their victimization, but rather because of their ability to promote the human security agenda, as Mr. Kirn explained and delegates mentioned in the 2000 deliberations, as well. Mr. Kirn later noted, "…while recognition of the contribution of women's networks and grassroots peacebuilding initiatives to peace consolidation processes is growing, we still need to integrate them much better" (S/PV.5556, 23). Thus, Mr. Kirn recognized women's primary contribution to be efforts toward peace. Likewise, Mr. Rehn's statement indicated the need to "prioritize women's role throughout the peace process" (27). In both instances, we see women's agency as being valuable insofar as it is peaceful or contributing to peace. The subjectification of women as agentic in these statements reflects "inherited perceptions of women as….peace-loving" (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007, 1), and it is this tendency towards peace that makes their participation valuable.

The disclosure of women's agency treats women as instrumental pieces in the UNSC's efforts, rather than as individuals who are valued in their own right. As these statements constituting women as agents reveal peacefully active capacities, they simultaneously enframe women so that women's multiple (and possibly non-peaceful) capacities and/or desires are *concealed*. Women are perceived as having "Beautiful Souls," meaning that women are female innocents whose purity ought to be defended (cf. Elshtain 1985). The possibilities of women being disinclined towards peace, or indifferent to peace, are excluded entirely from the constituted subject of woman agent. Further, the emphasis on women's peaceful proclivities implicitly reinforces historical assumptions of their roles being passive, rather than active. The practices of WPS deliberations make it so that there is an inevitable, and simultaneous, representation of women as passive even when women are being portrayed as agentic and

active participants (cf. Cook 2016, 372). In the case of portraying women as peaceful, this identification is tacitly linked to the underlying assumption that women's peaceful nature means that they more often suffer at the hands of others' actions.

Although the apparent move away from causally linking victimization and agency seemingly indicates movement towards recognizing women as active in their own right, I suggest that the overarching tendency to classify this agency in terms of peace reflects a continued concealment of women's myriad experiences in conflict. We see delegates' enframing of women to conceal the spectrum of experiences (women as victims, active, combatants, survivors, and targets) Heyzer brought forward in 2000. While most delegates have apprehended the possibility of agency without reference to victimization, their discussion of agency indicates that they are more concerned with utilizing (mis)conceptions of women's peacefulness to pursue institutional aims. One UN DPA officer noted, "The narrative has changed from the normative argumentation saying women need to participate because it's their right, and now we talk about, well, women are actors for change; they need to participate. If you want to be a successful mediator, you need to make sure women participate if you want to achieve sustainable peace" (Interview, UN DPA officer A, May 2-15). Thus, the trend towards instrumentalizing women's participation in deliberations is part of a broader tendency in the UN wherein women are encouraged to participate, not because it is their right, but rather because it is necessary to "achieve sustainable peace."

Even delegates who explicitly separate women's agency from perceived peacefulness subjectify women as instruments for institutional goals. Consider Ms. McAskie's (Assistant Secretary General, head of Peacebuilding Support Office) statement at the very start of the 2006 deliberation:

> Women have a key role to play in building peace—in their own right, and not only because they are disproportionately victimized or because they are seen more naturally as agents of peace. Women's key role must be recognized because societies where women participate fully generally enjoy more peace, more prosperity and more opportunity" (S/PV.5556, 10).

McAskie's statement suggests that even non-peaceful women are instrumental to the UN's goals: Women have a key role because when they participate fully in matters of peace and security, everyone is better off. Women are instrumental to not only goals of maintaining peace, but also increased prosperity and opportunity. While McAskie acknowledges that women are not necessarily peaceful, or valued because of their victimization, she nonetheless makes women instrumental to Council goals.

We see, in both McAskie's and other delegates' statements, the ways that linguistic subjectifications conceal women's lived experiences. By making women instrumental to policy goals, and thereby not allowing women's experiences to emerge in their own right, these Council deliberations illustrate that women's own lives and identities are being concealed through linguistic acts of domination. Heidegger explains that language does not allow us to understand the truth of being: "Instead, language surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of domination over beings" (Heidegger 1999[1946], 243). Recognizing language as a means of dominating, we see that although delegates like McAskie may believe themselves to be conveying the truth that women are important "in their own right, and not only because they are disproportionately victimized or because they are seen more naturally as agents of peace," their language ultimately makes women instruments of elite politicians' efforts. These statements obscure the myriad women's experiences that may *not* help the UN achieve goals of prosperity and peace. The Council's vision for the WPS agenda inhibits the constitution of non-instrumental women subjects.

This instrumentalization is not only clear in deliberations, but also in the very ways that individuals in the UN system implement policies. One UN Officer explained how delegates are more concerned with the perceptions of UN efforts rather than the lived experiences of the women whose lives they discuss and their policies impact:

> There's got to be an end goal in mind, there's got to be a practical ramification that needs to occur, and while I think that mainstreaming occurs on many different thematic issues, with gender we forget what we're trying to achieve in the end, and it ends up being, "let's add more women," or, "let's make sure a woman comes to this meeting," the optics of it or whatever it is, rather than, "I want to make sure that the voices and opinions of women on the ground are actually transferred to the Security Council." (Interview, UN Officer, July 2015)

This statement reflects that delegates use different subjectifications of women not to ensure that their experiences impact policy, but rather to achieve the "optics of whatever" the issue is. The policies constructed to uphold the goals of the agenda, rather than to support the women the agenda is intended to address and help.[34]

In sum, we see dynamics of power shaping the subjectifications of women that emerge in 2006 deliberations. The Council's historic goal of peace results in a norm of focusing on how participants can achieve the institution's goals, therefore concealing identities that are not perceived as instrumental to the UN's efforts. While it is clear that the tying of agency to victimization no longer dominates Council deliberations, the resultant focus on agency does not free women subjects from the Council's domination. Rather, we see statements that constitute women subjects who are means to institutional ends of peace and security (see: UN Charter, Article 24). Although delegates explicitly sever women's agency and victimization, they create new ties between agency and institutional goals. Thus, in the 2006 meetings, we see how the Council's institutional aims for WPS instrumentalize women. Across the 2000 and

---

[34] This portrayal of mainstreaming also reflects a general institutional ambivalence about the concept of "gender mainstreaming" in the UN system. For more on this, see Shepherd 2016.

2006 WPS deliberations, we see examples of a general trend in the UN system to be more concerned with optics than with the accuracy of their portrayals and understandings of women's experiences on the ground. This means, ultimately, that policies and practices continue to exclude women's experiences that do not clearly map onto the subjectifications that dominate Council deliberations and documentation.

2013 WPS Meetings

By the end of 2013, six additional SCRs on the WPS agenda had been instituted. The resolutions addressed the need to protect women from sexualized conflict (SCR 1820), created the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (SCR 1888), stressed the need to increase women's participation in peace and security governance (SCR 1889), and integrated Women's Protection Advisors in missions alongside Gender Advisers (SCR 1960). In the 7 years following the 2006 deliberations, we therefore see expanded, specific recommendations and efforts to realize the original goals laid out in SCR 1325.

Arguably, the expanded recognition of the WPS agenda via SCRs and other policy efforts are reflected in the 2013 deliberations, wherein most delegates acknowledged women as having myriad experiences and roles in conflict. For example, in the first meeting on WPS, S/PV.6984, the Council predominantly focused on the ICC and how cases of sexual violence are handled by international institutions. In S/PV.6984, women were often described as victims, but among those who described women as victims, some mentioned women as survivors, and some also mentioned women as vulnerable. Others described women as both victims and agents of change. Among those who described women as victims and agents of

change, many also portrayed women in different ways: The United States, United Kingdom, Chilean, and Italian representatives described women as survivors; Angelina Jolie mentioned women as survivors and targets; the Argentine ambassador described women as vulnerable; the Danish ambassador portrayed women as survivors and vulnerable. Overall, delegates' language constituted multiple subjects: survivors, vulnerable, victims, targets, and agents of change.

In deliberations, we can see the resignification of women as subjects—agents, victims, vulnerable persons, survivors, etc.—and each subjectification demonstrates a different possibility for recognizing women under the auspices of the UNSC's WPS agenda (cf. Butler 1992, 13). This is not to say, though, that these different characterizations do not instrumentalize women in some way. For example, while the subjectification of survivor has become more prominent since the inauguration of the WPS agenda, this change has happened for particular reasons. A DPA officer explained the emergence of survivor as a frequent subjectification in Council meetings:

> I think there was a certain push from the more, the activist side. But that's not necessarily consistent, because I think when you have very politically savvy individuals—in NY, let's say the NGOWG—who wanted to, you know, maybe push women as important actors and they need to be consulted, is not necessarily what we have in other contexts where we have grassroots organizations who maybe want an emphasis on women as victims who need to be helped. I don't know, whatever serves your purpose, I guess. (Interview, UN DPA officer B, May 2015)

Similarly, a UN Officer explained that the portrayal of women as victims or survivors depends on one's end goal:

> I think if you're talking about it from a rights-based perspective, it should be "survivors," for example, an empowerment sort of model. If you're talking about it from an operational-military point of view, it's "victims," because they are victims, or international criminal law. It depends on what purpose, how you try to classify this, and you have to use the language of that discipline to classify them. It's not about

> what won't sit well with you, it depends on which context to make sure you achieve your goal. (Interview, UN Officer, July 2015)

The motivation for subjectifying women as victims or survivors does not necessarily depend on a desire to bring to presence women's lived experiences, but rather on an effort to achieve particular institutional goals. When one wants to push women as important actors, one focuses on them as survivors of suffering. And when one wants to push for aid for women's needs, one describes them as victims of suffering. While both categories reflect women as suffering, "survivor" depicts women as overcoming and being empowered to act, whereas "victim" suggests that women are in need of assistance. Thus, not surprisingly, the subjectification of women depends not on women's lived experiences, but rather the goals of the elite politician making and discussing policies.

It is interesting to note that an NGOWG official explicated that she finds the language of "victim"as absent from current Council debates. When asked about the increase in the language of survivor, she claimed, "And then you have seen a change, obviously, we now only refer to them, for example, on the SC agenda, we now only refer to them as survivors" (Interview, NGOWG Executive, May 2015). This statement reflects activists' own linguistic concealing and revealing of women's identities. Women are subjectified as survivors to serve the WG's purpose of empowering women. And this subjectification, of course, conceals other possible lived experiences of women, including that of "victim."

When asked to explain why women are recognized as having multiple experiences more frequently in recent UNSC meetings, a UN DPA officer noted, "I think it's sort of natural….I mean, I think it has to do with information, because the only information that we got from the outset was….information kept on coming, and you have a more nuanced look at women engaged in different ways….You saw that the narrative changed with the information

that was given" (Interview, UN DPA officer A, May 2015). Thus, the evident expansion of subjects present throughout statements in 2013 WPS deliberations reflects expanded information. More information about women's experiences turned once possible-subjects into articulated-subjects. Through gaining more information about conflict situations, delegates have learned more about women's experiences between 2000 and 2013, and used this information to create new women subjects and new ways to instrumentalize these subjects to achieve goals of the WPS agenda.

The influence of new information extends not only to deliberations in 2013, but also to the 2013 UNSCRs on the WPS agenda. Resolution 2106 (2013), which challenged impunity and the lack of accountability for CRSV, describes women as agents, survivors, combatants, and vulnerable; and Resolution 2122 (2013), which stressed the importance of civil society's inclusion in the Council and called for the 2015 High-Level Review of SCR 1325's implementation, portrays women as agents, vulnerable, and victims. In these resolutions, the UNSC is arguably presenting new women subjects outside of the victim-agent opposition that dominated the inaugural WPS deliberations in 2000.

I suggest that the shift to subjectify women in multiple ways in deliberations and in resolutions is connected to the UNSC's role as a metapower. Foucault (1984) explains that a metapower is constituted by the relationships among networks of power (64). As the Council is not a sovereign state or entity, but rather an institution that rests on an array of complex networks, including networks that connect sovereign states, it is arguably a metapower. Thus, the developments in language used to describe women is symptomatic not of any one entity, but of shifts within the limitless array of networks that are tied to the Council. As I explained above with respect to the victim-survivor distinction, different subjects are constituted

depending on the institution's goals. This is not to say, of course, that the constitution of multiple subjects is *always* tied to their instrumentality. We can imagine speakers, such as Noeleen Heyzer in 2000, discussing multiple roles of women to ensure "that the voices and opinions of women on the ground are actually transferred to the Security Council" (Interview, UN Officer, July 2015). The constitution of women subjects in deliberation is, therefore, never complete. The woman as subject is always a possibility that emerges through processes of resignification (cf. Butler 1992, 13). Through these Council deliberations, we see the permanent process of resignification, where the women subjects constituted in deliberation depends on advocates' goals, delegates' information about events, and institutional goals.

Interviewees repeatedly noted how improved information about women's varying roles in conflict situations has led to more holistic deliberations regarding WPS issues in the Council. One interviewee explained that whether a delegate understands women as having multiple roles (victims, survivors, agents, etc.) depends on "knowledge and expertise and level of engagement" (Interview, UN DPA officer A, May 2015). Several interviewees noted that over the course of the WPS agenda's development, knowledge and information regarding women in conflict has significantly increased. One UN Officer explained, "For me, for instance, I've been working on these [WPS] issues for 8 years in the UN system. I've never seen so many senior officials in the UN use the terms. I don't know what they think the terms mean, but I've never seen so many people talk about it" (Interview, UN Officer, July 2015). Delegates, therefore, use the language of "agent," "victim," or "survivor" to achieve particular goals—whether it is to address concerns in line with international criminal law or to work to empower women on the ground—but they do not have a firm grasp of the implications of

these words. Rather, as one might expect, they use the words strategically to achieve their respective goals in the context of the UN.

This means that while their language may help them achieve policy aims, the resultant policies do not reflect, or respond, to women's lived experiences that may not clearly map onto the subjects constituted through Council deliberations. This lack of reflection is in part because, as I explained earlier in this chapter, individuals' identities can never be made entirely explicit (cf. Bourdieu 1977, 14). It is also due to the very limits of representation. Sam Cook (2016) writes about the problem of representation in the UNSC: "It is of course impossible in both theoretical and practical terms for stories (and even the names) of the many millions of historically situated women connected to various events framed as war over time, to come before the Security Council to speak" (362). Thus, Cook argues, it is the work of feminist activists to contribute more narratives to the Council's work. However, it remains impossible for all women's stories to be told—it is a matter of expanding the horizons of experiences represented in the deliberations.

Strategically using articulated subjectifications extends not only to achieving WPS policy aims, but also to getting a seat on the Council (cf. Kirby and Shepherd 2016). For example, one UN official explained the increased references to UNSCR 1325 as necessary for a member-state to increase its respective power within the UN: "1325 has become one of those integral things that you must mention for most countries—I'd say 85%—to get on the Security Council. It's such a central part of their mandate, you have to know what you're talking about on this, as well. So, I feel like it's being understood as the foundation to many, many other things" (Interview, UN Officer, July 2015). It is interesting that the UN official notes that 1325 needs to be mentioned and not comprehended or critically analyzed for a seat on the

Council. Just as senior officials increasingly mention WPS issues and portray women in statements without knowing what the concepts mean, member-states vying for a seat on the Council mention SCR 1325 without necessarily grasping the WPS agenda's aims, challenges, and history.

Member-states reap political profit for embracing WPS issues in their statements, without necessarily backing these statements with any kind of significant understanding of what the agenda entails. Delegates use WPS jargon not necessarily to advance the goals of the WPS agenda, but to improve their standing in the UN via a seat on the Council. As Foucault's theory of power explains the 18th Century bourgeoisie's endorsement of the medicalization of madness to be not because of any understanding of, or care for, the mad, but to be for economic or political profit (Foucault 2003, 33), my application of his theory of power illustrates delegates to be incorporating WPS language for political profit in the UN system.

While the naming of women's experiences has undoubtedly contributed to participants in the agenda achieving aims (e.g., using the language of "victim" to argue for protective policies, or using the language of "survivor" to argue for empowering policies), this naming has also led to the concealment of women's lived experiences on the ground. As Jamie J. Hagen (2016) notes, "The WPS architecture is a powerful vehicle for informing peace and security work with a gender perspective, though heteronormative and cissexist assumptions about gender can have an exclusionary impact" (331). Through subjectifying women as survivors, victims, agents of change, combatants, and targets, UNSC deliberations conceal, or exclude, narratives that do not align with these identifications.

Utilizing my practical theory of deliberation, I have not only identified moments of inclusion and exclusion regarding subjectifications of women, but also explicated the

mechanisms that make these moments possible. Historic norms of discussing women, the WPS agenda's architecture, and policymakers' identities all contribute to subjectifications of women that have emerged over time. Linguistic turns have undoubtedly made the WPS agenda a powerful vehicle for informing peace and security work, as well as contributed to an expanded horizon of women's experiences that are represented in the Council. Just as the agenda has recognized different characteristics of women over time, we can imagine the agenda to eventually unconceal women's experiences that are currently excluded from deliberations and policies. Because the subject is "the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process" (Butler 1992, 13), we can imagine new subject possibilities emerging in deliberations. I explore the possible inclusion of heretofore unspoken women's experiences, and what practices might shift to further expand the horizons of subjectifications, more fully in the next chapter.

Subjectifications of Women and Topics of Conversation

It should now be clear that the WPS agenda's trajectory has been shaped by improved understandings of women's experiences, as well as the instrumentalization of the resultant subjectifications. Consequently, the WPS agenda's increased acknowledgment of women's multiple experiences has not translated to tremendous strides in the WPS agenda's goals; many experiences and identities remain concealed given the current subjectifications. In this section, I turn to consider how specific topics of Council deliberations affect delegates' subjectifications of women. I focus on two main topics of the deliberation: civilians and indicators. I utilize my practical theory of deliberation to evaluate how power and identity impact, and are impacted by, these subtopics of WPS deliberation. Ultimately, I illuminate

reasons why the Council is less responsive to, and reflective of, women's experiences when discussing civilians and indicators.

Analyzing the practice of deliberation regarding civilians and indicators reveals two things. First, I find that deliberations focused on civilians discourage explicit considerations of women's roles in peace and security. Using my practical theory of deliberation, I explain that the conflation of women with civilians emerges from systems of power and elite politicians' identities' distance from the populations they discuss. I demonstrate that the feminization of civilians is a result of the UN's historic-masculine identity, as well as the predominant, heteronormative understandings of the WPS agenda among Council members. Second, I find that deliberations focused on indicators portray women as targets, or ends for UN policy goals, rather than as ends in themselves. Although this instrumentalization of women is expected, the deliberative dynamics contributing to the strategic framing of women are not immediately apparent. I utilize my practical theory of deliberation to explicate that this instrumentalization via indicators is made possible by deliberative norms and elite politicians' identities.

Civilians

When considering deliberations regarding civilians, it is first important to address why civilian concerns put under the heading of "Women, Peace, and Security" in the first place. Arguably, concerns with civilians are grouped under the WPS agenda because there is no other arena in which they can be discussed on the SC and because civilians are generally feminized, i.e., presumed to be women and children, in Council deliberations (cf. Carpenter

2005). A former executive of the NGOWG addressed this implicit feminization in an interview:

> There's a lot of talks about civilians, and civilians equaling women and girls, and that's really problematic. I don't know if you remember, men and boys can be civilians, too, and by not, by emphasizing, by always emphasizing, which I mean, you know again, coming back to this issue of having a feminist lens and having the specificities and the particular concerns of women and girls in conflict and the protection issues they face and the assistance needs that they have, I don't want to lose that tightness, but at the same time, I remember it was 2013, and there was a town in Syria that was being just, it was just besieged by the government forces, so there were negotiations with, I think UN actors, it might have been one of the humanitarian actors, to get civilians out of the town, and they managed to do it, but they basically pushed back from allowing any men and boys, because the just flat-out assumption is that, I mean, this is the horrible, stereotypical, you know typical approach, that the women and girls are not seen as armed actors and all men and boys are seen as armed actors. And so I think that that's probably one of the things that the women, peace, and security agenda has not helped with, or has not tackled, in a way that's sort of deserted is a civilian is a civilian is a civilian. And talking about, yea, continuing the sort of idea that women and girls, or, allowing that to be implicit is really problematic. (Interview, NGOWG executive, 2015)

According to this account, the discussion of civilians is implicitly feminized. In the interviewee's experience, this feminization is a "horrible" approach, as it has dire consequences in the field. Because the feminization of civilians does not reflect the actual state of civilians, as civilians are not only women and girls, but also men and boys, as well as people who do not conform to man/woman identities, the norm of feminizing civilians leads to conversations and policies that are unable to address civilians' needs.

Women are equated to civilians in deliberations and in policies on the ground because of the institutional structure of the Council as well as historical norms of civilians being understood as women. As Helen M. Kinsella (2004) argues in her genealogy of the laws of war, sex and sex difference have long-served served as foundations for the differentiation between civilians and combatant, protected and protector (255). The existence of binary differentiation between people based on sex are presumed and serve as the primary

differentiator of combatants and civilians in the laws of war, with "civilian" being "the category to which women are most often relegated and the concept by which they are most frequently defined" (Kinsella 2004, 256). The UNSC's discussion of civilians and women as one and the same fits squarely in the historical dialogue of civilians and combatants.

In fact, Kinsella (2004) explains that the very point of the WPS agenda reinforces a "dyad wherein men are regularly positioned as combatants and protectors during war, and women as civilians and protected" (254). She notes that evidence for this dyadic structure is

> ….most clearly captured by the very need to continually establish that women can also be combatants and should be allowed to be….Indeed, one of the purposes of the report conducted under the auspices of the groundbreaking UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and Armed Conflict is to continue to document and verify the participation of women in combat and as combatants. (Kinsella 2004, 254)

Thus, deliberations regarding the WPS agenda, as well as the WPS agenda itself, implicitly illustrate the historic-legal equation of women with civilians and men with combatants. While the WPS agenda intends to subvert these norms, the 2010 deliberations reveal that this subversion is unsuccessful. Rather, in S/PV.6302 (2010), the norm of women and civilians being one and the same dominates, so much so that delegates rarely refer to women specifically. By feminizing civilians in deliberations, then, diplomats are in line with broader institutional norms as well as the agenda's legal structure laid out in UNSCRs.

This feminization is ultimately successful because it is in line with the norm of women being victims who need male protectors to save them. In feminizing civilians, then, these deliberative subjectifications reify the UN as a masculine institution. In an interview with Carol Cohn for *Signs*, Cynthia Enloe explained:

> It is not men-on-top that makes something patriarchal. It's men who are recognized and claim a certain form of masculinity, for the sake of being more valued, more 'serious,' and 'the protectors of/and controllers of those people who are less masculine'

> that makes any organization, any community, any society patriarchal. (Cohn & Enloe 2003, 1192)

In constituting women as subjects that are less masculine, insofar as they are perceived as requiring control/saving, the Council reaffirms the UN as a patriarchal institution, as I explored in greater detail in Chapter 2. Further, as Iris Marion Young (2003) explains, it is the logic of protection that places women "in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience"(2). If women need protection, then they are located as "less than" the organizations that step in to protect them.[35]

We, therefore, see the focus of conversation on civilians as reinforcing heteronormative and cissexist understandings of the WPS agenda. Civilians are constituted as feminine subjects who need protecting, specifically protection from a masculine entity, thereby excluding alternative civilian experiences from the deliberations. For example, the Austrian delegate said, "More consistent and comprehensive reporting on sexual violence in the Secretary-General's country specific reports would enable the Council to address the protection of civilians, in particular women and children, from sexual violence in a more systematic manner" (Austria, S/PV.6302, 10). The Austrian delegate's statement addresses civilians with particular attention to women, suggesting that the civilians most in need of attention are women—specifically women who need protection. As a result, the delegate's claim asserts the perspectival truth that civilians addressed by the Council are women, specifically women who require the protection of masculine entities like the UN. Similarly, the Special Representative to the Secretary General on Sexual Violence claimed, "The changing nature of conflict is characterized by an increased civilian-combatant interface, which has seen

---

[35] It is also important to note that this logic of protection can be used to mask desires for conquest or sentiments of greed that may be the motivations for UN member-states' actions (cf. Young 2003, 8). The appeal to the role of "protecting" makes UN policies and actions more palatable and praiseworthy.

the targeting of populations and the placing of women and girls at ever greater risk" (Wallström, S/PV.6302, 3). Ms. Wallström's statement as Special Representative to the Secretary General implicitly upholds the idea of a civilian-combatant dyad, wherein women and girls are put at risk as civilians, but are incapable of putting others at risk. Thus, conversations about civilians reinforce the idea of women subjects as advocates for peace, as well as victims in need of assistance.

Both delegates' statements conflate women with civilians, and men with combatants. Such truth claims in the Council's WPS deliberations are intended to benefit many by prioritizing women's needs, but they also unintentionally harm men and boys. As Foucault explains, perspectival truth claims are ultimately violent and forceful. While they may allow for the "survival of the speaking subject himself" (Foucault 2003, 52), in the case of delegates speaking before the UNSC, truth claims do not allow for the survival or victory of others. The feminization of civilians fits squarely within norms and the legal bounds of WPS, but this feminization does not fit with women's experiences. Through these claims, diplomats—especially non-permanent members—are able to ensure their survival as members on the Council by *not* rocking the boat. Statements that fit squarely within the historically accepted understandings of civilians and combatants, even if these understandings are wrong, serve to help them maintain their relative power in the UN system. They use the UN-lingo, consciously or unconsciously, and ensure their own survival as respected members of the UNSC. Thus, they are rewarded for upholding institutional norms in their statements. Civilians are feminized instrumentally: to help the UN act as a protector in conflict situations.

As the above example from Syria demonstrates, those whose survival *is* threatened by these statements are not diplomats, but rather people in the field. Deliberations in the Council

that fail to recognize that "a civilian is a civilian is a civilian," as the former NGOWG executive put it, lead to failures to assist actual civilians on the ground, because men and boys are unquestionably defined as combatants and consequently refused the assistance that they need, not to mention that people who do not fit into the category of woman or man are not addressed at all. The conventional understanding of civilians as women has disastrous consequences among those who are not making the truth claims regarding civilians' experiences—civilians themselves— but are nonetheless directly affected by them.

Beyond the civilian/woman equation illuminating the role of power dynamics in shaping deliberations, especially insofar as this equation affirms the UN's role as a masculine institution that saves, this conflation also illuminates the way that identity shapes the contours of Council deliberations. I suggest that we can further interpret delegates' failure to grasp an alternative truth about civilians as a failure of elite politicians to fully engage with, or understand the plights of, civilians. Policymakers' implicit claim that civilians and women are one and the same arises from and reinforces dissymmetries present in the relations of power between elites and civilians. Foucault (1982) explains the system of differentiations as

> ….that which permits one to act upon the actions of others: differentiations determined by the law or by traditions of status and privilege; economic differences in the appropriation of riches and goods, shifts in the processes of production, linguistic or cultural differences, differences in know-how and competence, and so forth. Every relationship of power puts into operation differentiations which are at the same time its conditions and its results. (792)

In these subjectifications of civilians, differentiations are systematically present in the separation and distance between civilians and policymakers. A power dissymmetry exists in the divide between policymakers and civilians: Policymakers lead lives as part of high society, whereas the civilians they discuss lead lives of comparable destitution. There is an inarguable differentiation of power in terms of economic status and privilege, culture, know-how, etc. A

diplomat's identity as a diplomat informs his/her statements in Council deliberations insofar as his/her claims reflect his/her culture, know-how, and privilege. Diplomats understand the acceptable language and norms of the Council, and their statements reflect this understanding. Of course, as I established in my analysis of the conflation of women and civilians above, this acceptable or formal understanding does not always align with the experiences of the people they discuss. As a result, deliberative claims are sites at which this differentiation is evident. In the case of civilians being equated to women, we see delegates' distance from the very experiences and people they impact.

One interviewee anecdotally noted this distance between policymakers and the populations they discuss in deliberations: "The Chilean government official turns to my director and goes, 'You know, I can't wait for this, for our Council time to be over because I am just so tired of all of this death and war.' Are you? So are the millions affected by it while you live in a very lovely penthouse in the Upper East Side. Welcome to the issue. They're so far gone from the problem" (Interview, WILPF official, July 2015). UN officials can tire of decisions regarding war and conflict, but their position of privilege fundamentally distances them from the experience of conflict. With such extreme differences in power, policy failures are more likely and delegates are more likely to portray women in ways that do not reflect their lived experiences. Officials will continue to lack insight into civilians' experiences of conflict and continue to make policies that are, as the WILPF official described, "so far gone from the problem." The system of differentiation prevalent in international institutions—separating policymakers from civilians, giving each distinct experiences and identities—makes this divide seemingly unbridgeable.

These concerns with difference between policymakers and civilian populations came to the forefront during discussions leading up to the 2016 election of a new UN Secretary-General (UNSG). 2016 was expected to be the year the first woman was elected to the position of UNSG. Stephen Lewis, the former Canadian ambassador to the UN, has said, "Women represent slightly over half of humankind, surely it's time to have a woman as Secretary-General, and I think men who continue to run in the face of what is so obvious and so imperative are ethically bankrupt. There is no question in my mind" (Momoisea 2016, 3). However, Lewis' sentiments were not shared by the majority of diplomats. Women candidates polled poorly prior to the UNSG election, and UN climate chief, Christiana Figures announced that she would bow out of the race. Further, on September 16, 2016, Bulgaria's Irina Bokova (head of UNESCO) trailed the polls in fifth place, with men occupying all four leading places.

The recent struggle, and ultimate failure—former Portuguese PM, Antonio Guterres, was elected as UNSG—to elect a woman as UNSG further illuminates the institutionalization of power differences in the UN. The UN is not only a masculine institution in its efforts to protect feminized subjects, but also in its leadership that is overwhelmingly made up of men. Women are systematically differentiated from men in terms of the power they have within the UN—men are continually given preference to hold executive positions and shape the trajectory of the UN. Consequently, the institution does not reflect, as Ambassador Lewis noted, the constitution of humankind, thereby making the institution's makeup notably different from the world population. Difference and distance are, therefore, present in discussions about civilians, as well as the UN's lack of gender parity.

Indicators

In the context of deliberations, I suggest that the problem of difference is moreover evident in discussions about indicators. Ms. Mayanja, speaking on behalf of the Secretary-General to introduce the use of indicators for the WPS agenda, explained indicators as follows:

> The report before the Council responds to the Security Council's request, in October 2009, that the Secretary-General submit, within six months, for consideration a set of indicators for use at the global level to track implementation of its resolution 1325 (2000), which could serve as a common basis for reporting by relevant United Nations entities, other international and regional organizations and Member States on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) in 2010 and beyond. (S/PV.6302, 5)

I argue that just as UNSC delegates' exclusion of non-heteronormative experiences in conversations about civilians, or about women more broadly, leads to problematic policy outcomes in the field. Although the intent of policymakers is to help women, their methods of doing so inhibit this intent from aligning with the outcome. Although indicators and data about women's experiences do certainly disclose many women's needs, these same indicators also fail to address the needs and experiences of many women, especially those who do not fit into the WPS agenda's cissexist and heteronormative assumptions. And by not fully understanding women's actual needs, policies are unable to help these needs to be met.

I suggest that indicators are a means by which the Council constitutes the world as picture, which conceals the world as it actually is. To understand the world as picture is to grasp the world as an entity that is set up, arranged, and represented by human (mis)perceptions, rather than an entity that can set forth and reveal its own presence (cf. Heidegger 1977, 129). In the WPS agenda, I maintain that UNSC delegates use the information they have, and their limited understandings of women's experiences, to construct the world that they desire—a world in which only heteronormative, cisgendered women who

are primarily understood as victims need their help. Indicators, in particular, are a key means by which the Council has constructed the world as picture. These indicators have helped to reveal the Council's picture of the world because indicators directly respond to, and reflect, elite politicians' perspective of the world.[36] Simultaneously, they have concealed women's experiences that do not fit into this picture by excluding them.

In an interview, a former NGOWG executive who was active in these indicators' creation, reflected that the indicators, while undoubtedly beneficial, often miss the reality of women's situations and the treatment of women in countries. For instance, she stated,

> It counts as content if you have one line in one paragraph of the signed agreement that references women to the same extent as if you have streamlined throughout, CEDAW [Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women] references, you know, strong measurable, implementable calls for women to be involved, you know, to have like a quota for women in national parliaments...those count the same. (former NGOWG executive, 2015)

While indicators can help provide information about the state of women around the world, they often fail to accurately portray what that state is. Indicators, as a result, are a technological means of enframing women's experiences, where enframing is that which conceals the appearance of presences (cf. Heidegger 1977, 21). Indicators conceal women's experiences that are not included in the instrumental subjectifications included in the indicators.

Moreover, we can understand that because indicators are intended to represent objective realities about the WPS agenda's implementation, they assert a certain kind of truth. As they assert truth, indicators themselves are "a part of a relationship of force, of

---

[36] The creation of a picture is, as Heidegger explains, linked to the modern use of technology to enframe, in which enframing conceals that revealing which "lets what presences come forth into appearance" ("Question" 1977, 27). Thus, technology helps create the world as picture and reveals people's production of the world, but *conceals* the world and being as they actually exist. Indicators are, arguably, a modern technology that enframes women in an effort to construct a particular picture of the world.

dissymmetry, decentering…." (Foucault 2003, 53). Insofar as indicators are motivated by facades of truth, they are inherently forceful and reinforce the system of differentiation. By enframing women subjects, indicators are also a mechanism for the Council to assert its dominance over women.

The Council's assertion of dominance is especially evident in the language of "target" applied during these deliberations regarding indicators. In S/PV.6302, delegates frequently talked about indicators as having certain "targets," or goals, to demonstrate the successful implementation of WPS aims. At the same time, they described women as being "targets" of combat. For example, the Lebanese delegate stated, "Today, the changing nature of conflict and the increased number of civil wars make women and girls more frequent *targets"* (S/PV. 6302, 12, emphasis added). Later, the Chinese delegate said, "Much work remains to be accomplished before the international community will be able to achieve the various *targets* set by resolution 1325 (2000)" (S/PV.6302, 17, emphasis added). Why do delegates deploy the language of "targets" to indicate dehumanization of women in conflict as well as the positive aims of the WPS agenda?

When discussing indicators, and their associated targets, elite politicians are asserting a truth about experiences during conflict—conflicts from which these elites are physically distant. Thus, politicians focus on "targets" as a means of representing the world in the way they see fit—to make their own goals come to fruition and make the picture of the world that they desire. However, by enframing women's lived experiences in this way, policymakers marginalize experiences in conflict and solidify their distance from the lives their policies affect.

It is interesting to note that Rey Chow (2006) links the modern idea of the world as target to Heidegger's description of the world as picture. Writing about knowledge surrounding the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Chow explains that the world has been transformed into a target, not just a picture, in the age of bombing. Chow writes, "Supplementing Heidegger, we may say that in the age of bombing, the world has also been transformed into—is essentially conceived and grasped as—a target. To conceive of the world as a target is to conceive of it as an object to be destroyed" (31). In the Council meetings about indicators, I argue that we see one result of the modern world as target—individual people (specifically women) being perceived as targets. Thus, not only is the Council enframing the world as a picture through its subjectifications of women and use of indicators, but it is also presenting women are targets in two ways: First, they are targets insofar as they can be (and often are) intentionally destroyed/attacked during combat situations. Second, their experiences are targets for the Council insofar as the Council want their experiences to not only fit into predetermined categories, but also be at certain ideal-levels. While the Council's quest to achieve "targets" with respect to WPS policies does not result in the physical destruction of women's lives, the quest to achieve targets results in the exclusion or silencing of experiences. And this silencing or exclusion results in, often, the destruction of their lives.

As a result, I maintain that indicators are not designed in a way to really benefit women in need of aid, but rather as a way for the Council to construct the picture of its efforts that it wants to see. Although one might think, as UNSC policymakers and WPS advocates do, that these indicators represent clear strides forward in ensuring the WPS agenda's implementation, careful attention to the roles of power and identity in deliberations

surrounding these indicators' creation illuminates the ways that these indicators hinder the WPS agenda's development. Indicators are instrumental for the WPS agenda's persistence in the Council, insofar as it gives member-states clear goals and "targets," but these same indicators use women's experiences instrumentally (where the women are also described as "targets") and exclude experiences that do not easily map onto the picture of the world the Council imagines.

By utilizing my practical theory of deliberation to analyze S/PV.6302 deliberations, I have shown that certain topics of conversation—indicators and civilians—serve to marginalize considerations of women. It is not just the topic of conversation motivating this marginalization, though. Institutional, historic, and legal norms regarding conversations about civilians make it so that "civilian" is interchangeable with "woman" in these deliberations. While this conflation may seem innocuous, it ultimately limits the consideration of women's multiple roles in conflicts and has disastrous consequences on the ground, preventing men and boys, as well as non-heteronormative and non-cisgendered persons, from receiving the assistance they need in conflict situations. Further, systematic identity differences between elites and civilians shape delegates' statements, making it so that their discussions of civilians and indicators are severed from civilian populations' lived experiences.

In recognition of these differences' prevalence in UNSC deliberations, interviewees reported that conscious efforts to bring in new individuals, specifically civilian women, significantly altered the landscape of Council deliberations on WPS issues. However, as I explain below, these well-intentioned efforts for inclusion often have the unintentional side effect of instrumentalizing women and reinforcing distance and difference. For example, a former NGOWG official explained that their work in the mid-2000s to bring women and their

experiences before Council members is what truly motivated the agenda to take off and contributed to the now 6-sister resolutions on WPS. It is important to note that bringing women in to share their experiences, while effective in changing deliberations around the WPS agenda, was an arguably imperialistic move. Using these women's voices can be interpreted as exemplary of a discourse of cultural imperialism, one in which women's experiences are instrumentalized for the NGOWG's goals, much in the same way particular subjectifications of women in statements are used to advocate for particular goals.

Foucault (1972) explains this kind of discursive imperialism in his lecture, "The Order of Discourse": "[I]n every society, the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality" (109). Foucault suggests that imperialism can be evident in prohibition, that is, the external regulation of what people can say, and how they say it. Further, discourses can be regulated from within by limiting the possible discourses that can emerge in a given society. Cultural imperialism, then, is the means of regulating the ideas that are shared and expressed in a given society, where these restrictions are external or internal (cf. Tomlinson 1991, 9).

By using women's stories to advance the WPS agenda, their experiences are being internally regulated within the context of the Council. The only reason their stories are told is because the NGOWG is *allowing* them to be told for the WG's particular aims. The NGOWG acted imperialistically insofar as the WG's power is what sanctions these women's voices' presence before Council members. Recognizing the WG's actions as imperialistic reveals that while the inclusion of these women's experiences was admirable because it allowed voices to

be included in deliberation that had previously been excluded, the inclusion happened because of the WG's relative power in the UN system specifically, and world politics more broadly.

Dynamics of power, especially systematic differentiations in power between elites and civilian populations, shape conversations regarding both civilians and indicators, and contribute to different subjectifications. I have demonstrated that by acknowledging these dynamics, WPS meetings are affected by deliberative norms that challenge the WPS agenda's aims. Although delegates increasingly use the language of WPS, these linguistic shifts' impact is thwarted by dynamics of distance and difference. Thus, even though significant disruptions —as exemplified by Heyzer and the NGOWG—have helped the WPS agenda progress, not *all* norms have been disrupted, and problematic norms persist, even among the groups that spearheaded the agenda's incorporation in the UNSC's portfolio.

Conclusion

Utilizing my practical theory of deliberation to analyze the emergence of different subjectifications throughout WPS deliberations, I have demonstrated that the WPS agenda has not progressed linearly. The WPS agenda shifts and changes depending on a variety of factors, including information about women's experiences in conflict, deliberative norms, and strategic goals. Dynamics of power and identity contribute to the emergence of different subjectifications, meaning that subjectifications are not necessarily as progressive as they seem. For example, recall my analysis of the 2000 WPS deliberations, wherein the language of agency was implicitly rooted in an interpretation of women as victims first and foremost. Theories of communicative action and rhetorical action would be unable to examine these

subjectifications' emergence, as these approaches would not adequately consider the informal and historical dimensions of UNSC deliberative practices.

Focusing on deliberation as shaped by identity and power reveals the WPS agenda's constantly moving trajectory. As a former NGOWG executive stated:

> I think it's really important to recognize that the women, peace, and security agenda is not, like, a monolithic thing, that there is healthy, I think, discussion, debate, sometimes tension, about what it means, where it's applicable. Some of the biggest discussions, I think, are around whether it's a feminist pacifist movement--I don't mean that those things are necessarily together, but feminist and/or pacifist movement--whether it is, what we mean by participation, which ties in with that, and that's participation in armed forces, that's presence at the table, whether it's peace talks or other decisions that are being made. (Interview, former NGOWG executive, July 2015).

The WPS agenda cannot be understood by merely looking at what is happening at a particular moment with a particular group of countries or people. To understand the agenda's history and future trajectory, as the NGOWG executive noted, we must be attentive to the agenda as consisting of "discussion, debate, sometimes tension" about what the agenda entails, regarding the very subjects that delegates discuss, and how policies should address the very changing ideas of what constitutes the WPS agenda.

My practical theory of deliberation has revealed that the very idea of what constitutes a woman subject—an integral component of the WPS architecture—is constantly changing. And I maintain that it is this innate tension about the agenda's meaning and goals that motivate its continued existence and importance in the Council's portfolio. If the agenda were fully understood and accepted, there would be no need for lengthy discussions or costly global studies about its implications. It is the agenda's, and its essential subjects', contestability that keep the WPS architecture in place.

Chapter 4: Works Cited

Åhäll, Linda. "Motherhood, myth and gendered agency in political violence." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 14.1 (2012): 103-120.

Aoláin, Fionnuala Ní, Dina Francesca Haynes, and Naomi Cahn. *On the Frontlines: Gender, War, and the Post-conflict Process*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Aoláin, Fionnuala Ní. "The 'war on terror'and extremism: assessing the relevance of the Women, Peace and Security agenda." *International Affairs* 92.2 (2016): 275-291.

Backer, Larry Catá. "The structural characteristics of global law for the 21st century: fracture, fluidity, permeability, and polycentricity." In *Reflections on Global Law*. New York: Brill, 2013. 45-67.

Bourdieu, Pierre. *Outline of a Theory of Practice" translated by R. Nice*. New York: Cambridge UP, 1977.

Butler, Judith. "Contingent foundations: Feminism and the question of postmodernism." In *Feminists Theorize the Political*. Eds. Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott. New York: Routledge (1992), 3-21.

Carpenter, R. Charli. "'Women, children and other vulnerable groups': gender, strategic frames and the protection of civilians as a transnational issue." *International Studies Quarterly* 49.2 (2005): 295-334.

Chow, Rey. *The age of the world target: Self-referentiality in war, theory, and comparative work*. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2006.

Cohn, Carol. ""Maternal thinking" and the concept of "vulnerability" in security paradigms, policies, and practices." *Journal of International Political Theory* 10.1 (2014): 46-69.

Cohn, Carol, and Cynthia Enloe. "A conversation with Cynthia Enloe: Feminists look at masculinity and the men who wage war." *Signs* 28.4 (2003): 1187-1207.

Deleuze, Gilles. *Foucault*. Trans. Seán Hand. New York: Continuum, 2006 [1988].

Engle, Karen. "The Grip of Sexual Violence: Reading UN Security Council Resolutions on Human Security." *Rethinking Peacekeeping, Gender Equality and Collective Security*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. 23-47.

Former NGOWG Executive. Personal Interview. July 2015.

Cook, Sam. "The 'woman-in-conflict'at the UN Security Council: a subject of practice." *International Affairs* 92.2 (2016): 353-372.

Elshtain, Jean Bethke. "Reflections on war and political discourse: Realism, just war, and feminism in a nuclear age." *Political Theory* 13.1 (1985): 39-57.

Foucault, Michel. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Trans. Sheridan Smith. London: Tavistock, 1972.

Foucault, Michel. *The Order of Things*. New York: Vintage, 1970[1966].

Foucault, Michel. "The Subject and Power." *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 8, no. 4, 1982, pp. 777–795. www.jstor.org/stable/1343197.

Foucault, Michel. "Two Lectures on Power." In *Power/Knowledge*. Ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon, 1980.

Foucault, Michel. *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976*. Eds. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana. Trans. David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003.

Foucault, Michel. "Truth and Power," in *Foucault Reader*, Ed. Paul Rainbow, p.. 51-75. New York: Random House, 1984.

Hagen, Jamie J. "Queering women, peace and security." *International Affairs* 92.2 (2016): 313-332.

Heidegger, Martin. "The Age of the World Picture." In *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. Trans. William Lovitt. New York: Harper and Row, 1977: 115-154.

Heidegger, Martin. "Letter on 'Humanism' (1946)." In *Pathmarks*. Ed. William McNeill. New York: Cambridge UP, 1999: 239-77.

Kinsella, Helen. *The Image Before the Weapon: A critical history of the distinction between combatant and civilian*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2011.

Kinsella, Helen M. "Securing the civilian: sex and gender in the laws of war." In *Power in Global Governance*. Eds. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall. New York: Cambridge UP, 2004: 249-72.

Kirby, Paul, and Laura J. Shepherd. "Reintroducing women, peace and security." *International Affairs* 92.2 (2016): 249-254.

Mardorossian, Carine M. "Toward a new feminist theory of rape." *Signs* 27.3 (2002): 743-775.

Momoisea, Leilani. "Why is it reigning men at the UN?" *RNZ* 16 September 2016. http://www.radionz/co.nz/news/world/313416/why-is-it-reigning-men-at-the-un. Accessed 17 September 2016.

NGOWG (NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security) "Letter to Ambassadors of the Security Council on the United Nations Security Council Open Session on Women, Peace and Security," www.peacewomen.org/un/ngo/ngoletters/excellence.html (accessed 12 January 2016).

NGOWG Executive. Personal Interview. May 2015.

NGOWG Officer. Personal Interview, July 2015.

Povinelli, Elizabeth A. *The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous alterities and the making of Australian multiculturalism*. Durham, NC: Duke UP 2002.

Shepherd, Laura J. *Gender, violence and security: discourse as practice*. New York: Zed, 2008.

Shepherd, Laura J. "Victims of violence or agents of change? Representations of women in UN peacebuilding discourse." In *Peacebuilding* 4:2 (2016): 121-35.

Sjoberg, Laura and Caron Gentry. *Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's Violence in Global Politics*. London: Zed Books, 2007.

Tomlinson, John. ^. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins UP 1991.

Tryggestad, Torunn L. "Trick or Treat? The UN and Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security." *Global Governance: a review of multilateralism and international organizations* 15.4 (2009): 539-557.

UN (United Nations) (1945) 'Charter of the United Nations', www.un.org/aboutun/charter Accessed 10 June 2016.

UN DPA Officer A. Personal Interview. May 2015.

UN DPA Officer B. Personal Interview, May 2015.

UN Officer. Personal Interview. July 2015.

United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1325 (2000), available from undocs.org.

United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1820 (2008), available from undocs.org.

United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1888 (2009), available from undocs.org.

United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1889 (2009), available from undocs.org.

United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1960 (2010), available from undocs.org.

United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 2106 (2013), available from undocs.org.
United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 2122 (2013), available from undocs.org.
United Nations, Security Council, "Women and peace and security," S/PV 4028 (2000), available from undocs.org.
United Nations, Security Council, "Women and peace and security," S/PV 4028 R1 (2000), available from undocs.org.
United Nations, Security Council, "Women and peace and security," S/PV 4028 R2 (2000), available from undocs.org.
United Nations, Security Council, "Women and peace and security," S/PV 5556 (2006), available from undocs.org.
United Nations, Security Council, "Women and peace and security," S/PV 5556 R1 (2006), available from undocs.org.
United Nations, Security Council, "Women and peace and security," S/PV 6302 (27 April 2010), available from undocs.org.
United Nations, Security Council, "Women and peace and security," S/PV 6984 (2013), available from undocs.org.
WILPF Officer. Personal Interview. July 2015.
Young, Iris Marion. "The logic of masculinist protection: Reflections on the current security state." *Signs* 29.1 (2003): 1-25.

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

At the outset of this manuscript, I sought to understand how and why the WPS agenda has remained an important part of the Council's portfolio despite its numerous challenges. I have explained that although the WPS agenda faces noteworthy difficulties, dynamics of power and individual interests contribute to its continued development and integration in the Council's portfolio. I have also shown that the agenda has progressed intermittently, and I have argued that the agenda's goals and consequent subjectifications vary depending on vectors of power and individuals' identities. I, therefore, maintain that the agenda's continued persistence in the Council is a consequence of the agenda's essence. The WPS agenda is not defined by static meanings and goals, but rather, as especially evident in WPS deliberations, by continual tension about what the agenda entails. This intrinsic tension results in the WPS agenda's challenges, shortcomings, moments of triumph, and continued integration in the Council.

In this chapter, I bring my arguments together and consider their consequences for scholarship and policymaking alike. I first summarize the arguments I presented throughout this manuscript. As a practical theory is transformative dually, because it is transformed by the practices it studies and in turn transforms these practices, I then reflect on how my findings alter my practical theory of deliberation. Third, I explain the implications of my findings for WPS advocates and policymakers, exploring how my conclusions could influence or change deliberative practices. I also consider what my project suggests about the possible inclusion of other marginalized people in UNSC deliberations: LGBTQI* persons. Finally, I explore potential future research areas that expand on this project.

Summary of Arguments

After explaining the WPS agenda's challenges and the need for detailed study of practices surrounding the agenda's creation and implementation in Chapter 1, I explicated the practice of deliberation in the Council generally, and regarding the WPS agenda more specifically. Drawing from formal documents, feminist IR scholarship, and my own interviews with policymakers, in Chapter 2, I analyzed the Council's rules, procedures, and norms with attention to the ways that they produced gender regimes. I also examined how these rules, procedures, and norms have, and have not, impacted the WPS agenda's trajectory in day-to-day practices.

Having established the WPS agenda's "nested newness," in Chapter 3, I constructed a practical theory of deliberation that is suited to analyze the quotidian practice of deliberation, where I defined deliberation as the sharing of ideas. In the chapter's first part, I criticized IR scholarship on communicative behavior to justify the need for a practical theory of deliberation to make sense of the WPS agenda's development. I demonstrated that theories of rhetorical action (e.g., Schimmelfennig 2001, 2003) and communicative action (e.g., Risse 2000, Müller 2004, Deitelhoff 2009) do not account for the *actual* practice of deliberation that I provided in the first chapter. I drew from Charles Mill's (2005) typology of ideal theory characteristics to evaluate the degree to which each theory entails ideal and nonideal components. Ultimately, I criticized each approach's focus on the ideal, rather than the actual, and explained that an over-reliance on the ideal not only makes the theory inapplicable to events that actually happen, but also makes the theory apolitical. I concluded that both theories problematically marginalize, or ignore, the realities of power and identity.

In Chapter 3's second part, I crafted my practical theory of deliberation. Against theories of deliberation that I critiqued, I explained how my theory is grounded in the actual practice of deliberation, rather than an ideal speech situation. A practical theory of deliberation accommodates considerations of power and identity that theories of rhetorical action and communicative behavior exclude or marginalize entirely. To elucidate the roles of power and individuals in deliberation, I utilized Michel Foucault's theory of productive power, and I explained the relationships between power and individuals. Finally, I outlined what we can expect my theory to illuminate about the WPS agenda. I suggested that we could expect applying a practical theory of deliberation would reveal the ways that historic norms of not addressing women's issues have continued to shape UNSC WPS-deliberations. It would also elucidate how individuals' identities affect their deliberative participation.

In Chapter 4, I employed my practical theory of deliberation to examine WPS deliberations. I explained the ways that power dynamics and individuals' identities intersect and inform how and why different subjectifications emerge across time and meeting focus in the UNSC, ultimately illuminating reasons that the WPS agenda architecture continues to persist in the Council. To do this, I used two main sources of data: transcripts from Council meetings on the WPS agenda between 2000 and 2013, and interviews. In my analysis, I focused on just one part of deliberations: the ways that delegates' language constructs subjectifications of women. In the chapter's first part, I used my theory to unpack how changing power dynamics in the Council have influenced how deliberations subjectify women. I analyzed deliberations in 2000, 2006, and 2013. I concluded that Council deliberations have increasingly recognized multiple roles of women because of increased information about

women's experiences on the ground, *as well as* the instrumentalization of more subjectifications to achieve policy goals.

Although the strategic use of women's experiences to achieve policy goals is to be expected (cf. Aoláin 2016, 289; Cook 2016, 355; Kirby and Shepherd 2016, 378), the conditions that allow for, and encourage, this instrumentalization are not immediately apparent. Utilizing my theory, I identified and explained moments at which the Council is more or less responsive to women's experiences on the ground. I ultimately demonstrated that although multiple subjectifications of women have become increasingly evident in Council meetings over time, these subjectifications do not signal linear progress. Rather, emergent subjectifications are often nested in problematic rules and norms that perpetuate perceptions that the WPS agenda intends to subvert. In 2000, I demonstrated that women's agency comes to the forefront of conversation because it is causally linked to women's victimization. In 2006, I established that women become more agentic subjects, but only insofar as their actions are perceived to be peaceful and contribute to Council aims. And in 2013, I uncovered that women are described as having myriad roles because of increasing information about women's experiences *and* because these roles often align (for better and for worse) with strategic goals of member-states and NGOs alike. Overall, I foiled the agenda's apparent linear progress by explicating how and why different subjectifications have become increasingly prominent over time.

In Chapter 4's second part, I examined how two specific topics of deliberation within the WPS agenda—civilians and indicators—affect how women are subjectified. I demonstrated that deliberations focused on civilians reinforce the Council's identity as a masculine institution, insofar as these deliberations equate civilians with women, thereby

painting civilians/women as needing saving, and the UN as the entity to do this saving. I also found that deliberations regarding indicators further demonstrate the ways that subjectifications of women affirm the Council's dominance. I argued that the use of indicators represents an attempt of the Council to make the world exist as the picture that they desire, rather than acknowledging the world as it is. Constructing this picture, via achieving target levels in indicators, leads to the concealment of women's experiences that do not fit into the subjectivities that the Council acknowledges and measures.

Overall, my analysis of deliberative practices in the Council, and regarding WPS matters more specifically, has shown that complex vectors of power and individual identities influence the shape and trajectory of the WPS agenda. Despite the difficulties faced by the WPS agenda, its architecture continues to develop and solidify its presence in the Council's portfolio. By understanding the agenda's arc through deliberation, with especial attention to subjectifications of its focus (women), it becomes clear that the agenda is continually evolving and sorting out what and who it entails. Different subjectifications of women surface for different reasons—whether it is increased information or strategic policy goals—and these subjectifications enable different potentialities and different goals for the agenda. The agenda's deliberative progression, while intermittent rather than linear, illustrates that the agenda's own identity is constantly being sorted out.

Transforming the Practical Theory of Deliberation

Recognizing the factors that contribute to different subjectifications, it becomes possible to contemplate how the WPS agenda's future might avoid problems of the past. It is to these concerns that I turn, first considering how my findings transform my practical theory

of deliberation, and then the insights my findings provide into future UNSC policies and research. As I explained in Chapter 1, a practical theory of deliberation is transformative dually: It is transformative insofar as its horizons are shaped by emerging information from deliberative practices, *and* insofar as it actively strives to influence the practices it helps one analyze. I suggest the theory can therefore be understood as hermeneutic; the theory itself is continually (re)interpreted based on findings. Hans Georg Gadamer (1995[1960]) writes that "a hermeneutical consciousness is gradually growing that is infusing research with a spirit of self-reflection" (285). This spirit of self-reflection is made possible because "new sources of understanding are continually emerging that reveal unsuspected elements of meaning" (298). For my project, the new sources of understanding are the insights garnered from applying the theory and learning more about the practice of deliberation.

In the spirit of self-reflection, I now briefly consider the new sources of understanding that have emerged from my findings, particularly my findings in Chapter 3, and how they compel changes to the practical theory of deliberation. One impetus for transformation is my finding that subjectifications of women in deliberations not only convey participants' understandings and deliberative norms, but also construct identities and limit policy implications for these constructed subjects. Because of deliberation's consequences, deliberation ought to be understood as a process of constituting subject possibilities, I maintain the definition of deliberation as the "sharing of ideas" is not adequate. To use Foucauldian terms, I argue that deliberation is better understood as the *conducting* of ideas and possibilities.

Foucault describes conduct: "Conduct is the activity of conducting (conduire), of conduction (la conduction) if you like, but it is equally the way in which one conducts oneself

(se conduit), lets oneself be conducted (se laisse conduire), and finally, in which one behaves (se comporter) under the influence of a conduct as the action of conducting or of conduction (conduction)" (Foucault 2007, 193). I suggest, based on my analysis, that deliberative participants conduct and are conducted in each of these four ways. First, and most important for my practical theory of deliberation's transformation, deliberators engage in the activity of conducting (conduire) or conduction (la conduction) insofar as their actions produce and constitute subject possibilities and potential policy solutions. Their subjectifications of women lead to particular policies, depending on the perceived needs of the subjects, and limit the subjectifications that are addressed in these policies. Excluded subjects are implicitly silenced, and their needs tacitly deemed unimportant. Deliberators also conduct the WPS agenda because it is their participation and statements that make up the WPS agenda's quotidian existence. Deliberations do not merely consist of *shared* ideas, but rather ideas that construct the very meaning and arc of the agenda discussed within.

Second, as I explained in Chapter 1, deliberators conduct themselves (se conduit) insofar as they carefully construct their messages in response to institutional and member-state goals, norms, and identities. Third, deliberators are themselves conducted (se laisse conduire), as they unconsciously respond to deliberative norms in and outside of the Council. As Foucault (1970) writes about language: "Expressing their thoughts in words of which they are not the masters, enclosing them in verbal forms whose historical dimensions they are unaware of, men believe that their speech is their servant and do not realize that they are submitting themselves to its demands" (297). Any deliberative statement entails habits of thought to which the participant is not aware. Deliberators are thereby conducted by habits of thought and historical dimensions unbeknownst to them. Finally, deliberative participants

behave under the influence of a conduct. In the case of UNSC deliberations, the UN conducts conduct via expressions of governmentality. These mechanisms of conduct include informal and formal procedural rules, which I outlined in Chapter 1, by which the UN conducts relations between individuals, and the ways that individuals conduct themselves. For example, the Council's PROP, the UN Charter, and the norm of marginalizing women's issues all shape UNSC deliberations and in turn influence the statements that deliberators make.

Recognizing deliberation as a conductive activity, my transformed practical theory of deliberation more closely aligns with practice theory approaches to IR. As I explained in Chapter 1, practice theorists focus on activities as procedural, especially interpreting activities as processes of ordering (cf. Bueger and Gadinger 2015). By redefining deliberation as the *conducting* of ideas, I openly acknowledge deliberation as a process of ordering insofar as it orders subjects. However, the language of *conduct* reflects deliberative processes as being continually conducted and conducting in a way that practice theorists' language of "ordering" would not. Ordering does not incorporate the reflexivity that the language of conduct does.

Redefining deliberation in terms of conduct makes the practical theory of deliberation more acutely attentive to the ways that deliberations conduct and are conducted. It also attunes the scholar's awareness to the inseparability of deliberation from dynamics of power. Whereas the language of "sharing" indicates a voluntary exchange, the language of "conducting" indicates simultaneous control and lack thereof. Signifying the complexities of deliberation within the definition of deliberation itself would lead the researcher to more carefully examine the power that shapes, and the power that emanates from, deliberative statements.

Transforming Future WPS Policies

In addition to a practical theory being transformed by its findings, the theory itself is intended to transform the practices it studies. My project has explained how and why different subjectifications of women have been included in Council WPS-deliberations over time. These past developments suggest that new subjectifications could emerge in the Council in the future. For example, we can imagine non-cissexist and non-heteronormative women's experiences being represented in Council deliberations. If delegates learned more about women's myriad experiences and needs in conflict, more women's needs might become recognized and addressed in policies. Knowing that increasing information about women's experiences has been shown to influence the ways that delegates discuss women's needs, and ultimately implement policy (especially evident in the 2013 WPS SCRs), we can imagine WPS advocates dedicating efforts to sharing information about myriad women's experiences. Doing so, advocates would be able to expand the subjectifications of women evident in the Council and help make policies and deliberations more inclusive of women's experiences.

That being said, my findings have also illuminated the dark side to this inclusion. While being more inclusive is beneficial, the instrumentalization of these experiences to foster their inclusion is concerning. Advocates working to expand subjectifications addressed in the Council, therefore, need to be attentive to the ways that they and policymakers alike utilize different women's experiences to achieve their own aims. While this strategic use of experiences is, arguably, inevitable in politics, being aware of the ways that women and their experiences are utilized to advance political aims can help keep policymakers and advocates attuned to the consequences of this instrumentalization and assuage negative consequences where possible.

Another avenue by which advocates could encourage more inclusive deliberations and policies would be to concentrate their efforts within more local, rather than global, institutions. When I attended the 2016 LSE Conference on "Women, Peace and Security Post-2015: Concepts, criticisms and challenges," many advocates and scholars noted the limitations of the WPS agenda simply because of its position in an international, rather than regional or local, institution. Like any policy made to appease the global community, policymakers often agree upon the lowest common denominator, which in the case of WPS, often results in the exclusion of experiences that do not fit within the conventional woman-man binary and roles. If advocates were to move away from focusing on WPS internationally, and move toward focusing on WPS regionally, we could potentially see a wider array of women's experiences being acknowledged at local levels. Addressing WPS more locally would also likely avoid the extreme instrumentalization that happens in the Council, as well as allow activists' goals to be more rapidly achieved.[37]

Finally, my research provides points of reflection for policymakers to consider how particular topics and current events contribute to, and influence, the ways that women are described. By illuminating how certain habits, such as the norm of feminizing civilians, shape the WPS agenda, my findings can encourage change in deliberative subjectifications. Recognizing that different subjectifications are consequences of historic informal and formal norms, policy objectives, and identities, policymakers can be more attentive to how their words are shaped by context. While this awareness will never be complete, as much of deliberation consists of habits unbeknownst to people, seeking to understand these factors' influence could yield deliberations and subjectifications that are more sensitive to such

[37] For more on reasons why regional/local governance efforts may be preferable to working within IOs, see: Smith (2015) and Lake and Morgan (2010).

influences. This consciousness could consequently help deliberators craft their statements and resultant subjectifications of people's experiences so that they more closely reflect the situation at hand, rather than reify nested rules and subjects.

Other Marginalized Persons

I suggest that my project helps us consider how/if/when/why different and new subject possibilities might emerge even outside the confines of the WPS agenda. In particular, I posit that it helps us contemplate how and why LGBTQI* persons might come to be discussed and subjectified in the UNSC. As I explained in my analysis, the WPS agenda repeatedly conflates gender and women, both in formal policy documents and deliberations. This confusion results in the tacit silencing of non-heteronormative and non-cissexist persons. Scholars like Jamie J. Hagen (2016) have suggested that if the WPS agenda is to advance in the future, it must be effectively queered. To queer the WPS agenda would be to move beyond the narrow, binary understanding of gender (men and women) that currently dominates deliberations. Recognizing this queering as a possibility, one might ask: Why would LGBTQI* persons be included in deliberations? And how would they be subjectified via deliberations?

To answer these questions, it is first important to note that the UN held its first meeting about LGBTQI* persons in 2015. On August 24, 2015, the UNSC organized a meeting regarding the situation of LGBTQI* persons in Syria after reports of ISIS targeting LGBTQI* persons (Al Jazeera 2015). The reason for this meeting suggests that the possibility of queering the WPS agenda depends on a mass targeting that is tied up with a broader security concern, such as counterterrorism efforts. Because of this issue-linkage, one can argue that LGBTQI* persons have already started to be used strategically to advance

counterterrorism efforts in the same way that the WPS agenda has been used (cf. Aoláin 2016). Thus, it seems that LGBTQI* persons will, at least for the near future, be included as relevant persons in the Council insofar as their needs align with preexisting definitions of security and threats.

In terms of subjectifications of LGBTQI* persons, my findings suggest they will follow a similar arc to subjectifications of women. Depending on the circumstance, policy goals, and level of information, LGBTQI* people will be portrayed differently. At first, however, LGBTQI* persons will predominantly be addressed as victims—this prediction is supported by the fact in the first ever UN meeting on LGBTQI* persons was concerned with their victimization. As these LGBTQI* experiences become increasingly visible, the subjectifications surrounding their experiences will vary, and linguistic horizons will expand.

Writing about the politics of visibility and LGBTQI* movements in Europe, Phillip M. Ayoub (2016) reflects, "Visibility awakens a discourse that moves us away from the impotence of invisibility's silence" (203). Thus, by making the LGBTQI* community visible through Council meetings and initiatives like the Free and Equal Campaign,[38] the community would become able to take political action because it is made visible—it is represented in Council deliberations. Even though the representation of LGBTQI* persons will likely be inaccurate, and never include the entire spectrum of experiences within the community because language can never reflect the entirety of human experience, the very act of giving them a voice is enough to make different subjectifications possible.

In the case of LGBTQI* persons, the visibility they gain creates a window by which recognition and resistance may come about (cf. Ayoub 2016, 223). By being recognized,

---

[38] For more on the Free & Equal campaign, see the campaign's website: https://www.unfe.org

LGBTQI* persons can be subjects addressed in deliberations. Moreover, LGBTQI* persons can subsequently *resist* these subjectifications, therefore making the moment of visibility—regardless of how (in)accurate these portrayals are—a moment that can allow for increased dialogue about LGBTQI* persons and their needs. As women have been subjectified differently in the Council over time, we can imagine a similar path of simultaneous norm-reification and progression emerging as LGBTQI* persons become increasingly visible in UNSC deliberations. Utilizing my practical theory of deliberation to assess these subjectifications' concealment and unconcealment, then, could illuminate the dynamics that contribute to these descriptions' possibilities and consequences.

Future Extensions

My project lends itself to several potential future research avenues. One such extension would be to evaluate deliberations following 2013 as well as the 2015 Global Study on UNSCR 1325's implementation. Utilizing my practical theory of deliberation to assess these more recent deliberations, it would be possible to further understand the complex influences of power and identity on possible subjectifications. Moreover, analyzing the Global Study would give us purchase on how the UN is evaluating the WPS agenda's progress, thereby providing a window into the ways that power and identity influence expert assessments of the agenda—a perspective for which, prior to the Study, there was no resource.

Other thematic UNSC agenda items that have similar trajectories to the WPS agenda—i.e., underfunded portfolio items that remain key parts of UNSC policies and goals—could also be analyzed via my practical theory of deliberation. Such policy areas include

disarmament and drug trafficking and security.[39] Using my theory to analyze deliberations regarding disarmament, one could examine the ways that "arms" are constructed through deliberations. One could also evaluate the ways that people engaged in, and affected by, disarmament efforts are constructed, described, and situated. Evaluating the ways that these different subject possibilities have been present in Council deliberations, we could gain insight into disarmament's importance in the face of funding challenges.

Likewise, using my practical theory to examine deliberations regarding drug trafficking and security, one could examine the ways that security and trafficking are constructed over time. Moreover, one could examine the different subjectifications of traffickers themselves to trace the agenda's arc. Again, using my theory would shed light on the ways that factors of power and identity have contributed to the drug trafficking and security agenda's persistence in the Council, and how these same factors have influenced the horizons of the agenda for better and for worse.

Outside the context of the UN, my practical theory of deliberation could be used to analyze other deliberations about gender in other IOs, including NATO, the European Union, the World Bank, and the IMF. Understanding the ways that different subjectifications of women emerge across institutional contexts, one could then assess how different institutional histories, dynamics of power, and participants influence the ways that gender is constituted. This would be particularly useful for policymakers and advocates seeking to change the course of policymaking in a particular context, as they could learn from efforts made in other institutions. Further, my practical theory could be utilized to assess *any* topic of deliberation

---

[39] UN Women budget for 2016-2017: 15,276,200 USD; disarmament budget for 2016-2017: 24,572,800 USD; drug trafficking and security budget for 2016-2017: 43,148,400 USD. Compare this to the peacekeeping budget for 2016-2017: 111,776,400 USD. (For more on the 2016-2017 Budget, see UN General Assembly, "Part II, Section 4," "Part II, Section 5," "Part IV, Section 16," and "Part IV, Section 17").

within *any* institutional context—international or domestic—to trace the ways that power and identity impact the course of deliberations. I could imagine, for example, my practical theory as giving us purchase on the complex dynamics at play in the British Parliament's discussions regarding Brexit. Applying my theory in an array of contexts would also provide more points of self-reflection, thereby helping my practical theory to be transformed so that it better reflects the practice of deliberation.

Having a more intricate understanding of the roles of power and identity in international politics within and without the UNSC, it becomes possible to acknowledge the different subject possibilities that exist within international relations, and how/when/why these possibilities might become visible and, eventually, contested (cf. Butler 1992; Ayoub 2016). Recognizing how dynamics of power and identity influence deliberation allows us not only to recognize people's (in)visibility in politics, but also to contemplate how the seemingly impossible might be made possible. Although we will never be able to incorporate *all* experiences in policies, scholars and policymakers alike can reflect on human experiences and work to expand the horizons of identities made visible.

Chapter 5: Works Cited

Al Jazeera. "UN Security Council holds first meeting on LGBT rights," *Al Jazeera: Human Rights*. 24 August 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/08/security-council-holds-meeting-lgbt-rights-150824201712751.html. Accessed 1 December 2016.

Aoláin, Fionnuala Ní. "The 'war on terror' and extremism: assessing the relevance of the Women, Peace and Security agenda." *International Affairs* 92.2 (2016): 275-291.

Ayoub, Phillip M. *When States Come Out*. New York: Cambridge UP, 2016.

Bueger, Christian, and Frank Gadinger. "The play of international practice." *International Studies Quarterly* 59.3 (2015): 449-460.

Butler, Judith. "Contingent foundations: Feminism and the question of postmodemism." *Feminists theorize the political*. New York: Routledge (1992), 3-21.

Cook, Sam. "The 'woman-in-conflict' at the UN Security Council: a subject of practice." *International Affairs* 92.2 (2016): 353-372.

Davison, Andrew. *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey*. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1998.

Deitelhoff, Nicole. "The discursive process of legalization: charting islands of persuasion in the ICC case." *International organization* 63.01 (2009): 33-65.

Foucault, Michel. *The Order of Things*. New York: Vintage, 1970[1966].

Foucault, Michel. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978*. Ed. Michel Senellart. Trans. Graham Burchell. New York: Picador, 2007.

Gadamer, Hans Georg. *Truth and Method*. Trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall New York: Continuum, 1995[1960].

Hagen, Jamie J. "Queering women, peace and security." *International Affairs* 92.2 (2016): 313-332.

Kirby, Paul, and Laura J. Shepherd. "Reintroducing women, peace and security." *International Affairs* 92.2 (2016): 249-254.

Lake, David A., and Patrick M. Morgan. *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*. University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2010.

Mills, Charles W. "'Ideal theory' as ideology." *Hypatia* 20.3 (2005): 165-183.

Müller, Harald. "Arguing, bargaining and all that: communicative action, rationalist theory and the logic of appropriateness in international relations." *European journal of international relations* 10.3 (2004): 395-435.

Risse, Thomas. "'Let's argue!': communicative action in world politics." *International organization* 54.01 (2000): 1-39.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. "The community trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the Eastern enlargement of the European Union." *International organization* 55.01 (2001): 47-80.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. *The EU, NATO and the integration of Europe: Rules and rhetoric*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Smith, Jackie. "Exploring connections between global integration and political mobilization." *Journal of World-Systems Research* 10.1 (2015): 255-285.

UN General Assembly, "Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017: Part II Political affairs, Section 4 Disarmament." http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/6(Sect.4). Accessed 1 December 2016.

UN General Assembly, "Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017: Part II Political affairs, Section 5 Peacekeeping operations." http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/6(Sect.5). Accessed 1 December 2016.

UN General Assembly, "Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017: Part IV International cooperation for development, Section 16 International drug control, crime and terrorism prevention and criminal justice." http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/6(Sect.16). Accessed 1 December 2016.

UN General Assembly, "Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017: Part IV International cooperation for development, Section 17 UN-Women." http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/6(Sect.17). Accessed 1 December 2016.

APPENDIX A: FULL TEXT OF UNSCR 1325[40]

Resolution 1325 (2000)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, as well as relevant statements of its President, and recalling also the statement of its President to the press on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Women's Rights and International Peace (International Women's Day) of 8 March 2000 (SC/6816),

Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled "Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century" (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and recognizing the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation,

Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,

Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls,

Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard noting the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of

---

[40] Text transcribed from http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1325(2000)

Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693),

Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations,

Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security,

Noting the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls,

1. *Urges* Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;

2. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision- making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;

3. *Urges* the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard calls on Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster;

4. *Further urges* the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;

5. *Expresses* its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace- building measures, invites Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and further requests the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training;

7. *Urges* Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;

8. *Calls on* all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia:

(a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;

(b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements;

(c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary;

9. *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

10. *Calls on* all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict;

11. *Emphasizes* the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions;

12. *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000;

13. *Encourages* all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants;

14. *Reaffirms* its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions;

15. *Expresses* its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women's groups;

16. *Invites* the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and further invites him to submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls;

18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

APPENDIX B: TABLE—DESCRIPTIONS OF WOMEN

UNSC Mtg. Number	Victim	Agent	Actor	Diverse Roles	Partici-pant	Contrib-utor	Vulnera-ble	Combat-ant	Surviv-or	Target
4208	75	87	84	88	83	85	79	79	87	79
4589	43	57	52	58	57	58	54	54	57	52
4635	51	62	57	62	56	62	56	56	62	57
4852	59	65	59	69	65	68	66	66	69	63
5066	61	76	61	77	74	72	72	72	75	69
5294	69	77	64	78	67	74	74	74	77	69
5556	77	82	72	87	83	86	82	82	86	84
5766	83	100	79	100	97	98	97	97	98	93
5916	87	109	102	115	114	112	108	108	109	104
6005	84	92	75	96	90	95	88	88	92	90
6180	51	71	60	75	75	73	70	70	66	62
6195	25	32	32	32	32	32	31	31	29	29
6196	84	94	87	103	100	100	94	94	99	95
6302	15	16	14	18	18	18	18	18	16	14
6411	144	165	147	173	167	171	164	164	169	147
6453	50	70	63	71	69	70	67	67	64	53
6642	94	100	94	106	104	102	101	101	105	90
6722	71	97	84	98	97	98	93	93	86	78
6877	84	94	82	97	93	94	91	91	94	86
6948	67	103	89	105	104	103	98	98	83	83
6984	65	102	90	103	100	101	100	100	83	87
7044	88	109	102	113	107	111	109	109	108	99
Mean	*69*	*84*	*75*	*87*	*84*	*85*	*82*	*82*	*82*	*77*