

**Theorizing the dynamics of civilian control over law enforcement militarization:
A case study of the 2018 Federal Intervention of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil**

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Abstract

Theorizing the dynamics of civilian control over law enforcement militarization:

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Why and to what effect do civilian institutions form to control law enforcement militarization? Facing extreme insecurity, Latin American democracies increasingly deploy soldiers for policing and operate police like soldiers. This trend risks undermining democratic governance in multiple respects (e.g., fueling human rights violations). However, civilians reportedly have few incentives and capabilities to control militarization by concluding troop deployments and reducing police violence.

It therefore is puzzling that a coalition emerged to monitor the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, wherein the Brazilian Army controlled local policing. Moreover, the Intervention and preceding military operations in Rio de Janeiro were discontinued from 2019 to 2022. The Intervention saw considerably more police violence than prior military operations, which surprisingly had corresponded with fewer extrajudicial killings than non-deployment periods.

To illuminate these puzzles, I argue that the *autonomy paradox* explains institutions' formation and impacts. Independence from militarization's principal and agents gives civilians the opportunity to establish institutions to contest militarization. Because autonomy limits their access to information, institutions must collect original information to monitor militarization. Such information could enable them to shape political discourse (by influencing critical media coverage) and, thus, military officials' concerns with deployments' legitimacy (by raising societal costs), potentially contributing to military lobbying against deployments.

The paradox is that autonomy and its effects could limit institutions' access to military officials. Civilians thus have few opportunities to socialize officials against substituting military presence with police violence. Institutions could raise militarization's cost, potentially cannot facilitate demilitarization necessarily, and could have the unintended consequence of intensifying violence. Overcoming the paradox could require balancing independence and collaboration to increase socialization opportunities.

I develop this argument by synthesizing theory on controlling the military and controlling militarization. The former entails monitoring the military to raise societal costs of disobeying civilian authority and socializing officials into considering this authority legitimate. The latter involves using political discourse to delegitimize military force. A theory-building case study advances the argument. Through process-tracing based on 119 interviews and several original datasets, I analyze whether autonomy was necessary and/or sufficient for institutions to form, monitor, and influence the Federal Intervention.

For Danya, Mom, and Dad

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Abbreviations

<i>ADPF das Favelas</i>	<i>Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental 635</i> (Argument of Breach of Fundamental Precept 635)
<i>GLO</i>	<i>Garantia da Lei e da Ordem</i> (Guarantee of Law and Order)
NGO	Non-governmental organization
<i>UPP</i>	<i>Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora</i> (Police Pacification Unit)

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Throughout Latin America, democracies increasingly deploy their soldiers like police and their police like soldiers in attempt to reduce high crime and violence levels. This trend of law enforcement militarization risks undermining democracy by exacerbating violence, fueling human rights violations, reducing accountability, precluding police reform, and empowering the security forces (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021; González 2019; Macaulay 2012; Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017). The conventional wisdom is that politicians, bureaucrats, and civil society have limited capacities and incentives to establish civilian control over militarization once soldiers are on the streets by curtailing troop deployments and state violence (Dammert 2019; Dammert 2021; González 2019; Macaulay 2012; Pion-Berlin 2016; Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007). We therefore would expect such civilians to make little effective effort to control militarization once soldiers are on the streets.

President Michel Temer's 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro would seem to exemplify these dynamics at first glance. Through this policy, the Brazilian Armed Forces conducted law enforcement operations and assumed full authority over local police agencies. The policy's causes and consequences, as well as its limited likelihood of civilian control, seemed to reflect predictions from Latin American and Brazilian Politics scholarship (Amorim Neto 2019; Bruneau and Tollefson 2014; Cano and Ribeiro 2016; Garcia 2014; Imanishi Rodrigues and Armstrong 2019; Harig 2021; Landim and Siqueira 2013; Lima et al. 2021; Macaulay 2002; Passos 2019; Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017; Veloso Hirata et al. 2021; Wolff 2022).

However, a diverse, multi-sector coalition of 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions formed to monitor the Federal Intervention from outside the Temer administration and security forces. The Intervention and the Armed Forces' concurrent Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO) operations surprisingly were discontinued from 2019 to 2022 under President Jair Bolsonaro. Police violence, which prior GLO operations had reduced relative to periods without soldiers on the streets, also increased during the Intervention. These empirical puzzles raise two theoretical questions. Why do civilian control institutions form in attempt to control law enforcement militarization? How impactful are they at curtailing troop deployments and police violence?

To illuminate the empirical puzzles and answer the theoretical questions, this dissertation argues that the *autonomy paradox* characterizes dynamics of civilian control over law enforcement militarization. Formal independence from militarization's principal (i.e., the executive leader who commands security forces) and agents (i.e., the security forces) enables civilians to create and join institutions in order to contest militarization.

A combination of formal and informal independence also encourages a strategy of collecting original information in order to monitor militarization. Indeed, information is the mechanism that links civilian control institutions' formation to their potential impacts. These impacts span three sequential stages. In the first stage of initial impacts, more autonomous institutions could use this original information to shape political discourse more through critical media coverage due to journalists' reporting incentives. In the second stage of intermediate impacts, these institutions could shape military officials' legitimacy concerns by raising the societal costs of troop

deployments. In the third stage, more autonomous institutions' initial and intermediate impacts potentially could lead military officials to lobby executives against sustaining troop deployments.

The paradox is that institutions' autonomy, along with the contestation, information, discourse, and concerns that this autonomy engenders, also limits civilians' access to military officials.

Civilians therefore have little opportunity to socialize officials against considering not only deployments but, also, police violence illegitimate. The military consequently could substitute the presence of soldiers as a means of providing security with killings by police. Civilian control institutions thus could raise militarization's societal costs, potentially could not bring about demilitarization, and could have unintended consequences of intensifying militarization. They nonetheless could offer repertoires and lessons for future attempts at reducing police violence.

The dissertation secondarily argues that *principal prerogative* is an additional factor that, separate of autonomy, limits institutions' ultimate impact. National executives who initiate troop deployments have few incentives to send soldiers back to the barracks and curb police violence, given the popularity of repressive policies amidst high crime and violence levels. Their authority over the armed forces also has few bureaucratic, civil society, or legislative constraints. Their predecessors, who might come to office with different interests, options, and preferences, are more likely to curtail deployments. The fact that continuity depends in no small part on executive decision-making underscores how actors outside the principal-agent relationship overall have little opportunity to shape militarization regardless of their independence.

I develop the *autonomy paradox* argument through two approaches. The theoretical, deductive approach involves extended dialogue between scholarship on civilian control of the military (Croissant et al. 2011) and civilian control of militarization (Levy 2016). The former concerns monitoring the armed forces to raise their societal costs of disobeying civilian authority and socializing military officials into considering such authority legitimate. The latter, controlling militarization, entails using political discourse to delegitimize military force. I derive hypotheses of institutional formation, strategy, and impact by juxtaposing and synthesizing these concepts.

The empirical, inductive approach is a theory-building case study of the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro. It traces the process that links the formation, strategy, and impacts of the monitoring coalition's 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions. Original sources for process tracing include 119 interviews, an original dataset of 2018 legislative committees in Brazil's National Congress, an original dataset of media coverage about the Intervention, and an original dataset of Army officers' writings. Analyzing strategy and institutions involves focusing on two institutions, the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit.

In addition, I briefly discuss the argument's generalizability by considering its likelihood of holding in Colombia and Mexico. The dissertation claims, based on prior research on civilian control institutions (Dizard 2018) and proxy measures of relevant conditions, that the *autonomy paradox* argument is likely to hold strongly in these countries with respect to institutional formation and moderately with respect to institutional impacts. More comprehensive theory-testing in these and other countries represents an opportunity for continued research.

The dissertation has two main implications for controlling militarization in theory and practice. One implication is that civilian control institutions likely need to balance autonomy and cooperation to a greater extent. Overcoming the autonomy paradox likely will require collaborating strategically with militarization's principal and agents in order to increase socialization opportunities. However, another implication is that civilian controls institutions outside the principal-agent relationship are insufficient to mitigate militarization's risks for democracy. Achieving this objective likely will require executives to participate further in curtailing troop deployments and police violence. That such participation is unlikely to increase organically, given executives' incentives to initiate and sustain militarization, points to an opportunity for international pressure and public socialization against militarization.

Dissertation outline

The dissertation proceeds as follows. The remainder of this chapter presents the theoretical background of law enforcement militarization, including how this phenomenon emerges and varies, how it risks undermining democracy, and how civilians nonetheless are unlikely to control it. The chapter then introduces the empirical context of the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro. Upon first glance, this context seems representative of militarization's sources, dimensions, and limited likelihood of civilian control. The chapter next presents three puzzles: the monitoring coalition's formation during the Intervention; the discontinuation of the Intervention and Rio de Janeiro GLO operations from at least 2019 to 2022; and the increase of police violence during the Intervention relative to prior GLO operations.

The dissertation's second chapter introduces the theoretical argument for understanding institutional formation and impacts. This argument includes scope-conditions, as well as theories of institutions' formation, strategy, initial impact, intermediate impact, and ultimate impact. These theories consist of hypotheses and, where relevant, additional factors and rival hypotheses. Next, the chapter describes the research design of a theory-building case study to trace the process from institutional formation, to strategy, to impacts. The research design discussion includes a description of the original data that this dissertation brings to bear. The chapter then previews subsequent empirical chapters' main findings related to the argument.

The third chapter empirically analyzes institutional formation through the Federal Intervention case study. It uses original data from interviews to understand civilians' reported motivations for creating or joining ad-hoc institutions aimed at monitoring the Intervention. It also uses the original legislative dataset to gauge their incentives for doing so. The chapter compares organizations that created institutions to comprise the monitoring coalition with organizations that did not create institutions or engage otherwise in monitoring. The chapter begins with additional factors of collective memory, political conflict, and militarization rewards. It then examines the hypotheses of autonomy and the rival hypothesis of opposition.

The fourth chapter empirically analyzes ad-hoc civilian institutions' strategy of collecting original information to monitor the Federal Intervention. It illustrates how the Civil Society Observatory's data activism and the Favelas for Rights Circuit's collective tutelage strategies were products of these institutions' combination of formal and informal autonomy. In contrast, institutions with informal autonomy tended not to adopt such strategies. The chapter then

examines the factor of institutional cohesion with respect to internal staff and external consortia. It illustrates how more cohesive institutions tended to adopt such strategies.

The fifth chapter empirically analyzes ad-hoc civilian institutions' initial impacts on political discourse. It examines the autonomy hypothesis by analyzing the media coverage dataset, including the reasons and sources behind journalists' critical stories about the Federal Intervention. It also uses interview data to discuss institutions' media strategy and journalists' incentives to reference institutions. Next, the chapter examines the factor of transparency by discussing how limited official information about the Intervention created an opportunity for journalists and institutions to fill the gap with original information. It then examines the rival hypothesis that such coverage was a mere effort to legitimize the Intervention.

The sixth chapter empirically analyzes ad-hoc civilian institutions' intermediate impact on Brazilian Army officers' concerns with the Federal Intervention's legitimacy. Sources include an original dataset of Army officers' writings about the Intervention and Rio de Janeiro GLO operations, as well as original interviews. Supplementary data includes military interviews conducted by Castro et al. (2023). The chapter begins by examining the autonomy hypothesis. It presents the reasons and sources of officers' legitimacy concerns, as well as civilians' perceptions of these concerns. It then discusses the rival hypothesis that troop deployments beyond Rio de Janeiro policing, such as other GLO operations elsewhere and international peacekeeping missions, shaped legitimacy concerns to a greater extent than institutions did.

The seventh chapter empirically analyzes ad-hoc civilian institutions' ultimate impact on Rio de Janeiro troop deployments' discontinuation after 2018 and on Rio de Janeiro police violence's increase during 2018. It uses original interviews, as well as military interviews from Castro et al. (2023), to inform this analysis. It begins with the additional factors of *principal prerogative* and military presence. It then examines two autonomy hypotheses. One relates to controlling militarization as an episode. The other relates to controlling militarization as a practice.

The eighth and final chapter concludes with a summary and implications. The summary revisits this dissertation's empirical puzzles to illustrate how the *autonomy paradox* makes the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro more intelligible. The summary also identifies general conditions under which the argument is likely to hold in other places and times. Based on these conditions, the chapter then discusses the arguments' generalizability to Colombia and Mexico. It uses secondary data on similar institutions (Dizard 2018) and proxy measures related to public opinion. It claims that the *autonomy paradox* has a strong likelihood of holding in these countries with respect to institutional formation and a moderate likelihood with respect to institutional impacts. The chapter then discusses opportunities for continued research, including more complete theory testing in Colombia and Mexico. It concludes with policy implications in light of both the *autonomy paradox* and *principal prerogative* arguments.

Background: Limited civilian control of law enforcement militarization in Latin America

Sources and dimensions of law enforcement militarization

Latin American democracies increasingly exhibit the “militarization of law enforcement” (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021). This phenomenon involves countries throughout the region

deploying the armed forces for domestic policing operations with ever greater frequency and intensity. It also involves police agencies becoming less accountable to civilian law, possessing heavier weaponry and equipment, training more in the lethal use of force, centralizing their command structures and making these more hierarchical, and deploying officers in larger units.

Militarization stems from how the region's high crime and violence levels surpass the capacity of civilian law enforcement agencies, which tend to be underequipped, underpaid, undertrained, and perceived by the public as abusive, corrupt, and ineffective. Rather than undertake the difficult, long-term process of police reform, politicians therefore have electoral incentives to supplement or to supplant police with the armed forces in responding to crime and violence. By providing military cooperation, equipment, and training, U.S. security assistance for controlling the production and trafficking of illicit narcotics further incentivizes Latin American states to deploy their armed forces for law enforcement operations (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021).

The degree of law enforcement militarization is greater where security forces are more accountable to military law than civilian law, have more access to heavy weaponry and equipment, have more training in lethal use of force versus non-lethal conflict resolution, are more centralized and hierarchical, and deploy in larger units. From lowest to highest levels, Latin American democracies range across “militarized police” in Costa Rica and Panama (which do not have militaries), “paramilitary police” in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, “limited constabularization of the military” in Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru, and “generalized constabularization of the military” in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Venezuela. Constabularization, “when the armed

forces take on the responsibilities of civilian law enforcement agencies” (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021, 519) or when the armed forces are “police-iciz[ed]” (520), is “the most extreme type” (522) and overlaps with police operating like soldiers to a considerable degree.

Risks to democratic consolidation

Law enforcement militarization risks undermining democratic consolidation by exacerbating criminal violence, fueling human rights violations, undermining police reform, eroding the rule of law, and empowering the security forces politically. Introducing military weaponry, training, and organization into domestic law enforcement devastatingly enhances the state’s ability to confront criminal organizations. This shift translates to more excessive use of violence due to the armed forces’ “engage and destroy mentality” and their “physical and social distance” (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021, 522-524) from communities. It also encourages criminal organizations to escalate their violence in order to sustain their control.

Militarization nonetheless is politically expedient and popular. This is because citizens have limited confidence in police and, consequently, have favorable views of using soldiers for law enforcement amidst high crime and violence levels (Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017).

Militarization thus incentivizes politicians to keep soldiers on the streets and to increase the armed forces’ resources instead of investing in the challenging, slow process of police reform.

The armed forces’ domestic deployments also tend to be less regulated than police activities in democracies, with soldiers operating more under military than civilian jurisdiction. As a result, militarization occurs “without clearly defined legal boundaries. This can undermine the rule of

law and contribute to a sense of impunity whenever the armed forces engage in violations of constitutional protections” (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021, 524).

Involvement in policing also is a key source of “military power” (Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017, 78), or Latin American armed forces’ organizational autonomy and decision-making influence within national politics. As their deployments and authorities over police agencies expand, armed forces’ power increases at the expense of democratic consolidation. This is because consolidating democracy requires removing militaries from politics and subordinating them to the authority of civilian elected officials, civilian bureaucracies, and the broader societies that soldiers are supposed to serve.

Moreover, militarization can be a key source of Latin American police agencies’ “structural power”: the organizational capacity to ensure that governments implement agencies’ preferred policies and do not pursue policies that challenge agencies’ interest; and the ideological ability to “shape how politicians and citizens understand security issues” (González 2019, 49). Police agencies can use their structural power “to credibly threaten to withdraw cooperation due to hierarchical, often-militarized structures that facilitate coordination” (49) among officers. As police agencies become more hierarchical and militarized, their structural power therefore expands. Militarization also empowers police by limiting their accountability and, consequently, increasing their autonomy. This is because police seek the “privileges and protections afforded by their institutional links with the military, such as the enduring jurisdiction of military courts [... ensuring] impunity for the worst abuses” (Macaulay 2012, 169).

Importance of civilian control

Despite these consequences, no Latin American Politics scholarship examines comprehensively how civilians can reduce the risk of law enforcement militarization once soldiers are on the streets alongside police. Some scholarship discusses civilian oversight of domestic troop deployments (Pion-Berlin 2016; Dizard 2018; Passos 2019). I consider this literature insufficient for understanding civilian control over law enforcement militarization for two reasons. First, oversight differs from control. The former involves monitoring and directing militarization. The latter aims more specifically at delegitimizing militarization as the next chapter will discuss. Oversight thus does not aim necessarily to reduce the risks of militarization.

Second, troop deployments are but one dimension of law enforcement militarization.

Subordinating soldiers to civilian authority does not equate to establishing oversight, much the less control, vis-à-vis the police. There even could be a substitution dynamic at play: if civilians gain control over the armed forces to reduce militarization's risks, police might assume the responsibilities for repression that previously fell to soldiers. I seek to fill this gap by theorizing civilian control, not only oversight, of law enforcement militarization in terms of both soldiers and police, not only troop deployments.

I consider the first step of establishing civilian control over militarization to be reducing the risks of having soldiers on the streets for operations. Reducing such risks requires working to curtail troop deployments once they are underway and to reorient the police toward community-based law enforcement as quickly as possible. Doing so is necessary but insufficient for the next,

longer-term step of instituting systemic change to preclude military operations and militarized policing. Sending soldiers back to the barracks and reorienting law enforcement to community policing nonetheless is a crucial emergency measure during episodes of militarization because it reduces risks to democracy.

If using soldiers like police and police like soldiers threatens to increase criminal and state violence, shift accountability from civilian to military jurisdiction, limit opportunities of police reform, and empower the military and police (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021), disrupting this phenomenon intuitively has the potential to halt these trends. Such disruption also could lay the foundation for longer-term reforms that remove the military from law enforcement and reform police to be more respectful of human rights and subordinate to civilians. Understanding this first step to establishing control over militarization therefore is valuable in and of itself.

In this way, I consider a concern with reducing the risks to democracy by ending militarization episodes necessary if an effort to subordinate the security forces to civilian authority is to represent an attempt at civilian control. This consideration departs from Latin American Politics scholarship that presents establishing civilian control as preserving democratically legitimate leaders' "overarching political control" (Pion-Berlin 2016, 189) of troop deployments and as increasing the transparency of police agencies independent of their community orientation (Ungar 2011, 8-10). Those views value control as an end, as if security forces' mere compliance with, and reporting to civilian authority were sufficient for democratic governance. They imply that, as long as troop deployments and police orientations are consistent with political leaders' directives and transparent to the public, militarization can embody civilian control.

Because militarization is risky for democratic governance (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021), however, I consider military and police subordination to civilian authority insufficient for establishing civilian control if that authority does not work to curb militarization's risks. In other words, I consider civilian control a means of protecting democracy rather than an end in and of itself. The more that attempts at cultivating external authority over troop deployments and police orientations work to curtail these expressions of militarization, the more that I consider them efforts to establish civilian control over troop deployments.

An implication is that civilian control is unlikely to come from the presidents who initiate militarization episodes by deploying the armed forces for law enforcement operations. Having responded to popular demand by using soldiers domestically in attempt to reduce crime and violence, militarization's principals are likely to view the potential electoral benefits of such policies as outweighing the risks to democracy. Curtailing troop deployments, in this perspective, would be contrary to presidents' self-interest. It could reduce the political payoffs of militarization while making the president seem ineffectual and inattentive to citizens' concerns.

Presidents' calculations might change if militarization's risks become realities during troop deployments. However, it might be less politically costly for the principal to blame the agent for negative consequences than it is to reverse course by sending soldiers back to the barracks.

Establishing civilian control therefore depends on actors who are external to militarization's principal-agent relationship, including civil society organizations, bureaucrats, and legislators.

Unlikely civilian control over troop deployments

The predominant view in civil-military relations scholarship on Latin America, exemplified by Pion-Berlin and colleagues, implies that civilians are unlikely to control militarization effectively by curtailing troop deployments. In this perspective, politicians, bureaucrats, and civil society actors have too few incentives and too limited capabilities to monitor troop deployments effectively. Dizard (2018), however, implies that increasing military accountability during troop deployments is possible if these actors work in coalition and have international support, especially from U.S. bureaucrats and politicians. These views combine to imply that controlling troop deployments is unlikely unless civilians form monitoring coalitions and collaborate with international actors to apply pressure so that soldiers return to the barracks.

In the Pion-Berlin perspective, politicians have few incentives to pay attention to the armed forces other than trying to prevent coups. Not only do “strong Latin American traditions of executive dominance over defense and military affairs” ensure that “the legislative branch struggles to find its own voice” (Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017, 172). Latin American countries also tend to face few international threats, have small defense industries, and have a history of military intervention in politics (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007, 76). What attention politicians pay to the armed forces therefore tends to focus on mitigating coup risk.

Politicians tend to fall short of controlling deployments once underway because they do not monitor deployments adequately. Adequate monitoring would be “ongoing, vigilant, [...] with permanent, fully funded agencies” aimed at “preventing problems from materializing or making sure that they do not get out of hand” (Pion-Berlin 2016, 190-191). Presidents would have “eyes

and ears on the ground, observing military conduct and reporting on any inefficiencies, infractions, or irregularities”. Congressional defense committees would “call officials to testify, conduct investigations if needed, and in general fulfill legislative oversight duties” (190).

Politicians instead tend to rely on the media to monitor troop deployments (Pion-Berlin 2016, 190-191). Moreover, politicians’ “most difficult task [...] is to exert effective oversight because the tendency is to show deference toward the [military] rather than to scrutinize [its] behavior” (Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017, 172). Legislative committees therefore tend not to “serve as the democratic watchdog” (Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017, 172) that they are designed to be.

Judges are unlikely to play an active role in controlling troop deployment because, rather than arbitrate, Latin American courts tend to mediate between civilians and the military by resolving information uncertainties. Such uncertainties relate to whether soldiers must obey all orders from superiors during domestic deployments, whether they will face legal consequences for human rights violations committed during domestic deployments, and whether their cases will take place in civilian or military courts (Ríos-Figueroa 2016, 1-15).

Courts with greater independence, accessibility, and authority are more likely to obtain, interpret, and transmit information on deployments in a mediating fashion that leads to more regulation of militaries’ domestic use of force. Not only are these conditions historically rare in Latin American countries with either high or moderate levels of militarization. When present, they also lead to mere judicial constraints upon troop deployments instead of concerted attempts at returning soldiers to the barracks (Ríos-Figueroa 2016, 1-15).

Bureaucrats, meanwhile, are unlikely to control troop deployments due to their limited expertise on military affairs. In this perspective, Latin American bureaucracies suffer from “a defense wisdom deficit” (Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017, 211). They have “too few civilians who can call themselves experts – knowledgeable about the military organization and its inner workings and knowledgeable about defense policy, strategy, planning, and implementation” (211).

This lack of expertise limits bureaucrats’ abilities “to both advise policymakers and assume positions of leadership” (Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017, 211). The knowledge gap makes military officials unlikely to follow civilian bureaucrats’ guidance regarding troop deployments because “[s]oldiers can only be expected to fully comply with orders if they trust that their political overseers have sufficient understandings to be able to lead on the issues” (216).

This characterization of limited expertise also applies to the non-governmental sphere. “Soldiers are physically walled off from civil society” as, “institutionally and attitudinally, they lead separate lives [...] with their own codes, standards, and norms, which may be foreign to society at large” (Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017, 251). This separation contributes to civil society organizations being unable to understand the armed forces in order to control them.

An exception to the Pion-Berlin perspective is Dizard (2018). In this view, “oversight coalitions” (13) in 2010s Colombia and Mexico helped strengthen accountability for extrajudicial killings by soldiers during counterinsurgency and counternarcotics operations. A key factor in coalitions’ impact was “international reform pressure”, or the “the degree to which domestic activists and

their transnational allies prioritize democratic oversight [...] and their criticisms are echoed and reinforced by supranational organizations and foreign governments” (32).

The coalitions included domestic and international human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), left-wing political parties, anti-militarization allies among Democrats in the U.S. Congress, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and United Nations human rights entities. Domestic actors’ ability to constrain military autonomy depended partially on U.S. bureaucrats’ and politicians’ willingness to lobby the Colombian and Mexican governments, to which they were providing considerable security assistance, for increased oversight of the armed forces (Dizard 2018, 13-32).¹

Dizard (2018) is more optimistic about the prospect of civilian control than Pion-Berlin and colleagues, yet the two perspectives share an emphasis on executive authority. Another determinant of oversight coalitions’ impact for Dizard (2018, 32) is “the successor to the president who initiated militarization.” Executives “shift their support back and forth between the [oversight and the pro-militarization coalitions with presidential turnover], depending on their policy goals and the pressure mounted by members of the two coalitions” (32). Presidents who initiate troop deployments “are unlikely to break with the military” whereas their successors’ “preferences may diverge from both military” (33) and their predecessors.

¹ Dizard’s (2018) title is “The Paradox of Militarization: Democratic Oversight and Military Autonomy in Mexico and Colombia”. I do not base my *autonomy paradox* argument consciously on Dizard’s title. Dizard references military autonomy whereas I reference civilian institutions’ autonomy. Dizard references the paradox that, as militarization increases, the armed forces lose autonomy. I reference the paradox that civilian institutions’ autonomy contributes to their formation, strategy, and initial and intermediate impacts but limits their ultimate impact.

Alternatives to militarization are likely to come not only from oversight coalitions but, also, from executives other than those who initiate militarization (33).

Unlikely civilian control over policing

Scholarship about police reform in Latin America mainly implies that civilians are unlikely to control militarization by reorienting law enforcement from confronting criminal organizations to protecting citizens' rights once troop deployments are underway. This is due to civilians' limited incentives and capabilities to monitor policing effectively. Like Dizard (2018), however, Fuentes (2004) implies that civilians can contribute to reform by working in coalition, monitoring police, shaping the public debate, lobbying, and coordinating with international actors.

Reorienting law enforcement from militarized policing requires “[c]itizen security reform”, or “the process in which [...] five areas of change [...] begin to coalesce around crime as well as [the government’s historical] weakness in [responding] to it” (Ungar 2011, 6). These areas of change are as follows: restructuring police agencies to be less centralized and hierarchical; increasing professional support to police in the form of compensation, standard operating procedures, and technical assistance; establishing governmental and non-governmental oversight institutions; instituting legal changes to the criminal justice system that clarify police authorities (7-9); and initiating “community policing”, “a preventive approach based on making society [rather than government] the first line of defense against crime and insecurity” (9) and, thus, separating law enforcement from “dysfunctional state institutions and their rigid responses” (10).

Enacting such changes is a long-term process. The more that civilians can lay the foundations for this process during militarization episodes when soldiers are on the streets, the more that they can make progress toward controlling militarization itself. Politicians nonetheless have few electoral incentives to institute such reforms (Dammert 2021, 270). Latin America's extraordinary social inequality tends to produce "preference fragmentation [...] wherein characteristics like race, class, and geography shape demand formation and political decision-making over the distribution of protection and repression" (González 2019, 79).

Law enforcement agencies and their allies therefore have "been able to render police reform very costly in terms of likely political capital required" (Macaulay 2012, 185). Consequently, "some national politicians, for fear of being punished rather than rewarded at the ballot box, have left the status quo untouched, or engaged in populist 'tough on crime' rhetoric, rather than deal with the thorny institutional arrangements" (185) that police reform would need to reconstitute. The resulting "[l]ack of policy alternatives ha[s] consolidated a process that has granted police forces extensive new powers to deal with newly emerging threats, but with limited oversight and training to ensure quality of service to citizens" (Dammert 2021, 262).

Over recent years, "a growing concern about police performance has emerged from [non-governmental] organizations, think tanks, and civil society organizations working on corruption and human rights abuses" (Dammert 2019, 270). This concern, however, has not led necessarily to robust non-governmental participation in police reform. This is because of "problems linked to lack of expertise, professionalization, and even modernization in the public security sector, both inside police institutions and civil society organizations" (Dammert 2019, 270).

Citizen security reform efforts typically include establishing civilian accountability institutions like national ombudsmen and attorney's general offices. In addition, "[e]ven entities lacking official legal powers, such as media outlets and [... civil society organizations] can and do exercise less formal oversight through investigative reports and publicity" (Ungar 2011, 8). Police resistance to institutional change, these efforts' incremental nature, and inter-agency competition nonetheless "have all combined to undermine the accountability mechanisms" and "civilian oversight bodies [...] introduced in all the police reforms conducted in the region" (Macaulay 2012, 178). Oversight bodies' limited organizational autonomy, political support, and fiscal capacity further undermine civilian control (Macaulay 2012, 178).

Consequently, levels of police impunity for abuse, corruption, and violence remain high (Dammert 2019, 37) while "institutional weakness [is what] describes the low capacity of police bureaucracies and the civilian entities overseeing them" (González 2019, 45) to control individual officers. "There is a clear need for more civilian control of the police, as this would limit already high levels of political and professional autonomy, which, in turn, would increase transparency and effectively fight corruption" (Dammert 2019, 36), violence, and impunity. Militarized police agencies operating alongside police-icized militaries especially lack "robust civilian oversight to monitor service delivery, appraise standards and procedures, and investigate allegations of misconduct" (Sung et al. 2022, 317).

Fuentes (2004) offers an exception to the view that demilitarizing reforms are unlikely due to civilians' limited incentives and capabilities. Like Dizard (2018) on troop deployments, Fuentes

(2004, 5) identifies the interactions between “civil rights coalitions” and “pro-order coalitions” as shaping police reforms in Argentina and Chile. Civil rights coalitions include domestic and international advocacy networks. Three factors shape civil rights coalitions’ policy influence.

One factor that shapes civil rights coalitions’ influence is the political opportunity structure. Coalitions are more likely to be effective when the countries’ democratic transition has curtailed police power more, when civil society has more access to the political system, and when police are less insulated from society. Another factor is resource mobilization. Coalitions are more likely to be effective when leaders are more capable, when institutions within the coalition coordinate more, and when they have more access to external funds. Third is strategies. Coalitions are more impactful when they are more effective at lobbying politicians and using technical expertise to feed policy proposals into the public debate (Fuentes 2004, 26-37).

Context: The 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

We might have expected the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro State’s Public Security to be a “typical” (Gerring 2008, 648-650) or representative instance of limited civilian control over law enforcement militarization. This is because of the policy’s causes and consequences. It also is because of how scholarship on troop deployments and police reforms in Brazil echoes Latin American Politics scholarship’s pessimism about the likelihood of civilian control. In these ways, the 2018 Federal Intervention might seem to exemplify militarization’s risks and the dominant view that civilian control is unlikely to be effective.

Representative sources of law enforcement militarization

With the Federal Intervention, right-wing president Michel Temer granted the Armed Forces and, specifically, the Army strategic authority over Rio de Janeiro state police: the Military Police, responsible for preventing crime; and the Civil Police, responsible for investigating crime. The Army exercised this authority from February to December 2018 in attempt to bolster police effectiveness at reducing Rio de Janeiro's high crime and violence levels associated with drug trafficking. It was the first federal intervention in a state's law enforcement since Brazil's 1988 democratization after 21 years of military dictatorship (Betim 2018b). During these 11 months, the Army also continued to conduct Operation Rio de Janeiro, a Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO) operation in place since July 2017 to support state police tactically in reducing crime and violence (Gabinete de Intervenção Federal no Rio de Janeiro 2022a).

The Army's 2018 participation in law enforcement thus focused strategically on building police capacity through the Federal Intervention and tactically on supporting police actions through the GLO Operation Rio de Janeiro. Unless otherwise noted, I nonetheless use the term "Federal Intervention" in reference to a troop deployment that encompassed both strategic and tactical participation. I use the term "Federal Intervention Cabinet" in reference to the Army agency that President Temer established to oversee all aspects of Rio de Janeiro law enforcement in 2018.

The Federal Intervention is representative of law enforcement militarization partially because it resulted from high crime and violence levels, limited police capacity, and strong electoral incentives for troop deployment. President Temer's intervention decree on February 16, 2018, stated, "[t]he objective [...] is to put an end to the severe compromise of public order in the State

of Rio de Janeiro” (Presidência da República 2018). The city (6.6 million residents in February 2018), metropolitan area (12.2 million), and state (17.0 million) of Rio de Janeiro had experienced sharp upticks in crime and violence. From December 2017 to January 2018, homicides had increased by 46% at the city level and killings of police officers had increased by 50% at the state level (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2022a; 2022b). The city’s famous Carnival celebration, from February 9 to 14, 2018, had witnessed highly publicized street crime in upper-class and tourist-oriented neighborhoods with surprisingly limited police presence and response (Grilo Serrinha 2018; Nunes et al. 2018). Rio de Janeiro governor Luiz Fernando Pezão admitted that the state’s planning for police deployment during Carnival had failed (G1 2018b).

Reflecting these trends prior to the Federal Intervention, only 7% of Rio de Janeiro city residents surveyed in 2017 had either “a lot” or “some” confidence in state police. This percentage was down about 13 points from 1998 and was roughly 27 points less than Brazilians overall in 2017. In contrast, around 36% of city residents and 50% of Brazilians surveyed had “a lot” or “some” confidence in the Armed Forces in 2017 (Latinobarómetro 2022).

These security and institutional factors incentivized President Temer to place Rio de Janeiro’s law enforcement fully under military authority. Temer had been vice president before assuming the presidency through the controversial impeachment of leftist Dilma Rousseff in 2016. Temer’s October 2018 reelection prospects had dimmed sharply due to corruption allegations and severely limited popularity (Hunter and Power 2019, 70-74). The fact that 83% of Rio de Janeiro residents, according to a survey by the Temer administration, supported the Federal Intervention shortly after its decree seemed to reinforce his populist gambit (Azedo 2018).

One way that the 2018 Federal Intervention did not reflect militarization's sources is how it corresponded with limited U.S. security assistance (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021). U.S. bureaucrats and politicians had used security assistance as leverage to influence the domestic politics of civilian oversight during 2010s troop deployments in Colombia and Mexico (Dizard 2018), two high-militarization countries (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021). Brazil, which has a moderate militarization level relative to other Latin American countries (521-528), received \$104.5 million in U.S. security sector assistance² between 1996 and 2018 (Security Assistance Monitor 2023a; 2023b).

Aid to Brazil represented one and three percent of U.S. security assistance to Colombia and Mexico, respectively. Indeed, Brazil received about 10 times less U.S. assistance than the average high-militarization country, seven times less assistance than its average peer in the moderate category, and 63% less assistance than Panama, a low-militarization country. An implication is that the U.S. government, whether as part of the oversight or social order coalition (Dizard 2018), had less leverage over the 2018 Federal Intervention than it typically has over militarization episodes in other Latin American countries. Table 1 below presents militarization and U.S. security aid levels by Latin American country.

² Reported in yearly U.S. dollar values, “security sector assistance” includes bilateral defense and law enforcement cooperation outside the categories of Arms Sales and Foreign Military Training (Security Assistance Monitor 2023a).

Table 1: Militarization and U.S. security sector assistance by country		
<i>Militarization level</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>U.S. security sector assistance (1996-2018)</i>
High ("generalized constabularization")	<i>Average</i>	\$1,676,167,910
	Colombia	\$10,415,744,178
	Mexico	\$3,300,934,524
	Ecuador	\$498,549,508
	Guatemala	\$257,743,501
	El Salvador	\$179,684,178
	Honduras	\$169,626,536
	Dominican Republic	\$108,313,699
	Venezuela	\$90,346,343
	Nicaragua	\$64,568,724
Moderate ("limited constabularization")	<i>Average</i>	\$708,285,147
	Peru	\$1,684,343,214
	Bolivia	\$1,001,224,731
	Brazil	\$104,544,810
	Paraguay	\$43,027,833
Low ("paramilitary" / "militarized" police)	<i>Average</i>	\$79,658,729.80
	Panama	\$170,433,199
	Argentina	\$77,377,648
	Chile	\$71,375,702
	Costa Rica	\$57,185,937
	Uruguay	\$21,921,163

SOURCE: Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021, 521-528; Security Assistance Monitor 2023b.

NOTE: Militarization level corresponds with Flores-Macías and Zarkin's (2021) categorization of the degree to which a country's law enforcement system exhibits accountability to civilian versus military law, no access versus full access to heavy weaponry and equipment, community-based versus combat-based training, and limited versus extensive centralization and hierarchy. The more accountable to civilian law, the more access to heavy weaponry and equipment, the more combat-based training, and the more centralization and hierarchy a country's law enforcement system is, the more that this country exhibits law enforcement militarization. U.S. security sector assistance includes bilateral defense and law enforcement cooperation outside the categories of Arms Sales and

Foreign Military Training. The data source reports yearly U.S. dollar values between 1996 and 2018 (Security Assistance Monitor 2023a).

Representative dimensions and risks of law enforcement militarization

The Federal Intervention also is representative of law enforcement militarization in Latin America with respect to dimensions (i.e., accountability, weaponry, training, and organizational structure) and risks (i.e., political empowerment). First, although Law 13491 of 2017 had moved accountability for most extrajudicial killings by the Armed Forces during GLO operations from civilian to military jurisdiction (Presidência da República 2017), the Intervention arguably reinforced this trend (Harig 2021, 475). The Army used the Intervention to seek additional legal protections for soldiers accused of such crimes (Villas Bôas 2018).

Second, the Army-led Federal Intervention Cabinet provided Rio de Janeiro state police with a large volume of military-style weaponry. This aid included eight submachine guns, 1,500 rifles, 1,126,300 lethal munitions, and 72 bulletproof helmets. The Cabinet further reinforced police firepower by supplying 27,424 pistols, 292 shotguns, 6,324 non-lethal arms, and 58,275 non-lethal munitions (Gabinete de Intervenção Federal no Rio de Janeiro 2022b).³

Third, as of November 11, 2018, the Federal Intervention Cabinet had facilitated training of 2,422 local law enforcement agents. Army officials redesigned police curricula for such trainings. Nearly all trainings occurred at local Army installations, including a course on strategic military leadership at the Brazilian Army Command and General Staff School. The

³ Due to procurement delays, the Federal Intervention Cabinet delivered materiel to police through November 2020 (Gabinete da Intervenção Federal no Rio de Janeiro 2022b).

Cabinet facilitated police instructors' visits to the Agulhas Negras Military Academy (Gabinete de Intervenção Federal no Rio de Janeiro 2018a). These visits focused on military doctrine, leadership, and professionalization.

Fourth, the Federal Intervention Cabinet also focused on reorienting the Military Police from its nascent community orientation to its more conventional, repressive orientation of "preventive policing" (*policamento ostensivo*) (Gabinete de Intervenção Federal no Rio de Janeiro 2022a). The Cabinet folded multiple community-based Police Pacification Units, which had been relatively independent within the force (Cano and Ribeiro 2016, 371), into battalions responsible for preventive policing (Gabinete de Intervenção Federal no Rio de Janeiro 2018b).

These dimensions of the Federal Intervention might seem unsurprising because state-level Military Police agencies are reserve forces of, and share many organizational characteristics with the Brazilian Army. In this respect, militarization might be the natural state of law enforcement in Rio de Janeiro and throughout Brazil (Bordin 2021). The Intervention nonetheless constituted a dramatic increase in militarization by deploying the Army with strategic authority over, and tactical participation in Rio de Janeiro law enforcement, by increasing state violence, and by empowering the security forces as discussed below in further detail. This policy thus was both a representation and an incarnation of militarization's risks.

Fifth, a consequence of the Federal Intervention was empowering the security forces politically. The Intervention deepened the Armed Forces' political power by expanding their law enforcement operations, their authority over police, and their authority within the Ministry of

Defense, an institution designed to enhance civilian control of the military (Azzi and Littlefield 2021, 35-45). Shortly after declaring the Intervention, President Temer replaced the civilian Minister of Defense with a retired Army general. This general was Brazil's first defense minister with a military background since the institution's creation in 1999 (Betim 2018c). This change further limited how much this institution would help control the troop deployment.

Less directly, the Federal Intervention corresponded with the military's increased influence over national politics. This influence was evident in military leaders' April 2018 contestation of the pending decision by Brazil's high court, the Supreme Federal Tribunal, regarding whether to permit former leftist president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to seek reelection in October 2018 while imprisoned for alleged corruption. Increased influence also was evident in active-duty and retired military officials' support for right-wing congressman Jair Bolsonaro's rival presidential bid.

Finally, this increased influence was evident in military authority within the Bolsonaro administration once the Federal Intervention concluded (Harig 2021, 473-477). President Temer had designated Army Gen. Walter Braga Netto as the "Federal Intervener" (*Interventor Federal*) to lead the Federal Intervention Cabinet. During Bolsonaro's 2019-2022 administration, Braga Netto would become the president's chief of staff, Brazil's Minister of Defense, and Bolsonaro's vice-presidential candidate in an unsuccessful 2022 reelection bid (Behnke and Fagundes 2022).

The Federal Intervention also empowered Rio de Janeiro state police politically. The number of Military Police agents elected to state and national office in October 2018 increased by 225% from October 2014 (Ferreira de Oliveira 2020, 34). After the Intervention, newly elected

governor Wilson Witzel disbanded Rio de Janeiro's State Secretariat of Public Security, which had been responsible for coordinating the Civil and Military Police. This move eliminated agencies' subordination to any civilian authority except the governor (Betim 2018a).

Seemingly representative unlikelihood of curtailing troop deployment

Scholarship on Brazilian civil-military relations and police reform suggests that we would have expected limited and ineffective mobilization to control the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro. Given Brazil's lack of external threats, "there are minimal incentives for civilian politicians to be concerned about national defense and security issues" (Bruneau and Tollefson 2014, 121). Moreover, Brazil's 1988 Constitution "does not provide a generalised guide to the institution of civilian oversight" (Garcia 2014, 489) and "full civil society participation in security sector life through the media and academia is deficient" (491). The authority to hold security forces accountable therefore is limited in practice to the Public Prosecutor's Office.

This is despite how the National Congress' Foreign Relations and National Defense Committees also have military oversight responsibilities (Garcia 2014, 496-497). Moreover, it is despite how "there is much interest in civil society regarding public security" due to "high homicide rates and a generalised sense of insecurity and impunity" (497). The committees meet regularly, yet "important pieces of legislation [...] usually originate in the executive branch" (Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017, 190). The committees' divided focus between foreign affairs and national defense limits their ability to make policy regarding the military. They "lack [...] strong, independent source of defense-related wisdom" (190). They "tend not to scrutinize the [A]rmed [F]orces to any considerable [de]gree" (190).

Brazil therefore is “perhaps the most stunning example of legislative disinterest vis-à-vis the executive branch” (Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017, 373) regarding military issues compared to its fellow post-authoritarian Southern Cone democracies of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. As evidenced by limited oversight of troop deployments, Brazil exemplifies “national security neglect”: how “a lack of attention towards national security policymaking from civilian political elites can weaken political controls over the armed forces, reduce incentives to defence reforms that challenge the armed forces’ prerogatives, and reinforce militarization of national security and defence policymaking” (Lima et al. 2021, 99).

The military’s Rio de Janeiro GLO operations involve attempts to reduce crime and violence via incursions into *favelas*: generally low-income, high-crime, gang-controlled neighborhoods with informal housing. Because “[t]hese restricted missions are not enough to grab the sustained attention of voters”, “[t]here are practically no electoral incentives for politicians, especially legislators, to care about defense” (Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017, 348-349).

“Internalism”, or the Brazilian military’s orientation toward domestic policing instead of national defense, remains “rampant not only because of the armed forces’ legal role in internal security” (Amorim Neto 2019, 23) codified as GLO operations by the 1988 Constitution and subsequent legislation (Câmara de Deputados 2022; Ministério da Defesa 2022a). This orientation also stems from popular support for the military’s involvement in law enforcement. In this perspective, the militarization “problem is more complex” than an analysis of formal institutions like oversight agencies and constitutional stipulations would suggest:

[T]he mass public is internalist and civilian elites are pragmatic about the domestic use of the military. Brazil is thus trapped in a vicious cycle. The military has ample prerogatives in internal security; crime rates keep rising; state police forces are deficient; civilians frequently call the armed forces to perform [GLO] operations; the mass public supports these operations; the military appreciates the short-term budgetary and reputational benefits generated by such operations; and the combination of all these conditions weakens civilian resolve to reduce military prerogatives in internal security (Amorim Neto 2019, 23-24).

All these factors combined to limit the effectiveness of civilian control during military' GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro between 1992 and 2018. Especially after 2010, Rio de Janeiro GLO operations became more frequent vis-à-vis the number of intervening months, longer vis-à-vis the number of deployment months, more expansive vis-à-vis the number of armed services deployed (Ministério da Defesa 2022b), and more intense vis-à-vis the number of military actions during deployments (Viana 2018). These actions resulted in at least 25 civilians killed by Army or Marine troops during Rio de Janeiro GLO operation from 2010 to 2017, with little accountability for soldiers or compensation for victims (Viana 2018).

Table 2 below presents GLO operations in response to “urban violence” (Ministério da Defesa 2022b) throughout Brazil from 1992 to 2022. It shows the intensification of troop deployments to Rio de Janeiro, including relative to other Brazilian states. Ten of 22 (45%) such operations occurred in Rio de Janeiro. No other state received more than two GLO operations. Sixty-three of 99 (64%) months with such GLO operations occurred in Rio de Janeiro. Only one other state had more than 10 months with GLO operations.

Table 2: Urban violence GLO operations in Brazil, 1992-2022

<i>Beginning</i>	<i>End</i>	<i># Months</i>	<i>Armed service(s)</i>	<i># Armed services</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>State(s)</i>
Nov. 1994	Nov. 1994	1	Army	1	Rio	Rio de Janeiro
Nov. 1994	Jan. 1995	3	Navy	1	Alvorada	Rio de Janeiro
Jun. 1999	Jun. 1999	1	Army	1	Asa Branca	Pernambuco
Nov. 1999	Jan. 2000	3	Army	1	Mandacaru e Paz nas Estradas	Bahia, Pernambuco
Jan. 2001	Jan. 2001	1	Army	1	Crime Organizado	Rio de Janeiro
Feb. 2003	Mar. 2003	2	Army, Navy	2	Guanabara	Rio de Janeiro
Apr. 2004	Jul. 2004	4	Army	1	Mamoré	Rondônia
Jun. 2004	Jun. 2004	1	Army	1	Piauí	Piauí
Jun. 2004	Jun. 2004	1	Army	1	Minas Gerais	Minas Gerais
Nov. 2004	Nov. 2004	1	Army	1	Vitória	Espírito Santo
Sep. 2006	Sep. 2006	1	Army	1	Iguatemi	Mato Grosso do Sul
Jan. 2007	Jan. 2007	1	Army	1	Entorno	Rio de Janeiro
Nov. 2010	Jul. 2012	20	Army, Navy	2	Arcanjo	Rio de Janeiro
Sep. 2012	Sep. 2012	1	Army	1	Pré-eleições	Rio de Janeiro
Feb. 2014	Jul. 2014	7	Army, Navy	2	Ilhéus	Bahia
Apr. 2014	Jun. 2015	15	Air Force, Army, Navy	3	São Francisco	Rio de Janeiro
Sep. 2014	Oct. 2015	14	Army	1	Dourados	Mato Grosso do Sul
Aug. 2016	Aug. 2016	1	Army	1	Potiguar	Rio Grande do Norte
Jan. 2017	Jan. 2017	1	Air Force, Army, Navy	3	Potiguar II	Rio Grande do Norte
Feb. 2017	Feb. 2017	1	Air Force, Army, Navy	3	Carioca	Rio de Janeiro
May 2017	May 2017	1	Air Force, Army, Navy	3	Esplanada	Brasília, D.F.
Jul. 2017	Dec. 2018	18	Air Force, Army, Navy	3	Rio de Janeiro	Rio de Janeiro

SOURCE: Ministério da Defesa 2022b.

NOTES: This table includes the Brazilian Armed Forces' Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO) operations in response to "urban violence". # months includes total calendar months with a GLO operation in effect. Operation Rio de Janeiro corresponds with the Federal Intervention period of February - December 2018. The table excludes Operation Varredura, from January 2017 to January 2018. It was the only operation to occur throughout national territory and the only one to focus exclusively on prison inspections.

Rio de Janeiro GLO operations have been subject to limited control because authority is shared between the government and military, rather than monopolized and delegated by government civilians alone, and because the military enjoys considerable autonomy. During the Arcanjo (Nov. 2010 – Jul. 2012) and São Francisco (Apr. 2014 – Jun. 2015) operations, for instance, the following indicators of limited military accountability and, thus, of limited civilian control were evident. The military's rules of engagement were negotiated between the defense minister and military commanders, rather than imposed by civilians. The defense minister exercised informal oversight before operations began but not formal oversight during operations. The Rio de Janeiro State Legislative Assembly did not attempt to monitor operations systematically. The civilian judiciary exercised limited independent monitoring, instead relying on military expertise and information and ceding authorities to the military justice system. There was limited civil society mobilization against GLO operations outside *favelas* (Passos 2019, 68-70).

Seemingly representative unlikelihood of reorienting policing

The 2018 Federal Intervention also seemed to reflect civilians' limited likelihood of reorienting police once soldiers were on the streets. This is due to what scholarship characterizes as the inadequacy of citizen security reforms, civil society mobilization, and police oversight. These limitations had corresponded with a high level of police violence before the Intervention. The resulting impression is that Rio de Janeiro's police had been uncontrollable before 2018.

As crime and violence linked to drug trafficking gangs increased in Rio de Janeiro from the 1980s to the mid-2000s, "the prevailing response of the state [... had been] a militarized strategy" (Cano and Ribeiro 2016, 365). This strategy focused on large-scale, temporary police

deployments, often with support from police special operations units and/or the military, to encircle or occupy *favelas* as a means of reducing narcotics sales. Such “interventions did nothing to eliminate drug trafficking, for dead dealers were quickly replaced and business continued as usual.” This approach to law enforcement instead produced “enormous insecurity among *favela* dwellers, who learned to fear police ever more than the dealers” (365). *Milicias*, or paramilitary groups with ties to the security forces, concurrently formed to challenge local gangs for control of *favela* territories and of these territories’ illicit markets.

Several community-oriented initiatives emerged in Rio de Janeiro over this period, the most prominent being the Police Pacification Units (*Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora*, UPPs). This Military Police program, which started in 2008, aimed to establish more permanent territorial control in *favelas* through large-scale operations supported by the Armed Forces. The program then sought to reduce armed violence through community-oriented policing, to connect communities with public services, and to facilitate economic development. The UPPs initially reduced violence and enjoyed strong public support (Cano and Ribeiro 2016, 367-371).

However, “by 2013, the [UPP] programme had entered a state of crisis” (Wolff 2022, 58) due to police corruption and abuse scandals that “tarnished the project’s legitimacy” (Cano and Ribeiro 2016, 371). Additional factors included intensifying challenges to UPPs’ territorial control by, and increasing conflict between gangs. A deepening state financial crisis limited investments in community policing and economic development (Wolff 2002, 58).

As a result, “[i]ncreasingly exposed to ambush, [UPP] commanders in many *favela* communities reduced or eliminated their regular walking patrols, leading to increased criminal violence and territorial control that was little different than that which existed prior to ‘pacification’” (Wolff 2022, 58). The number of UPPs that operated during the full calendar year increased by 400% from 2010 to 2011, by between 25% and 150% per year from 2011 to 2014, and either barely or not at all between 2015 and 2017.⁴ The latter year was the first since 2009 during which the program had not expanded (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2022c).

These oversight and reform limitations illustrate how civil society alone had been unable to reorient law enforcement from militarizing policing. Mobilization against police violence and, to some extent, for the UPP program in Rio de Janeiro since the 1990s had included a variety of actors: local civil society organizations focused on human rights and violence prevention, ranging from lower-class groups of victims’ family members to middle- and upper-class groups of professionals; labor, professional, and student associations; elected officials and staff from the state legislature; state government agencies; and nationwide social movements (Landim and Siqueira 2013, 30-31).

These actors had divergent objectives, power asymmetries, and varying capacities. They nonetheless forged a network aimed at controlling the police in response to especially symbolic instances of state violence. The network occasionally operated through mass mobilizations and participatory government bodies (Landim and Siqueira 2013, 49). Given the state’s incomplete

⁴ These counts include only UPPs that were operational during the entire calendar year, excluding years when a unit was installed or closed.

publication of information about police operations and killings (Veloso Hirata et al. 2021, 68-73), several civilian society organizations also began to collect original data on violence and police abuse. Their sources included emerging digital applications for citizen monitoring of violence. They also analyzed media coverage and social media trends. These data and analyses informed their critiques of, and legal challenges to militarization (73-78).

Overall, “the system of external/social control of police activity in a broad sense is not developed sufficiently in Rio de Janeiro” (Imanishi Rodrigues and Armstrong 2019, 18). The state lacks an independent public entity “with civil society participation [...] specifically designed to act in mediation between the population, which denounces police abuse, and the security forces” (18). For example, the State Human Rights Council has civil society participation and organizational independence from, but no formal relationship with police. Executive and legislative human rights entities like the Social Development and Human Rights Secretariat and the State Legislative Assembly’s Human Rights Committee have limited public security expertise (18).

Police violence is the most dramatic example of limited civilian control of law enforcement militarization in Rio de Janeiro. Such violence takes the form of “extrajudicial killings” (Peterke and Vasconcelos 2021; Palma 2023), often during operations in *favelas*. Prior to the Federal Intervention, average number of monthly police killings had increased by 171% from 2013 to 2017 (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2022a). Relative to 11 of 26 Brazilian states with over 100 police killings were reported in 2016, Rio de Janeiro had the third largest population, the sixth highest homicide rate at 36.4 per 100,000 people, and the most killings at 925. It had about 33% of São Paulo’s population and 10% more killings (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada and

Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública 2018, 31). Black people comprised 52% of state residents and 87% of those killed by state police in 2021 (Fórum Justiça 2023, 7).

Such violence is not only a matter of the Military Police, which conducts large-scale, sporadic, highly lethal *favela* incursions to regulate drug trafficking instead of regular preventive patrols (Veloso Hirata et al. 2021, 69). The more investigative Civil Police carried out fewer massacres, or single events with killings of at least three people (i.e., 95 to 525), from 2007 to 2021. They nonetheless killed slightly more people per massacre (i.e., 4.8 to four) in the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area than the Military Police (Grupo de Estudos dos Novos Ilegalismos 2022, 17).

Such violence exemplifies limited civilian control even though police killings tend to reflect state government policies and voters' preferences. This is because police violence demonstrates civilians' inability to oversee and reform local law enforcement. On the one hand, notwithstanding the UPPs, Rio de Janeiro governors historically have directed the police to use violence liberally in order to contain drug trafficking (Flom 2022).

State residents also exhibit strong support for police violence. A 2016 survey found that 36% of residents agree either fully or partially with the phrase, "a good criminal is a dead criminal" (*bandido bom é bandido morto*). Forty-eight percent believe that criminals do not deserve rights. Fifty-six percent agree either fully or partially with the viewpoint that human rights activists only defend criminals. Seventy-three percent agree that human rights hamper the state government's effectiveness at reducing crime and violence (Lemgruber et al. 2017, 10-18).

On the other hand, while these considerations reveal how police killings respond to state governors' and many local voters' preferences, Rio de Janeiro's extreme level of state violence also illustrates law enforcement agencies' limited accountability. This limited accountability is evident in the Public Prosecutor's Office, Brazil's main police oversight agency. Independent of the executive and judicial branches at federal and state levels, the Public Prosecutor's Office exercises limited control in practice. It "has strong de jure powers [...] to investigate and prosecute police officers for misconduct but has been constrained by institutional conflicts and limitations from fully exercising those powers" (Macaulay 2002, 22).

Consequently, "[t]he most 'external' element of control in this system is not truly independent, [because] the [Public Prosecutor's Office's] responsibility for criminal prosecution leads it into both conflict and connivance with the police, neither of which are conducive for impartial oversight" (Macaulay 2002, 24). That only 12% of state-level Public Prosecutor's Office staff across Brazil consider police oversight a priority (Lembruger et al. 2016, 30) further illustrates this agency's limited ability to establish civilian control.

Owing to these imitations, "the majority of complaints made by civil society [about Rio de Janeiro police] echo through social networks but remain [unaddressed]" (Imanishi Rodrigues and Armstrong 2019, 19). Moreover, "the few abuse cases that are investigated occur within the criminal justice system [... where complainants are unlikely to find] satisfactory resolution" (19). An illustration is that the Public Prosecutor's Office of Rio de Janeiro State brought arraignments against officers in only 39% of police violence cases investigated from 2011 to 2021 (Fórum Justiça 2023, 32). While there is limited data available for comparison, one study suggests that

the counterpart institution in neighboring, demographically similar Minas Gerais state brought arraignments in 55% of such cases between 2003 and 2018 (Mourão 2021, 41). Given the Public Prosecutor's Office's limitations, controlling law enforcement requires "a broader set of public, private, and [non-governmental] organizations that seek the moderation, legality, and legitimacy of the use of police force" (Imanishi Rodrigues and Armstrong 2019, 17).

Notwithstanding these limitations to reorienting Rio de Janeiro's historically violent law enforcement, military GLO operations had corresponded with decreased police killings before the Federal Intervention. Forty-eight of 181 (27%) months between January 2003 and January 2018 had a GLO operation in Rio de Janeiro. These months averaged 60 police killings in the state. In contrast, the 133 of 181 (73%) months without GLO operations averaged 80 police killings (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2022a; Ministério da Defesa 2022b). Police violence levels therefore were 33% higher during months without troop deployments in this period.

An implication is that, contrary to scholarly expectations, having soldiers on the streets of Rio de Janeiro somehow might have pacified the state police before the 2018 Federal Intervention. Granted, the Federal Intervention Cabinet provided state police with military-style equipment and training that could contribute to more killings (Gabinete de Intervenção Federal no Rio de Janeiro 2018a; 2018b). Historical observations nonetheless might have led us to expect that, given the concurrent GLO operation, the Intervention would not have corresponded with a dramatic increase in state violence. We therefore might have expected the Intervention to be unrepresentative of civilians' limited likelihood of controlling militarization.

Case: Monitoring coalition around the 2018 Federal Intervention

This chapter has illustrated how we would have expected the Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro to be “typical” (Gerring 2008, 648-650) or representative of law enforcement militarization vis-à-vis its sources, dimensions, risks, and consequences, as well as the limited likelihood of civilian control over troop deployments. It therefore is puzzling that a diverse, multi-sector coalition of 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions formed to monitor the Intervention, given civilians’ reportedly limited incentives. It also is puzzling that this coalition’s formation and monitoring corresponded with the unexpected discontinuation of military operations in Rio de Janeiro under the 2019-2022 Bolsonaro administration, given civilians’ reportedly limited capabilities. These puzzles suggest that the Intervention in fact was a “deviant” (Gerring 2008, 655-656) or unrepresentative case of civilian control over militarization in several respects.

This chapter also has discussed how we might have expected the Federal Intervention to be “deviant” (Gerring 2008, 655-656) vis-à-vis civilians’ limited likelihood of controlling policing, given how GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro previously had corresponded with considerably fewer police killings. A secondary puzzle is that extrajudicial killings during the Intervention drastically surpassed those during prior GLO operations. This secondary puzzle suggests that the Intervention, while representative of limited civilian control over policing based on regional and national politics scholarship, was unrepresentative of historical patterns in Rio de Janeiro.

These divergences between scholarly and empirical expectations and real-world observations make the Federal Intervention’s monitoring coalition an especially fruitful case for building theory about the dynamics of civilian control. The divergences specifically raise questions about

why civilian control institutions form and how they impact militarization, including what the relationship is between controlling troop deployment and controlling police violence. Table 3 below summarizes these puzzles.

Table 3: Three puzzles of civilian control over law enforcement militarization during the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro	
<i>Expectation</i>	<i>Observation</i>
<i>Typical (regional/national):</i> Civilians have limited incentives to control law enforcement militarization	<i>Deviant (regional/national):</i> A civilian coalition formed to monitor the Federal Intervention
<i>Typical (regional/national):</i> Civilians have limited capabilities to control law enforcement militarization	<i>Deviant (regional/national):</i> The civilian coalition corresponded with the discontinuation of troop deployments after the Federal Intervention
<i>Typical (local):</i> Rio de Janeiro troop deployments correspond with comparatively limited police violence	<i>Deviant (local):</i> The civilian coalition corresponded with comparatively extensive police violence

SOURCE: Author's research

NOTE: Typical indicates that we would have expected the 2018 Federal Intervention to be representative. Deviant indicates that we do not observe the Intervention to be representative. Regional/national indicates that the expectation and observation are relative to Latin American Politics and Brazilian Politics scholarship. Local indicates that the expectation and observation are relative to historical patterns in Rio de Janeiro.

Puzzling formation of monitoring coalition

The 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions that comprised this monitoring coalition shared four characteristics, according to my research. First, they were formed by permanent, preexisting organizations after President Temer's decree of the Federal Intervention on February 16, 2018. Second, they disbanded within 12 months. We therefore can think of the ad-hoc institutions as short-term programs of permanent organizations, to which I hereafter will refer as "parent organizations." Third, the 13 ad-hoc institutions had autonomy from the federal and state executive branches. They were independent of the Temer administration, Brazilian Army,

Federal Intervention Cabinet, and Rio de Janeiro state government and police. Fourth, they had an exclusive focus on monitoring the Intervention.⁵ An illustration of this monitoring focus is that three institutions had the word “observatory” (*observatório*) in their title.

My research also suggests that, despite these similarities, the institutions’ mutual recognition was limited. No individual within these institutions considered all other 12 institutions as partners in monitoring. No individual even was aware of all 13 institutions’ existence. This lack of full recognition and coordination resulted from how two of the 13 (15%) institutions conducted no monitoring whatsoever after being established. These two were the institutions that individuals did not consider partners and of which many individuals were unaware. That said, the other 11 of 13 (85%) institutions coordinated with, and recognized one another as participants in a joint monitoring effort to some degree.

I consider these institutions constitutive of a monitoring coalition, however loose, due to these shared characteristics. When discussing institutional formation, I refer to all 13 institutions as part of a coalition because they all had the potential to conduct monitoring at the time of being established. Understanding the 13 institutions’ formation is the dissertation’s first empirical motivation. When discussing institutional strategy and impact, I refer to the 11 active institutions as part of the monitoring coalition because the other two did not conduct monitoring.

⁵ One ad-hoc civilian institution, the Chamber of Deputies’ External Committee on the Marielle Franco Assassination, focused specifically on monitoring a police investigation. I consider this institution an example of monitoring the Federal Intervention for several reasons: Marielle Franco had been one of the Intervention’s most prominent critics; she had been participating in one of the ad-hoc civilian institutions as a Rio de Janeiro city councilor; the assassination occurred in Rio de Janeiro during the Intervention; and, due to its authority over state police, the investigation fell under the Federal Intervention Cabinet’s purview. Chapter 3 further discusses this assassination.

Understanding the 11 institutions' strategy and impact is the dissertation's second and third empirical motivation, respectively.

Although not all ad-hoc monitoring institutions coordinated with, or were aware of one another, I describe them as a coalition for consistency with Latin American Politics scholarship on civil-military and civil-police relations. Dizard (2018, 40) describes "oversight coalitions" and "social order coalitions" around troop deployments in 2010s Colombia and Mexico as "loose" due to their varying levels of "cohesion". Fuentes (2004, 5) describes "civil rights coalitions" and "pro-order coalitions" around police violence in post-authoritarian Argentina and Chile as "not necessarily highly coordinated all the time" but demonstrating "more intense degrees of coordination at key junctures" (6). These scholars suggest that civilian control institutions need not coordinate fully in order to constitute a militarization monitoring coalition.

My research further suggests that, notwithstanding their commonalities, the 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions varied considerably. Each institution was established by a different parent organization. Their parent organizations varied by sector, jurisdiction, and authority. Four were in the civil society sector, three were in the justice sector, and six were in the legislative sector. In Brazilian federalism, the justice sector has formal autonomy from the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. It includes the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Public Defender's Office (Arantes and Moreira 2019; Buta 2021). Seven parent organizations had federal jurisdiction, five had state jurisdiction, and one had municipal jurisdiction. Four parent organizations had comparatively high authority to sanction the Federal Intervention Cabinet through official channels, three had moderate authority, and six had low authority.

Apart from their parent organizations, the 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions themselves also varied in their levels of autonomy, capacity, cohesion, coordination, and longevity. Eight of the ad-hoc civilian institutions had full autonomy while five had partial autonomy. Institutions with both formal and informal independence from either or state executive had full autonomy. Informal independence meant all members of the institution, as well as the institution itself, being free of political alignments with, and financial dependence on the executive.

Four of the ad-hoc civilian institutions had robust capacity while eight had limited capacity. Institutions with robust capacity had at least one full-time, paid staff member and/or an extensive consortium of external partners. Three institutions had a high level of cohesion, six had a moderate level, and four had a low level. Institutions with more cohesion had more unity in objectives and consistency in support among internal staff and external consortium partners.

Seven institutions had longevity in terms of producing a final report. Final reports suggested longevity in monitoring throughout 2018 because they summarized institutions' activities during, and final evaluations of the Federal Intervention. Of the six institutions that did not produce a final report, two institutions performed no monitoring whatsoever after being established. Table 4 below summarizes this variation among the 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions. Appendix A presents brief summaries of the seven institutions that are most relevant for this dissertation. Appendix B presents the 13 institutions' Portuguese names and relevant hyperlinks.

Table 4: Variation within the monitoring coalition around the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro

<i>Ad-hoc monitoring institution</i>	<i>Permanent parent organization</i>	<i>Characteristics of permanent parent organization</i>			<i>Characteristics of ad-hoc monitoring institution</i>				
		<i>Sector</i>	<i>Jurisdiction</i>	<i>Authority</i>	<i>Autonomy</i>	<i>Capacity</i>	<i>Cohesion</i>	<i>Coordination</i>	<i>Longevity</i>
Center for Supervision of Rights Guarantees	Federal University of Rio de Janeiro	Civil society	State	Low	Full	Limited	Moderate	Yes	No
Civil Public Inquiry into the Federal Intervention	Federal Public Prosecutor's Office	Justice	Federal	High	Full	Limited	High	Yes	No
Civil Society Observatory	Candido Mendes University	Civil society	State	Low	Full	Robust	High	Yes	Yes
Committee to Represent the Municipal Chamber in Brasília	Municipal Chamber of Rio de Janeiro	Legislative	Municipal	Low	Partial	Limited	Moderate	Yes	Yes
External Committee on the Federal Intervention	Chamber of Deputies	Legislative	Federal	High	Partial	Limited	Low	Yes	Yes
External Committee on the Federal Intervention	Federal Senate	Legislative	Federal	High	Partial	Limited	Low	No	No
External Committee on the Marielle Franco Assassination	Chamber of Deputies	Legislative	Federal	Moderate	Full	Limited	Moderate	Yes	Yes
Favelas for Rights Circuit	Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender's Office	Justice	State	Low	Full	Robust	High	Yes	Yes
Juridical Observatory of the Intervention	National Bar Association of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro Division	Civil society	State	Low	Partial	Limited	Moderate	Yes	No
Legislative Observatory on the Intervention	Chamber of Deputies	Legislative	Federal	Moderate	Full	Robust	Moderate	Yes	Yes
Popular Truth Commission	Brazil Popular Front	Civil society	State	Low	Full	Robust	Low	Yes	Yes
Rio Plus Public Defender's Group	Federal Public Defender's Office	Justice	Federal	Moderate	Full	Limited	Moderate	Yes	No
Subcommittee on Human Rights in the Federal Intervention	Federal Senate, Human Rights and Participatory Legislation Committee	Legislative	Federal	High	Partial	Limited	Low	No	No

SOURCE: Author's research as described in Chapter 2, "Design" section. See Appendices A for institutional summaries and B for translations and key links.

NOTE: Institution names are abbreviated. Permanent parent organizations are those which established the ad-hoc civilian institutions. Authority reflects permanent parent organizations' comparative official ability to sanction the Federal Intervention Cabinet. Autonomy indicates the level of formal (i.e., official) and informal (i.e., unofficial) independence from federal executive and the security forces: "Full" indicates both formal and informal independence; "Partial" indicates formal independence only. Capacity indicates whether ("Robust") or not ("Limited") institutions had full-time staff and/or an extensive consortium of external partners. Cohesion reflects unity of objectives and consistency of support among internal staff and external partners. Coordination indicates whether institutions collaborated with at least one other institution within the monitoring coalition. Longevity indicates whether institutions produced a final report.

A potential account of this monitoring coalition is that its ad-hoc civilian institutions mainly existed in form rather than function. They could have been on paper only. Their varying levels of authority, longevity, and capacity might seem to support this conclusion. This account, however, does not explain fully why civilians created and joined these institutions and to what effect. Given civilians' reportedly limited incentives to control militarization, forming institutions would have been costly. Given their reportedly limited capabilities, even those institutions with coordination, authority, longevity, and staff would seem unlikely to have any impact. That militarization was controlled to some degree, as the next subsection discusses, underscores how at least some institutions might have amounted to not only form but, also, function.

Puzzling discontinuation of troop deployment

In addition to the puzzle of this monitoring coalition's formation, it is surprising that Rio de Janeiro troop deployments did not continue into the 2019-2022 Bolsonaro administration. This correlation between the monitoring coalition's puzzling formation and the surprising discontinuation of deployments suggests that the former might have impacted the latter. Understanding this relationship is the dissertation's second empirical motivation.

There was ample reason to suspect that Rio de Janeiro troop deployments would continue after the 2018 Federal Intervention into the 2019-2022 Bolsonaro administration. Military GLO operations had been intensifying in Rio de Janeiro prior to 2018 (see Table 2). President Temer had prolonged Operation Rio de Janeiro, which had begun in July 2017 and was supposed to end in December 2017, through December 2018 (Bresciani 2017). Granted, Temer's decision not to

seek reelection (Fernandes and Caram 2018) meant that his mandate would end on the same day as the Intervention's anticipated conclusion, December 31, 2018. Extending the Intervention beyond 2018 nonetheless was a possibility as discussed below in further detail.

Some military leaders initially had considered the Federal Intervention a "model" to replicate elsewhere in Brazil, with Rio de Janeiro being a "laboratory" of crime and violence conditions and possible solutions (Charleaux 2018; DiLorenzo 2018; Woody 2018). The Temer administration and military leadership also depicted the Intervention as successful in reducing crime and violence (Câmara de Deputados 2018j; Galdo 2018). These factors suggest that the Temer administration and military leaders could have lobbied Bolsonaro to sustain Rio de Janeiro troop deployments. With such lobbying, Bolsonaro could have extended the Intervention beyond its anticipated end of December 31, 2018, and/or continued GLO operations.

Indeed, politicians seemingly had strong electoral incentives to extend Rio de Janeiro troop deployments after 2018 (Fontes 2018; G1 2018a). Before the October 2018 elections, a September 2018 survey suggested that 72% of Rio de Janeiro residents wanted the Federal Intervention to continue into 2019 (Datafolha 2018, 2). An early 2019 survey suggested that 73% and 77% of residents continued to support the Intervention and the military's GLO operations, respectively (Datafolha and Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública 2019, 11-12).

These survey results reflect how intensifying GLO operations and the 2018 Federal Intervention had corresponded with both noteworthy improvements in citizens' perceptions of security and a notable worsening of citizens' perceptions of police. Survey respondents in Rio de Janeiro city

reported a five-point decrease in crime victimization, a 10-point increase in feeling either “very safe” or “somewhat safe”, and an 11-point decrease in the view of security as Brazil’s main challenge from 2016 to 2019. Over the same period, they nonetheless reported an 11-point decrease of confidence in state police (LAPOP 2023c; 2023d; 2023e; 2023f). Relative to the previous 11-month period, the Intervention corresponded with decreases of 13% and 10% in Rio de Janeiro city’s homicide and robbery counts, respectively (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2022a). Sustaining such popular and, in some measures, effective policies would have seemed rational for elected officials amidst decreasing public trust in Rio de Janeiro police.

Moreover, as President Temer’s term concluded, incoming executives suggested an interest at least in sustaining Rio de Janeiro GLO operations. Bolsonaro was a right-wing former Army captain who, in February 2018, had voted for the Federal Intervention while representing Rio de Janeiro in the National Congress’ lower house, the Chamber of Deputies (Adorno 2018). He had won October 2018 president elections on an aggressively pro-military, tough-on-crime platform. He had expressed openness to continuing Rio de Janeiro GLO operations (Linhares 2018). He would assume the presidency in January 2019 with more members of the Armed Forces in his cabinet than there had been at any point during Brazil’s 1964-1985 military dictatorship (Hunter and Power 2019, 81; Passos 2019, 59). Rio de Janeiro’s similarly right-wing, tough-on-crime governor-elect, Wilson Witzel, also wanted to sustain GLO operations into 2019 (Alves 2018; Betim 2018a; Grellet 2018).

All these factors seemingly combined to portend the continuation of Rio de Janeiro troop deployments into 2019, whether through a prolonged Federal Intervention or through sustained

GLO operations. However, the Intervention ended in December 2018 as initially planned and the 2019-2022 Bolsonaro administration did not initiate another GLO operation to address crime and violence in the state (Kawaguti 2019; Harig 2021; Ministério da Defesa 2022b). This is despite how the Intervention's apparent impact on crime and violence was short lived. Relative to the 11 months that preceded the Intervention, Rio de Janeiro city saw a 19% increase in homicides over the 11 months that followed the Intervention (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2022a).

The conventional wisdom suggests that Rio de Janeiro troop deployments ended because the military in 2019 lobbied Bolsonaro, over whom they had unprecedented influence, against initiating new GLO operations until soldiers had complete immunity from prosecution for human rights violations (Kawaguti 2019; Harig 2021, 475). This wisdom is incomplete. Because this popular policy gave the Armed Forces authority over local police, the military conceivably could have advocated for decoupling the Federal Intervention from GLO operations in order to sustain power while decreasing its risks of violations and prosecution.

A reasonable account of the troop deployment's discontinuation, in turn, would seem be that the military could offset a decrease in power over law enforcement after 2018 with its increase in power over other dimensions of national politics during the Bolsonaro administration (Harig 2021, 473-477; Littlefield and Block 2023). This account, however, does not explain why the military would concede power if the public supported it and if its legal risks were minimal. That a powerful military independently would opt to jettison a popular, safe source of authority just because it had similar sources in other domains is unconvincing.

Puzzling intensification of police violence

Secondary to the monitoring coalition's formation and troop deployments' discontinuation is the puzzle of police violence. Extrajudicial killings increased dramatically with the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro even though GLO operations historically had corresponded with decreased violence by state police. The violence puzzle is secondary because, as discussed below in further detail, its explanation seems more intuitive than explanations of the other puzzles. This surprising correlation between the coalition's formation, deployments' discontinuation, and killings' increase nonetheless suggests that the former might have impacted the latter two outcomes. Understanding this relationship is my dissertation's third empirical motivation.

Relative to the 59 months with GLO operations between January 2003 and January 2018, the average number of police killings in Rio de Janeiro state during the Federal Intervention's 11 months was 108% higher. Relative even to the 133 months without GLO operations over this period, the average number of police killings was 56% higher at the state level during the Intervention (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2022a; Ministério da Defesa 2022b).

Table 5 below demonstrates this distribution of police killings based on whether a GLO operation and/or the Federal Intervention occurred in a given month between January 2003 and December 2018. Here and throughout the dissertation, I discuss GLO operations and police killings in terms of months because this is the unit of time for which such data is available (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2022a; Ministério da Defesa 2022c). The table illustrates how, as relative militarization levels deepened in terms of GLO operations and the Intervention from

2003 to 2018, police violence increased except for pre- Intervention months with GLO operations. The original measure of relative militarization ranges from 0, no militarization, to 5, acute militarization. Rio de Janeiro’s baseline level is 1 to indicate militarized policing. The more prominently that GLO operations and, most importantly, the Intervention figure into a sample of months, the higher the sample’s relative militarization level is.

<i>Sample includes months ...</i>			<i>Sample characteristics</i>		
<i>without GLO operations? (n=133)</i>	<i>with GLO operations? (n=59)</i>	<i>with 2018 Federal Intervention? (n=11)</i>	<i>Number of months</i>	<i>Relative level of militarization</i>	<i>Average monthly number of police killings</i>
Yes	No	No	133	1	80
Yes	Yes	No	181	2	75
No	Yes	No	59	3	60
Yes	Yes	Yes	192	4	77
No	Yes	Yes	11	5	125

SOURCE: Instituto de Segurança Pública (2022a); Ministério da Defesa (2022c).

NOTE: The Federal Intervention is concurrent with GLO Operation Rio de Janeiro from February to December 2018. Relative level of militarization is on a 0 (none) to 5 (acute) scale, with militarization increasing as GLO operations and, especially, the Intervention occupy a greater share of months from 2003 to 2018. Months with neither GLO operations nor the Intervention have a relative militarization level of “1” due to militarized policing. Figures include killings by Rio de Janeiro State Civil Police and Military Police, rounded to the nearest integer.

An intuitive account might be that police killings increased in 2018 relative to previous GLO operations because, by providing military-style weaponry and training (Gabinete de Intervenção Federal no Rio de Janeiro 2018a; 2018b), the Federal Intervention Cabinet gave officers more means with which to enact violence. Previous GLO operations had not focused on building police capacity (Souza 2019). This account is incomplete, however, because it does not address the apparent pacifying effect that prior GLO operations had exercised on Rio de Janeiro state

police. If increased police capacity led to increase police violence, then we might not have expected the level of extrajudicial killings to vary considerably with prior GLO operations.

Summary

This chapter has introduced my dissertation by describing scholarly expectations of limited civilian control over law enforcement militarization in Latin America, by presenting the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil as a seemingly representative instance of these expectations, and by introducing three puzzles within this context. These puzzles revolve around a coalition of 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions that formed to monitor the Federal Intervention.

Understanding why this coalition emerged, contrary to the conventional wisdom that civilians have limited incentives to control militarization, is the dissertation's first empirical motivation. Its second motivation is understanding how this coalition might have impacted the surprising discontinuation of troop deployments to Rio de Janeiro from 2019 to 2022 even though civilians reportedly have limited capabilities to control militarization. Understanding how these civil-military dynamics might have shaped the surprising increase in police violence during 2018 relative to prior GLO operations is the third motivation.

These empirical motivations, in turn, give rise to theoretical questions about civilian institutions that aim to control law enforcement militarization by curtailing troop deployment and reorienting policing. Why do such institutions form? To what extent and how are they effective? Regarding effectiveness, how does their impact on troop deployments relate to their impact on police

violence? The next chapter will outline my theoretical argument to answer these questions, as well as my methodological approach to developing this argument.

Chapter 2: Theoretical argument & research design

The previous chapter motivated, based on three empirical puzzles, several theoretical questions that my dissertation will aim to answer regarding the dynamics of civilian control over law enforcement militarization. The puzzles are why a civilian coalition formed to monitor the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, why the Intervention and GLO operations were discontinued during the 2019-2022 Bolsonaro administration, and why police violence increased during the Intervention. These puzzles give rise to the following theoretical questions:

1. *Formation*: Why do civilians create or join institutions that attempt to control law enforcement militarization?
2. *Impact*: To what extent and how are civilian institutions effective at controlling law enforcement militarization?
 - a. *Troop deployment*: How and why do civilian control institutions impact the decision of whether to continue to use soldiers in policing operations?
 - b. *Police violence*: How and why do civilian control institutions impact the number of killings by police officers during troop deployments?

This chapter will outline my answers to these questions and my plan for developing these answers. My answers revolve around a theoretical argument, which I call the *autonomy paradox*. On the one hand, autonomy contributes to the formation, strategy, and, potentially, the initial and

intermediate impacts of civilian institutions aimed at controlling law enforcement militarization. On the other, autonomy could preclude institutions from the ultimate impact of demilitarization. I am less confident in these dimensions of the *autonomy paradox* argument than I am in the argument's institutional formation and strategy dimensions. I therefore present institutional impacts as theoretically and empirically speculative throughout this dissertation.

Autonomy can be formal or informal. Formal autonomy here means official or *de jure* independence from the executive, or militarization's principal, and the security forces, or militarization's agents. An institution has more formal autonomy if it is less subordinate to militarization's principal and agents by statute. Informal autonomy means unofficial or *de facto* independence. An institution has more informal autonomy if it is less aligned politically with, or less dependent financially on the principal and agents. The more that an institution is both officially and unofficially independent, the more autonomy that it has (Buta 2021, 589-590).

My specific argument is that autonomy enables civilians to form institutions aimed at controlling troop deployments and police violence. Autonomy also leads civilian control institutions to adopt a strategy of collecting original information to monitor militarization. Information is the argument's mechanism. This strategy potentially leads to institutions' initial impact on political discourse regarding militarization. In addition, it could lead to institutions' intermediate impact on military officials' concerns with the legitimacy of troop deployments.

Civilian control institutions' initial and intermediate impacts could be insufficient, however, to bring about demilitarization. Although legitimacy concerns could contribute to officials'

decisions to lobby the executive against sustaining troop deployments, other factors could explain further the continuation of troop deployment and the increase in police violence.

Insofar as civilian control institutions are relevant for demilitarization, it could be because of autonomy. This is where the paradox comes into play. Independence potentially limits institutions' access to militarization's principal and agents. It therefore could hamper institutions' ability to socialize these actors into considering troop deployments and police violence illegitimate. At the same time, autonomy could contribute to institutions' long-term legacies. The information strategies and institutional constraints of these civilian attempts at controlling militarization potentially offer repertoires and lessons for subsequent demilitarization efforts.

My argument is not that autonomy is the only or most important factor or is more important than other factors in explaining the dynamics of civilian control over law enforcement militarization. Making such an argument is impractical if civilian control institutions potentially are insufficient to bring about demilitarization and if these institutions' formation results from a combination of historical, political, and rational factors as I discuss below in further detail. Rather, I argue that autonomy is the mostly consistently important factor that we can trace from institutional formation to institutional strategy, to potential institutional impacts.

Indeed, my dissertation secondarily argues that *principal prerogative* helps explain militarization's end more than autonomy does. National executives have considerable authority over troop deployments relative to bureaucrats, civil society actors, and legislators. Leaders who initiate deployments are unlikely to reverse them, given their popularity. However, these leaders'

successors could have different interests, options, and preferences regarding militarization. Presidents, especially successors to those who initiate deployments, have considerably more influence over militarization's continuity than actors outside the principal-agent relationship irrespective of these actors' autonomy from the executive and security forces.

My analysis suggests that a combination of formal and informal autonomy is an important, but not a necessary condition for institutional formation. It nonetheless is a necessary condition for selecting the original monitoring strategy and, potentially, for achieving initial and intermediate impacts. Understanding autonomy's role in these dynamics therefore is crucial even if factors beyond the influence of civilian control institutions ultimately explain demilitarization.

This chapter will describe the *autonomy paradox* further by detailing my argument's scope-conditions, theories, hypotheses, rival hypotheses, additional factors like *principal prerogative*, and mechanism. I use "argument" to indicate a macro-level "a set of key concepts" (Gerring 2012, 58). These are autonomy and how it influences institutional formation and impacts.

"Scope-conditions" (64) are contexts in which the argument applies. "Theories" are meso-level explanations of causal processes that the concepts encapsulate (58-59). "Hypotheses" are "micro-level [...] propositions" (59) of the theory. "Rival hypotheses" (Gerring 2012, 316-319) are alternative propositions that might explain the causal processes but, as I will argue, do not.⁶

⁶ This dissertation's rival hypotheses are *policy opposition* (relative to institutional formation, chapter 3), *legitimation* (relative to initial institutional impacts, chapter 5), and *deployment demand* (relative to intermediate institutional impacts, chapter 6). I argue that these hypotheses do not help explain the causal processes at hand whereas "additional factors" help explain the processes independent of my *autonomy paradox* argument.

“Additional factors” are those that shape the argument’s dependent variables alongside, but not necessarily through interaction with the argument’s independent variables (Gerring 2012, 219-246). My argument’s independent variable is institutional autonomy. The argument’s outcomes of interest are institutional formation and institutions’ diverse impacts. “Mechanisms” are “connecting thread[s] between” the independent and dependent variables, “which thereby [serve] to explain a covariational relationship” (412). My argument’s mechanism is information, which has three parts: civilian control institutions’ strategies; institutions’ impact on political discourse; and their consequent impact on military officials’ legitimacy concerns. The argument has two dependent variables. First is institutional formation. Second is demilitarization, which has two parts: the sustainment of troop deployments; and the level of police violence.

In addition to describing the *autonomy paradox*, this chapter presents my dissertation’s approach to developing the argument. Its theoretical, deductive approach is an extended dialogue between scholarship on civilian control of the military (Croissant et al. 2011) and civilian control of militarization (Levy 2016). I juxtapose and synthesize these concepts to derive hypotheses of institutional formation, strategy, and impact. The empirical, inductive approach is a theory-building case study of the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro. The case study traces the process through the monitoring coalition, especially its Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit, formed, monitored, and impacted the Intervention. The dissertation “arrives at an ultimate [argument ... partially] by looking at observed patterns in the data” rather than building the argument strictly “according to *a priori*” (Gerring 2012, 173) theories. I nonetheless use the term “hypotheses” because, “[w]hether originally conceived as deductive or inductive, any [argument] includes an interrelated set of causal hypotheses” (King et al. 1994, 99).

This chapter will proceed as follows. It first will describe the *autonomy paradox* argument, along with the supplementary *principal prerogative* argument. The chapter secondly will detail a research design focused on the theory-building case study. Third, it will preview the evidence that subsequent chapters will bring to bear in building the *autonomy paradox* argument and explaining the empirical puzzles.

The evidence is that a combination of formal and informal autonomy was an important but unnecessary condition for ad-hoc civilian institutions to form during the Federal Intervention. It was, however, a necessary condition for them to select the strategy of collecting original information with which to monitor the Intervention. It also could have been necessary for using this strategy to impact political discourse and legitimacy concerns. This combination potentially limited institutions' ultimate impact on the deployment decision and on police violence, although executive authority accounts for troop deployments' end and extrajudicial killings' intensification more than actors outside the principal-agent relationship do. More autonomous institutions nonetheless left more repertoires and lessons for subsequent efforts.

Scope-conditions: Strategic interaction during urban troop deployment

My argument about the autonomy paradox has two scope-conditions. One is that establishing civilian control over law enforcement militarization involves a strategic interaction between militarization's principal, this principal's agents, and actors who are external to the principal-agent relationship. Another scope-condition is that this strategic interaction occurs during an

urban troop deployment. Given the deployment's path-dependent nature, the principal who begins the troop deployment is not a main actor in the decision to end this deployment.

Strategic interaction

The first scope-condition of my argument is the strategic interaction between law enforcement militarization's principal and agents, on the one hand, and external actors who seek to control militarization's risks, on the other hand. The principal is the national executive who initiates the troop deployment to a given region. The agents are soldiers who conduct the troop deployment and police officers who operate in the region. Deployment can be tactical, using soldiers alongside police, and/or strategic, giving the soldiers authority over police.

The agents can shirk through some combination of incomplete or non-implementation of the troop deployment. "[S]hirking is a mechanism for defending the military's institutional well being [sic] in the face of pressures to abide by presidential orders", considering how "[c]arrying out these orders would threaten to divide the military against itself, tarnish its reputation, and expose it to future reprisals" (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2010, 396). In this way, "[t]he armed forces must weigh the benefits of complying with civilian control against the potential costs they could incur" (396) if they implement the executive's troop deployment as directed. Police can shirk, as well, by implementing incompletely the directives that accompany troop deployment. External actors are civilians outside the principal-agent relationship who seek to influence the agents' implementation of the troop deployment and police operations.

I arrive at this scope-condition through a comparison of controlling the military with controlling militarization. Civilian control of the military is a strategic interaction between the principal, or the executive leader who initiates the troop deployment, and the agent, or the armed forces that carry out the deployment (Croissant et al. 2011, 83-84). In contrast, civilian control of militarization involves actors who are external to the principal-agent relationship and who seek to minimize the deployment's negative consequences. Such actors include civil society organizations, justice sector agencies, and legislators with interests in controlling militarization's risks. Courts are not among these external actors because, while their work might influence civilian control, they function more as neutral arbiters (Levy 2016, 83; Ríos-Figueroa 2016, 1-9).

Power asymmetries exist between agents. Given that limited police capacity is a motivation for troop deployment, the armed forces have more authority in implementing the principal's policy. This authority can be informal, based on the military's comparative capacity and legitimacy, or formal, based on the executive's decision to delegate command of the police to the military. In militarization's principal-agent relationship, executives therefore have the most power and police have the least power while the armed forces fall in the middle.

Executives can decide to delegate their power to the security forces (Croissant et al. 2011, 78). They can place the police under the military's command, for example, creating a principal-agent relationship among security forces embedded within a principal-agent relationship between executives and security forces. There is an incentive to delegate because it enables the principal to take credit for the agent's success and to attribute blame for the agent's failure.

Urban troop deployment

The second scope-condition is that this strategic interaction plays out over the course of an urban troop deployment. That the deployment occurs in an urban area is an important scope-condition for two main reasons. One is “monitoring costs” (Feaver 2005, 101). The strategic interactions hinge on external actors’ ability to observe the deployment. This ability depends partially on the concentration of civil society organizations, justice sector agencies, and legislators, as well as the concentration of media outlets and residents. The more external actors, media outlets, and residents where a deployment occurs, the more that civilians can witness the deployment. The more witnesses, the more information that external actors can bring to the strategic interaction. As I discuss below in further detail, information is the key mechanism of civilian control.

That the troop deployment occurs in an urban area also is important because, for three intuitive reasons, the risks of law enforcement militarization to democracy are higher. First, the potential extent of criminal and state violence due to troop deployments increases with population density. More urban areas have more people that criminals, soldiers, and police can kill during deployments, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Second, the possible degree to which militarization undermines police reform increases with population density. The scope of policing is broader in more urban areas because the population density and, thus, the concentration of police is denser. The broader the scope of policing, the riskier the consequences are if reform does not occur. Third, the potential extent of security forces’ empowerment increases with population density. More urban areas have been more seats of power for military and police officials to influence during deployments.

There are two types of urban troop deployments. One is mobilizing the military to participate alongside, or in place of police during law enforcement operations, such as incursions into gang-controlled neighborhoods. Another is mobilizing the military to command the police during law enforcement operations. These types are mutually inclusive as the mobilizations can occur at the same time, in the same place. Both types constitute deployments because they involve mobilizing the military to act in law enforcement.

The executive's decision to mobilize the military in either way risks initiating a "spell of large-scale state repression" or a "duration of time when government repression is above a certain level of severity/lethality and scope" (Davenport and Appel 2022, 640). The spell not only results from electoral and institutional incentives. It also hinges on "the thoughts and discussions of coercion and force-wielding institutions who work out the more specific details of the repressive effort" and on "the actions of the relevant government agents who engage in repressive behavior and the norms of practice that develop after they have begun" (635).

As a repressive spell, the troop deployment consequently "involves a great number of actors, actions and phases before governments use this behavior in the first place, and once set on the relevant path there is a lot involved with getting governments to stop" (Davenport and Appel 2022, 635). What characterizes the spell is "the sticky nature of the repressive process once underway" and "the general inadequacy of many policies to perturb" (644-645) the principal and agents from perpetuating the spell. A theoretical implication is that controlling militarization requires breaking its path dependence.

Disrupting such spells to control the military requires “change agents [...] who have a strong interest in extending civilian decision-making authority” and who “possess the capabilities to offset [...] path dependence, establish new institutions and initiate [strategies]” (Croissant et al. 2011, 83) to pursue this interest. Creation of institutions and selection of strategies shape change agents’ ability to achieve this objective (83-90). In contrast, “status quo agents [...] are satisfied with the existing state of civil-military relations” (83) and are unlikely to initiate change.

It is intuitive that the repressive spell’s principal favors the status quo because they initiated the spell. It also is intuitive that external actors favor change because they seek to control the risks and mitigate the negative consequences of spells. A theoretical implication is that, depending on their institutions and strategies, external actors are the main force in controlling militarization’s agents. The principal who begins the deployment is unlikely to be the one to end it.

Theory 1: Institutional formation

My argument holds that autonomy contributes to institutional formation because civilian control of militarization is inherently contentious. Formation here refers to the creation and the consolidation of civilian control institutions. Consolidation occurs when individuals who did not participate in the creation decide to join an institution. To say that autonomy contributes to institutional formation is to say that autonomy helps understand why individuals create and join institutions. Civilian control’s contentiousness is evident through a comparison of controlling the military and controlling militarization.

On the one hand, merely controlling the military involves “civilians having exclusive authority to decide on national policies and their implementation” (Croissant et al. 2011, 78). Such control entails the freedom to delegate authorities to the armed forces and the ability to sanction the armed forces for carrying out such policies in a way that is inconsistent with civilian preferences (78). A theoretical implication is that, given the executive’s authority, both of the following decisions reflect civilian control of the military: the military’s decision not to shirk in implementing the executive’s orders with respect to the troop deployment; and the executive’s decision not to punish soldiers and their commanders for killings during the deployment.

On the other hand, “controlling militarization involves constraining “the mechanisms that legitimize use of [military] force” (Levy 2016, 76) as a “normal, pervasive, and enduring strategic preference” (79). It is “a deliberative process of decision making in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role” (92) from militarization’s principals and agents. It entails public, slow, and transparent debate about not only the operational dimensions of military deployment but, more importantly, about these deployments’ appropriateness and effectiveness (79-85). A theoretical implication is that contesting the legitimacy of decisions by militarization’s principal and agents to initiate and implement troop deployments, respectively, is more central for controlling militarization than it is for controlling the military.

Intuitively, because controlling militarization is inherently contentious, establishing new institutions to participate in this process requires preexisting organizations and individual actors to have autonomy from militarization’s principals and agents. The more autonomy that they

have, the more opportunity that preexisting institutions and individual actors have in order to organize for curtailing troop deployments and police violence once soldiers are on the streets.

Without autonomy, civilians have little freedom to contest militarization. Lack of autonomy can prevent civilians who align politically with, or depend financially on the executive, military, and/or police from contesting troop deployments and police violence. If aligned or dependent civilians nonetheless attempt to establish civilian control once soldiers are on the streets, they risk sanction from militarization's principals and agents.

Hypothesis 1: Institutional autonomy contributes to civilian control institutions' formation by granting the opportunity to contest militarization.

The dissertation's first rival hypothesis, which offers an alternative explanation that does not appear to account for the causal processes at hand, concerns policy opposition. Under this rival hypothesis, because controlling militarization is inherently contentious, opposition to militarization could be necessary for institutional information. This rival hypothesis could relate to the main hypothesis insofar as, if autonomy grants actors the opportunity to contest militarization, a desire to oppose militarization also must shape institutional formation.

The difference is that the main hypothesis centers opportunity while this rival centers motivation. This rival hypothesis assumes that opposition motivates individuals to seize the opportunity presented by autonomy in order to create or join civilian control institutions. Opposition could be

a necessary ideological condition for establishing civilian control, in this view, while autonomy is an institutional factor that enables actors to pursue their ideological goals.

Rival hypothesis 1: Policy opposition could contribute to civilian control institutions' formation by motivating actors to contest militarization.

A supplement to the main hypothesis holds that autonomy enables contestation dependent on several factors. These additional factors prime individuals to perceive militarization as warranting contestation. The factors also provide individuals with frames, or rhetorical and organizational tools, for mobilization. Such frames relate to broader historical and political struggles, as well as previous organizational models.

One of these additional factors is collective memory of past militarization episodes. Trauma from previous troop deployments and police violence primes civilians to contest militarization. It also gives civilians the historical frame with which to do so. They can tie current episodes to past traumas rhetorically. Collective also memory gives civilians the organizing frame with which to contest militarization. It makes the organizational repertoires of mobilizations against prior militarization episodes available for adaptation to present-day circumstances.

Factor 1.1: Collective memory contributes to institutions' formation by priming contestation and providing historical and organizational frames.

Ongoing political conflict also primes civilians and provides them with frames. It leads individuals to see militarization as part of a broader struggle over power. However, while collective memory tends to mobilize militarization's critics, political conflict mobilizes both critics and supporters. Civilian control institutions generally aim to contest militarization, yet some members of these institutions support troop deployment and police violence as a response to high crime and violence levels. Militarization's supporters prioritize controlling the military (Croissant et al. 2011). They see institutions as ways to assert their political authority. With this authority, they aim to help troop deployment and police violence appear more appropriate and more effective in the political discourse. They do not seek to control militarization by delegitimizing deployment and violence (Levy 2016).

Political conflict mobilizes both militarization's opponents and proponents by encouraging them to see civilian control institutions as sites of ideological and partisan competition for power. In addition to asserting their political authority so that militarization becomes more legitimate, proponents seek to prevent opponents from delegitimizing the troop deployment and police violence. They join institutions in order to protect militarization's agents from militarization's opponents. They also seek to help agents protect militarization's intended beneficiaries, the citizens, from militarization's intended targets, the criminal organizations.

Factor 1.2: Political conflict contributes to institutions' formation by priming both contestation and support and providing competition frames.

Hypothesis 1 concerns civilian control institutions' relationship to militarization's principals and agents whereas Factors 1.1. and 1.2 concern institutions' relationship to historical and political conditions. Another factor relates to how, in addition to being relational or contextual, institutional formation is rational. Bureaucratic and civil society organizations can appeal to funders for resources in order to create new institutions. Legislators can demonstrate responsiveness to voters who are worried about security. They also can gain publicity for reelection. In this view, creating or joining institutions stems less from the institutions themselves or from civilian control as an objective. The decision relates more to rewards that actors will forego if they do not form institutions.

Factor 1.3: Mobilization rewards contribute to civilian control institutions' formation by incentivizing participation in exchange for benefits.

Theory 2: Institutional strategy

My argument presents information as the mechanism that links civilian control institutions' formation to their impacts. Information is central to both institutions' strategies for monitoring militarization and these strategies' initial and intermediate impacts. Information here means qualitative and/or quantitative data related to troop deployment and police violence during militarization episodes. This data takes two forms. One is raw data that institutions collect through the monitoring process. Another, which the subsequent section will discuss, is processed data that institutions publicize to shape political discourse and legitimacy concerns.

Monitoring is an informational strategy for establishing civilian control. “[C]reating oversight institutions, surveillance mechanisms and reporting systems inside or outside the armed forces” helps civilians “reduce existing information asymmetries between themselves and the military, thereby minimizing the risks of ‘moral hazard’ and surreptitious acts by” (Croissant et al. 2011, 86) soldiers. Monitoring is one of the most powerful strategies because it entails “the threat or use of coercion and intrude[s] deeply into the military” and because it “will raise the costs imposed on the military if [it] resists institutional changes” (89). A theoretical implication is that more robust monitoring enables more robust civilian control.

Monitoring’s robustness, in turn, depends on civilians’ object of control. On the one hand, “monitoring is a coercive strategy” for controlling the armed forces because it “raises the expected costs of military non-compliance by increasing the probability of punishment” (Croissant et al. 2011, 86). Although “monitoring alone cannot enforce compliance, [...] the very possibility of detecting misbehavior and the anticipated social costs resulting thereof reduce the probability of military insubordination” (Croissant et al. 2011, 86).

Monitoring to control the armed forces can occur via both official channels, such as legislative committees and justice sector agencies. It also can occur through unofficial channels, such as civil society organizations and the news media. Because the threat of sanction is more credible, monitoring via official channels raises the expected costs of military insubordination more.

On the other hand, “a heavily monitored military acting on behalf of its political supervisors but carrying out an unquestionable militarized policy signifies a high level of civilian control of the

military but a low level of control of militarization” (Levy 2016, 82). Monitoring through official channels is insufficient for delegitimizing militarization in order to curtail troop deployment and police violence. Institutions must bring the information that they collect from monitoring to bear in political discourse, specifically the media, in order to achieve this goal (Levy 2016, 76-85).

Because controlling militarization is contentious, and because monitoring can raise militarization’s costs coercively through political discourse, militarization’s principals and agents have few incentives to cooperate with external actors by providing information about troop deployments and police violence. They have even fewer incentives to provide such information to more autonomous institutions, who have stronger motivations to contest militarization so that it appears illegitimate. Aiding autonomous institutions’ external monitoring is contrary to the principal’s and agents’ interests. To monitor militarization, more autonomous therefore must invest more in generating their own data by collecting original information.

Hypothesis 2: Institutional autonomy contributes to civilian control institutions’ strategy by encouraging collection of original information.

A supplement is that the informational link between institutional autonomy and impact depends on the additional factor of cohesion. Institutions that have more consistent support from internal and external stakeholders regarding the importance of, and strategies for controlling militarization are more cohesive. Consistency indicates shared objectives and stable recognition of the institutions’ legitimacy in pursuing these objectives (Croissant et al. 2011, 80).

The more cohesive that an institution is, the more effective that it is at collecting and publicizing original monitoring information. Using such information requires standardization of data collection and publication processes, with which less cohesive institutions struggle more. Institutions that are both more autonomous and more cohesive therefore are more effective at collecting and publicizing original monitoring information about militarization.

Factor 2: Institutional cohesion contributes to civilian control institutions' strategy by enabling collection of original information.

Theory 3: Institutional impact (initial)

My argument presents political discourse, or how society debates militarization in the public sphere (Levy 2016), as the first possible impact of civilian control institutions. Political discourse conceivably could have two dimensions. One is media coverage, which reflects political discourse's deliberative aspect. The other is public opinion, which reflects the societal aspect.

However, public opinion could be less central to political discourse around law enforcement militarization than is media coverage. The principal and agents could make militarization seem legitimate in public opinion partially by dehumanizing the objects of troop deployment and police violence. They also could do so by depicting "[u]nity of opinion as critical" (Levy 2016, 88). Insofar as it invests in monitoring, the public under these conditions potentially seeks to use information in order to control the armed forces instead of controlling militarization.

The public potentially aims to ensure that troop deployment and police violence enact this dehumanization instead of working to prevent such an outcome. Consequently, “when control of the military involves more monitoring by the public [...] the level of militarization grows [...] Less involvement by the public may reduce militarization” (Levy 2016, 88). The media, a primary vehicle through which the principal and agents communicate with the public and vice-versa (Groeling and Baum 2009), thus could be an essential site for delegitimizing militarization.

By focusing on how troop deployments unfold rather than what their underlying logics are, the media possibly tends to contribute to civilian control of the military rather than civilian control of militarization (Levy 2010). The media could contribute to controlling militarization, however, by structuring political discourse to be more deliberate, empirical, expansive, and inclusive.

Civilian control over militarization could expand with “the scope of the debates [...] in terms of the issues on the agenda, the slow thoughtfulness with which the debates are conducted, the degree of openness in discussing all of the issues [...], the availability of information, and the range of speakers” (Levy 2016, 82). A theoretical implication is that using monitoring to inform political discourse about militarization’s illegitimacy could enable institutions to raise the cost of militarization more. A policy’s legitimacy has two dimensions: the policy’s appropriateness in terms of reflecting society’s values; and its effectiveness in terms of satisfying society’s interests (March and Olsen 2009). The less that the media presents militarization as appropriate and effective, the less legitimate that militarization could become in political discourse.

When covering security crises, “journalists generally prefer stories that are novel, conflictual, balanced, and authoritative” (Groeling and Baum 2009, 441). Preferences for newer and more conflictive stories could lead journalists to prioritize sources with original data, which is more novel, and sources who contest militarization, which is more conflictual. Preferences for more balanced and more authoritative stories potentially lead journalists to supplement information from militarization’s principals and agents, which is more authoritative, with information from external actors, which provides for more balanced coverage. More autonomous civilian control institutions that create more original data therefore could receive more media coverage.

Hypothesis 3: Institutional autonomy could contribute to civilian control institutions’ initial impact by incentivizing media coverage.

A rival hypothesis could concern not only the media’s incentives but, also, its interests in covering civilian control institutions. In this hypothesis, the media potentially has an interest in preserving its role as interlocutor between the executive and the public. Because the executive is militarization’s principal, the media could have an incentive to produce coverage that legitimizes militarization despite this policy’s risks to democracy (Levy 2010). The media could do so by balancing coverage of information from civilian control institutions, whose novelty and contentiousness draw journalists’ attention, with coverage of information from militarization’s principals and agents, whose authoritativeness draws journalists’ attention.

Intuitively, creating balanced coverage could legitimize militarization in several ways. By presenting both anti- and pro-militarization views, balanced stories could center contestation of

the principal's and agent's appropriateness and effectiveness. The existence of such contestation could enable the principal and agent to dismiss concerns that militarization erodes democratic norms. They could say that, if the troop deployment jeopardized democracy like the deployment's opponents claim, there would be no political space for such contestation.

By presenting a pro-militarization view for every anti-militarization view, balanced stories could weaken the latter. They potentially prevent criticisms of troop deployment and police violence from gaining traction in the political discourse. Finally, by implying that militarization's benefits (as expressed by supporters) counterbalance militarization's risks (as expressed by opponents), such stories could create false equivalence (Artz 2014; Bachman and Brito Ruiz 2023). This equivalence would be false because, as discussed previously, the risks outweigh the benefits.

This rival hypothesis could help explain the same outcome, media coverage of civilian control institutions, as the autonomy hypothesis. The distinction is how this rival hypotheses would account for not only coverage of institutions but, also, coverage of additional views that serve as a counternarrative. The more that this rival hypothesis could explain media coverage, the less confidence that we would have in the *autonomy paradox* argument.

Rival hypothesis 3: Policy legitimization could limit civil control institutions' initial impact by incentivizing media coverage more than information does.

An additional factor potentially concerns the incentives of militarization's principal and agents to provide information about the troop deployment and police violence. Just as sharing this

information with monitoring institutions is contrary to the principal's and agents' interests, sharing it with the media could risk contributing to contentious, coercive attempts at controlling militarization. By informing external actors and the public about the deployment and extrajudicial killings, the media itself could raise the armed forces' costs of militarization.

To report on militarization, the media must use unofficial information due to the principal's and agents' lack of transparency. Institutions' original information, which their autonomy encourages, could meet this need. The media possibly is pulled to cover institutions due to their autonomy and their consequent reliance on original information. It also could be pushed to do so by the government's secrecy. Moreover, the principal's and agents' lack of transparency could give external actors an opportunity to delegitimize militarization by filling information gaps.

Factor 3: Official transparency could contribute to institutions' initial impact by creating journalistic need and institutional opportunity to fill information gaps.

Theory 4: Institutional impact (intermediate)

My argument presents military officials' legitimacy concerns as a possible intermediate impact of civilian control institutions. Legitimacy concerns here are officials' worries about the appropriateness and effectiveness of the troop deployment. As such worries deepen, officials' legitimacy concerns could intensify. Military officials could be sensitive to how, as political discourse turns against the deployment due to critical media coverage, the deployment becomes more costly. They could have an interest in appearing legitimate. Institutions' autonomy, information, and impact on political discourse therefore could raise officials' concerns with the

deployment's legitimacy. A comparison of controlling the military versus controlling militarization illustrates this potential dynamic.

Civilian control of the military depends little on the armed forces' sensitivity to such risks. A potential strategy for controlling the military is to use "legitimization", which involves cultivating "compliance with institutional change by transforming the normative framework of the armed forces" (Croissant et al. 2011, 87) so that soldiers consider civilian authority appropriate and effective. However, this strategy is less impactful than monitoring. The latter is more coercive in raising the military's costs for behaving in ways that do not align with civilians' preferences (85-90). A theoretical implication is that making military officials more sensitive to the risks of troop deployment could be unnecessary for civilian control of the armed forces.

Controlling militarization, in contrast, centers on "targeting the legitimization of the use of force" (Levy 2016, 85). This process mainly operates through political discourse, which actors external to the principal-agent relationship inform by challenging the normative justifications and technical requirements for, and political interests in using force (79-84). Controlling militarization depends not only on monitoring the troop deployment but, also, on influencing military officials' perceptions of deployments' appropriateness and effectiveness.

Military officials have a strong interest in society considering them legitimate. Officials base their views of deployments' appropriateness and effectiveness partially on society's views (Levy 2016, 86-92). As political discourse becomes more critical of the deployment, officials become more concerned with deployment's legitimacy. More autonomous civilian control institutions, by

using information to shape political discourse through critical media coverage, therefore could influence officials' perceptions to worry more about deployments' legitimacy.

Hypothesis 4: Institutional autonomy could contribute to civilian control institutions' intermediate impact by raising military officials' legitimacy concerns.

A rival hypothesis could be that military officials' legitimacy concerns respond less to the inappropriateness and ineffectiveness of the policing deployment and more to demand for other deployment types. In this view, officials could seek to satisfy as much demand for troop deployments as possible in order to achieve legitimacy in society. As new demands emerge, these demands potentially appear more urgent and draw more of officials' attention. It could be difficult to satisfy all potential demand, however, as the military's deployment capacity is finite.

Urban policing to reduce crime and violence is one type of troop deployment. Others include border security, counterinsurgency, inter-state armed conflict, and international peacekeeping. As demand for other types of deployment increases, military officials could consider these other types of troop deployment more legitimate than policing. Legitimacy concerns with policing, in this view, could be relative as military officials weigh different deployments against one another.

Rival hypothesis 4: Deployment demand could limit civilian control institutions' intermediate impact by raising legitimacy concerns more than political discourse does.

Theory 5: Institutional impacts (ultimate)

My argument holds that the demilitarization of law enforcement is the ultimate impact that civilian control institutions could achieve. This concept refers to militarization as both an episode and a practice. Regarding an episode, demilitarization means the end of the troop deployment and the non-intensification of police violence during this deployment. Regarding practice, demilitarization means the subsequent discontinuation of troop deployments for a considerable period even if this discontinuation is not permanent. It also means the sustained reduction of police violence after the troop deployment. Civilian control institutions could contribute to demilitarization by helping bring about the episode's end and the practice's discontinuation.

However, notwithstanding their initial and intermediate impacts, civilian control institutions potentially have little ultimate impact on demilitarization. Under civilian control of the military (Croissant et al. 2011), the curtailing of the troop deployment could result less from militarization's agents and more from its principal. Officials' legitimacy concerns, when acute, could contribute to this decision by leading the agents to lobby the principal against sustaining militarization. Such lobbying could be influential as troop deployment empowers the military politically. The principal, however, could have final say over whether to sustain the deployment.

Intuitively, the executive who initiates the troop deployment has little incentive to end it. They stand to benefit electorally from having soldiers on the streets. They also risk appearing ineffectual if they end the deployment themselves. They conceivably could avoid this risk if militarization were effective at reducing crime and violence, but this is unlikely to be the case. It consequently is in the executive's political interest to sustain the deployment.

Changes in the principal's interests and preferences therefore could be what most influence the decision to discontinue the troop deployment. Only such change could disrupt the deployment's path dependence (Croissant et al. 2011). For example, when the executive turns over with elections or other leadership selection processes, the new leader could bring new interests and preferences. The new executive could receive little credit for their predecessor's policies. For these reasons, the new executive could seek to establish their own political identity and policy platform. The new executive therefore could have an incentive to discontinue troop deployments.

The possible importance of executive turnover underscores how *principal prerogative*, more than civilian control institutions, could contribute to demilitarization. In militarization's principal-agent relationship, national leadership initiates the troop deployment. This leadership could retain final decision-making authority over the deployment's discontinuation whether or not turnover has occurred, although leadership change could make this discontinuation more likely. Civilian actors outside the principal-agent relationship potentially have little influence on the executive, who retains the prerogative over militarization throughout the deployment.

This additional factor of *principal prerogative* aligns with both the Pion-Berlin and the Dizard (2018) perspectives regarding the likelihood of civilian control over troop deployments as described in this dissertation's first chapter. On the one hand, Latin American presidents tend to have extensive authority over military affairs compared with legislatures (Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017, 172), bureaucrats (211-216), and civil society (251). Executives generally do not use his authority to monitor deployments (Pion-Berlin 2016, 190). Presidents who initiate

militarization therefore are unlikely to control its risks extensively through monitoring, which falls to comparatively powerless civilians outside the principal-agent relationship.

On the other hand, presidents following executives who initiate militarization could have interests and preferences that diverge from those of their predecessors. Recently elected presidents could pursue alternatives to militarization that were unavailable to the prior executive. Whether they pursue alternatives depends partially on monitoring coalitions' pressure but, also, on presidents' independent calculations. *Principal prerogative* therefore works somewhat alongside the monitoring coalition's strategy to influence whether militarization persists (Dizard 2018, 32-33). A synthesis of the Pion-Berlin and Dizard perspectives is that, while both factors could contribute to militarization's end, *principal prerogative* such as that which elections bring about is likely to influence this outcome more than civilian control institutions' strategy is.

Factor 5.1: Principal prerogative could limit civilian control institutions' ultimate impact by determining the end the troop deployment more than legitimacy concerns do.

Intuitively, the type of military presence could contribute to police violence during the troop deployment. There are two types of military presence. One is when soldiers deploy either alongside or in place of the police. Another is when the military deploys in command of the police. The former involves soldiers performing police functions while the latter sees the military directing the police. These types are not mutually exclusive in principle. However, the former entails more risk that soldiers will carry out, and be accountable for human rights violations. The latter gives the military an opportunity to reduce this risk. The two types consequently tend to be

mutually exclusive in practice. Deployments tend not to have soldiers under police command. Deployments empower the military, which likely will oppose such a constraint on its authority.

When a deployment involves soldiers conducting more police functions, military officials could be more sensitive to the costs of extrajudicial killings. The legal costs are high because soldiers could face sanction. The interrelated operational and societal costs are high because the public might lose trust in the military. These costs could be independent of whether soldiers or police commit extrajudicial killings. Because soldiers do not perform police functions regularly, society likely will attribute the killings to the new deployment instead of to policing. The military therefore could take more steps to reduce the likelihood of police violence during deployments.

When a deployment involves the military directing the police instead of performing police functions, military officials could be less sensitive to the costs of extrajudicial killings. The legal costs could be low because soldiers are not the ones killing. The interrelated operational and societal costs could be low because the public is unlikely to associate the killing with the military. The military therefore could take fewer steps to reduce the likelihood of police violence during such deployments. To satisfy societal demand for repression, the military even could encourage police to be more lethal.

Factor 5.2: Military presence could limit civilian control institutions' ultimate impact by shaping police violence more than legitimacy concerns do.

Demilitarization thus could depend on *principal prerogative* and military presence more than it depends on legitimacy concerns. Accordingly, curtailing militarization as an episode and practice potentially depends little on civilian control institutions' influence. These institutions could achieve initial and intermediate impacts without contributing significantly to this ultimate goal.

Insofar as institutions are relevant to whether demilitarization occurs, it could be because of autonomy. More autonomous institutions, while achieving more initial and intermediate impacts, potentially have less access to military officials in order to socialize them into considering militarization illegitimate. The possible importance of socialization is evident through further comparison of controlling the military with controlling militarization.

On the one hand, controlling the military comprehensively involves “transforming the ideational characteristics and self-identity of the military” through “political education, confidence-building measures, [...] and the reorganization of leadership principles in order to strengthen the acceptance of democratic civilian control” (Croissant et al. 2011, 87). This socialization, however, is “a long-term strategy and therefore less suited for the short-term enforcement of civilian control” (87). Monitoring, which imposes more costs on the military for behaving contrary to civilian preferences, is more suitable in the short term (89). An implication is that socialization could be a relatively weak way to establish short-term control of the military.

On the other hand, controlling militarization involves “political discourse that questions and shapes the social power relations affecting the legitimacy of using force” (Levy 2016, 85).

Controlling militarization requires socializing principals, agents, and the public on whose behalf

they claim to act into understanding troop deployment as inappropriate and ineffective (78-81). Monitoring alone is insufficient to control militarization. Monitoring imposes costs on the troop deployment by raising Army officers' legitimacy concerns. Socialization is necessary to convince principals and agents to act upon their legitimacy concerns by discontinuing deployment. It also is necessary to convince them of police violence's illegitimacy. Without socialization, legitimacy concerns only act modestly upon one dimension of militarization.

The very autonomy that encourages independent monitoring, however, could limit civilian control institutions' ability to socialize militarization's principal and agents. Transforming these actors' understanding of the troop deployment's legitimacy could require institutions to have access to these actors. Media coverage might convince executives and military officials that the troop deployment is costly. However, convincing them that both the troop deployment and police violence are inappropriate and ineffective potentially demands social interactions. Civilian control institutions and their members, through these interactions, could impart the principal's and agents' understandings of militarization's risks and, thus, of its illegitimacy.

The contentiousness of civilian control and coerciveness of monitoring could disincentivize militarization's principals and agents from granting autonomous institutions the access necessary to achieve this socialization. Less autonomous institutions potentially have more access to principals and agents but less motivation and capability to socialize them into considering militarization illegitimate. Less autonomous institutions therefore could have the opportunity, but not the willingness or capacity, to convince executives and military officials that troop deployment and police violence are neither appropriate nor legitimate.

Hypothesis 5.1: Institutional autonomy could limit civilian control institutions' ultimate impact by hampering socialization of militarization's principals and agents.

Despite this lack of ultimate impact during the troop deployment, autonomy could enable civilian institutions to lay the foundations for long-term attempts at controlling militarization as a practice once soldiers are back in the barracks. “[C]ontrol of militarization in the form of the debates over the conditions under which” episodes could occur “leads to formal arrangements” aimed at “limit[ing] future troop deployments” and police violence “by reconstructing a decision making [sic] hierarchy” (Levy 2016, 89) of militarization as a practice. “Such arrangements lay the foundations for cementing” the capacity “for public debate to shape the popular will prior to the use of force, hence enhancing control of militarization” (89) in the long term.

Civilian control institutions could serve as the foundations of future efforts at demilitarizing law enforcement mainly because they model strategy, initial impact, and ultimate impact. The original monitoring and media influence that they develop during the troop deployment provide repertoires for future institutions to use when addressing the legacy of troop deployment and attempting continuously to reduce police violence. Moreover, the *autonomy paradox* offers a lesson for subsequent institutions. Civilian control institutions' limited impact during the troop deployments shows subsequent institutions the need to work both within and outside official channels in attempt to bring about demilitarization. The *autonomy paradox* imparts the importance of combining contestation of, and collaboration with the principal and agents.

Hypothesis 5.2: Institutional autonomy could contribute to civilian control institutions' ultimate impact by offering repertoires and lessons for future civilian control efforts.

Design: Theory-building case study through process tracing

This *autonomy paradox* and, secondarily, *principal prerogative* arguments are inductive. I base them partially on my original case study of civilian monitoring during the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro. As such, the dissertation is a theory-building exercise. This approach is consistent with how the three puzzles make this case deviant or unrepresentative of civilian control over law enforcement militarization. “[T]he primary purpose of a deviant-case analysis is to probe for new – but as yet unspecified – explanations” that inform “a general proposition” and, in so doing, “illustrate some causal factor that is applicable to other [...] cases” (Gerring 2008, 656). My arguments represent the general proposition while my examination of the Federal Intervention represents the deviant-case analysis that informs this proposition. Although my case is the monitoring coalition, the study includes comparative analyses of why the coalition’s 13 different ad-hoc civilian institutions formed, what strategies the 11 active institutions used, and how these 11 impacted the discontinuation of troop deployment and increase of police violence.

My dissertation has two “within-case [methods] of analysis” (Bennett 2004, 22). One is “process tracing” (22-24). Process tracing examines “the putative causal mechanisms in operation in a case [...] to establish which of several possible explanations is consistent with an uninterrupted chain of evidence from hypothesized cause to observed effect” (22). This method helps probe to what extent the hypotheses, compared with their rivals, account for the monitoring coalition’s

formation, strategy, and impacts. The other method is “necessity/sufficiency causal argument[ation]” (Gerring 2012, 335-337), which assesses whether an independent variable’s presence is required for, or guarantees a dependent variable’s presence. This method helps examine the influence of autonomy, specifically, along the posited causal process.

My evidence consists of “observable implications” (King et al. 1994, 19) of the argument’s theories. Observable implications, or phenomena that we expect to see in the real world if a given theory is accurate, help gauge the presence of factors that my theories highlight in explaining institutional formation, strategy, and impact. The more that the observable implications of my theories’ main hypotheses and additional factors are present relative to those of their rival hypotheses, the more confidence that I have in the argument’s “internal validity” (Gerring 2012, 84) or its accuracy in explaining the case under examination. I present observable implications at the beginning of each empirical chapter. I dedicate one chapter per theory.

Original interview data

My case study probes the theories’ observable implications through multiple data sources. The main source is 119 semi-structured interviews conducted with individuals who have first- or strong second-hand knowledge of at least one of the following themes: the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro; and Intervention monitoring coalition; and either civil-military or civil-police relations in Brazil. Nearly all interviews were in Portuguese, included a single interviewee, and occurred between January and May 2023. I conducted in-person interviews in Rio de Janeiro and Brasília, the national capital, during this period. Between January and October 2023, I also conducted interviews by telephone and video conference.

I categorize interviews according to the sector in which interviewees worked during the 2018 Federal Intervention. Most worked in either the civil society or legislative sectors. Of the 119 interviews, 48 (40%) were in civil society while 26 (22%) were in the legislative sector. Fifteen (13%) were in government, namely the federal executive branch. Twelve (10%) were in the justice sector and 11 (9%) were in the Armed Forces. Seven (6%) were in the media. Table 6 below has the distribution of interviewees by sector.

Table 6: Original interviews (Jan. - Oct. 2023)	
<i>Interviewee sector in 2018</i>	<i>Number of interviews</i>
Armed forces	11
<i>Active-duty general officer / senior officer</i>	6
<i>Other staff</i>	5
Civil society	48
<i>Academia / think tank staff</i>	26
<i>Community-based / social movement organization staff</i>	9
<i>Association / NGO staff</i>	13
Government	15
<i>Federal staff</i>	11
<i>State / local staff</i>	4
Justice sector	12
<i>Federal staff</i>	4
<i>State / local staff</i>	8
Legislature	26
<i>Federal elected official</i>	8
<i>Federal staff</i>	13
<i>State / local elected official</i>	2
<i>State / local staff</i>	3
Media	7
Total	119

NOTE: All interviews were conducted by the author in accordance with University of Wisconsin-Madison's Minimal Risk Research Institutional Review Board #2019-1408. I recruited individuals with anticipated knowledge of the 2018 Federal Intervention Rio de Janeiro, the Intervention monitoring coalition, and/or civil-military or civil-police relations in Brazil. Interviews were confidential, semi-structured, and unrecorded. Nearly all were in Portuguese, included a single interviewee, and occurred between January and May 2023. Interviews were either in-person in Rio de Janeiro and Brasília or remote via telephone or video conference. Remote interviews occurred through October 2023.

Interviews were confidential and unrecorded as per the University of Wisconsin-Madison's Minimal Risk Research Institutional Review Board #2019-1408. Due to this protocol and the recent, sensitive nature of the themes in question (Amorim Neto and Acácio 2021; Akkoyunlu and Lima 2022), I endeavor to provide no personally identifiable information about interviewees other than the sector in which they worked during the 2018 Federal Intervention. I refrain from associating interview excerpts with institutions unless it is crucial for comparative purposes. This necessity hampers the case study by limiting my ability to relate interview data to specific individuals and institutions. I therefore present my analysis of interviews in general terms and, as discussed below in further detail, supplement the interviews with various data sources.

I combined “[i]nterpretivist and positivist approaches to analysis” (Fujii 2017, 73) of interview data. My approach was positivist as the initial goal with interviews had been to identify facts for the case study. I began to code excerpts by “sorting them into discrete categories” (74) based on the sector and institution of the interviewee, as well as the research questions that the excerpts seemed to help address. I quickly realized, however, that people asked in 2023 about events in 2018 might “forget, misremember, imagine, omit, or fabricate” (73) relevant information.

I therefore started to analyze interview excerpts for not only facts but, also, perceptions. This approach was interpretivist as it attended to “how [interviewees] *socially* – that is, intersubjectively – construct and understand the worlds in which they are embedded and the logics they use to navigate those worlds” (Fujii 2017, 74) more than it sought to capture “one kind of truth” or a “single coherent account” (79). It resulted in identification of “the repetition of names, terms, concepts, [and] themes” (76) with which interviewees retrospectively had

understood the case. That my theories concern perceptions, and that the subsequent analysis will concern recurring themes, to a considerable degree reflect how this shift from positivist to interpretivist analysis affected the dissertation. Indeed, I performed nearly all analysis of the interview data before developing my argument.

Other primary and secondary data

I supplement this mainly interpretivist analysis of interview data with primarily positivist analysis of additional sources, especially using descriptive statistics. To analyze institutional formation, I use institutional documents obtained through internet searches and access-to-information requests. I also use an original dataset of elected officials who comprised the monitoring coalition's legislative committees.

Because the institutional formation analysis relies on interview data more than the dissertation's other analyses, it differs in two main respects. The first difference is that, to a greater degree than other analyses, my analysis of institutional formation captures interviewees' retrospective understanding more than it captures historical causal processes. Relative to other analyses, I therefore present the institutional formation analysis more in terms of recollection and perception. The second difference is that, because the institutional formation analysis relies more on interview data, the risk to interviewees' confidentiality than with other analyses. I therefore avoid linking interviews to individuals and institutions more in this analysis.

To analyze strategies and impacts, I use original datasets of the following: the monitoring coalition's usage of information, based on eight institutions' final reports; media coverage of the

Federal Intervention, based on 373 Brazilian newspaper articles collected with help from multiple research assistants⁷; and military officials' perceptions of the Intervention and/or Rio de Janeiro GLO operations, based on 58 theses and journal articles by junior/mid-level Brazilian Army officers⁸. I supplement the latter dataset with original analysis of interviews conducted by Castro et al. (2023) with senior Army officers. Descriptive analysis of police violence during the Intervention and prior GLO operations (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2021; Instituto de Segurança Pública 2022a; Ministério da Defesa 2022b) also informs the impacts discussion.

I briefly explore my argument's "external validity" (Gerring 2012, 85), or its generalizability to contexts beyond the case study, by discussing the extent to which the *autonomy paradox* is likely to characterize civilian control over law enforcement militarization in other Latin American democracies. I identify the circumstances under which the argument is likely to hold in other Latin American democracies. These circumstances relate to civilian monitoring capacity and general political attitudes, which I use as proxies for additional factors like collective memory and political conflict. I then use secondary data to analyze whether these circumstances are present in other countries. Based on this analysis, I assess whether the likelihood of my argument applying in these countries is strong, moderate, or limited. This assessment lays the foundation for future research to examine the *autonomy paradox*'s generalizability in more depth.

⁷ Multiple University of Wisconsin-Madison undergraduate students provided invaluable support with collecting and analyzing media coverage through student hourly employment and Amy Gangl's Undergraduate Research Assistant Program in the Department of Political Science: Nick Bankiukiewicz; Payton Cushman; Liv Lockhart; Estella Ramirez; Carlos Sodi Aliseda; and Michaela Stromberg.

⁸ Through the Undergraduate Research Assistant Program, Anisa Pontes provided invaluable support with analyzing theses that preceded the 2018 Federal Intervention.

I focus my generalizability discussion on Colombia and Mexico because these appear to be the only countries where data related to civilian monitoring of troop deployments exists (Dizard 2018). That this data concerns deployments across rural and urban areas and, in Colombia, across crime-reduction and counterinsurgency missions, speaks to the limits of available information. Other Latin American democracies that regularly conduct urban troop deployments include the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina 2016, 74-78). To my knowledge, little to no systematic data exists on civilian monitoring or troop deployments in these countries. Brazil seems to be the only Latin American country with an official registry of domestic troop deployments (Ministério da Defesa 2022a). My generalizability examination involves briefly discussing the likelihood of the autonomy paradox holding elsewhere based on secondary data, rather than comprehensively testing the argument's constitutive theories with primary data, for this reason.

Preview of case-study findings

This dissertation's first empirical chapter will illustrate that having a combination of formal and informal autonomy from the 2018 Federal Intervention's principal and agents was important for the formation of ad-hoc civilian institutions. My interviews inform within-sector comparisons of parent organizations that did and did not create institutions. They suggest informal autonomy's importance. Informal autonomy was unnecessary, though, as the original legislative dataset demonstrates that ad-hoc committees had strong representation of Intervention supporters.

Interviews and institutional documents also underscore how collective memories of Brazil's 1964-1985 military dictatorship and of prior Rio de Janeiro GLO operations motivated

institutional formation. Acute political conflict around President Temer's legitimacy, civil society's representation, and Marielle Franco's assassination provided further motivations, as well as historical, competition-based, and organizational frames. The legislative dataset suggests that mobilization rewards, which manifested in competitive opportunities for politicians to signal their engagement with public security to voters, provided incentives for institutional formation.

The second empirical chapter will illustrate that having both formal and informal autonomy was necessary for institutions to adopt a strategy of collecting original information in order to monitor the Federal Intervention. Supplemented with interviews, the dataset of institutions' final reports suggests that only institutions with informal autonomy adopted this strategy. The Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit used strategies of data activism and collective tutelage, respectively, to collect primary data rather than rely on official information. These institutions used original monitoring strategies to a greater extent. They also had more cohesive internal staff and external consortia than other institutions with informal autonomy.

The third empirical chapter will illustrate that having a combination of formal and informal autonomy could have been necessary for institutions to achieve considerable influence on critical media coverage regarding the Federal Intervention. The original media dataset demonstrates how 32% of newspaper articles that included criticism of the Intervention and that cited sources referenced the Civil Society Observatory, the Favelas for Rights Circuit, and/or their consortium partners. Articles cited other ad-hoc civilian institutions, permanent and more established civilian organizations, and the Intervention's information actors less frequently. Interviews suggest that influencing media coverage was central to the Observatory's strategy. Moreover, their

information aligned with journalists' coverage incentives. Limited official transparency also created a journalistic need and an institutional opportunity to fill the information gap.

The fourth empirical chapter will illustrate that having a combination of formal and informal autonomy could have been necessary for ad-hoc civilian institutions to influence Army officers' concerns with the legitimacy of troop deployments. An original dataset shows that 20% of junior/mid-level Army officers' 2018-2021 writings about the Federal Intervention and/or Rio de Janeiro GLO operations referenced the monitoring coalition, mostly the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit. My original interviews, as well as interviews with senior Army officers conducted by Castro et al. (2023), show not only that Federal Intervention Cabinet officials had concerns with these two institutions. These interviews also suggest that such concerns altered the Cabinet's implementation of the Intervention in several ways. Demand for other deployments beyond Rio de Janeiro had little influence on such legitimacy concerns.

The fifth and final empirical chapter will illustrate, based primarily on interviews, that ad-hoc civilian institutions could have been insufficient to influence the continuation of Rio de Janeiro troop deployments. These ended mostly due to *principal prerogative* after the October 2018 elections, which introduced a president with interests in satisfying the armed forces and preferences related to curtailing troop deployments. Institutions also were insufficient to influence police violence. Extrajudicial killings increased relative to prior GLO operations mostly due to the shift from a tactical to a strategic military presence, which several *favela*-based examples help suggest. Insofar as institutions influenced deployments' discontinuation and

killings' intensification, it respectively was by encouraging military lobbying due to legitimacy concerns and by having little access to officials.

Access limitations resulted from the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit's autonomy, as well as this autonomy's influence on strategy, media coverage, and legitimacy concerns. The limitations are evident in a comparison of institutions' meetings with the Federal Intervention Cabinet. Such limitations hampered the Observatory's and Circuit's ability to socialize military officials into considering police violence an illegitimate substitute for the Army's tactical presence. By raising the societal costs of deployments without being able to socialize officials into considering extrajudicial killings inappropriate, institutions inadvertently could have encouraged the military to delegate extrajudicial killings to the police.

Although their monitoring potentially was insufficient to bring about demilitarization during the 2018 episode, a combination of formal and informal autonomy could have been necessary for institutions to have post-2018 legacies. The Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit informed subsequent efforts to control militarization as a practice more than other institutions did. Their parent organizations participated in *APDF das Favelas*, a high court case that briefly reduced police violence. The Observatory was a model for the Network of Security Observatory, a multi-state consortium of civil society organizations that monitors policing.

Summary

This chapter has introduced the theoretical argument to illuminate three empirical puzzles concerning the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro. This argument is that the *autonomy*

paradox most characterizes the dynamics of civil control over law enforcement militarization. Autonomy contributes to institutions' formation, strategy, and, potentially, their initial and intermediate impacts on militarization. Autonomy also could constrain institutions' ability to achieve the ultimate impact of demilitarization, however, although *principal prerogative* most accounts for troop deployments' continuity. The chapter has presented this argument's scope-conditions, theories, hypotheses, rival hypotheses, additional factors, and mechanism. Informing this argument is a deductive, theoretical approach. An extended dialogue between scholarship on civilian control of the military (Croissant et al. 2011) versus militarization (Levy 2016) leads to hypotheses on institutional formation, strategy, and impacts.

In addition, this chapter has detailed the argument's inductive, empirical approach: a theory-building case study of the Federal Intervention monitoring coalition and its 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions. This case study involves two methods. Process tracing examines the sequential links between institutional formation, strategy, and initial, intermediate, and ultimate impacts.

Necessity/sufficient argumentation probes autonomy's presence and influence along this process. These methods rely on extensive original information, including interviews and several datasets.

Finally, this chapter has previewed the case study findings. They suggest that autonomy is important for institutional formation, necessary for institutional strategy of collecting original monitoring information, and, potentially, necessary for initial and intermediate impacts. They also suggest that autonomy is insufficient for institutions to influence demilitarization in terms of troop deployment's discontinuation and police violence's reduction. Institutions alone cannot control militarization episodes necessarily, in part because autonomy limits access to the security

forces for socialization and mostly because presidents retain ultimate authority over deployments. However, autonomy could be necessary for institutions to shape post-deployments efforts at controlling militarization as a practice through constraints on, and monitoring of police.

The next five empirical chapters will include empirical analyses to demonstrate these case-study findings in support of the *autonomy paradox* argument. Each chapter will begin by revisiting the argument's corresponding theory, presenting its observable implications, and previewing the extent to which these implications are evident through the case study. After these empirical analyses, the final chapter will conclude by revisiting the empirical puzzles, discussing the argument's generalizability, and presenting research opportunities and policy implications.

Chapter 3: Institutional formation

My theory hypothesizes that autonomy contributes significantly to the formation of civilian control institutions by granting actors the opportunity to contest law enforcement militarization. Controlling militarization is contentious because it involves questioning the legitimacy of troop deployments and police violence. Without independence from the principal and agents, civilians are prevented from, or sanctioned for organizing to curtail militarization.

The rival hypothesis is that opposition to law enforcement militarization could be necessary for civilian control institutions' formation, given that attempting to control militarization is contentious. The theory also hypothesizes three factors that shape formation alongside autonomy by priming civilians, providing them with the historical, organizational, and power frames, and giving them the individual incentives to form civilian control institutions: collective memory of prior militarization episodes; ongoing political conflict; and mobilization rewards.

Given that the monitoring coalition consists fully of ad-hoc civilian institutions with formal autonomy, the theory's main observable implication is that parent organizations without informal autonomy tended not to establish ad-hoc civilian institutions. Civilians also understand autonomy as an important contributor to institutional formation. Although civilian control is contentious, opposition to law enforcement militarization is unnecessary for institutional formation because this factor can motivate opponents and supporters alike to create or join such institutions.

Further observable implications are that actors understand collective memory and political conflict as important motivations for institutional formation. These motivations reflect priming and, with respect to the rhetoric of memory and competition and the repertoires of organization, framing. Individuals who stand to advance their self-interest more by participating in civilian control tend to form institutions more. They view this self-interest as an important contributor to institutional formation. The rival hypothesis' observable implication is that individuals who form or join civilian control institutions tend to oppose militarization.

The more that these observable implications and, thus, the overall theory of institutional formation are valid vis-à-vis the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, the more that we should find the following vis-à-vis the monitoring coalition's 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions.

First, civilians tended to present the coalition partially as a product of collective memory regarding Brazil's 1964-1985 military dictatorship and Rio de Janeiro's prior GLO operations.

Second, we should find that civilians tended to present institutional formation partially as a product of political conflict regarding President Temer's legitimacy, civil society's representation, and Marielle Franco's assassination. Third, in legislative monitoring institutions, Rio de Janeiro politicians tended to be overrepresented and to compete for the electoral benefits of signaling their support for the Federal Intervention to voters.

Fourth, we also should find that parent organizations without autonomy from the national and state executives tended not to establish monitoring institutions. To supplement this finding, we should see that individuals understand autonomy as an important contributor to institutional

formation. We finally should see, to be confident in rejecting the rival hypothesis, that legislators who voted for the Federal Intervention participated extensively in creating or joining institutions.

Indeed, my analysis of institutional documents, original interviews, and an original legislative dataset lends strong support to the theory. It finds that these observable implications consistently hold with respect to the Federal Intervention. Civilians tended to emphasize collective memory vis-à-vis the military dictatorship and previous GLO operations, as well as political conflict vis-à-vis President Temer's legitimacy, civil society's representation, and Marielle Franco's assassination, as motivating institutional formation in their contemporary and retrospective understandings. Such emphasis concerned how these additional factors had primed civilians to contest the Intervention and, to a lesser extent, to contest one another's contestation. The factors had given civilians rhetorical and organizational tools for organizing such contestation.

Moreover, legislators from Rio de Janeiro were overrepresented within ad-hoc institutions and had more electoral incentives for monitoring the Intervention. These incentives were evident especially in Rio de Janeiro legislators' strong support for the Intervention within the Chamber of Deputies' External Committee on the Federal Intervention. This ad-hoc institution formed due to competition over electoral benefits with another institution, the Legislative Observatory.

Regarding the main and rival hypotheses, parent organizations' combination of formal and informal autonomy indeed corresponded with institutional formation. Interviewees' retrospective understandings suggest that organizations with formal autonomy but little informal autonomy from the national and state executives and their security forces tended not to form ad-hoc

monitoring institutions. Their sector peers with informal autonomy did tend to form institutions. Informal autonomy was an important, although not a necessary, condition for institutional formation. Finally, multiple legislators who had voted for the Federal Intervention in Brazil's National Congress created or joined ad-hoc civilian institutions, where diversity in policy preferences characterized initial proceedings.

This chapter will proceed as follows to demonstrate the above findings about the Federal Intervention monitoring coalition. It will start by examining the additional factors. The first section will discuss collective memory. The second will discuss political conflict. The third will discuss mobilization rewards. The chapter then will examine the main and rival hypotheses. The fourth section will discuss the main hypothesis regarding autonomy. The fifth will discuss the rival hypothesis of opposition. To conclude, the sixth section will summarize the findings. Because this chapter relies mostly on interview data, I present its findings more in terms of retrospective understandings and general themes than causal processes and specific institutions.

Factor 1.1: Collective memory

My research suggests that the 2018 Federal Intervention evoked civilians' collective memories of prior militarization episodes. These memories primarily concerned Brazil's 1964-1985 military dictatorship and, secondarily, Rio de Janeiro's previous GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro. Memories were evident in some institutions' founding documents and, more frequently, in interviewees' retrospective understandings of why individuals had created or joined institutions. Memories led civilians to view the Intervention as a historical continuation of repressive periods. This perception motivated civilians to draw upon their collective memories in contesting the

Intervention. This contestation included a rhetorical frame, wherein civilians criticized the policy as a continuation of state repression from previous periods, and an organizational frame, wherein civilians used monitoring institutions as the means of developing this criticism.

Brazil's military dictatorship

Founding documents of several ad-hoc civilian institutions referenced collective memory of Brazil's 1964-1985 military dictatorship as a motivation for monitoring the 2018 Federal Intervention. These references concerned human rights violations committed by the Armed Forces during the military dictatorship. They also concerned the National Truth Commission, established in 2011 to investigate these violations, and military leaders' insistence that no similar institution form around the Intervention (Benites 2018).

For example, three left-wing legislators' joint request to establish the Federal Senate's External Committee on the Federal Intervention stated the following: a federal intervention "is something that has not been applied in any state of the Federation since the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988. [... T]he [F]ederal [I]ntervention, combined with our recent re-democratization, revives memories of arbitrary acts committed by the Armed Forces in the past" and necessitates "having members of the Federal Senate monitor the development and execution of military and police operations" (Senado Federal 2018b, 2). The excerpt reveals a direct motivating link between the collective memory of military repression and creation of monitoring institutions.

Furthermore, a left-wing senator's request to establish the Subcommittee on Human Rights in the Federal Intervention within the Federal Senate's Human Rights and Participatory Legislation Committee stated the following:

Soon after the announcement of the [p]residential [d]ecree of the Federal Intervention under the command of an Army general in Rio de Janeiro, the press published the declaration of Army Commander Gen. Villas-Boas [sic] that it would be necessary to give soldiers 'the guarantee of acting without the risk of a new Truth Commission emerging' in the future. This declaration causes serious apprehensions because the [National] Truth Commission was a victory of society to investigate crimes committed during the military regime against politicians and opposition activists. Due to this, and in order to guarantee respect for [h]uman [r]ights during this federal government action, I propose the creation of a temporary subcommittee to monitor the Federal Intervention (Senado Federal 2018a).

This excerpt further illustrates how the military dictatorship primed civilians to view the Federal Intervention as threatening human rights and democratic governance and gave them the historical frames with which to contest this policy. These frames were not only rhetorical, with civilians criticizing the Federal Intervention for its similarity to the military dictatorship. They also were organizational, with individuals creating institutions inspired by former efforts like the National Truth Commission in order to channel their criticisms.

Interviews further suggest that collective memory of Brazil's military dictatorship motivated civilians to form ad-hoc institutions in order to monitor the Federal Intervention. A legislative interviewee (#45) said that one legislator had decided to join an ad-hoc civilian institution because they had "heard so much about the Armed Forces' repressive participation in public security that [they] wanted to verify in fact what Gen. Braga Netto's behavior would be and whether he would flirt with authoritarian stuff." This legislator was a conservative who had

voted for the Federal Intervention, suggesting that collective memory's priming and framing effects were somewhat independent of political ideology and policy preferences.

Another legislative interviewee (#77) suggested, though, that collective memory mainly had primed and provided frames to left-wing politicians within a specific monitoring institution:

On the left, [legislators] are critical of militarization, but [the monitoring institution] also had [right-wing] legislators [who were] defenders of the [Federal Intervention. ... The left] made the counterpoint [as much as possible] in order to have control [over the Intervention] due to the legacy of the military dictatorship. The Armed Forces have [a very prominent role] in Brazilian history. [...] Military interventionism is constant and alive. [The left] had a concern with how the Intervention would take shape. [...] Any military intervention awakens attentions. [...] Imagine how the Intervention raise[d] that concern (#77).

These interview excerpts suggest that collective memory of the Brazilian military dictatorship had primed legislators to view the Federal Intervention through the lens of past militarization episodes. The excerpts imply that this prime had led even some right-wing legislators to join ad-hoc civilian institutions. In these institutions, left-wing legislators used the legacy of dictatorship as a historical frame to contest the Intervention.

A justice sector interviewee (#66) evidenced this dynamic in discussing another monitoring institution's establishment. They said that the Federal Intervention had been "similar to the dictatorship period" because of President Temer's decision to delegate law enforcement to Army Gen. Braga Netto. For this reason, the institution's members viewed the Federal Intervention as reflecting "a process of militarization in the sense that the selection of a military intervener [gave] the character of a military intervention." Collective memory of the military dictatorship

both had primed these individuals to form or join the monitoring institution and had given them the frame, “militarization”, with which contest the Federal Intervention.

A government interviewee (#3) spoke more to collective memory as providing frames of not only rhetoric but, also, organizations. They said that the monitoring coalition had been an

attempt to continue the practices used during the dictatorship to document human rights violations by soldiers. [... The] idea was to do what had been done in Brazil historically: documentation to guarantee human rights, together with civil society; monitoring of the press; interviews of victims; visits to *favelas* (#3).

This excerpt suggests that collective memory not only encouraged civilians to view the Federal Intervention through the lens of Brazil’s military dictatorship but, also, to draw upon previous repertoires of organizational contestation as a response. Similarly, a civil society interviewee (#43) recalled how organizers of a monitoring institution had said that military leaders

‘only [were] afraid of their names being publicized in a truth commission.’ [... The organizers] perceived that the [military was] scared and that [this] was [an opportunity ...] to contest the threat that the Armed Forces represented to the *favelas*. [... I]nstead of using the mechanism of transitional justice through the state, [they] decided to create [a civil society project inspired by the truth commission model. ... T]he idea was to investigate human rights violations in real time and transform them into reports, international condemnations, and efforts to organize the *favela* population (#43).

This excerpt further suggests that collective memories of Brazil’s military dictatorship encouraged civilians to perceive the 2018 Federal Intervention as threatening renewed authoritarian repression. Memories also led them to consider monitoring institutions a viable format with which to contest the Intervention. Another civil society interviewee (#24) suggested that these concerns had made monitoring the Intervention more urgent than monitoring previous

GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro had been. They said that a specific parent organization had formed an ad-hoc monitoring institution because

such a security intervention had never been declared [since democratization]. GLOs, although causes for concern and monitoring and although recurring, [had been ...] transitory and infrequent. Moreover, the Federal Intervention occurred in a country with a very recent memory of military dictatorship [...] with large-scale human rights violations. [...] The Intervention brought this militarization to a new level [... T]hat was unacceptable because law enforcement should be commanded by civilians. [...] Furthermore, the Intervention had a long-term character [... It was to] remain in place [for a whole] year. [...] The perception was that entrusting the Armed Forces with law enforcement was the worst option [... T]he organization] anticipated that [the Intervention] would privilege the military character of operations over intelligence and human rights guarantees - other strategies that [the organization] considered more effective (#24).

This excerpt suggests that collective memories of the military dictatorship primed civilians to establish monitoring institutions around the Federal Intervention more than the legacy of prior GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro had. The interviewee implicitly juxtaposes GLO operations, in which soldiers occasionally had performed law enforcement tasks alongside police, with the Intervention, wherein the Armed Forces seemed positioned to assume full, more enduring authority over the police. This distinction, in the interviewees' eyes, made the Intervention illegitimate. It reflected the policy's inappropriateness in guaranteeing human rights and ineffectiveness in using intelligence to inform law enforcement.

A justice sector interviewee (#66) echoed this perspective about how the Intervention's seemingly unique risk of persisting had led civilians to establish monitoring institutions:

[A main] fear was [with the national government] taking a dramatic measure from the Constitution [in the form of federal intervention] and translating this into something more commonplace, [given that] there never had been an intervention in the democratic period.

[...T]he chance of it becoming a regularity [was] high. It became [...] much more [likely. ...] So, the first consideration is that it was a radical measure, of a civil-military character, but of public[ly facing] military character [that could persist] (#66).

This excerpt both reinforces the viewpoint that the Federal Intervention violated post-dictatorship norms and underscores a curious dynamic between collective memories and predictive uncertainty. Several interviewees stressed the Intervention's "unprecedented" (#24, 57, 111) nature in explaining institutional formation. Because it was the first intervention since democratization, civilians lacked a framework for predicting its consequences. Because it was reminiscent of the military dictatorship, they developed a historical framework for anticipating the worst. This anticipation led them to organize institutions as a means of monitoring.

A civil society interviewee (#43) described this uncertainty as having an atomizing, rather than an organizing, effect before a specific institution formed:

[Activists] were shocked [by the Federal Intervention decree] because soldiers going to the streets is worrying, with the legacy of the military dictatorship. [... A]ctivists were scared. [One of them] left the house, with [their] suitcase, passport, and clothes, and told [their spouse] to leave the country if [they] did not return. [They] prepared a type of underground existence because [they] did not know what was going to happen (#43).

This excerpt seems to suggest that uncertainty regarding the Federal Intervention threatened to undermine institutional formation. However, the civil society interviewee (#43) proceeded to indicate that this collective memory of the military dictatorship provided activists with the organizational framework with which to establish an ad-hoc monitoring institution. A government interviewee (#73) echoed this perspective that uncertainty had contributed to institutional formation. They said, "[w]hen the Intervention occurred, there were various

[institutions established ...] to monitor what was happening [... because the Intervention had been] a sudden thing” that had taken civilians by surprise.

A legislative interviewee (#45) said that a politician had decided to participate in a monitoring institution in order to obtain “a free perspective on how the [Federal Intervention Cabinet’s] actions would play out as [Brazil] had not experienced an intervention commanded by a general” (#45) since democratization. Another legislative interviewee (#57) similarly said that, although politicians who did not represent Rio de Janeiro had few electoral incentives to monitor the Intervention, several had decided to form or join ad-hoc institutions “due to the whole ‘unprecedented’ thing, as [such a policy] also could come to happen in other states.”

To explain institutional formation, several interviewees (#23, 59) more specifically associated this uncertainty around the Federal Intervention’s consequences with a suspicion that the Armed Forces would constrain preexisting means of civilian control. These interviewees implicitly linked collective memory of the military dictatorship to the formation of monitoring institutions by underscoring a fear that, as had occurred during authoritarian rule, the Armed Forces would reduce accountability and transparency. A justice sector interviewee (#59) said,

when the Federal Intervention [was decreed, justice sector actors] were very surprised [...] and very worried with what was happening. The whole world was surprised and [actors] did not know what was going to happen [with justice agencies’ pre-existing authorities to control the security forces now that the military was overseeing Rio de Janeiro’s law enforcement. ...] This is why [some justice sector actors] had the idea of creating [a monitoring institution]” (#59).

This excerpt suggests that uncertainty over justice agencies' authority during the Intervention had led bureaucrats to create a monitoring institution that would replace whatever justice authority the Federal Intervention Cabinet would curtail. Referencing Rio de Janeiro's state clearinghouse for crime and violence statistics, the Public Security Institute, a civil society interviewee (#23) similarly recalled how

[the] whole world was surprised by the Federal Intervention. [A monitoring institution's founder] almost fell out of [their] chair [when they learned about the policy. [... The parent organization] acted very quickly [to establish the ad-hoc institution] after the Intervention was decreed, thinking that the Public Security Institute would stop publishing data. ... [I]t was a surprise that the military authorized [the Institute's continued publication] of data (#23).

This excerpt suggests that the monitoring institution initially sought to be a substitute for the clearinghouse. Having come under the Federal Intervention Cabinet's control, the Public Security Institute seemed unlikely to continue to publish crime and violence statistics. The excerpt indirectly reveals a concern that the Armed Forces would use their authority, unparalleled since the military dictatorship's end, to reduce transparency in a way that reflected renewed authoritarianism. This concern motivated the institution's formation.

Prior GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro

Although interviewees emphasized it less than they stressed the military dictatorship, collective memory of prior Rio de Janeiro GLO operations secondarily shaped ad-hoc civilian institutions' formation. For instance, a legislative interviewee (#77) said that, within one institution, left-wing legislators had criticized the Federal Intervention by reiterating claims that military leaders previously had made about GLO operations' ineffectiveness. More illustrative of prior GLO

operations' priming and framing effects is how several interviewees (#22, 40, 41, 111) emphasized that community-based organizations' monitoring during Operation São Francisco (2014-2015) had laid the foundation for the coalition during the 2018 Federal Intervention. The Armed Forces had occupied Rio de Janeiro's Maré *favela* through that operation.

These interviewees mainly presented the 2018 coalition as a continuation of Maré organizations' monitoring, rather than a constellation of new institutions. None of the 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions were based in Maré. A civil society interviewee (#22) suggested that Maré-based organizations focused on monitoring only those military and police operations that occurred in their *favela* during the Intervention. However, Maré groups had strong representation within the Civil Society Observatory's consortium. The Observatory had an activist council that included representatives from Maré. It also had two Maré-based civil society groups, Networks of Maré and the Favelas Observatory, among its data partners (Observatório da Intervenção 2023).

Maré-based organizations had extensive experience with militarization before the 2018 Federal Intervention. A civil-society interviewee (#39) called one Maré organization a "pioneer" (#39) in monitoring police operations and a predecessor of the 2018 coalition. Another civil society interviewee (#111) distinguished between three main types of monitoring institutions during the Intervention: those in the justice sector; those in civil society; and those in Maré, where "there always were very strong social movements" and "a lot of [community] institutions." The interviewee thus suggested that these Maré organizations were distinct from others in the monitoring coalition due to being based in a *favela* and having extensive institutional trajectories.

Another civil society interviewee (#40) specifically said that community-based organizations “already had experience with military occupation in Rio de Janeiro, including in Maré. [...] These conditions already had signaled to [such groups] that the Federal Intervention had little chance of bringing something positive” (#40). Prior GLO operations thus primed Maré groups to view the Intervention negatively and to contest it in partnership with ad-hoc civilian institutions.

Maré-based organizations’ experience with prior militarization periods made it unnecessary for them to establish ad-hoc institutions. A civil society interviewee (#22) said that a Maré group’s 2018 monitoring was “not because of the Federal Intervention, which [was] an aberration” (#22). They stressed that the organization had not needed to establish an ad-hoc institution because its monitoring methodology did not differ between recurring GLO operations, constant police operations, and the temporary Intervention. Each involved security forces’ violent incursions into the *favela* and, thus, was approachable through the same monitoring methodology.

Maré-based groups thus saw the Federal Intervention as a continuation of state repression in the post-dictatorship era and of their work to monitor security operations. In contrast, ad-hoc civilian institutions associated the Intervention more with a return to military authoritarianism that required new forms of monitoring. This distinction, as I will discuss further in the subsequent section, reflected longstanding conflicts within Rio de Janeiro civil society. It also reflected convergence, however, in civilians’ tendency to view the Intervention as a continuation of previous instances of military empowerment and deployment and to consider monitoring a primary means of reducing these phenomena’s risks. Collective memory of past militarization episodes thus primed and gave civilians the organizational frames to contest the Intervention.

Notwithstanding Maré-based organizations' prior monitoring experiences, the limited role of previous police violence episodes in motivating institutional formation compared with prior GLO operations underscores how troop deployment is what made the Federal Intervention unique for those who formed or joined ad-hoc civilian institutions. Several interviewees (#6, 16, 94) nonetheless referenced prior police violence episodes as motivating institutional formation.

A civil society interviewee (#94) suggested that ad-hoc civilian institutions had been legacies of prior Rio de Janeiro mobilizations against police violence, which had remained the region's main example of militarization. Another civil society interviewee (#6) said that monitoring police violence, rather than military operations, had been a main motivation for organizations to establish ad-hoc institutions. A legislative interviewee (#16) mentioned that a specific politician had participated in a monitoring institution to ensure "that the police would not be so violent" as they feared "massacres" and "trampling of citizens' rights."

Factor 1.2: Political conflict

Another factor that primed and provided frames for civilians to establish ad-hoc civilian institutions during the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro was political conflict. This additional factor consisted of three contentious themes: President Temer's legitimacy; civilian institutions' representativeness; and Marielle Franco's assassination. Each of these conflicts concerned how appropriate and effective institutions within and outside the monitoring coalition would be at representing civil society during the Federal Intervention. These conflicts primed civilians to view the Intervention as a continuation of ongoing political struggles and ad-hoc

institutions as means through which to channel these struggles. At the same time, legislative institutions were sites of diversity between critics and supporters of the Intervention. They were means of mediating conflict between legislators, which the Intervention might intensify.

President Temer's legitimacy

The conflict over right-wing president Michel Temer's legitimacy had been acute ever since, as vice president, he had orchestrated and assumed power through the controversial 2016 impeachment of left-wing president Dilma Rousseff. This impeachment had reflected and reinforced several national crises. Before and during Temer's presidency,

a 'perfect storm' broke in Brazil due to at least four simultaneous crises: an economic crisis caused by a prolonged recession, [an electoral] crisis of rising polarization and falling trust in established parties, a corruption crisis brought to the fore by the Lava Jato investigation, and the deterioration of an already dismal public-security [sic] environment. Taken together, these four crises led to a plunge in not only *government* legitimacy – with the Temer administration massively unpopular over 2017-18 – but in *regime* legitimacy as well. Since 1985, Brazilian democracy had had its ups and downs, but never before had it performed so poorly for so long (Hunter and Power 2019, 70-71).

These crises, which comprised the national backdrop of the Federal Intervention, led civilians to view President Temer's Intervention as a continuation of political conflict over his legitimacy and ad-hoc civilian institutions as venues within which to wage this conflict. A civil society interviewee (#111) said that ad-hoc monitoring institutions had "formed [...] due to the 2018 crisis, when Brazil caught fire⁹. [...] It was very tense. The exit of Dilma, the interim government of Temer" (#111). In general terms, this interviewee suggested that President Temer's limited

⁹ On September 2, 2018, a large fire caused extensive damage to the National Museum of Brazil, located in Rio de Janeiro (Phillips 2018). The fire came to symbolize Brazil's national crisis (Dutra and Aguiar 2018).

legitimacy and the crises that this dynamic reflected had motivated civilians to form institutions in order to monitor the president's Intervention. In more specific terms, a civil society interviewee (#64) suggested that an ad-hoc monitoring institution's formation had resulted from a gap in political authority due to Temer's illegitimacy:

Brazil had been in a context of many political crises. [...] It was a context of democratic rupture [...] and [the institution's] focus was [on showing] society and the Armed Forces that [civilians] would be monitoring the human rights process vigilantly. [...] The political left] had a very traumatic process [...] of] the Dilma impeachment. [...] The Temer government's Federal Intervention [...] caused much concern in the state and national democratic sectors ... [The assessment was that] it would be important [...] to create a type of public authority [...] to monitor the development of the Intervention. It was based on this motivation that [civilians] took the initiative to [...] bring society's attention to the military's ineffective participation in law enforcement. [...] It was in this context that [they] created [the ad-hoc institution as a] type of public authority to monitor the development of the Intervention" (#64).

This excerpt presents the ad-hoc civilian institution not only as responding to human rights concerns around troop deployment but, also, as filling a vacuum of political authority that had resulted from President Temer's illegitimacy. Another civil society interviewee (#11) described civilian monitoring of the Federal Intervention in similar terms. They reflected on both collective memory of prior militarization episodes and the Temer administration's illegitimacy:

The country had been undergoing a difficult situation since 2013, with [...] the Dilma impeachment. It was very tense. [...] The Temer government knew that a portion of the population was not satisfied with his presidency, [especially in Rio de Janeiro. This is why] he executed the political maneuver of putting the military intervention in place. [Civil society] knew that [they] had to resist somehow, for literal survival. [...] They wanted to] show the Temer government and the soldiers that [civil society] would not accept this intervention and that [they] were organized, ready to mount resistance in the face of any massacre. [...] The Armed Forces have a history of violent action against uprisings, causing massacres. Brazil experienced diverse revolts throughout its history, but the Armed Forces massacred [the participants] and weakened the possibilities of

[future] revolts. When Brazilians unite to try to assert their rights, we have a violent upper class and an elite that appropriates institutions [like the Armed Forces] (#11).

This interviewee saw the Federal Intervention not only as a historical continuation of military repression. This excerpt also suggests that the Intervention was both a minimally legitimate president's attempt to curry voters' favor ahead of the October 2018 elections and the ruling elite's attempt to silence the administration's most vocal political opposition. Establishing ad-hoc institutions, in this perspective, was a main means for civil society to engage in this political conflict with the Brazilian elite, President Temer, and the Armed Forces.

Several military interviewees (#9, 30, 83) also presented ad-hoc civilian institutions' formation as a product of political conflict over Temer's legitimacy. A military interviewee (#30) said that, "[d]ue to Temer's position and, specifically, the [heavily criticized] impeachment, [the president] did not have many people's support. [... T]here was a very unpopular president, so the Intervention ignited [political] interests and criticisms of illegitimacy" on the left. Another military interviewee (#83) emphasized how "the Intervention was done by Temer, a president who assumed office [through] the Dilma impeachment. So, people on the left wanted to attack anything that Temer did. [...] The left had to oppose Temer because of this" (#83). A third military interviewee (#9) said that characterizing civilian institutions as leftist opponents of Temer had been part of the Armed Forces' strategy to invalidate criticisms of the Intervention.

Notwithstanding how such conflict motivated some civilians to establish and participate in monitoring institutions, several interviewees (#17, 19, 57, 99) presented creating or joining these institutions as a way of supporting Temer's Federal Intervention. A legislative interviewee (#17)

said that a right-wing politician had helped create a monitoring institution to prevent left-wing politicians from dominating political discourse around the Intervention. Another legislative interviewee (#99) said that a specific politician had participated in a monitoring institution “to aid” the Intervention and “to shield it from civil society criticisms.”

Some legislative interviewees reflected this dynamic less directly by discussing how the combination of support for the Intervention and concern with local manifestations of national crises had led politicians to participate in ad-hoc civilian institutions. A legislative interviewee (#19) said about one politician’s decision to participate in an institution, “there was no more moral authority to conduct public security in Rio de Janeiro” due to corruption in state politics. The politician thus participated in an ad-hoc legislative committee in order “to monitor and lend the necessary support to law enforcement.” Another legislative interviewee (#57) similarly indicated that a politician’s decision to establish an institution had stemmed from their desire to ensure the Intervention’s effectiveness amidst Rio de Janeiro’s fiscal and security crises.

These pro-Intervention perspectives illustrate how, whether by motivating civilians to contest or protect the Federal Intervention, political conflict over President Temer’s legitimacy and over the crises of his presidency motivated institutional formation. More civilians participated in institutions with the goal of contesting the legitimacy of Temer and his Intervention, though. An illustration is that the six legislative monitoring initiatives had strong representation of left-wing politicians.¹⁰ Left-wing legislators were more likely than right-wing legislators to resent the 2016 Rousseff impeachment that Temer had orchestrated and had used to reach the presidency.

¹⁰ Here and throughout the dissertation, I consider a legislator to be left-wing if their political party scores between 0 and 5.0 on a scale of 2018 political ideology. This scale uses 0 to indicate most left-wing and

Left-wing legislators were overrepresented in ad-hoc civilian institutions relative to their parent organizations. For example, 140 of 512 (27%) legislators in the 2018 Chamber of Deputies belonged to left-wing parties. Three of six (50%) and five of five (100%) founders, or legislators who submitted requests to establish the Chamber's external committees on the Federal Intervention and on the Marielle Franco Assassination, respectively, belonged to left-wing parties. Fourteen of 16 (88%) members of the Marielle Franco Assassination committee belonged to left-wing parties. In the Federal Senate, 18 of 81 (22%) legislators belonged to left-wing parties versus four of seven (57%) members of that house's External Committee on the Federal Intervention. These distributions, which Table 7 below presents, further suggest that ad-hoc civilian institutions resulted partially from contestation of President Temer's legitimacy.

10 to indicate most right-wing (Bolognesi et al. 2023). If their political party scores between 5.1 and 10, I consider them right-wing. This binary operationalization of political ideology might inflate left-wing legislators' representation in ad-hoc monitoring institutions relative to an operationalization that accounts for centrist parties. Thirty-three percent and 88% of members of the Chamber of Deputies' External Committees on the Federal Intervention and the Marielle Franco Assassination, respectively, belong to left-wing parties (0.0 – 5.0) under this binary operationalization as per Table 7 below. An alternative is to categorize parties between 0.0 and 3.33 as left-wing, parties between 3.34 and 6.66 as centrist, and parties between 6.67 and 10.00 as right-wing. Twenty percent and 69% of members of the Chamber of Deputies' External Committees on the Federal Intervention and the Marielle Franco Assassination belong to left-wing parties (0.0 – 3.34), respectively, under this alternative operationalization.

Table 7: Representation of left-wing legislators in ad-hoc monitoring institutions (2018)

<i>Ad-hoc monitoring institutions</i>			<i>Parent organizations</i>		<i>Difference (points, all members)</i>
<i>Name</i>	<i>% founders from left-wing parties</i>	<i>% all members from left-wing parties</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>% all members from left-wing legislators</i>	
Committee to Represent the Municipal Chamber in Brasilia	0	17	Municipal Chamber of Rio de Janeiro	19	-2
External Committee on the Federal Intervention	50	33	Chamber of Deputies	27	6
External Committee on the Federal Intervention	100	25	Federal Senate	22	3
External Committee on the Marielle Franco Assassination	100	88	Chamber of Deputies	27	61
Subcommittee on Human Rights of the Federal Intervention	100	50	Federal Senate, Human Rights and Participatory Legislation Committee	43	7

SOURCE: Author's analysis of legislative documents, including some obtained via freedom-of-information requests.

NOTE: Ad-hoc civilian institutions in this table include legislative committees. It thus excludes the Chamber of Deputies' Legislative Observatory. Founders include legislators who submitted requests to establish institutions.

Civil society's representation

In addition to political conflict over President Temer's legitimacy, conflict over parent organizations' representativeness shaped ad-hoc civilian institutions' formation.

Representativeness concerned which individuals and institutions, given class-based, geographic,

and racial factors, would be appropriate and effective delegates to the monitoring coalition. Representational conflict occurred between political parties, both on the left and right, and their civil society counterparts. It also occurred between Rio de Janeiro civil society organizations themselves. Such conflict influenced which parent organizations established ad-hoc institutions and how they established them.

In this way, contention over who could be the monitoring coalition's legitimate delegates inverted conventional views about civil society organizations' representativeness in Latin American Politics scholarship. Peruzzotti (2013) discusses how, because civil society organizations are "self-organized and self-appointed" (227), "[i]t is common to hear objections from elected officials concerning the unrepresentative and unaccountable status of" (226) such groups. Civil society, in this perspective, is the object of representational conflict rather than the subject. Because they are socially accountable, inclusive of historically excluded identities, politically influential, and active in participatory institutions, civil society organizations nonetheless are more representative than policymaking elites contend (230-236).

Representational conflict around the Federal Intervention, in contrast, entailed some civil society organizations contesting elites (e.g., elected and party officials, bureaucrats) and these elites' grassroots affiliates (e.g., other civil society organizations, particularly groups that had extensive links to electoral and bureaucratic actors) with similar claims. Such contestation concerned the degree to which elites and their affiliates would be accountable, inclusive, effective, and engaged emissaries of the monitoring coalition when the time came for using the coalition's information

to control militarization. Organizations making such claims were the subjects, while elites and their affiliates were the objects, of representational conflict here.

Representational conflict between political parties and their civil society affiliates involved both right-left and left-left contention. A civil society interviewee (#39) recalled a large organizing meeting in Rio de Janeiro soon after President Temer's Federal Intervention decree. Attendees from the Brazilian Democratic Movement, the right-wing political party of President Temer and then Rio de Janeiro governor Pezão, had proposed to lead a monitoring coalition. Other attendees, including ones who would proceed to establish or join ad-hoc civilian institutions, had reacted strongly and swiftly against the proposal. They insisted that "civil society would commit to creating [its own coalition] outside institutions linked to the state government" (#39).

Indeed, several interviewees (#54, 61, 111) cited Pezão's corruption scandals, in addition to those of prior governors, as further reason for civilians to distrust the state government and the Brazilian Democratic Movement as monitoring partners. The civil society interviewee (#39) said that this meeting had been

an important moment [...] because [civil society] could have taken another route in collaboration with the Federal Intervention. [Due to this reaction,] no one would be willing to collaborate with a military [intervention] because human rights organizations and social movements were represented [at the meeting]. [...] This strong reaction against the Brazilian Democratic Movement's proposal] galvanized and gave shape to what everyone was feeling. [...] From there, institutions to monitor [the Intervention] were established (#39).

This excerpt suggests that civil society opposition to the right-wing political party in control of the national and state governments contributed to monitoring institutions' formation. It reflects

conflict over representation as individuals considered the party an inappropriate and ineffective delegate to communicate and advance civil society's interests. This consideration stemmed from the party's corruption and, implicitly, from its association with the Intervention.

Another civil society interviewee (#43) described how left-wing political parties had played a key role in establishing an ad-hoc civilian institution. However, due to inter-party competition and the October 2018 national elections, they had reduced their role in the institution. The institution had started as a consortium of left-wing social movements and local organizations associated with two different left-wing political parties. Friction emerged as these local organizations competed "to see which political party would dominate the confrontation with the Federal Intervention" (#43). Members associated with one of the parties began to criticize the institution as being captured by the other party and vice versa. This friction led some groups to withdraw from the consortium and, in one instance, to create their own monitoring project. Other party affiliates began to withdraw in June 2018 to concentrate on the October 2018 elections. The interviewee (#43) said that "[a]ll of this ended up weakening" the institution.

In addition to conflict between civil society and political parties, conflict between civil society organizations themselves shaped institutional formation. Such conflict related to what multiple interviewees (#20, 34, 43, 78, 95) described as Rio de Janeiro's deep divisions along class-based, geographic, and racial lines. Interviewees encapsulated these divisions by distinguishing between the *asfalto* (asphalt) and *morro* (hill), which they used synonymously with *favela*.

The term *asfalto* characterizes Rio de Janeiro's middle- and upper-class neighborhoods. They tend to be whiter in demographics, to be flatter in topography, and have more public services and infrastructure like paved roads. The term *morro* characterizes lower-class neighborhoods. These tend to have more Black residents, to be more mountainous in topography, and to have fewer public services and infrastructure (see Landim and Siqueira 2013).

Asfalto-morro divisions manifested in conflict over which groups, whether preexisting organizations or ad-hoc institutions, could represent Rio de Janeiro's civil society legitimately based on their members' relative social positions. A civil society interviewee (#43) described how such divisions had risked limiting the formation of ad-hoc institutions at the start of the Federal Intervention. A large organizing meeting had been

very contested between people who were from the *favelas* and people who were not: the dichotomy between *favela* and *asfalto*. [...A] dispute occurred because [some people from] the *favelas* said that [...] people from the *asfalto* did not have legitimacy to act [at the meeting and, generally, in the *favelas*. ... People from the *asfalto*] responded that the struggle [against militarization] was everyone's (#43).

This excerpt illustrates how preexisting social divisions had engendered representational conflict between civil society organizations. The interviewee (#43) added, however, that structuring an ad-hoc civilian institution to include both *favela*- and *asfalto*-based organizations has been a way to mitigate this representational conflict (#43). None of the 13 ad institutions, and none of their parent organizations, were based in *favelas*. A main way that these actors sought to overcome Rio de Janeiro's social divisions was by establishing consortia with *favela*-based organizations.

A civil society interviewee (#78) said that a monitoring institution had begun as a consortium in “response to the fact that [people from the *asfalto*] could not monopolize the political narrative on the Federal Intervention [...] There was no way not to include that ecosystem of social movements and activists in the most affected territories” (#78). The fact that coalition-building had been unavoidable, as the interviewee suggested, stemmed from how

[t]here already was tension because you had white academics who do not know the *favelas* and do not know public security, but they have prominence in the public security debate. [...] There always had been tension over who has the right to speak on public security. [Social] movements protested the fact that they, too, had public security specialists, but the positionality [favored by political discourse] is the perspective spoken by white public security researchers from the middle and upper class, who have a white perspective within the Brazilian racial context and do not understand [the *favela* reality] necessarily. [...] One of the ad-hoc civilian institutions’ parent organizations] always had been criticized for being white and not having connections with social movements, so their [consortium-building effort was] an attempt to reverse this [image] (#78).

The interviewee thus suggested that this ad-hoc civilian institution’s formation as a consortium between *asfalto*-based and *favela*-based actors partially had been an attempt to legitimize the *asfalto*-based parent organization. Similarly, a civil society interviewee (#11) said that a *favela*-based consortium had started as the “axis of action in communities [against the Federal Intervention] but decided that [it] needed specialists in social media and in public security data.” In partnership with an *asfalto*-based organization, the *favela*-based group “sought to qualify what was happening with data [...] showing that there were no [positive] results” (#11) from the Intervention. Another civil society interviewee (#23) mentioned that an *asfalto*-based institution had contracted a *favela*-based communication specialists to create materials that would “reach *favela* youth” regarding the Intervention’s negative impact.

Such consortia did not stem strictly from the *asfalto* reaching out to the *favela*, though. Several interviewees (#47, 66, 80, 81) said that *favela* groups' and other community-based organizations' advocacy and claims of human rights violations had been a main impetus for creating multiple ad-hoc civilian institutions. Again, institutional formation partially was a way of bridging *asfalto-morro* divisions to contest the Federal Intervention with legitimate representation.

Marielle Franco's assassination

Marielle Franco was a Black, bisexual woman and left-wing human rights activist from the Maré *favela* who, since 2017, had served as city councilor in the Rio de Janeiro Municipal Chamber. Franco symbolized Rio de Janeiro civilian actors' resistance to law enforcement militarization (Pitasse 2017) and, specifically, to the Federal Intervention in its early days (Franco 2018). She had a leadership role in the Committee to Represent the Municipal Chamber in Brasília, one of the 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions (veja 2018b).

Franco was assassinated on March 14, 2018, in Rio de Janeiro, within a month of the Federal Intervention's start. Her assassins were found to be former police officers from *milicias*, or government-affiliated criminal organizations comprised partially of off-duty military and police officers (Hirata et al. 2022). The planners had yet to be identified as of November 2023. The investigation's slow pace reportedly had been due to government cover-ups (Reist 2023).

Franco's assassination implicated the Federal Intervention in several respects. Responsibility for the criminal investigation fell to the Federal Intervention Cabinet, which had newfound authority over the Civil Police. The assassination gave the impression that the Army and the state police

under its command were incapable of resolving Rio de Janeiro's public security crisis. The assassination also suggested that, whether by omission or collusion, the security forces somehow were guilty of murdering one of their most prominent critics (Dias Carneiro 2018; Rede Brasil Atual 2018; Sawicka 2019).

Although interviewees generally agreed about its seriousness, the Franco assassination represented political conflict by signaling a violent threat to civilians who critically monitored the Federal Intervention. This conflict, in turn, shaped the monitoring coalition's formation. It motivated civilians to establish institutions as vehicles for collective action. The conflict also provided civilians with another political frame with which to contest the Intervention. That said, this conflict impeded institutional formation to some extent by signaling the risks of monitoring.

The Franco assassination provided a rhetorical frame to contest the Federal Intervention's legitimacy. A legislative interviewee (#16) said that the incident had demonstrated "the Federal Intervention's ineffectiveness" at providing public security. A civil society interviewee (#93) described the Franco assassination's impact as indicating the Intervention's inappropriateness for protecting human rights and enabling democratic accountability:

[W]hen Marielle was assassinated, [an initial reaction was that the killing] had been a response to [civil society's] action against the [Federal] Intervention [... because she had been] the closest legislator to the movements and acting directly in monitoring the Intervention. She was coordinating the movements and [...] monitoring [the Intervention] in the Municipal Chamber. She represented a threat to [the Intervention]. In a way, [the assassination is] a result of the Intervention" (#93).

This excerpt suggests that civilians used Franco's assassination in attempt to delegitimize the Federal Intervention. It also suggests, however, that the assassination raised civilians' cost of monitoring. Indeed, the assassination had mixed consequences for institutional formation. On the one hand, it led to the formation of the Chamber of Deputies' External Committee on the Marielle Franco Assassination (Câmara de Deputados 2018a). The committee's final report extensively linked the assassination to the Intervention in terms of the subsequent criminal investigation and the need to demilitarize law enforcement (Câmara de Deputados 2018g).

On the other hand, the Franco assassination suppressed institutional formation to a degree. Some civil society actors viewed the incident as reflecting a persistent threat to all critics of militarization and, specifically, of the Federal Intervention. Several interviewees (#20, 29, 104) indicated that a particular Rio de Janeiro organization, which previously had a prominent monitoring role, had not established an ad-hoc institution because of the perceived risk to activists after the assassination. The organization instead opted to participate in the monitoring coalition as a consortium partner.

These interviewees thus implied that, while the assassination limited some attempts to monitor the Federal Intervention, it contributed to inter-organizational coordination in a way that ultimately strengthened the coalition. A civil society interviewee (#14) synthesized these dual consequences by stating that the Franco assassination had

made things even more tense in Rio de Janeiro. It drove home the threat [to civil society] and signaled that the balance of power between social movements, state police, and the Federal Intervention Cabinet was shifting. After Marielle, things became a lot more serious. People realized the need for organized resistance. It became the focal point of

resistance. Those were intense days. A lot of things got started due to the assassination. [... I]t partly incentivized [civilian institutions] to be more active [...] in contributing to the public debate on [public security. ... I]t was a turning point for many actors (#14).

This excerpt suggests that, rather than have a chilling effect on institutional formation, the political conflict symbolized by Franco's assassination encouraged civil society organizations to invest more in shaping political discourse and to coordinate their efforts more. These efforts concerned not only the Federal Intervention but, generally, law enforcement militarization in Rio de Janeiro. Another civil society interviewee (#40) echoed this assessment while relating the event's consequences more directly to the Intervention:

[When] the Federal Intervention [was decreed], a good part of [civil society organizations] immediately understood that they needed to coordinate collectively in order to [develop] monitoring strategies. [... However], soon after the start of the Intervention, you had the Marielle assassination. [This event impacted such] efforts very strongly [because it] put in question the level of attack on democracy. [...] In the first moment, parallel to the discussion of [...] monitoring pathways to minimize human rights violations, [you] also had mobilization to [demand] answers in the assassination investigation. They were very interrelated things because many [civil society] spaces debated both: the Federal Intervention and the Marielle assassination. [... Civil society] saw the necessity of facing the situation collectively" (#40).

This excerpt further suggests that the Franco assassination contributed to institutional formation by leading civilians to understand coordination in monitoring the Federal Intervention as necessary. In this way, the assassination both primed civilians and gave them political frames with which to contest the Intervention as inappropriate and ineffective via institutions. Although the event prevented the creation of ad-hoc institutions to some extent, it contributed to the overall coalition's formation by solidifying the need for coordination in monitoring the Intervention. Civilian generally agreed about the assassination's seriousness, yet the instance reflects political conflict in the threat that it signaled to civil society about the risk of monitoring.

Factor 1.3: Mobilization rewards

While collective memory and political conflict primed and gave civilians the rhetorical and organizational frames to monitor the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, the additional factor of mobilization rewards gave them the incentives to establish institutions with which to do so. As this section will discuss, most evident were electoral rewards in the legislative sector. Financial rewards also were evident in civil society, though. The following example briefly illustrates how financial rewards motivated civil society organizations to establish institutions.

A civil society interviewee (#23) implied that a parent organization had established an ad-hoc civilian institution partially due to external funding. The organization had received “emergency” funds to monitor the Federal Intervention. This support was “limited but important”, they said. “Without the [early] signal [from funders]”, the parent organization “would not have launched” its institution. The organization “was going to give a response to the Intervention independent of [such] support, but [it] would have done less without this money.” They added that a benefit of this ad-hoc institution had been to facilitate the organization’s relationship with a new funder.

Creation of legislative committees

Intuitively, because it was limited to Rio de Janeiro, the Federal Intervention had more electoral consequences for legislators from this state. These legislators stood to benefit from the Intervention’s successes and suffer from the Intervention’s failures more than legislators from other states. It also was consequential to other states’ legislators whose political brands centered

on military and police affairs. Such consequences, however, were less immediate than they were for legislators who represented the state where the Intervention occurred.

Indeed, mobilization rewards were evident in how Rio de Janeiro legislators had considerable overrepresentation among the founders and joiners of ad-hoc institutions in Brazil's National Congress. Forty-six of 512 (9%) legislators in the Chamber of Deputies represented Rio de Janeiro, on the one hand. Five of six (83%) and two of five (40%) legislators who submitted requests to establish the Chambers' external committees on the Federal Intervention and the Franco assassination, respectively, represented Rio de Janeiro, on the other hand. Thirty-six of 45 (80%) and nine of 16 (56%) overall members of the Intervention and Marielle Franco committees, respectively, represented Rio de Janeiro. These distributions, which Table 8 below summarizes, provide a strong illustration of how mobilization rewards based on legislative (over)representation of Rio de Janeiro corresponded with institutional formation.

Table 8: Representation of national legislators from Rio de Janeiro in ad-hoc monitoring institutions (2018)

<i>Ad-hoc monitoring institutions</i>			<i>Parent organization</i>		<i>Difference (points, all members)</i>
<i>Name</i>	<i>% founders from Rio de Janeiro</i>	<i>% all members from Rio de Janeiro</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>% all members from Rio de Janeiro</i>	
External Committee on the Federal Intervention	83	80	Chamber of Deputies	9	71
External Committee on the Federal Intervention	0	75	Federal Senate	4	71
External Committee on the Marielle Franco Assassination	40	56	Chamber of Deputies	9	47
Subcommittee on Human Rights during the Federal Intervention	0	33	Federal Senate, Human Rights and Participatory Legislation Committee	9	24

*SOURCE: Author's analysis of legislative documents, including some obtained via freedom-of-information requests.
NOTE: Ad-hoc civilian institutions in this table include legislative committees. This table thus excludes the Chamber of Deputies' Legislative Observatory. Founders include legislators who submitted requests to establish institutions.*

Mobilization rewards also were evident in how competition for electoral benefits between Rio de Janeiro legislators fueled the formation of two institutions within the Chamber of Deputies.

These were the Legislative Observatory and the External Committee on the Federal Intervention.

The competition was over who could signal support for the Intervention more strongly to voters.

Thirty-two of 46 (70%) Rio de Janeiro deputies had voted for the Intervention. Among Rio de Janeiro deputies in the External Committee, 24 of 36 (67%) had voted for the Intervention. Left-wing deputies who had not voted for the Federal Intervention were overrepresented slightly in the External Committee, yet the Rio de Janeiro legislators overall had strong support for the Intervention. This distribution, which Table 9 below presents in further detail, suggests that the External Committee's formation corresponded with a strong incentive of Rio de Janeiro legislators to show support for the highly popular Intervention.

Table 9: Partisanship and policy preferences among Rio de Janeiro legislators in the Chamber of Deputies (n=46) / External Committee on the Federal Intervention (n=36)		
<i>Political party</i>	<i>Vote for Federal Intervention</i>	
	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No / Not present</i>
<i>Left</i>	4 / 3	20 / 25
<i>Right</i>	65 / 64	9 / 8

Source: Author's analysis.

Note: Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number and, therefore, do not sum to 100 necessarily. Numbers on the left side of the slash reflect the percentage of overall deputies from Rio de Janeiro. Numbers on the right side of the slash reflect the percentage of deputies from Rio de Janeiro in the External Committee on the Federal Intervention. Percentages exclude Rodrigo Maia because, as Chamber of Deputies president, he was obligated to abstain from the Intervention vote.

Multiple legislative interviewees (#48, 65, 76, 86, 88, 99) suggested that, once Chamber of Deputies president Rodrigo Maia created the Legislative Observatory, legislators had stronger motivations to create or join their own ad-hoc committees. Maia, a right-wing Rio de Janeiro deputy, had created the Observatory as an institution comprised fully of legislative staff and tied directly to his presidency. Other Rio de Janeiro deputies soon began to lobby Maia for an "external committee" (*comissão externa*), or a temporary committee of legislators that conducts *in situ* monitoring. A legislative interviewee (#48) said that the Observatory had

created jealousy because the deputies said that it was comprised of technical staff [instead of elected officials]. Then, President Maia created the [External Committee on the Federal Intervention. ...] The deputies did not understand [Maia's institution because he had launched it with a large media event and because the idea of forming a legislative observatory] was very new. It created a fear because the deputies thought that they [not staff] should be the ones monitoring [the Intervention] (#48).

This excerpt suggests that perceived political competition from Maia, represented by the Legislative Observatory's formation, had encouraged other politicians to create the External Committee. That Rio de Janeiro politicians, as well as politicians who had voted for the Intervention, had strong representation among legislators who submitted requests to establish the External Committee further illustrates this dimension of mobilization rewards. Intuitively, Rio de Janeiro politicians competed more with Maia in local elections than did legislators from other states. It also is intuitive that politicians who had voted for the Intervention had incentives to signal their support for this popular policy.

Indeed, of the six legislators who submitted individual requests to establish the Chamber of Deputies' External Committee, five (83%) represented Rio de Janeiro, five (83%) had voted for the Federal Intervention, and three (50%) belonged to right-wing parties. Three (50%) requests indicated that the author's main reason for establishing the External Committee was to help the Army and state police improve public security in Rio de Janeiro. Two (40%) suggested that the main reason was to help protect constitutional and human rights. These distributions suggest further that, in response to Maia's formation of the Legislative Observatory, Rio de Janeiro and pro-Intervention legislators had strong electoral incentives to form or join ad-hoc institutions in order to signal their support for this popular policy.

That monitoring institutions were means through which some politicians could signal support for the Intervention is evident further in how a legislative interviewee (#52) described Maia's decision to establish ad-hoc institutions. They said, "[t]he middle class applauded the Intervention. People were celebrating, thinking that it would eliminate criminality." Maia "could not be against" the Intervention "and neither could he say that he was not" monitoring the policy in accordance with his constitutional role.

In this way, establishing a monitoring institution was Maia's "response" to the dilemma. The legislative interviewee (#52) thus implied that forming institutions had been a way for Maia both to demonstrate his support to voters and to fulfill his oversight responsibilities. Another legislative interviewee (#86) similarly said that Maia had established institutions "to monitor and contribute because [he is] from Rio de Janeiro and [he] wanted the Intervention to work out. [...] It was to have more participation" (#86) in both overseeing and contributing to the Intervention.

Several legislative interviewees (#65, 76, 88) echoed the competition-based explanation by suggesting that Maia had seen the Legislative Observatory as a means of strengthening his political position. This position was both with Rio de Janeiro voters and relative to potential challengers to his presidency. One legislative interviewee (#65) said that Maia had created the Legislative Observatory due to "being from Rio de Janeiro" and that the initiative had "a political bias" of the Chamber of Deputies' president.

Another legislative interviewee (#76) said that Maia had formed the Legislative Observatory because he wanted “a direct way to monitor the Intervention, seeing as how he is from Rio de Janeiro, and to give a response to the [people of Rio de Janeiro].” The interviewee suggested that, “[i]f we had a Chamber of Deputies president who was not from Rio de Janeiro, perhaps there would not be a Legislative Observatory. Maia used the Observatory as an electoral platform. He ran for reelection in 2018.” Another legislative interviewee (#88) said that having reporters at the Legislative Observatory’s launch event

was very important because [Maia] wanted to show that the Chamber of Deputies was performing its monitoring role, both for society and for the Federal Intervention Cabinet itself. It was very important to have the media. [On a scale from] 0 to 10, [its level of importance was] 10. [Maia’s staff] issued a call for the media to be there. It also was important because of Maia being the Chamber president (#88).

This excerpt testifies to mobilization rewards for creating ad-hoc civilian institutions by suggesting that Maia established the Legislative Observatory to project a public image as a political leader and responsible policymaker. Another legislative interviewee (#99) further suggested that Maia had used the Observatory to “capitalize politically on the Intervention.” In this interviewee’s perspective, Maia was running for

reelection [for the presidency] in the Chamber of Deputies and even was entertained as being a candidate for president [of Brazil] or governor [of Rio de Janeiro]. If the Federal Intervention had worked out, who would have benefitted? [...T]he Legislative Observatory [... was a means of] organizing information and mediating conflicts so that Maia would be perceived as a mediator and would benefit politically” (#99).

This excerpt further suggests that, by incentivizing institutional formation as a way of capturing political benefits, mobilization rewards led Maia to create the Legislative Observatory. Still other

legislative interviewees (#86, 88, 99) reiterated that, after witnessing the Observatory's formation, other politicians had lobbied for Maia to create the External Committee because they wanted to "contribute to" (#88), and "participate in" (#99) monitoring. Legislators reportedly "wanted an instrument of participation and [...] had the political will due to the Intervention having a lot of support in public opinion" (#86).

These excerpts suggest that legislators formed the Chamber of Deputies' External Committee because, after seeing Maia create the Legislative Observatory, they had wanted to engage in monitoring as a way of conveying support for the Intervention to voters. Whereas collective memory and political conflict mostly motivated critics of the Federal Intervention to form or join monitoring institutions, mobilization rewards thus incentivized supporters of the Federal Intervention to undertake monitoring.

Consolidation of legislative committees

Mobilization rewards also were evident in legislative interviewees' explanations of politicians' decisions to join ad-hoc committees as a means of signaling support for the Federal Intervention. A legislative interviewee (#53) said that a Rio de Janeiro politician had decided to join a committee because public security "was the principal thing [about which] people were worried. [...] The Intervention was an important challenge. It was very [important] to support the [policy]." That this interviewee emphasized public opinion as necessitating support for the Intervention underscores how electoral benefits contributed to ad-hoc institutions' formation.

Another legislative interviewee (#74) said that a politician from a state other than Rio de Janeiro had decided to join a monitoring institution because public security was central to their “political agenda.” Insofar as this agenda had constituted the legislators’ political brand, the interviewee further implied that electoral benefits had motivated joining. Still another legislative interviewee (#65) described a politician’s decision to join an ad-hoc committee as stemming from the view that “Rio de Janeiro needed a [hardline] solution [...] like the Federal Intervention, which was a forceful measure to combat criminality.” Although speaking less directly to public opinion, this third interviewee reiterated how politicians joined ad-hoc institutions to support the Intervention.

Indirect evidence of mobilization rewards also lies in the overrepresentation of Rio de Janeiro legislators among committees’ members (see Table 8). Intuitively, the Intervention was more electorally consequential for these legislators because the policy was limited to Rio de Janeiro. This dynamic was especially visible in the Chamber’s External Committee on the Intervention.

Forty-six of 512 (9%) legislators in the Chamber of Deputies represented Rio de Janeiro compared with 36 of 45 (80%) legislators on the External Committee. In comparison, the percentage of Rio de Janeiro deputies on the External Committee had who belonged to right-wing political parties and the percentage who had voted for the Intervention were consistent with those of the Chamber overall. An implication is that, even more than political ideology or police preference, the opportunity to signal support for the Federal Intervention to Rio de Janeiro voters shaped legislators’ decision to join this institution.

Moreover, of the 16 legislators who spoke during the External Committee's first meeting on March 6, 2018, 16 (100%) represented Rio de Janeiro, 10 (63%) had voted for the Intervention, and nine (56%) belonged to left-wing parties. The Committee's president, left-wing Rio de Janeiro deputy Hugo Leal, said to open the meeting, "[t]his committee, in reality, is the Rio de Janeiro caucus because no one from the caucus wants to be left out of a discussion of this nature" (Câmara de Deputados 2018h). That the Intervention was most electorally consequential for Rio de Janeiro helps explain why state legislators had such strong representation in ad-hoc institutions. More than other factors like political party and policy preferences, and more so than with other states' legislators, mobilization rewards likely were a considerable incentive for Rio de Janeiro legislators to participate in ad-hoc committees.

Hypothesis 1: Institutional autonomy

All 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions within the monitoring coalition had formal autonomy from the Temer administration, Brazilian Army, Federal Intervention Cabinet, and Rio de Janeiro state police. They varied in terms of informal autonomy, or whether they had political alignment with, or financial dependence on the Intervention's principal and agents. Eight of 13 (62%) institutions had both formal and informal autonomy while five (38%) lacked informal autonomy (Table 4). Informal autonomy was not a necessary condition for institutional formation. As this section will show, some founders and joiners of legislative committees aligned closely with the Intervention.

The combination of formal and informal autonomy nonetheless contributed to institutional formation by giving some institutions the ability and opportunity to monitor the Intervention.

This section will illustrate the importance of informal autonomy through two approaches. First, it

will present several comparisons of similar parent organizations that varied on informal autonomy. These comparisons will illustrate that informal autonomy helps understand why some organizations established ad-hoc civilian institutions. Table 10 below previews the comparisons.

Table 10: Comparison of select parent organizations during the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro

<i>Sector</i>	<i>Parent organization</i>	<i>Informal autonomy</i>	<i>Ad-hoc civilian institution</i>
Civil society	Candido Mendes University	Yes	Yes
	Igarapé Institute	No	No
	Live Rio	No	No
Justice	Federal Public Prosecutor's Office	Yes	Yes
	Rio de Janeiro State Public Prosecutor's Office	No	No
Legislature	Chamber of Deputies	Yes	Yes
	<i>Public Security and War on Crime Committee</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>
	Federal Senate	No*	No

SOURCE: Author's analysis of original interviews.

*NOTE: Informal autonomy indicates whether the parent organization had considerable political or policy alignment with the Temer administration, Brazilian Army, Federal Intervention Cabinet, and/or Rio de Janeiro state police. * indicates that ad-hoc committees formed in the Federal Senate but did not conduct monitoring. If we consider them examples of non-formation, the importance of informal autonomy becomes further evident.*

After presenting these comparisons, this section will discuss informal autonomy's role in the formation of legislative committees within the Chamber of Deputies. It specifically will compare the composition of the ad-hoc External Committee on the Federal Intervention with the composition of the permanent Public Security and War on Crime Committee, which could have created an ad-hoc subcommittee. The section will compare committees' compositions based on the presence of legislators with military and/or police backgrounds. The comparatively low level of informal autonomy that these backgrounds represent helps understand why the Public Security and War on Crime Committee did not participate in the monitoring coalition.

Civil society organizations' informal autonomy

Several interviewees (#14, 66, 78, 91 98) underscored how the Igarapé Institute and Live Rio, two *asfalto*-based civil society organizations in Rio de Janeiro that previously had focused on police reform, had not established ad-hoc institutions because they lacked informal autonomy from the security forces. Igarapé's co-founder and president published several newspaper editorials, some of which offered criticism of the Federal Intervention (Szabó de Carvalho 2018a; 2018b; 2018c). However, a civil society interviewee (#14) said that Igarapé “took the middle position” on the Intervention. “[T]hey did not want to close doors to the government” (#14) and, specifically, the Rio de Janeiro state police by participating in monitoring.

According to this civil society interviewee (#14), the Igarapé Institute saw monitoring as contestation. To avoid precluding collaboration with police, Igarapé decided against establishing an ad-hoc institution. This abstention from the monitoring coalition partially was philosophical. The organization had seen its role as “loyalty to the agenda, not who is in power.” A legislative interviewee (#98) similarly described the organization's position as “more of the center, of mediation, and of non-conflict” with the federal and state executives.

Another civil society interviewee (#78) said that Igarapé's abstention from the monitoring coalition had reflected and reinforced divisions within Rio de Janeiro civil society. They noted that Igarapé was similar demographically and institutionally to another *asfalto* organization, Candido Mendes University's Institute for Security and Citizenship Studies, which created the Civil Society Observatory. As the next chapter will discuss, the Observatory had informal

autonomy and an extensive consortium of *asfalto*- and especially *favela*-based activists and data partners (Observatório da Intervenção 2023). The Observatory exemplified how collective memory and political conflict had “obligated civil society to try to come together to give a more unified, centralized, and strong response in regard to the Federal Intervention” (#78).

However, the civil society interviewee (#78) said that these conditions ended up highlighting “the plurality of perspectives and the tensions around positionality” as much as they fueled coordination. Ad-hoc institutions in civil society, like the Civil Society Observatory, had been formed by *asfalto* organizations in cooperation with *favela* groups. The interviewee suggested that the Igarapé Institute’s decision to abstain from monitoring had reinforced *favela* groups’ doubts over *asfalto* organizations’ credibility as both experts on, and allies against militarization.

Several interviewees (#66, 91) suggested that Live Rio had decided, for similar reasons, against participating in the monitoring coalition despite having advocated previously for demilitarizing reforms. Live Rio had collaborated with the Brazilian Armed Forces when implementing humanitarian aid programs during the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, of which Brazil led the military component from 2004 to 2017 (Müller and Steinke 2018, 241-242).

A civil society interviewee (#91) said that, due partially to its previous relationship with the military, Live Rio had “celebrated” the Federal Intervention. A justice sector interviewee (#66) said that, rather than monitor it, the organization had sought “dialogue” with the Federal Intervention Cabinet. The interviewee attributed this decision to how Live Rio did not have “its

own opinion, only public opinion.” In these perspectives, lack of informal autonomy from the military had prevented Live Rio from participating in the monitoring coalition.

Justice agencies' informal autonomy

The Federal Public Prosecutor's Offices' Civil Public Inquiry into the Federal Intervention illustrates how justice sector autonomy contributed to institutional formation. The federal prosecutor in São João de Meriti, a municipality of metropolitan Rio de Janeiro, had established this ad-hoc institution (veja 2018a). A type of class-action investigation, it aimed to identify potential human rights violations during the Intervention. A justice sector interviewee (#73) said that, despite strong support for the Intervention within the Public Prosecutor's Office, the prosecutor had been able to establish the institution because the Office had “a lot of autonomy” and its prosecutors especially had “a lot of independence” within the agency.

Such autonomy enabled the federal attorney to create the Civil Public Inquiry as a response to civil society concerns with human rights violations and accountability limitations during the Intervention. A civil society interviewee (#47) said that the prosecutor had been “one of the only people in Rio de Janeiro and, specifically, in [that part of the metropolitan region] who tried to collaborate with the monitoring process.” The justice sector interviewee (#73) added, though, that the institution had been exclusively the prosecutor's undertaking. The agency's practice of prosecutorial independence to some extent had precluded benefitting from broader support within the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office.¹¹

¹¹ During the Federal Intervention, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office established an institution to monitor police violence in Rio de Janeiro. It did not establish this institution until November 2018, however, when the Federal Intervention was 90% complete. Moreover, it did not inaugurate the

In comparison, the Rio de Janeiro State Public Prosecutor's Office did not establish an ad-hoc institution because it had comparatively little informal autonomy. Several interviewees (#72, 73) suggested that such agencies throughout Brazil lacked informal autonomy in practice. A government interviewee (#72) described how state-level Public Prosecutor's Offices had begun to create anti-corruption task forces with law enforcement agencies prior to the Federal Intervention. State Public Prosecutor's Offices consequently had "stopped controlling the police because they developed a promiscuous relationship."

A justice sector interviewee (#73) added that, while state-level Public Prosecutor's Offices had constant tension between their mandates to carry out criminal investigations and protect human rights, the Rio de Janeiro State Public Prosecutor's Office especially had a reputation as "an accomplice" to police violence. Another justice sector interviewee (#66) described how the Rio de Janeiro State Public Prosecutor's Office's limited police oversight had created a vacuum that ad-hoc institutions sought to fill. Institutions' "focus was that [state prosecutors] would not avoid their [police oversight] responsibility [... which] they exercise [...] very poorly." Institutions "tried to pressure" state prosecutors to control the state police more during the Intervention.

Within the Rio de Janeiro State Public Prosecutor's Office, the Specialized Public Security Action Group attempted to control state police during the Intervention but did not create an ad-

institution until April 2019 (Ministério Público Federal 2020, 23-26). I therefore exclude this institution from the monitoring coalition.

hoc institution. Its lack of informal autonomy limited its ability to do so. The Group conducted both investigations of officers for alleged crimes. It also performed “collective tutelage” (*tutela coletiva*), a Brazilian legal concept that several justice sectors interviewees (#59, 90) translated to English as “class-action lawsuits”. Multiple interviewees (#12, 70, 87, 90, 103) described collective tutelage as an attempt to gather group-level testimonials of human rights violations and systematic police abuse, rather than individual testimonies of specific events, with the primary goal of influencing policy, rather than holding individual perpetrators accountable.

A justice sector interviewee (#87) suggested that the Group had directed the advocacy part of its collective tutelage work before 2018 at the Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Public Security, a civilian agency under gubernatorial authority that was responsible for coordinating the Civil and Military Police. However, the Federal Intervention Cabinet placed this agency under the command of Army Gen. Richard Fernandez Nunes (Vettorazzo and Rangel 2018). The Group’s previously autonomous collective tutelage work during the Intervention therefore had to flow through the Army if it wanted to sustain its collective tutelage vis-à-vis the Secretariat.

Several justice sector interviewees (#87, 90) suggested that this new, informal dependence on the Army for information had prevented the Group from creating an ad-hoc institution to monitor the Intervention. One justice sector interviewee (#90) said that “[t]here was no need from the criminal [investigations] point of view” to establish an ad-hoc institution “because everything continued as it had before. In terms of collective tutelage”, the Group’s work simply transitioned from the State Secretariat of Public Security to the Federal Intervention Cabinet.

Another justice sector interviewee (#75) suggested that limited informal autonomy relative to the Rio de Janeiro State Attorney General, who lead the Public Prosecutor's Office, also had hampered the Group's efforts to control police during the Intervention. The interviewee said that many members of the Public Prosecutor's Office had supported the Intervention. The Attorney General, for example, sought to collaborate with the Federal Intervention Cabinet rather than monitor the Intervention externally. Situated directly in the Attorney General's cabinet, the Group was more subordinate to the Attorney General than it would have been had it constituted its own department. The interviewee described this relative lack of autonomy as an impediment to monitoring police during the Intervention. If the Group had more informal autonomy from the Attorney General, it might have created an ad-hoc institution to conduct this monitoring.

These explanations of why the Rio de Janeiro State Public Prosecutor's Office did not establish an ad-hoc institution to monitor the Intervention might be understandable from a bureaucratic perspective. They nonetheless are revealing, given how police violence increased dramatically during the Intervention. That the State Public Prosecutor's Office went about business as usual, as a justice sector interviewee (#90) suggested, without establishing a new program testifies to how lack of informal autonomy hampered institutional formation.

Legislative institutions' autonomy

Legislators in the Federal Senate formed two ad-hoc committees to monitor the Intervention. One was the External Committee on the Federal Intervention. Another was the Subcommittee on Human Rights, within the Human Rights and Participatory Legislation Committee. Both committees had founding documents and assigned members. I therefore consider them part of the

coalition. However, neither committee held a single meeting or produced a final report (Senado Federal 2023a; Senado Federal 2023b). A legislative interviewee (#99) suggested that, given these factors, it is unreasonable to consider the committees an example of institutional formation.

This subsection will modify the dissertation's case selection criteria slightly to assume that, because they did not perform monitoring after their formation, these committees were not part of the monitoring coalition. Under this assumption, an insightful comparison is how the Chamber of Deputies established three ad-hoc institutions that did conduct monitoring after formation: the External Committee on the Federal Intervention; the External Committee on the Marielle Franco Assassination; and the Legislative Observatory.

A comparison of the Chamber and Senate presidents' informal autonomy from President Temer helps understand why the Chamber committees, but not the Senate's, performed monitoring after institutional formation. Several legislative interviewees (#37, 59, 77) and a military interviewee (#92) suggested that these presidents could have used their broad agenda-setting powers to curtail monitoring. Both Senate president Eunício Oliveira, who did not represent Rio de Janeiro, and Chamber president Rodrigo Maia, who did, were right-wing allies of President Temer.

A difference is that Oliveira belonged to Temer's Brazilian Democratic Movement while Maia belonged to the Democrats party. Multiple interviewees (#37, 82, 85, 97) said that Oliveira had a close relationship with Temer. A legislative interviewee (#92) said that Maia had "supported the [Temer] government, but he had more autonomy" (#92) than did Oliveira due to party membership. Another legislative interviewee (#77) said that, as the child of a politician who had

been exiled during the military dictatorship (Monnerat and Sartori 2019), Maia had “basic democratic values” and was more “open and sensitive to democratic questions” (#77) than most right-wing politicians. Oliveira had a more formal relationship with Temer than did Maia, who had both formal autonomy with respect to party and informal autonomy with respect to policy.

Both Maia and Oliveira were frustrated with the Temer administration’s process for deciding whether to decree the Federal Intervention (Bombig and Galhardo 2018). However, a legislative interviewee (#86) said that the informal Maia-Temer relationship especially had been strained by how the Temer administration had decreed the Intervention “without dialogue with the National Congress.” Another legislative interviewee (#52) emphasized how Maia had

gotten [irritated] because Temer made the decision [to decree the Intervention] without speaking to [Maia. He was both the Chamber president and a Rio de Janeiro representative. ...] He was very irritated with the decision that [Temer and his cabinet] made without consulting him. He at least wanted to know, but he learned through the newspapers. [... He decided to establish the Legislative Observatory because he] wanted to give a response and show that he was going to monitor [the Intervention]. (#52).

This excerpt suggests that Maia had not only an informal political relationship with Temer due to party identification but, also, a strained policy relationship due to frustration with the Intervention decree. Compared with Oliveira, Maia therefore had more political opportunity to enable contestation of the Intervention under his presidency through ad-hoc civilian institutions. This relative opportunity corresponded with ad-hoc institutions in Maia’s Chamber monitoring the Intervention whereas, after their formation, those in Oliveira’s Senate did not monitor.

Maia also had mobilization rewards for creating monitoring institutions due to representing Rio de Janeiro and competing for (re)election, as several legislative interviewees suggested (#57, 74, 76, 99) and as I discussed more in the previous section. Maia thus had both incentives to monitor the Intervention and, with his comparative autonomy, more opportunity to do so.

Legislators' informal autonomy

Brazilian legislators with military and/or police backgrounds tend to align more with, and, thus, have less informal autonomy from the security forces than legislators with neither background (Ferreira de Oliveira 2020, 88-90). Compared with participating in permanent legislative committees focused on public security, having experience in the security forces corresponded with politicians being somewhat more likely to support the Federal Intervention.

On the one hand, 14 of 17 (82%) legislators with military and/or police backgrounds in the Chamber of Deputies voted for the Intervention. Three hundred twenty-six of 495 (66%) deputies without such backgrounds voted for this measure. On the other hand, 203 of 273 (76%) deputies in the Public Security Parliamentary Front and 23 of 33 (70%) deputies of the Public Security and War on Organized Crime Committee voted for the Federal Intervention. These are the Chamber's main public security caucus and permanent committee, respectively. Legislators with military and/or police backgrounds therefore were slightly more likely to support the Intervention than legislators with other expertise in public security.

Lack of informal autonomy, given politicians' professional backgrounds, helps understand why some legislators and legislative committees within the Chamber of Deputies did not create or

join ad-hoc committees. The Public Security and War on Organized Crime Committee had an overrepresentation of legislators with security force backgrounds when its session began six weeks after the Federal Intervention had started. Seventeen of 512 (3%) deputies in 2018 had military and/or police backgrounds versus eight of 33 (24%) committee members. Deputies with security experience were overrepresented within this permanent committee by eight times.

Despite its subject matter focus, the Public Security and War on Organized Crime Committee did not establish a subcommittee to monitor the Federal Intervention. Despite a request from two members (Câmara de Deputados 2018i, 28), the Committee also held no hearings on the Intervention. Such inaction might stem from how, as a legislative interviewee (#85) said, this Committee was “dominated by the Bullet Caucus.” This caucus consists of politicians with security force backgrounds and/or other ideological and representational ties to the security forces. It tends to favor the military, police, and tough-on-crime policies over less repressive institutions and measures to reduce crime and violence (Ferreira de Oliveira 2020).

Deputies within the Bullet Caucus were unlikely to take a critical position toward the Intervention. However, as I have discussed regarding mobilization rewards, ad-hoc committees in the Chamber of Deputies were not exclusively the domain of left-wing legislators and opponents of the Intervention. The Public Security and War on Organized Crime Committee could have established a subcommittee in attempt to support the Intervention. Limited informal autonomy likely contributed to this lack of institutional formation.

Whereas about one in four deputies in the permanent Public Security and War on Organized Crime Committee had security backgrounds, only five of 45 (11%) or about one in 10 deputies of the temporary External Committee on the Federal Intervention had such experience. This difference in composition was despite how permanent committee members were overrepresented among temporary committee members. Permanent committee members accounted for 33 of 512 (6%) deputies overall and 10 of 45 (22%) deputies in the temporary committee. Indeed, a legislative interviewee (#65) said that the Public Security and War on Organized Crime Committee had influenced which representatives joined the External Committee.

Other legislative interviewees (#76, 85) suggested that the temporary External Committee's formation in February 2018 had precluded the permanent Public Security and War on Organized Crime Commission, whose legislative session did not begin until April 2018, from monitoring the Intervention. That multiple ad-hoc legislative institutions formed in the Chamber and Senate nonetheless highlights further how the Public Security and War on Organized Crime Committee could have established its own institution despite the External Committee having done so first.

Another legislative interviewee (#74) said that the temporary committee's formation had "generated a dispute because the [permanent committee] no longer had a leadership role" on public security. This competition, though, conceivably could have compelled the permanent committee to conduct its own monitoring work. After all, other types of competition had reflected and reinforced the mobilization rewards that coincided with formation the External Committee's formation. It seems likely that the Public Security and War on Crime Committee's

limited informal autonomy from the security forces, based on its members' overrepresented military and/or police backgrounds, contributed to institutional non-formation in this instance.

Rival hypothesis 1: Policy opposition

Opposition to the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro was not necessary for civilians to create or join ad-hoc institutions. In the civil society and justice sectors, members of the monitoring coalition shared this stance. As prior sections have referenced, however, various legislators who had voted for the Intervention either helped created or joined monitoring institutions. Five of six (83%) founders and 31 of 45 (69%) total members of the Chamber of Deputies' External Committee on the Intervention had voted for the policy, compared with 340 of 512 (66%) deputies overall. These distributions suggest that opposition to the Intervention within the External Committee was representatively minimal.

Among the other three ad-hoc committees in the National Congress, no founders had voted for the Intervention, whose supporters were underrepresented among members compared with their parent organizations. Three of seven (43%) members of the Senate's External Committee and three of six (50%) members of its Subcommittee on Human Rights had voted for the Intervention. These distributions suggest that opposition to the Intervention did not correspond consistently with institutional formation. Table 11 below summarizes the distributions.

Table 11: Representation of pro-Intervention national legislators in ad-hoc civilian institutions (2018)

<i>Ad-hoc monitoring institutions</i>			<i>Parent organization</i>		<i>Difference (points, all members)</i>
<i>Name</i>	<i>% founders who voted for Federal Intervention</i>	<i>% all members who voted for Federal Intervention</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>% all members who voted for Federal Intervention</i>	
External Committee on the Federal Intervention	83	69	Chamber of Deputies	66	3
External Committee on the Federal Intervention	0	75	Federal Senate	68	7
External Committee on the Marielle Franco Assassination	0	19	Chamber of Deputies	66	-47
Subcommittee on Human Rights during the Federal Intervention	0	50	Federal Senate, Human Rights and Participatory Legislation Committee	57	-7

*SOURCE: Author's analysis of legislative documents, including some obtained via freedom-of-information requests.
NOTE: Ad-hoc civilian institutions in this table include legislative committees. This table thus excludes the Chamber of Deputies' Legislative Observatory. Founders include legislators who submitted requests to establish institutions.*

Legislative institutions' political diversity

Notwithstanding how political conflict shaped institutional formation, ad-hoc legislative committees also reflected an interest in accommodating various ideologies and policy preferences. This dynamic speaks further to how opposition to the Federal Intervention was not crucial for institutional formation. The diversity within legislative committees was both a

product of lawmakers' varying views and, to some extent, a strategy for managing political conflicts that the Intervention could intensify.

For example, Hugo Leal, the left-wing president of the Chamber of Deputies' External Committee, said during the Committee's first meeting that this legislative institution had "to occupy a space that is neutral, that is plural, [because] this is the characteristic of the Committee and [...] our caucus" (Câmara de Deputados 2018h). Indeed, while the percentage of External Committee members who had voted for the Intervention was consistent with that of the Chamber overall, there was slightly more ideological diversity due to left-wing legislators' overrepresentation (see Table 7). Comments of the 15 deputies who spoke after Leal during the committee's first meeting reflected this diversity as discussed below in further detail.

Six of the 15 (40%) deputies who spoke at the External Committee's first meeting revealed a neutral motivation that was neither strongly for nor against the Intervention in their comments. One (6%) deputy emphasized both improving public security and condemning potential abuses by security forces. One stressed the importance of socioeconomic measures to address the root causes of crime and violence. Four (27%) suggested that summoning Temer administration and Federal Intervention Cabinet officials and measuring the policy's consequences was their goal.

Separately, four of the 15 (27%) comments highlighted deputies' goals of protecting human rights and supporting civil society through monitoring and *asfalto-favela* cooperation due to anticipated transparency limitations. Finally, five of the 15 (33%) underscored deputies' objectives of supporting the Army and police in improving public security. Such support

included granting legal protections so that security forces could conduct operations with few consequences in the case of extrajudicial killings. It also involved ensuring that operations in Rio de Janeiro city did not have the mere effect of displacing crime and violence to other parts of the state (Câmara de Deputados 2018h).

Such diversity in motivations for monitoring the Intervention suggests that civilians formed institutions to moderate conflicts that might result from competing policy preferences.

Legislative interviewees further reflected this emphasis on diversity as a key feature of institutional formation. A legislative interviewee (#16) said of a monitoring institution, “every member had their motivation. Some participated to back up the military while others, with histories of struggle, participated to defend human and social rights.”

Another legislative interviewee (#19) said that a monitoring institution had “sought unity of parties and ideologies in [its] composition.” A third legislative interviewee (#57) said of an institution, it “could not bring ideology to the Intervention. [... It was] a delicate moment, with the Intervention and with the [Rousseff] impeachment.” The politicians who established this legislative monitoring institution “did not want ideological dispute.” Collective memory and political conflict not only motivated some civilians to monitor the Intervention but, also, led some to see institutions as a way of moderating conflict that might stem from monitoring.

Summary

This chapter has used document analysis, interview data, and an original legislative dataset to show that four main variables shaped the formation of 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions to monitor

the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro. Contemporary and retrospective data suggest that collective memory of prior militarization episodes, especially Brazil's 1964-1985 military dictatorship and Rio de Janeiro's previous GLO operations, primed civilians and gave them the historical frame with which to contest the Federal Intervention. Another priming and framing factor was political conflict over President Temer's legitimacy, over civil society's representation, and over Marielle Franco's assassination. These frames were both rhetorical, with actors contesting the Intervention via historical and political critiques, and organizational, with actors looking to monitoring as a collective means of structuring contestation. Mobilization rewards also gave civilians, especially legislators, electoral incentives to form or join institutions.

Autonomy in terms of both formal and, to a degree, informal independence from the Temer administration, Brazilian military, Federal Intervention Cabinet, and Rio de Janeiro state police gave some civilians the opportunity to act upon these incentives and motivations. Several parent organizations without informal autonomy did not create ad-hoc institutions while their sector peers with informal autonomy participated in the monitoring coalition. Although contesting the Intervention was important, it was not essential as multiple founders and joiners of ideologically pluralistic legislative committees had voted for the Intervention. A combination of formal and informal autonomy was important, but not necessary, for institutional formation.

These findings lend support to this dissertation's theory about the *autonomy paradox*. They suggest that autonomy indeed contributes to the formation of civilian control institutions by creating an opportunity to contest militarization. Collective memory of prior militarization episodes, ongoing political conflicts, and mobilization rewards work alongside autonomy by

providing civilians with the understandings, vocabulary, organizational tools, and self-interested reasons to establish or join institutions. The rival hypothesis does not hold as opposition to militarization is not necessary for institutional formation. That opposition is unnecessary seems intuitive because political conflict motivates, and mobilization rewards incentivize, civilians of diverse partisan positions and policy preferences to create or join institutions.

These findings also raise questions about the relationship between civilian control institutions' formation and strategies. The chapter has sought to understand why ad-hoc legislative committees in the Federal Senate did not conduct monitoring after their creation whereas committees in the Chamber of Deputies did conduct monitoring. The chapter has suggested that autonomy helps understand whether institutions conducted monitoring and, thus, to what degree the institution achieved consolidation after creation.

The chapter thus has blurred the line slightly between institutional formation and action without addressing specific monitoring strategies. How, then, does autonomy relate to the strategies that civilian control institutions select and to these strategies' impact? What factors other than autonomy shape strategy selection and impacts? The next chapter will examine these questions.

Chapter 4: Institutional strategy

Information is the mechanism that links civilian control institutions' formation and their impact. The collection of monitoring information positions institutions to raise the cost of, and to delegitimize militarization. For this reason, however, militarization's principal and agents have few incentives to provide institutions with monitoring information. This especially is true with more autonomous institutions. Because they generally aim to contest militarization more, these institutions could undermine the principal and agents more with such information. I hypothesize that autonomy therefore contributes to civilian control institutions' strategy by encouraging collection of original monitoring information.

An additional factor, cohesion, works alongside autonomy to shape institutions' strategy by enabling more effective collection of original monitoring information. More autonomous institutions whose stakeholders have shared more goals and recognize the institution's legitimacy more are more effective. Monitoring militarization and influencing media coverage require process standardization and consistent support, with which less cohesive institutions struggle.

The hypothesis' observable implications are that more autonomous institutions rely on, and produce original monitoring information to a greater extent. Individuals also understand these differences in monitoring information as a product of institutional autonomy. The implications are that institutions with both more autonomy and cohesion fit this description.

The more that my hypotheses' observable implications and, thus, my argument's mechanism are valid vis-à-vis the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, the more that we should find the

following with respect to the monitoring coalition's 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions. The collection of original monitoring information represented a greater percentage of monitoring strategies among institutions with more autonomy and cohesion. Individuals understood autonomy and cohesion, more than capacity, as influencing institutional strategy.

Indeed, my analysis supports these expectations. Ad-hoc civilian institutions with more autonomy and more cohesion relied more on, and produced more original monitoring information. Having both formal and informal autonomy and a high level of cohesion was necessary for institutions to rely on such information for at least half of their data collection practices. Autonomy compelled and enabled the Civil Society Observatory and Favela for Rights Circuit to collect original data on security operations and human rights violations, respectively.

The external cohesion of consortium partners and internal cohesion of public defenders also enabled the Observatory and Circuit, respectively, to seize the opportunity that their autonomy had created to generate original monitoring information. In contrast, the fully autonomous Legislative Observatory and Popular Truth Commission had some combination of internal disunity, external disputes, and external isolation. They did not rely on original monitoring information to the extent that the Civil Society Observatory and Circuit did.

This chapter will proceed as follows. First, it will examine the autonomy hypothesis by analyzing ad-hoc civilian institutions' final reports. It specifically will discuss the Civil Society Observatory's and Favelas for Rights Circuit's strategies of collecting original monitoring

information. Next, it will examine the cohesion factor with interview data regarding institutions' internal unity and external support. It will conclude with a summary of findings.

Hypothesis 2: Institutional autonomy

To understand how autonomy related to collection of original monitoring information, I analyze ad-hoc civilian institutions' final reports. Seven of thirteen (54%) institutions produced final reports. These reports discussed both institutions' monitoring activities and their final evaluations of the 2018 Federal Intervention. I focus on information in these reports that relates to the sources, dimensions, and consequences of law enforcement militarization.

Whether an institution produced a final report indicates its relative longevity in monitoring the Intervention. Those that did not produce a final report performed comparatively little monitoring, if any. Five of these seven (71%) institutions that produced a final report had full autonomy. The other two (29%) had partial autonomy (see Table 4).

I analyze these seven final reports by identifying the range of practices that ad-hoc civilian institutions employed to collect original or "primary" versus "secondary" information about the Federal Intervention. I consider a practice reflective of primary data collection if it does not rely on official government information. Moreover, it does not rely on information that other institutions already have compiled and that only requires slight manipulation and interpretation. A practice reflects secondary data collection if it relies on at least one of these two information types.

I begin by identifying inductively five types of primary data collection practices between the seven reports. These are mutually inclusive because a given report can exhibit multiple types. Practices emphasized security operations, human rights violations, media coverage, social media trends, and public opinion. One of seven (14%) institutions with a final report monitored police operations. Two (29%) collected testimonies of human rights violations. Two (29%) monitored media coverage, two (29%) tracked social media trends, and one (14%) conducted public opinion surveys. Four of seven (57%) reports exhibited no primary data collection practices.

Next, I identify inductively six types of secondary data collection practices between the seven reports. These also are mutually inclusive because a single report can exhibit more than one type of practice. All the seven institutions (100%) that produced a final report used a secondary data collection practice. These involved previously compiled information, with five (71%) institutions analyzing crime and violence statistics and one (14%) analyzing human rights information.

Secondary practices also involved information from the Temer administration, Brazilian Army, Federal Intervention Cabinet, and/or Rio de Janeiro state police. Five of seven (71%) institutions requested documents, hearings, or meetings from these actors. Two (29%) hosted public events, three (43%) hosted public hearings, and four (57%) hosted private meetings with these actors. Requesting information from these actors was the most common data collection practice. Table 12 below shows the distribution of data collection practices by ad-hoc civilian institutions.

<i>Ad-hoc civilian institution</i>	<i>Variables of interest</i>		<i>Data collection practices</i>		
	<i>Autonomy</i>	<i>Cohesion</i>	<i># primary (n=5)</i>	<i># secondary (n=6)</i>	<i>% primary</i>
Civil Society Observatory	Full	High	5	1	83
Committee to Represent the Municipal Chamber in Brasília	Partial	Moderate	0	2	0
External Committee on the Marielle Franco Assassination	Full	Moderate	0	2	0
External Committee on the Federal Intervention (Chamber of Deputies)	Partial	Low	0	4	0
Favelas for Rights Circuit	Full	High	1	1	50
Legislative Observatory	Full	Moderate	2	5	29
Popular Truth Commission	Full	Low	0	2	0

SOURCE: Author's analysis based on original research (see Table 4) and institutions' final reports.

NOTE: Primary data collection uses neither official government information nor information that other institutions already have compiled. Secondary data collection does use such information. Autonomy indicates the level of formal (i.e., official) and informal (i.e., unofficial) independence from federal executive and the security forces: "Full" indicates both formal and informal independence; "Partial" indicates formal independence only. Cohesion reflects unity of objectives and consistency of support among internal staff and external partners.

Table 12 above suggest that autonomy contributed to ad-hoc civilian institutions' strategy.

Having full autonomy, or both formal and informal independence from the Temer administration, Brazilian Army, Federal Intervention Cabinet, and/or Rio de Janeiro state police, was necessary for usage of primary data collection. Three of the five (60%) institutions with full autonomy and neither of the two (0%) institutions with partial autonomy used such practices.

In addition, several of these more autonomous institutions relied on primary data collection for a considerable portion of their monitoring practices. Five of six (63%) data collection practices

used by the Civil Society Observatory and one of two (50%) practices used by the Favelas for Rights Circuit were primary. For another institution with full autonomy, the Legislative Observatory, two of seven (29%) or almost one-third of data collection practices were primary.

The Civil Society Observatory's final report (Observatório da Intervenção 2019, 4-15) was the only one to exhibit primary practices of monitoring police operations, conducting public opinion surveys, and tracking social media trends. As discussed below in further detail, the Favelas for Rights Circuit's report (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018, 22-36) was unique in its primary collection of human rights testimonies.

Further examination of the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit's primary data collection practices helps illustrate autonomy's role. A civil society interviewee (#6) said that "most [ad-hoc civilian institutions had been] pro forma" because they represent parent organizations that "need to [...] position themselves discursively but do not act effectively." The interviewee indicated, however, that the Observatory and Circuit were different in this respect.

Civil Society Observatory's data activism

What characterized the Civil Society Observatory's monitoring practices was "data activism" (Veloso et al. 2021): the non-governmental collection, analysis, and publication of quantitative information to fill gaps in, and challenge the dominant political discourse that results from government statistics. Data activism was crucial because, before and during the Federal Intervention, the federal and state governments' statistics about Rio de Janeiro police operations were incomplete and minimally accessible for non-governmental organizations (68-73).

A civil society interviewee (#39) said that quantifying information about the Intervention through data activism was valuable because “numbers [... are] structurers of public debate, [...] lend support to the recognition of certain problems”, and enable comparison and prioritization. The interviewee further discussed how quantitative data on crime and violence supplements individual testimonies of victims and family members by “connecting [and mobilizing] them for collective action.” In this way, the interviewee testified further to data activism’s importance.

The concept of data activism reflects how autonomy from the Federal Intervention’s principal and agents contributed to the Observatory’s monitoring strategy. Such autonomy encouraged collection of original information. Data activism also reinforces the relationship between autonomy and contestation, given the Observatory’s emphasis on challenging militarization.

Rio de Janeiro had seen a surge of data activism prior to the 2018 Intervention. Several civil society organizations and mobile technology developers had emerged to track crime, violence, and human rights violations through community networks, crowdsourced applications, and public opinion surveys (Magaloni et al. 2016; Silva 2017; G1 2017; Estado de S. Paulo 2020). The Observatory had a strong position to carry out data activism in continuation of these trends.

Candido Mendes University’s Center for Security and Citizenship Studies, the Civil Society Observatory’s parent organization, was “a reference on the politics of alternative data in Brazil” (Velooso et al. 2021, 73). The same applies to two civil society groups within the Observatory’s consortium, the Crossfire Institute and Networks of Maré (73-74). Several civil society

interviewees (#6, 22, 39) said that, instead of creating ad-hoc institutions to publish their monitoring data, these two groups contributed their information to the Observatory as consortium partners. The Favela for Rights Circuit also was in the Observatory's consortium.

Autonomy contributed to the Observatory's decision to focus its strategy on collection of primary monitoring information. A civil society interviewee (#23) said that the Observatory's parent organization previously had enjoyed constructive relations with government agencies and political institutions. In 2018, however, the Observatory decided "not to accept any official invitation to [...] speak with", and to have "no dialogue" with the Federal Intervention Cabinet.

The Observatory instead sought to be a "counterpoint" to the Cabinet, according to this civil society interviewee (#23). It also was against sharing information with ad-hoc legislative committees. Partially due to these institutions' comparatively limited autonomy, the Observatory reportedly considered them uncritical and inconsequential. It performed "autonomous work [whereas] legislators probably had to [engage in] institutional dialogue" (#23) with the Cabinet.

The Observatory's final report (*Observatório da Intervenção 2019*, 16-31) not only exhibited data activism through original collection of information about police operations, public opinion, and social media trends. The report also reflected on the Observatory's strategy in a way that further exhibited data activism. The section "To change what is counted" (16-17) described the Observatory's data activism around police operations. Due to the limited scope and availability of government statistics on police operations, the Observatory had decided to undertake

a data collection [process that was] unprecedented [...] in Rio de Janeiro [... The Observatory went about] compiling data on [operations'] location, number of officers involved, forces mobilized, civilian and police deaths, injuries, arrests, and seizures. This data collection enabled pinpointing the disproportionality between the investments made in [such] operations and the modesty of their results (Observatório da Intervenção 2019, 16-17).

This excerpt illustrates how the Observatory used data activism to criticize the ineffectiveness of police operations during the Intervention. The report also criticized how the Intervention, while failing to reduce homicides considerably, had corresponded with a dramatic increase in police killings (Observatório da Intervenção 2019, 32-35). Moreover, it criticized how the Federal Intervention Cabinet had prioritized reducing cargo and vehicle thefts over non-property crimes.

The final report (Observatório da Intervenção 2019, 34) stated that reducing cargo and vehicle theft “should not be an indicator used to advertise the [I]ntervention’s ‘success’” (34). It claimed that anti-theft operations were expensive, exacerbated violence, and produced results that likely would be unsustainable unless police dismantled the criminal groups that were acquiring stolen cargo and vehicles. By using original monitoring to criticize the Federal Intervention Cabinet’s own information practices (e.g., “indicator”), the Observatory clearly exhibited data activism.

Interviewees (#11, 23, 62, 107) further underscored how data activism had characterized the Observatory’s monitoring practices. A civil society interviewee (#23) said that the Observatory had refused to rely “only on government information and relationships.” Another civil society interviewee (#62) described how the media had not covered Army operations fully at the beginning of the Intervention and had relied on the Federal Intervention Cabinet’s information. For this reason, the Observatory began to monitor operations more closely.

A civil society interviewee (#11) said that the Observatory had led the “information dimension” of civil society’s response to the Intervention. The Observatory’s monitoring supplemented the “action dimension” led by community-based organizations, political groups, and social movements. Another civil society interviewee (#91) said, that, by producing “analysis of data that the [Federal Intervention Cabinet] did not want” to be public knowledge, the Observatory had been “very effective” at revealing the Intervention’s illegitimacy.

A civil society interviewee (#23) described how the Observatory “had an agile and dynamic way of communicating data, experimenting a lot”, that “combined academic work with activism” in the face of a “challenge to produce data quickly and safely and to communicate it quickly, including through social media, with frequent publications.” What resulted was “an immediate system of monitoring right after [something] occurs”, constituting “an important change” (#23) in how Rio de Janeiro civil society responded to militarization. Another civil society interviewee (#107) said that the Observatory had demonstrated to other civil society organizations

how to cover public security, how to challenge authorities’ discourse, [and] how to produce analysis and collect data that even the government does not collect. [...] When civil society begins to collect [such data], it shows its capacity for power in not becoming dependent on the government’s preferred data and topics. When the [Federal Intervention Cabinet] claimed to have reduced cargo theft, the [Civil Society Observatory] was able to show that there had been more horrible impacts for communities. [The Observatory] brought a lesson to civil society of how to oppose the government (#107).

This excerpt further illustrates how data activism was central to the Observatory’s strategy. It also reinforces how autonomy from, and contestation of the Intervention’s principal and agents

shaped the strategy. The above views combine to reflect how relying on, and producing original information were products of the Observatory's independence from the object of its monitoring.

If the Observatory had been less autonomous from the Temer administration, Brazilian Army, Federal Intervention Cabinet, and Rio de Janeiro state police, it could have had less motivation to challenge the Intervention. It also could have had more access to official information on the Intervention. Consequently, it could have had less reason to conduct original monitoring. The Observatory needed to create its own information in order to contest militarization due partially to its full autonomy from the Intervention's principal and agents.

The Favelas for Rights Circuit's collective tutelage

What characterized the Favelas for Rights Circuit's practice of gathering primary information to monitor the Intervention was collective tutelage. In this context, collective tutelage refers to the process of gathering information about group-level, rather than individual, human rights violations. The Circuit's main goal was to influence the Federal Intervention Cabinet to protect human rights, rather than establish responsibility for individual violations.

The Circuit's usage of collective tutelage as a strategy to gather original monitoring information reflects autonomy's influence in two respects. One is how the Circuit's parent organization, the Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender's Office, was a justice sector agency that had retained independence from the state executive branch during the Intervention. Secondly, although non-autonomous agencies conceivably can bring class-action lawsuits on the executive's behalf, it is

intuitive that agencies with more independence from the executive have more opportunity to investigate human rights violations committed by the executive's security forces.

The Circuit's final report (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018) exhibited collective tutelage in several ways. The first was how, based on interviews conducted with *favela* residents, the report constructed a typology of systematic human rights violations during the Intervention. Indeed, it was the only final report to do so. The report described the Circuit's process of collecting information for this typology as follows:

[T]he registration of [victims'] testimonies is not proposed to serve as [a means] of verification and punishment. They are analyzed in a collective and systematized fashion. [The violations'] importance is recognized through the repetition and similarity with which they are described, indicating a recurrent and standardized practice [by security forces]. Their solutions must be treated in a systemic, coordinated, and transparent way (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018, 18).

This excerpt reflects collective tutelage by illustrating how the Circuit used testimonies to identify patterns of human rights violations at the level of *favela* communities, not to pinpoint specific instances of chargeable violations at the individual victim level. The report also described how the Circuit had stressed to residents that its goal was collecting "testimonies and not [formal] complaints" (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018, 23). Rather, interviews focused on "the description of [security forces'] repeated procedures and not on the production of evidence or the verification of specifically narrated episodes" (23).

The Circuit's decision to use collective tutelage had stemmed from public defenders' perception that the legal process had failed *favela* residents. According to the final report, Rio de Janeiro's

institutional “channels of complaints [against government officials] end up [marginalizing already] vulnerable residents (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018, 94). The legal process served “the fragile purpose of a rarely used option” (94) to bring formal charges against security forces. Consequently, it worked “more as an obstacle to dialogue [...] than as an opening to ties of trust” (95) between *favela* residents and the Public Defender’s Office.

This critique illustrates how the Circuit sought to use its autonomy to facilitate *favela* residents’ access to human rights and justice outside the conventional legal process. Collecting primary information on systematic human rights violations by security forces and developing policy recommendations was the main way that the Circuit’s final reporting contributed to this goal (24-27). A product of this collective tutelage was that the Circuit’s typology of systematic human rights violations within the final report stemmed “from the testimonies collected in *favelas*, and not the inverse” (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018, 34).

Instead of fitting resident-reported violations into conventional legal categories, the Circuit based its typology on “the desires expressed in residents’ speeches and perceptions” (34). This was despite how some of the typology’s categories might be legal under Brazilian law.¹² Collective

¹² The Favela for Rights Circuit’s final report (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018, 36) identified the following types of violations that had been committed systematically by Federal Intervention security forces and identified by *favela* residents during interviews: violations in the household, to include invading, occupying, or hiding in homes, committing sexual violence, consuming or destroying foods, and damaging and removing property; violations in searches, to include photographing faces and identification cards, threatening or committing physical aggression, prohibiting filming or searching cell phones, stopping and frisking children, being under the influence of drugs, extorting citizens, and not displaying proper identification; violations in security operations, to include preventing emergency services from accessing areas of operations, altering crime scenes, and executing and massacring suspects; violations in other police operations, to include firing weapons randomly, using undercover officers, interrupting events or festivities, deploying during school drop-off and pick-up hours, destroying vehicles and other properties in public areas, using airplanes and drones, entrapping or falsifying evidence of criminal activity against innocent citizens; and violations in terms of individual

tutelage thus enabled the Circuit to receive and reflect *favela* residents' main concerns with the Intervention, rather than suppress residents' voices by attempting to fit their experiences into narrowly defined legal parameters for criminal proceedings. The report described this benefit as

creating, [... instead of tools] for individual tutelage, a work outlook for the Public Defender's Office that seeks not only the solution to the [legal] process, but [also] the solution to the problem [of limited access to justice] itself. As such, the dialogue prior to any action [of the Public Defender's Office] and prior dialogue [specifically] with the neediest population is a great achievement of the Favelas for Rights Network (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018, 60).

The emphasis on "dialogue prior to any action" implies that the Circuit conceivably could have attempted to use its testimonies against security forces in criminal proceedings. This excerpt nonetheless suggests most of all that, as a means of collecting primary information on systematic human rights violations, collective tutelage enabled the Circuit to uplift the voices of *favela* residents. The typology of violations informed the final report's recommendations to broaden the monitoring of security operations, expand external oversight of state police, enhance harm reduction services for violence-affected communities, institute demilitarizing police trainings, and develop a state public security plan in conjunction with academics and civil society organizations (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018a, 96-99).

Demilitarizing trainings, for example, would "oppose the reproduction of a warrior ethos [that is] distant from the parameters of police work in democratic contexts" (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018a, 99). Not only collective tutelage but, also, the policy

traumas, to include restricting freedom of movement, persecuting local activists and community leaders, persecuting previously incarcerated peoples, inciting disputes between rival gangs, suspending public and commercial services, and inducing psychological trauma.

recommendations produced by this information strategy reflected institutional autonomy's importance in the process of controlling militarization. Specifically, the final report's emphasis on external oversight and demilitarization reinforces how being outside the security forces related to both the Circuit's information strategy and its resulting policy recommendations.

Several interviewees (#34, 59, 70, 80) further affirmed that collective tutelage was central to the Favela for Rights Circuit's strategy and reflective of institutional autonomy's importance. A justice sector interviewee (#70) said that the Circuit's goal had been "to systematize [human rights violations] instead of generating legal cases." This goal was "innovative" because "what *favela* residents said [historically] did not have repercussions in the media" and the Circuit was able to "propagate people's voices" (#70). This emphasis on publicizing *favela* voices through the media previews my dissertation's next chapter on the initial impact of institutional strategy.

Another justice sector interviewee (#59) described how, because the Public Prosecutor's Office and not the Defender's Office determines whether individual complaints proceed to criminal processes, the latter "had no way to bring these cases into the judicial system." Public defenders consequently opted "for working in the public debate" outside the legal process. They also opted for demonstrating, "in an ethnographic way", how Rio de Janeiro has "extremely violent police." The emphasis on not only data but, also, discourse further previews this strategy's impact.

Another justice sector interviewee (#80) suggested that the autonomy of the Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender's Office had enabled the Circuit to position itself "against the state and federal governments." The autonomy involved guaranteed budgets and the inability of external actors to

impeach the agency's leadership. The Circuit's primary data collection practice of collective tutelage both reflected and reinforced this position of contesting the Intervention.

A civil society interviewee (#34) echoed these perspectives. The Circuit's collective tutelage had been "different from the judicial logic based on evidence" because it enabled collecting not only first-hand but, also, second-hand testimonies of violations. The resulting typology rigorously had exposed purposeful, recurring, and less known forms of state violence beyond police killings.

An example of this exposure, according to the civil society interviewee (#34), was violations of property rights. The *asfalto* historically does not perceive *favela* residents as having inviolable property rights. The Circuit had sought to bridge the *asfalto-favela* divide by highlighting violations of *favela* residents' property. The Circuit might have missed this specific violation if it had emphasized individual over collective tutelage and, thus, had tried to fit *favela* residents' formal complaints into conventional legal categories and norms.

This civil society interviewee (#34) therefore concluded that "the objective of monitoring and publishing systematic violations" through collective tutelage had been "something new and very innovative, especially when we remember that the Public Defender's Office is a government agency." Without the justice sector's autonomy, the Circuit could not have used this primary data practice to expose security forces' human rights violations in such a way. With autonomy, it was compelled and able to rely on original human rights testimonies in order to achieve this goal.

Factor 2.1: Institutional cohesion

Table 12 suggests that having a combination of full autonomy and either high or moderate cohesion levels was necessary for ad-hoc civilian institutions to adopt a strategy based on collection of original monitoring information. The two institutions with high cohesion levels, the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit, also had full autonomy and used primary information practices extensively.

The other institution that used such practices, the Legislative Observatory, had full autonomy and moderate cohesion. It relied on original monitoring information considerably less than the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit. Another ad-hoc institution, the Popular Truth Commission, also had full autonomy. It had low cohesion and did not use primary data collection practices. The combination of full autonomy and a high cohesion level was necessary for institutional strategy to rely extensively on collection of original monitoring information.

The additional factor of cohesion helps understand why the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit, not the Legislative Observatory or Popular Truth Commission, were able to use their autonomy toward broad collection of original monitoring information. Both the Civil Society Observatory and Popular Truth Commission functioned as consortia. They had multiple civil society, justice sector, and legislative partners to help collect monitoring information. The Civil Society Observatory's consortium, however, was more cohesive.

Meanwhile, the Favelas for Rights Circuit increased cohesion within the Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender's Office regarding organizational changes to expand collaboration with civil

society. The Legislative Observatory had moderate cohesion due to internal disunity and external isolation. Cohesion thus worked alongside autonomy to shape strategy by enabling more independent ad-hoc institutions to collect original monitoring information to a greater degree. Institutions with less cohesion, like the Popular Truth Commission, were less able to do so.

Civil Society Observatory's consortium partners

Interviews suggest that cohesion shaped the Civil Society Observatory's strategy by helping develop a consortium of monitoring partners. The Observatory's push for autonomy, specifically, led it to establish this consortium. Members of the Observatory's consortium considered the information strategy appropriate for representing *favela*-based organizations and effective at monitoring the Federal Intervention.

A civil society interviewee (#78) said that the Observatory sought "to be the focal point for civil society to monitor the Intervention." To achieve this goal, the *asfalto*-based institution needed to collect information from *favela*-based groups about how the Intervention was playing out in communities to which journalists had little access. This access was limited because *favelas* tended to be under the control of criminal organizations, which did not want journalists to expose their operations. Collecting original monitoring information would limit dependence on official sources and on media coverage for monitoring, another civil society interviewee (#25) said. It also would help bridge the *asfalto-favela* divide and strengthen the Observatory's partnership with community groups to delegitimize militarization.

The Observatory established an internal advisory council of community activists from multiple *favelas* to facilitate this partnership focused on data collection and delegitimization. It also developed partnerships with multiple organizations that themselves were collecting original crime, violence, and human rights information in *favelas*. The resulting structure (Observatório da Intervenção 2023) was that of a consortium within the broader monitoring coalition.

Several civil society interviewees (#24, 25, 41, 62, 110) said that the Observatory's staff had invested considerably in cultivating and leveraging activists' and partners' data analysis and visualization capabilities, media engagement skills, and relationship-building with other *favela* groups. They also described how the Observatory had helped uplift and channel *favela* activists' voices. These features distinguished the Observatory from the mainstream media and from data-driven, *asfalto*-based monitoring of prior militarization episodes (Winand et al. 2021).

A dissenting view was that political tensions hampered the Observatory's cohesion to some extent. A civil society interviewee (#4) described how, while some of the Observatory's partners had wanted to monitor the Intervention from a politically neutral position, "there was a [left-wing] social and political bias in the communities and groups" that comprised the Observatory's consortium and opposed the Intervention. The interviewee said that such actors had "wanted to make a name for themselves" rather than perform objective, information-driven monitoring of the Intervention's impact on crime and violence.

Overall, though, interviews suggest that the Observatory was cohesive. Consortium partners considered its goals and strategy legitimate. These partners contributed to the Observatory's

strategy by participating in the collection of original monitoring information from *favelas* about how security forces were implementing the Intervention. Without such cohesion within its consortium, the Observatory would have been less capable of collection original information.

Favelas for Rights Circuit's External Ombudsman division

Interviews suggest that cohesion also shaped the Favelas for Rights Circuit's strategy. Despite its autonomy, the Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender's Office had minimal cohesion and little reach to *favelas* pre-Intervention. Tensions within the parent organization concerned whether and how to collaborate with civil society in order to extend access to justice for *favela* residents.

The Circuit fostered this cohesion and reach by demonstrating for public defenders that expanding legal services to *favela* residents was possible. It also demonstrated how this expansion was possible. This resulting cohesion produced a virtuous cycle. It enabled the Circuit to leverage its parent organization's autonomy more effectively by collecting more primary information on human rights violations during the Intervention.

A civil society interviewee (#12) described how the Public Defender's Office "is one of the most democratic institutions in the country". Its mission is to expand access to justice for citizens in low-income communities. They also said that, of all the State Public Defender's Offices in Brazil, Rio de Janeiro's is the oldest and most consolidated in carrying out this mission.

This civil society interviewee (#12) added, however, that the Public Defender's Office "still is part of the Brazilian state." Despite its independence from other government branches, the Office

historically had reflected and reinforced Rio de Janeiro's inequities by falling short of its commitment to expanding low-income citizens' access to justice. A legislative interviewee (#20) said that this limitation had been evident in how public defenders rarely traveled from their *asfalto*-based offices to *favelas* in order to provide legal services before the 2018 Intervention.

A justice sector interviewee (#80) said that the Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender's Office had created its External Ombudsman division in 2016 to deepen the agency's collaboration with civil society organizations. This collaboration, in principle, would enhance the Office's ability to provide low-income citizens with legal services. The division's design is such that civil society organizations, not public defenders, nominate the division's leadership. Because this design reduced public defenders' authority within the Office, it had generated resistance from some public defenders against working with civil society to expand legal services in *favelas*.

When the 2018 Intervention began, the External Ombudsman created the Favelas for Rights Circuit. The External Ombudsman's main goal was to expand human rights protections to low-income residents. A secondary goal, according to a civil society interviewee (#12), was to increase public defenders' support for the division and for its objective of deepening collaboration with civil society. With increased cohesion, the External Ombudsman could expand access to justice for *favela* residents more effectively.

Multiple interviewees (#12, 66, 80, 81) described how the Circuit's collective tutelage had consisted of caravans that brought public defenders and a consortium of civil society, justice sector, and legislative partners to *favelas* in order to collect residents' testimonies. Caravans

reportedly were necessary because, as criminal organizations control *favelas*, justice sector officials and other institutional representatives were safer when arriving in larger concentrations. The Circuit often selected which *favelas* to visit based on recent reports of human rights violations. These caravans had demonstrated the External Ombudsman's division's coordination capacity and facilitated public defenders' unprecedented access to *favela* residents. Consequently, public defenders began to support the External Ombudsman's division more.

A legislative interviewee (#20) similarly said that the Circuit had brought public defenders and partner organizations "inside the [*favelas*], with direct [access to people whose rights were] being violated." According to the interviewee, "[t]his contact meant that the [public defenders and partner] organizations removed themselves from their offices, [from] their [bureaucracy], to listen to people and learn about types of violations of which [Rio de Janeiro] had not known previously." This proximity was evident in the Circuit's final report and its unconventional typology of human rights violations. It advanced the Circuit's goal of not only capturing testimonies and expanding legal services but, also, increasing buy-in from public defenders.

This outcome, in turn, illustrates how increased cohesion worked alongside the Circuit's autonomy to enable collecting original monitoring information through *favela* residents' human rights testimonies. The External Ombudsman's division established the Circuit partially to increase cohesion. The Circuit's model and initial work convinced public defenders of collaborating with civil society in order to expand *favela* residents' access to justice. Without this success, the Circuit would not have achieved the cohesion necessary to undertake its caravans. It would have been less capable of collecting primary data to create its typology.

Legislative Observatory's internal disunity and external isolation

The Legislative Observatory had full autonomy, moderate cohesion, and, compared to the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit, limited reliance on collection of original monitoring information. This example illustrates how full autonomy and a high level of cohesion contributed to greater production of, and reliance on such information. Interviews suggest that the Legislative Observatory's internal disunity among staff and external isolation within the Chamber of Deputies limited the extent to which it exercised this data collection practice.

Legislative interviewees (#17, 52) described the Legislative Observatory's internal disunity as product of disputes among staff. A legislative interviewee (#17) suggested that the distribution of roles and resources between staff had engendered internal distrust of the group's ability to monitor the Intervention. Another legislative interviewee (#52) suggested that the staff's limited expertise on public security and on Rio de Janeiro had a similar effect.

The Legislative Observatory's external isolation was evident in how, even though Rodrigo Maia had created and housed this ad-hoc institution as the Chamber of Deputies' president, its staff had little engagement with elected officials. A legislative interviewee (#52) said that legislators were busy preparing for the October 2018 elections, right-wing deputies supported the Intervention, and left-wing deputies suspected the Observatory of being under Maia's control. Another legislative interviewee (#17) described how being comprised fully of legislative staff was a hindrance because staff had little influence in the Chamber relative to elected officials.

Another factor in the Legislative Observatory's isolation was a minimal ability to establish partnerships and limited willingness to take sides. A legislative interviewee (#48) said that the Legislative Observatory had "limited reach" partially because of the Chamber's minimal credibility and reputation for polarization amidst Brazil's political conflicts. Several legislative interviewees (#48, 88) said that this reputation had led Maia and the Observatory staff to prioritize being "impartial." It also hampered the Observatory's ability to coordinate with potential consortium partners in civil society around collection of original monitoring information, according to several legislative interviewees (#48, 52).

A legislative interviewee (#52) said that, owing to these limitations, "no one cared" about the Legislative Observatory's "useless" monitoring of the Intervention. They added that "not a single" point of the Observatory's data collection and analysis had been "incorporated" into policy regarding the Intervention and the broader question of public security in Brazil. This view testifies to how, while the institution collected a moderate level of original monitoring data compared with the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit, this strategy's limitations were reflected and reinforced by the institution's isolation from policymakers.

Popular Truth Commission's internal disputes

The Popular Truth Commission was like the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit as they all had full autonomy. Like the Observatory and Circuit, the Commission also functioned as a consortium by monitoring the Intervention in partnership with various other civil society, justice sector, and legislative organizations (Comissão Popular da Verdade 2018, 2-3). The Commission, however, did not collect original monitoring information. Its final report

(Comissão Popular da Verdade 2018) used only secondary information on crime, violence, and human rights (10-20). One of the secondary sources was the Observatory. The Commission's final report extensively summarizes and quotes the Observatory's final report (15-16).

The Commission's final report listed the Civil Society Observatory, Favelas for Rights Circuit, and various members of these institutions' consortia as among "partner entities that contributed with the systematization of data" (Comissão Popular da Verdade 2018, 5). It might seem like a reasonable division of labor for the Commission to deemphasize primary data collection and rely instead on partner's original monitoring information. However, several interviewees (#43, 93) suggested that the final report's limited usage of primary data had resulted at least partially from the Commission's lack of internal cohesion.

A civil society interviewee (#43) described "disputes among the diverse segments of the human rights struggle" within the Commission. These disputes concerned which member of the consortium would lead the Commission and, relatedly, which political party would have the most influence. Owing to these disputes, members of the Commission's consortium "withdrew to their conventional spaces" and the Commission "ended up falling apart."

Another civil society interviewee (#93) said that, due to these disputes and the demobilizing consequences of the Franco assassination, the Commission experienced "difficulty in having continuity" after the Intervention's initial months. This difficulty manifested in the Commission's inability to monitor the Intervention with primary data as initially intended. A civil society interviewee (#43) said that the Commission lacked "methodology or expertise in

research for documenting human rights violations in urban areas.” Perhaps its consortium partners could have helped build this expertise were it not for internal disputes.

The civil society interviewee (#43) concluded that, owing partially to the consortium’s limited cohesion, the Commission’s “little report on human rights violations” was “very superficial” and unable “to capture the breadth” of the Intervention’s consequences. The final report’s usage of strictly secondary information, in this perspective, was not a decision based strictly on division of labor with other ad-hoc institutions. The Commission had full autonomy, yet low cohesion limited its ability to collect original monitoring information as intended.

Summary

This chapter has used document analysis and interview data to suggest that two main variables shaped the strategy of ad-hoc civilian institutions to monitor the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro with original information. One was autonomy. Among institutions that produced final reports, having both formal and informal independence from the Intervention’s principal and agents was necessary for collection of original monitoring information. An additional factor was cohesion. Having high levels of internal unity and external support was necessary for institutions to rely on original monitoring information for at least half of their data practices. The Civil Society Observatory and Favela for Rights Circuit are examples of these dynamics.

These findings lend strong support to this dissertation’s theory about the *autonomy paradox*.

They suggest that autonomy indeed contributes to civilian control institutions’ strategy selection by encouraging the collection of original monitoring information. Such information is the main

mechanism that links institutions' formation to their impact. Moreover, the additional factor of institutions' cohesion contributes to strategy selection by enabling such data collection. Having a unified staff and supportive consortia positions institutions to take advantage of their autonomy.

These findings also raise questions about the relationship between civilian control institutions' strategies and impacts. The chapter has sought to understand what information strategies ad-hoc civilian institutions selected to monitor the Intervention and what factors shaped this selection. In so doing, it has revealed how collection was not the only part of institutions' information strategies. They also sought to shape political discourse with their original monitoring.

How, then, does institutional strategy relate to institutional impact? To what extent does collection of original monitoring information correspond with influence on political discourse regarding law enforcement militarization? What other factors might shape institutions' influence? The next chapter will analyze these questions.

Chapter 5: Institutional impact (initial)

Political discourse could be the initial impact of civilian control institutions. Media coverage reflects and reinforces how society debates law enforcement militarization. The media has an incentive to cover more autonomous institutions that collect independent data more. Journalists prefer newer, more conflictual, more balanced, and more authoritative stories on militarization. Institutions that are more autonomous are more contentious and use original data to a greater degree. Being external to the principal-agent relationship, more autonomous institutions also satisfy journalists' preference for more balanced information. I hypothesize that autonomy thus could contribute to institutions' initial impact by incentivizing more media coverage.

A rival hypothesis holds that legitimation could incentivize media coverage of institutions. The media has an interest in presenting militarization as appropriate and effective in order to maintain its relationship with the executive. By counterbalancing coverage of institutions' information with information from militarization's principal and agents, the media legitimizes militarization. It centers contestation, weakens dissent, and constructs false equivalences.

An additional factor, transparency, could work alongside civilian control institutions' autonomy by creating both a journalistic need and an institutional opportunity to fill the gap in authoritative information. Militarization's principal's and agents have few incentives to share information with the media. Such information might inform contentious attempts to control militarization. Journalists therefore must seek out information from other sources. Institutions have an opportunity to fill the information gap with original data as a way of shaping coverage.

The observable implications are that civilian control institutions that collect original monitoring information to a greater degree potentially have more influence on media coverage. Individuals understand this influence as a function of journalists' incentives to cover more information that is more original and comes from more autonomous and contentious sources. Individuals also understand the limited transparency of militarization's principal and agents as contributing to these incentives by leading journalists and institutions to fill the information gap. The extent to which media coverage of militarization-related information from institutions overlaps with coverage of such information from the principal and agents is limited.

The more that these observable implications are valid in the context of the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, the more that we should see the following vis-à-vis the monitoring coalition. The Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit, which were more autonomous and collected original monitoring information to a greater extent, appeared more in critical media coverage regarding the Intervention than other ad-hoc institutions did.

Additionally, individuals understood their autonomy and information strategy as incentivizing journalists' coverage. Individuals also understood the Federal Intervention Cabinet's limited transparency as contributing to these incentives by creating an information gap that journalists and institutions sought to fill. Overlap between the Observatory and Circuit, on the one hand, and the Intervention's main informational actors, on the other, was limited within critical media coverage. Individuals understood the media's incentives as counterbalancing coverage of institutions with coverage of the Intervention's principal and agents to a minimal degree.

Indeed, my analysis appears to support these expectations. One in four critical newspaper articles with citations referenced at least one of the 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions. Of articles that referenced the monitoring coalition, four in five mentioned the Civil Society Observatory, the Favelas for Rights Circuit, or both. This proportion far surpassed references to other institutions. Almost one in three critical articles referenced the Observatory, at least one of its consortium partners like the Circuit, or both. This proportion was greater than that which referenced more established civilian organizations. It slightly surpassed references to the Intervention's principals and agents. Having full autonomy was necessary for considerable influence on media coverage.

The monitoring coalition's impact on critical media coverage could have resulted from a combination of institutional strategies and journalist incentives. Shaping political discourse by fueling critical media coverage was central to the Observatory's strategy. It did so mainly by feeding data to journalists and connecting journalists with its consortium's *favela* representatives.

Journalists also could have found the Observatory's and Circuit's information compelling because it was original, critical, and authoritative. The information offered journalists a way to balance coverage of the Federal Intervention Cabinet. Limited government transparency during the Intervention further incentivized journalists and institutions to coordinate in filling the information gap. The Intervention's principal and agents received similarly frequent references, yet journalists did not use them to counterbalance coverage of the monitoring coalition.

This chapter will proceed as follows. It will begin by examining the autonomy hypothesis, using an original dataset to identify the criticisms and citations within newspaper articles about the

Federal Intervention. Based on document analysis and interview data, a discussion of the Civil Society Observatory's and Favelas for Rights Circuit's monitoring strategy and journalists' incentives will supplement the dataset. The chapter then will examine the additional factor, transparency, with interviews and the rival hypothesis, legitimation, with a combination of interviews and the original dataset. The chapter will conclude with a summary of findings.

Hypothesis 3: Institutional autonomy

To examine the hypothesis that autonomy contributes to civilian control institutions' initial impact, I analyze 331 articles published by Brazil's three newspapers of record about the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro. The sample seeks to include all consistently available articles within the newspapers' digital archives that, based on a combination of content analysis and keyword searches, are interpretable as focusing on the Federal Intervention. The newspapers are *Estado de S. Paulo*, *Folha de S. Paulo*, and the Rio de Janeiro-based *O Globo*. Only the latter is based in Rio de Janeiro, yet several media interviewees (#1, 7, 42) suggested that the São Paulo outlets mainly used Rio de Janeiro-based reporters to cover the Federal Intervention.¹³

Most of the sample is from São Paulo outlets rather than *O Globo*, consists of news articles rather than opinion articles, and is published during the Intervention's first month (before coverage of the monitoring coalition's original information began). One hundred twenty-six of

¹³ My initial goal was to analyze all articles concerning the Federal Intervention within these three newspapers of record. I sought to identify these articles through a combination of content analysis and keyword searches. However, two main factors limited the sample size: multiple articles identified in newspapers' print archives, which are available online, were not identifiable in their digital archives; and multiple articles identifiable initially in digital archives ceased to be available online.

the 331 articles (38%) are from *O Globo*, 123 (37%) are from *Estado*, and 82 (25%) are from *Folha*. Two hundred fifty-one (76%) are news articles while 80 (24%) are opinion articles.

One hundred ninety-one (58%) articles have publication dates between February 16, 2018, when President Temer decreed the Intervention, and March 16, 2018. One hundred forty (42%) were between March 17 and December 31, 2018, when the Intervention ended. An ad-hoc civilian institution that used primary data collection practices first appeared in the sample on March 18, 2018. It was the Civil Society Observatory.

These distributions suggest that the sample captures more nationally relevant news than news whose relevance is limited to Rio de Janeiro. They also suggest that the sample involves more descriptive than argumentative articles. In addition, the sample likely captures more coverage of the Intervention's decree, planning, and initial implementation than of its subsequent implementation. These considerations would seem to make the sample unlikely to show that ad-hoc civilian institutions with more autonomy and collection of original monitoring information tended to receive more media coverage.

The institutions that best fit this description, the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit, were based in Rio de Janeiro. Although their information enabled description, their strategy sought to inform arguments about the Intervention's illegitimacy. They only began to receive media coverage after the Intervention's decree, planning, and initial implementation. If my sample shows compelling evidence that these institutions received more media coverage than others, I therefore will have considerable confidence in this hypothesis.

Indeed, the monitoring coalition, especially more autonomous institutions focused on primary information, contributed considerably to critical media coverage of the Intervention. As this section will discuss below in more detail, 25% of critical articles with citations referenced at least one of the monitoring coalition's ad-hoc institutions. Most references were to the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit. With the Observatory's other consortium partners, these institutions accounted for almost 33% of such critical citation articles.

In comparison, 23% of critical citation articles referenced at least one of three preexisting, permanent, more established civilian institutions. Twenty-six percent referenced at least one of the Intervention's main informational actors, such as the Federal Intervention Cabinet. These distributions suggest that the monitoring coalition and, specifically, its more autonomous and primary data-focused ad-hoc institutions, contributed considerably to media coverage.

Critical media coverage

My first step to analyzing the media coverage sample involves content analysis in order to identify newspaper articles that criticized the Federal Intervention. I consider an article critical if it is interpretable as containing at least one negative point about the Intervention's appropriateness and/or effectiveness. This interpretation is independent of whether the article's overall position or tone regarding the Intervention is negative. Of the sample's 331 articles, 194 (59%) are interpretable as criticizing the Intervention.

My second step is to categorize reasons for negative coverage of the Intervention within these 194 critical newspaper articles. I inductively identify 11 reasons for such criticism. These are mutually inclusive as one article can cite multiple reasons. Several reasons appeared in about one-third or more of the critical articles: the Intervention's effectiveness at reducing crime and violence (48%); the Temer administration's and Brazilian Army's effectiveness at planning the Intervention (46%); the legitimacy (i.e., appropriateness and effectiveness) of using the military for policing (44%); the legitimacy of state violence and human rights violations (42%); the effectiveness of security sector reform measures (33%); and the effectiveness of security operations (32%). Table 13 below describes these and less frequent reasons in greater detail.

Table 13: Reasons for negative coverage of the Federal Intervention within 2018 critical newspaper articles (n=194)

<i>Category</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>% of articles</i>
Effectiveness of crime and violence reduction	Federal Intervention's limited anticipated and observed ability to reduce crime and violence levels in Rio de Janeiro state	48
Effectiveness of policy planning	Temer administration and Army's limited and ineffectual efforts to consult stakeholders, set objectives, and develop strategy in designing and implementing Federal Intervention	46
Legitimacy of military mission	Army's limited suitability for conducting and administering Rio de Janeiro law enforcement due to negative legacy of military dictatorship, ineffectiveness of previous GLO operations, and risks of undermining democratic civil-military relations and Armed Forces' institutional image	44
Legitimacy of state violence and rights violations	Security forces' high anticipated and observed willingness and ability to kill and otherwise violate constitutional and human rights of suspected criminals, as well as innocent civilians, during operations	42
Effectiveness of security sector reform	Federal Intervention's limited anticipated and observed willingness and ability to reform Rio de Janeiro law enforcement via measures like purging corrupt officers, strengthening civilian oversight, instituting community policing, emphasizing criminal investigations and intelligence-based operations over non-strategic <i>favela</i> incursions, and targeting illicit firearms trafficking over illicit narcotics trafficking	33
Effectiveness of security operations	Federal Intervention's excessive, intensifying emphasis on security forces' incursions into <i>favelas</i> , given their limited usage of intelligence, unsatisfactory results, and considerable challenges and risks (excludes criticism based solely on previous GLO operations)	32
Appropriateness of political motivations	President Temer's incentives to avoid a likely-to-fail vote on social security reform and to curry public support ahead of possible October 2018 reelection bid as reasons for decreeing Federal Intervention	26
Appropriateness of policy transparency	Temer administration and Federal Intervention Cabinet's limited commitment to sharing information with the media, respecting press freedoms, and communicating with the public	20
Effectiveness of policy financing	Temer administration and Federal Intervention Cabinet's poor fiscal management in terms of planning budgets, allocating resources, procuring goods and services, and ensuring positive return on investment	17
Legitimacy of policy in public opinion	Temer administration and Army's limited anticipated and observed ability to sustain favorable public opinion of the Federal Intervention	13

Effectiveness of non-security measures	Temer administration and Federal Intervention Cabinet's limited willingness and ability to supplement security measures with social investments in education, housing, public health, and transportation aimed at preventing crime and violence and with political investments in toughening laws aimed at deterring and punishing crime and violence	13
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SOURCE: Author's inductive analysis of 331 online articles from the Estado de S. Paulo, Folha de S. Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro-based O Globo newspapers that focused on the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro.

NOTE: The categories are mutually inclusive as a single article can reference multiple reasons.

Sources of critical media coverage

My third step is to identify the sources of this critical media coverage regarding the Federal Intervention. This step specifically involves identifying the individuals and institutions that journalists referenced in articles that are interpretable as criticizing the Intervention. Among 194 critical articles, 140 (72%) provided citations for either data or commentary when presenting at least one of their negative points about the Federal Intervention. The remainder of this section will focus on these 140 articles to analyze journalists' information sources. Forty-two of the 54 (78%) articles that did not cite either data or commentary were opinion articles, which, intuitively speaking, differ systematically from more factual news articles in usage of sources.

I view an article as citing an ad-hoc civilian institution if it explicitly mentioned the institution itself and/or, after the institution's founding, an individual who was participating in the institution. Participating individuals include parent organizations' staff members, institutions' staff members, and, in the case of legislative committees, elected officials. Table 14 below previews the breakdown of references across key actors.

Table 14: References in critical newspaper articles with citations (n=140) on the Federal Intervention		
<i>Category of institutions</i>	<i>Sub-category of actor/institution</i>	<i>% of articles</i>
Monitoring coalition	All ad-hoc civilian institutions	25
	<i>Civil Society Observatory</i>	21
	<i>Civil Society Observatory consortium partners</i>	24
	<i>Civil Society Observatory and/or consortium partners</i>	32
Civilian establishment	Brazilian Forum on Public Security, Datafolha, and/or Public Security Institute	23
Federal Intervention	National executive agencies, Brazilian Army, Federal Intervention Cabinet, and/or Public Security Institute	26

SOURCE: Author's analysis of 331 online articles from the Estado de S. Paulo, Folha de S. Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro-based O Globo newspapers that focused on the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro.

NOTE: All percentages refer to the 140 critical newspaper articles with citations. A single article can reference multiple institutions. Civil Society Observatory consortium partners include but are not limited to the Favelas for Rights Circuit, Crossfire Institute, Brazilian Public Security Forum, and Violence Analysis Laboratory (Observatório da Intervenção 2023). The Public Security Institute appears within both the Civilian establishment and Federal Intervention categories because, before coming under the Federal Intervention Cabinet's authority, this organization was a key civilian reference for crime and violence statistics in Rio de Janeiro.

Of these 140 critical articles with citations, 35 (25%) specifically referenced at least one of the monitoring coalition's 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions. An implication is that the monitoring coalition contributed to one in four critical, citation-based newspaper articles on the Federal Intervention. Such references most frequently appeared in articles whose reasons for criticism of the Intervention included the effectiveness of security operations, appropriateness of policy transparency, legitimacy in public opinion, and effectiveness of financing.

One in four articles might seem like a minor contribution of the monitoring coalition toward critical media coverage. However, this contribution's weight is evident in comparison with coverage that cited at least one of three preexisting, permanent civilian organizations. These

preexisting, permanent organizations represented more established sources of data and commentary on public security in Rio de Janeiro and, generally, in Brazil.

One of the more established civilian organizations was the Brazilian Forum on Public Security, the country's most prominent think tank on law enforcement issues. Another was Datafolha, Brazil's most prominent public opinion polling organization.¹⁴ The third organization was the Public Security Institute, Rio de Janeiro state's crime and violence statistics clearinghouse.

Thirty-two of the 140 (23%) critical, citation-based newspaper articles referenced at least one of these three more established civilian institutions. Seventeen of these 32 (53%) articles also referenced at least one of the monitoring coalition's 13 ad-hoc institutions. References to the more established, permanent institutions appeared most frequently in articles whose reasons for critical coverage of the Intervention included legitimacy in public opinion, the effectiveness of security operations, the effectiveness of crime and violence reduction, the effectiveness of security sector reform, and the appropriateness of policy transparency.

This comparison is not to suggest that ad-hoc civilian institutions necessarily were competing with these more established sources. In fact, the Brazilian Forum on Public Security was a data partner within the Civil Society Observatory's consortium (Observatório da Intervenção 2023). The Observatory also contributed to a March 2018 survey by the Forum and Datafolha about Rio de Janeiro residents' initial perceptions of the Intervention (Datafolha and Fórum Brasileiro de

¹⁴ Both Datafolha and *Folha de S. Paulo* are owned by the Grupo Folha media conglomerate. *Folha de S. Paulo* published 10 of the 11 (91%) critical online articles within the sample that cited Datafolha.

Segurança Pública 2018). What it does suggest is that, in terms of references within critical articles, citation-based about the Intervention, the monitoring coalition's ad-hoc institutions surpassed (by eight points) more established civilian organizations.

Citations of the monitoring coalition

My fourth step is to disaggregate critical media coverage by references to ad-hoc civilian institutions within the monitoring coalition. Through this step, I find that the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit received considerably more citations within critical newspaper articles than other ad-hoc civilian institutions. This finding suggests that these institutions' strategy of collecting original monitoring information, driven partially by autonomy, shaped critical media coverage regarding the Intervention.

Among the 35 critical articles regarding the Intervention that cited at least one of the monitoring coalition's ad-hoc civilian institution, 30 (86%) referenced the Civil Society Observatory and/or Favelas for Rights Circuit. Twenty-four of 35 (69%) referenced the Observatory, specifically, while six (17%) referenced the Circuit. Citations of the Observatory and Circuit most frequently appeared in articles with criticisms of the effectiveness of security operations, legitimacy in public opinion, legitimacy of state violence and rights violations, effectiveness of security sector reform, effectiveness of financing, and appropriateness of transparency.

Moreover, 34 of 140 (24%) critical articles with citations referenced at least one of the Civil Society Observatory's consortium partners (Observatório da Intervenção 2019). These included not only the Circuit. Thirteen (38%) of such articles cited the Crossfire Institute, seven (21%)

referenced the Brazilian Forum on Public Security, and five (15%) mentioned Rio de Janeiro State University's Violence Analysis Laboratory. In all, 45 of the 140 (32%) critical articles with citations referenced the Observatory, at least one of its consortium partners, or both.

In contrast, two of the 35 (6%) articles cited the National Bar Association's Juridical Observatory, two (6%) cited the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office's Civil Public Inquiry, and one (3%) cited the Federal Public Defender's Office's Rio Plus Group. Two of these three institutions had full autonomy while one had partial autonomy. One had a high level of cohesion while two had a moderate level. Not one of the institutions published a final report. For my purposes, their collection of original monitoring information therefore was negligible. Several interviewees (#59, 60, 63, 73, 111) informed this assumption.

These distributions of references to the monitoring coalition suggest that the Civil Society Observatory and its consortium, including the Favelas for Rights Circuit, contributed to one-third of critical, citation-based media coverage regarding the Federal Intervention. They also suggest that the Observatory and Circuit contributed to four-fifths of such articles that specifically referenced at least one of the monitoring coalition's ad institutions.

The Observatory's and Circuit's initial impact on critical media coverage related specifically to the Intervention's legitimacy based on security operations, public opinion, and state violence and human rights violations. The two institutions informed roughly one of three articles that criticized the Intervention based on each of these reasons. That media coverage of these institutions overlapped with such reasons for criticism is fitting. The Observatory's original

monitoring information focused on security operations. The Circuit's information focused on human rights violations. Both institutions' media outreach involved connecting journalists with *favela* residents, whose opinions journalists previously had difficulty capturing. In this way, the institutions' initial impact closely reflected institutional strategy. If coverage of these institutions had overlapped more with reasons for criticizing the Intervention that did not reflect the institutions' strategy, we would have less confidence in the initial impact hypothesis.

Monitoring institutions' media strategy

That the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit received comparatively strong media coverage could reflect both institutional strategy and journalistic incentives. These institutions, as well as the Crossfire Institute and Networks of Maré within the Observatory's consortium, contributed to "journalism for peace" (Winand et al. 2021, 181-184; 191-194). Specifically, they uplifted and channeled "the voice of the *favela*" (191). They did so by helping counter the mainstream media's hegemonic narrative that "the *favela* is synonymous with criminality and brutal violence and that the use of military force is an effective remedy" (191)).

The Civil Society Observatory's final report illustrated how this ad-hoc civilian institution sought to use original monitoring information to make media coverage more critical of the Federal Intervention. The report described how the Observatory used "technical rigor in the production of data and analysis" (Observatório da Intervenção 2019, 20). Its goal was "to conquer the press and society's recognition of the quality of our work and to be identified as critical and independent voices [...] committed to information".

According to its final report (Observatório da Intervenção 2019, 20), the Observatory consortium “became a point of convergence for news about the [I]ntervention and the public security context” (20). Observatory staff distilled this news and other information into infographics with critical questions about the Intervention. “Shared with journalists, researchers, activists, and opinion leaders through WhatsApp lists¹⁵, these infographics served as a counterpoint to the Federal Intervention Cabinet’s official discourse” (21). The final report further described how

[a]n important part of the Observatory’s work was maintaining permanent dialogue with the national and international press. In addition to supplying journalists continuously with data and analysis, the Observatory worked to incentivize independent coverage [of the Intervention], pointing out reporting gaps and [journalists’] uncritical adherence to the official discourse. Another objective [...] was to help journalists expand the number of sources, recommending *favela* and periphery activists for interviews (Observatório da Intervenção 2019, 21).

This excerpt illustrates how influencing political discourse by shaping critical media coverage was central to the Observatory’s strategy of collecting original monitoring information. It suggests further that both autonomy and cohesion contributed to this strategy. Autonomy’s role is evident in the excerpt’s emphasis on challenging “the official discourse”. Cohesion with respect to external partners is evident in the excerpt’s reference to connecting journalists with community activists who comprised the Observatory’s consortium.

Interviews suggest that such community leaders and other civil society actors considered the Observatory’s strategy of using original monitoring information to shape critical media coverage appropriate and effective. A civil society interviewee (#25) summarized this strategy as, “the

¹⁵ WhatsApp lists, or large groups on the Meta Platforms-owned messaging service, are a main way that Brazilians consume news (Spagnuolo 2018).

mainstream media was the interlocutor between [the Observatory] and the Federal Intervention Cabinet. It received [the Observatory's] information and shared it with the Cabinet [...] for the military to respond.” What made this strategy especially legitimate was the Observatory’s focus on working in consortium with activists and data partners. A civil society interviewee (#62) said,

The Observatory’s legacy for society is very rich because [...] of its coordination [...] and because it] helped indicate where people should look [to monitor the Intervention. ...] Another legacy is how [the Observatory] showed that civil society can be united around public security [...] The Observatory placed the responsibility of [advocating for a more inclusive public security] in the hands of civil society. [...] We should think about public security] through the lens of *favelas* and urban peripheries and of all racial and social spheres, for the population as a whole. The Observatory showed this (#62).

This excerpt illustrates how the Civil Society Observatory’s media strategy was legitimate not only due to its effectiveness at informing critical media coverage. It also was legitimate because of its appropriateness and effectiveness with communicating, to civil society, the need for autonomous monitoring of the Intervention in order to bring about demilitarization. The excerpt suggests that the Observatory shaped political discourse not only through media coverage but, also, through civil society actors’ views of their own monitoring responsibilities.

The Favelas for Rights Circuit’s final report (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 208a) did not exhibit an explicit focus on shaping media coverage like the Observatory’s did. The Circuit’s report nonetheless demonstrated sensitivity toward the media’s role in constructing public opinion. For example, the report emphasized monitoring mainstream and community-based media coverage of the Intervention (4; 9; 63; 85; 106).

Journalists' incentives to reference monitoring institutions

Interviews illustrate how, in addition to reflecting institutional strategy, strong press coverage of the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit resulted from journalists' reporting incentives. These incentives were to produce coverage of the Federal Intervention that consistently was newer, more conflictual, more balanced, and more authoritative. The institutions' strategy of using original monitoring information to inform political discourse aligned closely with these incentives.

In journalists' eyes, these ad-hoc institutions' strategy was new because it used original information. The strategy was conflictual because it involved criticizing the Intervention. By challenging the Federal Intervention Cabinet's narrative, the strategy enabled balanced coverage. The strategy also enabled authoritative coverage because, as discussed below in more detail, the Intervention had placed a previously independent, reliable source of official statistics regarding public security under the Army's authority.

The ad-hoc civilian institutions also could have influenced media coverage to some extent by using their original information to socialize journalists regarding the Intervention's illegitimacy. A media interviewee (#49) said that, while individual "testimonies are important", quantitative information of state violence and rights violations demonstrates to the public how a given testimony "is not an isolated case" and reflects "a state practice against the poor and Black population in *favelas*." In this way, the Observatory "was super important." It showed that the Federal Intervention was "unacceptable." It also fostered "a critical sense" among journalists by using statistics to complement testimonies of human rights violations during security operations.

However, media interviews suggest that incentives were more consequential than socialization in linking ad-hoc civilian institutions' strategy of collecting original monitoring information to media coverage. One media interviewee (#26) suggested that the Observatory and Circuit had received more coverage than other civilian institutions because they enabled more conflictual, authoritative stories. They attributed this dynamic to the institutions' contestation of the Intervention. They also attributed such coverage to journalists' own concern that, during an election year and under the Federal Intervention Cabinet's authority, the crime and violence statistics produced by Rio de Janeiro State's Public Security Institute were untrustworthy.

Another media interviewee (#1) suggested that the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit had received more coverage because they enabled more balanced stories. The interviewee said that these institutions' data activism and collective tutelage, combined with the Observatory's media outreach, had helped create a counternarrative to the Federal Intervention Cabinet's positions and statements. They said that the Observatory "had an academic vision" due to being within a university. It nonetheless was the only institution "to monitor the number of [security] operations [... It] offered a lot of criticism and had a big part in the [public] debate." It achieved this influence by publishing "monthly reports and statistics [of indices like] the number of deaths and massacres", by circulating "unanswered questions", and by sharing this information "with the press, using their journalist contacts." This media outreach

helped show the other side of the Intervention beyond the Temer administration and Brazilian military's rhetoric. [...] We need to have two sides so that the reporting becomes richer. Having them as sources made coverage more critical, also, because they represented another set of eyes on the Intervention) (#1).

This excerpt illustrates how coverage of the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit responded not only to the institutions' strategy of collecting original information and reaching out to the media. Coverage also resulted from journalists' incentives to capture both sides of an issue. At the same time, the excerpt further suggests that the institutions' monitoring based on original information about security operations and human rights violations contributed to media coverage becoming more critical.

Another media interviewee (#42) described the Civil Society Observatory's role in constructing a counternarrative to that of the Federal Intervention Cabinet, in particular:

Civil society was able to organize itself well to carry out critical monitoring. The Observatory published critical reports. [...] Civil society influenced coverage because [...] to criticize, the press needs external evaluators to [develop the criticism]. Through interviews with someone who is monitoring, we can provide another perspective on what is happening. During the Intervention, we had this monitoring that fed our coverage (#42).

This excerpt illustrates how journalists' incentives to produce more balanced news stories fueled media coverage based on the Civil Society Observatory's original data. It also demonstrates how the Observatory's provision of original data and criticism of the Intervention aligned with journalists' incentives to bring new, conflictual stories to light.

Another media interviewee (#2) echoed these perspectives in describing how the Observatory had helped journalists build a narrative that was new, conflictual, and balanced at the same time:

The Civil Society Observatory was very vocal. They had a lot of important operations data, graphics, studies, reports, specialists, ... [They] passed information to the press through WhatsApp. They were very important. They impacted media coverage because the press must cover all sides [of a policy issue]. The side of the Armed Forces is easy to present because military officials [typically] release [statements], but it is harder to cover *favela* residents' perspective. These organizations [like the Observatory] have a tradition of contact with *favela* residents. They have the contacts and develop reports. They share them with the press. [...T]he two sides were the [Federal Intervention Cabinet] and the human rights organizations, so the Observatory was fundamental in this process (#2).

This excerpt further illustrates how coverage of the Civil Society Observatory resulted not only from the institution's strategy and media outreach but, also, from journalists' incentives to produce balanced stories about the Intervention. Another incentive that this excerpt demonstrates is to produce novel coverage. Given journalists' difficulty of capturing *favela* residents' perspectives on policy issues, the Observatory's primary data represented a new type of information for the media to reference.

The excerpt, in this way, speaks also to the Observatory's cohesion with respect to external partners. If *favela* activists had not considered the Observatory's monitoring strategy legitimate, the institution could have been less effective at uplifting and channeling their voices to shape critical media coverage. With such legitimacy, the institution was able to connect journalists and *favela* residents whose perspectives the media previously had struggled to access.

Similarly, another media interviewee (#7) emphasized how the Observatory had "acted as a bridge for the [predominantly white] press to [hear predominantly Black] residents' testimonies." Such a bridge was necessary because, due to personal safety risks, journalists have "difficulties with going to [*favelas*]." The criminal organizations that tend to control *favelas* do not want their operations to be exposed by journalists. Increased coverage of *favela* residents' views, facilitated

by the Observatory, even might have had a pacifying effect. It “avoided potentially greater abuses [by security forces] because [human rights violations] became topics of intensive debate. Without the coverage, it would have been even worse” (#7).

Factor 3: Official transparency

The additional factor of limited government transparency during the Federal Intervention could have worked alongside the monitoring coalition’s strategy to shape critical media coverage. Journalists struggled to obtain information from the Temer administration, Brazilian Army, Federal Intervention Cabinet, and Rio de Janeiro state police. Some consequently sought out ad-hoc civilian institutions for original data to fill the information gap. The coalition’s strategy and the executive’s limited transparency combined to enable institutions to shape critical coverage.

Media concerns with government transparency

Transparency was a source of concern for the media during the Intervention. Thirty-eight of the 194 (20%) critical newspaper articles referenced the Temer administration and Federal Intervention Cabinet’s limited commitment to sharing information with the media, respecting press freedoms, and communicating with the public about the Intervention (see Table 13). The monitoring coalition informed this concern. Of the 38 critical articles that referenced transparency, 15 (39%) mentioned at least one of the 13 ad-hoc monitoring institutions. Eleven (29%) specifically mentioned the Civil Society Observatory.

Multiple media interviewees (#1, 2, 7, 8, 26, 42) described challenges with obtaining information from the Temer administration, Brazilian Army, Federal Intervention Cabinet, and Rio de

Janeiro state police. Some media interviewees (#8, 26) suggested that these challenges had altered coverage considerably. A media interviewee (#8) said that the Cabinet's lack of transparency limited coverage to mere summary of government information. "The coverage was very factual," they said. "Reporting did not get very deep" beyond what the Cabinet released.

Another media interviewee (#26) said that the Cabinet's response to the Marielle Franco assassination had given journalists the impression that "the military controlled the information [...] and was hiding something. That was when [journalists] began to see the lack of transparency [...] and] part of the media became more critical." The media's initially favorable coverage of the Intervention took a turn in the face of information gaps.

The media's critical turn could have resulted from a combination of push and pull factors. Journalists struggled to obtain information from the government. At the same time, they found the monitoring coalition's original information compelling. Several media interviewees (#1, 42) suggested that transparency concerns fueled journalists' decision to rely more on ad-hoc civilian institutions for information about the Federal Intervention.

These media interviewees (#1, 42) also suggested, however, that this decision had resulted mainly from institutions' primary information. The monitoring coalition drew the media's attention with its strategy just as much as, if not more than the government deflected such attention with its limited transparency. Without transparency concerns, it is likely that autonomy and institutions' consequent focus on original information still would have shaped coverage.

One media interviewee (#1) said that, due to limited transparency, “the media and [civil society] reinforced one another [in collecting and publishing information about the Intervention]. The Favelas for Rights Circuit published very original and concrete data about the Intervention in terms of abuses.” Due partially to transparency concerns, the Observatory and Circuit became journalists’ main sources of information about the Intervention.

This media interviewee’s (#1) emphasis on the Circuit’s primary information, though, also suggests that difficulties with obtaining government information were not the only reason for covering the monitoring coalition. Institutional strategy also was key. Describing journalists’ relationships with sources like the Observatory, another media interviewee (#42) similarly juxtaposed the government’s limited transparency with civil society organizations’ information practices while continuing to emphasize the latter as a driver of coverage.

This media interviewee (#42) implied that journalists had relied on ad-hoc civilian institutions like the Observatory partially due the lack of government transparency. However, they attributed the Observatory’s impact mainly to its original information. Because the Federal Intervention Cabinet had been eager to delegitimize the Observatory’s primary data (as the next chapter will discuss), journalists could use the Observatory’s information to elicit responses from the Cabinet. The Observatory thus helped journalists overcome their transparency challenges.

Civil Society Observatory’s substitution strategy

Transparency’s role as an additional factor that operated alongside the monitoring coalition’s strategy is evident further in ad-hoc civilian institutions’ work to fill the information gap. Not

only did the government's lack of transparency lead journalists to seek original information from the monitoring coalition. It also provided an opportunity for institutions to collect original data with which to shape media coverage. The Civil Society Observatory again is a case in point.

The Observatory's final report (*Observatório da Intervenção 2019*) revealed how this institution saw limited government transparency as both a concern and an opportunity. It criticized lack of transparency during the Intervention (15). It illustrated this lack of transparency by stating that only nine of the 84 (11%) information requests that the Observatory had submitted to Rio de Janeiro state government agencies "were addressed satisfactorily" (17).

Moreover, the report suggested that civil society wanted to be an "ally of the state government in the production, systematization, and consolidation of data" in order to "construct, monitor, and evaluate public policies based on validated and transparent methodologies" (17). The Observatory implicitly tried to differentiate its methodology from the limited transparency of the Federal Intervention Cabinet and state agencies that had fallen under the Cabinet's authority.

The report distinguished the Observatory further by describing the institution's methodology. "Based on principles of transparency", the Observatory shared data with external partners and journalists to satisfy information requests and receive "critiques and suggestions" (17). The Observatory thus sought to serve as a counterpoint to the Cabinet not only by collecting original information about security operations. By publishing this information, the Observatory demonstrated a practice that set the institution apart from the agency that it was contesting.

Interviews further suggest that transparency concerns led the Civil Society Observatory to use original information toward shaping media coverage. Several city society interviewees (#25, 41) said that consortium partners had sought out the Observatory due partially to transparency concerns. Motivated by opposition to the Intervention, they wanted to help the Observatory fill the transparency gap by collecting and publishing original information.

Another civil society interviewee (#23) suggested that the Observatory had measured its impact based on the extent to which the Federal Intervention Cabinet became more transparent after the Observatory published its data. The Observatory published monthly reports. The more information that the Cabinet released each monthly in apparent response to the Observatory's reports, the more effective that the Observatory considered its strategy.

Rival hypothesis 3: Legitimation

I find little evidence that the media used coverage of the monitoring coalition in order to present the Federal Intervention as appropriate and effective. The percentage of critical articles that referenced the monitoring coalition was similar to that which referenced the Intervention's main informational actors. However, there was little overlap between references to the monitoring coalition and references to the Intervention actors as sources. Journalists used the coalition to counterbalance the Intervention, not vice versa, as previously discussed.

This is not to say that the monitoring coalition dominated media coverage relative to the Federal Intervention's main informational actors. The mainstream media's overall coverage of the Intervention privileged information from these actors. The Civil Society Observatory and

Favelas for Rights Circuit attempted to counterbalance these actors in their reports, but these received comparatively little coverage (Winand et al. 2021, 184-194). Among newspaper articles with criticism, though, the monitoring coalition received more frequent coverage and was not subject to clear counterbalancing with information from the Intervention's actors.

Media references to the monitoring vs. Intervention coalitions

While 25% of articles with criticism and citations referenced at least one ad-hoc monitoring institution, 37 of 140 (26%) referenced at least one of the Federal Intervention's four main informational actors: the Temer administration, such as the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Public Security; the Brazilian Army; the Federal Intervention Cabinet; and the Public Security Institute. A government interviewee (#27) suggested that the Institute, which had been a relatively independent source of crime and violence statistics before 2018, had functioned as the Cabinet's mouthpiece in publishing favorable police data. Sixteen of 37 (43%) referenced the Institute, 11 (30%) referenced the Cabinet, seven (19%) referenced Army Commander Gen. Eduardo Villas Bôas, and five (14%) referenced Federal Intervener Gen. Walter Braga Netto.

Despite this similar distribution of media references between the monitoring coalition and the Federal Intervention's actors, there was not considerable overlap. Fifteen articles referenced both ad-hoc civilian institutions and the Intervention's informational actors. The media therefore counterbalanced only 43% of references to the monitoring coalition with references to the Federal Intervention's main informational actors. Of these 15 articles, 12 (80%) referenced the Civil Society Observatory and two (13%) referenced the Favelas for Rights Circuit.

An example of such counterbalancing is how several *Folha de S. Paulo* articles (Barbon 2018a; Barbon and Vettorazzo 2018; Estarque 2018; Nogueira 2018) referenced both the monitoring coalition and the Federal Intervention's main informational actors with a recurring explainer below the news. The explainers varied slightly over time. However, they tended to reference the Civil Society Observatory' and other ad-hoc civilian institutions' critiques of political motivations, security sector reform, and ineffectiveness at reducing crime and violence (Table 13). These critiques were in response to the Cabinet as the following excerpt indicates:

According to researchers, [the Intervention has not prioritized the most important public security measures]. The measures [that have been] most heralded by the [Federal Intervention] Cabinet have been the purchase of [police] materiel and the reduction of [...] theft, rather than basics like reducing homicides and police lethality. 'It is the idea that public security is weapons, patrol cars, and bulletproof vests [which has corresponded with increased violence during previous GLO operations]. They are giving a solution that already has been tested and does not work', said Pablo Nunes, research coordinator of the Civil Society Observatory. 'The larger question is intelligence [and] fighting gangs, weapons [traffickers], and corruption. The most important fact is the [young *favela* resident] having a rifle, not the kid himself', said public defender Thales Arcoverde, coordinator of [Rio Plus Public Defender's Group]. Public security policy, for [these experts], continues [to be] based on confrontation and [drug control instead of community policing and intelligence] (Barbon and Vettorazzo 2018).

This excerpt suggests that, although references to the monitoring coalition and to the Intervention's main informational actors overlapped somewhat, this overlap often worked to counterbalance the Intervention's information with that of the coalition rather than vice versa. The article briefly referenced the Federal Intervention Cabinet's information. It then cited two ad-hoc civilian institutions' critical response. No articles that referenced both the coalition and the Intervention actors seemingly used information from the latter to counterbalance the former.

Journalists' views of counterbalancing

No media interviewees (#1, 2, 7, 8, 26, 42, 49) suggested that newspapers had sought to counterbalance coverage of the monitoring coalition with coverage of the Intervention's main informational actors. They recognized that, especially at the beginning, the media had presented the Intervention favorably. Several interviewees (#26, 42) also referenced instances of the military attempting to use the media to counterbalance criticism in the political discourse, including from the monitoring coalition. However, these interviewees did not present such attempts as effective at counterbalancing for legitimization purposes.

One media interviewee (#42) described how, “[o]ff the record, [military officials] would say that the Observatory did not understand [the Federal Intervention Cabinet’s numbers] and simply was [being oppositional] despite the public being in favor” of the Intervention. They added that limited post-2018 coverage of the Intervention illustrated how “the Armed Forces [were] able to preserve their image [... and] control the narrative [...] of what happened in 2018.

However, the Cabinet’s efforts did not correspond with a considerable proportion of critical articles referencing both the monitoring coalition and the Intervention’s main informational actors. This illustrates how legitimizing the Intervention through balanced coverage was not the media’s main incentive. Indeed, as discussed above in greater detail, media interviewees (#1, 2, 7, 8, 26, 42, 49) mentioned counterbalancing the Intervention actors with the coalition.

Summary

This chapter has used document analysis, interview data, and an original media dataset to illustrate that autonomy could have shaped ad-hoc civilian institutions' initial impact on political discourse during the 2018 Federal Intervention. More autonomous and primary information-focused institutions and their consortium partners, in turn, received more coverage within critical articles relative to other institutions, to more established civilian organizations, and to the Intervention's informational actors. The Civil Society Observatory explicitly focused on shaping media coverage. Journalists had strong incentives to use the Observatory's original information. Limited official transparency, more than attempts to legitimize militarization, worked alongside autonomy. Full autonomy could have been necessary to receive considerable media coverage.

These findings lend strong support to this dissertation's theory about the *autonomy paradox*. They suggest that autonomy indeed contributes to civilian control institutions' initial impact on political discourse. By encouraging the collection of original monitoring information, autonomy positions institutions to shape critical media coverage of militarization. Autonomy incentivizes the media to cover such institutions' because their information is novel, contentious, and authoritative due to limited government transparency. Their data also enables balanced coverage.

These findings raise questions about the relationship between civilian control institutions' initial impacts on political discourse and their impacts on militarization's principals and agents. To what extent do militarization's principal and agents recognize institutions and their initial impacts on political discourse? To what degree does political discourse influence the cost of

militarization in the eyes of these actors? What other factors shape actors' perceptions of militarization's costs? The next chapter will examine these questions.

Chapter 6: Institutional impact (intermediate)

Military officials' legitimacy concerns potentially are the intermediate impact of civilian control institutions. Officials are sensitive to society's perception of their appropriateness and effectiveness. As the political discourse becomes more critical of the troop deployment due partially to more autonomous institutions, officials consider the deployment less appropriate and effective. I hypothesize that autonomy thus could contribute to institutions' intermediate impact by raising officials' worries about the deployment's appropriateness and effectiveness.

A rival hypothesis is that, independent of civilian control institutions, legitimacy concerns could respond to demand. Policing is one type of troop deployment. Others includes border security, counterinsurgency, international peacekeeping, and inter-state conflict. As demand for troop deployment in other domains increases, military officials compare policing with other types of troop deployment when assessing legitimacy. Officials want to satisfy emerging demand as much as possible, but the armed forces cannot be in all places at once. The extent to which officials consider policing a legitimate type of troop deployment therefore decreases.

The legitimacy concerns hypothesis' observable implication is that more autonomous ad-hoc civilian control institutions inform military officials' worries about the troop deployment's appropriateness and effectiveness to a greater degree. Individuals also understand this relationship as stemming from institutions' autonomy, strategy, and initial impact. The rival hypothesis' observable implication is that demand for troop deployment in other domains corresponds with, and informs legitimacy concerns with troop deployment for policing.

The more that we see the following evidence during the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, the more confident that we should be in the autonomy hypothesis. First, Brazilian Army officers' concerns with the legitimacy of the Intervention and, generally, of Rio de Janeiro GLO operations centered on how society perceived these troop deployments. Ad-hoc civilian institutions' autonomy, strategy, and initial impact figured prominently into these societal concerns. Officials attributed concerns partially to institutions.

Second, GLO operations beyond Rio de Janeiro and beyond urban policing did not increase considerably during and after the Intervention. Other operations' budgets were limited relative to the budgets of Rio de Janeiro operations. Military officials dedicated comparatively little attention to other operations. The Armed Forces' international peacekeeping missions also were limited in scope and attention relative to Rio de Janeiro deployments.

Indeed, I find that Brazilian Army officers' concerns with the Intervention's legitimacy could have stemmed in part from societal reasons. Junior/mid-level officers worried during and after the Intervention about limited public support for Rio de Janeiro deployments and the consequent risk to the Army's public image. Both these and senior officers attributed such worries partly to the monitoring coalition, especially the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit. They suggested that these institutions' autonomy, strategy, and initial impact had informed such worries. Less autonomous and less information-driven institutions caused no worries. Full autonomy could have been necessary for institutions to influence officers' legitimacy concerns.

Moreover, the Armed Forces' GLO operations and international peacekeeping deployments during and after the Intervention were limited. Other GLO operations from 2018 to 2022 on average had smaller budgets than the GLO operation that coincided with the Intervention. Military officials did not associate these other GLO operations and legitimacy concerns with Rio de Janeiro deployments. Peacekeeping missions had considerably fewer soldiers than Rio de Janeiro GLO operations around this time. Brazil's participation in the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, which ended in 2017, informed legitimacy concerns to a minor degree. Taken together, these factors suggest that officers' legitimacy concerns could have stemmed from institutions' autonomy, strategy, and initial impact more than other deployments.

This chapter will proceed as follows. It first will examine the autonomy hypothesis via analysis of an original media coverage dataset. This analysis will consider Army officers' reasons for legitimacy concerns, the sources of these concerns, and civilians' perceptions of these concerns. Next, the chapter will discuss the rival hypothesis about demand for other troop deployments. This discussion will have two parts, 2018-2022 GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro and 2018-2022 international peacekeeping deployments. The chapter will conclude with a summary.

Hypothesis 4: Institutional autonomy

To examine civilian control institutions' intermediate impact on military officials' legitimacy concerns, I analyze two main data sources. One source is junior/mid-level Brazilian Army officers' writings. These include two types. One type of writing is undergraduate and graduate

theses at the Brazilian Armed Forces' officer training academies. Another type of writing is junior/mid-level officers' articles in the Brazilian Armed Forces' professional journals.¹⁶

Such writings are a valuable data source on military officials' legitimacy concerns. They often include original data from interviews and surveys of Army officers, augmenting the degree to which they capture officials' perceptions. As writings published within or through military schools and journals, they reflect a combination of individual and institutional views. They are, to my knowledge, the best source for a moderate-sized historical sample of officials' views.

The limitation is that, due to military institutions' influence, such writings might not capture individuals' views fully. I therefore complement my analysis of these writings with discussion of my original interviews. These interviews capture individual perceptions to a greater degree.

I mainly identify officers' writings through a combination of keyword searches and content analysis within the Brazilian Army's online library (Exército Brasileiro 2023). I aim to analyze all writings that focused on the political or strategic dimensions of either the 2018 Federal Intervention or, generally, GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro.

¹⁶ Three writings were anomalous. One was a mid-level Brazilian Army officer's thesis in Spanish at a Uruguayan officer training academy (Reis 2018). Another was a professional article with two authors (Cinelli and de Souza Dias 2018). At the request of a military interviewee (#9), I do not identify the third writing. All writings other than these three had one author, were in Portuguese, and were published by a Brazilian Armed Forces journal or officer training academy.

The sample includes 58 writings. Eight (14%) are writings about Rio de Janeiro GLO operations published between 2006 and 2017. Fifty (86%) are writings about the Federal Intervention and/or Rio de Janeiro GLO operations published between 2018 and 2021.

All eight (100%) of the writings published before 2018 were theses. Six (75%) were published in 2017. Five (63%) were written by junior officers, including cadets and captains. Three (38%) were written by mid-level officers, such as majors, lieutenant coronels, and coronels. Four (50%) used surveys of other military officers, totaling 107 responses. Two (25%) used interviews of other military officers, totaling four participants.

Of the 50 writings published during or after 2018, 40 (80%) were theses and 10 (20%) were journal articles. Forty-three (86%) were published between 2019 and 2021 while seven (14%) were published in 2018. Twenty-five (50%) were written by junior officers and 23 (46%) were written by mid-level officers.¹⁷ Ten (20%) used surveys of other officers, totaling 366 responses. Five (10%) used interviews of other officers, totaling 18 participants.

The second data source is interviews of senior Brazilian Army officers conducted by Castro et al. (2023). The writing and interview samples do not overlap. In 2021 and 2022, Castro et al. (2023) interviewed senior officers “who [had] occupied privileged positions in the decision-making, planning, or conduct” (8) of GLO operations focused on urban policing to reduce crime and violence. Several officers had participated in the 2018 Federal Intervention. I analyze the 11

¹⁷ One of the 50 (2%) writings during or after 2018 was published by a senior officer, a rank that includes brigade and division generals (Silva 2018). One (2%) was written by an officer whose rank I do not identify at the request of a military interviewee (#9).

interviews with brigade and division generals who were on active duty in 2018 and/or were involved otherwise in the Intervention.

Among the 11 interviews from Castro et al. (2023), two (18%) are Army generals who served as ministers in the Temer administration during the Intervention. Five (45%) are generals who served either in the Federal Intervention Cabinet or in the Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Public Security, which fell under the Cabinet's authority. Three of the four other generals had participated in Rio de Janeiro GLO operations before 2018.

Reasons for officers' legitimacy concerns

To analyze Army officers' legitimacy concerns, my first step involves using content analysis to identify writings and interviews that reflected concerns with the appropriateness and effectiveness of Rio de Janeiro troop deployments. I consider a writing or interview reflective of legitimacy concerns if it contains at least one negative point about these deployments' appropriateness and effectiveness. This interpretation is independent of whether the writing or interview has a negative overall position or tone regarding such deployments.¹⁸

¹⁸ This operationalization of legitimacy concerns might inflate the monitoring coalition's intermediate impact relative to an alternative operationalization that considers overall tone regarding deployments' appropriateness and effectiveness. For example, five of 50 (10%) junior/mid-level Army officers' writings between 2018 and 2021 both referenced the monitoring coalition and had a negative overall tone regarding deployments whereas 10 of 50 (20%) both referenced the coalition and had at least one negative point regarding deployments. I categorize a writing's overall tone as positive, neutral, negative, or uncertain based on its tones with respect to individual legal, operational, and societal considerations (see Table 15). I consider its overall tone negative under one of two conditions. One is that the number of individual considerations for which the tone is negative is greater than the number of considerations for which the tone is positive (e.g., negative for legal reasons, negative for operational reasons, and positive for societal reasons). Another condition is if the number of individual considerations with negative tone is greater than, or equal to the number of individual considerations with neutral tones (e.g., negative for legal reasons, negative for operational reasons, and neutral for societal reasons; negative for legal reasons, neutral for operational reasons, and, due to not addressing this consideration, uncertain for societal reasons).

Eight of eight (100%) junior/mid-level officer writings between 2006 and 2017, 36 of 50 (72%) junior/mid-level officer writings between 2018 and 2021, and eight of 11 (73%) senior officer interviews between 2021 and 2022 are interpretable as reflecting legitimacy concerns. An implication is that, while the percentage of junior/mid-level officers with legitimacy concerns decreased by 28 points from 2006-2017 to 2018-2021, the number of officers with such concerns increased by 350% over this period. Another implication is that approximately three of four Army officers had legitimacy concerns during and after the 2018 Federal Intervention.

My second step is to categorize reasons for such legitimacy concerns. Inductively, I identify three reasons for legitimacy concerns. These are mutually inclusive as a single writing or interview can express multiple reasons for legitimacy concerns. One reason is legal. It includes overly complex and restrictive rules of engagement, as well as the possibility that soldiers will face punishment for violence committed against civilians and other potential abuses during deployments. This reason also includes Temer's decision against expanding the Armed Forces' legal authorities and restricting civil liberties during the Federal Intervention to a greater degree.

Temer decided not to place the entire Rio de Janeiro state government under the military's authority. Instead, he limited the Intervention to Rio de Janeiro's public security sector. He also decided against declaring either a State of Defense or State of Siege, which would have imposed severe restrictions on civil liberties. Moreover, Temer withdrew permission for "collective search and seizure warrants" (*mandados coletivos de busca e apreensão*). At the beginning of the Federal Intervention, these warrants had targeted broad areas instead of specific addresses.

Multiple interviewees (#7, 17, 31, 55, 61, 99, 113) mentioned how Temer's decisions had constrained the Federal Intervention's implementation from a legal point of view.

The second reason for officers' legitimacy concerns is operational. This reason includes the Army's diversion from its conventional mission of national defense, soldiers' insufficient preparation for urban policing, and deployments' limited impact on crime and violence levels.

The third reason is societal. It includes limited public support for the Army's deployment, whether actual or potential, and the deployment's risk for the Army's public image.

Of the eight junior/mid-level officer writings between 2006 and 2017, five (63%) expressed legal concerns, four (50%) reflected operational concerns, and five (63%) exhibited societal concerns.

Nineteen of 50 (38%) junior/mid-level officer writings between 2018 and 2021 revealed legal concerns, 18 (36%) exhibited operational concerns, and 29 (58%) expressed societal concerns.

Of the 11 senior officer interviews between 2021 and 2022, four (36%) revealed legal concerns, five (45%) exhibited operational concerns, and three (27%) expressed societal concerns.

These distributions suggest that the levels of, and reasons for legitimacy concerns among Brazilian Army officers varied considerably with time and rank. The extent of concerns decreased from before to during/after the 2018 Federal Intervention. Senior officers interviewed after the Federal Intervention had considerably fewer legitimacy concerns for societal reasons than junior/mid-level officers had when writing before, during, and after the Federal Intervention. Table 15 below summarizes these distributions of officers' legitimacy concerns.

Table 15: Reasons for Brazilian Army officers' legitimacy concerns with Rio de Janeiro troop deployments

<i>Category</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>% of sources</i>		
		<i>Writings of junior/ mid-level officers</i>		<i>Interviews of Senior officers</i>
		<i>2006-2017 (n=8)</i>	<i>2018-2021 (n=50)</i>	<i>2021-2022 (n=11)</i>
Legal	Troop deployments' overly complex and restrictive rules of engagement, possibility that soldiers will face punishment for self-defense actions and potential abuses, and limited restrictions on civil liberties	63	38	36
Operational	Army's diversion from its conventional nation defense mission, soldiers' insufficient preparation for urban policing, and deployments' limited impact on crime and violence levels	50	36	45
Societal	Limited public support for troop deployment and the consequent risk to the Army's public image	63	58	27

SOURCE: Author's analysis of junior/mid-level Brazilian Army officers' theses at military institutions and articles in Armed Forces journals, and of senior Army officer interviews by Castro et al. (2023).

NOTE: I generate the categories inductively. They are not mutually inclusive as a single writing or interview can reference multiple categories. The 2006-2017 period includes writings that focus on GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro. The 2018-2021 period includes writings that focus on the 2018 Federal Intervention and/or GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro. The 2021-2022 period includes interviews by Castro et al. (2023) with Army generals who had been on active duty during 2018 and/or participated otherwise in the Federal Intervention.

During my original research, several military interviewees (#18, 30, 71, 83, 84, 92, 109) expressed legitimacy concerns for these reasons. Their concerns were interrelated. Legal reasons, for example, informed operational reasons for legitimacy concerns by leading officers to feel that the Intervention had been under too many constraints to be effective. Nonetheless, interviewees suggested that societal reasons had been prominent.

The reasons' interconnectedness is evident in how a military interviewee (#109) said that the Intervention had represented "a very big risk" for legal, operational, and societal reasons. These

risks were more acute if “there was [an inability] to reduce criminality [levels], if security deteriorated, if the Army’s image was harmed, if [soldiers] had to use force beyond what was reasonable, [and] if the [*favelas*] were against” the Army.

Another military interviewee (#84) expressed interconnected legal and operational reasons for legitimacy concerns. They said that the Intervention had been risky for the Army because it “was unprecedented and different from what people anticipated.” That President Temer had restricted the Intervention to Rio de Janeiro’s public security sector, instead of expanding it the overall state government, “generated certain anxiety” among officers. They considered more military authority crucial for a more effective deployment.

Other military interviewees (#30, 71) expressed legal and operational over societal reasons for legitimacy concerns. A military interviewee (#71) said that the Army’s main reason for concern had been the possibility that soldiers be held accountable for extrajudicial killings and other human rights violations during the Intervention. Another military interviewee (#30) acknowledged that “officers might think about the [Army’s] image.” However, they said, “that is not appropriate.” While “the risk of [the Intervention] tarnishing the [Army’s] image was high”, the greater risk was “not delivering results” in reducing crime and violence levels.

Other military interviewees (#18, 30) emphasized societal over efficacy reasons at some points. According to a military interviewee (#18), the Federal Intervention’s main legacy had been that the Army “did not want to be part of [Rio de Janeiro policing] in the future.” Improvements in some crime and violence levels were “not permanent and it tarnished [the Army’s] image,

reducing public support.” Another military interviewee (#30) said, “any type of territorial occupation tarnishes [the Army’s] the image.” Because the local population’s support might decrease as security operations intensify, “entering a *favela* is a risk” for the Army.

The most prominent societal reason reflected how political discourse had presented the Federal Intervention as a “military intervention”. A military interviewee (#92) stated that their main preoccupation had been “[t]o demystify the idea of ‘military intervention’” because “you have to deconstruct that narrative.” Another military interviewee (#109) stressed, “it was not a military intervention. [... The Army] always tried to repeat [...] that it was not [a] military [intervention].” Due to joint police-military operations soon after President Temer’s decree, “the impression of a military intervention emerged” in society and was a focus of military officers’ worries.

Another military interviewee (#83) said that the Federal Intervention Cabinet not only was worried about, but, also, took measures to counter usage of the term “military intervention” in political discourse. The interviewee emphasized that a civilian president had decreed the Intervention and could have nominated a civilian, instead of Gen. Braga Netto, as the Federal Intervener. They added that the Federal Intervention Cabinet consisted mainly of military officers due to bureaucratic barriers with hiring civilians rapidly, rather than a goal of cementing the Armed Forces’ authority. These considerations notwithstanding,

[the Federal Intervention Cabinet] tried, to the maximum extent possible, to disassociate [the Intervention from the military. ... I]t was difficult because [...] people thought that it was a ‘military intervention’. [...] This confusion happened with many people. [The Cabinet] heard ‘military intervention’ a lot. [...] The association of [the Federal Intervention was] with ‘military intervention’ and ‘return of the military dictatorship’, but [the Cabinet] insisted on trying to show the complete disassociation.” (#83)

This excerpt illustrates how military officers involved in the Federal Intervention not only worried about political discourse but, also, attempted to influence it. This and other expressions of societal reasons for legitimacy concerns suggest that military officers indeed viewed the Intervention through an informational lens. Officers not only were preoccupied with implementing the Intervention effectively under what they characterized as a restrictive, potentially punitive legal framework. They also were worried about dominating the political discourse with their own information regarding the Intervention's legitimacy.

Sources of junior/mid-level officers' legitimacy concerns

My third step is to identify the sources of Army officers' reasons for legitimacy concerns regarding the 2018 Federal Intervention and/or Rio de Janeiro GLO operations. This step specifically involves identifying the institutions that Army officers mentioned in those excerpts of writings and interviews that are interpretable as expressing concerns with such deployments.

None of the eight junior/mid-level officer writings between 2006 and 2017 cited civilian organizations in expressing legitimacy concerns. One thesis (Lima 2017, 33-35) cited a book (Silva 2017) published by the Networks of Maré. This organization would participate in the Civil Society Observatory's consortium during the 2018 Intervention. Nonetheless, civilian organizations apparently had little impact on legitimacy concerns before the Intervention.

Ten of 50 (20%) junior/mid-level officer writings between 2018 and 2021 cited the monitoring coalition when expressing legitimacy concerns. Of these 10 writings, six (60%) referenced the

mere existence of ad-hoc institutions as a cause for worry. The institutions threatened the Army's image by raising criticisms of the Intervention. The other four (40%) referenced institutions' information that reflected negatively on the Intervention's appropriateness and effectiveness.

Of the 10 writings between 2018 and 2021 with legitimacy concerns and references to the monitoring coalition, five (50%) mentioned the Civil Society Observatory and one (10%) mentioned the Favelas for Rights Circuit. The other four (40%) referenced ad-hoc monitoring institutions in general terms, including "committees" or "observatories". Multiple interviewees (#31, 38, 44, 61, 73, 111) used "observatories" to describe these institutions in general terms.¹⁹

The Observatory and Circuit thus informed legitimacy concerns of six of 36 (17%) junior/mid-level officers who used their writings to express reasons for worry about Rio de Janeiro troop deployments' appropriateness and effectiveness. These institutions also informed the legitimacy concerns of six of 10 (60%) officers whose worries were shaped by the monitoring coalition.

Coronel Ronald Alexandre Mandim de Oliveira (2019, 45) cited the Civil Society Observatory's final report as exemplifying "a negative vision of the Federal Intervention's" effectiveness. The author's thesis sought to counterbalance this "negative vision", a term that connoted the

¹⁹ At the same time, three of 50 (6%) junior/mid-level Army officer writings between 2018 and 2021 referenced ad-hoc civilian institutions as a source of the Federal Intervention's legitimacy. One writing cited Legislative Observatory data on 2017 killings of police, implicitly highlighting the need for Army deployment (Banar Alves 2021, 16). Another writing mentioned that the Federal Intervention Cabinet had planned to enter data-sharing partnerships with "observatories" (Silva 2018, 47) as an example of how the Cabinet had developed "an excellent management system" (53). The third writing suggested that the monitoring coalition's existence had affirmed the Army's constitutionally valid conduct of the Federal Intervention (Lira Preste 2019, 15-16). They implied that, if the Intervention were invalid, the Army would have restricted political space for monitoring.

deployment's risks in terms of public support and the Army's image. By stressing and attempting to counter this negative vision, the thesis recognized and revealed how the Observatory's initial impact on political discourse had shaped Army officers' legitimacy concerns for societal reasons.

Major Rômulo da Fonseca Botelho Atella (2021, 31-32) lamented how the Federal Intervention Cabinet had lacked the necessary "freedom of action" to fight crime and reduce violence. He attributed this constraint to how the Cabinet was "questioned for political-electoral, ideological, or technical viability reasons [... that were] exploited by various observatories." The Civil Society Observatory was the only civilian institution, ad-hoc or permanent, cited by this author.

Captain Matheus Marvila da Silva (2020, 22) referenced the Observatory's final report as evidence of how, "although the dominant narrative" of the Federal Intervention's effectiveness supposedly had "been conquered" by the Army and its allies, "its maintenance [... remained] a difficult task [...] and generate[d] debate among specialists." By emphasizing "narrative" and "debate", the author clearly revealed how the Observatory's initial impact on political discourse had raised officers' legitimacy concerns for societal reasons. This author had commanded an infantry company for Operation Rio de Janeiro during 10 of the Intervention's 11 months (6).

Another Army officer referenced the Civil Society Observatory extensively. The officer concluded, based on the Observatory's final report, that the Army's Rio de Janeiro troop deployments were ineffective. They consequently recommended that the Army reconsider participating in such deployments. At the request of a military interviewee (#9), this dissertation provides no further detail about the officer's writing.

Cadet Gabriel Lacerda Carius Pereira (2021) cited an extensive passage from the Favelas for Rights Circuit's final report as evidence of the Intervention's limited public support and the consequent threats to the military's public image. The author thus linked the Circuit's initial impact on political discourse to societal reasons for legitimacy concerns. They wrote that the Circuit's passage, which had described *favela* residents' negative experiences with security forces during the Intervention, had demonstrated

the local population's discontentment with the Armed Forces' performance, which can directly influence the [military's public] image [... According to public opinion polls, t]he Armed Forces are the institution with the most credibility in Brazil [...] Therefore, concern with this type of operation is of vital importance because [...] these operations involve soldiers' direct contact [...] with society [...] and the objective is that this high level of [public] approval [for the military] be maintained (Lacerda Carius 2021, 24-25).

This excerpt suggests that some Army officers considered the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit sources of societal reasons for legitimacy concern. Their worries stemmed from both these ad-hoc civilian institutions mere existence as part of a monitoring coalition and their critiques of the Intervention. Another factor is the Armed Forces' comparatively high esteem in Brazilian society according to public opinion polls (Datafolha 2019). That these critiques reflected *favela* residents' negative views of military operations during the Intervention was a particular cause for worry. By influencing political discourse, the institutions could have threatened the Intervention's public support and the Army's public image.

During my original research, several military interviewees (#30, 71) also attributed legitimacy concerns in part to the monitoring coalition's initial impact on political discourse. They

suggested that the monitoring coalition not only had raised officers' worries about the Intervention. The coalition also had driven officers to try to discredit the original monitoring information and to respond with the Army's own data.

One military interviewee (#71) said that ad-hoc monitoring institutions had "considerable impact" because "the Federal Intervention Cabinet was very worried [... about] all the media assessments" of Army's performance. The interviewee thus revealed a concern that institutions were shaping critical media coverage. In response, the Cabinet attempted to discredit the coalition's information. It specifically challenged the Civil Society Observatory's usage of geolocated gunfire data from a consortium partner, the crowdsourced application developer Where the Shootouts Are. The Observatory had claimed that its partner's gunfire data demonstrated how armed violence was increasing with the Intervention. This military interviewee (#71) described efforts to discredit such data as follows:

[The Federal Intervention] was a different mode of military involvement in public administration [than GLO operations, given the Army's authority over police. Consequently,] all eyes were on the Intervention. [You had] the creation of several groups in academia [such as the Civil Society Observatory ...], which were very active in writing news pieces regarding shootouts. There also was a website [called Where the Shootouts Are] where people could register these shootings. [... The Federal Intervention Cabinet worked] to give some responses to [...] critiques by these groups. [...] Praia Vermelha Military Observatory [an Army think tank in Rio de Janeiro] was used to give some responses regarding the application's methodology because [... Where the Shootouts Are's data was informing] a lot of criticisms [by the Civil Society Observatory that the Federal Intervention Cabinet considered unwarranted]. So, I think that the [Praia Vermelha Military] Observatory was used to challenge these criticisms" (#71).

This excerpt suggests that the Federal Intervention Cabinet's worries about the Intervention's public support and Army's public image fueled military efforts to discredit the Civil Society

Observatory, whose data was informing critical media coverage. The Cabinet specifically engaged an Army think tank to criticize the methodology of an Observatory consortium partner. That this methodology was based on citizens' crowdsourced reports of gunshots reveals how the monitoring coalition especially raised officers' societal concerns and compelled them to respond in defense of the Intervention and the Army's image. Intuitively, crowdsourced gunshot data especially was evocative for officers because it reflected citizens' experiences in violence-affected areas where the Intervention was working to provide security and gain support.

Another military interviewee (#30) expressed similar worries about the Civil Society Observatory's methodology. While dismissing the monitoring coalition's impact, this interviewee attempted to discredit its strategy and described how the Federal Intervention Cabinet had attempted to respond to the strategy. The extensive excerpt below illustrates the extent of officers' concerns with, and attempts to discredit the coalition:

Specialists appear in the media to comment on any topic. People want to promote themselves. [Civilian monitoring] was something against the Intervention [... and] various delusions were created. They had a big interest in weakening and tarnishing the image of the Armed Forces. These organizations, including ones financed by NGOs and [foreign] governments, came from [that perspective. ...] The majority of observatories produced absurd, dishonest, and ideological aberrations, specifically the [Civil Society Observatory. [...] The observatories had no impact on the Federal Intervention Cabinet or on how the Intervention developed because] when the [Army released] information, these observatories lost their disinformation power. The Praia Vermelha Military Observatory's role was to serve as a counterpoint to the observatories. It was not necessarily a war of narratives, but it was the clash of different positions. [The Civil Society Observatory] produced propaganda from the university world, which is very removed from reality. [... It] was created and financed by NGOs. No one spoke of [that institution] again [after the Intervention. ... I]t used data from the Where the Shootouts Are application, which were taken as the truth but had the wrong methodology. (#30)

This excerpt is most remarkable for the level of criticism that the military interviewee (#30) aimed at the Civil Society Observatory, which did receive some funding from Open Society Foundations (Observatório da Intervenção 2023). The Observatory's autonomy from the Intervention's principal and agents, as illustrated by their use of non-governmental funding, appears especially worrying for the interviewee. The institution's initial impact on political discourse via media coverage and, consequently, their threat to the Army's public image raises worries. This impact also elicits a response from the Army's think tank in Rio de Janeiro. If the Observatory had not contributed to Army officers' concerns, the interviewee probably would not have tried to discredit the institution to such a degree. Instead, the military interviewee strongly questioned not only the Observatory's strategy and impact, but, also, its ethics and motivations.

The same military interviewee (#30) separately contrasted the Civil Society Observatory and an ad-hoc legislative institution. They suggested that, because the legislative institution had become less autonomous throughout the course of the Intervention, its information had become less worrying for military officers. The legislative institution's decreased autonomy was evident in its increased collaboration with the Army's Rio de Janeiro think tank. The interviewee said that, unlike the Observatory, the legislative institution

did do good work. [The military] had a formal agreement with [this institution. It] initially [was] critical, but [the institution] became honest and collaborative. It was created to do monitoring. It sought out the other [ad-hoc civilian] institutions [for collaboration, but those] were very distant from reality. So, [the institution] sought out [the Praia Vermelha Military Observatory] for honesty. It was an attempt at oversight in the beginning, but it became more collaborative to understand [the military perspective]. In contrast, the [Civil Society] Observatory never reached out to [the military]. It was created and funded by NGOs to make things difficult [for the Army] (#30).

This excerpt suggests that military officers had more worries with more autonomous institutions like the Civil Society Observatory that collaborated less with the Armed Forces. The excerpt also demonstrates officers' preoccupation with monitoring as an information strategy. The interviewee characterizes monitoring as inherently oppositional to the Intervention. The strategy could have threatened to make the Intervention more costly for the military by making it appear less appropriate and effective in the political discourse.

That said, several military interviewees (#9, 28, 30, 31, 71, 109) also minimized ad-hoc civilian institutions' impact. A military interviewee (#71) said that, while the Army's transparency efforts partially had been a response to institutions' criticisms, they mainly had stemmed from worries about complying with federal procurement regulations when purchasing police materiel. Another military interviewee (#28) similarly said that, given its preoccupation with procurement, "the Federal Intervention Cabinet was not worried about [institutions] because it was too busy." This interviewee added that experience with prior GLO operations had made the Army comfortable with operating in Rio de Janeiro and confident in their ability to implement the Intervention regardless of societal factors like public support and civilian institutions' critiques.

Several military interviewees (#9, 109) said that institutions' impact had been limited partially because the Army had discredited them while making use of their information. A military interviewee (#9) said, "logically, there [was] a concern with public opinion. [However,] the [military's] strategy is to label critics as 'leftists' and 'communists', [thus] invalidating them." At the same time, institutions "were [useful for the Army to understand] *favela* residents' opinions."

The interviewee expressed greater worries about the Intervention's effectiveness at reducing crime and violence and its risk of increasing state violence and human rights violations.

Another military interviewee (#109) similarly recognized that, partially because their criticisms were reasonable, ad-hoc civilian institutions had frustrated the Army. However, these criticisms also had helped the Army understand the "environment" in which it was operating. The criticisms "did not come to influence the decisions of which operations would be executed." Weathering such criticisms was "part of [the job]." Based partially on previous GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro, Army officers "already [were] accustomed to" such criticisms.

Several military interviewees (#30, 31, 71) especially were dismissive of ad-hoc legislative institutions. They referenced legislative institutions' minimal longevity and media coverage. They also mentioned elected officials' limited incentives to invest in security sector reform. In dismissing legislative institutions, they juxtaposed these implicitly with the more autonomous and information-oriented Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit. This juxtaposition centered on how legislative institutions had been less motivated and cohesive in criticizing the Intervention and less impactful on political discourse through media coverage.

A military interviewee (#30) said that the Chamber of Deputies' External Committee on the Federal Intervention "did nothing" because it did not advance legislative proposals to improve Rio de Janeiro's public security. Moreover, its final report "was not even debated in the press. [...] It lacked impact. It was not relevant. In terms of the media, it had no impact. There was no divergence with [the Federal Intervention Cabinet's position]." The interviewee thus suggested

further that institutions with more autonomy relative to the Cabinet's position and more robust strategy in terms of using original monitoring information to shape critical media coverage had been more impactful with respect to military officials' legitimacy concerns.

Another military interviewee (#31) said that legislators "absolutely were irrelevant because [they] go whichever way the political winds blow. [... They] create[d] [ad-hoc monitoring institutions] in 2018. [...] When the Federal Intervention start[ed] to be effective [in reducing crime and violence], they abandon[ed] their work." This interviewee added, "in an election year" like 2018, "legislators do not concern themselves with monitoring."

A third military interviewee (#71) said that "[t]here were no one [in the National Congress] wanting to discuss the Intervention because no [legislator] wants the [political] responsibility for public security." The interviewee explained by describing how "the Intervention was [politically] convenient. The [left-wing legislative] opposition [to President Temer was] asking for another type of police." That said, "whoever already is in charge does not want to change things while whoever is not in charge, if they get in charge", wants to avoid responsibility for public security.

Sources of senior officers' legitimacy concerns

While 20% of 2018-2021 junior/mid-level officer writings cited the monitoring coalition when expressing legitimacy concerns, two of 11 (18%) senior officer interviews in 2021 and 2022 by Castro et al. (2023) did so. These interviews reflect the monitoring coalition's intermediate impact on legitimacy concerns as senior Army officers expressed worries with, and attempted to discredit the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit. The interviews also

suggest that such concerns could have led the Federal Intervention Cabinet to adopt a more proactive strategy to influence political discourse.

Senior officers' efforts to discredit the monitoring coalition and to adapt a more proactive communications strategy are striking in light of financial disparities. The Intervention's budget, channeled through the Federal Intervention Cabinet, was approximately USD 362 million.²⁰ The Civil Society Observatory's budget was around USD 100,000, according to a civil society interviewee (#23). Given this disparity and how the Observatory was the monitoring coalition's most prominent institution, any military effort whatsoever to discredit or adapt in response to the monitoring coalition seems noteworthy.

Army Gen. Richard Fernandez Nunes' interview with Castro et al. (2023) illustrates these dynamics of trying to discredit while responding to the monitoring coalition. Nunes was the Federal Intervention Cabinet's State Secretary of Public Security, responsible for the Rio de Janeiro's Civil and Military Police. After Gen. Braga Netto, he was the Cabinet's most prominent representative. The interviewers did not prompt Nunes by asking specifically about the monitoring coalition. On the one hand, when asked about media coverage and public opinion during the Federal Intervention, Nunes attempted to discredit the Civil Society Observatory's autonomy and strategy (Nunes, in Castro et al. 2023, 268-270).

²⁰ Brazil allocated 1.2 billion reais to the Federal Intervention on March 23, 2018 (Gabinete de Intervenção Federal no Rio de Janeiro 2018c, 6). The BRL-USD exchange rates on March 21 and March 25, 2018, were .302249 and .302, respectively (xe 2023).

Nunes addressed the Observatory's autonomy by criticizing its funding sources. He said, "we began to receive criticisms from certain institutions that we know very well are even subsidized by [international] NGOs. That was the case of the Civil Society Observatory" (Nunes, quoted in Castro et al. 2023, 268). He added that, to understand the Observatory's criticisms, it was "sufficient to see the list of donors of that observatory and the opinions that they advanced" (268). He thus insinuated that the Observatory represented the interests of foreign donors instead of Rio de Janeiro. This comment reflects a concern with the institution's autonomy. Foreign financing enabled more autonomy from, and, thus, criticism of the Federal Intervention Cabinet.

Nunes addressed institutional strategy by criticizing the Observatory's original monitoring information and media outreach. He said, "[t]hat observatory ended up being discredited because it did not support the numbers that it had" (Nunes, quoted in Castro et al. 2023, 270). At the start of the Intervention, "[t]he Civil Society Observatory said [...] that we" at the Federal Intervention Cabinet "only were concerned about property crimes because we wanted to curb vehicle and cargo theft. Then, when I released [...] evidence] that vehicle theft is responsible for half of felony murders²¹ [...] no one said anything else [...]" (270). Nunes thus insinuated that the Observatory's strategy was ineffective at understanding crime and violence in Rio de Janeiro and could not compete with the Cabinet's strategy in terms of information.

On the other hand, in answering the interviewers' same question about media coverage and public opinion during the Federal Intervention, Nunes revealed that the Observatory had

²¹ Felony murders (*latrocínios*) are homicides committed during armed robberies.

influenced the Cabinet's communications strategy. What follows is an extensive excerpt in which Nunes illustrates how the Observatory's criticism impacted the Cabinet's activities:

[... T]wo months after the intervention decree [... the Civil Society Observatory created] a document [...] saying: 'The failure of the Intervention.' [...] And I said clearly to the [communications] team: 'Either we lean into this thing and state clearly, [to] the general public, our purposes, our objectives, and the [low-capacity] situation that we found [in Rio de Janeiro's state police], or there will be no way, we are going to end this thing here as the big failures'. [...] I really needed to be incisive and occupy that [media] space [... in a way] that was unusual for a military leader [...] From the initial observation that this was the path forward, we applied a complex communication strategy involving all the actors, with all the outlets and on all the platforms [...] We had no misgiving whatsoever about changing the [Army's usual] stance [...] of staying quiet. The blow that the Civil Society Observatory gave us [...], they must regret it to this day, because that thing woke us up to lean in and not to let that narrative [of failure] be the dominant one. [...] We were very aggressive on communication, indeed, and I think that this was a big differentiator because, if we had [continued what we were doing] at the start of the [I]ntervention, we would have been lost. [... At the start], there already were charges, including from [the Observatory, of the Cabinet's supposedly insufficient planning, resourcing, and procurement ...] So, we dedicated ourselves to [those efforts, too] (Nunes, quoted in Castro et al. 2023, 268-270).

This extensive excerpt suggests that the Federal Intervention Cabinet reacted directly to the Civil Society Observatory's criticisms by developing an unusually proactive communications strategy and by investing more in planning than it otherwise might have. Especially revealing is Nunes' reference to how the Observatory "must regret" its "blow" to the Cabinet, which had galvanized the Army's aggressive communications. An implication is that the Cabinet could have considered the Observatory a peer and competitor within political discourse during the Intervention. The Observatory could have impacted not only worries about how the Intervention could undermine the Army's public image but, also, efforts to mitigate this risk.

During my original research, a military interviewee (#31) spoke further to Gen. Nunes' worries with, and responses to the monitoring coalition. They said that the Intervention "tarnishing the [Army's] image [had been] a threat to the [Army's] prestige." The coalition had raised a "residual, not central, concern" (#31) in this respect. It had caused some unease among Army officers. However, it had not been able to exercise widespread influence. Officers' main worry had been the Army's "extreme level of exposure for the possible lack of results" in reducing crime and violence. What follows is an extensive excerpt in which the interviewee relates this operational reason for legitimacy concerns to Gen. Nunes and the monitoring coalition:

[The Intervention] was a huge [level of] exposure. It had to do with [the possibility of] failure. Social organizations [like ad-hoc monitoring institutions were] part of this because the civilian narrative always was about failure. [They always sought to] question the narrative [of the Intervention. Military officials did not think] that [11] months would solve Rio de Janeiro's insecurity, but the band-aid needed to be effective so that the narrative did not become even more negative. [...] The [Favela for Rights Circuit's final] report had called the Armed Forces' conduct of the Intervention 'fascist'.²² Gen. [Nunes] could not let that slide and [in a meeting with the Public Defender's Office] responded strongly that it was not fascist [and] that the Armed Forces indeed had fought against fascism [with the Allies during World War II]. So, these observatories caused discomfort. However, it was a discomfort that did not generate operational alterations [and was not widespread. ...] There was certain discomfort with NGOs and foreign financing [...] Narrative construction was very important throughout the Intervention. [...] The Civil Society Observatory caused [the most] discomfort because it criticized very heavily. It was a dissonant voice and [...] the military's] perspective was that all of society had to support [the Intervention in a unified way] (#31).

This excerpt further suggests that criticisms from the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit worried the Federal Intervention Cabinet. This worry stemmed from how the

²² The Favelas for Rights Circuit's final report (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018) does not include "fascist", "authoritarian", or "dictator", "dictatorial", or "dictatorship" in reference to the Brazilian Armed Forces. I assume that the interviewee considered the accusation of fascism implicit in the Circuit's final report.

institutions threatened to undermine the Intervention's public support and the Army's image. It also was a product of how these institutions' autonomy, exemplified by their reliance on non-governmental and international funding, made them independent from the Army. The military interviewee (#31) said that such concerns had been limited and had not influenced operations. That the coalition elicited reactions and caused discomfort nonetheless could highlight the intermediate impact of their strategy to collect and publicize original monitoring information.

While revealing less direct impact, Army Gen. Sergio José Pereira's interview with Castro et al. (2023) demonstrated a similar dynamic in regard to the Public Defender's Office's Favelas for Rights Circuit. Pereira was the Federal Intervention Cabinet's Director of Institutional Relations. He was responsible for Cabinet's coordination with civilian institutions. In this capacity, he attempted to discredit the Circuit's strategy of monitoring with original information.

The Favela for Rights circuit's final report (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018a) had informed media coverage of sexual violence practiced by Military Police officers during the Intervention (e.g., Stabile 2018). Pereira described how, in response to such coverage, he had requested that the Public Defender's Office confirm the location of the sexual violence acts so that he could identify and punish the police officers involved (Pereira, in Castro et al. 2023, 240-241). This reaction itself reveals a degree of impact as the Federal Intervention Cabinet sought to respond to critical media coverage stemming from the Circuit's report.

Out of frustration with the Public Defender's Office's response to his request, Pereira tried to discredit the Circuit's report. He specifically criticized its emphasis on collective tutelage to

identify patterns of human rights violations over individual tutelage to identify perpetrators.

What follows is an extensive excerpt that shows Pereira's effort to discredit this strategy:

I asked the [person] from the Public Defender's Office to tell me the location [of the sexual violence acts by police ...] Answer: 'General, that was based on testimonies.' And me: 'But, where is the accusation?' 'No, it is not an accusation, they are testimonies.' [...] It is logical that, to schedule [a visit to *favelas* in order to collect testimonies, the defender needed] to ask permission of the neighborhood association, which requested permission of the [criminal organization that controls the *favela*], and [the defender] interviewed [people who the criminal organization had] authorized. ... [The Public Defender's Office] tabulated all [this information from *favela* residents] and those testimonies became facts. They took all that, produced a report, and put it in [the media ...] disparaging our image around the world. I said: 'In that case, we have no reason to talk [...]. You cannot tell me? Like I said, if you tell me the location and the time [that these acts occurred], I will find the guy, I will find the person responsible. Him: 'No, because it is a testimony.' 'So, there is nothing more to discuss with you all. This way, there is no reason to speak'. They are people who do not understand reality. Or, they want to take advantage or show [their] relevance [...] and do not engage in reality (Pereira, quoted in Castro et al. 2023, 241).

This excerpt suggests impact in three respects. It illustrates how the Favelas for Rights Circuit's final report compelled the Federal Intervention Cabinet to consider investigating human rights violations by police. It reveals how the Cabinet attempted to discredit the Circuit's strategy of original monitoring information through collective tutelage for allegedly relying on criminal organization's approval and lacking the legal weight of criminal accusations. It also underscores how the Cabinet nonetheless viewed the Circuit's report as a threat to the Army's image.

In addition, the excerpt highlights the Federal Intervention Cabinet's concerns with the autonomy of ad-hoc civilian institutions. This autonomy not only had encouraged and enabled the Favelas for Rights Circuit's strategy of gathering original monitoring data through collective tutelage. It also permitted the Circuit to opt out of sharing information about human rights testimonies gathered through collective tutelage with the Cabinet.

Civilian perceptions of officers' legitimacy concerns

Non-military interviews further suggest that ad-hoc civilian institutions contributed to Army officers' legitimacy concerns and, in some instances, compelled the Federal Intervention Cabinet to respond. At the same time, these interviews suggest that institutions' impact on the Army was limited. To examine these civilian perceptions, I identify civilian interviews that reference institutions' impact on the Federal Intervention Cabinet. I then separate these references inductively into categories. I consistently asked interviewees about institutional impact. The categories are mutually inclusive as a single interview can reference multiple impacts. Twenty-nine of 108 (27%) civilian interviewees referenced at least one institution's impact on the Cabinet. I divide these references into four categories.

Ten of these 29 (34%) suggested that institutions had caused discomfort or frustration among Cabinet officials and, in some instances, had caused Cabinet officials to respond by criticizing the institutions either publicly or privately. Nine (31%) suggested that institutions had caused the Cabinet to be more transparent than it otherwise would have been. Seven (24%) suggested that institutions had impacted how the Cabinet went about strengthening police capacity, commanding police and military operations, and assessing its effectiveness. Nine (31%) nonetheless suggested that such influence was limited. Table 16 below summarizes these views.

Table 16: Ad-hoc civilian institutions' impacts on Federal Intervention Cabinet as per non-military interviewees

<i>Category</i>	<i>% of interviewees (n=29)</i>
Discomfort, frustration & criticism	34
Increased transparency	31
Constrained security management	24
Little impact	31

SOURCE: Author's analysis of original interviews with 108 civilians in 2023.

NOTE: I generate the categories inductively. They are mutually inclusive as a single writing or interview can reference multiple categories. The sample includes 29 of 108 (27%) non-military interviewees who referenced at least one ad-hoc civilian institutions' impact on the Federal Intervention Cabinet. I consistently asked interviewees about institutional impact.

Regarding transparency and accountability, a civil society interviewee (#41) mentioned how the Civil Society Observatory's strategy had "obligat[ed] the [Cabinet] to respond to the data. [The Cabinet] responded critically, but [it] was obligated to do so publicly." Another civil society interviewee (#91) similarly said that, owing mainly to the Observatory, the Cabinet

was obligated to make [...] a change in accountability [... in terms] of [reporting] all the [Cabinet's] actions and simply disclosing important information. There clearly was impact because, as civil society collects more information and refutes the Army's information more, the Army must bring more information [to the debate] and must respond about the failures that civil society [is] pinpointing" (#91).

This excerpt illustrates some civilian interviewees' perspective that the Civil Society Observatory compelled the Federal Intervention Cabinet to be more transparent and, thus, more accountable. However, another civil society interviewee (#36) qualified this impact. They said that the monitoring coalition's strategy was "important in terms of accountability. In terms of agenda setting [...] and] the Intervention's actions, they did not have the desired effect." The interviewee implied that fostering transparency had been the limit of institutional impact. Several

other civilian interviewees (#41, 63, 77, 102) said that the Cabinet's overall insularity, uncooperativeness, and lack of transparency had constrained institutions' impact.

Regarding constraints on security management, a civil society interviewee (#64) and a legislative interviewee (#77) described how ad-hoc monitoring initiative had succeeded in convincing the Federal Intervention Cabinet to avoid deploying security operations to a specific area and with a certain display of force, respectively. A civil society interviewee (#12) and a justice sector interviewee (#80) referenced constraints imposed by the Favelas for Rights Circuit, specifically. The justice sector interviewee (#80) said that the Circuit had produced "a deterrent effect, inhibiting [further state] violence." It had done so by traveling to sites of alleged state violence and rights violations, systematizing such violence and violations in its final report, and sharing this report with the Cabinet. However, other civilian interviewees (#52, 60, 70) mentioned institutions' limited advocacy, partnerships, and public security expertise as barriers to impact.

While the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit impacted military officers' legitimacy concerns through contentious informational strategies, some other civilian institutions used more official strategies to encourage the Cabinet's cooperation. A legislative interviewee (#57) described how, by enabling "familiarity" between the parties, a specific legislative institution had encouraged the Cabinet to be more transparent in terms of sharing information. Two legislative interviewees (#45, 65) said that an ad-hoc legislative institution's advocacy had constrained the Cabinet's security management by leading it to adopt certain measures aimed at strengthening police capacity in line with politicians' preferences. Notably, these interviewees

implied an interest in controlling the Cabinet for short-term goals aimed at enhancing security forces' effectiveness instead of controlling the Intervention to achieve demilitarization.

Rival hypothesis 4: Deployment demand

Troop deployments beyond Rio de Janeiro policing were limited during and after the 2018 Federal Intervention. GLO operations had small average budgets compared to those in Rio de Janeiro. Brazil sent much fewer soldiers to international peacekeeping missions during this period than it did to Rio de Janeiro GLO operations around the same time. Brazil's participation in the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, which ended in 2017, had shaped some officers' legitimacy concerns regarding the Intervention to a degree. The extent of this influence was limited, however. These considerations, and the fact that Brazil did not engage in counterinsurgency or inter-state armed conflict, suggest that demand for other deployments could have been insufficient to shape Army officers' legitimacy concerns with Rio de Janeiro policing.

2018-2022 GLO operations beyond Rio de Janeiro

Between February and December 2018, the Brazilian Armed Forces conducted five GLO operations beyond Rio de Janeiro. These troop deployments were unrelated to urban policing for crime and violence reduction. They included state-level and nationwide election support operations in June and October, respectively. They also included responding to a nationwide truck drivers' strike from May to June, providing border security in the northern Roraima state from August to September, and protecting sites for receiving Venezuelan immigrants and refugees in the same state starting October 2018. The latter operation was until March 2019 (Ministério da Defesa 2022b, 10).

Between January 2019 and December 2023, the Armed Forces conducted 10 more GLO operations. They also were unrelated to urban policing and occurred outside Rio de Janeiro. They included three environmental protection deployments, three prison security deployments, two election security deployments, one event security deployment, and one deployment to provide security during a Military Police strike (Ministério da Defesa 2022b, 11).

Several measures suggest that these 15 other GLO operations between February 2018 and December 2023 are unlikely to have influenced military officials' legitimacy concerns regarding the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro and/or GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro. One is that the average cost of these 15 other GLO operations was less than half the cost of Operation Rio de Janeiro between July 2017 and December 2018, which overlapped with the Intervention (Ministério da Defesa 2023, 4-6). Implications are that Rio de Janeiro policing deployments could have been considerably more important for the Army and that legitimacy concerns with such deployments potentially were separate from troop deployments in other domains and states.

An additional measure is that, during my original research, no interviewees mentioned these other GLO operations when discussing the Federal Intervention. A media interviewee (#7) and a civil society interviewee (#14) suggested that, during the 2019-2022 Bolsonaro administration, civil society activism and national politics had shifted attention to Amazon deforestation. However, they did not mention this shift with respect to GLO operations. A government interviewee (#79) suggested that the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro had established a precedent for subsequent federal interventions elsewhere in Brazil, including Roraima.

However, the Roraima intervention stemmed mainly from a state financial crisis, had a civilian leader, was not limited to public security, and did not involve military policing (Folha BV 2022).

2018-2022 peacekeeping deployments

Brazilian soldiers' participation in United Nations peacekeeping was limited during and after the Intervention. Brazil's average monthly contribution of soldiers to United Nations peacekeeping missions decreased from 236 in 2018 to nine in 2021 (International Peace Institute 2023). In contrast, Operation Carioca in Rio de Janeiro during one week in February 2017 had involved a deployment of 4,268 soldiers (Ministério da Defesa 2023, 3). An implication is that peacekeeping was minimal compared to Rio de Janeiro deployments. As such, peacekeeping was unlikely to impact Army officers' legitimacy concerns with Rio de Janeiro GLOs operations.

The combination of Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro and GLO operations in Roraima precluded the participation of 900 Brazilian soldiers in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. This cancellation conceivably could have affected Army officers' perceptions of the Intervention negatively if demand for the Central African Republic mission had been high. Due to the mission's considerable risks, however, senior Army officials had come to oppose this peacekeeping deployment even before the Intervention began (Victor and Alencastro 2018). It therefore is unlikely that this cancelled deployment affected officers' legitimacy concerns during and after the Intervention.

If peacekeeping had shaped Army officers' legitimacy concerns with Rio de Janeiro deployments, it would have been due to Haiti. Between June 2004 and August 2017, Brazil had

contributed 1,549 soldiers to United Nations peacekeeping missions on the average month (International Peace Institute 2023). This period included the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, of which Brazil had led the military component. As the Haiti mission concluded, the number of soldiers on peacekeeping deployments decreased by 465% between August 2017 and the Intervention's start of February 2018 (International Peace Institute 2023).

The Armed Forces' experience in Haiti had informed military officers' legitimacy concerns regarding the Rio de Janeiro GLO operations for legal and societal reasons. Officers considered legal constraints upon GLO operations excessive relative to constraints on the Haiti mission. They worried that Rio de Janeiro deployments therefore would be less effective (Harig 2019).

A military interviewee (#18) described such worries as pertaining to "the rules of engagement. One thing is Haiti, but [in Rio de Janeiro] the [average] citizen has the press and has a camera [wherever you go] and everything goes onto social media immediately." They implied that, because community activism and media coverage were greater in Rio de Janeiro than in Haiti, officers wanted additional legal safeguards in order to carry out the troop deployment with a similar degree of effectiveness (and impunity) as the peacekeeping mission.

In my sample of 50 junior/mid-level Army officer writings between 2018 and 2021 about Rio de Janeiro troop deployments, only one (2%) text referenced the Haiti peacekeeping mission when expressing legitimacy concerns with the Intervention. The fact that few officers associated their legitimacy concerns directly with Haiti further suggests that this previous deployment is unlikely to have shaped officers' worries about the Federal Intervention considerably.

Coronel Renato Vaz (2019, 45) echoed the above military interviewee's (#18) perspective in describing how Haiti had informed officers' worries about the Federal Intervention. Reflecting legal reasons for legitimacy concerns, this author attributed their worries to the greater risk that human rights violations by soldiers be publicized by the media during the Intervention:

[Soldiers'] almost total exposure to the media, with live feeds, was exploited a lot during the Federal Intervention because Brazilian institutions continued to function and the purchasing power of the population and the media is much greater, more significant, and more constant [in Rio de Janeiro] than in Haiti. During the [United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti], in light of the population's extreme poverty, it was uncommon [...] to see people filming or photographing operations. The environment was much more controlled by the troops in Haiti. [It was] different in Rio de Janeiro, where even teenagers and kids filmed and photographed soldiers' every step (Vaz 2019, 45).

This excerpt suggests that the Haiti peacekeeping mission informed Army officers' legitimacy concerns with the Federal Intervention for societal reasons. The greater likelihood that civilians would record and share information about human rights violations in Rio de Janeiro than in Haiti reflected a worry with how political discourse, shaped by critical media coverage, could undermine the troop deployment's public support and the Army's public image. Nevertheless, the fact that few officers associated the Haiti mission with their legitimacy concerns regarding the Intervention illustrates the potentially limited influence of this other deployment type.

Summary

This chapter has used original interview data, interview data from Castro et al. (2023), and an original dataset of Army officers' writings to suggest that autonomy could have shaped ad-hoc civilian institutions' intermediate impacts on officers' concerns with the legitimacy of Rio de

Janeiro troop deployments. More autonomous institutions, their strategy, and their initial impact on political discourse figured more prominently into officers' worries. Officers feared that political discourse around the 2018 Federal intervention, informed by the Civil Society Observatory and Favela for Rights Circuit's strategy of using original monitoring information to shape critical media coverage, would undermine the deployment's public support and the Army's image. Full autonomy could have been necessary for institutions to influence legitimacy concerns. In comparison, other troop deployments were limited and potentially had little influence on officers' perceptions of Rio de Janeiro policing during and after the Intervention.

These findings lend support to this dissertation's theory about the *autonomy paradox*. They suggest that autonomy could contribute not only to civilian control institutions' formation, strategy, and initial impact on political discourse. Autonomy also could contribute, by extension, to military officials' perceptions of the degree to which policing deployments are legitimate. Insofar as concurrent deployments for missions like border security and peacekeeping shape these perceptions, they potentially do so much less than institutions do.

These findings also raise questions about the relationship between civilian control institutions' impact on Army officers' legitimacy concerns and their influence on militarization. To what extent do these legitimacy concerns lead militarization's principal and agents to demilitarize law enforcement? What other factors might explain the continuation of troop deployment and change in police violence? The next chapter will examine these questions.

Chapter 7: Institutional impact (ultimate)

The ultimate impact that civilian control institutions could achieve is law enforcement demilitarization. During a militarization episode, this ultimate impact could manifest in the end of the troop deployment and the decrease or stability of police violence during this deployment. After a militarization episode, this ultimate impact could entail the discontinuation of troop deployments for a considerable (although temporary) period and the sustained reduction of police violence. The more that institutions contribute to ending militarization as both an episode and a practice, the more that they could achieve this ultimate impact.

Civilian control institutions effectively could have little impact on demilitarization. Their intermediate impact might lead military officials to lobby the executive against sustaining the troop deployment. The executive could have the ultimate decision, however, given that Latin American presidents have extensive authority over the armed forces compared with civilians outside the principal-agent relationship. The executive who initiates the troop deployment is unlikely to end it because they benefit electorally from having soldiers on the streets. They risk appearing ineffectual if they terminate their own policy before it has reduced crime and violence, which it is unlikely to do. The subsequent executive could have interests, options, and preferences that diverge from those of their predecessor, possibly leading to policy change regarding troop deployments. *Principal prerogative* therefore could be what most determines when the deployment's path dependence ends so that soldiers return to the barracks.

Meanwhile, military presence could influence police violence during the troop deployment more than officials' legitimacy concerns do. When the military deploys in command of, rather than

alongside or in place of police, soldiers are unlikely to bear the cost of extrajudicial killings. The military delegates violence to the police. The executive and police consider such killings more legitimate. As police violence increases, the executive considers troop deployment less necessary. Police violence, in this way, could substitute for troop deployment.

Principal prerogative and military presence thus could be two additional factors that explain the end of troop deployment more than civilian control institutions do. Insofar as institutions are relevant in curtailing militarization episodes notwithstanding *principal prerogative* and military presence, it is due to the *autonomy paradox*. More autonomous institutions potentially have less access to militarization's principal and agents for socialization.

Without socialization, military officials could have some legitimacy concerns with troop deployment but continue to consider police violence appropriate and effective. The very autonomy that could enable institutions' initial and intermediate impacts potentially prevents them from consolidating these achievements into an ultimate impact toward demilitarization. The first hypothesis is that autonomy thus could limit institutions' ultimate impact on militarization as an episode by hampering socialization.

Autonomy nonetheless could contribute to institutions' ultimate impact on militarization as a practice by providing repertoires and lessons for subsequent civilian control efforts. The strategy of collecting original monitoring information, the initial impact of using this information to shape critical media coverage, and the intermediate impact of influencing officials' legitimacy concerns serve as models for future institutions that attempt to reduce police violence.

The *autonomy paradox* also could offer a lesson on the need to combine contestation of, and collaboration with militarization's principal and agent for socialization and, ultimately, demilitarization purposes. The second hypothesis is that autonomy therefore could contribute to civilian control institutions' ultimate impact by providing repertoires and lessons for future attempts at controlling militarization as a practice.

Regarding additional factors, this theory's observable implications are that both military lobbying and a shift in the executive's interests and preferences should correspond with the end of the troop deployment. Individuals understand this end as a product of the latter more than the former. Military presence in command of, rather than alongside or in place of police historically corresponds with more violence during troop deployment. Individuals understand police violence as a product of substitution, with the military delegating extrajudicial killings to avoid sanction.

Regarding the hypotheses, this theory's observable implications are that more autonomous civilian control institutions could have less access to militarization's principal and agents. Individuals understand this comparatively limited access as hampering institutions' impact on the troop deployment and police violence. More autonomous institutions also have more continuity in the form of post-deployment efforts to reduce police violence. These efforts use a similar strategy and pursue similar initial and intermediate impacts as the institutions did. They also engage with militarization's principal and agents more than institutions did. Individuals understand this difference as a product of how autonomy enabled institutions' strategy and initial and intermediate impacts while constraining ultimate impact on the deployment.

The more that these observable implications hold during the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, the more that we should see the following. First, legitimacy concerns led Army officers to lobby presidents Temer and Bolsonaro against sustaining the Intervention and Rio de Janeiro GLO operations. Individuals understood such discontinuation more as a product of Bolsonaro's political incentives than a product of military lobbying. Second, prior GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro saw the military conducting *favela* incursions alongside, or in place of police while GLO operations during the Intervention saw the military directing the police's *favela* incursions at a distance. Individuals viewed increased police violence in 2018 as a product of this distinction.

Third, we should see that the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit had limited engagements with the Temer administration, Brazilian Army, Federal Intervention Cabinet, and Rio de Janeiro state police during the Intervention. Other ad-hoc civilian institutions met more frequently and constructively with these actors. Individuals understood the monitoring coalition's minimal impact on troop deployment and police violence as a product of these two institutions' limited access, of which such engagements are reflective.

Fourth, nascent efforts to reduce police violence after the Intervention stemmed more from the Observatory and Circuit than they did from other ad-hoc civilian institutions. These efforts focused on gathering original monitoring data, shaping media coverage, and collaborating strategically with state executives and police. Individuals understood these efforts as continuations of the Observatory and Circuit. They also viewed such efforts as attempts to avoid the monitoring coalition's problem of having insufficient access for socialization purposes.

Indeed, my findings seem to support these observable implications. The military lobbied Bolsonaro against sustaining Rio de Janeiro troop deployments, yet military interviewees attributed this decision more to Bolsonaro's interests and preferences. Military interviewees suggested that police violence was appropriate and effective while the Federal Intervention Cabinet sought to minimize the risk that soldiers carry out, and be accountable for extrajudicial killings. Several examples suggest that, when GLO operations involved soldiers alongside police, extrajudicial killings were fewer than when police alone conducted *favela* incursions.

Ad-hoc civilian institutions potentially had little influence over Bolsonaro's decision to discontinue deployments or the Cabinet's decision to designate extrajudicial killings to the police. Civil Society Observatory's and Favelas for Rights Circuit's autonomy limited their access to the Cabinet and, thus, to police. These more autonomous institutions nonetheless had broad legacies. They helped lay the organizational foundation for a 2020 court case that reduced police violence temporarily. The Observatory also laid the methodological and organizational foundation for a multi-state monitoring consortium after the Intervention. Relative to the Observatory and Circuit, less autonomous institutions had more access and fewer tangible legacies. Full autonomy could have been necessary for institutions to have these broad legacies.

This chapter will proceed as follows. It will begin with additional factors. The chapter will discuss how *principal prerogative* could have contributed to Rio de Janeiro troop deployments' discontinuation. It also will discuss how the nature of military presence possibly contributed to increased police violence during the Federal Intervention. Next, the chapter will discuss the

hypotheses. It will provide evidence that autonomy potentially limited institutions' ultimate impact on militarization as an episode during the Intervention. Then, before concluding, it will discuss impact on militarization as a practice. The chapter will conclude with a summary.

Factor 5.1: Principal prerogative

To examine civilian control institutions' ultimate impact on militarization as an episode compared with additional factors like executives' interests and preferences, my first step is to identify military officers' explanations of Rio de Janeiro troop deployments' discontinuation after 2018. I use two data sources. Castro et al. (2023) asked eight military interviewees about decisions not to extend the Federal Intervention and/or Rio de Janeiro GLO operations after 2018. Their interviewees included seven Army generals and one Marine Corps admiral, all of whom were on active duty when the Intervention occurred in 2018. I also asked seven military interviewees about such decisions. Some of my interviewees were military officers who, in 2018, had mid/senior-level ranks and were on active duty.

Both Castro et al. (2023) and I conducted semi-structured interviews. A difference is that mine were confidential. This difference limits the interview samples' comparability. Because they are unique data sources with no overlap, I nonetheless compare my interviews with those of Castro et al. (2023) briefly in this section.

My second step is to categorize interviewees' explanations of troop deployments' discontinuation. To trace the impact of ad-hoc civilian institutions' strategy, I use the same categories of legal, operational, and societal reasons from my analysis of legitimacy concerns

(Table 15). The categories are inductive and mutually inclusive. A single interviewee can reference multiple explanations for the discontinuation of Rio de Janeiro troop deployments. I also include a category for other explanations that do not coincide with the three reasons.

Among the eight military officials interviewed by Castro et al. (2023), two (25%) offered legal explanations, three (38%) cited operational explanations, none (0%) mentioned societal explanations, and five (63%) referenced other explanations such as executive turnover, political rivalries, and increased police capacity. Among the seven military interviewees from my original research, none (0%) mentioned legal explanations, three (43%) referenced operational explanations, none (0%) cited societal explanations, and six (86%) gave other explanations.

Table 17 below summarizes this distribution of interviewees' explanations.

<i>Category</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>% of interviews</i>		
		<i>Interviews by</i>	<i>Interviews by</i>	<i>Total</i>
		<i>Castro et al. (2023)</i>	<i>Littlefield (2024)</i>	
		<i>2021-2022 (n=8)</i>	<i>2023 (n=7)</i>	<i>2021-2023 (n=15)</i>
Legal	Missions' overly complex and restrictive rules of engagement, the possibility that soldiers will face punishment for self-defense actions and potential abuses, and Army's constrained authority due to the Temer administration's decision not to restrict civil liberties to a greater degree	25	0	13
Operational	The Army's diversion from its conventional nation defense mission, soldiers' insufficient preparation for urban policing, and Army policing's limited impact on crime and violence levels	38	43	40

Societal	Limited public support for the Army's policing mission and the consequent risk to the Army's public image	0	0	0
Other	Political leadership changes and rivalries, as well as increased police capacity due to the Federal Intervention	63	86	73

SOURCE: Author's analysis of interviews with senior military officers by Castro et al. (2023) and of original interviews conducted for this dissertation. The Castro et al. (2023) sample includes only interviews that asked about why Rio de Janeiro troop deployments had ended.

NOTE: I generate the categories inductively. The categories are mutually inclusive as one interviewee can provide explanations within multiple categories. Castro et al. (2023) interviews include seven Army generals and one Marine Corps admiral, all of whom were on active duty when the Federal Intervention occurred in 2018. My interviews include some military officers who, in 2018, had mid/senior-level ranks and were on active duty.

Eleven of 15 (73%) military interviewees in this sample attributed the discontinuation of Rio de Janeiro troop deployments to a combination of political leadership changes and rivalries, possibly testifying to the importance of *principal prerogative*. Police capacity improvements, in their mind, also shaped new leaders' incentives. They included five of eight (63%) senior officers interviewed by Castro et al. (2023) and six of seven (86%) military interviewees from my original research. These explanations reflect *principal prerogative* as the October 2018 introduced change in the national president and Rio de Janeiro state governor. New executives' interpersonal rivalries and preferences against inheriting predecessors' policies disincentivized sustaining troop deployments. Their preferences also were a product of military lobbying, which stemmed from legal and operational considerations over societal considerations.

Election of Bolsonaro and Witzel

During my original research, several military interviewees (#9, 18, 28, 83, 84) said that change in the national and Rio de Janeiro executives was a main factor in the discontinuation of Rio de Janeiro troop deployments after 2018. This electoral turnover made incoming executives' policy preferences especially consequential for deployments' continuity. They stressed how Brazilian

law prohibits constitutional amendments while federal interventions are underway. They also emphasized how president-elect Bolsonaro and Rio de Janeiro governor-elect Wilson Witzel, both of whom took office one day after the Federal Intervention ended on December 31, 2018, likely opposed the idea of inheriting their predecessors' security policies.

A military interviewee (#28) said that the Federal Intervention had ended because “it was an election year and the new governor should assume [leadership of] the entire state” rather than have the Army continue to command Rio de Janeiro state police. “Even with the public support and the [positive impact] of the Intervention” in reducing crime and violence”, they added, “the new governor decides.” Another military interviewee (#84) said that the “main reason” for ending the Intervention had been how “the governments were changing and governor-elect Witzel would not want to assume [leadership of] the state” without controlling state police.

A military interviewee (#9) stressed how federal interventions preclude constitutional amendments that Bolsonaro likely wanted to pursue upon entering office. Another military interviewee (#18) suggested that the 2018 Federal Intervention's end had resulted from “politics and the Temer question in regard to pension reform.” Temer had failed to secure legislative support for this, his main policy platform. Of 51 newspaper articles that criticized the Federal Intervention due to Temer's political motivations, 29 (57%) referenced how Temer's inability to secure support for pension reform reportedly had led him to decree the Intervention. Temer had decreed the Intervention, in this perspective, partially to distract from his failure on pension reform and to generate alternative public support in anticipation of a potential October 2018 reelection bid (e.g., Peron 2018; Pupo et al. 2018; Rosa 2018).

Bolsonaro also had prioritized pension reform upon assuming the presidency (Alegretti and Veras Mota 2019). A military interviewee (#84) said that, despite the incoming national executive's hardline pro-military and tough-on-crime stance, "not even President Bolsonaro would want to [take office] with a federal intervention [underway]." This dynamic would produce "bureaucratic problems as there cannot be constitutional amendments."

Several military interviewees (#83, 84) added that the Federal Intervention Cabinet's efforts to strengthen police capacity had rendered it unnecessary for Witzel to request continued troop deployments. One military interviewee (#84) said that troop deployments often result from governors' requests. As such, the decision to curtail Rio de Janeiro GLO operations likely stemmed from how "the police increased their capacity [through] the Intervention in terms of equipment [and] training, so the state had no more need" for the Armed Forces' support.

A civil society interviewee (#23) further emphasized this relationship between the Federal Intervention's effectiveness and the new leaders' incentives to sustain troop deployments. They said that "extending GLO operations would have been a demoralization for the [incoming] Bolsonaro government." Bolsonaro and his military allies had presented the Armed Forces as Brazil's main hope for solving national crises. Sustaining troop deployments would have been tantamount to admitting that the Intervention and, by extension, the Army had failed.

Rivalry between Bolsonaro and Witzel

Another military interviewee (#83) said that the Bolsonaro-Witzel rivalry also had contributed to the curtailing of Rio de Janeiro troop deployments, illustrating how changes around executive interests with electoral turnover could have contributed to militarization's continuity. Reportedly, with the presidential and gubernatorial leadership changes, "there was no reason to continue" Rio de Janeiro troop deployments. "[I]n political terms, [such deployments] demonstrate governors' weakness due to being unable to deal with their responsibilities and needing federal support." They added that, after the Federal Intervention, "in theory there were no more [police] needs because the [materiel] acquisitions already had been delivered." Furthermore, military "operations ended because the governor is [the one] who requests [federal] support."

Witzel, as governor elect, had wanted to extend the military's GLO operations (Alves 2018). However, a reported rivalry with Bolsonaro (Bernardes 2020) possibly made Witzel less inclined to request Bolsonaro's cooperation and Bolsonaro less likely to provide such cooperation if requested. Indeed, a military interviewee (#18) said about the discontinuation of Rio de Janeiro GLO operations after 2018, "Bolsonaro attacked his rivals a lot. He did not want to empower any [governor to be a] hero of GLO operations, which give media [attention] to [...] actors [other than the president]. The Bolsonaro administration did not want to give prestige to anyone."

Senior military officers interviewed by Castro et al. (2023) further suggested that federal-state tensions had accounted for the discontinuation of Rio de Janeiro troop deployments after 2018. Army Gen. Sérgio Etchegoyen had led Temer's Institutional Security Cabinet in 2018. He told

Castro et al. (2023, 211) that Bolsonaro's contentious, polarizing governance style had reduced federal-state cooperation and made governors less inclined to request troop deployments:

There is a decoupling of the federal government with the state governments [under Bolsonaro]. A GLO needs to be requested by the state government. [... Nowadays] you cannot find two groups disposed to identify [policy] convergences [...] President Bolsonaro chose the politics of permanent conflict [...] Some people fell into the trap and accepted it, others did not. [...] So, I think that this politics of permanent conflict, a need to be against everything, or to fight with everyone, ... [m]aybe this has reduced the number of GLO requests [from governors. ...] The criminality problem has not been solved, the police problem has not improved ... maybe it is a [matter of politics] (Etchegoyen, quoted in Castro et al. 2023, 211).

This excerpt suggests the view that Rio de Janeiro troop deployments' discontinuation stems not from local security dynamics. Rather, it is a product of national political dynamics like federal-state tensions and president-governor rivalries. Army Gen. Walter Braga Netto, who had led the Federal Intervention Cabinet, similarly told Castro et al. (2023, 224) that troop deployments' discontinuation had stemmed from how "the political situation is changing. [If I am a governor, a]m I going to declare that I am incapable [of handling my state's security in this new environment]?" (Braga Netto, quoted in Castro et al. 2023, 224).

Such views imply that Army officers' perceptions of troop deployments' public support and of deployments' implications for the Army's image possibly had little influence on Bolsonaro's decision. Bolsonaro's aggressive style, which centered conflict between the federal and state governments, could have led him to discontinue deployments independent of military lobbying.

Army Gen. Sergio José Pereira, the Federal Intervention Cabinet's Director of Institutional Relations, said that troop deployments' discontinuation had been Witzel's decision. Perhaps

informed by rivalry with Bolsonaro, Witzel had opted against adopting long-term policing plans that the Cabinet had developed for Rio de Janeiro. This was despite how Witzel had benefitted politically from the Intervention's legacy of increased police capacity. "It became very difficult", Pereira said, "for the governor of our main GLO client, Rio de Janeiro, to justify a GLO request" (Pereira, quoted in Castro et al. 2023, 237) under these conditions.

A military interviewee (#31) during my original research also mentioned Witzel's decision to "throw [the Federal Intervention Cabinet's plans] in the garbage." They said that this decision had "caused a lot of irritation" among Army officers, who thought that Witzel had done so for political reasons. In officers' view, Witzel's decision reflected and reinforced how the discontinuation of Rio de Janeiro troop deployments had resulted from political instead of security considerations. Without Witzel, Rio de Janeiro deployments could have continued.

Military lobbying against troop deployment

During my original research, several military interviewees (#31, 109) emphasized military lobbying of the Bolsonaro administration against Rio de Janeiro troop deployments for operational instead of societal reasons. These interviews suggest that Bolsonaro's decision to discontinue such deployments could have stemmed partially from the military's legitimacy concerns. However, these legitimacy concerns mainly had legal and operational reasons over societal reasons. Lobbying therefore reflected limited influence of ad-hoc civilian institutions.

A military interviewee (#31) said, "the Army does not like GLOs and, with the election of Bolsonaro, that message was given more directly. The Army does not like GLOs and is not

trained for this. Therefore, there were none in the Bolsonaro government.” The interviewee dismissed the influence of ad-hoc civilian institutions and societal reasons on this lobbying. Regarding some senior officers’ views that the Federal Intervention would be a model, another military interviewee (#109) similarly said that the Army’s operational concerns had informed Bolsonaro’s decision to discontinue Rio de Janeiro troop deployments:

[That the Intervention] would be a model for other states never was the Army’s opinion. [The Army] always understood that that it was a risky and extraordinary measure and that it was not the solution for anything. [... The Army] never understood it as a model. [... The Army] fulfilled [its] mission because [civilian leaders] gave [it] an order, but [Army officers] never saw [the Intervention] as a definitive solution that should be exported. [... Policing is not the Army’s] primary constitutional role. [...] The Army was never clearly in favor of GLO operations. [... Army officers] do not like this activity because it distracts from [their] main task [of national defense. ...] Bolsonaro, due to the close relationship that he had with military leaders and due to his experience [as an Army captain], perceived that it was not something that [the Army] liked [...] so there was no need [for continued deployments to Rio de Janeiro. ...] That is why there were no more [GLO] operations. It had nothing to do with the success [of the Intervention] or the opinions [of people other than Bolsonaro and Army officers] (#109).

This excerpt further suggests that Army officers’ legitimacy concerns for operational reasons informed Bolsonaro’s decision to discontinue Rio de Janeiro troop deployments. That Bolsonaro had a strong affinity for the Army enabled this influence. The excerpt also underscores how such concerns possibly were independent of actors outside the executive-military relationship.

In a 2022 interview with Castro et al. (2023), Army Gen. Fernando Azevedo e Silva, who had led the Army General Staff from 2016 to 2018, reiterated this emphasis on military lobbying by stressing Bolsonaro’s sensitivity to the Army’s concerns. “The current [Bolsonaro] government,” he said, “has in mind not to devalue the Armed Forces [...] in terms of GLO [operations. Bolsonaro] thinks that the [...] states and municipalities need to exhaust their means” of

providing public security before they can request troop deployment. Public security “is not a principal mission” (Azevedo e Silva, quoted in Castro et al. 2023, 320) of the Armed Forces.

These interviews from my original research and from Castro et al. (2023) align with a 2019 media account. This account implied that Bolsonaro had discontinued Rio de Janeiro troop deployments mainly due to military lobbying, which itself had resulted from senior Army officers’ legitimacy concerns. Such concerns had legal, operational, and societal foundations:

After fulfilling prolonged missions in Rio de Janeiro between 2017 and 2018, members of the Armed Forces’ leadership wants to avoid troops being used in new GLO missions. [...] During this period, the [Rio de Janeiro] state police [...] returned to having an active posture and conducting operations. This contributed to increasing confrontations with criminal organizations and increased by 35% the number of [police killings ...] drawing criticism from human rights activists. Confrontations with criminal groups also made soldiers become targets of judicial processes [for human rights violations] and caused five deaths of Army members, something unprecedented in that type of mission. [...] This scenario made military officials turn even more against GLO [operations] unless [policy] changes that give them more [legal] protections are implemented. Another change desired by [military officials] is greater freedom of action on the streets, according to two officials connected with the Army High Command. According to a high-ranking member of the Ministry of Defense, the Bolsonaro government is in favor of legal changes but does not yet intend to authorize new GLO operations (Kawaguti 2019).

This excerpt further suggests that legitimacy concerns shaped military officers’ decision to lobby Bolsonaro against sustaining Rio de Janeiro troop deployments. That criticisms from human rights activists contributed to such concerns testifies to the monitoring coalition’s potential influence. The excerpt nonetheless stresses legal and operational over societal explanations of Rio de Janeiro deployments’ discontinuation. It does so by emphasizing soldiers’ deaths, as well as judicial constraints and consequences. An interpretation of this media account is that “the military’s leadership succeeded in lobbying [Bolsonaro] against public security missions unless

they were given [more] legal guarantees” (Harig 2021, 475). Military leaders’ unprecedented influence in Bolsonaro administration (473-477) enabled such lobbying.²³

Factor 5.2: Military presence

Ad-hoc civilian institutions could have had little influence on extrajudicial killings partially because of their limited access to police officers. There was a possibility of socialization as legitimacy concerns with extrajudicial killings existed within the state police. However, the Federal Intervention Cabinet mediated institutions’ access to police. Army officers could have considered police violence a legitimate substitute for military participation in extrajudicial killings. Without access to either Army or police officers, institutions could have had little opportunity to shape legitimacy concerns further and to convince the security forces that extrajudicial killings were inappropriate and ineffective.

Police officers’ legitimacy concerns

Before and after the 2018 Federal Intervention, some Rio de Janeiro state police officers apparently had legitimacy concerns around extrajudicial killings and *favela* incursions. Although there is limited data available on police perceptions, such concerns seemingly tended to stem from an alternative vision of community- and rights-based policing. If they had access to such

²³ In my original research, interviewees did not reference the judicial procedures mentioned in the above media account. A civil society interviewee (#23) and a government interviewee (#27) suggested that unprecedented deaths of soldiers had informed the Army’s decisions to discontinue patrols in the Vila Kennedy *favela*, which the Federal Intervention Cabinet initially had prioritized. They also suggested that such deaths had made Army leaders realize the risks of Rio de Janeiro deployments. However, they did not mention legal repercussions.

officers, ad-hoc civilian institutions conceivably could have socialized them into acting upon these concerns in order to reduce extrajudicial killings.

Before the Intervention, some police officers apparently had worried about the legitimacy of a public security model that centered on extrajudicial killings. A 2014 survey found that, consistent with police views in Brazil overall (Lima et al. 2014, 41), 88% of Military Police and 87% of Civil Police in Rio de Janeiro agreed either fully or partially with the idea of “[r]eorienting the Military Police’s focus toward protection of citizenship rights” (53). A 2015 study by the Civil Society Observatory’s parent organization, the Center for Security and Citizenship Studies (Musumeci Mourão 2015, 9), found via interviews that “the image that police officers themselves have of [their] corporation seems to have been affected” positively by community policing work. This alternative “represent[ed] a pathway of change in the Military Police’s *modus operandi*” of “military, or adversarial, logic” centered on *favela* incursions.

During and after the Intervention, concerns with extrajudicial killings among some police officers apparently persisted. A critical newspaper article in 2018 cited an anonymous Military Police colonel saying of the Intervention, “the solutions continue being the same: more people; more patrol cars; *favela* incursions. That does not solve” (Barbon 2018c) Rio de Janeiro’s crime and violence challenges. Military Police Sergeant Ivan Carvalho Ramos Júnior wrote in one of his agency’s journals that, to uproot “a militarized, hierarchical mentality, ingrained in the worldview of [...] officers”, “specific training [...] for [...] effective insertion into the community” (Ramos Júnior 2022, 320-321) was necessary. It must go “beyond [...] body searches and confrontation tactics” to capture “how to coexist empathetically and in dialogue” (320).

Furthermore, during my original research in 2023, a police officer wrote via confidential e-mail²⁴ that the Federal Intervention had been “an eminently political act.” They added that the Intervention’s impact on policing had been limited to “the application of resources for the purchase and repair of equipment.” They concluded that the Intervention did not “bring more lasting effects for the police and, consequently, for Rio de Janeiro state’s public security.”

Ad-hoc civilian institutions’ limited access to police

Civilians could have had little access to police for socialization purposes. The police’s political power and distrust of autonomous institutions had hampered civilian access before the Intervention. The Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Public Security and the State Public Security Council nonetheless had been official channels through which civilians could exercise a modicum of influence on policing. By placing the former agency under the Army’s authority, the Intervention constrained a key potential channel for socialization. When he effectively eliminated the Council after the Federal Intervention, Governor Witzel did the same.

Several interviewees (#100, 101, 107) suggested that civilians could have struggled to socialize police against extrajudicial killings irrespective of the Intervention. A civil society interviewee (#107) attributed this difficulty to the “judicial autonomy of police.” Because they faced few consequences for extrajudicial killings, police officers had few incentives to attempt to legitimize their violence through openness to civil society. Indeed, a government interviewee (#100)

²⁴ The police officer agreed to participate in a confidential interview but preferred to receive and respond to questions in writing. I do not include this e-mail exchange in the dissertation’s interview count.

implied that Rio de Janeiro state police are more hesitant to engage with more autonomous civil society organizations because of “a concern with [these organizations’ credibility]” and “dubious interests”. The interviewee said that some police officers “want to avoid being exposed at [the] democratic meetings” of civil society organizations due to the risk of being “criticized”, “questioned”, and put “in an uncomfortable situation.”

A civil society interviewee (#101) added that, partially due to worries regarding their own autonomy, police officers had been concerned with collaboration between an ad-hoc civilian institution and a civil society organization that itself was collaborating with state police. Officers feared that the ad-hoc institution might interpret the organization as speaking for the police, which had decided not to engage with the institution. They also feared that the ad-hoc institution’s parent organization would try to establish similar collaborations elsewhere. These could compete with the state police’s own partnerships for leadership in the accountability politics of public security, potentially constraining the police’s independence.

The Army’s authority through the Intervention could have compounded civilians’ struggles with trying to access and socialize police officers. The main example was the Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Public Security, which reported to the governor and was responsible for strategic coordination of the rivalrous Civil and Military Police. A civil society interviewee (#107) said that, before the Intervention, this agency had contributed to a modicum of civilian control.

The Secretariat’s control had been insufficient. Other state agencies were unwilling and unable to constrain the police, which had strong veto power over state policy. Nonetheless, several civil

society interviewees (#40, 45, 101) described the Secretariat as a channel through which civilians had exercised some influence. One civil society interviewee (#40) said that it had been one of the main “spaces for civil society to participate in formulating public security policies” (#101).

These interviewees (#45, 101, 107) suggested that, by placing the State Secretariat of Public Security under the Army’s authority, the Intervention constrained this opportunity for civilians outside the government to influence policing. Gen. Nunes, the Federal Intervention Cabinet’s second most prominent representative, assumed command of the Secretariat. Civilians now needed Nunes’ approval to socialize the police into considering extrajudicial killings illegitimate.

Interviewees (#40, 45, 100) similarly described how the State Public Security Council had been a channel for civilians to influence policing to some extent. This was a consultative and deliberative agency comprised of civil society, government, and police representatives. A civil society interviewee (#45) said that, during the Intervention, one of the Civil Society Observatory’s consortium partners had used the Council “for processes of systematizing information”, “lodging complaints”, “promoting accountability for violations”, and “demanding that the investigation into the [Marielle Franco] assassination advance.”

A government interviewee (#100) suggested that the Federal Intervention Cabinet’s Gen. Nunes even had been more responsive to civilian demands in the Council than previous State Secretaries of Public Security had been. Although it did not have direct participation of ad-hoc civilian institutions, the Council was a main official channel for such access. A civil society interviewee (#40) said that, when Governor Witzel placed the Council under police authority,

“the channels of coordination with civil society [were] broken.” These interviewees saw Witzel’s 2019 decision as a logical extension of the Intervention’s restriction of opportunities for civilians outside the executive branch to influence policing.

Federal Intervention Cabinet’s support for police violence

By placing the State Secretariat of Public Security under the Army’s authority, the Intervention not only restricted civilians’ opportunities to socialize police against extrajudicial killings. It also subordinated the police to a new agency, the Federal Intervention Cabinet, that considered extrajudicial killings legitimate. Army officers could have perceived police violence as an appropriate and effective substitute for military presence, which, partially due to ad-hoc civilian institutions’ strategy and preliminary impacts, had become more costly.

Several military interviewees (#71, 84, 109) suggested that the Federal Intervention Cabinet had considered police violence a legitimate replacement for military participation in *favela* incursions. A military interviewee (#109) said that, while Rio de Janeiro state police sometimes “go too far [...] that world is difficult” due to the threat that police officers face from criminal organizations. They said that these police “have a very different reality. It is not easy [...] to understand the reasons for eventual excesses because it is such a different reality, such an extreme world that it is like its own type of war.” By framing Rio de Janeiro as “war” and relativizing killings, they implied that Army officers did not see police violence as inappropriate.

Another military interviewee (#84) suggested that the Federal Intervention Cabinet had considered increased killings a reflection of intensified police presence in *favelas* and,

accordingly, a measure of the Intervention's effectiveness. The Cabinet initially had been concerned with police violence from a "strategic communication" perspective, the interviewee said. This was because Rio de Janeiro state's Public Security Institute historically had labelled police killings as 'homicide[s] from police intervention.' The Cabinet changed this statistical categorization to "deaths from police intervention" in order to avoid the implicit presumption of guilt. Otherwise, they said, the Cabinet saw police violence as a measure of success:

The police started to have more capacity [due to the Federal Intervention Cabinet's materiel acquisitions and to conduct] more operations, so naturally there were more confrontations with criminal organizations and that generated the increase in deaths. [...] Police] operations were not a way [for the Cabinet to achieve its goal of] improving the perception of public security, but the increased [police] presence was. The more patrol cars, the greater presence on the street. The greater presence on the street, the more combat. When you give capacity to the police officer, [they] manage to be present in all their area of responsibility. Naturally, this increased confrontations. [...] More police on the street increases the perception of security and, where there was no police officer before, the criminal is going to resist (#84).

This excerpt suggests that, for the Federal Intervention Cabinet, extrajudicial killings indicated the Army's effectiveness at equipping and mobilizing Rio de Janeiro state police to fight crime. Another military interviewee (#71) echoed this view. The Cabinet not only avoided responsibility for police violence in the face of ad-hoc civilian institutions' criticisms by saying that extrajudicial killings had been a longstanding part of public security in Rio de Janeiro. The Cabinet also considered killings legitimate due to strong public support for repressive measures against criminal organizations. Rather than threaten the Army's public image, an increase in police killings could have the opposite effect. The Cabinet therefore prioritized increasing capacity, not reorienting the police toward community engagement and human rights protection:

[T]he Intervention [...] did not change the way that police and GLO operations were conducted [...] Violence will happen in violent places and the military already was accustomed to that. [As a result, Army officers] did not feel the need to respond [to critiques about police violence, which] is not a new problem. It is an old problem. We have been listening to [stories about] kids being shot by drug traffickers or police for years and years and years [...] Criticisms by the Public Defender's Office and civil society were] more of complaining in this context of a chronic problem. [...] The Federal Intervention Cabinet [did not see police violence] as a threat to the Army's prestige or image because people [in Rio de Janeiro] support that. ... [A] huge part of Rio de Janeiro society supports more violent police. [...] The Intervention] did not change the violent nature of the police. What they did was try to [...] make things better in terms administration [and capacity]. The nature [...] of the police never was in question (#71).

This excerpt suggests that, given the historical persistence of, and public support for police violence, the Federal Intervention Cabinet considered extrajudicial killings an appropriate and effective means of providing public security in Rio de Janeiro. In this view, ad-hoc civilian institutions' criticisms did not influence Army officers to consider police violence illegitimate.

The military interviewee (#71) proceeded to imply that institutions had led officers to consider police violence more legitimate. By influencing Army officers' legitimacy concerns to an extent, autonomous institutions had raised the cost of troop deployment. Such institutions nonetheless had little access to officers in order to convince them that police violence also was illegitimate. Officers therefore saw police violence as an appropriate and effective substitute for troop deployment. The interviewee summarized this dynamic by saying that the Cabinet had been

wise to focus only on the management of public security. When you talk about highly violent operations, the [Army] itself was not in the *favelas*. [The Army] just sent the police [to the *favelas*. Soldiers] only were in the surroundings for backup, but it was the police doing the violent operations during the Intervention. [It was] police officers [who were] used to that. It was a wise decision [for the Army] in terms of avoiding accountability for [killings]" (#71).

This excerpt suggests that the Army's legitimacy concerns, to which ad-hoc civilian institutions had contributed without opportunity for socialization, fueled extrajudicial killings by leading the Federal Intervention Cabinet to delegate *favela* incursions to police. By remaining on the perimeter of incursions, soldiers minimized the risks of troop deployment for the Army's public image. They also empowered the police to kill. An implication is that, insofar as institutions influenced this outcome, it could have been by raising Army officers' legitimacy concerns incompletely without being able to socialize them into substituting police violence for military presence. A caveat is that the excerpt reveals a legal reason for legitimacy concerns, accountability for extrajudicial killings, whereas institutions mainly informed societal reasons.

A media account gave further evidence of how the Intervention had empowered state police to kill. It quoted a Favelas for Rights Circuit consortium partner as saying, "[i]n the *favelas*, the 'brute force' policy continues and the Army's presence has made bad police officers even worse. We always hear residents' reports of police saying, 'look, now we have backup'" (Arcoverde, quoted in Linhares 2018). By placing them under the Army's authority, the Intervention could have given police support to commit even more violence with fewer consequences.

This is not to say that the Army refrained from violence altogether. According to Networks of Maré (Redes da Maré 2018, 6), a consortium partner of the Civil Society Observatory, the Armed Forces participated in three of 16 (19%) police operations in the Maré *favela* during the Intervention. These three operations accounted for eight of 19 (42%) killings by security forces during such operations. Police operations in Maré with a military presence therefore averaged 2.7 killings while those without a military presence averaged 1.2 killings. Although there is

limited data available on extrajudicial killings by soldiers, that the military participated in only three Maré operations nonetheless suggests an emphasis on empowering police to kill over running the risk that soldiers be responsible for extrajudicial violence when present in *favelas*.

A civil society interviewee (#23) acknowledged that such emphasis on, and legitimation of state violence reflected and reinforced the limited ability of ad-hoc civilian institutions like the Civil Society Observatory to achieve their ultimate desired impact. Such impact

would have been that [the Army and police] stopped killing [...] Soldiers and police never worried about killing Black, poor *favela* residents without a scandal. [...] That public security policy did not change independent of the Intervention. It is something specific to Rio de Janeiro that [civil society] cannot manage to change. [The Civil Society Observatory] had wanted [its] impact to be the reduction of violence, but [its] activism did not produce [this] change (#23).

This excerpt suggests that police violence was too entrenched in Rio de Janeiro politics for ad-hoc civilian institutions like the Civil Society Observatory to reduce during an 11-month troop deployment. In this respect, institutions like the Observatory did not achieve their objective. That soldiers and police killed without consequence resulted partially from how the Federal Intervention Cabinet had insulated police from external actors, who could have socialized officers against extrajudicial killings. The Cabinet considered police violence an appropriate and effective substitute for a consistent military presence during *favela* incursions. Army officers' legitimacy concerns, or lack thereof, and incentives to avoid accountability thus contributed to police violence more than civilian control institutions did. Insofar as institutions were relevant, it was because their information strategy raised the costs of the troop deployment without them having the access necessary to raise the cost of extrajudicial killings.

Police violence during previous GLO operations

That the Federal Intervention Cabinet assumed authority over Rio de Janeiro state police and considered extrajudicial killings a legitimate substitute for military repression could help understand why such violence was greater in 2018 than it had been during previous GLO operations (see Table 5). From 2003 to 2017, GLO operations typically had involved soldiers patrolling *favelas* alongside or in place of police. Operation Rio de Janeiro, which overlapped with the 11 months of the 2018 Federal Intervention, mainly involved soldiers securing the perimeters while police performed violent incursions. Indeed, although there is limited information available on the relationship between military presence and police violence during GLO operations both before and in 2018, several examples appear to suggest that such operations tended to be more lethal when soldiers did not accompany police into *favelas*.

Operations Arcanjo (2010-2012) and São Francisco (2014-2015) saw the Armed Forces “act exclusively in missions of preventive patrols and [crime disruption]” (Passos 2019, 52) in the Alemão, Maré, and Penha *favelas*. The average number of police killings per month increased between four and five times from previous GLO operations to the Federal Intervention in these *favelas*. The monthly average increased from 0.5 during Operation Arcanjo in Alemão and Penha to 2.1 during the Intervention. It increased from 0.5 during Operation São Francisco in Maré to 2.5 during the Intervention (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2021; Instituto de Segurança Pública 2022a; Ministério da Defesa 2022b).

From February to April 2018, the Federal Intervention Cabinet focused military patrols through the concurrent GLO Operation Rio de Janeiro extensively on the Vila Kennedy *favela* (Beck et al. 2018; Goulart 2018). The Cabinet saw Vila Kennedy as a “pilot project” that would “extend to other communities” (Gabinete de Intervenção Federal no Rio de Janeiro 2022a, 5) controlled by criminal organizations. The average number of police killings per month was 3.3 during this period. The average rose slightly to 3.9 between May and December 2018, the Federal Intervention’s remaining months, after the extensive military patrols concluded (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2021; Instituto de Segurança Pública 2022a).

Favela incursions that lasted less than a month during the Federal Intervention could have had the opposite dynamic. In August 2018, the Federal Intervention Cabinet deployed soldiers alongside police for a “mega-operation” (Heringer and Rosa 2018) in the Alemão, Maré, and Penha *favelas*. The number of police killings that month was four both in Alemão and Penha and in Maré. During other Intervention months, the average number of police killings was 2.3 in Maré and 1.9 in Alemão and Penha. In June 2018, the Cabinet deployed soldiers alongside police for an operation in the Rocinha *favela* (Kawaguti and Pamplona 2018). The number of police killings was one that month, the same as the monthly average during other Intervention months (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2021; Instituto de Segurança Pública 2022a). An implication is that police briefly accompanied by soldiers could have been equally or more lethal compared with police unaccompanied by soldiers. Perhaps the Armed Forces encouraged state police to use maximum force during brief, accompanied *favela* incursions in order to limit the risk of prolonged incursions due to the heightened probability of soldiers being accountable for killings.

Hypothesis 5.1: Institutional autonomy (episode)

I previously have discussed how not relying on government information was a strategy of the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit. I also have discussed how government transparency regarding the Intervention was limited. Owing to these factors, more autonomous ad-hoc civilian institutions could have had less access to information from the Temer administration, Brazilian Army, Federal Intervention Cabinet, and Rio de Janeiro state police. This dynamic was evident in how more autonomous institutions accessed less government information through public events, public hearings, private meetings, and information requests.

Among the seven institutions that published final reports, two (29%) participated in public events with the government, three (43%) held public hearings, four (57%) had private meetings, and five (71%) submitted information requests. Two (29%) institutions used all four practices, two (29%) used two of the four, two (29%) used one of the four, and one institution (14%) used none. Table 18 below presents this distribution of practices.

<i>Ad-hoc monitoring institution</i>	<i>Variables of interest</i>		<i>Practices for collecting data from government</i>				
	<i>Autonomy</i>	<i>Cohesion</i>	<i>Events</i>	<i>Hearings</i>	<i>Meetings</i>	<i>Requests</i>	<i>%</i>
Civil Society Observatory	Full	High	No	No	No	Yes	25
Committee to Represent the Municipal Chamber in Brasília	Partial	Moderate	No	No	Yes	Yes	50
External Committee on the Marielle Franco Assassination	Full	Moderate	No	Yes	No	Yes	50

External Committee on the Federal Intervention (Chamber of Deputies)	Partial	Low	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	100
Favelas for Rights Circuit	Full	High	No	No	Yes	No	25
Legislative Observatory	Full	Moderate	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	100
Popular Truth Commission	Full	Low	No	No	No	No	0

SOURCE: Author's analysis of institutions' final reports.

NOTE: Events and Hearings occur in public venues. Meetings occur in private venues. Requests involve petitions for information through official channels.

Among the five (71%) institutions with full autonomy, or both formal and informal independence from the government, the average institution used between one and two of the four practices for collecting government information. Among the two (29%) institutions with partial autonomy, or formal but not informal independence from the government, the average institution used three of the four practices. The Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit both used one practice. In comparison, the Chamber of Deputies' External Committee on the Federal Intervention had partial autonomy and used all four practices.

Interviews suggest that less autonomous institutions had not only less access but, also, less opportunity to socialize government officials into considering Rio de Janeiro troop deployments and police violence illegitimate. This dynamic is evident in how several interviewees (#45, 65, 70, 80, 81) discussed meetings between ad-hoc civilian institutions and the Federal Intervention Cabinet. On the one hand, the Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender's Office's meeting with the Cabinet to discuss the Favelas for Rights Circuit's final report illustrated how closed the Cabinet was to more autonomous and critical institutions. On the other hand, meetings between the Chamber of Deputies' External Committee on the Federal Intervention and the Cabinet illustrated how open the Cabinet was to less autonomous, less critical institutions.

Favelas for Rights Circuit's meeting with Federal Intervention Cabinet

The Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit had few constructive meetings with the Cabinet. A civil society interviewee (#23) suggested that meetings with the Cabinet, which the Observatory had decided not to request or accept, had been a main way for civilians to influence the Federal Intervention's course. For example, they mentioned how the Rio de Janeiro State Industry Federation had met with the Cabinet so that the Intervention would prioritize reducing cargo and vehicle theft. The Observatory could have had more opportunity to influence the Cabinet through such access.

The Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender's Office was able to schedule one meeting with the Cabinet. The purpose of this November 2018 meeting was to discuss the Favelas for Rights Circuit's final report. A justice sector interviewee (#70) described how the Cabinet's distrust in the Public Defender's Office had been evident during this meeting:

[The Public Defender's Office] had a meeting with [Gen. Nunes]. It was tense because the military officers' idea was to deliver a presentation deconstructing what the [Office was] going to say. [...] It was an intervention led by generals, so [the Office's] concern was to prove that the police had a permanent mission creep [from their responsibility of protecting citizens to their practice of killing citizens. ...] The generals also were uncomfortable with the [Office's] demonstration of [human rights] violations. [...] Without the [Favela for Rights Circuit's final] report, [the Office] would not have been able to get the meeting. However, [the public defenders] were not able to advance [with the Cabinet] because the Intervention ended [soon thereafter. ... The military officials] had been made uncomfortable by the report, which they already had seen, and their concern was to [deliver a presentation to protect the Army]. They tried to deconstruct [the Office's information about police violence] with a focus on the Army. They were very uncomfortable with being in charge of the Military Police and [the Office's] focus was on the Military Police. [The Office's stance held that reducing police violence] was [the Cabinet's] responsibility. That is when [the military officers] became worried" (#70).

This excerpt suggests that autonomous ad-hoc civilian institutions with strategies that focused more on original monitoring information, and with more initial and intermediate impact, had less opportunity to socialize Army officers into considering militarization illegitimate. The Favelas for Rights Circuit's final report was sufficient to capture the Federal Intervention Cabinet's attention and to enable the Public Defender's Office to meet with the Cabinet. However, the report's criticism of police violence also restricted space for socialization. Army officers were defensive and protective of the Cabinet because of these criticisms, rather than receptive and cooperative. Because the meeting occurred late in 2018, there was no opportunity to meet again so that the public defenders could socialize the military officials. The Office might have been unable to meet with the Cabinet if it had not been so autonomous, critical, and, at least preliminarily, impactful, yet these characteristics prevented further influence on the Cabinet.

Another justice sector interviewee (#80) described the meeting similarly. They said, "Gen. Nunes, within that [military] universe, was one of the most suitable people" with whom to meet. He was more receptive than other Federal Intervention Cabinet officials, especially Gen. Braga Netto, to external perspectives. However, "[... although Nunes] met with [the public defenders] and promised to act upon" the Circuit's final report, "the Army [evidently rejected] claims against their soldiers" for violations. This rejection limited the Circuit's influence.

Another justice sector interviewee (#81) described the Cabinet's counter-presentation during this meeting with the Public Defenders' Office in further detail:

Gen. Nunes opened the PowerPoint and [it had] the logos and [names of] organizations [like the Civil Society Observatory] that were critical of the Intervention. He made the

connection with international donors like George Soros and Open Society Foundations. [... Nunes' list included] all the traditional human rights organizations. He had critical rhetoric regarding the donors and left-wing political parties. [The Public Defender's Office's presence in that meeting] gave legitimacy to those organizations. [...Nunes seemed to] have a clear intention of delegitimizing civil society's role in controlling the Intervention. [...] He gave [the Office] a clear message" (#81).

This excerpt further suggests that the Favelas for Rights Circuit had little opportunity to socialize the Federal Intervention Cabinet during its meeting. Gen. Nunes' implicit warning against association with the Civil Society Observatory demonstrated that the Cabinet distrusted institutions with independent funding sources, such as foreign donors, and with critical stances on the Intervention. Such distrust, as well as Nunes' apparent attempt to delegitimize such institutions, illustrated how the Circuit had little chance of convincing these military officers regarding the illegitimacy of troop deployments and police violence.

External Committee's meetings with the Federal Intervention Cabinet

The Chamber of Deputies' External Committee on the Federal Intervention, which had formal but not informal autonomy due to some members' alignment with the Intervention, had more frequent and constructive meetings with the Cabinet than did the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit. A legislative interviewee (#45) described a meeting between the Committee and Gen. Braga Netto, President Temer's Federal Intervener. This interviewee said the following to illustrate the Committee's influence:

Gen. Braga Netto listened to [the Committee] on multiple occasions. There were left-wing legislators in meetings with him, but he respected and listened to many opinions. [...] He was very attentive. [The Committee] influenced [the Intervention] a lot. [...] The Federal Intervention did a lot of renovation of the police fleet and the [Committee] developed the criteria for distribution of new vehicles. [...] Even the left-wing legislators thought that it had been a success (#45).

This excerpt suggests that the External Committee, which had partial autonomy, had greater access than the Favelas for Rights Circuit, which had full autonomy. Whereas the Circuit met with Gen. Nunes, the External Committee met specifically with Gen. Braga Netto as head of the Cabinet. The Cabinet was defensive during the Circuit meeting but, despite left-wing legislators' presence, receptive during the External Committee meeting. The Circuit was unable to meet again with the Cabinet in order to reiterate the importance of human rights because the Intervention was about to end. The Committee met early enough to inform the Cabinet's procurement process and frequently enough for members to feel a sense of efficacy.

Another legislative interviewee (#65) described the External Committee's meetings with the Federal Intervention Cabinet similarly. To illustrate this institution's influence, they said that "there were various meetings with Gen. Braga Netto, including about the return of police assigned to other agencies." These included officers who, for instance, had been assigned to security detail at the Rio de Janeiro State Legislative Assembly instead of preventive patrols and *favela* incursions. The Committee had "made the suggestion. The Cabinet already had the idea, but it is a difficult decision politically [for any Brazilian state] and [the Cabinet] needed external support. Because of [the Committee's] support, there was no resistance" from the agencies. The Cabinet, in a way, relied on the Committee. It saw the Committee as a partner, not as a critic.

A justice sector interviewee (#81) suggested that the Cabinet's closedness to the Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender's Office and its Favelas for Rights Circuit had stemmed from how Gen. Braga Netto prioritized engagement with national over local actors. However, the Cabinet's

openness to federal institutions also varied with these institutions' autonomy. The Chamber of Deputies' External Committee on the Marielle Franco Assassination had formal autonomy and considerable difficulty with obtaining information from the Cabinet.

In its final report (Câmara de Deputados 2018k, 104), the External Committee on the Marielle Franco Investigation criticized "the total absence of responses by authorities" to information requests. The Committee had sent 21 information requests combined to the Temer administration, Brazilian Army, Federal Intervention Cabinet, and Rio de Janeiro state police. Two (10%) of these 21 requests had received responses at the time of the final report's publication. Such difficulty with obtaining responses suggests that the Committee had considerable barriers to accessing the Intervention's principal and agents. Comparable information for the less autonomous External Committee on the Federal Intervention is not available. Nonetheless, an implication is that the more autonomous Chamber committee had more access limitations and, by extension, fewer socialization opportunities with those responsible for designing and implementing the Federal Intervention.

Hypothesis 5.2: Institutional autonomy (practice)

Despite their limited ability to impact militarization as an episode by socializing the Federal Intervention Cabinet and Rio de Janeiro state police, the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit could have laid the foundation for subsequent attempts at controlling militarization as a practice more than other ad-hoc civilian institutions did. Their long-term legacies involved a federal court case against the Rio de Janeiro state police, as well as a multi-state monitoring consortium. In contrast, ad-hoc legislative institutions' long-term impacts

potentially were more symbolic and tenuous. They inspired at least one permanent committee, yet interviews suggest that these institutions enabled subsequent efforts to a lesser extent.

ADPF das Favelas

Several interviewees (#22, 39, 40, 41, 47, 107, 110) mentioned Argument of Breach of Fundamental Precept 635, or *ADPF das Favelas* (ADPF of the *Favelas*) as an example of ad-hoc civilian institutions' long-term impact. Before Brazil's Supreme Federal Tribunal in 2020, Rio de Janeiro-based civil society organizations and justice sector agencies charged the state government with carrying out police operations that disrupted the distribution of food and hygiene products during COVID-19 stay-at-home measures. Among the 20 groups that collectively had brought this case to the high court were parent organizations of both the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit. Seven organizations from the Observatory's consortium also helped bring the case (ADPF das Favelas 2023).

In 2020, the Supreme Federal Tribunal ordered Rio de Janeiro state to restrict police operations to extraordinary circumstances during the COVID-19 pandemic. Police decided to stop complying with this order after four months. This four-month period of compliance with the court order coincided with a dramatic reduction of police killings in Rio de Janeiro (Grupo de Estudos dos Novos Ilegalismos 2021; Rede de Observatórios de Segurança 2023b).

ADPF das Favelas highlighted both the extent and limits of ad-hoc civilian institutions' ultimate impact. Regarding the limits, a civil society interviewee (#23) who was skeptical of institutions' influence in 2018 said, “[t]he only action that drastically reduced [police violence] was the

[Supreme Federal Tribunal's] decision that [Rio de Janeiro] could not carry out police operations during the pandemic. It reduced killings over four months, with important results.” However, “the Military Police [...] stopped complying [with the order]. If the [high court] cannot manage to make the police stop killing, civil society is not going to be able [to do so].” *ADPF das Favelas* thus symbolized the uncontrollability of police violence in Rio de Janeiro.

Moreover, Candid Mendes University's Center for Security and Citizenship Studies and the Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender's Office predated the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit, respectively. Several civil society interviewees (#40, 47, 110) emphasized, while ad-hoc civilian institutions had been valuable nodes of collaboration during the Federal Intervention, mobilization before 2018 is what most laid the foundation for *ADPF das Favelas*. These parent organizations probably would have participated in a high-profile case like the 2020 *ADPF das Favelas* regardless of their ad-hoc institutions' experiences in 2018.

The Civil Society Observatory's and Favelas for Rights Circuit's strategy of collecting original monitoring information through consortia nonetheless could have been an important contribution to *ADPF das Favelas*. A civil society interviewee (#22) said that the Intervention had “generated strong collaborations and dialogues [between civil society organizations, which] continue today through the *ADPF das Favelas*.” They described the case as “a process of the very organizations that found each other during the Intervention [...] An impact of the Intervention was this mobilization.” Another civil society interviewee (#39) said that the Civil Society Observatory and its consortium partners like Networks of Maré and the Crossfire Institute represented “new

civil society unity and collaborations.” They suggested that, without this coordination, *ADPF das Favelas* would have been impossible.

A third civil society interviewee (#41) said, “it is not coincidental that many institutions that participate in *ADPF das Favelas* come from the Civil Society Observatory’s [consortium].”

They proceeded to describe how “the *ADPF* reframes [... police violence] and arrives with very important intensity because the data presented there about the collective experience in Rio de Janeiro is unquestionable. So, the Observatory [...] was important for monitoring and for dialogue” between civil society organizations.” A fourth civil society interviewee (#107) clarified that 2018 had been “an opportunity of affirmation” for civil society, “[t]he fruits [of which] remained after the Intervention.” They continued, “*ADPF* 635 in a way is the niece or daughter, or family member, of” the 2018 monitoring coalition.

The 2020 *ADPF das Favelas* also suggested the legacy of justice sector participation in the 2018 monitoring coalition. A civil society interviewee (#91) suggested that the *ADPF das Favelas* had stemmed mainly from civil society mobilization during the Federal Intervention. They added, however, that the Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender’s Office had acted with the autonomy of a civil society organization in monitoring the Intervention through the Favelas for Rights Circuit and in joining other civil society organizations before the high court.

Network of Security Observatories

Several interviewees (#33, 41, 62) also mentioned how the Civil Society Observatory had served as the foundation for the Network of Security Observatories. Established in 2019, the Network is

a consortium of preexisting civil society organizations across eight Brazilian states. The Observatory's parent organization, the Center for Security and Citizenship Studies, administers the network, in which it represents Rio de Janeiro state. This consortium uses the Observatory's methodology to collect original monitoring information and inform political discourse about crime, violence, human rights, and public security (Rede de Observatórios de Segurança 2023a).

A civil society interviewee (#33) said that the Civil Society Observatory serving as the Network of Security Observatories' foundation "was very important because it created a culture [of having] to value civilian supervision of public security, which was not so consolidated" before the Federal Intervention." Another civil society interviewee (#41) said that, while the Network could have formed without the Observatory, "the Observatory was a stimulus that accelerated national collaboration around [the public security] debate" and "produced a methodology that ended up being incorporated by other institutions." A third civil society interviewee (#62) said that the Network illustrates how the Observatory "had an extended legacy [...] beyond Rio de Janeiro [...] that related to] public security [throughout] the country."

In addition to using the Civil Society Observatory's methodology and consortium-based model, the Network of Security Observatories apparently learned from the Civil Society Observatory's success with media coverage and difficulties with socializing the Federal Intervention Cabinet. A civil society interviewee (#115) described how staff from the Center for Security and Citizenship Studies who had participated in the Observatory had connected another state's Network partner with the Crossfire Institute, a member of the Observatory's consortium in 2018. The interviewee said, "the Crossfire Institute produces monthly [crime and violence] data and [the Network

partner] does the work of publicizing, doing media interviews and commentary, as well as political advocacy.” The Center’s staff also had helped this Network partner train a state government agency on publishing drug consumption data. With the agency starting to monitor usage, the Network partner’s relationship with this agency would become even more important.

Legislative institutions’ legacy

Interviews suggest that, whereas the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit had concrete legacies in the form of *ADPF das Favelas* and Network of Security Observatories, ad-hoc legislative institutions’ long-term impacts were more performative, symbolic, and tenuous. These impacts involved demonstrating parent organization’s engagement and leadership around public security. While this demonstration is valuable, it is less immediate and tangible than the long-term impacts of the more autonomous Observatory and Circuit.

Some legislative committees did have more concrete legacies. A legislative interviewee (#19) said that the Representation Committee’s experience had empowered its parent organization, the Rio de Janeiro Municipal Chamber, to become more active on public security issues. For example, after this ad-hoc civilian institution’s work concluded, the Municipal Chamber established a permanent Public Security Committee. Another legislative interviewee (#65) said that the Chamber of Deputies’ External Committee on the Intervention had been a model for subsequent legislative committees. At the time of our 2023 interview and based on the External Committee’s experience, legislators were considering the creation of a similar ad-hoc committee on the public security crisis in Rio Grande do Norte state (Lima and Silva Paiva 2023).

Several other legislative interviewees (#48, 77) nonetheless suggested that ad-hoc civilian institutions' legacies had been more symbolic. A legislative interviewee (#77) said more generally when asked about an ad-hoc institution, “[e]very committee is important to affirm legislative power. Brazil has very strong presidentialism and an authoritarian bias. It is important to highlight parliamentary power”, especially given how militarization can undermine democratic governance. Another legislative interviewee (#48) similarly said of a specific ad-institution, “monitoring is the weakest area in many legislatures because it is easier for legislators to [concentrate strictly] on legislation. So, [...] monitoring the executive [was a positive development. The initiative’s parent organization] needs to develop this [capacity].”

This same legislative interviewee (#48) lamented the parent organization’s limited engagement in monitoring public security after the 2018 Federal Intervention. “There was no continuity,” they said, and “no more feedback. Nothing remained. [The institution’s work concluded] and there was no continuity. There also was no change in the [parent organization] related to [monitoring] public security [policy] ... [The initiative] was good, but, afterwards, [there was] no more monitoring.” They suggested that this lack of continuity had stemmed partially from how the institution’s main political supporter had considered it a platform for gaining “visibility”. Once this legislator realized that monitoring the Intervention could be interpretable as criticizing a popular policy, which could pose political risks, they lost interest.

Another legislative interviewee (#45) echoed this skeptical viewpoint regarding legislative institutions' legacies. They said that a specific legislative institution had not impacted its parent

organization partially because the October 2018 elections and subsequent political leadership changes had reduced legislators' attention to the Federal Intervention and its aftermath.

Summary

This chapter has used document analysis, original interview data, and interview data from Castro et al. (2023) to suggest that *principal prerogative* and military presence could have accounted most for the discontinuation of Rio de Janeiro troop deployments after, and the increase in police violence during the Federal Intervention. The October 2018 elections introduced President Bolsonaro, whose interests in satisfying the military and preferences against the Federal Intervention contributed considerably to deployments' discontinuation. Insofar as ad-hoc civilian control institutions influenced these outcomes, it possibly was indicative of the *autonomy paradox*. The more autonomous Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit could have contributed to the Army officers' legitimacy concerns with troop deployments.

However, the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit could have had insufficient access to military and police officers in order to socialize them regarding the illegitimacy of extrajudicial killings during the Intervention. These more autonomous institutions nonetheless had a more enduring legacy. They helped lay the foundation for a court case that temporarily reduced police violence. The Observatory also became the model for a multi-state monitoring consortium. In contrast, less autonomous institutions had more access and less of a legacy. Full autonomy could have been necessary for institutions to offer such legacies.

These findings seemingly lend support to this dissertation's theory about the *autonomy paradox*. They suggest that autonomy could limit civilian control institutions' ultimate impact by restricting their opportunities to socialize military and police officials into seeing militarization, including both troop deployment and police violence, as illegitimate. Institutions potentially have an intermediate impact on military officials' legitimacy concerns with troop deployments but are unable to convince them that police violence also is inappropriate and ineffective. Officials therefore consider police violence a legitimate substitute for military presence. Although institutions could have less influence than principal prerogative on deployments' discontinuation and cannot control police violence during such deployments, more autonomous institutions potentially have more enduring legacies by offering repertoires and lessons for future efforts.

This chapter also has raised questions about the generalizability of my *autonomy paradox* argument beyond 2018 Rio de Janeiro. It has suggested that GLO operations before 2018 tended to be less violent as the military accompanied police more on *favela* incursions. The chapter also has suggested that one of the Civil Society Observatory's legacies was the Network of Security Observatories, a consortium of civil society organizations from eight Brazilian states.

To what extent does my autonomy paradox argument apply to militarization elsewhere? What makes the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro fruitful for theory-building is partially its deviance from scholarship about Latin American Politics. To what degree is the argument generalizable to other countries? The next chapter will examine these questions in conclusion.

Chapter 8: Generalizability & conclusion

This dissertation has argued that what most characterizes the dynamics of civilian control over law enforcement militarization is the *autonomy paradox*. Civilian control institutions form partially because their independence from militarization's principal and agents creates an opportunity to contest troop deployments and police violence. Such independence encourages collecting original information with which to monitor militarization because the principal and agents have little incentive to share such information. This original information could have an initial impact of shaping political discourse by incentivizing journalists' critical media coverage of militarization. It also could have an intermediate impact of shaping military officials' legitimacy concerns by raising the societal costs of the troop deployment.

However, autonomy could limit institutions' access to military officials and police officers in order to convince them that police violence is an illegitimate substitute for military operations. Institutions therefore could have little influence on the ultimate impact of curtailing the troop deployment and constraining police violence. An additional factor that potentially limits institutions' impact is *principal prerogative*. Executives have extensive authority over troop deployments compared with civilians outside the principal-agent relationship. Presidents who initiate deployments have few incentives to curtail them, yet their successors could have interests and preferences that lead to militarization's discontinuity. The importance of presidential authority underscores how civilian control institutions' ultimate impact could be minimal.

Civilian control institutions' informational strategy and the *autonomy paradox* itself nonetheless could offer repertoires and lessons for subsequent attempts at controlling militarization after the

troop deployment. Full autonomy from militarization's principals and agents could be important for institutional formation, necessary for a strategy based on original monitoring information, necessary for robust initial impact on political discourse and intermediate impact on legitimacy concerns, insufficient for an ultimate impact on demilitarization of episodes, and necessary for ultimate impact on demilitarization of practices.

This dissertation has developed the *autonomy paradox* argument inductively through a theory-building case study of the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It has used multiple data sources to trace the formations, strategies, and impacts of a coalition of 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions that monitored the troop deployment. In so doing, the dissertation has illuminated three empirical puzzles. The puzzles have concerned why the monitoring coalition formed, why Rio de Janeiro troop deployments were discontinued after 2018, and why the Intervention saw with more police violence than previous troop deployments. These puzzles have motivated both the *autonomy paradox* argument and the case study from which it stems.

In this final chapter, I begin by revisiting the dissertation's motivating questions to suggest that the *autonomy paradox* and its constitutive theories make the Intervention less puzzling. I also use this discussion of puzzles to identify circumstances under which the argument potentially holds in other places and times. These discussions inform the chapter's second focus: speculating on the extent to which the *autonomy paradox* is likely to hold in Colombia and Mexico. It suggests that the argument could generalize strongly around institutional formation and moderately with respect to institutional impacts. Third, it presents opportunities for continued research related to the argument, case study, and generalizability discussion. Fourth, it discusses policy implications

for civilians in Latin America and the U.S. The chapter summary concludes the dissertation. The chapter primarily focuses on my *autonomy paradox* argument, yet the discussion of policy implications also reflects upon the secondary *principal prerogative* argument.

Puzzle of the monitoring coalition's formation

This dissertation's first empirical puzzle has been why a coalition of civilian institutions formed to monitor the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro. Latin American Politics scholarship implies that civilians, especially politicians, have few incentives and capabilities to control militarization. Brazilian Politics scholarship implies that institutions with such incentives are limited to civil society organizations and justice sector agencies with limited authority over the security forces and jurisdiction beyond the local level. However, 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions formed to monitor the Intervention. They came from the civil society, justice, and legislative sectors. Their parent organizations had varying authority and jurisdiction levels. They had formal autonomy from the Intervention but varied in their degrees of informal autonomy.

Four main variables could help make this coalition's formation less puzzling. One is that political autonomy from the Temer administration, Brazilian Army, Federal Intervention Cabinet, and Rio de Janeiro state police gave civilians the opportunity to contest the Intervention. Not all individuals who created or joined these institutions opposed the Intervention. However, this was the case for many institutions. Ad-hoc legislative committees had considerable representation of left-wing politicians whose policy platforms and preferences included guarding against militarization's risks. Organizations that did not have such autonomy did not monitor the Intervention extensively, whether through preexisting programs or ad-hoc institutions.

Additional motivating or incentivizing factors were collective memory, political conflict, and mobilization rewards. Memory of Brazil's military dictatorship and of previous GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro motivated individuals to contest militarization and gave them the historical, rhetorical, and organizational repertoires with which to do so. Conflict over the Temer administration's legitimacy, Rio de Janeiro-based civil society organizations' representativeness, and the Marielle Franco assassination provided contemporary motivations and frames. Individual and organizational benefits for monitoring the Intervention, especially related to political competition and positioning in the Chamber of Deputies, provided incentives. Individuals with stronger memories of past militarization episodes, more engagement in political conflict, and more prospective rewards were more likely to create or join institutions.

I expect this explanation of institutional formation to hold more in other Latin American democracies under the following circumstances. First, when civilian coalitions form to monitor urban troop deployments, a prior ecosystem of civil society organizations, justice sector agencies, and legislative committees specialized in human rights and public security exists in the deployment city and/or national capital. These actors are independent of the national and local executives, the national army, and the national and/or local police. Second, deployments occur in countries that recently have transitioned from military dictatorship to democratic governance. Previous troop deployments have occurred in the democratic era.

Third, when monitoring coalitions form, deployments occur during periods of acute political conflict. Presidential and political party legitimacy are subject to considerable contestation.

Sufficient coordination nonetheless exists between civil society organizations of different social classes for lower-class organizations to pressure middle- and upper-class ones for inclusion in the coalition. Fourth, the population strongly supports the deployment to reduce crime and violence. When coalitions include legislative committees, such deployments occur shortly before elections and at times when left-wing parties have non-negligible representation in the national legislature. The less that these circumstances are present before and during urban troop deployment, the less likely that I consider the formation of monitoring coalitions.

Generalizability of institutional formation theory

Comparing these countries with Brazil across the above conditions, I expect that the *autonomy paradox*'s theory of institutional formation will generalize strongly to Colombia and Mexico. Colombia and, to a lesser extent, Mexico have recent experiences with autonomous civilian coalitions to constrain troop deployments. Relative to Brazil, they have similar levels of institutional legitimacy. Colombia and, especially, Mexico, also exhibit stronger public support for troop deployments. Although neither Colombia nor Mexico has prominent histories of military authoritarianism, extrajudicial killings during deployments have galvanized coalition formation in these countries' recent pasts. Deployments have corresponded somewhat with elections, although they have not received strong responses from left-wing parties.

Colombia and, to a lesser extent, Mexico have strong ecosystems of civilian organizations. Civil society organizations focused on human rights and left-wing political parties comprised "oversight coalitions" (Dizard 2018, 13) that helped strengthen accountability for extrajudicial killings by soldiers in the 2010s. Colombia has a "dense, coordinated, well-articulated, and

experienced rights network”, with “a multi-decade emphasis on coordination and professionalized documentation” (210). “Mexico possesses a set of similarly sophisticated” civil society organizations, yet they are “more fragmented across the country and less coordinated” (210). Neither country has a strong, autonomous justice sector like Brazil. Public defender agencies have considerable autonomy in Brazil compared with other Latin American countries (Buta 2021). Perhaps reflecting and reinforcing public defenders’ limited autonomy, the oversight coalitions in Colombia and Mexico had little focus on cross-class coordination. Their membership instead was limited to elites (Dizard 2018).

Colombia and Mexico have moderate collective memories of past militarization episodes compared with Brazil. Neither country has prominent recent histories of military authoritarianism like that of Brazil. A reflection of this difference is how a 2012 survey found that 49% and 38% of Mexicans and Colombians, respectively, considered a hypothetical military coup justifiable when crime was high. This percentage was 34% in Brazil but 17% in Rio de Janeiro city (LAPOP 2023a; 2023b; 2023g; 2023h; 2023j; 2023k). If collective memories of military authoritarianism were more comparable between the national level in Colombia and Mexico and the subnational level in Brazil, we might have expected more similarity in views of military authoritarianism to address crime.

Troop deployments in both Colombia and Mexico nonetheless have exacerbated criminal and state violence. Intensive episodes of state repression have contributed to the formation of civilian coalitions aimed at constraining deployments (Dizard 2018). Military authoritarianism evidently has been unnecessary for institutional formation in these countries.

Presidential and party legitimacy have similar levels of stability in these countries relative to Brazil. A proxy measure is individuals' respect for political institutions. This measure adjusts survey responses from a 1-7 scale, with 7 being the highest level of trust, to a 0-100 scale. Average respect for Brazil's political institutions went from 52.8 to 57.1, with a low of 46.9, from 2006 to 2021. Average respect for Colombia's political institutions went from 66.6 to 63.3, with a low of 60.9. Average respect for Mexico's political institutions went from 69.1 to 67.5, with a low of 52.7 (LAPOP 2023i). The difference between the lowest level of average respect and the 2021 level was greatest in Mexico while the 2021 level was considerably lower in Brazil. The difference between 2006 and 2021 average respect levels, however, was similarly small across these three countries. Levels of trust in the president and political parties were more stable in Brazil between 2008 and 2021. However, the countries had comparable 2014 and 2016 declines and somewhat similar 2018 levels across these additional proxies of institutional legitimacy (LAPOP 2023a; 2023b; 2023g; 2023h; 2023j; 2023k).

Support for troop deployments has been stronger in Colombia and Mexico than in Brazil. Seventy-six percent of Brazilians, compared with 67% of Rio de Janeiro city residents, expressed strong support in 2012 for military participation in crime and violence reduction. This measure includes individuals who selected 5, 6, or 7 on a 1-7 scale, with 7 indicating strongest support. Support levels were 83% and 82%, respectively, in Colombia and Mexico. On a similar scale, there was a 40-point gap between the percentage of individuals who strongly trusted the military versus the police in Mexico. The gaps were 24 and 22 points in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro,

respectively (LAPOP 2023a; 2023b; 2023c; 2023d; 2023f; 2023g). Larger gaps predict greater support for deployments to reduce crime and violence (Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017).

Neither Colombia (Dizard 2018, 81-82) and Mexico (158-162) exhibit clear correspondence between urban troop deployments and upcoming elections. That such deployments have come soon after elections in both Colombia (105-115) and Mexico (152-159) nonetheless suggests that *principal prerogative*, as evidenced by executive turnover, has had some influence. A difference is that deployments in both countries have corresponded with a marginalization of left-wing legislators. In Colombia, left-wing legislators “were often tarred as supported of the guerrillas” (68). The legislature’s “subordinate status on [military] matters was unsurprising” (69) as a result. In Mexico, even as the left gained seats in the national legislature, “no substantive oversight or notable legislation emerged” (145).

Puzzle of troop deployments’ discontinuation

This dissertation’s second empirical puzzle has been why neither the Federal Intervention nor GLO operations continued in Rio de Janeiro during the 2019-2022 Bolsonaro administration. This puzzle relates to how the monitoring coalition might have influenced such an outcome. Latin American Politics and Brazilian Politics scholarship implies that civilians have few incentives and capabilities to end troop deployments compared with members of the principal-agent relationship, such as the national executive. It also implies that troop deployments benefit the principal electorally and the agents institutionally. Given these considerations, as well as apparent motivations to sustain Rio de Janeiro deployments after 2018, we would have expected the Intervention and/or GLO operations to continue under Bolsonaro.

A four-step process could help make the relationship between the 2018 monitoring coalition and the surprising discontinuation of Rio de Janeiro troop deployments after 2018 less puzzling. In the first step, information was the mechanism that could have linked the coalition to the discontinuation of deployments. More than the coalition's other ad-hoc institutions, the Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit extensively collected original information with which to monitor the Intervention.

Such strategy selection was a product of these ad-hoc institutions' informal autonomy from the Temer administration, Brazilian Army, Federal Intervention Cabinet, and Rio de Janeiro state police. Indeed, informal autonomy was necessary for institutions to use this strategy. Informal autonomy limited institutions' access to information from the Intervention's principal and agents. This limitation, in turn, motivated institutions' usage of data activism and collective tutelage to monitor how security forces were implementing Temer's policy. The cohesion of their internal staff and external consortia aided their original monitoring.

In the second step, influencing political discourse could have been the initial impact that the monitoring coalition could have achieved. The Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit used their original monitoring information to shape critical media coverage about the Intervention. They did so more than the coalition's other ad-hoc institutions and more than prominent, preexisting civilian organizations. Informal autonomy could have been necessary for institutions to have a considerable influence on media coverage.

This influence on media coverage did not result from newspapers' mere attempt to legitimize the Intervention. Rather, it could have resulted from journalists' incentives to produce stories about the Intervention that were novel, conflictual, balanced, and authoritative. The Observatory's and Circuit's autonomy contributed to coverage by encouraging collection of original information and by enabling external criticism of the Intervention. The Intervention's limited transparency provided the Observatory, Circuit, and journalists with an additional motivation, as well as a new opportunity, to fill the gap in authoritative information regarding this troop deployment.

In the third step, influencing legitimacy concerns could have been the intermediate impact that the monitoring coalition could have achieved. The Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit figured more prominently than other civilian institutions, whether ad-hoc or permanent, into Army officers' worries about Rio de Janeiro troop deployments' appropriateness and effectiveness. The institutions' original and critical information specifically contributed to societal reasons for officers' concerns. These societal reasons related to the Intervention's level of public support and its consequences for the Army's public image, especially among junior/mid-level officers. Informal autonomy could have been necessary for institutions to influence legitimacy concerns. Deployments outside Rio de Janeiro had little influence.

In the fourth step, influencing military lobbying could have been the ultimate impact that the monitoring coalition achieved. Army officials lobbied the Bolsonaro administration against continuing Rio de Janeiro troop deployments. This lobbying stemmed partially from legitimacy concerns that the coalition could have influenced. However, the deployments' discontinuation resulted from *principal prerogative* as evidenced by national and state executive turnover more

than from military lobbying. President Bolsonaro and, in Rio de Janeiro, Governor Witzel had few political incentives to sustain such deployments after their October 2018 elections.

Incentives could have been limited because executives' interests and preferences necessitated distinguishing their policies from those of their predecessors. The executives' interpersonal rivalry also restricted space for cooperation. Insofar as the monitoring coalition influenced military lobbying by using its information and its impact on political discourse to raise legitimacy concerns, this influence was less consequential than *principal prerogative* in shaping troop deployments' discontinuation.

I expect this explanation of institutional impact on troop deployment to hold more in other Latin American democracies under the following circumstances. First, when monitoring coalitions form during urban troop deployments, at least some of the coalition's institutions have both informal autonomy and the capability to collect extensive original information about the deployment. Second, these institutions have the capability and relationships to influence media coverage about the troop deployments. The media also is willing and able to produce coverage that deviates from the official position.

Third, military officials are sensitive to how political discourse might influence deployments' public support and the armed forces' public image. Fourth, regardless of whether military officials lobby against sustaining deployments, change elections or other processes for executive selection introduce new national leaders interested in differentiating themselves from

predecessors and not in cooperating with the local leaders of the deployment region. These circumstances are on top of those related to institutional formation.

Generalizability of institutional impacts theory

Comparing these countries with Brazil across the above conditions, I expect that the *autonomy paradox*'s theory of institutional impacts on troop deployments will generalize moderately to Colombia and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Mexico. These countries' civilian coalitions have shown mixed capacity for monitoring and little influence on media coverage. Military officials, while concerned with the armed forces' international image, have exhibited little worry about domestic legitimacy. However, executive turnover has enabled and encouraged newly elected presidents to constrain their predecessors' troop deployments through legal reforms. The importance of executive turnover suggests that *principal prerogative* determines troop deployments' discontinuation more so than civilian institutions' impacts on legitimacy concerns.

Civilian coalitions in Colombia and Mexico have shown mixed capacity for monitoring troop deployments. In Mexico "legislators remained largely supine, with little attempt to exercise greater monitoring of the military" (Dizard 2018, 37) and "[l]evels of external monitoring and civilian expertise on military issues increased only slowly" (136). In Colombia, presidential "demand for [counterinsurgency] results and the [human rights] monitoring that accompanied large-scale U.S. security assistance generated more civilian presence within the military, limiting [the armed forces'] autonomy" (45) from civilians. Civilian monitoring of military expenditure also increased (87). Capacity thus has been greater in Colombia. Relative to Brazil, however,

Colombia's civilian capacity depended more on U.S. influence and involved reacting to human rights violations more than monitoring to detect and raise the cost of such violations (72-75).

Civilian coalitions in Colombia and Mexico have had little influence on media coverage regarding troop deployments. In Colombia, the media's "late awareness" of human rights violations during troop deployments "came to the frustration of the oversight coalition, which had been documenting and calling attention to" such violations for years (Dizard 2018, 111). "The late arrival of the Colombian media" to covering violations during deployments thus "underscores the importance of [civil society] reporting as an indispensable element of sustaining oversight coalition pressure" (112). "Despite the volume of reports by rights groups, the national media paid little attention to [extrajudicial] killings" (112) until journalists had developed the stories independent of the coalition's information. In Mexico, media coverage of rights violations also was independent of coalition information (165-166).

In relation to civilian coalitions, military officials in Colombia and Mexico have shown little sensitivity to public support for troop deployments and their consequences for the armed forces' public image. Officials have been sensitive to deployments' costs, yet this sensitivity has stemmed mainly from legal reasons in the face of judicial sanctions for human rights violations (Dizard 2018, 105-129; 192-200). The Colombian (57; 91; 113; 122) and Mexican (140; 148; 173) militaries have worried about how public criticism and legal consequences of extrajudicial killings risk undermining the armed forces' image. However, these concerns have related to militaries' international image. They have been a product of U.S. influence (208-210), rather than the domestic influence of public opinion and civilian monitoring.

Demonstrating the importance of *principal prerogative*, executive turnover has corresponded with increased legal constraints on troop deployments in Colombia and, to a lesser extent, Mexico. These countries' civilian coalitions have been able to influence such constraints partially because of "the presidents who *inherit* [sic] militarization policies from their predecessors" (Dizard 2018, 207). The countries suggest that, even if they themselves have little informal autonomy from the security forces, center-left presidential "successors [...] can pursue policy alternatives to militarization" (207). Although such alternatives have involved constraining instead of curtailing deployments, they have reflected how turnover can enable and encourage new executives to use their prerogative to control militarization in a way.

Puzzle of police violence's intensification

This dissertation's third empirical puzzle has been why the Federal Intervention saw more police violence than had previous Rio de Janeiro GLO operations. This puzzle concerns how the monitoring coalition was unable to constrain police violence. Previous GLO operations had averaged fewer police killings per month than periods without GLO operations. Military presence might have had a pacifying effect on police during these prior troop deployments. We therefore might not have expected the Intervention, which overlapped with a GLO operation, to result in considerably more police killings than prior deployments.

A logic of substitution could help explain the relationship between the 2018 monitoring coalition and the increase of police violence during the Federal Intervention relative to previous GLO operations. By informing Army officers' legitimacy concerns with the Intervention, the

coalition's Civil Society Observatory and Favelas for Rights Circuit helped raise the military's cost of sustaining Rio de Janeiro troop deployments. Because their autonomous and critical information strategy had contributed to these legitimacy concerns, though, such institutions had little access to Army officers. Access limitations could have hampered civilians' ability to socialize the military into considering not only deployment but, also, police violence illegitimate.

Without such socialization, Army officers could have considered police violence a legitimate substitution for military presence. The Army commanded police incursions into *favelas* but, due partially to legitimacy concerns, had minimal direct participation in these operations. With limited risk of sanction for human rights violations, the Army freed police to kill. A difference is that previous GLO operations had seen soldiers conduct such operations alongside or in place of police. The Army's risk of sanction for human rights violations was greater during such operations. During the Intervention, the Army could have delegated killings to the police with little fear of consequences.

I expect this explanation of institutional impact on police violence to hold more in other Latin American democracies under the following circumstances. First, autonomous, critical institutions have limited access to military officials during troop deployments. Second, soldiers' presence during troop deployments varies from operating alongside or in place of police to commanding but not participating directly in police operations. Third, there is a consistent public and political demand for state violence to reduce crime and violence regardless of whether soldiers or police carry out this violence. These circumstances are on top of those related to institutional formation and institutional impact on troop deployment.

Generalizability of institutional impacts theory

Comparing these countries to Brazil across the above conditions, I expect that the *autonomy paradox*'s theory of institutional impacts on police violence will generalize moderately to Mexico and, somewhat less, to Colombia. Both countries' civilian coalitions have had little access to military officials for socialization. Both countries exhibit the possibility that military presence during troop deployments will vary between conducting and directing police operations. However, views that suggest demand for state violence to reduce crime have decreased considerably in both countries relative to Brazil and are less prevalent in Colombia.

Civilian coalitions in Colombia and Mexico have had little access to military officials during troop deployments for socialization purposes. Military officials in both countries exhibit a "doctrine related to the enemy" toward civil society organizations "that is extremely anachronistic" (Dizard 2018, 217). Colombian military officials view such organizations as "communist infiltrators" (217) who aim to hamper the armed forces' counterinsurgency campaign against left-wing rebels. Mexican military officials view such organization as "pawns of drug cartels" (217) who seek to constrain the armed forces' attempts to dismantle criminal organizations. These perceptions stem partially from organizations' inability to "to more effectively engage military officials" (217) around "education and doctrine" (217),

Both Colombia and Mexico exhibit the possibility for soldiers' presence during troop deployments to vary between conducting and directing police operations. Military and police functions overlap considerably in Colombia, where both the National Police and Military Forces

are within the Ministry of Defense (Viana 2020). Mexico has seen both joint police-military operations against drug trafficking organization, as well as increasing subordination of police agencies to formal and informal military authority (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021, 530-533).

Demand for state violence to reduce crime has decreased across the three countries but more in Colombia and Mexico. In addition to reflecting collective memory of military authoritarianism, support for a hypothetical military coup to reduce crime indicates the extent to which individuals are willing to tolerate potentially repressive measures in exchange for security. Between 2006 and 2018, the percentage of survey respondents who supported a coup in the face of high crime levels went from 44% to 37% in Brazil, 47% to 29% in Colombia, and 63% to 44% in Mexico (LAPOP 2023i). Demand for state violence was stronger and more stable in Brazil.

Opportunities for continued research

The above generalizability discussion has highlighted an opportunity for future research to test this dissertation's *autonomy paradox* argument in Colombia and Mexico. In addition to theory testing, this opportunity includes addressing questions about civilian monitoring capacity, U.S. influence, and the nature of troop deployments. This dissertation also has raised theoretical questions about institutional non-formation, legislative committees, and police-military relations. Moreover, the case study gives rise to empirical questions about the Federal Senate's lack of monitoring, Army officers' self-perception, and Rio de Janeiro's police culture.

Opportunities from the argument

To theorize the formation of civilian control institutions, this dissertation has examined 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions that formed a monitoring coalition during the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro. These institutions shared formal autonomy from the Temer administration, Brazilian Army, Federal Intervention Cabinet, and Rio de Janeiro. The dissertation compared these institutions with one another, and with organizations that did not comprise the monitoring coalition, based on their informal autonomy. It suggested that having both formal and informal autonomy contributed to institutional formation. An opportunity for continued research is to identify additional examples, whether in 2018 Rio de Janeiro or beyond, of institutions that have not formed to control law enforcement militarization. Further analysis of null cases could help develop, test, and strengthen our confidence in the *autonomy paradox* argument more.

A first step toward analyzing null cases of institutional formation further could be to capture the universe of urban troop deployments in Latin America. To my knowledge, no such data exists. Brazil seems to be the only country with an official registry of domestic deployments (Ministério da Defesa 2022b). One approach to capturing the universe is through information requests, including of civilian complaints about human rights violations by security forces (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2023, 9). Another could be using media coverage to identify the time, place, and scope of deployments. A third could be using a registry of Latin American militaries' domestic deployment policies (Red de Seguridad y Defensa en América Latina 2012, 74-78) to identify, in conjunction with the other approaches, the times, places, and scopes of deployments. With such information, a next step is to identify and assess the monitoring (or lack thereof) by main civil society, justice sector, and legislative institutions at the subnational and national levels.

To theorize the formation of civilian control institutions, this dissertation also has discussed legislators' motivations for creating or joining ad-hoc committees aimed at monitoring troop deployments. These committees represent not only another opportunity to identify and assess null cases of civilian monitoring. They also offer a chance to understand institutions' limited impact. We might have expected legislative institutions, with their comparatively strong oversight capabilities and mandates, to influence deployments more than civil society and justice sector actors did. That the opposite occurred in 2018 Rio de Janeiro, where the monitoring coalition's ultimate impact apparently was limited, raises a question about the extent to which controlling militarization is possible without robust legislative participation. Non-governmental organizations and justice agencies can impose societal and legal costs on deployments. Whether these costs can be impactful if legislators do not impose political costs is unclear.

To theorize impacts, this dissertation also has suggested that the military's delegation of repression to the police due to legitimacy concerns could help explain state violence during deployments. It therefore has posited that police-military relations are central to understanding state violence. We nonetheless have little scholarship on police-military relations in Latin America (Cassman 2007). Consequently, we have limited insight regarding the conditions under which police might accept, shirk, or not comply fully with such delegation. We also have little knowledge of police officers' views regarding troop deployments. Building such knowledge will become more important as law enforcement militarization intensifies in Latin America.

Opportunities from the case study

Of the 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions that comprised the Federal Intervention monitoring coalition, the two legislative committees in the Federal Senate did not hold a single meeting or undertake a single monitoring activity. This dissertation has attempted to explain such non-consolidation of civilian control institutions by comparing Federal Senate president Eunício Oliveira, who had little informal autonomy due to close political alignment with the Termer administration, and Chamber of Deputies president Rodrigo Maia, who had more informal autonomy. Oliveira likely had an incentive to keep the Senate's committees on paper whereas Maia had an opportunity to let the Chamber's committees meet and monitor. However, this dissertation's evidence of such a claim is suggestive. Confirming whether Oliveira indeed worked to prevent the Senate committees from meeting and monitoring would help understand why some civilian control institutions form but do not function. A legislative interviewee (#99) and a confidential e-mail with legislative staff²⁵ suggested that this remains an open question.

Regarding impacts, another opportunity for continued research lies in Army officers' legitimacy concerns. Several military interviewees (#9, 18, 31, 71, 109) suggested that "prestige" (*prestígio*) is a key dimension of the Brazilian Army's concerns with societal perceptions of its appropriateness and effectiveness. To my knowledge, however, there is little research to define and conceptualize what this term means for Army officers. Such research would strengthen knowledge about what societal factors shape officials' perceived costs of troop deployments. An

²⁵ This e-mail exchange does not figure into the interview count.

approach could be to analyze usage of this term in Brazilian Army officers' writings, which this dissertation has used as the main data source for understanding legitimacy concerns.

Another impact-related opportunity is understanding Rio de Janeiro state police officers' legitimacy concerns. Because Army officers were the Federal Intervention's main decisionmakers and had authority over the Rio de Janeiro state police, this dissertation has focused on understanding Army officers' perceptions of civilian control and troop deployments more than police officers' views. Further research on police officers' views of troop deployments and extrajudicial killings would contribute to more comprehensive knowledge of law enforcement militarization. A civil society interviewee (#23) indirectly described this research opportunity as follows: "It remains a mystery why such a lethal model [of public security] continues in Rio de Janeiro because it is not effective and has a high cost. [It must be because t]here is a very entrenched and established police culture that gets passed through the generations." Understanding this culture further during troop deployments would be valuable.

As for civilian control institutions' long-term impacts, another opportunity relates to the Network of Security Observatories. Examining its influence on media coverage, legitimacy concerns, and policy change with respect to police violence would help test the generalizability of this dissertation's argument. Because it is based partially on the Civil Society Observatory, and because it spans multiple states and years, the Network offers a valuable opportunity to analyze the *autonomy paradox* with similar institutional design and broader scope.

Opportunities from the generalizability discussion

To explore its argument's generalizability, this dissertation has discussed the extent to which the *autonomy paradox* is likely to hold in Colombia and Mexico. The discussion has used previous scholarship on civilian control institutions in these countries and high-level proxy measures for relevant background conditions. The main opportunity to emerge from this dissertation involves testing the argument's theories more comprehensively in Colombia and Mexico. Such a test could include the above approaches to identifying institutions and deployments. It then could involve a similar approach to data collection and analysis as that which this dissertation has used.

In these and other countries, an additional opportunity to explore the argument's generalizability is to identify and assess the monitoring capacities and strategies of Latin American countries' civilian control institutions. There is little research, to my knowledge, of such capacity at either the national or cross-national levels (Dammert et al. 2014). This gap hampers comparisons within and between countries of civilian control over law enforcement militarization.

Independent of such an assessment, probing the argument's generalizability in Colombia and Mexico also represents an opportunity to examine the relationship between domestic institutions and U.S. security assistance. This international influence contributed to constraints upon troop deployments in Colombia and Mexico. At times, however, U.S. security assistance also hampered efforts to constrain deployments. Whether the U.S. hampered or contributed to such efforts depends partially on whether the U.S. president was a Democrat or Republican and on how much influence Democrats had in the U.S. Congress. Democrats were more sympathetic than Republicans to efforts to constrain deployments (Dizard 2018).

A counterfactual question, then, is whether the Federal Intervention monitoring coalition in Rio de Janeiro would have achieved initial and intermediate impacts if U.S. security assistance had been greater. Republicans controlled the U.S. Congress and presidency in 2018. With more influence through security assistance, U.S. pressure potentially could have worked to constrain the monitoring coalition's formation, to limit critical media coverage, and to insulate Army officers from societal worries about appropriateness and effectiveness. Analyzing this counterfactual is impossible. However, hypothesis testing in Colombia and Mexico could help understand U.S. influence more. It could do so by identifying times and places where, due to geographic or temporal gaps in U.S. security assistance, civilian control dynamics might have been most comparable to 2018 Rio de Janeiro. Such analysis would help understand the extent of U.S. influence on these dynamics more comprehensively.

The generalizability discussion also raises questions about the nature of troop deployments. Intuitively, it is easier for civilians to monitor deployments that have clearer starts and stops. Colombia and Mexico have subnational and temporal variation in troop deployments, yet the Colombian military by design and Mexican military since 2006 have deployed domestically on a fluid basis (Dizard 2018). A deployment to a given city thus represents a reallocation of already mobilized soldiers more than it signifies soldiers leaving and returning to the barracks.

In contrast, Brazil's troop deployments are limited to the constitutional provision of GLO operations or federal interventions. A GLO operation's activation makes it somewhat easy for institutions to identify when and where deployments occur. The iterative nature of Rio de Janeiro

GLO operations arguably makes distinction slightly difficult, yet the start and end of the 2018 Federal Intervention also were hard to miss in government communications and media coverage. Differentiating civilian control dynamics based on the subtlety of deployments could help gauge further the conditions under which institutions form to monitor and impact militarization.

Policy implications

This dissertation offers lessons for how civilians in both Latin America and the U.S. can continue to work toward controlling law enforcement militarization. In Latin America, overcoming the *autonomy paradox* might require balancing independence and cooperation to a greater degree while avoiding cooptation. It might require U.S. civilians, while recognizing their own illegitimacy in these dynamics, to support institutions' information capabilities and to supplement these by pressuring U.S. and Latin American presidents against militarization. In this way, both the primary *autonomy paradox* and secondary *principal prerogative* arguments offer instructive lessons for reducing militarization's risks in the region.

Civilians in Latin America

On the one hand, the *autonomy paradox* argument suggests that civilian control institutions should maximize their informal independence from law enforcement militarization's principal and agents, should collect original monitoring information, and should engage journalists. Doing so could help influence media coverage and raise the military's societal costs of sustaining deployments. On the other hand, the argument suggests that the same conditions of institutional formation, strategies of monitoring, and influences on media coverage risk limiting civilians' ability to socialize military officials into considering extrajudicial killings illegitimate. A

secondary argument concurrently suggests that, more than civilians outside the principal-agent relationship, presidents have the greatest influence over militarization's continuity. The crux of this paradox is how institutions should seek to constrain militarization if what enables their initial and intermediate impacts hampers their ultimate impact and would be compromised by collaboration with leaders who retain *principal prerogative* of militarization.

One possible response is to balance autonomy and cooperation to a greater extent. Being formally and informally independent of militarization's principal and agents is not mutually exclusive, necessarily, with collecting information from, and sharing information with these actors. If civilian control institutions can take measures against cooptation and mitigate the risk that their information will fuel militarization, they possibly could increase their opportunities to socialize military officials against both troop deployments and extrajudicial killings.

Another potential approach to the *autonomy paradox* involves enhancing civilians' ability to take advantage of these socialization opportunities. One proposal is that civilians "ought to consider active efforts to acquire expertise in military doctrine" (Dizard 2018, 217) if they want to alter how officials perceive militarization. The risk of cooptation might increase with civilians' level of expertise insofar as acquiring such knowledge and skills involves submitting to socialization by military officials themselves. Deepening knowledge of how military officials think nonetheless might be crucial in order for civilians to access and socialize these officials.

A final policy implication for civilians in Latin America concerns how this dissertation has underscored the importance of *principal prerogatives* in shaping militarization's continuity. On

top of positioning themselves for socialization opportunities, civilians who are intent on controlling militarization's risks might benefit from strategies alliances with challengers and newcomers to the presidency. Working to shape presidential candidates' and incoming presidents' interests, options, and preferences around troop deployments could pay even greater dividends than attempting to convince soldiers of deployments' illegitimacy.

Civilians in the U.S.

This dissertation offers several implications for civilian policy actors in the U.S. despite, or perhaps because of how its theory-building case study does not focus on U.S. influence. The case study has suggested that, absent considerable U.S. influence through security assistance, civilian control institutions possibly can achieve initial and intermediate but not ultimate impacts towards curtailing law enforcement militarization in Latin America. A policy question, therefore, is how allies of these institution might help achieve these ultimate impacts.

Balancing autonomy with cooperation and building expertise in military doctrine might help domestic institutions overcome the *autonomy paradox* through access and socialization. U.S. allies in the academic, legislative, non-governmental, and philanthropic sectors could supplement these efforts in several ways. One is through their capacities as donors. Providing funds, partnerships, and trainings to support capabilities like data activism and collective tutelage could help strengthen institutions' work to shape media coverage and to influence military officials' costs of troop deployments. Structuring funds to foster and preserve institutions' autonomy from U.S. policy sectors could reduce the risk of cooptation, including by U.S. interests, and minimize the extent to which military officials can discredit such institutions as tools of these interests.

Perhaps more importantly, allied U.S. legislators could pressure presidential administrations in the U.S. and Latin America against militarization in light of *principal prerogative*'s importance. This dissertation has suggested that the *autonomy paradox* limits domestic civilian control institutions' impact on militarization's principal, who retains ultimate decision-making authority around the deployment. The logical alternative is for international allies to influence militarization's principal. Conditioning security assistance on demilitarization and, to reduce extrajudicial killings, incentivizing community policing as a main means of security provision could be avenues.

Highlighting militarization's risks to the armed forces' societal standing could be another avenue. Executives who have gambled on militarization for electoral gains partially have staked their political survival on the armed forces' public image. If U.S. allies can help executives understand military officials' potential concerns with how deployments risk the armed forces' public image, executives might be more amenable to getting soldiers off the streets. Intuitively, officials might be unlikely to convey this message themselves because of how deployments empower the armed forces politically. The institutional benefits of deployments might continue to outweigh the institutional costs even as the societal costs increase. Liaising between the principal and agent could help ensure that militarization's risks to the armed forces' image and, thus, to the president's political fortunes are clear.

Of course, U.S. civilians' legitimacy is limited because their policy preferences, their political behaviors, and their tax dollars have fueled law enforcement militarization in Latin America.

There is a risk that further pressure will have unintended consequences that exacerbate militarization. The Federal Intervention case study suggests, also, that civilian control institutions could be influential without U.S. pressure. Understanding what, if anything, such institutions want from international partners should be the first step in any funding and pressure campaigns.

Summary

This chapter has concluded the dissertation by revisiting its empirical puzzles, speculating as to its argument's generalizability, presenting its opportunities for continued research, and offering its policy implications. The puzzles concern why a coalition of 13 ad-hoc civilian institutions formed to monitor the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, why the Intervention and GLO operations did not continue into the 2019-2022 Bolsonaro administration, and why police violence was greater during the Intervention than prior GLO operations.

By explaining these institutions' formation, strategies, and impacts, the *autonomy paradox* and secondary *principal prerogative* argument could make such developments less puzzling.

Institutions' autonomy from the Intervention's principal and agents enabled their formation, shaped their strategies of collecting original monitoring information, and could have contributed to their impacts on media coverage and Army officers' concerns with deployments' legitimacy. The October 2018 elections potentially contributed more than the monitoring coalition did to Rio de Janeiro deployments' discontinuation. At the same time, autonomy could have limited their access to, and, thus, their opportunity to socialize officers into considering police violence illegitimate. The Army potentially delegated repression to the police whereas prior GLO operations had seen more military involvement in operations.

The argument that these puzzles inform should generalize moderately to strongly in Colombia and Mexico. Similar coalitions have formed to constrain previous troop deployments in these countries. They have had mixed capacity to monitor deployments, influence critical media coverage, and raise military officials' concerns with deployments' domestic legitimacy.

Presidential elections have accounted for constraints upon troop deployments, but so has U.S. security assistance - a limited factor in Brazil. Both countries' coalitions have had little access to officials for socialization. Both countries have the possibility for soldiers to command police operations without participating directly. Demand for state violence is less stable and weaker than in Brazil. Future research could examine such claims via theory testing in these countries.

Additional research opportunities related to generalizability include assessing the monitoring capacities and strategies of civilian control institutions through Latin America, about which we have little scholarship. Examining the argument's generalizability also could involve subnational and temporal variation in U.S. influence and the fluid nature of deployments, both of which are more prominent in Colombia and Mexico than in Brazil. The argument and case study also present opportunities to examine null cases of institutional formation, analyze whether controlling militarization is possible without strong legislative participation, and understand police-military relations to a greater extent.

The dissertation's policy implications are that civilian control institutions, while sustaining their autonomy, might need to cooperate more with militarization's principal and agents. Sharing information and developing expertise in military doctrine could expand opportunities for

civilians to socialize officials against troop deployments and police violence. Allying with presidential candidates and incoming presidents could help shape executives' interests, options, and preferences against militarization, given how successors are more likely to curtail troop deployments than are predecessors who initiate deployments. U.S. civilians could support these institutions as donors, helping strengthen information capabilities, and as advocates, helping convince U.S. and Latin American presidents of militarization's illegitimacy. Acting upon both sets of implications will present risks. If civilians can mitigate these risks, their ability to control militarization by curbing deployments and violence could expand considerably.

A final reflection is that, while civilians outside militarization's principal-agent relationship could impact this relationship to some extent, the greatest opportunity to impact militarization itself potentially lies with the principal. If executives militarize law enforcement, it is unlikely that civilians outside their administration could reduce militarization's risks to democracy. Executives ideally would participate in such risk reduction by ending deployments as soon as possible and preventing killings as much as possible. Even more ideally, rather than militarize policing, executives would orient public security away from repression and toward rights.

Because executives have few incentives to do so, it also would be ideal that voters elect leaders who will protect democracy and rights instead of repressing in the name of security. Civilian institutions outside the principal-agent relationship might not control militarization fully, yet civilians in the electorate could advance this objective with how they signal their preferences and select their leaders. Understanding how these preferences and selections could change is another important task for scholars of Latin American Politics and supporters of democracy in the region.

Appendix A: Institutional summaries

To supplement the first chapter's "Puzzling formation of monitoring coalition" subsection, this appendix offers short, descriptive summaries of the 13 ad-hoc monitoring institutions. The first six concern institutions that did not produce final reports whereas the final seven concern institutions that did produce final reports. The summaries focus on formation and, to the extent possible, on strategy for the six institutions that did not produce final reports. For the seven that did produce final reports, the summaries focus on strategy and impacts.

The goal of this appendix is to consolidate descriptive information on these institutions in a single place for readers' convenience, not to offer comparative, comprehensive, or explanatory narratives of these institutions' dynamics and empirical importance for the argument. I use interview data to explain institutions' formation and strategy in the absence of other sources. Most information here appears diffusely in the dissertation's empirical chapters, which relate the institutions directly to my *autonomy paradox* argument. Assuming that readers already have reviewed the dissertation, I avoid repeating background information here to the extent possible.

Ad-hoc monitoring institutions that did not produce final reports

Center for Supervision of Rights Guarantees (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro)

A civil society interviewee (#64) described how, before calling themselves the Center for Supervision of Rights Guarantees, a group of Federal University of Rio de Janeiro administrators and professors established the Human Rights and Academic Community Defenders for Democracy (*Defensores de Direitos Humanos e Comunidade Acadêmica*). Soon after President Temer decreed the Federal Intervention, they meet with civil society and justice sector

representatives to discuss the troop deployment's likely consequences. This meeting underscored the need for a "public authority" (#64) to monitor the Intervention, comprised of civil society organizations, justice agencies, and legislators. Motivating this group's formation were the additional factors of collective memory regarding prior militarization episodes and political conflict over President Temer's legitimacy. Given that this university borders the Maré *favela*, mobilization rewards also contributed to institutional formation insofar as controlling the Intervention's consequences in *favelas* could reduce its risks for the university campus.

The Human Rights and Academic Community Defenders then launched a March 2018 online petition, intended for President Temer, to express concern with the Federal Intervention. Ending with the petitioners' commitment to monitor the Intervention, the text reflected multiple factors of institutional formation that this dissertation highlights: the autonomy of academia, including public universities, from the Temer administration; collective memory of prior militarization episodes; and political conflict over President Temer's legitimacy. The petition collected 3,181 signatures, including from current and former university administrators, emeritus professors, elected officials and former senior bureaucrats, artists and intellectuals, legal experts and human rights defenders, and labor leaders and other professionals (Defensores de Direitos Humanos e Comunidade Acadêmica pela Democracia 2018).

After launching the petition, the Human Rights and Academic Community Defenders became the Center for Supervision of Rights Guarantees. Comprised of administrators, professors, and students, this institution aimed to monitor the Federal Intervention's unfolding in *favelas*. It was led by chancellor Roberto Leher, law professor Carol Proner, and engineering professor Oscar

Rosa Mattos. Motivating the Center's formation were both "institutional concern" over the Intervention's human rights consequences in *favelas* and "ethical neutrality" (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2018) or autonomy from the Temer administration and security forces. Participants in the Center's first meeting included civil society activists and left-wing legislators of three other ad-hoc monitoring institutions: the Committee to Represent the Municipal Chamber in Brasília, represented by city councilor Tarcísio Motta of the left-wing Socialism and Freedom Party (*Partido Socialismo e Liberdade*); the Chamber of Deputies' External Committee on the Federal Intervention, represented by Rio de Janeiro deputy Jandira Feghali of the left-wing Communist Party of Brazil (*Partido Comunista do Brasil*); and the Popular Truth Commission (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2018).

A civil society interviewee (#64) nonetheless emphasized that the Center for Supervision of Rights Guarantees had been nonpartisan. The Center collaborated with legislators but not political parties, which were focused on the October 2018 elections. The Center resolved, at its first meeting, to coordinate with other monitoring institutions and deepen the study of human rights and violence. Some participants also sought "to dialogue with the [federal] government" (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2018) around human rights during the Intervention.

A civil society interview (#64) suggested that, despite meeting with representatives of the Federal Intervention Cabinet and Brazilian Navy, the Center for Supervision of Rights Guarantees had performed little monitoring. The Center created individual, voluntary research groups. These groups, to a degree in coordination with other ad-hoc monitoring institutions and permanent organizations, received some information from *favela*-based organizations about the

Intervention's human rights consequences. These groups monitored the Intervention with moderate intensity through August 2018 and, due partially to political attention around the October 2018 elections, with little intensity from September to December 2018.

The civil society interviewee (#64) added that this monitoring had produced no reports. Having no full-time staff and insufficient coordination with other institutions limited the Center's monitoring. Another limitation, symbolized by the Marielle Franco assassination, reportedly was *favela*-based organizations' fear of monitoring the Intervention extensively. Owing to these factors, the interviewee said that the Center lacked a "systematic [monitoring] capacity."

The Center for Supervision of Rights Guarantees did not receive mention in either critical newspaper coverage or Army officer writings sampled for this dissertation. It also received no mention in interviews about the relationship between the monitoring coalition and Rio de Janeiro troop deployments' discontinuation.

Civil Public Inquiry into the Federal Intervention (Federal Public Prosecutor's Office)

Julio José Araujo was the federal prosecutor in São João de Meriti, a municipality of metropolitan Rio de Janeiro's Baixada Fluminense region. He established the Civil Public Inquiry into the Federal Intervention as a type of class-action investigation to monitor potential human rights violations (veja 2018a). It specifically sought "accountability for the Federal Intervention's lack of planning and its long-term consequences" in Baixada Fluminense, according to a justice sector interviewee (#73). As discussed below, a subsequent investigation

fueled by Araujo's 2018 monitoring led the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office to take the national and state governments to court over their conduct of the Federal Intervention.

A justice sector interviewee (#73) said that, despite strong support for the Intervention within the Public Prosecutor's Office, Araujo had been able to establish the institution because the Office had "a lot of autonomy" and its prosecutors especially had "a lot of independence" within the agency. Such autonomy enabled Araujo to create the Civil Public Inquiry as a response to civil society concerns with human rights violations and accountability limitations during the Intervention. The interviewee added, though, that it had been exclusively Araujo's undertaking. Prosecutorial independence to some extent had precluded benefitting from broader support within the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office when monitoring the Intervention.

The justice sector interviewee (#73) stated that the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office had created the Civil Public Inquiry "because there was a lot of concern [in civil society] with the measures adopted by the Intervention and with the lack of transparency. [...] There was a lot of confusion about how the [Intervention] would be conducted." As a result, "the Inquiry tried to collect data on [the policy's] implementation", including through public hearings and information requests. The Inquiry monitored the Intervention during 2018 and, as part of the broader Federal Public Prosecutor's Office investigation, built its case after 2018.

The exact number of Civil Public Inquiry hearings and requests is unclear. That said, an example is how the Inquiry requested information from the Cabinet and Eastern Military Command (*Comando Militar do Leste*) on the following: Operation Rio de Janeiro's activities in Baixada

Fluminense since July 2017; the Cabinet’s operational plans in the region; and the Cabinet’s plans for transparency and dialogue with residents (Estado de S. Paulo 2018). A justice sector interviewee (#73) added that it “was difficult to obtain information” from the Cabinet, which “had a laconic way of responding to [the Inquiry’s] questions and shared unspecific information. This was one of the greatest problems [of] monitoring the Intervention.” The Cabinet often refused to share such information with the Civil Public Inquiry.

A court document provided by a justice sector interviewee (#73) suggests that, aside from monitoring through public hearings and information requests, the Civil Public Inquiry investigation had informed prosecutors’ oral arguments (*eventos*) before the federal district court in Rio de Janeiro. The document seems to reference roughly 20 arguments, some of which apparently included Federal Intervention Cabinet representatives. Some might have involved the broader Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office and occurred after the Intervention’s conclusion in December 2018. These arguments concerned the Intervention’s plans, budgets, operations, and consequences, as well as Rio de Janeiro State’s plans for police reform and greater public participation in policymaking related to law enforcement. Recurring themes in this document included difficulties with obtaining information from the Cabinet, as well as the court’s siding with the Cabinet and State over the Inquiry (Ministério Público Federal 2022, 7-56).

That said, the Civil Public Inquiry also collected some operational details from civil society. An example from the court document is how one civil society organization, the Scream Baixada Forum (*Fórum Grita Baixada*), provided the Inquiry with June 2018 testimonials from community leaders and with details from social media about a joint police-military operation in

the Mesquita municipality. The organization described how officers had covered their faces with masks, flown their helicopters low over homes, and aimed their weapons at residents on the street. In response to these details, the Federal Intervention Cabinet reportedly defended its operations during oral argument rather than share more information or commit to making operations more transparent and less disruptive (Ministério Público Federal 2022, 15-16).

The Civil Public Inquiry's 2018 monitoring eventually led the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, in March 2021, to ask the federal district court to demand retroactive transparency and accountability from the national government and Rio de Janeiro State regarding the Intervention in Baixada Fluminense. After the district court determined the case inadmissible, the Office asked the federal regional court in September 2022 to condemn the national and state government for lack of transparency and accountability. The Office argued that, although the district court had determined the case inadmissible on the grounds that judges could not evaluate public policy, the regional court indeed was responsible for evaluating violations of transparency and other constitutional guarantees (O Dia 2022). A justice sector interviewee (#73) said that, at the time of interview, the Office's case still was making its way through the courts.

Two critical newspaper articles referenced the Civil Public Inquiry. One focused on Araujo's opening of the Inquiry, citing transparency concerns around the Federal Intervention (Estado de S. Paulo 2018). Another, which more generally covered the Intervention in Rio de Janeiro's Baixada Fluminense region, quoted Araujo regarding the Federal Intervention Cabinet's limited transparency: "The situation is terrible. We sent information request, we reiterated [the requests] later. One of them received a response, in a very generic way, and the others were unanswered.

The first aspect [of the Intervention] that we already see is the lack of transparency” (Araujo, in Franco and Amâncio 2018). The Inquiry did not appear in either Army officers’ writings about Rio de Janeiro troop deployments or interviews about deployments’ discontinuation after 2018.

External Committee on the Federal Intervention (Federal Senate)

Three left-wing legislators, none of whom either represented Rio de Janeiro or had voted for the Federal Intervention, submitted Federal Senate Requirement 37 on February 20, 2018 to establish the upper house’s External Committee on the Federal Intervention. They were Vanessa Grazziotin of Amazonas state and the left-wing Communist Party of Brazil, Lídice de Mata of Bahia state and the left-wing Brazilian Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Brasileiro*), and Randolfe Rodrigues of Amazonas state and the left-wing Sustainability Network (*Rede Sustentabilidade*). The stated justifications were that this policy constituted the first such federal intervention since democratization, that it evoked images of military authoritarianism, and that civil society organization were concerned with human rights. It therefore was “essential that the Federal Senate monitor” the Intervention (Senado Federal 2018b). Collective memory thus was a main factor in this institution’s formation.

The External Committee had four members: primary (*titular*) member Rose de Freitas, from neighboring Espírito Santo state and the right-wing Brazilian Democratic Movement; primary member Lindbergh Farias, from Rio de Janeiro and the left-wing Worker’s Party; alternate (*suplente*) member Eduardo Lopes, from Rio de Janeiro and the right-wing Brazilian Republican Party (*Partido Republicano Brasileiro*); and alternate member Romário, from Rio de Janeiro and the right-wing *Podemos* party. The committee did not assign a president or vice president. It had

vacancies for both a primary and an alternate member (Senado Federal 2024b). A legislative interviewee (#97) said that, because it did not assign a president or vice president and because it had vacancies, the institution was not formed fully in practice.

Legislators from Rio de Janeiro were somewhat overrepresented among the External Committee's few members. On the one hand, three of 81 (4%) senators represented Rio de Janeiro, 18 (22%) belonged to left-wing parties, and 55 (68%) had voted for the Intervention. On the other, three of four (75%) External Committee members represented Rio de Janeiro, one (25%) belonged to left-wing parties, and three (75%) had voted for the Intervention.

Legislators who had participated in similar permanent and ad-hoc committees also were overrepresented to a degree. Twenty-three (28%) senators were members of the permanent Human Rights and Participatory Legislation Committee (*Comissão de Direitos Humanos, e Legislação Participativa*), eight (10%) were members of the 2013-2014 Public Security Financing Committee (*Comissão Temporária Externa destinada a debater e propor soluções para o financiamento da Segurança Pública*), and 10 (12%) were members of the 2015 Parliamentary Inquiry Committee on Murders of Youth (*Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito do Assassinato de Jovens*). Among the External Committee's seven members, two (50%) were on the Human Rights Committee, one (25%) had served on the Public Security Finance Committee, and one (25%) had served on the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee.

The Federal Senate's External Committee held no public hearings (Senado Federal 2024a). The institution's only publicly available document other than Requirement 37 concerns meeting

requests from another ad-hoc monitoring institution, the Committee to Represent the Municipal Chamber in Brasília (Senado Federal 2018a). The External Committee produced no reports on the Federal Intervention. Indeed, as a legislative interviewee (#97) confirmed, the External Committee performed no monitoring whatsoever of the Intervention after being established.

A legislative interviewee (#97) gave several possible explanations of why the Federal Senate's External Committee did not monitor the Federal Intervention. One was that the Federal Senate's 2018 attention to law enforcement was focused on legislation regarding the Unified Public Security System (*Sistema Único de Segurança Pública*), which aimed to integrate federal security and intelligence agencies. The interviewee said that, because the Federal Senate has three legislators per state whereas the Chamber of Deputies apportions legislators based on state population, Rio de Janeiro senators had less opportunity to draw colleagues' attention to the Federal Intervention than Rio de Janeiro deputies did.

A related reason from this legislative interviewee (#97) was that the Federal Senate reportedly struggles with sustaining temporary committees because it already has too many permanent committees relative to the number of senators. Another reason was that the left-wing opposition to President Temer mainly sought to challenge the Federal Intervention through the Supreme Federal Tribunal, Brazil's high court (Partido Socialismo e Liberdade 2018), rather than in the National Congress. However, that the Chamber of Deputies' external committees did perform substantial monitoring and had strong left-wing representation seems to bely this third reason.

This ad-hoc monitoring institution received no mention in the dissertation's sample of either critical media coverage regarding the Federal Intervention or Army officers' writings about Rio de Janeiro troop deployments. The institution also received no mention in interviews about the relationship between the monitoring coalition and such deployments' discontinuation after 2018.

Juridical Observatory of the Intervention (National Bar Association of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro Division)

Felipe Santa Cruz, President of the National Bar Association of Brazil's Rio de Janeiro Division, announced the creation of the Juridical Observatory of the Intervention shortly after President Temer's decree in February 2018. Its nine members would include Santa Cruz, the Division's prosecutor general Fábio Nogueira, the Division's Public Security Committee (*Comissão de Segurança Pública*) chair Breno Melaragno, the Division's Human Rights Committee (*Comissão de Direitos Humanos*) chair Marcelo Chalhó, Brazilian Lawyers Institute (*Instituto dos Advogados Brasileiros*) president Tércio Lins e Silva, and lawyers Ana Paula Barcellos, Gustavo Binenbojm, Rodrigo Brandão, and Thiago Bottino (Fraga 2018).

Motivating the Juridical Observatory's formation was the idea of political conflict more than collective memory. A civil society interviewee (#60) suggested that being the son of an activist who had been disappeared during the military dictatorship had informed Santa Cruz's perception of the Federal Intervention's risks. At the institution's launch event, Santa Cruz was clear-eyed about the Intervention's human rights risks. Santa Cruz said, however, that the Juridical Observatory would not seek to relitigate "what happened in the 1960s [...] We need to have the Constitution as this discussion's legal framework and our eyes to the future, not the past. We are

discussing not the military dictatorship but the crisis in Rio de Janeiro” (Fraga 2018). He later would stress the need “to analyze the Intervention or even criticize it without creating conflict with the [Armed Forces, given that soldiers ...] were put into a crisis situation by a [presidential administration that] does not have any credibility” (Ordem de Advogados do Brasil, Seccional Rio de Janeiro 2018a). President Temer, not the military, seemed like the main motivator.

The importance of political conflict was evident further in Santa Cruz’s comments about how the Juridical Observatory would aim to prevent President Temer from using the Intervention “for electoral ends” and from “manipulating the emotions and hopes of the Rio de Janeiro people” (Fraga 2018). That said, the Juridical Observatory apparently sought to collaborate with the Federal Intervention Cabinet in a way. This collaboration would center on obtaining information and provide guidance to ensure that the security forces guaranteed constitutional rights. Santa Cruz said, “[w]e decided to create [the Juridical Observatory] so that, when the government informs us of the facts, we can monitor the [Intervention]” (Fraga 2018). He added, “the need for dialogue [with the Cabinet] is accepted [because Rio de Janeiro’s security crisis is acute and] saying that we do not want anything [to change] does not fix [the situation]” (Fraga 2018). Restricting collective search warrants would be one of the Juridical Observatory’s main goals (Fraga 2018; Ordem de Advogados do Brasil, Seccional Rio de Janeiro 2018b).

At its first meeting in March 2018, the Juridical Observatory resolved to request information from the Federal Intervention Cabinet about security forces’ new practice of photographing *favela* residents’ identification cards at checkpoints. Members were concerned with how “the lack of regulation and [of] public and transparent criteria” around this practice “can generate

doubts and challenges regarding [...] constitutionality” (Ordem de Advogados do Brasil, Seccional Rio de Janeiro 2018a). Members also discussed the possibility of coordinating with the Chamber of Deputies’ Legislative Observatory of the Intervention (Ordem de Advogados do Brasil, Seccional Rio de Janeiro 2018a). That said, the Juridical Observatory’s number of internal and partners meetings, as well as its number of information requests, are unclear.

The Juridical Observatory’s Santa Cruz met at least once with the Federal Intervention Cabinet. The first meeting, in mid-March 2018, was attended by Federal Intervener Gen. Walter Braga Netto, Minister of Human Rights Gustavo do Vale Rocha, Rio de Janeiro State Secretary of Women and the Elderly Átila Alexandre Nunes, and Rio de Janeiro Attorney General José Eduardo Ciotola Gussem. Santa Cruz advised curbing security forces’ collective search warrants and investigating thoroughly the Marielle Franco assassination. He reportedly was pleased with Braga Netto’s response that the Cabinet would cease collective search warrants (Passi 2018).

In addition to private meetings and information requests, the Juridical Observatory apparently monitored the Federal Intervention via media coverage of deaths, injuries, arrests, and torture by security forces. An internal September 2018 document shared by a civil society interviewee (#111) appears to compile media coverage of 62 deaths, eight injuries, two arrests, and one torture incident between roughly mid-April and mid-September 2018. This document, compiled by the Rio de Janeiro Division’s Documentation and Research Center [*Centro de Documentação e Pesquisa*], was to inform the Juridical Observatory’s monitoring (Ordem de Advogados do Brasil, Seção do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018). Indeed, a civil society interviewee (#63) suggested that media coverage had been the institution’s main information source. The document

also mentions coordination with the Popular Truth Commission, another ad-hoc monitoring institution (Ordem de Advogados do Brasil, Seção do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018).

Several civil society interviewees (#60, 63, 93, 111) nonetheless described the Juridical Observatory's monitoring as limited. One civil society interviewee (#60) said that the Juridical Observatory merely had conducted "a juridical analysis" of the Federal Intervention. It was "very limited to the juridical and legal aspects" of the Intervention "instead of focusing [...] on [the policy and politics of] law enforcement. The Juridical Observatory could have analyzed the latter through "a more interdisciplinary approach with public security specialists and not just lawyers." An additional barrier was that many members of the parent organization had supported the Intervention. The interviewee suggested that, for these reasons, the Juridical Observatory had published internal reports on an interim basis but no final report for the broader public.

Another civil society interviewee (#63) added that, although the Juridical Observatory had monitored media coverage and collaborated with civil society and justice actors (e.g., Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender's Office) to follow specific cases of human rights violations, it had not produced a final report because of Santa Cruz being elected the National Bar Association's general president in late 2018. Two other civil society interviewees (#93, 111) suggested that the Juridical Observatory had been an informal way of facilitating the Rio de Janeiro Division's collaboration with other ad-hoc monitoring institutions and permanent civil society organizations more than an effort dedicated strictly to monitoring.

Two critical newspaper articles referenced the Juridical Observatory. One, concerning military operations in Vila Kennedy, mentioned the institution's intention to request the Federal

Intervention Cabinet's explanation as to why officers had begun to photograph residents' identification cards at checkpoints (Pennaft 2018). Another, concerning Army leaders initial plans for the Intervention, quoted Juridical Observatory member Rorigo Brandão as suggesting that the Federal Intervention Cabinet should measure success based on crime and violence statistics, not public opinion, and should invest heavily in police reform (Texeira and Bacelar 2018). The Juridical Observatory did not receive mentions in Army officers' writings on in interviews regarding troop deployments and their discontinuation after 2018.

Rio Plus Public Defender's Group (Federal Public Defender's Office)

Within the Federal Public Defender's Office, National Public Defender for Human Rights Anginaldo Oliveira Vieira established the Rio Plus Public Defender's Group in February 2018 to monitor the Federal Intervention and to field reports of human rights violations. Oliveira Vieira created this ad-hoc monitoring institution after submitting a letter to Federal Intervener Gen. Braga Netto about the need to respect to human rights during the Intervention. This ad-hoc monitoring institution then focused on developing a webpage for individuals to enter such reports anonymously. The group's coordinator was Thales Arcoverde Treiger, Regional Public Defender for Rio de Janeiro. Additional members were Federal Public Defenders Ana Lúcia Castro de Oliveira, Daniel Macedo Alves Pereira, Marcelo Uzeda de Faria, and Renan Vinícius Sotto Mayor Oliveira, all from Arcoverde Treiger's office (Defensoria Pública da União 2018).

A justice sector interviewee (#59) said that the Rio Plus Public Defender's Group's creation had resulted partially from the idea that Arcoverde Treiger would need "a task force" of additional colleagues to help field a large volume of reports regarding human rights violations and monitor

the Federal Intervention. Because of uncertainty around how the Intervention would unfold, Arcoverde Treiger had requested that Oliveira Viera create the institution for support.

This uncertainty was evident in the justice sector interviewee's (#59) emphasis on how, "when [President Temer decreed] the Intervention, [the Federal Public Defender's Office was] very surprised" and "concerned" and "did not know what was going to happen." This uncertainty indirectly reflected the additional factor of collective memory around prior militarization episodes. Although such a federal intervention was unprecedented, the Office implicitly had reason to worry because of the military dictatorship's legacy and the perception of violence by security forces during *favela* operations since democratization.

The justice sector interviewee (#59) added, however, that the Rio Plus Public Defender's Group's monitoring had been limited. The Federal Public Defender's Office had needed "a channel for complaints [regarding human rights violations and other] information" about the Federal Intervention." However, members of this ad-hoc institution "realized that the creation of a channel for complaints [via the anonymous webpage] was insufficient for the problem [at hand]." They suggested that, because of "digital exclusion", *favela* residents likely would have limited internet access with which to submit complaints. Owing partially to this limitation, the ad-hoc monitoring institution did not produce interim or final reports regarding the Intervention.

Another limitation or explanation of non-reporting was the Rio Plus Public Defender's Group's decision to fold itself into the Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender's Office's Favelas for Rights Circuit. The justice sector interviewee (#59) described how the federal public defenders "realized

that [they needed] to depart from [...] the [standard operating procedure and] to create other expectations of relationships” with *favela* residents during the Intervention. Reportedly, Arcoverde Treiger also had been prioritizing collaboration with *favela*-based organizations and other justice sector agencies. Group members recognized that, whereas they had full caseloads apart from the Group and whereas Arcoverde Treiger’s Regional Public Defender’s Office had only two human rights specialists and, the State Public Defender’s Office had seven. It also had an External Ombudsman’s Office focused on expanding *favela* residents’ access to justice.

The justice sector interviewee (#59) concluded that, because they “knew that the Rio Plus Public Defender’s Group was insufficient”, this institution’s members decided to focus on coordinating with the State Public Defender’s Office and its External Ombudsman’s Office’s Favelas for Rights Circuit. Some of the Group’s members participated in the Circuit’s caravans to *favelas* and contributed to the Group’s final reports rather than continue to operate as a standalone institution. As a result, although the Group itself conducted little monitoring, its members contributed in no small part to the Favelas for Rights Circuit’s strategy.

Two critical newspaper articles referenced Arcoverde Treiger but not the Rio Plus Public Defender’s Group, suggesting that the group had folded itself into the Favelas for Rights Circuit by the time of publication. One article described the Federal Intervention’s first six months. The other discussed Bolsonaro’s intention of discontinuing the Intervention. Both quoted Arcoverde Treiger on how military presence had contributed to police violence: “In the favelas, [...] the Army’s presence empowered bad police officers. We hear *favela* residents’ testimonials all the time about police saying, ‘now we have back up’ (Barbon and Vettorazzo 2018; Linhares 2018).

This ad-hoc monitoring institution did receive mentions in Army officers' writings about Rio de Janeiro troop deployments or in interviews about these deployments' discontinuation.

Subcommittee on Human Rights in the Federal Intervention (Federal Senate, Human Rights and Participatory Legislation Committee)

Regina Sousa, senator of Piauí state and member of the left-wing Worker's Party, submitted Requirement 21 of 2018 for the Federal Senate's permanent Human Rights and Participatory Legislation Committee to create the Subcommittee on Human Rights in the Federal Intervention. Sousa then was serving as president of the permanent committee. Sousa's requirement exemplified how collective memory of prior militarization episodes had been a crucial additional factor when it came to ad-hoc monitoring institutions' formation. The justification for creating this Subcommittee was that, whereas Army Commander Gen. Eduardo Villas Bôas sought to prevent "a new Truth Commission" around the Intervention,

[t]his declaration causes serious apprehensions because the [National] Truth Commission was a victory of society to investigate crimes committed during the military regime against politicians and opposition activists. Due to this, and in order to guarantee respect for [h]uman [r]ights during this federal government action, I propose the creation of a temporary subcommittee to monitor the Federal Intervention (Senado Federal 2018a).

The Subcommittee on Human Rights in the Federal Intervention had three primary members: Paulo Paim of Rio Grande do Sul state and the left-wing Worker's Party; Romário of Rio de Janeiro and the right-wing *Podemos*; and Telmário Mota of Roraima state and the right-wing Brazilian Labor Party (*Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro*). It also had three alternates: Angela Portela of Roraima state and the left-wing Democratic Labor Party (*Partido Democrático Laborista*); Hélio José of the Federal District (Brasília) and the right-wing Republican Party of

the Social Order (*Partido Republicano da Ordem Social*); and Lindbergh Farias of Rio de Janeiro and the Worker's Party. Farias also was a member of the Federal Senate's External Committee. The Subcommittee had three vacancies, including for president and vice president (Senado Federal 2024c), suggesting that it not formed fully in practice.

Human Rights and Participatory Legislation Committee members from Rio de Janeiro and left-wing parties therefore were overrepresented somewhat on the Subcommittee whereas members who had voted for the Federal Intervention were underrepresented slightly. On the one hand, two of 23 (9%) Committee members were from Rio de Janeiro, 10 (43%) were from left-wing parties, and 13 (57%) had voted for the Federal Intervention. On the other hand, two of six (33%) Subcommittee members were from Rio de Janeiro, three of six (50%) were from left-wing parties, and three of six (50%) had voted for the Federal Intervention.

The Subcommittee also exhibited slight overrepresentation of Committee members who had participated in prior ad-hoc institutions with a similar focus. Three of 23 (13%) Committee members had participated in the 2013-2014 Public Security Financing Committee and six (26%) had participated in the 2015 Parliamentary Inquiry Committee on Murders of Youth. One (17%) and three (50%) Subcommittee members had done so in 2013-2014 and 2015, respectively.

During the permanent Committee's February 21, 2018 meeting, it was evident that members had motivations beyond collective memory for joining the Subcommittee on Human Rights in the Federal Intervention. Motta said, "monitoring [...] does not mean a witch hunt, it does not have the [goal] of [hampering] the [Federal Intervention ...] Rather, it works to for us to avoid

excesses [*exageros*]” by security forces (Senado Federal 2018c). Mota wanted to ensure that “all [legal] measures be adopted” to protect” both those who “are in the situation of the police and those who are on the other side” (Senado Federal 2018c). At the same time, Mota wanted the Subcommittee to prevent the Federal Senate’s approval of President Temer’s decree from serving as a “blank check” (Senado Federal 2018c) for the security forces. Mota thus evidenced the importance of political conflict for institutional formation to the extent that his motivations centered on constraining anti-Intervention voices, as well as the security forces themselves.

The Subcommittee on Human Rights in the Federal Intervention performed no monitoring. It held no meetings (Senado Federal 2024c). As with the Federal Senate’s External Committee, a legislative interviewee (#97) gave several possible explanations of why the Subcommittee did not monitor the Federal Intervention. First, the Federal Senate’s attention to law enforcement issues in 2018 was concentrated on the Unified Public Security System. This legislation sought the integration of federal security and intelligence agencies. Whereas the Chamber of Deputies apportions legislators based on state population, the Federal Senate has three legislators per state. Rio de Janeiro senators had fewer opportunities, as a result, to draw colleagues’ attention to the Intervention than their colleagues in the lower house did.

The legislative interviewee (#97) said that a related reason was how, relative to its number of legislators, the Federal Senate struggles with sustaining temporary committees because it already has too many permanent committees. Another reason was that left-wing parties mainly sought to challenge the Federal Intervention through the Supreme Federal Tribunal (Partido Socialismo e

Liberdade 2018) instead of the National Congress. That the Chamber of Deputies' committees performed more monitoring than the Federal Senate's committees did belies this third reason.

The Subcommittee received no mention in this dissertation's samples of either critical media coverage regarding the Federal Intervention or Army officers' writings regarding Rio de Janeiro troop deployments. It received no mention in interviews about deployments' discontinuation.

Ad-hoc monitoring institutions that produced final reports

Committee to Represent the Municipal Chamber in Brasília (Municipal Chamber of Rio de Janeiro)

The Municipal Chamber of Rio de Janeiro's Resolution 9704 of 2018 established this ad-hoc institution in February 2018 to monitor the Federal Intervention and advocate for the city in Brasília. The resolution was authored by right-wing city councilor Carlo Caiado of *Democratas* "to seek information [from federal authorities related to the Intervention] budget, how much will be spent, and what will be done", "to respect residents of Rio de Janeiro city's communities", and to help "reequip" the state police" (Câmara Municipal do Rio de Janeiro 2018g, 13).

These objectives evidenced how, at least for Caiado, the Committee to Represent the Municipal Chamber in Brasília sought both to monitor and to support the Intervention. Indeed, Caiado elsewhere said, "[w]e want to visit each [Military Police] batallion, each [Civil Police] delegacy to understand the [I]ntervention, which cannot be only [a matter] of preventing policing [*policiamiento ostensivo*]." He continued, "[w]e need to see the planning. [... T]he greatest impact that we want is the restructuring of the police" (Câmara Municipal do Rio de Janeiro 2018f, 77).

In addition to Caiado as president, the Committee to Represent the Municipal Chamber in Brasília included nine members selected at the first meeting in February 2018: Cláudio Castro and Otoni de Paula of the right-wing Social Christian Party (*Partido Social Cristiano*) as first and second vice presidents, respectively; Thiago K. Ribeiro of the right-wing Brazilian Democratic Movement and Marcelino D'Almeida of the right-wing *Progressistas* party as third and fourth vice presidents, respectively; Teresa Bergher of the right-wing Brazilian Social Democracy Party (*Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*) as fifth; Fernando William of the left-wing Democratic Labor Party and Leandro Lyra of the right-wing *NOVO* party as rapporteur-general and rapporteur, respectively; and, as assistant rapporteurs, Jones Moura of the right-wing Brazilian Social Democracy Party and Marielle Franco of the Socialism and Liberty Party until her March 2018 assassination (Câmara Municipal do Rio de Janeiro 2018b).

Eight city councilors also joined the Committee after its launch event: Rocal and Marcelo Arar of the right-wing Brazilian Labor Party; Felipe Michel and Junior da Lucinha of the right-wing Brazilian Social Democracy Party; Luiz Carlos Ramos Filho of the right-wing *Podemos*; Reimont of the left-wing Worker's Party; Professor Célio Lupporelli of the right-wing *Democratas*; and Dr. Jairinho of the right-wing Brazilian Democratic Movement party (Comissão de Representação 2018, 1).

The Committee had generally proportionate representation with respect to political ideology and participation in similar committees. Ten of 52 (19%) city councilors overall belonged to left-wing parties, three (6%) were members of the permanent committees on human rights, drug prevention, and civil defense. In comparison, three of 18 (17%) Committee members belonged to

left-wing parties, two (11%) Committee members were on the permanent Human Rights Committee (*Comissão de Defesa dos Direitos Humanos*), and one (6%) was on each of the other permanent committees.

The Committee apparently held four internal meetings and nine external meetings in 2018. Internal meetings focused on summarizing external meetings in which the Committee had participated and planning future meetings in which the Committee would participate (Câmara Municipal do Rio de Janeiro 2018a; 2018b; 2018c; 2018d). External meetings involved the Legislative Observatory of the Intervention, Ministry of Public Security, Federal Intervention Cabinet, Rio de Janeiro State Military Police and Civil Police, Rio de Janeiro Municipal Guard (*Guarda Municipal do Rio de Janeiro*), Rio de Janeiro's neighborhood-based Community Security Councils (*Conselhos Comunitários de Segurança*), and several civil society organizations. Some external meetings apparently occurred in Brasília. In Rio de Janeiro, one meeting with the Federal Intervention Cabinet involved Committee members submitting a formal request to sustain a Municipal Guard initiative that focused on patrolling Rio de Janeiro's downtown district (Comissão de Representação 2018, 4-26). In addition to collecting information through these meetings, the Committee submitted around 50 information requests. The Cabinet shared documents in response to some of these requests (7).

Published in December 2018, the Committee's 32-page final report focused on summarizing the above meetings and information requests more than discussing the Federal Intervention itself. The report was strictly textual, with no designs, charts, graphics, or tables. Discussion of the Intervention was limited to the conclusion that, despite limitations, the Intervention had been

“positive and should remain in place [...] at least until [the capacity of Rio de Janeiro state police had increased sufficiently to reduce crime and violence levels” (26). Otherwise, given that federal interventions prevented constitutional amendments, the report suggested that sustaining GLO Operation Rio de Janeiro was the best alternative (26).

In addition to the aforementioned sections, which apparently were authored by president Caiado, the report had two small sections authored by Committee rapporteurs (Comissão de Representação 2018, 26-31). The first, by assistant rapporteur Lyra, summarized the Committee’s meetings and the Rio de Janeiro transition plan that the Federal Intervention Cabinet had shared with the Committee. Lyra concluded, based on this summary, that the Committee had demonstrated “consistent performance in the exchange of information and requests between the government agencies responsible for [...] the Federal Intervention, civil society organizations, and the [Municipal Chamber]” (Comissão de Representação 2018, 28-29). Lyra added, “the Committee also was responsible for proposing means of collaboration [between] the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro [and] the Federal Intervention [Cabinet]” (29). Such collaboration would involve the municipality investing further in education, health, and, through the Municipal Guard, law enforcement in order to address the root causes of crime and violence and limit the need for future interventions (29).

The final report concluded with three pages from assistant rapporteur Moura, himself a former Municipal Guard officer, with details about his specific activities. These included a request that the Federal Intervention Cabinet compel the Municipality to provide new Municipal Guard non-lethal weaponry, legal action against the postal service for charging an additional fee due to the

cost of crime and violence on delivery operations, a meeting with the National Public Security Secretariat (*Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública*) in Brasília regarding the Municipal Guard, and, lastly, a request that the Cabinet donate non-lethal weaponry to the Municipal Guard (Comissão de Representação 2018, 29-30).

Whereas the Cabinet had not responded to Moura's first weaponry request, it replied to the second request by stating that the Municipal Guard was beyond the Intervention's scope. Moura's section also offered four parting recommendations for the Municipal Chamber to engage further in law enforcement: create a permanent Public Security Committee; enhance coordination with the federal and state governments at the level of security forces; strengthen monitoring of the Municipal Guard's weaponry, to include permitting usage of lethal arms (Comissão de Representação 2018, 29-31). Indeed, the Municipal Chamber established permanent Public Security Committee in 2019 (Câmara Municipal do Rio de Janeiro 2019). The institution did not appear in critical media coverage, Arm officers' writings, or, relating to troop discontinuation after 2018, interviews about the Federal Intervention.

Civil Society Observatory (Candido Mendes University)

Within Candido Mendes University's Center for Security and Citizenship Studies, the Civil Society Observatory had the equivalent of five full-time staff and a budget of USD 100,000 according to a civil society interviewee (#23). The Ford Foundation and Open Society Foundations, according to this interviewee, contributed to the Observatory's budget. Leaders were Silvia Ramos, Observatory Coordinator, and Pablo Nunes, Research Coordinator. It worked as a three-part consortium. First was the Activist Council, comprised of leaders from 20 *favelas*

(e.g., Alemão, Maré, Rocinha, and Vila Kennedy). The Council was responsible for “monitoring and directing” (Observatório da Intervenção 2023) Observatory activities.

Second was the Supporting Entities Network (*Rede de Entidades Apoiadoras*), which consisted of 16 civil society organizations focused on aiding and publicizing the Observatory’s work. Such organizations included the Brazilian Public Security Forum, Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender’s Office, Scream Baixada Forum, Global Justice, Networks of Maré, and Violence Analysis Laboratory, as well as the national Amnesty International (*Anistia Internacional Brasil*) affiliate. Third was Data Production Partnerships (*Parceiros de Produção de Dados*), which collaborated with the Crossfire Institute, Where The Shootouts Are, and the group behind *Defezap*. The latter was a mobile application for reporting state violence produced by Our Cities (*Nossas Cidades*), a Brazilian civil society organization, to collect and analyze information related to criminal and state violence. The three components together sought to build “trustworthy knowledge” on the Federal Intervention, “strengthen the leadership of *favela* [representatives]”, “develop [policy] positions based on democratic and collective processes”, and “ensure the transparency” (Observatório da Intervenção 2023) of Observatory activities.

A civil society interviewee (#24) suggested that collective memory of prior militarization episodes had been the Center for Security and Citizenship Studies’ main reason for creating the Civil Society Observatory. Another civil society interviewee (#23) implied that mobilization rewards, reflected in the opportunity to access donor funding, had been a secondary reason.

Another civil society interviewee (#62) suggested that individuals and organizations had decided

to join the Observatory's consortium to consolidate and publicize information about how the Federal Intervention was unfolding in *favelas*, which the media seemed unlikely to cover.

The Civil Society Observatory extensively used primary data collection practices to monitor and inform critical media coverage of the Federal Intervention. Whether independently or through consortium partners, the Observatory gathered human rights testimonials, monitored media coverage, police operations, and social media trends, conducted public opinion surveys, and analyzed social media trends (Observatório da Intervenção 2019, 16-17). The Observatory also issued information requests. However, its final report stated that Rio de Janeiro state agencies had answered only nine of the Observatory's 84 information requests (11%) satisfactorily (17).

The Civil Society Observatory generated multiple information products apart from the final report, which itself was published in February 2019. It contributed to an early survey by the Brazilian Public Security Forum and Datafolha on Rio de Janeiro residents' views of the Federal Intervention. It produced two interim reports, including one about the Intervention's planning and early consequences (28 pages) and another with resident, artist, expert, and security force testimonials regarding the Intervention's first six months (40 pages). The Observatory also produced nine infographics on the Intervention. Infographics ranged from one to three pages in length. Indeed, a civil society interviewee (#24) suggested that graphic design had been a major focus of the Observatory when creating these products. The graphic design, which included computer-generated images and photographs, were highly evocative, professional, and standardized across products (Observatório da Intervenção 2024).

In addition to presenting the institution's primary data, the Civil Society Observatory's 40-page final report argued that the Federal Intervention and Rio de Janeiro's general militarization was illegitimate. The report consisted of short articles written by individual Observatory staff and partners (Observatório da Intervenção 6-31), ending with an article in which Ramos offered 16 takeaways on the Intervention (31-35). "The experience of Rio de Janeiro demonstrated that the 'federal intervention of a military character' [policy option] should not be copied" in other Brazilian states, the report concluded, because it "did not solve structural problems and it accentuated the war-like and lethal character of public security responses" (32) to crime and violence. "Rio de Janeiro needs policies that [prioritize] life", the report continued, but "[t]he Intervention was a lost [opportunity] to establish this priority and change" (35) policing.

A civil society interviewee (#24) and the final report itself (Observatório da Intervenção 2019, 20-21) described how engaging closely and sharing monitoring information with journalists had been key to the Civil Society Observatory's strategy. That the Civil Society Observatory and its partners informed critical news coverage considerably relative to more established civilian institutions and the Intervention's principals and agents (see Table 14) reflects this strategy.

Another civil society interviewee (#23) suggested that the Observatory had not engaged with the Intervention's principals and agents on principle, reflecting how autonomy was central to this institution's strategy (see Table 18). Along with its consortium partner the Favelas for Rights Circuit, the Civil Society Observatory shaped the legitimacy concerns of six of 36 (17%) junior/mid-level Brazilian Army officers who used writings to express worries about Rio de Janeiro troop deployments' appropriateness and effectiveness. These institutions also shaped the

concerns of six of 10 (60%) officers whose worries were informed by the monitoring coalition overall (see “Hypothesis 4: Institutional autonomy” section in chapter 6). The Observatory’s limited access to security forces hampered its impact on demilitarization (see “Hypothesis 5.1: Institutional autonomy [episode]” section in chapter 7), yet this institution helped lay the foundation for subsequent attempts at controlling militarization (see “Hypothesis 5.2: Institutional autonomy [practice]” section in chapter 7).

External Committee on the Federal Intervention (Chamber of Deputies)

Most noteworthy about this institution’s formation was the representation of legislators from Rio de Janeiro. Five of the six legislators (83%) who submitted request to establish this institution represented Rio de Janeiro, three (50%) belonged to left-wing parties, and five (83%) had voted for the Federal Intervention. Thirty-six of the 45 overall members (80%) represented Rio de Janeiro, 15 (33%) belonged to left-wing parties, and 31 (69%) had voted for the Federal Intervention. The most noteworthy members were president Hugo Leal, representing Rio de Janeiro and the left-wing Brazilian Socialist Party, and rapporteur Laura Carneiro, representing Rio de Janeiro and unaffiliated at the time of this committee’s establishment. Of the 16 legislators who spoke during the External Committee’s first meeting on March 6, 2018, 16 (100%) represented Rio de Janeiro, nine (56%) belonged to left-wing parties, and 10 (63%) had voted for the Intervention (Câmara de Deputados 2018h). These factors suggest that, relative to the Chamber of Deputies as a whole, the External Committee on the Federal Intervention was somewhat a venue for left-wing politicians’ disproportionate participation in monitoring and mostly a venue for Rio de Janeiro representatives’ highly disproportionate participation.

External Committee president Leal said when opening this institution's first meeting, "[t]his committee, in reality, is the Rio de Janeiro caucus because no one from the caucus wants to be left out of a discussion of this nature" (Câmara de Deputados 2018h). Leal added that this legislative institution had "to occupy a space that is neutral, that is plural, [because] this is the characteristic of the Committee and [...] our caucus" (Câmara de Deputados 2018h). Indeed, while the percentage of External Committee members who had voted for the Intervention was consistent with that of the Chamber overall, there was slightly more ideological diversity due to left-wing legislators' overrepresentation.

Comments of the 15 deputies who spoke after Leal during the first meeting further reflected this diversity. Comments by six (40%) deputies suggested a neutral motivation that was neither strongly for nor against the Intervention. One (6%) deputy emphasized both improving public security and condemning potential abuses by security forces. One stressed the importance of socioeconomic measures to address the root causes of crime and violence. Four (27%) suggested that summoning Temer administration and Federal Intervention Cabinet officials and measuring the policy's consequences was their goal (Câmara de Deputados 2018h).

Separately, four of the 15 (27%) comments highlighted deputies' goals of protecting human rights and supporting civil society through monitoring and *asfalto-favela* cooperation due to anticipated transparency limitations. Finally, five of the 15 (33%) underscored deputies' objectives of supporting the Army and state police in improving public security. Such support included granting legal protections so that security forces could conduct operations with few

consequences in the case of extrajudicial killings. It also involved ensuring that operations in Rio de Janeiro city did not have the mere effect of displacing crime and violence to other parts of the state (Câmara de Deputados 2018h).

The External Committee monitored the Federal Intervention through secondary data collection practices of summarizing crime and violence statistics, issuing information requests, and engaging in public events, public hearings, and private meetings. The two public hearings concerned the Intervention's fiscal implications, with guests including federal and state auditors and Legislative Observatory representatives. Other activities included three private meetings with the Federal Intervention Cabinet, as well as a public event on the Federal Intervention at the Chamber of Deputies. At least one private meeting occurred in Rio de Janeiro. The External Committee had at least four internal meetings. These activities were concentrated in the Intervention's first six months (Câmara de Deputados 2018f, 1-9; Chamber of Deputies 2024d). A legislative interviewee (#65) described the External Committee's activities in further detail:

[The External Committee carried out] a lot of meetings and, also, had [subcommittees] to evaluate [the Intervention's] results. The External Committee had many public security professionals who could contribute [...] The [subcommittees] had quarterly meetings to monitor the Intervention's unfolding and they also developed suggestions [regarding information and meetings that the External Committee should request. ...] There were two subcommittees. One focused on monitoring the Intervention budget so that resources were employed effectively. The other focused on the Intervention's operational results. [...] Most public security professionals participated in the operational [subcommittee] (legislative interviewee #65).

This excerpt illustrates how the External Committee monitored the Federal Intervention through budget- and operations-focused subcommittees, which indeed would have met around four times, and legislators with law enforcement backgrounds played a prominent role. Indeed, these

themes of budgetary and operational analysis and of potential contestation between pro- and anti-Intervention legislators would characterize the institution's final report. Published in December 2018, this was a text document with few charts and tables (most of which the author apparently copy-and-pasted from other organizations' document) but no design elements or photographs.

The External Committee's 40-page final report began with a summary of meetings (Câmara de Deputados 2018f, 1-9) before moving to "the Rapporteur's vote" (9-34) and an appendix with screenshots of strategic plans provided by the Federal Intervention Cabinet (35-40). Carneiro used "the Rapporteur's vote" to describe the Intervention's origins (9-10), its administrative challenges related to budgetary issues and others (10-14), its strategic planning (14-16), its inattention to the root causes of crime and violence in Rio de Janeiro (16-19), its mixed results with respect to crime and violence levels (20-26), its contribution to police capacity (26-27), and Rio de Janeiro state's fiscal challenges (27-30). These sections mainly used information from the Cabinet, media, state police, and state Public Security Institute. "The Rapporteur's vote" ended with Carneiro's conclusion regarding the Intervention (30-34), although parts of the rapporteur's assessment were evident throughout the report's preceding sections.

Carneiro concluded that the Intervention had been appropriate, given Rio de Janeiro's high crime and violence levels, but ineffective: "the results are far below what was expected and, despite a momentary reduction in criminality [levels], the citizens of Rio de Janeiro continue to suffer from the shootouts, robberies, threats, and the oppression of organized crime" (Câmara de Deputados 2018f, 10). The report argued that, despite increasing police capacity, the Intervention was an expensive and "missed opportunity to solve or, at least, [significantly] reduce [the state's]

public security problem” (31) due to bureaucratic hurdles, inadequate strategic planning and focus on the social roots of crime and violence, and insufficient improvements in public safety (10-31). A legislative interviewee (#17) described how, perhaps due to its level of criticism, Carneiro’s final report had not received the External Committee’s institutional endorsement. The committee had not submitted this report to a vote, suggesting that the Armed Forces might have lobbied against the report because of Carneiro’s conclusions.

Only one critical newspaper article referenced the External Committee. It described an April 2018 meeting with Federal Intervener Gen. Braga Netto at the Ministry of Defense in Brasília. It quoted External Committee members from Rio de Janeiro, including Leal, India Costa of the right-wing Social Democracy Party, Alessandro Molon of the left-wing Brazilian Socialist Party, and Glauber Braga of the left-wing Socialism and Freedom Party. They criticized the Federal Intervention’s insufficient planning, resourcing, and transparency (Werneck and Camporez 2018). The External Committee did not figure into Army officer’s legitimacy concerns, senior military officers discussions of the Intervention’s discontinuation, or interviewees’ discussion of the monitoring coalition’s impact on militarization as an episode or a practice.

External Committee on the Marielle Franco Assassination (Chamber of Deputies)

Five left-wing legislators, two of whom represented Rio de Janeiro, submitted a request to create this institution on March 15, 2018, the day after Marielle Franco’s assassination. The Rio de Janeiro legislators were Jean Wyllys of the Socialism and Freedom Party and Wadih Damous of the Worker’s Party. Other legislators were Luiza Erundina of São Paulo and the Freedom and Socialism Party, Érika Kokay of the Federal District (Brasília) and the Worker’s Party, and Jô

Morães of the Communist Party of Brazil and Minas Gerais state. Their request described Franco's importance and assassination, which represented, "to those who work for human rights, especially the rights of Black, poor, and gay people, a serious attack on the rights to life and democracy." It concluded, "[i]t is essential that [the Chamber of Deputies] create an external committee to monitor *in situ* the investigation of this crime" (Câmara de Deputados 2018m).

Nine of the External Committee's 16 members (56%) represented Rio de Janeiro, 14 (88%) were from left-wing parties, and three (19%) had voted for the Intervention. Leaders were coordinator Wyllys, vice coordinator Jandira Feghali of the Communist Party, and rapporteur Glauber Braga of the Socialism and Freedom Party, all representing Rio de Janeiro. Several deputies were in both the External Committee on the Federal Intervention and the External Committee on the Marielle Franco Assassination. These included Wyllys, Feghali, Braga, Carneiro, Molon, Damous, Benedita da Silva of Rio de Janeiro and the Worker's Party, Chico Alencar of Rio de Janeiro the Brazilian Socialist Party, and Reginaldo Lopes of Minas Gerais and the Worker's Party. Additional members were Erundina, Morães, Janete Capiberibe of Amapá and the Brazilian Socialist Party, Maria do Rosário of Rio Grande do Sul and the Worker's Party, and Professora Dorinha Seabra Rezende of Tocantins state and the right-wing *Democratas*.

The External Committee sought to monitor the Franco investigation, facilitate the protection of key witnesses, ensure support for surviving relatives of Franco and her murdered driver Anderson Gomes, and "monitor and take measures regarding defamations against the memory" (Câmara de Deputados 2018k, 4) of the victims. The External Committee pursued these

objectives through public hearings with civil society representatives, as well as private meetings with, and information requests to government agencies (6-93).

The 25 main activities highlighted in the External Committee's final report included nine (36%) private meetings, seven (28%) requests for information, five (20%) internal meetings, two (8%) public hearings, one (4%) press release, and one (4%) response to Inter-American Commission on Human Rights questions about the assassination. The Ministry of Human Rights (*Ministério dos Direitos Humanos*) had shared these questions with the External Committee. Private meetings were with Minister of Defense Gen. Silva e Luna, Federal Intervener Gen. Braga Netto, Federal Intervention Cabinet second in command Gen. Nunes, Minister of Public Security Jungmann, Minister of Human Rights do Vale Rocha, Rio de Janeiro State Civil Police and State Prosecutor's Office officials, and Niterói, Rio de Janeiro city councillor Taliria Petrone, as well as academic experts and civil society representatives. The seven main information requests highlighted went to Attorney General Raquel Dodge, Minister Jungmann, and the Civil Police and Prosecutor's Office (Câmara de Deputados 2018k, 6-93).

In its final report, however, the External Committee on the Marielle Franco Assassination lamented the lack of government transparency in response to such requests. Nineteen of 24 (79%) total information requests to government agencies received no response (94-98). Requests went to European Union and Mercosul parliamentarians, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Executive Secretary Paulo Abrão, Ministers Jungmann and do Vale Rocha, Attorney General Dodge, Federal Intervener Gen. Braga Netto, Rio de Janeiro State Secretary of Public Security Gen. Nunes, Governor Pezão, State Prosecutor-General José Eduardo Ciotola Gussem,

the Civil Police, the Niterói Municipal Chamber (*Câmara Municipal de Niterói*), and the local Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch affiliates (Câmara de Deputados 2018k, 94-98).

Within rapporteur Braga's 118-page final report, the last 17 concerned conclusions and recommendations (102-118). The report was a text document with no design elements. Its only table served to present the Committee's aforementioned information requests (94-98). The conclusion and recommendations focused mostly on protection of human rights defenders. This report nonetheless connected the Franco assassination to the Federal Intervention in three main ways. It presented the Intervention as evidence of Rio de Janeiro's inappropriate militarization at the time of Franco's assassination (Câmara de Deputados 2018k, 106). It suggested that the Intervention had exemplified militarization's ineffectiveness, given what the Committee characterized as the Federal Intervention Cabinet's mismanagement of the Franco investigation (106-111). Although these did not relate directly to the Intervention, it provided several recommendations aimed at demilitarizing Rio de Janeiro law enforcement. The recommendations concerned creating an independent entity to monitor investigations of human rights violations (111-112), enhancing "social control over public security" (113), strengthening protections for human rights defenders, victims, and witnesses (116-117), and, given suspected police involvement in the assassination, improving the tracking of police firearms (117).

Within my samples, no articles with critical media coverage of the Federal Intervention and no Army officer writings about Rio de Janeiro troop deployments referenced the External Committee on the Marielle Franco Assassination. The closest reference was in the graduate thesis by Army Lieutenant Colonel Sérgio Wilson dos Santos. It read as follows:

[I]t is worth underscoring the [...] informational and human dimensions [... of] 2018. The country was experiencing delicate political issues when then-president [Temer ...] had his image tarnished and the Armed Forces undertook yet another public security [mission]. Added to this was the social impact of the Marielle Franco [assassination] and [criticism from] the media, reinforced by the creation of various observatories to [monitor the Federal Intervention]. As such, [the Federal Intervention Cabinet] organized a [unit] responsible for planning, coordination, and monitoring [... as well as public relations unit] (Santos 2019, 21-22).

Although it references the External Committee on the Marielle Franco Assassination neither explicitly nor implicitly, this excerpt suggests a link between the assassination and the “various observatories” (i.e., ad-hoc monitoring institutions) that formed to monitor the Federal Intervention. The excerpt also suggests that the assassination and institutions affected the Federal Intervention Cabinet by leading the Army to invest more in planning and public relations. That said, interviewees did not mention this institution when discussing the relationship between ad-hoc monitoring institutions and the troop deployments’ discontinuation after 2018.

Favelas for Rights Circuit (Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender’s Office)

Led by External Ombudsman Pedro Strozenberg, the Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender’s Office established the Favelas for Rights Circuit. It monitored the Federal Intervention by facilitating visits of public defenders and their consortium partners from the civil society, legislative and justice sectors to *favelas* in order to document human rights violations. A justice sector interviewee (#66) suggested that the Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender’s Office had formed this institution in order to “go beyond the courts” and “not limit [itself] to the courts” in guaranteeing access to justice for low-income Rio de Janeiro residents. The Office sought to enable public defenders’ collection of *favela* residents’ testimonials of rights violations.

“[F]avela leaders’ demand was for the Office to be present in the *favelas*”. Public defenders and consortium partners “began to organize [themselves] in order to be in the *favelas* every week and [monitor human rights conditions]”, especially where state violence had been most prevalent.

A justice sector interviewee (#66) suggested that the Favelas for Rights Circuit had no full-time staff. The Circuit instead relied on staff from the State Public Defender’s Office, its External Ombudsman’s Office, and their organizational partners. Over eight months in 2018, the Circuit visited 30 *favelas* throughout the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan region and collected around 500 testimonials over eight months in 2018 (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018, 12). Before taking the Circuit to a given *favela*, the External Ombudsman’s Office met with community representatives to propose the visit and determine its schedule and route (29). During the visit, Circuit members would split into groups of two or three and cover parts of the *favela* with a local guide. They collected testimonials “in streets, alleys, houses, and community spaces” (12) over two to three hours in each *favela*. Visits typically occurred on weekends and involved 20 total members (30).

Although data is incomplete, around 500 individuals apparently participated in these visits. The largest seemingly were to the Alemão, Cidade de Deus, Chapadão, Dendê, and Rocinha *favelas*. Most participants apparently fell into one of four categories, organized here in descending order of frequency: local government staff; community leaders; civil society representatives; and public defenders (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018, 33). Over 60 public defenders participated in these visits over eight months (12; 33).

Participants also included “more than 35 institutions committed to, and supportive of” (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018, 12) the Circuit. Institutions that participated consistently included the Federal Public Defender’s Office, Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender’s Office, its External Ombudsman’s Office, *Defezap*, the Rio de Janeiro State Legislative Assembly’s (*Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro*) Human Rights Commission (*Comissão de Defesa dos Direitos Humanos*), the Rio de Janeiro State Subsecretariat of Human Rights (*Subsecretaria de Direitos Humanos*), and the Rio de Janeiro State Federation of Favelas (*Federação de Favelas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro*). Partners that participated less consistently tended to be civil society organizations, including ad-hoc monitoring institutions like the Civil Society Observatory and Popular Truth Commission. Multiple Civil Society Observatory consortium partners also participated (31-32).

Based on the public defenders’ visits to collect *favela* residents’ testimonials, the Favela for Rights Circuit’s 114-page, design- and photography-heavy final report presented a typology of 30 frequent human rights violations during the Federal Intervention. Its violations fell into five categories: violations in the home (*violações em domicílio*); violations associated with security forces’ stop-and-frisk practices (*abordagem*); violence caused by the state (*letalidade provocada pelo estado*); violations specifically during police operations (*operação policial*); and psychosocial consequences of the security operations (*impactos*) (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018, 34-36). The report contextualized this typology as follows:

The typology [...] stems from testimonials collected in favelas and not the inverse [which would involve testimonials being organized around pre-determined typologies. That the typology’s violations do not fall into conventional legal categories necessarily] might cause some discomfort and [perceptions of spuriousness] in regard to the legal [system],

but the typology attends fundamentally to the desires expressed in the [testimonials] and perceptions of *favelas* residents due to violations [that they have] suffered. [... The first four categories include] actions resulting directly from police practice in one-off and repeated situations [...] The last [category ...] represents consequences stemming from [human rights] violations (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018, 34).

This excerpt illustrates how the Favelas for Rights Circuit based its typology on *favela* residents human rights testimonials instead of conventional legal norms. In addition to describing the Circuit's activities and presenting its typology, the final report included various excerpts from residents' testimonials and short essays by public defenders and consortium partners. Short essays included "community texts" (*textos comunitários*) from local leaders about the Circuit's importance (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018, 42-47) and "institutional texts" from public defenders and partner entities (48-81). The final report ended with a timeline of the Federal Intervention (85-92), conclusions and recommendations (94-103), and an annex of juridical analysis regarding the Intervention and the typology of human rights violations (104-112). The final report's sections were interspersed with excerpts and photographs (mostly of bullet holes) from *favela* testimonials and visits, respectively.

The report offered policy recommendations, including to expand the "mechanisms of control over police activity" (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018, 96). It specified that implementing these recommendations would fall to the Federal Intervention Cabinet, Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Public Security, and Rio de Janeiro Public Prosecutor's Office (96-98). Additional recommendations concerned monitoring and mitigating the education- and health-related consequences of police operations (98), reforming the police through training, and developing a Rio de Janeiro public security plan (99). The report reads, "[t]his document was

presented to the Federal Intervention Cabinet [...] in October 2018” (100), and makes no other reference to meetings with security forces or other government agencies.

The Favelas for Rights Circuit’s final report concluded that the Federal Intervention had been inappropriate and ineffective (Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2018, 101-103). Moreover, “public institutions, aligned with civil society organizations, [must recognize] in [the *favelas*] a legitimate and necessary place of action”, rather than approach *favelas* as central to “the logic of a [p]ublic [s]ecurity model oriented toward war against drug trafficking and a perverse [discourse that links] *favela* and criminality” (102).

Four critical newspaper articles referenced the Favelas for Rights Circuit. Two articles summarized its final report (Barbon 2018b; Jansen 2018). The other two referenced the final report’s typology of human rights violations in discussing the Federal Intervention’s conclusion (Linhares 2018; Nogueira and Barbon 2018). A junior Army officer quoted the Circuit’s final report as reflecting “the local population’s discontentment with the Armed Forces’ performance [during the Federal Intervention], which could influence directly the image of defense institutions” (Carius Pereira 2021, 24). Army Gen. Sergio José Pereira, the Federal Intervention Cabinet’s Director of Institutional Relations, suggested that the Favelas for Rights Circuit had influenced the Cabinet by compelling it to consider investigating human rights violations by police, leading it to attempt to discredit the Circuit’s monitoring strategy, and bringing it to view the Circuit as a threat to the Army’s image (Pereira, quoted in Castro et al. 2023, 241).

Legislative Observatory on the Intervention (Chamber of Deputies)

Chamber of Deputies president Rodrigo Maia, representing Rio de Janeiro and the right-wing *Democratas*, created the Legislative Observatory as a “forum of data collection and analysis and of collaborative [...] studies, evaluations, and surveys”, of “promotion of transparency”, and of “social control of” (Câmara de Deputados 2018b) the Federal Intervention. The official justification was that the Chamber’s “constitutional mission” involved “promoting the evaluation, monitoring, and control of public policies and Executive Branch [*Poder Executivo*] acts” (Câmara de Deputados 2018b). The Legislative Observatory sought to “promote [the Chamber’s] cooperation” with “public, private, federal, state, and municipal entities”, and with “the population” (Câmara de Deputados 2018b), in monitoring the Intervention.

In contrast with legislative committees, this institution had no elected officials. Maia created the Legislative Observatory as an institution comprised fully of legislative staff and tied directly to his Chamber of Deputies presidency. The Observatory had one full-time staff, coordinator Andréa Sampaio Perna (Câmara de Deputados 2018c). Based on information from a legislative interviewee (#48) and the Observatory’s final report (Câmara de Deputados 2018l, 15-16), it also seemed to have the rough equivalent of two part-time staff at any given moment in 2018. This apparently included the following personnel: legislative staffers André Freire da Silva, Sebastião Neiva Filho, Roberta Cabral Rabay, Jorge Paulo de França Júnior, David Miranda Silva Almeida, and Luiz Fernando Botelho de Carvalho; budget analyst Ricardo Alberto Volpe; and consultant Marcelo Reis Garcia (Câmara de Deputados 2018c; 2018d).

Several legislative interviewees (#65, 76, 88) suggested that Maia had viewed the Legislative Observatory as a means of strengthening his political position, both with Rio de Janeiro voters and relative to potential challengers to his presidency. One legislative interviewee (#65) said that Maia had created the Legislative Observatory due to “being from Rio de Janeiro” and that the initiative had “a political bias” of the Chamber of Deputies’ president.

Another legislative interviewee (#76) said that Maia had formed the Legislative Observatory because he wanted “a direct way to monitor the Intervention, seeing as how he is from Rio de Janeiro, and to give a response to the [people of Rio de Janeiro].” The interviewee suggested that, “[i]f we had a Chamber of Deputies president who was not from Rio de Janeiro, perhaps there would not be a Legislative Observatory. Maia used the Observatory as an electoral platform. He ran for reelection in 2018.” Another legislative interviewee (#88) said that having reporters at the Legislative Observatory’s launch event

was very important because [Maia] wanted to show that the Chamber of Deputies was performing its monitoring role, both for society and for the Federal Intervention Cabinet itself. It was very important to have the media. [On a scale from] 0 to 10, [its level of importance was] 10. [Maia’s staff] issued a call for the media to be there. It also was important because of Maia being the Chamber president (#88).

This excerpt suggests that Maia established the Legislative Observatory to project a public image as a political leader and responsible policymaker. Another legislative interviewee (#99) further suggested that Maia had used the Observatory to “capitalize politically on the Intervention.” In this interviewee’s perspective, Maia was running for

reelection [for the presidency] in the Chamber of Deputies and even was entertained as being a candidate for president [of Brazil] or governor [of Rio de Janeiro]. If the Federal Intervention had worked out, who would have benefitted? [...T]he Legislative Observatory [... was a means of] organizing information and mediating conflicts so that Maia would be perceived as a mediator and would benefit politically” (#99).

This excerpt further suggests that Maia established the Legislative Observatory for his political benefit. Notwithstanding these electoral motivations, the Legislative Observatory extensively used primary and secondary data practices to monitor the Intervention. It published daily bulletins of media coverage regarding the Intervention between March 6 and December 28, 2018 (Câmara de Deputados 2024b). It also produced around 70 “portraits of the Intervention”, which were like relatively in-depth newspaper articles about various aspects of the Intervention and general public security in Rio de Janeiro (Câmara de Deputados 2024f).

This institution additionally compiled key legislation, legislative proposals, and legislative speeches regarding the Intervention. These included 13 federal legislative files directly concerning the Intervention, five federal legislative files indirectly related to the Intervention, two state/local files regarding Rio de Janeiro law enforcement, one class-action lawsuit (*ação civil pública*) with respect to a 2016 police operation in Maré, six federal legislative proposals regarding the Intervention, 1,248 federal legislative proposals related to public security in general, and various speeches on these topics (Câmara de Deputados 2018h).

The “studies and surveys” (Câmara de Deputados 2018f) that this institution compiled and produced had three types. First were “Numbers of the Intervention” (Câmara de Deputados 2018f). These included a municipal-level dashboard of Rio de Janeiro crime and violence statistics, monthly reports on such statistics between April and October 2018, five dashboards of

Public Security Institute statistics, three fiscal analyses related to Rio de Janeiro law enforcement, and seven reports on social media trends regarding the Intervention. Next was 15 “Chamber of Deputies studies and technical notes” from before and during the Intervention, addressing topics that ranged from youth unemployment to whether to suspend the Intervention for a pension reform vote. Third was 37 “studies of other entities/NGOs” (Câmara de Deputados 2018f). Twenty-two (59%) of these were from the Civil Society Observatory and its consortium partners. Most others were from government agencies (Câmara de Deputados 2018f).

The Legislative Observatory organized four public events, engaged in three others, and participated in two public hearings and 17 private meetings, both in Brasília or Rio de Janeiro (Câmara de Deputados 2018l, 15-16). The most prominent of these were as follows: a March 2018 public hearing in Brasília the Chamber of Deputies’ External Committee on the Federal Intervention; a March 2018 private meeting in Rio de Janeiro between the External Committee and the Federal Intervention Cabinet; a March 2018 private meeting in Brasília of the External Committee; and April 2018 public hearing in Brasília by the External Committee regarding the Intervention’s budget; an April 2018 meeting in Brasília with Federal Intervention Cabinet and Ministry of Defense leaders; May, June, August, and October 2018 private meetings in Rio de Janeiro with the Federal Intervention Cabinet; October 2018 private meetings with the Rio de Janeiro State Civil and Military Police; and a December 2018 conference in Rio de Janeiro about the Federal Intervention’s “legacy and lessons learned”, including participation from the Federal Intervention Cabinet (Câmara de Deputados 2024a).

Beyond describing the Legislative Observatory's activities and the Intervention's unfolding (Câmara de Deputados 2018l, 1-10), the 14-page final report evaluated the Intervention's organizational and strategic challenges and contributions to Rio de Janeiro policing more than it summarized consequences for crime, violence, and human rights (Câmara de Deputados 2018l, 10-12). This text document, written by coordinator Andréa Sampaio Perna, had no design elements but included an appendix table summarizing the institution's activities (13-14). It concluded that the Intervention would be for naught without "integrated public policies that [addressed challenges and] guaranteed social rights" (14) related to education, income, housing, sanitation, and city planning. If "social inequalities are not combatted and education is not [... prioritized] by elected officials" (14), the report stated, then the Intervention's goal of bolstering local law enforcement would be unobtainable.

The Legislative Observatory received no references within the critical media coverage analyzed for this dissertation. Closest to such coverage were five articles that referenced the institution's founder, Chamber of Deputies president Maia, as a source of criticism regarding the Intervention. These articles concerned President Temer's political motivations for decreeing the Intervention and Maia's frustration with, and hesitation around the decree, including vis-à-vis the Intervention's limited strategic planning (Alencastro et al. 2018; Bombig and Galhardo 2018; Lima 2018; Matais et al. 2018; Rosa 2018).

Several Army officers' writings made general references to "observatories" (Atella 2021, 32; Santos 2019, 22; Silva 2018, 47) when expressing societal concerns with Rio de Janeiro troop deployments. However, no references directly concerned to the Legislative Observatory or

generally addressed the legislative process. One writing used Legislative Observatory data on killings of police to justify the Intervention (Banar Alves 2021, 16). Interviewees did not emphasize this institution when relating monitoring to troop deployments' discontinuation.

Popular Truth Commission (Brazil Popular Front)

Brazil Popular Front, a social movement affiliated with left-wing political parties, established the Popular Truth Commission “to monitor the effects of the [illegitimate and unconstitutional Federal] Intervention on Rio de Janeiro’s population” and in *favelas* that “experience militarization in their daily life and deal [regularly] with deaths and losses” (Comissão Popular da Verdade 2018, 4) from state violence. The Commission’s name was a clear reference to the National Truth Commission aimed at investigating human rights violations during Brazil’s military dictatorship. In addition to this evidence of collective memory as a factor behind institutional formation, the Commission’s creation stemmed from political conflict. The Commission saw President Temer as a “coup supporter”, as “illegitimate”, and “corrupt” (4), further necessitating the monitoring of the Intervention.

The Popular Truth Commission, which had one part-time staff according to a civil society interviewee (#43), in practice functioned more as a consortium of civil society organizations, justice agencies, legislative entities, and political parties than as a standalone monitoring institution. Its 21-page final report begins with a list of 62 partner organizations to show that the Commission had “gained the adherence of various collectives” (Comissão Popular da Verdade 2018, 2-3). Of these 62 partners, 45 (71%) were civil society organizations, 13 (21%) were either legislative committees or the offices of individual legislators, three (5%) were political parties,

and two (3%) were justice agencies (Comissão Popular da Verdade 2018, 2-3). This list did not include the Civil Society Observatory and its partner, the Crossfire Institute, but the report mentioned them elsewhere as data partners (5). Other data partners included six civil society organizations and one justice agency, the Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender's Office (5).

Among these 62 partners were some who had participated in ad-hoc monitoring institutions. One was the External Ombudsman's Office of the State Public Defender's Office, which established the Favelas for Rights Circuit. Others were the offices of left-wing Rio de Janeiro federal deputies Jandira Feghali and Wadih Damous, both of whom participated in the Chamber of Deputies' external committees on the Federal Intervention and the Marielle Franco Assassination. Another was the office of city councilor Marielle Franco, who, before being assassinated in March 2018, had participated in the Committee to Represent the Municipal Chamber in Brasília (Comissão Popular da Verdade 2018, 2-3).

Further evidence of the Popular Truth Commission's limited monitoring is that the final report used only secondary information on crime, violence, and human rights (Comissão Popular da Verdade 2018, 2-3; 10-20). A secondary source was the Civil Society Observatory, whose own final report the Commission's final report extensively summarized and quoted regarding the Intervention's ineffectiveness (15-16). Another source was the Crossfire Institute, an Observatory consortium partner, which the final report cited broadly regarding gun violence during the Federal Intervention (10-13). The report also cited the Legislative Observatory regarding crime and violence statistics (20). On top of referencing ad-hoc institutions, the final

report cited Rio de Janeiro State's Public Security Institute (14-15) and civil society organizations Global Justice (*Justiça Global*) and Networks of Maré (18-19).

The Commission had “carried out several [roundtables] with residents of communities that confront the difficult [daily reality of the] Intervention and compiled numerous testimonials” (5) for analysis. These roundtables informed the final report's brief discussion of daily human rights violations experienced by favela residents (17). Moreover, four of the report's 21 (19%) pages also were dedicated to a historical contextualization of the Federal Intervention, implicitly written by Commission staff (6-9). The final report nonetheless was explicit about how the Commission had relied on partners like the Civil Society Observatory for data and analysis (5).

Regarding why the Popular Truth Commission performed little monitoring of its own for the final report, a civil society interviewee (#43) described “disputes among the diverse segments of the human rights struggle” within the institution. These disputes concerned which member of the consortium would lead the Commission and, relatedly, which political party would have the most influence. Owing to these disputes, members of the Commission's consortium “withdrew to their conventional spaces” and the Commission “ended up falling apart.”

Another civil society interviewee (#93) said that, due to these disputes and the demobilizing consequences of the Marielle Franco assassination, the Commission experienced “difficulty in having continuity” after the Intervention's initial months. This difficulty manifested in the Commission's inability to monitor the Intervention with primary data as initially intended. A civil society interviewee (#43) said that the Commission lacked “methodology or expertise in

research for documenting human rights violations in urban areas.” Another civil society interviewee (#43) concluded that, owing partially to the consortium’s limited cohesion, the Commission’s “little report on human rights violations” was “very superficial” and unable “to capture the breadth” of the Intervention’s consequences.

Rather than perform extensive original monitoring, the Popular Truth Commission’s main activities were facilitating *favela* visits for Argentine human rights activist Adolfo Pérez Esquivel and UN Goodwill Ambassador Danny Glover (Comissão Popular da Verdade 2018, 4-5). These visits were aimed at bringing international attention to the Federal Intervention. In April 2018, Pérez Esquivel visited the Maré *favela* and gave media declarations criticizing the Marielle Franco investigation. In May 2018, Glover visited the Rocinha *favela* to meet with community leaders and residents. The Commission selected Rocinha as the site of Glover’s visit because, immediately leading up to, and on the day of the visit, this *favela* had been “the stage of violent actions” (4) by security forces as part of the Intervention.

The Popular Truth Commission’s final report suggested that, in addition to facilitating these visits, the institution had at least two consortium meetings. In February 2018, it first met at an office affiliated with the National Bar Association of Brazil’s Rio de Janeiro Division in order to establish and begin to structure the Commission. The Commission then had an April 2018 launch event at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro’s Law department (Comissão Popular da Verdade 2018, 4). These do not include the Commission’s roundtables in favelas (17).

The Popular Truth Commission's final report (Comissão Popular da Verdade 2018, 21) concluded with six recommendations for security forces to demilitarize law enforcement in Rio de Janeiro: stop firing indiscriminately into *favelas* from helicopters; publicize the Federal Intervention's final expenditures; investigate the involvement of off-duty soldiers and police in extrajudicial killings; provide that all soldiers and police be identifiable during operations; adopt "a public security strategy that ensures the rights of *favela* residents as legitimate citizens"; and adopt "violence prevention strategies", including through intelligence-based measures.

Within my samples of critical media coverage regarding the Federal Intervention and Army officers' writings about Rio de Janeiro troop deployments, the Popular Truth Commission received no mentions. It also received no mentions in interviews about the relationship between the monitoring coalition and these troop deployments' discontinuation after 2018.

Appendix B: Brazilian institutions & policies

Brazilian institutions			
<i>English</i>	<i>Portuguese</i>	<i>Website</i>	<i>Final report link</i>
Brazilian Democratic Movement	Movimento Democrático Brasileiro	Yes	No
Brazilian Forum on Public Security	Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública	Yes	No
Brazil Popular Front	Frente Brasil Popular	Yes	No
<i>Popular Truth Commission</i>	<i>Comissão Popular da Verdade</i>	No	Yes
Candido Mendes University	Universidade Candido Mendes	Yes	No
<i>Institute for Security and Citizenship Studies</i>	<i>Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania</i>	Yes	No
<i>Civil Society Observatory</i>	<i>Observatório da Intervenção</i>	Yes	Yes
National Congress	Congresso Nacional		
<i>Chamber of Deputies</i>	<i>Câmara de Deputados</i>	Yes	No
<i>External Committee on the Federal Intervention</i>	<i>Comissão Externa da Intervenção Federal na Segurança Pública do Rio de Janeiro</i>	Yes	Yes
<i>External Committee on the Marielle Franco assassination</i>	<i>Comissão Externa destinada a acompanhar, no Rio de Janeiro, as investigações referentes aos assassinatos da Vereadora Marielle Franco e do Sr. Anderson Pedro Gomes</i>	Yes	Yes
<i>Foreign Relations and National Defense Committee</i>	<i>Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional</i>	Yes	No
<i>Legislative Observatory on the Intervention</i>	<i>Observatório Legislativo da Intervenção Federal na Segurança Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro</i>	Yes	Yes
<i>Public Security and War on Crime Committee</i>	<i>Comissão de Segurança Pública e Combate ao Crime Organizado</i>	Yes	No
<i>Federal Senate</i>	<i>Senado Federal</i>	Yes	No
<i>External Committee on the Federal Intervention</i>	<i>Comissão Externa de Fiscalização da Intervenção Federal no Rio de Janeiro 2018</i>	Yes	No
<i>Foreign Relations and National Defense Committee</i>	<i>Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional</i>	Yes	No
<i>Human Rights and Participatory Legislation Committee</i>	Comissão de Direitos Humanos e Legislação Participativa	Yes	No
<i>Subcommittee on Human Rights in the Federal Intervention</i>	Subcomissão dos Direitos Humanos na Intervenção Federal	Yes	No
<i>Bullet Caucus</i>	<i>Bancada da Bala</i>	No	No
<i>Public Security Parliamentary Front</i>	<i>Frente Parlamentar de Segurança Pública</i>	No	No
Crossfire Institute	Instituto Fogo Cruzado	Yes	No
Democrats	Democratas	No	No
Federal Intervention Cabinet	Gabinete de Intervenção Federal no Rio de Janeiro	Yes	No
Federal Public Defender's Office	Defensoria Pública da União	Yes	No
<i>Rio Plus Public Defender's Group</i>	<i>Grupo DPU Mais Rio</i>	No	No
Federal Public Prosecutor's Office	Ministério Público Federal	Yes	No

<i>Civil Public Inquiry into the Federal Intervention</i>	<i>Inquérito Civil Público nº 1.30.017.000125/2018-01, com destaque para a atuação das Forças de Segurança no âmbito da Baixada Fluminense</i>	No	No
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro	Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro	Yes	No
<i>Center for Supervision of Rights Guarantees</i>	Central de Supervisão das Garantias dos Direitos Fundamentais	No	No
Ministry of Defense	Ministério da Defesa	Yes	No
<i>Brazilian Army</i>	<i>Exército Brasileiro</i>	Yes	No
<i>Agulhas Negras Military Academy</i>	Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras	Yes	No
<i>Army Command and General Staff College</i>	Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército	Yes	No
<i>Praia Vermelha Military Observatory</i>	<i>Observatório Militar da Praia Vermelha</i>	Yes	No
<i>Army High Command</i>	Alto Comando do Exército	No	No
<i>Brazilian Marine Corps</i>	<i>Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais</i>	No	No
National Bar Association of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro Division	Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil seccional Rio de Janeiro	Yes	No
<i>Juridical Observatory of the Intervention</i>	<i>Observatório Jurídico da Intervenção</i>	No	No
Igarapé Institute	Instituto Igarapé	Yes	No
Institutional Security Cabinet	Gabinete de Segurança Institucional	Yes	No
Live Rio	Viva Rio	Yes	No
National Truth Commission	Comissão Nacional da Verdade	Yes	No
Networks of Maré	Redes da Maré	Yes	No
Network of Security Observatores	Rede de Observatórios de Segurança	Yes	No
Municipal Chamber of Rio de Janeiro	Câmara Municipal do Rio de Janeiro	Yes	No
<i>Committee to Represent the Municipal Chamber in Brasilia</i>	Comissão de Representação para representar a Câmara Municipal em Brasília para acompanhar a Intervenção Federal na Segurança Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro	Yes	Yes
Rio de Janeiro State	Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro	Yes	No
<i>Public Security Institute</i>	<i>Instituto de Segurança Pública</i>	Yes	No
<i>Rio de Janeiro State Civil Police</i>	<i>Polícia Civil do Estado do Rio de Janeiro</i>	Yes	No
<i>Rio de Janeiro State Human Rights Council</i>	<i>Conselho de Direitos Humanos do Estado do Rio de Janeiro</i>	No	No
<i>Rio de Janeiro State Military Police</i>	<i>Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro</i>	Yes	No
<i>Police Pacification Units</i>	<i>Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora</i>	Yes	No
<i>Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender's Office</i>	<i>Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro</i>	Yes	No
<i>External Ombudsman</i>	<i>Ouvidoria Externa</i>	Yes	No
<i>Favelas for Rights Circuit</i>	<i>Circuito de Favelas por Direitos</i>	No	Yes
<i>Rio de Janeiro State Public Prosecutor's Office</i>	<i>Ministério Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro</i>	Yes	No

<i>Specialized Public Security Action Group</i>	<i>Grupo de Atuação Especializada em Segurança Pública</i>	No	No
<i>Rio de Janeiro State Public Security Council</i>	<i>Conselho de Segurança Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro</i>	No	No
<i>Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Public Security</i>	<i>Secretaria de Estado de Segurança</i>	No	No
<i>Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Social Development and Human Rights</i>	<i>Secretaria de Desenvolvimento Social e Direitos Humanos</i>	Yes	No
<i>Rio de Janeiro State University</i>	<i>Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro</i>	Yes	No
<i>Violence Analysis Laboratory</i>	Laboratório de Análise da Violência	Yes	No
Rio de Janeiro State Legislative Assembly	Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro	Yes	No
<i>Human Rights Committee</i>	<i>Comissão de Defesa dos Direitos Humanos e Cidadania</i>	Yes	No
Supreme Federal Tribunal	Supremo Tribunal Federal	Yes	No
Where the Shootouts Are	Onde Tem Tiroteio	Yes	No

NOTE: This table excludes institutions mentioned only in Appendix A.

Brazilian policies		
English	Portuguese	Website
Argument of Breach of Fundamental Precept 635 (ADPF das Favelas)	Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental 635	Yes
Federal Intervention	Intervenção Federal na Área de Segurança Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro	No
Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO) operations	Operações de Garantia da Lei e da Ordem	Yes
State of Defense	Estado de Defesa	No
State of Siege	Estado de Sítio	No

NOTE: This table excludes policies mentioned only in Appendix A.

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²⁶ Where the dissertation quotes a Portuguese-language bibliographic reference, the translation is my own.

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