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Foreign Relations of the United States

1950

Volume VII

KOREA

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Department of State
Washington



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

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Volume VII

Korea

United States
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PREFACE

This volume was prepared under the direct supervision of the late S. Everett Gleason, former Chief of the Foreign Relations Division, currently headed by William Z. Slany. The entire documentation was the work of John P. Glennon.

Valuable assistance by the historians of the Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is gratefully acknowledged. The editors are also grateful for the cooperation of the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency, which concurred in the declassification of various papers for release herein.

The technical editing of this volume was the responsibility of the Publishing and Reproduction Division, Willard M. McLaughlin, Chief. The index was prepared by Francis C. Prescott.

FREDRICK AANDAHL
Acting Director, Historical Office
Bureau of Public Affairs

PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPILATION AND EDITING OF "FOREIGN RELATIONS"

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulations 2 FAM 1350 of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the regulation, as further amended, is printed below:

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record is guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the Historical Office:

a. Refers to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
b. Refers to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

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NOTE ON SOURCES

Unpublished

Information cited as *Korean Conflict* refers to a special historical collection of material entitled *American Policy and Diplomacy in the Korean Conflict* prepared in the Division of Historical Policy Research of the Department of State shortly after the occurrence of the events recorded.

This source has been used to provide information on dates and times as well as on the substance of meetings and communications for which no documentary record has been found in the Department of State files.

Another unpublished source, herein cited as *Record of the Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, contains the record of actions taken by the JCS relative to the U.N. operations in Korea from June 25, 1950 to April 11, 1951. This record was prepared by the JCS for the Senate Armed Forces and Foreign Relations Committees in April 1951 for use in the so-called MacArthur Hearings which are listed below in the "Published Sources" under the title *Military Situation in the Far East, etc.*

United Nations Material

United Nations documents are cited according to their U.N. designations. Thus, Security Council and General Assembly meetings are identified by symbol and the number of the meeting (e.g., S/PV.473, A/PV.294); similarly identified are Security Council and General Assembly documents (e.g., S/1752, A/1583). The Security Council and General Assembly meetings may be found in *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year*, and *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session*, respectively. Most of the individual U.N. documents cited are found printed in *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, Supplements*, and *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Annexes.*

Also referred to frequently are the Report of the U.N. Commission on Korea, covering the period from December 15, 1949 to September 4, 1950 (cited as U.N. document A/1350), printed as *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 16*, and the Report of the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, covering the period from October 7, 1950 to September 5,

1951 (cited as U.N. document A/1881), printed as *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 12.*

Published Sources

Listed below are some of the published sources which proved helpful in the preparation of this volume. The list is a partial one and is not intended to be definitive. No responsibility is taken by the Department of State for the truth or accuracy of events set forth in unofficial sources. Some of these accounts, however, were written by direct participants in the events; others were written by persons having access to official materials, occasionally supplemented by oral interviews of participants in the decision making processes.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

EDITOR'S NOTE—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

AA, anti-aircraft
ADCOM, Advance Command and Liaison Group in Korea (US)
AFP, Agence France Presse
Alusna, U.S. Naval Attaché
AMIK, American Mission in Korea
AP, Associated Press
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ASCOM, Army Service Command
AT, antitank
avgas, aviation gasoline
BCOF, British Commonwealth Occupation Force (Japan)
BOAC, Bristish Overseas Airways Corporation
Bo An Dae, North Korean Border Constabulary
CA, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State
CCF, Chinese Communist Forces
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIC, Counter Intelligence Corps
CINCFE, Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACFLT, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCUNC, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
cirtel, circular telegram
CKS, Chiang Kai-shek
CNAC, China National Aviation Corporation
ConGen, Consulate General
CP, command post
CPG, Central People's Government (of the People's Republic of China)
C/S, Chief of Staff
CSA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
CVE, escort aircraft carrier
CWO, Chief Watch Officer
DA, Department of the Army
Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly
Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram
Dept, Department of State
DeptAr, Department of the Army
DNP, Democratic National Party (South Korea)
DTG, dating
ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration
ECA/W, Economic Cooperation Administration, Washington
ECOSOC, United Nations Economic and Social Council
EDT, Eastern Daylight Time
Embtel, Embassy's telegram
ESC, Joint Korean-American Economic Stabilization Committee
EST, Eastern Standard Time
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUSAK, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea
FA, Field Army
FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FEAF, (U.S.) Far East Air Forces
FEC, Far East Command
FECOM, Far East Command
FM, Foreign Minister
FMACC, Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee (an interdepartmental body composed of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and the Economic Cooperation Administration)
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
FSO, Foreign Service Officer

FSR, Foreign Service Reserve Officer
FYI, for your information
G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)
G–2, intelligence section (U.S. Army)
G–3, operations and training section (U.S. Army)
G–4, supply section (U.S. Army)
Gadel, Series indicator for telegrams to the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly
GARIOA, Government and Relief in Occupied Areas
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GHQ, General Headquarters
Gimo, Generalissimo (Chiang Kai-shek, China)
GOI, Government of India
GOP, Government of Pakistan
HC, High Commissioner
HICOG, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany
HMG, His Majesty's Government
HoMin, Home Minister
HQ, Headquarters
IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee
IC, Indochina
IC, Interim Committee on Korea
IC, Interim Committee of the U.N. General Assembly
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization
intel, information telegram
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
JAS, Joint Administrative Services
J.I.C., Joint Intelligence Committee (U.S.–U.K.)
JIIC, Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
KA, Korean Army
KMAG, U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea
KMT, Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), Republic of China
KPDR, Korean People's Democratic Republic
L/FE, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
MA, Military Attaché
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MATS, Military Air Transport Service
MCC, Military Control Commission
MDAA, Mutual Defense Assistance Act
MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
ME, Middle East
MEA, Ministry of External Affairs
MG, machine gun
Mistel, Mission's telegram
MSC, Military Staff Committee (United Nations)
NA, National Assembly (Republic of Korea)
NA, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State
NAT, North Atlantic Treaty
NCNA, New China News Agency
NE, Near East
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
NGO, non-governmental organization
niact, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NME, National Military Establishment
nr, number
N.S.C., National Security Council
NYT, *New York Times*
OAFE, Office for Occupied Areas, Far East, Department of the Army
OCSA, Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
OIR, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State
OPI, Office of Public Information (Republic of Korea)
P, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Edward W. Barrett
PC, Patrol Vessel, Submarine Chaser
PIO, Public Information Officer
PLA, People's Liberation Army (of the People's Republic of China)
PM, Prime Minister
POC, Peace Observation Commission
POL, Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants
POLAD, U.S. Political Adviser
PrinSec, Principal Secretary, U.N. Commission on Korea
PTI, Press Trust of India-Reuters

R, Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State
RCT, regimental combat team
RFC, Reconstruction Finance Corporation
ROK, Republic of Korea
S/AE, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs
SA/M, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations, Michael J. McDermott
SANA, State, Army, Navy, Air Force
SCAP, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan
SEA, Southeast Asia
Secto, series indicator for messages from the Secretary of State when he is absent from the Department
Secy, Secretary of State
SGS, Secretary of the General Staff
SIGO, Signal Officer
SITREP, situation report
SKLP, South Korea Labor Party
S/MDA, Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State
SOA, Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Telcan, indicator of telegrams to the branch of the American Embassy in China at Canton (Use of the indicator was continued after the closing of the Embassy in Canton in 1949)
T.O., Travel Orders
Tosec, series indicator for messages to the Secretary of State when he is absent from the Department
UNA, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
UNCOK, United Nations Commission on Korea
UNCURK, United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNKRA, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
UNRRA, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UNSCOB, United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans
UP, United Press
urad, your radio message
urtel, your telegram
USAFIK, U.S. Army Forces in Korea
USALO, U.S. Army Liaison Office
USAMGIK, United States Army Military Government in Korea
USFEAF, U.S. Far East Air Forces
USIE, U.S. (International) Information and Educational Exchange Program
USIS, United States Information Service
USUN, U.S. Mission at the United Nations
VOA, Voice of America
WARX, Military Communications indicator
WCPP, World Congress of Partisans of Peace
WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State
WEEKA, Weekly Analysis
WESTPAC, Western Pacific
WRI, Weekly Report on Intelligence
YMS, yard mine sweeper
Z, Indicator for Greenwich Mean Time
ZI, Zone of the Interior


CONFLICT IN KOREA
UNITED NATIONS ADVANCE
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Line of greatest U.N. advance
NORTH
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OF
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SINANJU
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PYONGYANG
WONSAN
TRUCE LINE
Agreed upon by both sides
July 26, 1953
PANMUNJOM
38th PARALLEL
KANGNUNG
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SUWON
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SOUTH
KOREA
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SEA
September 1950
Line of greatest
Communist penetration
TAEJON
KUNSAN
POHANG
TAEGU
PUSAN
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EVENTS PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, JANUARY 1–JUNE 24, 1950 [1]

611.95/1–1450

Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large, Philip C. Jessup [2]

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, January 14, 1950.

President Rhee

I had several conversations with President Rhee,[3] first when we called to pay our respects on the afternoon of our arrival, second after we dined with him that same evening, third when we called on him officially in his office the next morning, and finally when we called to say goodbye the evening before our departure. The following notes cover the general views which he expressed.

His primary emphasis was upon the communist menace in Korea and in the world. So far as the Korean situation is concerned, he pointed out over and over again as do many of the other Koreans the fact that they are fighting the guerrilla bands throughout South Korea as well as meeting border forays along the 38th Parallel. Several times he made the statement that they were prepared to fight to the death. With obvious reference to his pleas for further military aid and probably in defense of his domestic security measures, he kept stressing the fact that the infiltrating communists were killing large numbers of people in the area all of the time. He says that he keeps telling the Koreans in the north what their attitude is toward resistance. In one of the first talks he explained that they would have a much better strategic defense line if their forces moved into North Korea and he expressed confidence that they could defeat northern opposition. Subsequently, he was careful to add that they were not planning to embark on any conquest. The general tone of his statements, however, lends credence to the belief that he has not objected when the Southern Korean forces along the 38th Parallel have from time to time taken the initiative. In regard to the military assistance they desire, he stressed the familiar pleas for planes, ships and tanks. My conversation with

[1] For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 940 ff.

[2] Mr. Jessup visited the Republic of Korea from January 11 to January 14 as part of a 3-month fact-finding trip to the Far East on behalf of Secretary of State Dean Acheson. For further information on Mr. Jessup's visit to Korea, see despatch no. 103, January 28, from Seoul, p. 18.

[3] Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea.

General Roberts [4] and with other officers of KMAG as well as with the Korean Minister of Defense [5] and Korean officers all make out a good case for the need for at least a few aircraft and antiaircraft guns. General Roberts said that, while he would like very much to have a few light tanks, these were low on his priority list.

President Rhee branched out into a consideration of the world menace of communism and spoke very strongly about the British policy of recognizing the Chinese communist government.[6] He can not understand how they could make such a decision and thinks they will be unsuccessful in getting any advantage from it. I explained to him that, whether one considered it wise or not, one must take into consideration as a political fact the attitude not only of the British but of many other governments which do not regard recognition as related to approval and who do not see the same significance in recognition that the President sees in it. The President went on to argue the necessity of the United States defending the free world. He expressed great appreciation for American help to Korea and his especially warm feelings toward Ambassador Muccio. It seems to me clear that the relations between the Ambassador and the President are excellent. The Ambassador talks with him very frankly and the President takes it in very good part. I tried to stress in all my talks with the President the need for his close cooperation with the Ambassador and the ECA staff. It was interesting that on the occasion of our first call on the President, Mrs. Rhee immediately began a political conversation with special emphasis on the need for developing Korean trade. She is evidently well informed. She discussed the possibilities of their developing their exports in tobacco and such specialities as glassware of the Czech type. She said that they had had some recent inquiries about the possibility of their taking up the former Czech glass markets, but the Korean plants are not now adequate and lack the capital for development.

When we called on the President in his office in the morning (January 13) I began by referring to the problem of inflation as one of the most vital ones which Korea needed to solve. The Ambassador added certain specific points. The President was obviously on the defensive on this point and merely stated that he would bring it under control. When we called on him to say goodbye (January 14) I said that I hoped that by the time I returned to Washington we would have reports from Ambassador Muccio that in cooperation with his Mission all of the major problems confronting Korea would have moved for-

[4] Brig. Gen. William L. Roberts, Chief of the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea.
[5] Sihn Sung Mo.
[6] The U.K. Government extended recognition to the Government of the People's Republic of China on January 6, 1950.

ward to a solution. The President immediately mentioned the question of inflation and said that he was going to take active steps to control it. In the same connection, he said that he had discussed this matter and other financial questions with his Cabinet that day. He told them that some of the banks must be sold since it was unsatisfactory to force Koreans always to turn to the Government when they needed capital. He spoke also of orders which he had issued for the sale of rice from Government stores. Without explaining why the Government had held its large stores of rice for so long, he noted that private speculators had been hoarding and that this had resulted in an increase in the rice price. This he would meet by putting Government rice on the market. The profiteers would be unable to meet this Government competition.

At our morning session (January 13) with the President, he spoke also of his desire that a Pacific Pact should be concluded.[7] He referred to his conversations with Chiang Kai-shek [8] and said they had both agreed that the initiative should be left to Quirino.[9] He felt that Australia and New Zealand would be interested, but that the leadership must be taken by the United States. I reminded him that we had made clear our position of sympathetic interest in any development of a regional arrangement but noted that all successful regional arrangements such as those in the Americas, in Western Europe and in the North Atlantic community developed in response to a local regional sense of solidarity. This could not be imposed from outside. With this the President agreed. However, during my last conversation with him (January 14) he again stressed his hope that the Pacific Pact could be concluded.

He talked a good deal about their relations with Japan. He is much interested in increasing trade relations. He and Mr. Sebald [10] exchanged views on this question. He asked me to tell President Truman how much they needed a Naval and Air Mission here. He expressed the greatest admiration and gratitude for Mr. Hoffman's [11] interest and asked me to convey this message to him.

My general impression is that there is no question about the dominance of the President in the whole picture. Ambassador Muccio re-

[7] For documentation concerning the proposed Pacific Pact, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1115 ff.; *ibid.*, 1950, vol. VI, pp. 1 ff.

[8] For the text of a joint statement issued by President Rhee and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, former President of the Republic of China, at the conclusion of their talks on August 8, 1949, see *ibid.*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1184.

[9] President Elpidio Quirino of the Republic of the Philippines had met with Chiang Kai-shek in July 1949 prior to the latter's meeting with President Rhee; for related documentation, see *ibid.*, pp. 1151 ff.

[10] William J. Sebald, Acting U.S. Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japan, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, accompanied Mr. Jessup to Korea.

[11] Paul G. Hoffman, Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration.

ports that there is really no one who really dares stand up against him, although Mr. Shin Ik Hi, Chairman of the National Assembly, has shown a good deal of independence. This independence was illustrated by a conversation I had with him at dinner on Friday night [12] in which he told Dr. Bunce [13] and me that under no circumstances could they allow the elections to be postponed, that they must be held in May as scheduled since this was the whole basis for democratic development.

Prime Minister [14]

When Ambassador Muccio, Mr. Sebald and I called on the Prime Minister Thursday morning,[15] he began his conversation by a speech about Formosa which both Mr. Sebald and I thought was very significant. It is of course clear that all of the Koreans were disturbed by the President's recent statement on Formosa [16] and still hope that we may do something to help the Nationalists there. One of the most frequent questions asked me was whether I was still planning to go to Taiwan.[17] The Prime Minister then went on to say that their two greatest problems are inflation and control of the guerrillas. Ambassador Muccio interposed that they were doing quite well in their campaign against the guerrillas but not so well on inflation. Both from General Lin,[18] as a military man, and from other Korean officials and our own KMAG, I got quite a complete picture of the operations against the guerrillas. Some of these still infiltrate across the 38th Parallel, many along the very rugged terrain in the eastern part of the country. However, our officers think that their road blocks and controls have largely cut down this avenue of infiltration. This is driving the communists to intensify their efforts to smuggle in men and arms by sea. The Korean lack of coast guard patrol craft makes it very difficult to control this. They have however captured a sufficient number of smugglers and smuggling vessels including plans and instructions to give them a clear picture of the pattern. Small groups of trained communists are sent through the country to organize guerrilla bands

[12] January 13.
[13] Arthur C. Bunce, chief of the ECA Mission in Korea.
[14] Lee Bum Suk.
[15] January 12.
[16] In the statement under reference, issued on January 5, 1950, President Truman had said that the United States would not provide military aid or advice to the Chinese forces on Formosa; for the text, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents* (Department of State publication 6446), vol. II, p. 2448.
[17] Mr. Jessup proceeded to Taiwan on January 15 following a visit to Okinawa after his departure from Korea; for documentation on his talks with officials of the Republic of China, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.
[18] A marginal notation in the source text indicated that the reference to General "Lin" may have been incorrect.

which begin operating when they number anywhere from 20 to a couple hundred men. The operations against these bands have been very successful and many of the bands have been completely exterminated. This is accomplished, however, only by devoting to the campaigns overwhelming superiority. This means tying up considerable numbers of troops in this work. General Roberts is now organizing some of the national police in units which will operate as constabulary and relieve the demands on the regular army. I gather that the Koreans are adequately trained and equipped for this type of operation.

In our visit to the 38th Parallel in the Uijongbu area, one was impressed with the smartness of the Korean troops in drill. We noted particularly the crews training in handling anti-tank guns (of which they have only six) also rifle squads and their few batteries. The northern artillery is heavier than theirs and outranges them by at least a thousand yards. General Roberts stressed the fact that five or ten bombers could come over and be absolutely unopposed and probably disrupt South Korea by the panic which would result from a raid on Seoul. Up at the line, the officers stressed the need for more anti-tank guns since the North has a good many light tanks. They have anti-personnel land mines in the South and their combat engineers are well trained in demolition of bridges, etc., in case of an enemy attack. Both observation and all reports would indicate that the morale of the Southern Korean troops is high. I was interested in talking, however, with some of the Korean officers to find that they had no tendency to play down their fellow countrymen to the north pointing out that they were not only in greater strength and armed with superior weapons but were equally good fighters. They did agree that their own morale was better. The defensive positions laid out near the 38th Parallel have been arranged in collaboration with KMAG but the extensive trenches which were dug by civilian Korean labor are considered by our people to be quite useless. The day we were there they were sharply outlined by strips of snow and would seem to afford admirable targets to the enemy. At the most advanced post about a thousand yards from the Parallel they produced for our benefit a boy 24 years old who was said to have been captured after he came in. They said he had been trained in a special school in the North to assassinate the Southern Korean governmental leaders. He was one of a group being sent in for this purpose. The Minister of Defense and other Korean officers interrogated him in our presence, but the translation seemed to cover very little of what was said in Korean. It was hard to tell whether the whole affair was a plant or was genuine.

There seems to me a general realization in Korean government circles of the necessity of solving some of their principal economic problems. The impression of our mission which was borne out by conversations with the Koreans is that they are quite ready to make decisions in principle and to agree to proposals which we make, but action to implement the decisions simply is not taken. For instance, the adoption of the further legislation on the land reform was carried through successfully but the implementation has been held up.[19] Ambassador Muccio told me that this was clearly due to the opposition of the landlord group while the Koreans, especially the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, insisted that it was due merely to the difficulties in setting up the administrative machinery. As another example, they planned boldly for the building of new cement plants while they are not operating any where near capacity the plants they already have. This industry, incidentally, is of particular importance because of its relation to the program for construction of dams to increase their hydro-electric power. The rice crop has been a bumper one for two years and the farmers are quite prosperous. The only exception has been the area around Seoul where this year they have been suffering from drought. The briefings by the members of the mission give more details on some of these points.

Riding on the train to and from the 38th Parallel, I talked at some length with Mr. Chang Kyung Keun, Vice Minister of Home Affairs. His English is not very good and when he found it convenient he was unable to understand what I said. I discussed with him the national security law which is the basis of much of the criticism of the "police state" aspects of the Korean Government.[20] He told me that the President had suspended the enforcement of the law pending the adoption of certain amendments particularly in regard to eliminating the ex post facto feature. Ambassador Muccio had told me that the President had not vetoed the law but had allowed it to take effect without his signature. The picture I got even from the Deputy Minister's statements was one in which any one could be arrested on the ground that he was pro-communist. He is tried by a special court composed of four judges but there is no appeal from the decision of this court.

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[19] Concerning this question, see the memorandum, dated December 16, 1949, from Assistant Secretary of State Butterworth to Secretary of State Acheson in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1110, and also U.N. document A/1881, p. 49.

[20] For the views of the United Nations Commission on Korea concerning the application of the National Security Act during this period, see U.N. document A/1350, p. 25.

If he should argue that the security law under which he is being tried was unconstitutional, this question could go up to the Supreme Court only if the judges themselves decided to refer it. The accused is allowed to have counsel and, if he is unable to get counsel, the court will designate someone. In discussing with him the arrest of the 15 members of the National Assembly, he was very evasive.[21] He told me there were only 7 instead of the actual 14 or 15 who were arrested. He claimed that they would not be convicted unless it were proved that they were acting under orders of a foreign power. He endeavored to maintain the thesis that no one would be prosecuted because he merely held views in opposition to the government. Ambassador Muccio doubts very much if they could prove the foreign instructions and pointed out to me that when Rhee arrested this group of National Assemblymen he wrote a letter indicating that he had perhaps 20 more on his list whom he would not arrest at this time. It was a clear threat over the heads of the Assembly. The Deputy Minister also insisted, in response to my questions, that newspaper editors were perfectly free to sponsor views hostile to the government just so long as they were not under the orders of a foreign power or the communist party. He was unable to explain why in some of these cases the advocacy of the withdrawal of the American forces seemed to him such clear proof of communist orders since this opinion concided with the action decided upon by the United States Government. On the question of police administration, he insisted that centralization of authority was necessary until they succeeded in licking the problem of communist guerrillas. He was unable to explain, however, why even the local police charged with traffic control and the ordinary petty crimes needed to be under national rather than local authority. Although he argued that some of the police were under the authority of the provincial governments, he admitted they were actually responsible to the central national police administration. He was quite ready to agree with my little lecture on the vital necessity of reconciling provisions for the freedom of the individual with provisions for the protection of the national safety, but it was quite apparent that their thinking is dominated by the idea of centralized authority which they now justify on the ground that they are engaged in such active operations against the communist guerrillas. He insisted, however, that legally the peacetime rather than wartime system of justice operated.

[21] For information on the arrest of the members of the National Assembly in 1949 and their trial in 1950, see U.N. document A/1350, p. 22.

895.00R/1-1850

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 57

SEOUL, January 18, 1950.

Ref: Depins 90, December 30, 1949 [1]

Subject: Control of Inflation in Korea [2]

As instructed in the reference cited above, I called on President Rhee Syngman at his office by appointment at 2:00 o'clock p.m. on Sunday, January 15, 1950, in the company of Dr. Arthur C. Bunce, Chief, Economic Cooperation Administration, Mission to Korea. The following is a summary of the ensuing conversation, in course of which I presented to the President certain documents referred to in the text below. Copies of these documents are attached as enclosures herewith.

I expressed regrets at having to call on a Sunday. I recalled that I had mentioned in the course of my recent visit with Dr. Jessup that I had received firm instructions to present a note to him expressing my Government's grave concern over the mounting inflation and recommending a drastic plan of control. I explained that I had discussed this instruction with Dr. Jessup, who left Saturday, and intended originally to present the note and plan for control on Monday. With the near rice panic in Seoul, I had decided to come to see him immediately.

I mentioned that the Economic Cooperation Administrator and the Secretary of State could not understand why President Rhee did not take a more serious view of the mounting inflation. If he appreciated its seriousness he would and could keep it under control. I had been instructed by my Government to present the note and the plan for con-

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1112.

[2] In despatch no. 68, January 21, from Seoul, not printed, the Ambassador reported on a meeting he had had on January 5 with President Rhee concerning the state of the Korean economy. Mr. Muccio explained that he had not reported on this meeting at the time in anticipation of the receipt of instruction no. 90 from the Department. Ambassador Muccio concluded despatch no. 68 with the following observations:

"It will be noted that the Mission's efforts to correct and improve the critical economic situation frequently have not found response in the President and that the latter's attitude has not reflected the gravity of the situation. Obviously, the President's proposed remedies are often not related to either the magnitude of the overall problem or to the specific considerations which are essential to improve Korea's economic plight. This condition is illustrated by his views on the sale of vested properties and by his lack of deep concern over the delay in concluding the sale of rice to Japan." (895.00R/1-2150)

trol, which were thereupon handed to him (Enclosure 1).[3] I cited that Korea seemed to be in the same position as China in 1947–1948; that the Chinese officials also continuously stated that they could put a stop to inflation at any time. They never faced the situation realistically; inflation got out of hand and contributed even more than the military inertia to bringing about the Nationalist downfall.

President Rhee went into a long dissertation on his difficulties. It was almost impossible for him to get his cabinet members to carry out his policy and his orders. He did not like to change ministers. He would have to remove them. He had the resignations of Agriculture and Forestry, of Commerce and Industry, and of Home Affairs. He would change others but he just could not find competent men to take the jobs. After listening to this harangue, I pointedly expressed my opinion that the difficulty would not be solved by a mere change of ministers. I considered most of his ministers quite competent. I admitted that there was a great deal of bureaucracy, particularly in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, where Bureau chiefs were thwarting the good intentions of the Minister in order to perpetuate their respective empires.

However, I did not consider that the main impediment to effective government. I considered the main impediment the repeated instances where: first, he and the State Council adopted a policy, then plans were drawn up by the competent ministry in discussion with ECA officials, and finally, when recommendations were sent to him, there was an inordinate delay. Time and again when inquiry was made by Americans as to the delay in getting going, the reply was that the matter was still pending in the President's office and, in many instances, that the matter lay on Mr. Lady's desk.[4] I cited two glaring instances, reading to him from the memoranda dated January 15, 1950 (copy of which

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[3] Not printed. The plan for control called for firm action by the Republic of Korea in the following fields:

I. Control of Government expenditures and establishment of budgetary accounting controls; II. Control over extension of bank credit and creation of Government debt; III. Elimination of subsidies in prices and rates of Government-produced goods and services; IV. Increase of the counterpart deposit rate, increases in the prices of aid supplies and restriction of credit in sales of aid supplies; V. Improvement of tax assessments, enforcement of tax collection, and elimination of the "voluntary contribution" system; VI. Expansion of extraordinary and non-recurring Government revenues; VII. Implementation of Land Reform Law; VIII. Expansion of exports and facilitation of approved imports; IX. Measures to facilitate the development and establishment of unitary rate of foreign exchange; X. Termination of the rice purchase program.

[4] Harold Lady, an American, was an adviser to President Rhee.

was also left with the President, see Enclosures 2 and 3),[5] of bungling: the rice export program and the food program culminating in the current rice price crisis.[6]

I reminded him that we had in ECA some two hundred Americans, that these men had been most carefully selected in the course of the past year. Some of them were outstanding experts in their respective fields. They were brought here at great effort and expense to the United States specifically to advise and make available to the Korean Government the best technical and professional talent obtainable in the United States. If he felt that men available to him were better qualified on food matters, there was no point in having men like Mr. Dawson, who is probably the world's best authority on agriculture in the Far East, Mr. Beck and others waste their time here. If he felt that the President of the Bank of Korea knew all there was to know about banking and finance there was no need to have Messrs. Loren, Bloomfield, Jensen or Smith here.

President Rhee countered that he had several times asked me to have an American placed in each ministry and that I had failed to do so. I reminded him that every member of the American Mission was available to him and to the Korean Government. I could not, however, see my way to placing an American in each ministry with a view to checking and reporting direct to President Rhee what was going on therein. The Koreans would consider the Americans spies and the Koreans would not cooperate with any one under such conditions. I added that Mr. Lady for that very reason was the most despised American in Korea. The President agreed that Americans would be so considered and stated the Koreans hated Mr. Lady because he reported their actions to him.

I made the suggestion that one possibility that occurred to me would be for him to select two or possibly three capable and reputable Koreans and for Dr. Bunce to select two or three of the most competent men he had, to work together as a committee. This committee should be exclusively charged with implementing the control plan outlined in the detailed memorandum (Enclosure 2) accompanying my note (Enclosure 1). This committee could keep in touch with each ministry concerned and report direct to the President its findings and recommendations.[7] The President inquired if I had any Koreans in mind

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[5] Not printed.

[6] The memorandum on the rice crisis attributed the situation to the failure of the Korean Government to carry out programs which had been agreed upon with the ECA, specifically calling for a rationing program and the export sale of 100,000 metric tons of rice to Japan. The sale of rice had been personally held up by President Rhee in hopes of exacting a higher price.

[7] Despatch no. 96, January 25, from Seoul, not printed, reported on the establishment of the committee under reference, known as the Joint Korean-American Economic Stabilization Committee (895B.10/1–2550).

I could recommend for this purpose. I told him that I considered several of his cabinet members eminently qualified, and that undoubtedly there were other Koreans in the community who could discharge such an undertaking.

Several times during the conversation, the need to decentralize executive authority was stressed; on each occasion the President agreed that he had too much to do and must have responsible men to carry out his (i.e. the President's) ideas. At no time did the President appear to grasp the thought that a Minister should be any more than a "yes" man whose sole purpose was to carry out the President's ideas. The concept of other persons sharing in leadership and being given responsibility was completely missing.

President Rhee concluded the interview at 3:30 o'clock p. m. by saying that he would study the note and the control plan. I expressed the hope that he would send word to me as soon as possible, hopefully by the following day.

I desire to assure the Department that I am personally, in cooperation with Dr. Bunce and his associates, exerting every possible effort to bring the present most unsatisfactory situation under control and shall keep the Department currently informed of developments.

I attach (Enclosure 4)[8] as further reflecting the President's views on inflation, excerpts from a press interview which President Rhee held with foreign correspondents on January 14, 1950, as reported by the United States Information Service.[9]

It is requested that copies of this despatch with enclosures be provided to the Economic Cooperation Administration.

JOHN J. MUCCIO

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[8] Not printed.

[9] In the interview, President Rhee was quoted as making the following statement:

"Although Jessup did not say so, it seems some people in America think there might be some big inflation which might cause an economic crash in Korea. I want to say, we do not fear any economic crash. Conditions here are completely under control and we will see that inflation does not get beyond control."

895A.00R/1–2050

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John Z. Williams of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1950.

Participants: John M. Chang, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea
W. Walton Butterworth, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Williams

Having been informed that the Secretary was not available for appointments because of his appearance before Congressional Com-

mittees, Dr. Chang called at his request on Mr. Butterworth at 5:30 p. m.

After expressing his concern over the possible reaction in Korea to the failure by the House yesterday to act favorably on the Bill relating to ECA aid for Korea, Dr. Chang asked if the Department could do anything to bring about reconsideration.[1] Mr. Butterworth informed Dr. Chang, in confidence, that the Secretary and the President expected to issue statements soon.[2] It was explained that the Executive branch of the Government could do no more at this point, but it was suggested that the action contemplated might well stimulate favorable Congressional results in one form or another. In reply to Dr. Chang's question, the point was made that no portion of the $75 million at the disposal of the President for expenditure "in the general area of China" from MDAP legislation could be spent in Korea unless the will of the House, as expressed yesterday, could be overcome. Dr. Chang then said that he had been at a loss to explain to himself, and to reporters who had asked him, the significance to Korea of the line of U.S. interest in the Far East the Secretary had drawn in his recent statement at the Press Club.[3] He said that the fact Korea found itself on the other side of that line, combined with the House action yesterday, appeared to raise the serious question as to whether the United States might now be considered as having abandoned Korea. Mr. Butterworth said he could not share this view. He pointed to the fact that with respect to Korea the United States had associated itself with others of the United Nations in support of Korea's cause and in that sense therefore, Korea's position transcended a definition of interest by a line drawn in any direction.

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[1] On January 19, 1950 the House of Representatives by a 193–191 vote defeated legislation authorizing the remaining $90 million of a $150 million aid appropriation originally requested for fiscal year 1950 by the President on June 7, 1949; for further details, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1039. A $60 million authorization for Korea was approved on February 14 under the Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 5). The amount actually appropriated on June 29 under the Deficiency Appropriation Act was $50 million (64 Stat. 275), bringing the total appropriation for aid to Korea in fiscal year 1950 to $110 million. In addition, the Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act had provided for the advancement of up to $30 million from the RFC to the ECA for Korean aid, provided that no coalition government was formed in the Republic of Korea which included Communists or members of the ruling party of North Korea.

[2] On January 21, President Truman issued a statement calling for Congressional reconsideration of the Korean aid program; he also released a letter addressed to him on the previous day by Secretary of State Acheson. For the texts of these documents, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents*, vol. II, p. 2527.

[3] Reference is to Mr. Acheson's address at the National Press Club on January 12, the text of which is printed *ibid.*, p. 2310. In one portion of this speech, referring to the military security of the Pacific area, the Secretary spoke of a U.S. defensive perimeter running from the Aleutian Islands through Japan and the Ryukyus to the Philippines.

Mr. Butterworth commented on the soundness of President Rhee's statement relating to the House action,[4] and said that the press of business had not permitted him to read Dr. Chang's recent communication regarding the financial situation in Korea.[5] Dr. Chang stated that he had communicated to his Government Mr. Butterworth's past expressions of concern regarding the inflationary trends in Korea, and had been informed that strong measures were being taken to combat this development. Mr. Butterworth reminded Dr. Chang that should the Congress finally pass legislation for the remainder of a FY 1950 Korean ECA program, the proposed FY 1951 program would probably be subjected to very critical examination, and that therefore any measures that might be taken to check the inflation could be considered as being doubly important.

Dr. Chang said that reporters were waiting at the door for a statement from him and asked if he could say that he had received assurances that the Department would do something to remedy the unfavorable House action. Mr. Butterworth stressed the fact that such a statement should be avoided as it might create an unwarranted pressure on the Secretary and the President and prejudice the action they contemplate taking. Mr. Butterworth suggested that the usual practice in similar circumstances, and one understood by the press, was for the Ambassador to state that he had expressed his concern, and that he had been accorded a sympathetic hearing. Just before his departure Dr. Chang said that he had been instructed by President Rhee to call upon the Secretary in order to express the confidence of his Government in the Secretary's and the President's good will toward Korea and the faith President Rhee had expressed that Korea would not be abandoned by the United States. Mr. Butterworth mentioned the heavy schedule the Secretary had imposed upon him these days, but assured Dr. Chang he would make every effort to arrange a meeting early next week. Dr. Chang said that he would not expect to occupy the Secretary's time for longer than five minutes.[6]

After leaving Mr. Butterworth, and in his interview with the reporters, Dr. Chang expressed the view suggested by Mr. Butterworth but stumbled into an almost inaudible statement to the effect

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[4] In his statement, which was transmitted to the Department in telegram 77, January 20, from Seoul, not printed, President Rhee expressed confidence that upon reflection the U.S. Congress and Government would not fail to extend aid to Korea. On the same day, Secretary Acheson instructed Ambassador Muccio to convey to President Rhee his appreciation for the President's "excellent, temperate statement". (895.00R/1–2050)

[5] Not printed.

[6] Ambassador Chang met with Mr. Acheson on January 28, expressing the appreciation of President Rhee and the National Assembly for the Secretary's remarks on Korea in his National Press Club address and for his letter to President Truman on Korean aid (895B.00/1–2850).

that the Department was "going to do something". He caught himself however, and directed the attention of the reporters to President Rhee's statement, saying that copies were available at the Embassy and at the Press Club.

795.56/1–2150

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
No. 56

SEOUL, January 21, 1950.

Ref: Embtels 447, Apr. 26, 1949; 931, July 26, 1949; 1295, Oct. 19, 1949; [1] and Embdes 653, Oct. 20, 1949 and 809, Dec. 20, 1949.[2]

Subject: Transmitting Request From President Rhee on Needs of Korean Coast Guard

Transmitted herewith are copies of the texts of a letter, dated January 5, 1950, with attached memorandum,[3] received from President Rhee, setting forth his position with regard to the needs of the Korean Coast Guard, and requesting the further assistance of the United States Government in this respect. These communications from President Rhee may be regarded as the formal request of the Government of the Republic of Korea for additional United States assistance to the Korean Coast Guard.

Also transmitted are copies of memoranda [3] prepared by the Naval Attaché and by the Chief, KMAG, offering comment on President Rhee's request for additional Coast Guard assistance.

The Embassy continues to be of the view that the Republic of Korea's Coast Guard needs can be best and most adequately met by provision of the articles and advisors recommended in the Embassy's telegram no. 1295 of October 19, 1949.

With regard to President Rhee's request for three of the United States frigates recently returned by the USSR, the Embassy adheres to the position set forth in the second paragraph of its Despatch no. 809, December 20, 1949.[4]

Attention is invited to the fact that spare parts, valued at approximately $250,000, for the YMS now in the hands of the Korean Coast Guard, are expected to arrive in Korea early in February. Moreover,

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[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 995, 1066, 1088.
[2] Neither printed.
[3] Not printed.
[4] The position referred to was set forth as follows:

"The Ambassador continues to be of the opinion that the provision of frigates to the Korean Coast Guard should be made only in the event that they will be wholly surplus to United States needs and can be turned over to the Republic of Korea virtually without cost, and in the further event that patrol craft cannot be obtained readily and speedily and at a very low cost." (795.56/1–2150)

all funds ($344,564) allotted for Coast Guard purposes under the MDAP grant to the Republic of Korea for 1950 are scheduled to be utilized for the acquisition of spare parts for craft already on hand. These considerations are being drawn to the attention of President Rhee.

For the Ambassador:
EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT
Counselor of Embassy

795.5/1–2550

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SEOUL, January 25, 1950.

No. 97

Ref: Embtels 1519, Dec. 17, 1949; 1521, Dec. 19, 1949.[1]

Subject: Transmitting Recommendations for Additional United States Military Aid to Korea During Fiscal Year 1950

The Embassy refers to the visit of Mr. Niles W. Bond, Officer in Charge, Korea Affairs, Department of State, and Lt. Col. Richard Lawson, Plans and Operations Division, Department of the Army, Washington, to Seoul in December 1949, for the purpose of reaching agreement with the Republic of Korea on the fiscal year '50 MDA Program within the framework of a $10.23 million allocation. As reported in the Embassy's telegram no. 1519, the Korean authorities, including the President, agreed to the program recommended by KMAG and the Embassy, after consultation with Mr. Bond and Col. Lawson, although it is only fair to note that the Korean authorities, and especially the Air Force and the Coast Guard officials concerned, were deeply disappointed by the meager aid allotted to those branches of the Korean Security Forces.

It is also the considered opinion of the Embassy and of KMAG that the $10.23 million allotment was far from adequate to meet the minimum all-around needs of the Korean Security Forces in the light of the situation existing in this part of the world;[2] accordingly, in

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[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1112.

[2] The Report of the Survey Team comprised of Mr. Bond and Lt. Col. Lawson, dated January 17, 1950, was issued by the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee on February 8 as FMACC Document 31. The final paragraph of the Report's conclusions stated that ". . . the Survey Team was particularly impressed by the uniquely compelling urgency which attaches to the military assistance requirements of the Republic of Korea by virtue of the presence on its very frontiers (and not more than 30 miles from the capital city of Seoul) of an aggressive Soviet-dominated Communist regime which is publicly committed to the destruction of that Republic by armed force, a factor which the Survey Team believes should be given due weight in the determination of relative priorities among MDA recipient countries." (Lot 54D–5 Box 13392)

its telegram no. 1521, the Embassy recommended the supplementation of the $10.23 million allocation with funds to be provided under Section 303 of the MDA Act,[3] it being pointed out that the strengthening of the defenses of the Republic of Korea would obviously contribute to the accomplishment in the general area of China of the policies and purposes set forth in the MDA Act. The Embassy specifically recommended that urgent and favorable consideration be given to the allocation of funds under Section 303 of the Act sufficient to bring the total funds available for military assistance to Korea, in the fiscal year '50, to a minimum of $20 million.

In this connection, there are now transmitted the recommendations [4] of KMAG for additional military assistance to Korea scaled down to fall within the approximate dollar limitation of $9.8 million. Also transmitted is a copy of a covering letter from the Chief, KMAG, setting forth the considerations on which the KMAG recommendations are based.

The KMAG recommendations for additional military aid to the Republic of Korea have been prepared after very careful thought and study and are designed to meet what are regarded as minimum all-around needs of the Korean Security Forces in the light of existing situation in this part of the world.

I concur in the recommendations of KMAG, and I earnestly hope that the concerned policy, defense and MDAP authorities will give full and favorable consideration to the granting of these minimum needs of the Korean Security Forces.

JOHN J. MUCCIO

[Enclosure]

The Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (Roberts) to the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)

SECRET

JANUARY 7, 1950.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit to you herewith, the recommendations of KMAG for possible additional fiscal year 1950 Military Assistance to Korea.[4]

This recommendation has been compiled with a view toward bringing total logistic support for Korea to the 20 million dollar figure mentioned in your radio Deptel 1521 of 19 December 1949. Recommendations are based on and related to all previous requests for Military Assistance to Korea scaled down to fall within the approxi-

[3] Approved October 6, 1949; 63 Stat. 714.
[4] Not printed.

mate dollar limitations of $9,800,000. It is the desire of KMAG that this recommendation, coupled with the approved fiscal year 50 MDAP be considered the only valid recommendations at this time.

The objective of this program is to strengthen the existing Security Forces without providing means for an increase in numerical strength. We have included crew served weapons for the additional 15,000 men previously armed with individual arms only, to bring the total U.S. supported ground forces to 65,000 men. There are also included a limited quantity of tools and maintenance equipment considered necessary to enable the Koreans to maintain the equipment on hand and to protect the U.S. investment in the Security Forces. A limited amount of artillery and 4.2″ mortar, with supporting Signal equipment, has been included in an attempt to equalize the range and weight of weapons in South Korea with those known to be in North Korea.

The fighter type aircraft requested [5] are considered by KMAG to be absolutely necessary for the defense of South Korea. Confirmed reports of North Korean air strength indicate a minimum of thirty (30) Yak–3 Russian fighter planes have been transferred to North Korea. The South Korean Security Forces are totally without means of combating this type aircraft.

The Coast Guard portion of this recommendation is based on the assumption that Korea is willing to finance the procurement of three (3) additional US Navy type P. C. vessels in the United States. Experience with the ship *Bak Du San*, recently purchased in New York by Korea, indicates that hull and main engines can be purchased for about $25,000 and the cost of outfitting, armament and ammunition is approximately $130,000. To expedite the refitting of Korean purchased vessels KMAG recommends refitting charges be assumed under the attached Program.

To summarize, KMAG recommends the U.S. offer to Korean limited logistic support to include:

a. Equipment for existing Ground Forces to the extent of $4,574,976 including crew served weapons, additional artillery with supporting Ordnance and Signal equipment, and a limited quantity of Engineer items.

b. Minimum essential equipment for an airforce capable of offering combat to high performance aircraft presently in North Korea, and training planes to supplement those which have been purchased by Korea. Total estimated cost is $3,914,024.

c. Ordnance and Signal equipment necessary to outfit three (3) U.S. Navy type P. C. vessels with necessary shore signal installations,

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[5] The request called for 40 F–51 fighter aircraft; see Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisers in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War* (edited by Walter G. Hermes), a volume in the *United States Army Historical Series* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 94.

provided the Korean Government finance procurements of hull and main engines.

Attached hereto are preliminary estimates of amount of material required and dollar cost including packaging, handling and transportation charges.[6]

Faithfully,

W. L. ROBERTS
Brig. Gen., U.S. Army

[6] Not printed.

Editorial Note

Under date of January 26, 1950 the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea concluded two agreements. For the text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2019; *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), volume 1, page 137. The text of the Military Advisory Group Agreement is printed as TIAS 2436; 3 UST 2696. In connection with article IV of the latter agreement, the Embassy at Seoul transmitted to the Department under cover of despatch no. 105, January 28, from Seoul, not printed, copies of an exchange of letters between Ambassador Muccio and the Korean negotiators, Minister of Defense Sihn Sung Mo and Minister of Finance Kim Do Yun, dated January 26, confirming the understanding of the two governments that the United States would exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal offenses that might be committed by members of KMAG (795.58/1–2850).

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123 Jessup, Philip C.

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 103

SEOUL, January 28, 1950.

Subject: Ambassador Jessup's Visit to Korea [1]

The Embassy herewith encloses available material bearing on the visit to Korea of Ambassador Philip C. Jessup from January 11th to January 14, 1950 and offers comment on this visit.

The visit of Ambassador Jessup, though brief, was one of the most successful of the visits paid to Korea by American officials in recent months. Ambassador Jessup was well-prepared for his visit; he was quick to absorb the various aspects of the Korean situation and deft

[1] See also Ambassador Jessup's memorandum of January 14, p. 1.

and forceful in responding to it in the various addresses he made during his visit. Considering the brevity of his stay, Dr. Jessup left Korea with an impression of problems faced that was, to an unusual degree, extensive and balanced.

Ambassador Jessup arrived from Tokyo on the afternoon of January 11th accompanied by Mrs. Jessup; Miss Anderson, his secretary; Mr. William J. Sebald, Acting Political Adviser to SCAP; Mr. William M. Gibson, a Foreign Service officer who is traveling with Dr. Jessup. On his arrival at Kimpo, where he was greeted by numerous Korean and American officials, Dr. Jessup was immediately taken to the Embassy Building for a briefing on various aspects of the Korean situation.

In the course of the briefing, the Ambassador reviewed American policy and outlined recent significant developments—political, military, economic and cultural. The Ambassador was followed by General Roberts, Chief, KMAG, who succinctly described the organization, status and functions of KMAG and went on to paint a generally optimistic picture of the developments of the Korean security forces, especially of the Army. General Roberts expressed the view that the Korean Army had the capability of containing the North Korean forces in being. However, he pointed to the need for additional U.S. aid for the Korean security forces, especially the air force and the coast guard. The Chief of the ECA Mission to Korea reviewed the ECA program, pointing out that much progress had been made in the past year, especially in the field of production. Dr. Bunce also adverted to shortcomings, particularly to the inflationary spiral which threatens the Korean economic well-being and to the reform measures ECA is pressing on a reluctant Korean Government. Mr. Stewart the Public Affairs officer gave a concise account of the USIE program, while the Director of Joint Administrative Services pointed up some of the major functions of his organization. Dr. Jessup listened attentively, taking notes and from time to time directing relevant inquiries to the speakers.

After the briefing, Dr. Jessup, the Ambassador and Mr. Sebald paid a courtesy call on President Rhee where they also had dinner that evening. There was general discussion of Korean problems on these occasions. Following dinner, Dr. Jessup and the President had an extensive private conversation together. No member of the Embassy participated in the conversation.

On Thursday morning, January 12, various officers of the Embassy were introduced to Dr. Jessup and chatted with him. Dr. Jessup then paid a brief call on the Prime Minister followed by a call on the President's office with Ambassador Muccio and Mr. Sebald. On this occasion, the subjects covered in the memoranda given to Dr. Jessup

by the President were discussed (see enclosure 2).[2] The first of these—on American aid to Korea—asked not only that U.S. aid be continued but assurances either that "the United States will not permit the conquest of Southern Korea by the communists" or "that the United States will not support the Republic of Korea against communist invasion." The second memorandum advocated a Pacific Pact on the model of the Atlantic Pact "with definite features of military alliance", welcomed Philippine leadership in the pact, but stated that the Government of Korea "does not believe that such a program can be expected to succeed without early American participation." The statement also looked to the eventual partnership of Japan in the Pacific Pact. The third memorandum envisaged closer future relations with Japan under adequate safeguards, hoping that any possible United States efforts to build up Japan or enter into a treaty of alliance with her would involve proportionate and similar concern with Korea. Dr. Jessup gave the President a detailed exposition of U.S. thinking on the subject of a Pacific association. Discussion with the President covered certain aspects of these problems.

Immediately following this discussion, the party left for a visit to Chairman Shin of the National Assembly. Chairman Shin escorted the group to the Assembly floor. Mrs. Jessup, who had been sightseeing and shopping, joined the group on this occasion and was presented with her husband to the Assembly. Chairman Shin then made a dignified and forthright address (enclosure 3).[2] In it he stressed that the United States should give to democratic nations fighting against communism help equivalent to that given by Soviet Russia to her satellites and ventured the opinion that U.S. help "though sincere, seems rather scattered and weak" compared to "the definite and determined help of Soviet Russia". Dr. Jessup replied in an excellent extemporaneous speech[2] (enclosure 3) which began with a short review of United States policy toward Korea and ended with well-pointed quotations from President Truman's State of the Union message[3] which Dr. Jessup then summarized and applied to Korea: "I believe that if the Republic of Korea and the United States of America each are equally successful in holding and maintaining the fundamental institutions of personal freedom, that the two nations can go forward hand in hand towards a better life if it is a cooperative and bilateral progress along the road which I have described. It is not sufficient that either one of us should make these advances." The speech was well received. Copies of the enclosed text translated by the Embassy's translation section were distributed subsequently to all Assemblymen by the Assembly Secretary General and have since been quoted on the Assembly floor.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Text in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, p. 2.

Following a lunch at Dr. Bunce's residence with certain American and Korean officials concerned with ECA, Dr. Jessup met and had a discussion lasting nearly two hours with over twenty prominent Korean educators: the presidents of the principal universities in Seoul, the deans of the colleges of Seoul National University, the principals of two women's middle schools, several prominent religious leaders, the publisher of the *Tong-A Daily* and a bureau chief in the Ministry of Education. Those participating brought out the many unfortunate financial difficulties faced by educational institutions in Korea, especially stressing the burdens placed on Korean families by the contributions asked of virtually all students' parents by the School's Patrons Association. It was believed, however, that such contributions would be necessary until the Ministry of Education received adequate funds to support education—which it was unlikely to be in a position to do in the foreseeable future. Difficulties in teaching English were also stressed. Dr. Jessup inquired particularly of the law college which proved to be more similar to European than American law colleges. Dr. Jessup was exceedingly pleased with this conference and remarked that the group was unusually articulate and that he had been able to get far more frank information from the participants than he had in a similar conference in Japan. He further remarked that the Korean discussion group was as candid in discussion as any American group.

Thursday ended with a visit by Dr. Jessup to the U.N. delegates and Principal Secretary[4] at the Duk Soo Palace and a buffet dinner at the Ambassador's residence at which large numbers of the principal Korean Government officials, U.N. officials, members of the diplomatic corps, et cetera, were present.

On Friday morning, Dr. Jessup and his party went by train to the town of Uijongbu, 10 miles north of Seoul. At Uijongbu they witnessed an artillery demonstration and visited divisions headquarters where they were briefed on terrain, operations, et cetera. From there they drove to the 38th parallel near Ch'ungsan myun. Numbers of Korean military and Home Affairs officials, including the Minister of National Defense, accompanied the party. The Jessups approached the parallel closely enough to be able to see many installations on either side of the border. Well conducted troop deployments were also observed. A prisoner captured recently by the South Korean Army in that vicinity was hurried up from Seoul to be interviewed by the Minister of National Defense in front of Dr. Jessup. On the

[4] Reference is to the Principal Secretary, Bertil Renborg, and the members of the U.N. Commission on Korea (UNCOK).

trip back, Dr. Jessup had a talk with Vice Minister Chang of Home Affairs on the subject of National Security Act and the current trials of the members of the Korean National Assembly. During this talk, he stressed that these Assemblymen should not be tried for holding opinions opposed to those held by the Korean Government. Dr. Jessup subsequently reported that Vice Minister Chang, who has been in the United States, had claimed to "find my English rather difficult".

At 1:30, Friday, Dr. Jessup attended a lunch given by the Korean Chamber of Commerce. On this occasion, the President of the Chamber, Mr. Chun Yong Soon, gave an address (enclosure 5)[5] in which he stressed the necessity of solving the problem of the 38th parallel and expressed hope that the United States would direct its attention to this. He also begged Dr. Jessup to "exert your influence to correct the negative policy of your Government" in the Far East. Dr. Jessup rose to make a "frank" speech;[5] it was also perhaps the most candid speech made by an American official in Korea since the end of the occupation. In it he pointed out that the United States helped countries which helped themselves and in this connection said "you in Korea have made extraordinary progress along certain lines, but there are other things which are within your power which you have not achieved." He emphasized that Korea's problems, like those of the United States, could be solved only with patient and cooperative effort and that the United States did not "believe that war is the only solution to the international problem." Dr. Jessup then flatly disagreed with Mr. Chun's belief that American policy was less affirmative in the Far East than in Europe and urged the Koreans not to "sit back and hope that the United States will cope with the situation alone. The strength of your defense against communism will be based on the strength of your economy and of a fundamental policy of political freedom." The speech ended with a nettle: "In closing, I want to say that I will take with me from Korea many fond memories of Korean hospitality but also memories of those aspects of the situation which you have not conquered."

On Friday afternoon, Dr. Jessup was presented with the honorary degree of Doctor of Law by Seoul National University in a well-conducted ceremony. On this occasion, Foreign Minister Limb delivered a light and graceful speech (enclosure 6)[5] and Dr. Jessup replied in another fluent extemporaneous speech[5] of acceptance stressing the importance of the position of educational institutions in modern society. In them, he pointed out, the urge both for students and for

[5] Not printed.

the faculty to seek the truth was fundamental. In order to do this freedom to seek the truth was essential. Dr. Jessup also pointed out the responsibilities which freedom brought with it. On this occasion, the Minister of Education and the Dean of the Graduate School of Seoul National University also delivered brief speeches.[5]

At 5 p. m. the Jessups went to the Chosun Hotel for a tea given them by the numerous Korean alumni of Columbia. Dr. Jessup did not speak at this time but he was visibly pleased with the occasion and was presented with a handsome silver bowl by former Ambassador at the United Nations (and Columbia Ph. D.) Dr. Chough Pyung Ok.

After the gift presentation, Dr. Jessup held a press interview at which he distributed the statement of policy transmitted in this Embassy's telegram 46, January 13 (enclosure 7).[6] He also answered certain questions from the Korean press. Following this interview, the Jessups, their party and many members of the Embassy attended a dinner at Seoul's largest restaurant given by the Foreign Minister. At 9 a.m. Saturday, January 14th, the Jessups emplaned for Formosa.[7]

Ambassador Jessup's arrival had been heralded with high hopes by Koreans and their Government. It had been a signal for a flurry of editorials calling for more aggressive U.S. policy in the Far East and for more aid to Korea in particular (enclosure 8).[6] Koreans did not, of course, get from Dr. Jessup the definite commitments which some had wishfully expected. They were disappointed, however, in no other respect. Koreans everywhere were impressed by the charm and poise of both Dr. and Mrs. Jessup. They could not help noticing the fluency and incisiveness of Dr. Jessup's speeches, many phrases of which have been since quoted and will be long remembered. His very presence and visible, informed interest in Korean problems gave Koreans the self-confidence of knowing that there are American citizens who have broad knowledge of the situation they face and take an interest in them.

The visit bore for the Embassy and President Rhee a subordinate but most welcome result in the presence of Mr. Sebald who provided sympathetic liaison with the problems Korea faces with Japan—the need for which had been long felt on both sides.

For the Ambassador:
EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT
Counselor of Embassy

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[6] Not printed.

[7] Ambassador Jessup and his party proceeded to Formosa by way of Okinawa; for documentation on his talks with officials of the Republic of China, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.

795.5622/1–3150

The Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Halaby)

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 31, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. HALABY: In a message from our Embassy at Seoul, Korea, Ambassador Muccio on December 9, 1949 anticipated the arrival in Korea of ten AT–6 aircraft, recently procured by the Government of the Republic of Korea in Canada through private sources in the United States and shipped to the United States for armament prior to retransfer to Korea, and recommended the assignment to Korea on a temporary basis of three officer flight instructors, three airplane mechanics, two radio mechanics and one aircraft electrician to serve as advisers for aircraft assembly, maintenance and initial flight training.[1]

It is understood that three of the ten aircraft are now on their way to Korea and due to arrive about February 10, and that the others are expected to arrive shortly thereafter. In this connection, the Air Intelligence Digest, Vol. 2, No. 11 of November 1949 stated, in part, that:

"There is, however, a likelihood that in the absence of competent advisers to assist in transition training, the new aircraft and equipment will be lost to the South Korean government through misuse."

For purposes of compliance with the terms of the Conclusions of NSC 8/2[2] the Department would not consider the furnishing of advisory personnel as a commitment in support of an autonomous Korean air force. That is, the Department does not consider that it is supporting the creation of an autonomous Korean Air Force by suggesting to the Department of Defense that air advisers be assigned to Korea. It is felt, however, that the reports from our Embassy relating to the threat to the defenses of the Government of the Republic of Korea occasioned by the air strength in north Korea cannot be ignored. Our Embassy at Seoul has reported that with these ten aircraft as a nucleus, and forming a part of an air detachment of the Korean Army, the defensive position of the Government of the Republic of Korea would be on a more secure footing.

Under the circumstances, it would be appreciated if, in compliance with Ambassador Muccio's recommendations, urgent consideration could be given to the assignment of Far East Air Force personnel of the above categories to Korea for temporary duty. It is understood,

[1] Ambassador Muccio's recommendations were contained in telegram 1473, December 7, 1949, from Seoul; see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, footnote 4, p. 1106.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 969.

however, that the costs associated with the temporary assignment of these air force advisers are not to be charged against Mutual Defense Assistance Program funds.[3]

Sincerely yours, JOHN M. ALLISON

[3] For further discussion of this matter, see the memorandum of conversation by Messrs. Bond and Emmons, dated May 10, p. 78.

895.00R/1–1850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 3, 1950—5 p. m.

113. From State and ECA. Gratified and encouraged by reports of vigorous action taken by ECA Mission and Emb to bring inflationary forces under control (Embdes 57, Jan. 18).

In connection Congressional consideration FY 1951 program, we anticipate criticism may be directed against ECA program for failure ROK bring about financial stabilization as provided aid agreement, and especially against recovery projects 1951 program in view inability ROK finance *won* requirements even with counterpart funds. Since expenditures Ministry Natl Defense one of big de-stabilizing factors, we shld be prepared here indicate how such expenditures can be controlled and reconciled with stabilization objectives. In this connection Embdes 75 Jan 21 and especially Embdes 96 Jan 25 have been extremely helpful.[1]

Dept and ECA wld like AMIK prepare fuller statement than has been recd of possibilities controlling and reducing such expenditures, enlisting full cooperation chiefs KMAG and ECA Mission as well as ECA budget consultant. Perhaps it wld be useful for KMAG appoint a senior finance officer to work in cooperation with ECA and Heer[2] to assist in analysis. In this connection wld it not be useful include Rep KMAG and Rep Ministry Natl Defense on joint stabilization comite. Meanwhile wld appreciate such info as you can provide on fol questions:

1. How are expenditures of Defense Ministry divided between (*a*) regular forces (*b*) naval and coastal patrol forces, and (*c*) reserves, Natl Guard, Youth Movement, etc.?
2. Are the additional 25,000 men referred to Encl. One Embdes 96 in addition to 100,000 present basic troop strength?
3. Can an estimate be made by Subcommittee NR 4 of minimum fixed expenditures for a basic security force of 100 thousand men, a police force of 50 thousand, and existing naval forces given the present mil situation. What we have in mind is a benchmark from which to

[1] Neither printed.
[2] Clarence Heer, fiscal consultant to the ECA Mission in Korea.

evaluate desirability of additional expenditures for combat aircraft, heavy weapons, patrol craft, etc., in terms of their internal budgetary costs.

4. What are anticipated budgetary effects of Emb's recommendation Dec 19 that mil assistance funds for Korea be increased from $10.2 million to $20 million.

5. What mil expenditures are included in accts of Home Ministry and other govt agencies.

Any other pertinent info will be welcomed as well as further reports on other aspects of inflation and stabilization program. [State and ECA.]

ACHESON

895B.00R/2–1050 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, February 10, 1950—6 p. m.

188. Joint State-KMAG–ECA message Redeptel 113, February 3.

I. After prolonged discussions between KMAG and officials Ministry National Defense, chief of staff Korean Army agreed to limit allocations for fourth quarter Korean fiscal year ending 31 March to 4.37 billion *won* for national defense by eliminating all expenditures for Youth Corps, Reserve Corps, and other irregular forces, except 116 million for training leaders National Defense Corps (National Guard), by deferring maintenance and repair of buildings and by reducing food ration allowance for units from *won* 270 for troops in combat and *won* 220 for noncombat troops to *won* 200 per day. This recommendation has not yet been approved by President and State Council. Joint Economic Stabilization Committee is striving to effect other reductions in order present coordinated recommendation for total expenditures fourth quarter. Present indications are that, despite strongest representations all components American mission, Republic of Korea does not recognize grave consequences continued deficit spending. At recent meeting with Joint Committee President stated he hoped Committee would correct impression that there was financial crisis in Korea. Attitude that there is very little Government can do to correct situation also held by Minister Finance, Governor Bank Korea, and virtually all members State Council. Adherence this attitude in glaring contrast known facts indicates it will be extremely difficult to obtain enforcement by ROK of measures essential to economic stability without extreme pressure from mission. Lieutenant Colonel Ralph R. White, fiscal officer, KMAG, has been designated to serve on Joint Committee. Have suggested ROK designate representative National Defense.

II. Answers to specific questions URAD follow:

1. Total allotments by Minister National Defense to its units first three quarters ending 31 December 19,048 million *won*. Divided as follows, by quarters: Ministry National Defense, 121 million; Army 16,523 million; Navy 2,154 million; Air Force, 250 million. Allotments to Army included 720 million for all civil components. KMAG is exerting every pressure to reduce expenditures for Youth Movement, National Guard and other civil components to minimum. KMAG strongly feels and has advised Koreans only expense for civil components should be for Leaders' School of National Defense Corps (National Guard), which is made up of National Youth members only. However, many members National Youth are not members of National Defense Corps and receive no support from defense appropriations. Cost of school for FY 50–51 is estimated at 42 million *won*.

2. Original budget current fiscal year calculated on basis average Army strength 75,000 men. Additional 25,000 men referred to inclosure 1 Embdesp 96 are part of present "basic troop strength" of 100,000 men but are in excess strength provided for in appropriations passed to date by National Assembly.

3. Preliminary calculations indicate total authorized strength Army 100,000, Navy 7,500, and Air Force 2,000 can be supported coming fiscal year on total appropriation for Ministry National Defense of 27 billion *won* in contrast to 36 billion *won* included in budget for fiscal year 1950–51 submitted to National Assembly without mission concurrence. This assumes minimum present value of *won* and military situation as it now exists and flow of military aid continuing in future years as at present. In view limitations Korean heavy industry deemed most essential this flow continue. Home Affairs has requested 10.4 billion for police for fiscal year 1950–51. Believe minimum cost police force of 50,000 would be 6.7 billion *won*.

4. Budgetary effects Embassy's recommendation December 19 of raising military assistance funds up to 20 million dollars estimated a 4 billion *won* annually for Air Force (POL, construction new hangars and shops and maintenance) 150 million *won* annually for Army (POL, gun sheds, maintenance) and 15 million *won* annually for coast guard (fuel, lubricants, paint, etc.) *Won* cost POL included since National Defense must reimburse office of supply and use by National Defense will reduce availability POL for sale in general economy. Since date of arrival of equipment unknown above figures are annual and not necessarily cost in fiscal year 1950–51.

5. Appropriations for police current fiscal year to date are as follows by major categories:

Police communication system, *won* 31,340,500.
National Police College, *won* 77,702,200.
District police, *won* 3,958,151,700.

Clothing, *won* 767,100,000.
Temporary expenses for public security, *won* 3,601,452,300.
Total, *won* 8,435,762,700.

About 20,000 men regarded as "combat police" and ⅖ above total might be considered direct supplement to military expenditures. In addition to police, Ministry Education has expended 56 million *won* for "youth and student training" and 10 million *won* for "student patriotism movement", both activities regarded by Koreans as quasi-military, but regarded by KMAG as of no military value. Minister Education has requested additional supplemental appropriation 98 million *won* for this purpose, of which mission informed 50 million already obligated.

III. Information on developments affecting stabilization program being forwarded promptly as received by mission.

DRUMRIGHT

895.10/2–1450 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 14, 1950—5 p. m.

145. From State and ECA for Muccio (Drumright) and Bunce.

Subj is inflation.

Refs: Embdes 835, Minutes Food Sub-Committee, 1 Feb, AMIK Report 49, dated 14 Jan.[1]

1. Pres Rhee shld be most candidly informed that passage on 9 Feb of Bill authorizing $60 mil for Second Period FY 1950[2] is not occasion for relaxation of AMIK–ROK efforts to curb inflation. Pres shld be reminded that authorization legis passed only after ten months concerted, persistent efforts State-ECA; that very serious questions were raised in House as to ability ROK to control inflation; that serious reservations expressed concerning ability and willingness ROK to utilize ECA program effectively and to promote democratic processes in south Korea; that essential condition of authorization was that it did not constitute any commitment beyond 30 June and that Congress will completely reappraise econ situation before authorizing further aid to Korea; finally that funds were authorized only after Korea aid request was joined to China aid request. Clear implication of Congressional attitude is halfway anti-inflationary measures by ROK cld possibly result in ROK receiving no more than $30 mil to be advanced by RFC total for Second Period.

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[1] None printed.

[2] Reference is to the Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act which was approved on February 14; see footnote 1 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Williams, January 20, p. 12.

2. Being fully aware of these very real dangers, State-ECA/W view with great concern and disapprobation (*a*) apparently unrealistic attitude responsible ROK officials toward inflationary situation and tendency shift blame on ECA or US Govt as exemplified by statement of Min of Food in the Assembly regarding rice situation; (*b*) official distortion of facts concerning financial situation of ROK as exemplified by memo to Jessup from Pri Min as contained in your desp 103 Jan 29, 1950; and (*c*) President's act of by-passing ROK–US Stabilization Comite (expressly established to deal with inflation) on 1 Feb in matter of food distribution Seoul and disregarding ECA advice on rationing as reported in desp 123, Feb 4, 1950.[3]

3. Hearings before Fon Affairs and Fon Relations Comites on Korea Aid request for FY 1951 scheduled late Feb. Critically important ECA/W be in position to satisfy these Comites that ROK has demonstrated progress in controlling inflation and rectified administrative weakness resulting in present dangerous situation. Such proof will be required by Congress before authorization FY 1951 aid and demanded by Appropriations Comites when and if FY 1951 aid is authorized. Thus far State and ECA/W in presenting case for Korea Aid can only present to Congressional Comites record of action taken by State-ECA/W and AMIK as proof of action taken by US Gov to make ROK aware of dangerous financial policies tending to undermine Rhee Govt. Record of action taken by ROK thus far and visible effect of such actions not impressive and may be viewed by Congressional Comites with concern. [State and ECA.]

ACHESON

[3] Not printed.

895.10/2–2150 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, February 21, 1950—6 p. m.

228. This joint State-ECA message. Bunce and I called on President Rhee this afternoon and orally conveyed to him substance Deptel 145 February 14; left with him for study paraphrase of main points of reftel.

Rhee received message in extraordinarily good heart and gave assurances that he is with us 100 percent in seeking measures to curb inflation.

Opportunity was taken during conversation which lasted more than hour to discuss a number of factors affecting Korean financial situation, especially shaping up of 1951 budget, reduction of military expenditures, etc. Bunce filled Rhee in on recent activities of Joint Stabi-

lization Committee and urged that Rhee carefully consider its findings and recommendations. Rhee promised to do so.

DRUMRIGHT

895B.13/3–1550

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Bond)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1950.

Subject: 1. Integration of Korean and Japanese Economic Aid Program.
2. Economic and Political Situation in Korea.

Participants: ECA—Dr. Bunce, Dr. Johnson[2], Mr. Bunting, Mr. Street; State—Mr. Butterworth, Mr. Merchant[3], Mr. Allison, Mr. Doherty, Mr. Bond

[Here follows discussion of subject no. 1.]

2. *Economic and Political Situation in Korea.*

Dr. Bunce said that the question which he was most anxious to discuss with the Department was that arising out of the difficulty which the American Mission in Korea was encountering in dealing effectively with President Rhee and his personal entourage (especially Madame Rhee and Mr. Harold Lady, his personal "economic adviser"). He said that the Mission was seriously concerned with the increasing tendency on the part of President Rhee toward a personal authoritarian type of government backed by police support. As an example, he cited President Rhee's somewhat equivocal conduct in connection with the sale of 100,000 tons of rice to Japan. He added that in this and other analogous transactions the influence of Mr. Lady appeared to carry much more weight with the President than the advice of his own Cabinet Ministers, who customarily supported the position of the Mission. He stated that President Rhee had failed completely to appreciate the nature and the gravity of the inflationary threat in Korea and that, apparently with encouragement from Lady, he had continued to by-pass the provisions of the Constitution with respect to the financing of the Government.

Dr. Bunce referred to the recent defeat of the Constitutional amendment designed to create a system of parliamentary, rather than execu-

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[1] The memorandum was codrafted by Mr. Edward W. Doherty, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

[2] Edgar A. J. Johnson, Director of the Division of Korea Program in the Economic Cooperation Administration.

[3] Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

tive, responsibility in Korea,[4] and said that he had been somewhat disturbed by the fact that Ambassador Muccio, in conversations with Korean legislative leaders, had expressed opposition to that amendment. He stated that Clarence Ryee, the Korean Director of Public Information, had gone so far as to issue a public statement to the effect that ECA aid would cease if the Constitutional amendment were adopted, a statement to which the Mission had forced the Korean Government to issue a prompt retraction. Dr. Bunce went on to say that the present police state tendencies of the Government lead him to fear that the elections presently scheduled for May 10 will, if held at all, be dominated by the police and youth groups. In this connection he suggested the desirability of our encouraging the UN Commission on Korea to observe those elections. Mr. Bond said that attention was already being given to this problem.

Dr. Bunce said that he wished to make it clear that he and the Ambassador were in complete agreement on the fundamental issues with which they were confronted in Korea, and that they had both appreciated the support which they had received from Washington, particularly on the question of financial stabilization. He added, however, that it was his own view that the Department might do well to provide the Ambassador with more ammunition with which to fight President Rhee's trend toward personal government. On this point he said he thought President Rhee might be more compliant with our wishes if he were made to feel a little more uncertain about continuing U.S. support. Dr. Bunce went on to say that, while he realized the necessity of relatively optimistic statements for Congressional consumption in connection with consideration of Korean aid bills, he wanted to point out that such statements did create a problem for the Mission by bolstering the President's complacency over the certainty of continuing U.S. aid. He said, however, that the defeat of the Korean Aid Bill in the House in January[5] had had a most salutary effect and had been worth a thousand official statements. Dr. Bunce emphasized once more that the greatest obstacles with which the Mission was confronted in dealing with President Rhee were, first, the President's own incompetence, and second, the influence of Mr. Lady, who was persistently endeavoring to minimize in the President's mind the importance of the inflationary threat.

In response to a question from Mr. Butterworth Dr. Bunce outlined the work of the Joint Economic Stabilization Committee in attempt-

[4] The constitutional changes referred to received approval from a majority of those voting on them in the National Assembly, but failed to gain the required two-thirds vote of the duly elected and seated members of that body; see U.N. document A/1350, p. 21.

[5] See footnote 1 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Williams, January 20, p. 12.

ing to retard the inflationary trend. He stated that the Stabilization Committee was receiving a gratifying degree of cooperation from all branches of the Korean Government except the defense and police authorities who, despite the efforts of KMAG, continued to expend government funds excessively and irresponsibly within their respective bailiwicks. Dr. Bunce said that the Department's instruction No. 90 (of December 30, 1949)[6] had been a very useful weapon for the Mission and that the Ambassador had talked to President Rhee with great firmness on the basis of that instruction. He added that his own view would be that we should have used instruction No. 90 as an ultimatum, with the threat of publicity. Mr. Butterworth pointed out, however, that such publicity, had we been obliged to resort thereto, might well have sunk the pending Korean aid legislation. Dr. Bunce expressed confidence that the threat of inflation could be licked if the political situation were effectively dealt with and if the anti-inflation program were carried out.

Mr. Street said that he wished to point out that Mr. Hoffman was fully advised of the problems confronting ECA and State in Korea, although it was his feeling that the time had not yet come when all of the circumstances of the situation, as they were being discussed at this meeting, should be made available to the Congress. Mr. Street went on to express the opinion that the problem in Korea was basically a political problem and that the State Department should take steps to bring about a return to "normal democratic processes" in Korea. Mr. Butterworth replied that, in the first place, there is no such thing as "normal democratic processes" in a country such as Korea and that we would be deluding ourselves to think otherwise. He expressed the view also that the problem with which we are confronted in Korea is compounded of both political and economic factors which cannot be separated. Mr. Butterworth went on to point out that the State Department had become concerned as early as last fall with the growing threat of inflation in Korea and with the lack of vigor with which that threat was being combatted, and that it continued to be concerned with both the inflationary situation and the unsatisfactory political situation which, by interacting one upon the other, served to create the present total problem.

Mr. Street then suggested that we might use the termination clause of the Aid Agreement[7] as a weapon vis-à-vis the Korean Government, a course of action which Mr. Butterworth said that he regarded as superfluous. Mr. Bond suggested that the tactics with which we could

[6] *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1112.

[7] The agreement relating to economic aid between the United States and the Republic of Korea entered into force on December 14, 1948; for the text, see TIAS 1908, or 62 Stat. (pt. 3) 3780.

best combat the existing unhealthy political and economic tendencies in Korea would in the last analysis have to be determined in the field, and that the Department would certainly be receptive to any suggestions from the Mission as to how it could best backstop such tactics. He expressed the opinion that President Rhee's strongest weapon is his knowledge that the U.S. could not let the Republic of Korea fall without incurring the gravest political repercussions. Mr. Doherty interjected the thought that, if the present trend continued very long, the time might come when the lesser of two evils would be to cut loose and run the risk of incurring such consequences.

Dr. Johnson then suggested the possible advisability of sending to Korea a high level U.S. official (possibly the Deputy ECA Administrator [8]) to impress upon President Rhee and the Korean Government the gravity with which we viewed the trend of events there. Mr. Bond expressed the view that such a mission might have the unintended effect of undermining the authority of the Ambassador and the Chief of the ECA Mission, and that a preferable course might be to recall the Ambassador for consultation and send him back armed with new and stronger representations from the highest quarters of this Government.

Mr. Bond then raised the question of whether any useful purpose would be served by using the threat of stoppage of military assistance as a weapon with the Korean Government. In support of this he suggested that President Rhee, as an old revolutionary, had a more ready understanding of bullets than of capital investments, and that such a threat might get more directly at the heart of the obstacles to stabilization interposed by the defense and police officials.

Mr. Butterworth suggested at this point that a State-ECA working group be set up, while Dr. Bunce was still in Washington, to formulate recommendations. Mr. Doherty asked what the terms of reference of such a group would be, expressing the thought that all the technical and administrative problems had been thoroughly explored by the Economic Stabilization Committee and that the crucial remaining and unsolved problem was the basically political problem of the ability and willingness of the present Korean Government to enforce the measures which had been recommended. Mr. Butterworth repeated that in his view the problem of the inflation was compounded of a number of factors—political, economic and administrative—and that the working group should concentrate on all the steps that could be taken to get the Korean Government to deal in a responsible fashion with this problem.

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[8] William C. Foster.

795B.5622/3–1650

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, March 16, 1950.
No. 272–bis

Ref: Embtel 318, Mar. 10, 1950;[1] Embdes 777, Dec. 7, 1949,[2] and previous [communications?]

Subject: Request from President Rhee for Excess FEAF Aircraft

The Embassy refers to its telegram no. 318 of March 10, 1950, and to communications cited therein, and encloses, for the Department's information and records a copy of the request from President Rhee, dated March 6, 1950, for the shipment to Korea of FEAF aircraft now reportedly obsolescent.[3]

Upon receipt of this request from President Rhee, the advice of the Chief, KMAG, was sought concerning advisability of procurement of such planes for the Korean Air Force, and there are quoted below pertinent excerpts from the memorandum received from General Roberts under date of 8 March:

"It is obvious that immediate measures must be taken to provide Korea with effective air means of countering the growing air threat from the North. This has consistently been the attitude of KMAG....

"In view of the foregoing, KMAG has sent messages to Washington (ROB 380, 21 Sept 49; ROB 449, 6 Oct 49[4]) and has assisted in the preparation of numerous Embtels requesting that measures be taken to assist the Korean air force with advisory personnel and air materiel. It is understood that this matter has been under discussion in the Department of Defense since last October. . . .

". . . In order to present the whole problem in one bundle, together with a proposed solution, reference should be made, in forwarding the request, to our numerous proposals for air advisors to insure that if and when air materiel is turned over to Korea it is used efficiently. Further, reference should also be made to FMACC D–6 Revision 1, dated 23 January 1950,[1] subject "Policy with reference to training foreign nationals under MDA Act of 1949." Since one of our proposals contained in ROB 380 of 21 Sept 49 was to train Korean pilot instructors in FEAF installations, and since such training would seem to be contemplated under the MDAA, the present is a logical and propitious time to bring the subject up.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1105.

[3] In his letter to Ambassador Muccio, not printed, President Rhee noted that the Republic of Korea's intelligence sources had stated that the Soviet Union had supplied North Korea with between 70 and 100 fighters and bombers. He went on to say that there would obviously be a disastrous effect on South Korean civilian morale as well as on the military situation north of Seoul if enemy planes could bomb and strafe without any fear of retaliation.

[4] Neither printed, but their content is summarized in telegram 1376, November 8, 1949, from Seoul, in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1094.

"I am not in a position to comment on the availability or proposed use of obsolescent aircraft now in Japan. It is known that F–84's and F–86's are now being sent to Japan to replace some or all of the F–51's now in FEAF. I feel that aircraft rendered excess by this substitution will, if excess to the needs of the Air Force on a world-wide basis, be used to supply MDAP countries having an air force recognized by the N.S.C. I doubt that they will be "discarded" or "junked" as President Rhee presumes. In any event, I feel that if the planes are to be efficiently and properly used by Korea or any any other country either trained indigenous personnel must be presently available or an advice and training program must be undertaken by the U.S. to produce suitably trained indigenous personnel prior to delivery or use of the aircraft.

"To sum up: I feel that the President's request should be forwarded with a strong statement as to the urgent necessity for a well equipped Korean Air Force; I feel that reference should be made to all our previous requests; and I feel that we should also refer to the language of the FMACC paper referred to above which contemplates training of MDAP country nationals in U.S. installations, either in the ZI or overseas."

The Embassy has reviewed the recommendations set forth in its Despatch No. 777, December 7, 1949, and remains of the view that they are still appropriate with respect to the Republic of Korea's current air needs. If it is a fact that air equipment in Japan is being rendered obsolescent and declared surplus, it is earnestly hoped that such of this equipment as will meet the requirements of the Republic of Korea will be allocated to this country. This is particularly true of fighter, transport and trainer aircraft.

Action Requested: It would be appreciated if the Department would inform the Embassy of the action taken, or of such action as is proposed to be taken, with respect to President Rhee's request for United States air assistance, transmitted under cover of the Embassy's Despatch No. 777.

For the Ambassador:
EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT
Counselor of Embassy

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123 Muccio, John J.: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 23, 1950—7 p. m.

278. For Muccio. Info reaching Dept, both from Mission's reports and from conversations with Bunce, Heer, etc, leads Dept believe critical nature problems created by apparent inability or unwillingness ROK recognize and deal effectively with inflation threat, and by ap-

parently increasing anti-democratic tendencies ROK, wld justify your return to Dept for brief consultation. It has also occurred to Dept and ECA that useful purpose might be served were you to issue brief statement prior your departure Seoul to effect your recall for consultation due your Govt's concern over inflationary situation.

Request your views as to usefulness and optimum timing such consultation, as well as advisability issuance statement along suggested lines.

ACHESON

895B.13/3–1550 : Telegram

The Deputy Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration (Foster) to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 27, 1950.

Reference: Ecato 354, Toeca 430 [1]

Ecato 395. Eyes only Johnson to Bunce.

Subject is Prime Minister's letter March 4 delivered to Bunce at Airport

Following is full text Hoffman's answer to Prime Minister despatched 23 March. State has concurred.

"Your letter of 4 March to the Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission in the Republic of Korea,[2] on the subject of inflation, has been shown to me by Dr. Bunce. In recent weeks, as a result of your Government's participation in the affairs of the 'Korean Government—American Mission Economic Stabilization Committee', I had come to feel some assurance that your Government was really determined upon a vigorous anti-inflationary course of action. Your letter deprives me of such assurance.

It is my candid opinion that the appraisal of the present economic situation in the Republic of Korea which your letter sets forth is invalid and that the optimism which the letter seems to reflect is unwarranted. Obviously, certain immediate revenues can be derived from the sale of presently held government stores of rice, cotton and tobacco. This expedient, however, does not come to grips with the central problem, namely, that regular government revenues continue to fall far short of matching present rates of expenditure.

It is a foregone conclusion that unless tax revenues are sharply increased and expenditures are drastically reduced, prices will continue to rise, probably at an accelerating rate. The value of the Korean currency will seriously depreciate, and public confidence not only in the currency but also in the Korean Government will be progressively undermined. Such continuing deterioration in basic economic conditions in Korea will make our efforts to help your country increasingly difficult. It is my real fear that the point will be reached in the not too distant future where our aid would make no further net contribution to the welfare of the people of the Republic of Korea.

[1] Neither printed.
[2] Not printed.

In view of the thorough-going and detailed examination of all the inflationary forces which has been conducted by representatives of the ECA Mission and representatives of your Government in the Economic Stabilization Committee, I can hardly believe that the true nature of the situation is not known to you. I am, therefore, impelled to raise with you the question of whether your Government has a real intention to deal with the problem of inflation.

It is my duty to make certain that ECA funds are purposefully and effectively utilized in a genuine recovery program. The investment which the United States Government is making in Korean recovery is not an inconsequential amount. Further inflation will jeopardize the entire ECA program in Korea. I have asked Dr. Bunce to keep me personally informed of the progress made by the Government in carrying out the anti-inflationary measures recommended by the Economic Stabilization Committee. I must inform you that stop-gap measures will not be adequate.

It is my duty to remind you that the Government of the Republic of Korea must take such measures as will satisfy the ECA Mission in Korea and will satisfy me that the inflationary problem is being dealt with effectively. I cannot otherwise justify an aid program for Korea of the size and character contemplated for the remainder of fiscal year 1950 and for fiscal year 1951, and unless I am convinced that a forthright, immediate effort will be made to control inflation in Korea, I must consider the advisability of requesting a lesser sum from the Appropriations Committees than the $60,000,000 authorized by the Congress of the United States. Similarly, I must further review the request of $100,000,000 which the ECA is making for Korea aid during fiscal year 1951."

FOSTER

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123 Muccio, John J.: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, March 29, 1950—4 p. m.

412. Re Deptel 278, March 23. Brief consultation would be most useful and timely. In addition to inflationary situation and political developments I think it desirable to discuss aspects of NSC policy paper,[1] MDAP, future of KMAG and ECA, etc. While there are many disturbing developments in situation here, there are equally a number of favorable developments. Projected elections in late May, how they are conducted and their outcome may mark an important turn in developments. I feel consultation should be at earliest in order I may return here well before holding of elections.

Present time is not propitious for making statement on lack of cooperation ROK for following reasons. While recommendations of Economic Stabilization Committee during past two months have en-

[1] Reference is to NSC 8/2, approved March 23, 1949; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 969.

countered many frustrations and delays, some progress has been attained especially during past two weeks and with constant pushing many other measures may be accepted.

Some of the results to date are as follows:

a. Food program for current season accepted and now in operation.
b. Agreement on program for purchase and distribution cereals in 1950/51 also of basic importance to economy.
c. Agreement on procedure for disposition of vested property.
d. Passage of measure to implement land reform which Ministry Agriculture says can be gotten underway this season.
e. Agreement on pricing of aid supplies.
f. Agreement on proposals for elimination of certain subsidies to Government enterprises.
g. Agreement on balanced budget for 1950/51 now before the assembly.
h. Agreement on Dai Han Coal Corporation.

Latter two have been affected greatly in recent days by delaying tactics, but still hopeful they can be passed by this assembly.

Admittedly results, excepting current year food plan, are yet in paper stage. But progress is being made and we have all pushed Korean counterparts as strongly as possible, and almost to breaking point at times.

Therefore, to make statement on lack of cooperation ROK at this moment would in my opinion not serve helpful purpose and, in fact, might react discouragingly on Korean members of ESC who have gone along with us at times under tremendous opposition.

If there should be a serious hitch in implementing propositions already agreed upon by ESC prior to my departure, public statement would be warranted. I propose to inform President Rhee and few keymen in cabinet and in National Assembly in general way reasons impelling Department to call me back to Washington.

MUCCIO

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123 Muccio, John J.: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 31, 1950—6 p. m.

316. Reurtel 412 Mar 29. T.O. being telegraphed. Pls report dates.

Re suggested statement Deptel 278 Mar 23 did not envisage ref to "lack of cooperation ROK" but merely to our "concern over inflationary situation". Dept still inclined believe statement along latter line might be useful but desires leave this your discretion.

While gratified at results enumerated urtel, Dept and ECA/W inclined to view ltr of Mar 4 from PriMin [1] as more significant indi-

[1] Not printed, but see telegram Ecato 395, March 27, p. 36, and the *aide-mémoire*, April 3, p. 43.

cator of real attitude of ROK toward financial problems than measures upon which agreement reported urtel as having been reached.

On this end fol steps have been or will shortly be taken to emphasize this Govt's concern over inflationary situation:

1. On Mar 23 ECA/W dispatched Hoffman's reply to PriMin's ltr of Mar 4 (text transmitted Ecato 395 Mar 27).
2. On Apr 3 Korean Amb will call Dept (prior his departure fol day on goodwill mission Austral and NZ) and will be handed *aide-mémoire* setting forth Dept's views on inflationary situation, text of which will be telegraphed for transmittal also by Emb to ROK.
3. On same date Korean Amb expected call on ECA Administrator who will express ECA's deep concern over situation and will hand him copy Mar 23 ltr to PriMin.

ACHESON

795B.00/4–150: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, April 1, 1950—6 p. m.

432. Reference Embtels 427, March 31, 431 April 1,[1] and Deptel 317 March 31.[2]

Consider additional comments criticizing attempted postponement elections desirable addition *aide-mémoire*. Should proposed 1950–51 budget, new taxes be voted, but elections postponed as President suggesting, latter would become more serious than economic problems discussed in proposed *aide-mémoire*. Have appointment Monday morning when intend urge President most strongly against this course, but if Secretary of State does not mention same subject Ambassador Chang, might have appearance only Embassy concerned. Therefore suggest following paragraph be added following paragraph 4 of draft *aide-mémoire*.

"Of equal concern to this Government are the reported intentions of the Korean Government, as proposed by the President of the Republic of Korea in a message to the National Assembly on March 31, to postpone the general elections from the coming May until sometime in November. The Secretary of State wishes to draw to His Excellency's attention the fact that United States aid, both military and economic, to the Republic of Korea has been predicated upon the existence and growth of democratic institutions within the Republic. Free, popular elections, in accordance with the constitution and other basic laws of the Republic, are the foundation of those democratic institutions. The holding of the elections as scheduled and provided for by the basic laws

[1] Not printed. Telegram 431 reported that at a press conference on March 31, President Rhee had informed the Chairman of the National Assembly of his intent to postpone the elections for seats in that body, scheduled to be held in May, until some time in November (795B.00/4–150).

[2] This telegram, not printed, transmitted to Seoul the draft text of the *aide-mémoire* to be presented to the Korean Ambassador on April 3.

of the Republic appears to this Government as equally urgent with the taking of necessary measures for the countering of the inflationary forces already discussed." [3]

MUCCIO

[3] This paragraph was incorporated in the text of the *aide-mémoire* of April 3, see p. 43.

795.00/4-350

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Bond)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1950.

Subject: Situation in Korea, With Special Reference to (*a*) Inflation and (*b*) Postponement of Elections.

Participants: Mr. Dean G. Rusk, Assistant Secretary [of State for Far Eastern Affairs][1]
Dr. John M. Chang, Korean Ambassador
Mr. Niles W. Bond, NA

The Korean Ambassador called by appointment today to pay his respects prior to his departure on a trip which will take him to Australia and New Zealand on a goodwill mission and to Seoul for consultation. He stated at the outset that he had just been obliged to postpone his departure until April 10, due to certain prior commitments of the New Zealand Foreign Minister, and that he would probably not reach Seoul until about May 10.

In response to the Ambassador's remark that he would thus be arriving in Seoul just about in time for the elections, Mr. Bond stated that it was our present understanding that the latest decision of the President was that the elections should be postponed until November. The Ambassador replied that he was not aware of any final decision to that effect, and that he personally hoped that such a postponement would not take place. He pointed out, however, that if the National Assembly did not act promptly on the budget legislation now before it, the President might have no alternative but to put off the date of the elections. Mr. Rusk said that, whatever the reasons might be, the postponement of the long-scheduled May elections would certainly be widely interpreted as an arbitrary action and one inconsistent with the democratic principles in accordance with which the Republic of Korea had been brought into being. It would in particular, he said, be regarded in an unfavorable light by those nations which, through the instrumentality of the UN General Assembly, had lent their support to the establishment of the Republic. He added that, as the

[1] Mr. Rusk, who had been Deputy Under Secretary of State, assumed his new position on March 28, 1950.

Ambassador well knew, the continuing good will and sympathetic support of those nations was one of the primary sources of strength of the Republic and one which it could not afford to forfeit. Mr. Rusk went on to say that the effect of a postponement of the elections would likewise be markedly unfavorable in terms of American public and Congressional opinion. The Ambassador said that he was in entire agreement as to the unsalutary effect of postponing the elections, and that he would write immediately to his President pointing out that the climate of international opinion and of opinion within the U.S. was not favorable to such a postponement.

Mr. Rusk stated that there was one other subject which he wished to raise with the Ambassador, concerning which he hoped the Ambassador would carry back a strong expression of our views when he returned to Seoul. He said that he had in mind the problem of inflation, which had been causing this Government an increasing amount of concern during recent months. He said that it was our firmly-held belief that the success of the Republic of Korea in maintaining itself as a free nation was at the present juncture dependent in large measure upon its ability to deal effectively with the mounting inflation. Adverting to Mr. Hoffman's letter of March 23 to the Korean Prime Minister,[2] Mr. Rusk explained that the statement to the effect that this Government would have to reexamine its ECA program in Korea if the inflation were not soon brought under control was not intended as a threat, or as a means of forcing the Korean Government to conform to our views of how it should run its economy, but that it represented rather the considered judgment of this Government that continued inflation in Korea would serve to destroy the basis for further American aid—in other words, that continued inflation would bring about a situation in which it was no longer within the power of the United States to provide the "missing component". The Ambassador replied that he fully understood that our strong views on this subject were expressed as those of a friend, and that he would do his best to bring those views forcefully to the attention of his President. Mr. Rusk explained that we had summarized our views on the inflationary situation and on the proposed postponement of the elections in an *aide-mémoire* which the Ambassador could take with him, the text of which was being telegraphed to the Embassy in Seoul for informal transmittal to the Korean Government.

The Ambassador said that he wished to express his appreciation for the splendid reception accorded the Chairman of the National Assembly, Mr. Shinicky, and his party during their recent visit to Washington. He added that Mr. Shinicky had been particularly grateful for

[2] See telegram Ecato 395, March 27, to Seoul, p. 36.

the opportunity of being introduced on the floor of the Senate and that he and his party had left Washington thoroughly satisfied with the treatment which they had received.

The Ambassador then raised the question of a Japanese peace treaty,[3] and inquired whether or not any concrete developments could be expected from that quarter. He explained that this was a matter in which Korea, as one of the principal victims of Japanese oppression, was vitally interested. Mr. Rusk said that he had just come from a meeting on the subject of a Japanese treaty and that, while it was not possible at this time to make any predictions concerning the actual convening of a peace conference, he could say that this Government was formulating its views on the subject and might be in a position to discuss those views with other interested governments in the near future.

The Ambassador stated that he did not wish to take leave of Mr. Rusk without expressing the hope of the Korean Government that the American defense line in the Far East could be extended to include south Korea.[4] Mr. Rusk observed that this was not a subject which he was in a position to discuss, but that he did wish to caution the Ambassador against putting too much faith in what he read in the newspapers. Mr. Rusk went on to point out that the so-called "defense line" to which the Ambassador had referred was in actuality merely an enumeration of those sectors in the western Pacific in which the United States had firm military commitments; i.e. our responsibilities as an occupying Power in Japan, our special interest in the Philippines as a former part of United States territory, etc. The Ambassador replied that he realized that no statement could be made on this subject and that he himself had avoided making any such statements which he felt might prove embarrassing. He added that he did wish, however, to impress upon the Department the importance which the Korean Government and people attached to their apparent exclusion from the defense plans of the United States in the Far East. Mr. Rusk replied that the inference that the United States had decided to abandon the Republic of Korea to its enemies was scarcely warranted in the light of the substantial material aid and political support which we had furnished and were furnishing to that Republic. The Ambassador was quick to point out that he was not expressing any doubts of his own, but merely a point of view which unfortunately enjoyed wide currency in Korea. Mr. Bond then made the further comment that, in the case of Korea, it had been the carefully considered judgment of this Government that the most efficacious

[3] For documentation on this subject, see vol. VI, pp. 1109 ff.
[4] See footnote 3 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Williams, January 20, p. 12.

means of defending against Communist expansion was to bring about the creation in south Korea of a strong, self-reliant, Korean government, and that it was to that end that our policy in Korea continued to be directed.

Returning to the subject of his trip, the Ambassador said that the purpose of his visit to Australia and New Zealand was two-fold: (1) to express the appreciation of his Government for the support accorded by those two nations in the UN during consideration of the Korean problem, and (2) to sound out the Australian and New Zealand Governments on their intentions with respect to collective security arrangements in the Pacific. Having been told earlier in the conversation of Ambassador Muccio's projected return for consultation, the Ambassador asked that he be informed of Ambassador Muccio's exact plans at the earliest possible moment in order that he might be able so to arrange his travel as to meet Ambassador Muccio either in Washington or en route.

Attached is a copy of the *aide-mémorie* which was handed by Mr. Rusk to the Korean Ambassador at the conclusion of the foregoing conversation.[5]

[5] See *infra*.

895B.13/4–350

The Secretary of State to the Korean Ambassador (Chang)

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Secretary of State wishes to take this opportunity to express to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea, prior to the latter's return to Seoul, the deep concern of this Government over the mounting inflation in Korea. The Secretary of State wishes His Excellency to convey to the President of the Republic of Korea the view of this Government that the communication of March 4, 1950 [1] from the Korean Prime Minister to the Chief of the Economic Cooperation Mission in Korea, in which the view was expressed that there is no serious problem of inflation in Korea, but rather a threat of deflation, indicates a lack of comprehension on the part of the Korean Government of the seriousness of the problem and an unwillingness to take the drastic measures required to curb the growing inflation.

It is the judgment of this Government that the financial situation in Korea has already reached critical proportions, and that unless this progressive inflation is curbed in the none too distant future, it cannot but seriously impair Korea's ability to utilize effectively the economic assistance provided by the Economic Cooperation Administration.

[1] Not printed.

Government expenditures have been vastly expanded by bank overdrafts without reference to limits set by an approved budget. Tax collections have not been increased, aid goods have been under-priced, and governmental subsidies have been expanded. The dangerous practice of voluntary contributions has been used as an inefficient substitute for a sound taxation system. These uneconomic practices have in turn served to expand the currency in circulation, unbalance the Korean national budget, and cause a sharp rise in wholesale and retail prices, thereby strengthening the growing forces of inflation.

The Secretary of State must inform His Excellency that unless the Korean Government is able to take satisfactory and effective measures to counter these inflationary forces, it will be necessary to reexamine, and perhaps to make adjustments in, the Economic Cooperation Administration's assistance program in Korea.

The Secretary of State wishes to inform His Excellency in this connection that the American Ambassador in Seoul is being recalled for consultation within the next few days regarding the critical problems arising out of the growing inflation in Korea.

Of equal concern to this Government are the reported intentions of the Korean Government, as proposed by the President of the Republic of Korea in a message to the National Assembly on March 31, to postpone the general elections from the coming May until sometime in November. The Secretary of State wishes to draw to His Excellency's attention the fact that United States aid, both military and economic, to the Republic of Korea has been predicated upon the existence and growth of democratic institutions within the Republic. Free, popular elections, in accordance with the constitution and other basic laws of the Republic, are the foundation of those democratic institutions. The holding of the elections as scheduled and provided for by the basic laws of the Republic appears to this Government as equally urgent with the taking of necessary measures for the countering of the inflationary forces already discussed.

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1950.

895B.13/4–450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, April 4, 1950—6 p. m.

453. Redeptel 320, April 3.[1] Called on President 11 a. m. giving him *aide-mémoire* text Deptel 317 March 31 [2] plus additional paragraph suggested Embtel 432, April 1.

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[1] Not printed. It authorized Ambassador Muccio to convey to the Government of the Republic of Korea the text of the *aide-mémoire* of April 3 (895B.13/4–150).

[2] See footnote 2 to telegram 432, April 1, from Seoul, p. 39.

President read aloud, then commented much concern. I expressed belief that with President's earnest backing, following recommendations Economic Stabilization Committee possible establish stabilized financial condition near future, if current delaying tactics overcome. Cited example delaying tactics, specifically recent changing foreign exchange regulations after presidential acceptance committee's program.

I said developments anti-democratic character cause considerable concern, citing retention authoritarian Education Minister, constant improper police arrests, use torture threats by high officials against NA. I said would be impossible explain election postponement by government.

President finally asked what he could do satisfy Secretary and Hoffman. I replied, (1) cause passage laws, budget and taxes, and (2) hold elections before end May.[3]

MUCCIO

[3] For a report on subsequent developments, see despatch no. 435, April 28, from Seoul, p. 52.

795B.5622/3–1650

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1950.

No. 31

The Secretary of State acknowledges receipt of the Embassy's despatch No. 272 of March 16, 1950, on the subject "Request from President Rhee for excess FEAF aircraft". Reference is made to the Embassy's despatch No. 777 of December 7, 1949,[1] on the subject "Transmitting official request from President Rhee for United States air assistance", and to the Embassy's despatch No. 56 of January 21, 1950, on the subject "Transmitting request from President Rhee on needs of Korean Coast Guard".

The Department submitted the requests of the Republic of Korea for air and for Coast Guard assistance to the Department of Defense for consideration. In a memorandum dated April 5, 1950, addressed by the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Office of the Secretary of Defense,[2] to the Director of Mutual Defense Assistance, Department of State,[3] the tentative views of the Department of Defense on these two requests were expressed, reference being made to the Embassy's despatch No. 97 of January 25, 1950, which recapitulated the Embassy's recommendations regarding an increased

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1105.
[2] Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer.
[3] James Bruce.

military aid program for the Republic of Korea for Fiscal Year 1950. The text of that memorandum is herewith quoted:

"1. Pending the completion of formal studies within the Department of Defense regarding the proposed increase in the Fiscal Year 1950 MDA Program contained in Ambassador Muccio's despatch No. 97 of 25 January 1950, forwarded by your memorandum dated 16 February 1950,[4] the following is provided as the tentative views of this office:

"*a.* Based on the existing authority and intent of NSC 8/2,[5] there appears to be no military necessity for an increase in the Fiscal Year 1950 MDA Program for Korea at this time.

"*b.* In connection with the development of a Korean Air Force, it is pointed out that such a program would be beyond the concept of NSC 8/2, which authorizes "an Army of 65,000 men with air detachments," since by U.S. standards air detachments are normally considered to consist of light aircraft for ground liaison and courier service under Army control. The Korean request, on the other hand, contemplates development of a separate tactical Korean Air Force and includes 25 fighters, 6 long-range reconnaissance and 9 transport aircraft, together with ground support and a U.S. Advisory and Training Mission.

"*c.* With regard to the Ground Force Program, the present Fiscal Year 1950 Program for the Korean Ground Forces was proposed to provide adequate support for the existing forces in order that they may maintain internal security and protect the Republic of Korea from border incidents. This is in accordance with the provisions of NSC 8/2.

"*d.* The Coast Guard is established at 4,000 men by NSC 8/2. Vessels are on hand for this number of men and the present program provides maintenance spare parts for these vessels.

"2. If it is anticipated that the Department of State, for political reasons, may recommend the revision of NSC 8/2 to provide for a Korean Air Force, and an increase in Army and Coast Guard strengths, it is requested that this Office be so advised."

The whole question of aid to the Republic of Korea will be reviewed with Ambassador Muccio upon his arrival in Washington within the next few days. In the meantime, for the Embassy's information only, the foregoing is provided in compliance with the request contained in the Embassy's despatch No. 272.

[4] Not printed.
[5] *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 969.

795B.5 MAP/4–2050 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, April 20, 1950—4 p. m.

550. For Muccio. Approved FY 1950 MDAP has been received by Chief KMAG which with minor exceptions follows program recom-

mended and agreed to by Korean Government in December 1949. Most significant aspect of approved program is scheduled deliveries by which only $108 of military aid will arrive in FY 1950, two-thirds of total dollar value will be shipped in FY 1951 and remaining third in FY 1952. Impact of this very serious, delay in deliveries is greater than at first appears in that all vehicle and weapons spare parts and all powder and primers for arsenal program are scheduled for delivery in FY 1952. Owing to quick wearing out of weapons and vehicles (a factor of limited equipment used by large number of troops) and due to critical need of supporting Korean arsenal program, it is essential these 2 categories of MDAP arrive Korea soonest. Material wearing out so fast and currently so seriously in need of spare parts that unless prompt shipment of parts can be assured KMAG considers real danger exists. Major items for which needed will be beyond repair by FY 1952. As you know in attempt to stabilize economy, Republic of Korea has cut defense budget substantially. One of first items to be cut was arsenal program (from about 4 billion *won* to 1.2 billion) which results in increased early need for US assistance in form of powder and primers. Early delivery consonant with US desire that Korea balance budget. Year and half delay contemplated in deliveries these categories should not be accepted except as matter of utmost necessity.

Korea now faced with a condition of materially lessened US military supplies with new flow not coming in significant amounts for 9 months versus enemy force north of parallel which periodic reports put at constantly increasing materiel potential.

Telecon between G–4 KMAG and Lt. Colonel Kaufman G–3 DA and Major Geist G–4 DA April 18 indicated there was hope of earlier delivery powder and primers and possibly of other items. General Roberts and I request that you do everything in your power to speed dates of delivery of MDAP materials, especially of critical items such as vehicle and weapons spare parts, powder and primers.

DRUMRIGHT

795B.00/4–2550 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, April 25, 1950—5 p.m.

574. During last weekend Korean Army units broke up organized resistance of remaining band of North Korean guerrillas, numbering more than 600, who had penetrated into Odae Mountain area of Kangwon Province on or about March 25. On April 21 and 22, 70 guerrillas were killed, including leader Kim Mu Hyon, 24 captured. Total result of operations against Kim Mu Hyon group, which lasted intermittently for more than three weeks, were 237 killed, 47 captured, and 172

small arms, 12 automatic weapons and 3 mortars seized. Kim Mu Hyon guerrillas were best trained and equipped Korean Army has yet faced. Fierceness of battles, which took place in very rugged country, attested by fact Korean Army had 57 killed, 164 wounded and 5 missing. Other large band which had simultaneously crossed parallel in area west of Kangnung was routed and virtually destroyed first week in April. Of more than 600 guerrillas who came across in total operation, it estimated not more than 50–75 remain and these are now scattered in small groups.

It perhaps significant these guerrillas had been systematically trained for a year, first at Kangdong Academy and later at other centers. They were far and away best equipped guerrillas yet to come south. It seems clear their mission was to join other guerrillas in north Kyongsang with aim of setting up "liberated area". Communist hopes in this direction have, of course, been utterly dashed.

6th and 8th divisions of KA gave very good account of themselves in these operations, especially 8th, which acted with dispatch and efficiency and with small cost to own forces. Leadership of 6th, especially 8th Regiment, was weak and lacked aggressiveness until past week when new colonel was brought in to assume overall command.

It is understood another force of 500 guerrillas remains just north of parallel in same area. Thus far they have made no effort to come south. With loss during past three weeks of about 500 men and several hundred weapons, North Koreans may be loath to commit more men and equipment to such adventures.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/4–2750

Memorandum by Mr. W. G. Hackler of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 27, 1950.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL MEETING ON THE FAR EAST[1]

11:30 a. m., Room 5106

Mr. Merchant opened the meeting and reminded those present that the material presented at these meetings was classified as top secret.

Ambassador Muccio reviewed the history of military government in Korea and the assumption by the Koreans of responsibility for their own government in 1948. He says that the Koreans, although jittery over their security in 1949, had not been willing to accept U.S. advice on economic matters. The *aide-mémoire* and the strong letter from

[1] A list of persons present is attached as an annex.

Washington, which resulted from Ambassador Muccio's suggestion, had jolted the Koreans and recently every recommendation of the Joint Commission on Economic Stabilization has been accepted. Mr. Muccio believes that the balancing of the budget, the raising of taxes and the regulation of foreign exchange presaged an improvement in the economic situation.

He stated that 95% of Korean industries had been owned by the Japanese; the problem now facing the Korean government is one of denationalization. 500,000 Korean families have been given property which previously belonged to the Japanese. 80% of the Korean people live on the land and since they are much better off than they ever were before, they constitute a strong element of stability.

The Korean government is only 21 months old and follows 40 years of Japanese control and 3 years of U. S. military government. The important question in everyone's mind in 1948 was the ability of the Koreans, who had no experience in government, to handle their own affairs. Recent actions of the National Assembly indicate, Mr. Muccio said, a growing sense of responsibility and freedom of action not stifled by the President. Recent favorable developments are the Prime Minister's statement concerning free elections [2] and the request for UNCOK observation of these elections.[3]

Also heartening, Ambassador Muccio reported, is the effective training of the Army. The Korean Army has kept pace with the aggressive actions from the north and has been successful in controlling the constant flow of saboteurs and special agents from North Korea.

Ambassador Muccio said that the Koreans need help in the economic and military fields and since they have the will and the ability to defend themselves, the U.S. should provide the "missing component" which will enable them to hold on to the area. He said that the U.S. had made heavy investments in Korea during the days of military government and only small additional amounts are required to keep Korea on its feet. Korea is a symbol of U.S. interest in Asia, Ambassador Muccio said, and it is important to help the Koreans keep their freedom and independence.

In response to a question from Mr. Merchant, Ambassador Muccio stated that there are too many intangibles involved to make possible an estimate of the length of time that U.S. economic and military aid would be needed. If Korea were unified, South Korea would not require the imports which it does now nor would the military establishment need to be as large. Ambassador Muccio suggested that too many Americans (particularly those in ECA missions) had never lived

[2] See *infra*.

[3] The Republic of Korea on April 21 had invited UNCOK to observe the elections, and UNCOK accepted on May 4; see U.N. document A/1350, p. 23.

abroad before. They went to the Far East and over estimated the needs of the area because they were unfamiliar with Far Eastern standards. Spiritual and mental uplift resulting from confidence in U.S. interest is most important to the Koreans, Mr. Muccio said, and he thought that a Point IV program for Korea would be a tremendous help.

In response to a question from Mr. Zempel, Mr. Muccio said that there were no labor unions in Korea as we understand the term. The SK [*LP*], or Labor Party, is a political instrument and not a trade union.

In response to a question from Mr. Ogburn, Mr. Muccio said that 2,000,000 Koreans had moved south, whereas none had moved north. The Soviets have moved out of North Korea those persons and groups who had expressed opposition to a police state. As a consequence, rigid police controls and the absence of disaffected persons had kept North Korea quiet, thus making it difficult to estimate the attraction of the present Korean government for the North Koreans. After 40 years of Japanese control the Koreans are determined to resist further interference from outsiders. Mr. Muccio estimated that $75 million worth of goods have been taken out of North Korea by the Soviets in the form of coal, fertilizer and power.

In response to questions by Mr. Rossiter, Mr. Muccio said that there were not enough textiles for the people but that the supply was steadily increasing. Trade was just getting under way with Japan in the form of exports of rice and imports of spare parts for the Japanese-make machinery which is in use in all of the Korean industries. The Koreans seem to be anxious to trade with Japan but fear the Japanese as being more of an immediate threat than the Soviets and are apprehensive concerning economic engulfment by the Japanese.

In response to questions by Mr. Sprouse and Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Muccio said that it was encouraging that so much interest had been shown in the elections about to be held, with more than 2,000 candidates filing for the 200 positions. Many independents are running for office which indicates that the National Assembly is considered an important body. No Communist party exists in Korea nor are there any organized political parties. The Koreans are not proud of their police force which being Japanese trained uses only force in its operations and is guilty of restricting civil liberties.

In response to a question by Mr. Barnett, Mr. Muccio stated that President Rhee had been a leading figure in the Korean independence movement for 45 years and has considerable support from most Koreans who consider that he has a genuine desire to do something for the Korean people. Detested by many politicans, Rhee has been able to retain power because he is a shrewd manipulator. In the 1880's and

1890's almost all of the younger Koreans were in revolt against the brutal Imperial family. When the Japanese took over control of Korea they instituted an effective program of de-Koreanization. Many influential Koreans emigrated to Hawaii, the United States, Manchuria, Shanghai and other places in the Far East. When they returned to Korea at the end of the war, coming as they did from different environments, the big question was whether they would be able to work together since they had no established patterns in Korea to revitalize and since they had become familiar with so many different traditions during their exile. Fortunately, all signs pointed to continuing success by the Korean leaders in cooperating with each other.

Mr. Bunting of ECA admitted that some errors had been made in ECA operations in the past and asked if $120 million for the present year and $100 million for the next year were considered too much. Ambassador Muccio replied that he did not consider that $182 million was too high because of the large investment the U.S. had made previously. Mr. Muccio explained that his word of caution concerning unrealistic standards did not apply to this figure but was a general remark which he thought it desirable to make to counteract unrealistic estimates of future help which would be needed to make the Korean economy viable.

Mr. Bunting said that the ECA program had not been calculated to provide the Koreans with a high standard of living. He suggested that ECA may be too ambitious in trying to promote capital development and investment in Korea but the plan had been to cut down imports and increase exports. Mr. Muccio said that he did not disagree with the basic ECA program.

In answer to a question by Mr. Young, Ambassador Muccio stated that all Koreans wished their country to be unified and the desire for unity permeates all their thinking. At the present time the only public intercourse between North and South Korea is the delivery of mail every two weeks.

In response to a question by Miss Bacon, Mr. Muccio said that UNCOK was now favorably regarded by the Koreans in contrast to its low prestige last year, which had been caused by the Commission's constant bickering over petty questions of prestige.

In answer to a question by Mr. Hirschtritt, Ambassador Muccio said that the question of disposing of all the property which had belonged to the Japanese was a very difficult one and was not capable of rapid solution because of the huge amount of capital needed.

Mr. Merchant expressed appreciation to Ambassador Muccio for his analysis and again emphasized the Top Secret classification of the discussion.

468-806—76——5

(List of persons present is attached)

[Annex]

Name	*Agency*
Kenneth Young	Defense
Arthur W. Stuart	Treasury
Ralph Hirschtritt	Treasury
Fred J. Rossiter	Agriculture
W. I. Ladejinski	Agriculture
Dr. Quincy Adams	Army
Mr. McComb	Army
Edwin D. Arnold	ECA
Frederick Bunting	ECA
Miss Eades	Commerce
Arnold Zempel	Labor
Leo Wertz	Labor
Seymour Weiss	Budget
Mr. Lawson	Budget
Frank D. Collins SOA	State
Mr. Merchant FE	
Mr. Hackler	
Miss Bacon	
Mr. Wright	
Mr. Gay	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Sprouse	
Mr. Allison	
Mr. Connors	
Mr. Ogburn	
Mr. Peake	
Ambassador Muccio	
Mr. Johnson	
Mr. Barnett	

895B.13/4–2850

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, April 28, 1950.

No. 435

Subject: Reaction to the Secretary's *Aide-Mémoire*

The Secretary of State's *aide-mémoire* to the Korean Ambassador [1] was, after President Rhee caused it to be translated and distributed to the National Assembly, received here as the stern warning which it was intended to be. There was some immediate resentment, outstand-

[1] April 3, p. 43.

ing among which was that of Assembly Vice Speaker Yoon Ch'i Yung, who charged that there was no Korean intention of violating the principles of democracy by delaying elections; Yoon further went on to direct remarks against Dr. Arthur C. Bunce, chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Korea, described in a separate report to Washington by Dr. Bunce in Toeca A–25, April 12, 1950.[2] Unofficial censorship kept the contents of the *aide-mémoire* out of the Korean press until press association despatches carried the gist, from Washington, on April 9.[3] Editorial reaction was generally thoughtful, although there was some comment that the tone of the *aide-mémoire* and letter of Economic Cooperation Administrator Paul C. Hoffman to the Korean Prime Minister, of March 23, 1950 [4] was sterner than Korea deserved. In this, the press betrayed much the same complacency regarding the seriousness of the situation as was evident in Korean Government circles prior to receipt of the *aide-mémoire* and Hoffman letter. Radio Pyongyang characterized the *aide-mémoire* as "interference of American imperialism" in Korean affairs, although the Communists apparently worked from the confused premise that May elections to provide continuous existence of Parliamentary government in Korea were evil in themselves as well as a scheme of President Rhee to perpetuate himself in power. There was little, if any, comment in newspapers outside the city of Seoul, and after initial editorials in the Seoul papers, the *aide-mémoire* disappeared as a topic of press comment, being overshadowed by the coming election campaign. Anti-administration forces may make use of it in the campaign, however.

Events subsequent to delivery of the aide-mémoire. After delivery of the text of the *aide-mémoire* to the President, as described in Embtel 453 of April 4, an officer of the Embassy called on Kim Sung Soo, head of the Democratic Nationalist Party, at present the strongest organized political group in opposition to the President. The conversation, in which other members of the DNP also participated, is described in Enclosure No. 1.[2] The two main points of the *aide-mémoire* were made known to the DNP leaders, and they indicated that they had come to the same conclusions concerning the necessity of passing a balanced budget and holding May elections as scheduled. They were in doubt, however, as to the President's intentions.

It is the Embassy's opinion that the President came to the conclusion the following day, April 5 (which was a Korean holiday, Arbor Day), that he must support May elections, and it is understood that

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[2] Not printed.

[3] The text had been released by the Department of State on April 7; see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 17, 1950, p. 602.

[4] See telegram Ecato 395, March 27, to Seoul, p. 36.

he ordered translations of the *aide-mémoire* and parts of the Hoffman letter to the Prime Minister made for intended distribution in the National Assembly the next day, when a vote on the vetoed Election Bill was scheduled. This bill, vetoed April 3 by the President, had provided for elections within the last 20 days of May. On that same day, April 5, the President also was visited by the senior Vice Speaker (and Acting Speaker) of the Assembly, Kim Tong Wun, a DNP. According to Kim, the President offered to appear in the Assembly the next day, when the vote on overriding was scheduled. The President, however, did not appear, and by failure of the Office of Administration to deliver the material to the Assembly secretariat in time, translations of the *aide-mémoire* and the Hoffman letter were not distributed in the Assembly that day. Despite reference by some Assemblymen to Government receipt of a strong warning from the United States, the Assembly failed to override the veto. As in the Constitutional amendment voting, abstentions largely by the generally pro-Administration Taehan (Great Korea) Nationalist Party resulted in failure of the measure to obtain the necessary two-thirds affirmative votes.

National Assembly reaction. Translations of the Secretary's *aide-mémoire* and parts of the Hoffman letter were distributed in the Assembly shortly after it convened the day following the vote on the vetoed Election Law, April 7. The President himself also made an unscheduled appearance, during which he discussed the possibility of loss or reduction of American aid, suggesting that if Assemblymen had any doubts about Government receipt of United States warnings they "might ask either the ECA or the American Ambassador." After blaming much of the criticism of the Republic of Korea on Owen Lattimore [5] and unspecified Koreans in the United States, the President urged passage of the FY 1950/51 budget [6] and necessary revenue measures without regard to "personal" considerations. He then promised elections sometime between May 25 and 30, excusing his own previous requests for election postponement on the grounds that he had wanted "to enable you (Assemblymen), in leisure, to pass the important bills with an easy mind." Enclosure No. 2 [7] summarizes Assembly proceedings for that day.

The President's remarks, and the *aide-mémoire*, produced one immediate, violent reaction, from Assembly Vice Speaker Yoon, leader of the Taehan (Great Korea) Nationalist Party. Yoon, by inference, charged interference in Korean internal affairs, criticizing not only the

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[5] Director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University and former editor of *Pacific Affairs;* see footnote 1 to telegram 640, May 5, from Seoul, p. 67.

[6] The National Assembly passed the budget legislation and related revenue measures on April 22.

[7] Not printed.

aide-mémoire but previous communication with the Assembly by Dr. Bunce, and likened the situation to a communication written by former Japanese Ambassador to Washington Hanihara during Congressional discussion of Japanese exclusion in the 1920's.[8] "We must be sure," Yoon said in a speech more agitated in manner of delivery than in actual words, "that we do not receive such letters from foreigners again. . . . I am not criticizing our American friends here but I am merely saying it for the preservation of the prestige of (this) civil law country." Speaker Yoon's remarks, translated from the official stenographic record of the Assembly session, are also contained in Enclosure No. 2.

As indicated by Enclosure No. 3,[9] giving details of a later conversation between Yoon and an Embassy officer, Yoon recognized "as did all members of the Assembly, that although Korea was nominally an independent country it was actually dependent upon the United States for its very existence" and that "the question was not one of conforming to United States desires but of saving face as a supposedly independent legislative body of an independent country." A point was made by Yoon that he regretted that the *aide-mémoire* and Mr. Hoffman's letter had been published by the United States Government, and in this connection it may be pointed out that the Korean press did not carry the text of the *aide-mémoire*, although there were newspaper stories describing the President's appearance in the Assembly and his reference to the *aide-mémoire* and Hoffman letter, and Washington despatches later supplied further details.

After Yoon's speech, no other Assemblyman spoke on the subject. Even those who had professed themselves as hoping for a sterner attitude on the part of the United States confessed that they were startled when the warnings actually were delivered and read. Remarks to this effect were made privately by the Independent Assemblyman Cho Heun Yung, a former DNP member, who throughout the last Assembly session has been a consistent spokesman for common sense and attention to the main business of passing necessary fiscal legislation. When Cho, incidentally, on April 11 drew parallels between Greece and Korea in urging Assembly action on tax matters, it drew from Hong Sung Ha, DNP chairman of the Committee on Finance and Economy, a retort that "one talks about foreign aid in private conversation but it is very unpleasant to hear some talking of foreign aid on the rostrum of the National Assembly."

Newspaper comment. The leading Seoul newspapers carried comment on the warnings (without the texts themselves) in which the

[8] See *Foreign Relations*, 1924, vol. II, pp. 375–383.
[9] Not printed.

attitude was one of admitting the faults charged, reservations, and then of counselling determination to make reforms to insure further United States aid. The *Yunhap Shinmoon*, however, which often speaks for the President, commented that it was "sorry that the tone of the note (*aide-mémoire*) was rather severe" and went on to protest that although "our economic system is in bad shape" it was not "so bad as to call for a curtailment of United States aid." The editorial asked that the United States render assistance to small and weak nations by handing out more aid. Enclosure No. 4 [10] summarizes the *Yunhap* editorial.

The *Seoul Shinmoon*, reorganized last year under Government direction, suggested that Korea was not the only nation aided by the United States in which inflation was a problem—the *Seoul* pointed to the Philippines—but ended by recognizing the "cold reality" of the situation, advocating doing "our utmost so that our house can be put in order." Enclosure No. 5 [10] summarizes the editorial.

The *Kyunghyang Shinmoon*, representing Catholic interests, chided the Administration and the Assembly equally for trying "to pass the buck to each other", and said that "all of us must join hands in assuming responsibility and correcting the defects." The editorial, given in Enclosure No. 6,[10] continued: "We must continually bear in mind the import of Acheson's warning that United States aid to Korea is based on the existence and development of democratic institutions in our country. Days of lip-service . . . are gone."

The *Chosun Ilbo*, an independent, generally middle-of-the-road newspaper, occasionally critical of the Government, said it was "sorry that such a warning had to be sounded" but advised that Koreans had "better seize the opportunity to reflect on ourselves as to why such a step had been taken by our friend who has shown so far nothing but goodwill, and rendered valuable aid." The editorial is summarized in Enclosure No. 7.[10]

The *Tong A Ilbo*, organ of the anti-Administration, conservative DNP, whose stand had been in favor of early budget action and May elections "rather welcome(*d*) this warning because it concurs with our contention . . . that inflation must be curbed and the election be held in May." *Tong A*, whose editorial is summarized in Enclosure No. 8,[10] gave the United States credit for "thus far avoiding any actions which could be interpreted as United States interference in our domestic affairs" and suggested that it "must have pained" the United States to "administer us a stern thrashing, knowing very well that the Soviets and the puppet group up in the North would seize upon the chance and launch vicious propaganda." The *Tong A* warned its readers that

[10] Not printed.

the Administration still had to be watched, to make sure it did its part, and concluded on the note that "Acheson's (*aide-mémoire*) should be an impetus for a new determination on our part."

The Embassy regularly watches provincial newspapers and others outside the city of Seoul, including Pusan, but has seen no comment in them on the *aide-mémoire*. Newspapers outside Seoul did, of course, carry news stories from Washington, as distributed locally from Seoul, with accounts of the United States messages to the Korean Government.

Other Comment. The then Prime Minister, Lee Bum Suk,[11] whose letter on the dangers of deflation, rather than inflation, in Korea provoked the Hoffman letter of March 23, commented on the *aide-mémoire* at a press conference April 10. He termed the *aide-mémoire* a "friendly advice" and tried to reconcile differences between views in his (Lee's) letter to the ECA and the *aide-mémoire* as resulting from a difference in viewpoint: Korea he said, was looking at her own situation alone, whereas the United States, in his view, was basing its remarks on "its world economic policy." He admitted Korea's obligation to accept the advice of the aid-giving country. A newspaper account of the interview is contained in Enclosure No. 9.[12]

Enclosure No. 10 [12] contains comments by Koreans in Ch'oonchun, capital of Kangwon province, as reported by the Korean manager of the United States Information Service there. In an accompanying note to the director of the USIS in Korea, the USIS branch manager commented that the "memorandum warning the Republic of Korea . . . has aroused a more or less big sensation among the leading people in this town." He enclosed specific comment; a newspaper publisher remarked that the *aide-mémoire* was deserved; a merchant took the same view; a judge dodged the issue although criticizing the Korean Government; a Christian minister said he felt "ashamed" and a candidate for the National Assembly (identified only as a "politician") termed the memorandum "timely", but went on to suggest that fundamental solution of Korean economic problems must await elimination of the division of Korea at the 38th parallel.

As mentioned in the *Tong A Ilbo* editorial above, the North Korean regime did indeed make propaganda use of the *aide-mémoire*. A Radio Pyongyang broadcast of April 9 is given as Enclosure No. 11.[12] The broadcast took the view that President Rhee had intended to hold May elections "with a view to regaining his prestige" but that he had changed his mind several times subsequently, finally taking a position in favor of May elections on receipt of "a United States Department

[11] Prime Minister Lee Bum Suk resigned on April 3 and was succeeded by Defense Minister Sihn Sung Mo who became Acting Prime Minister on April 22.
[12] Not printed.

of State . . . order to Syngman Rhee that the general elections be held in May without fail." The broadcast pictured the President as unwilling "to announce publicly that orders had been received from Washington" but that the President, having no alternative but to do so gave as his "recommendations of the United States." According to Radio Pyongyang, these recommendations "were couched in such brazen and shameless words of suppression against the traitors, and of interference of American imperialism in the internal affairs of the Republic of Taehan (Korea) that they could not but evoke the resentment of even the members of the country-ruining National Assembly." Yoon Ch'i Yung's remarks were then quoted in part, together with the President's brief reply to Yoon.

EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT

795B.00/5–150: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, May 1, 1950—6 p. m.

605. I had long informal talk yesterday with Acting Prime Minister who evinced discouragement over experiences of a harried first week as Acting Prime Minister. He confirmed he had been by-passed by Home Ministry in making top police changes (Embtel 596, April 28[1]) and as result had offered his resignation, but Rhee had rejected it. He said police changes made to date were not decisive, but he expressed fear Home Ministry might be able prevail on President to make further wholesale police changes at county and local levels which could seriously affect course of election. He accordingly, urged me to see President and intimate wholesale police changes would be unwise and should not be made at this time. He indicated he had exerted every effort check further changes but that matter was now beyond his control.

Late yesterday Kim Sung Soo, leader Democratic National Party, also came to see me. He expressed concern over police changes made to date and professed to believe additional changes were imminent which could seriously affect prospects of his party. However, he said DNP candidates had thus far been able to campaign in free atmosphere.

This morning King, AP correspondent, came to see me with report further police changes were rumored which might influence course

[1] Not printed. It reported the receipt of confidential information from a Korean official that the Home Ministry had transferred a number of senior police officials and dismissed six others, with the sanction of President Rhee but over the objections of Acting Prime Minister Sihn Sung Mo (795B.00/4–2850).

of election. It was agreed that rather than send despatch, King would make informal inquiry of President whether further wholesale police changes were contemplated. Subsequently King came to tell me he had made such inquiry through one of President's secretaries and had received reply that no such changes were in prospect.

I have engagement to see Rhee tomorrow afternoon at which time I propose find opportunity to suggest that if any wholesale police changes are in contemplation, it would seem best that they be deferred until after election, lest impression get abroad that changes are designed to influence course of election. Inform Muccio.

DRUMRIGHT

795B.00/5–250 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY SEOUL, May 2, 1950—6 p. m.

613. Embtel 605, May 1. Mrs. Rhee telephoned Noble[1] before nine a. m. this morning saying President was sick in bed but would like see him at once. Prior to leaving office Noble discussed with me question of reported police changes. On arrival at residence Noble was met by Mrs. Rhee, who said President decided issue public statement about changes in police force, but she was fearful he might include some unfortunate remarks and had persuaded him to talk with Noble first. Noble went to President's bedroom, where he found President in bed apparently suffering from grippe.

President first gave long background account of situation. He said he considered party fights and factionalism greatest weakness of Koreans politically and fights between factions in US before liberation had done more harm than even Japs had done. Therefore, when he returned to Korea he was determined party politics should be avoided. He had tried to organize a coalition of all national elements in National Society for rapid realization for Korean independence, in which all groups and factions would work together for common cause. In this he had failed. Meanwhile there had developed Democratic National Party and he had maintained friendly relations with it. Indeed most of his good friends had been members. In consequence he had frequently been attacked by foreign correspondents as being a reactionary since DNP was conservative party of Korea. He had to admit, however, that DNP had attracted most of competent and able men in South Korea, wealthy men, local leaders, men of education and leadership. He found DNP would have been willing and in fact was desirous he should be party leader, but DNP wished to monopolize all political power in Korea. Since he did not believe in party politics he would

[1] Harold J. Noble, Attaché at the American Embassy in Seoul.

not accept party position. After assuming Presidency he offered Finance Minister's post to Kim Sung Soo, DNP leader, but Kim had set down as condition of acceptance appointment of majority of DNP members to Cabinet and control of Government by DNP. This he had refused and Kim Sung Soo did not enter Cabinet. Nevertheless he had made extensive use of DNP members in government, including several Cabinet Ministers. In addition, Defense Minister Sihn Sung Mo, in whom President put great confidence, worked closely with DNP. In fact, President had appointed Kim Kyo Suk Home Minister upon Sihn's recommendation.

Rhee told Noble that without his own knowledge or even suspicion, Kim Kyo Suk had proceeded to develop DNP party machine through police chiefs who were members of or attached to DNP. He said this had come to his attention at time of struggle over constitutional amendment when numerous persons had come in from country to complain police were supporting DNP political leaders only and used their power against persons not supporting DNP. He said about fifty members of National Assembly also had called and presented similar charges. He had then called in Kim Kyo Suk and asked him about these charges. Kim had said it was necessary to organize police in order to keep Communists and moderates from being successful in elections and so obtain control of government. President said he considered this meant Kim had actually organized police to advance fortunes of DNP. He had therefore demanded Kim's resignation and had appointed present Home Minister Paek who had no connections with DNP.

After assumption of office, President had directed Paek to make complete shift of police chiefs before election so there could be free elections. He said each police chief would have developed his own organization in his own district, but a new police chief coming in would not be able to take over that organization or have time to develop a new organization in which police influence could be used on behalf of one group of candidates.

Noble replied that whatever facts were, general public impression among Koreans and foreigners was new Home Minister was now engaged in establishing his own police machine in order control elections on behalf of candidates he supported. President's objection this not so, Noble said President had to face not only facts as he knew them but general opinion which even though not based on facts would have very powerful influence. Rhee said he understood this but he was determined there should be free elections and he intended proceed with his program of shifting every police chief to a new district. He continued although there might be suspicion of motives at present time, nevertheless when elections were held everyone would see results had

been beneficial in making free elections possible instead of having police power utilized on behalf of one party.

Noble then said Home Minister had in addition effected dismissal of several senior police officers and this would not appear to be preparation for free elections but elmination of officers who might be in way of setting up of new political machine by Home Minister. President, seemingly concerned, said he had not been told any had been dismissed and wanted to know who they were. Noble replied he would obtain names. President requested he do so, saying if Home Minister had dismissed police chiefs, he would fire Home Minister.

President then said in view of public concern over issue, especially that of foreigners, he wished to make public statement and requested Noble's advice. Noble rejoined there no point in making statement unless it contained all essential facts, specifically who was being transferred, from which post to what post and why, and who was being discharged and why. President then said he would like Noble to talk with AP correspondent and that he had greatly appreciated latter's handling of matter yesterday. Noble rejoined it would seem well to take up matter with correspondent when all facts were available.

Noble stressed current shifts were having bad effect on police morale. Noble then urged that regardless of merits of President's position, because of harmful effect upon public opinion, especially foreign opinion, projected changes be delayed until after election. In reply President indicated he intended go ahead because he wanted free elections. President then asked Noble what was purpose of my projected call this afternoon. Noble replied I was greatly concerned about police changes and wished discuss them with President. He then told Noble he would be glad to see me if I felt I must come this afternoon, but since Noble could now give his views to me, and since he was ill, he hoped I would find it convenient to call another day.

After careful consideration of President's position, I asked Noble to call on President late this afternoon with information about dismissed police and at same time convey to him following facts:

"State that I fully sympathize with his desire that the elections shall be conducted in a free, honest and impartial manner. Inform the President that as a friend and as a supporter of Korea, I earnestly venture to hope that he will consider long and carefully the repercussions and reactions which may be brought about by any wholesale changes in the police chiefs at this time. Say that I have long felt that the police organization needs a thorough overhauling and appropriate training in order to enhance its efficiency and make it more popular with the Korean people, but that I am of the view that such reforms should be undertaken only after thorough study which would have to be after the elections.

"Inform the President that in my view any wholesale or complete shifting of police chiefs at this time will unquestionably expose him to charges of endeavoring to control or rig the elections. Say that in my opinion this will be the general interpretation given such an action not only by people of the friendly nations but by the Korean people, as well. Point out that the repercussions are incalculable. Inform the President it is my feeling that the reaction in US quarters, official and unofficial, is almost certain to be adverse, no matter what explanation may be given for the police changes. Bearing in mind that the US Government suggested an early election, inform the President that this matter could conceivably affect US policy toward Korea, including the voting this very week on the ECA appropriation in the US Senate.[2]

"Say that if the President is convinced of the validity of the charges made against Mr. Kim Kyo Suk, it would have been more convincing if the police changes had been initiated immediately following Kim's removal from office. Say that no amount of explanation more than two months after the appointment of Kim's successor and within thirty days of the holding of the elections is likely to be convincing to impartial persons.

"Inform the President that I share the views which you expressed to him this morning. Say that I am reporting fully by urgent cable to my government".

I fear if notwithstanding our strong advice Rhee goes through with plan to effect wholesale police changes, rift between him and DNP will be seriously widened and existing Cabinet will dissolve, in which case a crisis may ensue. Results of Noble's latest interview will be telegraphed as soon as available.

Inform Muccio.

DRUMRIGHT

[2] On May 5, the U.S. Senate approved the legislation calling for an authorization of $100 million to the Republic of Korea in fiscal year 1951; this authorization was enacted into law on June 5, 1950 (see 64 Stat. 202). On September 6, 1950, an appropriation of $90 million for economic assistance to Korea was approved (see 64 Stat. 758).

795B.00/5–250 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY SEOUL, May 2, 1950—8 p. m.

614. Inform Muccio reEmbtel 613, May 2. Noble called on President 5 p. m. this afternoon. Was received again in bed room with Home Minister, Director National Police, Kim Tae-Sun, and President's private secretary present. President instructed Home Minister explain police changes. Home Minister, consulting records, stated since assump-

tion office had changed 34 senior police officers: 5 being required to resign, 29 having posts changed. He gave reasons for requiring 5 resignations, of which Noble felt 3 probably admissible and 2 possibly politically based. President evidenced some dissatisfaction with Home Minister's explanation. Home Minister stated categorically would be no further dismissals in appreciable future. Home Minister explained are now 31 police chiefs vacancies throughout Republic of Korea which he intends to fill. In process filling these vacancies, total about 90 police position changes envisaged through lower promotions since all such posts must be filled by officers presently in police force.

On May 4 all Republic of Korea police chiefs gathering Seoul for conference. At that time certain police inspectors previously sent throughout country by Home Minister will report to board consisting of district police chiefs on possible improper conduct including political activity. In such case board will recommend transfers to other posts.

In Noble's presence, President directed Home Minister must not dismiss any other officers; must not transfer officers excepting for proven political activity; would hold Home Minister personally responsible for execution this order; required all police refrain completely from any political activity during election period and any policeman violating this order would be punished for criminal acts.

During conversation Noble repeated arguments similar to those presented in morning conference against police interference. Subsequent to departure Home Minister, Director National Police and secretary, Noble presented my views orally and then left copy of memo with President.[1] President said he was determined guarantee free elections and would not be deterred by criticism from friends from changing police who did engage political activity. He asked Noble what would be done in US with police officer attempting manipulate elections and said he intended act similarly here. He conveyed his appreciation my expression of views.

Following further discussion problem, President told Noble he had directed Home Minister submit to him name or names of any police officers listed for further transfer and said he would show it to and discuss it with Noble before he permitted transfer to be made.

[DRUMRIGHT]

[1] Not printed, but see the portion within quotation marks of telegram 613, May 2, from Seoul, *supra*.

611.95/5–250

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1950.

STATEMENTS BY SENATOR CONNALLY[1] REGARDING U.S. POLICY IN KOREA

There is attached an excerpt, consisting of two questions and answers on the subject of Korea, from Senator Connally's interview on "World Policy and Bipartisanship" which has appeared in the May 5, 1950 issue of *U.S. News and World Report.*

It is recommended that you take advantage of your weekly meeting with Senator Connally to express to him the Department's concern over the possible effects of his remarks on this subject, particularly on the Government and the people of Korea.[2] Specifically, the Department's concern arises out of the following considerations:

(1) Senator Connally's reply to the first of the two quoted questions betrays an attitude of defeatism which the Department does not share and which it has consistently endeavored to counteract. The Department's position with respect to the suggestion that we "abandon" south Korea is apparent from the following excerpt from the Secretary's statement of March 7, 1950 before the Foreign Relations Committee,[3] delivered in the presence of Senator Connally:

"There is one further and fundamental question which must be considered: That is the probability of ultimate success of the effort of the Korean Republic to survive. In recent debates a number of members of the Congress have indicated their feeling that the possibility of failure makes them doubt the wisdom of the United States giving a helping hand in this effort. It is my belief that American policy should be based on determination to succeed rather than on fear of the possibility of failure. Despite the problems with which the Republic of Korea is beset both internally and externally, and despite its necessarily limited experience in self-government and paucity of technical and administrative know-how, conditions of stability and public order have continued to improve and the threat of Communist overthrow appears at least temporarily to have been contained.

"There is good reason to hope from progress made thus far that with our assistance, the Republic of Korea can survive and thrive. This cannot, of course, be guaranteed. However, it continues to be true that without our assistance there can be no such hope."

[1] Senator Tom Connally was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

[2] A memorandum by Under Secretary Webb, dated May 10, stated that at his meeting with Senator Connally on that date the subject of the Senator's remarks on Korea was not mentioned (795.00/5–1050).

[3] Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 20, 1950, p. 454.

(2) Senator Connally's reply to the second of the two questions raises an issue with respect to which the Korean Government is particularly sensitive—i.e. the apparent exclusion of Korea from the American defense line in the Far East. Following the Secretary's reference in his Press Club speech to the Japan-Ryukyus-Philippines "defensive perimeter", the Department was subjected to a barrage of representations from the Korean Government and its representatives designed to elicit from the U.S. a commitment to extend its defense line in the Far East to include South Korea. Inasmuch as this Government is not in a position to provide the Korean Government with such a commitment, any public reference to the Japan-Ryukyus-Philippine line can serve only to undermine the confidence of the Korean Government and people, and consequently their will to resist the ever-present threat of Communist aggression.

For Senator Connally's information, it is being proposed to the Secretary that he reply along the following lines if questioned by the press concerning the views expressed by the Senator with respect to Korea:

"I have had many discussions about Korea with Senator Connally and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which he is chairman, and with the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I am confident that there exists between us no difference of opinion or intention.

"The United States is deeply interested in the survival of the Republic of Korea as an independent nation. In order to assist Korea in achieving this goal the United States is providing political support, directly and through the United Nations, as well as economic and military assistance.

"I believe it is perfectly evident from what Senator Connally said that he does not mean that the United States does not consider it a matter of grave importance to the United States that Korea, and, in fact, other Asiatic countries, should remain independent and free from Communist domination. This has been fully recognized by the Congress in appropriations for military assistance and in other ways."[4]

[Annex]

Excerpt From: "U.S. News & World Report" May 5, 1950

ARTICLE: WORLD POLICY AND BIPARTISANSHIP: AN INTERVIEW WITH SENATOR TOM CONNALLY

Q—Do you think the suggestion that we abandon south Korea is going to be seriously considered?

A—I am afraid it is going to be seriously considered because I'm afraid it's going to happen, whether we want it to or not. I'm for Korea. We're trying to help her—we're appropriating money now to help her. But South Korea is cut right across by this line—north of it

[4] See footnote 1 to telegram 640, May 5, from Seoul, p. 67.

are the Communists, with access to the mainland—and Russia is over there on the mainland. So that whenever she takes a notion she can just overrun Korea just like she probably will overrun Formosa when she gets ready to do it. I hope not, of course.

Q—But isn't Korea an essential part of the defense strategy?

A—No. Of course, any position like that is of some strategic importance. But I don't think it is very greatly important. It has been testified before us that Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines make the chain of defense which is absolutely necessary. And, of course, any additional territory along in that area would be that much more, but it's not absolutely essential.

795B.00/5–350 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY SEOUL, May 3, 1950—1 p. m.

617. Re Embtels 613, 614, May 2. Consider in light yesterday's discussions that while President strongly opposed election any considerable numbers DNP, he also genuinely concerned lest police pressures interfere with free elections, and his only planned moves attempts break up possible DNP organization through police chiefs to influence elections various districts.

President's instructions Home Minister presence Embassy officer, and statements to Embassy officer indicate intention hereafter only transfer police chiefs if evidence secured their misuse posts for political purposes.

President made excellent statement, published in full Korean papers, May 1, on free elections, calling upon populace including police do all possible guarantee rights campaigning, free casting ballots. Text being pouched.[1]

Believe Embassy representations yesterday, plus President's subsequent orders Home Minister, probably have salutary effect.[2]

DRUMRIGHT

[1] Not printed.

[2] For a further report on the situation in the Republic of Korea prior to the elections, see telegram 767, May 27, from Seoul, p. 89.

795B.00/5–550

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED SEOUL, May 5, 1950—6 p. m.

640. Embtel 623, May 4. Continuing press reaction Connally statement Korea. All Seoul newspapers May 5, carried wire service stories

Secretary of State's clarification Connally statement without comment.[1]

Two May 6 newspapers on street late today (*Seoul, Kyung Hyang*) prominently featured AP story Muccio statement.[2] *Kyung Hyang* editorial captioned "refuting Connally's foolish idea" identified Korea with America's fight against Soviet, emphasized difficulty and determination Korean struggle against Communism. Said Connally's statement did not represent view American people nor US State Department that in view determination Democratic Party and strong Congressional diplomatic policy toward Soviet could not understand Connally's statement since he famous politician and leader Senate Foreign [Relations] Committee. Pointed out US committed aid Korea by international agreement, defense line Japan, Okinawa, Philippines indefensible if Korea Communist.

Secretary of State's statement was received with acclaim and largely vitiated damage resulting from Connally statement. In his weekly press conference with foreign correspondents today President commented saw Acheson's statement "and clarifies Connally statement. I think Acheson referred to failure joint commission.[3] US made every effort get Soviet withdrawal from north but they didn't."

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[1] On May 3, Mr. Acheson held a news conference, a memorandum of which for the record was prepared by Mr. Michael McDermott, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations. The Secretary was asked to comment on Senator Connally's views on Korea and observed that the Department had continuously stressed the importance which it attached to South Korea. "He stated," read the memorandum, "that it [the Department] had recounted its efforts to establish Korea as an independent nation, that it had told how the Soviet Union had made it impossible to unify the whole country and how under the United Nations Commission the United States had gone forward with the other nations in establishing Southern Korea; that the United States had been and was now giving them very substantial economic help, military assistance and advice." Mr. Acheson concluded by saying that he doubted very much whether Senator Connally took a different view from that which the Secretary had just stated.

Secretary Acheon was then asked about Owen Lattimore's recent suggestions that the United States should withdraw from South Korea, which, since this course of action seemed unlikely in view of the Secretary' comments, might be taken to indicate that Dr. Lattimore was not the architect of Far Eastern policy. Mr. Acheson replied that that was a pretty good assumption.

[2] On May 4, Ambassador Muccio, who had paid a visit to President Truman at the White House, was quoted as saying that there could be no doubt of the eagerness of the United States to maintain Korean independence, toward which end the United States was providing political support directly and through the United Nations, as well as military and economic assistance. Ambassador Muccio also expressed optimism about the Korean Government's ability to control inflation and spoke with enthusiasm about the attitude of top Korean officials concerning the upcoming elections.

[3] The joint U.S.-Soviet commission had been established at the Moscow Conference in December 1945 (see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VI, p. 1150) for the purpose of setting up a provisional government for all of Korea. The commission met in 1946 and 1947 but became deadlocked; see *ibid.*, 1946, vol. VIII, pp. 637–638, 679–681, and *ibid.*, 1947, vol. VI, pp. 601 ff.

357.AD/5-550

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, May 5, 1950.

No. 474

Ref: Embtel 628 May 5, 1950.[1]

Subject: UNCOK Request to UN SYG Lie To Use Good Offices

The Embassy has received further information on the request of UNCOK to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie to take up certain questions in Moscow,[2] and transmits it for the Department's information.

The more detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the decision to send that letter and a copy of the letter itself (which is enclosed) were supplied to an Embassy officer by a person who did so on condition that the supplier's name would not be made known in any report made by the Embassy. Assurances were given that the informant's anonymity would be protected.

The idea of a request to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie to take up the question of UNCOK contact with North Korean leaders during his visit to Moscow originated with the Principal Secretary, Mr. Bertil Renborg, who easily persuaded the Indian Delegate, Dr. Anup Singh, to assume sponsorship, according to this informant, who is believed to be most reliable.

According to the informant, about April 24, the Indian Alternate Delegate, Mr. Kondapi (Dr. Singh, Indian Delegate still being hospitalized) raised this subject in an unofficial meeting of the Commission in the chairman's office. It was immediately apparent that Mr. Renborg was the author, however, since Mr. Kondapi showed only a superficial knowledge of the subject, whereas Mr. Renborg did most of the talking, and Mr. Renborg urged that the Commission ask Mr. Lie to utilize Mr. Zinchenko, Assistant Secretary General, to exercise good offices for UNCOK. In the following conversation it was obvious, according to the informant's statement, that the members of the Commission, including Mr. Kondapi, were scarcely acquainted with Mr. Zinchenko's name let alone his record and character, but Mr. Renborg described him as a man of outstanding character and ability, a man of the future, Mr. Renborg's personal acquaintance, and a person with whom Mr. Renborg maintained a mutual regard.

At this first discussion, in which it was urged that UNCOK should not lose so excellent an opportunity to try to make contact with Pyong-

[1] Not printed; it transmitted to the Department a summarized version of the material contained in this despatch.

[2] Mr. Lie visited the major European capitals including Moscow during a trip (April 22–May 25) in connection with his 20-year program for peace through the United Nations; for related documentation, see vol. II, pp. 371 ff.

yang in the carrying out of their responsibilities, Mr. Jamieson, Australia, is reported to have made no comment. This is said to be Mr. Jamieson's custom when a new subject is raised on which he is without instructions, and on which he wishes to come to a decision in private or to ask his Government's instructions.

Mr. Henri Brionval, France, is said to have raised several questions: (1) How did the Commission know as a fact that Mr. Lie was going to Moscow? (2) Was Mr. Lie going with the support of other leading member states of the UN, or was he acting on his own and contrary to the interests or wishes of member Governments? (3) Was Mr. Zinchenko a proper person for the Commission to use for the suggested purposes?

Dr. Liu, China, is said to have supported Mr. Brionval's questions. Nothing was decided at this time. It is understood that Mr. Brionval informed his Government and asked instructions, following this informal meeting and again following a subsequent one, but received no reply. It is said that Mr. Brionval, who was personally doubtful of the wisdom of this action, considered silence on the part of his Government as indicating lack of objection.

A day or two later the subject was again raised in an informal meeting in the chairman's office. On this occasion Mr. Kondapi presented the draft of a letter to Mr. Lie. The informant was of the opinion that this draft had been prepared originally by Mr. Renborg, although it was possible that Dr. Singh and Mr. Kondapi had made some small changes. Unfortunately, the Embassy has been unable to secure a copy of this original draft.

Mr. Brionval and Dr. Liu are said to have raised questions similar to those of the previous informal meeting, and Mr. Jamieson to have expressed a cautious interest, without making any commitment. Mr. Renborg and Mr. Kondapi continued strongly to urge the proposed action. The group decided, by common consent, following the urgings of Mr. Renborg and Mr. Kondapi, to consider the question, and Mr. Kondapi's draft, at a formal meeting of the Commission.

The account which follows of the two formal meetings of the Commission is taken largely from the summary records of UNCOK for April 27 and April 28, 1950, with the addition of some descriptive information added by the informant, who states that the summary records never clearly show the force or detail of Mr. Renborg's interventions, since these records are prepared by Mr. Renborg's subordinates and then edited by him personally before being approved.

The Commission met on Apil 27, at 10:30 a. m. In addition to Mr. Jamieson, Australia, Mr. Liu and Mr. Ssutu, China, Mr. Brionval, France, and Mr. Kondapi, India (Alternate), Mr. Renborg and Mr.

Gaillard, Principal Secretary and Deputy Principal Secretary, plus the usual staff, were present.

Mr. Kondapi presented his draft of a letter from UNCOK to UN SYG Lie, asking the Secretary General of the United Nations, if he visited Moscow as the press reported he intended to do, to discuss with the Soviet authorities the difficulties experienced by UNCOK in making contact with the North. Since the Secretary General would have matters of greater importance than the Korean question to discuss in Moscow, Mr. Kondapi proposed that the services of Assistant Secretary General Zinchenko should be made use of, referring to Paragraph 1 (*c*) of the General Assembly Resolution on Korea of October 21, 1949,[3] as authority for this.

Dr. Liu, China, while approving in principle, said he thought Mr. Lie would be more successful if he were asked to approach the USSR solely in regard to the question of the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from Korea. Dr. Liu also thought it preferable not to mention Mr. Zinchenko, but to leave to the discretion of Mr. Lie the decision as to whom to use to achieve the objective.

Mr. Jamieson also supported the proposal in principle. He thought Mr. Lie might well be asked to take up matters under paragraph 1(*b*) as well as on troop withdrawal (paragraph 1(*e*)). Dr. Liu said his proposal regarding troop withdrawal was intended to make it impossible for the Soviet Government to evade the issue, since this question certainly concerned the USSR, whereas the Soviet Government might claim the matter of unification should be taken up directly with Pyongyang.

Dr. Liu also suggested that the Commission should remember the well-known attitude of the Government of the Republic of Korea which was opposed to making contact with the Northern officials. By limiting the approach to Moscow to the question of troop withdrawal, controversy with the Korean Government would be avoided.

Mr. Kondapi, Indian Alternate, thought stressing the subject of troop withdrawal would unnecessarily irritate the USSR and so cause failure in the primary purpose of making contact with the North.

Mr. Renborg, Principal Secretary, agreed with Mr. Kondapi. He suggested that since subsequent to U.S. troop withdrawal the U.S. had entered into the KMAG Agreement with the Korean Government, the USSR might be asked whether a similar agreement had been entered into between the USSR and the Northern regime. The larger issue of making contact with the North might be raised subsequently to the raising of this question. Mr. Jamieson considered Mr. Renborg's proposal an unnecessary round about means for accomplishment of the intended purpose.

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[3] *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1091.

Dr. Liu didn't think the Commission need worry about irritating the USSR since by its very existence UNCOK was a continuing source of irritation to the USSR. Since the USSR had claimed to have withdrawn its forces from Korea, an approach along the line he had suggested would be a challenge to the Soviet Government to provide proof of the claim.

Mr. Kondapi considered the question of Soviet troop withdrawal unrealistic, since Russian troops in any case were just across a frontier, while the bulk of U.S. troops were thousands of miles away. Confining the approach in Moscow to troop withdrawal questions might only intensify the Soviets' negative attitude.

Mr. Brionval agreed the opportunity presented by Mr. Lie's reported visit to Moscow should not be missed as a means to contact the North. He suggested, however, that the question of how best to approach Moscow might be resolved by an unofficial suggestion to the Secretary General to take up the Korean problem, leaving to him to use his own judgment as to whether conditions were favorable for so doing. Mr. Jamieson, however, objected, believing that only an official approach to Moscow could have any effect.

Dr. Liu raised the point that this action might be open to an interpretation that UNCOK "recognized" the Northern regime. Both the Principal Secretary and Mr. Jamieson asserted the proposed action could not be so construed. Mr. Jamieson cited the recent case of ECA officials who were released after direct contact had been established by U.S. officials with North Korean officials, although there was no question of U.S. recognition of the Northern regime.[4]

Mr. Jamieson summed up to the effect that all were agreed on the desirability of making every effort to contact the North, but that nothing should be done which implied recognition of the Northern regime. He did not believe, however, that the Indian proposal entailed any such risk.

Mr. Renborg then proposed an *ad hoc* committee to revise the draft letter in the light of this discussion, and such a committee was appointed consisting of Mr. Jamieson and Mr. Kondapi.

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[4] Reference is to the case of Messrs. Alfred T. Meschter and Albert Willis, ECA employees who were aboard the steamship *Kimball R. Smith*, a U.S. vessel on loan to the South Korean Government, when it defected to North Korea on September 22, 1949. The U.S. Government transmitted two notes to the Soviet Government, on October 1 and 29, 1949, requesting information on the fate of the ship and the Americans. The Soviet Government agreed to inform the North Korean authorities of the U.S. request for information and, on November 15, the North Korean Government broadcast its willingness to turn over the two Americans. On December 11, the two men were handed over to a representative of the American Embassy at the 38th parallel. (See *Background Information on Korea. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Pursuant to H. Res. 206.* House Report No. 2495, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 69–70.)

There appears to have been no active decision to adopt the proposal. Dr. Liu and Mr. Brionval simply ceased to interpose objections. Mr. Renborg proposed a committee to revise the letter, and in effect a decision was thereupon made to communicate with Mr. Lie along the lines originally suggested by Mr. Renborg to Mr. Kondapi and by the latter to the Commission, without further discussion.

Dr. Liu had presented the strongest arguments against the Indian proposal, and Mr. Brionval also had raised serious questions as to its wisdom. According to his subsequent account to an Embassy officer, Mr. Jamieson thought the proposal harmless, one which would be rejected by the Soviet Government and yet which would clearly establish the intent and effort of UNCOK to work towards unification. Mr. Jamieson says that after reflection he decided the proposed action fell within his general instructions and therefore he did not ask Canberra for specific instructions.

Dr. Liu's ultimate silent acquiescence in a proposal which he considered unwise is in line with his general conduct in the Commission and is supposed to be related to the difficult position of the Government which he represents. He is said to follow the practice of presenting his views, but of never following through in attempts to get them adopted by the Commission if some other Delegate has strong contrary feelings.

Mr. Brionval likewise is said to have had serious misgivings as to the wisdom of the proposal, but having twice informed his Government by telegraph of what was proposed and having received no reply he is said to have concluded that his Government did not object and so he acquiesced despite his own misgivings.

The Commission met for the second formal meeting on this subject at 10:30 a. m., April 28, and was in session fifty minutes, almost all of which were devoted to consideration of the letter as redrafted by the *ad hoc* committee. It was read paragraph by paragraph, a few minor changes being suggested and made. The draft communication was then approved as amended, by general consent without a vote. (It is rare that the Commission makes decisions by formal vote.) It was agreed that the letter, signed by the Acting Chairman, Mr. Jamieson, should be transmitted by cable and by pouch to Lake Success, to be forwarded to Mr. Lie.

It will be noted that Dr. Liu's suggestions regarding verification of troop withdrawal, combined with Mr. Renborg's suggestion of tieing the KMAG Agreement to the question of an analogous Soviet-North Korean agreement was added to the original draft, but not as matters of primary emphasis.

The essential element of the letter, as in the original draft, was a request that the Secretary General, while he was in Moscow, either

personally or through Assistant Secretary General Zinchenko, should use his good offices (in accordance with UNGA Resolution on Korea, October 21, 1949, Paragraph 1(*c*)) with the Soviet authorities to discover ways and means by which the Commission would be able to enter into discussions with the North, either through a visit to the North or through a meeting in a neutral place outside Korea. The Commission further suggested the possibility of Mr. Zinchenko continuing his journey to North Korea to pursue this question there.

In the Embassy's opinion, the transmittal of this letter in the form adopted has explosive possibilities should knowledge of its contents become known in South Korea. Mr. Brionval's proposal of an informal request to the Secretary General to take up this question in Moscow, and the suggestions by both Mr. Brionval, France, and Dr. Liu, China, that it was unwise to name Mr. Zinchenko, seem to have shown greater awareness of the dangers involved in the form the letter took than was shown by other members of the Commission, and by Mr. Renborg.

The Embassy recognizes that the Commission was entirely within its prerogatives in taking this action and in attempting to carry out its terms of reference in the manner chosen. But such is the emotional antagonism of the Korean Government to the Communist regime in the North and to Communists, including Russians, in general, the Embassy believes the Commission would have shown more practical wisdom in not specifying by name a Soviet citizen as the one to extend good offices, but to have left this decision to the discretion of the Secretary General after he had reached Moscow. Although the proposal itself is a simple one which would not cause controversy in normal times, these not being normal times, as evidenced by the presence of the Commission in Korea and its continued inability to make any contact with the North, considerable controversy may be expected if knowledge of the contents of this letter becomes general at an early date. In the emotional reaction immediately following knowledge of this letter, it is considered even possible that the Korean Government might withdraw or restrict its invitation to UNCOK to observe elections. If the Government did not go so far, at least it would be likely to enter into public controversy with the Commission to the mutual harm of the Government and the Commission.

It is the earnest hope of the Embassy that knowledge of the contents of this letter and its despatch shall remain secret, and that the Russians will not make propaganda capital of it, until well after the elections and until it has become clear that the USSR will not accept Mr. Lie's, or Mr. Zinchenko's, good offices.

In the meantime, it is expected that the Commission will make other efforts to contact the North directly, first by another radio

address by Dr. Anup Singh, India,[5] and second by attempts to transmit a letter possibly addressed to "His Excellency Kim Il Sung, Prime Minister of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea," instead of to "General Kim Il Sung", as was done last year.[6] The adoption of the new address, with the use of the self-claimed name of the Northern regime, if it occurs, will be on the recommendation of Mr. Renborg, who has been urging it upon the Commission for a considerable period of time. While no doubt the Government of the Republic of Korea would find the use of the proposed address for Kim Il Sung objectionable, it is believed that the Government could be persuaded not to react too strongly. The Korean Government's attitude on such subjects has changed materially since last year, the change being largely due to the assumption of responsibility by the Commission, and the consequent elimination of the Secretariat from policy dealings with the Government. The Commission has always been more diplomatic and friendly in its conduct than the Secretariat. The result is that questions which might lead to controversy usually are discussed privately in advance of public decision, and in a tactful manner, by the Chairman of UNCOK with the President or the Foreign Minister. Both these gentlemen have a high regard for Mr. Gulek, UNCOK Chairman, who unfortunately has not returned from Turkey,[7] and for Mr. Jamieson, the *Rapporteur* and currently Acting Chairman. Although Mr. Renborg, Principal Secretary, has rendered himself anathema to the Korean Government, and is himself most antagonistic to that Government and to Koreans in general, in accordance with current Commission practices he is not permitted to deal with the Government on any but administrative matters. Consequently, it can be hoped that the Acting Chairman, Mr. Jamieson, or the Chairman, Mr. Gulek, should the latter return to Korea, would take appropriate steps to allay Korean suspicions by advance conversations before the suspicions actually had been aroused.

In the present instance, however, the transmittal of the letter to Mr. Trygve Lie requesting the good offices of Mr. Zinchenko, since no preparation of Korean Government opinion has been undertaken by the UNCOK Chairman through advance and private discussion, it is feared that disclosure of the contents of the letter would result in very unfortunate controversy.

EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT

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[5] Mr. Singh had made a radio broadcast on May 3 and made a second on May 11; Mr. Jamieson made a broadcast on May 1 (see U.N. document A/1350, p. 17).

[6] No letter was transmitted by UNCOK to the North Korean authorities during 1950.

[7] Kamil Gulek was in Korea from January 26 to March 24, 1950; he did not return from Turkey to Korea.

[Enclosure]

The Acting Chairman of the United Nations Commission on Korea (Jamieson) to the United Nations Secretary-General (Lie)

SECRET FOR LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SEOUL, April 28, 1950.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SIR, As you are aware, one of the major difficulties which confronted the United Nations Commission on Korea last year in the implementation of the General Assembly resolution on Korea insofar as it concerns unification was its inability to establish contact with North Korea. This difficulty confronts the Commission again this year. It is evident that unification by peaceful means cannot be achieved without prior contact with the North. Last year the Commission attempted various approaches. It directed a radio broadcast to North Korea. It despatched a telegram to the Soviet Union through you and subsequently letters to General Kim Il Sung, one by Hong Kong and one by direct mail across the 38th parallel. None of these approaches elicited any response whatsoever from the North.[8]

In its endeavour to implement its terms of reference, the Commission is again this year making similar and other attempts to get in touch with the North and break the deadlock.

It is known to the Commission that you are contemplating a visit to Moscow in the near future for the purpose of discussing problems connected with the participation of the USSR in the work of the United Nations. The Commission does not have any specific information as regards the agenda for your projected discussions at Moscow, but believes that the occasion of your visit to Moscow might be taken advantage of, if circumstances are appropriate, in order to facilitate the task of the Commission in Korea. In this connection, the Commission desires to draw your attention to the following paragraph of the General Assembly resolution of 21 October 1949, "(*c*) Have authority, in order to accomplish the aims defined under clauses (*a*) and (*b*) of the present paragraph, in its discretion to appoint observers, and utilize the services and good offices of one or more persons whether or not representatives on the Commission." The Commission suggests that the good offices of the Secretary-General or of another high official of the United Nations might be utilized by the Commission for the purpose of obtaining contact with the authorities in North Korea. The press informs us that you would be accompanied to Moscow by the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council Affairs, Mr. C. E. Zinchenko, and it appears to the Commission, subject to your con-

[8] See U.N. document A/936, pp. 7–9.

currence, that Mr. Zinchenko might be a suitable person as contemplated in the above quoted paragraph of the General Assembly resolution. The Commission would like you, yourself, or Mr. Zinchenko to discuss in Moscow ways and means by which the Commission would be able to enter into discussions with the North, either through a visit to the North or through a meeting in a neutral place outside the Korean peninsula. If conditions prove propitious, the Commission suggests that Mr. Zinchenko might continue his journey to North Korea in order to pursue this problem there.

The Assembly resolution of 21 October 1949 further instructs the Commission to "verify the withdrawal of Soviet occupation insofar as it is in a position to do so." The Commission has, so far, not been in a position to undertake this task. It has, as you know, verified the withdrawal of the United States forces from the Republic of Korea. It has further been provided with full information in regard to the agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Korean Military Advisory Group which is functioning on the territory of the Republic. It would be desirable for the Commission to obtain official information from the Government of the Soviet Union, both in regard to the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces which is said to have taken place in the latter part of 1948 or early 1949 and as regards any agreements negotiated and in force between the Soviet Union and North Korea having to do with military training and advice. The Commission would like you to consider whether these matters could also be brought up with the Soviet authorities during your visit to Moscow.

The Commission, in making these proposals to you, has in mind the possibilities of fulfilling some of the tasks entrusted to it by the General Assembly. It is perfectly clear to the Commission that the negotiations which you may undertake in Moscow concern matters of general and vital interest to the future of United Nations. It does believe, however, that in the course of your negotiations with the Soviet Government you may find an opportunity of raising the questions relating to the work of the Commission and thus open the way for the Commission to make progress in the fulfillment of its task.[9]

I have [etc.]

A. B. JAMIESON

[9] Following his return from Moscow, Mr. Lie replied to UNCOK in a letter dated June 19 which reached that body on July 5, after the outbreak of hostilities. The Secretary-General said that he had not been able to satisfy UNCOK's request, since he had concentrated most of his attention on the problem of obtaining continued participation by the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries in the work of the United Nations. He stated that the question of Korea had not come up in his conversations, and he had not felt it appropriate in the context to give undue emphasis to the Korean problem. Mr. Lie's letter is quoted in part in Leon Gordenker, *The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: the Politics of Field Operations, 1947–1950* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 224.

795B.00/5–1050

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in Korea (Drumright)[1]

SECRET [SEOUL,] May 9, 1950.

Subject: Pres. Rhee's Comment on Sen. Connally's Remarks on Korea

Participants: President Rhee
Mr. Drumright

In the course of a conversation this morning with President Rhee, he raised the subject of Senator Connally's recent remarks about Korea. Speaking in a deeply bitter and sarcastic manner, President Rhee said it was very easy for a man several thousand miles away from Korea airily to dismiss Korea and its 30 million people as of no strategic or other importance to the United States. The President went on to say he regarded Senator Connally's remarks as an open invitation to the Communists to come down and take over South Korea. He wondered how any man, in his right senses, not to mention Senator Connally, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, could make such an irrational statement. The President implied that Senator Connally's statement had done much harm and that it could not be easily disassociated from United States policy in view of Senator Connally's close relation to the State Department.

Mr. Drumright reminded the President of the statement made by the Secretary of State following Senator Connally's remarks. He also reminded the President that the United States was continuing to extend military, economic and moral aid to the Republic of Korea. He reminded the President that during the present fiscal year the ECA was spending more than 100 million dollars in Korea and has, perhaps, its largest staff in Korea. Mr. Drumright said that the United States was also continuing to extend military aid and advice to the Republic of Korea. In this connection, Mr. Drumright pointed out that with the possible exception of Turkey, the United States had its largest Military Advisory Mission in Korea.

Comment: During the same conversation, the President also commented in bitter terms about what he termed the failure of the United States to provide Korea with air support adequate to meet the North

[1] Transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch no. 493, May 10, from Seoul, not printed, which drew the Department's attention in particular to the comment in the final paragraph of the memorandum.

Korean air menace (Embtel 662, May 9, 5 p. m.).[2] It seems clear that the President's faith in the determination of the United States to assist Korea in the event of North Korean aggression has been shaken to an appreciable extent by Senator Connally's remarks, by failure of the United States thus far to take any discernible action to meet Korea's request for air support, and by what appears to be the failure of the United States thus far to supply Korea with military supplies and equipment under the terms of the MDA program. The foregoing factors, coupled with persistent "talk" that Korea lies outside the United States' Far Eastern strategic defense zone, is having a decidedly unsettling effect on Korean officials and the public.

EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT

[2] The pertinent passage of this telegram read as follows:

"President . . . [Rhee] protested what he termed failure of US to respond his request for air support capable of containing rapidly growing North Korean Air Force. Speaking with considerable feeling, he asserted Stalin-aided and trained North Korean Air Force is capable of playing havoc with Korean Security Forces as presently constituted and will continue hold this advantage unless and until existing air disparity is redressed. I replied so far as I knew problem of air assistance to ROK was still under consideration in Washington and Ambassador Muccio had planned discuss it while there." (102.23/5–950)

See also the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Bond, May 10, *infra*.

795B.5 MAP/5–1050

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Bond)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1950.

Subject: Military Assistance to Korea

Participants:

State:	NA—	Ambassador Muccio
		Mr. Niles W. Bond
		Mr. Arthur B. Emmons
	S/MDA—	Mr. Galbraith
		Mr. Stevens
Army:		Maj. Gen. Lemnitzer
Navy:		Capt. Murdaugh[2]
Air Force:		Lt. Gen. Edwards[3]

Ambassador Muccio opened the discussion by pointing out the extent of American financial aid thus far committed to south Korea and

[1] The memorandum was codrafted by Mr. Arthur B. Emmons of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

[2] Capt. Albert C. Murdaugh, Assistant Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense.

[3] Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, U.S. Air Force.

the necessity of plugging certain "gaps" now existing in the Korean defense picture so that our stake in south Korea could be more adequately protected. These "gaps" included the lack of any defense against possible attack by air, and a similar lack of sufficient coastal patrol facilities, in both of which respects the Koreans themselves, from their own funds, had been endeavoring to provide a remedy.

General Lemnitzer pointed out that the question of military assistance to the Republic of Korea at the present time was essentially a political one, in as much as south Korea was not regarded as of any particular value to the overall American strategic position in the Far East, a point to which the Ambassador agreed. The General continued by saying that the funds to be employed in military aid in this case were therefore a matter of concern principally to the Department of State which should take the initiative in obtaining the allocation of such funds from Section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act or any other source available for that purpose.

Mr. Galbraith pointed out that it continued to be the opinion of S/MDA that there was no provision for the support of an air force in the present NSC directive on Korea, and that a revision of that directive solely on a political basis would have to be made were an air force to be so provided. The Ambassador pointed out that a fully effective air force was not essential but that south Korea should have a few combat planes at least for morale purposes. General Edwards stated, and several times reiterated, that the position of his Department was that the terms of NSC 8/2 [4] were intended to cover liaison aircraft only and that a revision of that paper would be necessary to cover combat aircraft. In response to a question from the Ambassador, General Edwards expressed the opinion, however, that the present language might be stretched to include a limited number of transport aircraft, such as C–47's, for logistic support of ground forces.

The Ambassador then emphasized the difficult position in which he had been placed when President Rhee had learned that surplus fighter aircraft, including F–51's, were being "junked" by FEAF in Japan, a thing which the Koreans found very difficult to understand in view of what they regarded as their desperate need for a few such planes. In this connection General Lemnitzer remarked that if F–51's were to be transferred to Korea from Japan, the Air Force would have to be reimbursed for their handling and transportation even though they might be surplus and involve no initial cost of acquisition. The General went on to add that, in his opinion, the Department of State would have to take the policy initiative if it wished to bring about the estab-

[4] *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 969.

lishment of a Korean Air Force fighter group, but that the Department of Defense would support such a program if the NSC directive were to be appropriately amended. Since the question was a political one, however, he did not feel that Defense should sponsor such a policy revision.

Mr. Bond then pointed out that the request for combat aircraft comprised only a part of the Mission's recommendations for additional military aid to Korea for FY 1950, well over half of the recommended program being made up of items which fell well within the terms of NSC 8/2 as presently written. Principal among these, he added, were ground forces items designed to bring the total U.S.-supported ground forces in Korea to the level of 65,000 called for by the terms of NSC 8/2; these items, he said, together with the coast guard portion of the proposed additional aid, accounted for almost 5.9 out of a total of 9.8 million dollars. He then urged that prompt action be taken to obtain an allocation of funds to meet this 60% or more of the program which did not involve the question of the transfer of combat aircraft and whose implementation, therefore, should not have to await a decision on that question.

With reference to the question, raised by Mr. Galbraith, of future financial support for a Korean air force program, Mr. Bond suggested the possibility of finding funds for support of the program from within the $10 million to be allocated for military assistance for FY 1951 or from an increase over and above that amount, to which Mr. Galbraith replied that he did not believe the Bureau of the Budget would be inclined to view any increased expenditures along this line with favor at this time. No conclusion was reached on this matter.

General Edwards agreed that the Air Force would be willing to examine a Korean air force program with a view to going along with it, assuming the State Department would provide a political justification therefor. The Ambassador reiterated his earlier point that a full scale Korean air force was not necessarily desirable, and that what was contemplated was merely a few defensive combat planes, for morale purposes.

The Ambassador then raised the question of the training of Korean ground crew personnel by FEAF in Japan, for which a precedent had already been established in the training of Korean Army officers in FECOM. General Edwards replied that the Air Force would go along with such a proposal insofar as it could, and suggested that the matter might be arranged locally with FEAF. The question was then discussed of sending technical training personnel from FEAF to Korea

for a short period to train Korean personnel in the operation and maintenance of American planes. General Edwards commented that many demands were now being made upon the Air Force to furnish such personnel in many areas in the world, and that it would be difficult to find such personnel who might be available at the present time. In this regard Mr. Bond asked whether State's request for the temporary assignment of FEAF personnel to assist the Koreans with their newly-acquired AT–6's had ever received Air Force consideration. General Edwards did not know that it had. Captain Murdaugh, sitting for Mr. Halaby to whom State's request had been addressed, promised to look into the matter.[5]

The Ambassador then read a telegram from the Embassy in Seoul (No. 662 of May 9, 1950)[6] concerning the reaction of the Korean Government to the request of the U.S. Air Force for a defected north Korean *Stormovik* plane [7] and containing the suggestion of the Chargé d'Affaires that it might be highly desirable for the U.S. to compensate the Koreans with one or more F–51 aircraft. He also asked whether the question of additional advisers under KMAG for the Korean Coast Guard, as requested by the Mission, had been given consideration. General Lemnitzer replied that he did not know what had been done but that he would look up a telegram on this subject which the Ambassador said General Roberts had sent to the Department of the Army some time before.

Adverting to the point which he had raised earlier, Mr. Bond asked whether it would be a proper procedure on the part of State, pending consideration of the question of the revision of NSC 8/2 to permit the transfer of combat aircraft, to request the immediate allocation of funds to cover the other portions of the requested additional aid to Korea, so that the entire program would not have to be held up. General Lemnitzer said that he perceived no objection to that procedure and that such a request would be sympathetically received, particularly in the light of the strong case which Ambassador Muccio had made before both the FMACC and the Deputy Joint Chiefs of Staff. He added that his present thinking was that the necessary funds could be more expeditiously obtained from surplus Title II fund[s] than from funds available under Section 303, but that the final decision on this point would have to be left up to the FMACC.

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[5] See the letter from Mr. Allison to Mr. Halaby, January 31, p. 24. No action was taken on this matter prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea (795B.5/6–1450).

[6] See footnote 2 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Drumright, May 9, *supra*.

[7] See telegram 683, May 11, from Seoul, p. 84.

795B.5 MAP/5–1050

Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (Ohly) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1950.

Subject: Proposed increase of military aid to Korea

I refer to the meeting held this morning at the request of Ambassador Muccio with Major General Lemnitzer, Lieutenant General Edwards and other Defense officers, Messrs. Galbraith and Stevens of S/MDA being present.

In summary, it appears that the Ambassador made the point that, while he does not advocate setting up a full-fledged Air Force for Korea, he does strongly urge that a combat force of anywhere from 20 to 40 fighter aircraft—F–51s being specifically mentioned—be provided.

The decision to approve the Ambassador's recommendation would entail (1) revision of NSC 8/2 (since fighter aircraft are involved) and (2) obtaining funds to cover the costs of providing and maintaining such a force.

On the assumption that NSC 8/2 were modified to permit approval of the Ambassador's recommendation, this office feels answers must be found to the following questions: (*a*) can arrangements be made to provide the training, maintenance and necessary operational facilities that the furnishing of such equipment makes essential. From General Edwards' comments during this morning's meeting this appeared doubtful. (*b*) From what source would funds be available to pay for the training, maintenance, spare parts and all the related items and services required to keep the aircraft operational? This question applies both to FY 1950 and to subsequent years. Even though funds for FY 1950 are found (such as from surplus funds becoming available from the Greek program) with which to acquire the aircraft no FY 1951 funds have been requested under MDAP for Korea which would permit support of a force of F–51s. The use of Section 303 funds is highly problematical. (*c*) According to Gen. Edwards, the supply of spare parts for the F–51s rapidly will become difficult, thus posing another serious problem.

It will be recalled that Defense has maintained, and still maintains that there is no military justification for military assistance to Korea. Consequently, in advancing the proposal that additional military assistance in the form of fighter aircraft be given to the ROK, the justification will have to be wholly on political grounds.

In this connection, the furnishing of additional Army and Coast Guard equipment can, in the view of this office, be justified on other than strictly military grounds. The real question concerns the provision of fighter aircraft to ROK.

This office believes that the first step in giving consideration to the furnishing of fighter aircraft to ROK under the MDAA is a clear cut statement indicating that the political advantages of such action (in disregard of NSC 8/2) outweigh the adverse factors which will arise as soon these craft become non-operational. As indicated above, attention should be called to the fact that the requested funds for military aid to ROK in fiscal year 1951 do not include an allowance for the support and maintenance of these aircraft, assuming spare parts can be obtained. This office would therefore be pleased to learn your views regarding solutions of these problems.[1]

[1] On the question of allocation of combat aircraft to the Republic of Korea, the Department requested further information from the Embassy in Seoul; see telegram 505, May 19, to Seoul, p. 85. With regard to the immediate allocation of funds for proposed additional military aid to South Korea exclusive of combat aircraft, Mr. Rusk sent to Mr. Ohly, on May 19, a memorandum suggesting that the matter be referred to the FMACC for approval (795B.5/5–1950). No action was taken by the FMACC prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

795A.00/5–1150 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

PLAIN

SEOUL, May 11, 1950.

675. At hurriedly called conference with foreign correspondents yesterday at 3 p. m., Defense Minister released following statement:

"Arrival of two divisions of Chinese Communist troops in Northern Korea since last August has raised the fully-armed, effective fighting force there to 183,100, the Korean Defense Ministry announced today in making public a carefully calculated estimate of the northern areas military strength.

"With constabulary not counted in the army, youth groups and other quasi-military organizations, the Northern Korea fighting force is estimated at well above 300,000.

"Six divisions of the 'People's Army' and three '*Bo An Dae*' brigades number 118,000 men, to which are added approximately 37,000 mixed troops, including the women whom the northern regime recently began to conscript.

"One tank brigade in the North consists of 10,000 men. Naval manpower consists of 15,000 and the air force has 2,500. The air force is being increased by intensive conscription and training.

"Northern mechanized cavalry has 155 medium tanks and 18 small tanks, a total of 173, as well as 30 armored cars and 300 motorcycles.

"In artillery the northern army has 609 76 mm and 122 mm guns, 1,162 82 mm and 122 [*120*] mm mortars, 54 anti-aircraft guns, 627 anti-tank guns, and 9,728 light and heavy machine guns.

"The northern navy has 32 large and small patrol boats.

"The northern air force has 195 aircraft, comprising a division."

Comment follows.[1]

Sent Department 675; repeated CINCFE.

DRUMRIGHT

[1] *Infra.*

795A.00/5–1150 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, May 11, 1950—6 p. m.

683. ReEmbtel 675, May 11 quoting External Defense Minister's statement on North Korean military strength, Embassy offers following comment.

In contrast figures quoted in statement, following is our current estimate of North Korean security strength. Total armed forces 103,000 including "People's Army", Korean volunteer army returnees from Manchuria, border constabulary, air division, armoured formation and navy. In addition foregoing, provincial police estimated number about 25,000. Only armoured formation in North Korea is of brigade size and composed of estimated 65 tanks, heaviest of which is Soviet model T–34. Estimated number of artillery pieces as follows: 76.2 mm guns and howitzers 224; 122 mm howitzers 72; 82 mm mortars 637; 120 mm mortars 143; 45 mm AT guns 356. Light and heavy machine guns 6,032. North Korean Air Force strength estimated prior defection April 28 of Lt. Lee Kun Soon[1] as follows: 35 yak fighter aircraft; 3 twin engine bombers; 2 twin engine transports; 35 trainer aircraft. Information derived from Lt. Lee evaluated F–3 suggests 100 yak aircraft, including 22 trainers; 70 IL–10 attack bombers; 8 PO–2 reconnaisance and 2 US L-type liaison aircraft.

If Embassy estimates approximately accurate, it follows Korean figures are exaggerated—probably deliberately so. Purpose of exaggeration undoubtedly is to convince friendly powers, especially US, of disparity of strength between North and South Korean forces and thus enlist for additional military aid. In this connection, it perhaps not without significance that during recent conversations with President,

[1] Lieutenant Lee had defected from the North Korean Air Force with a Soviet plane, as mentioned in the memorandum of conversation of May 10, p. 78.

including one today, he has spoken emphatically of need for further military aid.[2]

That Defense Minister's statement was expressly issued for foreign consumption is indicated by fact Korean press excluded from conference with foreign correspondents and was later given much less detailed report of North Korean military strength. Fear specific figures would alarm ROK populace probably dictated exclusion detailed information from Korean press.

Sent Department 683, repeated CINFE.

DRUMRIGHT

[2] On May 12, President Rhee held a press conference, a report on which was sent to the Department in despatch no. 519, May 15, from Seoul, not printed. In regard to the Defense Minister's press conference of May 10, President Rhee was quoted as follows:

"I have heard North Korean troops (are) concentrating near the 38th parallel. A few days ago a North Korean rocket fell in the city of Kaesung. Another shell killed two more soldiers and wounded two civilians who died in the hospital. We can do nothing. We will solve this matter through the UN and the United States. A few days ago one American friend said that if the United States gives weapons to South Korea, she feared that South Korea would invade North Korea. This is a useless worry of some Americans who do not know South Korea. Our present war is not a cold war, but a real shooting war. Our troops will take all possible counter-measures. I think preparing counter-measures is the duty of our soldiers in self-defense. North Korea is concentrating near the 38th parallel. I do not think these North Korean troops are concentrating near the 38th parallel to invade Japan or China. . . . In South Korea the United States has one foot in South Korea and one foot outside so that in case of an unfavorable situation it could pull out of our country. I daresay that if the United States wants to aid our country it should not be only lip-service. General Roberts and Ambassador Muccio have worked to obtain more arms for Korea, but people in the United States are dreaming." (795B.00/5–1550)

795.56/5–1950: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 19, 1950—8 p. m.

505. In connection consideration by interested agencies of Mission's request that combat aircraft (F–51 type) be made available for transfer ROK, Dept desires answers fol questions:

1) How is it intended provide maintenance and other ground facilities necessary to keep such planes operational? How wld initial expense such installations be met?

2) How is it intended meet continuing expense of support of such aircraft (avgas, spare parts, etc.) for FY 1951 and thereafter, including internal financing? (No provision such requirements included FY 1951 MDAP.)

3) How is it intended provide adequately trained Korean air and ground personnel, especially mechanics?

In preparing answers foregoing questions it suggested Mission investigate extent to which FEAF facilities cld by utilized to provide servicing and maintenance (periodic engine overhaul for example), equipment and spare parts, and technical training for Korean air and ground personnel.

Although Dept appreciates Mission not advocating estab modern air force for ROK, it nevertheless true that support even small force obsolescent fighters wld require considerable outlay in specialized equipment and trained personnel, none of which Dept understands to be presently available in Korea, as well as considerable continuing financial burden if such force is to be kept operational.

WEBB

795B.5/5–2350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, May 23, 1950—5 p. m.

744. Deptel 505, May 19. Felt here some confusion exists owing various recommendations sent Department (Randall report,[1] KMAG semi-annual report [2] and others) on proposed air program for ROK. This message concurred in by KMAG and ECA and should be regarded as definitive and authoritative recommended program for support ROK Air Force.

Following aircraft recommended: 40 F–51 aircraft complete with weapons and air signal equipment; 10 T–6 aircraft complete with weapons and air signal equipment; 3 C–47 aircraft complete with air signal equipment. All foregoing aircraft should be delivered complete with adequate stock of spare parts, maintenance equipment and special tools and items of equipment needed to maintain aircraft.

Recommend following air advisors be sent here to be charged against authorized strength to KMAG and to be an integral part thereof:

(*a*) Officers: One senior air advisor with air command and staff experience to act as tactical advisor. One technical advisor. One service supply and maintenance officer. Three flight instructors. Total six officers.

(*b*) Airmen: One armament technician. One communications technician. Three airplane mechanics. Two radio mechanics. One depot

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[1] Brig. Gen. Russell E. Randall, U.S.A.F., Ret., made a trip to Korea in November 1949 at President Rhee's invitation to give advice on the proposed build-up of the South Korean Air Force; for his recommendations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, footnote 3, pp. 1102–1103.

[2] Reference is to the report for the period ending December 31, 1949, which was transmitted to the Department with despatch no. 99, January 26, from Seoul, not printed. In the despatch, Ambassador Muccio called attention to and endorsed the KMAG recommendations for an increase in strength of the Korean Air Force (795.58/1–2650); see also Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, p. 94.

maintenance man. One aircraft electrician. One propeller mechanic. One photographic technician. Total eleven airmen.

Maintenance and other ground facilities adequate to support such aircraft are now in existence as far as air fields and buildings are concerned. Kit of spare parts, maintenance equipment and tools to be delivered to ROK with aircraft should be sufficiently complete to equip ground maintenance installations. Airfields and buildings now in need of limited amount to rehabilitation. Expenditures for this purpose estimated at 400 million *won*. It proposed initial expense rehabilitation such installations to be included in a ROK supplementary appropriation to support expanded air program. Mission will insist ROK raise sufficient additional tax revenues to cover supplemental appropriation. Study indicates first year cost of program including 400 million *won* mentioned above, to be 1,820,809,000 *won*. This sum includes *won* equivalent US $887,000 estimated cost of POL for expanded program to be procured with Korean foreign exchange; proportion of this cost falling within current fiscal year will of course be dependent on date initiation program.

It is intended to meet continuing cost of program by initial appropriation outlined above plus regular annual appropriations which Mission will insist in each case be offset by taxes or other revenues. Estimated annual cost of program for each year after first will be approximately 50 percent of first year expense for 910 million *won*. Foregoing estimates based on assumption no provision for such requirements exists in MDAP. Assuming NSC 8/2 is revised to provide support for air force,[3] it will be possible revise first estimate of fiscal year—1951 MDAP to provide any equipment FEAF unable supply under this request.

Approximately 60 pilots now in Korean Air Force qualified for transition training to fighter aircraft. In this connection, 10 T–6 aircraft now in use by Korean Air Force being used to maximum extent in preparing pilots to fly fighter craft. Ground personnel now in training on liaison and T–6 aircraft. Comprehensive mechanic school system now in operation. Main reliance for pilot and mechanic training, however, must be on air advisory personnel recommended above.

It felt here reliance should not be placed in FEAF facilities to provide servicing and maintenance (periodic engine overhaul, for example) equipment and spare parts. FEAF reported currently converting jet fighter aircraft and presumably will not be in a position for long to service F–51 aircraft or maintain large supply of parts. In view reported discarding of F–51 aircraft it hoped FEAF will be

[3] Between the time of the receipt of this telegram and the outbreak of hostilities, no effort was made to revise NSC 8/2.

in position supply most complete kit spare parts and maintenance equipment for F–51's. Recommend, however, that a limited number Korean air technicians and mechanics be authorized for training with FEAF.

For description Korean Air Force facilities, attention invited to enclosure Embdes 777, December 7, 1949.[4]

Sent Department 744; repeated info CINCFE.

MUCCIO

[4] The text of despatch no. 777 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1105; the enclosure is not printed.

611.95B/5–2550

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SEOUL, May 25, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There is an aspect of the United States Government's pronouncements in general, and that of the Department in particular, which has often caused me concern, and to which I would like to call your attention.

I refer to public statements attributed to the President, the Secretary or other high Government officials in which various countries are named as especial objects of United States interest and concern, but from which the name of Korea very frequently is omitted.

These omissions are always noted here in Korea, and they add to the sensitivity and fear of the Korean Government and Korean citizens that the United States Government is not fixed in its determination to assist Korea and will abandon Korea at the earliest opportunity. The Korean Government, and especially President Rhee, is particularly concerned in noting these omissions following the recent statements by Senator Connally in *United States News and World Report*, and also by the omission of Korea from the Baguio Conference invitation list.[1] Since this Republic is so close to the enemy, and in fact is daily engaged in armed conflict with him, responsible Korean leaders are understandably concerned at what appears to be their extreme isolation and are most sensitive to any hint that the United States Government or officials may be indifferent to their peril.

The most recent examples of that which I have in mind are the AP news stories of the Secretary's comments from London on the Atlantic

[1] Representatives of Australia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand met at Baguio in the Philippines on May 26. At the conference, they agreed on the desirability of closer economic, cultural, and social cooperation. For related documentation, see volume VI.

Council talks[2] (received here on May 20) and the longer USIS story, from London, dated May 19, on the same subject. Although the Secretary was speaking primarily of U.S. interest in and support of the Atlantic Pact countries, as the AP condensed his statement, ". . . Acheson promised continued support to Indo-China, Greece, Turkey, Iran and Germany in any struggle for freedom from aggression." The USIS story, while longer and more detailed, makes the omission of any reference to Korea even more noticeable.

I should like to urge that those persons particularly charged with drafting speeches and statements on United States policy have this problem brought to their attention, so that in any listing of Asiatic countries in whose freedom the United States maintains a continuing interest, Korea may always be included.

I think this is especially important now that increasing emphasis is being put on Indo-China and South East Asia generally, so that official comment on U.S. interest in that area is bound to increase. It would be a pity if in the increase of that volume, by omission of reference to Korea, Koreans would come to believe that despite their able and courageous fight to preserve their own independence against Communist aggression they had been written off as expendable.[3]

Sincerely yours, JOHN J. MUCCIO

[2] Documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in volume III.
[3] For the text of Mr. Rusk's reply, June 15, see p. 106.

795A.00/5–2750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, May 27, 1950—3 p. m.

767. Based on personal observation Embassy officers during past ten days all provinces except Cheju, following is situation on eve May 30 general elections:

1. Conduct of election. Election atmosphere generally conceded free. Freer than 1948. With exception those affiliated with National Independence Federation, Korea Independence Party, other lesser groups between left and right (termed "middle-of-roaders" by President and Korean Government) candidates state no official interference encountered, although in some areas (e.g. South Cholla) candidates expressing outspoken criticism government. Candidates everywhere participating "joint lecture meetings" under auspices local election committees with large crowds attending. One provincial governor privately stated received instructions from central government to turn out larger vote than 1948, although reduction by about half in number polling places (as compared 1948) may reduce vote slightly. Can-

didate withdrawals to date total 27, in scattered districts. Arrests by government total about 15, mostly charge Communist connections but some for violations election law, some apparently for severe criticism of government, and one for financial irregularities. Police some areas making daily spot-check popular opinion for relay to Minister Home Affairs. No Communist disturbances election yet reported, and no observable opposition (as in 1948) to holding elections. Government sources expect some guerrilla disturbances North Cholla Province and along parallel, but KMAG G–2 anticipates only minor incidents. Government obviously regards so-called "middle-of-road" candidates and some unspecified independents (see paragraph 3) as actual or potential Communists, several reports received from moderates of petty harassment, arrest campaign workers, anti-moderate public statements by government officials, detention candidates short periods for investigation, and arrests. Election officials apparently have permitted wholesale disregard of election law provisions against organization participation in campaigns by government-sponsored groups such as Youth Corps and National Society but this probably will have little effect on most local elections since fact that competing candidates same district often members same organization tends to split organizational vote.

2. Report which released to Seoul newspapers May 26 disclosed wholesale roundup of North-South-Korea-Labor-Party directed political committee South Korea. Sung Shi Paek, supreme leader North Korea Labor Party group, arrested May 15, with simultaneous confiscation 14,800 US dollars, Korean currency, weapons, motor vehicle documents showing personnel and leaders organization. 112 persons so far arrested in connection case. Mission of organization said to gather political, economic, other information on ROK affairs and report to Pyongyang; obstruct flow US aid Korea; infiltrate UNCOK and foreign diplomatic establishments for espionage; infiltrate Assembly through running Communists as candidates and financing campaigns "middle-of-roaders" and certain rightists. Report named 10 candidates as targets of organization, of whom one, DNP member Kim Seung Wun, allegedly received 1,850,000 *won* for campaign in Poyong County, South Chungchong Province. Others not said received funds and it possible they unaware of activities of net. Examples: Cho So Ang, Socialist Party head, running against Chough Pyung Ok, USAMGIK national police director; Wun Sai Hoon, National Independence Federation member, running against Yun Chi Yung, Assembly vice speaker; Chang Keun Sang (arrested), running against Ryang Han Na, South Kyongsang governor's sister.

Foregoing report of which Embassy had considerable knowledge was released by prosecutors without prior knowledge of OPI director.

3. President Rhee departed May 24 for speaking trip South Korean provinces (Embtel 742, May 23).[1] Speeches generally were impartial, referring to no candidate or group candidates, urged people to vote fairly and wisely. At Chongju, however, President quoted as saying "Communists trying to bring about victory of candidates who are leftist, leftish sympathizers or even critics of government policies no matter how slight." Continues: "While leftists, middle-of-roaders in conjunction placing only one candidate in district, rightists competing with each other. Patriotic citizens should prevent the former from being returned. If election representatives should attempt carry out motions of nature constitutional amendment in National Assembly, I urge voters not hesitate recall them." Information available to Embassy from number of sources, Korean and controlled, indicates Communists may in fact be attempting to bring about election of candidates considered subject to their influence, ideologically compatible, etc.

4. Issues. Virtually all candidates promise action (but omit specific remedies) as regards: (*a*) economic problems, particularly food problem (this issue made critical by coincidence election period and traditional spring hunger period in Korea); (*b*) problem of 38th parallel; and (*c*) education, particularly shortage schools in rural districts. Chorus of agreement that ECA aid must be used wisely, and US often praised for demands such as contained Hoffman letter to Prime Minister and *aide-mémoire*. Candidates with US connections (residence, education, USAMGIK positions, etc.) making point of same. Issues less stressed by campaigners: Abolition voluntary contributions, need for judicial reforms (these particularly mentioned in Cholla provinces, where DNP strong), and need for early implementation of land reform law. No demand for enforcement local elections: Existence enabling legislation unknown in rural areas. While Rhee remains sacrosanct and virtually no mention constitutional amendment proposals or other suggestions alteration in form of government, important to note that criticism of administration implicit in platforms most candidates and these criticisms not publicly countered even by known pro-administration candidates. Also should be noted that issues and individual candidates platforms far less important in determining outcome than candidates family connections, personal reputation, organizational support, and size of electorate in place where candidate born and where he has largest group of relatives.

5. Estimate of probable outcome. In intrenched position Cholla provinces, DNP may generally hold present predominance but will probably suffer setbacks elsewhere. Organized party campaigning

[1] Not printed.

generally weak, however but "middle-of-roaders" and unidentified "independents" probably will have increased success over 1948. Despite government harassment of them in effort prevent Communists from being elected, psychological effect government personnel changes, police and local civil officials and actions against Communist candidates may give DNP and administration group strength not held organically and may enable them gain some representation though probably not majority. Consequently, it appears election will not prove a decisive victory for any contesting group, and will be followed by realignments and contests in the Assembly similar to 1948. Probably greater part incumbents seeking reelection will be defeated account popular disappointment nonfulfillment 1948 campaign promises.[2]

MUCCIO

[2] For the report of UNCOK on its observation of the elections, see U.N. document A/1350, pp. 23–25. Of the 210 seats at stake in the National Assembly, only 31 were retained by members of the previous body; of the 210 members, 133 were elected as independents.

795B.55/5–2950

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 569

SEOUL, May 29, 1950.

Subject: Improvement of Korean Army Logistical Situation

There is transmitted, for the Department's information, a copy of a circular instruction issued by the Chief, KMAG, to the KMAG Advisors on the subject of the logistical situation in the Korean Army, on the steps being taken to improve it, and on the responsibilities resting on KMAG personnel to assist in this endeavor.

The Embassy is glad to report that much attention is currently being paid to the problem of effecting economies in the operations of the Korean Army. Much waste has already been eliminated. Particular attention, on the insistence of KMAG, is being paid to the conservation of vehicles, with a goodly proportion now being put in reserve. Fuel economies have also been marked. Accounting procedures and practices are being revamped to conform to modern efficient methods. Elimination of the vicious system of contributions, voluntary or forced, is also under way.

Persistent and unremitting effort will have to be made, particularly on the part of KMAG, to see to it that logistical reforms are consolidated and retained. Appreciable progress is being made. It is expected that even more progress will be made in the future.

For the Ambassador:
EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT
Counselor of Embassy

[Enclosure]

The Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (Roberts) to all KMAG Advisors

CONFIDENTIAL 5 MAY 1950.

Subject: KA Logistical Situation

1. The purpose of this letter is to acquaint all advisors with the logistical situation in the Korean Army, steps that are being taken to improve it, and the ways in which advisors can assist in carrying out these steps.

2. The original U.S. commitment was to supply the Korean Army with an initial issue of equipment and a six months supply of spare parts for a strength of 50,000. Later an additional 15,000 individual weapons were supplied. The result of the increase in strength to 100,000 has been a serious deficiency in major items of equipment. The six months supply of parts is exhausted, and it is estimated that 10 to 15% of the weapons and 30 to 35% of the vehicles are unserviceable. It is tentatively planned by Dept. of Army that the spare parts approved for issue to Korea under 1950 MDAP will not arrive until some time in FY 52. The Korean economy lacks the resources to supply these parts from its own production or from foreign exchange. It is very seriously threatened with continuation of the inflationary spiral which, if it is not halted, may very well wreck the economy entirely. The attempts to control this spiral have necessitated a very limited budget for the Armed Forces for the FY just begun. All items of issue will be in short supply and funds for all services will be deficient. The significance of this situation is that unless prompt, effective and vigorous measures are taken to conserve available resources the Army will be dangerously reduced in fire power, mobility and logistical support. The economy will deteriorate further and be unable to support either the military establishment or the civil and political movement toward a free and democratic country. In short, Korea is threatened with the same disaster that befell China.

3. There are numerous deficiencies and unsound practices which have contributed to the situation outlined above. There has never been established a sound basis in regulations, orders, doctrine and standing operating procedures upon which to build a good logistical system and govern its operation. Allowances of supplies and equipment, instructions for handling them, maintenance procedures, and other logistical matters have been largely prescribed by piecemeal, uncoordinated, inadequate instructions, often in oral form. The result is confusion and ignorance as to proper procedures. To this has been added the deficiencies of Korean practices, personnel and concepts outlined in Inclosure 1.[1]

[1] Not printed.

4. The Advisory Staff to KA Hqs is taking vigorous action to correct the deficiencies and to improve the logistical situation. There is no doubt that the deficiencies can be corrected. However, to do so will require the utmost efforts of the entire Group working together in close cooperation and coordination. Following is an outline of the steps being taken:

a. The G–4 Section, KA, has been reorganized upon Advisor's recommendations in such a manner as to enable it to function efficiently. Every step is being taken to increase the speed, efficiency and effectiveness of the units and individuals responsible for logistical support of combat units.

b. Strong representations are made at frequent intervals to the U.S. Dept of Army and Dept of State in an attempt to secure additional military aid and to expedite delivery of the approved FY 50 Aid Program. Advisors must understand and the Koreans should understand that the US has many large and important commitments for aid and that therefore some delay is unavoidable in delivery of aid goods. Current efforts to expedite this delivery have already achieved some success, and more success is anticipated.

c. The Embassy and ECA are making constant and vigorous efforts to improve the functioning of the government and the economy and to control the inflationary spiral. The most important device for this purpose is the Stabilization Committee, which contains both Korean and American members. It has made considerable progress toward accomplishing its mission.

d. Existing deficiencies have been repeatedly brought to the attention of the Minister of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, the G–4 and others concerned, and recommendations for their correction have been made. These efforts are beginning to show results. The Koreans have begun to take stern disciplinary measures against offenders. They have reconciled themselves to the fact that they must live within a limited budget and are trying to work out for themselves effective measures for doing so. They have begun to scale down their overambitious ideas about the standard of equipment and living for the Army. They have also begun to adhere more closely to proper channels for supply and to directives concerning supplies. They have instituted a large salvage program and thereby relieved the stagnation in the disposition of salvage which existed a short time ago. Their staff work is becoming better coordinated and more sound. They will stop the allocation of funds to unit and installation commanders except for pay and travel and for purchase of perishable items of the ration. This means that all other goods and services will be procured through the Central Procurement Agency as is proper.

e. In order to hasten the effective implementation of the recommendations mentioned above the advisory staff is preparing comprehensive, detailed plans to guide the Koreans. Some of the major projects are:

(1) A study of the requirements for regulations, manuals, bulletins, tables of allowances, orders, and standing operating procedures to establish a basis for a sound logistical system. These publications will then be drafted and issued.

(2) A program to insure enforcement of the recently prescribed ordnance maintenance system.

(3) A plan to impart to the Koreans a sound understanding of the meaning, scope and importance of supply discipline, to establish high standards of supply discipline, and to insure its enforcement.

(4) A conservation program to insure the most economical use of funds, supplies and equipment and thereby to live within the budget.

(5) A plan to insure that supplies, equipment and funds are handled according to regulations.

(6) Plans to redistribute supplies and equipment so that they are properly balanced and so that an adequate combat reserve may be constituted.

(7) A plan to establish accurate statistical data on logistical matters and an adequate system of logistical reports, and to insure proper rendition of accurate reports.

(8) Continuing formulation of logistical doctrine to be taught at schools and education of Korean officers in proper staff procedure and methods and techniques of planning.

(9) A program of troop housing for the Army.

(10) Plans for logistical support of the Army defense plans.

5. It will require much time and effort to make these plans and place them in operation. The assistance of every member of the Advisory Group will be required in doing so. Following are some of the ways in which each member is expected to assist.

a. Imparting to his counterpart an understanding of the problems and their proper solution, and stimulating him to take vigorous action toward their solution.

b. Educating his counterpart to an understanding of his responsibilities in connection with supply and the means of carrying them out.

c. Reporting violations of sound practices and prescribed procedures promptly and in full detail to the Chief, KMAG, Attention G–4.

d. Devising and practicing every possible means for economizing in the operation of the Army. This means that advisors must be thoroughly conversant with the procedures used by their counterparts for handling of supplies, equipment and funds. They must rigidly control the tendency to hoard, misuse, and misappropriate funds and supplies. They must control the practice of disobeying orders and circumventing orders by devious means such as borrowing and soliciting of funds. The collection of contributions is a particularly vicious and undemocratic practice. Every effort must be made to detect it and all instances will be reported to Chief, KMAG.

e. Preventing the purchase of goods and services by their counterparts. Whenever goods or services are required, recommendations should be made to the chief of the appropriate technical service. He supplies the goods or services if they are available to him. If they are not, he submits a purchase request to the Central Procurement Agency. Goods, when procured, are handled through the supply channels of the technical services and must not bypass these channels. This procedure is most important. The violation of it has resulted in a tremendous waste of funds and must cease absolutely and at once.

f. Preventing the sale or barter of equipment, supplies, and salvage. These absolutely must be disposed of through prescribed channels if a sound logistical system is to be built.

g. Constantly checking on compliance with the recently published directive on ordnance maintenance and taking vigorous action to correct violations. Insuring compliance with forthcoming directives in implementation of the plans mentioned above. Such directives will be issued in both Korean and English.

h. Taking every possible precaution to insure that funds are used in the most effective manner possible and for legal and proper purposes only.

i. Devising and implementing his own methods for establishing and maintaining high standards of supply discipline and maintenance.

j. Rendering accurate reports on logistical matters and seeing that his counterpart does the same. Inaccurate reports have been submitted quite often in the past. They require a great deal of time in investigation and reconciliation with facts, throw the entire logistical system off balance, and prevent concentration on the important planning work which must be done. Reports must be based on facts as nearly as can be determined by thorough and conscientious investigation.

6. The tactical organization and training of the KA has shown gratifying progress. This is not true of the logistical practices and procedures. The best fighting troops are virtually worthless if they cannot support themselves logistically. KMAG will make the solution of the problems outlined herein a major effort. Advisors will place equal emphasis on logistical matters and training, and each will be held strictly responsible for carrying out his part of this effort. Recipients of this letter will insure that it is studied by all KMAG officers under their supervision.

W. L. ROBERTS
Brig. Gen., U.S. Army

611.95/6–150

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SEOUL, June 1, 1950.

DEAR DEAN: The recent letter from John Allison, with your own postscript,[1] suggesting a Korean invitation to John Foster Dulles to visit Korea has reminded me of a subject which has often been on my mind.[2]

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[1] Not printed.

[2] For background information on the visit of John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, to Japan and Korea, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1950, p. 998, and *ibid.*, June 26, 1950, p. 1061. A memorandum of conversation on his meeting with President Rhee on June 19 is printed on p. 107.

I think it would be very helpful if the Department would adopt a general practice of attempting to persuade more high U.S. officials who make inspection trips to Japan to include Korea in their itinerary. Such visits would be helpful to the men concerned and so to the formation of policy by the Government, and would also be helpful to the Korean people and Government.

Seoul is only about four hours by air from Tokyo, so that almost any visitor to Japan could find the time to stop in Seoul at least over night. The Koreans not unnaturally are continuously concerned at their exposed military position, despite the obvious indications of American determination to continue aid to the Republic of Korea. Their morale would be greatly heartened by periodic visits of high United States officials, especially those connected with the Departments of Defense and State. Unfortunately, in the past such officials have tended to stop in Japan, thereby giving credence to Korean fear and suspicion that the United States is more interested in developing and sustaining their recent enemy than their long friends!

For example, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff visited Tokyo,[3] although the President of Korea invited them to visit Seoul none of them came.

Subsequently, the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, indicated he would come to Seoul after visiting Tokyo,[4] but he was called home suddenly and so was unable to do so.

Currently, the Secretary of Defense and General Bradley are reported to be about to visit Tokyo,[5] and the Korean Minister of Defense, by direction of the President, has telegraphed Secretary Johnson inviting him to visit Seoul. This morning when I called on the President with General Roberts and Dr. Bunce, the President asked whether Secretary Johnson was coming. General Roberts had just received a message that the Secretary was not coming and told the President so. The President was much distressed. This afternoon an Embassy officer learned from those close to the President that he had become depressed and angered at what he took to be not only a slight to Korea but more important that the U.S. Department of Defense was showing its indifference to the fate of Korea. I understand the President intends to write urgently to General MacArthur to try to get him to persuade Secretary Johnson to visit here.[6]

The visits of the five Senators and ten Representatives to Korea last autumn, and that of Dr. Jessup last January,[7] in my opinion, had an

[3] The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been to Japan in February.
[4] In October 1949.
[5] Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Omar Bradley arrived in Tokyo on June 18.
[6] Mr. Johnson did not visit Korea.
[7] See the memorandum by Mr. Jessup, January 14, p. 1.

excellent effect both in informing the visitors and in affecting Korean judgment about United States intentions and in raising Korean morale.

Every American visitor who has come here appears to have gone away much impressed with what has been and is being done both by the Korean Government and people and by this Mission. I think it is impossible to get a clear picture of the Korea situation from Tokyo. General Hobbs, who was recently detached from FEC for duty in the Philippines, came over not long ago at the suggestion of General MacArthur, before proceeding to Manila. I understand he was reluctant to come, but that he stayed longer than he had intended and went away enthusiastic about the work of KMAG, and the Korean Army, and especially about their antiguerrilla tactics. Yet General Hobbs had been stationed in Japan for a considerable period of time. I think that proves that you have to see it to believe it. Assistant Secretary of Commerce Thomas C. Blaisdell is also a case in point. His three-day visit [8] was profitable both to him and to this Embassy, as well as the Korean Government.

You will have learned before you get this letter of the results of the May 30 elections here. All the ballots have not yet been counted, but the picture is pretty clear that in general the electorate chose those candidates not holding public office. In Pusan two candidates were elected even though they were being held in jail. It seems clear that the voter cast his ballot freely, secure in the secrecy of his voting, and not under intimidation of the Government.

Sincerely,

JOHN

[8] In April.

795B.00/6–950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

SEOUL, June 9, 1950—noon.

829. Pyongyang Radio commenced new propaganda campaign June 7 analogous similar one 1949.[1] "Democratic Front" deploring continued division Korea by American-Rhee police state proposes "patriotic parties" and organizations celebrate liberation day August 15 in unison, accordance following principles: (1) from August 5, for eight days,[2] elect "unified supreme legislative organ" throughout Korea; (2) hold first session this legislature Seoul August 15; (3)

[1] See *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, footnote 2, p. 1064.

[2] The text of the proposal by the North Korean "Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland" (DFAUF) is printed in U.N. document A/1350, p. 35; it actually called for elections during the period August 5–8.

hold preliminary joint north–south leaders conference Haeju or Kaesong discuss (*a*) measures peaceful unification; (*b*) create general election committee for holding elections; (4) exclude UNCOK from work for attainment peaceful unification; (5) make "north and south regimes responsible for public peace and order during period joint meeting and general election (although 'Syngman Rhee, Lee Bum Suk and other criminals' not allowed participate joint meeting)". Three persons to be sent south deliver copies this appeal to various parties and UNCOK.

Comment: Noteworthy first time date set for occupation Seoul, although many previous claims intention do so. Embassy estimates program purely propaganda campaign attempting offset results recent election which portrayed by Pyongyang Radio as complete failure with popular participation only under duress. Possible some border incidents may coincide with "election campaign" but no estimate basic change military situation (unlikely this propaganda much effect South Korea since Communists all underground while "middle roaders" largely supporting ROK).

Methods of meeting this new propaganda campaign now subject informal conversation with ROK and UNCOK officials.

MUCCIO

795B.00/6–950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, June 9, 1950—6 p. m.

834. ReEmbtel 829 June 9. North Korean "Democratic Front for Attainment of Unification of Fatherland" appeal of June 7 expedite peaceful unification of Korea. Doubtless originated by USSR. Its overt development began June 1, when according Pyongyang radio, Lee Yong, Chairman Central Committee Laboring People's Party (Communist front organization formerly in South Korea), published article in two Pyongyang newspapers proposing that June 27, 1949, appeal DFAUF be reviewed for purpose "expediting peaceful unification" country. Central Committee DFAUF announcing June 5 that at fifth meeting had studied Lee Yong's proposal and "opinions expressed in support thereof by leaders political parties and social organizations affiliated with DFAUF;" that agreement was reached by leaders those parties and organizations; that 11 member committee had been charged with drafting appeal incorporating new agreement; that expanded meeting Central Committee DFAUF would be called June 7. Meeting met as scheduled on June 7 and promptly issued its new appeal.

As political move DFAUF appeal may be lead from weakness as results success May 30 elections and North Korea failure "frustrate" them in any significant measure although in this connection it should be noted DFAUF appeal apparently in process development before May 30. Since NK now lacks capacity push its guerrilla activity in ROK to extent of undermining stability government perhaps present appeal intended serve as substitute therefor.

As propaganda move, however, appeal seizes initiative. Its superficial reasonableness may be attractive to large body South Korea public opinion which still yearns for elimination 38th parallel left unsatisfied by pre-election promises National Assembly candidates. New appeal may be intended tempt some newly elected but as yet unaffiliated middle of road Assembly men, few of whom represent body confused liberal opinion which looked with favor on Nanking [*North Korea*]–South Korea joint meetings two years ago [1] and still possibly not wholeheartedly antagonistic to Nanking [*North Korean*] regime.

Fact that specific dates for elections (August 5–13) [2] and first session new all-Korea Assembly in Seoul (August 15) were given may be considered dangerous from viewpoint sound propaganda. These dates, however, conceivably may serve as convenient peg upon which hang argument that increased guerrilla warfare and Communist subversive activity only method by which Korea can be unified. They conceivably might also serve as preliminary step toward all-out civil war, although seems improbable.

Broadcast June 8 stated three persons (one identified here as Korean-Soviet, formerly Red Army Master Sergeant, now Major General, internal security; others unknown) will wait at Yohyun station just north 38th parallel from 10 a. m. to 5 p. m., June 10, deliver 300 copies DFAUF statement.

UNCOK broadcasting 1815 brief statement reiterating deep concern for unification through free elections, desire examine any sincere proposals, welcoming what appears first offer open border at 38th parallel. Understand UNCOK considered, rejected proposal proceed Yohyun tomorrow; rejection based on uselessness going to receive copy letter whose contents already known.

ROK planning broadcasts emphasizing deep concern unification, but insisting must be through free elections UK under UNCOK observation; will repeat portions recent Rhee, Singh, Jamieson broadcasts.[3] Possibly some recently elected "middle roaders" will be put on

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[1] See telegram 291, April 30, from Seoul, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. VI, p. 1184.
[2] See footnote 2 to telegram 829, June 9, from Seoul, *supra*.
[3] Concerning the broadcasts by Messrs. Singh and Jamieson, see footnote 5 to despatch no. 474, May 5, from Seoul, p. 74; the text of a broadcast to the people of North Korea by President Rhee on May 6 is printed in U.N. document A/1350, p. 17.

air telling why reject North Korea and support ROK. General plan emphasize intention unify without making specific reference DFAUF proposals. KA alerted against possible border incidents.

Department pass Moscow, sent Department 834, repeated information Moscow unnumbered.

MUCCIO

795.00/6–1050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, June 10, 1950—11 a. m.

837. Re Embtel 834, June 9.

Subsequent despatch reference telegram UNCOK reconsidered, decided send Deputy Principal Secretary, John P. Gaillard, Yohyun meet North Koreans. Should he be allowed cross parallel, Gaillard would accept letter from Northerners; give them copies UNGA Korean resolution, October 21, 1949; Jamieson's radio address May 1; Singh's addresses May 3 and 18; Jamieson's address June 9; assert UNCOK's desire assist unification through elections, willingness go north earliest; Gaillard not empowered discuss anything else.

Jamieson broadcast English 1820 June 9, followed by Korean interpretation; latter repeated 4 times same night; included was offer send Gaillard for meeting 1600 today, asking radio reply before 1000. Without reference UNCOK, Pyongyang radio 0800 extended waiting time to 2100, possibly preparatory reply.

Jamieson broadcast, text unanimously agreed by UNCOK, follows, preceded by explanatory statement for South Korea issued to press last night.

"At its 28th meeting on Friday, 9 June 1950, the United Nations Commission on Korea decided to broadcast the following radio message to North Korea in connection with a letter of appeal from North Korean sources concerning unification of all Korea, an appeal repeatedly broadcast over radio Pyongyang on June 7, 8 and 9, 1950. Radio Pyongyang at the same time stated that 3 North Koreans would be present at Yohyun, north of the 38th parallel, on June 10, 1950, between 10 a. m. and 5 p. m. to deliver copies of the appeal to political parties, social organizations and leaders of the southern half as well as to the United Nations Commission. In making this broadcast the Commission does not associate itself in any way with the substance of the proposals contained in the letter of appeal. It is merely utilizing this opportunity to make contact in North Korea with representatives of the North Koreans in line with its previous efforts to reach representatives of the North in order to explore the possibilities of peaceful unification.

"The text of the broadcast follows:

'For almost a year and a half the United Nations Commission on Korea has tried to get in contact with the people in North Korea for the purpose of discussing the possibilities of removing

the barrier at the 38th parallel and achieving peaceful unification of Korea. The terms of reference of the Commission, fixed by the General Assembly of United Nations on 21 October 1949, requests the Commission to make available its good offices and be prepared to assist whenever in the judgment a favorable opportunity arises in bringing about the unification of Korea. In pursuance of the task, I, as chairman of the Commission, on May 1, 1950, made a broadcast to the people of all Korea to appeal for their co-operation in achieving unification. On May 3, and again on May 11, Dr. Singh, chairman of sub-committee one [and?] representative of India, made special appeals to the people of North Korea explaining that the Commission was searching for unity, to break down economic and social barriers and for this purpose was anxious to visit North Korea to carry out its mission. On behalf of the Commission Dr. Singh extended to you in the North, in utter sincerity, its hand of friendship and its offer to visit you in the North. The sole purpose of the Commission is to carry out the mandate of the General Assembly, aiming at unification, which is the fervent desire of all true Koreans.

'The Commission is aware of the broadcasts made from North Korea in the last few days containing an invitation to the Commission to meet representatives of the North Koreans on the other side of the parallel. The Commission welcomes this opportunity to establish contact with some representatives from the North and deputi[z]es Mr. Gaillard, Acting Deputy Principal Secretary of the Commission, to meet you at 1600 hours at Yohyun station on June 10 and convey personally to you the Commission's desire for peaceful unification. I would remind you that we are available for observation and consultation throughout Korea in the continuing development of representative government. On this occasion, however, the Commission has authorized me, as chairman, to explain to you again, people in the North, that the Commission is always ready and willing to meet you and come to the North in order to discuss with you, without prejudice, the possibilities of achieving unification.

'The Commission would appreciate hearing by 9 a. m. North Korean time tomorrow morning whether you are willing to meet Mr. Gaillard at the time specified.' "

Department pass Moscow; sent Department 837, repeated info Moscow unnumbered.

MUCCIO

795B.00/6–1150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, June 11, 1950—11 a. m.

842. Re Embtel 840 to Department.[1] Gaillard, UNCOK Deputy Principal secretary, with Korean interpreter, reached ROK forward

[1] The text of this telegram read as follows:

"Pyongyang Radio off air since 0900 without replying UNCOK; reopens 1200 for two hours. Gaillard, with ROK Foreign Office clearance, and Foreign Office official accompanying, proceeding by jeep vicinity Yohyun await possible clearance. Expects proceed parallel afoot 1600 testing reception." (995B.40/6–1050)

CP closest Yohyun about 1530 yesterday, remained under cover till about 1815. Intermittent exchange rifle, MG fire near by positions since about hour previous arrival, continued till 1800.

AP, UP, Reuters correspondents, Australian military observers with Gaillard at forward CP, remained there able observe conference through glasses after Gaillard crossed parallel. UNCOK Foreign Office clearance for Gaillard not transmitted local commander through military channels, who reluctant permit Gaillard proceed. Accompanying Foreign Office official finally took responsibility, signing document accepting same.

Firing stopped about 1800. Gaillard, Korean interpreter, crossed parallel about 1845 unchallenged, no guards visible. Before reaching Yohyun station Gaillard met three North Korean emissaries as named in broadcast, remained in conference at table on platform till return south about 2020. Gaillard given, signature necessary for, four copies "Democratic Front" communiqué previously broadcast, which includes statement UNCOK not permitted participate unification program. North Korean emissaries refused accept UNCOK documents from Gaillard, stating only messengers, unable act without instructions, in any case thoroughly familiar Jamieson, Singh broadcasts, UNGA Korea resolution. Gaillard still unreturned Seoul; remained Paekchon overnight.

Embassy estimates although North Korean regime able secure some propaganda advantage from incident, claiming officially met UNCOK informing him North Korean desire peaceful unification through elections, without UNCOK participation, major advantage with UNCOK and ROK. First time UNCOK made any contact North Korean regime despite repeated attempts, establishing precedent. Both UNCOK, ROK official positions unification highest desirability, but only through democratic North Korean elections UNCOK observed. ROK propaganda probably able exploit this thesis.

Department pass Moscow; sent Department 842, repeated info Moscow unnumbered.

MUCCIO

795B.00/6–1150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, June 11, 1950—2 p. m.

843. Re Embtel 842 to Department. Pyongyang radio announced because failure emissaries deliver "Democratic Front" message South Koreans owing firing ROK forces yesterday, Secretariat Central Committee Democratic Front directed same three emissaries pass parallel 1000 today. Fragmentary reports police South Korea Yohyun village these persons did come south, now being held custody. ROK

action uncertain, President out of town; acting Prime Minister-Defense Minister and Home Minister will decide. Initial reaction desirable shoot emissaries, subsequently considered bringing Seoul, jailing; currently considering returning them across parallel.

Department pass Moscow; sent Department 843, repeated info Moscow unnumbered.

MUCCIO

795B.00/6–1250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, June 12, 1950—5 p. m.

845. ReEmbtel 843, June 11. Three "Democratic Front" emissaries now military detention Seoul, Korean Army G–2 claims all have pre-1948 CIC South Korea subversive records, but facts unclear.

ROK councils re disposition divided but probable will transport to 38th parallel after attempting secure maximum information through interrogations. Some ROK officials hope these men may defect but no such indication yet; others want try them under old charges or for carrying subversive literature.

Embassy advising cautious, gentle handling, avoid supporting North Korea propaganda; after intelligence or counterpropaganda usefulness ended transport to parallel, release, carrying ROK terms for unification.

Department pass Moscow, sent Department, repeated information Moscow unnumbered.

MUCCIO

795A.5/6–1350 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 13, 1950—11 a. m.

576. Pls. clarify urdesp. 456, May 4, 1950 [1] stating that "South Korean Army is superior today" to North Korean Army and is better equipped. Intelligence available here as well as most recent KMAG semi-annual report [2] indicate that North Korean airpower and heavier artillery make North Korean armed forces superior and capable of successful operations against South.

ACHESON

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Reference is to the report for the period ending December 31, 1949, which was transmitted to the Department with despatch no. 99, January 26, from Seoul, not printed (795.58/1–2650).

795A.5/6–1450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, June 14, 1950—4 p. m.

857. Re Deptel 576, June 13. Phrasing Embdes 456, May 4, 1950 [1] stating that "South Korean army is superior today" to North Korean army and is better equipped was intended refer to estimated superiority training, leadership, morale, marksmanship and better small arms equipment, especially M–1s, army of South Korea to that of North Korean army as distinguished from air force.

Embtel 683, May 11, contains good estimate strengths, equipment North Korea. North Korean air power, tanks and heavier artillery, but especially air power, give preponderance strength to North despite estimated inferiority North Korean ground forces compared to South Korean ground forces.

Capacity North Korean forces conduct successful operations against south hinges primarily on capacity north overcome southern infantry superiority by undisputed command of air plus heavier artillery with consequent adverse effect both actual military operations and morale South Korean forces. Embassy believes, and KMAG concurs, should South Korean forces be strengthened by some measure air defense and heavy artillery, superiority or at least reasonable equality would rest with south vis-à-vis North Koreans (USSR or Chinese forces not considered in this estimate).

Apart from strictly military estimate, consider necessary consider psychological effect ROK Government and civilians constantly facing knowledge northern capacity control air at will, including capacity uninterrupted bombing Seoul, as well as general knowledge northern artillery outranges southern artillery while northern army has tanks but none here.

Invite attention fact Brigadier General W. L. Roberts, chief KMAG, departing tomorrow by plane for Tokyo where he will board transport June 23 for San Francisco expecting arrive about July 3 en route new assignment Los Angeles. Suggest Roberts, who extremely conversant this problem, proceed Washington discuss, explain this problem.

MUCCIO

[1] Not printed.

611.95B/5–2550

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1950.

DEAR JOHN: In reference to your letter of May 25, 1950, I would like to assure you that I share your interest in ensuring that Korea receives its fair share of publicity in its successful struggle against Communist aggression. I therefore appreciate your calling this problem to my attention and hope that you will do so in any similar cases which may arise.

After studying the USIS story of May 19, the AP news story of May 20 and the reports on the Foreign Ministers Conference, I have come to the conclusion that the omission of Korea from the statements in question was probably not an oversight. All of the statements released from the Atlantic Council talks appear to concern problems discussed by the Foreign Ministers in London and Paris. Since Korea was not the subject of such discussions, its omission from the statements should not be construed as an indication that this Government holds a diminished interest in the Korean problem.

The Departmental officers charged with the drafting of speeches and statements on U.S. policy are, in general, aware of the problem pointed out in your letter and I believe that they are making every effort to emphasize Korea's importance. This, I believe, is evidenced by the enclosed recent statement on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program made by the Secretary before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in which he dealt with the pressures faced by Korea and stressed the importance of continued U.S. assistance.[1]

In order to make sure that continued publicity be given to the Korean problem and that unjustified omissions of Korea be avoided in future statements, I have circulated your letter to our Policy Information Officers for their future guidance.

Sincerely yours, DEAN RUSK

[1] The text of Mr. Acheson's statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 5 was issued in Department of State press release no. 585; it was substantially similar to his statement on June 2 before the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, which is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 12, 1950, p. 940.

795B.00/6–1650: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, June 16, 1950—5 p. m.

873. Re Embtel 845 June 12. Two of three representatives (Lee In Kyu, Kim Tae Hong) "Democratic Front" who brought south "All-

Korea election" appeals June 11, promptly arrested, held army custody Seoul, now having defected, broadcast to North Korea from Seoul 2230 June 15, subsequent repeats; general tenor recantation previous beliefs, stating North Koreans deceived re conditions South Korea, speakers astonished discovery peace, freedom, plenty, that "Father of Country," President Rhee leadership superior, absence US occupation forces contrary Pyongyang broadcasts; advised North Koreans hereafter disbelieve lies propagated Northern regime.

Embassy understands men well-treated, only oral questions, no violence used. Third man, Kim Chae Chang, Secretary "Democratic Front" reportedly also defected but because of family Pyongyang afraid make public announcement. Currently all three being permitted tour Seoul allegedly without guards; expect broadcast again June 18 giving observations local conditions.

Embassy considers ROK able use men's statements successfully discredit Pyongyang "Democratic Front" propaganda campaign; UNCOK possibly, US delegate UNGA probably able use discredit USSR claims re Korea question.

Broadcasts being translated transmitting upon completion.[1]

MUCCIO

[1] The texts of the broadcasts were transmitted to the Department in telegram 879, June 17, from Seoul, not printed (795B.00/6–1750).

795B.00/6–1950

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)[1]

SECRET [SEOUL,] June 19, 1950.

Participants: President Rhee
Mr. Dulles
Foreign Minister Ben C. Limb
Ambassador Muccio
Mr. Allison

President Rhee requested a special unscheduled interview with Mr. Dulles this morning with the apparent objective of impressing upon Mr. Dulles his view that more positive action must be taken to make more difficult the task of the communists in North Korea.

President Rhee was also apparently hoping for some definite commitment of continuing American aid and was seemingly apprehensive least [*lest*] Korea be left alone while other countries in Asia united in some form of regional association. The President stated that before

[1] Mr. Allison accompanied John Foster Dulles on his trip to Japan and Korea; see footnote 2 to the letter from Mr. Muccio to Mr. Rusk, June 1, p. 96.

the Chinese communists have an opportunity to consolidate their position in China the division of Korea at the 38th parallel must be removed. He also expressed deep concern over the fate of Formosa, saying that its loss would be greatly deplored by Korea. He referred to a report he had received that Chinese, Korean and Japanese communists have recently had a meeting in Japan to discuss ways and means of making trouble for South Korea and went on to say that should Formosa fall to the communists Korea would then be threatened by communist elements from the south as well as from the north. At a later point in the conversation the President did state that his desire for positive action did not necessarily mean action by armed forces but he was insistent that unless something was done the cold war would be lost.

Mr. Dulles went to considerable length to explain that formal pacts, alliances or treaties were not necessary prerequisites to common action against a common foe and that the important thing was for a government to prove by its actions that it was in fact a loyal member of the free world in which case it could count on the support of the other members of the free world against the forces of communism. Mr. Dulles explained that it was the opinion of the best informed minds in the U.S. Government that Soviet Russia did not for the present wish to become involved in a shooting war but that its more likely action would be to foment insurrection, intrigue and sabotage within countries. He pointed out that no country could guarantee another country against the results of a third world war with its potentialities of atomic warfare and that if such a war was precipitated the attack might just as likely come first in New York as in Seoul. However, the other form of indirect aggression which appeared more likely was one in which America could help but it could only help if the governments threatened were themselves taking active steps to create conditions within their countries which would prohibit growth of communism. A true allegiance to the principles of representative government and a real effort to self-control and hard work to create a stable economy and a government which deserved the support of its people would insure the continuation of such additional aid as might be needed. President Rhee had raised the question of the Baguio conference[2] of southeast Asian countries along with the various conferences of the British Commonwealth group and seemed to feel that there should be some such grouping which Korea might join. Mr. Dulles pointed out that neither the United States or Korea had been present at the Baguio conference and that he did not think either country needed to be concerned about what happened there. With respect to the British Commonwealth, this was a good example of a group of countries bound

[2] See footnote 1 to the letter from Mr. Muccio to Mr. Rusk, May 25, p. 88.

together by their mutual allegiance to freedom and democracy rather than because of any written documents. In fact, it was pointed out, the only formal document binding the Commonwealth together, the Statute of Westminster, was a document which gave each member of the Commonwealth the right to go its own way completely independent of the others if it so desired.

With respect to President Rhee's concern over Formosa Mr. Dulles pointed out that this problem was of equal concern to the United States and was under-going constant review within the Department of State. He made clear that economic aid to Formosa was continuing and he explained that just before he left Washington licenses had been issued for the exportation to Formosa of various forms of military equipment. Mr. Dulles asked President Rhee whether or not there was any likelihood of elements of the Nationalist Government wanting to come to Korea for asylum should Formosa fall to the communists and the President replied that while there had been rumors that such might be the case and that while he obviously would want to do what he could for a friendly neighbor it was his opinion that each country should stand on its own feet and not make use of its friends in such ways. Without directly answering Mr. Dulles' question it was apparent that President Rhee did not look with any favor on any requests of high Chinese Nationalists for asylum in Korea.

Mr. Dulles concluded by assuring President Rhee that if the Korean Government continued along the path it is now following it would not need to rely on formal agreements to obtain continuing aid from the U.S. in such measure as possible but that the main thing was for the Koreans to realize that they had the primary responsibility to show that they were really attached to the principles of free representative government.[3]

[3] For the text of a statement made by Mr. Dulles before the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea on June 19, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 3, 1950, p. 12.

FE Files: Lot 55D275

*Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency**

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 19 June 1950.

CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE NORTHERN KOREAN REGIME

ESTIMATE OF CURRENT CAPABILITIES

The "Democratic People's Republic" of northern Korea is a firmly controlled Soviet Satellite that exercises no independent initiative and

**Note:* The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report. It contains information available to CIA as of 15 May 1950. [Footnote in the source text.]

depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence. At the present time there is no serious internal threat to the regime's stability, and, barring an outbreak of general hostilities, the Communists will continue to make progress toward their ultimate domestic goals. The Communist regime in northern Korea suffers from a shortage of skilled administrative personnel and from weaknesses in its economy and its official Party organizations. There is widespread, although passive, popular discontent with the Communist government. Despite these weaknesses, however, the regime has, with Soviet assistance, clearly demonstrated an ability to continue its control and development of northern Korea along predetermined political, economic, and social lines.

The northern Korean regime is also capable, in pursuit of its major external aim of extending control over southern Korea, of continuing and increasing its support of the present program of propaganda, infiltration, sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla operations against southern Korea. This program will not be sufficient in itself, however, to cause a collapse of the southern Korean regime and the extension of Communist control over the south so long as US economic and military aid to southern Korea is not substantially reduced or seriously dissipated.

At the same time the capability of the northern Korean armed forces for both short- and long-term overt military operations is being further developed. Although the northern and southern forces are nearly equal in terms of combat effectives, training, and leadership, the northern Koreans possess a superiority in armor, heavy artillery, and aircraft. Thus, northern Korea's armed forces, even as presently constituted and supported, have a capability for attaining limited objectives in short-term military operations against southern Korea, including the capture of Seoul.

Northern Korea's capability for long-term military operations is dependent upon increased logistical support from the USSR. If the foreign supporters of each faction were called upon for increased assistance, there is no reason to believe that Soviet support would be withheld and consideration of proximity and availability of such assistance would greatly favor the northern Korean regime. Soviet assistance to northern Korea, however, probably would not be in the form of direct participation of regular Soviet or Chinese Communist military units except as a last resort. The USSR would be restrained from using its troops by the fear of general war; and its suspected desire to restrict and control Chinese influence in northern Korea would militate against sanctioning the use of regular Chinese Communist units in Korea.

Despite the apparent military superiority of northern over southern Korea, it is not certain that the northern regime, lacking the active participation of Soviet and Chinese Communist military units, would be able to gain effective control over all of southern Korea. The key factors which would hinder Communist attempts to extend effective control under these circumstances are: (1) the anti-Communist attitude of the southern Koreans; (2) a continuing will to resist on the part of southern troops; (3) the Communist regime's lack of popular support; and (4) the regime's lack of trained administrators and technicians.

Annex A

Soviet Position in Northern Korea

The USSR's fundamental strategic concern with Korea is positional. Northern Korea has a short common border with Soviet territory, flanks sea and land communication lines between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, and shares a long, common frontier with Manchuria. Control of northern Korea provides the USSR with an advance fringe of secondary air and naval bases beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Far East. In addition, northern Korea provides a base for eventual extension of Soviet control over southern Korea, which, if accomplished, would give the Soviet Union a further strategic advantage in its positional relationship with Japan and consequently enhance the position of the USSR vis-à-vis the US in the Far East. Of increasing importance at the present time is the area's economic potential, which, although limited, can make valuable contributions to the economy of the Soviet Far East.

To assure continued control and to protect and advance strategic and economic interests in northern Korea, the Soviet Union since 1945 has concentrated on the following objectives: (1) the establishment of a strong, effective, and obedient Communist government and society; (2) the exploitation of economic and human resources, with simultaneous development of a self-supporting, expanding economy within northern Korea; and (3) the exploitation of northern Korea as a base for the penetration and subversion of southern Korea.

Since the establishment of the "Democratic People's Republic" (September 1948) and the withdrawal of Soviet troops (December 1948), the Soviet Union has maintained the fiction of northern Korean independence and has exercised its control through the medium of the Communist-dominated Korean Government and associated political organizations. The Soviet Embassy at the "capital city" of Pyongyang is headquarters for the four- to five-thousand-man Soviet mission in

northern Korea. The Soviet mission, infiltrated as advisers throughout the government, economy, and political organizations, serves as a guarantee of northern Korean subservience and a source of technical assistance.

Annex B

Current Political Situation

1. *Indigenous Leadership.*

The "Democratic People's Republic" is under the immediate control of a small group of Korean Communist leaders whose primary qualification for high office is loyalty to the USSR and willingness to accept a subordinate role within the pattern of Soviet control. Thus, Koreans with a Soviet background appear to have been given positions superior to those held by either native-trained Communists or Koreans who received Communist indoctrination in Yenan and Manchuria, and this Soviet-trained leadership appears to be well knit. The intensity of Soviet control, the leaders' lack of strong personal followings among the Korean people, and the composition of the present southern Korean Government which makes it unpalatable to possible northern "nationalist deviationists" as an alternative prevents either significant deviations or disruptive factionalism.

Except for their loyalty and subservience to the USSR, northern Korea's leaders possess few qualifications for the responsibility of high government and party office. They have gained no popular support and despite four years in office they still lack requisite administrative and technical skills. Although these weaknesses lower the regime's efficiency and decrease its popular appeal, they do not materially affect the stability of the "People's Republic," since experienced Soviet advisers adequately maintain government efficiency at the top level and the police effectively control the populace.

2. *Government Organization.*

The Government of northern Korea closely resembles that of all other "people's democracies" and a democratic facade obscures its basic totalitarian pattern. Constitutional provisions for a popularly elected representative assembly, a responsible cabinet—actually the key organ in the government—civil liberties and other rights and institutions normally associated with democratic government, are intended to develop popular support for the "People's Republic" not only in northern Korea but in southern Korea as well. Changes gradually being made in the institutions established by the Constitution, however, point to the transformation of the "People's Democracy" into an "orthodox" socialist state of the Soviet type.

3. *Party Organization.*

The organization of the Communist Party (officially known as the North Korea Labor Party) (NKLP), which parallels the hierarchical government structure, is similar to the Party in the USSR. Top government positions are all held by NKLP members, and the Party's Politbureau is the regime's major policy-making body. Most of the government's bureaucrats are drawn from the Party ranks. The Party is intended to be the activist element among the politically passive northern Koreans, is responsible for political activities—including elections, demonstrations, and the dissemination of propaganda—and is the nucleus for what will eventually be a one-party system. In the interim, however, the fiction of a multi-party system is maintained. The Front and its organizations, manipulated and controlled by the NKLP leadership, and designed to include every segment of society, support and assist internal indoctrination and control programs and play an even more important role in operations against southern Korea.

Membership in the NKLP is estimated at between five and six hundred thousand, an unusually high percentage of the total population. The Party is controlled by a group of about a hundred, who provide the indigenous leadership in the state apparatus and who subject the several thousand petty officials, intellectuals, and professional men in the middle bracket of the Party (generally less thoroughly indoctrinated Marxists) to the most stringent Party discipline.

The remainder of the Party's membership is four-fifths peasant and one-fifth urban and industrial workers. The support of this vast majority of the Party's members is maintained through preferential treatment and strict discipline. Devotion and loyalty to the Party's leadership, rather than intellectual adherence to Marxism, is required from this Party majority that serves fundamentally as a large base with a vested interest in perpetuation of the regime, rather than as a mature activist element.

4. *Methods of Control.*

Both the state organization and the regimentation of Korean society depend on firm control of the people and the maintenance of internal security. The police force is the instrument of primary control. Exclusive of the para-military border constabulary which is still under the Minister of Interior, there are some thirty to forty thousand police agents and uniformed police. The former maintain a constant check on public attitudes and seek out dissident elements. Groups such as former landlords, businessmen, property owners, intellectuals and Christians in the north Korean population are singled out by the

police (as dissident or potentially dissident elements) and are subject to particularly rigid police controls.

As a long-range source of stability, Korea's Communist regime has sought popular support through the use of persuasive techniques, principally propaganda and the conferring of material benefits. Propaganda, disseminated through a wide variety of media, reaches every element of the Korean population. Its main effort is directed at concealing the dictatorial nature of the government, the extent of Soviet domination and similar aspects of Communism in Korea, while creating, on the other hand, the illusion of national independence, representative government, equality with the Soviet Union, and other favorable stereotypes. Material benefits designed to recruit mass support include: reforms purported to correct deep-seated inequities in the Korean social and economic system; the provision of social and public services on much larger scale than under the Japanese; and specific state actions—such as the release of extra consumer goods—timed to counteract public discontent over new economic regulations.

5. *Effectiveness of the Political System.*

The "Democratic People's Republic" has established firm control over the northern Korean people. Despite weaknesses, the Communist regime is progressing toward its ultimate domestic objectives of establishing a stable, fully socialized state. Its strength and stability are mainly attributable to: (1) rigid direction exercised through Soviet advisers and loyal Korean Communists; (2) Soviet material aid and technical advice in all fields; (3) comprehensive and highly organized state regulation of political, economic, and social activity, maintained both through government controls and through the actions of Communist-controlled mass organizations; (4) effective police control, supplemented by techniques of persuasion and psychologically bolstered by the proximity of Soviet forces; (5) cohesiveness and loyalty to both the government and the Soviet Union on the part of northern Korea's indigenous leaders, the bureaucracy, the police, the North Korea Labor Party and the more skilled technicians and workers; and (6) the achievement, since 1946, of substantial increases in production, which have raised living standards in northern Korea to a minimum subsistence level.

Despite the strength and stability of the "People's Republic" the regime has a number of important weaknesses to overcome, major among them being: (1) a lack of experienced and competent leaders, administrators, technicians, and dynamic activist strength in the NKLP; (2) the regime's narrow base of popular support, which results from the relatively widespread popular discontent; (3) Soviet

interference and exploitation, which offends Korean desires for complete independence and contributes to the low standard of living, which is a basic cause for popular discontent and a factor contributing to low labor productivity.

The Communist system, itself inherently incompatible with traditional social, economic, and political forms in Korea, assures the existence of discontented groups under the northern regime. In the brief period of Communist control, nearly two million northern Korean refugees have moved to the south; the great mass of the northerners have not yet appeared receptive to a Communist, Soviet-oriented state, and indoctrination in Marxian ideology remains extremely limited. There is believed to be widespread discontent and dissatisfaction among farmers, for example, particularly among those who formerly owned large or medium-sized farms. The forced labor required on community projects, as well as the government's collection of large special crop taxes, moreover, has incurred the resentment of former landless tenant farmers, whose support was actively solicited by means of the 1946 "land reform." The 100,000 or more Christians are strongly anti-Communist, and considerable discontent also exists among the preliberation middle classes. This popular discontent appears to be largely passive, however, and in the few known attempts to organize the opposition for action, the groups were quickly broken up by the police.

The low standard of living, although primarily an economic problem, has its political ramifications. The problem is a difficult one because the low standard arises directly and indirectly from other weaknesses in the system and cannot be resolved completely so long as the Soviet Union continues the economic exploitation of northern Korea.

None of these problems, however, is sufficiently critical at present either to threaten the USSR's control over northern Korea or to challenge the northern Korean regime's ability to maintain itself. Northern Korean internal security forces are fully capable of maintaining the regime in power during the period required for the reduction of current weaknesses in administration, leadership and production, and the progressive development of more advanced Communist political forms. Barring a period of internal disorganization, or crises arising from external military pressures, the Communist regime's present lack of popular support does not represent a serious problem. In the long run, living standards probably will be somewhat improved, and the regime's persuasive tactics are likely to gain additional recruits among the younger generation. On the other hand, while these weaknesses do not seriously impair the Communists' ability to control and develop northern Korea, they do materially reduce that regime's current ability to extend and maintain control over southern Korea.

468-806—76——9

Annex C

Current Economic Situation

1. *Organization of the Economy.*

Koreans were almost completely excluded from ownership and management when Korea's economic system was under Japanese rule. As a consequence, the USSR's introduction of a socialized economy in northern Korea after 1945 proceeded with little internal opposition. The principal Soviet economic objective in northern Korea has been the gearing of the economy to the requirements of the Soviet Far East while developing northern Korean resources to provide the maximum of self-support. The USSR has fostered the development of those industries producing exports required by its economy and has also sought to overcome the existing shortages in consumer goods production and other items presently obtained from external sources. These plans, if successful, would ensure a viable, although low level, economy in northern Korea and would also insure increasing returns to the USSR in their exploitation of the northern Korean economy.

Effective Soviet direction of the northern Korean economy is insured through: (1) the placement of Soviet advisers and Koreans loyal to the USSR in all key positions controlling the economy; (2) the use of Soviet advisers and engineers in all key Korean installations; and (3) the existence of "joint" Soviet-Korean control over northern Korea's foreign trade.

All major economic undertakings in northern Korea are planned, financed, and directed by the responsible government ministries, which are under intensive Soviet supervision. Private ownership is confined to small commercial establishments and trading companies, some mining activities, and agriculture. Even in agriculture, legal title to the land distributed by the Communist regime in the Land Reform Program of 1946[1] still rests with the state, and there is a considerable degree of state control over agricultural production.

2. *Production and Trade.*

By the end of 1946, a combination of Japan's wartime abuses of Korea's arable land and industrial plant, and subsequent Soviet looting and Korean neglect, had reduced northern Korea's economy to a state of near chaos. Recovery has been slow, but by 1949 the industrial plant had achieved a significant level of activity. Today, to judge by the northern Korean regime's published two-year production plan (1949–1950) and by scattered intelligence reports, heavy industrial plant production, while it has increased significantly over 1946, it is still 15–30 percent below the peak 1944 level.

[1] For information and pertinent documentation on land reform in North Korea, see U.N. document A/1881, pp. 59–62.

Postwar production plans have reflected a reduction in the production of some finished heavy industrial items, such as pig iron and aluminum, which formerly was geared to Japanese rather than to domestic absorption capacity. Emphasis has been shifted, instead, to the construction and expansion of plants producing basic and end-use equipment and consumer goods.

The current production of iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, fertilizers, industrial chemicals, and cement is still in excess of the Korean economy's capacity to process and absorb. The resultant surplus is exported both to meet Soviet demands and to obtain needed imports of basic equipment and consumer goods. Although only spotty information is available concerning the degree of recovery in the fields of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, these too have apparently revived to such an extent that selected exports are practicable. As a result of the possession of some industrial and agricultural surplus, and the need for basic and end-use equipment, a relatively large volume of foreign trade is both possible and necessary for the maintenance of the northern Korean economy. Additionally, the area's lack of petroleum and bituminous coal forces the importation of both.

It is believed that northern Korea's balance of payments is unfavorable. This unfavorable balance probably arises largely from Soviet pricing policies which underprice Korean exports and overprice Soviet exports. Exports to the USSR, northern Korea's principal postwar trading partner, are, for the most part, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals and ores, chemicals, lumber, marine products, and grain. Imports are machinery, armaments, coal, and petroleum.

Hong Kong is northern Korea's principal non-Communist trading partner, and a wide variety of imports are sought on that market. Chief among these are textiles, basic machinery, pharmaceuticals, and selected industrial chemicals. Korean exports to Hong Kong consist of cattle fodder, marine products, grains, fats and oils, and chemicals. Less important trade relations are conducted directly with Manchuria, North China, Southeast Asia, and—clandestinely—with Japan and southern Korea.

3. *Standards of Living.*

The living standard of the great majority of northern Koreans has shown a significant increase from the below-subsistence level which immediately followed World War II. Rationing of all foods and basic necessities, which has ensured the meeting of the population's minimum requirements, has been a factor in preventing development of the widespread discontent into active resistance.

The shortage of housing in urban areas, harsh working conditions, low wages, the high cost of consumer goods, and the high taxes on agricultural production are all major problems which remain to be

overcome before the present subsistence level of living can be raised. Attempts to this end are evident in the Communist regime's current plans for expansion of consumer goods industries, as well as in the volume of consumer goods imported from Hong Kong in 1949. While Soviet exploitation of the northern Korean economy continues, however, any substantial improvement in living standards will be inhibited.

4. *Limitations on the Economy.*

Several problems will continue to hamper the Communist regime's progress toward self-support. The most important among these arises from the fact that the USSR will continue to support and assist the development of the northern Korean economy only to the ultimate benefit of the Soviet economy. So long as the importation of bituminous coal and petroleum and the operation of the northern Korean merchant marine is under Soviet control, the operation of Korea's economy will remain almost completely dependent on the USSR. A further major problem faced by the northern Korean regime is the internal one of the Korean people's low level of productivity. Since there is a shortage of both skilled and unskilled manpower in the north, low productivity can be expected to continue despite the Communist regime's efforts to improve the situation.

Annex D

Current Military Situation

Northern Korea's military forces are still being expanded. So far as the ground forces are concerned, this process involves the integration into the "People's Army" of local recruits and of Korean troops that have seen service under the Chinese Communists in Manchuria, as well as the equipping of this force with small arms, artillery, vehicles, aircraft, and armor from the USSR.

Trained and equipped units of the Communist "People's Army" are being deployed southward in the area of the 38th Parallel. "People's Army" and Border Constabulary units there equal or surpass the strength of southern Korean army units similarly deployed. Tanks and heavy artillery have also been moved close to the Parallel in recent months.

1. *Army.*

Current estimates place the strength of the "People's Army" (PA) at 66,000 men (including 16,000 ex-Manchurian troops) organized into at least three infantry divisions and an independent brigade. The PA's critical arms include: (1) an armored unit, estimated to possess 65 Soviet T–34 tanks; (2) divisional artillery units equipped with 76 mm guns and 122 mm howitzers; and (3) anti-aircraft units in the border

regions. The 20,500-man Border Constabulary (BC), which is also being expanded with ex-Manchurian levies, is nominally a paramilitary police force and was previously armed with Japanese weapons. The BC has been trained to infantry standards, however, and has now been re-equipped with Soviet weapons.

2. *Air Force.*

According to current accepted estimates, the "People's Army Air Force" (PAAF) consists of an air regiment of 1,500 men, including 150 pilots, equipped with 35 YAK–9 and/or IL–10 fighters, 3 twin-engine bombers, 2 twin-engine transports, and 35 Japanese or Soviet training planes. This estimate may be subject to an upward revision in the near future.

3. *Navy.*

The northern Korean navy performs mainly as a coast guard force. Present navy strength is estimated at 5,100 men. A marine unit, whose exact functions are as yet undetermined, numbers approximately 5,400 men. Northern Korean navy shore installations and ships are of little consequence.

4. *Logistics and Manpower.*

The northern Korean armed forces depend almost wholly on the USSR for logistic support. Recent reports have indicated, however, that limited quantities of Soviet-type small arms, munitions, and uniforms are being locally manufactured.

A large segment of the domestic economy is as yet uncommitted to the logistic support of the armed forces and could provide further manpower for expansion of the military machine. However, the Communist regime's military machine already constitutes a drain on the undermanned northern Korean economy. An additional sixty to seventy thousand Koreans who have seen service with the Chinese Communists, furthermore, are believed to be available in Manchuria if needed for integration in or loan to the "People's Army."

5. *Training.*

The northern Korean military forces are entirely the product of Soviet planning, and depend heavily on the large Soviet military mission for training at higher command levels and for tactical advice down to the battalion level. The PA's state of training is comparable to that of the southern Korean Army. Air training is probably still in a basic stage, however, and there is no indication that the Air Regiment has attained operational status. The navy has received less Soviet attention.

There is evidence of a continuing program of sending small numbers of ground and air officers to the USSR for advanced training. Soviet

advisers to the PA are believed to number at least 2,000; to the PAAF, 70; and to the Navy, 33. An additional 2,000 Soviet naval personnel are reported to be stationed in major northern Korean ports, to service Soviet naval units and to control port facilities.

6. *Morale.*

The morale of the northern Korean military forces generally appears to be good, and, although factions exist, factionalism is not a significant problem. Troops are subject to continuous indoctrination and surveillance, and their loyalty is further induced by above-average food rations, good wages, and special privileges. At the present time, the northern Korean armed forces are probably psychologically prepared to fight wholeheartedly against southern Korean troops. Their loyalty to the Communist regime and their fighting spirit, however, would vary inversely with the strength of the opposition and the duration of the struggle. In contrast, the ex-Manchurian Koreans, whose loyalty was indicated by the fact of their transfer to the PA, now form a significant percentage of that force. These troops possibly have less feeling of kinship for southern Koreans and therefore may provide a firm backbone for the PA in the event of military operations.

Annex E

Current Operations Against Southern Korea

The ultimate local objective of the Soviet Union and of the northern Korean regime is the elimination of the southern Republic of Korea and the unification of the Korean peninsula under Communist domination. To this end, an open invasion of the Republic by northern Korean military forces has thus far been delayed in favor of a coordinated campaign involving political pressure within southern Korea, subversion, propaganda, intimidation, economic pressure, and military actions by infiltration of guerrilla forces.

To date, this campaign has succeeded in damaging south Korea's economy to a serious extent. The withholding of northern Korean power, fertilizer, coal, iron, and steel from the southern Republic has been offset only in part by large-scale US economic aid. In turn, the Communist-trained guerrillas operating in south Korea, while they have not been successful in developing large concentrations or seriously threatening the Republic's internal stability, have forced the Republic to expend large sums of money in "suppression campaigns," and thus have contributed materially to the dangerous inflationary situation in south Korea. Anti-guerrilla activity, moreover, has prevented the deployment of some Republican Army units along the strategic corridors adjacent to the 38th Parallel.

Communist propaganda, especially that which reiterates the theme of unification, probably has little present appeal to the southern Korean people, since they are basically anti-Communist. The Republic's anti-Communist program has also materially reduced the Communists' ability to infiltrate southern Korean governmental and political organizations.

Although Communist operations against the southern Republic of Korea have not thus far produced decisive results, the Republic has been forced to make serious political and economic sacrifices in order to counter the ever-present Communist threat. At the same time, the cost to the Communists has been relatively slight, and their ability to continue the campaign far exceeds the Republic's capability to continue effective resistance without US aid.

795B.58/6–2350

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SEOUL, June 23, 1950.

No. 660

Ref: WARX–81993, April 20, 1950 to Chief, KMAG [1]

Subject: Transmitting Plan for Reduction of KMAG Personnel

There are enclosed, for the Department's information and consideration, copies of an exchange of self-explanatory communications between the Chief, KMAG and the Embassy on the subject of the proposed reduction in KMAG personnel. KMAG was instructed, by the Department of Army in radio message WARX–81993, April 20, 1950, a copy of which is presumably available to the Department, to submit such a plan after consultation with the Embassy. Following several discussions with General Roberts and Colonel Wright,[2] the reduction outlined in the enclosure to the Chief, KMAG's letter of June 22, 1950 was found acceptable in so far as it related to Army and police advisory duties. The Embassy's views regarding Coast Guard and Air Force advisory personnel, apart from those having been transmitted to the Department in various telegrams and despatches, are set forth in the Embassy's letter of June 23, 1950 to the Chief, KMAG.

Briefly, the proposed plan provides for a reduction in KMAG personnel from a total of 472 to 242 (exclusive of Coast Guard). Officer strength is slated to decline from 181 to 96 and enlisted men from 283 to 139. Despite the severity of this proposed reduction, provision has

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Col. Sterling Wright, who had been Chief of Staff of KMAG, assumed command of the Group pending the arrival of a new Chief following the departure of General Roberts from Korea on June 15. At this time, Colonel Wright was in Japan and Lt. Col. Carl H. Sturies was in temporary command of KMAG. (See Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, p. 119.)

been made for retention of officers and enlisted men in the field at approximately their present strength. In this way close supervision will continue to be exercised over Korean Army units through the regimental level—an essential desideratum if Korean Army units are to be maintained at an efficient level. Under the reduction plan, the Engineer and Ordnance sections of KMAG will be strengthened in order better to handle the expected flow of MDA supplies and equipment, which should reach a high level in the calendar year 1951. Some reduction is envisaged in officers assigned to the various schools, but it is believed that this can now be done without impairing the efficiency of the schools which are now well established and operating under definite curricula. Most of the contemplated reductions will be found in Headquarters personnel. Various logistic functions, such as the motor pool, are being turned over in their entirety to Joint Administrative Services, with the result that officers and enlisted men in such spaces can be spared.

The Embassy, after careful consideration, is of the view that the reductions proposed can be effected after January 1, 1951 without any appreciable impairment of the ROK Security Forces. The Korean Army, in particular, has made enormous progress during the past year; and the systems and institutions set up through the instrumentality of KMAG are now such that reductions in advisory personnel can well be made.[3]

For the Ambassador:
EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure 1

The Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (Sturies) to the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)

SECRET 22 JUNE 1950.

SIR: In accordance with instructions contained in WARX 81993, dated 20 April 1950, I have the honor to submit herewith for your consideration the detailed plan for the reduction of KMAG.[4]

[3] Under cover of despatch no. 661, June 23, from Seoul, not printed, Ambassador Muccio transmitted copies of the semiannual report of KMAG for the period from January 1 to June 15, 1950, the latter date having been advanced 15 days to coincide with the departure of General Roberts from Korea. The concluding portions of despatch no. 661 read as follows:

". . . It is hoped that every effort will be made to expedite the shipment to Korea of items critically needed. It is also hoped that an affirmative decision will be reached regarding the additional fiscal year 1950 MDA program which is now under consideration in Washington.

"The continued progress made by the Korean Security Forces during the first half of the calendar year is yet another indication of the fine performance of KMAG. General Roberts and his staff have worked exceedingly hard and are entitled to the highest commendation." (795B.58/6–2350)

[4] Not printed.

This plan envisions a one-time reduction with an effective date of 1 January 1951. Normal attrition, curtailment of extensions and suspension of requisitions will be utilized to achieve a smooth reduction and obviate the necessity for reporting large numbers of officers and men for reassignment to other commands.

Please note that since our last informal discussion of the problem it has been deemed advisable to increase the strength of both Engineer and Ordnance advisory sections each by two officers. This increase has been motivated by consideration of the problems involved in those two sections in handling MDAP supplies and equipment, and in the progress made by the Engineers in affecting major economies. As approximately seventy five (75) percent of the dollar value of the MDAP program for Korea is in ordnance materiel, it is considered essential that the maximum supervision be exercised over this type of equipment. The addition of *two* Engineer officers is justified on the grounds that Engineer advisors are currently achieving remarkable results in saving ROK many millions of *won* by insuring proper utilization of Korean Army engineers in preference to hiring civilian contractors for construction or rehabilitation projects.

It would be appreciated if you would indicate your concurrence at your earliest convenience in order that the proposed Table of Distribution may be submitted to Department of the Army with the least practicable delay.

CARL H. STURIES
Lt. Col., Sig. C

Enclosure 2

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (Sturies)

SECRET

SEOUL, June 23, 1950.

SIR: I have received your letter of June 22, 1950, with which you submitted a detailed plan, pursuant to instructions contained in WARX 81993, for the reduction of KMAG personnel to take effect from January 1, 1951.

I note that the plan submitted by you corresponds generally with the plan originally agreed upon in consequence of informal discussions with General Roberts and Colonel Wright, except for the changes outlined in the third paragrah of your letter. I fully agree that the Engineer and Ordnance advisory sections should be strengthened in order to handle MDA equipment and supplies to the best effect.

In so far as your plan relates to Army and police advisory duties, it has my full concurrence. I note, however, that the plan includes no provision for Coast Guard advisors who have hitherto been carried as

a part of the KMAG complement. I strongly feel, as I am sure you do, that the United States must retain and even strengthen its Coast Guard advisory personnel. I wish, therefore, to go on record as endorsing the written request which went forward from the Chief KMAG to the Department of the Army, under date of April 1, 1950, for the strengthening of the advisory group to the Coast Guard.[5] The financing of the Coast Guard advisory group is obviously a matter for determination in Washington.

While, under existing policy, the inclusion of Air Force advisory personnel in the KMAG complement would not be proper, I am hopeful that a top-level decision will be taken in Washington, in accordance with the recommendations set forth in the Embassy's telegram no. 744, May 23, 1950, to the Department of State, which will permit of the inclusion of Air Force advisory personnel in the KMAG complement.[6]

Very truly yours,

JOHN J. MUCCIO

[5] Not printed; the substance of the request is given in Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, p. 92.

[6] See footnote 3 to telegram 744, May 23, from Seoul, p. 87.

THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN KOREA; RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS TO EVENTS IN KOREA, JUNE 24–30, 1950

Editorial Note on the Arrangement of Documents

The difference in local time between Seoul and Washington (EDT) was 13 hours; because they lay on different sides of the International Date Line, Korea from 12 midnight to 1 p.m. was one calendar day ahead of Washington.

The material is here arranged chronologically, as far as possible, according to Washington time. Incoming telegrams appear in order of the date and time of their receipt in Washington, which is indicated in the heading of the document. Outgoing telegrams are printed according to the time of their transmission from Washington.

JUNE 24–25, 1950

(Saturday and Sunday)

795.00/6–2550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT

SEOUL, June 25, 1950—10 a. m.

[Received June 24—9 : 26 p. m.]

925. According Korean army reports which partly confirmed by KMAG field advisor reports, North Korean forces invaded ROK territory at several points this morning. Action was initiated about 4 a. m. Ongjin blasted by North Korean artillery fire. About 6 a. m. North Korean infantry commenced crossing parallel in Ongjin area, Kaesong area, Chunchon area and amphibious landing was reportedly made south of Kangnung on east coast. Kaesong was reportedly captured at 9 a.m., with some 10 North Korean tanks participating in operation. North Korean forces, spearheaded by tanks, reportedly closing in on Chunchon. Details of fighting in Kangnung area unclear, although it seems North Korean forces have cut highway. Am conferring with KMAG advisors and Korean officials this morning re situation.

It would appear from nature of attack and manner in which it was launched that it constitutes all out offensive against ROK.

Repeated information CINCFE.

MUCCIO

Note: Mr. Connors (FE),[1] Mr. White (SAM)[2] notified 10:15 p. m. 6/24/50.

Relayed to Army Dept. 10:30 p. m. 6/24/50.

Two copies delivered to White House at 11 p. m. for transmission to President, per Mr. Rusk (cleared with the Secretary).

Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Ottawa, Tokyo, Canberra, Manila, Wellington, New Delhi, Djarkarta, and Taipei. Per Mr. Rusk. 11:30 p. m. June 24, CWO/FED.[3]

[1] W. Bradley Connors, Officer in Charge of Public Affairs in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

[2] Paul Lincoln White, Executive Assistant to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations (McDermott).

[3] The initials are those of the Chief Watch Officer in the Department of State, Frank E. Duvall.

795.00/6–2450: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

NIACT PLAIN WASHINGTON, June 24, 1950—10 p. m.

612. UP bulletins report tonight North Korean forces launched general offensive across border. Heavy tanks in use; 1st Army reported defeated. Story by Jack James.[1] Advise urgently.[2]

ACHESON

[1] UP correspondent in Korea.

[2] This telegram had been drafted prior to the receipt in the Department of State of telegram 925, *supra*, on the basis of the news bulletins referred to and was transmitted following an unsuccessful attempt by Mr. Connors to reach the Embassy in Seoul by telephone (*Korean Conflict*).

Editorial Note

At 10:30 p. m., Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, both of whom had been notified by telephone, arrived at the Department of State. Within an hour, they were joined by Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs John D. Hickerson, Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup, Director of the Office of Western European Affairs Theodore Achilles, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs David Wainhouse, and Miss Ruth Bacon of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson was notified of the content of telegram 925 from Seoul by telephone and agreed to its being sent to the White House for transmission to President Harry S. Truman in Independence, Missouri; it was also suggested to Mr. Acheson that the situation be referred to the United Nations Security Council. Accordingly, Mr. Acheson called the President at 11:20 p. m., informed him of Ambassador Muccio's report and suggested that a meeting of the Security Council be called. Mr. Truman agreed. At 11:30 p. m., Mr. Hickerson telephoned United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie, informed him of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, and told him of the intention of the United States to bring the case before the Security Council.

Drafting then began in the Department of State by Mr. Wainhouse and Miss Bacon of three documents: (1) a formal communication from the United States Mission at the United Nations requesting a Security Council meeting, (2) a resolution to be introduced by the United States Acting Representative, Ernest Gross, and (3) a statement to be made by Mr. Gross. (*Korean Conflict*)

795.00/6–2550: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

NIACT PLAIN

SEOUL, June 25, 1950.
[Received June 24—11:47 p. m.]

926. Following announcement is being made over mission radio at 1 p.m. today.

"Stand by for a special announcement.

WVTP has been authorized by the Ambassador to make the following announcement:

At 4 o'clock this morning North Korean armed forces began unprovoked attacks against defense positions of the Republic of Korea at several points along the 38th degree parallel. Fighting is now in progress at several points along the parallel.

Korean defense forces are taking up prepared positions to resist Northern aggression. Both Korean officials and the security forces are handling the situation calmly and with ability. There is no reason for alarm. As yet it cannot be determined whether the Northern Communists intended to precipitate all out warfare. New developments will be reported regularly over this station. Please keep tuned to WVTP.

Mission personnel are advised to travel about as little as necessary. The Ambassador requests that Mission personnel remain at home or at their posts, as the situation may dictate. Our next announcement will be heard at three o'clock this afternoon."

Repeated info CINCFE.

MUCCIO

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Rusk 12 midnight June 24. Relayed to Army Department and Tokyo 1 a. m. 6/25/50 CWO/FED.

795.00/6–2550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 25, 1950—2 a. m.

NIACT

613. Urtels 925 and 926 June 25 received. Planning UN Security Council action. Need continuing fullest reports. All US Govt agencies alerted.[1]

ACHESON

[1] By 2 a. m., approval had been given in the Department of State to drafts of the U.S. request for a meeting of the U.N. Security Council and a resolution to be introduced by the U.S. Delegation; the texts were communicated to Ambassador Gross in New York by telephone at 2:30 a. m. (*Korean Conflict*).

A circular telegram, bearing the transmission time 2 a. m., to the American Missions in the other member states of the Security Council (the Republic of China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, India, Norway, U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia) informed them of the decision to call a Security Council meeting; it also directed them to urge the respective Governments to instruct their Security Council representatives so that prompt action could be taken (330/6–2550 (although this circular telegram bears, in the record copy, the transmission time 2 a. m., the date below the drafters' initials reads "June 25–3 : 05 a m")).

Editorial Note

On August 7, 1950, Assistant Secretary of State Rusk was interviewed by Mr. John W. Huizenga of the Division of Historical Policy Research on the events of June 24–25. In a memorandum of conversation, Mr. Huizenga recorded Mr. Rusk's observations on the timing of the decision to take the Korean situation to the United Nations Security Council as follows:

"Mr. Rusk stated that the decision to go to the Security Council was taken on the strength of the single telegram from Seoul, No. 925. Efforts were made during the night to obtain a clearer picture of what was actually happening in Korea but no further information was in fact obtained.

"When the Secretary first telephoned the President shortly after 11 p. m., he obtained the approval of the President for presentation of a resolution in the Security Council if the Secretary decided that that course was indicated. By 2 a. m. no further information about the course of events in Korea had been obtained. It was considered, however, of utmost importance that the decision to present the case to the Security Council should appear in the morning papers simultaneously with the news of the North Korean attack. Therefore the Secretary made the final decision to go to the Security Council shortly in advance of the press deadline." (*Korean Conflict;* 795.00/6–2450)

795B.5/6–2550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

SEOUL, June 25, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received June 25—2 : 05 a. m.]

929. KMAG has just been impelled to despatch urgent telegram to CINCFE, repeated DeptAr (WRI 077) appealing to CINCFE to ship ten day supply of certain items of ammunition at once to Pusan for Korean Army.[1] KMAG found it necessary to make this urgent appeal because ammunition is critically needed to meet situation arising from widespread Communist attacks today along parallel. For an account of Korean ammunition situation, Department is referred to semi-annual KMAG report which was air pouched yesterday under cover Embdes 661.[2]

I earnestly appeal to Department to back up to such extent as may be necessary KMAG's appeal for additional ammunition. Without early receipt such ammunition and assuming hostilities continue at present level, is feared modest stocks in Korean hands will be exhausted within ten days time. In my opinion, it would be catastrophic for US to permit gallant Korean forces to succumb for lack of ammunition. I am confident that if adequately supplied, ROK security forces will fight bravely and with distinction.

Repeated information CINCFE.

MUCCIO

Note: Mr. Connors (FE) informed 2:26 a. m., 6/25/50 (CWO) FMH.

Relayed to Tokyo, 4 a. m., 6/25/FMH.

[1] The request called for ammunition to support 90 105-mm. howitzers, 700 60-mm. mortars, and 40,000 .30-caliber carbines; see Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, p. 120.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3 to despatch no. 660, June 23, from Seoul, p. 122.

795.00/6–2550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

SEOUL, June 25, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received June 25—2 : 54 a. m.]

928. For the Department's information I quote below text of memorandum of conversation which I had with President Rhee this morning:

"I called on the President by appointment at 11 : 35 at his residence.

"The President appeared under considerable emotional tension, but was nonetheless composed. I opened the conversation by saying that I had just visited Korean Army headquarters, where I had found both the Korean military establishment and the American advisors moving quickly and efficiently to cope with the emergency. I had found that SCAP had been notified at 10 a. m. today of the situation. I had found that the city of Seoul appeared calm and normal.

"The President said that Korea needed 'more arms and ammunition'. He subsequently made specific mention of 'more rifles'. I told him that the Korean Army was far better trained than it had been last year (when the North Koreans had made several strong raids along the 38th parallel). I said that there was a sufficient supply of artillery ammunition to last for the time being. President Rhee, apparently implying he hoped for support in that quarter, said he had not notified General MacArthur because his government had no code.

"The President mentioned the various points under attack—Ongjin, Kaesong (where he said the post office had been occupied; actually it had fallen to the North Korean forces); Chunchon and the east coast where a landing had been effected from boats. The President said that the patrol craft currently at Honolulu were urgently needed, and that they had sent word to the Korean Consul at Honolulu to have the ships leave immediately; the crews had been expected to stay there a week. He said that the PC already acquired by the Korean Navy had been a tremendous boost to morale. At last they had a ship which could make some speed whereas their other craft could proceed only at a snail's pace.[1]

"I informed the President that American advisors were on duty with all Korean divisions along the parallel including the Ongjin peninsula; and that their presence would help Korean Army morale. I pointed out that he would be under pressure from various civilian groups along the parallel to despatch reinforcements but the Korean Army must act as a coordinated unit despite local situations and that there would be temptation to interfere with military decisions which should be avoided. I commented that it was important for everyone to maintain calm.

"The President said that there would be a cabinet meeting at 2 p. m. to discuss the situation. He said that he was considering proclaiming martial law in Seoul and that the people must be told the facts. He remarked that the situation came as no surprise to anybody; that he had been warning the people about it a long time and calling upon every man, woman and child to come out and fight with sticks and stones if necessary. He seemed to feel that the people would support him in this way. He said that if it were certain that enough arms and

[1] The Republic of Korea, from its own foreign exchange funds, had purchased from the United States one PC which arrived in Korea in February 1950 and the hulls and main engines of three others, repair and refitting expenses for which were borne by the United States. These were en route to Korea at the time of the outbreak of hostilities (Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, p. 92).

ammunition would be available, this word would be passed from mouth to mouth and thus boost public morale. He stated that he had been trying to avoid making Korea a second Sarajevo; but perhaps the present crisis presented the best opportunity for settling the Korean problem once and for all. He commented that American public opinion seemed to be growing stronger day by day vis-à-vis Communist aggression. He hoped that the US would take action to 'maintain the present situation in Formosa', because he would 'like to see the Chinese Communists kept occupied for a while'.

"I concluded the conversation by assuring the President that I would be available all day and that I had confidence that the situation was being competently met."

Repeated info CINCFE Tokyo.

MUCCIO

Editorial Note

At 3 a. m. on June 25, Ambassador Gross telephoned United Nations Secretary-General Trygve Lie and read to him the formal United States request that the Security Council be convened immediately to consider the aggression in Korea (*Korean Conflict*). The request, subsequently confirmed in writing later in the morning (U.N. document S/1495), read as follows:

"The American Ambassador to the Republic of Korea has informed the Department of State that North Korean forces invaded the territory of the Republic of Korea at several points in the early morning hours of June 25 (Korean time).

"Pyongyang Radio under the control of the North Korean regime, it is reported, has broadcast a declaration of war against the Republic of Korea effective 9 p. m. EDT June 24.

"An attack of the forces of the North Korean regime under the circumstances referred to above constitutes a breach of the peace and an act of aggression.

"Upon the urgent request of my Government, I ask you to call an immediate meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations."

At 4 a. m., Assistant Secretary of State Rusk spoke by telephone with William J. Sebald, Acting Political Adviser in Japan, and John Allison, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, who had accompanied Mr. Dulles on the latter's visit to Korea (see page 107) and Japan, both of whom were in Tokyo. Mr. Rusk informed them of the intention of the United States to take the Korean question to the United Nations and asked them for further information, which they were unable to give, on the military situation and on the reported North Korean declaration of war. (*Korean Conflict*)

468-806—76——10

795.00/6–2550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

PLAIN PRIORITY SEOUL, June 25, 1950[—3 : 55 p. m.] [1]
[Received June 25—5 : 44 a. m.]

931. Following is summary translation Pyongyang radio broadcast at 11 : 00 a. m. today:

"Official announcement made by the Home Affairs Bureau of the Peoples Republic of Korea. The so-called 'defense army' of the South Korea puppet regime started a surprise invasion of the north along the whole front of the 38th parallel line at dawn on the 25th. The enemy, who started the surprise operation, invaded the territory north of the 38th parallel line one to two kilometers at three points west of Haeju, Kumchon, and Chorwon. The Home Affairs Bureau of the Peoples Republic of Korea has issued an order to the security army of the Peoples Republic to repulse the enemy. At this moment, our security army is putting up stiff counter-operations against the enemy. The Peoples Republic army succeeded in repulsing the enemy force which penetrated into the north at Yangyang. In this connection, the People's Republic of Korea wishes to remind the South Korea puppet regime of the fact that, unless the puppets immediately suspend their adventurous military actions, the Peoples Republic will be obliged to resort to decisive countermeasures. At the same time the Peoples Republic entrusted the Home Affairs Bureau to call the attention of the South Korea puppet regime to the fact that the whole responsibility for the grave consequences arising from their reckless venture would squarely rest on the shoulders of the South Korea puppet regime."

It will be obvious that by terms broadcast North Koreans are attempting to clothe their naked aggression against ROK with patently absurd charges that ROK commenced invasion. Developments during course of day of course wholly disprove this unfounded propaganda.

Repeated info CINCFE.

MUCCIO

[1] The transmission time is supplied from information contained in the Department of the Army teletype conference, June 25, 8 : 44 a. m., p. 134.

795.00/6–2550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, June 25, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received June 25—6 : 46 a. m.]

935. Info CINCFE. Wish inform Department that with clearing weather setting in about midday North Korean Air Force became

ominously active in Seoul area. Action was initiated at 1135 this morning, when two North Korean fighters buzzed Kimpo Airport but left without bombing or strafing. Commencing this afternoon sometime after 4:00 o'clock four North Korean fighter planes strafed Kimpo Airport, making five separate runs. Airport building was slightly damaged, Standard Vacuum Oil Co. fuel truck destroyed, POL dump ignited and MATS C–54 plane which was on ground undergoing minor repairs had one engine destroyed and one wing badly damaged. Also North Korean fighters strafed Seoul airstrip, inflicting slight damage on seven T–6 aircraft. Embassy had warned C–54 this morning to leave Kimpo, and Defense Ministry was strongly advised this morning to disperse T–6's on more southerly fields. Embassy without information why steps not taken to move C–54 and T–6's earlier in day.

In view of today's air activities, it seems logical conclude North Koreans intend make full use their complete air superiority. Danger of this situation has been pointed out on several occasions to Department and defense agencies.[1] I can only express hope that some positive and speedy action can be taken at this late date to remedy this deficiency which is exceedingly serious threat and handicap to gallant ROK forces who are otherwise capable of putting up most effective opposition. As Department doubtless aware, Rhee and other Korean officials will look to US for air assistance above all else. Future course of hostilities may depend largely on whether US will or will not give adequate air assistance.

MUCCIO

[1] At approximately 3 p. m. (Seoul time), Ambassador Muccio had met with UNCOK at its request to discuss the situation in Korea. He reported on the meeting in telegram 933, June 25, 6 p. m., from Seoul, which was received in the Department of State at 5:51 a. m. (EDT) on June 25. When asked by the Indian representative on UNCOK, Anup Singh, for his expectation of the outcome, Mr. Muccio replied:

"I feel certain the South Koreans will give a good account of themselves. The unknowns of the situation are the number of Chinese Communists with battle experience available to the North Koreans, and the possibility of a North Korean air offensive which might hurt by air raids on Seoul." (795.00/6–2550)

357.AD/6–2550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, June 25, 1950—8 p. m.

NIACT [Received June 25—7:38 a. m.]

938. Embtel 933, June 25.[1] UNCOK chairman Liu informs us that at meeting today UNCOK resolved send report to Secretary Gen-

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 935, *supra*.

eral UN setting forth all facts re hostilities gathered to date.[2] Message will further state UNCOK regards situation as serious and one which may assume status of full-fledged war. Message will ask Secretary General to consider inviting attention of SC to matter. Liu stressed message will only ask Secretary General consider possibility of bringing matter to SC. Liu went on to say that if situation "deteriorates tomorrow" UNCOK will probably send further message definitely requesting Secretary General to put matter before SC.

Liu further stated UNCOK decided he should go on air at 9 o'clock Seoul time on GHT and broadcast one or two minute appeal for both sides to cease-fire.

Theme will be Koreans should not fight Koreans. Broadcast will include offer to mediate with view to peaceful settlement.

Text of broadcast will be telegraphed when available.[3] Suggest USUN endeavor obtain copy of UNCOK message to Secretary General referred to above.

Repeated info CINCFE Tokyo.

MUCCIO

[2] UNCOK's report to the Secretary General was distributed as U.N. document S/1496. For further information on this document, see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Noyes, June 25, p. 144, and telegram 541, June 26, from New York, p. 171.

[3] See U.N. document A/1350, p. 3, and U.N. document A/AC.26/SR.32.

795.00/6–2550

Memorandum of Teletype Conference, Prepared in the Department of the Army

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 25 June 1950—8:44 a. m.

Nr: DA TT 3415

Subject: Korean Situation

References: C–56777; C–56775;[1] Dept. 931; 250655Z.[2]

Conferees:

WASHINGTON (G2)		TOKYO	
Gen J Lawton Collins	C/S[3]	Maj Gen C A Willoughby	G2[4]
Lt Gen M B Ridgway	Dep C/S		
Maj Gen Charles L Bolté	G3	Col L J Fortier	G2
		Lt Col P B Davidson	G2
Maj Gen A R Bolling	G2	Capt C E Howard	G2

[1] Neither printed.

[2] Greenwich Mean Time was 9 hours behind Korean time and 4 hours ahead of Washington EDT; thus 6:55 a. m. GMT was 3:55 p. m. in Korea and 2:55 a. m. in Washington.

[3] Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

[4] Chief of Intelligence, U.S. Far East Command.

WASHINGTON (G2)

Maj Gen S Le Roy Irwin	G2
R/Adm Carl Espe	ONI
Brig Gen Thomas S Timberman	G3
Col Charles V Bromley	G2
Col B S Talley	G2
Col Frank T Folk	G3
Col Schow	CIA
Lt Col Jung	G2
Lt Col John R Beishline	Sec Gen Staff
Lt Col Richard H Lawson	G3
Maj Evans	AFOIN
Capt Brown	G2
Dr Wade	ONI
Dr Robert S Spencer	G2
Mr Roy S McNair	G2
Mr K R Bendetsen	Asst Sec
Mr Bond	State
Mr Evan T Sage	G2

Washington: DA–1

What NK units were committed?

a. Ground—especially armor.

b. Air—and in what areas. (*End DA–1*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 1

Re item 1 ur agenda

1. *a.* Reports at 252100I [5] indicate 3rd Border Constabulary Brigade on Ongjin Peninsula; two divisions, possible 1st and 2nd, attacking S on axis Pochon (1021–1682) Uijongbu (1005–1665) located at Pochon; 40 tanks reported 5 kilometers north of Uijongbu, 1st Border Constabulary Brigade, minus 2 bns, reportedly landed on east coast and committed in Kangnung—(1183–1668)—Makho (1204–1644) Area; two bns 1st Border Constabulary Brigade attacking south along East Coastal Road (1205–1645); 7th Border Constabulary Brigade located vicinity Pochon; 6th Division reported formerly in Sariwon (880–1758) moving south toward Kaesong (958–1692); independent mixed brigade, possibly 4th Division, in general reserve, location unknown.

b. Map reference is AMS 55–1 to 250,000. No air identifications. Three of four planes bombed and strafed Kimpo Airfield at 251735I. (*End Item 1*)

[5] Korean time.

Washington: DA–2

Resistance of SK

a. Rate and orderliness of Army withdrawal.

b. Are SK people fleeing or remaining in towns. (*End DA–2*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 3

Re item 2 ur agenda

Resistance of South Korea:

a. Reports indicate orderliness of withdrawing South Korean units.

b. Late reports states morale of people good. No disorder or disturbances reported. (*End Item 3*)

Washington: DA–3.

Is SK Government standing firm and maintaining internal order? (*End DA–3*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 4

Re Item 3 ur agenda

South Korean Government reported to be standing firm and maintaining internal order. Martial law declared in most towns. Curfew in Seoul. (*End Item 4*)

Washington: DA–4

What is your estimate of objective of current NK effort? (*End DA–4*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 5.

Re item 4 ur agenda.

There is no evidence to substantiate a belief that the north Koreans are engaged in a limited objective offensive or in a raid. On the contrary, the size of the North Korean Forces employed, the depth of penetration, the intensity of the attack, and the landings made miles south of the parallel on the east coast indicate that the north Koreans are engaged in an all-out offensive to subjugate South Korea. (*End Item 5*)

Washington: DA–5

Has there been a formal, confirmed Declaration of War? (*End DA–5*)

Washington [Tokyo]: FEC Item 6

Re Item 5 ur agenda

There has been no firm confirmation that a formal Declaration of War has been made by either contender. Radio Pyongyang (North Korea) is reported to have issued a Declaration of War. But our investigations have failed to substantiate this report. See also radio from Am Embassy Seoul (State Dept. 931) 205655Z for additional information. (*End Item 6*)

Washington: DA–6.

Do you have any information regarding numbers of north Korean Naval Forces involved in amphibious landings on Korean East Coast. (*End DA–6*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 9

Reur DA–6; G–2, GHQ, FEC to DA

We have no information as to number of ships involved. However, landing of 3200–3800 troops reported at four points in East Coast:

400–600 at Chumunjin (1170–1680); 2,000 at Hosan (1220–1590); 400–600 at Ulchin (1230–1570); 400–600 at Kuryong-Po (1250–1450). (*End Item 9*)

Washington: DA–7

Have South Korean Naval Forces engaged North Korean Naval units in any location other than Samchok. (*End DA–7*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 7

Reur DA–7

KMAG reports one Russian type destroyer engaged by SK Naval element at Kangnung (1180–1660). KMAG reports SK Coast Guard are engaging enemy in Mokpo (930–1300) Area. (*End Item 7*)

Washington: DA–8

General Roberts is available to you. (*End DA–8*)

Washington: DA–9

We assume reference FECOM responsibility to assist U.S. Amb to Korea in providing for safety U.S. natls in emergency you are communicating directly with Korea and info copies will be received here. Are we right in assuming CINCFE is meeting KMAG request for emergency supply of ammunition? (*End DA–9*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 8

Reur DA–9

Partial answer is subpar (2) two our C–56772. We are meeting emergency request for ammunition. Safety and/or evacuation nationals under study and will advise. (*End Item 8*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 12:

In view of proximity enemy tanks AmEmbassy plans to evacuate American personnel women and children beginning tomorrow thru Inchon on available transportation. CINCFE provide Naval and Air protection. General situation points to tank break through via Uijongbu. Other Infantry units generally in previously reported positions. (*End Item 12*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 2: G–2, GHQ, FEC to DA

Official

Have you received our C–56777 which was receipted for by your Communications Center at 1204 Z? (*End Item 2*)

Washington: DA–10

Your C–56775 answers question last sentence in our number 9. (*End DA–10*)

Washington: DA–11

Are there any indications of USSR military participation, if so give details. Where is main effort? What appears to be its weight, direction and objective. (*End DA–11*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 10

Reur DA–11

There is as yet no evidence of Soviet military participation in invasion. Main effort is believed to be along axis Pochung–Seoul. Weight appears to be two Infantry divisions supported by 40–70 tanks. Objective is Seoul. (*End Item 10*)

Washington: DA–12

What casualties are reported. What is source of report? (*End DA–12*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 13

Reur DA–12; G–2, GHQ, FEC to DA

KMAG has been queried and has no information ref casualties. (*End Item 13*)

Washington: DA–13

Is there anything you require from US at this time. (*End Item DA–13*)

Washington: DA–14

In addition to your regular reports request complete summary by Telecon 260800 Washington daylight time (261200Z). Additional questions will be asked at that time. Suggest your G3 members be present as in case here. Navy and Air will also be represented here.

Have you anything further. (*End DA–14*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 11

Last minute information from KMAG Seoul:

70 tanks concentrated in night bivouac five miles north of Uijongbu. As of midnight tonight morale of South Korean troops reported good. Civil population disturbed but fairly stable.

Chun Chon reported surrounded.

Leading elements of South [*North?*] Korea 2nd Division reported now entering Seoul. (*End Item 11*)

795.00/6–2550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

Moscow, June 25, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received June 25—9 : 59 a. m.]

1726. From Barbour.[1] If estimate last paragraph Seoul's 925 June 25 to Department correct, this aggressive NK military move against ROK represents clear-cut Soviet challenge which in our considered opinion US should answer firmly and swiftly as it constitutes direct threat our leadership of free world against Soviet Communist imperialism. ROK is a creation of US policy and of US-led UN action. Its destruction would have calculably grave unfavorable repercussions for US in Japan, SEA and in other areas as well.

We feel therefore, that we are called upon to make clear to the world, and without delay, that we are prepared upon request to assist ROK maintain its independence by all means at our disposal, including military help and vigorous action in UNSC. Embassy assumes that ROK has or will shortly ask for such assistance. Public declaration our willingness to assist in any feasible way desired by ROK need not, and should not, in Embassy view, await formal ROK initiative. Delay could suggest to Soviets possibility their precipitating with impunity further immediate action against Indochina et cetera.

Soviets probably calculating that we will be inclined to allow "neutralization" of Korean civil war in which numerically stronger and more heavily armed NK troops and Commie fifth columnists in ROK territory will form victorious combination and thus advance boundaries Soviet empire without actual use Soviet military forces. For reasons given Embtel 1214 April 24 [*25*] and despatch 514 same date ("Embassy estimate Soviet intentions")[2] which we believe still valid Embassy does not think Soviets prepared now risk possibility full scale war with West.[3] Kremlin's Korean adventure thus offers us opportunity to show that we mean what we say by talking of firmness, and at same time, to unmask present important Soviet weaknesses before eyes world and particularly Asia where popular concept Soviet power grossly exaggerated as result recent Soviet political and propaganda successes that area.

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[1] Walworth Barbour, Counselor of Embassy, was Chargé in the absence of Ambassador Kirk.

[2] Documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in volume IV.

[3] This estimate was based on the premise, according to despatch no. 514, that the Soviet Union stood to gain more by avoiding a shooting war and that the only way—according to the Soviets—in which the West could really stop Soviet cold war successes would be by initiating a shooting war (661.00/4–2550).

View urgency situation foregoing transmitted without benefit views of Ambassador who returns Moscow early June 26. Ambassador will no doubt wish cable his comments as soon as possible after his arrival.[4]

Service Attachés concur in foregoing.

Department pass USUN, repeated info niact USUN 35. [Barbour.]

KIRK

[4] Ambassador Kirk sent the following message in telegram 1736, June 26, 6 p. m., from Moscow, which was received in the Department of State at 2:47 p. m. on June 26: "I concur with views contained Embtel 1726, June 26 as basic." (795.00/6–2650)

795.00/6–2550 : Telegram

The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

TOKYO, June 25, 1950 [— 9 p. m.][1]

[Received June 25—10:35 a. m.]

619. For Acheson and Rusk from Dulles and Allison. It is possible that South Koreans may themselves contain and repulse attack and, if so, this is best way.[2] If, however, it appears they cannot do so then we believe that US force should be used even though this risks Russian counter moves. To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war. We suggest that Security Council might call for action on behalf of the organization under Article 106 by the five powers or such of them as are willing to respond. [Dulles and Allison.]

SEBALD

[1] The time of transmission is supplied from a subsequent statement of Mr. Allison on events in Tokyo following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea (*Korean Conflict*).

[2] In the same statement, Mr. Allison indicated that at 6 p. m. (Tokyo time) on June 25 Messrs. Dulles, Sebald, and Allison had met with General MacArthur at which time the latter expressed his beliefs that: (*a*) the attack was not an all-out effort, (*b*) the Soviets were not necessarily behind the attack, and (*c*) the Republic of Korea would gain victory (*ibid.*). See also Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie*, p. 129.

For Mr. Dulles' views, see his notes on Korea under date of June 29, p. 237.

295.1122/6–2550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NIACT

SEOUL, June 26, 1950—1 a. m.

[Received June 25—11:32 a. m.]

941. In view of threat from Uijongbu area about 17 miles directly north Seoul where North Korean tanks reportedly massed, I have

reluctantly decided to carry out evacuation of dependent women and children tomorrow morning through Port of Inchon. There are three vessels in Inchon Harbor which will be used to transport these women and children to Japan. Evacuation is being coordinated with CINCFE.[1]

Repeated information CINCFE.

MUCCIO

[1] In his statement on events in Tokyo subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Mr. Allison indicated that in a conference at 11:45 a. m. (Tokyo time) on June 26 with Messrs. Dulles, Sebald, and Allison, General MacArthur continued to view the attack as not an all-out effort supported by the Soviet Union and questioned the necessity of the evacuation begun the night before by Ambassador Muccio (*Korean Conflict*). See also Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie*, p. 132.

330/6–2550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
NIACT

MOSCOW, June 25, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received June 25—11:39 a. m.]

1727. From Barbour. Reference circular Deptel June 25.[1] I have not yet been able get in touch with responsible Soviet Foreign Office official to transmit message re emergency SC meeting on Korea. Minor employee on duty at Foreign Office has informed me that it is difficult to reach Gromyko[2] on Sundays, and I have therefore asked to see Sobolev (head US section)[3] and am now awaiting Foreign Office reply to this request.

Department pass USUN;[4] repeated info niact [USUN] 36. [Barbour.]

KIRK

[1] See footnote 1 to telegram 613, June 25, 2 a. m., to Seoul, p. 128.
[2] Andrey Gromyko, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister.
[3] Arkady Sobolev, Chief of the United States Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry.
[4] A notation on the telegram indicated that it had been passed to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations at 12:30 p. m.

795.00/6–2650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

SEOUL, June 26, 1950—midnight.
[Received June 25—12:26 p. m.]

940. President Rhee telephoned at ten tonight and asked me to come and see him. Acting Prime Minister Sihn who was at Embassy ac-

companied me. Ex-Prime Minister Lee Bum Suk was at President's residence when I arrived. Following is memo covering our ensuing conversation.

President was under great strain. His face was working and his statements were repetitious, half-formed and disconnected. He mentioned situation at Uijongbu, where he said many tanks were rapidly advancing toward Seoul, beyond power of Korean Army to resist them. He then addressed his Acting Prime Minister in both Korean and English, with occasional asides to Lee Bum Suk in Korean. He stated that Cabinet had decided to move government to Taejon tonight. This decision, he repeatedly asserted, was not reached for any considerations of personal safety, but because government must continue, and because if he himself were lost to Communists, it would be serious blow for his country's cause. He incoherently directed Acting Prime Minister to call together "several capable men" with military knowledge to discuss situation and decide upon appropriate action. He said he knew that if Prime Minister were satisfied that another man could handle military situation better, he would not hesitate to resign in that man's favor. He stated that Korea could not count on much aid from US, remarking "we had hoped that ten million dollars would help . . .[1] we understand that a wealthy man, Pak Heung Sik (owner of the Hwashin business enterprises) has offered million dollars to buy arms, but I suppose that now it is too late".

Acting Prime Minister repeatedly said "yes sir", "I will sir" to President's instructions in best manner of his Merchant Marine experience; but it was obvious that he was very disgusted at President's decision and orders. He finally excused himself, announcing that he would telephone for latest news of fighting at Uijongbu.

I endeavored to persuade President to keep government in Seoul pointing out that armament and troops were available and should be thrown into fight to stop tanks with bazookas, anti-tank guns, and land mines. Prime Minister said that 57 millimeter anti-tank guns had failed to penetrate North Korean tanks armor whereupon I stressed the land mines. (Prime Minister's allegation seems doubtful; Korean roads and bridges would not support extremely heavy tanks). I said that if government left Seoul, much of battle would be lost; that if Korean situation ever became disorganized, it would be impossible to pull it together again. None of these arguments appeared to make any impression on President, who repeatedly affirmed his disregard of personal safety and his conviction that government must not run risk of capture.

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[1] Omission indicated in the source text.

When it became evident that nothing would change President's mind, I rose and said that he might go to Taejon but that I would remain in Seoul. I said that American women and children would be evacuated early next morning, and that during evacuation there would be air cover over Seoul. President agreed that women and children must go. I said that men of American mission, however would remain.

As I was leaving conference, Lee Bum Suk, in halting English, told me that he thought original North Korean strategy had been to feint toward Seoul, meanwhile landing guerrillas along east coast; but that when it was discovered that progress toward Seoul was so easy, more effort had been put on that sector. He said they must fight strongly against thrust toward Seoul. When I left conference room, Lee stayed behind, saying that he would remain and have some words with President.

Outside residence Prime Minister Sihn took me aside and told me that President had reached his decision to move government without consulting him.

Repeated info CINCFE.

MUCCIO

Editorial Note

The following information is taken from *Korean Conflict.*

At 11:30 a. m. a high-level State–Defense conference met in the Department of State.[1] The military representatives stated that Korean appeals for supplies had been promptly met and that 10-day emergency supplies were already being flown under air escort to Korea. It was decided at this meeting that the American military advisers of KMAG should remain at their posts with Korean units. In the political field, Mr. John Davies of the Policy Planning Staff commented that the fact that the Russians had gone so far so openly meant that they thought all the Far East their "oyster", and pointed out that if they could get away with this move they would probably move in other areas. During the general discussion it was brought out that American reaction was of extreme importance and that the United States could not meet the situation with half measures. It either had to take a stand and stick to it or take no stand at all.[2]

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[1] Attended by Under Secretary Webb; Deputy Under Secretary Matthews; Assistant Secretaries Rusk, Perkins, and Hickerson; Ambassador Jessup; Deputy Assistant Secretary Livingston Merchant; Mr. Achilles; Mr. Charles Yost (Acting Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs); Mr. Robert G. Barnes (Executive Secretariat); and Mr. John Davies and Miss Dorothy Fosdick (Policy Planning Staff) for the Department of State; and by Secretary of the Army Pace, Assistant Secretary of the Army Bendetson, General Timberman, and others.

[2] Information drawn from notes made by Mr. Lincoln White.

Further conferences [3] followed Secretary Acheson's arrival in the Department shortly after noon, at which the possible courses of military action open to the United States were discussed preparatory to laying the matter before the President. At 2:45 the Secretary telephoned the President and suggested that he return to Washington.[4]

[3] Attended by Messrs. Webb, Rusk, Jessup, Perkins, Hickerson, Davies, Matthews, Pace, Bendetson, and others, and joined by General Collins.
[4] Information supplied by Ambassador Jessup.

795.00/6–2550

Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

SECRET [NEW YORK,] June 25, 1950.

Subject: Korea—Conversations, separately, with:

Participants: Sir Terence Shone, United Kingdom
Ambassador Jean Chauvel, France
Ambassador B. N. Rau, India
Ambassador Fawzi Bey, Egypt
Mr. Bredo Stabell, Norway
Mr. L. N. Palar, Indonesian Representative
Mr. Adnan Kural, Turkey
Mr. K. C. O. Shann, Australia
Messrs. Cordier and Feller, UN Sec't [2]
C. P. Noyes, United States Mission

Before the meeting started,[3] I showed a copy of our draft resolution to Sir Terence Shone, Ambassador Chauvel, Ambassador Rau, Fawzi Bey and Stabell. There was general reaction against the use of the words "act of aggression".[4] There was also considerable hesitancy to take a position on which party was responsible for the invasion. In particular, Fawzi Bey and Stabell urged that we did not have enough information to justify placing this responsibility. They pointed out that they had been and would be unable to reach their foreign offices to get instructions; that this was a very serious decision for them to take

[1] The source text is a copy of a document in the files of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State (hereafter cited as "IO Files"), bearing the designation US/S/1252 and the date June 26, 1950.
[2] Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Assistant to the U.N. Secretary General, and Abraham H. Feller, General Counsel of the United Nations.
[3] Reference is to the 473rd meeting of the U.N. Security Council, which met at 2 p. m. on June 25; for the record of the meeting, see U.N. document S/PV.473.
[4] The U.S. draft resolution, not printed, referred to the "armed attack on the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea" as constituting "an unprovoked act of aggression" (see Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 404); this language was altered in the U.S. draft resolution as read by Ambassador Gross at the Security Council meeting (see U.N. document S/1497).

on their own responsibility. They also took the general line that this was a fight between Koreans. In its essence, therefore, it was in the nature of a civil war and they objected to the use of the word "aggression" since that implied aggression of one State against another State. Fawzi Bey indicated that if we dropped the word "unprovoked" and took out the words "act of aggression" he might feel able to support the resolution.

During the meeting, CHAUVEL indicated his desire to change the language of the resolution so that both sides would be ordered to cease fire rather than only the North Koreans. He said he was pushed in this respect by Fawzi who was sitting next to him; he though it a reasonable change. I argued vigorously against this on the ground that the South Koreans should not be asked to cease fire until the invaders themselves had obeyed the Security Council's orders.

During the intermission [5] I had quite a long talk with PALAR. At first he expressed anxiety that his people might think that the Security Council had acted without full information in making a finding that the Koreans had invaded South Korea. I gave him a good deal of background information based on our telegrams and told him that Mr. Lie had had to suppress part of the Commission's telegram [6] which indicated that the North Koreans were the aggressors. Palar expressed anxiety that the Security Council having passed this resolution should back it up with strength.[7] He was convinced that the North Koreans would pay no attention to the Security Council's order and wanted to know what we would be prepared to do if that should occur. I indicated we had no instructions on that point but that in any case it was a matter for the United Nations to decide. I thought it was of great importance for us to know what the Indonesians thought about this affair and what kind of action they would support. I said I wished the Indonesians were members of the United Nations, now. I hoped, in any case, we could have full consultation with Palar during the course of this crisis so that he would know what was going on in our minds and we would know the Indonesian position. Palar said he was most anxious to keep in close touch with us and would get in touch with his government immediately.

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[5] The U.N. Security Council meeting recessed at 4:15 p. m. and reconvened at 5:25 p. m.

[6] Reference is to the message from UNCOK to the Secretary General alluded to in telegram 938, June 25, 8 p. m., from Seoul, p. 133; UNCOK's message had been distributed as U.N. document S/1496 and placed on the agenda of the 473d meeting of the Security Council. For the complete text, see telegram 541, June 26, from New York, p. 171.

[7] At the time of the intermission, amendments had already been proposed to the U.S. draft resolution (S/1497), but voting on the amended version did not take place until after the Security Council reconvened at 5:25 p. m. For the text of the resolution finally adopted by the Council (S/1501), shortly before 6 p. m. on June 25, see p. 155.

At the end of the conversation, I asked Palar whether I would be correct in informing Ambassador Gross of his (Palar's) position as follows: that he fully supported the United States resolution in the Security Council and the course of action which that contemplated; that he was somewhat concerned that his people did not have the full information that would be necessary to convince them of the serious significance of this attack. Palar said that was correct.

I spoke to KURAL during the meeting. He was thoroughly in favor of our resolution and advocated a strong line. He was sorry that the resolution had been watered down. He considered this event of vital significance. It was the first time in his view that the Communists had undertaken direct military aggression without any attempt to cover it up. He thought this was an important test and that it was essential that it be met with strong action. He wanted to know what we would be prepared to do when it was clear that our resolution was being ignored. I indicated that we had no instructions on that point as yet; we had had a very short time in which to react; I thought, however, it was a United Nations matter and that it would make an enormous difference to us what the attitude of the other members of the United Nations was.

SHANN indicated his view that the Security Council action was vital but that it was obvious that no attention would be paid to the Council's resolution by the North Koreans. He wanted to know what we could do in the way of meeting force with force. He thought perhaps the Australians were in a position to help if the United Nations decided to take strong action.

FELLER and CORDIER were both delighted at Lie's strong statement.[8] It was obvious that they had had something to do with it. Cordier was quite frank in pressing the view that this would help Lie in the light of his present troubles with American public opinion. He hoped it would get good publicity. They both indicated that this event had made it possible for Lie to prove that he was a United Nations man right down the line regardless of which way the chips fell. Feller was very anxious to talk about the problem of what to do next. Both he and Cordier advanced the thought that the Security Council resolution would not be effective and indicated that they understood that a major decision had to be made whether to meet force with force. They both seemed to me to favor a strong line. Cordier indicated that it was clear to him that this event would completely upset all United Nations plans,

[8] Text in U.N. document S/PV.473, p. 3. At the conclusion of his statement, Mr. Lie said: "The report received by me from the Commission, as well as reports from other sources in Korea, make it plain that military actions have been undertaken by North Korean forces. . . . The present situation is a serious one and is a threat to international peace. The Security Council is, in my opinion, the competent organ to deal with it. I consider it the clear duty of the Security Council to take steps necessary to re-establish peace in that area."

including particularly the question of Seating the Communists. He thought it was out of the question, now, that the Communists would be seated either at the ECOSOC meeting on July 3 or at the General Assembly.[9]

C. P. NOYES

[9] For documentation on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations, see vol. II, pp. 186 ff.

330/6–2550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT

NEW DELHI, June 25, 1950—10 p. m.
[Received June 25—3 : 39 p. m.]

928. I telephoned Bajpai who is in charge MEA [1] at 9 p. m., immediately on receipt Depcirtel June 25 [2] in order inform him its contents.

He stated impossible get into communication GOI representative to SC this evening but he was confident B. N. Rau in framework of standing instructions and as President of SC would do all proper in matter of presiding over Council.

GOI could not issue any instructions of substantive character until it had more complete information of what was going on in Korea.

HENDERSON

[1] Girja S. Bajpai was Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.

[2] See footnote 1 to telegram 613, June 25, 2 a. m., to Seoul, p. 128.

795.00/6–2650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

SEOUL, June 26, 1950—5 a. m.
[Received June 25—3 : 46 p. m.]

944. Sent CINCFE; repeated information Department 944. President has not yet left Seoul (remytel 940, June 26). He has just phoned that he was unable to get through to General MacArthur or to his Chief of Staff [1] in order to submit an urgent request that 10 F–51s with bombs and bazookas be delivered to Taegu where Korean pilots are awaiting to take off. He hopes that they can be here before dawn. He asserts that unless these planes are here before dawn, it will be very difficult to meet the northern attack.

[1] Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond.

In addition, he requests 36 105 mm. howitzers, 36 75 mm. anti-tank guns, and 36 155 mm. howitzers.

MUCCIO

795.00/6–2550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT WASHINGTON, June 25, 1950—4 p. m.

538. Please ask immediate interview Vishinsky [1] on Korean invasion. Say to him you are instructed to call his attention to fact that North Korean forces have crossed 38th parallel and invaded territory of ROK in force at several points. Refusal of Soviet Rep to attend UNSC meeting this afternoon despite clear threat to peace and obligations of SC member under Charter requires US to bring this matter directly to attention of USSR Govt. In view universally known fact of USSR controlling influence over North Korean regime US Govt. asks assurance USSR disavows responsibility for this unprovoked and unwarranted attack and that it will use its influence with North Korean authorities to withdraw their invading forces immediately. FYI we intend to make this public as soon as delivered. If Vishinsky will not receive you, deliver message to any official you can reach.[2]

ACHESON

[1] Andrey Vyshinsky, Soviet Foreign Minister.

[2] The following message, dated June 26, 1 a. m., from Moscow, was received in the Department of State at 6:48 p. m. on June 25 as telegram 1731: "From Barbour. Neither Gromyko nor any Vice Minister nor Sobolev was available Sunday. (Embtel 1727 June 25) Gromyko and Sobolev reported out of town." (330/6–2650)

795.00/6–2750

Intelligence Estimate Prepared by the Estimates Group, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1950.[1]

I.E. No. 7

KOREA

(PRELIMINARY VERSION)

I. PROSPECTS IN KOREA

A. The North Korean objective in invading South Korea is outright control over the Korean peninsula. North Korea presently

[1] The cover sheet of the source text bore the following statement: "This is an Intelligence Report; nothing in it is to be construed as a statement of US or Departmental policy or as a recommendation of any given policy."

An attached memorandum, dated June 27, from W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, to William J. Sheppard, Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, stated that copies of this document were delivered in the late afternoon of June 25 to Dean Rusk, George F. Kennan, Counselor of the Department of State and Director of the Policy Planning Staff, and officials in the Bureau of Public Affairs.

intends to attain a decisive victory through the capture of Seoul in the next 7-day period. In the next 72 hours, North Korea may make a "peace offer," but it can be taken for granted that this offer will be of such nature as to involve the surrender of the Rhee Government and will not indicate modification of the original objective.

B. Without effective US aid, the South Korean forces will offer immediate resistance along the Seoul defense line, in which effort they will receive strong popular support. The Communists will not be capable of developing effective local resistance behind the lines. The South Korean forces are, however, militarily inferior to the North Korean forces and are not considered capable of offering more than limited resistance because of the lack of equal armor, heavy artillery, and aircraft. It is anticipated that the inferior equipment and their limited supply of ammunition will within a short period force a break at some point in the defense line, the eventual loss of Seoul, and the collapse of organized resistance. At the point when military defeat appears imminent, the will to resist among the South Korean people is also likely to collapse.

US withdrawal would signify the end of organized resistance in South Korea. In view of Defense Department estimates, the delivery of limited US aid and the assumed failure of the US to make a full commitment to South Korea would have an adverse effect on Korean morale and, while limited resistance would be maintained for a period, the capture of Seoul would end organized resistance. If military assistance were received from the US immediately, in effective quantities, and including critical armaments—planes, artillery—the will to resist of the South Korean military forces and people would be strengthened.

II. U.S.S.R. MOTIVATIONS

A. The North Korean Government is completely under Kremlin control and there is no possibility that the North Koreans acted without prior instruction from Moscow. The move against South Korea must therefore be considered a Soviet move.

B. A Kremlin decision to resort to open aggression in Korea is in line with the increasing militancy that has marked Soviet policy during the past eight months. However, it is unique among moves during this period, in fact among postwar moves generally, in that it clearly carries with it the definite risk of involving US armed forces and hence the risk of a general war. (The Kremlin probably discounts this risk, but even allowing for a heavy discount, the Kremlin must recognize that there still remains a possibility of war breaking out.) The Kremlin must therefore have either (1) considered Korea as more important than we have assumed, or (2) calculated that under any circumstances an armed clash with the US is more imminent than we

had estimated. It is estimated that of these two alternatives, the first is the more likely.

C. There have been indications since early June that the USSR has been reviewing its Far Eastern policy with a conference in Moscow of practically all of the top Soviet Representatives in Far Eastern areas. It therefore can be assumed that the move in Korea was decided only after the most minute examination of all factors involved in the Far Eastern situation. Ambassador Panyushkin's [2] and General Derevyanko's [3] special function in this decision might well have been to estimate probable US reaction to the invasion.

D. While overt indications were that the conference was concerned with particular local Far Eastern situations—specifically US moves on the Japanese Peace Treaty, on aid to Indo-China, and further assistance to Korea—it is not believed that the attack on South Korea was resorted to merely for the purpose of achieving or furthering local Korean aims. Considering the *apparent* US commitments to South Korea, is estimated that Moscow would not have taken the risks involved—even allowing for a heavy discounting of these risks—unless liquidation of the South Korean Government was called for by the Kremlin's global strategy, as distinct from North Eastern Asian strategy.

E. The liquidation of the South Korean Government would fit into Soviet global strategy in the following particulars:

1. It offers a test on ground militarily most favorable to the Soviet Union of the resolution of the US in its announced policy of "total diplomacy." Such a test would probably be considered important in connection with possible Chinese moves in support of Ho Chi Minh,[4] Burmese Communists, or Malayan Communists; possibly, a satellite attack on Yugoslavia; and possible Soviet moves in Germany or Iran.

2. A severe blow would be dealt US prestige throughout Asia and the encouragement which has been felt in widely scattered areas in consequence of the promise of more active American support of anti-Communist forces would be reversed. Equally important, the feeling would grow among South East Asian peoples that the USSR is advancing invincibly, and there would be a greatly increased impulse to "get on the bandwagon."

[3.] Soviet military control of all Korea would be, from the Soviet standpoint, an important step in making secure the approaches to the USSR. During recent weeks Moscow has demonstrated increasing sensitivity over this matter—i.e., Baltic, Black Sea, and Iranian approaches. Elimination of the US "salient" in Korea would deny to the US any area where land forces could be staged for an attack on either Soviet Far Eastern territories or China.

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[2] Alexander Panyushkin, Soviet Ambassador in the United States.

[3] Gen. Kuzma Derevyanko, Soviet representative on the Allied Council for Japan.

[4] President of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

4. Soviet military domination of all Korea would give Moscow an important weapon for the intimidation of the Japanese in connection with Japan's future alignment with the US. The Kremlin may estimate that with control of Korea, elements in Japan favoring a neutral course would be greatly strengthened. Moreover, Soviet military leaders may estimate that if war does actually come, possession of Korea would be of great strategic value in neutralizing the usefulness of Japan as an American base.

III. CONSEQUENCES IN THE FAR EAST

A. *Japan.*

The consequences of the invasion will be most important in Japan. The Japanese will unhesitatingly assume that the invasion is Soviet-directed and forms part of an over-all strategy which, at some point, includes Japan. Japanese reactions to the invasion will depend almost entirely upon the course of action pursued by the United States since they will regard the position taken by the United States as presaging US action should Japan be threatened with invasion.

Failure of the United States to take any action in Korea would strengthen existing widespread desire for neutrality. Defeat of the ROK would greatly intensify Japanese feelings of vulnerability while at the same time the failure of the US to assist the ROK would add force to the argument that alignment of Japan with the United States would, while inviting Soviet aggression, in no way ensure American protection of Japan against such aggression. Although this reaction might be counterbalanced to some degree by the commitment of significant additional US military strength to Japan and the restoration of Japanese sovereignty to the point where the Japanese could feel themselves at least partially partners in a defensive arrangement rather than the unwilling tools of American strategy, the undercurrent of doubt as to ultimate US intentions would remain sufficiently strong to reduce Japan's utility and reliability as an ally.

Rapid and unhesitating US support for the ROK, on the other hand, would reassure the Japanese as to their own fate and, since Soviet aggressive intentions in the Far East will be underlined for the Japanese by the invasion, would enhance their willingness to accept US protection and its implications, though not the indefinite continuance of US direction of internal affairs.

Should US support be insufficient to prevent defeat of the ROK, the question of the value to Japan of similar support—as against the provocation support constitutes—will inevitably be raised. Considerations that will enter into the formation of Japanese attitudes under such circumstances—other than the immediate factors responsible for the Republic's defeat—will include the following: (1) the degree to which American opinion appears to be moving toward the conclusion

that a Communist Korea renders Japan valueless as a US base, or, conversely, enhances Japan's value as a base; (2) the degree to which the Japanese regard Japan's geographic, political, and economic situation as so different from that of the ROK that the defeat of the Republic does not point to US inability to defend Japan; and (3) the degree to which the Japanese feel that considerations of the undesirability of precipitating World War III are valid in the case of Korea, but would not be applied to themselves.

B. *Nationalist China.*

The remnants of the National Government of China on Formosa have long viewed the outbreak of World War III as their only real hope of survival and they doubtless therefore welcome the Communist attack on South Korea. Their reaction to a US withdrawal from Korea would be all the more severe. The tendency for flight or defection to the Communists would increase, military morale and governmental efficiency would deteriorate, and prospects for a Communist take-over would greatly improve.

Ineffective intervention by the US in Korea would have a somewhat less adverse effect, but the encouragement derived from increased militancy of the US would be more than cancelled by the fear that the US is unwilling to make the commitments necessary for success in stopping Communism in the Far East.

If the US were to adopt measures that succeeded in defeating the aggressive North Korean forces, the Chinese Nationalists would gain greatly in morale, efficiency, and general will to resist.

C. *Communist China.*

The Communist victory in Korea that would almost certainly follow US withdrawal would operate to the advantage of the Chinese Communist regime both at home and abroad, inasmuch as that regime would share in the increased prestige of the international Communist movement. This gain would, however, be over balanced by the repercussions on China of any stiffening of the US position elsewhere in the Far East as a result of the reverse suffered by the US in Korea.

If this hypothetical stiffening of the US position were to include effective measures to forestall Chinese Communist capture of Formosa, the Chinese Communists might come to view the Korean adventure as a move by the USSR in disregard of Chinese Communist interests. It is possible, however that the Chinese Communists were consulted before the attack on South Korea and that, for one of two reasons, they did not oppose the launching of that attack:

1. The invasion of Formosa may be scheduled for the very near future, in which case any US reaction to actual or impending defeat in Korea might not occur in time to change the military situation in China.

2. The invasion of Formosa may already have been called off as beyond the capabilities of the Chinese Communists. This possibility, however, is less likely of the two, in view of the sustained and intensive Chinese Communist propaganda build-up on the need to take Formosa.

If a defeat for US policy in Korea is not counteracted by a strong move elsewhere in the Far East, developments in Korea may be expected to cause Chinese Communist leaders to adopt more bold and militant tactics in their attempts to promote Communism in other parts of Asia. Specifically, a major force—fear of US intervention—that now inhibits direct Chinese Communist military intervention in Southeast Asia would be very much weakened. The consequences of ineffective intervention by US in Korea would differ from the above only insofar as the fact of US intervention—even though ineffective—would sustain, or possibly even increase, Chinese Communist fears of US intervention to check Communist expansion elsewhere in the Far East.

Effective intervention by the US in Korea would produce a marked psychological reaction in the public mind and in the minds of the Chinese Communist leaders. Doubts would be created, or increased, as to the ultimate success of the Soviet camp in the cold war. In view of its public commitment to that camp, the prestige of the Chinese Communist regime would suffer, both within China and in other parts of the Far East. Resistance to the regime, both passive and active, would be encouraged. Within the regime itself, the doubts would take the specific form of a questioning of the advantage for China of the Soviet alliance. The Chinese Communist leadership would be impressed not only by the relative weakness or ineptness of the USSR in its Korean adventure, but also by the threat of the newly militant posture of the US in the Far East, a threat that had all but been created by Soviet blundering. As a consequence, the strength of the Chinese Communist ties to the USSR would be significantly weakened.

D. *Southeast Asia.*

The countries of Southeast Asia have not been particularly aware of Korea and its problems. The only personal contact that most Southeast Asians have had with Koreans occurred during the war when the Japanese used Koreans as guards, informers, prostitutes, and in other similar capacities, in conjunction with their own armed forces. These Koreans were a particularly hated and feared group, considered inferior in most respects, but more ruthless than the Japanese themselves. When they are remembered, the reaction to any news from Korea would be highly unsympathetic regardless of the specific context.

If the US abandons South Korea, whether or not token military assistance has been provided, the Southeast Asian leaders will lose

whatever confidence they may have had in the effectiveness of US aid to combat Communism. Although regional attitudes toward Chinese Communist imperialism may not be changed, the increased confidence of Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia in the Communist destiny will strengthen opportunities for Communist penetration. Failure of the United Nations to solve peacefully the Korean issue would not immediately affect the Southeast Asian countries since, with the exception of Indonesia, reliance on the UN has not been an important consideration. However, hope that the UN might become an effective international organization will have been virtually destroyed.

IV. CONSEQUENCES IN EUROPE

Success of the current Soviet-sponsored invasion of South Korea will cause significant damage to US prestige in Western Europe. The capacity of a small Soviet satellite to engage in a military adventure challenging, as many Europeans will see it, the might and will of the US, can only lead to serious questioning of that might and will.

In occupied Germany, the success of the North Korean invasion forces will cause especial alarm. Germans in all Zones will inevitably consider the possibility of the East German paramilitary police playing in Germany the same "unifying" role the Soviet has assigned to its North Korean forces. Neutralist pressures and pressures for some sort of West German security force may be expected to increase.

Communists will make much of American inability or unwillingness to support effectively those who cast their lot with the US and will stress the line that the American imperialists are willing to fight only to the last Korean, Formosan, etc. Propaganda will be increased to point up Communism and Sovietism as a wave of the future.

295.1122/6–2650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

SEOUL, June 26, 1950—6 a. m.
[Received June 25—5:05 p. m.]

945. Repeated information CINCFE. All AMIK women and children dependents, as ordered, and few women employees of mission, given option of leaving, were safely evacuated from Seoul to ASCOM assembly area by 5 a. m., Seoul time, June 26. Negotiations now under way with SS *Reinholt*, Norwegian flag, and SS *Norelg*, Panamanian flag, both freighters now in Inchon harbor, to take as many evacuees as possible to Japan. SS *Marine Snapper*, American flag, due in Inchon noon 26th will also be contacted. It may be necessary to request US

destroyers, which understood now proceeding Inchon, to serve as cover to transport some evacuees.

While head count of those now at ASCOM assembly point not yet completed, it is estimated they number more than 700. In addition AMIK dependents, they include missionaries, United Nations, and British and Chinese nationals. Dependents in other parts of country advised proceed Pusan for evacuation where available shipping standing by. Names all evacuees will be telegraphed when list completed.

MUCCIO

Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Security Council, June 25, 1950 [1]

The Security Council

Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution of 21 October 1949 [2] that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government "having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; and that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea";

Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its resolutions of 12 December 1948 [3] and 21 October 1949 of the consequences which might follow unless Member States refrained from acts derogatory to the results sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report menaces the safety and well being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and might lead to open military conflict there;

Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,

Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace,

I. *Calls for* the immediate cessation of hostilities; and

Calls upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel;

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[1] U.N. document S/1501. This resolution was adopted shortly before 6 p. m. at which time the 473rd meeting concluded. The vote was 9 in favor to 0 opposed, with 1 member abstaining (Yugoslavia) and 1 member absent (U.S.S.R.).

[2] Text in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1090.

[3] Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 19, 1948, p. 760; for related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. VI, pp. 1079 ff.

II. *Requests* the United Nations Commission on Korea

(*a*) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay;

(*b*) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel; and

(*c*) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution;

III. *Calls upon* all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.[4]

[4] Following the adoption of this resolution, the Security Council voted upon a draft resolution presented by the Yugoslav representative (Nincic), which read as follows (S/1500):

"*The Security Council*

"*Noting* with grave concern the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, and anxious to obtain all the necessary information enabling it to pass judgment on the merits of the case,

"*Calls for* an immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of forces,

"*Invites* the Government of North Korea to state its case before the Security Council."

The Yugoslav draft resolution failed of adoption by a vote of 1 (Yugoslavia) in favor, to 6 (including the U.S.) opposed, with 3 (Egypt, India, Norway) abstentions, and 1 member absent (U.S.S.R.).

During the 473rd meeting, the Security Council had allowed, without objection, the representative of the Republic of Korea (Chang) to take a place at the Council table.

795.00/6–2550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 25, 1950—6 p. m.

618. For Muccio. This telegram in no way dilutes your present authority and discretion ref evacuation plans. Now being considered utmost urgency by highest US officials what immediate US aid or action possible under circumstances. From this distance it appears very important to keep military advisers actively associated Korean army in accordance with instructions contained para three capital FOX CMA WARX 90992 of Ø1 July 1949[1] unless situation clearly renders impossible or futile. Greatest concern here is whether Korean army can pull things together for brief period required for US decision and action or help.

For your info we hope matter of hours get decision whether CINCFE receives full authority to furnish his discretion ammunition, arms and equipment without regard existing MDAP programs as well as decision on action CINCFE might be authorized to take di-

[1] This telegram, not printed, had established the terms of reference for KMAG at the time of its inception; see Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, pp. 121, 123.

rectly to influence situation based on safety US citizens. Obviously vigorous fighting by Koreans with what they have and heroic initial effort are essential if any action by us is to have chance take effect. Urtel 940 just arrived and underlines need Koreans now do superhuman job until other factors begin to operate. Dept Defense concurs. Copy this message being furnished CINCFE.

ACHESON

795.00/6–2550

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1950.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Subject: Korean Situation

Participants: The President
Secretary Acheson
Secretary Johnson [1]
Secretary Matthews [2]
Mr. Webb, Mr. Rusk, Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Jessup (State Dept.)
Secretary Pace
Secretary Finletter [3]
General Bradley [4]
Admiral Sherman [5]
General Vandenberg [6]
General Collins [7]

The persons listed above met with the President for dinner at Blair House at 7:45 PM. Before dinner General Bradley read a memorandum prepared by General MacArthur in which he emphasized his views about the importance of denying Formosa to the Communists.[8]

After dinner the discussion began around the table. The President called on the Secretary of State to open the discussion.

MR. ACHESON summarized the various problems which he thought the President should consider. The first point was the question of authorizing General MacArthur to supply Korea with arms and other equipment over and above the supplies of ammunition presently authorized under the MDAP program. He recommended that this be done. He suggested that our air cover should be used to aid in the evacuation of the women and children from Seoul and that our air force

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[1] Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson.
[2] Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews.
[3] Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter.
[4] Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[5] Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations.
[6] Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.
[7] Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
[8] General MacArthur's memorandum is printed as an Annex to this document; it had been brought back from Japan by General Bradley and Secretary Johnson who had just returned from a trip to the Far East.

should be authorized to knock out northern Korean tanks or air force interfering with the evacuation. He then mentioned the resolution adopted by the Security Council and suggested that consideration should be given to what further assistance we might render to Korea in pursuance of this or a supplementary Security Council resolution. He next suggested that the President should order the Seventh Fleet to proceed to Formosa and prevent an attack on Formosa from the mainland. At the same time operations from Formosa against the mainland should be prevented. He said that he did not recommend that General MacArthur should go to Formosa until further steps had been decided upon. He said that the United States should not tie up with the Generalissimo. He thought that the future status of Formosa might be determined by the UN.

THE PRESIDENT interposed "or by the Japanese Peace Treaty".

MR. ACHESON finally suggested that our aid to Indochina should be stepped up.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that we must draw the line somewhere.

THE PRESIDENT stated he agreed on that.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that Russia is not yet ready for war. The Korean situation offered as good an occasion for action in drawing the line as anywhere else and he agreed with the actions suggested by Mr. Acheson. He said that jets flying over her would have a great morale effect on the South Koreans even if they were unable to spot the North Korean tanks. He said that naval action could help on the East Coast. He questioned the value of sending materiel which the Koreans were not trained to use. He mentioned the F–51's in this connection. He said that we should act under the guise of aid to the United Nations. He proposed that we should move fleet units now in Subic Bay. He thought it would probably not be necessary for them to shoot but that they might frighten off the North Korean amphibious forces. He questioned the advisability of putting in ground units particularly if large numbers were involved.

GENERAL COLLINS reported on a telecon with Tokyo. General MacArthur is shipping the mortars, artillery, and so on with ammunition. These supplies will reach the Koreans within the ten-day period for which they already have supplies. The F–51's are available in Japan for Korean pilots to fly back. The Korean pilots will be flown from Kimpo. General Collins urged that authority be given MacArthur to send a survey group to Korea.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said that the Russians do not want war now but if they do they will have it. The present situation in Korea offers a valuable opportunity for us to act. Korea is a strategic threat to Japan; this was the conclusion which he reached in his studies during

the war when we were planning our attacks on Japan. He favored sending a survey group from Tokyo and increasing the strength of KMAG. He thought we should stop the use of the sea as a means of attack on South Korea. This was the logical corollary of the views stated by the Secretary of State. On Formosa he thought we must adjust our position to our general occupation position in Japan. He thought that MacArthur fitted into that situation as SCAP. He agreed, as had General Bradley, that in the Formosa operation we must apply our guarantees against military action both ways, that is to prevent attacks from Formosa as well as on Formosa. We could not otherwise justify our action. He said it would take two days to bring the fleet up from the Philippines. It need not be used if we decided against such action but the movement should be ordered now. He wished also to move some ships from the mainland as far as Pearl Harbor, for example, at least one carrier.

THE PRESIDENT asked about Russian fleet strength in the Far East and Admiral Sherman gave him the details.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed that we must stop the North Koreans but he would not base our action on the assumption that the Russians would not fight. He said that we could knock out the North Korean tanks with our air if only the North Korean air force is involved. However, Russian jets might come into action and they would be operating from much closer bases. In regard to Formosa he pointed out that all places were interrelated. Formosa was therefore important only in relation to other places.

THE PRESIDENT asked about Russian air strength in the Far East.

GENERAL VANDENBERG gave him the information including the fact that a considerable number of Russian jets are based on Shanghai.

THE PRESIDENT asked whether we could knock out their bases in the Far East.

GENERAL VANDENBERG replied that this might take some time. He said it could be done if we used A-Bombs.

MR. PACE expressed doubts about the advisability of putting ground forces into Korea. He stressed the need for speed and for encouraging General MacArthur to take action.

MR. MATTHEWS also stressed the need for prompt action and said that we would get popular approval.

MR. FINLETTER said we should go as far as necessary in protecting our evacuation. He expressed some doubt on the additional items which had been suggested by the Secretary of State. He said our forces in the Far East were sufficient if the Russians do not come in. He advised that only the necessary decisions be made that night. He thought that General MacArthur should be authorized to go beyond a mere evacua-

tion. He stressed the analogy to the situation between the two world wars. He thought we should take calculated risks hoping that our action will keep the peace.

MR. JOHNSON agreed with Mr. Acheson's first recommendation concerning instructions to General MacArthur but thought the instructions should be detailed so as not to give him too much discretion. He thought there should not be a real delegation of Presidential authority to General MacArthur. He mentioned the three islands south of Okinawa in the Ryukyus which could be made ready in a few days as air bases. He pointed to the fact that they are already under our jurisdiction and said that the Formosan situation could be handled from them. He agreed with the views that had been expressed by Mr. Finletter. He was opposed to committing ground troops in Korea.

MR. WEBB, MR. JESSUP, MR. RUSK and MR. HICKERSON made brief comments in amplification of Mr. Acheson's statements.

THE PRESIDENT confirmed his decision that the following orders should be sent:

1. General MacArthur was to send the suggested supplies to the Koreans.
2. General MacArthur was to send a survey group to Korea.
3. The indicated elements of the fleet were to be sent to Japan.
4. The Air Force should prepare plans to wipe out all Soviet air bases in the Far East. This was not an order for action but an order to make the plans.
5. Careful calculation should be made of the next probable place in which Soviet action might take place. A complete survey should be made by State and Defense Departments.

He stressed that we are working entirely for the United Nations. We would wait for further action until the UN order is flouted.

He wished the State Department to prepare a statement for a message for him to deliver in person to Congress on Tuesday [9] indicating exactly what steps had been taken. He wished the Department to put its best brains on it and said that there were plenty of them there.

He said he was not yet ready to put MacArthur in as Commander-in-Chief in Korea.

He said our action at this moment would be confined to the United Nations and to Korea.

He said that our air was to continue to give cover for evacuation destroying tanks if necessary.

He asked whether more bazookas and possibly recoilless rifles could be sent.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that on the recoilless rifles we had few available and that there was also a shortage of ammunition.

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[9] June 27.

THE PRESIDENT again emphasized the importance of making the survey of possible next moves by the Soviet Union. He also emphasized that no statement whatever was to be made by any one to the press until he speaks on Tuesday. It was absolutely vital that there should be no leak in regard to this matter and he wished everyone to be careful. They should not even make any background comment to the press.

MR. ACHESON pointed out that he and Secretary Johnson were scheduled to appear before the Congressional Appropriations Committee tomorrow and wondered whether any statements should be made on the Korean situation. The President said that he thought no comment on this question should be made by either of the Secretaries at that time.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN inquired whether he had been authorized to move fleet units from California to Pearl Harbor.

THE PRESIDINT said that he was.

In response to further questions THE PRESIDENT said that our air cover should take action against North Korean tanks if this were necessary.

[Annex]

Memorandum on Formosa, by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far East, and Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan

TOP SECRET [TOKYO,] 14 June 1950.

1. Since the fall of 1948 when the military capability of the Chinese Communist to engulf all of the mainland of China became clearly evident I have been concerned as to the future status of Formosa and I have been convinced that the strategic interests of the United States will be in serious jeopardy if Formosa is allowed to be dominated by a power hostile to the United States.[10] In my personal conversations with distinguished civilian and military representatives of the Government of the United States who have visited this Headquarters during the past eighteen months I have reiterated the premise that Formosa should not be allowed to fall into the hands of a potential hostile power or of a regime which would grant military utilization of Formosa to a power potentially hostile to the United States. On the 29th of May last I forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff my estimate of the strategic consequences which would result from the capture of Formosa by the Chinese Communists.

2. The front line of the Far East Command as well as the western strategic frontier of the United States rests today on the littoral islands

[10] For documentation on U.S. policy toward Formosa, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.

extending from the Aleutians through the Philippine Archipelago. Geographically and strategically Formosa is an integral part of this offshore position which in the event of hostilities can exercise a decisive degree of control of military operations along the periphery of Eastern Asia. In the event of a war United States striking forces based on this line would have the capability to interdict the limited means of communication available to the Communists and deny or materially reduce the ability of the USSR to exploit the natural resources of East and Southeast Asia. This essential capability on the part of the United States is dependent to a large degree upon the retention of Formosa by a friendly or a neutral power.

3. The geographic location of Formosa is such that in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very center of that portion of our position now keyed to Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. At the present time there is on Formosa a concentration of operational air and naval bases which is greater than any similar concentration on the Asiatic mainland between the Yellow Sea and the Strait of Malacca. Additional bases can be developed in a relatively short time by an aggressive exploitation of World War II Japanese facilities not now utilized by the Chinese Nationalist Forces. Formosa bases are 100 miles closer to Okinawa than any point on the Chinese mainland and are 150 miles closer to Clark Field and Manila than any other area which could be acquired by Communist military forces. An enemy force utilizing those installations currently available on Formosa could increase by 100 percent the air effort which could be directed against Okinawa as compared to operations based in China proper and at the same time could direct damaging air attacks with fighter type aircraft against our installations in the Philippines which are currently beyond the range of fighters based on the mainland of Asia.

4. As a result of its geographic location and base potential, utilization of Formosa by a military power hostile to the United States may either counterbalance or overshadow the strategic importance of the central and southern flank of the United States front line position. Formosa in the hands of the Communists can be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accomplish Soviet offensive strategy and at the same time checkmate counteroffensive operations by United States Forces based on Okinawa and the Philippines. This unsinkable carrier-tender has the capacity to operate from ten to twenty air groups of types ranging from jet fighters to B–29 type bombers as well as to provide forward operating facilities for the short-range coastal submarines which are predominant in the Russian Asiatic Navy. If Formosa should be acquired by the Chinese Communists and bases thereon made available

to the USSR, Russia will have acquired an additional "fleet" which will have been obtained and can be maintained at an incomparably lower cost to the Soviets than could its equivalent of ten or twenty aircraft carriers with their supporting forces.

5. Current estimates of Soviet air and submarine resources in the Far East agreed to by both Washington and Tokyo military intelligence agencies satisfy me that the Russians have the capability to extend their forces southward from their present positions and still maintain an imposing degree of military strength in both the Maritime Provinces and the Chinese seaboard. The ability of the USSR–Chinese Communist hordes to meet promptly logistic requirements either by improvisation or by the import of critical materials from Europe is being demonstrated daily by military activities extending from Tientsin to the southern border of China. The interest of the USSR in the southward displacement of termini of the Trans-Siberian Railroad has been reported by competent observers whose information indicated that rail lines are being extended through China southward from the vicinity of Lake Baikal and eastward from Russia Turkestan in the vicinity of Alma Ata. A trans-Siberian railhead in the vicinity of Shanghai would materially assist in the logistic build-up of Formosa. Pending the actual outbreak of hostilities United States military forces will be unable to prevent the stockpiling of essential military supplies on Formosa if that area is acquired by the Communists.

6. Historically Formosa has been used as a springboard for military aggression directed against areas to the south. The most notable and recent example was the utilization of Formosa by the Japanese in World War II. At the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Formosa played an important part as a staging area and supporting base for the various Japanese invasion convoys. The main strength of the forces which landed at Lingayen Gulf on Luzon were staged from Keelung, Takao, and the Pescadores. The supporting air forces of Japan's army and navy were based on fields situated along Southern Formosa at Takao, Koshun, and Taichu. Takao also served as a staging area for the invasion of Java in February 1942. From 1942 through 1944 Formosa was a vital link in the transportation and communications chain which stretched from Japan through Okinawa and the Philippines to Southeast Asia. In 1944–45 Formosa was the key staging point for troops and air reinforcements deployed to the Philippines in preparation for the all-important operation to hold the Philippine areas. As the United States carrier forces advanced into the Western Pacific, the air bases on Formosa assumed an increasingly greater role in the defense scheme of the Japanese. After the invasion of Luzon in January 1945 the Japanese air forces withdrew to For-

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mosan fields to take up forward operational positions to be used against our advancing forces. The military utility of Formosa is sharply underlined by the fact that Japan in 1941 controlled not only the Ryukyus but the entire eastern periphery of China.

7. In addition to its military value, Formosa has not only been self-sufficient as regards food for its own population of more than eight million but it has exported since 1910 with a favorable balance of external trade. In normal times Formosa held the position of a food surplus area in a generally food-scarce locality. Its prewar export of rice and wheat exceeded imports by approximately 600,000 metric tons annually. There is no reason to believe that able political and economic advisors cannot once more establish Formosa as a prosperous economic unit. Such a factor, particularly the availability of a food surplus, may be of considerable importance in reestablishing the economies of those Oriental nations now largely dependent upon United States assistance.

8. Formosa represents a political area of no less importance to western ideology than other areas in the Orient. The Taiwanese are a homogeneous racial group who as individuals have resisted the intrusion of foreign blood. Although Formosa was promised to China as a consequence of World War II this promise was given in consonance with a political situation entirely different than that which now exists. There is every basis from a moral standpoint to offer to the Taiwanese an opportunity to develop their own political future in an atmosphere unfettered by the dictates of a Communist police state. In view of the moral implications, as well as the geographic proximity of this area to other endangered peoples on and near the periphery of China, the future status of Formosa can well be an important factor in determining the political alignment of those national groups who have or must soon make a choice between Communism and the West.

9. There can be no doubt but that the eventual fate of Formosa largely rests with the United States. Unless the United States' political-military strategic position in the Far East is to be abandoned, it is obvious that the time must come in the foreseeable future when a line must be drawn beyond which Communist expansion will be stopped. As a means of regaining a proper United States posture in the Orient it is apparent to me that the United States should initiate measures to prevent the domination of Formosa by a Communist power. I am equally certain that it would be a fundamental error with regard to any part of the Orient to fail to take appropriate measures in those areas still open to our influence.

10. At this time I am unable to recommend the exact political, economic and military measures which should be taken to prevent the

fall of Formosa either into the hands of a potential hostile power or into the hands of a power who will grant military utilization of Formosa to a hostile power. It is my firm conviction that a realistic estimate of requirements can only be based upon a physical survey of the area made by experienced military, economic and political observers. I concur whole-heartedly with the recommendations made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 December 1949 [11] to the effect that the Commander-in-Chief Far East should make an immediate survey of the need and extent of the military assistance required in Formosa in order to hold Formosa against attack. Although this recommendation was apparently not acceptable at the time to the National Security Council, I note that the Joint Chiefs reaffirmed this recommendation on 4 May 1950.

11. Formosa has not yet fallen to Communist domination. There are conflicting reports as to the capability and will of the Chinese Nationalist Forces as now constituted and equipped to prevent either the military or political conquest of the island of Formosa. I cannot predict what the cost may be of preventing Communist domination of that island, although I have advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff what the cost may be if such an event transpires. I am satisfied, however, that the domination of Formosa by an unfriendly power would be a disaster of utmost importance to the United States, and I am convinced that time is of the essence. I strongly believe that the Commander-in-Chief Far East should be authorized and directed to initiate without delay a survey of the military, economic and political requirements to prevent the domination of Formosa by a Communist power and that the results of such a survey be analyzed and acted upon as a basis for United States national policy with respect to Formosa.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

[11] Text in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. IX, p. 460.

795.00/6–2650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
NIACT

SEOUL, June 26, 1950—9 a. m.
[Received June 25—8:05 p .m.]

946. For Rusk. I much appreciate your encouraging phone message.[1] After being taken by surprise and knocked off balance yesterday morning by overwhelming North Korean armor and artillery aided

[1] No record has been found in the Department of State files; presumably the telephone message conveyed the substance of the information conveyed in telegram 618, June 25, 6 p.m., to Seoul, p. 156.

in afternoon by aircraft, hard fighting ROK ground forces made gallant comeback by midnight and seem to have stabilized situation. I can give assurances that Korean GIs have given extremely good account of themselves, and I am confident they will not be found wanting in the tests to come. But it is obviously essential that we give them not only adequate but sustained aid. Already General MacArthur has been most helpful in this respect.

I wish we could have avoided the evacuation of our dependents, but on the advice of our military advisors and in deference to the expressed wish of President Rhee, I felt I had no alternative but to issue the necessary guidance.

The mission staff responded almost to a man to the call of duty yesterday and all through last night. The removal of dependents from Seoul, which was not decided upon until about midnight, was executed without a hitch, thanks to well-laid plans, good organization, and hard work. KMAG, although handicapped by the recent loss of the recent departure of General Roberts and the temporary absence of Col. Wright, performed extremely well, several advisors having risked their lives in the call of duty yesterday and last night.

P.S. Since writing foregoing, there is some evidence that North Korean armor and artillery are withdrawing all along the line.

Repeated information CINCFE.

MUCCIO

JUNE 26, 1950
(Monday)

661.00/6–2550 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 26, 1950—1 a. m.[2]

In view possibility invasion Korea first of series coordinated Soviet military action, pls maintain utmost vigilance and report any positive or negative evidence however fragmentary re situation ur country.

ACHESON

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[1] Sent to the Embassies in Ankara, Belgrade, and Tehran, the Legations in Saigon and Vienna, the High Commissioner in Berlin, and the consular offices in Taipei and Hong Kong. It was also repeated, as routine, to the Embassies in Seoul, London, Paris, Manila, Bangkok, Djakarta, Rangoon, New Delhi, Moscow, Athens, Warsaw, Praha, Rome, and Stockholm; the Political Advisers in Tokyo and Trieste; the Legations in Bucharest, Budapest, and Helsinki; and the Consulate General in Singapore.

[2] The Department of State record copy bears the date June 25. In a memorandum to Mr. Noble dated August 21, however, Mr. Merchant, who drafted the telegram, indicated that it was reasonable to assume that the Code Room had mistakenly dated it June 25 rather than June 26. He added that he recollected drafting it in the evening of June 25 and sending it to the Code Room about midnight, which led him to believe that it had been transmitted at 1 a. m. on June 26 (795.00/6–2550). See also President Truman's comment during the June 25th Blair House meeting on the need for making a survey of possible next moves by the Soviet Union, p. 160.

795.1122/6–2650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY SEOUL, June 26, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received June 26—5 : 49 a. m.]

955. Evacuation of balance of dependent women and children is still under way (see my telegram 953 to Department [1]). Request air cover be maintained until termination. I shall inform you soon as possible as to termination.

Sent CINCFE, repeated info Department.

MUCCIO

[1] Received in the Department at 6:14 a. m., p. 168.

795.00/6–2650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

PLAIN SEOUL, June 26, 1950.
[Received June 26—6 : 02 a. m.]

951. National Assembly meeting in relatively calm spirit this morning appealed to President US, Congress and UN General Assembly for aid, and without dissent affirmed Assembly support of government in this crisis. Also voted for relief and encouragement of soldiers and civilians in battle area, authorized Assembly delegation to visit front lines (3 members volunteered) and approved establishment special emergency military fund. Then went into closed session to hear President, Defense Minister and Home Minister on situation.

Translation of appeal to President US and Congress follows:

"Beginning early morning 25 June, North Korean Communist Army began armed aggression against South. Your Excellency and Congress of US already aware of fact that our people, anticipating incident such as today's, established strong national defense force in order to secure bulwark of democracy in the east, and to render service to world peace. We again thank you for your indispensable aid in liberating us and in establishing our Republic. As we face this national crisis, putting up brave fight, we appeal for your increasing support and ask that you at same time extend effective and timely aid in order to prevent this act of destruction of world peace."

Translation message to UN General Assembly (through UNCOK) follows:

"Beginning early morning 25 June North Korean Communist Army began armed aggression throughout 38th parallel area. For self protection our brave and patriotic army and navy opened heroic defense operations. This savage and unlawful act of rebel force is commission of unpardonable sin. We, representing 30 million Koreans,

hope UNGA realized our defensive fight against aggression is inevitable reaction of our people and government. We also appeal for your immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security, not only for Korea but also for peace loving people of world."

Repeated info CINCFE.

295B.1122/6–2650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED
PRIORITY

SEOUL, June 26, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received June 26—6 : 14 a. m.]

953. Embtel 945, June 26.[1] SS *Reinholt*, Norwegian flag, with 682 dependents on board, departed Inchon harbor this afternoon en route Fukuoka unless destination changed at request to occupation authorities. Request SCAP contact vessel and arrange receive evacuees. Evacuation went off smoothly and without incident, with much credit due KMAG and JAS officers who supervised operation.

There remain in South Korea approximately 300 potential dependent evacuees, including non-Americans, most of whom would find easiest to evacuate through Pusan. Approximately 175 of these dependents, including 156 Americans, are now concentrated Pusan. It is estimated that, in addition, another 50 may now be in transit to Pusan from various southern and western areas. No firm decision has been taken to carry out mass evacuation through Pusan. At present, four merchant vessels are available in Pusan harbor for evacuation purposes, and with other vessels calling regularly, passage appears to present no problem.

Sent CINCFE; repeated info Manila 42.

MUCCIO

[1] Received in the Department on June 25 at 5 : 05 p. m., p. 154.

795.00/6–2650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

PLAIN
NIACT

SEOUL, June 26, 1950.
[Received June 26—6 : 24 a. m.]

Unnumbered. Secretary General from Renborg. Following from Commission. North Korean advances have created dangerous situation with possibilities of rapid deterioration. Impossible estimate situation which will exist tomorrow in Seoul. In view Commission's past experience and existing situation Commission convinced North Korea will not heed Council resolution nor accept UNCOK good offices.

Suggests for Council consideration either invitation both parties agree on neutral mediator to negotiate peace or request a member government undertake immediate mediation. Commission decided standby in Seoul. Danger is that critical operations now in progress may end in matter of days and question of cease fire and withdrawal North Korean forces as suggested Council resolution prove academic. UNCOK.[1]

Department pass USUN New York EM 9.[2] [Renborg.]

MUCCIO

[1] This message from UNCOK to the Secretary-General was read aloud at the 474th meeting of the Security Council on June 27 by the President of the Security Council (Rau) and was distributed as U.N. document S/1503.

[2] A note on the file copy indicated that this telegram was relayed to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations at 6:25 a. m.

795.00/6–2650: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

Moscow, June 26, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received June 26—8:09 a. m.]

1734. Embassy has considered carefully Deptel 538, June 25 and in light information available to us up to this hour on Korean situation ventures to solicit the Department's further study of the tactical desirability of the approach requested therein at this time. As set forth Embtel 1726, June 25, the Embassy assesses the invasion in its broadest implications as a direct challenge to the free world and US leadership thereof, but believes that determined countermeasures will deter the Soviets who are not prepared to risk the possibility of global war. Whether that appraisal is or is not confirmed by developments, it would seem essential that tactically we handle the matter in such way as to focus our formal action on the local Korean situation and avoid formal engagement of the USSR with the North Koreans to an extent which might make it difficult for the Soviets to disassociate themselves from the North Koreans in the face of successful free world counter-action. We question whether our "bringing the matter directly to the attention of the USSR Government" and placing on the record "the universally known fact of the USSR's controlling influence over the North Korean regime" does not tend to identify the USSR formally with the invasion forces to a degree contrary to tactical desirability.

We are inclined to feel that for the time being it might be the course of wisdom to postpone a direct approach to the Soviets on the

merits of the issue confining our action toward Soviet participation in a settlement to the routine procedures of notification and information to which the USSR is entitled as a member of the UN (for example the procedure envisaged Depcirtel June 24, 2 p. m.).[1] However, if the Department feels strongly that some direct representation should be made, we would recommend that it be confined to urging Soviet cooperation, which is of course unrealistic but might serve as a basis for appropriate Soviet withdrawal when effective counter-action will have convinced them the risks of perseverance are no longer worth taking.

I am sufficiently persuaded of the validity of the foregoing to request the Department's further consideration. If nevertheless, the Department feels immediate approach should be made, either on the modified line above suggested or as set forth Deptel 538, I will request appointment for purpose this evening.

Department pass London, Paris, USUN, repeated info London niact 261, Paris niact 247, USUN Niact 40. Department pass Tokyo and Seoul, if desired.

KIRK

[1] Presumably this is a reference to the Department's circular telegram dated June 25, 2 a. m., which is summarized in footnote 1 to telegram 613, June 25, 2 a. m., to Seoul, p. 128.

795.1122/6–2650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED
NIACT

SEOUL, June 26, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received June 26—9 : 31 a. m.]

957. In view of rapid deterioration and disintegration, I am immediately starting evacuation of all females toward south. All indications are that situation is disintegrating so rapidly that we may not all be able to get out particularly in view of fighting at Ascom and Kimpo. Plan is to follow road toward Taejon by motor vehicle.[1]

Repeated information CINCFE unnumbered.

MUCCIO

[1] Notes on the source text indicate that an advance copy of this telegram was sent to the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs at 10 : 05 a. m. and also that it was relayed to the Defense Department at 10 : 30 a. m.

Editorial Note

Between 10 : 15 and 10 : 50 a.m., Secretary of State Acheson spoke by telephone with Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations; Senator Alexander Wiley, second ranking minority member of the Committee; and Representative John Kee, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He gave them an account of the Department's action in the crisis and said that the situation seemed to be in hand.

In a subsequent talk with Representative Kee, who called him at 1:45 p. m., the Secretary indicated that, since their earlier conversation, reports indicated that things were now not going so well in Korea. (*Korean Conflict*)

Meanwhile, President Truman had issued his first formal statement on the Korean situation. He referred to his meeting on the previous evening with Secretaries Acheson and Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, termed the action by North Korea "lawless" and "unprovoked aggression", and promised that the United States would "vigorously support the effort of the [Security] Council to terminate this serious breach of the peace". For the complete text, see *United States Policy in the Korean Crisis* (Department of State publication 3922; Washington, Government Printing Office, July 1950), page 16.

357.AD/6–2650 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 26, 1950—2 : 19 p. m.
[Received 3 : 02 p. m.]

541. Following is full text of report from the Korean Commission. On the ground that material in brackets involved military information, sentences in brackets were deleted from the text of the report circulated to the Security Council and made public.[1] Material in brackets was shown privately to members of the SC[2] and we have now urged Secretariat to issue full text on ground this indicates Commission's opinion that North Korean forces were attackers.[3]

"Government of Republic of Korea states that about 04 : 00 hours 25 June attacks were launched in strength by North Korean forces all along the 38th parallel. Major points of attack have included Ongjin peninsula, Kaesong area and Chunchon and east coast where seaborne landings have been reported north and south of Kangnung. Another seaborne landing reported imminent under air cover in Pohang area on southeast coast. The lightest attacks have occurred along the parallel directly north of Seoul along shortest avenue of approach.

[1] Reference is to U.N. document S/1496.
[2] See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Noyes, June 25, p. 144.
[3] The full text was not released at this time.

"[South Korean troops apparently withdrawing to prearranged main line of resistance which runs along Imjin River 27 miles northwest of Seoul where crossing by northern forces has been reported at one point. Attack completely unexpected to both Korean Army and KMAG. Early fragmentary reports indicating complete surprise and withdrawals everywhere now being replaced by more confident statements. Situation reported being stabilized along main line of resistance.]

"Pyongyang radio allegation at 13:35 hours of South Korean invasion across parallel during night declared entirely false by President and Foreign Minister in course of conference with Commission members and PrinSec. Allegations also stated People's Army instructed repulse invading forces by decisive counterattack and placed responsibility for consequences on South Korea. Briefing on situation by President included statement 36 tanks and armoured cars used in northern attacks at four points. Following emergency Cabinet meeting Foreign Minister issuing broadcast to people of South Korea encouraging resistance against dastardly attack. President expressed complete willingness for Commission broadcast urging cease fire and for communication to UN to inform of gravity of situation. Although North Korean declaration of war rumored at 11:00 hours over Pyongyang radio no confirmation available from any source. President not treating broadcast as official notice. US Ambassador appearing before Commission stated his expectation Republican Army would give good account of itself.

"At 17:15 hours four Yak type aircraft strafed civilian and military air fields outside Seoul destroying sole planes, firing gas tanks and attacking jeeps. Yongdungpo railroad station on outskirs also strafed. [South Korean Air Force only consists of 6 training planes.]

"Commission wishes to draw attention of SYG to serious situation developing which is assuming character of full scale war and may endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. It suggests that he consider possibility of bringing matter to notice of SC. Commission will communicate more fully considered recommendation later."

AUSTIN

795.00/6–2650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State (Acheson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 26, 1950.[1]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION AT THE WHITE HOUSE

The President received the Korean Ambassador at the latter's request this afternoon, the Secretary of State being present.

The Korean Ambassador presented to the President the attached resolution of the Korean Parliament,[2] asking for expeditious and

[1] The time of this meeting, according to *Korean Conflict*, was 3:50 p. m.

[2] For the text of the resolution, see telegram 951, June 26, from Seoul, received at 6:02 a. m., p. 167.

substantial help. He said that he had received three telephone calls from President Rhee, stating that the great deficiencies of the Korean forces were in artillery, tanks, and aircraft, and asking for all possible aid in furnishing these. He said that nothing had as yet arrived.

The President said that he had already issued orders to General MacArthur to supply all items of ammunition and equipment which, in General MacArthur's opinion, the Korean army was trained to use, and that the Koreans must now continue to fight effectively so that help from the United States could strengthen them. He pointed out that the battle had been going on for only forty-eight hours and that other men and other countries had defended their liberties under much more discouraging situations through to ultimate victory. The Korean Ambassador insisted that the soldiers were brave but that they did not have adequate equipment. The President again said that help was on the way and that the Koreans must develop the steadfast leadership which would carry them through this crisis.

It was agreed that the Ambassador should say to the press that he had presented a petition asking for help and that the President had assured him that he had issued the necessary orders to give necessary supplies at the earliest possible moment in order to support the resolution of the UN and the efforts of the Koreans to defend themselves.

795.00/6–2750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT SEOUL, June 27, 1950—6 a. m.
[Received June 26—5:07 p. m.]

966. North Korean forces north of Seoul have advanced slightly during night. Best appraisal situation indicates although figures enemy strength and tanks exaggerated enemy nonetheless have numerical superiority vicinity Seoul. Embassy in some current danger owing cut off. President and most Cabinet have departed south from Seoul. Acting PriMin and Defense Minister Sihn and Korean Army Staff still assert will stick it out here. I propose remain Seoul with limited volunteer staff until bitter end, sending Counselor Drumright with few FSO's south by motor vehicle to follow President. It proposed key KMAG personnel move southward via motor vehicle, timing depending upon developments, to preclude potential accusation abandonment; other KMAG personnel to be airlifted.

Repeated info CINCFE.

MUCCIO

795.00/6–2650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

PARIS, June 26, 1950—9 p. m.
[Received June 26—5 : 55 p. m.]

3113. Personal from Bohlen[1] for Kennan. I fully realize that I do not have all the considerations which entered into instruction contained in Department's 538 of June 25 to Moscow,[2] but I am heartily in accord with views contained in Moscow's 1734, repeated Paris 247,[3] expressing doubt as to desirability of making direct approach to Soviet Government in regard to Korean situation. I agree with them that such a direct approach would offer the Soviets a distinct tactical advantage.

(1) They could utilize this approach to confuse the issue and perhaps by holding out some hope of Soviet cooperation in bringing the conflict to a close, et cetera, et cetera. Could easily inhibit or at least introduce a delaying element in any international or US action which might be in contemplation to assist South Koreans. It would not take too much for certain members of the Security Council to seize on any ray of hope from Moscow to try to hold up further UN action.

(2) Perhaps even more important, it would publicly involve the Soviet Union directly in the Korean matter. We all know, of course, that the Kremlin has set in motion and is directing the Korean operation, but as long as it is not so publicly cited, it would be easier for the Soviets privately to restrain the North Koreans if as a result of strong, determined countermeasures the Kremlin considered that the risks were becoming too great.

This would certainly appear to be a very clear case of typical Stalin methods whereby he initiates action not formally and directly involving the Soviet Union which he can and will press to the full if only weakness is encountered while leaving himself a way out without too direct loss of Soviet face if he considers the risks were becoming too great. It is significant to note in support of this contention that the chief Soviet-Communist propaganda line is that the South Koreans are the aggressors seeking on US instigation to provoke a general war while the North Koreans are merely repelling attacks on their territory. This is standard cover used by any aggressor, but it also indicates the facesaving way out if the Kremlin for its own reason decides that South Korea is not worth the risk of a major conflict.

This is the clearest case of direct defiance of the United States plus for the first time overt violation of a frontier that has occurred since the end of the war and you may be sure that all Europeans to say nothing of the Asiatics are watching to see what the United States

[1] Charles E. Bohlen, Minister at the American Embassy in Paris.
[2] Transmitted at 4 p. m., p. 148.
[3] Received on June 26 at 8 : 09 a. m., p. 169.

will do. It is a situation requiring the maximum firmness, and even a willingness to take major risks in order to convince the Kremlin that we mean business without, however, forcing them publicly into a position from which there can be no retreat.

It is for these reasons that I completely agree with Moscow's telegram under reference that what is needed is the strongest and most vigorous countermeasures backed by the US on the spot in order to convince the Kremlin that the most serious risks are directly involved in the North Korean aggression. In submitting the foregoing I realize that there may be overriding reasons from point of view of public opinion or UN attitudes which necessitate an approach to the Soviet Government in this situation in which case I would certainly agree with Moscow's suggestion that it would be merely confined to a simple request for cooperation. [Bohlen.]

BRUCE

795.00/6–2650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

PARIS, June 26, 1950—9 p. m.
[Received June 26—6 : 15 p. m.]

3118. Saw Parodi [1] tonight at his request. He read me telegram from Massigli [2] reporting latter's conversations with British Foreign Office. Gist of report was that British seemed rather calm over Korean episode, were busy analyzing Russian motives and because of their Far Eastern commitments, especially Hong Kong and Malaya, would be unable to make any military contribution to South Korea. Parodi disappointed over what he considers phlegmatic British attitude and puzzled over reasons their amendment requiring time-consuming report from UNCOK.[3] Parodi said that in absence of a French Government, any views expressed by him were personal, but that he hoped US would send American troops and throw back Northern assault. Further, he believed that if such action were taken, the Russians would not send their own troops to attack ours or use our action as a reason to wage war there or elsewhere. If we do not send American troops, he thinks Korea will quickly be overrun and Western prestige irretrievably impaired. Bidault [4] compares situation

[1] Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry.
[2] René Massigli, French Ambassador in the United Kingdom.
[3] Reference is to the British amendment (S/1498) to the U.S. draft resolution (S/1497) introduced at the June 25 meeting of the U.N. Security Council; for the record of the proceedings, see U.N. document S/PV.473.
[4] Georges Bidault had been French Prime Minister from October 28, 1949 until June 24, 1950.

at present to Hitler tactics in 1938 and 1939 and the plucking of the leaves of an artichoke. Parodi expressed grave concern at repercussions in Indochina in event all Korea fell to Communist forces, a sentiment known to be fully shared and strongly expressed earlier today by Pignon.[5]

We will repeat all messages this subject to London, HICOG, Moscow and hope they will keep us similarly informed.

Department pass Moscow. Repeated information London 879, Moscow 118, Frankfort 441.

BRUCE

[5] Léon Pignon, French High Commissioner in Indochina, was at this time in France.

795.00/6–2750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT SEOUL, June 27, 1950—8 a. m.

[Received June 26—6:54 p. m.]

967. Acting PriMin visited me 7 a. m. Confirmed President had left at 3 a. m. heading for Chinhae and Cabinet at 7 a. m. for south both travelling by special trains.

Capt. Sihn says fight will be all over by this afternoon, in meantime has turned over full authority to chief Army Staff Chae Pyong Tuk and radioed people to remain indoors and calm when tanks arrive. He says he will stay in Seoul with Army command to end. He despaired of saving anything and inquired possibility President and Cabinet moving to Japan as "government in exile." I made no commitment.

Repeated information CINCFE.

MUCCIO

795.00/6–2650 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 26, 1950—7 p. m.

540. Dept appreciates importance considerations set forth Embtel 1734, June 26 and recognizes disadvantages of involving Sov prestige more directly in Korean aggression. Our proposed approach was predicated on belief, so ably set forth in Embtel 1726, June 25, that Sovs not now prepared risk possibility full-scale war with West and hence will not permit themselves become directly involved in Korean hostilities. We wld expect them for this and other reasons, assuming that UN and

US reaction to Korean attack is firm as it has been, to reply to our approach by denying their responsibility for action of "North Korean Govt" and hence to refuse to permit themselves to be directly involved.

Our reasons for considering an approach along these lines desirable at this time were fol: We incline to view that, as long as Sovs can utilize their satellites or stooges to take aggressive action without serious danger of becoming involved themselves, they will be likely to employ this device with increasing boldness. If, on other hand, it can be made clear to them that aggressive action by satellites risks involving their prestige directly, they may, in light considerations set forth Embtel 1726, be more cautious in pushing such tactic to extremes.

Second reason prompting Dept's proposal is that excellent opportunity is here offered to disrupt Sov peace offensive [1] which, as Emb is aware, is assuming serious proportions and having a certain effect on public opinion in many critical areas. Prompt and explicit exposure of Sov responsibility for clear-cut case of aggression shld go far, appropriately played by Western propaganda, to destroy effectiveness of peace offensive.

In light these considerations, Dept believes that approach outlined Deptel 538, June 25, shld be made promptly. In deference Emb's views, however, opening clause third sentence of reftel shld be altered to read as fol: "In view universally known fact close relations between USSR and North Korean regime".

ACHESON

[1] Documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in volume IV.

795.00/6–2650: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 26, 1950—7 p. m.

505. Yugo Amb [1] called today to inquire re Korean situation. We took occasion to express surprise at Yugo abstention in vote on major portion resolution adopted yesterday by UN SC. Amb, appearing clearly on defensive, sought to explain action on grounds (1) that Yugo had recognized North Korean Govt year ago; (2) that Yugo had not recognized UN Korean Comm; (3) that facts as reported yesterday had not made perfectly clear which party was responsible for attack; and (4) that Yugos felt their resolution,[2] which called on both parties to cease hostilities and withdraw behind frontier, was adequate to meet need until situation further clarified.

[1] Vladimir Popovic.

[2] See footnote 4 to the U.N. Security Council resolution adopted on June 25, p. 156.

We replied that there is no question that North Koreans had invaded South Korea without slightest provocation from ROK, which had been taken completely by surprise. We added it was obvious North Korea wld not have taken such action without Sov inspiration. We pointed out vital importance of SC taking prompt and effective action in cases of armed aggression against independent countries and expressed view it must certainly be in Yugo's direct interest that precedents for SC action of this character be created.

In view of fact SC will presumably be asked to take further action on Korean case and desirability that such action have unanimous support you are requested urgently to reiterate above considerations to ranking Yugo officials.

ACHESON

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123 Muccio, John J.

The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald)

UNCLASSIFIED
NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1950—9 p. m.

483. For Ambassador.[1] While Department deeply appreciates willingness you and members your staff remain Seoul, it is felt inadvisable for you or any members your staff voluntarily to become hostages and accordingly unless there are overriding considerations not known here Department feels you should endeavor leave Seoul to join Government before safe departure becomes impossible.

ACHESON

[1] This message was repeated to Seoul as Department telegram 629.

795.00/6–2650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 26, 1950.

Subject: Korean Situation

Participants: The President
Secretary Acheson
Secretary Johnson
Mr. Matthews, Mr. Rusk, Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Jessup (State Dept)
Secretary Pace
Secretary Finletter
General Bradley
Admiral Sherman
General Vandenberg
General Collins
(Secretary Matthews[1] arrived just after meeting adjourned)

[1] Reference is to Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews.

The above group met with the President at Blair House at 9:00 PM.[2]

GENERAL VANDENBERG reported that the First Yak plane had been shot down.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that he hoped that it was not the last.

GENERAL VANDENBERG read the text of the orders which had been issued to our Air Forces calling on them to take "aggressive action" against any planes interfering with their mission or operating in a manner unfriendly to the South Korean forces. He indicated, however, that they had been avoiding combat where the direct carrying-out of their mission was not involved.

MR. ACHESON suggested that an all-out order be issued to the Navy and Air Force to waive all restrictions on their operations in Korea and to offer the fullest possible support to the South Korean forces, attacking tanks, guns, columns, etc., of the North Korean forces in order to give a chance to the South Koreans to reform.

THE PRESIDENT said he approved this.

MR. PACE inquired whether this meant action only south of the 38th parallel.

Mr. ACHESON said this was correct. He was making no suggestion for any action across the line.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked whether this meant also that they should not fly over the line.

MR. ACHESON said they should not.

THE PRESIDENT said this was correct; that no action should be taken north of the 38th parallel. He added "not yet".

MR. PACE said that care should be used to avoid hitting friendly forces.

GENERAL COLLINS agreed but suggested that the orders themselves should not put restrictions on the operation.

MR. ACHESON said that if it was considered useful the orders could add that the purpose which the orders would implement is to support South Korean forces in conformity with the resolution of the Security Council.

MR. ACHESON said that the second point he wished to bring up was that orders should be issued to the Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on Formosa.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed.

MR. ACHESON continued that at the same time the National Government of China should be told to desist from operations against the

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[2] In his account of the June 26 meeting, President Truman quoted from General MacArthur's "latest message," which stated that North Korean tanks were entering the suburbs of Seoul and that the South Koreans were unable to resist the North Korean offensive (*Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, Volume Two, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), p. 337).

mainland and that the Seventh Fleet should be ordered to see that those operations would cease.

MR. ACHESON said his third point was an increase in the United States military forces in the Philippines and an acceleration of aid to the Philippines in order that we might have a firm base there.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed.

MR. ACHESON said his fourth point was that aid to Indochina should be stepped up and that a strong military mission should be sent.

He suggested that on all these matters if orders were issued tonight it would be desirable for the President to make a statement tomorrow. He handed the President a rough draft [3] of the type of statement which might be issued.

THE PRESIDENT said he would work on the statement tonight. The President continued that he wished consideration given to taking Formosa back as part of Japan and putting it under MacArthur's Command.

MR. ACHESON said that he had considered this move but had felt that it should be reserved for later and should not be announced at this time. It required further study.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had a letter [3] from the Generalissimo about one month (?)[4] ago to the effect that the Generalissimo might step out of the situation if that would help. He said this was a private letter and he had kept it secret. He said that we might want to proceed along those lines in order to get Chinese forces helping us. He thought that the Generalissimo might step out if MacArthur were put in.

MR. ACHESON said that the Generalissimo was unpredictable and that it was possible that he might resist and "throw the ball game". He said that it might be well to do this later.

THE PRESIDENT said that was alright. He himself thought that it was the next step.

Mr. JOHNSON said that the proposals made by the Secretary of State pleased him very much. He thought that if we hold the line as indicated that that was alright.

MR. ACHESON added in regard to the Formosan situation that he thought it undesirable that we should get mixed up in the question of the Chinese administration of the Island.

THE PRESIDENT said that we were not going to give the Chinese "a nickel" for any purpose whatever. He said that all the money we had given them is now invested in United States real estate.

MR. JOHNSON added or in banks in the Philippine Islands.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said that the Command of the Seventh Fleet could be either under Admiral Radford at Pearl Harbor [5] or under

[3] Not printed.
[4] The parenthetical question mark is in the source text.
[5] Adm. Arthur W. Radford was Commander in Chief, Pacific.

General MacArthur. He said that under the orders issued yesterday the Seventh Fleet had been ordered to proceed to Japan and placed under General MacArthur's Command. He said that the orders in regard to Formosa would be issued from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur so to employ the forces allocated by Admiral Radford to General MacArthur.

No objection was raised to this statement.

MR. ACHESON said that the Security Council would meet tomorrow afternoon and that the Department had prepared a further resolution for adoption. Our reports were that we would get full support. He noted that even the Swedes were now supporting us.

MR. HICKERSON. read the draft of the Security Council resolution recommending that UN members render such assistance as was needed to Korea to repel the attack.[6]

THE PRESIDENT said that was right. He said we wanted everyone in on this, including Hong Kong.

GENERAL BRADLEY reported that British Air Marshal Tedder[7] had come in to see him, was generally in accord with our taking the firm position, and gave General Bradley a full report of the forces which the British have in that area.

MR. RUSK pointed out that it was possible the Russians would come to the Security Council meeting and cast a veto. In that case we would still take the position that we could act in support of the Charter.

THE PRESIDENT said that was right. He rather wished they would veto. Ne said we needed to lay a base for our action in Formosa. He said that he would work on the draft of his statement tonight and would talk to the Defense and State Departments in the morning regarding the final text.

MR. RUSK pointed out that it was Mr. Kennan's estimate that Formosa would be the next likely spot for a Communist move.

SECRETARY JOHNSON reported that SCAP's guess was that the next move would be on Iran. He thought there should be a check on this.

GENERAL COLLINS said that SCAP did not have as much global information as they have in Washington. He and Mr. Pace stated that they have asked for full reports all over the world in regard to any developments, particularly of Soviet preparations.

SECRETARY JOHNSON suggested to Mr. Acheson that it would be advisable to have some talks with the UK regarding possible action in Iran.

MR. ACHESON said he would talk with both the British and French.

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[6] The resolution was introduced at the 474th meeting of the U.N. Security Council on June 27 as document S/1508/Rev. 1; see editorial note, p. 207.

[7] R.A.F. Air Marshal Lord Tedder was Chairman of the British Joint Services Mission in Washington.

MR. ACHESON asked Admiral Sherman whether he desired that any action should be taken regarding the utilization of the Sakishimas, south of Okinawa.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said he would leave this to General MacArthur.

MR. ACHESON said it would be better to put any necessary supporting air forces on these Islands than to try to put them on Formosa itself.

MR. PACE inquired whether the State Department would inform Ambassador Muccio concerning the orders which were being given.

MR. ACHESON said from latest reports it would probably be impossible for us to contact Ambassador Muccio.

GENERAL COLLINS reported that they were in contact with Seoul through a ham radio operator there.

MR. PACE said that they could pass a message to Ambassador Muccio through General MacArthur.

MR. ACHESON suggested that the President might wish to get in Senator Connally and other members of the Senate and House and tell them what had been decided.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had a meeting scheduled for 10:00 tomorrow morning with the Big Four and that he would get in any others that the Secretary thought should be added. He suggested that Secretaries Acheson and Johnson should also be there.

MR. JOHNSON suggested that the majority and minority members of the two Armed Services Committees be included.

After the discussion it was agreed to set the meeting for 11:30.

THE PRESIDENT then read the following list of persons to be included in the meeting:

> The Big Four (Lucas, Rayburn, McCormack—the Vice President will be out of town),[8] Senators Connally, Wiley, George, Alexander Smith, Thomas of Utah, Tydings and Bridges; Congressmen Kee, Eaton, Vinson and Short.

MR. JOHNSON referred again to the draft statement for the President, said that it was very forthright, that he liked it very much and that the Joint Chiefs would consider it during the evening and make any suggestions in the morning.

GENERAL COLLINS stated that the military situation in Korea was bad. It was impossible to say how much our air can do. The Korean Chief of Staff has no fight left in him.

MR. ACHESON stated that it was important for us to do something even if the effort were not successful.

MR. JOHNSON said that even if we lose Korea this action would save the situation. He said this action "suits me". He then asked whether

[8] The Big Four referred to here, in addition to Vice President Alben W. Barkley, are Senate Majority Leader Scott Lucas, Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, and House Majority Leader John McCormack.

any of the military representatives had any objection to the course of action which had been outlined. There was no objection.

GENERAL VANDENBERG, in response to a question from Mr. Finletter, said that he bet a tank would be knocked out before dark.

THE PRESIDENT said he had done everything he could for five years to prevent this kind of situation. Now the situation is here and we must do what we can to meet it. He had been wondering about the mobilization of the National Guard and asked General Bradley if that was necessary now. If it was he must go to Congress and ask for funds. He was merely putting the subject on the table for discussion. He repeated we must do everything we can for the Korean situation—"for the United Nations".

GENERAL BRADLEY said that if we commit our ground forces in Korea we cannot at the same time carry out our other commitments without mobilization. He wondered if it was better to wait now on the question of mobilization of the National Guard. He thought it would be preferable to wait a few days.

THE PRESIDENT said he wished the Joint Chiefs to think about this and to let him know in a few days time. He said "I don't want to go to war".

GENERAL COLLINS stated that if we were going to commit ground forces in Korea we must mobilize.

MR. ACHESON suggested that we should hold mobilization in reserve.

MR. JOHNSON said he hoped these steps already authorized will settle the Korean question.

THE PRESIDENT said the next question would be the mobilization of the Fleet Reserve.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said there must be a degree of balance.

THE PRESIDENT noted that there is some pretty good air in the National Guard. He had never been in favor of this and thought it should be like the Naval Reserve.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said he was very glad to hear the President say this.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN asked whether MacArthur could anchor the fleet in Formosan ports if necessary.

THE PRESIDENT asked Mr. Acheson what he thought about this.

MR. ACHESON said that they should go ahead and do it.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said this would be the best procedure.

GENERAL COLLINS remarked that if we had had standing orders we could have stopped this. We must consider this problem for the future.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed.

MR. JOHNSON said that if there was danger of a Russian veto in the Security Council the President's statement should be put out before the Security Council meets tomorrow.

MR. ACHESON agreed.

330/6–2650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY BELGRADE, June 26, 1950—7 p. m.

[Received June 26—9 : 55 p. m.]

812. Deputy Foreign Minister Prica has just told me this morning high Yugoslav authorities have been meeting for several hours on Korean situation and had decided to instruct Bebler [1] to press for resolution condemning aggression, calling on both sides to return to original positions, and demanding UN investigation. Bebler will be instructed to abstain on other issues.

Prica referred to special difficulties facing Yugoslavia in this matter. I pointed out that situation seemed to me entirely clear cut for Yugoslavia and every one else. Whether UN could take decisive action in face of open aggression was as important to Yugoslavia as any other country in world. I said I hoped isolationism in America was dead but that Yugoslav Government should remember that if other countries were hesitant to cooperate with US in banishing aggression, Americans could become disillusioned. I knew of no country which might be more affected by such a development than Yugoslavia. I said that if Yugoslavia ever had occasion to invoke UN assistance, I hoped Yugoslav Government would not have cause to regret position it had taken in Korean case.

ALLEN

[1] Ales Bebler, Yugoslav representative on the U.N. Security Council.

295.1122/6–2750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

PLAIN NIACT SEOUL, June 27, 1950.

[Received June 26, 1950—11 : 12 p. m.]

Unnumbered. Counselor Drumright accompanied by Commander Seifert, Naval Attaché, Lt. Colonel Edwards, Military Attaché, J. Stewart, Public Affairs Officer, Prendergast, Third Secretary, Ivo Fatigati, clerk, Branch, JAS motor officer, left via motor 10 a. m. today to follow Korean Government south.

I am remaining at ROK national defense headquarters accompanied by Berry, clerk, Morgan, JAS commission officer, Smith, JAS motor officer, MacDonald, Third Secretary, Edwards, security, Holland, KMAG, and Lynch, Military Attaché. My party plans to leave with last KMAG party for Siheung 1500 today possibly proceeding Taijon under cover darkness if situation deteriorates.

All other personnel include 33 KMAG, 20 UNCOK,[1] 14 Chinese. 5 British. ECA and JAS to be airlifted. If airlift fail, for [apparent garble] up to 150 can be transported by motor south.

Exceptions to above are Bishop Patrick Byrne and Father Carroll of Apostolic delegation who remaining Seoul in their quarters time being.

Repeated information Tokyo.

MUCCIO

[1] On June 27, UNCOK decided to leave Korea for Japan. On the following day, having been informed by SCAP that it was feasible to return to Pusan, Korea, the Commission resolved to do so and sent an advance party which arrived in Pusan on June 30; for details, see U.N. document A/1350, p. 30.

795.00/6–2650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT THE HAGUE, June 26, 1950—midnight.

[Received June 26—11 : 19 p. m.]

773. After today's Cabinet meeting I saw Stikker[1] by appointment this evening at his house and asked him for the reaction of the Dutch Cabinet to the Korean attack. He intimated that he was not surprised at my visit and said that his own opinion was an accurate reflection of that of the whole government—that he was extremely concerned for he felt that if the US should "permit" South Korea to fall the consequences for all Asia, but particularly SEA, would be absolutely disastrous. We, he continued—the Western world—could write the whole area off forever. He added that he would not mention the effect on Western Europe which would be lamentable, but preferred at this time to confine himself to Asia. I then asked whether he thought that this was a feint to cover some action towards the West. He replied no and that in his opinion this is an effort to clear out the North Asian Continent and have a base pointed at Japan.

Stikker said he felt that this was one more Russian bluff, although a very serious one, and that he was convinced that the Russians did not want war, were not prepared for it and would back down if strong, immediate counteraction were taken. He said that it was apparent from the rapidity with which events were moving that there was not time to wait for action by the Security Council. He had no doubts that this invasion was sponsored, planned and directed by the Russians. He expressed hope that US aid would not be limited to supplies. When

[1] Dirk Stikker, Netherlands Foreign Minister.

I asked him whether he meant by this the landing and employment of American troops, he said of course, for one could always find a reasonable excuse. "Had not an American plane been attacked?" He referred to a Dutch Government release this morning which although attributed to a spokesman had been given out by him personally. In this he stated that North Korea attack was a "test case" for US policy in Asia and that it would be so judged throughout all Asia. He added in this statement that "in responsible circles in the Netherlands" it was firmly believed that the US would not fail in its active support to the threatened country.

Stikker concluded our interview by saying (as I am informed he also said to AP correspondent) "all eyes are on America."

However, since drafting above telegram I learn from Huyler[2] who has seen Queen's chief political advisor that consensus of official Dutch opinion is that "Korea will be lost as result of American default, as usual."

Department pass Paris, London, Tokyo; repeated information Paris 178, Moscow 14, London 193.

CHAPIN

[2] Coulter D. Huyler, Attaché at the American Embassy in The Hague.

JUNE 27, 1950

(Tuesday)

795.00/6–2750 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 27, 1950—1 a. m.

3124. Advise FonOff urgently of substance of following:

North Korean forces, armed for this purpose by Sov Union with planes and tanks, have invaded ROK and captured capital.[2] UNSC has called upon invading troops to cease hostilities and withdraw to 38th parallel. This has not been done but on contrary invasion has been pressed forward. SC has called upon all UN members to render UN every assistance in execution this res. In circumstances President has ordered US air and sea forces to give cover and support to ROK forces.

[1] Repeated niact for action to the Embassies in Paris as 3018, Rome as 2288, Oslo as 427, Ottawa as 97, Lisbon as 176, Copenhagen as 357, Brussels as 844, New Delhi as 640, Manila as 1117, Canberra as 124, Wellington as 95, The Hague as 635, and to the Legations in Luxembourg as 65, Reykjavik as 59, and Saigon as 422; and also repeated for information to the Embassy in Moscow as 541.

[2] North Korean troops did not actually seize the center of Seoul until the early afternoon of June 28 (Korean time); see Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950)*, a volume in the series *United States Army in the Korean War* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 34.

Attack makes amply clear centrally directed Communist Imperialism [3] has passed beyond subversion in seeking conquer independent nations and now resorting to armed aggression and war. It has defied UNSC. In circumstances Communist occupation of Formosa would directly threaten security of Pacific area and US forces performing necessary and legitimate functions that area.

Pres has accordingly ordered Seventh Fleet, which is taking necessary positions, to prevent any attack on Formosa. He is also calling upon Chi Govt in Formosa to cease all sea and air operations against mainland. Fleet will see this is done. Future status of Formosa must await determination in connection with restoration of Pacific security, peace settlement with Japan or possible UN consideration.

Pres has also directed military assistance to Phils be expedited and US forces there strengthened.

Pres has similarly directed military assistance to French and Associated States forces in IndoChina be expedited and US military mission sent to provide close working relations with those forces.

Since return to rule of force would have far-reaching effects all UN members must carefully consider consequences of latest aggression. US rep on SC accordingly advising it of these steps.

Foregoing will be announced at approximately 12 noon E.D.T. June 27.[4]

ACHESON

[3] The British Foreign Office in a message to the British Embassy in Washington suggested the removal of the reference to "centrally directed Communist imperialism", on the grounds that the Soviet Union should be allowed the opportunity to beat a retreat when confronted with U.S. determination to oppose aggression in Korea. The substance of the message from the Foreign Office was transmitted to the Department of State, and the words in question were not included in the statement as issued on June 27 by President Truman, p. 202. On the following day, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin expressed his gratitude for the acceptance of the suggested changes in a message to Mr. Acheson. (611.61/6–2750; 795.00/6–2850)

This suggested omission was the only one specifically mentioned in the British communication, but see also telegram 973, June 29, from New Delhi, received on June 29 at 3:54 p. m., p. 234.

[4] See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Jessup of the meeting held at the White House at 11:30 a. m. on June 27, p. 200.

330/6–2750: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 27, 1950—1 a. m.

3125. At UNSC meeting June 27 Austin [1] will introduce resolution which after appropriate preamble will contain following operative paragraph:

"Recommends that the Members of the UN furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack."

[1] Warren R. Austin, U.S. Representative at the United Nations.

Please advise FonOff with request it telephone instructions to its SC rep to support this res.

Sent London as 3125 repeated for action to Paris as 3019 and Oslo as 428.

ACHESON

611.94A/6-2750 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in China

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 27, 1950—1 a. m.

Telcan 39. Top secret and eyes only for Strong.[1] You are directed to seek an interview at once with the Gimo [2] and to communicate to him the fol msg, of which a copy shld be left as an *aide-mémoire:*

"I have been directed by my Govt to communicate to your Excellency the fol:

The attack of the North Korean forces against the Republic of Korea raises problems concerning the security of the Pacific area to which the United States, in view of its responsibilities in Japan and its general interest in the peace of the area, cannot be indifferent.

For this reason, the United States Seventh Fleet has been ordered to prevent any attack from the mainland against the island of Formosa, and the necessary dispositions have already been made.

Your Excellency will understand that a continuation of air and sea operations by forces under Your Excellency's command against the Chinese mainland or against shipping in Chinese waters or on the high seas wld not be compatible with the discharge by the Seventh Fleet of the mission assigned to it. The US Govt is therefore confident of your full cooperation in the issuance of the orders necessary to effect the termination of such operations, and its forces have been instructed to proceed on the assumption that such orders have been issued.

Your Excellency will appreciate that these steps are motivated by a deep concern not only for the peace and stability of the Pacific area but also for the future freedom and well being of the peoples of China and Formosa."

ACHESON

[1] Robert C. Strong was Consul at Taipei and Chargé at the American Embassy in the Republic of China.

[2] Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had resumed office as President of the Republic of China on March 1, 1950.

330/6-2650 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, June 26, 1950—midnight.
PRIORITY [Received June 27—1:35 a. m.]

546. Reports from USUN re Korea: The following telegram reports conversations by USUN officers with other delegations and

Secretariat personnel and is substituted for usual USUN daily classified summary and separate documents of these conversations.[1]

Views of Security Council Members:

UK—In exploratory talk on possible courses of action which SC might take in event North Koreans ignored resolution, Laskey (UK) indicated he had no instructions. He gave personal estimate of type of action which Council might be willing to take. It might make findings in more detail regarding invasion and determine it was unprovoked act of aggression, violation of Charter, et cetera. He also thought SC would be willing to authorize or give blessing to action which any member might take in support of south Koreans with respect to military aid.

Laskey doubted Council's willingness to give blessing to direct military support, or to lay aggression at door of USSR. In any case, he felt Council would be swayed by events. If South Korea had fallen or was obviously about to fall, there would be no inclination to take strong action. If South Korea appeared able to hold out, chances for strong action would greatly increase. However, he felt there would be difficulty in assuming full moral responsibility for action which might result in third world war.

In confidence, Laskey indicated British Embassy Moscow had suggested SC take advantage of Russian absence to request USSR formally to support Council's June 26 [*25*] action. UK delegation reaction, he indicated, was that it would be inappropriate to direct resolution to Russians but that this general line might be developed in speeches. He had no question in his mind that Russians were fully responsible. He seemed to hold view it might be advantageous not to lay attack at door of Russians in hope that if South Koreans proved strong enough to defend themselves, the Russians might conceivably ditch North Koreans since Russians had not committed their own prestige publicly. (Noyes, J. Hyde.)

Ecuador—at end of SC meeting June 25, Correa (Ecuador) said he had just been on telephone to Quito and had been instructed to keep in closest touch with USUN and to support US moves in dealing with problem. He added that continuing and strong Ecuadoran support in SC could be counted upon. (J. Hyde.)

Cuba—During the meeting, Ribas (Cuba) stated there was no question of their continuing support in handling problem. (J. Hyde.)

China—Tsiang (China) telephoned and recalled that US Chargé in Formosa had been in touch with former's government and that understanding was that US and China would keep in close touch on

[1] The names of the members of the U.S. Delegation involved in the conversations are given parenthetically at the end of each section.

Korean case. In light of this, he asked what last word on US thinking was. (J. Hyde.)

Views of Members not Represented on Security Council:

Australia (UNCOK member)—Indicating no reactions had yet been received from his government but that they were expected June 27, Shann's personal view was that Australia would be prepared to support SC action calling for armed intervention and that its position would be as strong as that of any UN member. His conversations with other members had given him impression that most would gladly support a resolution which meant US would fight their battles. He thought UN might be prepared to support action placing responsibility on Soviet Union but he did not feel this would be of much value even though it resulted in their ouster from the UN.

Considering this action on part of Russians a clear indication that they did not intend to return to UN, and having thought for a long time that reorganization of UN without them would be advantageous, Shann now felt it was far preferable to oust them over an issue of this kind rather than for them to leave over an issue such as Chinese representation. In his opinion, events in Korea made it impossible to seat Chinese Communists at GA.

Shann thought there would be little advantage in a GA special session unless it were called to work out strong measures to save the situation. It might provide an opportunity for the small powers who feared starting a world war to exercise influence in the direction of mediation, half measures, et cetera, but he thought they might prefer to be faced with a SC decision binding upon them.

The UN had no alternative but to stand up to this test, in Shann's view, for if it failed to do so, it would go way of League and situation in South East Asia would be worse than disastrous.

In earlier conversation, Shann indicated that although the June 25 resolution was vital, it was obvious to him that no attention would be paid it by North Koreans. He wanted to know what US could do in way of meeting force with force and thought perhaps the Australians were in position to help if UN decided to take strong action. (Noyes.)

Philippines (UNCOK member)—Ingles (Philippines) as usual had nothing to say in Romulo's absence. Romulo apparently told him before departing for Manila that he would telephone or telegraph "some thoughts" to delegation here. (Maffitt.)

Canada—Although he had no word from his government on Korean developments, Holmes (Canada) expressed view that SC might conceivably give its blessing to any military action which US was willing to take. He agreed some action would be necessary June 27 or 28. (Noyes, J. Hyde.)

Dominican Republic—During SC meeting, De Marchena (Dominican Republic) said he had been on telephone to his Foreign Office and his government was firmly behind vigorous US approach to problem. In subsequent conversation, Henriquez-Urena did not appear unduly alarmed, seeing present situation as simply another provocative act in series occurring in past few months. He felt June 25 resolution was sufficient first step but next one should be stronger. He suggested possibility of Council calling on any country able to do so to go all out to Korea's assistance. He felt SC vote had shown unanimity in free areas of world. (J. Hyde, Maffitt.)

Uruguay—Fabregat (Uruguay) was very much alarmed, said concept of aggression could not be tolerated and thought strongest measures should be taken. He had no specific suggestion but felt Henriquez-Urena's idea should be tried. (Maffitt.)

Argentina—Situation was most serious and required energetic measures, Munoz (Argentina) stated. He thought it time to call things by their right names and therefore USSR should be named as source of this aggression. He greatly feared results in rest of Asia from successful aggression in Korea. (Maffitt.)

Pakistan—Chhatari (Pakistan) said formally that Pakistanis deplored this resort to arms and any government striking at foundations of UN through aggression should be dealt with very strongly. He thought June 25 resolution childish but seemed to be referring more to fact that only UN action so far had been a resolution. If all an aggressor had to fear from SC was paper resolution, he said aggression would not be deterred. He was worried at possibility an aggressor might get away with his act and present world with *fait accompli* of most illegal nature. (Maffitt.)

Netherlands—Luns had been instructed to impress on all members he saw how seriously Netherlands Government considered this crisis in UN. Discussing next SC step, Luns felt it necessary to go farther and probably attempt a resolution condemning North Koreans action, and making it possible not only for US but all members to supply at least material assistance to South Korea. He found President's statement strong and very helpful.

Speaking personally, Luns felt if Council adopted resolution calling on members to assist Korean Republic with military supplies, Netherlands would be prepared to do so at least in token manner. He referred to strong Dutch forces now in Pacific and thought it possible that his government, if asked on basis of such resolution, would supply perhaps two destroyers. He stressed Dutch still had interests in Pacific and took very basic view as UN member.

Luns was critical of France, feeling they did not see clearly enough the implications of this attack on over-all Asian situation. Indochina

and Korea were all part of Asia problem. He offered make preliminary check with his government as to what military assistance it would be prepared to give. He referred with some bitterness to statement by Indonesian spokesman that this was US-Russian fight in which Indonesians should be absolutely neutral. Commenting on immediate SC activities, Luns gave personal view, as was all of above, that escape hatch should be allowed for Russians to disassociate selves from what may prove to be unsuccessful adventure. (J. Hyde.)

Brazil—Ouro Preto fully supported resolution adopted by SC but, in absence of his ambassador, indicated he would have to ask for instructions as to general line to follow if cease-fire order ignored. Commenting on desire of number of members to admit Chinese Communists, he implied there would be considerable sentiment among such nations against taking strong action. He gave impression his attitude was one of extreme caution rather than that he had strong views against UN taking strong action. (Noyes.)

Sweden—Grafstrom (Sweden) felt this was most serious crisis that UN has faced in two years. He agreed that if North Koreans disregarded SC order, Council must take further action if UN was to survive. He was thinking in terms of resolution condemnatory of North Korean regime and permitting US and others to give military assistance to Republic. There was no implication that his government would be party to such undertaking, but Grafstrom stressed that further action should be taken. He was clearly thinking of sanctions. He felt strongly that handling of case should not point finger inevitably to Russians as responsible. He thought to attempt to underline Russian liability and supply military assistance to the Republic of Korea on that basis meant war. (J. Hyde.)

Thailand—Amatayakul (Thailand) had no instructions and said he did not expect any. He seemed most concerned to report to his government on (1) whether US at June 27 meeting would ask aid be given by members to Korea; and (2) what validity should be given to Pyongyang allegation that June 25 resolution was illegal because Nationalist Chinese participated. (Maffitt.)

Turkey—During SC meeting, Kural (Turkey) advocated a strong line in conversation with USUN and said he was sorry SC resolution had been watered down. It was first time in his view that Communists had undertaken direct military aggression without attempt to cover it up. He thought this was important test which must be met with strong action. He wondered what US was prepared to do when it was clear that resolution was being ignored. (Noyes.)

Indonesia—Palar (Indonesia) who was also interviewed at SC meeting, fully supported US resolution and course of action it contemplated. However, he was somewhat concerned that his people did not

have full information necessary to convince them of serious significance of this attack. At outset, he expressed anxiety that Indonesians might think SC acted without full information in finding South Korea had been invaded. He was convinced SC resolution would be ignored by North Koreans and wondered what US was prepared to do in that case. Palar was most anxious to keep in close touch with USUN and planned to get in touch immediately with his government. (Noyes.)

Other Comments:

Mascia, Italian observer, stated his government was not only deeply interested but concerned because it saw in this case the future of the UN directly involved. He liked the US approach. (J. Hyde.)

Feller and Cordier (Secretariat) were both delighted at Lie's strong statement in SC. Cordier was quite frank in pressing view this would help SYG in light of his current troubles with American public opinion. They felt this event helped Lie to prove he was a UN man right down the line regardless of which way the chips fell.

Both UN officials advanced idea that Council's resolution would not be effective and indicated their understanding that major decision had to be made whether to meet force with force. They seemed to favor a strong line. Cordier indicated this development would completely upset all UN plans, including especially question of seating Chinese Communists. He considered it out of question that they would be seated either at ECOSOC session July 3 or at GA. (Noyes.)

AUSTIN

795.00/6–2750 : Telegram

The Chargé in Viet-Nam (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

SAIGON, June 27, 1950—noon.
[Received June 27—4 : 24 a. m.]

513. 1. First word local French had of Korea attack was fragmentary UP message received morning June 25. I delivered news in Seoul's 925 to Department, June 25, to High Commissariat in afternoon of June 25 which was first confirmation received here. French are not receiving any information directly from Far East sources in any quantity and appreciate all information we can pass to them.

2. French asked if we had any advance warning. I assumed that our authorities may have had but I personally had none. French had no advance intelligence information according to Acting Commander-in-Chief and Acting High Commissioner. Practically all important Vietnamese and French now in France for Inter-State Conference.[1] Assume Paris may do cable on their reactions.

[1] For related documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 690 ff.

3. Following is preliminary report on IC reactions as seen from Saigon:

4. Attack gravely disquieting to Vietnamese already worried about future, constancy of American intentions, and uncertain of their nationhood. Similarities in IC and Korean situation suggest to all levels of population that if Soviet-inspired forces are attacking without regard to UN and US in order "unify" Korea, then Soviets and Chinese may do same in aid of Viet Minh. Complaints are heard about slow arrival US aid to IC.

5. US firmness is regarded under test, especially at least sophisticated elements and natives. They believe if US will not come to aid of Korea where it has invested vastly more prestige and money, then it could not be expected to defend IC in case of invasion. More sophisticated groups and French also see test of US policy but believe any US intervention depends on whether a line can be stabilized. They do not look for troops but consider use we make of our Japan-based and carrier-based air may be token of our possible actions if IC were invaded.

6. The attack demonstrates to more perceptive that where Western troops are withdrawn, or where Soviets have reason to believe US has renounced strategic interest, Reds will not hesitate to move. At same time they are awed at nicety of Soviet calculations and boldness of their risk under guns of US–Japan force.

7. Acting Commander-in-Chief Alessandri not familiar with situation but believes if North Koreans are using Russian type planes and Russian type tanks, South is doomed. An AFP despatch announced "MacArthur sending all assistance," and considerable speculation heard on its meaning.

8. In propaganda war Viet Minh will bring charges on similarities of situations, and dwell on fate of Asians who allow themselves to be seduced by American capitalist warmongers into fighting their countrymen. Coming unification of Vietnam will be played as theme. Those elements of Viet population who persist in regarding civil war as one between French and Viet Minh from which they stand apart, will be easy target groups for Ho Chi Minh.

9. French and US counter-propaganda may point how presence French Army preserves Vietnam from fate of Korea. (This difficult line since French Army without US air intervention powerless to hold massive Chinese attack; also because question may arise why did not US leave army in Korea.)

10. Some comment heard that action undertaken because Communist world strategists now realize insufficient time left take Formosa before monsoon; so launched surprise attack to hold initiative.

11. Also some speculation whether event may not precipitate US reconsideration Formosa policy and increased aid for Formosa and Chinese Nationalist guerrilla groups.

12. Seen against background of recent Moscow conference,[2] coordination Soviet SEA policy, absorption of Manchuria, Korean attack thought by some to be first step in execution of coordinated Soviet continental policy designed to complete Communist domination of Asia. Political counsellor, Bonfils, believes Soviet-inspired attacks will not necessarily be simultaneous since they must be engineered to appear as nationalist risings. Soviet manipulation this policy not difficult since rank and file of Viet Minh, Chinese-Malayan guerrillas, North Koreans and Chinese do not appreciate that Moscow directs their nationalist movements.

13. Consensus local views seems to be that UN will be unavailing, that US will not be able intervene, that collapse South Korea will be defeat for US, that future of Asia will be darkened.

Repeated info Paris 258; Department pass priority Paris.[3]

GULLION

[2] See section II, paragraph C of the Intelligence Estimate, dated June 25, p. 150.
[3] This telegram was relayed to Paris at 4:30 a. m.

795.00/6–2750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Moscow, June 27, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received June 27—8:55 a. m.]

1743. Indian counselor Kapur called at Embassy June 26 to obtain information re US position on Korean situation, saying his Embassy had received urgent instructions to find out how far US prepared to go both within and without UN to assist ROK in throwing back North Korean invaders. Embassy officer said he was not in position to give authoritative answer to such a broad question and asked whether it was correct to assume that Ambassador Pandit[1] would be keeping in close touch with responsible US officials in Washington on this important question. Kapur answered that Pandit had received same instructions as Indian Ambassador Moscow but that frankly she had proved such a "bust" in Washington that he doubted she would ascertain what GOI wanted to know, i.e., "whether US was prepared risk World War III over Korea".

[1] Madame Pandit was Indian Ambassador in the United States.

Kapur then proceeded expound in similarly frank vein views which he said reflect present GOI outlook on situation Asia in light Soviet military move Korea:

1. He said that Indian estimate has been that US not prepared follow firm line in Asia if possible risk of war with Soviets involved.
2. Soviets are not themselves prepared for full-scale war but being aware underlying lack of firmness in US position will continue extend their power by indirect means with minimum risks until such time as they have developed necessary military and economic potential to engage in all-out war if latter at that time necessary achieve their final objectives.
3. When Ambassador Radhakrishnan [2] asked Stalin [3] last January, whether US intervention in Indochina would not make a difference, Stalin replied "the people will decide first," this being interpreted by Kapur to mean that Soviets would not be deterred by kind of aid US now contemplating furnish Indochina.
4. Indians believe that US action or inaction re Korea will be key to our subsequent policy (and thus also to Soviet policy) in SEA.
5. If US takes a firm stand on Korea, doubtful that war with Soviets will occur, but if it should materalize over that issue, India will come into US camp.
6. GOI very skeptical efficacy UN action if confined to vague restraining moves and not accompanied by clear-cut and forceful application of US military power.
7. India's reluctance thus far place itself squarely in anti-Soviet camp not based on lack realistic appreciation of threat to India arsing from link between Soviet power and Indian Communists but rather on peculiar domestic and regional considerations which US has so far failed utterly to understand, most important being that for India to adhere unequivocally to US camp would almost certainly drive Pakistan into Soviet bloc, and Soviet "Communism would quickly entrench itself only an overnight's journey from Delhi, i.e. at Lahore".
8. If US makes firm and successful display its military power in Korea, not only will this have heartening effects in Japan, SEA and India but it will also impress Communist China.
9. Reports just received from Indian representative Tokyo do not. however, indicate that such application US military power forthcoming in Korea.

Kapur was told at end conversation that his frank expression of views appreciated and that since US particularly interested in Indian attitude on such Asian questions as Korea, it was hoped that at this critical juncture Indian representatives at Washington and New York, not to mention MEA Delhi, would not fail to transmit to responsible US officials candid expressions of GOI views on this latest flagrant Soviet threat to peace.

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[2] Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan was Indian Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
[3] Iosif V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

Though Kapur purported be taking official line, his remarks probably mixture personal and official opinion. Nevertheless, Embassy believes that views expressed by him sufficiently authoritative to warrant conclusion that GOI policy on Korea will be shaped to considerable extent by their estimates as to firmness US counter-moves.

View nature Kapur's approach, Embassy would appreciate receiving any appropriate information on US position Korea which can be passed on to Indian Embassy here. Also please protect source.

Department pass New Delhi, USUN; repeated info New Delhi 28. USUN 41.

KIRK

795.00/6–2750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

LONDON, June 27, 1950—noon.
[Received June 27—9 : 08 a. m.]

3636. Personal for the Secretary.

1. For what it is worth Holmes [1] and I want to express our complete endorsement of the course of action we propose to take as outlined Deptel 3124 to London.[2]

2. In view of the action contemplated, we both suggest giving very careful consideration to Moscow's 1734 to Department.[3] Secondly, if in any public announcement which we may make, the use of armed forces by the North Koreans is associated with the Soviet, either directly or indirectly, we may possibly be ourselves so committing the Soviet that they will find it difficult to save their face. Although we believe with confidence that the Soviet has not only approved of this action of aggression and has provided the North Koreans with the implements of war necessary to the operation, it would, we believe, be better for the present to reserve our own opinion for ourselves and our Allied governments than to express it publicly. In a situation of this sort which might develop into a general world conflagration, as a matter of principle, and in this particular case, as a matter of pragmatic tactics, we believe it essential so to refrain from committing a major power capable of precipitating a world war that it will not be embarrassed by what otherwise would be a moral if not a political retreat.

3. Our position (Deptel 3124 to London) explained to Foreign Office this morning. Instruction in Deptel 3125 to London [4] carried

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[1] Julius C. Holmes, Minister at the American Embassy in London.
[2] Transmitted on June 27 at 1 a. m., p. 186.
[3] Received on June 26 at 8 : 09 a. m., p. 169.
[4] Transmitted on June 27 at 1 a. m., p. 187.

out. Cabinet meeting this morning to consider matter and instructions will be sent to Shone before this afternoon's meeting Security Council. As Prime Minister [5] will probably want to make statement in Commons this afternoon, Foreign Office requests that we be notified of precise hour of US release referred to in final paragraph Deptel 3124, together with exact text of our statement as they wish to confine any remarks by the Prime Minister to the area of our pronouncement. Foreign Office desires this information by 4 p. m. London daylight time today.[6]

Repeated niact Paris 1096 personal for Bruce; HICOG Frankfort niact 320, personal for McCloy [7]; Moscow niact 181, personal for Kirk; Brussels niact 159, personal for Murphy [8]; The Hague niact 148, personal for Chapin; Rome niact 308, personal for Dunn[9].

DOUGLAS

[5] Clement Attlee.
[6] See footnote 5 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Jessup, June 27, 11:30 a. m., p. 201.
[7] John J. McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.
[8] Robert D. Murphy, Ambassador in Belgium.
[9] James C. Dunn, Ambassador in Italy.

794A.5/6–2750: Telegram

The Chargé in China (Strong) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT
NO DISTRIBUTION

TAIPEI, June 27, 1950—9 p. m.
[Received June 27—9:43 a. m.]

991. Message and *aide-mémoire* delivered to Generalissimo 8 p. m. tonight, two and one-half hours after receipt in coded form.[1] At first Generalissimo requested message be delivered Foreign Minister Yeh but latter arranged meeting and acted as interpreter. Only other person present was Shen Chang Huang.[2]

During delivery of verbal message Generalissimo inquired of Yeh whether from President Truman or US Government, and also for his interpretation of request cease operations. Generalissimo stated would give reply following detailed study after translation. I said would be available at any hour to receive reply. On way out Yeh promised very early reply.

Generalissimo showed no emotion.[3]

STRONG

[1] See telegram Telcan 39 to Taipei, transmitted on June 27 at 1 a. m., p. 188.
[2] Member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang Party.
[3] In his telegram 992, June 28, Mr. Strong reported that a Foreign Ministry official had informally advised him that a cease-fire order would be issued that afternoon. Subsequently, his telegram 999 stated that the National Defense Liaison Office had indicated Chinese acceptance of all major points in the U.S. *aide-mémoire*, with some further details to be worked out with the Commander of the 7th Fleet. A formal Chinese reply was to be forwarded on June 29. (794A.5/6–2850)

330/6–2750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, June 27, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received June 27—11:24 a. m.]

1748. In connection meeting today UNSC, Embassy offers following comments Korean situation as seen from Moscow to date.

Thus far no evidence that SC resolution June 25 is being obeyed, nor does it appear that North Korean forces have any present intention as result thereof abandon course aggression. UNCOK suggestion for mediation perhaps legally sound but we consider it unrealistic in view time element involved and rapidity North Korean advance.

Embassy believes entire world focusing attention on US reaction to Korean situation, and that in particular areas in Far East and elsewhere which are threatened by Communist aggression consider that absence of successful firmness by US in dealing with Korean crisis will require fundamental reconsideration of orientation in cold war. In present situation, as we see it Soviets through utilizing satellite have thus far avoided direct Soviet implication in Korean situation, and we feel this to be a fundamental Soviet tactic. As emphasized in Embtel 1726, June 25, we estimate Soviets not yet ready to embark on World War III. Of course, two important qualifications must be attached to this estimate: first, in view our limited sources information and observation, estimate might be incorrect; second, we have always believed and reported that war with Soviets may occur through international developments which maneuver Soviets and/or US into position where war inescapable. Ordinary prudence therefore dictates that US Forces be alerted to all possible consequences wherever they may be. However, we reiterate view expressed Embtel 1214 and Embdesp 514, April 24 [*25*] [1] that Soviets have in past backed down when faced with US firmness, and we believe US, on basis calculated risk, may with some degree assurance estimate that Soviets will not engage in war with US if we take firm stand and effective action to assist ROK immediately to halt and throw back North Korean aggression.

Repeated information London 262, Paris 249, Tokyo 48, USUN 42. Department pass London, Paris, Tokyo, USUN.

KIRK

[1] Scheduled for publication in volume IV.

795.00/6–2750

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1950 [—11:30 a. m.] [1]

Subject: Notes on Meeting in Cabinet Room at the White House

Participants: The President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Congressional leaders [2]
Mr. Rusk, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Jessup and Mr. McFall [3] accompanied the Secretary of State

THE PRESIDENT asked the Secretary of State to summarize the developments in the Korean case which the Secretary did.

THE PRESIDENT stressed the prompt action of the UN Security Council. He then read the statement which was subsequently released to the press.[4] He said that he intended to release this at the end of the meeting and asked for any expression of views. He added that we could not let this matter go by default. He referred to the fact that the Secretary of State had directed the Ambassador at Moscow to get in touch with the Soviet Government. He still hoped there would be no Soviet involvement in the attack but their possible next moves were being studied.

SENATOR WILEY asked what forces General MacArthur had sent in.

GENERAL VANDENBERG supplied details beginning to outline the forces we had available.

SECRETARY JOHNSON broke in to say this information was secret and he did not wish details regarding our forces in the Far East to be known.

SENATOR WILEY said it was sufficient for him to know that we were in there with force and that the President considered this force adequate.

SECRETARY PACE mentioned that no ground troops had been sent in.

SENATOR TYDINGS reported on the action of the Armed Services Committee that morning extending the draft act and giving the President authority to call out the National Guard.

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[1] The time is that given in *Korean Conflict*.

[2] The question of precisely which Congressional leaders were in attendance is in doubt; see the list read by President Truman at the June 26th Blair House meeting, p. 182, and also Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 338; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 408; and Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean Decision* (New York, The Free Press, 1968), p. 187.

[3] Jack K. McFall, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

[4] *Infra*.

SENATOR CONNALLY asked what further UN action was to be anticipated.

SENATOR SMITH commented that our aid is in support of the UN and not the United States.

THE PRESIDENT said this was true.

SENATOR SMITH continued that in regard to Formosa and other areas the action was US action and not UN action.

THE PRESIDENT again agreed.

CONGRESSMAN MCCORMACK asked Admiral Sherman whether he thought the Navy should not now be strengthened.

SECRETARY JOHNSON said the Joint Chiefs are studying this. He said there was to be balanced program for the three services.

SECRETARY ACHESON reported that the UK had sent a message of support and were discussing the kind of action they could take.[5]

CONGRESSMAN SHORT said he hoped that other countries would join in support of the UN.

CONGRESSMAN KEE, SENATOR CONNALLY, and SECRETARY ACHESON discussed the Security Council resolution [6] and a possible Soviet veto.

CONGRESSMAN MANSFIELD said that we should stiffen Western Europe as well.

SENATOR LUCAS asked what our attitude would be if other nations hung back in giving support.

SECRETARY ACHESON said that we could not expect military help from the French whose hands are already full.

SENATOR CONNALLY said this was a clear-cut case for the UN. This was an opportunity to test its methods.

CONGRESSMAN EATON inquired whether the United States was now committed to defend South Korea from invasion.

THE PRESIDENT replied that his statement made this clear.

SECRETARY ACHESON added that we were doing this in support of the UN.

SECRETARY JOHNSON said that Senators and Congressmen would be kept posted by the Defense Department on developments with regular briefings.

SECRETARY ACHESON pointed out that the USSR has carefully not committed itself as yet. He referred to the approach made by Ambassador Kirk and pointed out this information was not yet public. He added that we are avoiding publicly engaging Soviet prestige at this time.

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[5] On June 27, Prime Minister Attlee made a statement in the House of Commons supporting President Truman's course of action; for the text, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 476, col. 2159.

[6] Reference is to the resolution (U.N. document S/1508/Rev. 1) to be introduced by Ambassador Austin at the 474th meeting of the U.N. Security Council at 3 p. m. on June 27 (see U.N. document S/PV.474).

CONGRESSMAN KEE asked whether any other governments doubted that we were acting in support of the UN.

THE PRESIDENT and SECRETARY ACHESON said that this was perfectly clear.

In answer to questions from Senator Connally, SECRETARY ACHESON said that he doubted whether the Russians would attend the next Security Council meeting. He said Senator Austin would be there to represent the United States.

SENATOR WILEY asked whether the action in regard to Formosa, the Philippines and Indochina was taken under the UN.

THE PRESIDENT said no that was United States action.

SENATOR WILEY inquired whether we had adequate forces.

THE PRESIDENT said yes.

SENATOR [*Congressman*] RAYBURN stated that on leaving the room he would say nothing to the press beyond the statement which the President was issuing.

SENATOR CONNALLY said that we must be careful in handling the Formosan question not to divert attention from Korea.

THE PRESIDENT agreed.

Statement Issued by the President[1]

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1950.

In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. This they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

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[1] Copies of the statement (*Korean Conflict*) were distributed to the participants in the meeting at the White House (see *supra*) which terminated at approximately noon.

Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

I have also directed that United States Forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated.

I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indo China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.

I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.

I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the representative of the United States to the Security Council, to report these steps to the Council.

330/6–2750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

PARIS, June 27, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received June 27—11:42 a. m.]

3127. Delivered to Schuman [1] at 12:30 Paris time substance of Deptels 3018 and 3019.[2] Schuman said French representative on SC had already firm instructions support any US resolution but he would like specific confirmation of instructions to support proposed resolution. He read very carefully announcement contained in 3018 and expressed his full concurrence therewith, saying that in his opinion it was only proper course of action and he personally, while recognizing risks involved, was of opinion that Soviet Union was not at this time prepared to embark on general war. He said that it was wise to request government in Formosa to cease all operations against mainland and he expressed, understandably, considerable interest in part dealing with Indochina.

Repeated info niact London 882, niact Oslo 30.

BRUCE

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[1] Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister.
[2] Same as telegrams 3124 and 3125, June 27, 1 a. m., to London, pp. 186 and 187.

795.00/6–2750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

Moscow, June 27, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received June 27—12:05 p. m.]

1749. I have tried five times since 11 o'clock today to get appointment with Gromyko (Vyshinski was stated out of town), and on last two asked to be received by official other than Gromyko. On third trial query was posed what for and reply was "important and urgent message from US government". On fourth try suggested officer protocol receive message and at 5 p. m., Postoev said he was available.

Accordingly, I sent Freers[1] to read substance text Deptel 538, June 25 (as modified by Deptel 540, June 26), and to leave copy thereof. Freers instructed state American Ambassador regretted Foreign Minister unable receive him upon important matter and that American Ambassador was ready to receive Soviet Government reply as to assurances, et cetera, at any hour day or night.

Freers saw Postoev (Protocol Section) at 5:10 p. m. handed him memo giving substance message and expressed my availability to receive Soviet reply.[2]

KIRK

[1] Edward L. Freers, First Secretary at the American Embassy in Moscow.

[2] At 4 p. m. on June 27, the White House authorized release of the information that the United States had communicated with the Soviet Government to request it to use its influence to effect a withdrawal of the North Korean forces (*Korean Conflict*); the text of the announcement by the Department of State is contained in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 3, 1950, p. 5. The text of the note from the American Ambassador in Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Minister is printed in *United States Policy in the Korean Crisis*, p. 63.

330/6–2750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, June 27, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received June 27—12:41 p. m.]

943. 1. Bajpai asked to see me this morning. He inquired whether I had any indication from my government as to what further action was contemplated in or out of Security Council re Korean problem. I replied in negative stating such information as I had received thus far was restricted to factual statements of what had taken place or was taking place. I believed that I had already given him this information and much of it had appeared in press.

2. Bajpai read to me excerpts from telegram just received from B. N. Rau which stated latter's impression that US might be planning in case cease-fire resolution should be disregarded by North Korea, to introduce new resolution invoking Articles 40, 42 and 48 of Charter.

He said Article 42 in particular seemed to him to be somewhat drastic and action under it might well lead to new world war. He was therefore instructing Rau to withhold vote on any resolution this character pending careful consideration of consequences by GOI and receipt instructions from New Delhi. He asked whether in my opinion US likely introduce such resolution immediately.

3. I replied I was entirely without instructions in this regard. It would appear however from rapid progress North Korean Army that if drastic action was to be effective it must be taken immediately.

I had some doubt however that my government would introduce resolution this kind into SC without first discussing matter either in Lake Success or through diplomatic channels with governments represented in SC. I thought that only in great emergency would US Government introduce resolution without previous diplomatic preparation which would require members of SC to decide on actions which might result in bringing additional countries into armed conflict. I would imagine that American officials responsible for formulation our foreign policy were exploring every avenue which might promise blocking or at least discouraging aggression without at some time seriously endangering world peace. It seemed to me that they were probably faced with several desperate alternatives; one of which would be advocating action which might lead to war; and another of which would be advocating action of such weak character that aggressors would be encouraged and potential victims of aggression would feel that since UN was impotent and there was no relief from any other source it would be futile for them to endeavor to oppose forces of aggressor. I thought that perhaps every member of UN, including India, opposed to aggression must be faced, to an extent at least, with similar perplexities. Korea was not primarily an American problem, it was UN and world problem. What was done re Korea might well determine world trends during immediate future. Disruption of world peace would be very serious; unopposed aggression throughout world would be still more serious.

4. Bajpai seemed to agree and remarked that he found Nehru [1] very troubled re situation. He then read aloud excerpts from an instruction ready to go to Rau which he said had been drafted prior to receipt of Rau's telegram. This instruction was based on recommendations apparently sent by UN Commission to Korea to UN. These recommendations seemed to suggest two alternatives to SC: (1) That SC should appoint at once mediator who would endeavor settle dispute between North and South Korea; or (2) Members SC themselves should undertake mediate dispute. Instruction authorized Rau to support either recommendation if it should be introduced in form of resolution. Rau was

[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

advised however not to vote for any resolution calling for sanctions without reference to his government. Bajpai said that he believed this instruction must go forward at once.

5. I said I had not seen text of recommendations of UN Commission. It seemed to me however judging from what he had told me that these recommendations took it for granted that North Korea would observe cease-fire. If North Korea continued to march I could see nothing left to mediate. If North Korea should succeed to occupy South Korea and to "purge" all persons of consequence opposed to Commie domination of Korea mediator would have nothing to do. Bajpai agreed and said that it looked as though North Korea was succeeding in bringing about a *fait accompli* before SC would be able to take effective action. He then read to me another paragraph in instruction to Rau approving Rau's action thus far and stating GOI fully agreed that attack by North Korea was act of aggression.

6. I promised pass on to Bajpai any information received from my government which might be helpful to him and GOI in determining its policies.

HENDERSON

795.00/6–2750 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 27, 1950—2 p. m.

642. Madame Pandit was read copy Pres statement re Korea at 11:30 AM, June 27 at Dept. She appeared not too seriously concerned thereby; agreed India had been involved Korean question from beginning; and thought India wld undoubtedly welcome US support of UNSC.

Although Dept not sanguine Indian reaction will be universally favorable Pres declaration Madame Pandit's remarks indicate it may be possible vitiate potential original criticism, even win support, by emphasis UN aspects US action.

ACHESON

357.AD/6–2750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in The Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT THE HAGUE, June 27, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received June 27—2:05 p. m.]

779. When I delivered substance Department's 635 June 27 [1] to Stikker he stated as a first reaction, "I am mighty glad that the US

[1] Telegram 3124, June 27, 1 a. m., to London, p. 186, was repeated to The Hague as telegram 635.

has taken this action." In taking my leave he added, "US may count on all possible support from Netherlands Government in UN."

Repeated info Paris 179, London 194, Moscow 15, Brussels 41.

CHAPIN

Editorial Note

The 474th meeting of the United Nations Security Council began in New York at 3 p. m. on June 27; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.474. The President of the Security Council (Rau) read aloud three communications from United Nations Commission on Korea (U.N. documents S/1503, 1504, and 1507), the last of which read as follows:

"Commission met this morning 10 o'clock [June 26] and considered latest reports on hostilities and results direct observation along parallel by UNCOK military observers over period ending forty-eight hours before hostilities began. Commission's present view on basis this evidence is first that, judging from actual progress of operations, Northern Regime is carrying out well-planned, concerted and full-scale invasion of South Korea; secondly, that South Korean forces were deployed on wholly defensive basis in all sectors of the parallel; and thirdly, that they were taken completely by surprise as they had no reason to believe from intelligence sources that invasion was imminent. Commission is following events and will report further developments."

The United States representative (Austin) read to the Council the text of President Truman's statement of June 27 after offering a draft resolution (S/1508/Rev. 1) which was subsequently adopted by the Security Council, without amendment, as S/1511; see page 211. Before voting, however, the Council adjourned at 5:10 p. m. and did not sit again until 10:25 p. m.

330/6–2750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

BRUSSELS, June 27, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received June 27—4:42 p. m.]

1012. Urtel 844.[1] Belgian Foreign Office immediately informed substance your message. I met shortly afterwards, at Van Zeeland's [2] invitation, with Prime Minister Duvieusart, Van Zeeland, and Minister National Defense Moreau de Melen. Initial reaction these members Belgian Government is gratification that US has proceeded within framework of UN in Korean issue. They felt generally Belgian public

[1] Telegram 3124, June 27, 1 a. m., to London, p. 186, was repeated to Brussels as telegram 844.

[2] Paul van Zeeland, Belgian Foreign Minister.

would welcome USG's attitude. Matter will be considered by entire Cabinet. Van Zeeland promised to instruct Belgian delegate UN to cooperate fully. Prime Minister and Minister National Defense inquired what action if any Belgians should take at this stage. I suggested that it was important that Belgian public be fully and accurately informed and that chiefs of Belgian military establishments be provided with accurate information.

Van Zeeland asked a number of questions regarding the sentence "In circumstances President has ordered US air and sea forces to give *cover* and *support* to ROK forces." In the event that it is possible to provide additional data defining the words "cover" and "support" it would be appreciated.

It was assumed that President's reasons for calling upon the Chinese Government in Formosa to cease all sea and air operations against mainland was to avoid provocation of Soviets direct action in that theater. This part of the message, however, is not clearly understood here and if Department is able to provide additional background, it would also be appreciated.

Van Zealand said that Belgian Government took an extremely grave view of the Korean development and felt that it brought nearer a generalized conflict. He stressed again that Belgium would live up to its obligations thus far taken and again expressed satisfaction over US policy in proceeding within framework of UN.

Department pass Moscow; repeated info Paris 194, London 213, Frankfort 72, Moscow 6, The Hague 83, Rome 30.

MURPHY

795.00/6–2750 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, June 27, 1950—4:47 p. m.
[Received June 27—5:13 p. m.]

547. For Hickerson. Gross at Zinchenko luncheon for Malik [1] talked at some length with SyG Lie and Malik re Korean situation. President's statement had been released and Lie commenced conversation by expressing gratification with firm tone of statement. Malik, after re-

[1] Yakov A. Malik, Soviet Representative at the United Nations.

marking that Lie's attitude was "one-sided", said that "one-sidedness" characterized action taken by SC on June 25. Malik proceeded with argument SC decision illegal because of absence of USSR and of lawful representative of China. Both Lie and Gross maintained SC action legal.

Proceeding to discussion of Korean situation, Malik at first argued on basis radio reports from Moscow that action against ROK was reply to border attack by ROK forces. Malik did not pursue this line after Lie and Gross commented upon major nature of North Korean offensive. Malik then referred to "intervention by US" and said late reports showed American planes were bombing Korean cities and people. Again both Lie and Gross denied charge of "intervention" and pointed to fact that action by US sea and air forces was being taken in aid of SC resolution and to repel clearly unlawful invasion. Lie asked Gross and Malik for reaction to earlier suggestion of UNCOK for appointment of mediator. Gross replied he was sure that pre-condition for any mediatory or other procedure was cessation of hostilities and withdrawal North Korean forces. Lie emphatically agreed. Malik made no comment.

Malik asked Lie whether he thought Peiping Government would be seated before GA. Lie replied he hoped so, and said he thought that US instructions to 7th Fleet to prevent attacks upon mainland by Nationalist Government from Formosa constituted a "kind of recognition of the Peiping Government". Gross said this was of course not correct, that it involved recognition of nothing except that it took into account the fact that the Chinese Government on Formosa did not, at the present time, control the mainland of China. Gross said there was no evidence satisfactory to US that the Peiping Government did either.

Gross asked Malik whether he had any suggestion to terminate a situation which we considered so grave that American lives were being jeopardized in behalf of UN decision. Upon Malik's evasion of a reply, Lie pressed him to answer question. Malik again referred to argument of illegality of SC decision and conversation terminated as Gross said question of Korea so clearly involved question of protection of Charter and hence world peace that the time had passed when debate on the question of Chinese representation could be substituted for compliance on part of North Korea with decision of SC. Malik told Gross he still intends to leave for USSR first week July and evaded reply to question of length of stay.

AUSTIN

330/6–2750 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

SECRET PRIORITY NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1950—8 p. m.

644. Personal for Henderson from Hickerson. Reurtel 943 June 27 pls see Bajpai again and assure him that it is of course our practice and our desire to consult with our friends, among them most particularly India, prior to introducing major proposals for UN action. In case of Korea however we were confronted with very grave emergency. Forces Rep of Korea lightly armed for purposes internal order and frontier defense were subject to all out surprise attack by northern forces heavily armed with offensive weapons. Purpose attack clearly to overwhelm Rep in short order and present UN with *fait accompli*. It was indispensible that we act at once to save Rep from extinction. We hope Bajpai will understand that under circumstances we had no alternative to foregoing prior consultation.

I was particularly impressed skill and accuracy ur analysis our position. As indicated Deptel 642, June 27, we did talk with Madame Pandit in Dept this morning at which time she welcomed US support UNSC and Pres statement.

As Rau had already recd insts mentioned ur para 2 he suggested postponement vote on US June 27 SC Reso pending consultation his Govt. Dept Rep again talked Madame Pandit who expressed regret nature Rau's insts said she wld talk with Rau again and go NY personally to help.

Dept now understands Rau attempting communicate by phone Delhi for further instructions.

ACHESON

795.00/6–2850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT

SEOUL [*Suwon*], June 28, 1950—10 a. m.
[Received June 27—9 : 33 p. m.]

Unnumbered. Situation had deteriorated so rapidly had not President's decision [1] plus arrival General Church party [2] become known

[1] Reference is to President Truman's statement of June 27, p. 202.

[2] In accordance with the decision reached at the Blair House meeting of June 26, p. 178, General MacArthur had been instructed to send a survey party to Korea. Brig. Gen. John H. Church was chosen to lead the group, whose mission was to assist Ambassador Muccio and KMAG in determining logistical requirements to assist the ROK Army. General Church's party arrived at Suwon in the morning of June 27 (Korean time). On June 28, he advised General MacArthur that the United States would have to employ ground forces to restore the situation in Korea prior to the outbreak of the fighting. (Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, pp. 43–44)

here, doubtful any organized Korean resistance would have continued through night. Combat aid decision plus Church's orders have had great morale effect, forthcoming air strikes hoped demoralize enemy make possible reform Korean army south bank Han River. Seoul situation confused; KMAG probably all out but count still impossible. Kimpo lost.

Re Deptel 631 [3] unable communicate Seoul. Arranging air drops.

Drumright party reached Taejon area with President, majority Cabinet some national Assembly. I am at Suwon, HQ General Church, General Chae. With me are Noble, other Embassy personnel listed mytel 27th.[4] FonMin at Suwon.

CINCFE forwarding military information.

MUCCIO

[3] Not printed; it dealt with transmission of President Truman's statement over the Voice of America (511.954/6–2750).

[4] See the unnumbered telegram from Seoul received on June 26 at 11:12 p. m., p. 184.

Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Security Council, June 27, 1950 [1]

The Security Council

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace;

Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities; and

Having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel; and

Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security; and

Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,

Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.[2]

[1] U.N. document S/1511. This resolution was adopted shortly before 11:50 p. m., at which time the meeting rose. The vote was 7 (including the U.S.) in favor, to 1 (Yugoslavia) opposed, with 2 (Egypt and India) not voting, and 1 (U.S.S.R.) member absent.

[2] Following the adoption of this resolution, the Security Council voted on a draft resolution (S/1509) introduced by the Yugoslav representative (Bebler), which would have renewed the call of the Security Council for an end to hostilities, initiated a procedure of mediation between the two parties, and invited a representative from North Korea to the United Nations to participate in the mediation procedure. The Yugoslav draft resolution failed of adoption by a vote of 1 (Yugoslavia) in favor, to 7 (including the U.S.) opposed, with 2 (Egypt and India) not voting, and 1 (U.S.S.R.) member absent.

JUNE 28, 1950
(Wednesday)

795.00/6–2850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, June 28, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received June 28—8 : 56 a. m.]

1754. Embassy welcomes public announcement re Korea by President noting modifications original statement contained Deptel 541,[1] June 27. In our view this firm stand exactly what is necessary to serve notice to Soviets that Communists have gone too far. Needless to say US action will prove tremendous influence all areas threatened by Communist aggression, and effects in Asia should become manifest shortly.

Repeated information London 264, Paris 251, USUN 44, Tokyo 26, Department pass London, Paris, USUN, Tokyo.

KIRK

[1] Telegram 3124, June 27, 1 a. m., to London, p. 186, was repeated to Moscow as telegram 541.

Lot File 53D–250

Memorandum of a Meeting in the Office of the Under Secretary of State (Webb)[1]

TOP SECRET
UM M–212

[WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1950.

The Secretary stated that the Department could be proud of its personnel and the speed with which they worked following news of the Korean attack. He particularly noted the excellent cooperation achieved with Defense and the Congress.

Mr. Armstrong gave a round-up of the latest intelligence available as a result of Telecon with Tokyo at 7 this morning.[2] It is apparently true that Seoul is lost, but it is not sure whether the air field is in Communist hands or not. U.S. intelligence estimates that the North Koreans have some 100 medium tanks of Soviet make operating primarily in the valley leading south to Seoul. They also have a number of old light amphibious tanks. Reports indicate that the morale of

[1] The meeting took place at 9 : 30 a. m. It was one of a number of regularly held meetings ordinarily attended by Under Secretary of State Webb and other high officials of the Department of State such as Assistant Secretaries and Special Assistants; on this occasion, Mr. Acheson was present.
[2] Not printed.

South Korean troops is good and so far as we know none has surrendered yet. There is no guerrilla activity behind the South Korean lines. Three amphibious landings have been reported on the East coast, two of which are being contained and the third is unreported. We have no intelligence of any logistic planning by the North Korean forces. SCAP is distributing by air over both North and South Korea pamphlet containing the President's announcement and the UN resolution. The reaction in the Japanese press has been so favorable that SCAP is also dropping 250,000 copies of Japanese newspapers into Korea.

The confusion in the reports of the situation are due to the poor communications and to the lack of a central unit in Korea to evaluate intelligence reports. It was also pointed out the optimistic reports came largely from the Korean Minister in Tokyo. SCAP is sending a forward echelon unit into Korea, but this has not yet been able to improve the situation. U.S. planes are operating from Japanese fields since they could make only limited use of airstrips in South Korea. The whereabouts of the Seventh Fleet was not reported.

Mr. Hickerson reported on the passage of the second UN resolution with India and Egypt not participating. He indicated that the representatives of both countries had made favorable speeches and that a final vote had been delayed as long as possible in the hope that they would receive instructions from their Governments. It was decided, however, that a vote should be taken yesterday in any event rather than waiting in the hope of Indian and Egyptian approval of our resolution.

The Secretary asked what the reactions of the various Ambassadors had been when they were informed of our decision. He was told that they were generally favorable; that Madame Pandit of India was, to our surprise, very receptive and cooperative; that the Indonesian Ambassador was also pleased and the Danes were under instructions to express their great pleasure. The Latin American countries appreciated being informed in advance and about half of them have already expressed their approval of our action.[3] Mr. Armstrong stated that a report was being compiled on world-wide reaction, which seemed to be generally favorable. Mr. McFall stated that the reception in Congress had been good with the exception of Marcantonio on the left and Senators Watkins and Kem on the right.[4]

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[3] At a special meeting on June 28, the Council of the Organization of American States resolved unanimously: "1. To declare its firm adherence to the decisions of the competent organs of the United Nations. 2. To solemnly reaffirm on this occasion the pledges of continental solidarity which unite the American States." (*Annals of the Organization of American States, 1950* (Washington, Pan American Union, n.d.), p. 222).

[4] Reference is to Congressman Vito Marcantonio, American Labor Party, from New York and Republican Senators Arthur V. Watkins of Utah and James P. Kem of Missouri.

795.00/6–2850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1950.

Subject: Korea

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador
Mr. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. James C. H. Bonbright, Deputy Assistant Secretary [of State for European Affairs]

The British Ambassador came to see me at 10:30 today at my request. After outlining to him briefly the latest information which we had regarding the military situation in Korea, I told him that there were two matters which I wished to take up with him. The first was to ask him to inquire of his Government whether the latter was in a position to contribute military assistance of some kind in the present situation. I pointed out that this was not only important from the point of view of stressing the fact that our military operations are in support of a United Nations decision, but would also have a useful psychological effect in this country by showing that the United States was not acting alone. I said that we naturally expected to have to bear the brunt of the burden in view of the position of our forces in the Far East. I also said that we would probably be approaching several other countries with the same request.

Sir Oliver agreed to take the matter up at once with London. He said that while he had no instructions on the subject, he thought that one of the first questions which would come to mind in the Foreign Office would be why President Truman had omitted any reference to Hong Kong in his public statement. This omission protruded a bit in view of the reference to the Philippines, Formosa and Indochina.

Secondly, I told Sir Oliver of our intention to apply economic sanctions to Northern Korea and asked if the British Government would likewise act in this direction. I indicated that, according to our information, an embargo would probably not have highly important effects, but we had found that it was worth doing particularly in view of the shipments to that area from Hong Kong.

At the end of our conversation I received word that our action on halting exports to Northern Korea had been held up temporarily in view of certain questions raised by the Secretary of Commerce.[1] I so informed Sir Oliver.

G[EORGE] W. P[ERKINS]

[1] Charles Sawyer. See the circular telegram, June 28, 8 p. m., p. 223.

795.00/6–2850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Security Council (Ross)

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] June 28, 1950.[1]

Subject: Egyptian vote on 27 June Resolution—Korea.

Participants: Ambassador Mahmoud Fawzi Bey—Egyptian Delegation
Mr. John C. Ross—United States Mission

I telephoned Fawzi at 12:45 to ask him if he had received instructions from his Government concerning the resolution of 27 June. Fawzi said he felt sure the Egyptian position "will take good shape". He said he thought it would be a parallel thing on two sides (this apparently was in reference to India's position as well as the Egyptian position). Fawzi said that he did not contemplate action in the way of voting subsequent to a decision having been taken. He said he was thinking of a communication to the President of the Security Council or an announcement. He said he thought things were in good shape; that "without forgetting the necessity of speed he wanted to go straight ahead without wobbling from left to right".

Although Fawzi was evasive and avoided a direct answer that his Government would support the 27th June resolution, I had the impression that they would do so.

In response to a telephone call from Lacoste [2] for information concerning the Egyptian and Indian positions I gave him the foregoing information in confidence.

JOHN C. ROSS

[1] The source text is a copy of a document in the IO Files, Department of State, bearing the designation US/S/1260 and the date June 29, 1950.
[2] Francis Lacoste of the French Delegation at the United Nations.

795.00/6–2850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT BELGRADE, June 28, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received June 28—1:35 p. m.]

830. During conversation with Tito [1] today late [morning?] he undertook extensive explanation Yugoslav point of view re Korean issue in SC. He said his chief aims were to show clearly Yugoslav con-

[1] Marshal Josip Broz-Tito, President of the Council of Ministers of Yugoslavia and Minister of National Defense.

demnation of aggression and Yugoslav support for UN, but at same time to convince world opinion of Yugoslav independence from any bloc. In latter regard he said that he must keep constantly in mind that if Cominform suddenly attacked Yugoslavia, Moscow would make every effort to picture Yugoslavia as instrument of western aggression aimed against Cominform and would seek to justify attack as necessary defensive measure. He said he must make it abundantly clear to "progressive opinion" that such allegations had no foundation whatsoever. He admitted, after some hesitation, that he also had to keep in mind potential Cominform fifth column inside Yugoslavia as well as in other countries.

I said while I welcomed his explanation I felt clear-cut situations arose from time to time when a nation as an individual must be willing to stand up and be counted definitely on side of forces opposing aggression, without any equivocation or proposal for delay. I believed such occasion had arisen in Korean case.

Tito said he was aware that position taken by Yugoslav representative in SC would not alter decision of that body and remarked, not for attribution, that Bebler had introduced resolution without instruction. He gave no hint that Bebler would be disavowed or be sent new instructions but his implication was that Yugoslav government would abide by any decisions taken by SC in accord with Charter.

Tito said he did not expect Korean situation or troop movements in Balkans to interrupt his plans for leaving Belgrade at end of week and said he expected to see me in Bled on July fourth.

ALLEN

Editorial Note

At 2:30 p. m. on June 28, the National Security Council met in the Cabinet Room of the White House to discuss Korea. A memorandum of conversation by Philip Jessup who was present, filed in Department of State top secret file 795.00/6–2850, was not declassified by the National Security Council in time for inclusion in this volume.

Published accounts of the meeting can be found in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pages 340–341; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, page 411; and Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pages 221–226.

Part of the discussion dealt with possible future moves by the Soviet Union, concerning which subject Secretary Acheson had transmitted the paper to Secretary of Defense Johnson prior to the meeting, *infra*.

795.00/6–2850

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 28, 1950.

DEAR LOUIS: We have been giving urgent attention to the situation which would arise if Soviet forces appeared and took an active part in the present operations in Korea. I am attaching for your consideration a very short policy statement, the purpose of which is to ensure that major decisions about the extension of the Korean issue into a major war be taken in Washington and not be merely the result of a series of events in Korea.

Since this is of great urgency, I hope that we can place it before the President for decision at the National Security Council meeting this afternoon.

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

[Enclosure]

Draft Policy Statement Prepared by the Secretary of State

The decision now made to commit United States air and naval forces to provide cover and support for South Korean troops does not *in itself* constitute a decision to engage in a major war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces intervene in Korea. The decision regarding Korea, however, was taken in the full realization of a risk of war with the Soviet Union. If substantial Soviet forces actively oppose our present operations in Korea, United States forces should defend themselves, should take no action on the spot to aggravate the situation, and should report the situation to Washington.[1]

[1] Responsibility for the resurvey of all policies affecting the perimeter of the Soviet Union was assigned to the NSC staff and resulted in the NSC 73 series, "The Position and Actions of the United States With Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation", of July 1; documentation is scheduled for publication in volume I.

The Secretary of Defense was assigned responsibility for preparing for the NSC recommendations on U.S. courses of action in the event Soviet forces entered the Korean hostilities; the first report by the Secretary of Defense was sent to the NSC as NSC 76 under date of July 21, see footnote 2 to the memorandum by the JCS, July 10, p. 346. (NSC files: NSC Actions 308 *b* and *c*)

330/6–2850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, June 28, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received June 28—3 : 02 p. m.]

955. 1. I handed Bajpai Secretary General MEA this morning at 9 : 30 o'clock formal note addressed to Nehru containing substance information set forth in Deptel 640 June 27.[1]

2. After reading note Bajpai said he had assumed my call was to discuss with him resolution understood to have been introduced by US into SC on June 27 recommending to members of UN that they furnish assistance to ROK. I replied in negative stating my only knowledge thus far of resolution was that derived from alleged text appearing in Delhi morning papers. I might well, however, receive instructions later in day which would prompt me get in touch with him again.[2]

3. Bajpai said he had as yet received no message from Rau on subject but one would probably come in later. In meantime he had been discussing matter with Nehru. Both he and Nehru were of opinion that decision as to attitude which GOI should take re this resolution would be extremely difficult. On one hand GOI desired throw its moral weight against aggression in framework UN; on other hand, GOI vote for resolution in present form might initiate chain of events which would have unfortunate consequences in Asia. For instance, if GOI should support resolution it would in effect be calling on countries like its close associate Burma or like Siam to furnish assistance to ROK. Situation of Burma vis-à-vis Communist China at present most precarious. Latter might under pretext that India and Burma were favoring policy of rendering assistance to ROK move into Burma in force. Furthermore, matter had become somewhat more complicated by introduction on part of US of Formosa and Indochina into picture. There seemed to be merging of problem resistance to aggression with that of extension of assistance to certain forces which millions of Asians including many Indians considered to be imperialistic, colonial or reactionary. GOI could not overlook possible internal reaction to any decision which Cabinet might take.

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[1] Telegram 3124, June 27, 1 a. m., to London, p. 186, was repeated to New Delhi as telegram 640.

[2] In telegram 954, June 28, 5 p. m., from New Delhi, not printed, Ambassador Henderson reported that he had spoken to Bajpai following receipt of the text of the Security Council resolution of June 27. The Ambassador explained the impossibility of advance consultation between the United States and India because of the press of time and Bajpai expressed his understanding. Mr. Henderson went on to inform the Department that he had gained the impression that India was relieved that the Security Council vote had been taken so quickly and decisively that there had been no need for India to take a stand. (330/6–2850)

4. I told Bajpai that in my opinion support by GOI of resolution as published did not necessarily involve GOI in US decisions re Formosa and Indochina. I hoped that in talking with Prime Minister or with Cabinet he would bear in mind essence of problem was whether now that UN was faced with clear-cut armed aggression, India would display sufficient moral courage approve action which would cause aggressors realize they would not be permitted by free nations of world to force one by one various peoples of Asia and Europe under their domination. I was never more proud of being a servant of Government of US than I was today. After having just gone through one terrible war, US in spite of its ardent desire to remain at peace had taken courageous step for purpose, not of defending its own territory but of showing aggressors and world at large that it took its UN obligations seriously. Would Indians in years to come be proud of stand taken by their government if latter failed even to vote for a resolution which was the logical sequence to one already supported by it branding North Korea as an aggressor.

5. Bajpai visibly somewhat shaken said GOI had no military forces to send to Korea. I said that although I was talking *without* instructions I was convinced and I was sure after giving some thought to subject he also would be convinced that every nation which supported resolution would not be expected furnish armed assistance. I went on to point out that hesitation and wavering at this historic moment might encourage aggressors to go on with an aggressive program which would inevitably result in world war. Positive and speedy action by GOI would have tremendous influence among all peoples of Asia. Hestitation on part GOI might well strengthen those elements in Asia which were endeavoring confuse issue and prevent any effective action on part UN. Issue was not between two power blocs but aggressor and UN.

6. Bajpai promised discuss matter further with Nehru. I said that if Prime Minister would care to talk it over with me I would be at his disposition at any time.

7. Referring to our conversation June 27 (Embtel 943, June 27) I told Bajpai it was clear that element of time had prevented my government from discussing resolution of June 27 without previous consultation with GOI. Carefully planned North Korean invasion was moving so rapidly that there was no time for consultation with other governments. Similarly the President had been compelled to issue his statement on June 27 without previous consultation. Department in brief time its disposal had endeavored to apprise GOI of its intentions. It had called in Madame Pandit for instance shortly before issuance of President's statement to inform her in advance of substance of statement. Bajpai said that thus far nothing on subject had been received from Madame Pandit.

8. I told Bajpai our decisions re Formosa, Philippines, Indochina and so forth were undoubtedly taken as result of lesson learned in Korea. Soviet-inspired North Korean action made it clear that international communism was now embarking on policy of using undisguised force in order achieve its objectives. We had no choice in our own self defense as well as in interests of world security other than to move quickly and decisively. We could not afford again to be taken by surprise particularly in area vital to defense of US. There would undoubtedly be criticism of our action. Nevertheless if brunt of defense of free nations against aggressors must for time being be borne by US we could not afford to permit petty considerations and doubts to prevent us from making moves which would strengthen our ability to perform task we had undertaken. Bajpai said he did not wish me to obtain impression that anything which he had said was intended as a criticism of recent decisions made by U.S. He was merely trying to help me understand some of considerations which would possibly influence GOI decision.

HENDERSON

Editorial Note

Secretary of State Acheson held a news conference at the Department of State on June 28, prior to which he delivered some remarks relating to President Truman's statement of June 27 concerning United States support for the Republic of Korea; for the text of Secretary Acheson's remarks, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 3, 1950, page 6.

795.00/6–2950 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY [SUWON,] June 29, 1950—2 a. m.
[Received June 28—5 : 59 p. m.]

Unnumbered. Ambassador Muccio flew Taejon today where he conferred with Rhee, Cabinet and spoke before Assembly. He explained US commitment and urged all-out war effort concentrated in hands Supreme Staff. He urged temporary reestablishment government at Taejon. This is now being done.

Koreans from Rhee down seriously dispirited by course hostilities, especially loss Seoul. They also disheartened by lack actual US military aid. Very strong effort on part US Air Force and Navy will be needed during next few days if situation is to be stabilized. Muccio

expects return Suwon 29th. Further information on this subject being developed in subsequent message.

Department pass CINCFE, repeated info CINCFE.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/6–2850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Security Council (Ross)

SECRET [NEW YORK,] June 28, 1950.[1]

Subject: Korea

Participants: Mr. John Hickerson—Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. John C. Ross—USUN

Mr. Hickerson telephoned me at about six o'clock. He said that he had just come from a meeting of all the geographic Assistant Secretaries at which Lie's proposal to ask all United Nations Members to indicate what assistance they were prepared to offer pursuant to the Security Council resolution of 27 June had been discussed.[2]

It was agreed in the Department's meeting that it was a good idea to use the United Nations umbrella as much as possible. It was felt however that Lie should function as no more than a post office. This was Lie's idea and if he were disposed to circularize United Nations Members as indicated, it was OK with the Department.

On the other hand, Department considered that the form of Lie's communication to Member Governments was very important. It was the Department's view that it was not likely that many Members would be able to contribute very much. Therefore, the Department felt that Lie's communication should be drafted so as to permit Members not in a position to contribute assistance to refrain from replying to Lie's communication without embarrassment. The Department had in mind that Lie's communication might call attention to the Security

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[1] The source text is a copy of a document in the IO Files, Department of State, bearing the designation US/S/1256 and the date June 29, 1950.

[2] Reference is to a proposed message from the Secretary-General to the U.N. member states. The actual message was not sent until June 29, and the text read as follows:

"I have the honour to call the attention of your government to the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 474th meeting on 27 June 1950 which recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. In the event that your government is in a position to provide assistance it would facilitate the implementation of the resolution if you were to be so good as to provide me with an early reply as to type of assistance. I shall transmit the reply to the Security Council and to the Government of the Republic of Korea." (*United States Policy in the Korean Crisis*, p. 28)

Council resolution of 27 June which had already been transmitted to them and indicate that Lie would be glad to have them transmit to him any specific offers of assistance they might be in a position to make "for communication by him to the Korean Government".

It was felt that it was not practicable for the United Nations to get into the actual use and control of assistance.

The Department felt that it was unthinkable to use the Military Staff Committee in any way and the Department wanted this stated very clearly to Lie and Cordier.[3]

The Department also did not want any formal or informal action designating the United States as the agent of the United Nations or MacArthur as Commander of United Nations forces.

As a practical matter Hickerson said we would be very much interested of course in obtaining informally information submitted to Lie. As a practical matter also, the Department envisaged that offers of assistance made, for example, by the United Kingdom or Canada would be transmitted to Lie, by him to the Korean Government, and in turn the Governments offering assistance would work out the details directly with us. In effect we would be the operating agent and MacArthur the Commander.

As reported by telegram to the Department (Our 555, June 28)[4] the foregoing was communicated to Cordier, Chauvel and Jebb[5] by Ambassador Gross.

JOHN C. ROSS

[3] Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General.
[4] Received at 8:26 p. m., p. 225.
[5] Sir Gladwyn Jebb had become Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations on June 27.

795.00/6–2850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 28, 1950—7 p. m.

549. Fol for your info to be used at your discretion in any conversations you may have with FonMin or appropriate officials re Korea:

Ross Dep US Rep UNSC informed Dept this afternoon that in conversation between UN Official and Jacob Malik USSR Rep to UN, latter had spoken of US action re Korea as "19th century imperialism". Against this background Malik interpreted non-participation of Egypt and India in SC vote night of 27th as refusal on part of Asiatic states to "knuckle under US domination". We believe Malik is undoubtedly taking this line generally.

ACHESON

495A.119/6–2850 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions [1]

PLAIN WASHINGTON, June 28, 1950—8 p. m.

In order to implement UN SC Resolution of June 27 requesting member governments refrain from giving aid North Korea, US instituted complete embargo of exports to North Korea effective 4 p. m. June 28, 1950. Inform Government to which accredited.[2]

ACHESON

[1] Sent to all diplomatic missions except Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw.

[2] For documentation on this subject, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.

795B.5/6–2850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 28, 1950—8 p. m.

3183. From Perkins. I called in Franks today and told him that while we were grateful for prompt and effective Brit support in UN on Korea resolution, we considered it of utmost importance that Brit actually send material help quickly. Attlee's announcement which reached us later this morning that Brit were making ships available most gratifying. We strongly feel future announcements shld stress that assistance is rendered in support of UN resolution rather than as aid to US forces.

For ur info we are expressing to Austral, Canada, France and the Netherlands hope that these countries supply material aid. Present indications are that both Austral and Canada will render military assistance. When we have further word from French and Dutch we will let you know. [Perkins.]

ACHESON

330/6–2850 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, June 28, 1950—7:30 p. m.
PRIORITY [Received June 28—8:18 p. m.]

554. President's statement and US Resolution 27 June on Korea generally acclaimed by delegations, secretariat, correspondents and public at Lake Success with powerful surge support our policy and

action, in particular decision to work with and through UN in suppressing unprovoked Communist-controlled aggression. Obviously desirable to ride on top of and not fall behind this wave.

Following is checklist items raised with US by various delegations and secretariat on which Department's guidance soonest would be helpful:

1. *Legal basis for US action.*

(*a*) Broad UN approach by US and political, military and moral necessity and justification for our action thus far generally understood and appreciated by all delegations. Friendly delegations agree action taken pursuant 25 June Resolution also legally justified, but there is some undercurrent of opinion this not so and we have therefore to some extent at least given assist to Russian propaganda.

(*b*) Without questioning legal basis continued action pursuant 27 June Resolution, there is some question whether continued action by US and under US command on behalf of UN should not be formalized. For example, Chauvel at lunch today with Gross and Ross questioned whether some formal action by SC should not be taken as further logical step beyond generality operative clause 27 June Resolution in order establish clearly right of US to act on behalf UN and continue extension aid through US command; in other words, quoting Chauvel, "to establish link between SC action and US action". We do not favor such action.

(*c*) We have had considerable questioning along lines Bajpai's questioning of Henderson concerning specific chapter VII articles under which SC action taken.[1]

2. *Co-ordination of assistance.*

(*a*) Confirming telephone messages to Department last night and again this morning, a number of delegations and secretariat have approached us to ask what "we" wanted and from whom. So far at least as a number of delegations here are concerned there seems to be strong desire to participate this broad UN effort.

(*b*) Does "assistance" cover economic as well as military assistance to ROK and if so, what kinds of economic assistance?

(*c*) Does "assistance" cover "sanctions" against North Korea and if so, what would be nature of such sanctions; for example, are there any commercial relations which could or should be cut off?

(*d*) What should be machinery for coordinating assistance? To what extent, if any, should MSC be used; if it were to be used, under what charter articles would it be used? We oppose use of MSC in any form and strongly recommend against.

3. *Should SC action be taken to establish Soviet complicity?*

(*a*) Feeling that Soviets behind invasion virtually universal. There seems to be equally wide feeling US wise in avoiding up to now asking UN to accuse USSR of illegal actions. In the absence of adequate evidence of aid to North Koreans as basis for charging USSR in SC,

[1] See telegram 943, June 27, from New Delhi, received at 12:41 p. m. on June 27, p. 204.

would there be basis for putting them into SC dock because of their failure to disavow and disassociate themselves from North Korean invasion and to comply with SC recommendations?

(*b*) Should fact our direct approach to USSR (Deptels 538 and 540 to Moscow)[2] and Soviet reply or failure to reply in reasonable time be brought formally to attention SC in order to maintain UN approach and in order to expose Soviet position?

4. *Special session General Assembly.*

(*a*) If armed hostilities continue or expand in next few days or if evidence develops of Russian intervention, direct or indirect, would it be desirable for SC to request SYG call immediate special session of GA so that broad membership of UN could participate in grave decisions to be taken and publicly record support for SC resolution? We understand from Lie that special session could be convened within 3 or 4 days.

5. *China and Formosa.*

We have large number questions along following lines on paragraph in President's statement dealing with Formosa.

(*a*) Apart from obvious military objective isolating conflict in Korea, what is legal and political significance President's call upon Chinese Government on Formosa to cease air and sea operations against mainland and flat statement "Seventh Fleet will see that this is done?"[3]

AUSTIN

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[2] Transmitted June 25, 4 p. m., and June 26, 7 p. m., respectively, pp. 148 and 176.

[3] For the Department's reply, see telegram 10, July 3, 7 p. m., to New York, p. 295.

330/6–2850 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, June 28, 1950—7 : 43 p. m.
[Received June 28—8 : 26 p. m.]

555. Reference Lie's proposal circulate UN members asking what assistance they propose to offer compliance 27 June SC resolution on Korea, Gross passed on to Cordier, Jebb, and Chauvel late this afternoon Department's views as telephoned by Hickerson to Ross.

Cordier agreed change draft communication in accordance Department's views but, apparently after consulting SYG, indicated reluctance to include reference to transmitting responses from member governments to government of ROK.

Gross emphasized Department's feeling SYG should be transmittal agent of offers to ROK and indicated other dels (UK, France) would probably object to concept SYG being recipient offers.

Cordier agreed hold up proposed communication pending further consultation.[1]

AUSTIN

[1] See footnote 2 to the memorandum of conversation by Ross, June 28, p. 221.

794A.5/6–2950 : Telegram

The Chargé in China (Strong) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT
NO DISTRIBUTION

TAIPEI, June 29, 1950—1 a. m.
[Received June 28—9 : 39 p. m.]

1000. Mytel 991, June 28 [*27*].[1] Following is FonOff translation of reply handed me by Foreign Minister Yeh 10 p. m. June 28:

[Here follows the Chinese note expressing agreement in principle with the content of the American aide-mémoire of June 27 (see telegram Telcan 39, June 27, 1 a. m., to Taipei, page 188) and stating that, as requested, orders had been issued to suspend air and sea operations against the mainland or against shipping in Chinese waters or on the high seas.

The note continues on to point out that the Chinese Government was at present maintaining positions in Lintin and the Lema Islands off Canton, in the Island of Kinmen off Amoy, in the Island of Matsu off Foochow, and in the Tachen Islands off Chekiang Province, which positions, along with the Pescadores, formed part of the defense of Taiwan. The forces on these islands came under constant Communist attack, and the Chinese Government wished to know if orders to the U.S. Seventh Fleet took into consideration prevention of attacks against these islands. For purposes of coordination, the Chinese Government asked for direct consultations with the U.S. Government on these matters.

The note concludes by stating that the present emergency measures should in no way affect the position of the Chinese Government in the exercise of its authority over Taiwan, its stand against international Communist aggression, and its determination to maintain China's territorial integrity.]

Comment follows separate message. Yeh stated Generalissimo wanted message transmitted to President Truman soonest with his "best regards and respects".[2]

STRONG

[1] Received on June 27 at 9:43 a. m., p. 198.
[2] For further documentation relating to China, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.

JUNE 29, 1950
(Thursday)

795.00/6–2950 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 29, 1950—8 a. m.

549. For Kirk from Rusk (TopSec). Following undoubtedly fully understood by you but are my last minute thoughts prior your conversation with Gromyko:

1. There can be no possible doubt but that North Korean forces committed an unprovoked aggression. Our complete knowledge of the facts eliminates any possibility of South Korean aggression.
2. UN Security Council resolutions are entirely legal and fully based upon the charter and the generally accepted practice of the UN. Security Council has for years acted on the basis that absence by permanent member does not constitute veto and Soviet Union itself directly assisted in establishing that precedent. No illegality can arise from presence of Chinese National Government since UN must determine by regular parliamentary procedure any question of credentials or authority respecting the right to vote.
3. The only practicable solution to present Korean situation is immediate withdrawal of North Korean forces behind 38 parallel. This is without prejudice to our view that UN should be permitted to carry out its plan of unifying Korea by peaceful means under existing UN resolutions.
4. US action in Korean situation is based solely upon desire to support UN effort to maintain peace.
5. We have had an overwhelming response from the nations and peoples of the world in support of the UN action and consequent US action. We believe Soviet Union must be impressed by the strength of this disinterested opinion which suggests USSR should act promptly as already proposed by us to use its influence to obtain withdrawal North Korean forces.

[Rusk]
ACHESON

795.00/6–2950 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY [SUWON,] June 29, 1950—9 p. m.
[Received June 29—9 : 50 a. m.]

Unnumbered. Ambassador Muccio accompanied by President Rhee flew in from Taejon to Suwon this morning to confer with General MacArthur and his staff who flew in from Tokyo.[1] After briefing at

[1] General MacArthur had arrived in Korea at approximately 10 a. m. on June 29 (Korean time) and remained until approximately 6 p. m.; see Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, pp. 44–45. General MacArthur had decided to fly to Korea following General Church's report that U.S. ground troops would be needed to restore the boundary at the 38th parallel; see footnote 2 to unnumbered telegram from Suwon received at 9:33 p. m. on June 27, p. 210.

which Rhee and his Chief of Staff present, MacArthur drove up Seoul road to vicinity Han River where he surveyed critical situation. Following return Suwon he conferred privately with Ambassador and Rhee. Later Ambassador and Rhee returned Taejon by car.

As result of trip it understood MacArthur arrived at certain momentous decisions which he will no doubt communicate Washington.

War activities. Today dominated by air actions. In addition many strikes at enemy positions, a steady stream of supplies arrived from Japan. Artillery fire from enemy positions main activity Han River front. Threat to Korean left wing appears developing Kimpo area where enemy advancing south with estimated 1500 men. Eight Division defenses east coast area appear deteriorating. Estimated 60 percent First Division which encircled Munsan area attempting break through enemy lines and cross Han River to join friendly forces. Sixth Division continues hold well south of Chunchon. Most significant Korean activity today is regrouping of stragglers. Within day or two ROK should be able throw 25,000 men into Han River defenses. However, their fire power limited by small arms. Situation on the Han front remains critical and even with air and other support US now supplying, it highly doubtful whether sustained attempt to cross river can be thwarted.[2]

Koreans enormously heartened by MacArthur's visit and there is little improvement if at all. Thousands of refugees continue stream south from Seoul.

DRUMRIGHT

[2] At 6:48 a. m. (EDT), a teletype conference had been held with HQ, FEC in Tokyo by officers of G–2 in Washington along with officials of the Department of State and other agencies (DA TT–3437). At that time, FEC estimated that the ROK army had suffered 50 percent casualties, killed, wounded, and missing (*Korean Conflict*).

330/6–2950

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Barber) to the Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs (Dreier)

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1950.

Subject: Decision of higher officials of the Department against using any pressure on LA Governments to contribute armed forces for Korea.

At the meeting today [1] with Deputy Under Secretary Matthews, I was informed that it is the decision of the higher officers of the Department that we should not exert any pressure on the Latin American

[1] The meeting was held at 12:30 p. m. (*Korean Conflict*).

Governments to contribute armed forces in response to a circular telegram to all UN members which Secretary General Lie is sending out.[2]

Would Mr. Dreier please review the circular telegram that has already gone out on the subject to see if any amendment or modification is necessary? [3]

WILLARD F. BARBER

[2] Concerning Secretary-General Lie's request for assistance from U.N. members, issued on June 29, see footnote 2 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Ross, June 28, p. 221. The responses by the various governments were distributed as U.N. Security Council documents and are also printed in *United States Policy in the Korean Crisis*, pp. 28 ff.; a table listing offers of assistance to the Republic of Korea during 1950 is printed in *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950*, pp. 226–228.

[3] The telegram had been sent on June 28 at 7 a. m. to diplomatic offices in all the other American Republics and read as follows:

"Dept understand SYG Lie of UN is communicating Jun 27 Resol of SC to all member states and probably suggesting that any offers of assistance to ROK in accordance that Res be communicated through him. Cable Dept promptly any indication you may receive of reaction of Govt to Lie's circular." (330/6–2850)

795.00/6–2950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
NIACT

Moscow, June 29, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received June 29—1:02 p. m.]

1767. Saw Gromyko at 5 p. m. taking Freers along and Gromyko had Postoev and Lavrov [*Lavrentiev?*] present. In atmosphere of calm and without constraint, Gromyko said he had statement to make in reply to mine of 27 June [1] which he read in Russian, translation as follows:

"In connection with the statement of the Government of the USA transmitted by you on June 27, the Soviet Government has instructed me to state the following:

"1. In accordance with facts verified by the Soviet Government, the events taking place in Korea were provoked by an attack by forces of the South Korean authorities on border regions of North Korea. Therefore the responsibility for these events rests upon the South Korean authorities and upon those who stand behind their back.

"2. As is known, the Soviet Government withdrew its troops from Korea earlier than the Government of the US and thereby confirmed its traditional principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. And now as well the Soviet Government adheres to the principle of the impermissibility of interference by foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea.

"3. It is not true that the Soviet Government refused to participate in meetings of the Security Council. In spite of its full willingness, the Soviet Government has not been able to take part in the meetings of the Security Council in as much as, because of the position of the

[1] See telegram 1749, June 27, from Moscow, received at 12:05 p. m., p. 204.

Government of the US, China, a permanent member of the Security Council, has not been admitted to the Council which has made it impossible for the Security Council to take decisions having legal force." [2]

Postoev then translated into English.

I then asked if this statement was really a reply to last part of mine of 27 June (which I said I was sorry not to have been able to make to him in person on Tuesday—and got nothing from Gromyko) wherein US Government asks Government USSR to "use its influence with North Korean authorities to withdraw their invading forces immediately", adding we hoped in this way to stop the fighting. Gromyko replied the statement was complete in itself and should be taken as a whole. He added I could always return if need be to discuss further.

I assume Soviets will shortly release text their statement.[3]

Department pass USUN, London, Paris, Tokyo; repeated info niact USUN 46, niact London 269, niact Paris 256, niact Tokyo 29.

KIRK

[2] On June 30, the Department of State issued a detailed statement contradicting the Soviet allegation that the actions of the Security Council on Korea were illegal; for the text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 10, 1950, p. 48.

[3] On June 29, the Department issued a press release concerning the exchange of notes in Moscow; the text of the Soviet note is printed *ibid.*

At 2:30 p. m. (EDT) on June 29, the Minister of the British Embassy in Washington, Sir Derick Hoyer Millar, called the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to inform him that the British Ambassador in Moscow had been instructed to make representations to the Soviet Government along the same lines as those made by the American Ambassador (795.00/6–2950; *Korean Conflict*).

In telegram 2, July 1, from Moscow, Ambassador Kirk gave the following account of the British Ambassador's efforts to present his Government's views to Mr. Gromyko:

"In connection with UK *démarche* here on UN Resolution on Korea, British Ambassador Kelly was unable see Gromyko when on 29 June he was instructed to make statement British Government's urgent hope Soviets would use their influence with North Korean Government to respect UN cease-fire demand and return troops to 38 parallel. After fruitless attempts to get appointment, Kelly finally saw Pavlov, British Section at 7 p. m. and delivered his statement. Pavlov said, 'I will give it to Mr. Gromyko', whereupon Kelly said, 'Oh, is he here? Then I can see him myself'. But Pavlov at once said 'No, he is at a meeting now and not available'." (795.00/7–150)

795.00/6–2950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, June 29, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received June 29, 1950—1:22 p. m.]

971. I talked with Nehru this morning for over an hour for most part re Korea and SC matters. His attitude was exceptionally friendly and understanding. Telegram follows giving various details of our

conversation. I shall limit this telegram to summary of what at conclusion of conversation he told me I could inform my government.

1. GOI considers that action of Northern Korean forces in invading ROK was clearly aggression and it fully approves action its representatives in supporting resolution of June 26 [*25*].

2. GOI considers that resolution June 27 is natural corollary to resolution of June 26 [*25*]. It regrets, however, that this resolution was passed in such haste that it was not possible for its representatives in SC to obtain instructions from his government with regard to substance resolution or with regard to what its attitude should be. Nevertheless it understands circumstances responsible for such haste.

3. GOI will issue announcement in near future re its attitude towards resolution of June 27. It does not wish do so, however, until as matter of courtesy it has notified in advance governments of Burma and Indonesia of its intentions. India's relations with Burma and Indonesia are exceptionally close and they will both be affected by any action which GOI takes in this matter.

4. Statement of President Truman introducing Formosa, Philippines and Indochina into picture has somewhat complicated situation both externally and internally so far as GOI is concerned. Nevertheless he believes that it will be possible to make a decision limited to issues at stake—issues before SC itself.

I gained impression from tenor Prime Minister's remarks that he is personally convinced that GOI must support resolution June 27 but that he is not in position make any statement this effect prior another Cabinet meeting on subject which will probably take place some time today.

HENDERSON

795.00/6–2950: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Missions and Certain Consular Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 29, 1950—2 p. m.

Reactions to Pres statement [2] continue overwhelmingly favorable as follows: Indo Cabinet Min informed AmEmb Djakarta he greatly satisfied Indo leaders have come to support of Pres statement on Korea, and stated US policy shld have great influence in Far East. AmEmb New Delhi reports Bajpai of Indian FonOff made no direct comment on Pres statement but plunged into explanation of the difficult situation in which India found herself on matter of SC June 27th res. (India had not yet voted.[3]) Bajpai was informed US action demon-

[1] The code room was instructed to send this telegram to Hong Kong, Singapore, and to the U.S. Political Adviser in Tokyo.

[2] June 27, p. 202.

[3] See footnote 4 to telegram 973, June 29, from New Delhi, received at 3:54 p. m., p. 237.

strated US takes UN obligations seriously, that aggression was clearly essence of problem and that in supporting SC res India did not necessarily involve itself in US policy in Taiwan and Indochina. AmLeg Saigon reports local effect of US action was "all the more electric" since both Fr and Viets had discounted possibility US intervention. Local Fr auths highly gratified at Pres statement. AmEmb Manila reports Pres Quirino voiced satisfaction US intends prevent attack on Taiwan and will expedite help to Phil; he felt Korea US responsibility. Yugo UN deleg informed US deleg Yugo privately supported and understood US Korea action but cld not publicly support SC res because of its ideological war with USSR. AmEmb Ottawa reports enthusiastic applause greeted statement by FonMin Pearson that US had recognized its special responsibility in Korea and discharged it with admirable dispatch and decisiveness. Pearson said privately Canada wld not "let US down". Emb Moscow reports prevalent feeling among friendly dipl corps was relief and approval although some thought US had not gone far enough. AmLeg Helsinki reports official Finn reaction Pres statement was reserve mixed with curiosity as to real Sov position, while unofficial reaction was pleasure at sharp rebuff dealt Com aggression. AmEmb Oslo states US action apparently recd gen approval Nor public and officials, but considerable Nor apprehension possible consequences Korean situation noted. AmEmb observes growing realization significance Nor Atlantic Pact commitments. AmLeg Reykjavik reports Ice public heartened at firm US stand. AmEmb Lisbon states widespread approval Pres stand in Port coupled with relief US not taking Com challenge lying down. AmEmb Madrid reports consensus Span FonOff extremely favorable Pres ordering energetic action. AmEmb Cairo reports Egypt Council of Mins is expected make decision on Egypt vote on SC June 27 res soon. AmEmb San Jose reports all members local dipl corps agree our position supporting SC res was only one possible at this time. AmEmb La Paz and Ciudad Trujillo report Bol and Dom Republic support US position.

ACHESON

357.AD/6–2950 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 29, 1950—2 p. m.

502. Info OAFE. For USPolAd. In Dept view publicized presence of and reporting by UNCOK in Korea has been factor of outstanding

importance in enlisting support of overwhelming majority UN Member States for Rep of Korea and for US position re problem Korea in UNGA. Upon return UNCOK to Korea [1] its observation and reporting to GA will again be of great value in assuring that Member States continue to accord that support. Accordingly Dept is confident that SCAP will, subsequent to UNCOK's return, afford it broadest possible facilities designed to assist in performance its duties and to emphasize publicly its association as UN agent with task of repelling armed attack and restoring peace and security.

ACHESON

[1] See footnote 1 to the unnumbered telegram from Seoul which was received on June 26 at 11:12 p. m., p. 185.

330/6–2950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

CAIRO, June 29, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received June 29—3 : 15 p. m.]

699. I believe following factors in addition to the well-known Palestine difficulties are in part responsible for Egyptian hesitation to go along on Korean resolution:

1. Feeling that US is always asking for Egyptian support in UN but never prepared to give *quid pro quo* on questions which Egypt finds important (e.g. failure to approve transfer 160,000 rounds ammunition).

2. Lack of advance preparation with Egypt on resolution (Embtel 690, June 28 [1]).

3. Desire to study situation closely and avoid any action which might even indirectly give British lever to postpone negotiations re evacuation because of international emergency.

4. Hesitation to take positive pro-western stand because a danger of involvement in world conflict, (*b*) possible criticism from other Arab states that Egypt condoning western imperialism (Malik's statement reported Deptel 549, June 28 regarding refusal to "knuckle under US domination" has at least vestiges of truth), (*c*) feeling that Egypt has something to gain by maintaining bargaining position between east and west.

CAFFERY

[1] Not printed.

791.00/6–2950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, June 29, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received June 29—3 : 54 p. m.]

973. 1. Before making my call on Nehru this morning,[1] I had brief chat with Bajpai, SYG MEA. Among things Bajpai told me were:

(*a*) Cabinet meeting yesterday discussed attitude GOI should take regarding SC resolution June 27. Atmosphere of meeting was one of relief that since resolution had already been considered and passed it was no longer necessary for GOI to take stand. While Cabinet was still in session Bajpai learned that Rau had not abstained but had taken no position whatever, pending instructions from Delhi. Bajpai immediately sent message Nehru stressing significance this new information and pointing out that GOI as member SC could not well avoid stating its position re resolution without losing respect of other members UN. This message arrived too late enable Nehru make definite recommendations to Cabinet and no decisions were reached.

(*b*) Bajpai had long discussion with Nehru this morning endeavoring convince him that GOI could not logically fail support resolution June 27th. Nehru said he would make no decision pending conversation with me.

(*c*) One unfortunate aspect of matter had been that more information re developments in Washington and Lake Success had come through UK rather than US sources. For instance, UK Government had informed GOI that it had studied press statement before issuance and had made several suggestions including elimination of phrase "centrally directed" and mention of Formosa.[2] According UK Government, US had accepted first suggestion and rejected second. Furthermore, UK Government had had opportunity consider resolution June 27 and given instructions approving it before resolution submitted. Text resolution had come through UK channels rather than US channels. US tendency to consult with UK and not with GOI re matters primarily Asian had certain dampening effect on spontaneity of GOI desire support US in its undertaking.

2. I expressed appreciation to Bajpai of understanding attitude he was taking re resolution June 27 and read to him pertinent excerpts from Deptel 644, June 28,[3] stating that it was our practice to consult with our friends, particularly India, prior to introducing major proposals for UN action and explaining why we had not done so in this instance. I said that he should bear in mind that communications between Delhi and Washington were extremely slow; that therefore it must have been obvious to my Government that it would have been

[1] See telegram 971, June 29, from New Delhi, received at 1:22 p. m., p. 230.
[2] See footnote 3 to telegram 3124, June 27, 1 a. m., to London, p. 187.
[3] Transmitted June 27 at 8 p. m., p. 210.

physically impossible in existing emergency for Rau or for me obtain GOI views re President's speech or resolution in advance. Text resolution itself coming through USIS channels via Bombay did not reach Embassy until afternoon June 28. We had been trying for some time persuade GOI permit Embassy have special teletype facilities with Bombay. I hoped events last few days would show both GOI and my own Government importance improving communication facilities between US and India. Department had direct teletype facilities with Embassy London.

3. Bajpai said he did not wish to stress prior consultation too much but hoped US would bear this delicate point in mind in connection future important international moves.

4. As I left Bajpai's office I met Dutt, third ranking officer MEA, who has considerable influence in Ministry. He voluntarily congratulated me on courage and determination shown by my Government and said he personally hoped that GOI would decide support resolution June 27.

5. Nehru's reception was friendly. After we had discussed briefly various aspects his recent trip Southeast Asia, I told him primary purpose visit was explain events which led to introduction by US of two resolutions into SC and to decisions of far-reaching character announced by President on June 27. After listening carefully to my clarifications and explanations Nehru said it would have been preferable of course for GOI to have had opportunity to give careful consideration to both resolutions before presentation to SC, since their passage had great political and historical significance. He could not be over-critical, however, of our actions in this respect since he realized importance of time element. Decisions announced by President involving Formosa, Philippines and Indochina made matter somewhat complicated so far as GOI was concerned. There was little sympathy in India for French policies in Indochina.

GOI had recognized Chinese Communist Government and was hoping to develop with it as friendly relations as possible. There could be no friendly relations if GOI should appear to be giving support to US decisions re Formosa. GOI had little concern re developments US-Philippine relations since there were special arrangements between these countries. GOI furthermore did not wish take any action which would embarrass its close associate, Burma, the relations of which with Communist China were particularly delicate, in view fact Communist China could at any time invade Burma under pretext disarming 26th Nationalist Chinese Army which had taken refuge there. India, Burma and Indochina [*Indonesia?*] had common policy of non-alignment with either of two power blocs and GOI must take care not to give impression that without consultation it was shifting

its policy. Internally also GOI had certain problems. He and his colleagues were already being criticized by various elements in India as tools of "Anglo-American imperialists". None of these considerations was over-riding. Nevertheless they could not be ignored. Furthermore, even if GOI should support resolution, it had no armed forces, money or materiel to contribute to campaign against Northern Koreans. Its support would be merely of moral character.

5. I replied that support of resolution June 27 would not mean GOI was passing either favorably or unfavorably upon our decisions re Formosa and Indochina. Our decision re Formosa had been taken primarily for defensive reasons. Deliberate and carefully planned attack of Communist force on Republic of Korea raised possibility Communists throughout all Asia might be preparing commit series of aggressive acts. We did not know where they might strike next. Since we had taken lead in resisting aggression, our fleet or our bases in Japan might well become targets. We could not afford permit Communist planes and ships to swarm over Formosa and use that island for base for attack on US in Japan and elsewhere. We also believe we must do all possible to impress upon potential aggressors gravity of an invasion of Indochina. A constructive feature our decision re Formosa was that it might lead to cessation of futile and wasteful hostilities between Communist and Nationalist China. We would of course receive no gratitude from Communist China; nevertheless, all Asia should benefit.

6. I pointed out that among difficulties in maintaining system of collective security had been tendency of powers faced with special problems to refrain from supporting or participating in collective action against aggressors. If GOI, because of its special problems, should fail to support collective action in this instance result, in my opinion, would be serious set-back to UN and to whole principle of collective security. India, as most powerful and influential free country of Asia, could not, it seemed to me, fail to give at least its moral support to collective action against aggression in Asia without making principles of UN meaningless so far as Asia was concerned. I added that I did not wish press him for decision at this moment, but I desired stress that time element was still important. Public opinion throughout Asia as to correctness of SC action was still in formative stage; if GOI could issue statement supporting SC before this public opinion had time to congeal, those forces opposed, not to Soviet Union or to any power bloc but merely to aggression, would be immeasurably strengthened. I would appreciate it if he could at this time tell me what I should report to my Government. Nehru's reply was summarized in Embtel 971 of June 29.

7. When I left Nehru's office, I was detained for a few moments by one of his secretaries. I then went back to Bajpai as agreed upon to discuss conversation. Bajpai was not in his office and I waited his return. He told me that immediately upon my departure, Prime Minister had sent for him to discuss matter further and that he was encouraged at what Prime Minister had told him. Present indications were that constructive statement would be issued shortly. He hoped that statement would be limited to discussion resolution June 27 and not contain passages disassociating GOI from US decisions re Formosa, etc. He was doing his best to bring this about.[4]

HENDERSON

[4] On June 29, the Government of India issued and transmitted to the U.N. Secretary-General a statement accepting the resolution of June 27 and adding that this decision did not involve any modification of India's foreign policy (U.N. document S/1520). The statement made no mention of Formosa or of President Truman's announcement of June 27.

S/P Files: Lot 64D563

Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1950.[1]

NOTES ON KOREA

1. The South Korean nation was rapidly developing as a free society under the guidance of an excellent U.S. mission and with some material aid from the U.S.

What happened there cannot be blamed on internal abuses or failures. On the contrary, if there is any local explanation of the attack, it would be that the Soviet Communists were worried by the success of the South Korean experiment in free government and felt that they had to snuff it out as a dangerous moral salient on the otherwise communist-dominated mainland of North Asia.

2. The large initial success of the attack was contributed to by the following causes:

a) The South Korean military forces, by U.S. decision, were without combat planes, tanks and heavy artillery although the enemy to our knowledge possessed these in substantial quantity and good quality.

b) There was failure to evaluation properly the intelligence information. It showed that over several weeks there had been a gradual concentration of large troop and tank formations. But there continued to be a fixed idea on our side that there would not be more than border raids in strength.

[1] Mr. Dulles returned to Washington from his trip to Japan and Korea on June 29. The source text is a copy of this memorandum which was transmitted on June 29 by Mr. Allison, who had accompanied Mr. Dulles, to the Counselor (Kennan).

c) There was a mood of complacency on the part of U.S. military advisers, induced by over-confidence in the morale and discipline of the South Korean troops. They seem not to have weighed the fact that the South Korean troops were without battle experience and their morale and discipline could not, in actual combat, survive a totally unequal matériel situation.

d) GHQ Tokyo was not informed promptly, and when informed did not evaluate the attack as serious until the third day when Seoul was within the enemy grasp. It seems to have been assumed that the attack was a purely North Korean adventure, carried out without the Soviet planning, preparation and backing which would assure its success as against any resistance that the South Koreans could interpose.

The foregoing deficiencies can be substantiated circumstantially if desired. Perhaps they did not decisively affect the outcome. They are noted because it is possible that the same deficiencies exist elsewhere and that corrective measures may be desirable.

3. Presumably the Soviet policy represented by the attack has its origin in planning of a global nature. One possible local factor, namely the growing success of the South Korean experiment, has been noted above. It is also possible that the attack was designed to throw out of gear the planning under way in relation to Japan. In fact, the attack does have the effect of giving renewed importance in Japan to military factors and making difficult a transition to political, economic and social autonomy, a transition needed to prevent growing antagonism and perhaps hostility on the part of the people. This could give Communism an opportunity to make Japan a point of U.S. weakness rather than of strength in the Far East.

4. The response of the U.S. to the Korean attack, notably the President's statement in relation to Korea, Formosa and Indo-China and its prompt execution with U.N. backing, represented statesmanship of a very high order. The rapidity with which these major decisions were taken cannot but be impressive. The action provides the best chance of causing the Soviet Communists to pause in pursuing a course of militant aggression which, if left unchecked, would make probable a Third World War under conditions disadvantageous to the United States.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Editorial Note

On June 29 at 4 p. m., President Truman held a news conference, the text of which is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1965), page 502.

At 4:30 p. m., the Department of State released the text of an address to be delivered by Secretary Acheson on that date before the American Newspaper Guild in Washington, D.C.; that part of the address dealing with Korea is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 10, 1950, page 43. Mr. Acheson stated that the United States action in aiding the Korean Government by air and sea support in conformity with the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27 was taken "solely for the purpose of restoring the Republic of Korea to its status prior to the invasion from the north and of reestablishing the peace broken by that aggression".

795B.5/6–2950

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1950.

In Mr. Rusk's absence I saw the Chinese Ambassador[1] at 4:30 this afternoon at his request. The most important matter he had to discuss was to state that his Government's representative at Lake Success was informing Secretary Lie that in response to the latter's circular request, the National Government of China was prepared to afford military assistance to the best of their ability in Korea.[2]

The Ambassador went on to say that before making a specific offer his Government desired to know our reaction to what they had in mind. He said they are unable to spare naval or air force units but that they are prepared to furnish one army of approximately 33,000 men, composed of three divisions with the best field equipment available to the Chinese. They lack sufficient shipping to transport the entire body.

The Ambassador also said that the Chief of the Chinese Mission in Tokyo was approaching General MacArthur since it was their intention that any forces supplied would come under his command.

I thanked the Ambassador for this information and said that we would undertake urgently to provide him with the reaction of the U.S. Government to this proposal. A full memorandum of the entire conversation will follow.[3] A copy of the *Aide-Mémoire* which the Chinese Ambassador left with me is attached.[4]

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[1] V. K. Wellington Koo.
[2] Text in U.N. document S/1521.
[3] For the memorandum by Mr. Freeman, dated June 29, see vol. VI, p. 640.
[4] Not attached to file copy; text in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 10, 1950, p. 47.

Editorial Note

At 5 p. m. on June 29, the National Security Council met in the Cabinet Room of the White House to discuss Korea. A memorandum of conversation on the meeting by Philip Jessup, who was present, filed in Department of State top secret file 795.00/6–2950, was not declassified by the National Security Council in time for inclusion in this volume. Published accounts of the meeting may be found in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pages 341–342; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pages 411–412; Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year*, pages 76–77; and Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pages 244–252.

Part of the discussion dealt with a draft instruction from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, which was read to the meeting by Secretary Johnson. After discussion and emendation, as indicated in the account by President Truman, the instruction was sent as printed *infra*.

795.00/6–2950 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

WASHINGTON, 29 June 1950—6: 59 p. m.

JCS 84681. 1. This directive consolidates, broadens and supplements existing instructions governing your actions with regard to situation in South Korea and Formosa.

2. In support of resolutions of United Nations, approved on 25 June (transmitted as WCL 29851, 28 Jun 50) and 27 June (transmitted as WCL 30453) :

a. You will employ naval and air forces available to the Far East Command to provide fullest possible support to South Korean forces by attack on military targets so as to permit these forces to clear South Korea of North Korean forces.

b. Employment of army forces will be limited to essential communications and other essential service units, except that you are authorized to employ such army combat and service forces as to insure the retention of a port and air base in the general area Pusan-Chinhae.

c. By naval and air action you will defend Formosa against invasion or attack by Chinese Communists and will insure that Formosa will not be used as a base of operations against the Chinese mainland by Chinese Nationalists.

3. Seventh Fleet is assigned to your operational control. CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT will support and reinforce you as necessary and practicable.

4. You are authorized to extend your operations into Northern Korea against air bases, depots, tank farms, troop columns and other such purely military targets, if and when, in your judgment, this becomes essential for the performance of your missions as given in paragraph 2A and B, or to avoid unnecessary casualties to our forces. Special care will be taken to insure that operations in North Korea stay well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria or the Soviet Union.

5. You are authorized to send to Korea any munitions and supplies from resources at your disposal which you deem necessary. You will submit your estimates of amounts and types of aid required from sources outside your control.

6. The decision to commit United States air and naval forces and limited army forces to provide cover and support for South Korean troops does not constitute a decision to engage in war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces intervene in Korea. The decision regarding Korea, however, was taken in full realization of the risks involved. If Soviet forces actively oppose our operations in Korea, your forces should defend themselves, should take no action to aggravate the situation, and you should report the situation to Washington.

795.00/6–2950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, June 29, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received June 29—7 : 02 p. m.]

1768. Repeated information priority Delhi 29, priority USUN 47. Indian Counselor Kapur urgently asked Embassy officer call his home during office hours today and opened conversation by throwing down on table top secret "Radhakrishnan for Nehru" cable dated June 28 in which Indian Ambassador, while agreeing that linking of Korean question with Formosa "unfortunate", goes on to make strong case for forthright support by India of present UN action against North Korean aggression.

Saying that he was taking up matter on his own responsibility and that his Ambassador was unaware his initiative, Kapur said that Indian Embassy here has been making vigorous stand for clear

cut action by GOI on Korean issue (Embtel 1743, June 27) and that US declaration June 27 re Formosa has been block to Rau's voting for SC resolution that date without further instructions. Indian Ambassador Pannikar's cable blasts from Peking, "conceived in narrow terms GOI–Communist China relations", were adding to Nehru's indecisiveness and Soviet UN representative Malik was attempting to put pressure on GOI by telling Rau that UN action along lines June 27 SC resolution would mean "general conflagration". According to Kapur "next two or three days will tell story re India's orientation" and while "realizing risk of responsibility he is taking" he wanted to make specific suggestions which would put India on right road.

Kapur then proposed that US Ambassador India discuss Korean issue with Nehru and Bajpai (or if both not available together, then with one of them since discussion on lower level would not have desired effect), that Secretary take similar action with Ambassador Pandit in Washington ("imperious, vain woman who feels that as sister GOI Prime Minister she has been ignored") and that possibly Senator Austin also see Rau, all approaches to be along following lines:

1. Objective, factual review of history of Korean problem up to time North Korean attack, pointing out *inter alia* role played by India in UN history Korean question (e.g., US–India resolution in 1947 UNGA).[1]

2. Keep issues of Formosa and Korea separate, giving GOI representatives to understand that supporting UN action re Korea does not in any way tie their hands on Formosa and that they are free to say or do as they like on latter question. Better not to dilate on US reasons for Formosa step but rather to emphasize clearcut aspects UK aggression Korea and let GOI do its own worrying about Formosa.

3. Appeal to Nehru and other Indians on two grounds: (*a*) Asian aspects of Korean issue; and (*b*) UN aspect. Emphasize dire consequences for India's position of leadership in Asia should it acquiesce in trampling down of free Asian nation such as ROK. Furthermore as leading Asian nation and member SC, India has special responsibility for supporting UN and UN ideals. Asia is important to UN and UN to Asia. If Asian countries do not support "Asian issue" in UN, this means "tripartite disruption" of UN. Whatever action taken by India repercussions will have far reaching effects especially in SEA.

4. Avoid context of "cold war" as much as possible but speak in general terms of "rule of law" as against "rule of force", that is, contrast difference between violence and use of arms on one side and

[1] See *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. VI, pp. 853–859.

"political action" on other. In re SC proceedings and Soviet claims re number of vote, etc., emphasize that problem is not technical one but of "threshing it out around conference table in democratic way".

5. Keep in mind as background that Nehru sensitive to "European interference in Asian matters" and that "white race attitude toward colored races" very much in his consciousness. Avoid "tendency to give advice in imperious manner" or "any suggestion of pressure on Nehru". "Talk straight but not condescendingly; don't lecture."

6. "Keep British out of picture, for they are indelibly associated with pressure."

7. Message from President to Nehru, even if couched in friendliest terms, also would have appearance pressure; far better are suggested, intimate, high level talks.

Kapur then added as keystone his edifice proposal that Trygve Lie (not US Government) cable Nehru to effect, "Here is critical Asian issue on which I would like your mediatory assistance", making it clear that mediation cannot of course take place until after withdrawal North Korean troops from ROK; US representatives might wish discuss such course of action with Lie beforehand.

Though as is evident from foregoing Kapur is not seasoned or discreet diplomatic representative Embassy does have good reason believe that he is sincerely (and emotionally) concerned over failure his government adopt firm stand which he thinks it should take against international Communism if it is to survive. What he has done in effect is to furnish a revealing brief on how we should approach his government leaders and particularly Nehru and his sister if we wish get full GOI support on UN and US action re Korea (brief may be useful on other issues too). Embassy assumes US representatives are now in touch with appropriate GOI representatives in Washington, New York and Delhi on Far Eastern situation. While not wishing from this distance and with events moving so swiftly to make specific recommendations as to course we should follow vis-à-vis Indian implications for our position in SOA and Soviet, Communist prospects should GOI take neutral position on present UN action Korea are sufficiently grave to warrant careful consideration by Department of approach suggested by Kapur.

Please protect source.

Department pass Delhi, USUN.[2]

KIRK

[2] The Department's reply to this telegram is contained in telegram 7, July 3, 7 p. m., to Moscow, p. 294.
Concerning the Indian Government's acceptance of the June 27 Security Council resolution, see footnote 4 to telegram 973, June 29, from New Delhi, received at 3:54 p. m., p. 237.

795.00/6–2950

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Security Council (Ross)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] June 29, 1950.

Subject: Korea

Participants: Sir Gladwyn Jebb—British Delegation
Sir Terence Shone—British Delegation
Ambassador Warren R. Austin—USUN
Ambassador Ernest A. Gross—USUN
Mr. John C. Ross—USUN

Jebb called to pay his respects and there was very general and tentative discussion for about an hour of the various aspects of the Korean matter.

Jebb agreed that the Military Staff Committee should not be used and expressed strong views against this. We read the paper which Ambassador Chauvel had just sent to the Mission and which was telephoned to the Department and agreed that this was a very undesirable approach.[2]

Jebb said his Government shared his view that from the propaganda viewpoint it was essential that this matter be considered as a United Nations and not a United States operation.

There was considerable discussion of the possible need of machinery. Gross explained that this question was under review in the Department, which was not very favorably inclined towards the establishment of machinery. We gave to Jebb in confidence and as a Mission working paper a copy of the short draft resolution[3] prepared in the Mission (and telephoned to the Department) which would establish a committee of the Security Council consisting of nine named members (those which approved the resolution of 27 June). Jebb thought that if there were to be a committee of the Security Council it should be composed of civilians. He thought such a committee might concern itself not only with the military aspects of assistance to Korea but also with such economic work as might be necessary. He referred in this connection to the last paragraph of Article 48, mentioning in this regard the specialized agencies.

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[1] The source text is a copy of a document in the IO files, Department of State, bearing the designation US/S/1270 and the date July 3, 1950.

[2] The text of the paper was sent to the Department in telegram 561, June 29, from New York, not printed. It pointed to the need for the designation by the Security Council of a body to organize and coordinate contributions by United Nations member states to the effort in Korea, indicating that the body should be the Military Staff Committee or an *ad hoc* organization, preferably the latter (330/6–2950).

[3] Not printed.

On the legal aspect of the action taken by the Security Council, Jebb said this matter had been very thoroughly considered in London and that the United Kingdom Government agreed with what he understood was our view, namely, that the Security Council action was taken pursuant to Article 39 of the Charter.

Ambassador Austin asked Jebb's view concerning possible application of Articles 51 and 106. Jebb said the British had considered these two articles in their review of the legal issue and felt that Article 51 was inapplicable and that Article 106 was weak rather than strong.

Gross read to Jebb Kirk's telegram reporting on his interview with Gromyko and the Soviet response to our note.[4] Jebb observed this seemed to indicate the Russians did not want, at this point at any rate, to become directly involved.

JOHN C. ROSS

[4] Telegram 1767, June 29, from Moscow, received at 1:02 p. m., p. 229.

795.00/6–2950

Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET [NEW YORK,] June 29, 1950.[1]

Subject: Ambassador Rau's Proposal

Participants: Mr. Bredo Stabell, Delegation of Norway
Mr. C. P. Noyes, United States Mission
Dr. Carlos Blanco, Delegation of Cuba
Ambassador Gross, United States Mission

I called Stabell to advise him that we now had received instructions in regard to Rau's proposal.[2] Our attitude was negative. I indicated that we thought it would be inappropriate, particularly at this time, to give the impression that the issue in the world today was between the United States and the USSR; it was perfectly clear that the issue in the world today was between the United Nations and the Communist aggressors in North Korea.

Stabell indicated very strongly that that was his own view. He told me that this afternoon Rau had made a revised suggestion. He had proposed that the non-permanent members should issue a brief statement after the Security Council meeting tomorrow appealing to the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the USSR

[1] The source text is a copy of a document in the IO Files, Department of State, bearing the designation US/S/1267 and the date June 30, 1950.

[2] Reference is to a proposal for a Security Council resolution inviting the United States and the Soviet Union to meet at the "highest level possible" to discuss world problems, reported in telegram 533, June 23, from New York (357.AB/6–2350). For related documentation, see vol. II, pp. 371 ff.

to hold a high-level meeting. Apparently the rest of the text would conform to the original proposal. He asked me what our attitude would be towards this.

I told Stabell I of course could speak only personally; that it seemed to me that exactly the same considerations applied and that I was certain that our reaction would be the same. I thought such action by the non-permanent members would seriously undermine the position in which the Security Council and the other members of the United Nations had taken.

Stabell seemed thoroughly agreed. He did not know what the other non-permanent members of the Security Council would think about such a proposal. He urged me to pass this information to Ambassador Gross so that he could give Ambassador Sunde a definite reaction at tonight's dinner.

Blanco (Cuba) called Ambassador Gross to determine our reaction to Rau's latest suggestion. Blanco indicated that he understood that Rau's idea was that the non-permanent members would authorize him as President of the Security Council to make the appeal to the four Permanent Members in their behalf. The appeal would be similar to that described by Stabell.

Ambassador Gross indicated that our reaction to Rau's original proposal was negative. He pointed out that the new proposal would in effect take the Korean question out of the hands of the United Nations and place it in the hands of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He thought this would be a serious mistake. Blanco indicated that he agreed with this position and had called Ambassador Gross before communicating with his Foreign Office.[3]

C. P. NOYES

[3] On June 29, Mr. Noyes also talked with Gopala Menon of the Indian delegation to the United Nations and noted that no mention was made of the possibility of action in connection with Ambassador Rau's proposal for a high-level meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union (795.00/6–2950).

JUNE 30, 1950

(Friday)

330/6–2950 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, June 29, 1950—midnight.
[Received June 30—12 : 35 a. m.]

566. Re status and role of UNCOK under current situation in Korea, Cordier (UN) told USUN today that Katzin's first task in new posi-

tion of personal representative of UN SYG with UNCOK [1] would be to visit SCAP headquarters for discussion of relationships to SCAP and general problem of coordination. Katzin will be placed in position over Renborg, principal secretary of UNCOK, and has been given very strong briefing by UN SyG re importance of keeping UNCOK role prominent with respect to relationship with SCAP.

Cordier also stated that he had told member of Australian delegation to UN how important it was that UN be straightened all along the line at this time, including particularly representation on UNCOK. Received indication from Australian delegate that Colonel Hodgson might be replacement for Jamieson, present Australian representative on UNCOK. Cordier added that he might make similar approaches to certain other member states having representatives of UNCOK.

UN also plans to set up small administrative office in Tokyo to be headquarters for general administration and liaison in that area.

In re UNCOK military observers, Cordier reported that in addition to the two Australian observers now with UNCOK and two Salvadorans already reported in readiness, Canada and Philippines were shortly sending two military observers each. Because of present situation in Korea, including food problem, Cordier hopes additional observers will not be added at this time.

AUSTIN

[1] Following passage of the U.N. Security Council resolution of June 27, Secretary-General Lie appointed Alfred G. Katzin as his Personal Representative in Korea to represent him in relations with UNCOK, the Republic of Korea, and all military forces operating in conformity with the Security Council resolutions. Colonel Katzin presented his credentials to UNCOK at Taejon, Korea on July 6, 1950. (See U.N. document A/1350, pp. 31, 35.)

795.00/6–3050 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

[SUWON,] June 30, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received June 30—1 : 27 a. m.]

Unnumbered. Lee Hun Ku, former member National Assembly left Seoul disguised early morning 29th via Mapo ferry arrived Suwon today. Reports based largely information supplied him by young people on streets while he in hiding. Was considerable fighting around east gate and Chongno areas, resistance combined police and army overcome by Wednesday noon. All prisoners killed immediately. No fighting now in Seoul. All Peoples Army forces preceded by tanks in every advance. Enemy soldiers surprisingly young and small compared Korean Army; heavily armed with tommy guns. Kim Il Sung broadcast appreciation Seoul citizens assistance ridding Korea of Rhee gang, American imperialists, called for cooperation make Peoples Korea.

Kim Hyak Loo, unknown Pyongyang Communist appointed head Seoul Peoples Committee. Distributed four *mal* rice free per family as evidence difference life under two regimes. Opened west gate prison morning 28th, armed prisoners directed take revenge as seemed suitable. Bo An Dai recruited young men as auxiliary police have begun house to house search for government officials, police, other "enemies of people". Usually kill when caught. Many leading officials or public figures like Kim Sung Soo, head DNP, believed unable escape Seoul probably soon caught. Lee understands Communist headquarters in capitol but other information indicates American Embassy being used as headquarters.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/6–3050 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, June 30, 1950—12 : 50 p. m.
[Received June 30—1 : 31 a. m.] [1]

C–56942. From CINCFE Tokyo to JCS and State Department. I have today inspected the South Korean battle area from Suwon north to the Han River.[2] My purpose was to reconnoiter at first hand the conditions as they exist and to determine the most effective way to further support our mission.

The Korean Army and coastal forces are in confusion, have not seriously fought, and lack leadership through their own means. Organized and equipped as a light force for maintenance of interior order they were unprepared for attack by armor and air. Conversely, they are incapable of gaining the initiative over such force as that embodied in the North Korean Army.

The Korean Army had made no preparations for defense in depth, for echelons of supply or for a supply system. No plans had been made, or if made, not executed, for the destruction of supplies or material in event of a retrograde movement. As a result, they have either lost, or abandoned, their supplies and heavier equipment and have absolutely no system of inter-communication. In most cases the

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[1] Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 78, states that this message was received—in the Department of Defense—an hour before midnight on June 29.

[2] See footnote 1 to the unnumbered telegram from Seoul, June 29, received at 9 : 50 a. m., p. 227. General MacArthur had arrived back in Tokyo shortly after 10 p. m. (Tokyo time) on June 29 following his trip to Korea. According to the account given by Major General Whitney, this message was drafted by General MacArthur during the plane flight from Korea to Japan; see Whitney, *MacArthur*, p. 332; see also Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, p. 45.

individual soldier, in his flight to the south, has retained his rifle or carbine. They are gradually being gathered up in rear areas and given some semblance of organization by an advance group of my officers I have sent over for this purpose. Without artillery, mortars, and anti-tank guns, they can only hope to retard the enemy through the fullest utilization of natural obstacles and under the guidance and example of leadership of high quality.

The civilian populace is tranquil, orderly and prosperous according to their scale of living. They have retained a high degree of national spirit and firm belief in the Americans. The roads leading south from Seoul are crowded with refugees refusing to accept the Communist rule.

South Korean military strength is estimated at not more than 25,000 effectives. North Korean military forces are as previously reported, backed by considerable strength in armor and a well trained, well directed and aggressive air force equipped with Russian planes. It is now obvious that this force has been built as an element of Communist military aggression.

I am doing everything possible to establish and maintain a flow of supplies through the air-head at Suwon and the southern port of Pusan. The air-head is most vital but is subject to constant air attack. Since air cover must be maintained over all aircraft transporting supplies, equipment, and personnel, this requirement operates to contain a large portion of my fighter strength. North Korean Air, operating from nearby bases, has been savage in its attacks in the Suwon area.

It is essential that the enemy advance be held or its impetus will threaten the overrunning of all Korea. Every effort is being made to establish a Han River line but the result is highly problematical. The defense of this line and the Suwon–Seoul corridor is essential to the retention of the only air-head in central Korea.

The Korean Army is entirely incapable of counteraction and there is grave danger of a further breakthrough. If the enemy advance continues much further it will seriously threaten the fall of the Republic.

The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later the lost ground, is through the introduction of US ground combat forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the forces of our air and navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive.

If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a US regimental combat team to the reinforcement of the vital area discussed and to provide for a possible build-up to a two division strength from the troops in Japan for an early counter-offensive.

Unless provision is made for the full utilization of the Army–Navy–Air team in this shattered area our mission will at best be needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At worse, it might even be doomed to failure. [CINCFE.]

MAC

795.00/8–2550

Memorandum of Teletype Conference, Prepared in the Department of the Army

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 30 June 1950—3:40 a. m.

Nr: TT–3444

Subject: Korean Situation

References: CX–56942; [1] JCS–84681 [2]

Conferees:

WASHINGTON (CSA)	TOKYO (CINCFE)
Gen J Lawton Collins, CSA (mc)	G/A Douglas MacArthur, CINCFE
Lt Gen A M Gruenther, OCSA	Maj Gen E M Almond, C/S
Lt Gen T B Larkin, G4	Maj Gen A P Fox, DeP C/S SCAP
Maj Gen A R Bolling, G2	Maj Gen C A Willoughby, G2
Maj Gen Charles L Bolté, G3	Maj Gen G L Eberle, G4
Brig Gen James E Moore, SGS	Brig Gen E K Wright, G3
Brig Gen C Schuyler, Jr., G3	Brig Gen G I Back, SIGO
Mr Dean Rusk, State	Lt Col J H Chiles, SGS
Mr N W Bond, State	

Washington: DA–1

Authorization proposed in your CX–56942 will require Presidential decision which will take several hours for consideration. Meanwhile, your are authorized in accordance with Paragraph 2B JCS–84681 to move one RCT immediately to Pusan Base Area. This will be amplified in our telecon scheduled for 300800Z. (*End DA–1*)

Washington: DA–2

I was present at White House conference late afternoon June 29th when decision was made by President to authorize action covered in JCS 84681. Tenor of decision clearly indicated to me that the President would wish carefully to consider with his top advisors before authorizing introduction of American combat forces into battle area.

Will not authorization given you in DA–1 permit initiation of movement? Prior to completion of this movement, we should be able to obtain definite decision on your proposal. Does this meet your requirement for the present? (*End DA–2*)

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Transmitted June 29 at 6:59 p. m., p. 240.

Tokyo: FEC Item 1

Your authorization, while establishing basic principle that US ground combat troops may be used in Korea does not give sufficient latitude for efficient operation in present situation. It does not satisfy the basic requirements contained in my message C 56942. Time is of the essence and a clear cut decision without delay is imperative. (*End Item 1*)

Washington: DA–9

Ref FEC 1.

I will proceed immediately through Secretary of Army to request Presidential approval your proposal to move RCT into forward combat area. Will advise you soon as possible, perhaps within half hour. (*End DA–9*)

Washington: DA–3

Did FEAF carry on any operation north of the 38th parallel after receipt of JCS 84681? If so, what were the results?

General Church in message A–10 recommended aerial bombardment on troop concentration along north bank of Han River in Seoul area. Was this attack delivered and if so, with what results?

Are any bridges remaining over Han River in Seoul area? (*End DA–3*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 3

Reur DA–3:

FEAF made strikes on North Korean airfields north of 38 degrees. Reported results good on field near Pyongyang but no detailed reports of strikes yet received.

FEAF made B–26 strikes along north bank of Han River at 1100 and 1450. Results not reported other than little indication of enemy activity west of Seoul. This not substantiated by later report following.

Three railroad bridges still remain over Han south of Seoul. They are being covered with wooden planking for vehicle use and covered by artillery direct fire. (*End Item 3*)

Washington: DA–4

Have Reds any facilities for transporting any heavy equipment across Han River? (*End DA–4*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 4

Reur DA–4:

Yes. Ferry and barge services and planking of RR bridges vicinity Seoul. Bridge repairs by North Koreans reported. (*End Item 4*)

Washington: DA–5

Press dispatch just received reports break through across Han east of Seoul. Have you any confirmation? (*End DA–5*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 5

Reur DA–5:

Yes. (*End Item 5*)

Washington: DA–6

In part one of your last SitRep CX 56923 reference made to unconfirmed report that Soviet officers are with North Korean forces in Seoul and some Chinese and Soviet troops employed.

Have you received any confirmation of these reports? (*End DA–6*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 2

Reur DA–6:

Reports probably true but no definite proof or confirmation. Yak pilot interrogated Thursday afternoon reports Russian colonel as airbase commander assisted by some 15 lower rank Soviet personnel. (*End Item 2*)

Washington: DA–7

What is your latest information on results of US naval operation in Korean waters? (*End DA–7*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 6:

Reur DA–7

U.S. naval operations in Korea waters not of positive nature to date. Cruiser *Juneau* and destroyer *Dehaven* on east coast near 38 parallel, destroyers *Mansfield* and *Swenson* proceeding up Korean west coast. Generally report lack of floating targets. (*End Item 6*)

Washington: DA–8

What is your estimate as to time until RCT can be in action in Suwon area?

Do you contemplate moving it by air?

Can you move heavy equipment and artillery into that area by air? (*End DA–8*)

Tokyo: FEC Item 7

Reur DA–8:

Not feasible to make such an estimate until full extent of breakthrough at Han River is determinable. In any event movement by air would be impossible in view of lack of security of Suwon airhead. (*End Item 7*)

Washington: DA–10

Your recommendation to move one RCT to combat area is approved. You will be advised later as to further build up.[3] (*End DA–10*)

[3] See JCS telegram 84718, transmitted at 1:22 p.m. on June 30, p. 263.

Tokyo: FEC Item 8

Reur DA–10:

Acknowledged, is there anything further now? (*End Item 8*)

Washington: DA–11

Everyone here delighted your prompt action in personally securing first hand view of situation. Congratulations and best wishes. We all have full confidence in you and your command.

Nothing further here. (*End DA–11*)

795.00/6–3050: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

Moscow, June 30, 1950—noon.
[Received June 30—7:37 a. m.]

1773. We interpret Soviet statement June 29 in reply to US *démarche* June 27 (Embtel 1767, June 29) both of which published in full in *Pravda* June 30 (Embtel 1771, June 30 [1]), as tending corroborate other current evidence, such as relative lack editorial comment which so far confined to *Pravda* editorial of June 28 and absence other official Soviet pronouncements, that Soviets continue for time being at least to await developments before definitely taking position concerning their own situation in Korean affairs. Language Soviet statement seems to us carefully drafted to include numerous ambiguities which Soviets could utilize in future as basis either for strong Soviet reaction in support North Korea or to eschew any direct involvement. We have in mind particularly references to the "traditional principles of non-interference" and the "impermissibility of interference" in internal affairs which seems to be the crux of the Soviet attitude. We note that the reply contains nothing essential not previously indicated to be Soviet attitude on the statements contained in our message, except possibly the coupling of "those who stand behind their back" with the South Korean authorities. Paragraph 1, makes the previously publicized charge that the attack was provoked by the South Koreans. Paragraph 2, as indicated above, refers ambiguously to the principle of non-interference on which the Soviets have relied in past in such cases as UNSCOB et cetera. Paragraph 3, tortuously repeats argument advanced frequently in UN to justify Soviet absence UN bodies while at same time reiterating its willingness to participate UN. Statement does not, of course, specifically reply to US request that Soviets use influence with North Koreans to cease fire

[1] Not printed.

and withdraw and Gromyko declined to be drawn further on that point (Embtel 1767).

We do not think reply contributes materially to affirm or counter basic appraisal Soviet intentions et cetera, summarized Embtel 1726, June 25. It seems to us that Soviets are no doubt eyeing closely military developments in Korea but that crucial stage determination their course will be reached when developments turn in favor South Koreans. Meanwhile recommend we continue exercise caution to avoid forcing Soviet hand and if it is determined that we should reply to their statement we concentrate on refutation Soviet charges against South Korean authorities and continue to emphasize that UN members action, which has broad support, is pursuant Security Council resolutions to restore peace.

Department pass London, Paris, Tokyo; repeated info London 271, Paris 258, Tokyo 31.

KIRK

795.00/6–3050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

Moscow, June 30, 1950—noon.
[Received June 30—7 : 50 a. m.]

1772. For Rusk from Kirk. Appreciate urtel 549, June 29 which however, unfortunately arrived after I had seen Gromyko.

It seemed to me that important point of our *démarche* was to endeavor obtain definite Soviet expression as to whether they would or would not use their influence with the North Korean authorities to withdraw their forces. As noted mytel 1767, June 29 my efforts to draw Gromyko out in that connection were unsuccessful. He normally has little or no authority to discuss matters orally. I have the impression that he has even less in a matter of this importance which doubtless being handled directly by the Kremlin.

KIRK

795.00/6–3050 : Telegram

The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

TOKYO, June 30, 1950.
[Received June 30—8 : 05 a. m.]

688. Had brief telephone conversation with Muccio at 1730 in which he spoke of desperate and rapidly deteriorating situation. He said he had spent most of night and practically all day with top Koreans and

key members National Assembly and feels he can hold them in line a little longer. Danger, however, is that they might soon panic. He strongly urged all out effort before situation out of hand.[1]

SEBALD

[1] At 6:50 a. m. (EDT), a teletype conference had been held with HQ, FEC in Tokyo by officers of G–2 in Washington along with officials of the Department of State and other agencies (DA TT–3441). The Tokyo conferees reported that the ROK army had suffered 60 percent casualties, was reduced to a strength of 30,000 as against 100,000 North Koreans, and was low in morale; they also reported that the civilian population was very pessimistic and that the Government was in a disorganized state (795.00/8–2550).

Editorial Note

President Truman met at the White House at approximately 9:30 a. m. with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and a few other officials. At this meeting, the President decided to commit United States ground forces to Korea in addition to the one Regimental Combat Team already authorized and also to establish a naval blockade of North Korea. For accounts of the meeting, see Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, page 343; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, page 412; J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime: the History and Lessons of Korea* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), page 23; Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pages 257 ff.; and Beverly Smith, "The White House Story: Why We Went to War in Korea," *The Saturday Evening Post* (November 1951), pages 22 ff.

501/6–3050: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Missions and Certain Consular Offices[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 30, 1950—10 a. m.

Dept making every effort keep you fully informed significant developments far as possible by Wireless Bulletin, especially statements by US officials.

Widespread support SC res on Korea and US action in support of res continue. Pessimism and gloom in Phil have been succeeded by vigorous approval US actions which viewed as support of democracy in Asia. Thai FonMin stressed Thai allegiance democratic camp. While some apprehension exists in Thailand that hostilities may spread, Pres statement expected encourage Thai resistance to Commies.

[1] The code room was instructed to send this telegram to Hong Kong, Singapore, and to the U.S. Political Adviser in Tokyo.

[Burmese]PriMin "greatly encouraged" by SC and US stand, without which he believes he cld not have resisted left wing efforts align Burma with Sov bloc. In connection India's acceptance SC June 27 res, high-ranking official Indian FonOff has congratulated AmAmb on US courage and determination. Official Fr circles describe US action as brilliant statesmanship.

Neth response overwhelmingly favorable, even enthusiastic. Neth Govt, in response to SC res, considering sending naval units to Korea from Indo. Initial Belg pessimism displaced by "immense uplift"; Belg govt has publicly approved US action "without reservation". Fr and Turk Ambs Moscow, who believe US took only possible means saving entire FE, fear Iran may be next victim Sov pressure tactics. Their Ital colleague also considers US move only one to save Asia but doubts wisdom linking Formosa with Korea and feels peace is precarious, especially in Balkans. Den feels US took only possible course, while Dan FonOff indicated accord. Swed Govt stated merely for time being it unnecessary Swed take an attitude on SC res since "Swed has no connection with North Koreans".[2] Swiss jubilant at confrontation Moscow by overwhelming strength non-Commie world, while chief Swiss Commie daily leads with article on gymnastic competition. Turk FonMin concurs in US action as only proper thing to do, and has Turk support. Cuban Govt supports US completely and would welcome suggestions on assistance it might offer. Dir Gen Mex dpl service considers the "about-face" in handling of US fon rels during last 10 years most striking in history. El Salvador, in token its support, will probably embargo exports to North Korea. According press, Guat informed UN it views with concern Korean problem and is cheered by hope measures taken by UN may re-establish world peace. Pan announced it will cooperate with US efforts to maintain world peace, particularly defense Pan Canal. Parag FonMin see US leadership enormously strengthened, democracy strengthened, and Atlantic Pact revitalized. Parag will support measures taken by UN. Remarkable unanimity of agreement with US decisions reported in Ecuador while US prestige has taken "sudden jump". Ecuador FonMin offered his country's entire moral support and such material support as it can extend. Peru's complete solidarity expressed in official communiqué. Braz, although concerned lest another world war develop, welcomes our decision to avoid "another Munich", Braz Govt has cabled full support to UN. Arg Govt accorded UN its full support and has ratified the Rio treaty. Arg Amb in Panama states faith of

[2] On July 3, the Swedish Foreign Minister (Unden) formally indicated to Secretary-General Lie the support of his Government for the June 25 and 27 resolutions of the Security Council, while at the same time pointing out that no diplomatic, commercial, or maritime relations existed between Sweden and North Korea (U.N. document S/1564).

other nations in US wisdom and leadership has risen to new heights.

In connection reports 60 percent casualties (killed, wounded, missing) suffered by Republic Korea forces, Dept learns operating efficiency Republic Govt greatly reduced because govt had been highly centralized and few subordinate officials evacuated from Seoul.

Dept informed Pol Adv Tokyo that owing importance of UN Comm on Korea reporting in enlisting support from Republic and US position in UN, it hopes SCAP will extend Comm every facility. Advance party of Comm has returned Korea, rest will follow. New principal secretary appointed [3] and instructed keep Comm role prominent. UN Secretariat has emphasised to Austral and may to other members UN Comm on Korea necessity strong representation. Dept learns Salvador, Canada, and Phil will join Austral in sending additional mil observers.

ACHESON

[3] Presumably, this is a reference to the appointment of Colonel Katzin as Personal Representative of Trygve Lie in Korea; Bertil Renborg remained as Principal Secretary of UNCOK. See telegram 566, June 29, from New York, received at 12:35 a. m. on June 30, p. 246.

Editorial Note

At approximately 11 a. m., President Truman and his chief advisers, including Secretaries Acheson and Johnson, the Service Secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with Congressional leaders. The following press release on the meeting was issued by the White House.

"At a meeting with congressional leaders at the White House this morning, the President, together with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviewed with them the latest developments of the situation in Korea. The congressional leaders were given a full review of the intensified military activities.

"In keeping with the United Nations Security Council's request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the North Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea, the President announced that he had authorized the United States Air Force to conduct missions on specific military targets in Northern Korea wherever militarily necessary,[1] and had ordered a Naval blockade of the entire Korean coast. General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground units." (*Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, page 513)

[1] A circular telegram sent out by the Department of State on June 30 at 1 p. m. transmitting policy information guidance indicated that the presidential authorization for military operations beyond the 38th parallel was to be interpreted strictly in accordance with Mr. Acheson's statement (see the editorial note, p. 238) to the effect that such actions were aimed at the restoration of the Republic of Korea to its status prior to the aggression (511.95B/6–3050).

795.00/6-3050

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Frederick E. Nolting, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1950 [—11:05 a. m.[1]]

Subject: Korea

Participants: Mr. Matthews, Dr. Jessup, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Hare[2], Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Achilles, Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Bonbright, Mr. Nolting

Mr. Matthews opened the discussion by saying that the Secretary thought that we were perhaps giving too much attention to Korea, and not enough attention to the effects of the Korean war in other parts of the world. He also stated that the President had authorized General MacArthur to use the U.S. 24th Division stationed in Japan in the Korean operation and to authorize our Air Force to attack military targets north of the 38th parallel.

Dr. Jessup said that as of now there seems to be no evidence of Soviet intentions directly to intervene in the Korean conflict; that the main danger of intervention comes from the Chinese Communists. He suggested that we make a check-list of those matters which we should decide in common with the Defense Department, instancing the reply to Chiang regarding defense of the Channel Islands.[3] Dr. Jessup undertook to get up such a check-list.

Mr. Bohlen gave in summary form his views on probable Russian action in the Korean situation, stating that Mr. Kennan was of similar opinion. He said that he saw no evidence that the Russians had changed their traditional tactic of probing for soft spots; that now they had found a hard spot they would probably not directly intervene; they would do their utmost to get the United States involved with Asiatic Communist troops, particularly Chinese. Mr. Bohlen stressed, however, that if we or any of our allies indicate an intention to strike Soviet territory in the neighborhood of Vladivostok or elsewhere the Soviets could be expected to react in a more primitive manner. Mr. Bohlen expressed the view that it would be dangerous for us to become committed more deeply in Korea without replacing military units which were called up from other areas. In order to make the necessary replacement he felt that the President would probably have to order partial mobilization. He said that the places we should watch are: China (any

[1] The time is that assigned in *Korean Conflict*.

[2] Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

[3] For related documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.

movement of armies there), Indo-China and Hong Kong. He said he thought it possible that the Soviets might reimpose a blockade of Berlin and wondered whether in view of our commitments in the Far East the Air Lift would be feasible as a counter-measure there.

As an indication of Soviet intentions, Mr. Merchant mentioned the fact that key Soviet personnel had recently been withdrawn from Japan and Thailand to Moscow. Mr. Hare said that this had also been the case in Iran. A round-up was taken of the number of withdrawals of key Soviet personnel and it was agreed that a telegram querying all of our missions on this subject should be dispatched immediately.[4] (Mr. Armstrong's action.)

Dr. Jessup suggested that an announcement should be made at the UNSC of offers to help in the fulfillment of the SC resolution. He suggested that those countries willing to send forces should themselves be invited to state their intentions to do so, whether or not they were members of the SC. This general idea was approved.

It was also agreed, upon Mr. Hickerson's suggestion, that Senator Austin should announce before the SC this Government's new decisions (ground forces and removal of limitations on air operations), emphasizing that these actions were being taken in pursuance of the SC resolution. It was suggested that Senator Austin use a paragraph of the Secretary's speech of June 29 [5] to emphasize the point that we were acting on behalf of the Security Council and in conformity with its decision.

It seemed to be the consensus of the meeting that our European allies and our friends in the Orient would not be deterred, through fear of a more general war, from supporting those measures necessary to accomplish the objective in Korea.

[4] Not printed.
[5] See the editorial note under date of June 29, p. 238.

357.AD/6–3050 : Telegram

The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TOKYO, June 30, 1950.
[Received June 30—11 : 12 a. m.]

685. ReMistel 654, June 28 [1] and other telegrams concerning UNCOK. Dr. Renborg principal secretary UNCOK informed USPolAd by telephone June 28 that entire commission and dependents totaling about 50 desired proceed immediately to Tokyo and requested necessary travel and billeting accommodations. This mission informed

[1] Not printed.

him, with reference to UN SecGen Trygve Lie's instruction to commission to return to post in Korea, that (*a*) SCAP would be unable provide billeting, office space, other facilities for commission to function in Tokyo and commission members would accordingly be obliged to make own arrangements, (*b*) this mission had instruction from State Department to provide all possible assistance to enable UNCOK to return to Korea, (*c*) headquarters was prepared to provide UNCOK air transport to Korea at anytime, and (*d*) nothing other than delay would be accomplished by commission's coming to Tokyo.

Although commission then proposed sending three man delegation to Tokyo to discuss situation and determine feasibility of commission's operating in Tokyo or returning Korea, in consideration foregoing information from USPolAd Commission later decided to send seven man advance group to Pusan to prepare for later arrival of main body of Commission. Arrangements were accordingly made for advance group to go by courier plane from southern Japan to Korea early morning June 29 although they were unavoidably displaced to meet operational needs of highest priority and were accommodated on next plane leaving for same destination early morning June 30.

Upon receiving names of UNCOK personnel which commission desired transfer Tokyo we made arrangements June 29 with cooperation interested diplomatic missions for billeting independent of occupation facilities. This group of 40 is now en route to Tokyo by air and seven will follow by train, while attempts are being made to have remainder of group sent to general Tokyo area remaining together insofar as possible.

On evening June 29 Renborg telephoned text telegram which he desired transmitted to UN New York asserting Commission had found it necessary come to Tokyo in order be near headquarters and because military authorities were forcing them to leave Camp Hakata, pointing to headquarters delay in providing necessary transportation and requesting UN to have State Department "instruct SCAP" to provide air transport for UNCOK personnel to Tokyo immediately. We telephoned word to Renborg through liaison officer (FSO Farrior) that although his telegram would of course be forwarded if commission desired, it was considered to be a misrepresentation of the situation as (*a*) commission personnel is not being required to leave Camp Hakata, (*b*) every effort was being made by GHQ and this mission to facilitate UNCOK's return to Korea including providing necessary air transport and (*c*) State Department does not issue instructions to SCAP. I indicated proposed telegram appeared both unreasonable and presumptuous and suggested Commission might

wish to consider its revision before transmission to UN. Text finally approved by Commission was transmitted Mistel 674, June 29.[2]

It is SCAP's view in which I fully concur that no authority exists for UNCOK to function in Japan and that its presence Tokyo not only is unnecessary but has important disadvantage of suggesting its activities are being carried on under control and influence of SCAP. We have consistently discouraged UNCOK's coming to Tokyo and encouraged its return to Korea at same time endeavoring ensure Commission makes its own decisions and is given all possible assistance. In view its insistence on coming to Tokyo every effort has been made to assist in making necessary arrangements but I propose informing representative of Commission immediately upon arrival here that it is understood group has been authorized to proceed Tokyo as individuals for purpose of making arrangements to rejoin Commission in Korea and not as Commission entitled to carry on its official functions while here. Any other premise would, I believe, have the serious disadvantage of UNCOK splitting into two groups, a disadvantage which is entirely separate from the loss of prestige to UN by failure of major portion of Commission proceed to Korea when travel and other facilities are offered.

In circumstances I believe it would be desirable for Department to approach UN with view to having fresh instruction sent to Commission members now in Japan directing them to return immediately to their post in Korea in fulfillment of their responsibilities as members of UNCOK.[3]

SEBALD

[2] Not printed. It requested that State Department intervention be sought to obtain air transportation to Tokyo for the Commission and Secretariat members not proceeding with the advance party to Pusan (357.AD/6–2950).

[3] On June 30 at 7 p. m., the Department of State transmittted in telegram 518 to Tokyo, not printed, the text of telegram 566 from New York, received on June 30 at 12:35 a. m., p. 246, which indicated U.N. views on the status and role of UNCOK in the current situation (357.AD/6–2950).

330/6–3050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
NIACT

CAIRO, June 30, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received June 30—12:01 p. m.]

702. The Council of Ministers decided late last night to instruct Egyptian representative at Lake Success to inform SC that Egypt would continue to abstain on the recently voted Korean resolution, for two reasons:

(1) The Korean episode is another manifestation of enmity between two blocs which endangers peace of the world;

(2) Fawzi Bey is to point out in polite language that in the face of Israel aggression, UN took no effective action, and that when Egypt brought its dispute with Great Britain before SC in 1947,[1] nothing was done about it either.

The Egyptian authorities contend that in the face of the present extremely hostile attitude of the Arab States to the US it would be very difficult for any Egyptian Government to support US attitude in the UN.

CAFFERY

[1] For related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 761 ff.

795B.5/6–3050

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Freeman)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1950.

Subject: Chinese Offer of Military Aid to the Republic of Korea

Participants: Dr. Shao-hwa Tan, Chinese Minister
Mr. Freeman, CA

Dr. Tan called this noon at his request and handed me an *aide-mémoire* with respect to the offer of the Chinese Government to provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. A copy of this *aide-mémoire* is attached. Dr. Tan stated that this additional information was in substantiation of Ambassador Koo's conversation of June 29 with Mr. Merchant on this subject.

Dr. Tan informed me that the Ambassador was quite disturbed over the press reports emanating from Taipei on the subject of military aid to Korea, and he assured me that the disclosure of this information in Taipei was unauthorized and "must have come from non-government sources". He added that the Legislative Yuan was meeting today in Taipei and that it might agree on a recommendation that Chinese troops be sent to Korea. Dr. Tan pointed out that in such an event the Government would, of course, have no control over the publicity which might result.

[Annex]

The Chinese Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1. The Chinese Government will make available for use in South Korea to repel the armed attack of North Korea one army of seasoned

troops of approximately 33,000 men suitable for operations in plains or hilly terrain.

2. These troops carry the best equipment at China's disposal.

3. For the transportation of these troops the Chinese Government will provide 20 air transports of the type C–46 and, if necessary, can give a reasonable amount of air cover. If the troops are to be transported by sea, the Chinese Government can provide a moderate amount of naval escort.

4. These troops can be ready for embarkation in five days.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1950.

795.00/6–3050 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

WASHINGTON, 30 June 1950—1:22 p. m.

JCS 84718. Restrictions on use of Army Forces imposed by JCS 84681 [1] are hereby removed and authority granted to utilize Army Forces available to you as proposed your C 56942 [2] subject only to requirements for safety of Japan in the present situation which is a matter for your judgment.

[1] Transmitted on June 29 at 6:59 p. m., p. 240.
[2] *Ante*, p. 248.

795.00/8–2550

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] June 30, 1950.

Subject: Korea

Participants: Mr. Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General
Mr. A. H. Feller, Legal Office of the Assistant Secretary-General
Mr. C. P. Noyes, United States Mission

Cordier expressed disappointment that, as he understood, we were not in a position to make any move today in the Security Council in

[1] The source text is a copy of a document in the IO Files, Department of State, bearing the designation US/S/1269 and the date June 30, 1950.

implementation of the Council's decision. He indicated that he thought there were three problems:

The *first* involved the problem of coordination of offers of assistance and the organization of a channel of communication between Lake Success and Korea. I asked him how he thought this problem should be solved. He said that he had had many expressions of opinion from various government Representatives with whom he had spoken in the last two or three days and mentioned in particular Foreign Minister Pearson.[2] The general consensus seemed to be that it is important that there should be some official machinery with the United Nations label which could coordinate these offers of military assistance and take any other action in implementation of the Council's decision. He thought the simplest device would be a Security Council Committee made up of a number of the Members of the Security Council. This Committee could meet in private. It would be able to consider offers of assistance and make arrangements to decide whether offers could be accepted. It could establish a channel of communications via the United States Mission to MacArthur's command, and another channel of communications direct to the Government of Korea through a Representative of Korea. It would be an excellent umbrella for all activities in this field and would have important public relations aspects. In this respect he mentioned that its Reports to the Security Council would be useful. The Committee would also be in a position to meet with Representatives of States who were not Members of the Security Council and who had offered aid. I told Cordier I would let him know as soon as we got any reactions.

As to the *second* point, Cordier said that there had been a number of expressions of opinion, both from Representatives and the Press, in support of the designation in some way of a United Nations Commander in Chief. The title was not important but there was a strong feeling on the part of many Delegations that there should be some acknowledgment of the fact that the combined forces were acting on behalf of the United Nations; since in fact most nations who had offered substantial contributions had already made private arrangements to place these units under General MacArthur's command, it was obvious that the easiest device would be to arrange for General MacArthur to be given some title. He thought this could be done in several ways. It could be handled through appointment being made by the Security Council. It could be made by the Government of South Korea, or could be made, formally or informally, by the States who were contributing and later acknowledged or confirmed in some way by the Security Council. We discussed some of the difficulties. Cordier

[2] Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.

seemed to favor the third alternative. He thought it would be quite adequate. I told him we had no instructions on this point as yet but were still discussing the matter with the Department. I told him I would let him know as soon as we got any reaction.

The *third* point: the United Nations Flag. Cordier said that they considered the question of the combined forces flying the United Nations Flag. Feller came up and indicated he had already given us a copy of a legal memorandum.[3] His view is that it would be entirely legal for this to be done. I told them that Ambassador Austin's reaction had been that it is wrong to fly a flag of peace over troops. Feller pointed out that the philosophy behind the regulations which the Secretary-General had already approved was based on a different principle, namely, that the United Nations flag should fly over all United Nations activities of whatever nature. He pointed out that our purpose in the present crisis is peace and that the Charter itself contemplated that peace could best be served by enforcing collective security.

Cordier indicated that the Secretary-General was enthusiastic about the idea. He thought it would have excellent public-relations value and that something of this kind was badly needed. If the United States was willing to accept this suggestion, he was quite certain that the Secretary-General would be prepared to contact the other Members of the Security Council, as well as all nations whose forces were fighting under MacArthur's command, to determine whether they would agree to this proposal. If the consensus is favorable, he thought the Secretary-General would himself be prepared to propose to the Security Council that this be done.

Cordier suggested it might be done by a short resolution authorizing the combined forces to fly the United Nations Flag. It was conceivable that it might be done by the Secretary-General on his own responsibility if he had determined in advance that the nations primarily involved were agreeable.

Cordier urged that we move as rapidly as possible on these questions. He though that this coming long weekend provided an excellent opportunity to give the matter careful thought and to come up with a good solution by next Wednesday.[4] He said he would be available Monday for any consultations.

In the meantime I told Cordier that if he had any problems, we should be very glad to work closely with him and act as a channel of communication between his office and our authorities in Washington. I thought such a channel would serve for the moment.

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[3] Not printed.
[4] July 5, 1950.

Egyptian Position on Korea

Cordier and Lie indicated they were very much upset about the Egyptian position. Cordier thought Egypt's position with the Membership of the United Nations had suffered terribly. He commented that it was particularly bad in the light of the situation at the time of Egypt's election two years ago.[5]

C. P. NOYES

[5] Egypt was elected to a seat on the Security Council in 1948; for related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. I, Part 1, pp. 98 ff.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its 475th meeting on June 30 from 3:00 to 5:40 p. m. to discuss the situation in Korea; for the record of the meeting, see U.N. document S/PV.475. During the course of the meeting, the Egyptian delegate explained his Government's abstention on the June 27 resolution, while the Indian Delegate read the statement of the Government of India supporting that resolution. The Security Council also took note of a number of communications from member states indicating support and in some cases offers of assistance for the United Nations decisions on Korea. The French representative replied to a Soviet statement (U.N. document S/1517) denying the legal force of the June 27 resolution. Ambassador Austin reported on the press release concerning President Truman's decisions on intensification of United States military action in Korea. Before the conclusion of the meeting, the President of the Council (Rau) read aloud the text of U.N. document S/1518, a communication from UNCOK transmitting a report dated June 24 from UNCOK's field observers of a trip along the 38th parallel just prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The report had concluded that the ROK forces were organized entirely for defense and were in no position to carry out a large scale attack against North Korea.

791.00/6–3050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, June 30, 1950—noon.
[Received June 30—3:16 p. m.]

983. Upon issuance press statement setting forth GOI position re SC resolutions June 26 [*25*] and 27 (Embtel 974, June 29[1]) Bajpai Secretary General MEA sent word he would be glad discuss it at his

[1] Telegram 974 not printed; see footnote 4 to telegram 973, June 29, from New Delhi, received at 3:54 p. m., p. 237.

residence my convenience. Bajpai told me in utmost confidence that he felt compensated for staying on in MEA under extremely trying conditions by his contributions during this single day. He had resolved during morning hours that if announcement supporting resolution was not issued in immediate future he must retire at once. He said that he and Prime Minister had spent most of day making drafts and counter-drafts and he was satisfied with final result. He had been called to Cabinet meeting to explain points involved and possible consequences of India's proposed action and was surprised at calmness with which Cabinet accepted document without change. Only member Cabinet who suggested alterations was Ayyangar Minister of Railways whose suggestions would have vitiated document. Ayyangar received no support from colleagues or from Nehru and resolution was adopted with little debate. Adoption resolution might well result in shift of India's international position. Much depended on manner in which Commie powers would act in face of India's announcement and on course of action followed by Western powers. GOI hoped it would not be compelled to give up its present policy of "development of friendly relations with all countries;" "an independent policy . . . determined solely by India's ideas and objectives". It was his aim gradually to effect substitution of this description of GOI policy for such expressions as "policies of positive neutrality" or "policy of nonalignment".

2. Opinion he had on this day indeed made a notable contribution to the welfare of India and to promotion of world peace. GOI announcement would be received with gratification by all who were opposed to aggression and would help millions of Asian doubters to make up their minds. I personally was grateful to him for the consideration which he had shown me during the last three days and for helpful suggestions which he had given me.

3. Department will realize that although GOI announcement marks distinct step forward we should not assume that Nehru is ready as yet to go along with us all the way. He does not like our Formosa and Indo-China policies and it is not impossible he will give vent at some appropriate or inappropriate time to his feelings by critical outburst. I know it is not necessary to suggest that we observe care in all our utterances to say nothing which might make it appear we believe that GOI by supporting SC resolutions has placed stamp of approval upon all our Far Eastern policies. If we can do so without offense to France it would be particularly helpful here if our public announcements re assistance to Indo-China would place emphasis on our aid to Indo-Chinese states and contain as few references as possible to French in Asia.

HENDERSON

795.00/6-3050

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1950[—3:45 p. m.] [1]

Subject: Military Situation in Korea

Participants: Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. Graves called at his request this afternoon. He asked if I could inform him generally on the military situation in Korea, which I did. He then asked if I felt that the American public was prepared for the possibility of bad news on the military front in Korea for several days or a longer period. I told him there was no doubt as to the resolution of the public or the Congress on the matter. He then asked rather apologetically if I had any comment on a rumor which he thought foolish but which nevertheless had been picked up in New York by the Embassy to the effect that there was strong feeling in the Government in Washington that American military forces were being sent into Korea against the wishes of the Government under compulsion of the Security Council action. I replied that it was fantastic on the face of it and told him that the obvious answer was that we had taken the initiative in presenting the two Security Council resolutions.

Mr. Graves then observed that the line of defense in the Far East would obviously be strengthened by the specific inclusion and public mention of Hong Kong. I told him that it had always been our understanding that they were confident they could look out for Hong Kong themselves.

Next, Mr. Graves asked me whether we contemplated any change in attitude toward the Nationalist Government and called my attention to the reference in the President's statement to the "Chinese Government on Formosa". I told him that no change was intended or implicated and that the phrase he referred to was merely compression of the phrase, i.e., "the Government of the Republic of China now located on Formosa". At this point Mr. Graves, smiling cryptically, said that he thought the whole question of establishing diplomatic relations with Peiping must now be very carefully reviewed.

I asked Mr. Graves if he had received word yet from London regarding our request that Shell be asked immediately to suspend all shipments of petroleum products to China and emphasized again the urgent importance we attach to this request. He said he had telegraphed London immediately upon our request but that he had not

[1] The time is that assigned in *Korean Conflict*.

yet heard. He said he would try to expedite a reply. I then told him of our instructing the Department of Commerce to suspend action on all export licenses for 1B items to Communist China and said that I trusted London was giving the most urgent consideration to our request in the matter of trade between Hong Kong and Communist China, which should be immediately reviewed with a view to eliminating exports of any strategic implication to mainland China.[2]

[2] For documentation on this subject, see vol. VI, pp. 619 ff.

795.00/8–2550

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 30, 1950—3:56 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 84737. Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the decision whether to accept or reject the proffer of military aid by foreign governments should properly be made at highest levels in Washington. The Secretary of State has been advised that any proffer of troops made by Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek should be declined at present.[1] In the event any such proffer is made by the Generalissimo to you, he should be advised to refer it to Dept of State.

[1] See the *aide-mémoire* from the Secretary of State to the Chinese Ambassador, July 1, p. 276.

330/6–3050 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 30, 1950—4 p. m.

Egyptn Rep informed SC this afternoon that Egypt wld have abstained in vote on Jun 27 SC Res because

1. Conflict is simply another element of difficulty between East and West and
2. Similar actions of aggression were called to attn UN before but UN did not take action to end them.

Since Dept assumes you will be queried re US attitude toward Egyptn decision, you shld be guided by fol:

Overwhelming support by UN members for UN action re Korea has been greatly encouraging. However US has recd news of Egypt de-

[1] Sent for action to the Embassies in Baghdad, Cairo, and Jidda and the Legations in Amman, Beirut, and Damascus, and for information to the Embassies in London, Moscow, and Paris, and to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.

cision with deepest regret since issue involved is one of world wide scope in which all nations have important stake. Issue is full use and support of UN functions by its members in maintenance of peace and in opposition to aggression and is not question of special interest to any one country. While realizing that each UN member is free to determine nature of its obligations under UN Charter,[2] we believe that failure of any UN member to support UN actions diminishes effectiveness of UN and will have most adverse effect on reputation of those States as UN members and on their internatl position. Other material contained in Dept's guidance tels shld also prove useful.

Ref is made to Lie's request of Jun 29 to all UN members in conformity with SC Res of Jun 28 [*27*] on Korea to effect that "in the event that your Govt is in a position to provide assistance, it wld facilitate the implementation of the Res if you were to be so good as to provide me with an early reply as to the type of assistance". Request was drafted in such way that no reply wld be required except if affirmative. Shld you receive indication, however, that your country might intend misusing Lie msge as vehicle for negative reply, Dept hopes you will be able to prevent such attitude materalizing. Consideration is now being given in Dept to positive steps which we may make in fon capitals in support SC resolutions and Lie's request. This will be subject later tel.

FYI Dept has discussed Egypt statement informally with Syrian and Leb Ministers who both expressed strong disapproval of Egypt action and said they intended telegraphing their govts immediately that effect. Both Ministers expressed apprehension that Egypt statement wld be interpreted as indication of neutrality of all Arab states. They also expressed understanding that real issue is test of UN in preserving security of free world. We also intend approaching other Arab Reps here similarly.

ACHESON

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[2] A circular telegram transmitted at 3 a. m. on July 7 made the following change in phrasing of this passage:

"As phrase 'While realizing that each UN member is free to determine nature of its obligations under UN Charter' contained in Depcirtel Jun 30, 4 p m might be subj to possible misinterpretation re legal obligations assumed by each UN member under Charter, pls delete and substitute phrase 'While realizing that each UN member must determine its own policy in light of its obligations under UN Charter'." (795.00/7–750)

THE PERIOD OF THE NORTH KOREAN OFFENSIVE, JULY 1–SEPTEMBER 15, 1950: BRITISH AND INDIAN EFFORTS AT MEDIATION; UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITIES CONCERNING KOREA; THE PROBLEM OF THE 38TH PARALLEL

Editorial Note

At 6:53 a. m. (EDT) on July 1 a teletype conference was held with HQ, FEC in Tokyo by military officials in Washington along with representatives of the Department of State and other agencies (DA TT–3445). G–2 in Tokyo reported that the North Koreans threatened Suwon and that the members of the disorganized ROK Government had moved to Taejon. (*Korean Conflict*)

795.00/7–150 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 1, 1950—11:28 a. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 84808. 1. In keeping with the United Nations Security Council's request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the Northern Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea the President announced that he had ordered a Naval blockade of the entire Korean coast.

2. To implement this order you are authorized to use such means and forces as are available to you to deny unauthorized ingress to and egress from the Korean coast. The primary purpose is to suppress seaborne traffic to and from North Korea and to prevent movement by sea of forces and supplies for use in operations against South Korea. Care should be taken to keep well clear of the coastal waters of Manchuria and USSR.

3. Appropriate governmental notification and notice to Mariners will be issued from Washington.[1] Advise date measures will be effective.

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[1] In a circular telegram transmitted at 7 p. m. on July 3, not printed, the Department of State instructed all diplomatic officers to notify the government to which they were accredited that the naval blockade of the Korean coast was effective immediately (795B.5/7–350).

795.00/7–150

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 1, 1950.

Subject: Korean Speech for President Truman

I understand that there has been some suggestion that in the speech which is being prepared for President Truman to make on the Korean situation [1] there should be included a statement to the effect that United States forces and presumably South Korean forces will only attempt to drive the North Koreans back to the 38th parallel and will not go any farther. I most strongly urge that no such statement be included in the speech. In my opinion it would be fatal to what may be left of South Korean morale if such a statement were made. It would also appear to me to be most unrealistic in the present situation. I believe there is ample justification in the last part of the second Resolution of the Security Council [2] for any action which may be deemed appropriate at the time which will contribute to the permanent restoration of peace and stability in that area. I am convinced that there will be no permanent peace and stability in Korea as long as the artificial division at the 38th parallel continues. I believe the time has come when we must be bold and willing to take even more risks than we have already and, while I certainly would not advocate saying in the speech that we would proceed beyond the 38th parallel, nevertheless we should not commit ourselves at this time not to do so.

I personally feel that if we can, and I am not at all certain we can, we should continue right on up to the Manchurian and Siberian border, and, having done so, call for a UN-supervised election for all of Korea. Any action on our part now which would inhibit such action in the future would, I think, be most unwise.[3]

[1] Reference is to the address made by President Truman on July 19; see editorial note, p. 430.
[2] June 27.
[3] Manuscript note in the source text reads: "Agree D[ean] R[usk]".

795.00/7–150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [TAEJON,] July 1, 1950—11 p. m.
PRIORITY [Received July 1—2:21 p. m.]

1. Contrary to predictions most observers, ROK forces held their ground well on Han River and other fronts last night and today.

Enemy today reportedly strengthened ground forces in bridgehead area to about battalion strength. No enemy tanks appear to have crossed river but ROK Intelligence reports indicate enemy tanks massed near pedestrian bridge on which repairs going forward and in Mapo area to west where new bridge reportedly under construction. Inchon port remains in ROK hands while there apparently little change in Kimpo area. If ROK Intelligence reports have any basis, enemy may be expected push tanks across river under cover darkness and misty weather obtaining tonight.

ADCOM, on basis conflicting alarming reports and ROK Chief of Staff [1] inability to assume being able to hold Suwon air strip till next morning decided about 9 p. m. [to evacuate?] and was completed by early morning July 2 when headquarters reestablished Taejon about 110 [miles] southeast Seoul. All military personnel including KMAG officers near front lines were withdrawn thus leaving no US advisers at Korean Army headquarters or forward toward front. State personnel headed by Drumright and several correspondents were obliged to evacuate with military personnel. All arrived safely at Taejon where remaining Embassy personnel now concentrated excepting Noble and Prendergast who went to South Cholla today to keep contact with Rhee. Latter left Taejon about daylight today but Prime Minister states Rhee decided return Taejon, due arrive 10 tonight. Some KMAG personnel returning front areas tonight. It appears USAF air attacks have slowed enemy advance and have at same time put some heart in ROK soldiers. Word is now getting about about commitment US ground forces and this is having definitely steadying effects. It is earnestly hoped US ground forces can be transported North in time contain enemy at Han River. If this can be accomplished task of eliminating aggressors should be greatly facilitated.

I earnestly pleaded National Assemblymen congregating Taejon area return home districts and pacify people. Many left Taejon today to Lothab [apparent garble]. I also appealed Cabinet, Governors and public leaders to remain Taejon and carry on business as normal. Refugees streaming from Seoul–Suwon area constitute growing problem which government appears to be doing little to solve. Though people have lost considerable confidence in ROK Army, they appear willing continue support ROK Government. There has been remarkably little sabotage or guerrilla activity since start hostilities. However North Koreans crossing over in ROK uniforms and carrying ROK weapons create some difficulties. Near-panic Suwon yesterday started by two jeep-loads men in ROK MP uniforms rushing down highway shouting, "Tanks coming", undoubtedly Communist. I have been mak-

[1] On June 30, Lt. Gen. Chung Il Kwon had replaced Maj. Gen. Chae Byong Duk as Chief of Staff of the ROK Army.

ing supreme effort all week to fortify wavering determination of Koreans to continue resistance. With arrival US ground forces there no question of ROK determination to carry on.

Stewart is making full use of remaining USIS centers to bring news of conflict to ill-informed Korean masses whose knowledge of affair is based very largely on rumors.

MUCCIO

795.00/6–2850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

SECRET
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1950—3 p. m.

3. Pls arrange see Zafrullah [1] earliest to express US Govt gratification GOP attitude re Korean situation (urtels 614, 623 Jun 28, 30 [2]), and at same time to indicate our reaction to Egypt position in SC yesterday, particularly re contention that "The conflict under consideration is in fact but a new phase of the deep-rooted diversions between the Western and Eastern blocs, diversions which threaten world peace and security."

Fol is for your guidance and use in informal and oral approach (You may tell Zafrullah Dept officer is informally speaking along same lines to PM Liaquat Ali Khan before his departure from NY today):

I. US Govt notes with satisfaction prompt support which GOP is giving to UNSC action re Communist aggression against ROK. US Govt is employing sea air and land forces Korean theater in response to UNSC resolution in firm belief that maintenance of peace and prevention of aggression must be met effectively and swiftly by UN. It is therefore gratifying to know that GOP has without hesitation associated itself with action UNSC.

II. On other hand US Govt has received with deepest regret news of decision of Egypt Govt to abstain in UNSC voting. US Govt feels sure that GOP will agree that issue involved is one of worldwide scope in which all freedom-loving nations have vital stake. US believes issue is full support and use of UN by its members to maintain peace and oppose aggression. It is not matter of special interest to this or that nation.

III. While US Govt believes individual members UN shld be free to determine for themselves course of action they will pursue in UN, US also believes that effectiveness of UN will be seriously impaired by failure of any UN member to support UN efforts to prevent aggression and maintain international peace.

IV. US Govt noted with appreciation that Acting Prime Min and FonMin of GOP have informed Amer Amb Karachi that GOP will

[1] Mohamed Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan.
[2] Neither printed.

give moral support to UNSC action. It is hope of US Govt that GOP will make known its views on this matter to other states in Near and Middle East and South Asia.

Conclusion:

For your info Dept has reason believe that there are differences of opinion among leaders of Arab states as to wisdom and propriety of course followed by Egypt Govt. We believe that timely advice and influence GOP with particular relation to Arab States other than Egypt who are members of UN might forestall development of neutrality among all Arab States. Such a development wld be harmful to interests of free world.

In addition while US deeply regrets Egypt position it does not at this time wish adopt attitude publicly or privately which wld have effect of further stiffening Egypt attitude. If anything we wish play down Egypt position in hope that there will be change in attitude and other NE states will not rept not feel forced stand by Egypt.

Finally shld GOP wish use influence other states including NE ME and SOA States we wld of course wish that it be done in its own name and in support of UN action as a whole, and no ref shld be made our approach.[3]

ACHESON

[3] In telegram 12, July 3, from Karachi, not printed, Ambassador Warren reported that Zafrullah indicated he would be quite willing to approach the Arab states on the question of support for the U.N. action on Korea (795.00/7–350).

795.00/7–150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 1, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received July 1—4 : 10 p. m.]

1. 1. At request Bajpai SYG MEA I saw him at noon today. He said he had noticed press reports to effect Chiang Kai Shek was offering place armored division at disposal UN for action in Korea. GOI sincerely hoped UN would not permit use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea. Participation these troops would place GOI in difficult position since many Indians and other Asian nationals who thus far had approved UN action and GOI support thereof would be shocked and repelled and might join already appreciable opposition to stand taken by India against aggression. I told Bajpai I appreciated fully force of his statements and would pass them along to my Government.

2. Bajpai said GOI had today replied to circular from SYG UN informing SYG it was not in position furnish troops, material, or funds for fighting in Korea. It was not easy when India was unable to

contribute for it suggest contribution be not accepted from Nationalist China. Suggestion was made however because of wide unfavorable repercussion which would follow appearance of Nationalist China forces in conflict.[1]

HENDERSON

[1] In telegram 3, July 2, to New Delhi, not printed, the Department informed Ambassador Henderson of the Secretary of State's *aide-mémoire* to the Chinese Ambassador, July 1, below, and authorized him to tell Bajpai in confidence that the recommendations of the Indian Government were taken into fullest consideration in the formulation of the U.S. position on the question of use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea (795.00/7–250).

330/6–2850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 1, 1950—5 p. m.

4. Dept expects provide full reply questions raised Para 5(*a*) ur 554 Jun 28 soonest possible. Meanwhile fol present gen views Dept may be helpful.

Action to prevent attack on Formosa and to prevent Natl Govt air and sea operations against mainland taken as immediate security measure to preserve peace in Pacific and without prejudice to pol questions affecting Chi Govt. No change anticipated in relations between US Govt and Chi Govt.

Dept believes Amb Gross expressed this very well in his conversation with Lie (ur 569 June 30 [1]) when he pointed out US move respecting Formosa of mil significance only and believes USUN shld continue adhere this explanation.

ACHESON

[1] Not printed.

795B.5/6–2950

The Secretary of State to the Chinese Ambassador (Koo)[1]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In response to the request contained in the Chinese Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of June 29, 1950,[2] the appropriate authorities of the Govern-

[1] A manuscript note in the source text by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) indicated that this note was approved in substance by Secretary of Defense Johnson and directly by General Bradley for the JCS, incorporating changes Bradley suggested, after which it was initialed by Mr. Acheson at 5:50 p. m.

[2] See the memorandum by Mr. Merchant, June 29, p. 239, and also the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Freeman, June 30, with the annexed *aide-mémoire* from the Chinese Embassy, p. 262.

ment of the United States have given consideration to the expression of willingness on the part of the Government of the Republic of China to furnish ground forces for service in Korea in support of the United Nations.

The Secretary of State desires to inform His Excellency the Ambassador of the Republic of China of the deep appreciation of the United States Government for this prompt and substantial demonstration of support for the United Nations on the part of the Government of the Republic of China. In light, however, of the threat of invasion of Taiwan by Communist forces from the mainland, a threat repeated in the last day or so by spokesmen for the Chinese Communist regime in Peiping, it is the view of the Government of the United States of America that it would be desirable for representatives of General MacArthur's Headquarters to hold discussions with the Chinese military authorities on Taiwan concerning the plans for the defense of the island against invasion prior to any final decision on the wisdom of reducing the defense forces on Taiwan by transfer of troops to Korea. It is understood that General MacArthur's Headquarters will be in communication with the appropriate Chinese military authorities on Taiwan with a view to the dispatch from Toyko of representatives of General MacArthur's Headquarters for this purpose.[3]

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1950.

[3] For related documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.

795.00/7–150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

Moscow, July 1, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received July 1—6 : 29 p. m.]

7. Eyes only for Secretary of State, Department circular 30 June, 5 p. m.[1] has certain disturbing connotations particularly as regards military situation South Korea. We have assessed Politburo attitude as of yesterday (Embtel 1773, June 30) as poised to jump either way : i.e., if NK invasion stopped hurled back and full power western world (meaning chiefly that of US) manifested in prompt decisive defeat to Communist inspired attack in ROK, then Kremlin in nice position to remain aloof and disclaim any responsibility for what would doubtless

[1] Not printed; it provided background on President Truman's decision to authorize use of U.S. ground forces in Korea on the basis of General MacArthur's report that the ROK forces were not prepared to fight the kind of force thrown at them, had lost or abandoned supplies and heavy equipment, had not fought seriously, lacked leadership, and were discouraged and losing their willingness to fight (795.00/6–3050).

be described as regrettable "civil war"; but on other hand should military success favor attackers from NK or should struggle become protracted with issue uncertain, despite whatever strength western powers are able and willing to commit, it is then conceivable Soviets would commence to throw their weight more and more into scales on side of NK forces, either openly or by subterfuge, following pattern Spanish civil war. Just what might be course of military events from thence onward is difficult to foresee, although unmistakeably clear that we would suffer to some considerable degree in loss of prestige.

Essence of situation, it seems to me, lies in earliest military success our arms in SK. The issue has been put to the test of battle and entire world is watching and waiting for results this test. I am sure Politburo will be governed by such results which will constitute the kind of cold facts upon which their realistic attitude will be based completely unconditioned by any emotional or altruistic sentiments.

Consequently, I can only record my fullest concurrence with whatever action we and our allies can take to inflict at the earliest moment the most complete and crushing defeat upon NK invading forces. Every day of delay in stopping advance of NK troops increases our problem, and will shortly operate to reduce our prestige in all Asia as will in friendly western world. While I am impressed and encouraged by expressions approval, etc., as reported in Department's infotels and otherwise, yet I am anxious now to see resounding military success achieved by demonstrably overwhelming power.

We cannot afford a military reverse in Korea.

Dept pass London, Paris; repeated info London 5, eyes only Ambassador Douglas; Paris 4, eyes only Ambassador Bruce.

KIRK

357.AD/7–150

The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald)

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 1, 1950—7 p. m.

6. Info OAFE. While fully realizing difficulties involved, Dept recommends that if at all possible you communicate to Muccio or Drumright desirability Rhee and other ROK leaders be prevailed upon to endorse and sign statement to UN SYG along following lines for use in propaganda especially to SEA and SOA. Lack comment from ROK, due harsh necessity, has been serious propaganda handicap, which shld be remedied if at all possible.[1]

[1] Under date of July 4, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea (Limb) communicated to Secretary-General Lie a message substantially similar to that quoted in this telegram except as indicated in footnotes 2 and 3 below; the Korean message was circulated as U.N. document S/1571.

Beginning text: "The Govt and the people of Korea are deeply grateful for the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations calling upon its members to assist the Govt of the Rep of Korea to repel a brutal and unwarranted aggression against it and to restore the situation existing prior to the aggression.[2]

The Govt and the people of the Rep of Korea are likewise deeply moved by the promptness and vigor with which members of the United Nations, in honorable fulfillment of their obligations under the Charter, have acted to repel the aggression and to restore peace in Korea.

As the constitutionally chosen representatives of the people of Korea, freely acting in accordance with the democratic principles and processes embodied in the Constitution of the ROK, which was set up with the approval and sponsorship of the United Nations, we, the undersigned, solemnly declare that we shall unflinchingly carry on the struggle with all the resources at our command until the situation hitherto existing has been restored.[3]

We are deeply conscious of the harsh trials through which the people of Korea are now passing, but we share with them the conviction that, in this trial, we are fighting not for ourselves alone but for the great principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Only if these principles survive and flourish in the world can free nations and peoples, especially those newly arrived at national independence, hope to survive in freedom, dignity and peace. The knowledge that our struggle is filled with significance for millions of other peoples and many new nations buoys up our courage and stimulates our efforts. We call upon the people of Korea to renew their resistance to the aggressor with stout heart and furious purpose.

Confident of the ultimate success of the effort to repel aggression, we shall disdain negotiations with the aggressor for any purpose other than the restoration of the situation existing prior to the aggression. No support will be given by the people of Korea to any illegal negotiations with the aggressor undertaken ostensibly in their name, and no recognition will be tendered to any such negotiations that may be purported to have been made.

Recognizing the solemn obligations of our Constitutional position and filled with confident hope for the future, regardless of present trials, we hereto set our names and, with our signatures, pledge to the peaceful future of Korea our supreme efforts and our unstinted sacrifice to the cause in which, with a goodly company of nations devoted to freedom, we are involved."

ACHESON

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[2] The Korean message contained no mention of restoration of the situation existing prior to the aggression.

[3] In the Korean message, the word "removed" was used rather than "restored," at this point.

795.00/7–150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

BELGRADE, July 1, 1950—10 p. m.
[Received July 1—8:24 p. m.]

6. Tonight at Canadian reception Kardelj [1] made point seeking out Reams.[2] Mates,[3] Prica, and Admiral Manola [4] were in group. Kardelj began conversation by expressing hope that US would understand Yugoslavia's position in SC on Korea. He continued that he wanted US to know that Yugoslavs fully understood and approved US action. He added conviction that US intervention would quickly restore situation in Korea and stated that the result would be greatest possible "blow for peace". Kardelj went on to say that we should realize extent of prestige loss to Russians made it likely that Russians would attempt recoup elsewhere. He did not believe Russians were prepared to accept challenge in Korea.

Reams expressed appreciation for Kardelj's statement of understanding and support.[5]

Department pass Moscow niact, repeated info Moscow 1.

ALLEN

[1] Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslav Foreign Minister.
[2] R. Borden Reams, Counselor of Embassy in Yugoslavia.
[3] Leo Mates, Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister.
[4] Rear Adm. Srećko Manola, Chief of Staff, Naval Section of the Yugoslav General Staff.
[5] Telegram 2, July 3, to Belgrade, not printed, expressed gratification at the Yugoslav indications of understanding and approval of the U.S. action on Korea and concluded: "We believe we shld be satisfied at this stage with benevolent neutrality on part Yugo and not press Yugo Govt for open manifestations of support." (795.00/7–150)

795.00/7–250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, July 2, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received July 2—8:09 a. m.]

9. In accordance instructions from GOI Indian Ambassador Radhakrishnan called on Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin July 1 to make *démarche* Korea. Indian counselor Kapur informed Embassy officer that his Ambassador took a "stiffer line" than had either US or UK Governments and that Zorin "was taken aback when Radhakrishnan countered former's reference to Soviet Government reply to Trygve Lie on legal aspects SC action with blunt accusation that Soviets had violated Article 28 UN Charter in walking out

SC (Kapur observed this connection that US should also emphasize Soviet violation Article 28 in its publicity on Far East situation).

Kapur added that GOI cable requesting Indian Ambassador take this action indicated that British had suggested such step to GOI. Presumably GOI also instructed Indian Embassy consult with British Embassy in matter, for British Embassy informs me that Kapur called at British Embassy morning July 1 with proposed draft *démarche* asking Soviets use their influence persuade North Korean authorities obey cease-fire order UN, withdraw troops north 38th parallel, and adding that breach of peace was "your fault". At British Embassy Kapur was advised words "your fault" seemed possibly gratuitous and likely to place Soviets in undesirable position, but that otherwise *démarche* was welcomed, applauded and encouraged. British Ambassador states Indian Ambassador did omit on his own responsibility expression "your fault" from his prepared statement.

Department pass New Delhi, London, USUN 3. Repeated info New Delhi 2, London 6.

KIRK

795.00/7–250: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Department of the Army

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, 3 July 1950—12:43 a. m.[1]

CX 57097. Reference DA (JCS) nr W 84808 2nd July.[2] Consider that if effective Naval blockade of the entire Korean coast is to be maintained, the following principal port areas should be patrolled. Najin, Chongjin, Wonsan, Inchon, Chinnampo, Anju and Sonchon plus any South Korean port which may fall to North Koreans.

In order to keep well clear of coastal waters of Manchuria and USSR do not plan to blockade Najin, Chongjin and Sonchon. Plan to patrol on East Coast latitude 41 degrees North and West Coast to 39–30 degrees North.

With units already committed to WESTPAC no need for additional forces other than carrier CVE Task Group to provide air cover for forces operating and to increase range of surveillance. Blockade forces can be deployed as of 4th July within limitations of existing Naval Forces Far East but present patrol cannot be extended effectively until reinforcement combatant ships arrive.

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[1] The time of transmission is given in the source text as corresponding to 10:43 a. m. on July 2 (EDT).

[2] Transmitted on July 1 at 11:28 a. m., p. 271.

795.00/7–250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [TAEJON,] July 2, 1950—10 p. m.
PRIORITY [Received July 2—4: 55 p. m.]

5. Late reports from Korean sources suggest enemy forces estimated to exceed 2000 in number and transported in 90 trucks had by 6 p. m. today penetrated to vicinity Kimyanggang, about 10 miles east Suwon. This column appears to have crossed Han River in vicinity Kwamgjangni. Another much smaller column which apparently crossed at same place appears to have turned south through Kwangju and to have reached vicinity Yangin, about 4 miles northeast Suwon by dusk. Han River front south of Seoul appears to have held all day and situation in Kimpo area reported unchanged. Inchon still in ROK hands. 17th regiment which successfully evacuated from Ongjin peninsula now moving north from Taejon area in attempt to contain enemy threat east of Suwon.

UNCOK preparing establish headquarters Taejon and start functioning. For this purpose Kondapi of India and Brionval France now at Pusan being asked proceed Taejon and other absent members in Japan being requested proceed Taejon. However, when Brionval and Kondapi arrive Taejon quorum will be achieved and UNCOK will start functioning. Embassy facilitating UNCOK in every way possible.

Department pass CINCFE.

MUCCIO

Editorial Note

For purposes of Korean aid, Secretary of State Acheson on July 3 transferred $10,568,500 of funds authorized in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 from Title II (Greece, Turkey) to Title III (Korea, Philippines, Iran). (795B.5 MAP/7–350)

795.00/7–350

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Miss Barbara Evans, Personal Assistant to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1950.

Participants: Secretary of Defense Johnson
Secretary Acheson

The Secretary telephoned Secretary Johnson to find out whether his Department had any comments on the draft of the suggested Presi-

dential Message to Congress and the Joint Resolution on the Korean statement.[1] Secretary Acheson pointed out that he thought it would be possible to get a resolution through if it were confined solely to Korea, without mention of Formosa or Indochina. He felt that such a resolution would be helpful during the time ahead. Secretary Johnson said that the question was in Secretary Acheson's field and he would follow whatever course Secretary Acheson wished.

Secretary Acheson suggested that, if Secretary Johnson agreed, a recommendation from the two Departments should be gotten up by late afternoon, and that the President might be requested to meet this afternoon with State and Defense people, and any other advisers he wished, in order to decide what he wanted to do about the statement and resolution.

The Secretary suggested that he send over a copy of the latest draft so that General Burns and Secretary Finletter and others might go over it. Secretary Johnson indicated that he would be glad to have such a draft sent over, but that it should go from Mr. Matthews to General Burns. Secretary Acheson said he would so send it, and Secretary Johnson said he would see that General Burns received a memorandum on the subject from the Service Secretaries to Secretary Johnson.[2]

[1] Neither the draft Presidential Message nor the draft Joint Message is printed; the "Korean statement" is a reference to President Truman's statement of June 27, p. 202.

[2] For further discussion of the draft Presidential Message and the draft Joint Resolution, see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Jessup of the meeting at Blair House on July 3 at 4 p. m., p. 286.

Editorial Note

On July 3, the Department of State released a memorandum directed to the authority of the President to order the Armed Forces of the United States to repel the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea; excerpts from the memorandum are printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 31, 1950, pages 173–177, and a list of historical precedents is printed *ibid.*, pages 177–178.

795.00/7–350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 3, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received July 3—2 : 34 p. m.]

16. 1. During talk July 3 with Bajpai, SYG MEA, he emphasized that, in opinion GOI, it was extremely important for maintenance

world peace that Russia and Communist Chinese take seats soon as possible in SC. At this moment SC should be functioning with all 11 members since there was possibility, even though perhaps faint, that discussions could convince Russians and Communist Chinese that it was mistake to resort to armed force. GOI felt so keenly in this matter that it had instructed Radhakrishnan, its Ambassador to Moscow, to endeavor persuade Soviet Government to take its place in SC, informing it at same time of India's efforts favoring admittance Communist China.[1] Indian Ambassador had also been instructed undertake persuade Soviet Government use its influence prevail on North Korea cease fighting and withdraw troops from ROK, suggesting at same time that India would be glad participate if desired in discussions on this subject with US and Russia.

2. Indian Ambassador had talked to Zorin, Deputy FonMin, who had received him somewhat coldly. Zorin insisted Russia could not return to SC except in company with Communist China. Zorin also said that Russia could not intervene in Korea, particularly at time when US armed forces were killing Asians. He added significantly that Russia would be at disadvantage in conference with US and India since there would be two against one. Bajpai said, judging from Radhakrishnan's report, latter had not displayed strong attitude GOI had hoped. He had not, for instance, pointed out that North Koreans began killing of Asians and were still killing them; that it could be no comfort to Asians who were being killed and wounded that their attackers were Asians.

3. I asked Bajpai what, in general, was Radhakrishnan's attitude toward recent GOI decisions. (He had told me previously that Radhakrishnan frequently displayed certain amount of "wooliness" and "naiveté" in his dealing with Russians.)

4. Bajpai said Radhakrishnan had not thus far given GOI his personal views on subject. He imagined, however, that logic of situation was so clear that Radhakrishnan must believe that GOI decisions were correct. It is possible, although in my opinion not probable, that Radhakrishnan might have sent telegrams re Korean situation to Nehru which were not seen by Bajpai.

Department pass Moscow, repeated info Moscow unnumbered.

HENDERSON

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[1] At 5 p. m. on July 3, the Department of State sent the following message to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations as telegram 9:

"In view Korean situation Dept considers it wld be undesirable for Chi representation question be raised SC at this time. In event you receive evidence that question may be raised, you shld express this view other UN Delegations. In addition, you may as appropriate indicate that during Korean crisis we wld be even more disinclined see change Chi representation." (310.2/7–350)

795B.5/7–350

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1950 [—3:05 p. m.] [1]

Subject: Chinese Offer of Ground Forces for Employment in Korea

Participants: Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
Mr. Dean Rusk, FE
Mr. Fulton Freeman, CA

Ambassador Koo called this afternoon at his request and opened the conversation by expressing the complete agreement of his Government with the substance of the Department's *aide-mémoire* of July 1, 1950, in reply to the offer of the Chinese Government to despatch ground forces to South Korea. He stated that his Government concurred in the desirability of discussing this question with representatives of General MacArthur's headquarters and that the arrival of General MacArthur's representatives in Formosa would be eagerly awaited.[2]

I pointed out that the grand strategy of the Communists in the Far East was still unclear and indicated that they might be planning additional moves in that area. I also stated that if there had been some question a few months ago whether the forces on Formosa were in fact able to defend the island against an all-out Communist attack, then it would perhaps be unwise to spare troops at this time. I stated, in this regard, that a proper defense of the island would, in my opinion, require the coordinated action of the Chinese army, air force and navy together with the U.S. 7th Fleet, and pointed out that General MacArthur would undoubtedly wish to weigh the Chinese offer of assistance to Korea in this light.

Ambassador Koo acknowledged that the sending of 33,000 troops to Korea might in fact weaken the island's defense, particularly if they were given the best equipment available on Formosa.

In response to my inquiry whether the Ambassador had received any reports of Chinese Communist military movements or building-up operations on the mainland, the Ambassador replied in the positive. He stated, however, that the reports which he had received had been confined to military movements in three specific areas, namely Manchuria, Hongkong and the Indochina border area. He made no specific mention of any military movements in the so-called invasion area on the coast opposite Formosa.

The Ambassador then inquired whether any conclusion had been reached with respect to the question of the close in-shore islands

[1] The time is that given in *Korean Conflict*.

[2] On July 3, the Chinese Government formally sent to Secretary-General Lie its offer of three divisions of troops for use in Korea (U.N. document S/1562).

which he had mentioned to Mr. Merchant in their conversation of June 29. I replied that this matter was being discussed with the Defense establishment and with General MacArthur's headquarters and it was hoped that we would be in a position to give him an answer within a short time.[3]

Ambassador Koo then mentioned again the desirability of establishing satisfactory liaison between the U.S. 7th Fleet and the Chinese authorities on Formosa as soon as possible. I informed him that we had already communicated with General MacArthur with respect to the urgent need for such liaison, and I assured him that I would endeavor to ascertain the present status of the arrangements. I stated that I understood that, for the time being, the senior assistant naval attaché was acting as principal liaison officer.

Ambassador Koo then inquired whether we had received reports of any unusual movements of Soviet forces in other parts of the world, such as the Iranian, Turkish or Yugoslav border areas, that might indicate the planning of offensive actions similar to that in Korea. I stated in response that our reports from the areas he mentioned, while indicating normal troop movements, showed nothing unusual. I added that we frequently received reports of troop activity in these peripheral areas, but that we had received nothing which would clearly indicate that an early offensive action was being planned.

[3] For related documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.

795.00/7–350

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1950—4 p. m.

Subject: Meeting at Blair House

Participants: The President
Secretary Acheson
Secretary Johnson
Secretary Snyder
Secretary Brannan [1]
Postmaster General Donaldson
Senator Lucas
Secretary Pace
Secretary Matthews
Secretary Finletter
General Bradley
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Jessup and Mr. Rusk accompanied the Secretary of State

[1] Secretary of Agriculture Charles Brannan.

THE PRESIDENT asked Mr. Acheson to lead off.

MR. ACHESON said the purpose of the meeting was to lay before the President and his advisors a recommendation by the Department of State that the President go before Congress some time in the near future to make a full report to a Joint Session of the Congress on the Korean situation. It was proposed that this report to the Congress would be followed by the introduction of a Joint Resolution expressing approval of the action taken in Korea.[2] It was not proposed that the President should ask for such a resolution but that the initiative for this should come from the members of Congress. He said that Mr. McFall and others had talked to various Senators and Congressmen and that his exploration revealed a general desire for a Presidential message of this kind. This was partly due to the fact that they felt that so far only the leaders had been told what was going on. The Secretary then distributed copies of the draft resolution and read it aloud. He explained that in drafting it he had tried to avoid anything which would give rise to debate by concentrating on points on which there seemed to be general agreement. For example, the resolution proposes that the Congress commend the action by the United States rather than the action by the President.

THE PRESIDENT said that is right.

MR. ACHESON said they had also eliminated from the draft resolution any reference to Formosa or Indochina. There the action was preliminary; no American boys were getting shot and the action was clearly within the Presidential powers. The Secretary then distributed copies of the draft message and read it aloud.

THE PRESIDENT asked Senator Lucas what was his reaction to this suggestion. He indicated that Congress would not reassemble until a week from today but that he wanted to consider whether he should deliver such a message when Congress reassembled.

SENATOR LUCAS said it was hard for him to give an opinion without consulting his colleagues.

THE PRESIDENT said that all he was asking for was his personal opinion.

SENATOR LUCAS said that he frankly questioned the desirability of this. He said that things were now going along well and he questioned especially the paragraph on the top of page 14 which suggests that the President may come up with further recommendations. He said that one could draw whatever conclusions he pleased as to what such Presidential recommendations might contain. He said that the President had very properly done what he had to without consulting the Congress. He said the resolution itself was satisfactory and that

[2] Neither the draft Presidential Message nor the draft Joint Resolution is printed.

it could pass. He suggested as an alternative that the President might deliver this message as a fireside chat with the people of the country.

THE PRESIDENT said he had reached no decision on this point. He had merely discussed it with Secretary Johnson and Secretary Acheson and wanted this round-table discussion on it.

SENATOR LUCAS said that most of the members of Congress were sick of the attitude taken by Senators Taft and Wherry.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought Wherry had been a little better after the consultation the other day.[3]

SENATOR LUCAS said that he thought this was not the case in view of the statements which Wherry later made.[4]

SECRETARY JOHNSON thought that Senator Wherry's statement was not so bad.

SENATOR LUCAS said that to go up and give such a message to Congress might sound as if the President were asking for a declaration of war.

THE PRESIDENT said this was exactly the point. He said that he had not been acting as President but as Commander-in-Chief of our forces in the Far East.

SENATOR LUCAS reported that the President would be practically asking for a declaration of war if he came up to the Congress like this. On the other hand a fireside chat with the people would be good. He said the document itself was wonderful. He would merely leave out the paragraph on the top of page 14.

THE PRESIDENT then asked Secretary Snyder for his opinion pointing out this was a suggestion from the Department of State and that the Secretary of Defense agreed with Senator Lucas.

SECRETARY SNYDER said that it would be a fine thing for the people to know what was in this message and to hear this statement from the President himself. He said Senator Lucas had made a good point but that the substance of the message was excellent. He agreed it was debatable whether this should take the form of a message to the Congress or a fireside chat. His first reaction was in favor of having the President make this statement in some form.

THE PRESIDENT said that it was necessary to be very careful that he would not appear to be trying to get around Congress and use extra-Constitutional powers.

SECRETARY JOHNSON said there were some difficulties in the text that he would question; he had noted that Senator Lucas marked up his copy where it referred to Communist China, for example. He thought this was not the time for a message to the Congress but that this was a political decision.

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[3] Presumably this is a reference to the meeting at 11 a. m. on June 30; see the editorial note, p. 257.

[4] See *Congressional Record*, June 30, 1950, pp. 9537 ff.

THE PRESIDENT said he didn't want to call Congress back for this purpose.

SECRETARY JOHNSON said things were going very well and there was nothing in the message that was not already in the press. He suggested that the President wait until there were things which the public does not know and which could then be told to them.

SECRETARY BRANNAN said he thought the President could not go to the people without going to the Congress. He said that perhaps the talks with the leaders had filled the need for reporting to Congress but the real question was whether the President should now send a message to the full Congress. Such a message of course went to the people also. He questioned including in the last few pages the discussion of the diplomatic exchange with the USSR. This seemed to him to be at variance with the policy of not putting the Soviets on the spot. The less said about their machinations the better. He thought we should stick to the North Koreans and action under the UN.

THE POSTMASTER GENERAL said that he had carefully listened to Senator Wherry's remarks at the recent meeting. Wherry felt there should be a report to Congress and had raised the question of the President's authority. If the President made a report like this he might be called back again and again in further explanations to the Congress. He felt the President should not go unless he had some new information or wished to make a request for some legislative action.

SENATOR LUCAS stated that Senator Wherry was complaining because the President didn't go to Congress before he acted. Regarding the resolution he said he was just thinking out loud but it occurred to him that if the President should call the same group together we might get their reaction and then would have no trouble in getting it through. He thought they would be unanimous.

THE PRESIDENT said that it was up to Congress whether such a resolution should be introduced, that he would not suggest it. He said it was not necessary to make the decision today and that he too was just thinking out loud.

SECRETARY PACE said the legislative branch has a strong desire for participation at some time.

SECRETARY SNYDER said that we were going along a new road and making a historical record. He thought the President should make this record clear. On this point he disagreed with Secretary Brannan. He thought the President could not wait too long for a summation. He thought the public support should be kept steady as it is today.

SECRETARY MATTHEWS thought it was essential to say something to the people and not to by-pass the Congress. He was not sure as to the timing.

SENATOR LUCAS said that he felt he knew the reactions of Congress. He thought that only Senator Wherry had voiced the view that Con-

gress should be consulted. Many members of Congress had suggested to him that the President should keep away from Congress and avoid debate. He thought a debate on the resolution might last at least a week.

SECRETARY JOHNSON said that everybody in Congress wanted to pose as an expert on Constitutional law.

SECRETARY FINLETTER agreed with Secretary Snyder that we were treading new ground. If such a message were sent by the President people would feel a sense of participation. The report should stress that his one cardinal purpose is to maintain peace.

MR. HARRIMAN commented on the European reaction and stressed the need for close relation between the President and Congress under Presidential leadership. While things are going well now there may be trouble ahead. Regarding the paragraph on the top of page 14 which had been considered he thought people were wondering about this and that some statement should be made. He did not know that Congress would not reassemble until next Monday.[5]

THE PRESIDENT said we should not call them back before they planned to return.

SECRETARY ACHESON said no one thought of doing that.

MR. RUSK said that clear Congressional support would help abroad. Comments by Senator Taft and Wherry are reported abroad and may raise a question of our solidarity.

MR. JESSUP stressed the importance particularly for opinion abroad having the President reiterate the facts in the situation. The statement by the President would in itself be news.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that he thought some report at some time was a very good idea but he wished to avoid a long debate in Congress on matters which now seemed to be taken for granted.

THE PRESIDENT said he certainly must make a report some time but he did not want to call Congress back now. He said it was always difficult to keep 541 men informed even about legislative business. Even though he did explain matters to the leaders there were many in Congress who did not know and eventually he must report. He said his judgement was to hold up his decision for the rest of this week. He would have further consultations with the Big Four next Monday. He said he was still just thinking out loud and if there were any better suggestion he would be glad to listen to it.

SENATOR LUCAS commented that Senator Taft was merely following his same old line. Senator Jenner's statement in Indiana was unbeliev-

[5] July 10.

able. Senator Lucas said if there should be a row in Congress that would not help abroad. He did not think that Congress was going to stir things up.

THE PRESIDENT said this depends on events in Korea. He said that if this view met with the approval of those present he would wait until he had his talks with the leaders next Monday.

This was agreed.[6]

[6] President Truman did not deliver his message to Congress until July 19; see editorial note, p. 430. No action was taken on the draft Joint Resolution.

330/7–350 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 3, 1950—4 p. m.

8. Fol is draft text of res which Wainhouse[1] telephoned to Noyes for USUN comment:

The SC

Having determined that the armed attack upon the ROK by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having recommended that Members of the UN furnish such assistance to the ROK as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore internatl peace and security in the area,

(1) *Welcomes* the prompt and vigorous support which Govts and peoples of the UN have given to its resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the ROK in defending itself against aggression and to restore peace and security in the area;

(2) *Notes* that Members of the UN have transmitted to the UN offers of assistance for the ROK;

(3) *Recommends* that all Members providing mil forces pursuant to the SC resolutions to assist Korea place such forces under a unified command;

(4) *Requests* the US to designate the Commander of such forces;

(5) *Requests* the US to provide the SC with periodic reports on the course of action taken under the unified command.

(6) *Establishes* a SC Comite composed of five reps of the Members of the Council to be appointed by the Pres:

a) To receive offers of assistance for the ROK transmitted to the UN and to inform the ROK of all such offers.

b) To receive the periodic reports requested in Para 5, above.

c) To advise the SC concerning action taken by Members in support of its resolutions.

ACHESON

[1] David W. Wainhouse, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State.

795.00/7–350

Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

SECRET [NEW YORK,] July 3, 1950.

Subject: Korea

Conversations separately:

Participants: Mr. Joseph Nisot, Belgian Delegation
Mr. Bredo Stabell, Norwegian Delegation
Dr. Jose A. Correa, Ecuadorian Delegation
Mr. David Wainhouse, UNP, Dept. of State
Mr. C. P. Noyes, United States Mission

NISOT asked whether the rumor that there would be a Special Session of the General Assembly on Korea, in the near future, had any basis in fact so far as we knew. I told Nisot that I heard the suggestion at various times during the last several days but that so far as we knew, no one was taking it seriously at the present time. If the situation changes for the worse, of course, that would be a different matter. Nisot indicated he felt there was nothing to be gained at the present time in calling a Special Session. He simply wanted to check on our feeling.

STABELL wanted to get our advice as to when the next meeting of the Security Council could be held. He said that they were in a very difficult position to judge since while they knew there were some conversations going on, they did not know the substance of these conversations. He asked what we thought about holding a meeting on Wednesday [2] and that if that were to be done the decision should be made this afternoon.

I told Stabell I was in a difficult position. We had as yet received no instructions but hoped to receive them tonight or tomorrow. Ambassador Austin plans to see the British and French on Wednesday morning. I indicated that we were not in a position to initiate action. If a proposal were put forward, it would come from some other Delegation. While we would have our instructions by Wednesday, we did not know whether any other Delegations would have their instructions by that time and whether any resolution should be tabled on Wednesday.

Stabell indicated that under these circumstances his advice to Sunde [3] would be that they should not call a meeting this afternoon for Wednesday afternoon and should contemplate that the meeting should

[1] The source text is a copy of a document in the IO Files, Department of State, bearing the designation US/S/1273 and the date July 3, 1950.

[2] July 5.

[3] Arne Sunde of Norway was the President of the U.N. Security Council during the month of July.

probably not be held until Thursday morning or afternoon. This would give more time for private consultations and would perhaps enable the Security Council in a single meeting to have a resolution introduced and passed. I said that personally I thought that was a good approach. I did not think we felt any urgency about a Wednesday meeting. In case of real necessity, a meeting could of course be called on short notice.

Stabell made a plea that we should keep the President in close touch with the situation. I told him I would do my very best to let them know just as soon as we received our instructions. This might, however, have to await Ambassador Austin's return on Wednesday morning.

MR. WAINHOUSE. After speaking with Ambassador Gross, Mr. Ross and Ambassador Austin, I telephoned the Mission's comments to Mr. Wainhouse in the Department, as follows: [Re Resolution shown Dept's 8, July 3.][4]

The Mission thinks that the latest draft resolution is excellent and fully supports it. We hope the Department will give us the broadest possible discretion to negotiate on the basis of this resolution with other Delegations. We understand that we shall attempt to get some other Delegation to introduce a resolution along these lines. We should like to make the following comments:

Paragraph 5. It might be advisable, if possible, to find some language which does not pin the responsibility on the United States to make Reports. Wainhouse commented on this point to the effect that it was essential to have a single channel for Reports so as to avoid confusion. I indicated this was not a matter of any importance with the Mission.

Paragraph 6. The Mission agreed that the Committee should be composed of Five Representatives. However, we felt we needed considerable latitude here to change this if necessary in the light of the comments of other Delegations.

The main thing that concerned us with the resolution was that the Terms of Reference of the Committee seemed too limited. We doubted that we could sell such a limited Committee and we saw no reason why the United States should not support somewhat broader Terms of Reference. We were wholeheartedly in agreement with the Department, and were quite sure other Delegations would be, also, that we must stick to the principle that the Committee should have no jurisdiction whatever to deal with problems of the strategic direction or command of the joint forces.

As to *a*, we felt that the Department should consider giving the Committee power to coordinate the offers of assistance so that it would not be doing simply a secretarial function.

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[4] Brackets appear in the source text.

As to *c*, we suggest that the Committee should have the power to give advice to the Security Council concerning matters relating to the implementation of the Council's resolution. The Committee should of course *not* have any authority to give advice directly to Members on such questions. In this connection, we thought it might be possible for the Committee to make useful recommendations to the Security Council on economic problems; that in any case it should have this authority.

The Mission also felt that it might be advisable to invite the participation of Members of the United Nations who were contributing forces or other assistance when questions involving their interests were being considered, and, in particular, that some reference should be made to the effect that the Republic of Korea might be invited to sit.

The Mission also believes it would be desirable that in some way authority should be given to the combined forces to fly the United Nations Flag. Wainhouse indicated that the Department had now cleared its policy along these lines.

I emphasized that these were minor comments and that our basic position was that we should be delighted to get instructions as soon as possible authorizing us to negotiate on the basis of this resolution with as wide authority as possible.

Dr. Correa called and wanted to know where we stood. I told him we hoped to have instructions by Wednesday morning; that I would call him. I thought that on either Wednesday or Thursday it might be possible for the Council to take some affirmative action.

795.00/6-2950 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Moscow

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 3, 1950—7 p. m.

7. Embtel 1768 June 29. Development close relations Kapur Ind Emb highly commendable. Dept has found recent Embtels reporting his views extremely interesting. FYI although Dept gave Amb Pandit advance notice Pres statement of June 27, successful discussions with Indians on Korea culminating GOI acceptance SC Res June 27 conducted entirely New Delhi by Amb Henderson. Although reftel not recd until after GOI acceptance, in point fact, content, tone, and method Henderson's representations to Nehru Bajpai very similar Kapur's proposals. No special appeals such as msg from Pres or Secy utilized. No action being taken however along lines Kapur's idea of SYG appealing Nehru. Dept agrees Kapur's brief might be useful in future approaches GOI leaders.

ACHESON

310.1/7–350 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 3, 1950—7 p. m.

10. Fol are Dept's preliminary comments on some items in check list forwarded to Dept in urtel 554, June 28.

Re Para 1 (a and c) of urtel

Fol is Dept's analysis of Charter basis of SC resolutions of June 25 and 27.

Security Council Resolution of June 25, 1950

SC Res of June 25, 1950 contains explicit determination under Art 39 of Charter that action by forces from North Korea constitutes breach of the peace.

Para 1 contains cease-fire order and order to the forces to withdraw to the 38th parallel. These orders binding upon members.

These orders are enforceable against non-members under principle contained in Art 2 para 6 of the Charter.

In para 2 SC requests UNCOK to communicate its recommendations on situation, observe withdrawal of North Korean forces and keep SC informed.

In the third para SC, acting under Art 39, applies general principle of Art 2 para 5 of Charter to Korean situation.

In this para SC calls upon all members to render every assistance to UN in execution of Res. This requires members to facilitate execution of Res i.e., cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of the armed forces to the 38th parallel. The means of accomplishing this are not specified ("render every assistance") and presumably would be within discretion of members.

In second part of this para the SC calls on members to refrain from giving assistance to North Korean authorities, using language of Art 2 (5).

Action taken by the US on the basis of this Res prior to the adoption of the Res of June 27 was taken in response to the call for assistance in execution of the cease-fire order and withdrawal orders.

The SC Resolution of June 27

In this Res SC noted that its orders of cease-fire and troop withdrawal had been disregarded by authorities in North Korea. It concluded that urgent military measures were required to restore peace. As a result, the Council decided to recommend to members to furnish such assistance as may be necessary to repel armed attack and restore

international peace and security in area. This is a recommendation under Art 39.

The Charter envisaged the fol enforcement procedure:

1. Under Art. 39 the SC, having made an explicit or implied determination of threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression can make recommendations to members *or* can decide on measures in the nature of sanctions to be taken under Arts. 41 and 42 for purpose of maintaining or restoring peace.
2. The measures ordered by SC may be either of non-military character under Art. 41 or they may be of a military nature under Art. 42. The SC may take action under Art. 42 by air, sea and land forces which are made available to it by the Members of the UN under special agreements mentioned in Art. 43.
3. Pending the coming into force of such special agreements, under Art. 106 the 5 permanent members are to consult with views to joint action for maintenance of international peace.

No special agreements have thus far been concluded which would place armed forces at the disposal of the SC. The Soviet Union made it abundantly clear that it would not consult in a body in which the National Govt. represents China.

In the absence of the armed forces placed at disposal of SC the Council chose other alternative provided by Art. 39:—to recommend to members that they act on behalf of UN rather than to order action under Art 42. SC as organ holding primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under Art. 24 had power to do so. US and other Members have acted in accord with SC recommendations.

As result Members acting in response to recommendation of SC are under obligation to SC to ensure that their action is in fact designed to repel armed attack and to restore international peace. US Commander in charge of the military action in area is responsible only to US Govt. which in turn answers to SC.

Scope of continued US action in support of the Govt of the Republic of Korea is fully within both resolutions.

We believe that there is no room for any doubt as to legality of US action and any effort to present detailed public justification might be seized upon and misused for propaganda purposes as indication that we ourselves are not certain of legality of our actions.

Re para. 2 of urtel on Coordination of Assistance

"Assistance" covers economic as well as military assistance to ROK. "Assistance" also covers "sanctions" against North Korea as indicated in the above legal analysis of SC Res. of June 25. As you know US has already imposed embargo on exports to North Korea.

Re para. 3 of urtel asking whether SC action should be taken to Establish Soviet Complicity.

For the moment Dept thinks it undesirable to bring formally to attention of SC our direct approach to the USSR and the Soviet reply thereto. For time being Dept intends to continue careful course of avoiding formal charges against the USSR in the SC.

Re para. 4 of urtel regarding Special Session of the GA

Dept does not consider desirable to call a special session of the GA at this time. The SC has primary responsibility under Charter in matters relating to international peace and security such as armed attack against the Government of the Republic of Korea. Council action appears adequate at this time and we see no necessity for the submission of the Korean question to the GA now.

Para. 1 (*b*) on linking SC action and US action, part of Para. 2 dealing with coordination military assistance, Para. 5 on China and Formosa under consideration in Dept. See Deptel 4 to N.Y., however.[1]

ACHESON

[1] Transmitted on July 1 at 5 p. m., p. 276.

795.00/7–450

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1950.

Subject: Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. Livingston T. Merchant and Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor of the British Embassy.

Participants: Mr. Merchant and Mr. Graves

Mr. Graves came in to see me this morning at his request. At the outset he said that he was under urgent instruction from the Ambassador and Tedder, acting on a telegram from London, to obtain a general statement of the United States Government's ultimate intentions with respect to Korea. He said that he realized that this was difficult but that the Cabinet was most anxious to give full support from the very outset to the central theme of U.S. policy with respect to Korea and that the Cabinet was meeting tomorrow morning to decide what Mr. Attlee should say on the debate in the Commons tomorrow afternoon on Korea. Mr. Graves emphasized that they did not wish to pry into military matters but were anxious to secure the broad picture including, I gathered, such points as our attitude on unification of North and South Korea as opposed to mere restoration of the *status quo ante*. I

told Mr. Graves that we were naturally anxious to give them the benefit of our thinking and that I would take the matter up urgently with Mr. Rusk. (Immediately thereafter I spoke to Mr. Rusk and Mr. Jessup who agreed that the best and promptest method was to ask Sir Oliver Franks to come in today and discuss the subject with Mr. Rusk. Failing to get in touch with Mr. Satterthwaite [1] or Mr. Jackson [2] this was arranged for noon when the British Ambassador called on Mr. Rusk.) [3]

Secondly, Mr. Graves inquired what our views were regarding the technical implications of the President's orders to blockade North Korea. Again, he said he was acting under instructions from London who for historical reasons were sensitive to the classic legal problems of a blockade. He asked specifically what our position was with respect to the granting of belligerent rights, whether a state of war was thereby considered to have been established, the status of prize courts, whether or not a contraband list would be issued and the question of effectiveness. I asked him what the UK views were on this matter and he indicated he was not yet in receipt of them. I told him that I thought this was a matter that lawyers would be arguing about for years, that the President's action was taken in clear conformity to the Security Council resolution of June 25 and that I would see that our views on these and related aspects were collected and conveyed to him. (In a separate memorandum [4] I have asked Mr. Johnson of NA to consult with L with a view to formulating our views on the blockade and communicating them to Mr. Graves.)

In the above connection Mr. Graves pointed out that the status of their relations with Peking coupled with the presumable participation of British naval units in the enforcement of the blockade posed certain problems which while now hypothetical might materialize into a difficult situation. I asked Mr. Graves what news they had from Peking which might indicate the effect on the Chinese communists in the matter of recognition of the events of the last ten days. He said to their surprise they have been getting no information at all out of their people in Peking.

I then asked Mr. Graves what reply if any he had had from London concerning our request that the British Government ask Shell to suspend all shipments of petroleum products to communist China. I said in this connection we had received with satisfaction a message from Rankin [5] to the effect that a Shell tanker en route to Tientsin had been recalled by radio to Hong Kong. Mr. Graves said that the Embassy had

[1] Livingston Lord Satterthwaite, Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.
[2] Wayne G. Jackson, Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs.
[3] No record of the meeting between Ambassador Franks and Mr. Rusk has been found.
[4] Not printed.
[5] Karl L. Rankin, Consul General at Hong Kong.

had a reply from London which pointed out the minimal quantities of oil going through Shell to China. He added that the telegram neither said that London did or did not ask Shell to suspend the current shipments. The specific figures which he quoted (which incidentally emphasized that no aviation gas had gone to communist China) Mr. Graves stated would be given in detail to Mr. Freeman of CA.[6] I told Mr. Graves that both Caltex and Stanvac had immediately and completely acceded to our request. I further asked him to emphasize strongly to London that it seemed the height of foolishness to permit any oil supplies to move into Mainland China during this period of uncertainty as to the Chinese communists' reaction to the Korean situation. I said that, however insignificant the quantities involved, he could imagine for himself the effect on American public opinion and relations with the UK if Chinese communist troops appeared in battle against American troops in Korea and it could be said that they rode into battle on oil supplied by a British company. Mr. Graves did not attempt to reply but said he would emphasize this to London.

[6] The figures given by Mr. Graves indicated that in the period January 1–May 31, 1950, the Shell Oil Company exported 25,000 tons of petroleum products to mainland China; for further documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 619 ff.

330/7–450: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 4, 1950—4 p. m.

14. 1. Dept is submitting in the next fol tel revision of proposed SC draft Res in connection with the Korean problem. The text takes into consideration some of the suggestions which Noyes discussed with Wainhouse yesterday,[1] as well as those which the SYG included in his memo to USUN [2] as reported by Noyes.

2. Since this proposed Res recommends that all Members providing mil forces and other assistance make such forces and assistance available to a unified command under the US, and further requests the US to designate the commander of such forces, it would be desirable for some other friendly member of the Council to introduce the Res. It is suggested that you consult prior to the meeting with all friendly members of the Council and seek to have an agreed text.

3. Dept wld much prefer to have the Res include the draft text through numbered paragraph 6. If, however, strong pressure develops for the estab of a SC Comite, you may submit paras 7 and 8 to meet that pressure and stave off less desirable proposals.

[1] See the memorandum of conversations by Mr. Noyes, July 3, p. 292.
[2] Not printed, but see Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1954), pp. 333–334.

4. Dept is not wedded to the method proposed in its draft Res of selecting the SC Comite. It wld be disposed to have the SC itself name the 5 Reps. However, we do not agree with the composition of the Comite suggested by the SYG. As we understand his slate, it is US, UK, France, India and Norway. We believe there ought to be a Latin American State on it, and wld wish to see Cuba or Ecuador, preferably Cuba on the Comite in lieu of Norway.

5. Dept has no objection to your accepting the suggestion of the SYG that he be designated as *Rapporteur* of any Comite that may be estab.[3] This wld be in accordance with Rule 23 of SC Provisional Rules of Procedure.

6. If the SC shld meet to consider the draft Res we suggest Wed. or Thurs,[4] preferably Thurs to provide more time for consultation and instructions from Govts.

7. We have no objection to ROK being invited to participate in Comite discussions. We do not believe, however, that it is necessary to provide specifically for such participation in the SC Res since the Comite itself wld have authority to take such action. We believe that if the question of participation of the ROK is raised, many other states, both Members and non-Members on the SC, will likewise wish to have the SC invite them to participate in the discussions. This might tend to confuse the situation and impede the passage of the Res.

8. Dept. of Defense has informally cleared text of draft Res. You will be advised as soon as we obtain its formal clearance. Pending this formal clearance, your consultations with other Dels will have to be on a tentative basis indicating lines of our thought without final commitments.

ACHESON

[3] In a memorandum of July 4, not printed, to General Burns, Mr. Hickerson explained that this suggestion was intended to eliminate Mr. Zinchenko, the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council Affairs, from the administrative handling of this aspect of the matter in the proposed Security Council Committee (330/7–450).

[4] July 5 and 6.

330/7–450 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 4, 1950—4 p. m.

15. Fol is revision of proposed SC draft res in connection with the Korean problem:

The SC

Having determined that the armed attack upon the ROK by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having recommended that Members of the UN furnish such assistance to the ROK as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore internatl peace and security in the area.

(1) *Welcomes* the prompt and vigorous support which Govts and peoples of the UN have given to its ress of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the ROK in defending itself against armed attack and to restore peace and security in the area;

(2) *Notes* that Members of the UN have transmitted to the UN offers of assistance for the ROK;

(3) *Recommends* that all Members providing mil forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid SC ress make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the US;

(4) *Requests* the US to designate the Commander of such forces;

(5) *Authorizes* the unified command and the armed forces of Member States under it to use the UN flag in addition to their own;

(6) *Requests* the US to provide the SC with periodic reports on the course of action taken under the unified command;

(7) *Establishes* a SC Comite composed of Reps of ——— Members of the Council to be appointed by the Pres:

a. To receive offers of assistance for the ROK transmitted to the UN, to communicate these to the unified command, and to inform the ROK.

b. To receive the periodic reports requested in Para (6) above.

c. To advise the SC concerning action taken by Members in support of its ress.

(8) *Requests* the SYG to act as *Rapporteur* of the Comite.

ACHESON

795.00/7–350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

[TAEJON,] July 3, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received July 4—4:14 p. m.]

10. Mytel 7, July 3.[1] Enemy thrusts through Yongen and Songjongni do not appear to have made much progress today. Enemy believed to have pushed considerable number troops and equipment across Han River below Seoul with air opposition seemingly light. New threat has developed to east, this time in Yoju and Wonju areas which reportedly in enemy hands and with enemy advancing rapidly southeast. This enemy thrust evidently came from Chunchon direction and represents break through 6th division defenses.

Rhee arrived in Pusan yesterday by sea from Mokpo and is evincing strong desire return Taejon. About 105 assemblymen have registered with Assembly secretariat and others are known to have gone

[1] Not printed.

to constituencies in south. Cabinet had inaugurated informal meetings, though there little evidence of government offices being set up in Taejon. People more calm here today than any time since outbreak hostilities. Commodity prices have risen somewhat Taejon where influx of refugees relatively great, but little elsewhere.

Department pass CINCFE.

MUCCIO

795.00/7–550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, July 5, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received July 5—1 : 46 p. m.]

42. Indian Ambassador Radhakrishnan told Embassy officer at July 4 reception that he had not yet received any reply from Soviets to his July 1 *démarche* re Korea. Asked whether he intended "to return to the charge", he replied, "Goodness, no" (Delhi's 16, July 3 to Department). He anxiously inquired whether US would permit use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea and appeared relieved when told that published US reply to Chinese offer indicated negative attitude on our part.

Radhakrishnan also asked whether "we intended stop at 38th parallel" and speculated about political future of Korea after cessation hostilities. While saying that perhaps all that could be expected would be restoration of *status quo* line, he thought that military defeat of North Korean forces might create possibility holding all-Korea elections under UN auspices as basis for Korean unification under some kind of UN guarantee. He doubted UNCOK could accomplish this objective and considered appointment either smaller UN group or single "UN Commissioner" preferable instrument. From long-term viewpoint he wondered whether we could expect Koreans not to be influenced in their political orientation by their proximity to USSR and Communist China, adding, however, that with Stalin's demise, he thought Mao [1] would cut his apron-strings which now tie him to Kremlin.

At end conversation Radhakrishnan referred to earlier remarks he had made to effect that "when chips are down, India would be with US" and said that GOI stand on Korea was confirmation this prediction.

While Embassy agrees that there is some justification for Bajpai's remarks on Radhakrishnan's "wooliness" (Delhi's 16) all evidence

[1] Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central People's Government Council of the People's Republic of China.

here points to fact that on Korean issue at least he has taken firm stand along with US and other UN members. This connection Indian Counselor Kapur recently told Embassy officer that latter should not be deceived by his Ambassador's apparent naiveté and vagueness and that he himself had learned that behind facade was very observant and realistic mind.

Department pass New Delhi, USUN. Repeated information New Delhi 4, USUN 6.

KIRK

795.00/7–550

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1950.

Subject: Check List on Decisions in Korea Crisis

Attached are two copies of a check list[1] on decisions made in connection with the Korean crisis. You may wish to hand one copy informally to Mr. Harriman. The purpose of the list is to draw together the more important questions which require decision or action arising out of the Korean situation and applies to the responsibilities of both the Department of State and Department of Defense.

Two main points need emphasis. First, we must be unequivocally clear that we shall press the Korean issue through to a successful conclusion, subject to a reexamination of general strategy if the Soviet Union enters the fighting. Unless we have clearly in mind this basic determination, many day-to-day decisions become impossible to make and the American posture is one of timidity and uncertainty and not one of vigorous leadership.

Second, even though our policy may clearly be to see the Korean matter through to a successful conclusion, that policy cannot be acted upon with assurance by the Secretary of State unless all necessary military and economic action is being taken in support thereof. Our relations with other governments on a large number of details will be directly affected. Further, unless we act resolutely, the political effect upon the Soviet Union will not be what we hoped to produce in the opening days of the Korean conflict.

The attached list is not exhaustive, but if we get clear governmental answers to the questions raised, we shall be considerably ahead of where we are now.

FE will work closely with Mr. Matthews to get the answers which turn upon Department of State action, and Mr. Matthews will work

[1] Not printed.

with General Burns to attempt to get many of the military questions answered—although we recognize some of the difficulties in that channel.

Editorial Note

At 3:30 p. m. on July 5, Secretary of State Acheson held a news conference at which he made a statement in refutation of allegations of aggression by the Republic of Korea, likening such charges to Nazi claims in 1939 that Poland had started hostilities by attacking Nazi Germany. For the text of the statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 17, 1950, page 87.

791.00/7–550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 5, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received July 5—3:34 p. m.]

22. 1. Bajpai, SYG MEA, has informed me today by telephone that GOI had received one telegram from Mme. Pandit and another from B. N. Rau reporting that *New York Times* has leading article to effect that I persuaded GOI take decision in favor resolution of SC and that one reason for India acceptance resolutions was US announcement that it would send aid to Indochina.[1] Bajpai pointed out such stories were harmful to our common cause since they strengthen Communist propaganda that GOI had become tool of USA. They could also cause GOI embarrassment internally.

2. He said instructions were being issued to Pandit and Rau authorizing them deny truth story and to point out that my visit Nehru on day GOI decision was coincidence since I had obtained appointment prior any knowledge second SC resolution. Instructions also were to effect that GOI decision was based on logic of events and was not made as result influence any foreign power.

3. Bajpai said this is second time during recent months that *NYT* had given credit to American Ambassadors in SOA for decisions taken by SOA Governments. He recalled that Sulzberger in an article sent from Karachi about two months ago had indicated that Indian-Pakistan pact had been brought about as result efforts on part American Ambassadors to Pakistan and India.[2] This story had caused much

[1] Reference is to an article by Arthur Krock in the *New York Times*, July 4, 1950.

[2] Cyrus L. Sulzberger had been in Pakistan in early April 1950; for further information on this reference, see Cyrus L. Sulzberger, *A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries [1934–1954]* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 541.

embarrassment and harm. Latest story could be even more harmful.

4. I told Bajpai that I realized harm that story this kind could do to all of us; that I was deeply distressed that article appeared in so authoritative a newspaper as *NYT;* and that I was sure my government realized GOI decisions were based on merits and logic of events. I said that I was somewhat at loss as to what should be done; that I hoped some way could be found for my government to put matter in its proper perspective; but that denials in situations this kind sometimes did more harm than good. Bajpai replied that he had no suggestions to make but that tendency American press give US credit for everything that was done anywhere was exasperating for governments dealing with US.

5. Bajpai was deeply irritated and I am sure Nehru is furious. Publication such story will seriously injure my relations at least temporarily with Nehru at most unfortunate time. He will be annoyed both with US Government and with me even though he may realize neither was responsible for publication. Appearance this story will, of course, also be effective ammunition for those groups in India and elsewhere in Asia who are already charging that GOI has fallen under domination "Anglo-American imperialism."

6. I do not know whether Department can find some way of denying *NYT* story without giving it undue emphasis. I do not believe however we can remain silent in face of storm which is sure to rise in India. Perhaps Department can create occasion make statement along following lines:

Reports that US Government had attempted in Washington, Lake Success or New Delhi to exert pressure on India in matter of SC resolutions on Korea of June 26 and 27 are without foundation. US Government was of opinion that what had happened in Korea was so clear that events should be much more convincing than anything which it or any of its representatives could say.

It was entirely accidental that American Ambassador to India visited PM on June 29, the date GOI made decision to support resolution of June 27. Ambassador had requested appointment before he had any knowledge of this resolution in order explain considerations which had prompted US Government to take certain actions re Korea. Representative of India in SC had already supported SC resolution of June 26 [*25*]. It should therefore be clear that no representations from US were required to prevail upon GOI to support resolution of June 27 which was natural corollary to that of preceding day. US Government had no reason to believe that GOI decision re resolution of June 27 was influenced by Ambassador and PM. Its understanding is that decision was taken after Cabinet meeting had carefully reviewed all pertinent facts.

7. I would appreciate it if Department would inform me if it would have any objection to my issuance of statement similar to that out-

lined in paragraph 6 in response to inquiries certain to be received from press.

HENDERSON

330.1/7–550 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, July 5, 1950—3 : 51 p. m.
[Received July 5—4 : 56 p. m.]

16. I met with Chauvel and Jebb at former's office at eleven this morning to discuss proposals for SC action at next meeting on Korea. Lacoste, Ordonneau, Shone, Cole, Gross and Ross present.

We gave colleagues copies alternative texts draft resolution first alternative consisting of draft contained Deptel No. 15, July 4 through numbered paragraph 6, and second alternative consisting entire text set forth this reftel. I explained numbered paragraphs 7 and 8 reflected our present line of thinking should there be strong pressure to establish committee at this time. I pointed out difficulties involved in establishment committee at this time and particularly re composition, and question whether colleagues foresaw any embarrassment, particularly to commander designated by US pursuant paragraph 4, in postponing action on committee now but possibly taking up question of committee at later date should this seem necessary or desirable. I mentioned as wholly personal thought possibility at some stage committee consisting of president SC, president GA, and SYG in order to maintain maximum universality UN approach to Korean conflict.

Jebb said he sure UK Government would prefer short form of resolution (through numbered paragraph 6) and that in view of difficulties particularly re composition concerning committee would prefer to postpone question of committee time being. He read from instructions indicating his government view SC itself could meet as often as necessary to consider offers from member governments or further measures to be taken. In this way SC would demonstrate its active and continuing interest in Korean conflict. Meanwhile it should be possible unofficially and informally outside of SC to guard against undesirable resolutions or measures which might embarrass commander designated by US. Jebb said his government had suggested that ROK might be requested to report nominally to SC thus avoiding any embarrassment if such there be in requesting US directly to make such reports.

Chauvel indicated desire his government also to avoid embarrassment US commander. He said important question was to avoid going

back again to SC (attitude India, Egypt, Yugoslavia, possibly others) in event conflict spreads (Formosa, Indochina). Therefore Chauvel said important that resolution not be too precise. He had prepared personally draft resolution (sent separately as USUN 15)[1] which was very much along lines our short draft. He said he thought most essential point was asking us to designate commander. Neither we nor British reacted very favorably to Chauvel's idea of committee composed of Norway, US, UK, France and SYG. Chauvel stressed principal concept he had in mind was set forth in numbered paragraph 2 his draft resolution, namely that Sunde as individual might be named as *rapporteur* to continue in this role after expiration his presidency. Principal purpose Chauvel saw in committee was "negative" in sense blocking off SYG and preventing his trying to do "everything".

Neither Jebb nor Chauvel reacted very favorably to getting GA or Romulo[2] involved.

Both Jebb and Chauvel said they would have to get instructions concerning the use of UN flag (our No. 5).[3] Neither voiced strong objection this point nor enthusiasm.

Gross pointed out Department opposed putting non-members of SC on a SC committee on ground this would open field for effort various governments get on committee and that Department proposed naming Government of Korea to sit in on committee since committee itself would of course have ample power to request representative Government Korea to attend meetings. Jebb asked re paragraph 3 US draft whether we had intentionally omitted reference to Korean forces being placed under MacArthur command and I explained this had been intentional since Korea not member UN but forces UN members being unified in support of Korea. Neither Jebb nor Chauvel dissented from this point; both however considered point important.

Jebb and Chauvel appeared to agree it would be appropriate for their two delegations to introduce draft resolution.

It was agreed tentatively that we were not ready yet to decide on the committee and that we should proceed with consultations on basis short draft (through numbered paragraph 6). We agreed Jebb would inform Sunde our consultation, that the three delegations would meet with Dune [*Sunde?*] tomorrow afternoon, and that we would ask him to call a meeting of SC for Friday morning.[4]

AUSTIN

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[1] Not printed.
[2] Carlos P. Romulo, Philippines Representative at the United Nations, was President of the U.N. General Assembly.
[3] See paragraph 5 of telegram 15 to New York, July 4, 4 p. m., p. 301.
[4] July 7.

791.00/7–550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 5, 1950—8 p. m.
PRIORITY NIACT

16. Dept has been in consultation with Ind Emb re Crock [*Krock*] art.[1] First Secy states probable that no formal statement will be issued in US altho he has not consulted Amb or Rau. Press queries will be answered in sense Ind decision based on independent Fon policy, devotion to world peace and opposition to aggression and was in no way related to IC.

At Dept press conference tomorrow (urtel 22, July 5) press officer will respond to planted question in sense (1) Ind decision inherent in Ind Fon policy and position in UN since independence; (2) in light that policy and position, US Govt considered that facts Korean situation would speak for themselves to GOI and that no representations from outside source were required to convince GOI of rightness of decision it took; and (3) ur role was normal one of consultation with GOI in order that GOI might be currently informed of US views on developing situation and Dept aware of Ind opinion.[2] If queried re IC aspect reply will be in sense that Dept has no reason believe GOI was influenced by anything other than facts in Korean situation.

You may in ur discretion make statement or reply to press queries along foregoing lines adding such other comment as may seem useful locally.

ACHESON

[1] See footnote 1 to telegram 22, July 5, from New Delhi, p. 304.
[2] On July 6, a Department press spokesman did deny that the United States had exerted pressure on the Indian Government to support the June 27 Security Council resolution; see the *New York Times*, July 7, 1950.

330/7–550 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, July 5, 1950—8:37 p. m.
PRIORITY [Received July 5—9:12 p. m.]

22. Gross and Ross lunched with Sunde and Stabell this noon to bring them up to date on USUN and Department thinking on proposed resolution for action at next SC meeting. Gross and Ross gave them copy full text of resolution transmitted Department's 15, July 4, explaining that our present thinking with which UK and French delegates seem to agree was to drop paragraph 7 and 8 for time being and concentrate on short form of resolution through numbered para-

graph 6. Sunde indicated support for short form, and said he did not feel it necessary or desirable at this stage to get involved in complicated question of setting up committee. He said he was unaware of pressure from any quarter to set up a committee at this stage. He said he had talked with Lie on telephone this a. m. and that Lie was not pressing for committee.

Re sponsorship of resolution, Sunde although without instruction clearly indicated he favored Norway as sole sponsor. (Stabell told Ross privately he was personally opposed to Norwegian sponsorship since his government would not have full opportunity and time to consider many implications of action). Sunde recognized that French and possibly British also might wish to participate in sponsorship. He thought there should be maximum of free sponsors.

Question Chinese representation came up by Norwegian reference current activities Rau. Gross and Ross took line indicated Department's No. 9, July 3.[1]

Sunde indicated he thought if question should arise in SC, in light his government's position, he would probably have to vote for seating Communists; he agreed, however, it would be undesirable for question to come up during Korean crisis.

In context Chinese representation question and Russian absence, Sunde observed (referring to Hoover's speech)[2] that he thought whole function and structure of UN should be studied with view to charter revision in event continued absence Russians. He agreed, however, would be better not to give Russians excuse for charging free nations had broken up UN, but rather that we should continue on present basis, leaving seat open for Russians.

AUSTIN

[1] See footnote 1 to telegram 16, July 3, from New Delhi, p. 284.
[2] Text in the *New York Times*, April 28, 1950.

795.00/7–650 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 6, 1950—4 a. m.

Reporting NK advance to Pyongtaek, 20 miles south Suwon, Hq Tokyo states NK forces displaying resourcefulness and tactical skill. One NK division said to have 15 Sov advisers while Sov personnel manning NK tanks north Seoul were identified by ROK general. B–3

[1] This message was sent to all diplomatic missions except Colombo and to the Office of the Acting Political Adviser in Japan, and to the Consulates General in Hong Kong and Singapore.

report states 200,000 Chi Commie troops massing Antung on Chi-Korea border. US Far East Air Force reports NK planes avoiding combat.

Jap officials wholeheartedly behind US action Korea according USPolAd, who has received confidential msgs from Emperor expressing gratitude. Indications are Jap Govt wld like, within limits imposed by occupied status, offer support SC res.

In reply charge by Trotskyite MP that Ceylon is tied US and UK imperialism, Ceylon cabinet min stated that, faced by necessity choosing between US and USSR, his govt will follow US and its democratic principles.

Re Chi Govt offer send 33 thousand troops Korea, Chi Amb Wash has conveyed his govt's complete agreement our reply suggesting consultation with MacArthur whether Formosa defense wld thereby be weakened, which Chi Amb believed might well be case. In response question by Chi Amb, Dept stated no info recd clearly indicating USSR planning early offensive action other parts world.

Indians advise against dismissing lightly Chi Commie allegations US action re Formosa is aggression against Chi[2] and cite reports of rising feeling in Commie Chi that US is using Korea as pretext to strengthen its armed forces in region for eventual support Chi Natlsts. Indians note possibility Peiping making such claims as basis for possible future request for Sov assistance under Sino-Sov treaty.[3] While aware US conviction that USSR and Chi Commies wld if participating UN merely denounce as invalid all actions taken behalf Korea, Indians feel it important both countries take seats SC near future believing way might then be opened for negots on Korea and Formosa and for preventing decline UN into group nations revolving around US and West.

Port FonMin holds principal Sov objective remains Mediterranean and that Sov moves other areas may be flank operations preparatory to central drive somewhere between Adriatic and Afghanistan.

UK, Fr, and Nor delegs UN in agreement US draft res establishing unified command Korea under US with omission provision for UN Comite.[4]

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[2] The text of a statement to this effect was communicated to Secretary-General Lie by Chou En-lai on July 6; see U.N. document S/1583.

[3] Reference is to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, February 14, 1950; for related documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.

[4] At a meeting with President Truman on July 6, Secretary of State Acheson secured the President's approval for the U.S. draft resolution as contained in telegram 15, July 4, to New York, p. 300, through numbered paragraph 6 (795.00/7–650). Concerning JCS opposition to the concept of a U.N. Committee, see Schnabel, *Policy and Directions*, p. 101.

Austral PriMin informed AmAmb Canberra he wld like spend week Wash on return from London end July in order discuss with Pres questions Pacific and world defense and Austral contribution thereto.

Inform Dept if in view expense transmission and limitation your code facilities you believe circular tels Korea shld be discontinued to your post.

ACHESON

795.00/7–650

Memorandum of Teletype Conference, Prepared in the Department of the Army

[Extract]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1950—6:52 a. m.

Nr: DA TT 3467

. . . . . .

Tokyo: FEC Item 10

Reur DA–5, DA TT 3462 051029Z July 50:[1]

Official

The U.S. and the U.N. are committed in Korea to the extent that withdrawal is completely unacceptable from a political viewpoint. There are no known diplomatic steps which would deter the Chinese Communist Government. Should Chinese combat forces become involved in active opposition to U.N. forces in Korea, sufficient power must be added to U.N. forces to insure fulfillment of currently assigned missions. The first military steps should be to destroy the communication facilities into and through North Korea. The assistance of SAC would be required for this task. An announcement by the President that the U.S. would back up the U.N. decision with the Strategic Air Force if necessary might be a psychological deterrent to the Chinese people, including those in the military forces. (End Item 10)

. . . . . .

[1] The text of the referenced document reads as follows:

"*Washington: DA–5*

G3 also desires your opinion as to the following:

Should Chinese Communist combat forces become involved in active opposition to UN forces in Korea, what would be your recommendation as to US reaction from the political-military viewpoint? (*End DA–5*)." (795.00/7–650)

Editorial Note

On July 6, the National Security Council met to discuss Korea. A memorandum for the files, in Department of State top secret file

795.00/7–650, which covered Mr. Acheson's discussions with his principal Department of State advisers prior to the meeting, was not declassified by the National Security Council in time for inclusion in this volume. The memorandum dealt chiefly with the blockade of North Korea. At the NSC meeting, the Secretaries of State and Defense agreed that the two Departments should clarify the extent and meaning of the blockade of North Korea (NSC Files: NSC Action No. 310*b*).

A published account of the NSC meeting, covering topics other than the blockade, is printed in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pages 344–345.

Also at the July 6 NSC meeting, the President instructed the members that all proposals for presidential action in the current Korean crisis were to be forwarded to him through the NSC machinery; no unilateral proposals for his action were to be sent to him directly. (Harry S. Truman Library: Files of Charles S. Murphy, Box 22, Folder "Korea"; Elsey to Murphy, July 7, 1950)

795.00/7–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT Moscow, July 6, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received July 6—2 : 58 p. m.]

54. For the Secretary. Gromyko asked British Ambassador to call at two today, July 6. He asked Ambassador if he adhered to statement he had made to Pavlov on June 29 (Embtel 2, July 1).[1] The Ambassador said yes and repeated that he had urged that the Soviet Government cooperate in effecting a peaceful settlement of the Korean dispute. Gromyko asked if Ambassador still adhered to this position in spite of what had happened since and of American actions. The Ambassador confirmed that he did.

Gromyko then stated Soviet Government wished for a peaceful settlement and asked if Ambassador had any specific proposals to make. Ambassador said since [*sense?*] his instructions were that British hoped Soviet Government would use its influence with North Korean Government to stop bloodshed. Pressed to be more specific Ambassador said British obviously desired to restore status quo. A UN commission had been working in South Korea to promote peaceful union of two halves and British wished to return to *status quo* and to stop war. Gromyko nodded assent.

Ambassador inquired whether he could report Gromyko as meaning that, despite his recent statement (Embtel 32, July 4)[2] to effect that

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[1] See footnote 3 to telegram 1767, from Moscow, received at 1:02 p. m. on June 29, p. 230.

[2] Not printed.

Soviet policy was one of noninterference, Soviet Government would be willing to act if it found suitable means. Gromyko said that Ambassador knew position of Soviet Government from documents which have been published but that Soviet Government wished for a peaceful settlement and therefore he had asked Ambassador if latter had any proposals. Ambassador said that all British asked was for the use of Soviet influence with the North Korean Government, that he would report at once what Gromyko had said and that he would ask to see Gromyko again if he received a further communication for him.

On theory that, since reply to British will not be made public, press correspondents will determine that reply given him must be different from that given us (Embtel 1767, June 29) Ambassador Kelly has, to avoid undesirable speculation, informed correspondents off-the-record that Gromyko asked him for "elucidation of his request for Soviet cooperation".

KIRK

795.00/7–650

The British Embassy to the Department of State

SECRET

EXTRACT FROM TELEGRAM FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, DATED JULY 6TH, 1950

I think that you should at once communicate the text of Kelly's report [1] to Mr. Acheson personally and speak to him from me in the following sense.

2. He will remember that we decided to make a parallel approach to the Soviet Government after the United States had approached them. This Soviet response clearly needs the most careful consideration, and we shall not make any further move in Moscow without discussion with the United States Government. Meanwhile it would be very helpful to us to know what Mr. Acheson's reaction is.

3. Have in mind that the public here in the main believe that the Russians themselves recognise that they have overstepped the mark in Korea. They will therefore expect the most serious consideration to be given to any move which might lead to peace, and the Government for their part are bound to be careful not to act in any way which might lose them the unanimous support of the country which was demonstrated in yesterday's debate in Parliament.

[1] The text of Ambassador Kelly's telegram to the Foreign Office, July 6, on his meeting with Gromyko, which was transmitted to the Department of State along with this note from the British Embassy, is not printed; the substance of Ambassador Kelly's message is contained in telegram 54, from Moscow, *supra*, and is also summarized in Prime Minister Attlee's statement before the House of Commons on July 20, 1950, printed in British Cmd. 8078, Korea No. 1 (1950): *Summary of Events Relating to Korea, 1950*, p. 27.

4. Please impress on Mr. Acheson that it is of the utmost importance that details of Kelly's conversation with Gromyko should not be allowed to leak to the press. We are refusing to enlarge on what Kelly has already given out to the press in Moscow.

5. In my immediately following telegram I am transmitting a message from the Prime Minister to the President [2] regarding the military and political implications of the Korea situation. I am anxious that Mr. Acheson should see this message at the same time as he sees Kelly's report. The Prime Minister's message will indicate to the United States that we think that nothing should be left to chance. But I do not think that the proposals in the Prime Minister's message should detract from the importance of weighing carefully what reply we should give to Gromyko's approach.

[2] *Infra.*

795.00/7–650

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman

TOP SECRET

MESSAGE FROM MR. ATTLEE TO THE PRESIDENT

I have been giving much thought to the problems which are likely to face us as the situation in Korea develops. These problems are of course primarily military but they are likely to have increasingly wide political implications.

2. The implications will concern not only the way in which we should like to see the situation in Korea develop but also the reactions of the Russians as it develops. Russian reactions may be expected not only in the Far East; we have been giving some thought to other parts of the world where the Soviet Government may cause trouble for us.

3. A particular aspect of the situation in Korea which is causing us concern is that the Russians have involved the Western Powers in a heavy commitment without themselves playing an overt part, and there are other areas in the Far East where the same tactics are open to them. You have already made known your concern with Indo-China and Formosa. There is some reason to think that Communist-inspired activities in Malaya have already been stepped up in tune with the Korean affair. And we can not ignore the possibility of a Chinese attack on Hongkong.

4. But further, we can not be sure that these activities on the part of Russia will be confined to East Asia. I understand your Military Advisers have already expressed the view that Persia may again become a danger spot. We should consider whether the opportunity may not be taken of relighting the fire in Greece. And there may be other areas of potential trouble.

5. No-one can attempt to provide precisely in advance for every eventuality. But I hope you will agree with me that we should look ahead as far as we can and reach some agreement as to our common policy in these areas in the event of further outbreaks.

6. I would like to propose to you therefore that representatives of our two Governments should meet to consider what courses of action are most likely to be adopted by the Soviet Government and should have an exploratory discussion of the plans we should adopt to meet them. Plans have already been concerted between us over a wide field but I think that the time may have come for extending the area to which our detailed plans should apply. Other Governments, in particular the French, may be concerned but it will suffice if they are informed as and when the situation demands.

7. I would therefore like to suggest to you that you should authorise the appropriate United States authorities to discuss these problems with Lord Tedder in Washington. If you approve this suggestion, I should propose to send a representative of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff to advise Lord Tedder on our thinking here.

8. It seems to me that such talks cannot ignore the political implications. I should therefore be glad to hear whether you would propose that the Department of State should be associated with these talks. If so, I should of course arrange for Lord Tedder also to be supplied with appropriate political advice.

9. My colleagues and I attach very great importance to reaching the closest possible understanding with the United States Government so that we can both plan in full confidence that we understand each other's approach to these weighty problems. I therefore deeply hope that you will be able to give me an early and favourable reply to this suggestion.

10. I am sure you will agree that there should be no publicity about the proposed talks either before or while they take place.

[London,] 6th July, 1950.

795.00/7–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

Moscow, July 6, 1950—9 p. m.
[Received July 6—3:44 p. m.]

55. For the Secretary. Re my immediately preceding telegram Korea.[1] Without overlooking possibility that Russian move is solely designed as trap in effort to slacken pressure on Korea by endeavoring drive wedge in unanimity free world, our first reaction is that approach is genuine to the extent that it reflects Soviet view that, in

[1] See telegram 54, from Moscow, received at 2:58 p. m. on July 6, p. 312.

light of developments, outcome in Korea cannot be envisaged as favorable to the Soviets, that as of now at least they are not disposed to enlarge the conflict into a general Asian or world conflagration, that they wish to localize the affair, and that they are seeking means to salvage as much prestige as possible. Should their representations develop into a peaceful solution, they probably feel they could capitalize on their initiative as demonstrative of their peaceful pretensions. Even if nothing comes of it they may foresee advantageous exploitation of their step in terms of publicity in connection with their peace campaign. British Ambassador is of same view.

In any event it seems to us that Gromyko's request for "specific proposals" is one which cannot be let drop. We do not at this point have any specific ideas as to the most desirable UN action towards the unification of Korea following the re-establishment of the 38 parallel line. Presumably the obvious reply to Gromyko is to make fully clear that a prerequisite to a peaceful solution is complete compliance by the North Koreans with the SC order that they withdraw beyond the 38 parallel and cease fire. It seems to us that there might be added to such a statement a request for assurances that the Soviet Union would cooperate and participate in a subsequent UN supervised all-Korean election, should the other members of the UN determine such an election to be desirable, and, having left no doubt in the Soviet mind that such agreement on their part and on the part of the North Koreans are essential pre-conditions, inquiry might then be made whether the Soviet Government has anything specific in mind itself.

It will be noted Gromyko's remarks were confined to Korea.

KIRK

795.00/7–650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1950.

Subject: Air Force Reconnaissance Flights

Participants: Brig. Gen. P. M. Hamilton—U.S. Air Force [1]
Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State

General Hamilton came in this afternoon at his request and showed me a telegram [2] from the Commanding General of Far East Air

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[1] Brig. Gen. Pierpont Hamilton, Chief of the Policy Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Air Force.

[2] Not printed.

Forces [3] to Headquarters Air Forces, Washington, asking for permission to conduct high level (30,000 feet) reconnaissance flights over Dairen, Port Arthur, Vladivostok, Karafute, and the Kuril Islands. General Hamilton said that there had been some difference in the Air Force as to how this telegram should be handled. He said there were certain officers who felt that the Far East Air Force should simply go ahead and conduct such reconnaissance flights without raising any questions, particularly since they considered it most unlikely that such flights would be discovered. General Hamilton said others considered that very important political questions were involved and that political clearance would be required.

I told General Hamilton that such an operation at this time would raise political questions of the gravest importance, that such flights would be clearly contrary to the President's specific directives on the subject of Manchuria and Siberia, and that I could not under any circumstances give consent or clearance to such an operation. I told him that I felt certain that the President would have to consider this question after careful advice from the Secretaries of State and Defense and that I had no doubt but that the Secretary of State would strongly oppose such an operation under existing circumstances.

I suggested to General Hamilton that the matter was one which should be taken up with Secretary of Air Finletter, who had been present in all of the top-side meetings at which our recent basic decisions were made.

General Hamilton confirmed that he understood clearly that the Department of State was not giving any clearance to any such operation and that he would recommend to his own superiors that the question be taken up with Secretary Finletter.

Subsequently, I informed the top policy group of this item and suggested that Mr. Matthews (G) mention the matter to Secretary Finletter in order that the latter might get his own hand on the situation as soon as possible. Mr. Matthews has informed me that he spoke to Secretary Finletter and that Finletter took a serious view of the matter and would move in on it at once.[4]

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[3] Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer.

[4] The proposal for the reconnaissance flights was disapproved by President Truman; see Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 346–347.

330/7–650

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1950.

Subject: Draft Resolution on Unified Command

Participants: USUN—Ambassador Gross
UNP—Mr. Wainhouse

Ambassador Gross called me at 4:55 to report the following. The Norwegian representative has heard from his Government and reports that his Government does not seem prepared to sponsor the resolution. The Norwegian representative, however, has asked his government to reconsider and expects an answer around 5:30 this afternoon.[1]

The Norwegian representative wanted to know whether we would be prepared to add at the end of paragraph (3) of the draft resolution[2] the following words "as agent for the United Nations". Ambassador Gross stated that USUN is opposed to such an amendment. The Norwegian representative did not appear disposed to press the point.

The representatives of the UK and France are prepared to sponsor the resolution but they have a special problem relating to the flag and would like to submit the following language which although not expressed as a condition to sponsorship would make it more palatable for them to do so. The language for paragraph (5) as they gave it to Ambassador Gross is as follows:

"Authorizes the unified command to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations involved."

(I raised the question regarding the use of the word "involved" and suggested that a better word would be "participating".)

Ambassador Gross stated that India will probably vote for the resolution. It, however, would like to allay its fears regarding paragraph (1), that the phrase "to restore peace and security in the area" means only in the Korean area. Accordingly, the Indian representative suggests the use of the word "thus" in paragraph (1) before the phrase "to restore peace and security in the area."

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[1] See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Wainhouse on his talk with Mr. Hyde at 6:45 p. m. on July 6, p. 320.

[2] See telegram 15, to New York, July 4, 4 p. m., p. 300.

Ambassador Gross asked if Norway, UK and France dropped out, how strongly do we feel about having a resolution at all.

The Security Council meeting tomorrow has been postponed from 11:00 a m to 3:00 p m at the request of the British.

795.00/7–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

BELGRADE, July 6, 1950—10 a. m.
[Received July 6—4:58 p. m.]

22. Kardelj confirmed to me at Bled last night remarks he made to Reams in Belgrade (Embassy's 6, July 1). He repeated that equivocal position Yugoslav Government had taken on Korean case had been due primarily to considerations of Yugoslavia's own immediate security. Yugoslav Government did not wish to give Soviets any color of reason for creating "second Korea here". He added that Yugoslavia, as Communist country, faced some awkwardness in aligning itself with US now because certain American newspapers and statesmen were calling for "crusade against Communism". He said if action by North Korean troops were characterized as aggression by "Soviet type Communism", Yugoslavia would find much less difficulty in aligning itself clearly on our side. However, he said that despite these and other considerations Yugoslavia nevertheless recognized overwhelming fact that North Koreans were aggressors and that supreme necessity for Yugoslavia was for aggression to be banished. Consequently Yugoslavia was glad SC had taken action it did, which Yugoslavia accepted as fully legal. Refusal by North Korea to accept this decision had freed Yugoslavia's hand.

I replied that many people in US regarded Communism, like Fascism and other dictatorships by one group or class, as synonymous with aggression and that only way Yugoslavia could convince these persons that Yugoslav Communism was different would be for Yugoslav Government to come out publicly and categorically in opposition to aggression of North Korea and in support of UN action to stop it. I pointed out that if occasion ever arose for US to ask SC to take action in support of Yugoslavia, it would be difficult to arouse enthusiasm among American people if Yugoslavia maintained neutral position in Korean case.

Kardelj, who was clearly making point of informing me of firm decision taken by Yugoslav Politbureau, said Yugoslav Government

would seek early appropriate occasion to "get off the fence" and make declaration in support of SC resolution. He said recent troop movements in Bulgaria made Yugoslav situation delicate for the moment but they thought appropriate occasion for Yugoslav declaration might be when fighting returned to 38th parallel if not before.

While I have taken consistently strong line with Yugoslav Government since beginning of Korean case, urging open support of our position in UN, I recognize that valid arguments may be adduced that neutral position of Yugoslavia is advantageous to us for time being, and I would welcome any instruction or thoughts Department may have on subject. Otherwise I shall continue to press for early and categoric declaration. It seems to me that in present case desirability of clear Yugoslav position against aggression outweighs all other considerations, however persuasive contrary considerations may be.[1]

Department pass Moscow priority; repeated info London 1, Paris 1, Moscow 6. (Delayed in transmission from Bled July 4.)

ALLEN

[1] The Department of State sent the following message to Belgrade in telegram 6, July 7, 5 p. m.:

"Conversation with Kardelj reported Ur 22, July 6 undoubtedly made before receipt Deptel 2, July 3 [see footnote 5 to telegram 6, from Belgrade, received at 8:24 p. m. on July 1, p. 280], which after due consideration here was believed best course for US in present circumstances to follow in dealing with Yugo over Korean issue. In light that tel you shld defer pressing for Yugo declaration." (795.00/7–650)

330/7–650

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1950.

Subject: Draft Resolution on Unified Command

Participants: USUN—Mr. James Hyde
UNP—Mr. Wainhouse

Mr. Hyde telephoned at 6:45 tonight to say that the Norwegian representative has reported that he cannot sponsor the resolution. Mr. Hyde stated that the decision of the Norwegian representative is about 100% certain.[1]

[1] At 5:56 p. m., the Department of State had received telegram 22, July 6, from Oslo (not printed), wherein Ambassador Bay reported on a conversation held that afternoon with Foreign Minister Lange. Mr. Bay indicated that Lange's reluctance to accept sponsorship for the resolution was based on the grounds that it was a more appropriate matter for one of the larger powers to sponsor the resolution and that Norway had not participated in the preliminary drafting of the resolution (757.00/7–650).

Ambassador Chauvel cannot sponsor the resolution alone because he is without a Government, but felt he could go along in the joint sponsorship with the UK.

330/7–650 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, July 6, 1950—11 : 09 p. m.
[Received July 6—11 : 37 p. m.]

29. Tsiang [1] at his urgent request in my absence and that of Gross this afternoon called on Ross as follows:

1. He said that if at some point a committee were to be established China would wish to be member of such committee.

2. He said he felt we were under grave disadvantage Soviet propaganda attacks that Korean effort a "manifestation of American imperialism". Stressing he felt this propaganda having strong effect in Asia he proposed for urgent consideration USG including in pending SC resolution or in separate resolution at early date SC pronouncement that action in Korea limited to purposes already indicated (repelling North Korean attack) and that no country contributing aid to ROK should derive any political, economic or territorial advantage from participation in UN effort and that any final solution of Korean situation should be consistent with the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of ROK. Tsiang added each government offering aid to ROK should subscribe in entirety to foregoing SC statement. Tsiang felt this approach would go far to enlist support of India for UN effort.

3. Tsiang said he had advised his government that they should not be concerned too much about providing forces for effort in Korea but that they should make very clear that they would not be able to provide necessary transport and supply but only initial equipment for any Chinese forces. At same time Tsiang felt that from political viewpoint UN effort in Korea taking on much too much of western European complexion (he mentioned in this connection Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, UK) with no Asian forces so far offered. He said it was very important in his view that Asian forces participate in effort and he mentioned the possibility of Philippine and Pakistan forces with a question mark on possibility getting some contribution of forces from Thailand. India he felt was unlikely to contribute forces.

Tsiang was informed his views would be communicated immediately to Department [2] and reactions transmitted as soon as possible; mechanical difficulties of including SC pronouncement along lines his suggestion paragraph (2) above in time for tomorrow's meeting were pointed out and understood by him.

AUSTIN

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[1] T. F. Tsiang, Representative of the Republic of China at the United Nations.
[2] See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Wells, July 11, p. 362.

330/7–650 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, July 6, 1950—11 : 40 p. m.
[Received July 7—12 : 39 a. m.]

28. Reports from USUN re Korea: The following telegram reports conversations by USUN officers with other delegations July 6:

Views of SC members:

Bebler (Yugoslavia) told Sunde (Norway) that Yugoslavia would "make no difficulty" at SC meeting July 7, Sunde informed Gross. From Bebler's comments, Sunde believed Yugoslavia was "coming around".

Sunde also said he had talked separately with Bebler and Rau (India), who reportedly agreed that it would "not be opportune" to raise issue of Chinese representation during Korean crisis. Sunde apparently had given them substance of Gross' comments to him along lines of Deptel 9 of July 3[1] without attributing source of these comments.

In separate telephone conversations, Ross gave substance of six numbered points of pending draft SC resolution on Korea to Rau, Fawzi (Egypt) and Tsiang (China). Rau expressed thanks but made no comments. Tsiang offered no comment but in response to request for observations, Tsiang thought a resolution along lines indicated "seemed like a reasonable proposition".

Fawzi said he did not think the US could appropriately sponsor such a resolution, nor would he like China to do so. Upon Ross' inquiry, Fawzi suggested Norway as sponsor would be fine but that other possibilities should be considered in case Norway could not do so. UK and France would be all right, Fawzi agreed.

Asked if he cared to make comment either of personal nature or on behalf of his government, Fawzi said he thought Egypt's position would be "in line with what has taken place". He thought he detected some "straightening out of the line". He was not discouraged and was "not giving up".

Fawzi added opinion that the less discussion on resolution at SC meeting the better. He said he had been urging upon himself and others the view that legalistic points should not be subjected to a magnifying glass, and that after all we were trying to do a job in spirit of charter.

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[1] See footnote 1 to telegram 16, from New Delhi, received at 2 : 34 p. m. on July 3, p. 284.

Latin-American caucus:

The LA caucus July 6 discussed Korean problem particularly with reference to coordination of offers of aid, Muniz (Brazil) indicated to Noyes. Muniz had argued strongly against Latin Americans attempting to make concrete offers of supplies now. He thought all offers might not be accepted and refusal of coffee, rice, et cetera would have bad effect on people involved. He believed it wiser to await information from combined command. He said Alvarez (Cuba) reported that Austin thought this course was wisest and that seemed to be consensus of meeting.

A LA source reported to Corrigan that results of LA caucus were: 1) Unanimous decision to support US action in SC July 7; 2) agreed Korean question should not be referred to IC; 3) decided to give further study to Lie's message re contributions to UN effort in Korea. General atmosphere of meeting was reportedly harmonious and optimistic.

Other members' comments:

In conversation with J. Hyde, Carter (Canada) said his Ambassador had underlined great importance to Canada of having it clear that this was UN operation. He commented on two points of US draft: 1) Matter of UN flag, which he understood leaves a measure of discretion to unified command; and 2) reports from US to SC on actions of unified command. On latter point, he indicated Canada might prefer unified commander be requested to make reports to SC but he realized there were reasons why US chain of command must be respected. Carter seemed quite content that resolution contained no reference to SC committee.

Von Balluseck (Netherlands) expressed concern to Hyde about press reports indicating strong difference between British and French as to kind of administrative machinery for handling armed forces under MacArthur's command. He said the Netherlands, having recognized Communist China, wanted to be certain that its offer of a destroyer if accepted did not lead it into conflict with Communist China. When shown copy of draft resolution which represented joint thinking, Von Balluseck felt it met his problem. He added that UK, which also had recognized Chinese Communists, would be thinking of same problem as Netherlands.

Kyrou (Greece) called at his request on Austin to describe talk he had just had with the Jam Sahab of Nawangar, whom he considered to have considerable influence in Indian Government affairs. Jam Sahab apparently reported that if the resolution providing for unified command under MacArthur restricted the commander's activity

468-806—76——22

to area of Korea, he felt confident India would send forces. If however, there was no such limitation and possibility existed of fighting spreading to Formosa, Indo-China or elsewhere in Asia, he was equally sure India would not contribute forces. When Austin read pertinent passages from working paper on Korea, Kyrou agreed this draft limited action to Korea as much as could be reasonably expected.

AUSTIN

330/7–750: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 7, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received July 7—7: 14 a. m.]

35. 1. I discussed with Bajpai Secretary General MEA at 11 a. m. July 7 draft of SC resolution re commander of UN forces in Korea contained in Depcirtel July 6, 1 a. m.[1]

2. He thanked me for copy which I handed him and said he had received last night similar draft from B. N. Rau. Since GOI was contributing no armed forces to Korea campaign it was of opinion that it would be preferable for it not to vote on this resolution. Rau had therefore been instructed that he should not "participate" in voting, stating that he was taking this position because Indian armed forces were not involved. Bajpai hoped US would understand failure India cast vote on this question did not mean that it had any reservation about resolution or that it was "back-sliding" in giving full support to UN in its struggle against aggression. GOI believed that it was logical that an American should be commander of UN forces and that that American should be General MacArthur. Although he had not mentioned matter in instructions to Rau, he personally thought that it would have been preferable from India's point of view if resolution had provided that commander should report direct to SC rather than through US to SC. This point was, however, not of great importance and perhaps technical reasons had prompted decision to make report through US.

3. Continuing in personal vein, Bajpai said that although logic of situation called for US commander of UN forces and for that commander to be chief US armed forces officer in Far East, nevertheless there were certain complications so far as India was concerned. For instance, if Chinese Commies should move against Formosa order for UN armed forces to resist such attack would undoubtedly emanate from person who was in command of UN armed forces. Again he did not wish to labor this point. There was probably no way of separating

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[1] Not printed; the draft resolution referred is in telegram 15, July 4, to New York, through numbered paragraph 6, p. 300.

functions American UN commander from those of US commander in Far East without weakening effectiveness of UN forces engaged in battle in Korea.

4. Nehru, he said, would probably at press conference today make it clear that although GOI was giving full support to SC resolution of June 26 [*25*] and 27 it had not associated itself with President Truman's statements re Formosa and Southeast Asia. It was Nehru's intention, however, in making this statement not to display either approval or disapproval for those US decisions announced by President.

HENDERSON

795.00/7–750

Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen[1] *to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1950.

Subject: Indications of Soviet willingness to seek settlement of Korean fighting.

The handling of the indication of a Soviet desire to find some manner of terminating the hostilities in Korea, whether through the intermediary of the British or possibly directly with the Soviet Government, must be done with the greatest possible care. While subsequent evidence, i.e. Soviet press handling of this matter, continues to confirm our original impression that the Soviets are serious in this matter and wish to find some means of terminating a situation which obviously has taken a turn unanticipated by them, we must however remember that there is no reason to believe that this Soviet desire is unlimited. It looks to me as if Stalin, looking into the future, had foreseen a situation which would present him alternative choices, neither of which he would by preference like to make. It is doubtful if he believes that despite temporary reverses the U.S. will not in a comparatively short time bring sufficient power to bear on the North Koreans as to bring about victory on the spot. Then, as U.S. forces approach the 38th Parallel, he would be confronted with the following choices:

(1) To do nothing and permit American power to come up to the Soviet frontier right next door to Vladivostok and within easy bombing distance of their chief military headquarters in the Far East Khabarovsk, a situation which he might well find intolerable; or

(2) Prior to our reaching the 38th Parallel, to re-occupy Northern Korea with Soviet forces.

This he would undoubtedly prefer not to do since it would immeasurably increase the risk of an open conflict between U.S. and Soviet

[1] Mr. Bohlen, Minister at the American Embassy in Paris, was at this time in Washington for consultations.

forces and from the political point of view would be most undesirable for its psychological effect throughout Asia. He therefore, probably in anticipation of the development outlined above, is casting around for some means to prevent its occurrence.

This does not, however, mean that we could expect a complete Soviet surrender, i.e. withdrawal of North Korean forces and accepting the continued presence of important U.S. forces in South Korea. It is more likely that he is willing to accept a backdown but only a partial one and that the Soviet proposition might well be the restoration of the *status quo ante* in Korea in accordance with the terms of the June 25 resolution of the Security Council. This would mean the withdrawal of North Korean forces behind the 38th Parallel and the end of the fighting in Korea *but* on that basis would also involve the withdrawal of U.S. forces. This would clearly be unacceptable to us and I believe to the other members of the U.N. But we should not forget it is a position which might have important propaganda value to the Soviet Union. Considerable point could be made of the thesis that the Russians had offered to bring about the end of the fighting in Korea but that the U.S. had insisted on keeping its troops in that country and hence the peace effort had failed. We must therefore be very prudent in any discussions directly or indirectly with the Soviet Union to avoid (*a*) being caught in a position which might imply a willingness on our part to withdraw the troops, or (*b*) on the other hand getting caught in an awkward propaganda position, which the Soviets could exploit to advantage before world opinion, in rightly refusing to accept any such proposal.

We must, therefore, give a great deal of attention to this point and establish immediately the justification for our insistence on leaving U.N. forces in Southern Korea which will both be a position in any negotiations and will stand up in public.

There is another and perhaps even more important element which could bring about a change in the Soviet attitude at the present time. That is the development of the military situation in South Korea. I am quite certain that Stalin cannot conceive that the U.S. will for any appreciable time continue to suffer reverses in the field and he is therefore ignoring the initial difficulties we are encountering in the expectation that massive American forces will soon be brought to bear on the spot. Should it most unfortunately become apparent that the U.S. will not be able to bring this force to bear for a considerable period of time and that we have a steady series of reverses extending for several weeks, we should logically anticipate a considerable hardening of the Soviet attitude. Not, I should add, in the direction of Soviet involvement but in a much tougher line completely excluding any willingness on their part to contemplate terminating the hostilities in South Korea. It would seem, therefore, of vital importance to charting our political

course that we should obtain from the Defense Establishment the most realistic possible estimate of the probable course of military developments. It is not necessary to emphasize what the consequences might be, not only in Korea but in other parts of the world, of a sudden Soviet realization that the U.S. is not militarily in a position to win a relatively quick victory in Southern Korea, if this should prove to be the case. Therefore if our best military estimate is that we are in for a considerable period of military reverses there is only one way, quite apart from the obvious necessity of broadening our military base, of preventing the Russians from attempting to exploit dangerously such reverses. It would be to have the U.S. Government adopt some measure which would indicate a mobilization of our power to correct this situation. I honestly believe that in that case the reverses on the spot would be offset by the evidence of a seriously aroused America.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

795.00/7–750 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, July 7, 1950—12 noon.

83. Eyes only for the Ambassador. Please see Bevin [1] or Younger [2] immediately and present following US views on Gromyko approach of July 6 to Brit Amb Moscow:

(1) Although it is impossible to be certain that this is not an attempt to confuse issue and weaken our common resolve, we are inclined to regard this as serious approach designed to find way to end Korean affair without undue prestige loss to USSR but presumably for price as yet undisclosed.

(2) We agree that any move which might lead to peace should have the most serious consideration. However, we believe it important not to appear over-anxious and we are not willing to bargain away positions in exchange for termination of aggression against SK.

(3) We believe there would be advantage in Brit Amb Moscow playing matter out somewhat further without involving US or other govts in order to get clearer picture of what Soviets have in mind.

(4) We believe it of greatest importance that further responses to Gromyko should be wholly within framework UNSC Korea Resolutions of June 25 and 27 and should not become involved in other issues on which Soviets might attempt to extort concessions (e.g. Chinese representation in UN or Formosa).

(5) Foregoing for confidential info HMG only. Following three paras contain substance suggested approach to Gromyko.

(6) We believe Brit Amb might see Gromyko and reiterate three specific points in UNSC res of June 25, i.e., immediate cessation of

[1] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
[2] Kenneth Younger, U.K. Minister of State.

hostilities, immediate withdrawal of NK forces behind 38th parallel, UNCOK observation of withdrawal NK forces, and call Gromyko's attention to fact that forces are now in SK in response to UNSC resolutions of June 25 and 27. Brit Amb might say UK believes details of arrangements for withdrawal NK forces and restoration *status quo ante* (but see para (7) below) could be worked out if USSR willing to use its influence NK forces to obtain acceptance three specific points of June 25 res. Time and circumstances of withdrawal of forces from SK which are acting on behalf UN would have to be considered by UNSC in light situation and speed with which peace and security can be restored.

(7) Above is related to immediate restoration peace in Korea and is without prejudice to UN view re ultimate settlement that UNCOK should be permitted to carry out program in Korea as recommended by UNGA.

(8) If Brit Amb is asked whether he is representing views of US, it is suggested he make clear that he is speaking for his own govt but if Gromyko has any comments or views which he wishes to have transmitted to other members of SC, his govt would be glad to assist.

ACHESON

795.00/7–750

Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1950.

Mr. Hickerson has shown me the draft of proposed Security Council resolution [1] requesting U.S. and other members to make forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States and requesting the United States to designate the commander of such forces.

I assume that General MacArthur would be designated.

In view of the extreme delicacy of the present situation; the importance of preventing the Korean fighting from developing into a world war; the importance of maintaining the confidence of the other members of the Security Council that their resolutions will be scrupulously complied with; and in view of the factors which you and I discussed with the President, I suggest that the President might want to emphasize by personal message to General MacArthur the delicate nature of the responsibilities which he will now be carrying, not only on behalf of the United States but on behalf of the United Nations, and the importance of instructing his staff to comply scrupulously with political and military limitations and instructions which may be sent, the reasons for which may not always be immediately apparent but which will often have behind them political considerations of gravity.

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[1] The text of the resolution is printed, *infra*.

Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Security Council, July 7, 1950 [1]

The Security Council

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having recommended that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

1. *Welcomes* the prompt and vigorous support which governments and people of the United Nations have given to its Resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;
2. *Notes* that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;
3. *Recommends* that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;
4. *Requests* the United States to designate the commander of such forces;
5. *Authorizes* the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;
6. *Requests* the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.

[1] U.N. document S/1588. This resolution was adopted at the 476th meeting of the Security Council which met from 3 to 4:45 p. m. on July 7. It was introduced by the Representatives of France and the U.K. and was approved by a vote of 7 (including the U.S.) to 0, with 3 abstentions (Egypt, India, Yugoslavia), and 1 member absent (U.S.S.R.). For the record of the meeting, see U.N. document S/PV.476.

795.00/7–750

The British Embassy to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET

MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR OLIVER FRANKS
DATED 7TH JULY 1950

If the Soviet Government genuinely desire a peaceful settlement, it is possible that they in fact would agree to use their influence in the manner suggested. I cannot foresee precisely how they would extricate

[1] This message was handed to Mr. Acheson by the British Ambassador at 3 p. m. on July 8; see telegram 177 to London, July 11, 8 p. m., p. 365.

themselves from the difficult position in which they have placed themselves, but Soviet ingenuity could no doubt find some face-saving device.

We must expect however that if the Soviet Government do show a readiness to co-operate in re-establishing the *status quo* in Korea, they will almost certainly raise the question of Formosa, having regard to the situation which the President's declaration of 27th June creates. It also seems to us, that the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations would be raised and become acute, the Russians arguing that they could not play their part in the Security Council with China not represented.

I think that Mr. Acheson and the United States Government should appreciate, and I put it to them very frankly, the way I see the situation which is as follows.

The United States have the whole-hearted backing of world opinion in the courageous initiative they took to deal with the aggression in Korea. I do not believe they could rely on the same support for their declared policy in connexion with Formosa. Not only would many powers, particularly Asian powers, dislike the prospect of an extension of the dispute which might follow if the Central People's Government were to attempt an attack on Formosa, but some undoubtedly feel that, now that the Central People's Government are in control of all Chinese territory, it would not be justifiable, in view of the pledge under the Cairo declaration,[2] to take steps which might prejudice the ultimate handing over of the territory to China. India especially, as Mr. Acheson will have heard from the United States Ambassador at Delhi, is very sensitive on this aspect of United States policy. In general I think that the United States Government would be wise in their public statements to concentrate on the Korean issue and play down the other parts of the President's statement of 27th June, otherwise there may be a risk of a breach in the international solidarity happily achieved over Korea.

Thus the latest Soviet move has forced us to ask ourselves the question what the attitude of the United States would be if the Russians agreed to help in restoring the *status quo* in Korea in return for United States readiness to reconsider their present declared attitude in regard to Formosa.

Finally I want Mr. Acheson to know that I am keenly alive to the possibility, and even likelihood, that this Soviet move has a sinister significance. For example, the Russians, knowing there is a divergence of policy between Great Britain and the United States in regard to China, may well calculate that their move may increase the divergence. We must both be on our guard against this. Moreover the move may be no more than a manoeuvre in the Soviet peace campaign, launched

[2] *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448.

with the object of courting a refusal, though personally I am inclined to doubt this. Finally we must bear in mind that a restoration of the *status quo* in Korea may merely result, in the long run, in a development similar to that in Czechoslovakia. Clearly there can meanwhile be no relaxation of the military effort.

Mr. Acheson will understand my feeling that this is a time for us to be frank with each other. I know he will answer me with equal frankness.

330/7–850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

LONDON, July 8, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received July 8—9 : 50 a. m.]

156. Eyes only for the Secretary.

1. I called at Foreign Office this morning reDeptel 83 [1] and had preliminary conversation with Younger and later with Prime Minister who called at Foreign Office. As British had full text of Reftel detailed repetition of contents was unnecessary. Prime Minister stated that British thinking was consistent with ours; that they would despatch a holding telegram to Kelley at once informing him that instructions would follow; that instructions would be along lines of following paragraph; that text would be furnished you in Washington and to me here and that Kelley would be told not to take action for 48 hours to give you time to comment.

2. Kelley would be instructed to confine himself to general terms and to the resolutions of SC. He would be told to endeavor to draw Gromyko out in order to determine insofar as possible the Soviet's position and what they are prepared to do. Kelley will make it clear that UK is acting wholly within the framework of UN resolutions and that UK as a member of SC would be glad to listen to any proposals Soviets may have in mind.

3. Speaking entirely off the record and personally I suggested to Prime Minister that very probably one of the prices which Soviets would demand for using their influence to cause withdrawal North Korean forces would be agreement that Communist China be seated in SC. If Communist China became member SC its claim to Formosa would be difficult to refute and the US position would be made extremely difficult. Thus price of Communist representative in SC might result in a real estate swap of South Korea for Formosa. Prime Minister replied that British had been thinking along this same line and that the position of HMG would be that the question of Korea and admittance of Communist China to SC were wholly separate.

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[1] Transmitted at 12 noon on July 7, p. 327.

Department pass Moscow; repeated info Moscow 9 eyes only for the Ambassador.

DOUGLAS

795.00/7–850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

Moscow, July 8, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received July 8—1:55 p. m.]

77. Eyes only for the Secretary. While proposed instructions to Kelly (London's 156, July 8), are generally along line Deptel 83, July 7, I am apprehensive that they may not go far enough and may put us in the bargaining position we wish to avoid as forseen in paragraph two of Deptel 83. If Kelly confines himself to terms SC resolutions and then directly asks Gromyko for proposals, it seems to us almost certain Gromyko will respond with some sort of price, as a minimum the seating of Commie China (paragraph 3 London's 156). If we are all correct in assuming that Soviets are trying to bail maximum prestige out of a bad situation with minimum losses, we ourselves should be the ones to obtain concessions from them.

I feel it important, therefore, that Kelly should include condition that Soviets give assurances they will support effective implementation UNGA recommendations re work of UNCOK after cessation of hostilities, before he asks Gromyko's views. This seems to have been in the Department's mind (Deptel 83) as it was in ours (Embtel 55, July 6) and the groundwork has already been laid by Kelly in his references to UNCOK in his first meeting.

Repeated info London eyes only for the Ambassador niact 27.

KIRK

611.95A22/7–850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1950.

Subject: Korean Blockade

Participants: Mr. Matthews—Secretary of the Navy
Admiral McCormick—Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Mr. Matthews (G)
Mr. Jessup—S/A
Mr. Dean Rusk—FE
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson—NA

In reply to our queries Mr. Matthews stated that in the event a Russian merchant vessel attempted to enter a blockaded port in Korea

the vessel would be stopped and, if necessary, fired upon in order to enforce the orders of the blockading vessel. In the event a Russian naval vessel attempted to enter a blockaded port it would, in accord with normal international practice in such cases, be permitted to proceed as well as to leave the port. In the event a Russian merchant vessel, escorted by a Russian naval vessel, attempted to enter a blockaded port the merchant vessel would be stopped but the naval vessel would be permitted to proceed. If the Russian naval vessel attempted to interfere with any measures taken to stop the merchant vessel and fired upon the blockading vessel, the blockading vessel would return the fire as a matter of self-defense.

The question of the President proclaiming a blockade in conventional terms defining the presently patrolled area and other legal aspects were briefly discussed without decision. Sec. Matthews instructed Admiral McCormick to obtain more information from Admiral Joy[1] concerning the background of the decision to confine the patrolled area to 41 degrees on the east coast, 39 degrees, 30 minutes on the west coast.

Sec. Matthews indicated his tentative and informal agreement with Mr. Rusk's suggestion that consideration be given to having the Commander of UN Forces, designated by the United States in accordance with the Security Council resolution of July 7, to proclaim the blockade.

It was agreed that State would work out some formula for consideration by the Navy and that Mr. Fisher (L) and Mr. Johnson would confer with Admiral McCormick on the matter.

[1] Vice Adm. C. T. Joy, Commander of Naval Forces, Far East.

315.8/7–850

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1950.

I refer to General Bradley's telephone call to you today about that part of the President's statement directing General MacArthur, pursuant to the Security Council resolution, to use the United Nations flag.[1]

[1] The statement, issued by President Truman on July 8, designated General MacArthur as Commanding General of the U.N. military forces in Korea; for the text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 17, 1950, p. 83. General MacArthur formally established the U.N. Command with Headquarters in Tokyo and assumed the role of Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) in an order issued on July 25; see U.N. document S/1629.

The Security Council resolution which was passed yesterday (copy of which is attached)[2] was cleared by me through General Burns' office, with the Department of Defense, including the JCS and Secretary Johnson. You will recall that the resolution recommended that Members providing forces and assistance make these available to a unified command under the United States; requested the United States to designate the commander of such forces; and authorized the unified command (that is, the United States) at its discretion to use the UN flag.

The UN Secretariat yesterday afternoon urged upon us action by the President as early as possible today designating a commander and carrying out the terms of the resolution.

My associates in UNA and I drafted the press statement you took to the President this morning, a copy of which is attached for ready reference. I regarded this press statement as a completely routine announcement to give effect to a fully agreed resolution. As soon as it came off the typewriter I telephoned General Burns' office and read it to Captain Murdaugh who had a stenographer take it down. I told Murdaugh that I didn't think it required Defense clearance, and he said he was inclined to agree but that he would give it to Under Secretary Early[3] and the JCS for information. A little later, while you were still at the White House, Captain Murdaugh telephoned me and said that Under Secretary Early "thought the statement was fine" and that he had sent the statement in to a JCS meeting and had heard nothing adverse from them. He said Secretary Johnson was in West Virginia and that he would not telephone him about the statement since he was sure Secretary Johnson would be in accord.

About the same time General Bradley called me on the telephone and said that he thought the President's statement should "authorize" rather than "direct" General MacArthur.[4] I replied that the Security Council resolution authorized the U.S. Government to use the UN flag in these operations and in my opinion the President should direct General MacArthur to do this. I added that this was a press release and not military instructions to General MacArthur and that we assumed that the Defense Department would send General MacArthur military instructions giving him such discretionary authority in the application of this directive as they considered advisable from the military standpoint. When General Bradley seemed doubtful about this I suggested he call the White House and give his views about the statement to the President.

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[2] *Ante*, p. 329.

[3] Stephen T. Early, Deputy Secretary of Defense.

[4] The President's statement directed General MacArthur, pursuant to the Security Council resolution, to use the U.N. flag concurrently with the flags of the various participating nations.

I emphasized the fact that we drafted a press release announcing the President's acceptance of an agreed resolution of the Security Council. This press release should not in any way be a substitute for the required military instructions to General MacArthur, nor should it limit the form or scope of such instructions.

I am sorry General Bradley was unhappy about this. For the reasons stated in this memorandum I do not think there were grounds for his unhappiness, nor do I think our procedure in this matter was incorrect. If, however, our procedure was in any way incorrect I was, of course, entirely responsible for this and no one in the Department other than I should be blamed.

795.00/7–850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 8, 1950—7 p. m.

121. For the Amb. The Pres requests that the fol msg from him to the PriMin be delivered as early as convenient Mon:

"To PriMin Attlee from the Pres. I, too, have been giving a great deal of thought to the problems which may arise as the situation in Korea develops, and agree with your suggestion that these problems be explored between us.[1]

I note that you propose to send a representative of the UK Chiefs of Staff to advise Lord Tedder. I agree entirely that the political implications of the situation are of the greatest importance, in fact in some respects they are preeminent. For this reason I have asked the SecState to designate Amb Jessup to be associated with General Bradley in conducting the talks on our side. I understand that you are agreeable in this event to associate a representative of the FonOff with Lord Tedder.

I am in entire agreement with your thought that these talks shld be conducted in the greatest secrecy and note your observation that it will suffice if the Fr and other interested Govts are informed as and when the situation demands. It seems to me that we will have to make arrangements to bring in or consult other Govts when subjects of direct interest to them are under discussion; for example, Fr in the case of Indochina. I suggest we leave this point open for a joint consideration at the opening of our talks."

The Msg from Attlee to the Pres to which above is reply is as follows and was handed to Secy by Franks on evening of July 6:

[Here follows the text of the Attlee message.]

ACHESON

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[1] See Prime Minister Attlee's message to President, July 6, p. 314.

795.00/7–950 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [1]

SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, July 9, 1950—1:37 p. m.
[Received July 9—2:45 a. m.]

CX 57481. The situation in Korea is critical. We are endeavoring by all means now avail here to build up the force nec to hold the enemy, but to date our efforts against his armor and mechanized forces have been ineffective. His armored equip is of the best and the service thereof, as reported by qualified veteran observers, as good as any seen at any time in the last war. They further state that the enemy's inf is of thoroughly first class quality.

This force more and more assumes the aspect of a combination of Soviet leadership and technical guidance with Chinese Communist ground elements. While it serves under the flag of North Korea, it can no longer be considered as an indigenous North Korean mil effort.

Our own troops are fulfilling expectations and are fighting with valor against overwhelming odds of more than ten to one. To build up, under these circumstances, sufficiently to hold the southern tip of Korea is becoming increasingly problematical.

I strongly urge that in add to those forces already requisitioned, an army of at least four divisions, with all its component services, be dispatched to this area without delay and by every means of transportation available.

The situation has developed into a major operation.[2]

[1] A manuscript notation on the source text indicated that Secretary Acheson saw this message.

[2] On July 7, General MacArthur had informed the JCS of his intent, once the North Korean advance had been halted, "to exploit our air and sea control, and, by amphibious maneuver, strike him [—the enemy—] behind his mass of ground force." (See Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, p. 118.)

795.00/7–950 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

SEOUL, July 9, 1950—10 p. m.
[Received July 9—12:07 p. m.]

33. Rhee, who has been impatiently waiting in Pusan several days for signal to return Taejon, left Pusan this morning at eight by rail for Taejon. Ambassador thereupon discussed matter with General Dean.[1] It was agreed in view continued fluid situation around Chonan,

[1] Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, Commander of the U.S. 24th Division, assumed command of U.S. Army Forces in Korea on July 4.

Rhee should delay arrival Taejon. His train was intercepted at Taegu and he was requested to remain there for time being. Ambassador left Taejon by plane at six this evening for Taegu where he will see Rhee and bring him up-to-date on military and international situation. Ambassador plans to suggest to Rhee that he remain Taegu for time being and summon all Ministers there except following: Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Home Minister and Transportation Minister. View unsatisfactory performance Home Minister Paek, Ambassador will probably recommend his replacement. Ambassador expects return Taejon tenth.

Military situation has taken turn for better today. Enemy thrusts diminishing in strength and appear halted in most areas. ROK troops have won two small scale victories in past two days and their morale is rapidly returning.

Department pass CINCFE.

DRUMRIGHT

357.AD/7–950 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

LONDON, July 9, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received July 9—2:37 p. m.]

167. Eyes only for Secretary. We have received text of instruction to Kelly which British Embassy will show you today.[1] Kelly has been instructed not to act until final instruction after receipt your comments.

Instruction to Kelly is in line with our conversation Prime Minister yesterday and is, we believe, the correct first step. Gromyko said Soviets want peaceful settlement; they can stop fighting by calling off North Koreans. Position being taken that British are acting as member of and within framework of UN precludes risk of jeopardizing position under UNGA resolutions re work of UNCOK (Moscow's niact 77 to Department).[2]

If question of UNCOK supervision of North Korea withdrawal raised too early Soviets will no doubt call for immediate withdrawal US forces. This, of course, is matter for SC and is covered by paragraph 5 of British draft telegram to Kelly.

Department pass Moscow; Moscow niact 11, eyes only for Ambassador.

HOLMES

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[1] *Infra.*
[2] Received on July 8 at 1:55 p. m., p. 332.

795.00/7-950

The British Embassy to the Department of State

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

The attached message gives the line of an oral reply which Sir David Kelly will make to Mr. Gromyko. This is intended as a first step, which, if the Soviet Union are now genuinely anxious to find a way out of the Korean conflict, may encourage them to show their hand a little further.

WASHINGTON, 9th July, 1950.

[Annex]

MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR DAVID KELLY, MOSCOW, 9TH JULY, 1950

SECRET

Following is the line I wish you to take with Mr. Gromyko:—

I am much interested in the attitude taken up by Mr. Gromyko at your last conversation and I am glad to note his statement that the Soviet Government wish for a peaceful settlement. That is also the earnest desire of His Majesty's Government.

As regards his question whether we have any specific proposals to make, I am well aware of the precise and concrete sense attached by the Soviet Government to the word proposals. (The Russians read into the word proposals far more than we do and are apt to regard them as something by which the proposer is irrevocably bound, just as they regard a "basis of discussion" as something which is firmly agreed. Hence my use of the phrase "preliminary suggestion" in this telegram.) It would be difficult for His Majesty's Government as a member of the United Nations, to come forward with proposals in this sense. We could not properly do so unless we had assured ourselves that what we proposed carried with it the assent of the other members of the United Nations chiefly concerned. In view of our collective responsibility as a member of the United Nations, we could not, as an individual government, run so far ahead as this. We therefore think it best to make a preliminary suggestion. The Soviet Government may well make the comment that they see nothing new in the preliminary step which we propose. But any step is tremendously important if it leads to a cessation of hostilities and the clearing up of difficulties among members of the United Nations. It therefore seems to us that the influences making for peace ought to join together in order to bring about a cessation of hostilities, without concerning themselves for the moment with other causes of difference which have

arisen in the more distant or more recent past in connexion with the Korean question.

I want you therefore to emphasise to Mr. Gromyko that, irrespective of any other consideration, the plain fact is that the hostilities in Korea have arisen from the movement over the 38th parallel by the forces of North Korea. It follows that the best suggestion which His Majesty's Government, as a member of the United Nations, are in a position to put forward is to urge the Soviet Government—who His Majesty's Government are glad to note have expressed their desire for a peaceful settlement—to add their efforts to those of other members of the United Nations by using their influence as a member of the United Nations with the North Korean authorities to bring them to cease hostilities and to withdraw their forces to the 38th parallel.

If, as is possible, Mr. Gromyko tries to get you to say how you would see matters developing if the Soviet Government were willing to use their influence with North Korea and produce the desired result, you will have to say that the working out of these matters would fall to be dealt with by the Security Council. What you are now concerned to do is to suggest a step whereby, in the view of his Majesty's government, the way might be paved for an ultimate solution. If Mr. Gromyko, for his part, has any suggestions to make, you should of course say that you would be very glad to convey them to me.

Mr. Gromyko may also raise other questions such as Chinese representation on the United Nations or Formosa. I suspect that he may also be angling for an opening to suggest a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers. This would have the advantage for him, since it would arise out of a Far Eastern issue, of opening the way for the Soviet Government to bring the question of the Japanese Peace Treaty into this forum, which they have (unjustifiably in our view) always wanted to do. You will have to avoid such traps. Your best line would, I think, be to say that, without prejudice to other questions which remain to be settled, the cause of peace is of such over-riding importance that we feel entitled to call upon the Soviet government to lend their assistance. What do they think? Have they any suggestion to make? They and we have an equal interest in bringing hostilities to a close. You are not speaking for any other Government or organisation but for His Majesty's Government who feel deeply about the dangers of the present situation and make an earnest appeal to the Soviet Government to join their efforts to those of other members of the United Nations and to use their influence in the interest of peace. I want you to drive home the thought that it is essential to stop the fighting in Korea, to get back to methods of peaceful settlement and to promote the restoration of peace.

WASHINGTON, 9 July, 1950.

468-806—76——23

795.00/7–950 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NIACT

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1950—7 p. m.

123. Eyes only for the Ambassador.[1] I have fol comments on Kelly's instructions which in general seem satisfactory providing fol points are safeguarded.

1. While we certainly wish to explore every possibility of restoring peace, it is most important not to convey to Gromyko any impression of slackening in our determination to carry out UN decisions on Korea. Such impression would be contrary to fact and would be particularly dangerous while mil position remains in present difficult phase.
2. Soviets should not be permitted to lead discussions into framework of dealing with a dispute in which both parties are blameworthy. Kelly should leave no doubt of UK conviction that SC findings and decisions, supported by 46 members of UN, describe the situation as it exists in fact.
3. It also seems important to me that each ref to cessation hostilities by North Koreans should be coupled with ref to requirement of withdrawal behind 38th parallel.
4. Discussion restoration of *status quo* or former situation should not carry any implication obligation of UN forces thereupon to be withdrawn from SK nor any diminution in responsibilities UNCOK.

Foregoing appear to be among traps to be avoided which I believe should be further emphasized or amplified to Kelly.

ACHESON

[1] At 5 p. m. on July 9, the Department of State had transmitted telegram 122 to London requesting the Ambassador to see to it that Kelly withhold his approach to Gromyko until the Department's comments on Kelly's instructions could be conveyed (795.00/7–950).

795.00/7–1050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

MOSCOW, July 10, 1950—3 a. m.
[Received July 9—9 : 37 p. m.]

83. Eyes only for Secretary. Indian Counselor Kapur called on me this afternoon to deliver following "secret and personal" letter from his ambassador dated July 9:

"I have been thinking a great deal about Korean situation. I know that anything we do should not appear as matter of appeasement. What do you think of settlement on these lines: (1) that America support the admission of People's Republic of China into SC and UN; (2) and that SC with China and USSR on it support immediate cease fire in Korea and withdrawal of North Korean troops to 38th parallel and mediation by UN for creation of united, independent Korea.

Postscript: if we are able bring main disputants into SC to consider outstanding questions it may well be beginning of new chapter".

Kapur said he would appreciate my conveying contents letter to Washington and making reply thereto in due course. I told him that his Ambassador's request would receive every consideration and that I would inform my Government, at same time pointing out present attitude US Government re China and Formosa along lines Department circular telegram July 1, 3 a. m.[1]

Shortly after delivering letter to me Kapur made personal call on Thurston,[2] who had in meantime been informed of contents and asked by me to sound out whether his Ambassador's letter represented personal gesture or was written pursuant to GOI instructions. When Thurston queried Kapur along this line, latter expounded as follows:

1. Radhakrishnan's letter was delivered to me pursuant GOI instructions.

2. GOI has not been empowered by UN act as mediator in present Far Eastern crisis but is seeking resolve impasse by "informal mediation"; hence the "personal" tone of the message.

3. Moscow chosen as venue for this informal mediation effort because of danger of premature leaks if discussions took place New Delhi or Washington; furthermore Radhakrishnan is in touch with Soviets. who have been given same formula; and, lastly, because nature of GOI mediation effort shaped in large measure on recommendations of Indian Embassy Moscow. Kapur added: "I am sure our Washington Embassy is not acquainted with our mediation effort, and I don't believe any approach has been made to your Embassy New Delhi".

4. Kapur explained that R's first point is meant to be implemented by US only if point two accepted by Soviets.

5. Radhakrishnan has presented same formula to Soviets, who "have made it clear that they will not agree to second point, hence US has nothing to lose by accepting both points".

6. Indian Ambassador Peking has presented same formula to Chinese Communists "who have agreed to both points".

7. GOI views divergence between Soviet and Chinese Communists on proposed settlement as most significant and believes that US acceptance would bring about split between Kremlin and Peking "which is one important objective of GOI in its present effort".

8. Other important objective GOI is to eliminate present UN impasse over Chinese representation question and put spotlight on Soviet unwillingness to cooperate with UN in peaceful settlement Korean issue, that is, to put onus on Soviets if they refuse abide by SC majority. "If UN in present form is to break up, it is much better for all of us that this occur over Soviet veto of UN action directed against clear-cut aggression in Korea rather than on debatable Chinese representation question."

[1] For text, see vol. VI, p. 367. The telegram indicated that the action taken regarding Formosa in President Truman's statement of June 27 was intended as an immediate security measure without prejudice to political questions affecting the Government of the Republic of China (794A.00/7–150).

[2] Ray L. Thurston, Counselor of the American Embassy in Moscow.

9. When pressed as to whether positive US support Chinese Communist membership considered essential, Kapur said that "abstention coupled with friendly word to Ecuador and Cuba would probably do just as well".

10. Asked whether Indian formula might not create doubts as to legitimacy previous UNGA action re Korea, not to mention SC resolutions June 25 and 27 re Korea, Kapur said, "Not at all; new resolutions could incorporate appropriate references to previous action and thus not give rise such doubts". Present UN effort in Korea would continue.

11. Asked what GOI thinking was reference timing, especially in view impact GOI plan at time when North Korean forces have not yet suffered serious military set-back, Kapur said he did not consider this important consideration "since Soviets were sure to turn down point two". He added: "We have in mind publishing replies of governments concerned (he clearly means US and Soviets but also may have had Peking regime in mind) as soon as possible but before publication we'll check with you in order that wording Ambassador's letter may be amended to remedy omission about conditional relationship between points one and two."

12. Toward close conversation Kapur mentioned that it was the Formosa question which had started his Government thinking along lines proposed formula. He indicated that linking of Korean and Formosa questions were creating difficulties for GOI in its sincere desire back UN effort Korea whole-heartedly.

13. Kapur said that Radhakrishnan was personally very upset at news of "young American boys dying in Korea" and of "lack of vigorous resistance by South Koreans".

14. No indications from what Kapur said that Indian Embassy aware Gromyko approach to British Embassy.

15. Kapur made point of asking that nothing be said to British about Indian mediation effort.

KIRK

795.00/7–1050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

Moscow, July 10, 1950—3 a. m.
[Received July 9—11:20 p. m.]

84. Eyes only for Secretary. I hesitate to attempt any categoric assessment of the Indian *démarche* reported Embtel 83.[1] I see no reason to doubt Nehru's or Radhakrishnan's good faith, that they are sincerely endeavoring to reach a solution which would satisfy basic free world interests, nor that they firmly believe that an important step can be taken along this line to weaken the Kremlin's hold on Mao. However, the implications and ramifications not only of the proposal but even of the manner of its presentation are obviously portentous.

[1] *Supra.*

As I see it, regardless of the merits of the proposal as an ultimate solution, there is an overriding danger that its pursuit at this time, parallel with the anticipated further British soundings of the Soviets, will materially assist the Soviets to confuse the issues of the situation with a view to damaging free world unanimity. On the other hand, the Indian attitude cannot be dismissed lightly.

In the circumstances, we believe it essential some means be found to get British and Indians together before things go any further. Delicacy of matter is that Indians have specifically requested British not be informed and, as British apparently have not informed Indians, it is difficult to see how it can be accomplished without betraying confidences. On the other hand, we note that Indians talked with British before first, and so far as we can ascertain the only Indian conversation with Soviets on July 1 and possibility cannot be excluded that British and Indians are cognizant each others negotiations which are nevertheless being presented to us here as independent. In any event, considering all aspects of matter we feel British should be consulted in strictest confidence and their agreement obtained that, with a view to achieving tripartite understanding as to future moves, Indians be (1) informed of prior Soviet overture to British and (2) strongly urged to postpone further action along their line until possibilities of British conversations are further developed.

KIRK

795.00/7–1050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

LONDON, July 10, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received July 10—10 : 30 a. m.]

176. For the Secretary. Please inform the President that his message to the Prime Minister contained Deptel 121 July 8 was delivered by me this morning. Prime Minister indicated he received this message from Embassy in Washington and expressed complete satisfaction with its suggestions. A representative Foreign Office will be chosen to participate in the conversations. Prime Minister was not able to say at moment who it would be but will let me know soon as selection has been made. He indicated, however, that he was anxious that the talks commence soon as possible.

Have you any dates in mind? [1]

DOUGLAS

[1] Telegram 290, July 14, from London, not printed, reported that M. E. Dening, Assistant Under Secretary of State, had been chosen to represent the Foreign Office in the conversations which were to begin in Washington on July 19 (795.00/7–1450). The talks actually began on July 20; see the agreed memorandum on p. 462, and footnote 1 thereto.

795.00/7–1050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [TAEJON,] July 10, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received July 10—12 : 08 p. m.]

34. Pass CINCFE. When in Taegu today I had long conference with Rhee. I found him well, cheerful, composed and resolute. After bringing him up to date on war developments and international situation I discussed with him Cabinet and other problems. It was agreed he would remain in Taegu for time being and all Ministers except Acting Prime Minister (concurrently Defense Minister), Home Minister and Transportation Minister would shuttle between Taejon and Taegu. Rhee strongly felt there should be no formal move of Ministers from Taejon and no publicity will be given to shuttling of Ministers. I agreed this wise move. It also agreed Director of Office of Supply would set up in Pusan, port of entry for ECA supplies. Rhee likewise agreed prevail upon National Assembly Emergency Council to congregate in Taegu. I urged replacement of Home Minister and although Rhee sought my ideas re replacement I made no recommendation. Cabinet members who have been meeting informally Taejon last week and accomplishing virtually nothing should do better in Taegu where they will be less affected by battle developments.

In Military field US air power aided by good weather is taking tremendous toll of enemy and definitely checking his thrusting power. Meantime US manpower and equipment continue to pour in ever growing quantities and it should not be long before some offensive operations on ground may be within capability air [*our?*] forces.

MUCCIO

795.00/7–1050 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT LONDON, July 10, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received July 10—12 : 50 p. m.]

184. Eyes only for the Secretary. Re Embtel 175 repeated Moscow 12,[1] saw Younger instead of Strang [2] this afternoon who said that your

[1] *Infra.*
[2] Sir William Strang, Permanent Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

comments (Deptel 123)[3] would be incorporated one way or another in a follow-up message being sent to Kelly. This message would also give Kelly green light to go ahead. Hope to be able cable you text this message later today.

Repeated Moscow 14, eyes only for Ambassador; Department pass Moscow.

HOLMES

[3] Transmitted on July 9 at 7 p. m., p. 340.

795.00/7–1050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 10, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received July 10—2 : 03 p. m.]

175. Eyes only for the Secretary. Re Deptel 123, July 9. Discussed with Prime Minister four points suggested in reftel. He indicated complete approval but asked that matter be discussed detail with Strang who at that time had been sent out to see Bevin at the hospital.

Will see Strang soon as he returns.[1]

Department pass Moscow. Repeated information Moscow 12, eyes only for Ambassador.

DOUGLAS

[1] See *supra*.

795.00/7–1050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

LONDON, July 10, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received July 10—3 : 26 p. m.]

209. Eyes only for Secretary. Re Embtel 184 (repeated Moscow 14).[1] My immediately following telegram contains text revised instructions to Kelly.[2] Underlined portions indicate changes made to incorporate your comments. This appears satisfactory.

Department pass Moscow. Moscow eyes only for Ambassador 17.

DOUGLAS

[1] Received on July 10 at 12 :50 p. m., p. 344.
[2] See telegram 210, from London, received on July 10 at 5 :52 p. m., p. 352.

795.00/7–1050

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 10, 1950.

Subject: U.S. Courses of Action in the Event Soviet Forces Enter Korean Hostilities

1. In accordance with your memorandum dated 30 June 1950,[1] the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their recommendations as to the course of action to be adopted by the United States in the event that Soviet forces enter Korean hostilities.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion [that] the USSR armed forces should be considered to have entered Korean hostilities when major Soviet combat units engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities against U.S. and/or friendly forces in the Korean hostilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned, however, lest political considerations demand excessive commitments of United States military forces and resources in those areas of operations which would not be decisive. In the event the USSR should decide to undertake global war, that nation would be in a position to exploit such United States deployments and commitments and could thus render more effective Soviet over-all war strategy.

3. Preliminary to, or in the initial stages of a global war, it would be militarily unsound for the United States to commit large forces against the USSR in an area of slight strategic importance, as well as one of Soviet choice. Therefore, if major USSR combat units should at any time during military operations in the Korea area of hostilities engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities against U. S. and/or friendly forces the U. S. should prepare to minimize its commitment in Korea and prepare to execute war plans. These preparations should include initiation of full-scale mobilization.

4. In connection with the preceding paragraphs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would advise that, by their direction, the matters set forth therein are being kept under continuing study with a view to timely submission in accordance with development of suitable recommendations.[2]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

[1] Not printed.

[2] This memorandum was forwarded to the Executive Secretary of the NSC (Lay) by Secretary of Defense Johnson with a statement of his concurrence. Mr. Lay submitted it to the NSC as NSC 76, under date of July 21, for consideration at the 62nd NSC meeting scheduled for July 27 (NSC files). For the comments of the Department of State on NSC 76, see the enclosure to NSC 76/1 under date of July 25, p. 475.

795.00/7–1050 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 10, 1950—5 p. m.

NIACT

132. Eyes only for the Ambassador. Request you deliver fol message to Mr. Bevin from the Sec:

"I was glad to receive through Sir Oliver Franks your views on the possible relationship of Formosa to the Korean matter and appreciate the frankness with which you presented them. I believe it will contribute to a full understanding between us if I am equally frank.

I consider it vital before dealing with the specific points raised in your message that we clearly understand certain fundamental aspects of the US position in this matter which to us are completely controlling:

1. We have faced squarely a calculated act of aggression and in so doing we are profoundly convinced that we are acting for the protection of the entire free world. The future peace of the world in our view hangs directly upon the success we expect to achieve in defeating this first overt act of aggression since the end of the war.

2. I must tell you that we have no intention of retreating from the position taken by the Pres in his statement of June 27. We are convinced that any sign of retreat from those positions would have disastrous consequences that might easily place in jeopardy the entire venture of resistance to aggression. We believe the tragic history of the 30's demonstrates beyond any doubt that the sole hope of preserving the peace of the world is to halt before they spread initial acts of aggression of this character. We believe that the overwhelming support from the free nations of the world is precisely due to their recognition that the whole future of the free world is at stake. We value this support very greatly indeed and particularly appreciate the support which Great Britain is giving both in the battle and in the debate, but we think you should understand that while we will make every effort on our part to safeguard and preserve this world-wide support, the objective of all must be to do what has to be done to defeat the present aggression in Korea and to forestall its possible outbreak elsewhere in the Far East.

We recognize that the Soviets have placed themselves in a difficult position by their provocative and uncompromising public declarations but believe that, nevertheless, if over-riding factors dictate, they will find means of extricating themselves. Experience has shown that they can make sharp reversals even when publicly committed and we feel they have been careful in the present instance to leave the door open for such reversal. UN firmness and unity are most conducive to such a reversal, whereas any indication that we are prepared to pay a substantial price for termination of Soviet aggression in Korea might well encourage the Soviets to drag out the Korean war or even start similar ventures elsewhere.

There is no question but that a well-planned and unprovoked aggression is now in progress against the Rep of Korea. The deep resentment of the Amer people toward this cynical attack is multiplied because of the cruel strains upon our resources imposed by our attempt to meet it. Neither of us has any doubt but that this aggression was ordered by the Kremlin and is being actively directed by key Sov personnel in increasingly large numbers in Korea. Further, there is some evidence which shows Chi Communists may be participating in the fighting not only in Korea but in other parts of Asia, with obvious and serious implications for the special positions of the UK in Hong Kong and Malaya. We shall do what we can to prevent an extension of the Korean conflict, but as the fiction of no Sov or Chi involvement wears thin, questions will be raised of the gravest importance to us all.

If we are to prevent the recurrence of such conduct on the part of the Sov Union, it seems imperative that (*a*) the aggressor not be militarily successful and (*b*) the Soviets not be paid any price whatever for calling off an attack which they should never have started. The effect on the free world, on the UN and on the Soviets themselves would be disastrous if the Sov Union can now establish the proposition that aggression can be a profitable transaction. I am certain that neither the US nor the UK wish to contribute in any way to such a result.

For the above reasons it seems to us that the Korean matter must be dealt with by the UN and its Members on principle as a case of aggression and that if the UN should permit the aggressor to inject other issues and extort concessions for desisting from unlawful conduct, the ability of the UN and the free world to prevent aggression would be totally lost.

For similar reasons, we do not believe it possible to accede to the Sov view that in some way the UN itself and the US in particular have made it impossible for the Sov Union to participate in the UN. This is sheer unadulterated blackmail on their part which has no support in the Charter or in reason or conscience. I am certain we both agree that we cannot repeatedly pay appeasement prices to get the Sov Union to take their seat in the UN nor permit them to establish by indirection a veto in organs of the UN where no veto was ever intended. You will recall that I spoke strongly about this point of coercion at our last meeting.[1] I did so and do so now because I am deeply convinced that the UN would suffer a severe reverse if it should bow to such tactics. There might be some temporary satisfaction in having all the seats filled again, but if at the price of submission, the

[1] Reference is to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in London, May 11–14, documentation on which is scheduled for publication in volume III.

satisfaction would be more than offset by the wrecking tactics of the Sov Union in the UN during the present crisis and by the disillusionment and contempt the peoples of the free world, certainly the people of the US, would feel toward the UN and those responsible for the surrender. The UN could not improve its position if it brought back the Russians on terms which would lose for it the support of the US.

The question of Chi representation is affected by the considerations suggested above and is greatly complicated by the gap between our respective policies toward Chi. In all frankness, I do not see any likelihood of harmonizing our policies toward Chi by any significant change in the basic attitudes on which US policy is founded. We have not recognized Peiping because (1) there was little indication that Peiping genuinely desired the establishment of normal relations with others, (2) the Peiping regime singled out US citizens and Amer interests for specially hostile treatment, (3) it has made no pretense of accepting and carrying out the international obligations of Chi, (4) it has recognized Ho Chih Minh and is actively interfering in the situation in Indo-China, (5) it is lending encouragement and support to Communist insurgents in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and elsewhere, (6) it is cooperating with a degree of Sov penetration of Chi which can only lead to de facto dismemberment in violation of the territorial integrity and political independence of Chi, respect for which has been recently reaffirmed by the UNGA, (7) its support by and control over Chi is still incomplete, and (8) now, the Peiping regime is openly defying the UN with respect to Korea, is mobilizing political support in Asia on behalf of the aggressors, and is apparently furnishing manpower for aggression in Asia.

For these reasons we have also opposed seating Chi Communists in the UN. This latter question in our view must be considered against the background of general policy and the situation in the Far East. There can be little doubt but that Communism, with Chi as one spearhead, has now embarked upon an assault against Asia with immediate objectives in Korea, Indo-China, Burma, the Philippines and Malaya and with medium-range objectives in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Siam, India and Japan. We doubt that they will be deflected from their purpose by temporary accommodation, particularly if this accommodation is obtained by them at a time when their own conduct is aggressive and in violation of the Charter.

We do not believe that the question of the Chi UN seat should be dealt with until the aggression against Korea is resolved. We do not have a closed mind on the question of Chi representation in the UN, but we do feel strongly that the question should be taken up by the UN on its merits and dealt with as the UN decides it should deal with the question of competing claimant Govts for a UN seat. We do not

believe the UN can deal with the matter on its merits under the coercion of (*a*) Communist aggression against Korea or (*b*) Russian absence, with Peiping seating as the price of return. If the coercion were removed, the UN could set about the matter of seating in a normal fashion, perhaps seating no Chi representative pending full consideration of the unprecedented problem of competing claimant Govts.

In regard to Formosa, there is a short-range mil problem and a longer-range political problem. On June 25–26 it became apparent that the attack in Korea was an all-out act of aggression against the Rep of Korea, set in motion by the Sov Union. It was not and still is not possible to say with certainty what Sov mil intentions are in the Far East and elsewhere. Mr. Attlee and the Pres have agreed on the need for further talks between us on this broader question raised by the events in Korea. We felt that it was essential from both a political and mil point of view to try to stabilize the situation with respect to the Far East until we could get a clearer picture of the drastically new situation created by Sov aggression in Korea and learn what other orders it had given to its lackeys in the area. As a simple matter of mil prudence, we took the mil precaution of trying to eliminate or reduce the risk of hostilities between Formosa and the mainland and the risk of Communist occupation and mil exploitation of this strategically located island. The step taken by the Pres on June 27 was mil in character and did not purport to deal with the many complicated political questions involved.

I believe it important that we consult with each other and with certain other Govts as soon as practicable about the political aspects of the Formosa problem. So far as our attitude is concerned, it is essentially very simple and clear. It has been made plain that a carefully planned aggression has occurred in the Far East, that it has been well mounted and most capably led. We cannot accept that forces which are hostile, aggressive and capable should seize Formosa and exploit it as an air and naval base against us. Further, in the present situation in the Far East we do not wish to see hostilities erupt between Formosa and the mainland as a major distrubance to the peace of the Pacific. We have, therefore, taken mil measures to neutralize Formosa.

We are aware of the commitments of Cairo and Potsdam [2] concerning Formosa but existing conditions were clearly not envisaged at the time they were made. Commitments made by the Sov Union in connection with Cairo and Potsdam (e.g. independence of Korea and support of the National Govt of Chi) have been flouted. We think it

[2] *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. II, p. 1475.

one thing to turn Formosa over to the then Rep of Chi and quite another to turn it over either to the Sov Union or to a Peiping regime which at the least is encouraging aggression against its neighbors in open cooperation with Moscow.

I believe it fair to summarize our view by stating that we have not taken our recent action with any intention of taking possession of Formosa, we believe the ultimate fate of Formosa should be settled by peaceful means either in connection with a Jap peace settlement or by the UN, but we are not willing to see it go involuntarily to Peiping in the present state of affairs in Asia.

These are grave matters which I have discussed in the frankest terms because of their importance not only to our own relations but to the position of the free world as a whole in dealing with the vital issues thrown at us by the fact of aggression. I recognize the many difficulties of your position and have tried to set forth some of ours.

If I should close with an indication of the steps ahead as we see them it would be (1) as early and complete a liquidation of the Korean aggression as is militarily possible and in any case without concessions which would whet Sov appetites and bring on other aggressions elsewhere, (2) consideration by the UN of the Chi seating problem on its merits and out from under the duress and blackmail now being employed, and (3) a peaceful disposition of the Formosa problem in the Jap peace settlement or the UN without the employment of force or the outbreak of hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific.

I should be glad to have your further views at your earliest convenience."

ACHESON

795.00/7–1050 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1950—5 p. m.

133. Personal. Eyes only for Douglas from Secretary. I am sending you by separate telegram [1] message sent me from Bevin [2] and my reply.[3] I hope you will emphasize to Bevin that this reply which has been approved here at highest levels represents both my own strong personal views and has fullest concurrence of all official quarters here. I think you might well remind Bevin orally of grave doubts he himself expressed to me in private conversation in London [4] as to

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[1] Not printed.
[2] See the note from the British Embassy, July 7, p. 329.
[3] *Supra.*
[4] See footnote 1 to telegram 132 to London, p. 348.

wisdom of Britain's own China policy and ask him frankly what possible practical advantages he sees in trying to get Communist China into SC and return to SC of USSR in present situation. Fact that SC was able to take such prompt and effective action, subsequently endorsed by 46 nations, was due solely to absence of the Soviet and we can be certain that their return to SC at this time would be utilized solely to sow confusion and delay or hinder the primary objective of both of us—namely, to show that armed aggression does not pay. We have of course no wish to see USSR leave UN and are well aware of effect of such a permanent move on character of UN, but that is quite different matter from paying a price to obtain their return to Lake Success in an obstructionist role at this critical time.

I want you to leave him in no doubt of seriousness with which I view implications of his message and their possible effect on our whole future relationship.

ACHESON

795.00/7–1050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

LONDON, July 10, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received July 10—5 : 52 p. m.]

210. Eyes only for Secretary.

"Communication to Sir David Kelly.[1]

"I am glad to note Mr. Gromyko's statement at your last conversation that the Soviet Government wish for a peaceful settlement. That is also the earnest desire of HMG.

"As regards his question whether we have any specific proposals to make, I am well aware of the precise and concrete sense attached by the Soviet Government to the word 'proposals'. (The Russians read into the word 'proposals' far more than we do and are apt to regard them as something by which the proposer is irrevocably bound just as they regard 'a basis of discussion' as something which is firmly agreed. Hence my use of the phrase 'preliminary suggestion' in this telegram). The Soviet Government will understand that HMG can only take action in this matter in the light of their position as a member of the UN. The SC made certain recommendations in connection with Korea which have since received the overwhelming support of the members of the UN as a whole. HMG therefore could not come forward with any 'proposals' as such. We could not properly do so unless we had assured ourselves that what we proposed carried with it the assent of

[1] See telegram 209, from London, received on July 10 at 3 :26 p. m., p. 345.

the other members of the UN chiefly concerned. In view of our collective responsibility as a member of the UN we could not as an individual government run so far ahead as this. We therefore think it best to make a preliminary suggestion. The Soviet Government may well make the comment that they see nothing new in the preliminary step which we propose, but this step is tremendously important if it leads to a cessation of hostilities and the clearing up of difficulties among members of the UN. It therefore seems to us that the influences making for peace ought to join together in order to bring about a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal by the North Korean forces beyond the 38th parallel, without concerning themselves for the moment with other causes of difference which have arisen in the more distant or more recent past in connection with the Korean question.

"We, as a member of the UN are anxious to use our good offices to promote peace. Mr. Gromyko has stated that the Soviet Government wish for a peaceful solution. Therefore there is common ground between us. But Mr. Gromyko should be quite clear in his mind that there is nothing in the action being taken by HMG which will justify the assumption that there is any weakening in the determination to carry out the UN's recommendations regarding Korea.

"I want you therefore to emphasize to Mr. Gromyko that irrespective of any other consideration the plain fact is that the hostilities in Korea have arisen from the movement over the 38th parallel by the forces of North Korea. It follows that the best suggestion which HMG as a member of the UN are in a position to put forward is to urge that the Soviet Government—who, HMG are glad to note, have expressed their desire for a peaceful settlement—to add their efforts to those of other members of the UN by using their influence as a member of the UN with the North Korean authorities to bring them to cease hostilities and to withdraw their forces to the 38th parallel. Mr. Gromyko will appreciate that the aggression of the North Korean forces was a challenge to the UN who are handling the resultant situation. We feel sure therefore even if it can be arranged that the North Korean forces should withdraw to the 38th parallel that the UN would not entertain any proposal that the UN forces in Korea should thereupon be withdrawn from Korea and will insist that there shall be no diminution of the responsibilities of the UN Commission on Korea.

"If, as is possible, Mr. Gromyko tries to get you to say how you would see matters developing if the Soviet Government were willing to use their influence with North Korea and to produce the desired result, you will have to say that the working out of these matters would fall to be dealt with by the SC. What you are now concerned to do is to suggest a step whereby, in the view of HMG, the way might

be paved for an ultimate solution. If Mr. Gromyko for his part, has any suggestions to make, you should of course say that you would be very glad to convey them to me. But as said above it is the aggression of the North Koreans which is blameworthy and no suggestion which failed to take account of that fact could bear fruit.

"Mr. Gromyko may also raise other questions such as Chinese representation on the UN or Formosa. I suspect that he may also be angling for an opening to suggest a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four powers. This would have the advantage for him, since it would arise out of a free issue, of opening the way for the Soviet Government to bring the question of the Japanese peace treaty into this forum, which they have (unjustifiably in our view) always wanted to do. You will have to avoid such traps. Your best line would, I think, be to say that, without prejudice to other questions which remain to be settled, the cause of peace is of such overriding importance that we feel entitled to call upon the Soviet Government to lend their assistance. What do they think? Have they any suggestion to make? They and we have an equal interest in bringing hostilities to a close. You are not speaking for any other government or organization but for HMG who feel deeply about the dangers of the present situation and make an earnest appeal to the Soviet Government to join their efforts to those of other members of the UN and to use their influence in the interest of peace. I want you to drive home the thought that it is essential to stop the fighting in Korea, get the North Korean forces to withdraw beyond the 38th parallel and to get back the methods of peaceful settlement and to promote the restoration of peace."

Department pass niact Moscow 18, eyes only for Ambassador.

DOUGLAS

795.00/7–1050 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, July 10, 1950—6:53 p. m.
[Received July 10—7:10 p. m.]

39. Immediately after meeting with Lie on offers of assistance re Korea, separately reported next following telegram (USUN 40),[1] Korean Ambassador Chang took me aside as follows:

He said that 38th parallel was meaningless and that liberation and unification of all of Korea was essential, after which there should be UN supervised elections for whole country. He said that the UN should

[1] *Infra.*

not stop short of this objective. If they did, Chang went on, we would be confronted indefinitely with necessity defending 38th parallel, North Korean Reds continuously being aided and abetted by Manchurians.

Chang expressed earnest hope therefore that airborne force should be landed behind North Korean lines (38th parallel) and North Korean Reds crushed (slaughtered) in pincers beyond hope recovery.

I told Chang I would transmit his views to Department.[2]

AUSTIN

[2] On the following day, Ambassador Chang expressed his views to Messrs. Rusk and Allison in a conversation at the State Department, indicating his great concern at press reports that the British Government was attempting to achieve a settlement of the Korean problem through negotiations with the Soviet Union. Mr. Rusk stated that the actions of all concerned nations were being governed by the Security Council resolutions, that it was impossible to tell what the final outcome of the situation would be, and that there was no indication that the British or any other government intended to take action contrary to the Security Council resolutions. (795.00/7–1150)

330/7–1050 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, July 10, 1950—6 : 54 p. m.
[Received July 10—7 : 57 p. m.]

40. Accompanied by Gross and Ross at 11 this morning, I attended meeting called by SYG Lie with SC president Sunde and Korean Ambassador Chang to discuss coordination offers of assistance for Korea. Cordier, Stabell, and secretary of Chang's Embassy present.

Lie initiated discussion by reference to his responsibilities as SYG, indicating, however, that we had now reached stage where US had taken over responsibilities to act for UN. He said reason for calling meeting was that many delegates have been coming to him for advice about possible offers of assistance. He stressed importance maintaining UN aspect of whole operation. He said at this stage he was interested not only in votes but in tangible evidence of support of action in order to show aggressors that UN is behind ROK. He said delegates want to give to the UN not to the US nor to the ROK. He said he did not want to get UN secretariat involved in administration of anything; that he realized US must decide with ROK how to handle offers of assistance.

Lie stressed particularly two aspects of matter. First, current sufferings of Korean people and their need for short-term relief and long-term rehabilitation; second, the moral and political aspects of support in contrast with military aspects.

Lie ended his introductory statement by saying he wanted "help" to do a good job.

I told Lie we thought he was doing a fine job and emphasized that I thought present discussions must be exploratory until we know what is needed. I said we were dealing with essentially a military matter and that we must know what the unified command finds necessary. I said I thought we had not quite yet reached the time for decisions in this matter. Meanwhile, we felt the SYG should carry on as he has been as the chief administrative officer of the UN and representative, therefore, of the entire membership of UN. I said the machinery for dealing with the problem was being established in Washington and that I thought our present most important job was to provide smooth transmission through USUN.

I emphasized importance of security in dealing with strategic requirements.

Chang indicated general agreement with what I had said and added that he thought not only the commanding general but also the Korean Government should participate in determining needs. He said he was sure commanding general was in closest contact his government; he thought that he might, through his own channels, however, be helpful in determining Korean needs.

Appearing to agree generally with what I had said, Lie said he took a political view of the matter. He said the other side was very clever with their propaganda (e.g., international brigades from Iron Curtain countries) and that we must meet this propaganda politically. Emphasizing importance, as he saw it, of maintaining broad UN character of operation in defense of Korea, he said whole world must know that UN is behind suffering country.

He referred in passing to American political situation, saying that we must not lay ourselves open to charges that US is providing all the men and all the money to carry on Korean operation.

He said he thought we must get something definite and specific from others, at least on paper. He referred, for example, to availability of Norwegian and Swedish shipping paid for by those governments. He said that through material participation by other governments we would get and keep public of other countries on our side. In other words, he concluded, we must keep the snowball rolling and building up.

Sunde agreed with what I had said to the effect that our first task was to find out what was needed. He observed that, while he thought MacArthur would certainly know what he needs for military operations, "Washington" would know better what is available and from what sources, et cetera.

Cordier said he thought most important consideration was timing of requests. He agreed that first requirements were those of military urgency. At same time he felt we should not lose too much time in meeting ROK requests. He referred in this connection to his understanding that ROK already had a serious refugee problem. He said he thought we must at least begin to get supplies lined up and transport arranged to meet these needs as quickly as possible.

Chang agreed with what Cordier had said. He said he was very happy to learn of Thailand offer of rice. He said he would not hesitate a moment in accepting this offer, since military operations have come at worst time of year from viewpoint of Korean food supply. Medicines, he thought, were also urgently needed.

Chang said he thought there were three phases of requirements: first, strategic; second, relief; third, reconstruction. He said he thought first two should be dealt with in parallel.

Referring to propaganda problem, Chang said that, since his government had lost Seoul radio, it now had remaining only two very small transmitters. He said that facilities were urgently needed to give his people courage and hoped that more could be done very promptly in this regard.

No conclusions were reached at this discussion, there being general agreement that exchange of views had been helpful and that elements of problem were understood.

In course of meeting, Lie, Cordier, and Chang all spoke about weakness of UNCOK and necessity of strengthening it. Chang said that weakness of UNCOK was unfortunately well known to his people. Cordier pointed out that none of UNCOK members have had UN experience; that the commission seems to be virtually paralyzed and wholly lacking in leadership. He had just received indications that Salvadoran and Philippine representatives were going back home for instructions. The Australian (Jamieson) was described as a nice young man but inexperienced. Cordier said he thought that someone like Hasluck[1] would be ideal to represent Australia. He thought that Col. Hodgson[2] might be useful. Cordier has talked to Australians here and to Romulo about this problem. Lie expressed hope we could find some means of helping get commission strengthened. Lie, Cordier, and Chang all attached large importance to moral and political importance of UNCOK.

Lie expressed pleasure at report from Katzin of full cooperation by MacArthur headquarters.

AUSTIN

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[1] Paul Hasluck, Member of the Australian Parliament, had formerly been on the Australian Mission at the United Nations.

[2] William Roy Hodgson, Head of the Australian Mission in Japan.

795.00/7–1150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

LONDON, July 11, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received July 11—10:06 a. m.]

214. Eyes only for the Secretary from Douglas re Deptels 131,[1] 132 and 133, July 10. In response to question Deptel 133, what possible advantage can Bevin see in the return of USSR to its chair in UN and to seating of Chinese Communists under critical international situation and before:

(*a*) Soviets have learned that aggression does not pay,
(*b*) The Security of the Pacific has been restored, and
(*c*) The forces that have invaded Republic of Korea have withdrawn to 38th parallel, he probably will reply that India is the only country, which can exert real influence on the attitude of the vast populations of the Far East; and that India is important in maintaining common view among the members of the Commonwealth. India does not approve of US action in regard to Formosa, and our attitude toward the seating of the Chinese Communists in the Security Council and toward the People's Republic of China. Accordingly, the US should modify its view and its position.

In reply I should like to be able to ask Bevin if he will not join and support us in attempting to explain our policy and point of view and position clearly and adequately to the GOI. I might ask HMG to take the line which we believe to be true and which was so clearly presented in your message, that complete change in international environment from that which existed at Cairo and Potsdam, the repudiation of Soviet commitments to support the Chinese Nationalist Government, the clear and identifiable efforts of the Soviets to use communism as an instrument of aggression in China, Indonesia-China, Malay, Burma, Tibet, the Philippines, and Korea present situation of great danger to India herself. To seat Chinese communists in Security Council, to recognize the Communist regime in China, et cetera, all under Soviet coercion would aggravate immeasurably the very great threat to independent states in the Orient, to the freedom of India, indeed to peace of world. In President's statement of June 27 in regard to Formosa, US was moved only by very serious desire to prevent area of warfare from including Formosa and to restore security of Pacific so that the status of Formosa can be determined either under provisions of Japanese peace settlement or by decision of UN. We might ask HMG to emphasize that unless Communist aggression in Asia is stopped, there can be no security whatsoever for India.

[1] Not printed; it transmitted the text of the message from Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks conveyed to the Department of State in the note from the British Embassy dated July 7, p. 329.

In other words, may I not say to Mr. Bevin that we agree that India's leadership is important among the teeming millions of the Far East. It is because her leadership is so important that we ask HMG to join us in pointing out grave danger in view presently held by GOI. It will not restore the security of the world for us to yield to the Indian position when it is our clear conviction that it will produce nothing but further acts of aggression. It is far preferable that India be persuaded that our line is the only line which can restore security, that India's influence therefore be exercised among peoples of the Orient in the only direction which can insure peace than for us to yield to India's views for the purely nebulous gain of temporarily aligning ourselves with her leadership in the Orient and thereby to produce situation out of which only further and possibly vaster extension of the area of warfare will emerge.

I will telephone you. You can give me the answer yes or no. If yes I will follow the line indicated in this cable. If no, I will refrain.[2]

DOUGLAS

[2] A manuscript note on the source text by Dean Rusk indicated that the Secretary replied "yes".

795.00/7–1050 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 11, 1950—12 noon.
PRIORITY NIACT

28. Eyes only for the Ambassador. Dept desires give friendly answer Indians in view desirability maintaining their support Korea action (re Embtels 83 and 84 July 10) and agrees necessity respect Indian confidence. Dept considers it extremely important, however, Brit be informed activities Indian Amb in order to avoid muddying water Kelly–Gromyko conversations.

You are accordingly instructed immediately to inform Indian Amb orally along following lines:

1. You have transmitted his letter of July 9 to USGovt which has given careful attention Indian suggestions. Although US appreciates Indian concern to end aggression in Korea, Indian proposal presents fundamental difficulty. This basic difficulty involves UN as well as US and we believe it most improbable that UN or US would agree to settlement situation produced by unprovoked attack on Korea on any basis whatever which directly or indirectly meant payment or reward to aggressor or diluted requirements UNSC resolutions June 25 and 27 or left Korea after cessation hostilities exposed and defenseless situation.

2. You and ur Govt have adhered his counsellor's request that we not inform Brit of this approach. US believes, however, that in light

UK membership on SC and its important role in Korean situation, Indians shld immediately and fully take Brit into their confidence. US will keep in close touch with GOI as fellow SC member on Korean problem and will continue to keep USAmb New Delhi fully informed at all times for that purpose.

3. You shld add personal comment that in light Sov rejection Indian approach as reported by his counsellor, you assume Indian effort secure prompt liquidation Korean aggression already foreclosed.

ACHESON

795.00/7–1150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

Moscow, July 11, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received July 11—2 : 26 p. m.]

99. Eyes only for the Secretary. Kelly saw Gromyko this afternoon (London telegram 210, July 10). His report of conversation, copy of which will not be available to us until tomorrow morning, is being repeated immediately to British Embassy Washington.[1] Kelly states that speaking from notes he presented to Gromyko the substance of his instructions in considerable detail. Gromyko heard him out and then after some clarification of the translation remarked on only three points. First, he took issue with Kelly's statement concerning the North Korean attack, reiterating the Soviet contention that the attack was "provoked" by ROK. Second, he inquired why the British specifically sought Soviet influence with the North Koreans. Third, he mentioned the British reference to "running so far ahead". Kelly refuted Gromyko's charge of ROK provocation along the obvious line, said that Soviet influence with the North Koreans was being invoked because Soviet relations with that government were known to be close and repeated that he could not "run ahead" with any "proposals" as such, since the British were acting as a member of the UN and consequently could not properly make "proposals".

Gromyko concluded that the matter would be referred to the Soviet Government. No mention was made by Gromyko or Kelly either of China or Formosa.

Department pass London; repeated info London niact 33, eyes only for the Ambassador from Moscow.

KIRK

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[1] On the following day, Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor of the British Embassy, met with Livingston T. Merchant and read him the text of the telegram (not printed) which Ambassador Kelly had sent to the Foreign Office (895.00/7–1250).

795.00/7–1150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

LONDON, July 11, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received July 11—4:08 p. m.]

241. Eyes only for Secretary. I saw Bevin at hospital this afternoon and delivered your message contained in Deptel 132.[1] There follows a brief summary of the points which emerged from a long and somewhat rambling discussion.

(1) There is no deviation from the instructions sent to Kelly; that in his conversation with Gromyko or others he is to stick strictly to the UK's position as a member of and within the framework of the UN. I pointed out that in my conversation on Saturday with the PriMin the latter had said that the position of HMG was that the Korean problem and the question of seating the Chinese Communists in the UN, Formosa and other matters were unrelated (see Embtel 156).[2] This Bevin confirmed.

(2) Bevin seemed somewhat surprised and a little taken aback at the vigor of your response. He was rather defensive in explaining the motive which had prompted him to send his message to you saying that although Kelly's instructions confined any discussions the latter might have strictly to Korea, he felt that it was well to explore in advance what the position of the US would be in the event that the Soviets should respond with proposals which on the surface might appear to be honest and inviting. He said that he wanted to provoke the question in order that we might have consultations in anticipation of a Soviet question or proposal. He was indefinite and did not give a direct answer to my frank question as to what possible practical advantages he sees in trying to get Communist China into Security Council and return to Security Council of USSR in present situation. He said he would have to consider the matter carefully. In passing he said that he had never doubted the wisdom or justice of Britain's decision to recognize Communist China but had expressed doubts to us in London as to a satisfactory outcome. I had the impression that Bevin had not quite appreciated the significance of his message to you and it may well be some of his subordinates with less fortitude than he persuaded him to despatch his telegram to you without explaining its implications.

(3) Bevin said that he wished to enter a caveat that UK's position with respect to Korea is not to be construed as a commitment that the same position is taken with regard to Formosa as that of the US. UK is willing to consult with US, the Commonwealths—especially

[1] Transmitted on July 10 at 5 p. m., p. 347.
[2] Received at 9:50 a. m. on July 8, p. 331.

India—and others with respect to Formosa but that great care must be taken not to weaken UK–Commonwealth relations particularly with India and Pakistan. Moreover, India was an important influence in the Orient.

(4) I then raised the question of India and made the suggestion contained in Embtel 214.[3] Bevin seemed to be impressed by this proposal and suggested that Washington might be appropriate place for discussions with Indians. When it was pointed out that the Indian representative would be Madam Pandit, he immediately withdrew the suggestion but stated that in no event should talks be held in London. I then suggested the possibility of New Delhi and Bevin said that he would study my suggestion concerning India and let me know in the course of a few days.

(5) Bevin said that he could make no final comment on your message to him as it would require careful study by HMG; that it would receive immediate and careful attention and that he hoped to communicate with me again in a few days time.

(6) Please give me date and hour of Bevin's message to you so that I can determine whether it was sent before or after my meeting with Attlee on Saturday morning June [*July*] 8. This might reveal whether Bevin himself initiated message or whether it was some subordinate's handiwork—probably Strang's. It has marks of Strang's spoor.[4]

DOUGLAS

[3] Received at 10:06 a. m. on July 11, p. 358.
[4] See telegram 177, to London, transmitted on July 11 at 8 p. m., p. 365.

330/7–650

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. H. B. Wells of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, of a Meeting Held on July 11, 1950

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 17, 1950.

[Subject:] Tsiang Proposal Set Forth In US [*UN*] Telegram 29 of July 6

Participants:				
UNP:	Mr. Wainhouse	NA:	Mr. Emmons [3]
	Mr. Wells	CA:	Mr. Stuart [4]
USUN:	Mr. Ross	EUR:	Mr. Allen [5]
SOA:	Mr. Mathews [1]		
	Mr. Sparks [2]		

[1] Elbert G. Mathews, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs.
[2] Joseph S. Sparks, Officer in Charge of India–Nepal Affairs, Office of South Asian Affairs.
[3] Arthur B. Emmons, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.
[4] Wallace W. Stuart, Office of Chinese Affairs.
[5] Ward P. Allen, Bureau of European Affairs.

At a meeting here on July 11 Mr. Ross indicated the belief of USUN that it was necessary for us to see to it that steps be taken by the Security Council with respect to Korea which would have the effect of averting a severe hangover among the nations indicating their support of SC action on Korea, once the first fine enthusiasm should have worn off. There was need for continuing SC application to the various phases of the problem. One of the things that must be done was to consider measures which would help to line up the middle powers (the Middle Eastern states and the Asiatic) in continuing support of the SC resolutions, and which would maintain the solidarity of the whole democratic bloc in the United Nations, including the Latin American and Western European states as well. Something was necessary both to offset the Soviet propaganda advantage, derived by the Communist states from the ease with which they have been able to claim that the conflict in Korea is a war where white men are shooting Asiatics, and to prevent this propaganda advantage from spreading. It was also important to proceed with vigor and acumen in this case, since it might in so many respects serve as a precedent for the future.

In the foregoing setting, the Tsiang proposal appealed to USUN.

Mr. Ross further proposed that it would be desirable that frequent meetings of the SC be held; that reports from the Unified Command be kept flowing to the Council—there should certainly be one report to the Council this week;—and that the Specialized Agencies be called upon to consider what they might do to assist the UN's cause in Korea.

The consensus of those present at the meeting was to the effect that the Tsiang proposal had merit, and that the main difficulty with it was the question of how it should be sponsored. This question was left to the discretion of USUN, in view of the mission's acquaintanceship with the personalities involved. It seemed that there was some likelihood Tsiang might find an opportunity of bringing this proposal to the attention of the Egyptian representative with a view to the latter's making it his own and then discussing it with the Indians.

Mr. Mathews regarded the Tsiang proposal, in its present form as a mere self-denying ordinance, as being too negative. He considered that it should preferably take the form of a statement of the objectives which the UN seeks to accomplish in the present struggle.

It appeared to be agreed that while the objectives had already received preliminary definition in the SC's resolution of June 25 and 27, provisions of this character might perhaps be embodied in an eventual draft resolution designed to accomplish our purpose, and that such language might be used concurrently with the Tsiang "self-denying ordinance" language. It was agreed that what the resolution should contain was a matter which could not be passed upon finally

until after further conversations in New York with delegation of other states represented on the SC.

Mr. Ross agreed that he would talk to Dr. Tsiang further and inform us of the outcome of his conversation.

330/7–1150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW DELHI, July 11, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received July 11—6 : 17 p. m.]

66. Following are texts (*a*) of telegram of July 10, 1950 of Indian Ambassador in Peking to his government, and (*b*) of GOI reply thereto of July 11, 1950 as furnished me by Bajpai, Secretary-General of MEA (see Embtel 65 of July 11, 1950) :[1]

[Here follows the message from the Indian Ambassador in Peking transmitting an unofficial note of conversation handed him by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Chang Han-fu expressing the Chinese Government's agreement with the Indian position that the PRC should be represented in the United Nations and setting forth emphatically the view that the Korean problem and the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations should be considered separately. Panikkar's message went on to say that the Indian Government, however, did not agree with the Chinese contention that the June 27 Security Council resolution was invalid in view of Soviet and PRC nonparticipation.

The Indian Government's reply stated that it was continuing to press the United Kingdom Government for early admission of China to the Security Council and continuing to urge the United States not to stand in the way. The text of the Chinese note would be conveyed to London by the Indian Government for the attention of Mr. Attlee. The message concluded by saying that if China were admitted to the Security Council and the Soviet Union returned to that body the Indian Government hoped that all governments would work for a speedy settlement in Korea, although it understood that Peking could not speak for Moscow.]

HENDERSON

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[1] Received at 8 : 43 p. m. on July 11, p. 365.

795.00/7–1150 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1950—8 p. m.

177. Eyes only for the Ambassador from Rusk. Oliver Franks handed me ref message (urtel 241)[1] at Brit Emb at 3 p. m. Sat. July 8. When handing it to me Franks stated he had received it the day before but had just received a short message from London to go ahead and deliver it. Text of message handed me was in fact dated July 7. I got impression from Franks that FonOf wished us to be thinking about Bevin's message pending receipt text instruction to Kelly which arrived July 9.[2] On basis above, it is clear Bevin's message was sent at least one day before your meeting with Attlee on Sat. morning. [Rusk.]

ACHESON

[1] Received on July 11 at 4 : 08 p. m., p. 361.
[2] See the note from the British Embassy, July 9, p. 338.

330/7–1150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, July 11, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received July 11—8 : 43 p. m.]

65. 1. I saw Bajpai, SG MEA, this morning at his request. He showed me copy of telegram dated July 10 from Pannikar, Indian Ambassador to China, setting forth substance of conversation between Pannikar and Chinese Communist Vice MFA and copy of GOI reply thereto of July 11, and suggested US Government might be interested in contents these two messages. I said I would be glad telegraph Department but must admit I always disliked relying on my memory in conveying to my government with accuracy contents of important documents which I had not had opportunity carefully to study. He promised to send copies to Embassy as soon as they could be made. Copies have been received and texts are set forth in subsequent telegram No. 66 of July 11.[1]

[1] Received at 6 : 17 p. m. on July 11, p. 364.

2. After I had read two documents, Bajpai again argued with great earnestness importance of early admittance of Chinese into SC. He said he saw little hope of resolving Korean conflict or of preventing its spread unless China and USSR could begin participating in proceedings of SC. Statements made by Peiping Vice Minister seemed to him to be encouraging. He was relieved to note desire Chinese Communists to keep problem of admission to UN separate from that of Korea. GOI was not inclined to ascribe particular importance to insistence of Chinese Communists that all major decisions of UN organizations in absence of representatives of USSR and Chinese Communists were illegal or to Chinese Communists' reference to US invasion of Taiwan, et cetera. GOI hoped that when once Communist China was seated in UN organizations, it would assume more reasonable attitude towards developments. First step in direction of replacing use of violence in Korea with conversations would appear to be admission of Communist China. In opinion GOI such admission should be unconditional. He had learned from conversation yesterday with Roberts, acting HICOM of UK, that during recent conversation between UK Ambassador in Moscow and Gromyko, former had obtained impression that Russia might be willing to make some concessions re Korea in return for admission Communist China. GOI considered that attempts to attach strings to admission Communist China would lead to nothing: that atmosphere for achieving solution of problem of Korean aggression would be much better if Communist China could be admitted immediately and unconditionally.

3. I told Bajpai that I wished I could share his optimism; that it seemed to be [*me?*] international communism was now seeking admission of Communist China into UN as a reward for having committed aggression in Korea; that, if and when Russia and Communist China would be participating in SC, they would endeavor use that organization as forum for attacks on US and those forces which have been endeavoring combat aggression and to prevent SC from functioning effectively in its efforts to stop aggression. I was inclined to agree with him that it would be useless to try to lay down conditions for admittance Communist China. In my opinion, Russia would not agree to imposition of conditions and, if it should for some unexpected reason agree to conditions, it would probably not live up to them. It seemed to me that by hinting at its readiness to consider peaceful mediation after its admission to SC, Communist China was already beginning to divert attention from fact that aggression had been and was still being committed to other problems.

4. In view of Bajpai's earnestness and his evident keen desire that US Government be apprised of GOI views re urgency of admission

Communist China, I did not consider it advisable argue with him at length at this time. I told him, however, it would be impossible for US in view of both international and internal situation to vote for admission Communist China into any UN organization.

5. Bajpai said he appreciated this fact, but was still hoping that US would not take such hard attitude with regard admission Communist China, that other members SC would refuse to vote for such admission in order not to offend US. Egypt, for instance, at present took position that, after having failed to vote for recent SC resolutions, it did not wish further to offend US by voting for admission Communist China. Ecuador and Cuba, in his opinion, also would not vote for Communist China unless they had reason to believe that US reaction would not be too unfavorable.

6. I told Bajpai that US was not carrying on campaign against admission Communist China; that it would not, however, in my opinion, vote for admission of Communist China; and that I continued to believe that admission of Communist China at this time would not be likely to strengthen cause world peace. Nevertheless, I would endeavor to present fairly to my government GOI views re this matter.

HENDERSON

330/7–1150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, July 11, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received July 12—5:27 a. m.]

67. 1. I am somewhat concerned lest I find myself becoming gradually involved in a GOI effort of intermediation (see Embtel 65).[1] I have impressed on Bajpai that my comments to him were based on such background as I have and should not be considered as official answers to Chinese Communists statements to Pannikar or to his statements to me. Our conversations have been of an extremely personal character and should be considered as such. It might interfere with future conversations if what he says should be quoted to other Indian officials and should find their way perhaps in garbled manner back to MEA. I have outlined in utmost confidence portion of our talk to Canadian HICOM [2] who is deeply interested and whom Bajpai has also approached re his government's attitude towards admission Communist China and plan also to discuss matter briefly with Roberts, acting UK HICOM. It seems advisable for us to keep in close friendly touch with these two missions.

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[1] *Supra.*
[2] Warwick F. Chipman.

2. I hope Department will indicate at once if it does not approve what I have done so far. If it believes that it would be wiser in future for me to pass on further approaches by GOI without so much comment, I would be grateful if it would so inform me. One reason for my frankness in talking with Bajpai has been my belief that by doing so without committing my Government I am keeping open certain channels of information which might be useful to US.[3]

HENDERSON

[3] A note on the source text indicated that a reply to this message was drafted but was superseded by Prime Minister Nehru's communication to Mr. Acheson, July 13; see memorandum by Assistant Secretary McGhee, July 13, p. 372.

330/7–1250 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 12, 1950—10 p. m.

27. Confirming telephone conversation with Ambassador Gross, the following procedure in regard to contributions by Members of the United Nations to the military effort in Korea has been approved by the Departments of State and Defense:

(1) Ambassador Austin will see SYG immediately to suggest that he make a further communication to the Members that have replied favorably on the Security Council resolutions, along the following lines:

(*a*) That the replies received have been communicated to the unified command (US) recommended in the Security Council resolution of July 7;

(*b*) That he (SYG) has been informed that the unified command will communicate with individual governments regarding their offers of assistance;

(*c*) That the individual countries consider without delay what they can contribute in the way of effective assistance, including wherever possible combat forces, particularly ground forces.

(2) Immediately following SYG's circular a bilateral approach will be initiated with the countries that we consider in a position to offer effective economic or military assistance, particularly combat forces.

Mr. Lie should be informed of this proposed bilateral action on our part.

Although it is recognized that from a military point of view most Members of the UN cannot give effective assistance, there are com-

pelling political and psychological reasons for stimulating offers of assistance, particularly combat troops.[1]

ACHESON

[1] See the circular telegram transmitted at 8 a. m. on July 14, p. 377.

795.00/7–1350 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 13, 1950—2 a. m.

Fol summary re Korea:

Despite heavy US air attacks Tokyo Hdqrs reports NK forces continuing strong frontal assaults on US troops. Phil Scout Veterans Assn reportedly offering 31,000 Scouts for duty with US army in FE. US taking position in Consultative Group on export controls that complete embargo on NK shld not be instituted by group but wld be welcome if instituted by individual nations in response SC res calling on UN members refrain from aiding NK. Yugo UN rep states he has changed mind on invasion ROK since obvious US not only had no intention use force but had inadequate troops Japan for Korea defense. Believes this will influence many who previously suspected US intentions Japan and FE. Turk officials and press minimizing possibility immed Sov threat against Turk but concerned possibility Sov inspired moves Balkans and Iran. Dept's Iran desk estimates that while USSR militarily capable invade Iran any time, main threat is internal aggression which Iran security forces able handle providing econ deterioration halted and Commie Party held in check. Amemb Delhi learned Chi Commies have informed India they approve India's efforts obtain their admission UN, maintaining issue shld be separated from Korea and that only after they and Sov are in attendance can SC "mediate" Korea and stop "US aggression" Formosa. UK doubts Chi Commies will invade Burma, believing they unready risk repercussions in Asia from assault on free state unconnected "imperialist" powers. Fr intelligence has no evidence Chi Commie buildup for invasion Indochina or for increased aid to Ho Chi-minh. ConGen Hong Kong cites reports Chi Commie troops moving into Canton and out toward North, possibly either to coast opposite Formosa or to north China.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was also sent to the missions in Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Colombo, Damascus, Jidda, Monrovia, Tangier, and Tel Aviv; and was repeated by airgram to the missions in Addis Ababa, Kabul, Rangoon, Tripoli, and Tunis.

795.00/7–1350 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

TAEJON, July 13, 1950.
[Received July 13—10 : 55 a. m.]

1. Deptel 1 of July 12.[1] Foreign correspondents presently devoting entire time to American-held front because of greater news interest also closer proximity to headquarters here. Will try improve their coverage Korean fighting but correspondents not likely accept our suggestions. Suggest use OFL communiqués there to emphasize Korean resistance which still considerable.

While morale ROK Army varies with units, in general ROK still has army in field of over 50,000 men fighting delaying actions stubbornly and some success. Morale lower among Cabinet Ministers who have not risen to the crisis. Believe this situation will improve when Cabinet assembles with President in Taegu. Will try again there to arrange regular ROK press releases detailing government activities. Meanwhile Provincial Government leaders have done remarkable job maintaining public order. Also activities Railway Administration have been outstanding.

DRUMRIGHT

[1] The text of this message read as follows:

"Press here takes view ROK Govt and Army have collapsed entirely and latter offering little resistance leaving US to fight alone. CINCFE sitreps indicate ROK Army showing good resistance. Wld have most salutary effects if press reports emanating there play up ROK Army activities. Request ur comments attitudes and morale both Army and Govt." (795.00/7–1250)

795.00/7–1350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, July 13, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received July 13—11 : 32 a. m.]

111. Department pass New Delhi, London; repeated info New Delhi 10, London 41. In friendly conversation late afternoon 12 July at Indian Embassy our position, on matters contained mytels 83 and 84 July 10, as detailed in Deptel 28, July 11 was explained to Radhakrishnan who reacted along following line: (*a*) his endeavors would now cease as they were his own idea although approved by Nehru; (*b*) his sole approach to Foreign Minister had been on 1 July when he saw Zorin; (*c*) he responded favorably to my suggestion that British be informed of his efforts and without hesitation said he would undertake to advise British Ambassador promptly; (*d*) while accepting my views as conclusive for the present yet he expressed hope we would eventually recognize Communist China.

Our talk ranged over many aspects current situation in Far East and UN and I was able to hold him to point that North Korean aggression must first be stopped and without appeasement but he still insists we should recognize Peking Government saying this would open way to break between Mao and Kremlin. Throughout conversation I emphasized that we were not going to pay a "price" for the unprovoked North Korean aggression.

I feel he is very uneasy over Formosa and while realizing general nature threat Communist action in SEA and even wider including his own country, yet an idealistic streak pervades his thinking when urgent immediate problems arise. He takes considerable pride in his own recommendations to Nehru on 26 June which he feels contributed greatly to GOI action in SC. But I believe that we must face up to probability that GOI will not support us in matters concerning Formosa.

Radhakrishnan is currently informed on Pannikar's reporting from Peking which is discounted somewhat by my colleague here. Still he feels there is serious risk Chinese will go all out against Formosa and is persuaded Soviets must honor assurances to Mao of military support.

KIRK

791.00/7–1350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 13, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received July 13—12:39 p. m.]

79. 1. I have read with deep interest Deptel 52, July 12, 5 p. m.,[1] and my present impression is that Indian diplomacy at this juncture is somewhat confused and is working at cross purposes. It would appear to me that (*a*) Nehru is carrying on secret correspondence with Radhakrishnan unknown to Bajpai or (*b*) Radhakrishnan either personally or under influence Kapur is engaging in venture on his own without keeping his government fully informed of his activities.

2. I am confident that when Bajpai talked to me on July 11, he did not know that Indian Ambassador at Moscow was making proposal of character contained in latter's letter of July 9 to Ambassador Kirk. It will be recalled that Bajpai gave me to understand on July 11 that British Ambassador at Moscow had received impression that agreement along lines suggested in that letter might not be disagreeable to Russia but that he, Bajpai, thought it would be unwise to attempt to

[1] Not printed; it transmitted the texts of telegrams 83 and 84, July 10, from Moscow, received in the Department on July 9, at 9:37 p. m. and 11:20 p. m., pp. 340 and 342.

achieve such agreement. I am quite sure that Bajpai, in spite of his statements that our conversations are on personal basis, outlines them to Nehru. It would be rather surprising that person with Nehru's experience should permit Bajpai to adopt one attitude in talking with me while authorizing his Ambassador at Moscow to follow another line in discussions with Soviet Government and with our Ambassador at Moscow.

3. I have for time being lost contact with office UK High Commissioner. I understood from Bajpai that Roberts, acting UK High Commissioner discussed with him on July 10 recent conversation between UK Ambassador at Moscow and Gromyko. I have not pressed Roberts re this conversation since I have had feeling that he might be under instructions not to divulge character his latest instructions from London to other than GOI and I have not wished to embarrass him. It seems to me that British and Indian diplomacy is becoming entangled and that resulting confusion cannot be too unpleasant to the Russians.

Department pass London, Moscow. Repeated info London 3, Moscow 3.

HENDERSON

330/7–1350

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1950.

Subject: Personal Message from Prime Minister Nehru of India

At a meeting arranged at her request this afternoon,[1] the Indian Ambassador, Madame Pandit, handed me the attached note [2] including the text of a message to you from the Prime Minister of India [3] appealing to you to exert your authority and influence for the maintenance of peace and the preservation of the solidarity of the United Nations by localizing the present Korean conflict and facilitating its early peaceful settlement:

"By breaking present deadlock in Security Council so that representatives of People's Government of China can take seat in Council, the U.S.S.R. can return to it, and, whether within or through informal contacts outside Council, U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and China, with

[1] In a separate memorandum of conversation, not printed, on his talk with Madame Pandit, Mr. McGhee related that Madame Pandit told him she had received the message from Prime Minister Nehru after having arranged for her appointment with Mr. McGhee (795.00/7–1350).

[2] Not printed.

[3] The substance of Mr. Nehru's message is given in this memorandum; the full text is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 31, 1950, p. 170.

help and cooperation of other peace-loving nations, can find basis for terminating conflict and for permanent solution of Korean problem."

FE, UNA and NEA will cooperate in the preparation of a suggested reply to Prime Minister Nehru but I thought you might wish to see the message immediately.[4]

[4] A manuscript note in the source text read: "Sec[retary] saw".

795.00/7–1350

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1950.

Subject: CBS Broadcast on Korea.

During the CBS "World News Round-Up" at 8 o'clock this morning, the CBS correspondent in New York told of a statement by President Rhee to the effect that the action of the North Korean forces had obliterated the 38th parallel and that no peace and order could be maintained in Korea as long as the division at the 38th parallel remained. The broadcaster then went on to say that an American Army spokesman (it was not clear whether in Tokyo or Korea) had publicly stated that American troops were only in the fighting to drive the North Koreans back to the 38th parallel and would stop there and use force if necessary to prevent South Korean troops from advancing beyond the 38th parallel.

I think both of the above statements should never have been made. President Rhee's statement is understandable and it would be difficult to persuade him not to make such statements, but perhaps Ambassador Muccio could caution him about premature statements of final aims. I most strongly recommend that representations be made to the Department of Defense at once with a view to having prompt orders sent to Tokyo to the effect that commanders in the field and Army spokesmen should make no statements about what the policy of the United States Government will be in the future. If I were a South Korean soldier and had heard of the announcement by the American Army spokesman I would be strongly tempted to lay down my arms and go back to the farm. It is realized that there are many complicated problems connected with whether we do or do not proceed beyond the 38th parallel, but any statement by us at this time that we will not do so is, I believe, folly.[1]

[1] A copy of this memorandum was sent to Mr. Dulles, who, in a separate memorandum of July 13, expressed to Mr. Rusk his agreement with Mr. Allison's observation that no present commitments should be made with regard to the 38th parallel (795.00/7–1350).

795.00/7–1350

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1950.

Subject: Secretary's Message to Bevin

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador;
Secretary of State Acheson;
and Mr. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary.

Sir Oliver stated that Mr. Bevin had received my message through Lew Douglas [1] and was appreciative of the full and frank exposition of our views. He said they will study the message and will reply later. In connection with this Sir Oliver stated that apparently Mr. Bevin had been disturbed about the phrase "serious consequences" which Ambassador Douglas had used in the supplementary presentation of my message.[2] I assured Sir Oliver that what we intended to convey was that we regarded most seriously the possibilities of our policies drifting apart, and that there was no other meaning intended. Sir Oliver said he was sure of this, but that he wanted to reassure Mr. Bevin who was apparently disturbed.

Sir Oliver handed me a copy of the message from Sir David Kelly to Mr. Bevin reporting on his conversation of July 11 with Mr. Gromyko (copy attached).[3]

DEAN ACHESON

[1] See telegram 132, July 10, 5 p. m., to London, p. 347.
[2] See telegram 133, July 10, 5 p. m., to London, p. 351.
[3] Not printed; for a summary of the contents, see telegram 99, from Moscow, received at 2:26 p. m. on July 11, p. 360, and also British Cmd. 8078, p. 28.

795B.5/7–1350

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1950.

Subject: Korean Blockade

Participants: Mr. Ford, British Embassy [1]
Mr. Johnson, Department of State, NA.

Yesterday I called Mr. Graves of the British Embassy and told him that I would like to discuss with him, or anyone else in the Embassy that he might designate in the absence of Mr. Fossett who is in New York, the subject of the Korean blockade. He stated that he would have Mr. Ford see me. This morning Mr. Ford called and said that in

[1] Joseph F. Ford, First Secretary, British Embassy.

the meanwhile they had received a communication from the Foreign Office, and arranged to see me at 11 : 30.

Mr. Ford handed me the attached memorandum.[2] After a hurried reading, I informed him, that without presuming to speak on all of the technical legal aspects, it appeared that the general approach of the Foreign Office was very closely allied to ours and that I could see no points of major disagreement in the first two pages. With regard to page 3 which contains the suggestion that General MacArthur, in his new capacity, formally should declare the existence of a blockade, I informed Mr. Ford that we, ourselves, had given careful consideration to this idea but had rejected it as we felt that there was ample justification under the Security Council Resolutions of June 25 and 27 for the President's declaration. Therefore, we did not feel it necessary to take any additional action which might even imply that there was not a sound legal basis for the President's declaration.

I then informed Mr. Ford of our plan to include in our first report to the Security Council, under paragraph 6 of the Security Council Resolution of July 7, our action to prevent aid being given to the North Korean authorities including the prevention of ingress to and egress from Korean ports.[3] I said that we hoped that like-minded members of the United Nations would take any necessary action themselves to prevent their nationals or ships giving aid to the North Koreans. In reply to his query, I informed Mr. Ford that the United States had already taken administrative action to prevent any shipments from the United States to North Korea. Mr. Ford stated that while as a practical matter it was his understanding that no British shipments were being made to North Korea it would probably require legislative action to actually embargo such shipments.

I then informed Mr. Ford, in absolute confidence, of the limits of patrol of the Korean coast and the instructions to the patrolling vessels with regard to Soviet vessels. I stated that in the view of the limited patrol of the coast, it was our view that the only possible legal question that could arise with regard to the blockade would be its effectiveness, and that, at the worst, we could possibly lose a lawsuit. In the meanwhile supplies were being kept from North Korea.

In reply to Mr. Ford's query concerning the possible establishment of prize courts in Japan, I said that we have not gone into this subject but preliminarily it would appear highly doubtful whether this could be done, and it was my understanding that it would be necessary for any prizes captured by American vessels to be brought into the juris-

[2] Not printed.

[3] The text of the first report from General MacArthur was released and read on July 25, at the 477th Security Council meeting; see U.N. document S/PV.477.

diction of a Federal District Court for adjudication. Mr. Ford said that it was his tentative understanding that under British law prize courts were a matter for the Admiralty and that he thought there was a possibility that prizes could be adjudicated without necessity of their being brought within British territorial jurisdiction.

I told Mr. Ford that I would refer the memorandum from the Foreign Office to the Legal Section of the Department and would inform him as soon as possible of their comments. Mr. Ford stated that he would immediately refer our views on the blockade to the Foreign Office and inform us as soon as a reply has been received. I assured Mr. Ford of our desire to confer freely with them on these questions as they arose and to keep them informed of our views.[4]

[4] For the text of the reply by the Department of State on August 2 to the British note of July 13, see p. 516.

611.90/7–1350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, July 13, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received July 13—4:36 p. m.]

78. 1. I am grateful to Department for its thoughtfulness in making available to me information contained in top secret telegrams NR 40 of July 10. These telegrams [1] represent, in my opinion, one of greatest and most inspiring documents which I have seen during my years of service.

2. In view of faltering way in which GOI is following up its decision to support basic SC resolutions on Korea, of tendency of Nehru and his foreign advisers to seek for means of liquidating the struggle which has opened in Korea through mediation even though such mediation might involve appeasement, and of confused state of mind of formulators of GOI policies, I believe it would be helpful for President or Secretary of State to send personal message to Nehru, setting forth in considerable detail our policies and explaining reasons for them and for actions taken in pursuance of them. I would hope that in tone and content this message would resemble document under reference wording and stress would, of course however, be altered in places in order to make stronger appeal to Nehru. Such message could be drafted in Department and submitted to us for comment and suggested deletions or additions before presentation to President or Sec-

[1] A note in the source text indicated that the plural "telegrams" was in the wording of this message as received, although only telegram 40 is specifically referred to; the language of the remainder of this message appears to indicate that only telegram 40 is under reference. Telegram 40 to New Delhi, July 10, repeated the text of telegram 132 to London, July 10, 5 p. m., p. 347.

retary in final form, or if preferred by Department, could be prepared here in draft form and sent to Washington for completion.

3. Such message in our opinion should set forth in considerable detail our attitude here Formosa and also Indochina and reason therefor. We believe preferable message should not request Prime Minister's support or approval. It should merely aim to clarify your policy, set forth reasons for our actions, and contain our views re present international situation.

4. Message this kind might disturb Nehru because he would learn from it that some of his ideas about mediation are not likely bear fruit. On other hand, it seems to us that he is entitled to learn from highest quarter more about our position and what our intentions are than he apparently knows at present. Message if sent should, of course, be top secret since leak could be disastrous. To attain maximum effect it should be as soon as possible, since Prime Minister is constantly meeting in Congress Party and elsewhere critics of his line of action and he should not have any misconceptions during his various conferences as to where we stand.

Department pass London and Moscow, repeated information London 2, Moscow 2.

HENDERSON

330/7–1450 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 14, 1950—8 a. m.

UN SC July 7 Res recommends that all UN Members providing mil forces and other assistance ROK pursuant SC Res June 25 and 27 "make such forces and other assistance available to unified command under US".[2]

Dept desires clarify for urinfo and benefit Govt to which accredited procedure which it envisages re channeling and publicizing specific offers of assistance. Such procedure must necessarily be flexible in order balance consideration operational mil security against importance maximizing UN role through publicity, Lake Success datelines, etc. Actual decision as to extent specific offers are publicized will, of course, rest with contributing country.

[1] This message was sent for action to 46 embassies and 4 legations and was sent for information to the missions in Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Cairo, Moscow, and Warsaw.

[2] On July 14, the U.N. Secretary-General despatched communications to the 52 member governments which had supported either the Security Council resolution of June 25 or that of June 27, urging that they consider the possibility of providing assistance, particularly ground combat forces, for the U.N. effort in Korea (see U.N. document S/1619).

In general Dept's thinking is that in order to maximize UN effort nations making offers shld do so through UNSYG. Dept believes that nation contributing wld naturally want to give the maximum publicity to secure appropriate credit. However, in case of nations making offers of mil forces or strategic material it wld be undesirable for obvious mil security reasons to disclose the precise nature or details of such offers through UNSYG. In these cases Dept feels that contributing country shld communicate offer in general, nonspecific terms to UNSYG (for transmittal through USUN to USG) and in doing so indicate that details will be worked out directly with unified command. Details of such offers in terms numbers, types, characteristics, etc. wld thus be revealed only by direct communication to US and mil security thereby protected.

With respect to assistance such as food stuffs, medicine, etc. such offers in first instance and unless otherwise directed shld be made to SYG for transmittal to unified command and have full publicity.

Unified Command (USG) wld consider offers and inform countries of decision through UNSYG. US in addition wld discuss directly with offering Govts arrangements necessary.

You shld use best judgment with full regard to any special local conditions in determining whether to communicate this thinking to Govt to which accredited or whether utilize in these terms *mutatis mutandis* if approached for advice.

ACHESON

795.00/7–1450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, July 14, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received July 14—9 : 31 a. m.]

124. After allowing time for Indian Ambassador to advise British Ambassador (as Radhakrishnan said he would do in item (*c*) opening paragraph mytel 111, July 13 to Department, repeated New Delhi as 10) of his own approaches to me on ways of solving Korean question and my unreceptive reaction to this plan, I saw Kelly 6 p. m. yesterday and in course of talk asked if he had seen Radhakrishnan recently. Not since Saturday (8 July) said Kelly but I had a note from him last night (12th), in which Radhakrishnan deplored unhappy situation in Korea, no appeasement possible but could not something be done to restore authority UNSC, such as Chinese Communist representation and return USSR to meeting; and ending with expressions sorrow over bloodshed and hope something could be arranged. Kelly says he wrote in reply that in general he shared sentiments of concern

over situation and bloodshed but of course HMG was in close touch with Indian High Commissioner in London as well as through British High Commissioner in New Delhi, with GOI. (Kelly did not show me notes nor had he made any report this exchange).

I then summarized my two talks: That of 7 July (Embtel 76, July 8)[1] which Kelly said Radhakrishnan had mentioned on 8 July visit to British Embassy; and that of 12 July (Embtel 111). British Ambassador was surprised at Indian Ambassador's lack of frankness with him but said in view Radhakrishnan's assurances to me (as per (*a*) in mytel 111 that suggestion was abandoned), it was perhaps just as well Radhakrishnan had sent his note since personal visit just then might have made difficult avoid reference to recent talks British Ambassador with Gromyko.

I left the matter there with understanding that fuller briefing for background could be given Kelly whenever desirable. We did agree Radhakrishnan was vague and starry-eyed, rather professorial in manner, and gave impression of not always paying close attention to what was being told him. However both Kelly and I are of opinion Radhakrishnan inclines to exaggerate his powers although to Nehru he may have private pipeline.

Indian Embassy press release (Embtel 123, July 14[2]) is hard to reconcile with statements made to me on Wednesday[3] at 5 p. m. except on assumption Radhakrishnan received further instructions.

Department pass London, Delhi; repeated info London 46, Delhi 13.

KIRK

[1] Not printed; it dealt mainly with Indian concern over the reaction of the People's Republic of China to the recent U.S. course of action respecting Formosa (794A.00/7–850).

[2] Not printed; it transmitted the press release dealing with the Indian Ambassador's visit to Mr. Gromyko at 4 p. m. on July 13, to deliver an urgent personal message from Prime Minister Nehru for Generalissimo Stalin (601.9161/7–1450). The message was similar to that sent to Mr. Acheson (see the memorandum by Mr. McGhee, July 13, p. 372.

[3] July 12; see telegram 111, from Moscow, July 13, p. 370.

601.9161/7–1450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, July 14, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received July 14—12 : 17 p. m.]

125. On July 13 about hour before he and Ambassador Radhakrishnan called on Gromyko to deliver message from Nehru to Stalin (Embtel 123, July 14)[1] Kapur paid hurried visit this Embassy. He said that his Ambassador had asked him see Barbour and Thurston

[1] See footnote 2 to telegram 124 from Moscow, *supra*.

with the thought they would pass on to me the following resume of Radhakrishnan's views FE crisis:

"1. It is our anxiety to make UN effective organ. US is deeply interested in it. So should vote for admission of China.
2. Russia's boycott of UN organizations is wrong but that not justification for our non-recognition of China.
3. President Truman's instructions to Chiang Kai-shek to leave Chinese mainland alone is an implicit recognition of sovereignty of People's China in the Chinese continent.
4. A great nation like America can afford to be generous. Magnanimity may pay and China with whom America's relations have been fairly long and friendly may be moved to behave reasonably.
5. It will not be regarded as an act of appeasement for the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to 38th parallel would be required.
6. UN mediation may take all steps necessary for giving protection to South Korea until final settlement.
7. Soothing declaration by US on Formosa would be helpful."

Kapur performed his errand in *pro forma* manner clearly indicating that he was doing so to please his Ambassador and that he had no hope that presentation these Indian arguments would make any difference in US attitude. He did not reveal that approach to Soviets was imminent nor has he since been in touch with Embassy.

Department pass Delhi, London; repeated info New Delhi 14, London 47.

KIRK

795.00/7–1450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

LONDON, July 14, 1950—noon.
[Received July 14—12:56 p. m.]

291. Eyes only for the Secretary from Douglas. For the purpose of following up my meeting with Bevin July 11 and of having a survey of the international situation in general and the position in Far East in particular, I arranged a lunch with Younger, Strang, Dening and Holmes. The following major lines of thought clearly emerged.

(1) Bevin was very much surprised at the vigor of your response to his message and was hurt if not offended by the seriousness with which you view the implications of his message and their possible effect on the future relationship between the two countries. Strang inquired when your message had been written, whether before or after the amplifications of the instructions to Kelly had been received by you. I told him that I could not say when your message had been written but that I suspected that you were directing your message at

Mr. Bevin's request for a candid exchange of views in regard to the situation in the Orient and especially the question which Mr. Bevin had put in regard to what would be the attitude of the US should the Russians agree to help in restoring the *status quo* in Korea in return for US readiness to be considered [*reconsider?*] their present declared attitude in regard to Formosa.

Strang then asked whether we had thought that Bevin's inquiry implied a disposition on the part of Bevin and His Majesty's Government to accept such a trade. I told him that I could not say what the view in Washington had been but that when I read it, quite candidly, I thought the whole tenor of the note and the precise language justified the inference that His Majesty's Government was at least flirting with the idea of an agreement of that sort.

I said that it was because we interpreted the message to carry such an implication that I suspected you had replied so vigorously and so clearly and that personally it seemed to me that only good could come out of a very frank and candid expression of views which Mr. Bevin himself had specifically and we were assured quite sincerely, invited.

Strang gave me to understand that Mr. Bevin had no disposition to advocate an agreement along the lines implied in his message or to view such an agreement as something which was good. Mr. Bevin, Strang said (both Younger and Dening echoed this view) put forward his question based on a hypothetical state of affairs purely for the purpose of exploring with us in advance the situation as it might in the future develop.

(2) Notwithstanding the disavowals of any predilections or intentions in regard to a settlement of the Korean affair, the subsequent conversation made it very clear that all British present were extremely worried and anxious, if in fact they did not lean strongly toward an arrangement, if not identical with, at least similar to, the possible settlement which Bevin referred to in his message.

The unified world opinion and particularly the unity of thought and support among the free Asiatic nations of which the significant leader is India which we now enjoy because of our prompt action in Korea and determination to resist aggression, is essential to the Western world. While Korea was the binding and cementing influence, the action in regard to Formosa was disturbing and was viewed with grave alarm by the entire Oriental free world.

Viewed through Asiatic eyes, Formosa belongs to China, quite irrespective of what sort of government China may or may not have. Under the pronouncement of Cairo, confirmed by the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, Formosa is legitimately part of the area over which the Chinese Government, howsoever composed and of what-

soever political complexion should lawfully exercise jurisdiction. Asiatic powers had recognized the Chinese People's Democratic Republic. This was in their view the established and lawful Government of China. Any efforts undertaken by this lawful government to exercise its sovereignty over an area, in this case Formosa to which it was legitimately entitled, would not be an act of aggression but merely a normal, natural and legal measure. They could not therefore understand why the US should intervene by stationing its fleet in a certain position to prevent a lawfully established and recognized government from performing its normal functions over the Island of Formosa and its inhabitants.

Nor do they recognize that a settlement which contemplated withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel (the *status quo* thereby being restored) in return for the seating of the Chinese Commies in the Security Council and in the UN generally, the recognition of the Chinese regime and the inclusion of the island of Formosa within the territory of the People's Republic to be an extorted blackmail price. The free Asiatic nations, of which India is the principal spokesman, believe these three steps should have been taken long ago. Were they to be taken now at the same time the Korean affairs were resolved, it would be purely a matter of accident and coincidence and not extortion.

Moreover, the position of the US Government as expressed in the President's statement of June 27 constitutes a great change from the statement of January 5.[1] The free Asiatic peoples and those who constitute their governments believe this change to have been induced by purely strategic considerations on the part of the US and by the dislike which the US has for the Chinese People's Republic combined with the desire to maintain another outpost of the Western world from which the Orient could be dominated by the West.

(4) His Majesty's Government is strongly of the view that the Soviet would like nothing better than to have China and the US become entangled in armed conflict. This would punctuate and reinforce the Soviets blaring propaganda that the US and the Western world were anti-Asiastic and opposed to the yellow man and his independence and is intent upon a design of distant if not close imperialistic control. An armed conflict between China and the US, His Majesty's Government felt, would promptly and for an interminable period throw the whole of Asia into the USSR camp.

[1] Reference is to the statement issued by President Truman on that date wherein he announced that the United States would not provide military aid or advice to the Chinese forces on Formosa and would not pursue a course which would lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. For the text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 16, 1950, p. 79; for related documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.

(5) I replied that these views which had been tentatively and personally advanced tended to confirm the urgency of the US and UK finding some common platform in regard to Formosa and China from which we could attempt to persuade the Asiatic peoples and especially India of the rectitude of our position and to dissuade them from some of their deep-seated misunderstandings.

Merely because the British had recognized the People's Chinese Republic and the US had not was no reason, it seemed to me, for us necessarily to diverge in regard to Formosa. The international situation which we had forecast at Cairo and Potsdam and the cooperation of the Soviet in establishing peace which we had then expected and on which we rested so many of the arrangements including the statement about Formosa had not materialized. Quite a contrary international climate existed produced by a whole series of violations or commitments by the USSR in the Far East and elsewhere. Moreover, it was clear that the Soviets were using Communism as an instrument of expansion and of imperialism of the most violent and ruthless sort. May [*They?*] want confusion and disorder not peace.

Even though declarations in regard to the intention of the US and UK toward the return of Formosa to China had been made at Cairo and even though these declarations of intentions had been confirmed by the Potsdam pronouncements with which the USSR was associated, the fact was that the title to Formosa had not passed to China. I myself seriously doubted the legal authority of two or three powers to convey title for Formosa to China and that actually China could not be vested with the title to Formosa except by the terms of an international agreement or peace settlement with Japan or alternatively in accordance with and pursuant to a lawfully made decision of the UN.

The US was not seeking any territorial position in the Orient. We had no ambition to establish a Western outpost from which the yellow man could be dominated. We were trying to preserve the present international status of Formosa in order that in a peaceful international environment unmenaced by wars or threats of wars, undisturbed by acts of coercion, uninfluenced by duress, the disposition of Formosa could be wisely and dispassionately determined by one of the only two methods that were lawful and valid.

An extension of the area of warfare we felt would seriously jeopardize the achievement of this objective and might precipitate us into a world war. With this purpose solely in mind, we had ordered the Seventh Fleet to take its position to prevent an act of aggression by the Chinese Commies against the Island of Formosa on which there was established from our point of view, the only Chinese Government we recognized. In addition we had used our good influences and per-

suasions so far successfully to terminate the Chinese Nationalist air attacks upon the mainland and other interferences with the mainland.

(6) The British replied that this statement of the case had never been made to them. They had looked favorably upon the President's statement of January 5. The statement of June 27 was quite a different one. It did not make any reference to the legal position of Formosa. It, so the British viewed the matter, placed our case squarely on the grounds of the strategic significance of the Island. This was the motive too that most of the Asiatic world, the British thought, believed was behind our action. The British did not know what sort of a reply would be made to your message. They were now considering the matter from all these various angles and from all points of vantage. It was possible, they thought, that we could arrive at a common platform from which we could attempt to persuade the Asiatic countries, particularly India, of the propriety and the correctness of our position. This, however, was a purely personal view expressed on their part. The legal case they thought a good one.

They wondered, however, if there was time to go through the arduous process of persuading the Asiatic countries, and again, especially India. They wondered whether this suggestion did not really beg the question. Reinterpretation of their information led them to suspect that the Chinese Communists were massing their forces, their air and amphibious equipment, their ground and armored troops for an attack upon Formosa. (This may reflect Indian influence.) They thought that the invasion might be launched at almost anytime. Should it occur we would find the world divided with practically all of the Asiatic countries siding with the Chinese Communists and indeed some of the Western European countries.

(7) I cannot say that my statement of the legal position in regard to Formosa was even approximately correct but it is true that it has not been put to the public nor indeed has it been put to either the British Government or any Asiatic government. If there is a reasonable colour of validity to my statement of the case might it be wise to consider, but not necessarily to take any action until after Bevin's note has been received, an amplification by the President of his statement of June 27, this amplification to include an explanation of the legal position in regard to Formosa and an elaboration of our reasons for taking the action which we took including emphasis on cessation Nationalist operations against mainland. He might even give a solemn undertaking that when peace is restored and the North Koreans withdraw to the 38th parallel, et cetera et cetera, we would not attempt to exert any undue influence in the negotiation of the final disposition of Formosa either under the terms of a peace settlement with Japan or by the UN. Any statement, however, it seems to me on the subject elaborating what was necessarily the short statement of June 27 should

make it clear that it implies no slackening of our efforts in Korea and no compromise of our fundamental reasons for taking the measures re Formosa.

DOUGLAS

795.00/7–1450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 14, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received July 14—1 : 25 p. m.]

86. 1. Bajpai, SYG MEA, showed me today copy of telegram July 12, to Mme. Pandit containing message from Nehru to Secretary State. He also showed me copy of telegram to Indian Ambassador Moscow containing appeal to Stalin and another telegram to Indian High Commissioner London asking him inform UK of these two messages. He said that Prime Minister had felt so strongly gravity international situation that he considered it his duty to do what he could to prevent further developments in direction world war. I deemed it inappropriate to make any comments other than express appreciation to Bajpai for letting me see messages.

2. Message to Stalin was as brief as that to Secretary State. As I recall it Nehru expressed hope that if Communist China should be admitted into UN organization Soviet Union would take attitude which would lead to quick solution Korean problem.

3. Bajpai told me that he was rather disturbed that despite his statements to me of July 11 and instructions contained in his telegram of same date to Indian Ambassador to China (copy of which he had given me) there still seemed to be impression in certain circles in Washington that GOI was suggesting some kind of bargain between US and Soviet Union under which Soviet Union would prevail upon North Korea to withdraw its troops from ROK and US would support admittance Communist China into UN Organizations. I assured him that I had not given my Government any such impression. He said that he had just received telegrams from Indian Ambassador to Moscow outlining conversation which latter had had with Ambassador Kirk and that it would appear from this telegram that Ambassador Kirk seemed to believe that GOI was advocating an agreement of this character.

4. During discussion which ensued I became fully convinced that GOI not only had not authorized its Ambassador to Moscow to make suggestions of kind contained Ambassador's recent letter to Ambassador Kirk but was still ignorant of fact that such suggestion had been made. I gained impression that Radhakrishnan had been authorized to send out certain feelers but that latter had gone much further than his government had expected him to go and had not reported in detail

his activities to New Delhi. Examination of Prime Minister's letter to Secretary State makes doubly clear that GOI has not been supporting a *quid pro quo* arrangement.

5. I was not aware of Nehru's message to Secretary State when I sent suggestions yesterday contained in Embtel 79 of July 13.[1] This message apparently calls for basic statements of our policies and time element will of course prevent its examination by this mission before dispatch.

HENDERSON

[1] Presumably the reference here should be to telegram 78, July 13, from New Delhi, received at 4 : 36 p. m. on July 13, p. 376.

795.00/7–1450

Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 14, 1950.

Since I understand thought is being given in the Policy Planning Staff to the desirability of a present public commitment on the part of the U.S. to permit the North Koreans anytime they wish to retreat in good order and re-form behind the 38th Parallel,[1] I give you briefly my views as follows:

1. The 38th Parallel was never intended to be, and never ought to be, a political line. The United Nations, has, from the beginning, insisted that equity and justice require a united Korea. The 38th Parallel, if perpetuated as a political line and as providing asylum to the aggressor, is bound to perpetuate friction and ever-present danger of new war. If we have the opportunity to obliterate the line as a political division, certainly we should do so in the interest of "peace and security in the area". (U.N. Resolution)

2. I would think that, from a national standpoint, it would be folly to allow the North Korean army to retire in good order with its armor and equipment and re-form behind the 38th Parallel from whence it could attack again the now ravaged and weakened Republic of Korea. To permit that would mean either the exposure of the Republic of Korea to greater peril than preceded the June 25th attack or the maintenance by the United States of a large military establishment to contain the North Korean Army at the 38th Parallel. The North Korean Army should be destroyed, if we have the power to destroy it, even if this requires pursuit beyond the 38th Parallel. That is the only way to remove the menace.

[1] See the memorandum by Mr. Allison to Mr. Rusk, July 15, p. 393.

3. Neither equity nor good sense dictates that an unprovoked act of aggression should occur without risk of loss to the aggressor. If there can be armed aggression under conditions such that failure involves no permanent loss, then that puts a premium on aggression. There must be a penalty to such wrong-doing unless we want to encourage its repetition.

4. I do not suggest that we should at this time make any public declaration of intention. Perhaps expediency would make it wise to stop at the 38th Parallel. But I believe strongly that we should not now tie our hands by a public statement precluding the possibility of our forces, if victorious, being used to forge a new Korea which would include at least most of the area north of the 38th Parallel.

We should preserve our freedom to act in the way that seems best at the time when a decision is practically needed. That may be months hence and no one can now know the then surrounding circumstances.

5. I would not suppose that a united Korea would necessarily include the North Kankyo [*North Hamgyong*] Province, which runs up to the neighborhood of Vladivostok or the North Heian [*North Pyangan*] Province, which borders on the Yalu River. But most of Korea could be, and should be, united without this involving any territorial threat to the Soviet Union. Also, any reuniting should involve U.N. auspicies, not merely U.S. unilateral action.

795.00/7–1450 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 14, 1950—5 p. m.

16. Press report June [*July*] 13 quotes Pres Rhee as voicing determination ROK not to stop at 38th parallel in repelling invaders. Same report quotes US Army spokesman, presumably in Korea, as stating US forces will not only stop 38th parallel but will use force if necessary to prevent ROK troops from advancing beyond that line.

In order not prejudice US position this important and explosive question, Dept feels every effort shld be made to avoid official statements or other public discussion of course of action to be taken at such time as northern forces expelled from South Korea. This particularly true of any statements, such as that cited above, which cld be taken by Koreans as prejudging US attitude toward 38th parallel.

Foregoing views being conveyed also to Defense.[1]

ACHESON

[1] At his news conference on July 13, in answer to a question on whether the "police action" in Korea would be carried north of the 38th parallel, President Truman replied: "I will make that decision when it becomes necessary to do it." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, p. 523)

795.00/7–1450 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TAEJON, July 14, 1950—noon.
[Received July 15—8 : 02 a. m.]

6. All ROK Cabinet officers except acting Prime Minister and Foreign Minister left Taejon yesterday for Taegu where seat government being established. Both remaining here temporarily. On advice provincial governor civilians evacuating Taejon and most shops closing. With 8th Army headquarters established Taegu, administration here dissolved and KMAG moving headquarters to Taegu. Headquarters General Dean remain Taejon. At suggestion General Walker [1] Korean Army headquarters moving Taegu tonight or tomorrow.[2]

There was little appreciable change in military picture past 24 hours. US forces consolidated along south bank Kum River. Korean forces effected slight withdrawals in Chongju and Chungju areas. Main enemy forces and threat remain in area north of Taejon with possibility enemy may concentrate numerically superior ground forces for attempted drive on the Taejon somewhere between Chochiwon and Chongju. Morale and spirit ROK forces and populace remains good despite hardships and continued withdrawals. Loss of Taejon would be serious psychological blow, however. From military viewpoint loss Taejon would be even more serious since it links north-south railway network and since it would endanger Cholla provinces which rich in food resources and manpower.

DRUMRIGHT

[1] Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, Commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, had assumed command of all U.S. Army forces in Korea on July 13.

[2] On July 15, President Rhee assigned to General MacArthur command of the Republic of Korea's armed forces (see U.N. doc. S/1627).

795.00/7–1550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, July 15, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received July 15—8 : 57 a.m.]

138. British Ambassador informs me that Indian Ambassador stated last night at French national reception that communication he delivered to Gromyko for Stalin (Embtel 123, July 14)[1] was a sealed message from Nehru but that he knew its contents and it contained no specific proposals. He added that Gromyko remarked that the first requisite to a solution of the Korean situation is the

[1] See footnote 2 to telegram 124, July 14, from Moscow, p. 379.

withdrawal of American troops and that he had replied to Gromyko that such action is obviously impossible. He further stated that North Korean forces are making a desert of Korea to which Gromyko made no response. It appears, judging by timing of pouch arrivals, et cetera that Indian Ambassador in all probability received his instructions and message from Nehru Thursday July 13, i.e. after his talk with me on 12th (Embtel 124, July 14).

Department pass London, New Dehli, repeated information London 49, New Dehli 15.

KIRK

795.00/7–1050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

TAEGU, July 14, 1950—10 a. m.
[Received July 15—9 : 29 a. m.]

39. ReEmbtel 34, July 10. Immediately after arrival Taegu yesterday called on President, urged immediate appointment strong, vigorous, courageous Home Minister capable cooperation military authorities, inspire police confidence. Rhee said would dismiss Home Minister Paek but first must talk with him; has since received Paek's resignation but continuing him in office till successor appointed. Has summoned Chough Byung Ok and Kim Tae Sun as possible successors; would probably appoint Chough but must discuss with him before appointment in order secure certain guarantees re his conduct. Previously President had told Noble preferred appointment Kim Tae Sun since latter possessed current knowledge police situation; considered Chough involved police manipulations opposition DNP. Following my instructions Noble urged [neither?] although Kim was much lesser stature than Chough; President indicated willingness appoint Chough.[1]

About 50,000 police now South Korea, well organized and led; can be used both assist our troops combat areas, spot infiltrees and fight as small combat units against guerrillas relieving both US Army and Korean army this responsibility. Former activity being performed now behind our lines. Have discussed with General Dean and deputy chief staff 8th Army importance this function, necessity arming each police unit with some grenades and machine guns enable offset guerrilla superiority weapons, inspire police self-confidence. Both agree but emphasize necessity in shipment such weapons earmarked for police.

Pass CINCFE.

MUCCIO

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[1] See telegram 43 from Taegu, received at 4 : 17 a. m. on July 16, p. 399.

795.00/7–1550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

LONDON, July 15, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received July 15—1 : 35 p. m.]

330. Eyes only for the Secretary. In order to keep in close touch with working level Foreign Office, I arranged another luncheon today with Younger, Strang, Dening and Holmes.

Strang delivered me copy of Bevin's reply to your most recent message setting forth British position in general.[1] He also gave me another document which will be subject my immediately following telegram.

The conversation was frank and personal and there follows a summary of the principal points developed. There are three basic questions affecting US and UK positions and the present situation in the FE. They are (1) the seating of the Chinese Communists in the SC (2) recognition by the US of the Chinese Communists regime, and (3) the problem of Formosa.

As to (1) there appears to be no likelihood that in present circumstances a majority could be produced in the SC in favor of seating the Chinese Communists and therefore this question is not one of immediate concern and we are both agreed that it must not be related to the specific problem of Korea.

As to (2) there is no chance whatever that the US will recognize Peiping regime, British are fully aware of this and problem does not immediately trouble us. The question to be resolved is the one of Formosa and our respective positions with regard thereto. The British officials agreed that in spite of our divergence of views with respect to Chinese Communists, it ought to be possible for us to reconcile our positions with respect to Formosa and establish a common platform which would permit us to act in closer association. They agreed that a statement by the US along the lines recommended in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of Embtel 291, July 14 would constitute a substantial contribution to a common position.

It is my opinion that should we make such a statement the British will be prepared to argue our case and indeed they assure us they have been doing so in response to numerous inquiries. They consider to be of extreme importance assurances by us that once an atmosphere of peace and calm is reestablished in the FE, we will not use undue influence in determining the ultimate disposition of Formosa.

[1] See the annex to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Perkins, July 15, p. 396.

The British expressed the hope in which I concur, that we shall be able to see to it that there is on contribution of Armed Forces by Nationalist China to Lie's recent appeal.

DOUGLAS

795.00/7–1550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

LONDON, July 15, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received July 15—1:39 p. m.]

331. Eyes only for the Secretary. After luncheon meeting today (see mytel 330)[1] Strang handed me text of Nehru's message to Stalin transmitted in my immediately following telegram.[2] It was pointed out to Strang that text did not include details of India's proposal and he was asked whether British had substance of discussions between Indian Ambassador Moscow and Soviet Foreign Office. Reply was in negative. This answer leads us to believe that Indians have not wholly confided in UK. Strang made great point that it was highly exceptional for UK to give us text of communication between Prime Ministers within Commonwealth and also that our possession this text should not be disclosed to anyone.

Department pass Moscow; repeated info Moscow 27.

DOUGLAS

[1] *Supra.*

[2] Telegram 332 not printed; Prime Minister Nehru's message to Generalissimo Stalin was virtually identical with his message to Mr. Acheson; see the memorandum by Mr. McGhee to Mr. Acheson, July 13, p. 372.

795.00/7–1550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 15, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received July 15—2:41 p. m.]

95. 1. At request of Bajpai, Secretary General MEA, I called upon him at noon today. He told me Nehru had yesterday received through acting UK HICOM reply to Nehru's message to UK Government of July 12.[1] Reply was to effect that UK Government could not support seating Communist China in UN organization until Communist China had agreed it would not move against Formosa; until North Koreans

[1] See telegram 86, from New Delhi, received at 1:25 p. m. on July 14, p. 385.

had withdrawn from ROK; and until Russians had resumed their seat in SC.

2. Bajpai said GOI deeply disappointed at negative character UK reply and Nehru had immediately sent another appeal to UK Government. Bajpai outlined general character of this new appeal. According my recollection it was to effect that:

(*a*) There is threat of world war unless present deadlock in SC can be broken and way opened for solution of problems of Korea and Formosa.

(*b*) If one party attempts lay down conditions for seating of Communist China and for opening conversations for solving Korean and Formosa questions, other party may be prompted to do likewise. For instance, Russia may well insist that resolutions of SC re Korea be cancelled before it will re-enter SC or participate in activities SC.

(*c*) Assuming one party takes position that "face" is involved, other party may also ascribe more importance to "face" and no progress can be made.

(*d*) What is needed is a dispassionate and independent settlement of problem of Chinese representation in SC.

(*e*) UK and US would be serving cause of peace and of survival of mankind if, without any surrender of vital interests of prestige, they would agree to seating Communist China.

(*f*) If Russia and Communist China after admission would use veto to block efforts SC to solve problems before it, world would hold these two powers guilty of endangering world peace.

(*g*) Communist China certainly, and Russia probably, are anxious to avoid world war and admission Communist China at this time may help avoid such a war.

3. I assume UK has furnished Department with copy GOI's new appeal and can check from it accuracy my memory as to its contents.

4. Bajpai again expressed disappointment at UK attitude. He said UK apparently has gone backward rather than forward. Only recently it was prepared to vote to admittance Communist China. It seemed now, however, to be laying down conditions, some of which were not pertinent to merits of case.

5. I made no comments other than to thank Bajpai for giving me this information and promised to convey it at once to Washington.

Department pass London; repeated information London 7.

HENDERSON

795.00/7–1550

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1950.

Subject: United States Objectives in Korea with Particular Reference to Problem of 38th Parallel

Considerable thought is being given in the Policy Planning Staff and probably elsewhere in the Department to the desirability of issuing a public statement on our objectives in Korea which would make clear that we do not intend to allow our own troops or Republic of Korea troops to proceed beyond the 38th parallel. I have noted Mr. Feis's memorandum of July 14[1] urging that this government "positively and publicly disassociate itself" from President Rhee's statement that action of the North Koreans had obliterated the 38th parallel. I have also been asked to comment upon S/P document dated July 5,[2] recommending that General MacArthur announce that he will order forces under his command not to conduct "close pursuit" should North Korean forces offer to withdraw and that he should further undertake to prevent his troops and those of the Republic of Korea "crossing into North Korean territory in force". The reason given for these suggestions is, in the case of Mr. Feis, that the attitude of our Allies will be adversely affected and Chinese Communist and Russian governments will be encouraged to put their own troops into the fight in Korea if we don't disavow President Rhee,[3] while in the latter case it is stated such action will "aid in blocking Soviet charges of United States aggression in Korea . . .".

I wish to express my most emphatic disagreement not only with the above suggestions themselves but with the reasoning back of them. In my opinion any such action as that recommended by Mr. Feis or in the S/P document in question will go far toward making impossible a successful carrying out of the terms of the June 27 Resolution of the Security Council which stated in conclusion:

"RECOMMENDS that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." (Underlining added)

[1] Not printed. Herbert Feis was a member of the Policy Planning Staff.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Mr. Feis' memorandum concluded by saying that he did not believe that the Russian Government would possibly allow substantial American armed units to reach the Soviet frontier (795.00/10–550).

Obviously in determining what our course in Korea should be we must take into consideration the effect of our action both among the members of the United Nations now associated with us and also among the Korean people themselves. Any action taken in Korea with a view to keeping our UN Allies on our side will be of no avail unless it also keeps the Korean people on our side.

If any one thing seems certain as a result of our experience in Korea over the past five years it is that a perpetuation of the division of that country at the 38th parallel will make it impossible "to restore international peace and security in the area."

From the beginning the 38th parallel was meant to be a temporary line delineating areas in which to take the surrender of the Japanese. That it has become a permanent division of the country into two states has not been the fault of either the people of South Korea or of the United States. It is solely due to the intransigent attitude of the USSR and its lackeys in North Korea. This has been recognized by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations. It is North Korea and the Soviet Union that have restricted the movements of the UN Commission in Korea—not the South Koreans or the United States. Any solution of the problem which ignores the past and in effect says "If you stop fighting and withdraw to your original positions all will be forgiven and we will start over again attempting to reach a solution" disregards realities and would be a compromise with justice which would, and in my opinion rightly, cause the people of South Korea, to lose all confidence and faith in the moral position of the United States.

Conversations among officers in NA and representatives of Embassies of our United Nations allies, has, in the majority of cases, indicated a definite agreement that it would be utterly unrealistic to expect to return to the *status quo ante bellum*. It is believed that a positive program of persuasion conducted through the diplomatic channel, Voice of America and USIS would obviate most of whatever opposition there may be to taking advantage of this opportunity to carry out the pledges of Cairo and bring about a truly independent, unified Korea.

A determination that the aggressors should not go unpunished and vigorous, courageous United States leadership to that end should have a salutary effect upon other areas of tension in the world. Notice would be served on the aggressor elsewhere, who is the same as the covert aggressor in Korea, that he cannot embark upon acts of aggression with the assurance that he takes only a limited risk—that of being driven back only to the line from which the attack commenced.

At the very least we should destroy the North Korean Army, through force if necessary, or by disarmament under UN auspices as

a result of an offer of peace. We should then insist upon the full implementation in North Korea of the procedures laid down by the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947 and December 12, 1948, including the holding of elections under the observation of the UN Commission on Korea. In view of our desire to bring about permanent peace and order in the area and a removal of psychological as well as geographic barriers between North and South Korea, it is believed it might be desirable to be generous in such matters as reparations, war crimes and related problems.

I do not advocate a public statement at this juncture of our intentions with regard to Korea but I most strongly urge that no statement be made which in any way commits this government not to proceed beyond the 38th parallel or implies that we will agree to any settlement which merely restores the *status quo ante bellum*.

I also strongly recommend that an early determination be made of just what our policy toward a Korea settlement should be, at least in broad outlines. One of the reasons for the difficulties we now face in Korea is that we failed to realize that political forces would be more compelling than military and hence did not insist upon our military establishment being prepared to implement the political decision we made when the test came. I hope we will realize that political necessity will compel us to act in such a way as to bring about a real restoration "of international peace and security" in Korea, and that we will be adequately prepared. The risks are admittedly great—the risks in accepting a partial solution or in compromise are, in my opinion, infinitely greater.

795.00/7–1550

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1950.

Subject: Communication from Mr. Bevin to the Secretary

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador
Mr. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary

Sir Oliver left the attached communication from Mr. Bevin to the Secretary. It is in answer to the Secretary's communication to Mr. Bevin delivered by Mr. Douglas on July 11.

He said he had been asked to point out that the other members of the Commonwealth, they believed, took much the same attitude as that indicated in this communication. However, they wanted to make it perfectly clear that they had not consulted the Commonwealth in connection with this communication and that this communication represented U.K. views.

GEORGE W. PERKINS

[Annex]

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State

I am very glad to have the detailed and frank exposition of the U.S. view on the Korean situation and the implications arising from it which were communicated to me in your Ambassador's letter of the 11th July. I have already sent you a message to this effect through Oliver Franks.

I should also like you to know that we fully realise here how onerous is the duty which the United States have so readily assumed in Korea. We are all indeed indebted to the U.S. for their prompt action in coming to the assistance of the Korean Republic and recognise how heavy an additional burden has been added to the world-wide responsibilities of the U.S. Government.

I should like first of all to remove any misapprehension about the purpose of the message which I sent to you on the 7th July through Oliver Franks, and to which Mr. Douglas conveyed your answer on the 11th July. It was never in my mind, when I asked what the U.S. view would be in the event of the Soviet Union asking a price in return for using their influence with the North Koreans, to suggest that a bargain was desirable. We are just as determined not to submit to Soviet blackmail as you are. I want to make it quite clear that we could not agree with you more wholeheartedly when you say that you have faced squarely a calculated act of aggression. We ourselves, and I think the whole right-thinking world, appreciate to the full the stand which the U.S. Government have taken in Korea on behalf of us all. I think it essential to remove any misunderstanding before we discuss, as I hope we can dispassionately, the two questions of Formosa and our attitude towards China where clearly there has been a difference in our thinking.

I know that I can explain without troubling our relationship exactly why we have been very seriously worried here about the implications of the President's declaration about Formosa. I am sorry that it was not possible for you, no doubt owing to the speed of events, to consult us in advance on a step which is of such close concern to us, particularly in view of the undertakings we exchanged when you and I met in Washington last September [1] and again in London in May to consult on matters affecting China. We are, as you know in a very vulnerable position in Hong Kong, and we have vast Chinese communities in Malaya where we have a long drawn campaign on our hands. You know our views on China and that our aim remains that

[1] For documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. IX, pp. 1 ff.

China should not go irrevocably into the Soviet camp and be lost permanently to the Western world. The President's declaration on Formosa evidently has an impact on all these situations, and it therefore cannot be said to affect the U.S. alone.

As I see it the possibilities of the Formosa situation are as follows. If the Central Peoples' Government take heed of the President's declaration and abandon any attempt to invade Formosa and thus avoid an armed clash with the United States Forces, no very serious consequences may ensue. But the Central Peoples' Government have addressed a communication to the Security Council stating their intention to "liberate" Formosa whatever the United States may do, and though this may only be bravado, it may be unwise to assume that no attempt to stage an invasion will be made. If an attempt is made we must, in view of the position taken by the President in his statement of the 27th June, expect hostilities between the Forces of the United States and those of the Central Peoples' Government. We consider that the consequences of such a clash would be very grave. They might lead to an extension of the conflict. Even if that does not happen it is not improbable that Russia would appeal to the Security Council and accuse the United States of aggression. While no doubt you have considered this, and would have a good case I am concerned lest the solidarity of the support you now have should not be maintained in these circumstances. The Russians will of course, be out to make mischief.

I recognize that you attach great strategic importance to Formosa. What I am anxious to avoid is that we should give the Russians a chance to divide Asia from the West on an Asian problem. I really think there has been some misinterpretation of what the President said about Formosa and of course the Russians are doing their best to encourage this. Maybe the President in his own inimitable way could say something to remove any misapprehension by making it clear that the final disposal of Formosa is an open question which should be settled on its merits when the time comes, and that nothing which has been said or done implied any decision to go back on the position as set out in the Cairo declaration. I realise the delicacy of this matter.

Your communication to me deals in some detail with the question of Chinese (and Russian) representation in the United Nations. As already explained, I only raised this question in my message to you because of the likelihood that the Russians would put it forward as part of a bargain, and I am in entire agreement with you that we cannot bargain on the Korean issue. We should refuse to discuss with the Soviet Union the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations as part of the Korean problem. In other words, Russia must come back and take her place in the United Nations and, in order to

give a sense of security to the world, must renounce the practice by which one nation can claim to prevent the United Nations from working. The question of Chinese representation does not therefore seem to me to arise at this present stage, though I shall be very glad in due course to give you our views on the questions which you put.

You have elaborated to me at length the attitude of the U.S. Government towards China, and their reasons for that attitude. I do not think that we should necessarily find ourselves in full agreement with all your statements, but that is not the point which I want to make. You know our policy towards China, and I think it is the right policy. On the question of recognition you and we have differed, but I did think that, as a result of the official talks in London in May, we were agreed that we did not want to see China irrevocably alienated from the West. What I am afraid of is that the present situation will, if we are not careful, push China further and further in the direction of the Soviet Union. On our information China, though reacting violently to your declaration on Formosa, has committed herself no more than Russia has over Korea, and I should doubt if she wishes to become involved in that conflict. I should also doubt whether, for the present, she would embark on adventures further afield apart from Formosa, although we cannot afford to disregard that possibility. But I think we must be careful not to accuse China of what she has not yet done, or to give her the impression that she is already so much beyond the pale that she has no hope of re-establishing her position with the West. Once she becomes convinced that the Western Powers will have nothing to do with her, she will turn even more to the Soviet Union, who will be out to exploit such a tendency to our detriment and we may find that we have aligned against us a Power whose influence in Asia, for good or evil, is bound to have a profound effect upon the course of events. This is a question of vital concern to us because of our position in Hongkong and Malaya. It is also of vital concern to all Asian countries, who are very conscious of it.

Therefore I say that we must be very careful not to add China to our enemies by any actions or attitudes of ours. If China eventually demonstrates by practical evidence that she will in no circumstances co-operate with the free world; if she takes her seat in the United Nations and behaves in precisely the same way as the Soviet Union has in the past, then at any rate it will be clear to Asian as well as to other Nations what she is and where she stands. I do think it is important that we should not put ourselves in a position where it can be alleged that, but for some action of ours, China would not have gone irrevocably into the Soviet Communist camp. I will now try to summarise my views.

I think that the governing factor in our politico-strategic policy should be to localise the Korean conflict and attempt to prevent it from spreading. I think that this objective would be helped by some public clarification regarding Formosa and by the adoption of policy towards China which would not press her to the point where still closer association with the Soviet Union would appear to her to be her only course.

If you agree with this I should hope that we could find common ground on the following points.

The first is that the aggression in Korea must be repelled and North Korean Troops must go back to the 38th parallel.

The second is that there can be no submitting to Soviet blackmail, but that Russia's right course is, as said above, to come back and take her place in the United Nations, having renounced the practice of holding up the work of the United Nations by the action of one Nation.

Thirdly the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations should be considered in the United Nations and not in relation to any possible Soviet blackmail connected with Korea. In any case as a matter of practice I cannot believe that the necessary majority for the changeover at the United Nations could be secured so long as the Korean conflict lasts, even if any Power were to attempt to push it at the United Nations.

I hope that this exchange of correspondence will help to clarify the position and that we may continue our exchanges through our respective Ambassadors in an endeavour to remedy any weakness in the common front against Soviet expansion. My hope is that in the end we may arrive at an agreed policy. If our policies are somewhat divergent in the meanwhile, I think it very important that the United States and Britain should do their best not to take opposing lines in any statements we have to make to third Powers or publicly, and that we should make sure that these divergencies do not prejudice the future. The forthcoming talks in Washington will, I hope, help to clear our minds in certain important respects, but I should like to think that this will not be an isolated event but that we shall get ever closer together on Far Eastern questions.

795.00/7–1550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

TAEGU, July 15, 1950.
[Received July 16—4 : 17 a.m.]

43. ROK Government establishing Taegu. Following now here: President, Foreign Minister, Home Minister, Finance Minister, Edu-

cational Minister, Communications Minister, Commerce Minister, Agricultural Minister, Transportation Minister, Social Affairs Minister, Public Health and Welfare Minister, Directors Bureaus Administration, Public Information. Prime Minister-Defense Minister expected here today but possibly returning Taejon. Except Finance Minister who established at Bank Chosun, all ministers established Provincial Government building; hoping persuade disperse office enable conduct more normal government business instead congregating together devoting attention war news.

Home Minister Paek Sung Ok replaced today by Chough Pyung Ok, former chief national police USAMGIK. Chough's ability, energy courage expected have excellent effect leading police, including anti-guerilla operations, this crisis. Paek proved utterly incapable. Director Public Information Clarence Ryee being given "sick leave" sent Pusan owing incompetence; Foreign Minister Ben Limb unofficially being given additional duty Director Public Information, will work closely with Stewart, who informally recommended his designation.

Ever since Embassy persuaded President leave Taejon, President has been insisting on returning, both to head government and show self to people near front for morale purposes. President was stopped Taegu July 9 by my advice but strongly against his will; since then has been most insistent upon returning Taejon. Today General Walker persuaded President his presence, activities Taegu more helpful war effort than return Taejon; President appears accept this advice.

Chief Staff Chung Il Kwan promoted Major General, easing his command position relative other major generals, especially "Flk" Chaf ["*Fat*" *Chae?*] [1] who has shown reluctance accept Chung's orders. Chung probably will maintain headquarters Taegu near General Walker's headquarters, but for morale purposes of Korean army likely spend most time advance headquarters at Kumchon, or forward. ROK considerable concern lest psychological support Korean people be undermined by appearance retreat Korean Army command and government, causing either popular indifference or resurgence guerilla warfare and subversion.

Repeated information Tokyo unnumbered.

MUCCIO

[1] Presumably the reference is to Gen. Chae Byong Duk, whom Chung had replaced as Chief of Staff of the ROK Army.

330/7–1650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 16, 1950—10 a. m.
[Received July 16—6 : 14 a. m.]

97. 1. At request Bajpai, Secretary General, Ministry External Affairs, I called on him this morning. He said he had just received copy Stalin's reply [1] and was repeating it to Mme. Pandit with instructions that she discuss it with Department.

2. He showed me draft telegram to Mme. Pandit enclosing reply and containing instructions.

3. As I recall it, reply was in effect somewhat as follows: Stalin expressed appreciation of India's suggestions. He agreed that participation all five great powers in SC was prerequisite to settlement Korean question and, that in order for that question properly to be considered by SC, it should "hear representatives of the Korean people"

4. Instructions to Mme. Pandit were brief. They told her, as I recall it, to convey further appeal from Nehru to Secretary of State and also through Secretary of State to President for favorable consideration of admittance Chinese Communists into SC. It was pointed out that continued opposition on part of Western Powers to such admittance at this time might make them vulnerable to Communist propaganda, that they were standing in way of possible solution of Korean problem. It was true that admission Chinese Communists would be "act of faith" but in view of importance of issues involved, in opinion of Government of India there should be act of faith.

5. I was unable in glancing briefly through documents to make any notes or to commit all points to memory. Bajpai assured me however, that document itself and appeal would be conveyed to US Government within few hours. My description therefore of telegram to Mme. Pandit is not entirely accurate. Nevertheless I believe it fairly represents substance of Stalin's reply and of Government of India instructions.

6. I took advantage to convey to Bajpai information contained in telegram 68, July 15.[2] I made no comment with regard to Nehru's

[1] Transmitted to the Secretary of State by Madame Pandit on July 17, p. 407.

[2] The text of this telegram read as follows :

"For the Ambassador. Press reports emanating from Washington, misinterpreting statements by Dept spokesman do not reflect our answer to Nehru's message. Pls indicate to Bajpai we expect to have an early reply and our attitude should not be anticipated from erroneous press accounts." (791.00/7–1550)

appeals and answers thereto other than to state that I was confident that regardless of nature our reply my government fully appreciated constructive motives behind Prime Minister's various messages. Bajpai replied that he hoped we would appreciate motives, but he hoped still more that our answer would be favorable.

HENDERSON

795.00/7–1650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 16, 1950—9 p. m.
[Received July 16—2:22 p. m.]

99. 1. Immediately following this telegram is another containing a hastily prepared draft of message to Nehru as suggested in Deptel 63, July 14, 8 p. m. which we received only this morning.[1]

2. We are not satisfied with this draft which we believe is too long and perhaps too closely reasoned. Nevertheless, we hope some of the points contained in it will be useful to Department.

3. I wish it were possible immediately after delivery of reply, which in our opinion should be devoted primarily to matters emphasized in Nehru's message, for another message to be transmitted to Nehru setting forth in considerable detail our general policies re Korean problem, aggression, Far East, et cetera. This message might give him better understanding of our determination not to turn back or be diverted, the reasons therefor and the dangers of any appearance of vacillation. Unfortunately time has thus far prevented us from working on such a document.

HENDERSON

[1] The text of telegram 63 read as follows: "Eyes only for the Ambassador. Dept now working on draft message to Nehru and will submit for your comments. Sec would appreciate your own suggestions about our approach and hopes you will send them over weekend." (123 Henderson, Loy)

795.00/7–1650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 16, 1950—9 p. m.
[Received July 16—6:32 p. m.]

100. Following is draft referred to in Embtel 99 :[1]

I am deeply appreciative of the high motives which prompted Your Excellency in sending the message which I received on July 13. Both the President and I have been strongly moved by your appeal for the

[1] *Supra.*

US to exert such authority and influence as it may have for the maintenance of peace and for the preservation of the solidarity of the UN.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the US is to assist in maintaining world peace, and the Government of the US is firmly of the opinion that the UN is the most effective instrument yet devised for preventing the outbreak of war. The Government of the US is therefore eager to do all that is proper and possible to strengthen and preserve the UN.

We have been giving careful thought to the suggestion contained in your message since we are determined not to fail to take any step which might conceivably be in the direction of terminating the conflict in Korea on a basis which would be likely to promote world peace. It is our considered opinion however that support by us under present conditions of the admission of the so-called Peoples Government of China into the SC or into any other organization of the UN would not serve the cause of peace and would not strengthen the UN.

We do not believe that merely because an armed group has been able by force to take possession of a major portion of the territory of a country which is a member of the UN and to set up what it calls a government, the regime so established should be permitted to take a seat in the various organizations of the UN until it has made it clear by word and deed its intentions to adhere to the principles of the Charter of the UN.

In our opinion the Peiping regime has not thus far given indication by word or deed of its intention to live up to the principles of the Charter. On the contrary, by its announced policies and its acts, it has shown that its objectives are not in accord with those of the UN.

A qualified candidate for a seat in the UN, intending to abide by the principles laid down by Charter, would, we believe, indicate a desire to establish normal relations with other nations. Peiping has thus far not shown such desire. A regime qualified to hold seats in the UN does not engage in activities calculated to promote hatred between other nations and other peoples or to instigate, or to give support to armed uprisings in other countries. Peiping is actively endeavoring to promote hatreds between nations and between continents and to stir up and to encourage insurrectionary movements among other members of the UN. It is, for instance, trying to promote hatred and friction between the peoples of Asia and those of other continents. It is attempting to set one nation in Asia against another and nations of Asia against those of Europe and America. It is lending encouragement and support to Communists and other armed insurrectionaries in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Indochina and elsewhere. A regime qualified to occupy seats in the UN should not support aggression. In spite of the fact that the SC has found that the invaders of

the ROK are guilty of breach of peace, the Peiping regime is openly defying the UN and is seeking to mobilize international and internal political support in favor of the aggressors. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the General Assembly of the UN has only recently declared itself in favor of the territorial integrity and political independence of China, the Peiping regime is cooperating with another power in the latter's efforts to penetrate China, to bring about the de facto dismemberment of China, and to violate territorial integrity and political independence of China.

Until the Peiping regime shows that it intends to conduct itself like a member of the UN in good standing, we do not see how the Government of the US can support its admission into organizations of the UN. We do not believe that merely because China is a permanent member of the SC, any group which happens by force to obtain control of extensive Chinese territories must *ipso facto*, regardless of the principles to which it may adhere or of the objectives which it may be pursuing, take a seat in that body. It is our view that the problem of Chinese representation in the UN in itself is distinct from that of aggression in Korea. Each of these problems must be considered on its own merits. Aggression which is at the present time being perpetrated in Korea has not affected the attitude of the Government of the US with respect to the problem of Chinese represenation in the UN. The attitude of the Peiping regime towards the aggressors, however, has furnished additional evidence that the regime has not at present the qualifications which a member of the UN must have.

We are inclined to believe that it would be improper, if not immoral, for us to support the admission of the Peiping regime into the organizations of the UN so long as we are convinced that that regime is not qualified to be a member of the UN and that the presence of that regime in the UN would render the organizations of that body less, rather than more, effective in their efforts to preserve the world peace.

The Government of the US regrets the decision of the Soviet Government not to send representatives to fill the seats to which they are entitled. It would welcome the return of such representatives.

The Government of the US does not believe, however, that it would be strengthening or increasing the effectiveness of the UN by lending its support to the admission of representatives of the Peiping regime into the UN merely because the Soviet Union has indicated that it will not send its representatives back to organizations of the UN unless the Peiping regime is also represented. The Government of the US has no reason to think that in existing circumstances the presence of representatives of the Soviet Union and of the Peiping regime in the SC would contribute to the solution of the Korean problem. We encountered a negative attitude when we endeavored in a friendly

spirit to prevail upon the Soviet Government to exert its influence on the aggressors to withdraw from the ROK. Both Moscow and Peiping are engaging through direct and indirect propaganda and by the use of diplomatic channels to rally support for the aggressors and to immobilize world opinion which the acts of aggression have aroused. There can be no doubt that if the representatives of the Soviet Union and of Peiping take seats in the SC they will concentrate their efforts not on endeavoring to effect the withdrawal from the ROK of the aggressors but on stultifying the endeavors of the SC to combat the aggression and on attempting to obscure the issue which is now so clear. That issue arises from the facts that an armed attack was made upon the ROK obviously in pursuance of detailed plans prepared long in advance; that the SC passed resolutions describing this attack as a breach of peace, called upon the attackers to withdraw from the territory of the Republic and called upon members of the UN to furnish to the Republic assistance in repelling the attack and in restoring international peace and security; and that the attackers instead of heeding the call of the SC have not withdrawn from the ROK but have continued their warfare, apparently with the purpose of occupying all of the territory of that Republic. The attack has been made so openly that it is difficult to understand how any member of the UN can regard it as other than aggression. The overwhelming majority of the members have so regarded it and have pledged their support to the actions taken by the SC. The issue is whether the UN will or will not stop this aggression and force the aggressor to leave the territory which he has invaded.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union and certain other members of the UN as well as the Peiping regime are endeavoring to divert the attention of world opinion from this issue.[2] They are endeavoring to exploit at this time such differences of opinion with regard to various international problems which exist between members of the UN opposed to aggression. It is their hope to dissipate the energies of the nations opposed to aggression by inveigling these nations into considering problems other than the main issue. The Government of the US is confident that they will not succeed in so doing.

It is not unusual for those engaging in or supporting aggression to attempt to cloud the issue by indicating that if certain concessions are made to their views, an atmosphere might be created conducive to settlement of basic problems, the solution of which is necessary for the preservation of peace. The Government of the US has learned

[2] Subsequently, in telegram 101, July 17, from New Delhi, Ambassador Henderson suggested changing the wording of this passage, in order to avoid any misunderstanding on the part of the Government of India, as follows: "Unfortunately the Soviet Union, the Peiping regime, and other governments under the influence of Moscow are endeavoring, etc." (795.00/7–1750)

through experience that concessions made to aggressors or supporters of aggression do not create an atmosphere in which basic problems are solved but merely lead to a weakening of the forces opposed to aggression and to fresh demands and further aggressive actions.

In the opinion of the Government of the US there is for the present only one solution to the problem of Korea, and that is for the North Koreans to withdraw from the ROK and if they do not withdraw for them to be driven out by the combined forces of loyal members of the UN.

HENDERSON

310/7–1650 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1950—midnight.

71. For the Ambassador from Rusk. Urtel 100 [1] received here late Sunday night. Ind Amb sees Sec Monday morning,[2] probably to inform us of Stalin's reply. Since Nehru's message to Acheson was very short, we have considered replying very briefly in event early publication of exchange becomes necessary and to follow our short reply with long personal and confidential message from Pres or Sec giving full background and flavor our views present world situation. Urtel 100 contains excellent material for longer message but we have doubts about using it for formal reply. If public reply should contain much argumentation, Nehru might feel compelled to continue public debate on points of disagreement in order not to let silence give consent or let "points" stand against him.

We have in mind following short formal reply and would greatly appreciate your judgment soonest as to (1) whether we are right in replying so briefly for public record and (2) whether you consider our text would be helpful.

Text follows:

"My dear Mr. PM: I am deeply appreciative of the high purpose which prompted ur Excellency in sending the message which I received on July 13, 1950 through ur distinguished Amb in Wash. Both the Pres and I have given the most searching consideration to ur appeal for the US to exert such influence and authority as it may have for the maintenance of peace and for the preservation of the solidarity of the UN.

"One of the most fundamental objectives of the foreign policy of the US is to assist in maintaining world peace and the Govt of the US is firmly of the opinion that the UN is the most effective instrument

[1] *Supra.*
[2] July 17.

yet devised for preventing the outbreak of war. The US is, therefore, eager to do all that is proper and possible to preserve and strengthen the UN.

"The purpose of the US Govt and of the Amer people with respect to Korea is to support by all means at our disposal the determination of the UN to repel the armed attack upon Korea and to restore international peace and security in the area. We desire not only to prevent the spread of aggression beyond Korea but to end it—as required by the SC of the UN.

"We are deeply convinced that law-abiding Govts and peoples throughout the world have a vital stake in the issues involved in this aggression and in the success of the United Nations in dealing with it. It is painful to realize that there could have long since been a restoration of peace and the saving of the lives of those fighting on behalf of the United Nations had not certain Members of the United Nations failed to meet their obligations under the Charter and refused to use their authority and influence to prevent or stop the hostilities.

"We do not believe that the termination of the Korean aggression can be contingent in any way upon the determination of other questions which are currently before the United Nations. A breach of the peace or an act of aggression is the most serious matter with which the SC can be confronted. It has shown that it is both competent and willing to act vigorously for the maintenance of peace. There has not been at any time any obstacle to the full participation by the Soviet Union in the work of the United Nations except the decision of the Soviet Union itself.

"In our opinion, the decision between competing claimant governments for China's seat in the UN is one which must be taken by the UN on its merits. It is a question on which there is at present a wide diversity of views among the membership of the UN. I know you will agree that the decision should not be dictated by an unlawful aggression or by any other conduct which would subject the UN to coercion and duress.

"I wish to assure your Excellency of our earnest desire to see an early restoration of peace in Korea and elsewhere and of our eagerness to work with you and your great country to establish in the UN a means by which the fear of aggression can be permanently lifted from the peoples of the earth."

[Rusk]
ACHESON

330/7–1750

The Indian Ambassador (Pandit) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: I have the honour to enclose text of a message for you from the Prime Minister of India. Also enclosed is the text of Marshal Stalin's message to the Prime Minister and his reply thereto.

With [etc.] VIJAYA LAKSHMI PANDIT

[Enclosure 1]

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA TO HON'BLE DEAN ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

I consider Marshal Stalin's reply [1] most encouraging. I have already explained why, in my opinion, the apprehension that the entry of China into the Security Council and return of Soviets may possibly lead to obstruction of proceedings should not be allowed to stand in the way of restoring to the Council its full representative character. Insistence on prior fulfilment by Moscow or Peiping of conditions such as return of North Korean forces to 38th parallel may be pleaded by both as evidence of lack of desire of the Western Powers for a peaceful settlement. On the other hand, if Soviets and China prove unreasonable after entry into the Council, world opinion will hold them responsible for consequences. My honest belief is that Moscow is seeking a way out of the present entanglement without loss of prestige and that there is a real chance of solving the Korean problem peacefully by enabling the Peiping Government to enter and Soviet Union to resume its place in the Security Council without insistence on conditions. This may be an act of faith but the gravity of alternatives seems to justify it. In view of urgency of the matter I shall be grateful for earliest possible answer.

With [etc.]

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

[Enclosure 2]

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM MARSHAL STALIN TO PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA [2]

I welcome your peace initiative. I fully share your point of view as to the expediency of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question through the Security Council, the participation of the representatives of the Five Great Powers including the People's Government of China being indispensible. I believe that to reach an early settlement of the Korean question it would be expedient in the Security Council to hear representatives of the Korean people.

With respects,

J. STALIN
Prime Minister of Soviet Union

[1] Enclosure 2, below.

[2] This message was received by the Government of India on July 16 (see telegram 97, July 16, from New Delhi, p. 401) in response to Mr. Nehru's communication of July 13 (see footnote 2 to telegram 124, July 14, from Moscow, p. 379).

[Enclosure 3]

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA TO MARSHAL STALIN [3]

I am most grateful for Your Excellency's prompt and encouraging response. I am communicating immediately with the other governments concerned and hope to be able to approach Your Excellency again soon.

With respects, JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

[3] Communicated to the Soviet Government on July 16, in response to Generalissimo Stalin's message printed in Enclosure 2, above.

330/7–1750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 17, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received July 17—12:25 p. m.]

110. 1. During my conversation with Bajpai, SYG MEA, this morning he asked if I had as yet any indication as to when reply to Nehru's message re Chinese Commie representation in UN.[1] I replied in negative but said I had impression several additional days may lapse before its receipt. I know that we are giving careful consideration to message.

2. Bajpai asked if I could hazard any guess as to content of reply. I said I did not have slightest idea in that regard; to be frank, however, I was of personal opinion it would be extremely difficult for US just now, when American blood was being shed in a UN effort to halt aggression, to give its support to admission into SC of representative of regime which had thus far shown peculiar sense irresponsibility in conduct foreign relations and which was lauding aggressor.

3. Bajpai said GOI did not really expect US to go so far as to give support admission Commie Chinese. It hoped, however, US would indicate it would have no serious objection thereto so other members of SC which were refraining from voting for admission because they did not desire offend US would feel free to vote as they pleased.

4. This remark of Bajpai might be useful to officials of Department charged with drafting reply. If we have not changed our policy on Commie Chinese seating despite recent developments, Department may wish, after presenting with full force US reasons for voting against entry Peiping regime, insert paragraph to effect that while US cannot but be opposed seating delegates that regime it is not and

[1] See enclosure 1 to the note from Madame Pandit to Mr. Acheson, *supra*.

has not been carrying on systematic campaign this regard among other members SC; that every member SC is, of course, entitled to its own views; and that US is prepared accept vote of necessary majority and not make use its veto power.

HENDERSON

700.001/7–1750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, July 17, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received July 17—3:37 p.m.]

111. 1. Leak of contents Stalin's reply [1] to Nehru re representation China in SC has appeared in several Delhi newspapers including *Times of India*, *News Chronicle* and *Statesman*. General effect these stories is to build up Stalin as favorable to peace move and create impression that all that was now needed was for US to acquiesce in admission Communist China into SC.

2. Bajpai told me this morning that GOI distressed at leak which apparently was result of deliberate maneuver on part Soviet Embassy in New Delhi. He said GOI regretted that this maneuver was furnishing ammunition for pro-Soviet propaganda.

3. Indian journalist who has proved to be reliable source in past informed me this morning that yesterday Soviet Embassy called in four Indian journalists known to be on its payroll, showed them Stalin's reply, and outlined stories to be based on it.

HENDERSON

[1] See enclosure 2 to the note from Madame Pandit to Mr. Acheson, July 17, p. 408.

795.00/7–1750

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1950.

Subject: Future United States Policy With Respect to North Korea

The President has requested the National Security Council to prepare for his consideration a report on the subject, covering the policy which should be pursued by the United States after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel.

Accordingly, this project is being referred to the NSC Staff for the preparation of a report for Council consideration.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

320/7–1750 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald)

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 17, 1950—6 p. m.

102. Info: OAFE pls discuss at once with Gen MacArthur possibility of his inviting Romulo, as Pres of UNGA, to visit hdqrs in Korea of UN forces resisting aggression. Dept believes such visit wld be of material aid in continuing effort to emphasize UN character of Korean action. It is suggested Romulo might make broadcasts from Korea over VOA which wld have considerable propaganda value as well as bolstering morale of Koreans. Defense informed.

ACHESON

795.00/7–1750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, July 17, 1950—midnight.
[Received July 17—6 : 17 p. m.]

155. Eyes only for the Secretary. British Ambassador informs that report his conversation Gromyko this evening is being repeated British Embassy Washington which will make available Department [1] (reference Embtel 99, July 11).

In substance he says that Gromyko stated Soviet Government desires peaceful solution Korean affair, believes Security Council should take appropriate measures that end, and Communist China should be represented in SC deliberations which should permit Korean people to decide fate.

Gromyko gave Kelly written statement Soviet position and declined comment on Kelly's inquiry as to Soviet's views North Korea's continued hostilities against united will of 53 nations.

Department pass London. Repeated info London 54, eyes only Douglas.

KIRK

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[1] See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Perkins, July 18, p. 419.

795.00/7–1750 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 17, 1950—7 p. m.

303. Dept appreciates measure of agreement indicated in last para Embtel 264, July 12,[1] re legal basis of action in Korea. Dept shares FonOff desire for full understanding in this matter in order meet Communist allegations of illegality with a common UK–US position.

It is of course clear that even without any SC action US would have been justified under general principles of international law, which are recognized in Art 51 of Charter, in coming to assistance of Republic of Korea. However, US position is that initial action prior to June 27 also was in accord with SC Res of June 25. In justifying action, US position is that no differentiation should be made between period before and after June 27 since President's action seeks to accomplish objectives of both Resolutions.

Dept suggests Embassy in its discretion inform FonOff of above views which parallel line taken in discussions between US and UK Dels New York.

ACHESON

[1] Telegram 264 not printed; the paragraph referred to indicated that the United States and the United Kingdom were in agreement that the action at present being taken in Korea under the Security Council resolution of June 27 was in pursuance of Article 39 of the U.N. Charter (795.00/7–1250).

795.00/7–1750 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India [1]

TOP SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1950—8 p. m.

77. There fols text msg from Sec to Nehru approved by Pres which you shld deliver earliest opportunity:

"My dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am deeply appreciative of the high purpose which prompted ur Excellency in sending the msg which I recd on July 13, 1950 through ur distinguished Amb in Wash. and ur subsequent msg of the 17th transmitting Prime Min Stalin's reply to ur similar ltr to him of July 13. Both the Pres and I have given the most thoughtful consideration to these communications.

"One of the most fundamental objectives of the fon policy of the US is to assist in maintaining world peace, and the Govt of the US is firmly of the opinion that the UN is the most effective instrument yet devised for maintaining and restoring internatl peace and security. The US is, therefore, eager to do all that is proper and possible to preserve and strengthen the United Nations.

[1] Repeated for information to Moscow as 52, London as 307 and to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations as 44.

"The purpose of the US Govt and of the Amer people with respect to Korea is to support by all means at our disposal the determination of the United Nations to repel the armed attack upon Korea and to restore internatl peace and security in the area. We desire both to prevent the spread of aggression beyond Korea and to end it there—as required by the SC of the United Nations.

"We are deeply conscious of the fact that law-abiding Govts and peoples throughout the world have a vital stake in the issues involved in this aggression and in the success of the United Nations in dealing with it. It is painful to realize that there cld have long since been a restoration of peace and the saving of the lives of those fighting on behalf of the United Nations had not a small minority of the United Nations failed to meet their obligations under the Charter and refused to use their auth and influence to prevent or stop the hostilities. The acceptance of their obligations and the exercise of their auth and influence in accordance with those obligations wld restore peace tomorrow.

"A breach of the peace or an act of aggression is the most serious matter with which the United Nations can be confronted. We do not believe that the termination of the aggression from northern Korea can be contingent in any way upon the determination of other questions which are currently before the United Nations.

"There has not been at any time any obstacle to the full participation by the Soviet Union in the work of the United Nations except the decision of the Soviet Government itself. The Security Council has shown that it is both competent and willing to act vigorously for the maintenance of peace.

"In our opinion, the decision between competing claimant governments for China's seat in the United Nations is one which must be reached by the United Nations on its merits. It is a question on which there is at present a wide diversity of views among the membership of the United Nations. I know you will agree that the decision should not be dictated by an unlawful aggression or by any other conduct which would subject the United Nations to coercion and duress.

"I know that your Excellency shares our earnest desire to see an early restoration of peace in Korea in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council and I assure you of our eagerness to work with you and your great country to establish in the United Nations a means by which the fear of aggression can be permanently lifted from the peoples of the earth."

Since Stalin's reply has been made public, we believe we must shortly make public our reply to Mr. Nehru. Pls ascertain whether he has objection to publication his ltr July 13 at same time.

Inform Dept urgently when msg will be delivered New Delhi in order that copy may be provided Ind Amb here at about same time.[2]

ACHESON

[2] Telegram 135, July 18, from New Delhi, informed the Department that the message would be handed to Bajpai at 9:30 p. m. local time on July 18 (330/7-1850). See telegram 137 from New Delhi received at 4:27 p. m. on July 18, p. 417.

330/7–1750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 17, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received July 17—8 : 08 p. m.]

113. 1. In view wide publicity given to Nehru's approaches and deliberate leak Soviet reply, we agree that documents exchanged must eventually be made public and that therefore our reply should be brief and contain minimum argumentation. (Deptel 71 July 16).

2. We consider text helpful, but have some concern lest Nehru will be offended at our failure to let him know our present attitude re Chinese representation. He may consider our silence this regard evasive and indicative lack of proper respect for his approach on which he has staked so much before whole world.

3. We venture, therefore, suggest that something along following lines be substituted for last sentence of penultimate paragraph your draft:

"Our views in this regard are already known to you. There have been no recent developments which, in our considered opinion, would justify a change in them. We believe that in the interest of the UN and of world peace, such decision as the UN may make should not be influenced by threats or acts of aggression or by any other conduct which would subject the UN to coercion and duress."

4. Nehru has made so much of this diplomatic venture that he is sure to be annoyed at negative reply from US no matter how gentle and disarming our language may be. We probably shall be widely denounced for several days by Indian press and certain sections public for blocking "peace move." Nevertheless we are hopeful that the more sober although not so voluble elements among Indian leaders who are beginning to have a true appreciation of world situation and who quietly wield considerable influence will prevent Nehru and his more irresponsible advisors from giving expression to their irritation in manner which can do permanent damage.

5. I suggest that in delivery of message recipient be informed that it is short and devoid of argumentation because in view of wide publicity already given to Nehru's messages and Soviet reply, it is evident that eventually the whole correspondence must be published and we are of opinion that publication of detailed argumentation may exacerbate rather than relieve international tension.[1]

HENDERSON

[1] Telegram 78, July 17, 11 p. m., to New Delhi, authorized Ambassador Henderson to use the substance of paragraphs 3 and 5 of telegram 113 orally if he so desired (330/7–1750).

661.91/7–1850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 18, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received July 18—8 : 31 a. m.]

132. Bajpai SYG MEA called me noon today to say Soviet Government Moscow had published texts of recent exchange of notes with GOI without securing consent of latter. Bajpai added that he hoped that US government would not release either message until after agreement between the two governments for simultaneously release in Washington and Delhi. He referred to press report to effect US planned release messages at time delivery and said he thought this report must be inaccurate.

HENDERSON

795.00/7–1850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 18, 1950—8 a. m.
[Received July 18—11 : 18 a. m.]

129. 1. Last sentence of text Stalin's reply [1] as allegedly given out by Soviet Embassy and published in *Indian News Chronicle* read as follows: I suppose that for a quicker settlement of the Korean problem, it would be necessary to hear Representatives of the Korean people. Text telegraphed by Radhakrishnan read as follows: I believe that to reach an early settlement of the Korean question it would be expedient in the SC to hear Representatives of the Korean people. Bajpai, SyG MEA yesterday pointed out that Soviet translation text used word "necessary" whereas Radhakrishnan's word was "expedient". He took it for granted that Soviet Embassy had meddled with text.

2. It has occurred to me that text may have been received by Indian Embassy in Moscow in Russian language and that in making translation Embassy had toned down message somewhat by translating Russian word as "expedient" rather than "necessary" in order to make reply more palatable.

Department pass Moscow; repeated info Moscow 5.

HENDERSON

[1] See enclosure 2 to the note from Madame Pandit to Mr. Acheson, July 17, p. 408.

795.00/7–1850

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James N. Hyde of the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

[Extract]

SECRET [NEW YORK,] July 18, 1950.

Subject: 1. Korea
2. Appointment of a Secretary-General
3. General Assembly

Participants: Mr. John W. Holmes, Canadian Delegation
Mr. Pierre Ordonneau, French Delegation
Mr. John C. Ross, United States Mission
Mr. James N. Hyde, United States Mission

Holmes and Ordonneau had lunch with us at our request and we covered the following topics:

1. *Korea:* They were both concerned and unhappy about the Secretary-General's recent circular on military and other assistance. They had not been consulted about it in advance. Holmes stated that the first word his Office of External Affairs had was when correspondents came asking comments. Ordonneau shared this view and added that it would prove an even greater mistake if there is not widespread response. He added that it was a source of embarrassment to many governments, including his own, to know how to answer and that a good many governments might adopt the policy of no answer at all. He thought that this represented Lie taking a very serious and unwise step on his own responsibility. So far as troops are concerned, he said that any French troops would have to come from Indochina, which would simply weaken things there. The Benelux countries will meet to consider this question on July 20th.

As further evidence of Lie's questionable initiative, both men were critical of him sending Colonel Katzin as his personal representative. They wondered what the significance of this was and were doubtful of this personal diplomacy. Ross stated that he saw the mission of Colonel Katzin as simply strengthening the Secretariat support for the Commission at a critical time. Holmes wondered what use the military observers would be in Korea now, adding that there were two Canadian observers at Lake Success. There was some agreement that these

[1] The source text is a copy of a document in the IO Files, Department of State, bearing the designations US/S/1331 and US/A/2351, and the date July 19, 1950.

observers in Korea might perform the function of military advisers to the Commission, especially in the preparation of its report.

Ross thought that the next meeting of the Security Council might well be for the purpose of receiving the report of the Unified Command, and his suggestion that atrocities in Korea might be considered seemed acceptable.

. . . . . .

J. N. HYDE

330/7–1850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 18, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received July 18—4 : 27 p. m.]

137. 1. I delivered Bajpai 9 : 30 this evening message contained in Deptel 77, July 17. After he had read message, I communicated him orally substance paragraphs 3 and 5 Embtel 113 as authorized in Deptel 78, July 17.[1]

2. Sir Girja said he would bring message immediately to attention PriMin and it would be discussed tomorrow at committee of cabinet which had already been called for that purpose.

3. I told Bajpai that in view wide speculation and of rumors which are certain to circulate, Department would like to arrange for simultaneous release of exchange as soon as convenient. Bajpai replied that he also would discuss this with PriMin and arrangements would probably be made for release of messages sometime tomorrow evening Delhi time which would mean morning July 19 in Washington. I said I would like at least six or seven hours notice.

4. Bajpai added it was his own personal belief that PriMin's message of seventeenth should not be published since its contents obviously were not for publication. He would discuss this point however with PriMin before making definite statement with regard to it.

5. Bajpai was obviously disappointed although he did not so express himself.

HENDERSON

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[1] See footnote 1 to telegram 113, from New Delhi, received at 8 : 08 p. m. on July 17, p. 414.

310.2/7–1850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Mathews)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1950.

Subject: Delivery to the Indian Ambassador of a copy of the Secretary's Reply to Prime Minister Nehru

Participants: Mrs. Pandit, Ambassador of India
Mr. Kaul, First Secretary, Embassy of India
Mr. McGhee, Assistant Secretary
Mr. Mathews, Director, SOA

Before handing to the Indian Ambassador a copy of the Secretary's reply[1] to Prime Minister Nehru's messages of July 13 and 17, Mr. McGhee explained that we had given the most careful consideration to the questions raised by the Prime Minister and that our reply had been discussed with and approved by the President. Mrs. Pandit read the reply and said quite frankly that she was disappointed.

She asked in some agitation how the drift to war could be stopped if steps were not taken to bring the principal world powers together in the Security Council or elsewhere. She said that people everywhere were deeply fearful of the possibility of a new world war; the United States was losing friends all over the world because many people believed that our attitude toward the seating of Chinese Communist representatives in UN organs was contributing to the deterioration in the world situation. Mrs. Pandit said emphatically that she personally and her Government fully realized that the United States was sincere in its approach to the problems of maintaining world peace but she insisted that our policies could be and were widely misinterpreted.

Mr. McGhee stressed that in our view it was necessary to give primary attention to the most pressing problem which was the putting down of aggression where it had occurred, namely in Korea. Our people were just as concerned as people everywhere in the world at the grim possibility of a new global war and were determined to avoid it if at all possible. Unfortunately, the decision which might precipitate in a world war would be made in the Kremlin. It seemed essential to us therefore to make it clear to the Kremlin that aggression would be resisted. With reference to the problem of the seating of Communist China in the UN, Mr. McGhee observed that we considered this a separate issue which should not be allowed to divert the world's attention from the immediate problem of stopping aggression in Korea. He was aware that our position on this and other matters was being misinterpreted, but he feared that this was the price we had to pay for the role of world leadership which had been thrust upon us.

[1] See telegram 77, July 17, p. 412.

Mrs. Pandit expressed appreciation of the Department's cooperation in providing her so promptly with a copy of the Secretary's reply to the Prime Minister.

330/7–1750

Memorandum of Conversations, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1950.

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador; and Mr. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State.

Sir Oliver handed me copies of the report Ambassador Kelly had made on his last talk with Gromyko (copies attached).

He then gave me the following message for the Secretary: He said Mr. Bevin had inquired whether or not it would be possible to see the Secretary in Washington during the UN and had appreciated the Secretary's statement that he would probably be in New York for a considerable period of time and that, therefore, he was quite ready to agree that he should see the Secretary in New York and not in Washington.

Sir Oliver had a news dispatch indicating that London had released their action concerning oil in Hong Kong.[1] He asked that this action be explained to our Congressional leaders as soon as it was made public (This has been done).

Sir Oliver then repeated the question he had asked the Secretary on Sunday[2] as to whether or not he could have any information as to the President's message[3] to forward to London so that Mr. Attlee might be informed in the event of questions in the House of Commons as soon as the message was released (This was done at 10:00 p. m., July 18).

In response to a question which I put to Sir Oliver as to the Formosa situation, he indicated that he thought that the thing that was most troublesome about the original statement of the President was the implication that we would never agree that Formosa would go to China so long as there was a Communist Government in China.

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[1] The British Admiralty had requisitioned all oil stocks in Hong Kong for military requirements. The effect of this measure, since there were no direct deliveries to North Korea, was to prevent shipments from Hong Kong to Communist China, whence the oil might be transshipped to North Korea. For related documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 619 ff.

[2] July 16.

[3] Reference is to President Truman's message to Congress on July 19, concerning which, along with his radio address to the nation on the same day, see editorial note, p. 430.

Later in the evening Sir Oliver telephoned that he had received a message from London saying that they were now considering what reply if any should be made to Gromyko's statement to Ambassador Kelly and that they would consult with us on the reply before making it.

GEORGE W. PERKINS

[Enclosure]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

17 JULY 1950.

Mr. Gromyko asked me to call at 9:30 p. m. Moscow time and informed me of substance of a Russian text which he then handed me. Literal translation follows in my immediately following telegram.[4]

2. He began by briefly summarizing my communication of July 11th and then stated that in opinion of Soviet Government Security Council should be convened with "indispensable" (he emphasized the word) participation of Chinese Peoples Government. "And that" (Russian text has "so that") representatives of Korean people should be heard, and that Security Council should then solve the Korean question.

3. I said our general attitude to representation of Chinese Peoples Government was known but that this was separate from actual situation which was that forces representing 53 United Nations were being attacked in South Korea. Did he mean this was to be referred to Security Council with Chinese Government in it and that, meanwhile hostilities should continue?

4. Mr. Gromyko at first evaded direct answer but on being strongly pressed finally said that it was for Security Council to "solve the broad Korean question" including the cessation of hostilities.

5. By coincidence I had three journalists dining with me this evening and was therefore obliged to explain to them my reasons for leaving. I authorised them to report on my return that I had seen Gromyko at his request in continuation of earlier conversations on the subject of Korea.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On July 11th *M. l'Ambassadeur*, you informed me for communication to the Soviet Government that the British Government being bound by the latest decisions of the Security Council, cannot at the present time put forward definite proposals for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and that the British Government considers the putting forward of such proposals to be running ahead. At

[4] Printed in this document under the subheading "Aide-Mémoire", below.

the same time, so you stated, *M. l'Ambassadeur*, the British Government considers it necessary, by way of a preliminary proposal, that the hostilities in Korea should be terminated and the North Korean troops withdrawn behind the 38th parallel. I am authorised to state to you that the Soviet Government considers the best means for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question to be the convening of the Security Council with the indispensable participation of representatives of the Peoples Government of China so that representatives of the Korean people should be heard during the deciding of the Korean question.

With reference to the preliminary proposal of the British Government, the Soviet Government considers that, to avoid running ahead, this, and also any other proposals should be submitted for the consideration of the Security Council.

[Document, although in form of letter, has no superscription or signature.] [5]

17.7.50

[5] Brackets appear in the source text.

795.00/7–1850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 18, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received July 18—7 : 44 p. m.]

398. Eyes only for the Secretary. Foreign Office states that copies of Kelly's reports on conversation with Gromyko sent Franks as well as copies of correspondence between Prime Minister and Nehru [1] and that these documents will be shown to you.

Decision not yet taken as to next move in Gromyko–Kelly conversations. We are assured, however, that no further instruction in this connection will be sent Kelly until full consultation with you. Thinking on official level Foreign Office inclined to belief that Kelly should hand written statement to Gromyko, drafted with eye to future publication with special emphasis on fact that Gromyko stated in first interview that Soviet Government desired peaceful settlement in Korea and that UK suggestion that Security Council resolution be carried out and North Korean troops withdrawn north of 38th parallel was wholly ignored in Gromyko's last communication. Foreign Office officials are not optimistic that Soviets would agree to use influence on North Koreans to withdraw but feel that Gromyko's most recent statement should not be left as a last word.

[1] The Attlee–Nehru correspondence is not printed; see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Acheson on his talk with Ambassador Franks, July 19, p. 431.

There is a general feeling here of complete disapproval of Nehru's intervention and a belief that it has done considerable harm.

DOUGLAS

330/7–1850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET
URGENT NIACT

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1950—8 p. m.

88. Urtel 137 July 18. We urgently desire release messages 9:30 July 19 Washington time or not later than 10:30. Later release would conflict important presidential statement. Inform Bajpai and cable urgently time of release.

Re. para 4, Dept does not intend release Nehru message rec'd here July 17.

ACHESON

357.AD/7–1850 : Telegram

The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TOKYO, July 18, 1950.
[Received July 18—8:23 p. m.]

Unnumbered. For OAFE and State Department. Re State Department message 180106Z (sent Tokyo as 102).[1] I have discussed matter with General MacArthur who in effect states as follows:

"General MacArthur holds Secretary Romulo in highest esteem and personal regard, but the military situation in Korea does not permit this type of activity at this time. A further objection is the fact that he is the Foreign Minister of the Philippine Islands Republic and has no connection with the UN Commission on Korea. It is believed that his presence would tend to create friction and misunderstanding which at this time would certainly be most undesirable. If his services are to be employed in the Korean situation it should manifestly be from his UN Headquarters rather than Korea. If any opportunity presents itself in the future to utilize his services here, it will be reported at once."

SEBALD

[1] Transmitted on July 17 at 6 p. m., p. 411.

330/7–1850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

PARIS, July 18, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received July 18—9 : 23 p. m.]

332. Repeated info London 95. Embtel 331.[1] Following is text Schuman *aide-mémoire:*

[The *aide-mémoire*, not printed, began by reiterating French support for United Nations opposition to the North Korean aggression and expressed appreciation for United States contributions toward this end. The French note went on to point out that events in Korea after 3 weeks pointed to a protracted conflict rather than a rapid United Nations victory. In this light, and in view of the danger of extension of the fighting, the French Government felt that no opportunity to enter into conversations with the Soviet Union should be neglected, although a North Korean withdrawal to the 38th parallel must remain the fundamental condition of any basis for understanding.

In view of the dangerous situation in the Far East, the French Government called for as close contact as possible with the American and British Governments in the form of consultations aimed at warding off in advance any new perils which might arise and depriving the aggressors of the profit of the initiative. Questions meriting particular attention were the problem of armed intervention by Communist China, United States action in regard to Formosa, Chinese representation in the United Nations, Berlin, the Soviet threat against Yugoslavia, and the Near East situation.

The French note concluded by pointing out that military developments in Korea showed the relative weakness of the Western powers and the need for increased efforts to meet the threat of Communist armed aggression. Tripartite military talks, in addition to the suggested diplomatic discussions involving France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, should be held to discuss the challenge, perhaps in connection with the impending meeting of the Deputies of the North Atlantic Council in London, or within the context of the Standing Group, composed of representatives of the Three Powers,

[1] Not printed; it reported the receipt of the message transmitted in telegram 332, from French Foreign Minister Schuman, who stressed the great importance and seriousness attached to it by the French Government (330/7–1850).

which served in a subordinate capacity to the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Council.[2]]

BRUCE

[2] The tripartite discussions suggested by the French Government took place on August 3 and 4 in Paris; they were held on the political level and did not involve military talks. For the minutes of the meeting of August 3, see p. 519.

330/7–1950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 19, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received July 19—8 : 12 a. m.]

147. 1. Bajpai informs me not possible effect release messages so early as 9 : 30 July 19 Washington time because Nehru wishes his reply to Secretary's message to be delivered by Mme. Pandit today to be incorporated in release. Furthermore Moscow must be informed.

2. GOI is anxious that messages be published in New Delhi papers July 20 and therefore is informing both Washington and Moscow its intention issue release its exchanges with Washington and Moscow not including Nehru's message of July 17, July 20, 3 a. m. Delhi time. I assume this permits sufficient time to elapse after statement contemplated by President (Deptel 88, July 18).

3. Fearing that there may be some delay in receipt reply by Mme. Pandit, Bajpai gave me copy to transmit direct Department. If Mme. Pandit's text not received before time scheduled for release Department might arrange with her approval publication text given me which is contained in Embtel 148.[1]

HENDERSON

[1] Received at 9 : 27 a. m. on July 19, p. 425. The Department of State released the texts of the Nehru–Acheson exchanges on July 19 at 3 : 30 p. m. (EDT); for texts, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 19, 1950, p. 170.

795.00/7–1950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

MOSCOW, July 19, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received July 19—8 : 45 a. m.]

165. Russian text Stalin's reply to Nehru as published Soviet press confirms accuracy English translation transmitted GOI by Radhakrishnan. Key word is "*tselesoobrazno*" which can be translated "expedient" or "suitable". Bajpai's assumption Soviet Embassy Delhi meddled with text therefore appears correct.

Reur thought Indian Embassy here may have deliberately toned down Stalin's message in order make it appear more palatable, I feel

you may possibly have gained impression from Bajpai that divergencies between GOI and Radhakrishnan (urtels 3, July 13 [1] and 8 July 14 [2]) on Korean issue reflect tendency of latter take "softer" line with Soviets than desired by GOI. We do not have complete picture here of course but as stated mytel 10, July 13 [3] Radhakrishnan seemed to be genuinely proud of role he played in influencing GOI to support SC resolution of June 27 and his informal mediatory approach to me on July 9 smacked less of appeasement than Nehru's present mediation efforts.

In fact from recent conversation with Indian Embassy officer it seems Indian Embassy has received message from GOI rapping it over knuckles for way it handled informal mediation effort with this Embassy and implying arguments used by Indian Embassy that connection (which appear to have become known to MEA) raise question Radhakrishnan's good faith and impartiality and possibly compromise his position vis-à-vis Soviets. It appears therefore that whatever indiscretions Indian Embassy may have committed (and Indian Embassy source continues maintain that his Ambassador's approach to me was based on GOI instructions) stem from its allegedly unneutral, i.e., pro-US attitude on certain vital aspects Korean issue.

Incompleteness of our information here on what Radhakrishnan told Soviet DepFonMins Zorin and Gromyko in his conversations with them on July 1 and 13 respectively precludes my reaching 100% firm conclusions re Radhakrishnan's position in this affair but for reasons given foregoing paragraphs I am inclined to believe his approach to me although unrealistic was conceived in friendly pro-US spirit.

Dept. pass Delhi, sent Delhi priority 16.

KIRK

[1] See telegram 79 from New Delhi, received on July 13 at 12:39 p. m., p. 371.
[2] See telegram 86 from New Delhi, received on July 14 at 1:25 p. m., p. 385.
[3] See telegram 111 from Moscow, received on July 13 at 11:32 a. m., p. 370.

330/7–1950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 19, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received July 19—9:27 a. m.]

148. Following is text Nehru's reply to be delivered today by Madame Pandit (Embtel 147).[1]

"My dear Mr. Secretary of State: I thank you for your letter which your Ambassador conveyed to me last night.

[1] Received on July 19 at 8:12 a. m., p. 424.

I am grateful to President Truman and to you for the consideration that you have given to my message of the 13th July and to the subsequent communication forwarding Marshal Stalin's reply to my message to him of the same date. I recognize that one of the most fundamental objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is to assist in maintaining world peace, and that the Government of the United States is firmly of the opinion that the United Nations is one of the most effective instruments yet devised for maintaining and restoring international peace and security. As Your Excellency must be aware, the maintenance of peace and support of the United Nations has consistently been the policy of the Government of India. My suggestion for breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council, so that representatives of the Peoples Government of China can take their seat in the Council and the USSR can return to it, was designed to fulfill this policy, not to weaken it. In voting for the resolutions on Korea adopted by the Security Council, on the 25th and 27th June, it was our purpose to strengthen the United Nations in resisting aggression. Since the Government of India recognized the Peoples Government of China on 30th December, 1949, it has been our endeavour to bring about the admission of its representatives to the various organs and agencies of the United Nations. Our present proposal was a renewal of this effort. It was made on its merits and also in the hope that it would create a suitable atmosphere for the peaceful solution of the Korean problem. I do not think that the admission of China now would be an encouragement of aggression.

I am requesting our Ambassador in Moscow to communicate the text of Your Excellency's letter to me, and of my reply, to Marshal Stalin. Arrangements are also being made to release at 3 a. m. tomorrow (20 July, Indian standard time), copies of these two letters, of my messages to Your Excellency and to Marshal Stalin dated 30th [*13th*] July, and of the messages exchanged between Marshal Stalin and me on the 15th and 16th July, respectively.

Please accept the assurance of my highest consideration."

HENDERSON

795.00/7–1950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, July 19, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received July 19—9 : 29 a. m.]

166. Published exchange letters Nehru Stalin obviously contribute nothing to peaceful solution Korean crisis. On contrary Nehru's July 13 appeal omitted any reference to Security Council resolutions as framework solution. Stalin was thus given excellent opportunity confuse issue by concentrating on question seating Chinese Commies which he has done. Similarly Nehru's acknowledgement of July 16, in characterizing Stalin's reply as "encouraging" tends to play Stalin's game.

Embassy welcomes Secretary's reply to Nehru (Deptel 52, July 17)[1] and believes this exposition of US attitude re Korea and Chinese Commie admission UN is clear and should go far to demonstrate spuriousness Soviet maneuver.

Nehru's attitude towards prior compliance with SC resolutions as set forth Deptel 51, July 17[2] and his consequent omission any mention thereof in messages to Stalin seems clearly to have raised important doubt as to India's firmness of resolve in adhering to position it originally took. Soviets can manifestly obtain considerable comfort therefrom. Accordingly it is to be hoped that Nehru will restore India's stature by some firm reiteration India's support SC stand possibly in subsequent message he says he intends address Stalin.

Assuming that Nehru's appeals to Stalin and the Secretary were prompted by a sincere desire to assist in reaching a solution of Korean situation (and not by determination of a leading Asian power to take advantage of the situation to seat another Asian power in UN) Embassy feels that thus far appeal has led nowhere, Stalin has neatly seized initiative to exploit it by focussing attention on Chinese Commie seating, and India has given damaging impression of a change in her attitude of support of UNSC action.

Department pass Delhi, London. Repeated info Delhi 17, London 56.

KIRK

[1] See telegram 77, p. 412.

[2] Not printed; it transmitted the texts of the three messages printed as enclosures to the note from Madame Pandit to Mr. Acheson, July 17, p. 407.

611.91/7–1950

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 19, 1950.

Subject: Presentation by Madame Pandit of Prime Minister Nehru's Personal Message of July 19, 1950

Participants: Her Excellency, Madame Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Ambassador of India.
Mr. T. N. Kaul, First Secretary, Embassy of India.
The Honorable, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State.
Mr. Joseph S. Sparks, SOA

Madame Pandit handed me a note as she came in, saying that she did not wish to detain me long. I thanked her and read the note which was a reply from Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru[1] to my message

[1] The text of Mr. Nehru's message is in telegram 148 from New Delhi, received on July 19 at 9:27 a. m., p. 425.

of July 18, 1950. I told Madame Pandit that I very much appreciated her having brought the message to me and assured her that we would continue to give every serious consideration to the problems with which her brother is so actively concerned. I said that there were many grave issues in the world today but that I was confident that they could be resolved by the continued cooperation and determination of like-minded constructive nations such as India and the United States.

795.00/7–1950

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Truman[1]

RESTRICTED [TAEGU,] July 19, 1950.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I can not find words to express, for myself and for all the people and Government of Korea, our profound gratitude for your prompt and continued actions in bringing aid to Korea in these desperate days. While we deeply appreciate the support of so many free nations, through the United Nations, to the cause of Korea, which also is the cause of freedom, we know full well that without your courageous leadership in a time of bewildering crisis there would have been no support and no aid.

I am deeply moved as I learn of increasing American battle casualties here. It is a tragic thing that so many men should have had to give their lives for liberty in this land so far from their own. It is easier for me to accept word of our own battle casualties than of yours, cruel as ours have been, since our forces are fighting in and for their native land. I wish I could convey to every mother and father and wife and child, and sister and brother of an American soldier killed or wounded here in Korea even some slight comfort through the knowledge that no Korean can ever forget the courage and sacrifice of these men who in the great traditions of the United States of America have come to the defense of the weak against the cruel aggressor, and have fought and given their life's blood that liberty and freedom should not perish from the earth. These soldiers of your great country, Mr. President, have lived and died as Americans, but they have given their lives even beyond love of country as citizens of the world, knowing that to permit the further destruction of the independence of free nations by the Comminazis is to clear the way to assault upon every nation, even the United States itself.

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[1] The source text is the original of this letter as transmitted by Ambassador Muccio to Mr. Acheson under a covering note, not printed, on July 19; a copy of the text was also sent in telegram 60 from Taegu (not printed), July 19, which, however, was delayed in transmission and not received in the Department of State until July 23.

As you know, the Korean people were divided against their will as a result of military decisions in 1945 regarding the 38th Parallel, to which no Korean was a party. This division permitted the development in the north, under Soviet direction and leadership, of a communist regime wholly alien to Korean traditions and feelings. With absolute control of the military, police and fiscal powers in that region of Korea, the communists, with Soviet direction, were able to create the formidable force which has caused such cruel damage not only to Korea but also to the United States and most members of the United Nations. When the Soviet sponsored regime in North Korea simultaneously attacked the defense forces of the Republic of Korea in the early morning of June 25, they ended any possible claim to the maintenance of the 38th Parallel as a political or military dividing line between free and slave Korea.

It would be utter folly to attempt to restore the *status quo ante*, and then to await the enemy's pleasure for further attack when he had had time to regroup, retrain and reequip. The time has come to cut out once and for all the cancer of imperialist aggression, the malignant growth artificially grown within the bosom of our country by the world communists.

The people of North Korea are the same as the people of South Korea. All are loyal to the land of their birth with the very few minor exceptions of foreign trained and foreign directed communists. This war is not a conflict between North and South; it is a conflict between the few who are communists, who by an accident got control of half of our country, and the overwhelming mass of the citizens of Korea, wherever they may live.

The Government and the people of the Republic of Korea consider this is the time to unify Korea, and for anything less than unification to come out of these great sacrifices of Koreans and their powerful allies would be unthinkable. I am sure, Mr. President, that you have come to the same conclusion yourself, but I wish to make clear to you the position of this Government. The Korean Government would consider as without binding effect any future agreement or understanding made regarding Korea by other states or groups of states without the consent and approval of the Government of the Republic of Korea. From statements which you have made recently I believe that this also is the position of the Government of the United States.

Daily I pray for the joint success of our arms, for clear skies so that the planes of the United States Airforce may search out and destroy the enemy, and for the earliest possible arrival of sufficient men and material so that we can turn to the offensive, break through the hard

crust of enemy forces and start the victorious march north. I have no slightest doubt in the ultimate victory of our cause; I know that both right and might are on our side.[2]

With ever continued warm personal regards,

Sincerely yours, SYNGMAN RHEE

[2] For President Truman's reply, see telegram 68 to Taegu, August 10, p. 553.

Editorial Note

On July 19, President Truman sent to the Congress a special message on the situation in Korea in which he set forth his views on the significance for the United States and the world of the events taking place there, and laid before Congress certain recommendations for legislative action. The text of the message is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, page 527. In his message, the President made the following statement on Formosa:

"In order that there may be no doubt in any quarter about our intentions regarding Formosa, I wish to state that the United States has no territorial ambitions whatever concerning that island, nor do we seek for ourselves any special position or privilege on Formosa. The present military neutralization of Formosa is without prejudice to political questions affecting that island. Our desire is that Formosa not become embroiled in hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific and that all questions affecting Formosa be settled by peaceful means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. . . ."

At 10:30 p. m. on the same evening, Mr. Truman delivered a radio and television address to the nation on Korea; text *ibid.*, page 537. In the course of his talk, he quoted from a message recently received from General MacArthur wherein the latter stated: "Our hold upon the southern part of Korea represents a secure base . . . Our strength will continually increase while that of the enemy will relatively decrease. His supply line is insecure. He has had his great chance and failed to exploit it. We are now in Korea in force, and with God's help we are there to stay until the constitutional authority of the Republic of Korea is fully restored." The full text of General MacArthur's message is printed *ibid.*, page 542.

794A.00/7–1950

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 19, 1950.

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador;
Secretary of State Acheson;
Assistant Secretary of State, George W. Perkins.

I asked Sir Oliver what he thought the reaction would be to the President's message to Congress.[1] He stated that he thought it would be taken the way we would like it to be taken. He also indicated that he sensed a growing feeling of realism in the messages that were coming through from London although there was nothing tangible to support this and attributed it partly to the return of General Slim to London from his trip to the East.[2]

Sir Oliver stated that he felt that the statement on Formosa should be of assistance. He said he was not sure as to the effect of leaving out all numbers in connection with the calling up of additional personnel. He also stated that he thought the letter to Nehru which we had just forwarded would be well received.[3]

Sir Oliver then showed me, without leaving copies, Stalin's communication to Nehru,[4] Nehru's message to London on the Stalin message, and Attlee's message to Nehru in reply, together with the comments of the U.K. High Commissioner in India on the situation. I told Sir Oliver that I thought Mr. Attlee's message was admirable and most helpful.

Sir Oliver then said he had been asked to make the following remarks: The U.K. felt that an awkward situation had been created no matter how good the motives involved were. They had tried to make clear to Mr. Nehru the dangers arising from his course of action. There were other dangers which they wished to point out. India does not consider what they are suggesting as a bargain. Perhaps we must allow for this attitude on the part of the Indians as there is great danger in a cleavage between the East and West on the issue of seating Communist China in the UN and this could be disastrous. They were trying particularly hard to avoid direct collision between the U.S. and India. They felt that it would be best if nothing happened as a result of these communications, but they were not sure

[1] See *supra*.

[2] Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had recently returned from an extensive trip during June and July to the Near East, Southeast Asia, and Australasia, for defense discussions with Commonwealth Defense Ministers and Service Chiefs.

[3] See telegram 77, July 17, 8 p. m., to New Delhi, p. 412.

[4] See enclosure 2 to the note from Madame Pandit to Mr. Acheson, July 17, p. 408.

that that would be the outcome and felt that we should keep in close contact on the problem.

I indicated that I agreed and said that I thought it would be most unfortunate if it came up in the Security Council. If it had to come up at all it would be much better to have it come up in the General Assembly where the matter would be considered on a more leisurely basis, and a direct head-on collision would perhaps thereby be avoided.

I then asked Sir Oliver if he had heard of the French suggestions for consultations.[5] He said that he had not heard of this from London but had been informed by Washington.

I told him that I thought the proposals were in good spirit and that we must, of course, be careful in setting up such consultations; we must always bear in mind the problems of communications.

I raised with him the question of how the U.S. could best approach the problem with the U.K. of the build-up of U.K. forces, always assuming that there was an established plan towards which we were working. There was not time to go deeply into this subject, and it was agreed that Sir Oliver would be kept in touch and informed.

DEAN ACHESON

[5] See telegram 332 from Paris, received at 9:23 p. m. on July 18, p. 423.

795b.5/7–1950

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 19, 1950.

Subject: Aid from UN Members in Support of the Operation in Korea.

The Department is operating on the policy of seeking to encourage in all possible ways the maximum direct participation by all UN members in support of the UN effort in Korea. An offer of direct assistance, in military or non-military form, should be considered more valuable than an expression of moral support.

Our stated position is that in the area of military assistance we welcome all offers of naval, air and ground units, particularly the latter. As a practical matter it is recognized that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur have to determine what particular military units offered by other UN members can in fact be integrated into the military effort in Korea without creating problems greater than their military contribution.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reached tentative decisions as to the acceptability from a military point of view of contributions of ground

units from particular countries. They also are in process of reaching a decision with respect to certain other countries. (See Tab "A" attached).[1]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in reaching a negative decision on a particular country, presumably base the decision on one of two grounds. Either the army of a particular country is already committed under other defense arrangements which they deem it unwise to weaken, or the quality of the troops or difficulties related to logistic support, standardization of weapons, language barrier, etc., would render particular national units unsuitable or a positive hindrance.

We are operating on the assumption that in the case of countries in units from which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed a positive interest, the Department should by all means at its disposal urge, through diplomatic channels, the government in question to make a specific offer of ground forces. We are doing so in the case of Pakistan and the UK.

In the event that countries, ground units of which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have specifically decided could not be used, offer through UN to contribute ground units, the procedure established is to publicly welcome the offer and then for the appropriate officials in the Department of Defense to discuss with the military representatives of the offering country the terms of the offer in detail and in protraction, with a view not to turning down the offer but temporizing on a basis which will not affront the offering government.

It should be noted at this point that a case or cases may arise where the political importance of having even a token detachment accepted and landed in Korea will override the military disadvantages on which the Joint Chiefs have reached their decision. The procedure in such cases would be for the Secretary to write the Secretary of Defense, pointing out the political considerations which it is believed should control and requesting the Secretary of Defense to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reconsider in the light of such considerations.

In general, it is not believed that the Department should actively press another government to offer ground or other units when it is known in advance that on the military basis an offer would be unacceptable, unless it has been determined in advance that political considerations should control.

Non-Military Assistance

Tab "B" attached,[2] shows by types of commodities and services offers of non-military assistance already made or discussed with us by other governments. Most of these fall into the area of civilian relief rather

[1] See Annex 1.
[2] See Annex 2.

than military supplies or services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have given a preliminary indication that they are interested in offers of merchant shipping and in offers of harbor and airport facilities even though the latter may not be in the Korean area and may, in fact, never be availed of. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are considering what, if any, commodities (including medicines) would possess for them a military interest. The answer is expected to be completely negative. The Joint Chiefs have also been asked to decide what interest, if any, they would have in offers of transport, aircraft and hospital units. The problem presumably, in the case of commodities and medicines, becomes one of integrating such offers into a civilian relief program. This requires coordination with ECA, whose Korean staff has been placed under General MacArthur, to provide all possible economic support of the military operation.

Procedures

A general procedure for channeling and dealing with offers of assistance on both a military and non-military basis to the UN has been worked out with the Secretary-General of the UN and the Department of Defense (see Circular Telegram of July 14, 7:00 p. m. [*8 a. m.*], Control 4174, attached as Tab "C").[3] The basic procedure for integrating offers of food, medicine, etc. for civilian relief into the ECA program is in process of final agreement, the comments of General MacArthur, Ambassador Muccio and ECA Chief in Korea Bunce having already been sought on a preliminary proposal.

Decision to be Made

1. In the case of what, if any, countries whose ground units the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not welcome on military grounds does the Department wish to press for acceptance?

[Annex 1]

PRELIMINARY VIEWS OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RE GROUND FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS

Want	*Considering*	*Don't Want*
UK	India†	Italy
Canada	Argentina†	Turkey
Pakistan	Lebanon	Philippines
New Zealand	France	Saudi Arabia
Australia*	Benelux	China
		Bolivia

[3] *Ante*, p. 377.

*MacArthur prefers to keep BCOF in Australia [*Japan?*] to fill gaps caused by transfer USA ground forces to Korea. [Footnote in the source text.]

†Probably will want. [Footnote in the source text.]

[Annex 2]

OFFERS OF NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Merchant shipping	— Norway
Rubber	— Nicaragua
Copra, etc.	— Philippines
Copper, etc.	— Chile
Rice	— Thailand

TENTATIVE

Port facilities	— Lebanon
Ambulance units	— Sweden
Transport aircraft	— Greece

795.00/7–2050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

PLAIN

Moscow, July 20, 1950.
[Received July 20—7 : 28 a. m.]

168. Following translation item today's press entitled "In Ministry Foreign Affairs USSR".

On 11 July Ambassador Great Britain Moscow, Mr. Kelly, informed Deputy Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, concerning Korean question, that English Government being bound by recent decisions Security Council, cannot at present time put forward definite proposals for peaceful settlement Korean question, that English Government considers as premature the putting forth of such proposals. Together with this Ambassador stated that English Government considers essential that as preliminary proposition military operations in Korea should cease and the North Korean troops should be withdrawn behind 38th parallel.

On 17 July Deputy Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko stated to Mr. Kelly that the Soviet Government considers as a best means of a peaceful settlement of Korean question a convening of Security Council with the essential participation of representatives of Peoples Government of China, and also that the representatives of the Korean people should be heard for solution of Korea question. Regarding the preliminary conditions of English Government, A. A. Gromyko stated to Ambassador that in order to avoid premature action it should follow that the preliminary proposal, as well as other proposals, be transmitted for the consideration of Security Council. Mr. Kelly replied that he would bring contents of statement of Soviet Government to attention English Government.

Department pass London, Delhi. Repeated info London 58, Delhi 18.

KIRK

795.00/7–2050

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

LONDON, July 20, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received July 20—9:59 a. m.]

428. For Secretary, Rusk or Perkins. British yesterday cabled British Embassy, Washington, to consult you concerning instructions to Kelly to hand Gromyko written memo restating British position so as not to leave Gromyko's last statement to him as final word.[1] There has not been time for you to comment on this message. We have examined it and British have accepted suggestion that it be made perfectly clear that in the first move in this exchange made by Gromyko he stated that Soviet Government desired a peaceful solution of the Korean situation. It would also be made clear that this is not the first time that HMG has urged Soviets to use their influence with North Koreans for withdrawal.

In the light of the incomplete and slanted version of Kelly–Gromyko conversations released by Tass at early hour this morning,[2] Cabinet decided this morning to take following steps:

(1) Instruction to Kelly as described above will be immediately despatched;[3]

(2) At 3:30 p. m. London daylight time in response to question from Eden, Prime Minister will make a full statement tracing entire history of Gromyko–Kelly talks.[4] He will conclude by saying that Kelly has been instructed again to make position of HMG entirely clear to Soviets.

There will probably be no time for you to make useful comments concerning instructions to Kelly; however, should you have any suggestions concerning Prime Minister's statement, please telephone Holmes by 2:30 p. m. London daylight time. It is doubtful that this short time schedule will permit any alteration and we believe that both instructions to Kelly and statement of Prime Minister will be found

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[1] A copy of a message from Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks containing suggestions for a memorandum to be handed to Gromyko by Sir David Kelly was transmitted to the Department of State by the British Embassy on July 19; not printed (795.00/7–1950).

[2] See *supra*.

[3] See the note from the British Embassy, July 20, p. 437.

[4] See *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 477, col. 2485; also reprinted in British Cmd. 8078, p. 27.

satisfactory. In any event these next moves are in the lap of the Gods and the conscience of the British people.

DOUGLAS

795.00/7–2050 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 20, 1950—1 p. m.

26. If accurately reported, statement UP desp quoted immed preceding tel [1] attributed to "US Govt official" directly contravenes directive contained Deptel 16 Jul 14. Request immed report circumstances this statement and steps taken prevent recurrence.

ACHESON

[1] Telegram 25 transmitted the text of the following UP dispatch of July 19, datelined "Somewhere in Korea":

"A US Government official said today that when the United Nations forces push northward in Korea it would be most unrealistic from the military standpoint, if not actually impossible, to halt at the 38th Parallel.

"He contended that from the political standpoint it would be 'unthinkable' for the Americans and South Koreans to stop fighting at the boundary.

"The official, who worked and studied in Korea for years, said a return to the way things were before the war here would negate everything the Allies hoped to accomplish in fighting against the attempt to communize all Korea.

"That would make similar clashes in the future virtually inescapable, he said." (795.00/7–2050)

795.00/7–2050

The British Embassy to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR DAVID KELLY
DATED 20TH JULY, 1950

Following is text of *Aide-Mémoire*.[2]

His Majesty's Government observing that the Soviet Government have issued a version of the recent talks between Mr. Gromyko, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow on the Korean question, wish to restate their views so that the Soviet Government may be under no misunderstanding regarding their attitude.

[1] A manuscript note in the source text indicated that this document was handed to Mr. Rusk at 3 p. m. on July 20.

[2] A previous telegram from Mr. Bevin to Sir David Kelly, a copy of which (not printed) was transmitted by the British Embassy to the Department of State, had instructed Sir David to deliver this *aide-mémoire* to the Soviet Government at the earliest possible opportunity (795.00/7–2050).

2. His Majesty's Government have noted the views of the Soviet Government on the question of the participation of representatives of the Chinese People's Government in the Security Council. On this point His Majesty's Government have already made known their policy, namely, that it is a question which must be decided on its own merits by a majority.

3. The immediate issue, however, is that of stopping hostilities in Korea, in regard to which His Majesty's Government wish to reaffirm their support for the resolutions of the Security Council. In the view of His Majesty's Government the restoration of peace in Korea cannot be made conditional on the settlement of other issues.

4. Noting the expressed desire of the Soviet Government for a peaceful settlement, His Majesty's Government wish to reiterate the hope already expressed by His Majesty's Ambassador that the Soviet Government will use their influence with the North Koreans to bring about an immediate end of hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the northward of the 38th parallel.

WASHINGTON, [July 20, 1950.]

330/7–1850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 20, 1950—6 p. m.

359. Pls deliver fol reply to Schuman's *Aide-Mémoire* (Embtel 332 of July 18) :

The American Govt has been gratified by the full and prompt support of the French Govt in connection with its action in the Korean crisis both as an ally and as a fellow member of the UN. In this connection it has noted with particular gratification the decision of the French Govt to dispatch a naval unit to the Korean theatre.

In a crisis of this nature this Govt is in full accord with the suggestion that the closest contact be established and maintained between the Govts of France, Great Britain and the United States. The French proposal is being given urgent study and our comments on the best means of carrying out the necessary consultations will be advanced as soon as possible.[1]

Sent Paris as Deptel 359; Repeated London for info as Deptel 365.

ACHESON

[1] In telegram 398 to Paris, July 21, not printed, the Department suggested that tripartite talks might begin in Paris in early August by which time Mr. Bohlen would probably have returned to the Embassy there (330/7–1850).

795B.00/7–2050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 20, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received July 21—6 : 53 a. m.]

159. 1. At Rajagopalachari's suggestion (new Minister without Portfolio) I had long talk with him early July 19 re Korean situation. He said he wished to talk to me before meeting of special Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs called by Nehru to consider replies to Prime Minister's message to Stalin and Secretary of State.

2. Rajagopalachari initiated our substantive conversation by saying he supposed US Government and perhaps I were personally annoyed at approaches by Prime Minister at this time to Moscow and Washington, particularly at injection of Chinese representation SC into problem of Korean aggression. I replied "not at all". I understood and I was confident my government understood motives which had prompted Nehru to send his messages to Washington and Moscow. We appreciated international and domestic position of Prime Minister and could see he must convince Indians and other nations looking to him for leadership that he was leaving no stone unturned in bringing about termination hostilities in Korea without weakening effectiveness of UN. It was unfortunate that Stalin, instead of responding to Nehru in like spirit of sincerity, had with some success, given twist to exchange of messages which had served purpose Soviet and Communist propaganda. We could not blame Nehru for Stalin's trickiness.

3. At Rajagopalachari's request I explained to him at length developments in Korea and Far East and our attitude with respect thereto as I understood them. While I was pointing out to him necessity of our sending armed assistance to ROK even before SC had passed second resolution, he interrupted and said it was not necessary for me to enlarge on that point. It was clear that if US had failed to give immediate armed assistance to ROK, some free countries and many persons throughout world who were now making critical remarks re US policies would have been among first to criticize US for talking much and doing little. They would have said that although US for years had been stating its determination to resist aggression and that it was only power with forces close at hand sufficiently strong to stand up against the aggression, it had shown indecisiveness and hesitation until it was too late to be of any real assistance. There could be no question in his mind that US had no choice other than to send armed

forces to Korea just as soon as SC had resolved that breach of peace had taken place. What concerned him was US attitude re Chinese representation in SC. Nehru claimed that if US had not prevented Communist China from being admitted into UN, aggression in Korea would not have taken place.

4. I said I was frankly astonished at advancement such theory. I did not believe that it could be supported by evidence or logic. I could see no connection between Chinese representation in SC and attack on Korea, unless I should try to argue that Russia deliberately encouraged Communist China to conduct itself so that it would be refused admittance to SC thus giving Russia excuse not to be in SC at time aggression was being launched. I would not try, however, to support this thesis because I could not prove it. Aggression in Korea, however, not well planned and undoubtedly was merely one manifestation of aggressive designs on part international Communists which point in many directions. It seemed to me unfair to attempt to place blame for aggression on US because its attitude re Chinese representation instead of where it belongs—on international Communists. I added that although it must be clear to every intelligent, informed person that Korean aggression had been planned and directed by Russia with cooperation Communist China, we thus gain our desire not to put Russia and Communist China into position from which they could not well retreat had not [*we?*] publicly accused them of connection with this aggression.

5. Rajagopalachari asked if we had evidence that Russian or Chinese nationals were engaged in actual fighting. I replied that I could not answer this question but there was no doubt that strategy was being planned by Russian officers and that many of those engaged in fighting had been trained in the Soviet Union as well as in North Korea by Russian instructors. Planes, tanks, ammunition, et cetera, had been furnished by Russia. We on our part had refused to supply heavy tanks, et cetera, to ROK in pursuance our general policy not to supply other countries with weapons which might be considered to be of aggressive character. Result this policy had, of course, been disastrous to ROK but we still believed that policy was right because results had made it clear that while we had refrained from giving ROK equipment which would permit it to engage in aggression, Russia had been preparing Northern Korea for aggression.

6. Rajagopalachari said that it seemed to him that main difference of opinion between US and India at present related to Chinese representation. I said it was difficult for me understand how anyone could seriously believe that at time when American lives were being sacrificed in supporting UN opposition to aggression, US Government

would be expected to reverse position which it had taken in past and support admission into SC of regime that was lauding aggressor and condemning US and UN for opposing aggression. How could US change its attitude in such circumstances particularly when Peiping regime continued demonstrate all those qualities which had contributed to original US decision not to vote for its admission into SC? Rajagopalachari said he could well understand US attitude and appreciated my frankness in discussing matter with him. He hoped to keep in close touch with me during days to come.

HENDERSON

795.00/7–2150: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 21, 1950—8 a. m.

Although Taejon lost, Tokyo Hdqtrs reports local successes in center and on east coast where Allied naval strikes punishing enemy. In Hamchang-Andong area enemy flanking movements are complete failure. Several points retaken. Enemy force of undetermined size moving south on west coast plain and advance elements reported 60 miles southwest Taejon. No friendly forces this sector. ROK naval base Kunsan lost. Enemy growing more sensitive US air attacks, now reluctant to enter into action in daylight and taking steps conserve dwindling transport by elaborate camouflage. Enemy estimated lost half armor in 4 weeks action, 156 of estimated 260–412 armored vehicles knocked out. Our air action especially carrier strikes have reduced enemy air capabilities to only 75 sorties a day.

Re SyG Lie's circ request aid for Korea, top Canad officials endorse UN US stand but not convinced of gravity situation. Canad dispatched a long-range air transport sqdrn and may send more destroyers but probably not troops since Canad Army has only one operational brigade. NZ consulting other Commonwealth countries, waiting to see what they do. Unlikely NZ ground troops be sent due long training needed. Swed finds it impossible modify position and provide troops but willing supply field hospitals. Cannot supply ambulances since Swed Army has none spare. Ital cannot supply material aid at least for present. East Pak Army has urged Pak Govt send troops. SyG Indian Fonoff thinks Nehru unlikely assign even token force just now. Ceylon Primin stated if Korea shld develop into "struggle between Communism and democracy" no doubt which side Ceylon wld fight. According Pak Dipl in Jidda there some hope for change in

[1] Sent to 38 diplomatic missions and to the Consulates General in Hong Kong and Singapore.

Egypt attitude near future. Turk UN rep said any hesitation part Turk on offering troops due to fear of direct attack on Turk. Amemb Athens hopes Greek Govt offer of six C–47s will not be accepted by UN due technical problems. Little chance Iran will offer troops or other aid. Phil Fonmin Romulo repeated offer 25,000 Phil Scouts to be outfitted by US. Pres Quirino stated Phil Army needed in anti-Huk campaign at home. Thai Fonmin reported in press to have offered 4,000 best combat troops ready within month.

PolAd Tokyo notes current Jap anti-Commie drive taking edge off Jap Commie Party activities. Party line newspapers are closed as soon as they open. Commie line concentrating on appeal that US and UN will bring renewed suffering not peace. Numerical strength Party reduced and labor unions culling rolls. Jap Primin explains to Diet that move expand police reserves taken to provide against emergency of possible Commie infringement on Jap territory and disturbance internal law and order.

Emb Paris and Leg Dublin note that Commies capitalizing on sensational emotional type stories on "stumbling, sobbing GIs" such as those filed by Homer Bigart and Marguerite Higgins from Korea. Such stories have helped make Europeans seriously doubt effectiveness US mil support in event Sov aggression Europe.

Replying recent Schuman *aide-mémoire* calling for reassessment western strategy in light Korean developments, we state that US in full accord with Fr suggestion that closest contact be maintained between US, UK and Fr. We particularly gratified at Fr decision send naval unit to Korean area.

Yugo UN rep Bebler said he becoming personally more concerned possibilities aggression against Yugo. He referred to mounting campaigns in USSR and satellites alleging that Yugo prepares for war on neighbors with US connivance. He intends invite member Amer Progressive Party such as Henry Wallace to inspect Yugo first hand to determine whether Yugo permits fon powers to have milit bases on Yugo soil.

Bebler also commented that it unfortunate Nehru in message to Stalin had given latter opportunity to place Chi UN representation question in front of the aggression in Korea.

US Chargé in Taipei reports that most Amers there believe Commies having little success among civilians, particularly Formosans. However, ample discontent present in armed forces for Commies to work on.

ACHESON

795.00/7–2150 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 21, 1950—9 a. m.

Fol summary re Korea:

Re SYG's circ re material aid and troops Nor govt unable furnish ground troops. Swed unable provide troops but cld supply field hospitals. Requested clarification procedures envisaged in circ as did reps Fr, NZ, Canad, Braz, Bol, Mex, Urug, Arg. Neth states practically impossible send Dutch troops. Previous reports Peron planning offer Arg troops unfounded. Emb Tehran believes little chance Iran will offer mil support and cld hardly offer other aid in view internal situation. Indian FonOff doubtful Nehru wld feel he cld send token troops just now. Benelux powers to meet discuss question. Nic only country make UN firm offer troops. Iraqi Chargé privately assured us under instrs his govt that Iraq not neutral but lined up solidly with West. Peru placing embargo on trade with NK. We considering direct appeal for UK troops.

Hung first satellite openly suggest aid NK. All Hungs asked by "natl peace council" contribute money for field hospital. Turk FonMin wld deplore "Korean compromise" if *quid pro quo* were UN admission Commie Chi. Ceylon official said Ceylon not neutral and wld have supported SC res if UN member. In event Korean conflict shld become struggle between commies and democracy no doubt on which side Ceylon wld fight. While bulk Israel's population continues support govt decision back SC, commies and left-wing Mapam taking Cominform line. UK auths Hong Kong Singapore now have effective controls on exports I–A list to Chi, NK.

Korea situation reflected in planned Fr offensive against Ho Chi Minh, in our Mil Survey Mission recommendations that cuts in our mil aid program for Phils be restored and additional aid be provided soon, and in first MDAP shipments going Indo.

ACHESON

[1] Sent to Addis Ababa, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Colombo, Damascus, Jidda, Monrovia, Tangier, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, and Tunis.

711.5/7–2150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET Moscow, July 21, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received July 21—5 : 41 p. m.]

183. Needless to say President's address to nation on 19 July is inspiring and already gives great encouragement. It is particularly

gratifying to note that the word "Communist" has been used to name the aggressor, and the avoidance of referring directly to Soviets.

In this connection, we and all the world know what government has inspired this attack in Korea, but it is currently advisable to employ the term "Communist" to stigmatize the aggressor. Restraint for the moment will let the door stay partly open, at least, and give time for other events to produce their effect.

I continue to feel it is prudent to keep from engaging directly personal prestige of Stalin as well as of Politburo and Soviet Government, for there still is no evidence available here to show Soviets intend precipitate full scale world war. What moves Kremlin may be planning are not yet discernible, but it does seem their position remains sufficiently flexible to allow retreat under some formula which they might themselves devise. I would incline towards expectation of period of détente until military position develops further.

Of course the speedier the action taken by the Congress, and otherwise, to implement the President's program, the greater will be the effect not only upon the Politburo but also upon waverers elsewhere.

Reply to Nehru by Secretary State[1] likewise brings clearly into focus primary source of threat to peace in Korea, while at same time dissipating misty proposition concerning China seat in UN. We already see how well British Government has come forward to make it's position known to world on these issues.

Department pass London, Paris. Repeated information London 61, Paris 49.

KIRK

[1] See telegram 77, July 17, 8 p. m., to New Delhi, p. 412.

357.AD/7–2150 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 21, 1950—7 p. m.

127. For MacArthur eyes only from Dulles. I have just looked over the exchange of views between the Dept and yourself re Romulo.[1] I can quite appreciate that Romulo's presence at Korean headquarters wld be an embarrassing diversion in a tense situation requiring concentration on military matters. However, I feel that there are moral and psychological objectives of great importance which wld be served by bringing Romulo in some way onto the scene in his capacity as President of the United Nations General Assembly.

[1] See telegram 102, July 17, to Tokyo, and the unnumbered telegram from Tokyo, July 18, pp. 411 and 422.

This wld have immediate significance because of his UN position and because he is an Asiatic. Also it wld have longer range importance because of his probable presence and large influence at the Sept meeting of the Assembly which will undoubtedly debate the Korean matter. I know that you will fully grasp these implications. Wld it be feasible without excessive personal strain on you, for you to invite Romulo to come to Tokyo at a time you pick for a brief talk with you as the Supreme Commander for the United Nations forces? He might then make a broadcast from Tokyo and promptly return to Manila. If at that moment it seemed practical for him to set foot on Korean soil without disturbance to the GHQ there, that cld be determined by you at the time, but wld not be any part of a prearranged program.

Best wishes and we are all proud of the magnificent effort you are directing. [Dulles.]

ACHESON

795.00/7–2250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

MOSCOW, July 22, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received July 22—8 : 54 a. m.]

189. AP correspondent reports that he attempted transmit news story along line that only solution Korean issue lay in seating Chinese Communists UN and that Soviets would accept no other formula. Censors expunged all phraseology which indicated that Soviets view seating Chinese Communists as only path to peaceful settlement. Correspondent then took different tack and wrote newsstory to effect that "way to peacefully settling Korean question not completely closed", that door remains open, etc., and this was passed by Soviet censors.

While attitude censors obviously not conclusive evidence Soviet policy, foregoing would appear be further evidence that Soviets carefully keeping their position sufficiently flexible to allow retreat (mytel 183, July 21).

Department pass London, Paris. Repeated info London 63, Paris 51.

KIRK

357.AD/7–2250 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TOKYO, July 22, 1950—7 : 11 p. m.
[Received July 22—10 : 29 a. m.]

6310. Personal for Honorable John Foster Dulles.

"Reference your message No. 127, July 21. I understand fully the

psychological and moral factors involved in giving the greatest possible prominence to the United Nations Korea effort. I also fully understand the value of the use of an Oriental for such purpose. I do not believe, however, that Romulo is an acceptable agent in this particular area. He is immensely unpopular among the Japanese because of the bitter and unrelenting stand he has taken with reference to their recovery in any form. They understand fully how he has opposed, in the most implacable and unrelenting way, practically every United States effort with reference to Japanese recovery or an equitable and just Japanese peace. His completely selfish and nationalistic attitude on reparations has aroused hatred and resentment on the part of all Japanese of whatever party or affiliation. In the Far Eastern Commission, his stand has been perhaps the most obstructive and destructive of any of the members except that of the Soviet. His general attitude was only recently given particular emphasis in his tart and offensive reply to Ambassador Grew's appeal for support for the campaign to raise funds for the projected International Christian University in Japan. His presence here could not fail to arouse the greatest possible Japanese resentment, just at the moment when I am seeking the greatest possible Japanese cordiality. He is also completely unacceptable to the Koreans, as he is held responsible by them for canceling the invitation which President Quirino was understood to have given to the Korean Foreign Service at the time of the Southeast Asia meeting in Baguio some months ago.[1] The mortification and humiliation felt by Koreans at this incident has left a permanent scar. A similar feeling exists towards him in Nationalist China circles where he is credited with having not only blocked the presence of the Chinese Nationalists at the Southeast Asia meeting, but also to have completely vitiated its original purpose, which was to oppose the advance of Communistic influences in Southeast Asia.

As you know, he is an old comrade of mine and I hold him personally in the greatest possible esteem, but in my opinion, a most fundamental and irreparable error would result from trying to inject him into the local situation.

Everyone here joins me in heartiest regards. MacArthur."[2]

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[1] See footnote 1 to the letter from Mr. Muccio to Mr. Rusk, May 25, p. 88.

[2] The following reply to this message was sent by the Department of State in telegram 138, July 24, 7 p. m., to Tokyo:

"Personal for General MacArthur from Dulles. Thanks for your message Number 6310, DTG221011Z. I appreciate your going to the trouble to explain so fully the complications. I had known there were irritations, but had not sensed that they were big enough to offset the advantage of bringing onto the scene the President of the Assembly who is also an Asiatic. Your message puts the matter in a new light and I fear we must regretfully forego the project, at least for the present. With sincere good wishes." (320/7–2450)

795B.551/7–2250

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

LONDON, July 22, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received July 22—11:21 a. m.]

485. ReDeptel 401, July 21.[1] Strongly suggest that you permit me have personal talk with Attlee on subject of British plans and possible contribution ground forces in Korea before taking any further steps. I will not put anything formally to him but can sound him out as to British intentions.

It seems to me there are two issues here. First, the extent of British contribution of ground forces in Korean affair and secondly, whether British will follow our pattern of semi-mobilization. Reason I make this recommendation so strongly is that I believe it would be far better if British were to make offer on their own initiative instead of as result of *aide-mémoire* from us.

An *aide-mémoire* could probably not be withheld from Commons and feeling might begin develop in certain quarters of Labor Party that we were pressing issue.[2]

DOUGLAS

[1] Not printed; it stated the Department's strong feeling that the United Kingdom should make a commitment of ground forces to Korea as soon as possible and questioned Ambassador Douglas on the desirability of the Department's transmitting an *aide-mémoire* on this subject to the British Ambassador in Washington (795B.5/7–2150).

[2] Department telegram 416, July 22, 2 p. m., to London, not printed, expressed agreement with the line of action suggested by Ambassador Douglas in telegram 485 (795B.551/7–2250).

795.00/7–2250 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY NIACT

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1950—4 p. m.

106. Eyes only for Henderson. Dept now considering possible further msg from Sec to Nehru along lines fol text. Highly important that existence and content any such msg and any ensuing correspondence be kept secret. Dept requests your soonest advice such msg, particularly with regard to (1) content (2) whether we shld send another msg now or allow Nehru time to cool off and think things over and (3) whether it desirable to raise fresh series of exchanges on matters on which we disagree. Text follows:

"My dear Mr. Prime Minister: As my message of July 18[1] was to be released to the press, I did not for obvious reasons specifically

[1] See telegram 77, July 17, 8 p. m., to New Delhi, p. 412.

address myself therein to the points raised in the communication delivered to me by your Ambassador on July 17. I should now like, on a strictly personal and confidential basis, to give you my thoughts on those points.

"It may well be that Moscow is seeking a way out of its present entanglement without loss of prestige. Our experience with the Kremlin leads us to believe, however, that it will make every effort to find an exit which will also provide positive gain in terms of an increase of Soviet influence throughout the world. One such gain would be the seating of representatives of the Peiping regime in the Security Council in circumstances which would create the impression in many parts of the world that the US had made a deal with the USSR to buy off Communist aggression in Korea.

"It seems to me that the four sentences beginning 'Since the Govt of India' in your message of July 19 [2] put well and succinctly the Indian position with respect to the Peiping regime. I shall try to state as briefly our position.

"We have not recognized Peiping for reasons which you and I discussed while you were in the US last autumn [3]—reasons which we believe are still valid. We have consistently opposed the seating of Peiping representatives in UN organs, at the same time making it clear that we would accept the decision of a constitutional majority in any organ. Our position has not changed and in our view has been reinforced by Peiping's rejection of the findings of the UNCOK and the SC in the Korean situation and its open support of the North Korean aggressor.

"Your request that the US exert its authority and influence to bring about the seating of Peiping representatives in the SC put us in a very difficult position. It was, as you point out, consistent with India's past policy for you to make the request, but it would have been wholly inconsistent with our past policy for us to accept your proposal. We had hoped that in the present critical phase of the development of the UN as an effective mechanism to prevent aggression it would be possible for those nations sharing the common objective of stopping aggression in Korea to avoid becoming involved in difficulties over other questions such as Chinese representation in the UN. I am confident that this will still be possible between India and the US.

"You expressed in your message of July 17 the honest belief that there is a real chance of a peaceful settlement in Korea if Peiping representatives enter and the USSR returns to the SC. You also said that if Peiping and Moscow thereafter proved unreasonable, world opinion would hold them responsible for the consequences. I have given much thought to these two statements which I conceive to be very much at the heart of your position.

"I greatly doubt on the basis of our experience with the USSR that the presence of Moscow and Peiping in the SC would be conducive to a peaceful settlement in Korea. In any event, there has been no intimation from Moscow that they would comply with SC resolutions and stop the aggression in Korea. This is admittedly a matter of

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[2] See telegram 148, from New Delhi, received on July 19 at 9:27 a. m., p. 425.

[3] Related documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, volume VI.

judgment, but if they were to come into the SC and your estimate of the effect of their presence proved wrong, a real disaster might result. One consequence might be a development which our two governments have been striving to prevent—namely, the permanent splitting away from the UN of the USSR and its satellites. If Moscow and Peiping were unreasonable and world opinion were to mobilize against them as you foresee, the issue might be so sharply drawn between the free world and the Soviet bloc that no reconciliation within the UN system would be possible. It seems to us that the risks inherent in your proposal are even greater than those we face in the current situation.

"I know that you have been deeply concerned about Formosa as one facet of the Chinese problem. I hope that the President's message to Congress [4] removed any doubts that you may have had about our intentions with respect to that island.

(To Henderson: Here you could orally summarize this section message to Congress and furnish text excerpt, if you desire)

"I understand that yours is the only non-Communist government which has effective diplomatic relations with the Peiping regime. I hope you will find it possible to apprise your Ambassador in Peiping of our position with respect to Formosa and make every effort to persuade Peiping that its own interests require that it avoid intervention in the Korean situation or an attack upon Formosa.

"Although our recent communications unhappily highlighted our divergent views on the Peiping regime, they did reveal a gratifying unity of purpose to strengthen the UN in resisting aggression. I believe our agreement with respect to Korea is of greater importance than our disagreement over China."

ACHESON

[4] See the editorial note under date of July 19, p. 430.

795.00/7–2250

Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, July 22, 1950.][1]

Problem:

To decide upon U.S. policy regarding the advance beyond the 38th parallel of U.S. forces now engaged in Korea as a part of the U.N. forces.

Analysis:

1. As U.N. forces drive back North Korean forces and approach the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U.N. members which are supporting the Security Council

[1] The source text bore the notation that it was drafted on July 22, by George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff; an attached chit by Philip H. Watts of the Policy Planning Staff, dated July 23, 9:45 a. m., indicated that this was the latest draft of "the 38th parallel paper".

Resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities can be confined to Korea or will spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

2. In its Resolution of June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security Council noted "with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea", determined "that this action constitutes a breach of the peace," called for "the immediate cessation of hostilities", called upon "all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities."

3. In its Resolution of June 27, 1950, the Security Council noted "from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security"; noted "the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security"; and recommended "that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area".

4. In a third Resolution of July 7, the Security Council requested the United States to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized that these forces fly the U.N. flag. In response to this Resolution, General MacArthur has been designated as Commander of these forces. The Republic of Korea also has placed its forces under General MacArthur's command.

5. In his message to the Congress on July 19, President Truman stated that he thought it important that the nature of our military action in Korea be understood; that it should be made perfectly clear that the action was undertaken as a matter of basic moral principle; that the United States was going to the aid of a nation established and supported by the United Nations and unjustifiably attacked by an aggressor force.

6. The primary purpose of the present military action in Korea is to bring about the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. This action is being carried out under the provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which deals with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

7. The General Assembly Resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948 and October 21, 1949 are a part of the U.N. effort which is strongly supported by the United States, to bring about the

complete independence and unity of Korea. This effort is based upon provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter, dealing with pacific settlement of disputes.

8. There are, therefore, two major parts of the Korean problem: (*a*) the long-term effort to bring about unity and independence, and (*b*) the present enforcement action to repel North Korean aggression. This paper is addressed to the latter phase of the problem.

9. The following contingencies are envisaged as the U.N. enforcement action develops, provided North Korean forces are not reinforced by USSR or Communist Chinese troops; (*a*) voluntary withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel before U.N. forces have begun a counter-offensive; (*b*) a withdrawal in good order of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel at a time when they are being driven northward to a point approaching the 38th parallel; (*c*) a major defeat and disintegration of North Korean forces during the period when they are being driven back toward the 38th parallel; (*d*) continued resistance by North Korean forces after U.N. forces have reached the 38th parallel. Another contingency is the occupation of North Korea to the 38th parallel by Soviet or Communist Chinese forces before the U.N. forces reach the 38th parallel, or active support of the North Korean forces south of the 38th parallel by Chinese Communist or Soviet forces.

10. A need for important decisions will arise with a reversal of the military situation in Korea and the approach of U.N. forces toward the 38th parallel. It is probable that at the time when it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression cannot succeed and that eventually North Korean forces will be driven back north of the 38th parallel the Kremlin will take a decision (if it has not already done so) regarding a course of action in the new situation.

11. There is ample evidence of the strategic importance to Russia of the Korean peninsula. It is extremely unlikely that the Kremlin would accept the establishment in North Korea of a regime which it could not dominate and control.

When it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression will be defeated, there might be some agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the North Korean regime which would mean in substance that U.N. military action north of the 38th parallel would result in conflict with the U.S.S.R. or Communist China.

While fighting is in progress south of the 38th parallel, the Kremlin might bring about the occupation of North Korea either with its own or with Chinese communist forces.

The Kremlin might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities still are in progress south of the 38th parallel. It is possible that the basis would be the withdrawal in good order of

North Korean forces and the continued division of the country along the 38th parallel. The situation at the time of such a possible proposal might make its acceptance desirable; but we should guard against terms that would leave the aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

12. Since the United States is participating in a U.N. action, the attitude of its U.N. allies are important.

If North Korean forces withdraw or are driven back to the 38th parallel, it is doubtful that there would be majority support in the United Nations for continued military action by the U.N. forces for the purpose of imposing a settlement that would result in a unified and independent Korea.

There probably would be reluctance and opposition to multilateral use of force as a part of the United Nations effort, initiated under the provisions for pacific settlement, to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. This is particularly true as concerns many of the countries of Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia.

13. The future of the Korean people is an important consideration. The United States has supported the U.N. effort to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. The United States is concerned about the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea and the Korean people.

Having been the victim of armed attack from North Korea, the Republic of Korea naturally will want a settlement that gives a maximum guarantee against the danger of similar future attacks. Consequently, if the North Korean forces are driven back to the 38th parallel, the Republic of Korea may well urge the continued pursuit of those forces until they are destroyed.

14. Likewise, public and Congressional opinion in the United States might be dissatisfied with any conclusion falling short of what it would consider a "final" settlement of the problem. Hence, a sentiment might arise favoring a continuation of military action north of the 38th parallel. The development of such a sentiment might create serious problems for the execution of United States policy.

15. The disadvantages of a failure to attain the complete independence and unity of Korea after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel must be weighed against the risk of a major conflict with the U.S.S.R. or Communist China that such a settlement might well involve. Furthermore, if the North Korean forces are decisively defeated and if North Korea suffers heavy material damage from air attack, those forces are not likely to attack again soon. By that time the United States and other U.N. members should be in a much stronger position to take effective action. It seems

likely, also, that a satisfactory permanent solution of the Korean problem can be hoped for only when and if a substantial accommodation is reached between the U.S.S.R. and the non-communist world.

Conclusions:

16. If U.N. forces were to continue military ground action north of the 38th parallel except to the extent essential for tactical requirements as fighting approaches that line, the danger of conflict with Chinese communist or Soviet forces would be greatly increased.

17. From the point of view of U.S. military commitments and strength, we should make every effort to restrict military ground action to the area south of the 38th parallel, to bring about a cessation of hostilities on acceptable terms as rapidly as possible, and to work for a situation that will minimize the requirements for U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea.

18. U.N. military action north of the 38th parallel, except to the extent essential for tactical requirements as fighting approaches that line, would require a new Security Council resolution. Such new resolution might be difficult to obtain. U.S. action without U.N. support should be avoided unless absolutely required by considerations of national security.

19. The risks of bringing on a major conflict with the U.S.S.R. or Communist China, if U.N. military action north of the 38th parallel is employed in an effort to reach a "final" settlement in Korea, appear to outweigh the political advantages that might be gained from such further military action.

20. In the unlikely event that there is a complete disintegration of North Korean forces together with a failure of the Kremlin and Communist China to take any action whatever to exert influence in North Korea, U.N. forces, acting in pursuance of an additional Security Council resolution, might move into North Korea in order to assist in the establishment of a united and independent Korea.

21. Efforts to secure the unity and independence of Korea should be vigorously pressed if the North Koreans show a disposition to sue for armistice terms, or by means of the pacific settlement procedures of the United Nations after the North Korean forces have been driven back or withdraw to the 38th parallel and hostilities have ceased.

Recommendations:

22. It should be kept constantly before world opinion that U.S. forces in Korea are acting as a part of U.N. forces in response to Security Council resolutions; that they are acting in support of the moral principle of repelling aggression; that their immediate purpose is to bring about the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel; and that other measures in

regard to Korea which might be necessary or desirable, once the aggression has been brought to an end, would be a subject for U.N. consideration.

23. The Department of State should keep developments in Korea under close and constant study, in order that decisions regarding our action can be taken rapidly whenever they are required by new situations.

24. Copies of this paper should be sent to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations and to General MacArthur for information and guidance.

330/7–2350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 23, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received July 23—6:36 p. m.]

180. Deptel 106, July 22.

1. It is somewhat difficult decide whether or not we should engage in further correspondence on this subject. Among factors this end are:

(*a*) Nehru and Bajpai who in effect is FonMin appear to be considerably irritated at our reply. Bajpai particularly seems to have taken reply as personal affront and has made number of sarcastically critical remarks to other chiefs of mission. For instance, immediately following receipt our reply British Chargé asked him if Indian press might not start campaign against US. Bajpai's answer was "They won't like the American reply any better than I". To another diplomat he said "The US has made its decision and the worse for US". To another he said US had completely failed understand spirit in which approach was made. Bajpai's anger due in part personal pique. Although idea of sending messages was it seems first suggested by Krishna Menon HC to UK most effective foe of US among Nehru's trusted inner circle, Bajpai assumed role master strategist. He personally drafted messages after presenting arguments to me re importance seating of Peiping in SC, after working on British, etc. With his supersensitive mind he apparently has interpreted second paragraph our reply in which we state our policies re maintenance peace and of strengthening UN as veiled insinuations that our policies this respect were in contrast those of India. He apparently failed note that this paragraph had been inspired by mention these points in Nehru's original message to us. This misconception Bajpai's part responsible for third paragraph Nehru's second published note.[1] Neither Nehru nor Bajpai has made move discuss exchange with me subsequent receipt our reply. I have considered it wise not to approach them on subject for present. Bajpai has taken occasion twice to tell me over telephone

[1] See telegram 148, from New Delhi, received on July 19 at 9:27 a. m., p. 425. Reference is to the third and fourth sentences of Mr. Nehru's message.

that GOI considers correspondence on this subject as "terminated" and both times I have indicated my belief US Government has similar views.

(*b*) Indian press in general has denounced what it considers as thwarting by US of Nehru's efforts for peace. Nehru by this move has won back favor of those sections Indian press which most enthusiastically support India's policy of "non-alignment with either power bloc." Nehru and Bajpai are undoubtedly encouraging to some extent criticism in Indian press our response to Nehru's approach.

(*c*) There is no indication our reply has irritated such Indian political leaders as Patel [2] and Rajagopalachari who seem to understand our position.

(*d*) Nehru and Bajpai are further annoyed by leak in Washington of Nehru's second message.[3] Bajpai telephoned me about *NY Times* article expressing surprise Nehru and self and complaining same time re *NY Times* unfortunate editorial on Kashmir.

2. I am inclined believe that in spite Bajpai's intimations GOI would prefer correspondence closed we should send immediately another note along lines suggested. Following my reasons:

(*a*) By outlining with such frankness our reasons for turning down Nehru approach to us we would indicate that we consider his cooperation important and desire take him into our confidence.

(*b*) Delivery of note would furnish Nehru and Bajpai self-satisfying opportunity give vent to their resentment arising from injured pride. It would also give me chance to point out their misinterpretation spirit of our formal reply.

(*c*) Note contains convincing exposition our position which must have certain effect on Nehru and much more so on other members his new Cabinet Committee on Korea—Patel, Rajagopalachari, Ayyangar.

(*d*) Delivery should be soon in order prevent resentment Nehru and Bajpai from hardening and to influence them to curtail their critical comments of us to Indian leaders and press and foreign diplomats and from taking other steps which might be injurious.

3. Following represent certain suggestions re Department's draft:

(*a*) First sentence fourth paragraph. It might be helpful instead merely of referring to reasons given Nehru orally last autumn for our failure to recognize Peiping, to list most cogent reasons as we did in recent message to Bevin (Deptel 40, July 10 [4] section 2 first seven numbered points). Foreign Relations Committee Cabinet might thus be in better position understand our policy toward Peiping.

(*b*) Change next last sentence paragraph 5 to read:

"We are hoping that in the present critical phase of the development of the UN as an effective mechanism to prevent aggression

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[2] Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhai Patel.

[3] See enclosure 1 to the note from Madame Pandit to Mr. Acheson, July 17, p. 408.

[4] See telegram 132, July 10, 5 p. m. to London, p. 347, repeated to New Delhi as 40.

those nations sharing the common objective of stopping aggression in Korea will not permit differences of opinion over such questions as Chinese representation to divert their attention and energies from the attainment of this objective."

(*c*) Second sentence penultimate paragraph. Substitute words "continue to endeavor" for "make every effort".

4. Any leak Washington this message after previous leaks would be most unfortunate. It is difficult us believe leaks have been US sources. We are wondering whether member some foreign diplomatic mission in Washington might not have been indiscreet.

HENDERSON

795.00/7–2150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TAEGU, July 21, 1950.
[Received July 24—12:49 a. m.]

72. ReDeptels 25 [1] and 26, July 20 on UP despatch. Check reveals quoted despatch is paraphrase of much longer despatch on general subject filed by Ralph Teatsorth on July 19. Teatsorth filed despatch after long, private, off record, informal talk with FSR Noble who assures me he was not speaking on subject for publication.

I have again strictly instructed staff to refrain from any discussion whatsoever this issue. On receipt Deptel 16, July 14, I invited members my staff and also Army's attention to its content since US Government official, in that case, proved to be acting PIO. Every effort will be made by all US Government agencies here to abide by Department directives.

MUCCIO

[1] See footnote 1 to telegram 26 to Taegu, July 20, 1 p. m., p. 437.

330/7–2450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 24, 1950—10 a. m.
[Received July 24—4:52 a. m.]

182. Embtel 180, July 23.

1. I suggest further minor alteration to draft message to Nehru.[1] Last clause, first sentence, final paragraph be changed to read "they

[1] See telegram 106, to New Delhi, July 22, 4 p. m., p. 447.

also served to emphasize our unity of purpose to strengthen the UN in resisting aggression."

2. In order further to smooth ruffled feelings I suggest that passage similar to following be inserted in Department's draft immediately before last paragraph: "I particularly regret that we were unable to respond in what you might have considered a generous manner to your message of July 17. We fully appreciate your earnest desire that hostilities in Korea be terminated before they spread to other countries. We are convinced, however, that they can be terminated without encouragement to the aggressor and to potential aggressors only after the unconditional withdrawal of aggressor from the ROK. We also understand your deep interest in China and your evident desire for the maintenance of friendly relations with your neighbors, the people of China. We too are most anxious that the traditional friendship between the peoples of the US and those of China should not be allowed to languish. We look forward to the time when the contacts between the American and Chinese people, broken through no desire or acts on our part, can be resumed; and when there cannot be reasonable doubt on the part of the free nations that such persons as represent China in the UN are true spokesmen for a free and independent China. From our own knowledge of the Chinese peoples we can have no doubt that a free and independent China will fully associate itself with the great purposes of the UN."

HENDERSON

795B.5/7–2450 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to All Missions

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 24, 1950—5 a. m.

Ltr dated Jul 24 from Sec to Sec Def Johnson summarizing policy Re UN aid for Korea is quoted below for ur use and guidance in discussions this matter with Reps Govt to which you are accredited. If Sec Def reply modifies this policy you will be promptly informed.[1]

"I am outlining in this ltr the gen policies under which it is intended that the Dept of State and its Reps abroad shld conduct conversations with other Govts on the subj of contributions by members of the UN to the UN effort in Korea. I wld appreciate confirmation from you that this is in accordance with our several conversations on the gen subject in the light of the expressed wishes of the Pres. There is no doubt in my mind that the gen attitude described below has the support of Congressional leaders.

"The US Govt is anxious to encourage the maximum direct participation by all members of the UN in support of the UN effort in Korea. All offers of direct assistance, mil or non-mil in form, shld be

[1] No formal reply from the Secretary of Defense was received until September 25, see p. 774.

welcomed. Obviously mil assistance, and in particular the offer of ground forces is most important.

"All offers shld be made to the UN which will immed communicate them to the US Govt for consideration by the Unified Command. When Reps of other Govts discuss directly with US Reps intended or possible contributions, they shld be encouraged and thanked but reminded that the formal offer shld be communicated to the UN.

"Once an offer has been made to the UN and communicated to the Dept of State by the US Mission to the UN, arrangements will be made by the Dept for Reps in Wash of the offering Govt to discuss the specific details and eventual integration of the offer into the UN effort in Korea with appropriate Reps of the Office of the Sec of Def.

"As a practical matter, the JCS and the Unified Command will have to determine what particular mil units, or other types of assistance offered by other UN members, can in fact be integrated into the mil effort in Korea. It is the intention of the US Govt to accept all offers notwithstanding the fact that thorough examination in bilateral discussions between reps of the Dept of Def and Reps of the offering Govt may ultimately reveal that it will be impossible, as a practical matter, to use what is offered. In such cases, a modification of the actual offer into usable form may result or agreement may be reached that, while the offer stands as accepted, it may never be called forward unless circumstances change.

"In order not to mislead other UN members, the US Govt does not intend, through either mil or dipl channels, unilaterally to urge individual UN members to offer mil units except in cases on which the US Govt is agreed that for mil or other controlling reasons it is intended to employ such units in the combat area. In cases where such agreement is reached we will of course make every effort to secure commitments to provide mil forces.

"Since I am anxious promptly to confirm instrs in the above sense to our missions abroad, I wld appreciate it if you wld let me know as soon as may be convenient if you are in agreement with the views which I have expressed above."

You will be promptly informed if country to which you accredited is one which US Govt desires directly to ask for ground forces and of any action taken this regard here.

ACHESON

795.00/7–2450

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 24, 1950.

Subject: Policy Planning Staff Paper[1] on Problem of U.S. Policy Regarding Advance Beyond the 38th Parallel by U.S. Forces Now Engaged in Korea as part of the UN Forces

I have read and studied carefully the Policy Planning Staff paper on the above subject, and I regret to state that I must enter an

[1] See the draft memorandum dated July 22, p. 449.

emphatic dissent from its philosophy and conclusions. As I understand it, the paper proposes in effect that we make known at once to General MacArthur and the US Delegation to the UN the fact that US objectives in Korea are limited to repelling the aggression of the North Koreans and bringing about the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the attacking forces to the 38th parallel, after which a final solution of the Korean problem would be a matter for UN consideration. In other words we would go back to the *status quo ante bellum* and then ask the UN to start all over again doing what has been its attempt at three General Assemblies since 1947. The aggressor would apparently be consulted on equal or nearly equal terms and the real aggressor, the Soviet Union, would presumably go unpunished in any way whatsoever. The aggressor would be informed that all he had to fear from aggression was being compelled to start over again. There are given below my comments on specific parts of the paper in question and my further reasons for opposing the adoption of recommendations of this paper. There is also given my conception of what is the proper attitude for the United States to take.

The whole tone of the present paper implies that the North Korean regime has a legal status and that the area north of the 38th parallel is, in fact, a separate nation. This has no foundation in fact or morality. The North Korean regime is a creature of the Soviet Union set up in defiance of the will of the majority of the Korean people, and in deliberate violation of three Resolutions passed in the General Assembly.

The paper makes a false division between what it terms (*a*) the long term effort to bring about unity and independence in Korea and (*b*) the present enforcement action to repel North Korean aggression. It assumes the latter phase of the problem can be solved without regard for the former. This is a fundamental error. If a correct solution of the immediate problem is not reached, a correct long term solution will be impossible.

There is in the paper no recognition of the fact that in supporting the action of the North Korean regime the Soviet Union is acting in direct defiance of Paragraph 5 of Article 2 of the UN Charter which requires that:

"All members shall give the UN every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the UN is taking preventive or enforcement action."

While the paper rightly stresses the importance of the attitude of our UN Allies toward what is done in Korea, it gives only cursory attention to the attitude of the 20 million people of South Korea who have been wantonly attacked, and the more than 2 million Koreans who

fled from Soviet oppression in the North and sought refuge in the South. There can be no sound solution which does not take fully into account the hopes of these millions. Any action which implied that the aggressors would suffer but mildly if at all and that the artificial division of Korea was to be perpetuated would cause the people and army of South Korea to lose what little morale they have left and would run the grave danger of turning them actively against American forces now in Korea. And let us not comfort ourselves with the belief that we could adopt the recommendations and philosophy of this present paper and not have the Korean Government and people find it out. They would. And I should hate to have on my conscience the responsibility for what would follow. The Korean people and Government are already insisting that the 38th parallel division must go and that the present opportunity to unify the country must be seized. American diplomats in Korea have expressed agreement. If this is not done the people of Korea will lose all faith in the courage, intelligence and morality of the United States. And I, for one, would not blame them.

The nub of the problem confronting the United States is correctly stated in the paper—namely whether the disadvantages of a failure to attain complete independence and unity for Korea outweigh the risk of a major conflict with the USSR or Communist China that such a settlement might involve. But the answer given or at least implied is, in my opinion, the wrong one.

While rightly pointing out the strategic importance of Korea to the USSR, one of the main reasons for this importance, that possession of Korea makes easier the ultimate conquest of Japan—the real prize in Asia as is neither Korea nor even China—is ignored. And while accepting the fact that the USSR would not permit a regime hostile to it to exist in North Korea, there is no apparent realization of the fact that Japan is of critical importance to the United States and that we cannot afford to allow a regime hostile to American interests in Japan to dominate Korea.

The paper assumes we can buy more time by a policy of appeasement—for that is what this paper recommends—a timid, half-hearted policy designed not to provoke the Soviets to war. We should recognize that there is grave danger of conflict with the USSR and the Chinese Communists whatever we do from now on—but I fail to see what advantage we gain by a compromise with clear moral principles and a shirking of our duty to make clear once and for all that aggression

does not pay—that he who violates the decent opinions of mankind must take the consequences and that he who takes the sword will perish by the sword.

That this may mean war on a global scale is true—the American people should be told and told why and what it will mean to them. When all legal and moral right is on our side why should we hesitate?

We should determine now that we will accept in Korea no solution which does not:—

1. Eliminate the North Korean Army, either by force or disarmament under UN auspices.
2. Provide for the full implementation in North Korea of the UN Resolutions of November 14, 1947, and December 12, 1948, including the holding of elections under the auspices of the UN Commission on Korea. These elections to be held after the return to their homes in North Korea of the more than 2 million refugees who had fled from Communist oppression.
3. Provide for a UN police force to maintain order until such time as a unified Korea can provide security forces of its own.
4. Provide for the admission of the unified Korea to the UN with its consequent assumption of the obligations of the Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force in its international relations against the Soviet Union as well as all other members of the UN.
5. Provide that the members of the UN, upon the advice of a UN Commission in Korea, will give such political and economic aid to the Korean Government as may be necessary to get it fairly started on the road toward becoming a stable, peaceful member of the United Nations.

Having determined on the above course, we should make known our policy to all the world after having discussed it with our friends in the U.N. It is one of which no man need be ashamed. Its announcement would inspire the people of South Korea to greater efforts in their own behalf. It is in accord and the only solution which is truly in accord with the UN Resolution of June 27th which requires the restoration of "international peace and security in the area". Any member of the United Nations which did not support us would do so in the knowledge that its action was dictated by fear and not by doubt of the rightness of what we were doing. The free world cannot any longer live under constant fear. The issue is clear—we should now decide to stand up to what our President has called "raw aggression", or we should admit that Soviet Communism has won and be prepared to take the consequences.

611.41/8–450

Agreed Memorandum, Summary of United States–United Kingdom Discussions on the Present World Situation, July 20–24, 1950, Washington, D.C.[1]

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET

1. Following is a summary of discussions held in Washington between July 20 and July 24, between General Omar N. Bradley and Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, representing the United States, and Sir Oliver Franks and Lord Tedder representing the United Kingdom. Mr. Charles W. Yost,[2] Colonel L. K. Ladue,[3] Mr. M. E. Dening,[4] Major General Redman[5] and Captain R. D. Coleridge, R.N.[6] were also present.

Terms of Reference

2. The conversations were purely exploratory and involved no commitments by governments. It was understood that there would be no definitive or detailed discussion of areas in which third parties have a primary interest.

FAR EAST

3. The U.K. representatives emphasized the importance which their government attached to avoiding any further major involvement of Western forces on the Asiatic mainland.[7] They therefore expressed the hope that any new conflicts which might break out in the Far East might be localized and not be allowed to develop into general war, either with the Soviet Union or with Communist China. The U.S. representatives agreed as to the desirability of this objective but pointed out certain possible cases of aggression, as noted below, which it might be difficult or even impossible to localize.

Chinese Communists

4. The U.K. representatives particularly stressed the advantages of localizing any possible conflict between the U.S. or the U.K. on the

[1] Four meetings were held on July 20, 21, 22, and 24. This memorandum was prepared and agreed upon at the conclusion of the talks, following a comparison of the informal summary notes kept by each side. Herein are printed the parts of this memorandum dealing with the Far East; complete coverage of the talks is scheduled for publication in volume III.

[2] Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs.

[3] Deputy Secretary, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[4] Assistant Under-Secretary of State, United Kingdom.

[5] Director of Military Operations, U.K. War Office.

[6] Secretary, British Joint Services Mission.

[7] Paragraph 29 of this memorandum, not herein printed, indicated the view of the U.K. Representatives that a threat to Berlin should be placed at the top of the list of danger points.

one hand and the Chinese communists on the other; first, for the reason set forth in the preceding paragraph and, second, in order that a possible gradual drift of the Chinese communist regime away from Moscow might not be interrupted.

5. It was agreed that further study should be given by the U.S. and the U.K. to the question whether an overt large-scale involvement of the Chinese communists in Korea or a large-scale Chinese communist attack on any other state or territory should, as being indicative of a Soviet intention to force the issue, be considered as raising the immediate question of general war.

Korea

6. The U.S. representatives stressed the political and military importance of the contribution of ground forces to the campaign in Korea by as large a number of nations as possible. They pointed out, on the military side, that the campaign would presumably last for some months and that it was important that, when the counteroffensive was undertaken, it be carried out with very strong forces in order that the North Korean army could be destroyed to the maximum extent possible before our forces reach the 38th parallel. The U.K. representatives declared that they had not hitherto considered that any forces which they might be able to contribute could reach the theatre of operations in time to be used. In light, however, of the statement by the U.S. representatives that the campaign would be long and that very considerable land forces would be needed, they would represent to London the points made by the U.S. representatives.

7. The U.S. representatives expressed the view that careful study should be given to the question of the eventual solution of the Korean problem, particularly what will happen when UN forces reach the 38th parallel and what forces will remain in Korea after the end of hostilities. They indicated that this would be a question for consideration by the UN.

8. It appeared to be the view of both U.S. and U.K. representatives, as an exception to the general proposition stated above, that, if Soviet forces should interfere overtly on a large scale in Korea, this action would raise the immediate question of general war. The U.S. representative made it clear that they had no intention of fighting a major war in Korea. Should war occur, it was their intention to fight in accordance with our agreed over-all strategy.

9. It was agreed that further study should be given to the question of whether or not overt intervention of the Chinese communists in Korea should also raise the immediate question of general war. The U.K. representatives were inclined to consider such an intervention by the Chinese communists unlikely since the Chinese would not act

solely at Soviet direction unless they gained some material advantage to themselves. The U.S. representatives, however, believing that Peiping is at the present time under very strong Kremlin influence and that the Kremlin might wish to involve the Chinese communists in hostilities with the West, considered such a possible involvement less unlikely.

Formosa

10. The British representatives expressed a strong hope that any hostilities arising from a Chinese communist attack on Formosa would be localized. The U.S. representatives replied that it is their desire and intention that any such hostilities be localized. In view of the character of the President's statement of 27 June, there was reason to believe that there would be no invasion of the mainland in connection with a Communist attack on Formosa. The U.K. representatives stated they were in full agreement with this intention to localize any such hostilities.

Hong Kong

11. The British representatives stated that their forces in Hong Kong are adequate to resist internal disturbances or a small-scale attack from without, but they are not adequate to hold off a full-scale attack by the Chinese communists. Should such an attack occur, it would presumably lead to an appeal to the UN, but nevertheless the U.K. representatives would hope that the hostilities might be localized.

Macao

12. It was considered that action could not be taken to assist the Portuguese in case Macao were attacked. The U.K. representatives stated that they had already intimated to the Portuguese that the U.K. would not be able to assist in these circumstances.

Philippines

13. The U.S. representatives pointed out the fact that the U.S. occupied naval and air bases in the islands. Elsewhere in the discussions it was brought out that the Philippines constitute the southern end of the U.S. Japan-Okinawa-Philippine stopline.

Indochina

14. It was understood that the U.S. and U.K. would assist the French to the extent of their abilities in case of a Chinese communist attack, but the probability would be great that neither could provide

forces for this purpose. There was no further discussion of the Indochina problem in the absence of the French, though further tripartite discussions were considered to be necessary.

Burma

15. It was understood that neither the U.S. nor the U.K. could provide forces to Burma in case of attack and that it is unlikely, though not impossible, that India or Pakistan would do so. In regard to action to be taken it was understood that the U.K. would take the initiative.

Malaya

16. The U.K. representatives said that they did not expect to be able to reduce their forces in Malaya during the next twelve months but hoped to do so after that time. It was generally agreed that an early and favorable resolution of the Korean situation would have a salutary effect on the Malayan problem.

Siam

17. It was generally agreed that Siam would bend with the wind.

Japan

18. Interest was expressed by both parties in proceeding with joint preliminary political discussions of the Japanese peace treaty at a relatively early date.

Afghanistan

19. It was agreed that Afghanistan could not be effectively assisted in case of invasion by the Soviets.

. . . . . .

ACTIONS TO BE RECOMMENDED

1. A comprehensive study of the effects of overt large-scale Chinese communist intervention in Korea or attack upon any other state or territory, particularly with a view to determining whether or not such intervention or attack could be localized or would lead to general war.

2. An examination, within the UN framework, of the eventual disposition of the Korean problem, including the maintenance of UN forces in South Korea, possible reoccupation of North Korea by the Soviets, and the problem of ultimate unification of the country.

. . . . . .

795.00/7–2550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 25, 1950—2 p. m.

PRIORITY NIACT

115. Text msg for delivery Nehru fols. As indicated Deptel 106 Jul 22 highly important existence and content this msg and any ensuing correspondence be kept secret. We wish avoid further public exchange with Nehru. As press keenly interested suggest you deliver msg to Bajpai thus avoiding attracting attn by appt with PM.

"My dear Mr. Prime Min: I did not in my msg of July 18 specifically address myself to the points raised in the communication delivered to me by your Amb on July 17 as I wished to give you my thoughts on those points on a strictly personal and confidential basis.

"It may well be, as you say, that Moscow is seeking a way out of its present entanglement without loss of prestige. Our experience with the Kremlin leads us to believe, however, that it wld in such case make every effort to find an exit which wld also provide positive gain in terms of an increase of Sov influence throughout the world. One such gain wld be the seating of reps of the Peiping regime in the Security Council in circumstances which wld create the impression in many parts of the world that the US had made a deal with the USSR to buy off Communist aggression in Korea.

"It seems to me that the four sentences beginning 'Since the Govt of India' in your msg of July 19 put well and succinctly the Indian position with respect to the Peiping regime. I shall try to state as briefly our position.

"We have not recognized Peiping for reasons which you and I discussed while you were in the US last autumn—reasons which we believe are still valid. We have consistently opposed the seating of Peiping reps in UN organs, at the same time making it clear that we wld accept the decision of a constitutional majority in any organ. Our position has not changed and in our view has been reinforced by Peiping's rejection of the findings of the UNCOK and the Security Council in the Korean situation and its open support of the North Korean aggressors.

"The considerations influencing our position are of a most serious character. I shld like to restate some of them because of the weight which we attach to them.

1. Peiping has shown little indication of a genuine desire to estab normal relations with other states.
2. It has singled out Amer citizens and interests as special objects of its hostility.
3. It has made no pretense of accepting and carrying out the internatl obligations of China.
4. There is still room for doubt that it exercises effective control throughout the mainland of China or is supported by the Chinese people.
5. It is lending support to Communist insurgents in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and elsewhere, has recognized Ho Chi Minh

and is actively interfering with efforts to transfer polit power in Indochina by peaceful processes.

6. It is cooperating with a degree of Sov penetration of China which can only lead to China's dismemberment.

7. Its recent defiance of the United Nations in connection with the Korean situation is, of course, a new and grave factor.

"Your request that the US exert its authority and influence to bring about the seating of Peiping reps in the Security Council put us in a very difficult position. It was, as you point out, consistent with India's past policy for you to make the request, but it wld have been wholly inconsistent with our past policy for us to accept your proposal.

"You expressed in your msg of July 17 the honest belief that there is a real chance of a peaceful settlement in Korea if Peiping reps enter and the USSR returns to the Security Council. You also said that if Peiping and Moscow thereafter proved unreasonable, world opinion wld hold them responsible for the consequences. I have given much thought to these two statements which I conceive to be very much at the heart of your position.

"There has been no intimation from Moscow that it wld comply with the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27 and stop the aggression in Korea even if reps of the Peiping regime were seated in the Security Council. In view of the Kremlin's silence on this point and our gen experience with the USSR, I greatly doubt that the presence of Moscow and Peiping in the Security Council wld be conducive to a peaceful settlement in Korea. This is admittedly a matter of judgment, but it seems to us that the risks inherent in your proposal are so great that we cannot disregard our own appraisal of the situation. If Moscow and Peiping were to come into the Security Council and proved unreasonable, the UN effort to restore peace in Korea might be blocked. This wld be a very grave consequence indeed, and its effect on world opinion of the United Nations and the value of continued Sov participation therein would be difficult to predict.

"We hope that in the present critical phase of the development of the UN as an effective mechanism to prevent aggression those nations sharing the common objective of stopping aggression in Korea will not permit differences of opinion over such questions as Chinese representation to divert their attn and energies from the attainment of this objective.

"I know that you have been deeply concerned about Formosa as one facet of the Chinese problem. I hope that the President's msg to Congress removed any doubts that you may have had about our intentions with respect to that island. We understand your deep interest in maintaining friendly relations with your neighbors, the people of China. We too are most anxious that the traditional friendship between the Amer and Chinese peoples shall continue and be fostered. We look forward to the time when the present barriers to the full expression of that friendship, which barriers have come into being through no desire on our part, may be lifted.

"I understand that yours is the only Govt outside the Soviet bloc which has effective dipl relations with the Peiping regime. Wld it be possible for you to apprise your Amb in Peiping of the President's statement with respect to Formosa and continue to endeavor to per-

suade the Peiping authorities that their own interests require that they avoid intervention in the Korean situation or an attack upon Formosa.

"Although our recent communications unhappily highlighted our divergent views on the Peiping regime, they did serve to emphasize our unity of purpose to strengthen the United Nations in resisting aggression. We share your earnest desire that hostilities in Korea be terminated before they spread to other countries. I believe our agreement with respect to Korea is of greater importance than our disagreement over China."

ACHESON

Editorial Note

On July 25 at 3 p.m., the United Nations Security Council met for the first time since July 7; for the record of the July 25th session, see U.N. document S/PV.477. During this meeting, Ambassador Austin read the text (U.N. document S/1626) of the first report submitted to the Security Council by the United States Government, under date of July 24, 1950, in accordance with the Security Council resolution of July 7.

795B.551/7–2550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 25, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received July 25—4 : 04 p. m.]

548. Personal for the Secretary's eyes only. Supplementing Embtel 544,[1] Prime Minister informed me of details of decision to send ground forces to Korea. They will consist of a brigade group, three battalions of infantry, an armored regiment and supporting artillery. It will be a self-contained unit.

Forces will be sent from UK. It may take them some time to collect them since they are not now in existence in this particular form. Two months may elapse before the movement can commence.

These details may not be announced in House of Commons tomorrow but you doubtless will get them through Franks.[2]

DOUGLAS

[1] Although transmitted from London at 6 p. m. on July 25, this telegram was not received until 11 : 25 p. m. on that date. The text read as follows: "Personal for Secretary eyes only. Matter of sending British ground troops to Korea satisfactory and voluntary. Announcement will be made in House of Commons tomorrow. Please guard with great discretion until that time." (795B.551/7–2550)

[2] Ambassador Franks transmitted the information on the U.K. contribution of ground forces to Mr. Jessup on the afternoon of July 25; Ambassador Jessup then passed it along to Mr. Acheson in a memorandum of that date, not printed (795B.5/7–2550).

795.00/7–2550

Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, July 25, 1950.] [1]

Problem:

To decide upon U.S. policy regarding the advance beyond the 38th parallel of U.S. forces now engaged in Korea as a part of the U.N. forces.

Analysis:

1. As U.N. forces drive back North Korean forces and approach the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U.N. members which are supporting the Security Council Resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities can be confined to Korea or will spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

2. In its Resolution of June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security Council (*a*) noted "with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea"; (*b*) determined "that this action constitutes a breach of the peace"; (*c*) called for "the immediate cessation of hostilities"; (*d*) called upon "the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel"; and (*e*) called upon "all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities."

3. In its Resolution of June 27, 1950, the Security Council (*a*) noted "from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security"; (*b*) noted "the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security"; and (*c*) recommended "that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area".

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[1] The source text bore the notation that it was drafted on July 25 by George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff; it was forwarded to Max W. Bishop, Department of State representative on the NSC staff, by Philip Watts under cover of a memorandum dated July 26, not printed, which indicated that the document was now ready to go to the NSC staff for appropriate processing. Mr. Watts' memorandum also noted that the document had been prepared by the Policy Planning Staff in consultation with Messrs. Jessup and Bishop along with representatives of the Bureaus of Far Eastern and United Nations Affairs.

4. In a third Resolution of July 7, the Security Council requested the United States to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized these forces to fly the U.N. flag. In response to this Resolution, General MacArthur was designated as Commander of these forces. The Republic of Korea also has placed its forces under General MacArthur's command.

5. In his message to the Congress on July 19, President Truman stated that he thought it important that the nature of our military action in Korea be understood; that it should be made perfectly clear that the action was undertaken as a matter of basic moral principle; that the United States was going to the aid of a nation established and supported by the United Nations and unjustifiably attacked by an aggressor force.

6. The present military action in Korea responds to the Security Council resolutions which come within the scope of provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter dealing with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

7. The General Assembly Resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949 are a part of the U.N. effort which is strongly supported by the United States, to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. This effort is based upon provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter, dealing with pacific settlement of disputes.

8. There are, therefore, two phases of the Korean problem: (*a*) the long-term effort to bring about unity and independence, and (*b*) the present enforcement action to repel North Korean aggression. This paper is addressed primarily to the latter phase of the problem.

9. The following contingencies are envisaged as the U.N. enforcement action develops, provided North Korean forces are not reinforced by U.S.S.R. or Communist Chinese troops; (*a*) voluntary withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel before U.N. forces have begun a counter-offensive; (*b*) a withdrawal in good order of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel at a time when they are being driven northward to a point approaching the 38th parallel; (*c*) a major defeat and disintegration of North Korean forces during the period when they are being driven back toward the 38th parallel; (*d*) continued resistance by North Korean forces after U.N. forces have reached the 38th parallel. Another contingency is the occupation of North Korea to the 38th parallel by Soviet or Communist Chinese forces before the U.N. forces reach the 38th parallel, or active support of the North Korean forces south of the 38th parallel by Chinese Communist or Soviet forces.

10. A need for important decisions will arise with a reversal of the military situation in Korea and the approach of U.N. forces toward the 38th parallel. It is probable that at the time when it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression cannot succeed and that eventually North Korean forces will be driven back north of the 38th parallel the Kremlin will take a decision (if it has not already done so) regarding a course of action in the new situation.

11. There is ample evidence of the strategic importance to Russia of the Korean peninsula. It is unlikely that the Kremlin at present would accept the establishment in North Korea of a regime which it could not dominate and control.

When it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression will be defeated, there might be some agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the North Korean regime which would mean in substance that U.N. military action north of the 38th parallel would result in conflict with the U.S.S.R. or Communist China.

While fighting is in progress south of the 38th parallel the Kremlin might bring about the occupation of North Korea either with its own or with Chinese communist forces.

The Kremlin might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities still are in progress south of the 38th parallel. We should guard against terms that would leave the aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

12. If North Korean forces withdraw or are driven back to the 38th parallel, continued military action by the U.N. forces for the purpose of imposing a settlement with a view to a unified and independent Korea would depend upon majority support in the U.N.

13. There probably would be reluctance and opposition to multilateral use of force as a part of the United Nations effort, initiated under the provisions for pacific settlement, to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. Conversely, there probably would be gratification and acclaim were extraordinary efforts to be made to avoid such use of force. The above would be true particularly in many of the countries of Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia.

14. It will be desirable to bear in mind both the eventual advisability of securing, through intensive diplomatic preparation, support on the part of the majority of United Nations Members for any action that might be taken beyond the 38th parallel, and the possible advantages of assuming a position which will clearly show that every effort has been exhausted to avoid carrying the military struggle into a new phase by a land offensive beyond the 38th parallel.

15. The future of the Korean people is an important consideration. The United States has supported the U.N. effort to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. However, the United States has not had and does not now have any commitment to use military force to bring about that independence and unity.

Having been the victim of armed attack from North Korea, the Republic of Korea naturally will want a settlement that gives a maximum guarantee against the danger of similar future attacks. The Korean people and Government already are insisting that the 38th parallel division must go and that the present opportunity to unify the country must be seized.

16. Likewise, public and Congressional opinion in the United States might be dissatisfied with any conclusion falling short of what it would consider a "final" settlement of the problem. Hence, a sentiment might arise favoring a continuation of military action north of the 38th parallel.

17. The advantages of an effort involving the use of military force to attain the complete independence and unity of Korea after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel must be weighed against the disadvantages of such a course. If the North Korean forces are decisively defeated and if North Korea suffers heavy material damage from air attack, those forces are not likely to attack again soon. The United States and other U.N. members should be in a much stronger position to take effective action as present efforts have time to take effect. It seems likely, also, that a satisfactory permanent solution of the Korean problem can be hoped for only when and if a substantial accommodation is reached between the U.S.S.R. and the non-communist world.

Conclusions:

18. It is U.S. policy to help bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. That policy has a sound basis of right and principle. U.S. action to carry out the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council regarding North Korean aggression are in accord with our policy of strong support of the United Nations; but we have no commitment to use armed force in the effort to bring about Korean independence and unity.

19. The Korean problem must be dealt with in the wider framework of the conflict between the communist and non-communist countries. The necessity to maintain a realistic balance between our military strength on the one hand and commitments and risks on the other

hand, together with the need for additional information which depends upon political and military developments in the near future, make it impossible to take decisions now regarding our future course of action in Korea. It seems clear that our national security and interest will be best served at present by maintaining the greatest possible degree of flexibility and freedom of action.

Recommendations:

20. The present vigorous U.S. action in support of the United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding North Korean aggression should be continued.

21. Decisions regarding our course of action when the U.N. forces approach the 38th parallel should be deferred until military and political developments provide the additional information necessary to enable us: (*a*) to base our decisions on the situation in Korea and in other parts of the world at that time; (*b*) to consult with other U.N. members who are supporting the Security Council resolutions in regard to measures which might be necessary or desirable once the aggression has been brought to an end; and (*c*) to keep our military capabilities and commitments in safe balance.

795.00/7–2850

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Assistance (Burns)

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 25, 1950.

MY DEAR GENERAL BURNS: I refer to the Secretary of State's letter of July 24, 1950 [1] to the Secretary of Defense on the subject of general policy on offers of military assistance by members of the United Nations in support of the operation in Korea. On the basis of preliminary indications from the Department of Defense in the case of particular countries, the Department has already taken steps actively to encourage commitments to provide such assistance by certain governments, such as the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand. In order to extend these efforts, it is necessary to have an indication from the Department of Defense of those countries on whose governments we should concentrate our efforts. Without

[1] See the circular telegram, July 24, 5 a. m., p. 457.

prejudice to suggesting future additions, I would appreciate it if you could secure for me from the Department of Defense its views on our proposed approach to the governments of the countries listed below for the purpose of securing from them a promise to provide ground forces:

United Kingdom	Thailand
Canada	Philippines
Australia	Brazil
New Zealand	Belgium
Pakistan	Netherlands
India	Turkey
Argentina	Greece
France	Union of South Africa

Parenthetically, it should be noted that Thailand has already made a specific offer of 4,000 infantry subject to confirmation by its King.

It would also be helpful if in your reply you could inform the Department of the minimum requirements as, for example, to size of unit and arrangements for self-supply in order that we might put our request upon the proper basis. In this connection, it would also be helpful if you could indicate in the case of countries such as France which have defense obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, what would be the maximum force which the Department of Defense feels could be detached for service in Korea without seriously weakening defense arrangements elsewhere with which this government is concerned.

Finally, I would appreciate it if the Department of Defense would give urgent consideration to the possibility of enlisting Philippine nationals with combat experience in the United States Army. As you know, the Philippine Government has stated that former Philippine scouts to the number of 26,000 are available to volunteer for service with the United Nations in Korea. The Department is replying to the Philippine Government's offer that the United States welcomes all offers of military aid and assumes in the case of this offer that such Philippine forces would be paid by the Philippine Government and would serve under the Philippine flag. Notwithstanding this possibility, the Department is most anxious to have the alternative of their enlistment in the United States Army explored.

Sincerely yours, H. Freeman Matthews

Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 76/1

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1950.

NSC 76/1

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT SOVIET FORCES ENTER KOREAN HOSTILITIES

References: NSC Action No. 308–*c* [1]
NSC 76 [2]

The enclosed comments on NSC 76, prepared by the Department of State and the National Security Resources Board Consultants,[3] respectively, are submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of NSC 76 as Item 2 on the Agenda of the Meeting scheduled for Thursday, July 27, 1950.

The National Security Council Consultants recommend that after discussion by the Council, NSC 76 together with the enclosures be referred to the Consultants for preparation of a report on the subject in the light of the discussion by the Council.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Enclosure]

STATE DEPARTMENT CONSULTANT'S COMMENTS WITH RESPECT TO NSC 76

1. The State Department agrees completely that full-scale mobilization should be initiated immediately it is determined that major Soviet combat units have entered Korean hostilities or have indicated their intention of engaging. The further decisions set forth in NSC 76 relate to the most basic national policies and should not be taken except at the highest level in the light of all relevant circumstances at the time.

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[1] The text of the record of action, taken at the 58th NSC meeting on June 28, read as follows: "Agreed that the Council should prepare for consideration by the President recommendations as to the courses of action to be followed in the event that Soviet forces enter Korean hostilities." (NSC files) See also footnote 1 to the note from Acheson to Johnson, June 28, p. 217.

[2] See footnote 2 to the memorandum, July 10, from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, p. 346.

[3] The comments of the NSRB Consultant are not printed.

2. The determination whether major Soviet combat units have entered Korean hostilities or have clearly indicated their intention of engaging in hostilities, and the decision to initiate the actions contemplated by NSC 76 should be made only by the President. It is difficult at this time to foresee clearly the various possible ways in which the engagement of Soviet combat units might be indicated or occur. It would be of the utmost importance that a course of action not be touched off by an incorrect evaluation of the actual situation which had arisen.[4]

3. The phrases "prepare to minimize its commitment in Korea" and "prepare to execute war plans" appear to require clarification. The State Department assumes that the phrase "prepare to minimize its commitment" means that the evacuation of Korea would be prepared and undertaken. The State Department is not clear as to what, in addition to the initiation of full-scale mobilization, is contemplated by the phrase "prepare to execute war plans". In any event, it is the opinion of the State Department that the actual decision should be made by the President in the light of all the circumstances at the time. It is the State Department's opinion that, prior to the actual execution of war plans, careful consideration should be given to the following points, among others:

a. Appropriate action in the United Nations.

b. The effect on our relations with our principal allies. The Atlantic Pact does not by its terms cover hostilities breaking out in Korea.

c. The advisability of the immediate execution of war plans under the particular state of facts which had occurred. In this connection it would be important to determine:

(1) Whether the nature of the commitment of Soviet forces had been such as to secure the clear support of world opinion for the execution of war plans by us.

(2) What would be the effect upon our allies, in particular our European allies, of an immediate generalization of hostilities.

(3) Whether the country was sufficiently mobilized to carry out its war plans with maximum effectiveness in the light not

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[4] At its 62nd meeting on July 27, the NSC recorded the following decision taken as Action No. 324 (*b*):

"Agreed with the recommendation by the Secretary of State that, in order to establish the fact of support to the North Koreans by the USSR or the Chinese Communists, aerial reconnaissance over all Korean territory, including Korean coastal waters, up to the Yalu River on the west and up to but short of the Korean-Soviet International boundary on the east should be authorized, subject to the understanding that such operations will be conducted from as far south of the frontiers of Manchuria or the Soviet Union as practicable, and that in no case will these frontiers be overflown.

"*Note:* The action in *b* above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action." (NSC files)

Appropriate instructions were sent out by the JCS to General MacArthur in telegram JCS 88051, August 5, for text, see vol. VI, p. 424.

only of the immediate military situation but also of the total campaign to be waged, or whether additional time for mobilization would improve the prospects of ultimate victory.

d. The type of action to be taken by the Congress before the initiation of war plans. A decision as to what action the Congress should take would have to be made by the President.[5]

[5] According to Action No. 323 taken at the 62nd meeting of the NSC on July 27, the NSC "noted and discussed the reference reports [NSC 76 and 76/1] and referred them to the NSC Consultants and Staff for the preparation of recommendations for Council action thereon". (NSC files) Subsequently, this action was cancelled in the light of action taken on NSC 73/4 of August 25, scheduled for publication in volume I, and NSC 81/1, September 9, *post*, p. 712.

795.00/7–2650 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 26, 1950—11 a. m.

Reporting 2 NK divisions tentatively identified pushing E from SW Korea in direction Pusan, 3 or 4 NK divisions pressing against elements 2 US divisions in central front Yongdong (50 miles NWW of Taegu), and 3 fresh NK divisions, including veteran First Division, pushing ROK forces back near Hamchang (50 miles NNW of Taegu), Tokyo Hdqrs states NK engaged in classical double envelopment on theatre basis with 2 or possibly 3 corps of 3 or 4 divisions each. Tokyo Hdqrs reports that unless center line can be held against envelopment, forward elements must be retracted toward more continuous perimeter for final defense Pusan. Continuous advance NK forces regardless heavy losses and setbacks caused by US air attack indicates NK war footing and armament had been underestimated.

ACHESON

[1] Sent to 40 diplomatic and consular offices.

795B.551/7–2650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, July 26, 1950—11 a. m.
[Received July 26—7 : 39 p. m.]

554. Personal eyes only for the Secretary. Further supplementing Embtel 544 [1] and 548, July 25, failed to mention HM's offer will be to

[1] See footnote 1 to telegram 548, July 25, p. 468.

the United Nations in response to Trygve Lie's call.[2] US Government and Joint Chiefs of Staff can arrange for such details as have not already in advance of the notification to Trygve Lie been arranged.

I hope that when the announcement of the British contribution is made there will be a full explanation of the first-rate war the British have been fighting in Malaya against the Communist for some two years, of the position they are in at Hong Kong and the need for forces not only for the defence of the colony against attack from without but also for the security of the Colony against the widespread subversive elements that there are within. I hope too that an explanation will be made of the requirements for British troops to guard and defend the lifeline—the Middle East, and, finally, of the need for forces on this island which is so vulnerable to attack and so important in general strategic plan.

I suggest it might be helpful also if it were made very clear that, notwithstanding all these world-wide demands on their military resources, British had contributed in initial stages greater naval forces, prior to the arrival of the *Boxer*, than we ourselves had in the Korean affair and that notwithstanding the exposed position of this island to hostile air attacks, she had made available a carrier.

DOUGLAS

[2] The text of the message from the U.K. Government to the Secretary General is contained in U.N. document S/1638; it indicated that a "self-contained force" would be sent to reinforce the troops serving under the U.N. Command in Korea.

611.94A/7–2750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 27, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received July 27—4:17 a. m.]

210. 1. On evening of July 26, I handed Bajpai, SYG MEA, message from you to Nehru contained in Deptel 115, July 25.

2. Bajpai, whose ruffled feelings I had smoothed down during friendly chat at my house on preceding evening, received message graciously, read it carefully and said he thought that it would be helpful. Referring to suggestion re forwarding statement of President on Formosa to Peiping, Bajpai said that passage from President's speech on this subject had already been telegraphed to Panikkar. Panikkar had not been instructed to bring it to attention Peiping Government but Bajpai thought it likely Nehru would authorize instruction to be issued. I asked if President's statement had been useful in clarifying US policy and intentions re island. Bajpai said it had been extremely useful; it had been telegraphed to New Delhi by

Madame Pandit who claimed credit for its issuance. I said that I hoped Madame Pandit would be given credit. Some of her suggestions in Washington had been deeply appreciated.

3. Bajpai said that he hoped we would not obtain impression that Prime Minister was resentful because US could not accept his suggestion re Chinese representative in SC. Prime Minister had been disappointed but he had no ill will against US because our attitude. Prime Minister was concerned, however, at what situation would be when GA opened in autumn without Russia and Russian satellites. UN without Communist countries would not be truly representative of present world and might well deteriorate in manner League of Nations. It was to be hoped that US did not prefer permanent absence of Russia and her satellites from GA and organs of UN.

4. I said my understanding was that US deplored absence Russia but considered that such absence was voluntary and that it would be fatal endeavor induce Russia return by making concessions which would weaken UN or which would be at expense of nations or peoples who looked to UN for support in maintenance their independence and integrity. There was doubt, however, on part US Government that presence Russia at this time in SC would contribute to solution of Korean problem in its present phase.

HENDERSON

330/7–2750 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, July 27, 1950—12:38 p. m.
[Received July 27—1:18 p. m.]

140. Confirmation of telecon with Popper, UNA, following his text of UN draft resolution on emergency relief, assistance, and medical aid in Korea as received from Cordier:

"The SC, concerned by the destruction and suffering caused to the people of Korea as a result of the invasion by the NK forces,

"Desirous of providing for immediate and effective relief to aid the people of Korea,

"Recalling the provisions of its resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950 relating to assistance to the ROK,

"Request all governments as a matter of grave urgency to furnish such assistance as is within their means for the relief of suffering in Korea,

"Authorizes the Secretary General and the unified command, established under the resolution of July 7, to provide in consultation the necessary administrative procedures and organization for the mobili-

zation and distribution of relief supplies and for the employment and direction of relief personnel;

"Requests the Secretary General to make available such personnel as is necessary to assist in the conduct of the relief operation in Korea and to make reports to the SC and to the ECOSOC on the progress of the relief effort,

"Requests the ECOSOC:

"*a.* To urge the specialized agencies, the UNICEF, and other appropriate organizations to assist the relief effort in Korea in every way possible.

"*b.* To receive and consider reports by the Secretary General on the progress of the relief effort, and

"*c.* To consider plans for longer term economic assistance to the people of Korea".

AUSTIN

795.00/7–2750

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 27, 1950.

Subject: Policy Planning Staff Paper on Korea [1] to be Discussed at Under Secretary's Meeting, July 28.[2]

As I mentioned to you yesterday, the present Policy Planning Staff paper on the problem of what US policy should be regarding advance beyond the 38th parallel is much better than previous drafts and I believe can be supported by FE with only minor changes. These changes which I suggest are in the Analysis part of the paper rather than in the Conclusions and Recommendations.

I believe that paragraph 13 on page 5, as it now stands, gives a slanted view of the situation and I suggest that the first three words of the first sentence of this paragraph be eliminated and that the following words be substituted: "The possibility cannot be ignored that there might . . ."

It is suggested that in paragraph 14 the word "reasonable" be inserted in the third line from the bottom of page 5 after the word "every".

The following changes are suggested in paragraph 16 in order to bring it into line with what I believe to be the true situation. In the second line of paragraph 16, cross out the words "might be" and insert

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[1] See the draft memorandum dated July 25, p. 469.

[2] *Post*, p. 486.

instead "is already beginning to show" and then change the next word from "dissatisfied" to "dissatisfaction". In the second sentence of paragraph 16, cross out the fourth word, "might", and substitute "may well".

I believe the Conclusions and Recommendations are all right and, while they do not go as far as I personally would like, nevertheless I believe they do go as far as we can reasonably expect at the present time.

The present paper does not, in my opinion, entirely comply with the President's request, which was that the National Security Council should prepare for his consideration a report on the "Future United States Policy with Respect to North Korea". While it is true that special attention was called to the policy to be pursued after the North Korean forces had been driven back to the 38th parallel, there is much more to the problem than just that. It is suggested that you point out at the Under Secretary's Meeting that, while FE goes along with the present paper, it nevertheless feels that continued studies should be made on the whole question of future US policy toward Korea and that on this broader question you understand that FE will continue to have action responsibility in accordance with the memorandum you sent out last Monday to the various Offices concerned.[3]

[3] Reference is to a memorandum by Mr. Rusk dated July 22 (Saturday), not printed, wherein Mr. Allison was designated as the responsible officer to act as steering member for the Department of State's studies on future U.S. policy with respect to North Korea (795.00/7–2250).

795.00/7–2750

The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Assistance (Burns) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 27, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. MATTHEWS: I refer to your letter of July 25 concerning military assistance by members of the United Nations in support of the operation in Korea. The Department of Defense has under study the general questions of criteria of useful military assistance and countries from which, from a military point of view, and in light of general strategic considerations, such assistance might be afforded. These views will be transmitted to the Department of State in due course.

I can, perhaps, clarify to you the position of the Department of Defense with regard to some of the questions raised in your letter. By letter of 7 July,[1] the Department of State was informed that ground forces from Pakistan were desired. By telephone conversation between our respective Secretaries on 14 July and in discussions between members of our offices, you were informed of the Joint Chiefs of Staff opinion that useful aid, particularly in the form of ground units, could be provided from the United Kingdom, Australia, Pakistan, New Zealand and Canada, but that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that no aid be requested from the Philippines, Italy, Turkey or Saudi Arabia, since the latter countries may have urgent need for their own use of all the forces which are available to them.

With regard to minimum requirements, as for example size of units and arrangements for self-supply, I refer you to our letter of 26 July concerning New Zealand, Lebanese and French offers, which should furnish some guidance pending completion of the more general study previously referred to.[2]

Concerning the enlistment of Filipino nationals with combat experience in the U.S. Army, I am advised that present laws, subject perhaps to a few very minor exceptions, would not permit this to be done. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not, at this time, recommend new legislation to permit acceptance of alien volunteers in the U.S. armed forces.

Sincerely yours, J. H. BURNS

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[1] Not printed.

[2] In the letter of July 26, not printed, Secretary of Defense Johnson forwarded the views of the JCS, with which he concurred, on acceptance of the French offer of a warship for use in Korean waters and the Lebanese offer of use of ports and airfields. The letter also advised acceptance of offers from New Zealand and Lebanon to furnish ground force units for operations in Korea. In regard to the latter offer, the following views of the JCS were transmitted for general guidance:

". . . In order to permit ready integration of such units into the over-all military effort, it is considered that in accepting the offers of these countries it should be pointed out that it is desirable that the forces contributed by each should consist of one infantry battalion augmented by appropriate combat and service support, with a total strength of approximately 1,000. The forces so furnished should be fully equipped and should arrive in the field of operations with a sixty days level of supplies, on transportation provided either by the parent nation or by contributing U.N. nations. Parent nations should be responsible for full logistic support on a continuing basis utilizing shipping either available to them or as provided under an integrated shipping program. However, in the event such full support is not practicable, the units should be integrated into the U.S. supply program, to the extent that common supply items are usable by them. The cost of such items should be repaid to the U.S. Government. Items of supply peculiar to the forces furnished must be provided by the parent nations.

"It is desirable that sufficient personnel of the units speak English in order that language barriers will not unduly hamper operations." (795B.5/7-2650)

795.00/7–2750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, July 27, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received July 27—7 : 03 p. m.]

215. 1. Prospect of protracted UN/US military campaign Korea involving so much concentration on the fluctuations in our military fortunes, suggests importance continuing to clarify and delimit our political objectives in Korea. It would seem particularly important that our policy be currently adjusted so as to keep Korea in proper correlation to those other worldwide problems we face, in containing Soviet expansionism by building up "situations of strength" in the free world. Key political issue insofar as Korea is concerned would seem to be whether we should now, or in near future, commit ourselves to a policy of using armed force under UN auspices to eliminate Soviet influence and power from that part of Korea lying north of 38th Parallel, as essential step forward establishment unified and democratic Korea.

2. As understood here, present position this respect is that UN is by virtue UNGA recommendations still committed to achievement Korean unity by peaceful UNCOK mediation, whereas under recent SC decisions UN is now also committed to expulsion by force of NK troops from ROK territory (unless they withdraw voluntarily). Presumably under article 12 (1) of UN charter facts that SC now seized of Korean issue precludes further UNGA recommendations unless requested by SC. It would appear therefore that if UN is to make any further political recommendations re Korea, SC must itself take action or authorize forthcoming UNGA to do so.

3. To date neither in Soviet press nor in official statements has Politburo foreshadowed reaction to situation which will arise when tide of battle turns against NK troops and latter are retreating, or are about to do so. Cautious avoidance of any formal involvement of Soviet prestige in fortunes NK regime has been noteworthy (Embtel 183, July 21), and has effect leaving Soviets with freedom of action for time being. Embassy believes on basis: (1) its own estimate of Soviet intentions re all out war (Embdesp 514, April 25 [1]); (2) reasonable flexibility which Soviets have shown in past in withdrawing after tentative jabs beyond post war Iron Curtain frontiers (Iran, Greece, Berlin) have resulted in burnt fingers; and (3) Soviet attitude since Korean fighting began June 25, that at critical phase for

[1] See footnote 3 to telegram 1726, from Moscow, received at 9:59 a. m. on June 25, p. 139.

NK regime as above envisaged, Soviets will not throw their own forces into South Korea or any other forces possibly at their disposal (Chinese Communist troops). Rather they are more likely, first, to attempt to arrange some kind of cease fire and truce on basis military status quo, and if this is unsuccessful, then to order NK troops to withdraw to 38th Parallel, announcing to world that KPDR has been persuaded by Soviets to bring to halt their punitive measures to deal with ROK aggressors; that this is evidence Soviet love for peace (thus salvaging some face); and, lastly, possibly proclaiming in one form or another inviolability of 38th Parallel (perhaps by signing treaty of friendship and mutual defense with KPDR at this juncture).

Possibility cannot be excluded that Soviets may make declaration re inviolability 38th Parallel well prior to period of NK military reverses with view deterring UN from adopting any resolution calling for action to unify Korea with assistance UN forces and or to punish NK aggression through military occupation north of 38th Parallel. Soviets would then be counting on intimidating some UN members on basis that to take action in face such warning would precipitate WW III.

4. On other hand, Soviets may feel that for them to commit themselves definitely to defense NK, particularly if UN had earlier indicated its determination take all steps within its power to bring about establishment unified and democratic Korea after restoration peace and security in the area, would involve risk all out war, which Embassy believes Soviets still wish to avoid. We should obviously be prepared to take quick advantage of any such temporary military vacuum, such as political unification moves under UN auspices, using such UN and ROK military units as may be necessary for maintenance internal law and order.

5. Positive advantages which would derive from an early proclamation by UN of its determination to assist the Koreans by all possible means to achievement their freedom in an independent, unified and democratic state, are manifest. Such forthright enunciation would give heart to all non-Communist Koreans in their time of travail and would be particularly useful as a morale stimulant to those Koreans, both civilian and military, who are actively cooperating with US and UN forces. Proclamation by UN that objective UN effort is establishment unified and independent Asian state would also tend help our cause with vacillating non-Communist Asian opinion, which to considerable degree appears view present conflict struggle between two power blocs, without involving any fundamental principles of right or wrong.

6. From several points of view, therefore, it seems desirable UN formulate and declare its purposes regarding political future of Korea. No doubt we are sufficiently in touch with sympathetic fellow UN

members to take sounding with view crystallizing the nature and timing of such declaration. This connection Embassy believes that while an affirmation by SC, that UN will persist in its efforts towards Korean unity, might well be made now or in near future, it would be decidedly premature to make any move which would definitely commit us to use our forces north of 38th Parallel regardless of military situation in NK at time NK troops in South Korea near defeat. Our enormous responsibilities in Western Europe, not to mention peripheral sore spots in SEA and NE, preclude any commitments to extend our Korean effort beyond present objectives until we are in better position evaluate degree to which Soviets are willing to risk showdown in Korean peninsula which, it must be recognized, does constitute favorable military terrain for Soviets and their Asian puppets.

7. In essence Soviet inspired NK aggression left us with but one choice: to demonstrate unmistakably before eyes free world that we would not permit extension Soviet power by armed aggression beyond present limits Soviet sphere. Our firm stand and willingness to undertake risks and sacrifices for that end have made a deep impression not only on non-Communist world but, I am sure, on Soviet leaders too. We should seek to achieve a basic solution of the Korean political problem at the same time as we inflict a decisive defeat on the NK aggressors, and it is possible that the latter event will open the path to a solution. At present time, however, it should be recognized that we are not in a position to make a realistic appraisal of the obstacles, military and otherwise, that will face us even after NK troops in South Korea have been defeated; and elementary prudence dictates that we not take on now an obligation, the fulfillment of which may require a US military effort out of proportion to political and strategic importance of Korea.

Department pass London, Paris. Repeated info London 71, Paris 59.

KIRK

330/7–2850: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 28, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received July 28—7:40 a. m.]

219. 1. GOI apparently somewhat embarrassed at unexpected Soviet decision return SC even though Communist China has not been admitted.[1] This embarrassment arises from fact that GOI has been

[1] On July 27, the Soviet Representative at the United Nations (Malik) communicated to Secretary-General Lie his intention to assume the presidency of the Security Council during the month of August and to call a meeting of the Council for August 1 (see U.N. document S/1643).

basing its approaches to other governments re importance admittance Communist China on assumption that such admittance is condition precedent to return Russia.

2. Bajpai, SYG, MEA, told me this morning GOI taken completely by surprise at Soviet decision. Journalist had asked him whether Soviet decision had been influenced by Nehru's recent approaches and Bajpai had answered categorically that there could be no connection. GOI had not been working merely to get Russia back into SC.

3. I also obtained impression from conversation with Bajpai that GOI is somewhat concerned lest Russia take course of action in SC which will deepen rift in UN.

HENDERSON

Files of the Under Secretary of State: UM M–225

Memorandum for the Files on a Meeting Held in the Office of the Under Secretary of State (Webb)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 28, 1950—10 a. m.

Advance Beyond the 38th Parallel (UM D–109)[2]

1. Mr. Nitze explained that the substance of the recommendations in this paper was that we should wait until the time comes when our troops approach the 38th parallel before deciding whether to cross it or not. Mr. Dulles concurred with these conclusions emphasizing that the important thing was to remain flexible. Mr. McGhee pointed out that this conclusion was necessary in view of the possibility that Russian troops might reoccupy North Korea, in which case a U.S. decision to go beyond the 38th parallel would then involve us in fighting Russian troops.

2. It was recognized that other States will want to know now what our intentions are. Mr. McGhee also pointed out that it would be desirable for the UN to have a policy on how to punish an aggressor. The North Koreans should not be left in exactly the same position they were in before they started.

3. Mr. Tate[3] stated that the General Assembly actions of 1947, 1948 and 1949 on Korea had been taken under Article 14 of the Charter rather than under Chapter 6 as indicated in the paper. Mr. Tate also suggested that we should speak of the North Korean "attack" rather than of their "aggression", because the later word might imply the existence of a North Korean State.

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[1] The meeting, one of a regular series, was chaired by Mr. Webb and attended by 25 Department of State officials.

[2] See the draft memorandum prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, July 25, p. 469.

[3] Jack B. Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State.

4. Mr. Nitze will see that the section dealing with UN support for an advance beyond the 38th parallel is rewritten to take account of the views expressed by Messrs. McGhee, Miller, and Sandifer.[4] These agreed that it might be possible to get UN support for such a move and, as Mr. Rusk stated, that the important factor would be the position taken by those countries whose troops were doing the fighting.

5. It was recognized that the conclusions of this paper would make it difficult to conduct an effective public information campaign. It was felt, however, that P could emphasize the UN actions and continuing efforts for Korean independence and unity. Mr. Dulles stressed the importance to the Koreans of national unity. He said he believed the kind of government under which they would be united was of secondary importance to most Koreans. He recognized therefore, that our propaganda may have to go further than the political position we are willing to take at the moment. The danger was also pointed out that if we should be pushed out of Korea, other States, particularly India, might be inclined to approve the *fait accompli* which had united Korea. This would be especially likely if the U.S. had not promised unity.

6. Mr. Rusk will take the initiative to have a section added dealing with our attitude toward a possible Soviet suggestion for an early voluntary withdrawal by the North Koreans.

7. Paragraph 16 will be modified to indicate that U.S. public and Congressional opinion would not now be satisfied with a restoration of the *status quo ante*, but on the other hand that they would probably not desire to make elimination of the 38th parallel a U.S. war objective.

[4] Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.

761.00/7–2850: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, July 28, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received July 28—10:45 a. m.]

511. High Interior Ministry official in charge political intelligence has informed Embassy officer that according his best information Soviet objective now is to press China into war with US so as to keep US immobilized in Far East for long time to come. While recognizing potential Soviet threats to Western Europe, he largely discounts possibility Soviet aggression in Europe for time being. This opinion is shared by chief French counter-intelligence who also foresees Soviet policy turned primarily toward Asia in period immediately ahead. Latter appraises Soviet strategy as seeking encompass ultimate con-

quest West by initial exploitation weakened Western positions in so-called colonial areas. While envisaging no slackening meanwhile of Communist efforts to soften up Western Europe from within, he sees Soviets now seeking rapid acceleration this process through incitement to colonial insurrection. Accordingly, he anticipates out-break series limited "civil wars" or "wars of national liberation" principally in Asian theater and patterned on Korean model without risk direct engagement Soviet prestige or armed forces. Stalin in his opinion proposes maintain fixed abscess in Far East, draining of which will cost him nothing while requiring such immense US budgetary costs and dispersion of efforts as to invite serious economic crises and internal disorders in West upon which Soviets will continue to rely for final dislocation Western world.

Department pass Moscow. Repeated info Moscow 24, London 148, Rome 59, Belgrade 10, Berlin unnumbered, Praha unnumbered.

BRUCE

Editorial Note

For the text of the Agreement between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea regarding expenditures by forces under the command of the Commanding General, Armed Forces of the Member States of the United Nations, July 28, 1950, see TIAS No. 2135; 1 UST 705.

793.00/7–2850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

LONDON, July 28, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received July 28—3:25 p. m.]

622. Foreign Office has shown Embassy Office text of telegram dated July 25 from Peiping reading substantially as follows:

1. During long tête-à-tête on July 21, Chou En-lai [1] made it quite clear to Panikkar that Chinese had every intention of avoiding implication in present hostilities unless forced on them.[2]

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[1] Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China.

[2] At 9:23 a. m. on July 28, the Department of State had received the following message in telegram 218 from New Delhi:

"Acting British High Commissioner Roberts states he has received telegram from British Chargé Peiping which reported Chargé had been told by Panikkar that Chou En-lai during course of dinner with him stated frankly that Peiping *had* no desire to see hostilities in Korea extended beyond their present scope." (795B.00/7–2850)

2. Chou injected in conversation a tentative suggestion that India, Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia might make some sort of joint statement perhaps along with China that they, as recently established political entities primarily concerned in consolidation of internal social and economic structure, desired preventing if possible spread of hostilities, particularly into territories under their control.

3. Panikkar, in informing Hutchison [3] of above, stated he responded to Chou by pointing out nations mentioned had already made their views quite clear. He does not anticipate that the suggestion, tentatively mooted by Chou, will be pursued.

DOUGLAS

[3] John Hutchison, British Chargé in the People's Republic of China.

795.00/7–2850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 28, 1950.

Subject: Aid to Korea

Participants: The President;
Prime Minister Robert Menzies of Australia;
Secretary Acheson

The President received Mr. Menzies at 3:30 p. m. The interview, including the photographs, lasted approximately one hour.

The discussion opened with general conversation on non-business subjects.

The Prime Minister then raised the question of Australian defense and the sending of Australian ground forces to Korea. He said that Australia was wholeheartedly behind American policy and wished to play its full part in the defense of the free world. To do so Australia would have to increase its defense forces substantially. This required legislative changes. Australia also wished to send ground forces to support the United Nations in Korea. At present, however, it had no forces available. Out of the 2,000 troops in Japan only about 500 were combat troops and these had been enlisted only for service in Japan. The Prime Minister expected promptly upon his return to attack the whole broad subject. He did not think it advisable to confuse the broader issue by attacking first of all the problem of forces for Korea. He wished to get through a universal service bill and to remove restrictions upon the place of service since it was highly likely that in the event of general war Australian troops might be needed in the Near East and in the Far East beyond areas where service was now permissible. He had made his announcement that Australia would make ground forces available in Korea in order to commit his Govern-

ment to that objective, but it would not be immediately possible to provide the forces.

The President expressed the hope that the Prime Minister could make rapid progress both in regard to forces for Korea and the general expansion of the defense program.[1]

[1] In a separate memorandum of conversation dated July 28, not printed, Ambassador at Large Jessup reported on a conversation held on the previous evening at the Australian Embassy by Messrs. Acheson, Harriman, Dulles, and Jessup with Prime Minister Menzies and Australian Ambassador Norman J. O. Makin. Mr. Jessup's memorandum contained the following excerpt: "Mr. Menzies raised the question of the seriousness of the damage caused by Nehru's peace effort. The Secretary said that he thought the damage was serious but the consequences could not yet be determined." (795B.00/7–2850)

340/7–2850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 28, 1950—7 p. m.

73. Dept wishes USUN to seek passage by SC of Res on relief and non-military assistance to Korea before Aug 1. Fol text is approved in Dept and shld be used in consultation with other Dels:

"*The SC*

"*Recognizing* the hardships and privations to which the people of ROK are being subjected as a result of the continued prosecution by the NK forces of their unlawful attack; and

"*Appreciating* the spontaneous offers of assistance to the Korean people which have been made by govts, specialized agencies, and non-governmental organizations,

"*Requests* the Unified Command (USG) to exercise responsibility for determining the requirements for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, and for establishing in the field the procedures for providing such relief and support;

"*Requests* the Economic and Social Council and the specialized agencies to provide such assistance as the Unified Command (USG) may request in the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, and, as appropriate, in the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the SC on June 25, June 27 and July 7, 1950; and to that end directs the SyG, in consultation with the rep of ———, as rep of the SC [Alternative Form: in consultation with a comite of the SC consisting of reps of ———] to coordinate the nonmilitary assistance offered by govts, specialized agencies, and non-governmental organizations in fulfillment of the requirements set forth by the Unified Command (USG)."

Depts intention has been to produce simplified and flexible res whose passage wld place "UN umbrella" over civilian relief for Korea without interfering with responsibility of Unified Command (USG) in the field.

Ref in 4th para to implementation of SC Res is intended to cover such activities as UNESCO info program and ICAO air navigation assistance.

Re alternative language contained in para 4, Dept prefers single SC rep to participation SC comite. In Dept view centralization of coordinating functions in SYG is desirable as least cumbersome administrative arrangement. Moreover creation of SC comite here may stimulate request for SC Comite to handle military assistance. Nevertheless, in view of sentiment reported among SC Dels against leaving matter in hands of SYG,[1] USUN may in its discretion agree to SC Comite despite Dept reluctance to see one established.

Dept regards Secretariat draft (urtel 140 July 27) as unsatisfactory because it divides responsibility which shld be centralized in unified command.

ACHESON

[1] In this regard, Ambassador Austin had made the following observation in his telegram 109, July 24, not printed:

". . . [There is a] very widespread and strong feeling here, by no means limited SC members, but definitely including most of them, that Secretariat has already exceeded its authority in number of respects. It is felt that hopeless confusion and ineffectiveness will result in total UN effort re Korea if Secretariat and other organs UN such as ECOSOC go riding off madly in all directions on own initiative without prior consideration and authorization by SC. I disagree with opinion that SYG has exceeded his responsibility under Charter. Opinions reported above are probably result of manner in which business has been transacted. However, feelings described above are held so strongly, particularly by Chauvel but also by others, as to constitute important political factor. . . . " (340/7–2450)

330/7–2950 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 29, 1950—4 p. m.

78. Fol is text of draft SC Res communicated to USUN by phone this afternoon. You are authorized to confer with friendly delegations on this draft. While we desire as large a measure of support as possible for this draft, we do not want to see it watered down nor do we want our hands tied in the event we shld want to introduce it unilaterally.

The condemnation clause in the draft is indispensable.

We believe that the Res provides a basis around which USUN can build its statement in SC.

We have not determined when it wld be best to introduce Res. We wld welcome your views on this subject.

The Security Council,

Condemns the North Korean authorities for their continued defiance of the United Nations;

Calls Upon all States to use their influence to prevail upon the authorities of North Korea to cease this defiance;

Calls Upon all States to prevent the spread to other areas of the conflict in Korea; and

Calls Upon all States to refrain from action which might endanger international peace and security in other areas.

ACHESON

330/7–2950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, July 29, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received July 29—4:49 p. m.]

237. Embassy views prospective Soviet return to SC as Soviet tactical retreat dictated by over-all course world developments since inception Korean fighting and believes that Soviets have utilized the coincidental circumstances of their alphabetical succession to SC presidency as convenient face-saving cover for their decision to return. Embassy bases this opinion on its estimate of long-term prospects which have been confronting Kremlin in past few weeks, and perhaps one tangible corroborative piece of evidence is the curiously indirect manner in which Soviet public has been informed of this development (Embtel 232, July 29).[1]

One prospect facing the Soviets is that the UN is "marching away" from the minority Soviet bloc, taking with it the Charter, the UN flag, and the SYG. The free world, united as it never has been before on any important issue, is achieving a moral and physical cohesion through the UN which bodes ill for the Kremlin's long term ambitions to remake the world in its image.

As Embassy has stated in previous cables, while Soviets attach considerable importance to advantages which they derive from UN membership, at such time as they felt UN would hamper the attainment of important Soviet objectives, they would not hesitate to leave UN in a fashion calculated to disrupt the organization. The fact that the Soviet boycott of UN during its consideration of Korean issue has not achieved such disruption but, on the contrary, has led to

[1] The text of this telegram read as follows:

"Following complete text of Soviet announcement via New York Tass item dated July 28 their intention participate SC meeting August 1.

" 'Members of SC again assembling July 28 [see U.N. document S/PV. 478], during prolonged period discussion report submitted by Austin. Speakers limited selves to short remarks in which they obligingly approved Austin's report. After statements representatives of France, England, Cuba, India and Ecuador, President Sunde closed meeting and set new meeting for July 31. This decision of Sunde provides delegates of Anglo-American bloc with opportunity to continue hurried behind-scenes negotiations and hold new meeting before representative of USSR Malik occupies post of presidency of SC on August 1 when turn of representative of Soviet Union to preside in SC begins.' " (330/7–2950)

greater free world unity within UN, must have made deep impression on Soviet leaders (Soviet public was never permitted to glimpse factual picture of concerted UN effort re Korea).

Related to first prospect, but of even greater import to Kremlin is the stimulus which their Korean military adventure has given to building up of the military strength of the free world, and in particular that of the US and UK. If Embassy estimate that Soviets not now prepared to invite consequences of global conflict with west (Embdes 514, April 25 [2]) is correct even under present circumstances (which at least afford Soviets excellent opportunities for initial military victories in Europe and Asia) with what serious concern must Kremlin view march of events which threatens to give west much stronger relative military position within next year or two.

Impelled by considerations of foregoing nature to make tactical retreat from position so long and stubbornly maintained on Chinese representation issue, Soviets will no doubt exploit to the full the possibilities for maneuver which their new position affords. Their return to the UN opens up following avenues of approach which were at least partially closed to them during their willful boycott:

(1) They regain UN forum for use as world sounding board for all their views and propaganda;

(2) More particularly, they can once again project into UN their phony "peace movement", including "Stockholm appeal", and perhaps even a more attractively packaged version of their UNGA "peace pact".

(3) They will certainly take full advantage of their return to resume familiar disruptionist and obstructive tactics and to encourage maximum dissension among free world governments represented on SC. Use of veto one of several methods open to them this connection.

(4) They may feel that given the tough free world attitude that prompted their return and the serious dangers, military and otherwise, which confront them in that regard, the first three avenues will not suffice and that, making a virtue of necessity, the time has come to make concrete appeasement moves (e.g., on Korea) which would tend to relax marshalling of free world strength which has been under way since onset Korean affair. Their return to SC per se might be conceived as step in this direction.

Having indicated that they will return to SC without prior decision their favor re Chinese Communist representation, question arises as to what action Soviet representative will now take to press that issue. Unless Soviets have made advance deals assuring favorable vote for seating Chinese Communists (which seems unlikely from information available here), precipitating a vote on this matter would place Soviets in awkward position, particularly if Embassy analysis of underlying

[2] See footnote 3 to telegram 1726 from Moscow, received at 9:59 a. m. on June 25, p. 139.

reason for Soviet return to SC essentially valid. It is believed, therefore, that Soviets may follow path already marked for them in Nehru-Stalin correspondence of linking peaceful settlement in Korea with question proper composition SC, thus opening up general discussion with vote delayed for time being. Fact that spotlight has shifted from Chinese representation matter to Korea may, in fact, have been important reason why Soviets may have deemed it possible to get back in SC without too much loss of prestige.

From Soviet point of view this is propitious time make "peace" moves re Korea. NK regime is now in control most of South Korea, and though NK troops may still make some advances, it would appear that point of temporary military stabilization being reached with only Pusan beachhead and perimeter under control UN/US forces. To call for truce and armistice now would certainly meet Soviet requirements, though unlikely Soviets would consider that any such proposal by itself would receive SC support. More probable that Soviets would submit proposals based on idea that Koreans must settle their own political future, "foreign" troops should get out, and elections be held, perhaps under UN observation. If Soviets intend make real appeasement move, they may (refEmbtel 215, July 27) use this opportunity pull back NK troops to 38th Parallel to avoid defeat of latter and make maximum political capital as peacemakers on assumption that their continued participation in SC with veto power would be adequate weapon to forestall movement UN forces into North Korea, and that ROK troops would be too weak to attempt this alone. In appraising possible Soviet moves looking toward "peaceful" political solution Korean problem through cessation of fighting followed by elections (even if NK troops withdrawn), it cannot be overlooked that public opinion in South Korea may be very vulnerable to appeals based on "anti-foreign" aspect of UN intervention (including destruction wrought by UN forces), and outcome elections might be favorable Korean Communists.

Soviets may attempt by various means to make Formosa an issue, seeking to exploit unilateral US commitment and failure to date of SC to support US position. This might be considered by Soviets as good tactics to cover up their failure "stick it out" on Chinese Communist question, for Soviets would appear to be fighting for Chinese Communist interests within UN. If Chinese Communists should attempt invade Formosa and US naval units take defensive action, Soviets would, of course, in addition to any other reaction, exploit this issue for all it is worth in SC.

It is, of course, possible to view Soviet return to SC as presaging further overtly aggressive moves by international Communism (Indochina, Burma, Iran, Yugoslavia) on assumption that Soviets would

now be in position to block effective UN counter-action through veto and other obstructionist methods. If, as Embassy strongly believes, Soviets have their eyes on the major issues outlined at outset this message, it is doubtful that Soviet return was motivated by this somewhat legalistic motive. Further aggression in the near future, even though of a local character, would certainly intensify more than ever the strengthening moves now begun in the west and would reveal a Soviet recklessness out of keeping with Embassy observations and estimates of long standing.

Department pass USUN, London, Paris. Repeated information USUN 31, London 75, Paris 64.

KIRK

795.00/7–2950: Telegram

The United States Acting Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

NEW YORK, July 29, 1950—4:31 p. m.
[Received July 29—4:51 p. m.]

163. Re draft resolution including condemnation of North Korean authorities telephoned by Wainhouse,[1] we have following comments and questions:

1. It is our feeling that the third paragraph of the resolution would be interpreted by other members of the SC as committing them in advance to use their armed forces to prevent spread of conflict to areas other than Korea, and particularly to Formosa, and therefore would be quite unacceptable to them. If this meaning is not intended by Department, we feel third and fourth paragraphs are essentially duplications of the same thought. Either the third should be dropped completely or it should be merged in fourth paragraph. We suggest the following:

"Calls upon all states to refrain from action which might lead to the spreading of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further endanger international peace and security."

2. We should like to clarify the meaning of the words "calls upon". If this is intended as an order, it will make it extremely difficult in our view to obtain support. From the point of view of India and UK, for example, if they support an order to the Communist Chinese to refrain from attacking Formosa, they will then be morally committed to support a decision of the SC to take military action in case of such an attack. We doubt very much that many members of the SC will be prepared to commit themselves to this step at the present time. On

[1] See telegram 78, July 29, 4 p. m., to New York, p. 491.

the other hand, it might well be possible to gain support for these paragraphs if we make it clear that the words "calls upon" should be considered recommendations rather than orders.

3. Department does not state whether it desires that this resolution be approved at Monday's meeting.[2] In our view this would be most difficult to accomplish in view of the short time available and in view of the other irons we have in the fire for Monday's meeting. In any case, it is our opinion that it would be preferable not to approve a resolution along these lines at Monday's meeting but to save it until the Russians return to the Council. A debate on a resolution of this nature in which the Russians are forced to take part will give us a fine opportunity to put the Russians on the spot.

A veto by them of a resolution along these lines would be enormously valuable and would place upon the Russians full responsibility for the continuation of the conflict.

Our suggestion would be that the resolution might be tabled late Monday so that it would have priority of consideration over any substantive proposal which Malik introduces and would enable us to hold the initiative, rather than being forced on the defensive by a Russian proposal.

Please advise urgently.

GROSS

[2] July 31.

330/7–2950 : Telegram

The United States Acting Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, July 29, 1950—7 : 30 p. m.
[Received July 29—10 : 13 p. m.]

167. Deptel 73 of July 28 and telcon between Hickerson and Gross resulted in agreement on following draft resolution which USUN has handed to members of SC delegations with a view to its adoption in SC meeting on Monday, July 31 :

Draft resolution on Korean relief :

"*The Security Council*,

"*Recognizing* the hardships and privations to which the people of Korea are being subjected as a result of the continued prosecution by the North Korean forces of their unlawful attack ; and

"*Appreciating* the spontaneous offers of assistance to the Korean people which have been made by governments, specialized agencies, and non-governmental organizations ;

"*Requests* the Unified Command to exercise responsibility for determining the requirements for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, and for establishing in the field the procedures for providing such relief and support;

"*Requests* the Secretary General to transmit all offers of assistance for relief and support to the Unified Command;

"*Requests* the Unified Command to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on its relief activities;

"*Requests* the Secretary General, the Economic and Social Council in accordance with Article 65 of the Charter, other appropriate United Nations principal and subsidiary organs, the specialized agencies in accordance with the terms of their respective agreements with the United Nations, and appropriate non-governmental organizations to provide such assistance as the Unified Command may request for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, and as appropriate in connection with the responsibilities being carried out by the Unified Command on behalf of the Security Council." *End of draft.*

At meeting with UNSYG, Sunde of Norway, Jebb of UK and Lacoste of France, secretariat draft resolution (mytel 140)[1] was on the table.

Gross stated that without discussing this or any other resolution in detail Department felt that question of relief should be dealt with by SC before August 1 and purpose of any resolution would be (*a*) to underline responsibility of Unified Command which may have very extensive and responsible relief program. Also for domestic purposes and to utilize ECA it is useful from the US point of view to indicate this responsibility. (*b*) It is important to give ECOSOC the needed authority pursuant to Article 65 to concern itself in Korean relief and coordinate other agencies. This is also important to functions of UNESCO in disseminating information. He further mentioned that a resolution might provide that SYG, ECOSOC and other specialized agencies and NGO's should be asked to provide assistance as suggested by Unified Command.

SYG stated that his concern is sound relief program to avoid allowing Korea to be soil for Communism in wake of military action. He thought it important to adopt resolution before August 1, because he would expect USSR veto. He and his staff are anxious to assist within framework recognizing responsibility of Unified Command which he stressed.

Jebb saw general outline put forward by Gross and agreed by SYG as quite acceptable to FonOff but would like opportunity for consideration of draft. He mentioned importance that UN be associated with Unified Command in carrying out its responsibilities.

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[1] Received on July 27 at 1:18 p. m., p. 479.

Lacoste hoped that any draft resolution would emphasize that this operation so far as UN angles are concerned is subject to the SC.

While there was general agreement with Lie's view that it would be desirable to have the resolution unanimously adopted, Gross pointed out that probably the Yugoslavs could not vote for any resolution mentioning the Unified Command. However, it was felt that if by avoiding specific reference to SC resolutions on Korea Egypt's vote could be obtained, it was desirable to avoid such reference in order to get this support.

Gross agreed before end of the day to submit a draft to all SC delegations except USSR, and this has been done. He also agreed to request text be forwarded to US Embassies in SC members' capitals.[2]

Department please relay to London as USUN 3; Paris USUN 3; Oslo USUN 3; New Delhi USUN 3; Cairo USUN 3; Taipei USUN 2; Habana USUN 3; Quito USUN 1; Belgrade USUN 2; Moscow USUN 2.

GROSS

[2] In telegram 82, July 30, not printed, to New York, the Department of State authorized the U.S. Mission at the United Nations to introduce the draft resolution contained in telegram 167.

330/7–3050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, July 30, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received July 30—12:39 p. m.]

243. In absence details Department's thinking underlying contemplated resolution for SC meeting August 2 (Depcirtel July 29, 3 a. m.),[1] I have serious misgivings as to its desirability. Aside from probability that USSR action at intervening meeting on August 1 will introduce elements materially bearing on its aptness, it seems to me that SC actions to date have established sound position acceptable to free world and proposed resolution does not appear to augment basic platform on which we now stand. From point of view of embarrassing Soviets further it seems to me effort so transparent as to weaken chances its support by present friends.

Also, I feel Soviets could put reverse English on last clause for purposes their propaganda and make capital of our action in Indo-

[1] Not printed; it transmitted the text of the draft resolution contained in telegram 78, July 29, 4 p. m., to New York, p. 491.

china, Formosa, Philippines etc. as "action which might endanger international peace and security".

Department pass USUN, London, Paris; repeated info USUN 33, London 77, Paris 67.

KIRK

330/7–2950 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1950—1 p. m.

80. Reur 163 July 29. Dept is of the view that strong Res at this juncture of the Korean crisis is called for and with that view in mind it desires that you impress upon your friendly colleagues the importance of strong SC action. In the context of this view Dept interprets the word[s] "Calls upon" as an order.

Dept perceives no objection to your merger of paras 3 and 4 which as revised wld read as follows: "Calls upon all States to refrain from action which might lead to the spread of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further endanger international peace and security".

Dept perceives no objection to your tabling this Res late Monday (July 31) for SC meeting on Tuesday to secure priority of consideration over any substantive proposal which Malik might introduce. We shld maintain and hold the initiative. If USUN believes it more desirable or advantageous to table Res at SC meeting Monday afternoon (July 31) it may do so.

ACHESON

795.00/7–3050

The Prime Minister of India (Nehru) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[NEW DELHI, July 30, 1950.[1]]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY OF STATE, Very many thanks for your letter which was conveyed to me on the 26th July by your Ambassador in New Delhi.[2]

2. It was indeed good of you to have found time, in the midst of your urgent and anxious preoccupations to write to me so fully. I

[1] Transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Indian Ambassador (Pandit) under cover of a note, not printed, dated July 30.

[2] See telegram 210 from New Delhi, received at 4 : 17 a. m. on July 27, p. 478.

am also happy that you have written frankly, because it is only on this basis that we can understand each other, even though we may not always agree.

3. There are only two points, arising out of your letter, on which I think it desirable to dwell in some detail, and I shall do so, to quote your own words "on a strictly personal and confidential basis."

4. The first relates to the People's Government of China. You have referred to our conversations last year on the subject of the recognition of this Government. I explained to you then our point of view, and I think it worth while to recapitulate what I said.

Our recognition is not based either on approval of Communism or all the policies of the Peiping Government; it conforms to our views of the facts of authority over Continental China, which is far the greater part of China, and to our appraisal of the psychology of the majority of the peoples of Southeast Asia. A process of revolution is at work in most of these countries; Indonesia, Indo-China, Malaya and Burma offer abundant proof of this. It is both political and economical. In broad terms the political conflict is one between the urge of nationalism and Colonial rule. Communists have found an ally in nationalism especially in those countries where the resistance of Colonialism to nationalist aspirations has proved obdurate. The political evil of Communist totalitarianism has not proved an obstacle to this alliance so far nor is it likely to prove so in future as long as a people's natural longing for freedom from foreign domination is not satisfied. Moreover since all the countries that I have mentioned have a predominantly agricultural economy and land reform is their crying need, any regime which carries out such reforms successfully is bound to make a sympathetic appeal. We felt withholding of recognition from the People's Government of China would be to ignore these highly important considerations and to create a gulf not only between ourselves and China with whom we have a historical, almost immemorial, friendship but also misunderstanding between India and the peoples of Southeast Asia who are now struggling for their freedom. For us, situated as we are, and where we are, the recognition of the New China was not only inevitable but urgent. Our latest effort to seat China in the Security Council, an effort which, as I have already explained to you has been consistent and spreading over the last six months or so was prompted by the honest conviction that such a step was necessary to preserve the United Nations as a representative organisation and to maintain world peace. I think you will agree that so long as a nation of 450 million people remains outside the organisation, the organisation cannot be regarded as fully representative.

This view has nothing to do with the condonation of aggression whether by China or by any other country. Were China to resort to acts which in our opinion constitute aggression we should not hesitate to adopt the same attitude towards China as we have towards North Korea. The reports that we have received from our Ambassador in Peiping have led me to the conclusion that given the chance the New China will take a line of its own and work for peace so vital to its economic and social reconstruction rather than try the hazards of war, of its own will or at someone else's behest. But that chance can scarcely come if she is for whatever reasons kept out of the Community of Nations. I do not presume to challenge your sources of information but quite naturally have to be guided by my own.

5. My second point deals with your request to apprise our Ambassador in Peiping of the President's statement with respect to Formosa and to continue our endeavour to persuade authorities there that they avoid intervention in the Korean situation or an attack on Formosa. The President's statement about Formosa was repeated to our Ambassador in Peiping as soon as we received it from our Ambassador in Washington. Mr. Panikkar was advised in the first few days after the conflict in Korea started to impress upon the People's Government of China the necessity in the interests of world peace of avoiding action that might extend the area of armed conflict. You may rest assured that we shall persist in this endeavour.

6. In conclusion I should like you to know that the divergence of our views on the Peiping regime detracts in no way from our desire for cooperation between our two countries to terminate the hostilities in Korea and to ensure for the world lasting peace.[3]

With [etc.] JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

[3] On July 31, Mr. Acheson saw President Truman and made the following brief record of the conversation relating to Mr. Nehru's message: "I reported to the President on Nehru's last note to me which he thought showed development of Nehru's views in the right direction." (795.00/7–3150)

Editorial Note

On July 31 at 3 p. m., the United Nations Security Council held its 479th meeting; for the record of the meeting, see U.N. document S/P.V.479. The representatives of France, Norway, and the United Kingdom submitted the resolution on Korean relief, the text of which was identical with that contained in telegram 167, July 29, from New York, page 496. This resolution (U.N. document S/1657) was approved by a vote of 9 in favor (including the United States), to 0

opposed, with 1 member abstaining (Yugoslavia), and 1 member absent (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

At this meeting, the United States Representative (Austin) also introduced for discussion at the next Security Council meeting scheduled for August 1, the following draft resolution (S/1653):

"*The Security Council*

"*Condemns* the North Korean authorities for their continued defiance of the United Nations;

"*Calls upon* all States to use their influence to prevail upon the authorities of North Korea to cease this defiance;

"*Calls upon* all States to refrain from assisting or encouraging the North Korean authorities and to refrain from action which might lead to the spread of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further endanger international peace and security."

795.00/7–3150

Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 31, 1950.

U.S. COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

I. THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the implications of military and political actions which might be taken in areas north of the 38th parallel.

2. To determine the courses of action the United States should adopt which would contribute to the restoration of international peace and security to Korea.

II. MILITARY FACTORS

Estimate of the Situation:

3. The present military objective of the unified command is to repel the armed attack by North Korean forces and to restore international peace and security in the area. The Security Council resolution of 27 June noted that the authorities in North Korea had not withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel. No action of the Security Council has yet specifically limited military ground operations of the unified command to the area south of the 38th parallel.

4. From the point of view of military operations against North Korean forces as now constituted, the 38th parallel has no more significance than any other meridian. North Korean forces can be engaged and defeated wherever found, by whatever means are necessary, in the same fashion that air and naval power now are used to destroy military targets anywhere in Korea.

5. The only opposition to military operations north of the 38th parallel would be the entry of major Chinese Communist or Soviet forces in action in order to oppose further advances by the ground forces of the unified command. The movement of such hostile forces might be delayed, however, by destructions along the lines of communication into Korea. Furthermore, skillful coordination and timing of military and political operations in North Korea might forestall Soviet or Chinese Communist movements.

6. On the basis of available intelligence, the North Korean forces will not be reinforced by any large numbers of Chinese Communist troops, Soviet ground forces, or Soviet air forces as long as the ground fighting is confined to the area south of the 38th parallel.

7. The minimum offensive effort by the unified command in Korea might be to carry out the 25 and 27 June resolutions of the Security Council, and no more. The unified command could thus employ its troops only as far as the 38th parallel, and when the remaining North Korean forces had retreated north above the 38th parallel, hostilities would cease. The United Nations would be back where it was on 24 June 1950; the former military instability would again obtain. The USSR could re-arm a new striking force for a second attempt. Thus, a return to the *status quo ante bellum* would not promise security. It would not provide the unification which all Koreans so desperately desire, and it would still require a very great outlay of funds to reconstruct and secure South Korea. On the other hand, a cessation of hostilities by the forces of the unified command on their arrival at the 38th parallel would be least likely to provoke the Kremlin and might lay the basis for a negotiated settlement.

8. As an intermediate objective, the unified command could occupy P'yongyang and vicinity, in addition to important communications points in the center and east of Korea between 40° and 39° latitudes. An unoccupied, demilitarized zone might then be set up in depth along the Chinese and Soviet frontiers to allay their suspicions. But Korea would still not be united, and the security problem would be as great, if not greater, than in the case of a minimum effort.

9. A maximum effort would include the pacification and occupation of all Korea by the unified command, which would take any and all appropriate measures within Korea to accomplish its mission. The United Nations could then arrange elections to establish a government for all Korea. The future military frontier would coincide with the international boundary sanctioned by law, custom, and treaty, and perhaps guaranteed by UN authority and force.

Military Assumptions:

10. Any consideration of US courses of action in support of UN action in Korea must assume that the United States will mobilize and

use sufficient resources to gain the military objectives in Korea, while strengthening its military position in areas of strategic importance.

11. Secondly, the courses of action considered in this report would be taken only on the assumption that the Soviet government will not directly enter the hostilities in Korea, and will not initiate general hostilities. Should the Soviet government enter directly into the hostilities in Korea, the courses of action in NSC 76 would apply.[1]

III. POLITICAL FACTORS

Korean Unity:

12. For centuries Korea has been a cross-roads of conflict. In modern times foreign exploitation and suppression have stunted Korea's growth as a nation. A ruthless Japanese rule erased Korea as a nation, and a post-war irreconcilable split divided Korea. Even today some governments view the fighting in Korea solely as another clash of great powers, and not as the measure of United Nations responsibility and initiative in restoring international peace and security to Korea.

13. The urge for union is irrepressible and fundamental among all Koreans. During 40 years under the Japanese, their deepest dream was independence; today it is unification and independence. Five years of bisection culminating in a bitter, destructive civil war will probably intensify their desire for union.

14. The 38th parallel is a geographical artificiality violating the natural integrity of a singularly homogeneous nation. It began as a temporary military convenience; it became the eastern outpost of the iron curtain. As a result, the political economy of Korea has temporarily branched off in two completely different forms. One of the serious problems of reconstruction will involve the integration of the different political and economic institutions now established in the south and the north. However, after the cessation of hostilities, the intrinsic unity of Korean economic and human resources will help recast a divided Korea into one mold, provided political conditions permit.

15. The United States proposed the 38th parallel, but never intended it as a rigid frontier. In the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the United States spoke out for Korean freedom. During 1945–1947 the United States made repeated efforts to find agreement with Soviet authorities in order to unite Korea. The Moscow Decision of 1945, the sessions of the Joint US–USSR Commission in 1946 and 1947, the Hodge-Chistiakov exchanges in 1946–1947, and the Marshall-Molotov

[1] See the memorandum by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, July 10, p. 346.

exchanges of 1947 [2] are familiar landmarks of our persistent but unsuccessful effort to persuade the USSR to join in unifying the two occupation zones under a single provisional government.

16. Attempts at unification continued under the aegis of the United Nations but with no more success. By its resolution of 14 November 1947 the General Assembly sought the objectives of freedom and national independence for all Korea, and set out a program for its attainment. The United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK), established by subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly, has been, and still is, charged with seeking Korea's unification by pacific settlement. On 21 October 1949 the General Assembly reaffirmed these objectives and the mission of UNCOK, and called upon the member States "to refrain from any acts derogatory to the purposes of the present resolution". While the General Assembly for three years has sought to unify Korea by peaceful means, it has never formally considered nor explicitly approved the unification of Korea as a consequence of military operations taken to defeat aggression against the Republic of Korea.

17. Yet, the United Nations did succeed in establishing a government in South Korea. Its existence has considerable significance. It is a sovereign government recognized by 32 nations. It is the legal authority in South Korea. The General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1948 declared that there has been established "a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea), having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea."

18. The Government of the Republic of Korea, despite many weaknesses, demonstrated a growing capacity to govern prior to hostilities. As UNCOK pointed out in its report of 26 June 1950 to the Secretary General, "there have been distinct signs of improvement in recent months in both economic and political stability of the country". Recent elections for the National Assembly gave significant gains to moderate elements. However, the most conservative elements have exercised power in the Government of Syngman Rhee, usually in a harsh and

[2] The documentation referred to, along with a narrative summary of the events of these years, is contained in *Korea's Independence* (Department of State publication No. 2933; Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947); see also *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VIII, pp. 605 ff.; *ibid.*, 1947, vol. VI, pp. 596 ff.

authoritarian manner. Syngman Rhee has not been popular. In North Korea communist propaganda undoubtedly has aroused considerable hostility among Koreans to the South Korean administration. Political reconstruction in Korea will present a complex challenge.

19. In view of the establishment of a Soviet-style police state in North Korea, it is difficult to weigh the degree of popular support for or opposition to the regime there. The relatively large number of refugees who have fled south during the past five years indicates the possibility of considerable discontent. The ravages of war may create in North Korea a population hostile to the Communists authorities. They will, in any event, attempt to unite occupied South Korea to North Korea by so-called national elections.

IV. POLITICO-MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

20. By a quick and crushing victory in South Korea, the USSR would have gained its long-standing goal of the complete absorption of Korea into its orbit. Furthermore, the building of a "cordon sovietaire" from the Soviet borders of Sinkiang to the southern shores of Korea would have neared completion. Only Japan, at the edge of the orbit, and Southeast Asia to the South would have still remained outside. Yet, the aggression in South Korea may result in the opposite effect—the failure to complete the cordon.

21. In this light, the situation in Korea now provides the United States and the free world with the first opportunity to displace part of the Soviet orbit. If the basic policy of the United States is to reduce the preponderant power of the USSR in Asia and elsewhere, then UN-operations in Korea can set the stage for the non-communist penetration into an area of Soviet influence.

22. Penetration of the Soviet orbit, short of all-out war, would disturb the strategic complex which the USSR is organizing between its own Far Eastern territories and the contiguous areas. Manchuria, the pivot of this complex outside the USSR, would lose its captive status, for a free and strong Korea could provide an outlet for Manchuria's resources and could also provide non-communist contact with the people there and in North China.

23. The significance in Asia of the unification of Korea under UN auspices would be incalculable. The Japanese would see demonstrated a check on Soviet expansion. Elements in the Chinese Communist regime, and particularly important segments of the Chinese population, might be inclined to question their exclusive dependence on the Kremlin. Skillfully manipulated, the Chinese Communists might prefer different arrangements and a new orientation. Throughout Asia, those who foresee only inevitable Soviet conquest would take hope.

24. For the above reasons, it is probable that the danger of a free, united Korea will lead the Kremlin to try to prevent its total loss. When North Korean forces appear to be losing, or even before, the Kremlin may launch a vigorous attempt to mediate the dispute, or may employ Chinese or Soviet forces to hold part or all [of] North Korea. However, it is possible that, notwithstanding its considerable military strength located in the Far East, the Kremlin will not jeopardize its uncompleted strategic position in the Far East to risk a general war to prevent a full-fledged, rapid, and determined UN effort to unite Korea.

V. U.S. INTERESTS AND OBLIGATIONS

25. In subscribing to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, the US pledged its support to Korean independence. Our word has been measured in our diplomatic support, military aid, and economic assistance. Our obligation to the United Nations, to block a breach of the peace, is fixed.

26. The broad objectives of the United States were stated in NSC 8/2, approved by the President on 23 March 1949,[3] as follows:

"*a.* To establish a united, self-governing, and sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the UN.

"*b.* To ensure that the government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.

"*c.* To assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and educational system as essential bases of an independent and democratic state. A more immediate objective is the withdrawal of remaining U.S. occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable consistent with the foregoing objectives."

27. The political value to the United States of establishing a free, united, and stable Korea and of carrying out the resolve of the United Nations justifies the cost in military forces, as long as the assumptions in paragraphs 10 and 11 hold true.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

28. The following conclusions may be derived from the preceding analysis:

A. The unification of Korea squares with historical necessity, Korean aspirations, U.S. obligations and policies, and the objectives of the United Nations.

B. The establishment of a free and united Korea and the elimination of the North Korean Communist regime, following brutal mili-

[3] For the complete text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 969.

tary aggression, would be a step in reversing the dangerous strategic trend in the Far East of the past twelve months.

C. The 38th parallel, in and of itself, has no military significance.

D. The chief potential limitation on the objective of unifying Korea will be Soviet military countermeasures on a local scale, or Soviet diplomatic and political actions in the UN.

E. Consequently, the timing and speed of U.S. politico-military operations are crucial, and call for especially close working relationships.

F. In the long run, a maximum UN effort will be needed in securing peace in Korea and in meeting the acute problems of political and economic reconstruction.

G. The continued functioning of the Republic of Korea, as the only sovereign government in Korea, is indispensable to the re-establishment of the rule of law in Korea and the fulfilment of U.S. objectives.

H. Long-range policies in support of independence for Korea conform to the general objectives of the United States in Asia.

29. In consonance with the above conclusion[s] and in pursuit of its basic long-range objectives with respect to Korea, the U.S. should take measures to effect:

A. The unification of Korea under a united, sovereign, and representative government independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the UN.

B. The security of Korea against foreign aggression and internal subversion.

C. The reconstruction of Korea in political, economic, and social fields to develop a stable, self-sustaining, and advancing state.

30. As the basis for realizing these objectives, the United States should take the following series of actions:

A. *Statement of Aims:*

(1) *At an appropriate time*, the President should proclaim that our peace aim is a united, free, and independent Korea, as envisaged by the UN. Such a statement should be supported by a Joint Resolution of Congress.

(2) *Again at an appropriate time*, the U.S. should seek to translate this aim into UN objectives. In view of the possibility that uncoordinated measures would provoke Soviet counter-action, either in the military or diplomatic field or both, the United States should seek UN action in two stages: First, at the 1950 meeting of the General Assembly, the United Nations should immediately endorse the resolutions of 25 and 27 June and 7 July, of the Security Council and seek maximum support for the unified command; second, at a later date, at the moment when the unified command has taken the offensive, the United Nations should re-affirm the basic UN aims in Korea along the lines of the General Assembly Resolution of 14 November 1947.

(3) No statement of US general objectives should be made until the unified command has launched offensive military measures to carry out the military objectives listed below. Until such time, great caution and discretion should be taken in public discussion of the 38th parallel.

(4) In the meantime, the U.S. should use all its diplomatic means to forestall any Soviet effort to mediate the conflict on any terms short of the unification of all Korea on a free and representative basis under UN auspices.

B. *Military Objectives:*

(1) The unified command should seek to occupy Korea and to defeat North Korean armed forces wherever located north or south of the 38th parallel.

(2) To achieve this objective, the Commanding General of the unified command should be directed to take necessary military action in Korea, without regard to the 38th parallel.

C. *Occupation Problems:*

(1) As an interim measure the U.S. should encourage the UN to strengthen UNCOK to render it more effective in maintaining liaison with the government of the Republic, and with other political elements in Korea, in observing the course of hostilities, and in supervising the care of refugees and the civil organization of reoccupied areas.

(2) At or about the time of surrender or the cessation of hostilities, the U.S. should encourage the UN to create a new UN organization, incorporating UNCOK. This organization would be responsible for the long-term reconstruction and security of Korea. It should include (*a*) a UN administrator for relief and reconstructions; (*b*) a commission to supervise national elections and the reformation of the national government of the Republic of Korea to include all of Korea; and (*c*) a border commission to observe the integrity of the Korean frontier and it should use the international security forces provided by the UN to police this frontier.

(3) The United States should be prepared to provide its share of forces required to police the Korean frontier until such time as Korean forces are trained and equipped to take over that responsibility. Likewise, the U.S. should seek firm commitments from UN members to retain in Korea their individual contingents until the mission of the UN is accomplished.

D. *Politico-Military Measures:*

(1) The United States should make a maximum effort to support and strengthen the governing bodies of the Republic of Korea. The quality of administrative personnel should be improved, the National Assembly restored to full working order, and civilian teams selected and trained to take over reoccupied areas to provide effective follow-up of military operations.

(2) Psychological warfare should be intensified to discredit the Communist regime and improve Korean morale.

(3) An *ad hoc* committee of departmental representatives should be established immediately to develop detailed reconstruction plans to include recommendations for military, economic, and political assistance.

(4) The UN, and perforce the U.S., should not be deflected from its present course of action or stated objectives in Korea by any proposals by the USSR or minority groups in the UN which fall short of complete achievement of the present UN objectives.

330/7–2950 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 31, 1950—8 p. m.

91. Reurtel 164 July 29 [1] Dept considers rep North Korea cannot be accepted for fol reasons:

(1) GA has already established in UNCOK an instrumentality whereby North Koreans may be heard. They are at liberty make use UNCOK facilities any time. GA before NK attack decline seat reps that regime on ground UNCOK not availed of; now, after attack, SC will be the more unwilling override GA provisions this regard.

(2) North Korean regime is defying SC decisions and is carrying on armed hostilities against forces acting, pursuant to SC authority, to enforce these decisions and therefore its rep may not be seated at council table.

(3) Malik most likely, in light past USSR conduct, to call for hearing NK as "state" under Art 32. Our position that GA, in conferring status upon ROK, had denied status to NK, and that SC shld avoid adopting a contrary formula, was set forth in SC debate on Korean membership applications. SC did not refer NK application to committee on membership, thus presumably persuaded NK not a state.[2] Since Dept feels confident SC will not wish receive NK personages as reps of state, there is no likelihood that Art's auth to lay down conditions need be invoked.

(4) Conceivable some SC Rep may suggest invitation be issued under Rule 39. We shld in that case point out in addition (1) above that SC requires no communication from "other persons" to supply it with info or to give other assistance in examining matters so plain as propriety adopting, and insisting upon execution, its resolutions June 25 and 27.

ACHESON

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[1] The text of this message read as follows:

"Chauvel reports 'brain wave' that we should consider carefully and agree on action we will take in event Malik asks SC to accept representative North Korea at council table. Chauvel asks our views. Please instruct." (330/7–2950)

[2] See *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 943.

795B.00/7–3150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, July 31, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received July 31—8 : 56 p. m.]

254. 1. Bajpai, SYG MEA told me today he hoped US would not be disappointed at size and composition GOI "token force" for Korea.[1] It was contemplated that medical unit would comprise between 200 and 300 persons carefully selected from defense forces who would serve as military contingent in uniform. Among them would be some of best surgeons in India. It was regretted that GOI had no combat units available at present, but hoped medical unit could be of help.

2. I told Bajpai that I was sure GOI contribution would be appreciated. I had had some experience with Indian military doctors and considered that they stood extremely high in their profession.

3. It would be helpful if indication could be made through appropriate channel to GOI of US appreciation of this aid. I regard this contribution as only beginning. Meager as it is, announcement has given rise considerable criticism from Indian press. Decision represents in present atmosphere courageous act on part GOI.

HENDERSON

[1] See U.N. document S/1647, dated July 29, 1950.

795B.5/8–150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TAEGU, August 1, 1950.
[Received August 1—5 : 07 a. m.]

98. Question has been raised informally re authority US equipment and support for Korean Army beyond 65,000. Considering importance Koreans themselves making largest possible contribution manpower to military effort as means both defeating Communists and saving American lives and probability that after end major operations North Korean Guerrillas will continue fight mountain areas considerable time for whose suppression Korean Troops should be used to greatest possible extent, I recommend US or United Nations arming largest possible number able-bodied Korean soldiers who can be trained and who considered necessary by General MacArthur without regard to prewar 65,000 limitation.

General Walker concurs.

Repeated information Tokyo unnumbered.

MUCCIO

398.43 UNESCO/8–150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, August 1, 1950—12 a. m.
[Received August 1—10 : 19 a. m.]

254. When on July 30 Embassy officer delivered to Indian Ambassador message re UNESCO contained Deptel 87 July 28,[1] Radhakrishnan took occasion to discuss significance Malik's projected return SC, saying he thought it was sign Soviets disturbed by repercussions Korean affair and that they had decided to make move to stop rearmament of west. He feared that if Soviet return did not lead to some kind of settlement, UN would break up and Soviets would start war before west becomes stronger. Indian Ambassador was sure that democracies would in that event win military victory, but what would happen to democracies in course hostilities? Would they achieve moral victory?

It was clear that Radhakrishnan seemed to fear impact Malik's propaganda appeal in SC. He asked why we wouldn't cut Gordian knot by allowing Peking to take SC seat in return for Soviet undertaking to withdraw NK troops and to agree to UN mediation in Korea? He was sure that Soviets and Peking would agree not to vote against (i.e., they would agree to abstain) constructive Korean resolutions in SC, thus giving future SC action full "moral weight" of "800,000,000 additional people."

Indian Ambassador does not think Soviets are returning to SC with any assurance, based on secret deals, that Peking would be seated and expressed view that vote would continue be adverse at this stage unless US took positive action. Indian Ambassador Peking certain that Peking not yet solidly tied to Kremlin. Indian effort is to detach China from Moscow. Magnanimous gesture by US might help do the trick. China not yet "communized" except for agrarian reform; it is not as "socialistic" as Britain.

When Embassy officer emphasized "blackmail" aspect any change US position on China this time, Indian Ambassador said he feared that our stand very much "which comes first, chicken or egg" proposition, and that net result our standing on prestige would be war. After Embassy officer sketched course Soviet post-war imperialism in Europe and Asia since 1945 which underlies US disillusionment with possibilities negotiated settlements with Soviets, Indian Ambassador agreed that Soviets had been faithless and asked whether we then consider

[1] Not printed; the message related to the calling of a meeting of the Executive Board of UNESCO to discuss UNESCO's position on Korea (398.43 UNESCO/7–2850).

situation "hopeless." Embassy officer replied that "solidarity of non-Communist world" was answer to problem whereupon Radhakrishnan said we must take into account cross-currents in Asian part non-Communist world. Not difficult to convince many Asians that Korean affair staged or at least seized upon by west as pretext for re-introduction western military forces into Asia to reconstitute old nineteenth century imperialism. GOI in difficult position if its foreign policy appears consist of support for French in Indochina, British in Malaya, Americans in Formosa, etc.

Indian Ambassador then referred his call on Stalin last January, which appears to have left deep impression, and said he personally counted great deal on fact that Stalin an old man who would not wish do anything which might result in destruction Soviet "house" which he had constructed and that Stalin is proud of difference between himself and Hitler. Whereas latter impetuous and adventurous, Stalin considers that he is cool, detached, cautious and calculating. Radhakrishnan thinks we should take advantage this fact.

In review Stalin–Nehru correspondence, Indian Ambassador clearly implies he was not happy with way matter had been handled by GOI, particularly failure GOI pin Soviets down on details peaceful settlement in Korea. Added that if he had received "green light" instead of "flat no" as result this informal mediatory approach this Embassy, Nehru would have taken different tack.

Indian Ambassador indicated several times during talk that GOI stood by its position re NK aggression and withdrawal NK troops after which mediation should take place. Like many genuine idealists, he was naive enough to suggest that something might come of direct approach to Malik by US or one of its friends to effect, "My dear fellow, what are you chaps up to? You know you can't blackmail us, so let's get down to business." Nurtured in the atmosphere of British power in India, which was flexible and compromising, he fails almost completely to understand the implacable and fanatical persistence of Soviet Communist power.

Department pass New Delhi; repeated information New Delhi 23.

KIRK

795B.551/7–2650 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 1, 1950—12 noon.

561. For the Amb. Considerations outlined Embtel 554 [1] are important and I agree that public shd be made fully aware of them.

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[1] Received at 7:39 p. m. on July 26, p. 477.

However, we are disappointed with length of time which will elapse before forces are dispatched. Brit have already consumed month in reaching decision with net result that ground troops will not be available for action until at least three months after aggression started.

While welcoming commitment and ack all considerations you enumerate, we feel Brit shd be informed we hope forces will be enroute much sooner than now indicated.

ACHESON

795.00/8–150

Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1950.

With reference to the paper on "Advance Beyond the 38th Parallel" (UM D–109),[1] I want to make it clear that while I accept the conclusion that we should not make any commitment one way or another now, I did not agree with much of the body of the paper.

In my opinion, there is every reason to go beyond the 38th Parallel except possibly one, and that is our incapacity to do so and the fact that the attempt might involve us much more deeply in a struggle on the Asiatic mainland with Soviet and Chinese Communist manpower because of the strategic bearing that the northern part of Korea has toward Port Arthur and Vladivostok.

I think, however, we should allow the government of the Republic of Korea to advocate the unity of Korea as this is the one great popular issue and if the North Koreans advocate unity and the Republic of Korea seems to advocate a return to disunity, then it will forfeit all popular support throughout Korea.

[1] See the draft memorandum prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, July 25, p. 469.

795.00/8–150

Memorandum by Mr. George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff to the Department of State Representative on the NSC Staff (Bishop)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1950.

With reference to your memorandum of July 31, 1950[1] to Mr. Watts regarding future U.S. policy with respect to Korea, there are attached three copies of revisions of some of the paragraphs.[2]

[1] Not printed.

[2] References in the annexed document are to the paragraphs of the draft memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff of July 25, p. 469, as it had gone forward to the NSC Staff, bearing the date July 27 and with no changes in the text but with the paragraphs renumbered.

These revisions are based upon comment made at the Under Secretary's Meeting of July 28. They also reflect comment made by Mr. Jessup.

Messrs. Allison, Sandifer, and Wells and I agreed that work on this paper should go ahead but that another paper would be necessary to complete the study. This point is covered in the final paragraph of the revision.

GEORGE H. BUTLER

[Annex]

FUTURE U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To report upon the policy that the United States should pursue after the Korean communist forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel.

ANALYSIS

8. (The last sentence of this paragraph [3] should be deleted.)

9. (The last sentence [4] should read as follows): This paper is addressed primarily to the latter phase of the problem, for the reasons set forth in the following paragraph:

13.[5] If North Korean forces withdraw or are driven back to the 38th parallel, continued military action by the U.N. forces for the purpose of imposing a settlement with a view to a unified and independent Korea would depend upon majority support in the United Nations. Account would have to be taken of possible reluctance regarding the multilateral use of force as a part of the U.N. effort to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea.

14. (This entire paragraph [6] should be deleted.)

15. (Renumber as paragraph 14.)

16. (Renumber as paragraph 15.)

17. (Renumber as paragraph 16 and revise as follows):

Likewise present public and Congressional opinion in the United States would be dissatisfied with any conclusion falling short of what it would consider a "final" settlement of the problem. A sentiment favoring a continuation of military action north of the 38th parallel already is arising. On the other hand, there may well develop a contrasting sentiment against using U.S. military forces to help establish an independent Korea.

18. (Renumber as paragraph 17.)

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[3] See paragraph 7 of the draft memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff, July 25, p. 470.
[4] See paragraph 8, *ibid.*
[5] See paragraph 12, p. 471.
[6] See paragraph 13, *ibid.*

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CONCLUSIONS

19. (Renumber as paragraph 18.)
20. (Renumber as paragraph 19.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

21. (Renumber as paragraph 20.)
22. (Renumber as paragraph 21 and revise as follows) :

Decisions regarding the course of action when the U.N. forces approach the 38th parallel should be deferred until military and political developments provide the additional information necessary to enable us: (*a*) to base our decisions on the situation in Korea and in other parts of the world at that time; (*b*) to consult with other U.N. members; and (c) to keep our military capabilities and commitments in safe balance.

[Add new paragraph 22.] [7] Measures which might be necessary or desirable once the aggression has been brought to an end, either by defeat of the Korean communist aggressors or as the result of a possible Soviet suggestion for an early voluntary withdrawal by the Korean communists, should be the subject of immediate study and early report by the Department of State in cooperation with the Department of Defense.

[7] Brackets appear in the source text.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met from 3 to 6:15 p. m. on August 1; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.480. The discussion related principally to the efforts of the President of the Council, Mr. Malik, to raise the question of the seating of a representative of the People's Republic of China on the Security Council in place of the representative of the Republic of China.

795B.5/7–1350

The Department of State to the British Embassy

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy's memorandum of July 13, 1950 [1] set forth certain tentative views of the Foreign Office with respect to legal

[1] Not printed; but see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Johnson, July 13, p. 374.

problems arising out of the Korean hostilities and requesting the comments of the Department thereon.

The Department has not so far found it necessary to make any overall determination as to the legal nature of the Korean conflict, i.e. whether it is a civil war or an international war. It has certainly been the intention of the United Nations and of the United States that all of Korea should constitute one state with one government and no change in this as an ultimate aim has been made nor has the United States ever admitted the division of Korea into two independent states. Nevertheless, it is difficult to fit the Korean conflict into traditional concepts of either civil or international war and the Department feels that it is unnecessary for present purposes to do so.

Whatever the nature of the Korean conflict the United States is in agreement with the Foreign Office that the international police action taken by the United States and other members of the United Nations under its authority entitle[s] them to the exercise of all of the rights to which a normal belligerent is entitled under international law.

The United States is also in agreement with the Foreign Office that so long as the armed forces of Northern Korea observe the laws and customs of war they are entitled to the humane practices provided by international law for combatants, but that Northern Korea cannot be recognized as a lawful belligerent and hence is not entitled to the rights accorded to belligerents under international law, for instance, the belligerent right to interfere with neutral commerce. As the Foreign office is aware, General MacArthur has publicly proclaimed the intention to treat captured North Koreans in accordance with international practice in cases of armed conflict.

While the Department appreciates the informal suggestion regarding the declaration of a blockade by the Commanding General of the forces operating pursuant to the Security Council resolutions, it had reached the conclusion prior to the receipt of the Embassy's memorandum that such an action was neither necessary nor desirable. The blockade announced by the President and put into effect by General MacArthur pursuant to Security Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27 rests on the authority of those resolutions and subsequent measures taken by the Commanding General to maintain the blockade will no doubt be supported by all of the forces under his command. The blockade having been legally proclaimed by the Commander-in-Chief of the only forces in the field at the time, no need is seen for a further proclamation because of the augmentation of those forces with those of other members of the United Nations or the designation of

the General in command of those forces as the Commanding General of the augmented forces.

The above are the purely informal and tentative views of the Department on the matters covered.

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1950.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on August 2 from 3 to 6:15 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.481. No action was taken during the meeting, which dealt mainly with Korea, as the Council was deadlocked on the procedural question of the adoption of an agenda.

795B.551/8–250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, August 2, 1950—11 a. m.
[Received August 2—3 : 15 p. m.]

695. For the Secretary from Douglas. ReDeptel 561, August 1. We are all here disappointed at the interlude between now and the departure of British self-contained unit to Korea. I have already expressed our anxiety that they embark at earliest possible date and surprise at length of interlude.

The fact is, however unpleasant, that British do not have forces presently organized in the necessary infantry battalions, armored regiment, and other supporting troops, such as engineers and service of supply forces, to despatch on a mission of this sort. Because of this deplorable state of affairs it will necessarily take them some time to sift out the new selectees, those that have six to eight months training or more, and to rearrange the regulars that are now disbursed through every battalion, in order to assemble the self-contained unit which British are sending.

I am confident from conversation with responsible and high British military that British will make every effort to expedite the commencement of the movement and its completion.

The significant fact emerging from all this is the lamentable state of the ground forces in Britain.

DOUGLAS

661.00/8–1550

Minutes of a Meeting Held by Representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in Paris on August 3, 1950 [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

PARTICIPANTS

France: M. Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
M. Roland Jacquin de Margerie, Assistant Political Director.
M. James Baeyens, Director for Asia.
M. Jacques de Bourbon Busset, M. Bernard de Menthon, M. Jacques de Folin, M. Jean Laloy, M. Sauvagnargues } Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
M. Pignon, High Commissioner for Indochina (Part of 2nd Session).

U.K.: Mr. Maberly E. Dening, Assistant Under-Secretary of State.
Mr. William Hayter, Chargé d'Affaires a.i., Paris.
Mr. Anthony Montague-Brown, Third Secretary.

U.S.A.: Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Bohlen, Minister
Mr. Woodruff Wallner, First Secretary
Mr. William A. Crawford, Second Secretary.

M. PARODI opened the talks by referring to the French *aide-mémoire* of July 18, 1950 noting the dangers of the current world situation resulting from the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. He expressed the hope that the present conversations would offer the opportunity for a profitable study of the political lessons to be derived from the Korean aggression and for a reassessment and coordination of the positions of the three countries with respect to Korea and other danger points throughout the world. He preferred that the talks be kept on an informal basis and that their purpose be that of exchanging information rather than of arriving at specific commitments.

AMBASSADOR BRUCE expressed his agreement with M. Parodi's statement of the character and purpose of the talks and said that Mr. Boh-

[1] The minutes were transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 373 from Paris, August 15, not printed, which indicated that they were an informal record of the conversations prepared by an officer of the American Embassy. Herein are printed the portions of the talks dealing with Korea; the sections dealing with China and Formosa are printed in vol. VI, pp. 407 ff. These tripartite discussions were held in pursuance of the French *aide-mémoire* of July 18, contained in telegram 332, July 18, from Paris, p. 423, and took place in two sessions on August 3 and 4.

len, who had just returned from Washington, would make the United States presentation.

MR. HAYTER likewise expressed his agreement with M. Parodi's summation.

M. PARODI said that he would prefer to place the topics relating to Asia at the head of the agenda because Mr. Dening might not be able to remain for the full duration of the talks. There was general agreement on this suggestion.

MR. BOHLEN presented the United States position on Korea. He said that any attempt to analyze Soviet intentions in initiating the attack on Korea was pure guess-work. Our best guess as to the primary reason is perhaps the most obvious—that the Soviet Union desires to control South Korea because of the strategic importance of that area to the Soviet positions in North Asia, such as Port Arthur, Manchuria and Vladivostok. The fact that the Soviets had concluded no military agreements with North Korea such as they had with all their other satellites (except Albania) would indicate that they regarded North Korea as unfinished business which was to be completed by armed action with which the Soviet Union did not wish to be directly and juridically connected.

MR. BOHLEN stated that our entry into the Korean conflict was a political action based on the premise that aggression cannot be tolerated. From a purely military standpoint such action was undesirable because Korea from a strategic point of view was not vital to the United States defense position in Asia. For this reason there had been no American plan for a military action in Korea. The Soviet Union was doubtless fully aware of United States military thinking, which had been publicly stated, and had acted accordingly. We believe that for these reasons the United States and United Nations reactions to the North Korean attack came as a surprise to the Soviet Union. Further support for this belief lies in the fact that the Soviet propaganda machine was caught off guard and did not react immediately. Since the outbreak of the conflict, the Soviet Union has kept a free hand politically and militarily and has carefully avoided the impression that there is any special connection between itself and the North Koreans.

MR. BOHLEN reaffirmed that the United States action was a political action aimed at resisting aggression. He noted that it is based on the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27. He said that we cannot at this juncture predict the course of action that we should take if and when we reach the 38th parallel. That action will presumably depend on a Security Council decision when the time comes. As for the present military situation, it is critical but with luck we can hold.

Of outstanding importance are the long-term results of the aggression as evidenced in our mobilization and rearmament now under way. These actions should place the United States in a much stronger overall military posture within a reasonably short period. The President has already asked Congress for additional military appropriations of 10 billion dollars for ourselves and of 4 billion dollars for foreign military aid of which about 3.5 billion dollars will be for Europe.

MR. BOHLEN emphasized that whereas the purpose of the resolution recently submitted by Mr. Austin to the United Nations is to localize the Korean action, there is a real danger that the present hostilities may be extended. The greatest danger of this arises from the possible entry of Communist China into the conflict. So far no Chinese troops have been identified among the North Koreans. As for the North Koreans themselves, we have been much impressed by their fighting skill and believe that many of them had previous military experience in the Chinese civil war and possibly in Soviet Armies during World War II.

Turning to the possibility of direct Soviet involvement in the Korean conflict, MR. BOHLEN said that we consider such an eventuality unlikely so long as the fighting is confined to South Korea. Should the front be stabilized and the fighting turn again toward the North, we might expect a shift in the Soviet attitude. As the situation is today, we see no possibility that the Soviet Union would be prepared to settle the Korean question in a manner acceptable to the United Nations. There is no reason for the U.S.S.R. to adopt a conciliatory attitude so long as everything is going in its favor. If a real opportunity for an acceptable peaceful settlement (that was not merely a propaganda gesture) presented itself, we would certainly not reject it. However, we must remember that we are fighting for a political principle that aggression cannot be permitted to pay, and that this principle cannot be compromised.

MR. DENING expressed general agreement with what Mr. Bohlen had to say. In the British view the Soviets were employing the technique of aggression by proxy in a new form. Moreover they were seeking to exploit an initial success before the Republic of Korea could be armed to resist aggression. Unquestionably they had been surprised by the United States and United Nations actions. The United Kingdom–Soviet diplomatic exchanges in Moscow showed that the Soviets had nothing to propose by way of settlement in consonance with the Security Council resolutions. Nevertheless the Soviet replies have not closed the door to negotiations. The United Kingdom shares the United States view that so long as the North Koreans continue to be militarily successful the Soviet Union will be disposed to make

no acceptable offer. In short, the North Koreans must be forced by military action back to the 38th parallel. Doubtless the United Nations will then seek to unify all Korea. Unification, however, will be impossible without United Nations forces to support it. Although there is no question that the ultimate solution must be a United Nations solution, it is premature at this time to discuss the methods by which it may be achieved.

With regard to the possibility of Chinese Communist involvement in the Korean conflict, MR. DENING expressed the view that this was unlikely unless the Peking Government considered that very material advantage would accrue therefrom. Neverthless he did not exclude the possibility that the Peking Government might be compelled by Soviet pressure to take military action against its better judgment. So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, he believed that it desires above all to avoid involvement in total war and that should things go badly in Korea it will have no compunction in sacrificing its North Korean satellite in the hope of taking it over by political means at a later date. Meanwhile it will exploit the situation.

MR. BOHLEN said that United States public opinion has been aroused by the Korean action to a fuller understanding of the extent of the Soviet menace and is facing up admirably to the realities of the situation. He noted that whereas the technique of Soviet aggression by proxy is not new, this is the first occasion of an unconcealed aggression by proxy. This would seem to denote that the Soviet Union is prepared to take greater risks today than a year or so ago and that the Soviet rearmament program has doubtless progressed to a point permitting of greater risks. We are forced to conclude that only by rearming in turn can we deter the Soviets from continuing to take risks of an increasingly graver nature.

M. PARODI expressed general agreement with what had been said. In his view the Soviet Union had eschewed simulated aggression, such as a civil war might have offered, in favor of brutal and open aggression. He assumed that although the Soviet Union had believed there would be no armed aid to South Korea and had counted on United States non-intervention, it had nevertheless prepared for the worst. The lesson of the Korean aggression, he said, is that it is provoking the rearmament of the West. He expressed concern that the Soviet Union might be tempted to seize the opportunity of Western weakness in the months immediately ahead to start a general war. He said that we are now in a more dangerous phase than at the beginning of the Korean conflict and noted that the United States military cover on which Western Europe must depend is dispersed and largely tied down in Asia.

MR. BOHLEN spoke to this point. He said that we are fully aware of the danger of war in the period immediately ahead. We are, as M. Parodi indicated, entering a new phase of large scale rearmament. While this may entail the risk of war, it is a risk we must take because to do nothing would leave us in a weakened state in the event of aggression. In the past, Stalin's actions have not been based on the military factor alone. By nature he is very prudent, and he is not accustomed to launching wars where the odds are not overwhelmingly in his favor. These are deterrents to aggressive action which we must constantly bear in mind. Moreover, there are other deterrents, the first of which, from a military point of view, is our atomic arm. In the second place, Stalin must keep in mind the lesson of the defection of Soviet troops in 1941. Furthermore, he cannot feel entirely secure in his European satellites. By launching an intensive rearmament program, we may be taking a risk, but because we are living in a dangerous world where self-defense is a paramount necessity, the risk must be taken, and we cannot let our actions be dictated by fear of Soviet reactions.

M. PARODI remarked that it would be logical for Stalin to foresee that within three years the United States would be in a much stronger position than it is now and that this consideration might induce him to take preventive action against us at this juncture. He agreed that we must take the risk and expressed the hope that we can gain time now. He then referred to the inroads which Communist "peace" propaganda has made on public opinion in Europe and commented that the Russians had spoken so much of peace that many had begun to believe them. He concluded that while recognizing that United States intervention in Korea was indispensable and is fully supported by France, we must use every proper means to achieve a peaceful settlement.

MR. DENING expressed agreement with Mr. Bohlen that while there is danger in rearmament there is even greater danger in not rearming. He said that while the United Kingdom would like to buy time, as M. Parodi had suggested, we must preserve a firm attitude.

MR. BOHLEN recognized that by drawing our forces into Korea our position from the standpoint of offering effective military cover elsewhere has been temporarly weakened. At the same time Stalin must realize that the net result of our present effort will be increased strength for us in the near future. Stalin has often said that what he particularly respects is productive capacity and that by underestimating the role of production in modern war and the productive capacity of the United States Hitler had made his greatest mistake. There is no question that he continues to maintain a healthy respect for our productive potential. He can only conclude that from our standpoint

the adverse effect of our initial reverses in Korea must soon be offset many times by the cumulative results to be derived from mobilizing our industrial capacities for war.

M. PARODI asked Mr. Bohlen if we had envisaged the possibility of a Soviet proposal for elections in Korea.

MR. BOHLEN replied that it would be difficult to envisage such elections without the presence of United Nations troops throughout the country. Moreover, the Soviets are generally afraid of internationally conducted elections. In any case, as long as they hoped to get all Korea by military action, they would have no reason to favor general elections. A United Nations electoral commission in any case would not be enough, and United Nations troops would be required to guarantee security.

MR. BOHLEN said that contrary to the popular conception, the South Koreans have held together politically. There is no important guerrilla activity on the part of the South Koreans behind our lines. Not only have they fought well but after the initial defeat some four South Korean divisions have been regrouped and are continuing to make an effective contribution. It should be noted moreover that 700,000 South Korean refugees have preferred to flee behind our lines rather than to remain in Communist occupied territory.

M. PARODI expressed great interest in these facts and said that it would be desirable if they were more widely known in France.

M. PARODI then turned to the question of Formosa and expressed the view that perhaps the greatest present danger lay in the possibility of the Peking Government entering the conflict over this issue.[2]

. . . . . .

[2] At this point, Mr. Bohlen set forth the U.S. position on Formosa; for documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 407 ff. On the question of Chinese Communist entry into the Korean conflict, the minutes of the meeting of August 4 attributed to Mr. Bohlen the observation that "as regards Korea, the Chinese Communists have no special interest in Korea and if left to their own free will, would probably hesitate to take any aggressive action."

330/8–350 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, August 3, 1950—1:18 p. m.
[Received August 3.]

198. Rau on afternoon of August 2 on his own initiative raised with Gross problems he said GOI was facing in connection with motion for localization of conflict in Korea.[1] Saying he had not received

[1] See the editorial note under date of July 31, p. 501.

instructions as to how to vote on motion, Rau said he had been requested to take up several questions with US. Referring to condemnation paragraph in resolution, Rau asked if we had considered likelihood Soviet veto. If Soviet representative did veto, asked Rau, "Would that mean that SC did not condemn North Korean authorities?" Gross replied that it would mean no such thing, but would merely signify Soviet unwillingness for Council to condemn North Korean authorities. Rau, obviously cool to the condemnation clause and indeed to the resolution as a whole, did not argue the point but seemed unconvinced.

Rau also asked, what importance we attached to condemning the North Korean authorities, inasmuch as the SC "has already taken action much beyond the point of mere condemnation". Gross replied we attached importance to giving all members of the Council, including the Soviet representative, opportunity to express their true views concerning continued contempt by North Korean authorities of SC orders.

Throughout discussion Rau clearly indicated GOI reluctance go along with resolution and unhappiness concerning "hard line" being followed by US in SC during past few days.

AUSTIN

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on August 3 from 3 to 6:40 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.482. The debate continued to revolve around the procedural question of the adoption of the agenda. A Soviet proposal to include the question of representation of the People's Republic of China failed by a vote of 5 in favor (India, Norway, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia) to 5 opposed (China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, and the United States), with 1 abstention (Egypt). Another Soviet proposal to place on the agenda an item entitled "Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question" was defeated by a vote of 3 in favor (Egypt, India, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) to 7 opposed (including the United States), with 1 abstention (Yugoslavia). Thus, the agenda adopted contained one item, as moved by the United States Representative, "Complaint of Aggression Upon the Republic of Korea". The vote on this motion was 8 in favor (including the United States) to 1 opposed (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), with 2 abstentions (India and Yugoslavia).

611.91/8–350 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 3, 1950—6 p. m.

169. Text msg from Secy for delivery Nehru thru Bajpai fols:

"My dear Mr. PriMin: Thank you very much for ur gracious ltr, delivered to me by ur Amb on July 30. I am grateful to you for discussing so fully and frankly ur views on current developments in China, and I am confident that as a result of our exchange of ideas we now have a better understanding of each other's views.

"I very much appreciate ur kindness in forwarding to ur Amb in Peiping the Pres's statement re Formosa. I am likewise grateful for ur efforts to impress upon the auths in Peiping the desirability, in the interest of world peace, of avoiding action that might extend the area of hostilities.

"I was informed July 31 of India's offer of a medical unit for the UN effort in Korea. I shld like to express my personal gratification that ur Govt found it possible to take this step which further evidences India's solidarity with those members of the UN who oppose aggression.

"With warm personal regards. Sincerely yours."

You may wish to remark to Bajpai that the Secy and other top officials of Dept were gratified by the frank and friendly tone of Nehru's note and found it very helpful in clarifying our understanding of India's position. Such expressions of opinion are bound to increase mutual understanding between our two Govts.

ACHESON

795B.5/8–150 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 4, 1950—2 p. m.

60. Reurtel 98 [1] Dept understands from Dept Defense that emergency auth given Gen MacArthur immed fol outbreak hostilities permitting him, as operational expedient, fulfill, without limitation, all KMAG's requests for material on behalf ROK. It further understood MacArthur utilizing this auth to meet current requirements Korean forces.

For your further info Dept informing NSC its opinion that NSC 8/2 [2] which imposed limitation of 65,000 troops, now obsolete.

ACHESON

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[1] Received on August 1 at 5:07 a. m., p. 511.

[2] *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 969.

Editorial Note

At 3 p. m. on August 4, the United Nations Security Council met for its 483rd session. At the outset, the Soviet Representative introduced the following draft resolution (S/1668):

"*The Security Council*,

Decides,

(*a*) To consider it necessary, in the course of the discussion of the Korean question, to invite the representative of the People's Republic of China and also to hear representatives of the Korean people;

(*b*) To put an end to the hostilities in Korea and at the same time to withdraw foreign troops from Korea."

Most of the debate then centered on the question of Korean representation at the Security Council, but no vote was taken on the Soviet draft resolution. For the record, see U.N. document S/PV.483.

Editorial Note

At the request of President Truman, his Special Assistant, W. Averell Harriman, made a trip to the Far East in early August. He held discussions with General MacArthur in Tokyo on August 6 and 8, and with Ambassador Muccio in Korea on August 7. Mr. Harriman's notes on his conversations in Tokyo are printed under date of August 8, page 542; concerning his talk with Ambassador Muccio on August 7, see *infra*.

795.00/8–750

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President

[Extract]

TOP SECRET [TAEGU, August 7, 1950.]

I saw Muccio at General Walker's Headquarters. I asked him whether he wanted me to give the President any message, having in mind that there might be something that Muccio might want. He answered, "Tell him what great admiration I have for the stand that he has taken". There was nothing he wanted. He explained the strong support the South Koreans had given us. Their armies had fought well, even during the first attack when they were over-run by tanks and overwhelmed by heavy artillery. No ROK unit had surrendered, even down to company. The morale of the Army was good, and they were

fighting well. The morale of the Government was better, but Syngman Rhee was erratic, had his ups and down with the pulse of battle. The South Korean people were giving us full support, loading our ships, running the railroads, and South Korean police were maintaining order. No acts of major sabotage, in spite of Communist infiltration from the North, had occurred, and there were reports of cheering in Seoul whenever our planes came over. A million Koreans had come back with our troops. If there was victory, everyone would jump on the bandwagon. No doubt was in his mind as to the non-Communist outcome of an election. Some of the ROK police which had stayed behind were doing guerrilla work behind the enemy lines. Muccio sends texts for leaflets to Tokyo and data for radio. There has been some good work done, but not enough. The best thing of all would be good war news. Our radio is weak in Pusan, whereas the North Koreans have all the strong radios. He is now asking for a better radio in Pusan. Muccio has a staff of about 10, all of whom are good and their health is good . . .

. . . . . .

795.00/8–750

Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense for National Security Council Staff Consideration Only

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1950.

U.S. COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the implications of taking military and political actions in areas north of the 38th parallel.

2. To determine the courses of action the United States should adopt which would contribute to the security and stability of Korea.

ANALYSIS

Military Factors

3. The present military objective of the unified command is to defeat the North Korean forces and to restore international peace and security in the area. The Security Council resolution of 27 June noted that the authorities in North Korea had not withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel in compliance with the resolution of 25 June, but did not specifically limit military ground operations of the unified command to the area south of the 38th parallel.

4. From the point of view of military operations against North Korean forces as now constituted, the 38th parallel has no more sig-

nificance than any other meridian. There are no restrictions to preclude engaging and defeating North Korean land forces wherever found, by whatever means are necessary, in the same fashion that air and naval power now are used to destroy military targets anywhere in Korea.

5. The principal deterrent to military operations north of the 38th parallel other than North Korean armed forces, would be the entry of major Chinese Communist or Soviet forces in action in order to oppose further advances by the ground forces of the unified command. The movement of Chinese Communist or Soviet forces might be delayed, however, by destructions along the lines of communication external to Korea. Furthermore, skillful coordination and timing of military and political operations in North Korea might deter Soviet or Chinese Communist movements.

6. On the basis of available intelligence, it is not expected that the North Korean forces will be augmented by organized bodies of Chinese Communist troops, Soviet ground forces, or Soviet air forces as long as the ground fighting is confined to the area south of the 38th parallel.

7. Each of the following courses of action could be interpreted as in consonance with the UN Security Council resolutions of 25 and 27 June, 1950:

a. The minimum offensive effort by the unified command in Korea might be to carry out "repel the armed attack" provision of the 27 June UN resolution in seeking only a limited military offensive by forcing the North Korean armed forces to withdraw to positions north of the 38th parallel. The unified command would thus employ its troops only as far as the 38th parallel, and if the remaining North Korean forces had retreated north of the 38th parallel, hostilities might cease. The United Nations would be back where it was on 24 June 1950; the former military instability would again obtain. The USSR could use this force in being as a striking force for a second attempt to gain control of Korea. Thus, a return to the *status quo ante bellum* would not insure security. It would not provide the unification which all Koreans so desperately desire, and it would still require a very great outlay of funds to reconstruct and secure South Korea. On the other hand, a cessation of hostilities by the forces of the unified command on their arrival at the 38th parallel would be less likely to incite the Kremlin to military action and might lay the basis for a negotiated settlement.

b. As an alternative objective, the unified command could occupy Pyongyang and vicinity, in addition to key communications points in the center and east of Korea between 40° and 39° latitudes. An unoccupied, demilitarized zone might then be set up in depth along the Chinese and Soviet frontiers to allay their suspicions. But Korea would still not be united, and the security problem would be as great, if not greater, than in the case of a minimum effort.

c. A maximum effort would include the pacification and occupation of all Korea by the unified command, which would take any and all appropriate measures within Korea to accomplish its mission. The United Nations could then arrange elections to establish a government for all Korea. The future military frontier would coincide with the international boundary sanctioned by law, custom, and treaty, and perhaps guaranteed by UN authority and force.

8. Any consideration of US courses of action in support of UN action in Korea must assume that the United States will mobilize and use sufficient resources to gain its military objectives in Korea, while strengthening its military capabilities for execution of emergency war plans.

9. The courses of action considered in this report are based also on the assumption that the Soviet or Chinese Communist governments will not overtly enter the hostilities in Korea, and will not initiate general hostilities. Should the Soviet or Chinese Communist government enter overtly into the hostilities in Korea, the courses of action in NSC 73/1 [1] and NSC 76 [2] would apply.

Political Factors

10. For centuries Korea has been a cross-road of conflict. In modern times foreign occupation and exploitation have stunted Korea's growth as a nation. A ruthless Japanese rule erased Korea as a nation, and a post-war irreconcilable split divided Korea. Even today some governments view the fighting in Korea solely as another clash of great powers, and not as the measures taken by the United Nations in its responsibility to restore peace and security in Korea.

11. The urge for union is irrepressible and fundamental among all Koreans. During 40 years under the Japanese, their fondest hope was independence; today it is unification and independence. Five years of bisection culminating in a bitter, destructive civil war will probably intensify their desire for union.

12. The 38th parallel is a geographical artificiality violating the natural integrity of a singularly homogeneous nation. It began as a temporary military convenience; it became the eastern outpost of the iron curtain. As a result, the political economy of Korea has temporarily branched off in two completely different forms. One of the serious problems of reconstruction will involve the integration of the different political and economic institutions now established in the south and the north. However, after the cessation of hostilities, the intrinsic unity of Korean economic and human resources will help recast a divided Korea into one mold, provided political conditions permit.

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[1] Related documentation is scheduled for publication in volume I.
[2] See footnote 2 to the memorandum by the JCS, July 10, p. 346.

13. The United States proposed the 38th parallel as the dividing line for the acceptance of Japanese surrender, but never intended it as a rigid frontier. During 1945–1947 the United States made repeated efforts to find agreement with Soviet authorities in order to unite Korea. The Moscow Decision of 1945, the sessions of the Joint US–USSR Commission in 1946 and 1947, the Hodge–Chistiakov exchanges in 1946–1947, and the Marshall-Molotov exchanges of 1947 are familiar landmarks of our persistent but unsuccessful effort to persuade the USSR to join in unifying the two occupation zones under a single provisional government.

14. Attempts at unification continued under the aegis of the United Nations but with no more success. By its resolution of 14 November 1947 the General Assembly sought the objectives of freedom and national independence for all Korea, and set out a program for its attainment. The United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK), established by subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly, has been, and still is, charged with seeking Korea's unification by pacific settlement. On 21 October 1949 the General Assembly reaffirmed these objectives and the mission of UNCOK, and called upon the member States "to refrain from any acts derogatory to the purposes of the present resolution". While the General Assembly for three years has sought to unify Korea by peaceful means, it has never formally considered nor explicitly approved the unification of Korea through military means.

15. Yet, the United Nations did succeed in establishing in South Korea a sovereign government recognized by 32 nations. The General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1948 declared that there has been established "a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea), having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea."

16. The Government of the Republic of Korea, despite many weaknesses, demonstrated a growing capacity to govern prior to hostilities. As UNCOK pointed out in its report of 26 June 1950 to the Secretary General, "there have been distinct signs of improvement in recent months in both economic and political stability of the country". Recent elections for the National Assembly gave significant gains to moderate elements. However, the more conservative elements have exercised power in the Government of Syngman Rhee, usually in a harsh and authoritarian manner. Syngman Rhee has not been popular. In North

468-806—76——35

Korea communist propaganda undoubtedly has aroused considerable hostility among Koreans to the South Korean administration. Political reconstruction in Korea will present a complex challenge.

17. In view of the establishment of a Soviet-style police state in North Korea, it is difficult to weigh the degree of popular support for or opposition to the regime there. The relatively large number of refugees who have fled south during the past five years indicates the possibility of considerable discontent. The ravages of war may create in North Korea a population hostile to the Communist authorities. They will, in any event, attempt to unite occupied South Korea to North Korea by so-called national elections.

Politico-Military Considerations

18. By a quick and crushing victory of the North Korean military forces in South Korea, the USSR would have gained its long-standing goal of the complete absorption of Korea into its orbit. Furthermore, the building of a "cordon sovietaire" from the Soviet borders of Sinkiang to the southern shores of Korea would have neared completion. Only Japan and the Philippines at the edge of the orbit, and Southeast Asia to the South, would have still remained outside. Yet, the aggression in South Korea may result in the opposite effect—the failure to complete the cordon.

19. In this light, the situation in Korea now provides the United States and the free world with the first opportunity to regain territory from the Soviet bloc. Since a basic policy of the United States is to check and reduce the preponderant power of the USSR in Asia and elsewhere, then UN operations in Korea can set the stage for the non-communist penetration into an area under Soviet control.

20. Penetration of the Soviet orbit, short of all-out war, would disturb the political, economic and military structure which the USSR is organizing between its own Far Eastern territories and the contiguous areas. The bonds of Manchuria, pivot of this complex outside the USSR, would be weakened, for a free and strong Korea could provide an outlet for Manchuria's resources and could also provide non-communist contact with the people there and in North China.

21. The significance in Asia of the unification of Korea under UN auspices would be incalculable. The Japanese would see demonstrated a check on Soviet expansion. Elements in the Chinese Communist regime, and particularly important segments of the Chinese population, might be inclined to question their exclusive dependence on the Kremlin. Skillful manipulation might drive a wedge between the Chinese Communists and the Kremlin. Throughout Asia, those who foresee only inevitable Soviet conquest would take hope.

22. For the above reasons, it is probable that the danger of a free, united Korea will lead the Kremlin to try to prevent its total loss. When North Korean forces appear to be losing, or even before, the Kremlin may launch a vigorous attempt to mediate the dispute, or may employ Chinese or Soviet military forces to hold part or all North Korea. However, it is possible that, notwithstanding its considerable military strength located in the Far East, the Kremlin will not jeopardize its uncompleted strategic arrangements in the Far East to risk a general war to prevent a full-fledged, rapid, and determined UN effort to unite Korea.

U.S. Interests and Obligations

23. In subscribing to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, the U.S. pledged its support to Korean independence. Our intentions have been measured in our diplomatic support, military aid, and economic assistance. Our obligation to the United Nations to block a breach of the peace, is fixed.

24. The broad objectives of the United States were stated in NSC 8/2,[3] approved by the President on 23 March 1949, as follows:

"*a.* To establish a united, self-governing, and sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the UN.

"*b.* To ensure that the government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.

"*c.* To assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and educational system as essential bases of an independent and democratic state. A more immediate objective is the withdrawal of remaining U.S. occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable consistent with the foregoing objectives."

25. The political value to the United States of establishing a free, united, and stable Korea and of carrying out the resolve of the United Nations justifies our current military effort in behalf of South Korea.

CONCLUSIONS

26. The following principles form the basis for consideration of U.S. actions:

a. The unification of Korea conforms with Korean aspirations, U.S. policies, and the objectives of the United Nations.

b. The establishment of a free and united Korea and the elimination of the North Korea Communist regime, following unprovoked military aggression, would be a step in reversing the dangerous strategic trend in the Far East of the past twelve months.

c. The 38th parallel, in and of itself, has no military significance other than such an artificial barrier as would limit if not prevent a military victory.

[3] For the complete text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 969.

d. The chief potential limitation on the objective of unifying Korea will be Soviet military countermeasures including the use of Chinese Communist troops, or Soviet diplomatic and political actions in the UN.

e. Consequently, the timing and speed of U.S. politico-military operations are crucial, and call for especially close working relationships.

f. In the long run, a maximum UN effort will be needed in securing peace in Korea and in meeting the acute problems of political and economic reconstruction.

g. The continued functioning of the Republic of Korea, as the only sovereign government in Korea, is indispensable to the re-establishment of the rule of law in Korea and is necessary to the fulfilment of U.S. objectives.

h. Long-range policies in support of independence for Korea conform to the general objectives of the United States in Asia.

27. In consonance with the above principles and in pursuit of its basic long-range objectives with respect to Korea, the U.S. should take measures to effect:

a. The establishment of a free, independent and stable Korea oriented toward the U.S.

b. The security of Korea against foreign aggression and internal subversion.

c. The reconstruction of Korea in political, economic, and social fields to develop a stable, self-sustaining, and advancing state.

28. As the basis for realizing these objectives, the United States should take the following series of actions:

a. Statement of Aims:

(1) At an appropriate time, the President should proclaim that our peace aim is a united, free, and independent Korea, as envisaged by the UN. Such a statement should be supported by a Joint Resolution of Congress.

(2) Again at an appropriate time, the U.S. should seek to translate this aim into UN objectives. In view of the possibility that uncoordinated measures would provoke Soviet counter-action, either in the military or diplomatic field or both, the United States should seek UN action in two states [*stages*]: first, at the 1950 meeting of the General Assembly, the United Nations should immediately endorse the resolutions of 25 and 27 June and 7 July, of the Security Council and seek maximum support for the unified command; second, at a later date, at the moment when the unified command has taken the offensive, the United Nations should re-affirm the basic UN aims in Korea along the lines of the General Assembly Resolution of 14 November 1947.

(3) No statement of U.S. general objectives should be made until the unified command has launched offensive military measures to carry out the military objectives listed below. Until such time, great caution and discretion should be taken in public discussion of the 38th parallel.

(4) In the meantime, the U.S. should use all its diplomatic means to forestall any Soviet effort to mediate the conflict on any terms short of the unification of all Korea on a free and representative basis under UN auspices.

b. Military Objectives:

(1) The unified command should seek to occupy Korea and to defeat North Korean armed forces wherever located north or south of the 38th parallel.

(2) To achieve this objective, the Commanding General of the unified command should pursue military operations in Korea without regard to the 38th parallel.

c. Occupation Problems:

(1) As an interim measure the U.S. should encourage the UN to strengthen UNCOK to render it more effective in maintaining liaison with the government of the Republic, and with other political elements in Korea, in observing the course of hostilities, and in supervising the care of refugees and the civil organization of reoccupied areas.

(2) At or about the time of surrender or the cessation of hostilities, the U.S. should encourage the UN to create a new UN organization, incorporating UNCOK. This organization would be responsible for the long-term reconstruction and security of Korea. It should include (*a*) a UN administrator for relief and reconstructions; (*b*) a commission to supervise national elections and the reformation of the national government of the Republic of Korea to include all of Korea; and (*c*) a border commission to observe the integrity of the Korean frontier and it should use the international security forces provided by the UN to police this frontier.

(3) The United States should be prepared to provide its share of forces required to police the Korean frontier until such time as Korean forces are trained and equipped to take over that responsibility. Likewise, the U.S. should seek firm commitments from UN members to furnish military forces for occupation purposes until the mission of the UN is accomplished.

d. Politico-Military Measures:

(1) The United States should make a maximum effort to support and strengthen the governing bodies of the Republic of Korea. The quality of administrative personnel should be improved, the National Assembly restored to full working order, and civilian teams selected and trained to take over reoccupied areas to provide effective follow-up of military operations.

(2) Psychological warfare should be intensified to discredit the Communist regime and improve Korean morale.

(3) An ad hoc committee of departmental representatives should be established immediately to develop detailed reconstruction plans to include recommendations for military, economic, and political assistance.

(4) The UN, and perforce the U.S., should not be deflected from its present course of action or stated objectives in Korea by any proposals by the USSR or minority groups in the UN which fall short of complete achievement of the present U.S. and UN objectives.

330/8–750 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 7, 1950—5 p. m.

120. Dept's analysis present parliamentary situation SC re invitation reps of North and South Kor authorities fols:

1. At June 25 meeting rep of Repub of Kor was duly invited participate "during consideration of this case" by unanimous Council decision. At same meeting by vote of 1 in favor, 6 against, and 3 abstentions res inviting Gov of North Kor to state its case before SC failed to carry. At all subsequent meetings during June and July which considered agenda item "Complaint of Aggression Upon the Repub of Korea" rep of Repub of Kor was invited participate. Subsequent invitations were not separate decisions by SC but merely continuance of June 25 decision carried forward by Pres without objection by any member. Similarly, during these meetings in June and July no further motion was made to invite North Korean reps.

2. SC decision to invite reps of Repub of Kor was and is decision with continuing force and effect and remains operative, in words of original motion, "during consideration of this case"; the words "this case" referring generally to Korean situation and specifically to agenda item before Council on June 25, namely, Complaint of Aggression Upon the Repub of Kor. Decision therefore to invite reps of Repub remains in full force and effect at every subsequent meeting of Council at which that agenda item is under discussion. Decision could of course be reversed by subsequent SC decision taken by procedural majority of any 7 votes. Had objection been raised to issuance of automatic invitation by Pres during June or July, it wld have been duty of Pres put question of reversing prior decision to vote. No objection raised during this period so issue did not arise.

3. Sov del at Aug 4 meeting has now raised objection to automatic invitation pursuant to continuing decision of June 25. It is therefore privilege of Sov to move that June 25 decision shld be reversed. Unless such motion is made it is duty of Pres to issue invitation to Repub rep. To reverse June 25 decision requires direct action by SC taken by 7 vote majority.

4. As to priority of voting, it is clear that because of continuing nature of invitation to Repub reps under June 25 decision, a vote to reverse this decision shld be taken first. Once decision to invite a rep is made, practice of SC has always been at commencement of each subsequent meeting to invite participants immediately after adoption of agenda and prior commencement discussion of question. Agenda was adopted at conclusion of meeting Aug 3; therefore seating of Repub rep not called for until commencement meeting Aug 4. After vote on invitation to Repub rep it wld be appropriate for Pres submit question of invitation to North Kor reps and if he desires, participation without vote of Chi Commie under Rule 39.

Foregoing analysis sets forth what in our view is appropriate parliamentary action to be taken by any Pres of Council conforming to SC

Rules of Procedure and practice. Set forth below are various hypotheses which Sov Pres may fol and suggested methods of dealing with them:

a. If Pres puts question of invitation to Repub reps in such way as to require 7 votes to confirm decision of June 25 Pres ruling shld be challenged under point of order pursuant to Rule 30 on grounds set forth above that June 25 decision is legal continuing decision until reversed by subsequent SC vote.

b. If Pres rules that June 25 decision was illegal because of absence of Sov and Chi reps that ruling itself is subject to challenge under Rule 30.

c. If Pres rules that question must be put in way requiring 7 affirmative votes to invite Repub rep because question is subject to veto, that ruling must also be challenged on ground that San Francisco Four Power Statement[1] provides expressly to contrary (Part I, Para 2) and on ground of previous SC precedents where decision to invite participants under both Art 32 of Charter and Rule 39 of Rules were taken despite negative votes of permanent members (See Czech case, S/PV 268, page 62, S/PV 272, page 11; Indonesian case, S/PV 181, page 111.)

d. If Pres rules that Part (*a*) of Sov draft res must be voted on prior to vote on question of reversing June 25 decision, that ruling shld also be challenged.

e. Dept does not anticipate that in light San Francisco Statement Sov will attempt exercise double veto. However, if Pres makes any ruling to effect that decision of Council is not to invite Repub rep, that ruling shld be challenged and over-ruled. In such event US rep shld state that Sov rep in his capacity as Pres is not following decisions of Council and it is therefore duty of Council to instruct SYG to provide place for rep of Repub of Korea at table and to invite him to participate in Council discussions on present agenda item.

ACHESON

[1] Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 10, 1945, p. 1047; for related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, volume I.

330/8–750: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, August 7, 1950—8:53 p. m.
[Received August 7—10:09 p. m.]

227. Jebb (UK) convened meeting with Sunde (Norway), Ordonneau (France) and Gross to consider procedural tactics for Tuesday's[1] SC meeting.

[1] August 8.

At beginning of meeting Gross outlined the procedural situation at end of Friday's meeting [2] with Chinese point of order that SC had decided on June 25 to seat representative of ROK as the previous question. He therefore suggested that on Tuesday first business is this point of order which should be put to a vote immediately under rule 30. Therefore, Tsiang (China) or someone else should insist on Tuesday that President rule on point of order that President is bound by SC decision of June 25 to invite representative of ROK to the table. Under rule 30 he would request immediate ruling on this point.

It was suggested that other members of SC would thereupon remain silent until the President rules. If he refused to rule on the pending point of order we would suspend or adjourn to a day certain to consult on the ground that serious constitutional crisis created and SC cannot continue so long as President refuses to act. Gross then outlined other alternatives that might occur:

1. The President might rule that the Council made no decision on this question on June 25. In that event his ruling would be challenged and overruled.
2. He might rule that the Soviet proposal be put to the vote first. Here again his ruling would be challenged and overruled.
3. He might attempt adjournment for lack of speakers. Objection would be made on the ground Council should not adjourn without hearing President's ruling as rule 30 provides. If he adjourned the meeting in spite of objection and left the chamber other members of Council would remain.
4. Gross pointed out that in a variety of circumstances the President might claim that on a ruling after he has ruled as President and it is challenged, his vote as USSR representative in sustaining the ruling. and opposing a challenge constitutes a veto. That would raise the question of overruling the decision that a negative vote of a permanent member on a challenge constitutes a veto. Gross observed that this tactic is more a successive veto operation than the usual double veto problem.

The meeting indicated a general reluctance to be firm on the issue of seating the ROK representative if this involves anything resembling a double veto fight and the necessity for overriding a purported Soviet veto. Ordonneau, who will be sitting on Tuesday since Chauvel and Lacoste remain away, indicated that he would not be allowed to challenge a Soviet veto and added that even as to decisions stated to be procedural in GA resolution or part I of San Francisco statement, he would still feel bound by part II of San Francisco statement. The UK and Norwegians reflected to a lesser degree the same view. Jebb stated that although his FonOff did not like the idea he had suggested going ahead without ROK representative at the table to avoid this

[2] See the editorial note under date of August 4, p. 527.

entire subject. Gross pointed out that this would be a serious propaganda victory for USSR and appeasement to them on an important charter principle. If we avoided the issue this time we would undoubtedly have to face it later. Stabell (Norway) suggested that rather than be involved in a double veto fight we should point out that the decision of Malik is illegal, not a binding precedent and go on the ground that nothing could be done.

Gross pointed out that if we adjourn should the President refuse to rule, it would be possible to save the principle and consider a number of remedies, such as the amendment of the rules of the SC or a special session of the GA.

Jebb suggested that we might not insist on applying the rules of procedure but simply have a general debate on the subject of Korea in general without regard for the rules. Gross again stressed that this was giving in to dictatorial and illegal acts by the President and would lead to inch by inch capitulation. The major objection pressed by the UK and Norwegians was that Malik will refuse to rule on whether the ROK representative is entitled to sit and will simply say that he will put that question to the Council as previous Presidents have put question of substance or procedure to the Council. That would lead directly into the feared double veto fight.

Jebb suggested that it might be simpler for Malik to rule as requested that ROK should be seated if first we voted on paragraph *a* of Soviet proposal which provides that representatives of Korean people and Chinese Communists be seated. This would be defeated for lack of seven votes and then we would go ahead and insist on a ruling on the pending point of order. Gross pointed out that the major objection to this is that we would then have gone far toward abandoning our strong position that the Council has already decided on seating ROK representative and that force of that decision would have been put in doubt.

At the end of the meeting Ordonneau and Jebb came back to the point that it was unlikely Malik would insist on a veto but would take his medicine as he has on previous August votes. It was therefore agreed that subject to instructions and reflection the same group will meet Tuesday before SC meeting and that (1) Tsiang should raise a new point of order stating that the previous question is that the President is bound by the SC decision of June 25 to invite representative of ROK to table; (2) other SC members will not speak on this issue; (3) reasonable efforts will be made to get Malik to rule and his insistence that his resolution or some other motion be considered will be treated as a ruling against Tsiang's point; (4) if Malik as USSR representative casting a negative vote takes the position this

is a veto, SC will adjourn; (5) if he attempts adjournment without consent for lack of speakers and leaves the chamber, Council will continue in session without him; (6) it was agreed that we would at least consider the suggestion that in the light of rule 39 upon the adoption of the agenda Chang of Korea by agreement of all except the USSR privately reached should sit at the table so that the burden of removing him will be up to Malik; (7) it was agreed that we would oppose the seating of the North Korean representative. Ordonneau stated he would oppose it "for the moment". Jebb pointed out that there may be a movement by India to set down certain conditions precedent on which the NK representatives would be invited. This would include return of NK forces to 38th parallel. He added that Pearson of Canada had been thinking along this line and that Jebb's FonOff feels that the time will come when SC should hear North Koreans. Gross warned of the danger of weakening now about what might be done in the future and questioned whether the SC is the right body in the foreseeable future for hearing NK representatives in light of UNCOK and GA consideration of this case.

AUSTIN

795.00/8–850

Memorandum of Conversation, by Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, United States Army

TOP SECRET TOKYO, August 8, 1950—10:30 a. m. to 12:55 p. m.

Conferees: Gen. MacArthur
Mr. Harriman
Gens. Norstad [1]
Ridgway
Almond

1. In a brilliant 2½ hour presentation, made with utmost earnestness, supported by every logical military argument of his rich experience, and delivered with all of his dramatic eloquence, General MacArthur stated his compelling need for additional combat ground forces by the following dead-lines:

15 Sept—3d Infantry Division (U.S.)
Rest of 1st Marine Division (U.S.)
15 Oct—2d Marine Division (U.S.)

[1] Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad, Acting Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force. Mr. Harriman on his visit to the Far East traveled in the company of Generals Ridgway and Norstad who were on a special mission. They returned to the United States after the discussions in Tokyo.

2. *Conclusions:*

a. Time works against us in the Korean situation.

b. Early military victory is essential.

c. Delay in achieving it increases the chance of direct military participation Chinese Communist or Soviet forces, or both.

d. A maximum co-ordinated offensive effort of U.S. forces should be made at the earliest possible date that offers reasonable chance of decisive success.

e. This effort should have as its objective the destruction of the main North Korean armed forces South Korea before the onset of next winter.

f. The forces now scheduled to be operationally available in FECOM by 25 September are inadequate for the successful accomplishment of this mission.

g. Decisive success—destruction of hostile main forces in South Korea—is reasonably attainable by early winter, if the offensive is launched by about 25 September, and if the forces now in or enroute to FECOM are augmented by the approximate equivalent of two U.S. infantry divisions and one U.S. airborne RCT.

h. The diversion of these forces to this mission will still further seriously impair our mobilization base, and therefore entail acceptance of a substantial additional risk which the JCS must evaluate and proper authority decide.

i. Once launched, this operation must be given every chance of success.

j. To insure success, it must have reasonably adequate forces at the outset.

k. The alternatives to furnishing the additional forces required, involve the certainty of a more difficult and costly operation later, of an incalculable loss of military prestige world-wide and consequently of political advantage, and the probability of greater non-battle casualties during a Korean winter, than of battle losses in the operation as planned.

l. Present best intelligence estimates are that the Soviet will not intervene with armed forces during the next few months.

m. The forces should be furnished by the dates indicated and the operation ordered executed as planned.

n. Every effort should be made to secure the maximum of United Nations combat ground forces, particularly British, Canadian, Pakistani, Australian, Turkish, and perhaps French, and at the earliest possible date.

RIDGWAY

3. *Concurrences:*

Mr. Harriman [initialed] W.A.H.

Gen. Norstad [initialed] L.N.

Gen. Ridgway [initialed] M.B.R.

[The following note in longhand:] Delivered to Mr. Harriman about 091145 Aug and returned by him to me by hand in Sec Louis Johnson's office about noon same date. M.B.R.[2]

[2] The following information is taken from *Korean Conflict*, based upon conversations held with Mr. Harriman by Messrs. Noble and Dougall of the Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, on March 2, 1951 and by Mr. Dougall on March 5, 1951:

"Immediately after his return to Washington, on August 9, Harriman reported to the President upon his conferences in Tokyo. The President requested the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give immediate consideration to General MacArthur's proposals for a military offensive, and later in the morning Harriman conferred with Johnson, the Joint Secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs. . . . The Joint Chiefs of Staff met at once to consider the military recommendations proposed by MacArthur as transmitted and concurred in by Ridgway, Norstad, and Harriman, and within twenty-four hours approval had been given to the plan discussed for an offensive in Korea."

795.00/8–850

Extracts of Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President, With General MacArthur in Tokyo on August 6 and 8, 1950 [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 20, 1950.

. . . . .[2]

The reaction among the Japanese to our action in Korea was one of relief, as they interpreted it to mean that we would vigorously defend them against Russian invasion. They were not disturbed by our temporary difficulties, since they understood the military difficulties caused by the surprise attack. Their pride had been aroused by "his" confidence in them, shown by the withdrawal of most of the American troops. He could withdraw them all without danger of disorder in Japan.

. . . . .[2]

I had a 2½ hour talk with MacArthur in the morning; [3] lunch with him and Mrs. MacArthur for the entire party, and then a further 2-hour talk from 5:30 to 7:30 in the afternoon.

[1] The source text in the Department of States files, an unsigned typewritten document, bore the heading "Notes Dictated by Mr. Harriman on August 20 Concerning His Conversations With General MacArthur [Extracts]". At the conclusion of the document, the following note was typed: ["Note: This copy (no carbons) was made from rough, largely unedited notes dictated by Mr. Harriman. Some liberties have consequently been taken with the format and the spelling of the original. The wording, however, is not changed, except that a few queries of clarifications have been inserted in brackets.]"

A fuller version of Mr. Harriman's memorandum is printed in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 349–353.

[2] Ellipsis indicated in the source text.

[3] Of August 6.

On Tuesday morning,[4] after my return from Korea, we had a further four-hour talk before my departure.

The first 2½ hours included a military discussion at which Generals Ridgway and Norstad participated.[5] General Almond also was present.

I will not attempt to divide the conversations chronologically, but largely by subjects.

Military (Korea). Our first talk on Sunday morning covered the military situation as he saw it.

I explained to him that the President had asked me to tell him that he wanted to know what MacArthur wanted, and was prepared to support him as fully as possible. I asked MacArthur whether he had any doubts about the wisdom of the Korean decision. He replied, "absolutely none". The President's statement was magnificent. It was an historic decision which would save the world from Communist domination, and would be so recorded in history. The commitment of our ground forces was essential, and victory must be attained rapidly.

MacArthur described his firm conviction that the North Korean forces must be destroyed as early as possible and could not wait for a slow build-up. He emphasized the political and military dangers of such a course; the discouragement that would come among the United Nations including the U.S.; the effect on Oriental peoples as well as on the Chinese Communists and the Russians. He feared that Russia and the Chinese Communists would be able to greatly strengthen the North Korean forces and that time was of the essence, or grave difficulties, if not disaster, were ahead.

(His military appraisal is dealt with in a separate memorandum, including the statement to the Joint Chiefs prepared by Ridgway, and signed by him, Norstad and myself.)

He did not believe that the Russians had any present intention of intervening directly, or becoming involved in a general war. He believed the same was true of the Chinese Communists. The Russians had organized and equipped the North Koreans, and had supplied some of the trained personnel from racial Koreans of the Soviet Union who had fought in the Red Army forces. The Chinese Communists had cooperated in the transfer of soldiers who had fought with the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria. These had not come over as units, but had been released in Manchuria, and reorganized into North Korean forces after they had been transported to North Korea. Their leadership was vigorous. A number of Russian

[4] August 8.
[5] See *supra*.

officers were acting as observers but undoubtedly giving direction. Their tactics had been skillful, and they were as capable and tough as any army in his military experience.

. . . . .[6]

MacArthur wants maximum UN ground forces possible, as many as 30 or 40,000. He will take battalions (1,000 men) just as fast as they can come, with only their small arms. Actually, heavier artillery would be welcome, but the need is so great that he would take them with their small arms only. He feels the British should send a brigade from Hong Kong or Malaya, thinks it could be replaced from the United Kingdom. The French could send some forces from Indochina; a brigade from Pakistan and Turkey would be most welcome. Canada should send some troops. He was going to work on Menzies when he arrived the following week. He didn't have a good word to say about the Siamese, although he recognized the value of Eastern troops. He wasn't sure the Philippines could spare anything just now.

He has no doubts of the political outcome, once there is victory. Victory is a strong magnet in the East, and the Koreans want their freedom. When Syngman Rhee's Government is reestablished in Seoul, the UN-supervised election can be held within two months, and he has no doubt of an overwhelming victory for the non-Communist parties. The North Koreans will also vote for a non-Communist Government when they are sure of no Russian or Communist intervention. He said there was no need to change the Constitution, which now provides for 100 seats for the North. Korea can become a strong influence in stabilizing the non-Communist movement in the East.

. . . . .[6]

[Here follows discussion of China and Formosa printed in volume VI, page 256.]

[6] Ellipsis indicated in the source text.

795B.5/8–850

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 8, 1950.

I am putting down in outline form below a qualitative estimate of progress and prospects for UN military aid offers.

[1] A manuscript note in the source text indicated that Mr. Acheson saw this memorandum.

I. The following countries have provided military combat units already integrated into the Korean operation:

UK (naval and carrier)
Australia (naval and air force)
New Zealand (naval)
Netherlands (naval)
France (naval)
Canada (naval, military air transport)

II. The following countries have offered military aid in one form or another; the offer has been officially welcomed by the US and discussions have started or been arranged for between their representatives and The Pentagon:

Union of South Africa (fighter squadron)
Australia (combat troops)
New Zealand (combat troops)
India (army hospital unit)
Thailand (4,000 combat troops)
Turkey (4,500 combat troops)
(The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not yet decided whether or not they will be able or wish to utilize the Thai and Turk offers)[2]
UK (Combat troops)
Greece (air transport)
China (combat troops—refused by Unified Command for military reasons)
Belgium (air transport—accepted)

III. With some hope of success, we are actively encouraging ground troop offers from the following countries:

France
Philippines
Pakistan

IV. There appears no prospect of any troop offers from the Arab League.

V. There appears no prospect of troop offers from the Scandinavian countries, with the possible exception of Norway. Norway, however, has offered merchant tonnage and Sweden a self-contained hospital unit, both of which offers have been accepted and are in process of being integrated into the needs of the Unified Command. Denmark is considering offering a hospital ship.

VI. There appears no immediate prospect of troop offers from any of the Latin American Republics. We are encouraging offers from

[2] On August 10, Secretary of Defense Johnson informed Mr. Acheson of the views of the JCS, with which he concurred, that the Thai and Turkish offers be accepted (795B.5/8–1050).

Brazil, Mexico and Argentina which ARA considers the only countries in this group which conceivably could offer national units which would meet the minimum requirements of the Unified Command. An alternative would be to organize, equip and train mixed divisions or larger units from individual volunteers from Latin American countries. ARA has prepared a NSC paper at my suggestion on this general subject, which paper is now in the process of Departmental consideration.[3]

VII. There appears no prospect for the present of additional troop offers from any Asian countries.

VIII. The following countries may offer troops or other military aid which would be welcomed but would have to be considered for actual employment.

Italy (small naval vessel)
Belgium (token troop unit)
Netherlands (token troop unit)
Norway (token troop unit)

IX. Volunteers have been offered by certain governments, such as the Philippines, Costa Rica and Panama, and on an individual basis in many countries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, have decided that they do not wish to incorporate alien volunteers, including Filipinos, in US forces at this time. The Secretary General of the United Nations and UNA in the Department are urgently studying the possibility of recruiting, arming and training a United Nations Legion. This proposal is expected to come up for discussion at the General Assembly next month.

[3] Related documentation is scheduled for publication in volume I.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on August 8 from 3 p. m. until 7:40 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.484. The debate continued on the question of Korean representation, and Mr. Malik, as President, refused to make a ruling on the validity of the June 25 Security Council decision to invite the representative of the Republic of Korea to sit in on the meetings. Before the Council adjourned until August 10, Mr. Malik introduced the following resolution (S/1679), on which no vote was taken:

"Proposal Concerning the Inhuman, Barbarous Bombing by the United States Air Force of the Peaceful Population, Towns and Populated Areas in Korea

"*The Security Council*,

"*Having considered* the protest of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea against the inhuman, barbarous bomb-

ing of the peaceful population and of peaceful towns and populated areas which is being carried out by the United States Air Force in Korea,

"*Recognizing* that the bombing by the United States armed forces of Korean towns and villages, involving the destruction and mass annihilation of the peaceful civilian population, is a gross violation of the universally accepted rules of international law,

"*Decides*

"*To call upon* the Government of the United States of America to cease and not permit in future the bombing by the Air Force or by other means of towns and populated areas and also the shooting up from the air of the peaceful population of Korea;

"*To instruct* the Secretary-General of the United Nations to bring this decision of the Security Council to the very urgent notice of the Government of the United States of America."

795B.5/8–950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TAEGU, August 9, 1950.
[Received August 9—5 : 55 a. m.]

113. From Eighth Army advanced to SecState Wash DC. Repeated info Tokyo unnumbered. In hour's conversation General Walker pointed up his command greatly handicapped this critical period by inability make use available Korean manpower, both partially trained, such as police and recruits, and very considerable number would be volunteers, owing lack weapons for either training or combat. Reinforcement ROK army greatly delayed for same reason at time ROK army steadily depleted by combat losses. Currently over 20,000 Korean soldiers under training of whom 5,000 capable entering combat immediately if Walker were able arm them.

No stocks weapons held in Korea; depots in Japan largely depleted. It seems imperative ZI arsenals should be required earliest supply infantry weapons for air lift Korea: rifles, carbines, light machineguns, mortars vitally needed here quickest possible time.

I urge Department take whatever measures possible emphasize to DA critical need for earliest possible action this regard. Advice on necessity for this action coincides with my own observations as well as urgent requests of ROK.[1]

MUCCIO

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[1] The Department of State sent the following reply in telegram 70, August 11, to the Embassy in Korea:

"Your urgent interest and that of Gen Walker in obtaining additional arms for ROK forces (urtel 113 Aug 9) has been discussed with Defense, which assures that everything possible being done get additional weapons to Koreans quickly as possible." (795B.5/8–950)

330/8–950: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT

NEW YORK, August 9, 1950—2: 35 p. m.
[Received August 9—2: 58 p. m.]

240. We have carefully considered following alternatives for dealing with SC for remainder August beginning Thursday afternoon, August 10.

1. Do nothing but reply to Malik's attacks.

2. Continue drive for procedural decisions having objective to clear agenda for S/1653 (US resolution localization conflict).[1] This involves "sweating out" August on procedural rows interspersed with substantive statements.

3. Establishment committee of whole under rule 28 to consider and recommend on complaint of aggression upon ROK. Such committee would elect own chairman and report to SC September 1.

4. Adjournment for remainder of month of August.

5. Amendment rule 18 in order eject Malik from chair and elect new chairman.

6. Special session GA.

We strongly favor number 3. Number 2 is bad alternative for following reasons:

a. Continuation through month August of proceedings last ten days would play into hands Russians who, despite daily victories we may have won, have achieved objectives (1) paralyzing and demeaning Council; (2) using Council as effective sounding board, particularly in Asia.

b. Continuation of present procedure but in addition using every opportunity available to us and to our friends to make substantive statement would (1) increase paralysis SC; (2) improve Malik's propaganda position; (3) increase difficulty maintaining solidarity our friends; (4) impair our moral position which is one of our strongest assets; (5) give victory in fact to Malik on not seating ROK representative; (6) involve protracted and embarrassing discussion seating North Koreans, Chinese Communists; (7) prevent progress towards vote on Korea; (8) involve great damage SC machinery and prestige by demonstrating ability Russians to tie it up; (9) enlist public support here and abroad for Hoover proposal as irritation increases.

We strongly favor number three for following reasons:

a. It would extricate us from procedural morass we are now in which is very advantageous to Malik and disadvantageous to us.

[1] See the editorial note under date of July 31, p. 501.

b. It would provide us with opportunity to regain by legal means substantive initiative we effectively seized July 31 by introduction our localization resolution (S/1653) but which we lost to Malik during last ten days; under this procedure he would be forced to take position on localization resolution.

c. Re-assert the authority and competence of SC.

d. Give us opportunity to reply legally to Malik's propaganda speeches.

e. By acting within rules do least violation of established procedure of Council, having regard to disorderly precedents now being established which Soviet will exploit in months to come.

We recognize effort to establish rule 28 committee might involve us in double veto; we feel, however, that there is no reason to be afraid of this.

Foregoing, of course, is subject to consultations. We would contemplate, if possible, getting nine or ten sponsors motion to establish committee. We have in mind possibility giving Malik "last clear chance" by renewing, this time sponsored by ten members Council, point of order that President is requested by decision SC of June 25 to invite representative of ROK to table prior to transaction any other business. If Malik still dodges issue by refusing to give rule or otherwise seat them, contemplate introduction motion to establish committee.

Meeting with other delegates 4:30 p. m. today.

AUSTIN

330/8–950: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1950—6 p. m.

123. Dept has considered alternatives set forth your niact 240, Aug 9 and is in agreement with you that alternatives 1, 4, 5 and 6 are unsatisfactory and shld not be followed.

As to alternative 3 to establish comite under Rule 28, Dept does not believe this wld be satisfactory solution. In first place, to propose comite and to bring proposal to vote might require another 2 or 3 days procedural wrangling if Sov in his capacity as Chairman chose. This procedural wrangle wld simply compound parliamentary quagmire re invitation to South Koreans. Secondly, establishment comite is much less clearly procedural decision than an invitation to participate. Indeed, under Para 4, San Francisco Statement an argument with color of legal validity can be made that establishment of such

comite constitutes investigation (see experience Czech case). Dept doubts therefore desirability of overriding double veto on that decision when Council is unwilling override double veto on invitation to a party to dispute which is clearly and expressly set forth paras 2 and 3 SF Statement as procedural decisions.

Dept continues believe alternative 2 is best procedure follow and there is set forth below Dept's philosophy underlying that view. Dept believes however it is important as matter principle not to give up position that SC decision of Jun 25 is valid and continuing decision SC which Pres has duty put into effect. It might be possible if agreeable to reps South Kor to achieve in practical effect what Malik seeks prevent by having US rep or another SC member read to SC any statement or statements South Korean reps wld make had they been not prevented from participation by illegal presidential action.

In Dept's view, best procedure for dealing with situation in SC during remainder Aug is to take advantage of unique opportunity which attention that SC meeting now getting throughout world provides. Our statements in SC shld set forth our own natl policy in intensive effort to solidify unity of UN Members supporting Korean action and to win over peoples of Asia and Far East. Our speeches in SC shld stress the substantive themes which wld be stressed if orderly debate on Korean question was now in process. We shld not be diverted by Sov tactics of reducing SC discussion to procedural wrangle. As practical matter it is easy for us and any other member to say in SC what we wish to say under the agenda item as adopted no matter what parliamentary ruling the Pres may make as to precise question under debate. We can support frequent meetings of SC during remainder August at which there can be developed by us and by other SC Members the theme presented to Council in questions which Amb Austin put to meeting Aug. 8. We can embellish and enlarge at length the nature of Communism in Asia; we can stress the contrast between Communism and real nationalism, real independence and real freedom; we can stress the imperialism of Communism in contrast to our own espousal of freedom and independence for Asiatic peoples; we can set forth our views as to the ultimate destiny of Korea and the Korean people. In short, we can stress all themes which we have in common with the Asiatic peoples and de-emphasize by proper clarification collateral questions on which we differ with them such as the seating of Chi Commies which has little bearing on real issue of freedom or Soviet imperialism in Asia. We shld not hesitate to make long speeches if they wld carry an effective appeal to the Asiatic people. Nor shld we be afraid of departing from any parliamentary limitations set by SC Pres.

USUN has already statement supporting our substantive Res on localizing conflict. Dept is setting up working parties to provide further material for further statements to be delivered in Council to carry forward the propaganda war.

Suggest you discuss this approach as matter of urgency with other SC Members and if agreeable to them put this program into operation at Meeting Aug. 10.

ACHESON

330/8–950 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, August 9, 1950—8 : 37 p. m.
[Received August 9—9 : 26 p. m.]

247. Preceded by half-hour exchange views US, UK, France, 2 hour meeting Jebb's office 4 : 30 today all SC members, except Bebler and Malik, reached following conclusions:

1. General agreement proper course to follow SC Thursday afternoon meeting and perhaps at least day or two following would be along lines paragraph 2, USUN's 240, August 9. Fawzi objected but all other members with possible exception Rau agreed to interspersing drive for procedural decisions with substantive statements.

2. Brief discussion idea committee of whole under rule 28, (paragraph 3, USUN's 240) brought out some objections and it was agreed to postpone consideration this possibility for at least day or two pending outcome generally preferred course.

3. Majority favored opening proceedings Thursday afternoon with renewal of point of order that June 25 resolution stand and President required thereby to invite representatives ROK to table. There was also, however, considerable interest in procedural alternative suggested by Rau, namely, to request President to rule on manner in which question should be put; that is, whether question should be put as stated by Malik Tuesday's meeting: "Who is in favor of the permission that was extended to the representative of the Southern Korean authorities to attend the SC being considered as being still validly in force today"? or whether question should be put other way around to reverse June 25 decision of SC. Possibility also discussed of leading off with original Tsiang form point of order and falling back later in meeting to Rau idea as second string to bow. Agreed to consider these possibilities overnight and reach decision at meeting same group eleven tomorrow.

4. There was no support for "drastic action" such as amendment rule 18 in order eject Malik from chair nor in favor adjournment or other possible alternatives.

5. There was considerable interest in idea put forward by Rau "referring to substance of matter" that it might be desirable to prepare and publish our own general proposals for peaceful settlement.

He had in mind specifically establishing commission nonpermanent members to study all proposals for peaceful settlement of Korean problem; during this commission's study consideration of other resolutions would be deferred by SC. Rau added commission's terms of reference would, of course, be based on (*a*) cease-fire, (*b*) withdrawal to 38th parallel, and (*c*) basic conditions for peaceful settlement. It was agreed this idea merited very careful consideration and that meanwhile it should be held very closely without publicity.

6. On Quevedo's [1] proposal there was general agreement that Malik should be invited to informal, private consultation with entire SC membership prior SC meeting tomorrow afternoon. Sunde, tapped for this chore, telephoned Malik who agreed in principle to such informal, private consultation at 2 p. m. at Lake Success. Malik said he would let Sunde know tomorrow morning if he had any different thought.

At opening of meeting today Jebb explained Bebler had first agreed to attend but had subsequently telephoned and in effect said he thought it would not be consistent with his position of neutrality to do so.

Jebb also informed group he had called on Lie in connection Lie's desire to attend meeting and had offered to transmit Lie's views and advice to group. Lie felt (*a*) nothing drastic should be done such as forcing Russians out; (*b*) that we should go on with procedural course we are following; and (*c*) in event this leads to wholly intolerable situation SC should adjourn or walk out on Malik if he refuses to adjourn.

During course of discussion Rau referred at least three times mysteriously to probable development during week which would make it very undesirable for him to move any point of order or participate any action which would lay him open to Russian charge he was engaging in any way in conspiracy against them.

AUSTIN

[1] Antonio Quevedo, Ecuadoran Representative on the U.N. Security Council.

795B.5/8–450

The Department of State to the British Embassy

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to the memorandum of the British Embassy transmitting Mr. Bevin's message of August 3, 1950, to Sir Oliver Franks with regard to the issuance of a general warning to warships of powers not engaged in the conflict to avoid the Korean area.[1]

[1] Mr. Bevin's message, not printed, requested reconsideration on the U.S. Navy Department's decision not to issue such a warning (795B.5/8–450).

On July 27, 1950, the United States Chief of Naval Operations instructed the Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, to the effect that unidentified submarines may be attacked and driven off only in self-defense or when offensive action against our forces is indicated. The instructions further stated that the continued submergence of an unidentified submarine in position to attack our forces is considered to indicate offensive action against our forces.

It is the view of the United States Government that the foregoing instructions are entirely justified by the inherent right of self-defense and sufficiently explicit to minimize the risk of sinking a Russian submarine on a peaceful mission.

It is also the view of the United States Government that the issuance of a general warning to all warships of powers not engaged in the conflict to avoid the necessarily broad area related to the operations in Korea would be an undesirable restriction on the use of the high seas by warships of those powers, and would not have any legal effect in addition to that given by the inherent right of self-defense.

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1950.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its 485th meeting on August 10 from 3 to 5:50 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.485. Ambassador Austin made a lengthy statement reviewing the political history of Korea in the postwar period, but no substantive action took place in the light of the continuing procedural deadlock caused by the refusal of the President (Malik) to rule on the point of order raised by the representative of the Republic of China at the previous meeting on the matter of the President's obligation to honor the June 25 Security Council decision to invite the representative of the Republic of Korea to sit at the Council table.

611.95B/8–1050 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, August 10, 1950—7 p. m.

68. Fol is text of Pres Truman's reply to Pres Rhee's ltr to him of July 19:

"My dear Mr. President: I wish to acknowledge your kind letter of July nineteenth and, on behalf of the Amer people and myself, to convey to you our deep appreciation for the heartfelt sentiments which you have voiced. Free people everywhere share the concern

which you have expressed both for the brave soldiers fighting for the UN and for their families who must endure suffering and sorrow. This is clearly demonstrated by the response to the resolutions of the SC regarding the aggression against the Republic of Korea.

As the might of the free world gathers momentum, it is my earnest hope that the Govt of Korea, the Korean people and all the forces engaged in the present effort will take courage and comfort in the knowledge that the overwhelming majority of the UN stands with you in this hour of trial. The sacrifices being made today will, I am certain, have their reward in ultimate victory.

It has always been the expressed policy of the US to support the independence and unity of Korea. It is the belief of this Govt that any permanent solution of the problem of the unification of Korea shld be reached within the framework of the several resolutions of the UN designed to accomplish this purpose. The US considers that the future of Korea is not to be underwritten by any one great power, but holds, with the SC and with the GA, that it is a matter for determination by the UN and the Korean people. However, the first task to be accomplished is to repel the aggression which continues against the Govt and people of Korea. The US will therefore continue its present vigorous action in support of the UN SC resolutions regarding North Korean aggression.

Pls convey to the people of Korea my admiration for their steadfastness in the face of great adversity, my sympathy for their suffering and my assurance that the people and Govt of the US will not relax their endeavors on behalf of the Republic of Korea until peace and security are established in full accordance with the resolutions of the UN.

With assurances of my highest regard and personal good wishes, Very sincerely yours, (Sgd) Harry S. Truman".

Original this ltr being airpouched for delivery Pres Rhee.[1] Dept suggests no publicity be given this exchange of ltrs at this time.

ACHESON

[1] The text of President Truman's letter, bearing the date August 8, was sent to Korea under cover of instruction No. 5, August 16, with instructions for its delivery to President Rhee (611.95B/8–1050).

330/8–1150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, August 11, 1950—11 a. m.
[Received August 11—10 : 23 a. m.]

344. 1. In conversation with me yesterday Bajpai Secretary General MEA referred to Ambassador Austin's statements Security Council indicating that Council members would consult to determine what steps to take to assert authority Security Council in case Malik continued obstructive tactics. He asked if I had any ideas to what "steps" US had in mind. When I replied in negative he said he hoped US

would not complicate matters by endeavoring set up shadow Security Council or some kind committee without Russia to handle Security Council affairs. Only three weeks left of Malik's presidency and in GOI's opinion it would be preferable, unless any new aggression should develop, for Security Council struggle along even with handicap of Russian obstructionism until September 1. Malik had now made it clear that USSR had returned not for purposes of promoting world peace but to use Security Council as platform for disseminating propaganda and to prevent Security Council from taking any constructive action. Nevertheless GOI believed that any endeavor to circumvent Security Council or to replace it during presidency Malik would give Russians further opportunity to claim that UN had become nothing more than instrument of western imperialism.

2. Bajpai referred to Soviet resolution condemning inhumane actions of American Armed Forces in Korea. He said instructions had been sent Rau to vote against resolution pointing out in doing so that it was part of duties of Security Council to make sure that warfare was being conducted in as humane manner as possible. He hoped US Government and public opinion would not misconstrue such statement by Rau. GOI was of opinion that in rejecting USSR resolution it should indicate that it was not opposed to Security Council taking interest in manner in which war was being conducted.

HENDERSON

795.00/8–1150

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James N. Hyde of the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

SECRET [NEW YORK,] August 11, 1950.

Subject: The Settlement of the Korean Question

Participants: Dr. Tsiang, SC Representative of China
Dr. Alvarez, SC Representative of Cuba
Dr. Quevedo, SC Representative of Ecuador
Fawzi Bey, SC Representative of Egypt
Mr. Chauvel, SC Representative of France
Sir B. N. Rau, SC Representative of India
Mr. Sunde, SC Representative of Norway
Sir G. Jebb, SC Representative of the U.K.
Ambassador Gross, United States Mission
Mr. James N. Hyde, United States Mission

In the informal consultations among the Security Council members there has been some sentiment for stating now the basis on which the

[1] The source text is a copy of a document in the IO Files, Department of State, bearing the designation US/S/1390 and the date August 11, 1950.

Korean case can be settled. This is on the theory that it is not enough to oppose the Russian peace plan by condemning the Soviet Union.

Specifically, at the consultation on August 9 Sir Benegal N. Rau read from a recent issue of the London Times its leading article. The substance of it was that the major powers could with advantage prepare and publish the proposition upon which they are agreed for Korean independence after a cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops beyond the 38th parallel. Rau commented that this article had inspired him to suggest the consideration of this problem. He thought it could best be undertaken by a SC commission for the peaceful and honorable settlement of the Korean question. The commission would be made up of all the non-permanent members of the SC, and during its deliberations looking toward a formula the consideration of all other resolutions would be deferred. Rau commented that of course the proposals would be based upon the premise that North Korean troops must withdraw beyond the 38th parallel and that there be a cease-fire. Quevedo wanted to consider this idea further at a subsequent meeting.

It was agreed that this proposal be put aside for further consideration and that there be no discussion of it in the press.

At the end of the consultation with the nine SC members on August 10, Jebb detained Gross and read a paragraph or two of the speech he had prepared to be made in the Council on August 11. He stated that the speech had several "purple passages" condemnatory of Soviet tactics and policy, and he added that the Foreign Office had directed him to balance these passages with some constructive language. This language suggested that the time would come for a political settlement of this problem when the North Koreans had returned "whence they had come" and after a cease-fire. Gross commented that he was somewhat concerned about mention of a cease-fire at this stage. This had military implications because it might be that we would want to advance well beyond the 38th parallel and not have our hands tied in any way by a commitment made at such an early stage. In the light of this comment Jebb stated that he would at once call London and suggest that no mention of a cease-fire be made. Gross read the last paragraph of our instructions contained in the Department's No. 95 of August 1, Control 1812, and pointed out that we were using more general language.[2]

J. N. HYDE

[2] Telegram 95 not printed; the pertinent portion of the paragraph under reference read in part as follows: ". . . progress can be made toward a settlement of this problem only if the North Koreans should cease aggression and immediately evacuate the territory which they have seized in defiance of the UN. It is only thereafter that future steps can be taken to restore and maintain international peace and security in the area." (795B.5/8–150)

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on August 11 from 3 to 6:25 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.486. The procedural stalemate prevented any action being taken by vote and most of the session was taken up with lengthy statements by Sir Gladwyn Jebb and Mr. Malik, ventilating their opposing views of the conflict in Korea.

For the text of a statement by Secretary of State Acheson on August 11 commenting on Soviet tactics of obstruction in the United Nations Security Council, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 21, 1950, page 286.

661.00/8–1150: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, August 11, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received August 11—7:09 p. m.]

386. Despite the Korean conflict, plethora of subsequent rumors and an obvious increase in intensity of the war of nerves, none of the developments since April of this year seems to us to alter the Embassy's basic opinion that, although they are prepared to assume grave risks in the pursuit of their objectives, the Soviet leaders do not desire to engage themselves in global conflict in the near future. Their actions appear to indicate that they hope to make most effective use of their existing strength through championing world peace movements on the one hand and inflating a war scare on the other with a view to establishing a revolutionary situation on a world scale in which the military might of the USSR and its satellites could be either the critical element in a violent clash (war between the imperialist and anti-imperialist camps), or the power behind the throne for a grand *coup d'état*.

For victory by either method this dual policy of blandishment and threat must increase in intensity in order to achieve its purpose of isolating the US as much as possible from other capitalist governments and of isolating those capitalist governments that do cooperate with the US from their people. This process reached a certain crescendo with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea and the spurt in concentration on the Stockholm appeal signature campaign which accompanied it. Korea fits on what might be termed the left hand of this policy—demonstration of strength. The Berlin blockade, the Soviet walkout of UN, Soviet actions in the Baltic, the Soviet attitude on the Austrian treaty, and the Whitsunday demonstration are all part of this picture. These previous steps all created much tension and apprehension with-

out entailing for the Soviets direct risk of military reaction such as might have developed over an attempt to seize Berlin forcibly or dispose of Tito through overt military action. Korea was only a short step forward. It was a place where Soviet might could be impressively demonstrated and where the Soviet rulers had good reason to suppose that no effective military counteraction would be taken. At little risk they were playing for tremendous stakes in power-conscious Asia and in apprehensive Europe. Even so its repercussions were felt in India, Egypt and other sensitive spots that entertain doubts about the strength and unity of the western world vis-à-vis the USSR. Looking back it might have paid the Soviets to have made a greater expenditure to assist the Chinese in taking Formosa. This would have impressed Asia and have struck a heavy blow at the unity of the free world. This project cannot be undertaken now without large risk of involving themselves as well as China in a war with the US.

It is clear that the Soviets were prepared to follow up a quick complete victory in Korea with either another attack where there were adequate prospects for localizing the conflict or for a great display of saber rattling at sensitive points. Even though the latter can be conducted chiefly through the circulation of alarmist rumors, some shifting of troops along frontiers is helpful for both purposes. A decision as to whether to attack or rattle the saber indeed need not to have been made until world reaction to the developments in Korea became known.

It is unlikely the Soviets expected their action in Korea to meet with the united condemnation of 53 UN member states or to provoke a sharp speeding up of defense preparations on a scale calculated to cope with a major crisis rather than with the Korean situation alone. Thus instead of enjoying an increase in its relative politico-military position through this step the USSR has precipitated a reverse trend which will result in time working against it for the next few years. It must certainly now make some fresh calculations. The following appear prominent among the possible alternatives:

1. To undertake an immediate speed up in their own military mobilization and launch a broad attack in Europe in order to reap maximum advantage of their present military position. Aside from rumors circulating throughout the world and reported to us there is nothing discernible here to indicate they have taken this decision. Soviet propaganda continues to stress the defense aspect of the USSR's military might to the Soviet people and what military dispositions are known are largely of a defensive character. No urgent cause has been developed to pull the people into full support of an offensive move, which even such a dictatorship as this must consider essential. It is interesting that anger over Korea was allowed to subside in favor of work harder for defense. Major changes are taking place in the organization of agricultural production which may be sources of future strength, but are causing some weakness and un-

certainty at present. The same is true of the shake-ups in the fields of scientific theorization and research.

2. To touch off an outbreak of hostilities through a satellite on another scene, China or the Balkans, which might be localized, for a time at least, and cause a drain on the free world's resources and increase the strain on its solidarity. This course would entail great risk of Soviet involvement at a tempo unfavorable to the USSR. It would seem that slow but direct progress to a major clash which would allow the west to marshall preponderant military economic strength and guarantee security of all western Europe as now occuring temporarily, would be highly detrimental to attainment of long-term Soviet objectives.

3. To play down the military aspect of this policy and while continuing to champion the North Koreans and to clamor for peace, allow a settlement to work itself out in Korea over their protests perhaps and an atmosphere of relaxation to set in giving the huge military preparations in the west no place to go. This would offer the possibility of a return by the west to the uncertain position of quandary between expenditure of effort for defense or for economic progress while the USSR continues a steady growth of industrial military potential. This is a hard choice to make because it means an immediate if perhaps temporary loss of prestige among the people who respect power and success. However, this policy would permit the Soviets to consolidate their present empire further and to utilize their rather effective political and social weapons abroad even though they could not count on major political victories where power played the dominating role.

4. To continue to exploit the mystery of Soviet strength and keep the west heavily and uneconomically mobilized in the hopes that the economic burden will cause disaffection among the masses and make them defeatist and more receptive to Soviet peace blandishments. All economic and political controls in the direction of increasing western defense preparedness would be labelled as suppressive Fascist measures and as deterioration of individual welfare grew the appeal of Communism as well as peace would increase. Continuance of or intensification of the war of nerves as well as the peace movement, along with continuous experimentation with organizational methods for controlling the attitudes of the masses would be features of such a program. The magnitude of defense allocations made since the end of June as compared with that of Marshall Plan aid could lead the Soviet rulers to the belief that this course has promise.

Department pass London, Paris, Frankfort. Repeated info London 93, Paris 84, Frankfort 58.

KIRK

795B.551/8–1150 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 11, 1950—8 p. m.

PRIORITY

787. Malik's statements in UN and present Sov propaganda make it clear that one of main Sov objectives is to obscure UN character

of Korean action by placing emphasis on fact that burden of fighting is being undertaken by US forces virtually alone. Immed and decisive action is called for to place UN decision in true light of joint effort to meet aggression. While we appreciate support for UN already given by other govts we consider it essential that all those nations whose mil capabilities are adequate for the purpose shld increase their contribution by the sending of ground troops as a matter of urgency. In addition to political desirability [1] this step support of Brit ground forces would be of real military value.

Brit timetable for sending ground forces to Korea is much too slow under circumstances of situation. London's Weeka of Aug 4 [2] reports plans that UK brigade of about seven thousand will depart UK about end Oct meaning they cannot be engaged until Dec at earliest. US considers it of utmost urgency that some Brit ground troops be available Korea much earlier.

Pls see Attlee urgently and express above views as held most seriously by US and urge immediate reexamination of Brit capabilities as to increasing tempo forwarding Brit troops to Korea at once. Stress US view of extreme urgency of need for prompt and effective action.

Similar approaches being made other countries including France.[3]

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[1] The following message was sent to London and Paris in telegrams 788 and 770, August 11, 8 p. m.:

"Eyes only for Ambassador.

"In addition to reasons set forth Deptel 787, Aug. 10[*11*] re ground troops for Korea you will appreciate that there is another extremely important factor, namely rapidly increasing public and congressional opinion that in spite of their vocal support our allies are sitting back and allowing us to bear the full brunt of the Korean fighting. This is due to fact that casualties have been born in overwhelming proportion by ground troops and no amount of naval or air support, however welcome, will successfully counter this sentiment.

"You will readily appreciate possible effect of this growing opinion on our current plans for invigorating NATO and voting funds to assist our allies to build up their defensive strength." (795B.551/8–1150)

[2] Not printed.

[3] Telegram 771, August 11, 8 p. m. to Paris, not printed. Similar messages were sent on August 11 to the Embassies in Ottawa, Paris, The Hague, and Wellington, as well as to the Acting Political Adviser in Tokyo for use during the visit there of Australian Prime Minister Menzies. In addition, the Ambassadors in Bangkok and Manila were requested to expedite the despatch of Thai and Philippine forces to Korea, and the Ambassador in Stockholm to speed the sending of the promised Swedish Medical Unit to the United Nations Command in Korea. The Minister in Jordan was informed of U.S. interest in the idea of a contribution of a ground forces unit by the Government of Jordan, although no formal approach was to be made pending U.S. talks with the U.K. Government, and the Ambassador in Pakistan was instructed, at his discretion, to attempt to obtain an immediate offer of ground forces from the Government of Pakistan for use in Korea (795B.5/8–1150; 795.00/8–1150; 357.AD/8–1150).

Subsequently, Department telegram 1149, August 31, to London informed the Embassy that the Department of State was inclined to believe that States not members of the United Nations should not be pressed to supply troops for Korea, but that, if Jordan decided to offer troops, the offer would be carefully considered by the United Nations Command (795B.5/8–3150).

Neither Pakistan nor Jordan provided ground forces to the U.N. Command in Korea.

You shld explore with Attlee the possibility of transfer of Brit forces from Malaya or Hongkong for immediate use Korea, replacing them later with troops from UK. It appears to us that Brit themselves shld come to conclusion that situation warrants risk of withdrawing forces from Malaya or possibly Hongkong for immediate use Korea.

ACHESON

795.00/8–1150 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, August 11, 1950—9 : 20 p. m.
[Received August 11—10 : 08 p. m.]

265. For Hickerson. Pursuant to our phone conversation this morning, I talked with Rau on a purely personal and exploratory basis concerning a possible statement of position on peace aims in Korea. I said that it seemed to me important to keep clearly in mind the avoidance of any implied military commitments of a sort which might prevent UN forces from taking action which may prove necessary in order to effectuate SC decisions to repel aggression and restore international peace and security in the area. For this reason, it seemed to me important to avoid the use of general and undefined terms such as "cessation of hostilities" or "withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel". Instead, I believed that it would be preferable to use a formula such as "immediate cessation of aggression including withdrawal of armed forces" and "measures necessary to assure the ROK against renewed aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area". Rau agreed generally that the distinction was an important one.

With respect to "peace aims", I outlined (stressing the purely personal and unofficial nature of my thinking) the following as possible points for consideration:

1. Reaffirmation of GA policy for establishment of independent and unified Korea.
2. Reaffirmative GA policy of establishment of a government in a unified Korea through free popular elections under UN supervision.
3. Statement of UN interest in creation of conditions in Korea essential to maintenance of free institutions.
4. Statement of intention on part of UN to give all appropriate assistance to people of Korea in the achievement of these conditions.
5. Guarantee by UN of frontiers of an independent unified Korea.
6. UN guarantee of neutrality of a de-militarized Korea.
7. Establishment of UN advisory council, appropriately composed and preferably with India as chairman. Function of such council

would be to render all assistance in accomplishment of UN objectives in Korea, involving steps leading to the establishment of democratic government for a re-unified Korea and assistance to such government, when established, to set up a stable democratic regime.

8. Admission of a re-unified Korea to the UN.

Rau, while withholding specific comment, generally felt this outline might form basis for a UN policy.

However, Rau expressed belief that it would not be advantageous for USG to make such proposals. He felt they would be attacked by USSR if only because they were proposed by USG. Instead, Rau repeated his interest in seeing the SC establish a committee composed of non-permanent members, prime purpose of which would be to formulate a "peace plan". Rau volunteered the thought that it should be quite simple for such a committee to formulate, in a fairly short time, policy recommendations somewhat along the lines I had suggested. He thought that such recommendations, coming from a committee composed of non-permanent SC members might have a better chance of acceptance by USSR.

Rau said he was planning this week-end to communicate with Malik and discuss his proposal with him. Rau did not know whether Malik would wish to talk with him but said that he wanted to be in a position to tell Malik that the idea of establishing a committee was Rau's own idea, and that he did not know what the reaction of the USG would be. Rau therefore asked me to refrain from comment.

However, I said that without commenting upon the merits or demerits of the proposal, it seemed clear to me that it would be deplorable if any device were put forward which might be seized upon by USSR as an excuse for dilatory tactics. Rau replied this might be taken care of by making clear in putting forward such a proposal that the committee would be expected to report within a fixed short period and that in any event a minimum essential condition would be withdrawal of North Korean forces and compliance with SC resolutions. I also pointed out the danger of cushioning USSR from strong world pressures by diverting attention from necessity for compliance with SC decisions. I pointed out such diversions might occur by a protracted debate in SC concerning the desirability of establishing a SC committee, settling its composition and terms of reference, etc. Rau agreed that such danger should be avoided.

I concluded by saying that I wanted him to understand that we might consider it essential to make a statement and that I did not wish him to feel that if we concluded it weren't necessary or desirable to so do, we had in mind "stealing a march on him". He said he appreciated my frankness and certainly did not consider that he was "engaged in a race with us" to table his proposal before we stated what we considered would be appropriate aims. However, I said that before we did so, I was sure my Government would wish to consult with GOI in line with our customary friendly frankness, so as to secure as close a meeting of the minds as possible. He expressed gratitude for this assurance.

Rau said he would communicate with me as soon as he had talked with Malik and transmitted the results of his conversation.

Department may wish to repeat to New Delhi.

GROSS

793.00/8–1150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, August 11, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received August 11—10 : 46 p. m.]

883. Following based on what can be recalled from hurried reading of message received in War Office from UK MA China; evaluation B–2:

1. Tatung coal output being shipped in entirety to USSR even though dearth of fuel in North China.
2. Substantial part Fourth Army under Lin Piao garrisoned along Korean frontier.
3. Peiping-Hankow railway clogged throughout July and August with north-bound troop trains. On Tientsin-Pukow Railway 11 north-bound trains noticed first week August.
4. North of Shanhaikwan all station names removed and replaced by numbers.
5. Russian advisers stationed to south of Nanyuan Airfield, Peiping have left assumably for north.
6. According Mongolian travelers an entire area within 30 miles radius of a mountain (unfortunately not identified in Outer-Mongolia) had been evacuated of its population.

DOUGLAS

357.AD/8–1150 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, August 11, 1950—10 : 45 p. m.
[Received August 11—11 : 13 p. m.]

266. Following tentative views of UNCOK were given us tonight by Cordier, UN, in strictest confidence with request for US reactions : [1]

"A series of informal meetings have been held and on 5 August 1950 a number of recommendations were informally agreed upon as a basis for formal discussion at a later date after members have consulted their governments. (The member for El Salvador was not present at the discussions on 5 August.) These recommendations might be included in the report to the GA. It must be emphasized that these tentative recommendations should not be made known. However, you might consider communicating the text to certain delegations with the request that they expedite their instructions to their respective members on the Commission. Text of recommendations follows:

'4 August 1950.

1. The Commission's recommendations should include the following objectives:

I. Restoration and maintenance of peace and security in the area;

II. Unification of Korea in accordance with the will of the people so as to constitute one independent democratic state; and pending the establishment of constitutional authorities for unified Korea,

(*a*) To ensure that North Korea is not left in a position to renew its aggression at a later date, and

(*b*) Respect the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea as recognized by the GA and in defense of which the UN have taken action against the aggressor

[1] Telegram 269, August 12, from New York forwarded the following message in elaboration of the communication contained in telegram 266:

"Text quoted mytel 266 was from Renborg, principal secretary, UNCOK. It was enclosed in following letter from Cordier (UN) to Austin:

'The SYG has asked that I transmit a copy of the communication I have received from Mr. Renborg, principal secretary, UNCOK.

'You will notice from the communication that the Commission contemplates one inclusion of a series of recommendations in its report to the GA. The SYG and I agree that the policy of the UN with regard to the future of Korea is obviously in such a fluid state that it would be unwise to engage in precise recommendations with regard to it at this time. Furthermore, this question is of top importance to the membership of the UN and it is for that reason that we felt it advisable to transmit this communication to you.

'We should be glad for an informal expression of your views on the matter at your convenience.'" (357.AD/8–1250)

2. To secure these objectives:

(*a*) Korea as a whole will be internationally guaranteed from aggression both from within and from without by a UN security force stationed within Korea until a duly constituted government for the whole of Korea has been established or for such longer period as the SC may deem necessary;

(*b*) A Government and national assembly for a unified Korea shall be established after general elections organized and conducted by the UN have been held throughout Korea;

(*c*) The elections will take place when a free and democratic atmosphere allowing the free expression of the will of the people has been created, and not less than 12 months after the cessation of hostilities;

(*d*) Upon the cessation of hostilities the government of ROK will resume its functions in the whole of the territory of South Korea;

(*e*) The commander of the UN security force assisted by a UN advisory commission appointed by the GA will,

(1) Assume full responsibility for the administration of North Korea;

(2) Consult with the ROK on problems common to the whole of Korea; assist and advise the ROK in maintaining internal security in promoting general harmony among the people and in ensuring a free and democratic atmosphere for the general elections;

(3) In particular be charged with the duty of ensuring that no arbitrary punitive measures in connection with acts committed prior to the cessation of hostilities are resorted to in Korea.

(*f*) An international tribunal shall be set up to try acts committed in violation of the Nuremberg principles affirmed by the GA;

(*g*) The functions and responsibilities specified in clauses (*d*) and (*e*) above will terminate when the government and national assembly of unified Korea assume their function;

(*h*) In order to assist the government of unified Korea in maintaining order and achieving economic and social stability the UN will maintain a commission of experts in Korea for the purpose of organizing and coordinating such technical assistance as may be required.'" [2]

GROSS

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[2] The Department of State sent the following reply in telegram 168, August 19, 2 p. m., to New York:

"Reurtel 266 Aug 11 you may inform Cordier our appreciation his furnishing text quoted and state that Dept has warmly welcomed opportunity examine it. However, in interest GA's receiving wholly independent expression UNCOK judgment Dept prefers reserve comment at this time." (357.AD/8–1150)

795.00/8–1250

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 12, 1950.

After talking with General Norstad about another matter this morning, I told him that we in the State Department were disturbed at reports that American B–29s had bombed the port of Rashin. I said that, as he knew, the Russians were very touchy about any military activity in the neighborhood of their frontiers. I reminded him that the directive which had been sent to CINCFE had specified that our Air Force in its bombing missions north of the 38th parallel was to stay "well clear" of the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers. I said that 17 miles from the frontier did not seem to us to come within this definition. I asked him what was the importance of bombing Rashin. He replied that the Air Force had given the strictest instructions that B–29s were not to bomb Rashin except under the most favorable weather conditions when there could be no possibility of bombing Soviet or Manchurian territory through error.[1] He said he was sure that in this case the mission had not flown over or bombed Soviet or Manchurian territory. As to the importance of the mission, he said Rashin was very important for fuel supplies and as a rail and shipping center.

To make our views known through appropriate channels, I telephoned General Burns this afternoon. Being unable to reach him or Captain Murdaugh,[2] I delivered the following message to Mr. Kenneth Young:[3]

The State Department was deeply concerned over the bombing of Rashin and did not feel that this was consistent with the general directive approved by the President that all American bombing missions should stay "well clear" of the Soviet and Manchurian frontiers. I said I was communicating this as the official State Department view and asked that he communicate it to the proper quarters. I emphasized the sensitivity of Soviet authorities to any military activity in the neighborhood of their territory and the dangers involved, particularly in view of their presumed state of tenseness and irritation. Mr. Young

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[1] At 7:56 a. m. on August 12, the Department of the Army held a teletype conference with officials of the Far East Command in Tokyo, headed by General Willoughby, G–2, who made the following report: "FEAF Bomber Comd B–29's today dropped 550 tons of bombs on the important seaport and rail center of Rashin, 17 mi SW of Korea's NE boundary. Bad weather necessitated radar bombing against the target area; results unobserved. . . ." (DA TT–3650; *Korean Conflict*)

[2] Capt. Albert C. Murdaugh, U.S.N., Acting Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense.

[3] Mr. Young was Captain Murdaugh's Assistant.

expressed the personal view that he shared our anxiety on this score and said he would immediately communicate this message to any available members of the Joint Staff and that he would pass it on to General Burns and Secretary Johnson on Monday.[4]

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

[4] August 14.

795.00/8–1250

Draft Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 12, 1950.[1]

U.S. COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine what measures would be necessary and/or desirable in order to contribute to the restoration of international peace and security in the Korean area, either by defeat of the Korean Communists or as the result of a Soviet suggestion for an early voluntary withdrawal of the aggressor forces back to the 38th parallel.

ANALYSIS

Military Factors

2. The present military objective of the U.N. Command is to "repel the armed attack" of the Korean Communists and restore international peace and security in the area. The Security Council Resolutions in pursuance of which action is being taken call for the withdrawal of the aggressor forces beyond the 38th parallel but do not specifically limit military ground operations of the U.N. Command to the area south of the 38th parallel.

3. The strategic importance of Korea to the Soviet Union is of such a high degree that it is unlikely that it would permit the establishment of a regime in North Korea which it could not dominate or control.

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[1] The date is the drafting date given on the source text. This draft memorandum was forwarded for comment under date of August 14 to Messrs. Butler, Sandifer, Reinhardt, Jessup, and Rusk with an accompanying note from Mr. Allison which read in part as follows:

"Herewith is a draft NSC paper on the Korean problem. I am afraid you will find that it is not by any means a perfect presentation of the problem but it is the best I have been able to think up over the weekend. Certain of the paragraphs on this paper have been lifted bodily from a paper prepared by the Defense Department on the same problem. These paragraphs are 8, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, part of 23 and paragraph 24(*a*) (*b*) (*c*) (*g*). . . ." See the draft memoranda from the Defense Department dated July 31 and August 7, pp. 502 and 528.

4. Hence, the Soviet Union will probably take whatever action it deems necessary to prevent such a consummation of the present Korean hostilities. Such action might take the form of committing Soviet or Chinese Communist troops to action in Korea or at least occupying Korea north of the 38th parallel by such troops.

5. However, it is believed that when the tide of battle begins to turn, the Soviet Union will not wait for U.N. forces to reach the 38th parallel before taking action. When U.N. forces begin to have military successes then will be the time to look for new Soviet action—entry of Soviet forces, entry of Chinese Communist forces, a new effort at U.N. settlement, or all these together.

6. From a strategic point of view the Korean peninsula is not of such importance to the U.S. that it would be desirable to have large U.S. forces committed there. In fact in case of a global conflict, it would be a serious disadvantage to have U.S. forces so committed.

Political Factors

7. After 45 years of either colonialism or division, the people of Korea have an irrepressible urge for the unification of their country and its recognition as an equal and respected member of the family of nations.

8. The division of Korea at the 38th parallel is an entirely artificial barrier violating the natural integrity of the nation. This division was never meant to be permanent and for five years the U.S. has endeavored to eliminate it by all possible peaceful measures, first through bilateral negotiation with the Soviets and later through initiating action through the United Nations machinery.

9. Since November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations has passed, by overwhelming majorities, three Resolutions looking toward achieving the objective of a free, independent and unified Korea. A U.N. Commission on Korea was established and has been and still is charged with seeking Korea's unification by pacific settlement. In its Resolution of October 21, 1949, the General Assembly reaffirmed its aims in Korea and called upon all member states "to refrain from any acts derogatory to the purposes of the present resolution." While the General Assembly for three years has sought to unify Korea by peaceful means, it has never formally considered nor explicitly approved the unification of Korea through military means.

10. The Government of the Republic of Korea has been established in accordance with the Resolutions of the General Assembly, has been declared by the U.N. to be the only lawful government in Korea and has been recognized by 32 nations.

11. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities the Government of the Republic of Korea demonstrated, despite many weaknesses, a growing

capacity to govern. In its report of June 26, 1950, UNCOK pointed out that "there have been distinct signs of improvement in recent months in both economic and political stability of the country." Recent elections for the National Assembly gave significant gains to moderate and non-Government elements, thus confusing those critics who had raised the cry of "police state."

12. The leaders of the Republic of Korea have stressed that the aggression from the North provides the opportunity to abolish the 38th parallel and unify all of Korea under United Nations auspices. President Rhee has insisted on the special position of his government and has formally notified the President of the U.S. that the Republic of Korea will not recognize the validity of any decision reached about the future of Korea in the making of which the Republic of Korea has not participated.

13. There is a growing sentiment in the United States favoring a "final" settlement of the Korean problem and disapproving of any settlement which smacks of compromise or a "deal".

14. On the other hand there are significant groups who believe further efforts should be made to find a peaceful solution. Should a peace offer be made or the aggressor retire or be forced back to the 38th parallel there would doubtless be strong efforts made by large sections of the public and the Congress to stop the fighting and return to a peace basis.

15. There is evidence that the UNCOK which is operating in the field will make recommendations of a far reaching character designed to bring about the unification of Korea under U.N. auspices. (See USUN's 266, Aug. 11. Copy attached.[2]) The U.S. will have to take a stand on these recommendations.

Politico-Military Considerations

16. By a quick and crushing victory of the North Korean military forces in South Korea, the USSR would have gained its long-standing goal of the complete absorption of Korea into its orbit. Furthermore, the building of a "cordon sovietaire" from the Soviet borders of Sinkiang to the southern shores of Korea would have neared completion. Only Japan and the Philippines at the edge of the orbit, and Southeast Asia to the South, would have still remained outside. Yet, the aggression in South Korea may result in the opposite effect—the failure to complete the cordon.

17. In this light, the situation in Korea now provides the United States and the free world with the first opportunity to regain territory from the Soviet bloc. Since a basic policy of the United States is to check and reduce the preponderant power of the USSR in Asia and

[2] *Ante*, p. 564.

elsewhere, then UN operations in Korea can set the stage for the non-communist penetration into an area under Soviet control.

18. Penetration of the Soviet orbit, short of all-out war, would disturb the political, economic and military structure which the USSR is organizing between its own Far Eastern territories and the contiguous areas. The bonds of Manchuria, the pivot of this complex outside the USSR, would be weakened, for a free and strong Korea could provide an outlet for Manchuria's resources and could also provide non-communist contact with the people there and in North China.

19. The significance in Asia of the unification of Korea under UN auspices would be incalculable. The Japanese would see demonstrated a check on Soviet expansion. Elements in the Chinese Communist regime, and particularly important segments of the Chinese population, might be inclined to question their exclusive dependence on the Kremlin. Skillful manipulation might drive a wedge between the Chinese Communists and the Kremlin. Throughout Asia, those who foresee only inevitable Soviet conquest would take hope.

20. The above reasons, in addition to the strategic factor mentioned in paragraph [3], make it even more probable that the Soviet Union will not be willing to see settlement resulting in a Korean Government which it cannot control. However, it is possible that, notwithstanding its considerable military strength located in the Far East, the Soviet Union is not yet ready to risk a general war to prevent a determined and rapid effort by the U.N. to create a unified Korea. This possibility might be increased if the U.N. should adopt by a large majority a program recommended by UNCOK and if some means can be devised of assuring the Soviet Union that a U.N. settlement would not be only a U.S. settlement and that it would not be directed against legitimate Soviet interests.

U.S. Interests and Obligations

21. In subscribing to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, the U.S. pledged its support to Korean independence. Our intentions have been measured in our diplomatic support, military aid, and economic assistance. Our obligation to the United Nations to block a breach of the peace, is fixed.

22. The broad objectives of the United States were stated in NSC 8/2.[3] approved by the President on 23 March 1949, as follows:

"*a.* To establish a united, self-governing, and sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the UN.

"*b.* To ensure that the government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.

[3] *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 969.

"*c.* To assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and educational system as essential basis of an independent and democratic state. A more immediate objective is the withdrawal of remaining U.S. occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable consistent with the foregoing objectives."

23. The political value to the United States of showing to the world that it is determined that aggression shall be repelled, and that the expressed will of the United Nations shall be respected, justifies our current military effort in Korea.

Conclusions

24. The following principles form the basis for consideration of U.S. actions:

a. The unification of Korea conforms with Korean aspirations, U.S. policies, and the expressed objectives of the United Nations.

b. The permanent unification of Korea can only be fairly and correctly resolved with the participation of representatives of the Korean people chosen as the result of free elections on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot held under the authority and observation of the U.N.

c. The Government of the Republic of Korea should continue to be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem.

d. The problem of Korea is manifestly a United Nations problem and the final solution of that problem must be one which is consistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter.

e. The tremendous problem of an economic, social and political nature attendant upon the establishment of a unified Korea are of such a magnitude as to require the assistance of the United Nations. Korea is an Asiatic state and it is therefore appropriate that the Asiatic members of the United Nations should have a major voice and should play a prominent role in the assistance that the United Nations can give.

f. The establishment of a free and united Korea and the elimination of the North Korean Communist regime, following unprovoked military aggression, would be a step in reversing the dangerous strategic trend in the Far East of the past twelve months.

g. The 38th parallel, in and of itself, has no military significance other than such an artificial barrier as would limit if not prevent a military victory.

25. The following limiting factors on action which should be recommended by the United States must be kept in mind:

a. The probability that any attempt either by force or through U.N. action to establish a unified Korea would cause the Soviet Union to commit either its own forces or those of Communist China or both with the consequent danger of global war.

b. The fact that as stated in paragraph 3 of NSC 73/1, "The United States is not now capable of conducting immediately a general military

offensive against the USSR because our forces are either not appropriately positioned or are so inadequate as to be incapable of effective action."

c. Possible reluctance of other members of the United Nations to agree to action necessary to effect the unification of Korea if it appears it would lead to the outbreak of a general conflict with the USSR or the breaking up of the United Nations.

26. In consonance with the above principles and having in mind the above limiting factors, the United States should take the following steps:

a. Continue its efforts in cooperation with the other members of the United Nations to repel the aggressors and restore the integrity of the Republic of Korea, taking such military action north and south of the 38th parallel as is necessary.

b. Take such action through the diplomatic channel as necessary to assure the greatest possible support of United States action by United Nations members.

c. Announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter.

d. To the above end, recommend or urge others to recommend, the creation of an appropriate United Nations body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with principles enumerated above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as chairman of such a body.

e. Recommend to the United Nations that, after the successful repulsion of the aggression in Korea and the unification of the country in accordance with recommendations of the above named United Nations body, Korea be demilitarized, the United Nations body in question to recommend the methods by which this could be done, together with recommendations as to the size and character of internal security forces needed by the Republic of Korea.

f. Announce its belief that for as long as the 38th parallel divides Korea or until a stable unified Korea is established, a United Nations military force should be retained in Korea to prevent renewed aggression or internal strife during the natural period of readjustment, and that such forces should consist primarily of contingents from Asiatic countries. The United States might recommend that such of its forces as are included in the United Nations force be stationed south of the 38th parallel.

g. Recommend that the members of the United Nations, upon the advice of the United Nations body mentioned above, give such political and economic aid to the Korean Government as may be necessary after the conclusion of hostilities.

h. Should the United Nations Commission on Korea make recommendations along the lines indicated in paragraph 15, the United States should strongly support the general character of those recommendations reserving the right to suggest changes in detail as may appear desirable.

i. To the extent feasible take measures to speed up and intensify military and industrial preparations with a view to eliminating as early as possible the factors mentioned in paragraph 25*b*.

27. Should the USSR make clear that it intended to commit its own troops or those of Communist China into action in Korea with a view to making impossible the action contemplated above, the United States should undertake the action recommended in NSC 76,[4] at the same time making clear that it did not renounce in any way its ultimate objective of contributing to the creation of a free, independent and unified Korea in accordance with the announced objectives of the United Nations.

[4] See footnote 2, p. 346.

795.00/8–1350 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 13, 1950—7 p. m.

237. For Henderson from Hickerson. You will observe from several USUN tels repeated to you that we are stepping up as much as possible informal consultation between USUN and Rau on Korean and other UN matters. We are doing this deliberately and think it will pay good dividends.

Apropos of Rau's mysterious statement last Wednesday,[1] Rau yesterday told Gross that what he had in mind was that he had received instructions to support US position on all matters likely to come to a vote in connection with Korea in the near future and that on that account he did not want to get out in front with statements or initiatives in SC. [Hickerson.]

ACHESON

[1] See telegraph 247 from New York, received at 9:26 p. m. on August 9, p. 551.

795.00/8–1450

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1950.

I telephoned General Burns at 10:30 this morning and referred to my conversation with Mr. Young on Saturday.[1] I said I was calling to emphasize the very grave danger which the State Department felt

[1] August 12; see memorandum by Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews, p. 566.

was involved in the bombing of Rashin and our belief that such bombing is contrary to the directive to stay "well clear" of the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers.[2] I called his attention to the article by Talbert in this morning's *Herald Tribune* indicating that the real purpose of the mission was to hinder possible Soviet submarine operations out of the ice-free port of Rashin. I said that in view of what must be presumed to be the present state of mind of the Soviet authorities and their extreme sensitivity to any operations in that area, the State Department felt strongly that any repetition of the bombing of Rashin might entail the gravest consequences. I said that I understood that both the Defense Establishment and the State Department feel very strongly that we do not want active Soviet participation in the Korean war or the commencement of worldwide hostilities this year. We believed that if the Soviet authorities are undecided or are hesitating as to whether to move on a wider basis now the bombing of Rashin or similar moves might well prove an important deciding factor. I asked General Burns to convey this view immediately to the appropriate Defense authorities. He promised to do so and made no comment other than to say that he thought in view of the present Air Force precision there probably was no likelihood that the B–29s had flown over Soviet or Manchurian territory.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

[2] In a memorandum of conversation, not printed, Ambassador Jessup recorded his discussion of this same subject on the morning of August 14 with Secretary of the Air Force Finletter. Mr. Jessup registered the State Department's grave concern with the bombing and reported that Mr. Finletter urged that the State Department communicate formally with the Defense Department on the matter. Mr. Finletter also said that he would look into the question personally. (795.00/8–1450)

795.00/8–1450

Memorandum by the Counselor (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1950.

This memorandum is supplementary to my memorandum of August 8 containing a round-up of the present pattern of Soviet intentions.[1]

You will recall that attention was drawn in paragraph five of that memo to the concern which the Soviet leaders must feel over the proximity of the operations in Korea to their own frontiers and over the direct damage which could conceivably be done to their military interests by an extension of the area of hostilities.

[1] Text is scheduled for publication in volume I.

In paragraph 7(*c*) of that memo it was also pointed out that any further direct detriment to the Soviet military establishment in the Far East resulting from hostilities in South Korea might be expected to hasten a re-entry of the Red Army into North Korea.

According to releases from General MacArthur's Headquarters of August 13, attacks were made August 12 by three sweeps of B–29 bombers on military (including naval) targets at Najin (Rashin), a North Korean port described in one communique as only 17 miles from the Soviet border. The attacks were made, one communique states, through heavy cloud cover, by radar guidance, and 500 tons of high explosives were dropped.

There has now come to my attention a front page story in today's *New York Herald Tribune* by Ansel E. Talbert, despatched from Tokyo on August 13. This story states (*a*) that Rashin is "of tremendous future importance to the Soviet Union"; (*b*) that the Soviet Navy has been using it as a submarine base; (*c*) that it is particularly important to them in this respect because Vladivostok and other Soviet Far Eastern ports are ice-bound part of the year, whereas Port Arthur and Dairen are poorly situated as submarine bases; and (*d*) that although "officially" the attack was designed to interdict the flow of supplies to the front in Korea, actually most such supplies "are believed to have passed through Najin before the fighting began", and reconnaissance flights conducted the same day between Wonsan and Seishin "disclosed not a single supply train or any other rail traffic moving along the entire stretch . . ." (Despite requests of several days' standing we have been unable to get any information out of General MacArthur's Headquarters for the Department about such reconnaissance flights and their results.)

Given the speed at which these planes operate, and the fact that they were bombing through an overcast, it is obvious how easily they could not only have overflown the Soviet frontier but actually have inflicted damage on the Soviet side of it. Aside from this, we must remember that this point is less than 100 miles from the entrance to the roadstead of Vladivostock and that the Soviet authorities are pathologically sensitive even to any reconnaissance activities, let alone actual bombings, in that vicinity. On top of this, we have the story apparently passed by General MacArthur's Headquarters three or four days after the announcement that censorship had been imposed, making it entirely plain that the relationship of Rashin to the hostilities in South Korea was only a pretext for our bombing and that the real reason for it was the desire to injure the Soviet strategic position in the Far East.

It is my belief that this drastically heightens the importance and actuality of the passages in my analysis of August 8, cited above. In

the light of this conduct on our part, which can only appear to the Soviet authorities as evidence of a deliberate decision to exploit the South Korean hostilities for the purpose of reducing Soviet strategic capabilities in the area, we must be prepared at any time for extreme Soviet reactions going considerably beyond, and therefore not fully in accordance with, the analysis I gave on August 8. In the light of this situation, it is entirely possible that a Soviet military re-entry into North Korea might occur at any time; or the Soviet Government might take other local measures, such as putting strategic bombing planes nominally at North Korean disposal, and beginning operations with them against our forces and our bases in Japan. We also cannot exclude the possibility that this evidence, as it must appear to them, of a United States intent to damage their strategic interests under cover of the Korean war, even at the price of greater heightened danger of serious complications, will naturally affect their estimate of the possibility of avoiding major hostilities, of the likely timing of such hostilities, and of the relative advantages of a Soviet initiation of such hostilities as opposed to a waiting policy based on the continued hope of avoiding them altogether.[2]

GEORGE F. KENNAN

[2] A copy of this document was transmitted on August 15 to General Burns by Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews under cover of a note which drew General Burns' attention particularly to the last paragraph of Mr. Kennan's memorandum (795.00/8–1550).

795.00/8–1450

The Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 14, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department of State is very much concerned with the possibly serious results of the bombing by the American Air Force of the North Korean city of Najin. We believe that the Department of Defense should give urgent consideration to the relation between this bombing mission and the President's directive that bombing operations north of the 38th Parallel should stay well clear of the Manchurian and Siberian frontiers.

A further concern arises from the type of publicity which this mission is likely to get. For example, in today's edition of the *New York*

[1] On August 14, Mr. Webb met with President Truman and indicated to him the intent of the Department of State to take up vigorously with the Defense Department the matter of the bombing of Rashin. Mr. Webb informed the President that he was not suggesting that Mr. Truman take any action, but merely wanted him to know that this step was being taken by the State Department (795.00/8–1450).

Herald Tribune there appears a story by Mr. Ansel E. Talbert from Tokyo which left the strong implication that Air Force sources in Japan considered this raid as one directed against the Soviet Union and its submarine capabilities and not as a raid militarily essential to the successful prosecution of the Korean war. I am sure you will agree that stories of this sort, which seem to reflect official American thinking, could have very grave consequences in our efforts to localize the Korean fight and to prevent the outbreak of general hostilities. We believe it would be important for the Department of Defense to arrange for official statements relating the bombing of this port directly to the war in Korea and to deny flatly that it had any other purpose or implication.

Sincerely yours, JAMES E. WEBB

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its 487th meeting on August 14 from 3 to 6:30 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.487. Debate continued on the Korean question and procedural matters relating thereto, but no action was taken. The Indian Representative (Rau) made an informal proposal for the establishment of a committee, to be composed of the six nonpermanent members of the Security Council, which would study all draft resolutions or proposals that had been or might be presented under the title "A Peaceful Settlement in Korea". See *infra*.

795.00/8–1450

Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

SECRET [NEW YORK,] August 14, 1950.

Subject: Korea

Participants: As shown below. Conversations, separately, with Mr. C. P. Noyes, United States Mission

During the meeting, I asked ORDONNEAU for an explanation of the sentence in their speech relating to Rau's proposal,[2] indicating that

[1] The source text is a copy of a document in the IO files, Department of State, bearing the designation US/S/1405 and the date August 15, 1950.

[2] See the editorial note, *supra*.

this was a confidential proposal which it was agreed would not be discussed publicly. Ordonneau indicated that Rau was going to make this proposal public in his speech and that the French Delegation had instructions to support it. I indicated I was very much surprised and that we had had no advance warning that the proposal was going to be made. I showed concern that this would result in splitting the solidarity of the Members of the Security Council who supported the Council's decisions. I doubted that we should admit that this was a parallel of the Berlin Case. Ordonneau shrugged his shoulders and indicated it was too late for them to do anything about it.

I called MENON out of the meeting to ask him what was the proposal they intended to make. I referred him to the text of the French draft speech which had already been given to the Press. He indicated the nature of the proposal to me and pretended surprise that I did not already know about the proposal which had been discussed with Ambassador Gross. I indicated we knew they were thinking of something of this sort but did not know they were planning to make it, or its details. Menon came around later to advise Ambassador Gross that Rau had seen Malik about the matter on Saturday; that Malik's reaction had been rather cool. Menon was obviously somewhat embarrassed about the whole matter.

HANS ENGEN (Norway) asked me what our reactions were to the Rau proposal. I said we hadn't any yet. He indicated that the Indians had not really discussed the matter with them before the meeting; that they had not been told the details of the Indian proposal or consulted about it. His personal view was that it was rather naive.

AMBASSADOR SUNDE refused to comment to the Press on the Rau proposal and implied to me, afterwards, that he did not like it much.

CORDIER was upset by the way the Indians had introduced this proposal—in particular, the mean way in which it had referred to the United States.

C. P. NOYES

795B.551/8–1450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, August 14, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received August 14—3 : 52 p. m.]

910. ReDeptel 787 August 11.

1. Talked with Attlee and Bevin again regarding expediting the embarkation of troops for Korea or moving troops from Hong Kong or Malaya or some other spot such as the Middle East immediately and

making substitution of troops from the UK for those sent at once to Korea.

2. As to movement of troops from Malaya to Korea, both Attlee and Bevin made the argument that not only would they run the risk of being seriously repulsed in Malaya, but also, which they considered to be of great importance, the withdrawal of British troops from the battle in Malaya would have very adverse effect upon the battle in Siam and might even mean the loss of that part of Asia.

3. As to Hong Kong, they said the troops for Hong Kong were inadequate to meet the situation that might develop.

4. They realize of course the importance of refuting the Soviet propaganda aimed at concealing the fact that the Korean affair is a United Nations engagement and making it an exclusively US venture, but they would review the matter and would do everything they could to expedite the movement of troops to Korea and would let me know.[1]

DOUGLAS

[1] On August 21, the U.K. Government informed the U.N. Secretary-General that an infantry force would be dispatched immediately from Hong Kong to Korea (U.N. document S/1702). Subsequently, Ambassador Douglas reported to the Department of State in telegram 1119, August 22, that the British were speeding up the movement of ground forces from the United Kingdom to Korea and that the target date for sailing had been advanced from November 1 to October 1 (795B.551/8–2250).

795.00/8–1450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, August 14, 1950—11 p. m.

[Received August 15—8 : 56 a. m.]

393. 1. In view remarks made to me by Bajpai, Secretary General MEA on August 12 re GOI thinking in matter of peace moves (Embtel 376, August 12, paragraph 3 [1]) I took liberty of outlining to him during conversation August 14 eight numbered points made by Gross in his conversation on August 11 with Rau (Deptel 235, August 12 [2]). I explained background of conversation of Gross with Rau and told him that without instructions I was reporting these

[1] Paragraph 3 of telegram 376 (not printed) read as follows:

"Although GOI policies re peace moves not formulated GOI thinking at present along following lines: ceasefire with understanding North Korean troops be withdrawn from ROK. In view unpopularity Rhee in ROK it might be better for Government ROK to be taken over by UN and eventually UN take over government all Korea in order for nationwide plebiscite. GOI would not be happy at idea of merely *status quo* being restored. Efforts should be made to set up for all Korea kind of government agreeable to Korean people." (795.00/8–1250)

[2] Not printed; but see telegram 265 from New York, received at 10 : 08 p. m. on August 11, p. 561.

points to him because I thought it might be useful for him to know how some of our officials in Lake Success were thinking. I emphasized that I was not undertaking give fixed views of Department.

2. Bajpai said information was helpful. He would make no secret that India was still looking for possible avenues in direction of peace as was also UK. Acting UK High Commissioner had appointment with him in few minutes to exchange views re possible solution Korean problem.

3. Bajpai said he wished put question which was bothering GOI. Suppose it should become evident that UN Forces would either be driven out of Korea or be tied down in small sector for many months while US and other countries were preparing forces to invade country on appropriate scale. Would it be advantageous for cause of peace during this period of strain for SC to refuse to have any conversation or negotiations with North Koreans unless North Koreans would withdraw or agree unconditionally to withdraw? GOI considered that unfortunate unconditional surrender formula in World War II was partially responsible for present condition of world. Might it not be mistake for SC to adopt similar inflexible attitude at this time? He did not wish to be misunderstood; GOI was not planning to rush in with some suggestion which would embarrass those members UN opposing aggression. It had not as yet been able to determine what might or could be done. Nevertheless, it hoped that a formula would not be adopted at this time which would firmly close the door to discussion; with North Koreans to remain in undisturbed possession of Korea from six to eight months while forces were being mobilized to oust them might be more disastrous for cause of peace than for talks to take place. During those months Communists could eliminate all persons and groups who might have ability and energy to oppose them. If talks should take place they should, of course, be in certain framework in order that impression might not be obtained that determination UN was weakening in face military adverses [*reverses?*]. There could, of course, be no peace except on condition that North Korean forces be withdrawn and steps taken to ascertain real desires Korean people. He was merely thinking aloud.

4. I told Bajpai, although I appreciated his sharing of thoughts with me I could not reciprocate because my thinking had not as yet gone so far. We might pursue this matter again later.

5. Bajpai read excerpts from telegram which he had received over week-end from Rau. Latter reported that he had told Malik that he would vote against resolution inviting North Koreans to appear before SC. Malik had expressed regret at decision which seemed to him unfair and partial. Rau added he was in somewhat difficult posi-

tion. Both groups were clearly anxious for India's moral support and were treating him with so much courtesy and consideration that he sometimes found it unpleasant to take sides.

HENDERSON

795.00/8–1550

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 15, 1950.

CABINET MEETING, TUESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1950

The Cabinet meeting was quiet and nothing of concern to the Department was raised.

However, before the meeting of the Cabinet, Secretary Johnson took from his papers my letter regarding the bombing of Rashin, dated August 14, 1950. He stated that we should not be disturbed about the action taken; that it had been approved in advance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President; that there was a large chemical plant there in which munitions of war were being made for use in fighting, and that in the judgment of the Joint Chiefs it was essential to destroy it.[1]

I told him that our experts on Russia took a most serious view of this; that the Russians were undoubtedly now in the process of making important decisions; and that we were very concerned that such an action might precipitate the reoccupation of Korea down to the 38th Parallel or the introduction of the Chinese Communists into the war; that if that is the case, results of such action could not be overlooked. Secretary Johnson was adamant in his position and stated that, regardless of our view, it was essential to destroy this plant, and that they would go back time after time to destroy it. He seemed to think that as long as planes did not cross the Russian border the exact location of targets was of little significance. I explained to him that this was not the view of those who had had the most experience in dealing with the Russians, and I again expressed the hope that he would re-examine this whole matter and give more attention to the concern of the Department of State about the consequences of such actions in the proximity of the Russian border.

When I discussed this matter with the President yesterday he indicated some concern about it himself, but did not state that he had

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[1] The Department of Defense has supplied information indicating that Secretary Johnson was in error regarding the nature of the target at Rashin, having apparently confused it with another location on the approved target list. See Secretary Johnson's letter to the Secretary of State, August 21, 1950 (*post*, p. 613), in which he correctly identified the target as a petroleum storage plant.

approved the action. I frankly doubt that he approved the action in advance, and therefore believe we should address another, and stronger, formal communication to the Secretary of Defense, stating in more detail the reasons for our concern and particularly requesting that consultations be held with the proper officials of the Department of State prior to making exceptions to the orders which have been issued by the President specifically directing that actions in the proximity of the Russian border be avoided.

JAMES E. WEBB

795.00/8–1550

Memorandum by Mr. George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 15, 1950.

The papers on Korea now are so numerous that it is difficult to fit all of the pieces together. According to the July 17 memorandum from the Executive Secretary, NSC: "The President requested the NSC to prepare for his consideration a report on the subject, covering the policy which should be pursued by the United States after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel."

Papers now in draft form, none of which has been agreed to or approved, include:

1. NSC 73/1 (now being considered by the senior staff of NSC);
2. NSC 76 and 76/1 (being considered by the NSC consultants and staff);
3. A paper agreed to in the State Department and circulated by NSC under date of July 27 for NSC staff consideration only;
4. A Defense draft paper dated August 7 and circulated for NSC consideration only; and
5. The draft paper attached to your memorandum of August 14, 1950.[1]

The following comment on this paper is made in an effort to relate it to other papers on this subject and to keep duplication and possible contradiction to a minimum.

The Problem

To determine what policies the United States should pursue in order to contribute to the restoration of international peace and security in the Korean area once the aggression has been brought to an end, either by the defeat of the Korean communists or as the result of an early voluntary withdrawal of the aggressor forces to territory north of the 38th parallel.

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[1] Mr. Allison's memorandum is printed under date of August 12, p. 567.

Analysis

(This paragraph would be inserted as the first paragraph of the ANALYSIS.) Aspects of the Korean problem relating to the present U.N. enforcement action and other military operations are dealt with in NSC 73/1, NSC 76 and NSC 76/1, NSC staff draft (State Department) of July 27, and NSC staff draft (Defense Department) of August 7. This paper therefore deals primarily with the phase of the problem following the termination of the aggression.

Paragraph 6. The following sentence might be added to this paragraph: "However, a Kremlin-dominated Korean peninsula would be a threat to U.S. security interests in Japan."

Paragraph 9. The following sentence might be added to this paragraph: "Neither has the United States taken the decision to include the use of military force among the means by which it would seek to bring about the establishment of a unified and independent Korea."

Paragraph 16. The final sentence might be revised as follows: "The aggression in South Korea, if defeated in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions, may result in the opposite effect—the failure to complete the cordon."

Paragraph 20. The first sentence might read as follows: "The above reasons, in addition to the strategic importance of Korea to the U.S.S.R., make it even more probable that the U.S.S.R. will not be willing to see a settlement resulting in a Korean government which it cannot control."

Paragraph 21. The first sentence might read: "The United States has pledged its support of a unified and independent Korea."

Paragraph 24a. This paragraph might read: "The independence and unification of Korea conform with Korean aspirations, United States objectives, and the expressed objectives of the United Nations."

Paragraph 24d. This paragraph might read as follows: "Although the United States national interests are involved in the Korean situation, the problem of Korea is primarily a U.N. problem and its final solution must be one which is consistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter."

Paragraph 24e. The last sentence might read as follows: "Since Korea is an Asiatic state, it is appropriate that the Asiatic members of the United Nations should play a prominent role in the assistance that the United Nations can give, and that their views regarding a solution of the problem should be given sympathetic consideration."

Paragraph 24g. It is suggested that this paragraph be eliminated, since it refers to military operations which are dealt with in other papers.

Paragraph 25a. Insert the words "and independent" after the word "unified" in the second line.

Paragraph 25b. This paragraph might read as follows: "The fact that the military strength of the United States now is inadequate to assure the attainment of the objectives fixed by our national interests."

Paragraph 26. This paragraph might read as follows: "In consonance with the above principles and having in mind the above limiting factors, the United States should take the following steps once the aggression has been brought to an end:"

Paragraph 26a. This paragraph could be eliminated since it deals with military phases covered in other papers.

Paragraph 26b. Might read: "Take action through diplomatic channels to assure the greatest possible support for the attainment of United Nations and United States objectives regarding Korea."

Paragraph 26c. This paragraph might read: "At a time when the United Nations forces in Korea are achieving substantial victories over the Korean communists forces, or when any proposals may be made for the withdrawal from the Republic of Korea of the Korean communists forces, announcement should be made in the U.N. of the determination of the United States to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous U.N. resolutions and in a manner consistent with the U.N. Charter."

Paragraph 26d. "When such an announcement is made, the United States should recommend, or urge others to recommend, the creation of an appropriate U.N. body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with the principles enumerated above. It might be desirable to support the Representative of India as Chairman of such a body."

Paragraph 26e. This paragraph might start as follows: "At the time of the announcement, recommended to the U.N. that, after the unification of the country in accordance with recommendations of the above-named U.N. body, . . ."

Paragraph 26f. This paragraph might read as follows: "In its announcement to the United Nations, the United States should express its view that for as long as the 38th parallel divides Korea, or until a stable, unified, and independent Korea is established, a U.N. military force should be retained in Korea to prevent renewed aggression or internal strife during the natural period of adjustment, and that such force should include substantial contingents from Asiatic countries. The United States would make it clear that its forces would be available to participate in enforcing a U.N. guarantee against unprovoked aggression; but would recommend that its contingents in the U.N. force referred to should be stationed south of the 38th parallel."

Paragraph 26h. "Should the U.N. Commission on Korea make recommendations along the lines set forth in USUN telegram 266 of August 11, the United States should strongly support the general

character of those recommendations, reserving the right to suggest such changes in detail as may appear desirable."

Paragraph 26i. This might read: "Press forward urgently with measures to build up the military, political and economic strength of the United States and other non-communist nations."

Paragraph 27. This paragraph might be deleted since it deals with military phases covered in other papers.

GEORGE H. BUTLER

330/8–1550 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, August 15, 1950—1 : 52 p. m.
[Received August 15—4 : 06 p. m.]

283. For Hickerson, UNA.

1. Immediately following our telephone conversation, and before my staff had brought in the dispatch which I have promised to send you, I confirm the telephone statement to this effect:

I am not in favor of assenting to a resolution which would buy cessation of debate in the SC for the remainder of August at the price of turning over to a special committee under Article 28, consisting of non-permanent members of SC, responsibility of the SC regarding "complaint of aggression upon the ROK".

I favor attempting to guide our colleagues on the SC by informal consultations toward a SC resolution establishing principles for a peaceful solution without any committee. This is a UN effort (not the allegation by India that it is a US effort).

I favor a constructive effort at pacific methods through the UN to achieve:

1. Liberation of the Korean people from captivity;
2. Restoration of freedom and opportunity to govern themselves, and enjoy security, throughout the whole peninsula;
3. Arrest of aggression anywhere and everywhere (this being regarded as an aggression upon the UN and upon the world).

Details, such as you mention, could also be talked out informally:

1. Entire peninsula;
2. Democratic government guaranteed by UN;
3. Demobilization;
4. High-powered UN Commission;
5. Election.

Please refer mytel 265, August 11, page 2, for possible points for consideration.

2. Staff thinks this statement supplements my personal previous statement I agree.

1. We feel that Rau's proposal, including the method of its introduction, is very damaging to our interests and that we should make certain that it is not adopted.
2. We are most anxious that the United States should avoid responsibility before the world for killing an Indian initiative identified with peace in Korea.
3. It seems unlikely that the Russian delegate will accept this proposal. We doubt that the other delegations will be enthusiastic in support of it.
4. Our suggested tactic, therefore, for the immediate future would be to avoid taking a definitely negative attitude toward Rau's suggestion. Instead, we would propose to speak privately with the various delegations about the substance of what our peace aims in Korea should be and the importance of maintaining a solidarity among those members who are fighting together in Korea. We would hope to engender in the Security Council a substantive debate of these affirmative principles on the theory that the terms of reference of such a committee could not possibly be framed except in the light of consideration of these important principles. We would expect that by the time a number of friendly delegates had spelled out their own peace aims in public speeches in the SC, the uselessness and impracticability of Rau's suggestion would become apparent to all.

AUSTIN

330/8–1550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 15, 1950—7 p. m.

147. Re Rau proposal made in SC yesterday. US will give sympathetic consideration to any proposal made in Council which is likely bring about compliance of North Koreans with resolutions heretofore adopted by Council.

We cannot of course give support to Indian proposal until we learn purpose which Rau has in mind and precise terms of reference of proposed comite.

Accordingly, you shld approach Rau and make clear to him our concern with ref to fol:

1. Korean case is not conflict between US and USSR but UN against North Korean aggression and any who give support to it.
2. Principal function of Comite shld be to assist SC in formulating proposals for Korea on basis of cessation of hostilities and full compliance by North Koreans with SC resolutions. It shld not have any mediatory functions.

3. SC maintains and does not surrender any part of its responsibility for action in relation to Korea. SC in carrying out this responsibility is acting on behalf of all UN Members to achieve:

a. Cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of NK forces,

b. By example of UN action in this case to deter and prevent aggression anywhere, and

c. Establishment of free unified and independent Korea so that its people may govern themselves in manner recommended in prior GA resolutions.

4. That although Comite may of course consider resolutions now before SC, just as it may consider entire SC debate, those resolutions, particularly US res, are before SC and shld be put to vote as soon as Pres willing carry out his obligations as Pres. There is no reason why SC needs sub-comite consideration of these res before vote can be taken.

5. We feel strongly that North Korean reps shld not be heard by Comite until they cease their defiance of UN and that there is no occasion or justification for hearing Chi Commies.

6. If Com. established, its work should end by Sept. 15 to clear the deck for any GA rec. on Korea.

FYI our present thought as regards para 5 action is that it wld be better not to make issue of this point in formulating res but to rely on efforts US and UK and other friendly dels to persuade comite members individually of dangerously harmful results of such a course on continued public support in US of UN action in Korea.

You shld discuss also foregoing conception of nature and function of comite with other SC members with view obtaining their concurrence.[1]

ACHESON

[1] The text of this telegram was sent to New Delhi in telegram 248, August 15, with the added instruction to Ambassador Henderson that at his discretion he discuss its substance with Bajpai (330/8–1550).

795B.5/8–1550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 15, 1950—7 p. m.

148. Confirming telecon Ludlow to Hyde re MacArthur's Second Report to SC: MacArthur agrees to following wording penultimate paragraph report:

"The international character of the operations in Korea has received important emphasis since the preparation of the last report in the offers of combat forces made by a number of Members of the United Nations. But, it is my sincere hope that the Member Nations of the

United Nations will without delay build up the strength of our ground forces. To bring the conflict to a successful conclusion quickly, it is essential for the Member nations to act speedily. The material utility of each contribution is directly related to the rapidity with which it is despatched. Urgent attention therefore should be given to the arrival of organizations now in being." [1]

By agreement yesterday State Defense following paragraph has been deleted:

"There is increasing evidence that much of the equipment and supplies of the North Korean forces is of Soviet origin."

Report as revised may now be transmitted to UN.[2]

ACHESON

[1] The text of this paragraph, as submitted to Mr. Acheson by Secretary of Defense Johnson on August 11, had read as follows:

"The international character of the operations in Korea has received important emphasis since the preparation of the last report in the offers of combat forces made by a number of members of the United Nations. But, it is my sincere hope that the member nations of the United Nations will without further delay build up the strength of our ground forces. Speed in this matter is of the essence. Contributions should not be token but of real strength and come immediately. They are needed now, not indefinitely later. Organizations now in being must be dispatched if they are to be of material utility. It is necessary that they come now in order materially to shorten the operation and bring it quickly to a successful conclusion." (795B.5/8–1150)

[2] The text of the report was transmitted to the Security Council by Mr. Austin on August 16; see U.N. document S/1694.

795.00/8–1650

The Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 16, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am much concerned by the situation which we discussed before Cabinet meeting yesterday as outlined in my letter of August 14 on the bombing of Najin. You indicated to me that the action in question had been taken after prior approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and yourself, and that the State Department should not be disturbed about the possible reactions.

As you will recall, the pertinent directive to General MacArthur was worked out in its final form at a meeting at the White House by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the State Department and this final text was thereupon approved by the President, Secretary Acheson and yourself.[1] That directive contained the clear statement

[1] See p. 240.

that while bombing operations against specified military targets in Korea north of the 38th parallel were authorized, our planes engaged in the operations should stay "well clear" of the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers. Najin is just 17 miles south of the Soviet and Manchurian frontiers and its bombing does not, in the opinion of this Department, conform to the terms of the aforesaid directive.

We have a deep concern in this matter which in the view of this Department vitally affects the national security of the United States and our basic foreign policy objective to prevent the outbreak of a general war. I therefore feel that any modification of the above directive should be jointly considered with this Department for recommendation to or decision by the President.

The injunction to stay "well clear" of the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers in bombing operations in North Korea stemmed in our view from the extreme sensitivity of the Kremlin to any military action in this area which they consider to be of vital military importance to them and from the common State and Defense objective to avoid if possible direct Soviet participation in the conflict in Korea or elsewhere. It is the view of those in this Department most familiar with the Soviet Union and its policies that the bombing of Najin can only appear to the Soviet authorities as evidence of a deliberate decision to exploit the South Korean hostilities for the purpose of reducing Soviet strategic capabilities in the area. This belief on their part can only be strengthened by the article by Mr. Ansel Talbert in the *New York Herald Tribune* mentioned in my letter of August 14 and by similar statements appearing in the column of Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin in this morning's *New York Times*. In our opinion, this action greatly increases the possibility of a Soviet military reentry into North Korea, and the possibility of placing strategic bombing planes nominally at North Korean disposal for operations against our forces or our bases in Japan. We also cannot exclude the possibility that this evidence, as it must appear to them, of a United States intent to damage their strategic interests under cover of the Korean war, even at the price of greater danger of serious complications, will affect their estimate of the possibility of avoiding major hostilities, of the likely timing of such hostilities, and of the relative advantages of a Soviet initiation of such hostilities as opposed to a waiting policy based on the continued hope of avoiding them altogether.

In the light of the foregoing, I consider it to be highly important that the Department of State be consulted in advance of any repetition of the bombing of Najin or any other place equally close to the Soviet or Manchurian frontiers.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES E. WEBB

795.00/8–1650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

TAEGU, August 16, 1950—9 p. m.
[Received August 16—1:33 p. m.]

129. For Department's information only. On July 28 General Walker suggested it would appear in order for ROK Government to remove from Taegu to safer area in rear. I demurred, pointing out morale and psychological factors involved and requesting transfer of Government be delayed if military situation permitted at least until after August 15. As Department is aware enemy has for past two weeks been within 10 to 15 miles of Taegu at several points and has reportedly continued to build up strength. While General Walker has expressed confidence UN forces will be able to hold Taegu, he has during past two days renewed request that ROK Government remove to safer area saying General MacArthur is concerned as well. He pointed out realistic appraisal of situation dictated such a move and in this I concurred.

I accordingly broached move to Rhee and his War Cabinet this afternoon. All Rhee's Ministers concurred removal of Government desirable but should be accompanied by clear-cut explanation. Rhee professed reluctance leave Taegu, asserting at one point he preferred to resign Presidency and remain Taegu to fight enemy at head volunteers. However, in end he agreed War Cabinet should draw up plan for removal of government—probably to Pusan.

Removal of seat of government from Taegu will of course have deleterious effect on morale of Korean people and will require clear explanation. Explanation will probably be removal based on recommendations UN military commander and on consideration civil administration can better be handled in area more removed from hostilities. Department will be informed if and when removal plans crystallize.

MUCCIO

330/8–1650 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, August 16, 1950—5:45 p. m.
[Received August 16—7:17 p. m.]

293. After dinner last night at his apartment, Rau (India) told USUN officer he hoped both US and USSR could find it possible to say very little about his proposal for a committee, and perhaps to

abstain on the vote setting it up. He realized, he said, that if either the US or the USSR supported the proposal vigorously the other would be forced to vote against it. He did not ask what US reaction to committee was.

Queried on wire service story from Lake Success to effect that committee would not insist on fulfillment of 25 and 27 June resolution as prerequisite of settlement, Rau said story was incorrect. He said the fulfillment of those resolutions was obvious prerequisite to peaceful settlement, adding that five members of proposed committee had already voted in favor of resolution[s] and would therefore of course insist on their fulfillment. This may have been intended as indirect means of telling us not to be worried if reference to earlier resolution was not included in committee resolution; Rau implied that leaving out specific reference to earlier resolutions might make it possible for Soviet Union to abstain on committee resolution instead of vetoing it.

Queried on statement that committee might hear representatives of other governments, Rau said North Koreans would have to be heard at some time but that he had deliberately inserted phrase in his speech "at an appropriate time" so as to make sure that NK's would not be heard until they had complied with earlier resolution. He suggested possibility that withdrawal to 38th parallel, if agreed to by committee as prerequisite and also agreed to by NK's, might be carried out in stages. Queried on whether Chinese Communists might be heard by committee he said he was anxious to avoid details at this stage keeping resolution as general as possible so as to increase chances of its being accepted.

He asked what State Department views were on peace aims. Told that Department was giving matter careful consideration, he commented that he thought it essential to formulate the general terms of peace plan soon, indicating why UN is fighting in Korea. Malik's propaganda speeches, he said, were doubtless doing great damage in Asia, where even knowledge of fact that NK's committed aggression tends to be obscured by fact that Americans are fighting Koreans, and where determination to resist aggression also tends to be overlayed by emotional reaction against bombing of civilians and industry. He thought even presence of Turkish and Thailand troops would do little to offset Asian reaction against "colonial forces" fighting in Korea since Turkey was far away and Thailand was regarded in Asia as artificial creation designed as buffer between French and British territories, and therefore as untypical Asian state. Only way to meet Malik's propaganda. he thought, aside from reiteration of facts, was formulation of peace plan even if drawn in very general terms in order to avoid binding commitment or possible prejudice to future military operations.

The basis of a peace plan, he said, must be unification of Korea and establishment of free independent government through UN supervised election in entire country. Asked whether he thought UN troops should unify country by force if necessary, he replied that NK's were likely to agree to some such proposal when they saw they could not win war. On this point, he thought it important to make peace early and if possible before fighting our way back to north, both in order to localize fighting and to prevent further destruction which would increase number of Communist votes.

He said Malik had not liked the plan when he broached it to him over the weekend, but added "if you can show me the advantages, I may change my mind". Rau said he told Malik committee would of course base any proposal on NK's withdrawing. He said Malik replied quickly, "Would the foreign troops also withdraw". Rau said he was unable to reply to this. Malik said he would consult his government.

Rau said he had not been sure on Monday [1] that he would make his proposal until he was shown advance text of Chauvel (France) speech in which proposal was welcomed, at which point Rau decided he would speak. He said his only prior consultations with other delegates had been in secret meeting last week when he suggested plan. Since making speech he had received favorable personal reactions from Egypt, Ecuador, Yugoslavia and Norway, all of whom had told him they would consult their governments. He guessed chief reason for French enthusiasm was French concern about US troops being tied down in Asia when they might soon be needed on French border.

Rau advanced suggestion that ROK representative in council should write letter to SYG stating he would not sit so long as President was clearly opposed to it. We replied that a gentleman might leave the company where one member did not wish his presence, but that a government representative could hardly do so. Rau said this government representative would undoubtedly do so if the US Government suggested it to him. We replied we could not conceive that the US Government would entertain such a thought. Rau returned to point indirectly several times stating that council delegates were perhaps too much impressed by proper procedure and observance of correct forms, whereas people outside were not impressed, did not understand importance of procedure, and wished council to make progress somehow toward settlement in Korea.

AUSTIN

[1] August 14.

795.00/8–1750

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1950

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1950

BOMBING OF RASHIN

I showed the President a number of excerpts from Mr. Kennan's reports of August 8 and 14 [1] with respect to the present pattern of Soviet intentions, and also the attached letter under date of August 16 to Secretary Johnson, with respect to the Rashin bombing. The President's first reaction was that he thought we would have to take whatever risks were necessary to destroy the points from which supplies were flowing, but when I made the point that departures from agreed instructions should not be made without thorough consultation with the State Department on the political implications, the President agreed.

I later had a brief conversation with Secretary Johnson on this matter and he also agreed that we should have such prior consultation.

JAMES E. WEBB

[1] See *ante*, p. 574 and footnote 1.

795.00/8–1750

Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, August 17, 1950.]

Telegram No. 95 of August 1st to USUN [1] gives the text of a statement which Senator Austin should make in the Security Council in case Malik proposed the withdrawal of the UN forces concurrent with the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th Parallel. At the time this seemed to me a good statement, and it was cleared by a considerable number including Mr. Kennan and Mr. Butler for S/P. On rereading it in the light of the events which have transpired since

[1] Not printed.

and the present appreciation of the situation, it seems to me that we should consider a modification of it.[2]

It is true that the response stated in the telegram is not wholly negative in the sense that it poses three questions to the Soviet Union including acceptance of the General Assembly's resolutions, free access of UNCOK to North Korea, and supervised elections. It seems to me as a result of various conversations around the Department recently that we should be ready to suggest a willingness to withdraw American troops provided a UN force composed of other contingents remained in Korea to assist the Korean Government to re-establish itself in the south and to assist UNCOK in conducting free elections. The withdrawal of American forces would be staged to coincide with their replacement by an adequate number of other forces. It is at least possible that for that kind of a mission Indian and Pakistani troops would be available. Obviously there are many complications, such as the command factor. What I suggest at this point is that the telegram of August 1st should be re-examined with a view to giving it somewhat more of an affirmative note than we gave it when it was written.

Not only with relation to the above situation but in general it seems to me of very pressing importance that the Department should arrive at a decision concerning the formulation of our program for the future of Korea. That matter will be discussed next week by the Senior Staff of the NSC, and it is important for the Department's representative to have guidance. It seems to me it is also important that we should

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[2] The thrust of the proposed statement for Ambassador Austin was contained in the following excerpts from telegram 95:

" . . . Our experience has . . . been broadened by the events of the past few weeks, and I submit that the [Soviet] proposal is a dishonest one. We know now that the North Korean regime is a murderous automaton. The representative of the USSR must know it too. He knows it was lavishly supplied with heavy weapons of destruction. He knows, too, that it has with every appearance of satisfaction launched a concerted, planned attack upon a nation and a people who are certified by a UN Commission to this Council as having offered no provocation save that of their weakness and their lack of preparation. Merely to replace this conscienceless instrument in its original position, ready for another run, is not a solution. It is not a basis on which the people of the Republic of Korea can be deprived of the shelter which they receive through the presence in their territory of UN forces.

"Accordingly, Mr. President, my Govt cannot accept the proposal made by the representative of the USSR. If we are to reach agreement here, something far more radical and stable will be required. The essential point in which 53 Members of the UN have agreed is that progress can be made toward a settlement of this problem only if the North Koreans should cease aggression and immediately evacuate the territory which they have seized in defiance of the UN. The future steps can then be taken to restore and maintain international peace and security in the area.

"As for these future steps, in contradistinction to the govt of the USSR my Govt considers that the future of Korea is not to be underwritten by one great power, but holds, with the SC and with the GA, that it is a matter for determination by the UN in consultation with the Korean people. My Govt considers that an essential element of any plan which may be adopted by the UN to determine Korea's future shld be the elimination of the threat of renewed attack upon Koreans or upon the forces of the Members of the UN which are in the country pursuant to the action of this Council." (795B.5/8–150)

be able as soon as possible to make public our program for the future of Korea. It seems clear that we do not wish to remain in occupation. We do not wish on the other hand to have the Soviets in occupation or practical occupation even of the northern half. We wish to see the country united.

Could the following be taken as the core of our program?

1. A united, independent Korea.
2. This united Korea to remain at least for a time under United Nations auspices.
3. United Nations to supervise elections throughout Korea.
4. A United Nations force to remain within Korea for a brief period of time to assist in the establishment and maintenance of internal peace.
5. The United States will contribute troops to this United Nations force if requested by the Security Council or will gladly withdraw all of its troops and have the United Nations force constituted by troops of other countries.

I assume that a fundamental idea underlying our position is that we would be glad to extricate ourselves militarily from the Korean situation and that Korea does not have the strategic importance of, say Formosa, and therefore is free from the considerations which flow from those strategic considerations.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

795B.00/8–1750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

TAEGU, August 17, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received August 17—1:50 p. m.]

131. For Department's info only. Embtel 129, August 16. Rhee was reconciled this morning to withdrawal seat government from Taegu. At his request I arranged air travel to Pusan where he said he wished to go on urgent business. Late in afternoon he returned Taegu. After picking up Mrs. Rhee and personal entourage he flew to Chinhae where he plans to rest for two or three days. Later he will probably proceed to Pusan.

Korean Cabinet agreed this morning most of civil government should be removed to Pusan and that move should be accomplished during next three days, with announcement of move to be made at noon of 18th.

However General Walker called me late this afternoon to inform me enemy had launched strong drive on Korean sector north of Waeguan at noon today. He said enemy push was of such intensity he felt it advisable for Korean civil authorities, Diplomatic Corps and UN

officials to leave without delay. At my suggestion Walker called in ROK Acting Prime Minister and chief of staff, outlined situation and repeated advice to leave. Later after I had conferred with Prime Minister and Home Minister it was agreed latter would take steps to issue official announcement tonight and ready government employees and National Assemblymen to leave Taegu tomorrow. Arrangements are being made for special trains for this purpose.

Foreign Minister called on Diplomatic Corps tonight and orally informed them of intention ROK Government move most of civil departments to Pusan. At same time he advised them leave Taegu soon as convenient. It is understood Diplomatic Corps and UN officials plan to leave Taegu tomorrow. All members Embassy with possible exception Drumright and myself and possibly one or two others will probably leave tomorrow morning for Pusan where Embassy will be reestablished.

General Walker informed me there good possibility Taegu will still be held, but he does not wish assume responsibility for civilians remaining here. He stated he expects retain 8th Army Headquarters here unless and until military situation becomes precarious.

MUCCIO

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its 488th Meeting on August 17 at 3 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.488. The debate on Korea continued, but no action was taken to break the procedural deadlock which prevented voting on any substantive proposals.

Ambassador Austin made a statement setting forth the three great objectives to which the United Nations was committed in Korea: to end the breach of the peace; to provide a demonstration of United Nations achievement which would deter any future aggression; and to aid the establishment by the Korean people of a free, unified, and independent nation.

330/8–1750 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, August 17, 1950—6:21 p. m.
[Received August 17—7:45 p. m.]

303. Following is account of informal meeting SC members 2 p. m. today, called by Malik through intermediary Rau to continue in-

formal exchange of views on deadlock in SC. Malik opened meeting with expression "heartfelt thanks" to Rau for cooperating in arranging today's exchange of views.

Malik then mentioned that in discussion with Rau way of liquidating situation in SC had been discussed, particularly question of inviting two parties (South and North Koreans) to SC. He proposed deadlock should be liquidated as follows: both should be invited. Position Soviet Union boils down as follows, he said: in effect, Soviet Union, without changing its view as to validity June 25 resolution, was willing to leave aside question validity that resolution and agree to invite South Korean representative and simultaneously decide to invite representative North Korea.

In response Malik request for expression views, Jebb said if he understood correctly Malik's proposal boiled down to invitation to both representatives simultaneously. Jebb asked how this would change existing situation. Or would Malik have in mind first inviting representatives ROK and then discussion question inviting North Korean representative. Malik replied in affirmative to Jebb's statement that he was proposing both representatives be invited simultaneously. Malik went on to say his proposal alters substance of matter without altering position Soviet Union regarding validity June 25 resolution (or discussion further question validity since this question has already been fully discussed). Malik said "complications" indicate representative South Korea should be invited but that simultaneously representative North Korea should be invited. In other words, Malik said the two decisions must be covered in one. After decision had been taken to invite both simultaneously consideration could be given to the form in which this decision would be executed in formal meeting SC, that is, manner in which implemented.

After providing opportunity, which not taken, for further expression of views, Malik went on to say Soviet delegation feels without participation both parties at SC no peaceful solution Korean question can be achieved.

In response to request for clarification by Fawzi as to how Malik would propose putting decision he sought before formal meeting SC, Malik replied as follows:

Representative of Egypt was referring to second stage of matter which would be academic to discuss before decision had been reached on first stage (agreement to seat both simultaneously). Repeating his view no necessity going back over ground of validity of June 25 resolution (referred to by Fawzi) which had been sufficiently discussed, Malik said should not be difficult reach agreement on formal presentation in SC if agreement could first be reached privately on his proposal.

In further effort to clarify matter for Fawzi, Malik went on to say he had already made clear that when he refers to representative of Korean people he means representatives from South and North Korea. Substance of matter is that there are two governmental authorities in Korea which have clashed in armed conflict. In order deal with question of Korea SC must have representatives of both authorities available.

Malik then said that even assuming (as some members of SC say) question is really one of North Korea being on one side and UN on other side, equity and principles of charter require SC to hear North Korea which stands accused before UN. SC cannot ignore equity or indulge in petty vengeance or discriminatory measures.

Tsiang intervened to following effect: If authorities of North Korea had a grievance they could have brought complaint to SC which could have considered complaint as a dispute and SC might then have heard both parties. NK had, however, resorted to war and article 32 did not apply. It was open to NK to turn war back into a dispute by withdrawing to 38th parallel. Article 32 might then apply and SC might then hear NK; otherwise Chinese delegation would adhere to decision June 25.

Malik made no comment on Tsiang's remarks.

Sunde intervened that he could not understand how Malik's proposal today was any different from proposal he had previously made in SC.

Malik said he would make further endeavor to clarify matter as follows: He had made proposal in SC to hear representatives of Korean people. He had further clarified that this meant representatives of North and South Korea. Series of members had objected because of June 25 decision. The Soviet Union representative had objected and stated his views and as result of difference of views SC found itself unable to go on with substance of its work re Korea.

Malik said Soviet Union strongly stands on its position that both parties should be invited. He said again it would be impossible to achieve peaceful settlement Korean question unless both were invited. He said he wished to repeat and emphasize this point, which he did.

It then being past three o'clock, Malik inquired if it were desired to continue private exchange of views at specified later time.

Rau, speaking for first time, said first that in order to avoid any misunderstanding he wished to make clear to his colleagues that he had merely agreed to convey Malik's desire to hold meeting to have informal exchange of views.

Rau then went on to say he had submitted proposal at last Monday's meeting and that he had indicated he would submit resolution if there

were sufficient support for proposal. Many delegates had indicated they would like to see text of resolution. This, he said, would take time to prepare. Meanwhile, purpose of his proposal would be defeated if SC were to continue its discussion of substance of Korean matter. He therefore wished to ask indulgence of his colleagues for adjournment SC until Monday or Tuesday.

Malik suggested, and no objection being raised, it was agreed (*a*) there would be another informal exchange of views Monday afternoon, and (*b*) bearing in mind Rau's request, next official meeting of SC after today would be next Tuesday.[1]

It was also agreed without objection that Malik would state at opening SC meeting as follows: "An informal exchange of views took place between members of the SC on questions which arose during the course of meetings of the SC. It was recognized that it would be appropriate to continue the informal exchange of views on the question touched upon."

AUSTIN

[1] August 22.

795.00/8–1850

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1950.

CABINET MEETING, FRIDAY, AUGUST 18, 1950

KOREA

While General Bradley was briefing the Cabinet with respect to the military situation in Korea, Mr. Harriman stated that he was answering the criticism about the attack by American forces in the Southwestern area by saying that it had a real military objective and was not dictated from Washington. He asked General Bradley if this was true, and General Bradley indicated that it was, that the decision had been left to the commander in the field, as were all other decisions in that area. Secretary Johnson then stated that Ambassador Jessup had telephoned the Pentagon this morning lodging a protest by the British against bombing military targets in North Korea, and left the impression that perhaps some of the targets the British did not wish bombed might even be owned by the British. He stated that these matters had been left to the commander in the field, and that neither he nor the Joint Chiefs expected to change instructions with regard to bombing or interfere with the discretion of the commander in the field. General Bradley then stated that this was generally true, that

they had sent out information obtained from Mr. Pauley [1] and other sources with respect to military targets in North Korea which might be bombed to prevent their utilization in the military effort. General Bradley also stated that he had had a talk with Air Marshal Tedder this morning and believed that the concern of the British was due to a misunderstanding relayed from Tokyo by the British man there, and that he and Tedder both understood that the targets to be bombed were really military targets, such as marshalling yards, warehouses, industrial plants, etc. At this point I intervened to say that the British had lodged a protest last night based on an assumption that our dropping of evacuation warning leaflets over cities in North Korea indicated that we were preparing to engage in mass bombing of those cities, and that this, if carried out, would produce a feeling in Asia and elsewhere that would be harmful to the West. I stated I was sure this protest was not intended to influence the decision to bomb particular military targets.

The President stated that he understood my point, but then turned to General Bradley and said, in effect, that he was to go after any targets which were being used to furnish supplies to the North Korean troops fighting the UN forces.

JAMES E. WEBB

[1] Edwin W. Pauley had been Personal Representative of President Truman on reparations. Concerning his trip to North Korea, May 29–June 3, 1946, see Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 320–322, and *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VIII, p. 706.

795.00/8–1850

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 18, 1950.[1]

Subject: Factors Affecting the Desirability of a UN Military Conquest of all of Korea

Conclusions

Although an invasion of North Korea by UN forces could, if successful, bring several important advantages to the US, it appears at present that grave risks would be involved in such a course of action. The military success of the operation is by no means assured because the US cannot count on the cooperation of all the non-Communist UN members and might also become involved in hostilities with Chinese Communist and Soviet troops. Under such circumstances there would, moreover, be grave risk of general war.

[1] The source text indicated that this was the date on which this document was received in the NSC.

Discussion

A successful invasion of North Korea by UN armed forces could bring several important advantages:

1. The conquest of North Korea by UN forces would represent a major diplomatic defeat for the USSR. It would have a profound effect on the entire non-Communist world and would give renewed hope to anti-Communists in both the European and the Asian Satellite states. The recovery of a Satellite from Soviet domination, regardless of its geographical position or political importance, would be a decisive victory for the Western world.
2. The military victory achieved by the UN forces would greatly increase the prestige of the UN and particularly would bring prestige to the US as the chief participant in the UN forces. The countries of Western Europe and the Near East would place greater reliance in the UN as a practical force for world peace and in the determination and ability of the US to stem Communist aggression.
3. UN military conquest of Korea would not only deny the USSR a strategic outpost from which to threaten Japan, but it would provide the Western Powers with a buffer area and a wedge into Communist-held territory. . . .
4. The elimination of the arbitrary division of Korea at the 38th parallel and the expulsion of the North Korean regime would appear to provide an opportunity to bring about the economic and political unification of the country. Korean unity would be in accord with the wishes of the Korean people, the announced policy of the US, and the recommendations of the UN.

In addition to these advantages, however, an invasion of North Korea would involve certain grave risks for the US:

1. It is doubtful whether the US could secure the support of its allies and of other non-Soviet nations in the UN for such a course of action. Many non-Communist members of the UN would almost certainly be opposed to any action which would involve the risk of strong counteraction by the USSR. The nations participating with the US in Korea do not wish to become deeply involved in Korea or to take action which might bring them nearer to a general war. They would probably take the position that the UN forces are not committed to the liberation of North Korea and that the SC's resolutions do not provide an adequate legal basis for the conquest. Consequently, US action would provide the USSR with a strong wedge for attempting to separate the US from its Western European allies. It would also have serious repercussions among Asian nations, particularly India, which is habitually distrustful of Western motives, and might convince many Asians that the US is, after all, an aggressive nation pursuing a policy of self-interest in Asia.
2. The invading forces might become involved in hostilities with the Chinese Communists. As it became apparent that the North Koreans were being defeated in South Korea, the Chinese might well take up defensive positions north of the 38th parallel. The USSR, which might welcome the outbreak of hostilities between the US and

China, would thus have an additional opportunity of driving the wedge more deeply between the US and its allies. The USSR might use Chinese Communist troops at any stage in the fighting, but their participation would be especially useful at the 38th parallel where UN members could legally discontinue their support of the US policy.

3. Inasmuch as the USSR would regard the invasion of North Korea as a strategic threat to the security of the Soviet Far East, the invading forces might become involved, either directly or indirectly, in hostilities with Soviet forces. The USSR is now in a high state of readiness for general hostilities, and the Kremlin might well calculate that, with US mobilization set in motion, the USSR is better prepared now than it would be later for a full-fledged test of strength with the US. It could therefore place Soviet forces on the 38th parallel and oblige the US to initiate hostilities against Soviet forces under conditions which would alienate most of Asia from the US–UN cause in Korea, permit full exploitation of the propaganda theme that the South Koreans under US guidance opened the aggression against the North Koreans and other peace-loving peoples, and enable the USSR to neutralize and conquer most of Europe and the Near East before the impact of US industrial mobilization could be felt upon the defensive capability of those areas.

Even if the USSR should not choose to utilize a UN attempt to conquer North Korea as a pretext for the inauguration of general hostilities against the west, it is probable that the Kremlin would be prepared by one method or another to prevent UN occupation of North Korea. Along with exploiting fully its veto power in the UN and the opportunity for charging the US with aggressive action, the USSR might well provide sufficient ground, air, or naval assistance to interdict UN communications, halt the ground advance, and neutralize UN air and naval superiority. Concurrent with such action, the USSR might well inaugurate new limited aggressions elsewhere in order to offset the advantages which might be gained by an advance into North Korea and to strain further UN military capabilities. There is no assurance that the USSR is unprepared to assume such risks.

4. The conquest of North Korea would not provide assurance of peace throughout the country or of true unification. The Soviet high command would almost certainly attempt to withdraw into Manchuria or into the USSR a large portion of the North Korean forces. From these areas the USSR might continue to threaten aggression and infiltration and thus produce such instability as to require the continuing presence of large numbers of US or UN forces. Moreover, Syngman Rhee and his regime are unpopular among many—if not a majority—of non-Communist Koreans. To re-establish his regime and extend its authority and its base of popular support to all of Korea would be difficult, if not impossible. Even if this could be done, the regime would be so unstable as to require continuing US or UN military and economic support. If, as one alternative, a new government should be formed consequent to a UN-supervised free election, there is no assurance that the Communists would not win either control of or a powerful voice in such a government. If, as another alternative, a prolonged trusteeship under UN control and with US participation were established, instability would nevertheless continue, with probably even

the non-Communist Koreans reacting against the substitution of outside control for independence. Furthermore, Korea once more would become the catspaw of international politics, and its ultimate status would be dependent upon the comparative strength and ambitions of the countries whose representatives supervised the trust administration.

330/8–1850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, August 18, 1950—11 a. m.
[Received August 18—10 : 19 a. m.]

415. 1. I discussed with Bajpai Secretary General MEA August 17 substance message contained Deptel 248, August 16 [*15*].[1]

2. He listened to various points as outlined by me rather listlessly. When I asked if he would like to have notes made of them he replied in negative. If he had notes he would feel compelled to discuss them with Prime Minister and he did not believe matter was worth pursuing to that extent. He had in fact already telegraphed Rau asking him not to present this suggestion to UN in form of resolution. From outset GOI had not been enthusiastic of committee composed of non-permanent members of SC. It doubted that such committee would have any influence or great capacity. August 16 Roberts UK acting High Commissioner had informed him his government had misgivings re Rau's suggestions. GOI had no detailed knowledge of what Rau had in mind until it obtained from Roberts transcript of Rau's speech. For instance, he had learned only from Roberts that Rau had suggested proposed committee should "hear any person they please".

3. Bajpai added he was wondering whether, if committee were to be appointed, it should be limited to members SC. States which were not members SC might be able furnish statesmen more qualified to work out principles of peace than statesmen representing non-permanent members SC. What contribution, for instance, could be expected of Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt and Yugoslavia.

4. I asked Bajpai what states in his opinion might be able provide capable statesmen. After some hesitation he said that as examples Canada might furnish Pearson and Netherlands Van Royen [Roijen]. When I asked if he thought Malik would agree to committee composed of such countries as Netherlands and Canada he admitted some doubt. Perhaps some statesmen could be found also from among countries behind iron curtain. I said such "statesmen" could be nothing more or less than spokesmen for Russia so that committee would in fact

[1] See footnote 1 to telegram 147 to New York, August 15, 7 p. m., p. 587.

have in it representative of one of great powers. Bajpai acknowledged there would be problems connected with setting up of any kind committee but said efforts should not be halted merely because of difficulties.

5. Bajpai said for some time he had been wishing to make suggestion which he hoped would not be interpreted as lack of confidence in judgment of Rau. He had impression that America, British and other western colleagues of Rau in UN, in desire not to hurt Rau's feelings or to appear obstructive, were not sufficiently frank with him. There seemed to Bajpai to be tendency when Rau made tentative suggestions for his western colleagues, instead of telling him frankly why in their opinion they were impracticable, to act as though they deserved consideration. Too often his colleagues treated his suggestions sympathetically and as worth submitting to their governments. Rau was simple, straightforward man inclined to believe that sympathetic attitude towards his suggestions indicated belief they were sound. He was, therefore, sometimes misled into pushing forward projects which should have been discouraged at their very initiation. It was difficult for GOI to order Rau not to go ahead with some of his ideas when in submitting them to Delhi he indicated they had been greeted with at least tentative sympathy by his western colleagues.

6. I told Bajpai I would pass his suggestions along. I was sure they would not be misunderstood. I wanted again to assure him of the high respect and esteem in which Rau was held by US delegation at Lake Success.

HENDERSON

795.00/8–1850 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TAEGU, August 18, 1950—9 p. m.
[Received August 18—12 : 30 p. m.]

1. Rhee returned from Chinhae to Taegu this morning just before noon. Ambassador Muccio conferred with him at his request. Apart from showing displeasure at manner in which removal of civil officials was being conducted Rhee appears to have come here solely to show he had not run out on Taegu populace. He accepted Ambassador's invitation to accompany latter on NA plane to Chinhae and Pusan which left here about 2 p. m. Stewart, Prendergast, Berry, Wilson, Harris, Lorence, Naval Attaché Sifert and Marine guard Edwards left today either by rail or highway for Pusan where Embassy's main office being established. FSR Noble went by road to Chinhae where he will maintain contact with President and Mrs. Rhee pending their going to Pusan.

Contrary to 8th Army expectations and desires, provincial governor this morning distributed handbill ordering Taegu civilians to evacuate to selected areas to southeast. Following strenuous protest by army some steps were taken to rectify this mistake which by noon resulted in mass exodus and closing of great majority shops. By evening, however, as result radio and other public exhortations by Prime Minister and Home Ministers and better turn in military situation many evacuees were returning to homes in city.

Many ROK civil employees left today by highway for Pusan. About 500 others including Assembly, are expected to leave by train tomorrow. UN liaison group less military observers left this morning for Pusan as did members Chinese Embassy and British Legation. Following Embassy staff remains here: Military Attaché Edwards, Fatigati, Scherbacher, Jacoby, Floyd, Marine guard Goff.

DRUMRIGHT

330/8–1850: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, August 18, 1950—1: 58 p. m.
[Received August 18—2: 44 p. m.]

309. Department may find useful up-to-minute (noon, 18 August) roundup on developments past 48 hours re Rau proposal for SC subcommittee on Korean question.

1. On evening 16 August, Gross outlined to Rau points made Deptel 147, August 15. After expressing view that we would give sympathetic consideration to any proposal likely to lead to compliance with outstanding SC resolutions, Gross said we were anxious to receive more specifics from Rau concerning objective and terms of reference of subcommittee. Rau replied he had not yet prepared a resolution; he would be glad to show it to us when he had drafted one.

Rau denied any assumption his part that Korean problem was a US–USSR matter. He said that his reference in his SC speech to UNCOK report simply designed to bring out fact that it was inability of US and USSR to reach agreement regarding Korea which lead to necessity for GA action and that all he intended to say was that the genesis of problem lay in US USSR inability to agree upon a solution. Gross pointed out that even in pre-GA phase US approach was not "unilateral" but reflected policies of Charter whereas USSR approach was designed to obstruct unification and free choice of democratic government.

Rau agreed subcommittee should not have any mediatory functions nor did he contemplate SC would surrender any of its responsibilities to subcommittee but that, on contrary, latter would aid SC in carrying out its responsibilities.

With regard to point that there was no need for subcommittee consideration of US resolution, which we felt should be put to vote in SC as soon as Parliamentary situation permitted Rau with some vehemence disagreed, saying that a great advantage of his subcommittee idea was that it could take up US resolution as well as others before the Council.

At this point Rau said that while he appreciated our "openmindedness" in not rejecting his proposal out of hand, he was equally convinced that it would be a good thing if we did not publicly support his resolution. He thought our support would inevitably bring a Soviet veto. Gross had impression Rau was pleased with our lukewarm reception of his idea, and that our reaction to some degree seemed to him to clothe his proposal with even greater virtue.

Rau insisted that this proposal could not contain explicit reference to earlier SC resolutions since this would also compel a Soviet veto, but on other hand Rau said he felt there should be no doubt in our minds that it was not his intention that subcommittee take any action which was not in furtherance of those resolutions. Rau indicated his clear intention to proceed with his proposal.

2. At SC meeting 17 August, Yugoslav delegate made public statement supporting Rau suggestion "in principle".

3. During Council meeting Jebb showed us telegram from New Delhi reporting that Bajpai had sent Rau a message that Nehru considered this was not most opportune time in which to submit Rau proposal but that GOI did not wish to instruct Rau to refrain from doing so because of lack of knowledge in New Delhi concerning line-up of other delegates at Lake Success.

4. USUN has just learned of subsequent developments as follows:

5. Following SC meeting Jebb talked with Rau and ascertained Rau had received message from Bajpai referred to in paragraph (3) above. Rau nevertheless advised Jebb he intended to proceed to discuss his proposal with other members SC with view to possibly tabling a resolution at SC meeting Tuesday August 22.

6. Chauvel learned from Rau that resolution has been drafted and is in simplest possible form. Substance resolution, which has not yet been made available to USUN, merely provides for establishment of committee composed of six non-permanent members, requests committee to discuss all proposals put forward on Korean question, and instructs committee to report to SC.

Rau explained to Chauvel he wished to omit reference to prior SC resolutions in order to avoid a Soviet veto. Rau said he understood Washington and London had a "reserved point of view" and would probably abstain in a vote. Rau thought Malik might abstain if the resolution were vague enough and avoided reference to earlier SC resolutions.

7. Chauvel believes Tsiang is strongly in opposition and may vote against, thereby raising veto question. In talks with us up to this moment Tsiang has indicated he has not yet received final instructions from his government.

8. Rau has called a meeting of non-permanent members today. USUN will report results thereof as soon as possible. We are following matter very closely and will have further talks with Chauvel and Jebb during course of day.

AUSTIN

330/8–1850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, August 18, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received August 18—3:48 p. m.]

419. 1. Bajpai SYG MEA asked to see me urgently this afternoon. He referred to conversation reported in Embtel 415, August 18 and said that GOI had received telegram this morning from Rau asking that he be permitted to explore his plan further; that reception was not entirely negative; that US and UK were merely abstaining; and that certain elements American press including "influential columnist Lippmann" were supporting him. Bajpai after discussing matter with Nehru had sent instructions to Rau along following lines:

(*a*) No plan for restoration of peace could make progress with [*without?*] active support great powers. Negative attitude indicated his plan could not succeed.

(*b*) It was suggested he discuss with great powers alternative plan for setting up "advisory committee" of nations including not only members SC but also those of UN and possibly some outside UN. One difficulty of committee chosen for SC was that India only Asian power. Wider choice would give opportunity to include such countries as Burma, Indonesia, Turkey, etc.

(*c*) If attitude great powers should not be receptive plan should not be pushed since their cooperation necessary.

(*d*) Advisory committee could have two-fold task: that of preparing an immediate plan for bringing about cessation of fighting and that of working out plan for future of Korea including ascertainment of desires of Korean people.

2. I said that I assumed that GOI desired Indonesia to be member advisory committee. He replied that in his opinion Indonesia might be extremely useful in work this kind.

3. Bajpai asked me what in my opinion was real attitude US re Rau's original proposals. I stated I had no information other than that which I had given him during our conversation on August 17. I assumed that US had taken attitude of abstention partially because it did not wish to assume position which might indicate lack of confidence in non-permanent members of SC.

4. He asked me what in my opinion US attitude might be towards alternative scheme which he had just outlined. I replied there were too many factors involved for me to hazard an opinion at this distance from Washington. I was inclined believe, however, that my government would not be enthusiastic about any scheme which might permit conversations to take place between representatives of SC and North Koreans while latter were continuing to ignore resolution of SC or which would give North Koreans status of government while they continued to commit aggression in defiance of SC.

5. Bajpai said that matters this character were details which would necessarily be decided in Lake Success. In Delhi GOI must limit itself to suggesting framework possible peace plans. He hoped particularly that in conversation with Rau US representatives would say nothing which would give him impression that his government did not have full confidence in him or was going over his head direct to US Government.

HENDERSON

330/8–1850 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, August 18, 1950—3 : 36 p. m.
[Received August 18—3 : 48 p. m.]

310. Supplementing our 309, August 18, re developments Rau proposal, USUN has now learned Rau circulated to non-permanent members at meeting this morning copy of draft resolution. No commitments were sought other delegations present or given.

Shortly after conclusion of meeting Rau advised other conferees by telephone that he had received new instructions from India which would require him reconsider resolutions. Rau did not reveal nature of instructions and it was not clear whether he would redraft his resolution or hold up action on it or any similar one.

Norwegian delegation requested our views which were outlined to them by Gross basis Deptel 147, August 15.

AUSTIN

330/8–1850 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, August 18, 1950—8 : 14 p. m.
[Received August 18—9 : 40 p. m.]

325. At Rau's request he called on me this afternoon to discuss his proposal concerning Korean subcommittee. Rau said he had been giving further thought to his proposal and wished to ascertain whether we "had mental reservations" about his proposal since he felt that our attitude should be largely decisive in determination on his part whether to proceed further with his proposal. He commented that since USG was playing major role in Korea and bearing heaviest burden, he had grave doubts whether he should proceed if we felt that a subcommittee of sort he had suggested would hinder rather than help our effort in Korea. I replied that I could not characterize our attitude in terms of "mental reservations" but that I would repeat to him views expressed by Department of which I had told him two days ago as reported in USUN's 309, August 18. I then outlined Deptel 147, August 15, stressing opening paragraph and summarizing our main points of concern. I attempted to make clear that we were concerned lest his proposal might, because of inadequate terms of reference, be construed as derogating from force of earlier SC resolutions and that we thought it of decisive importance that any procedure should clearly be designed to bring about earliest possible compliance with those resolutions. I also stressed importance we attached to avoiding an unprofitable and diversionary debate in SC concerning subcommittee, which debate would open up opportunity for dilatory tactics and deflect from important matter of obtaining compliance with SC resolutions. Finally I stressed importance attached by Department to adhering to fact that there was no reason in logic or in sound policy why US pending resolution required subcommittee consideration but that, on contrary, it should be put to a vote as soon as Parliamentary situation in SC permitted.

I said I was sure it would assist Department in considering whole matter if I could transmit text of draft resolution which Rau earlier said "had been hammered out" in his meeting with other nonpermanent members this morning. However, Rau was clearly un-

willing to give me copy and I did not wish to embarrass him by pressing him for it. Department will recall substance of draft as transmitted earlier today in USUN 309.

With respect to Rau's comments concerning special interest of US in matter, I emphatically denied that we had any greater or smaller interest than any other member of UN in obtaining compliance with SC resolutions. I said that while we appreciated Rau's motive and friendship in requesting our views, we would not wish to assume to ourselves any special role or responsibility in leading him to a decision concerning his future actions. I said that I was sure Department would be interested in reaction of Soviet Union to his proposal and that I hoped Malik would be as forthcoming in expressing his views concerning proposal as we were. In addition, I expressed certainty that Department would also be affected by views of our other colleagues on SC and added that in informal discussions we had derived impression that a substantial number of SC members felt same concerns about his proposal which I expressed to Rau.

Rau then said that shortly after a meeting which he held with other non-permanent members of council earlier today, he had received new instructions from his government. He said that in view of heavy responsibility which would fall upon non-permanent members, particularly India if his subcommittee proposal were adopted, his government felt that it was of great importance to have affirmative support of permanent members of council rather than their mere acquiescence or abstention. He said it was for this reason that he had asked whether we had mental reservations.

I reminded Rau that this introduced a wholly new factor since up to this point he had advised us of his feeling that it would be best for us to abstain on theory that announced support of his proposal by US would compel a Soviet veto. I also reminded him that he had up to this point left us with impression that while our viewpoint was not irrelevant, he would prefer to proceed on basis of his own independent judgment. I attempted to convey foregoing comments in as tactful manner as possible and he readily admitted that a "wholly new factor" had been introduced by his present instructions from his government. I said that I would advise Department of introduction of this new factor.

Rau then adverted to discussion we had held on 11 August, reported in USUN's 265. He referred to mention I had made of possibility of a UN advisory council. Saying that he had understood that I had mentioned this in a tentative manner and that as he recalled I was referring to a council which might be established after cessation of hostilities, he said he wished to explore our views concerning possibility of SC establishing an advisory committee at present time. He envisaged a committee which would include at least two Asiatic powers mention-

ing India and Burma as illustrations. He had no views about other members of committee except that its composition would not be limited to SC members. Although he was somewhat vague about terms of reference, he pictures it as an advisory group which "would have no formal functions" and which would make no recommendation to SC. Apparently it would be a group which would be available for consultation to any members of SC desiring to consult with it and its primary purpose would be to assist in formulation of what Rau described as "war aims". I pressed Rau for an elaboration of his idea, which was clearly amorphous. He mentioned thought that such a committee or group might formulate post-hostilities aims, including a formula for establishment of a UN advisory council, but would not formalize them in any way and would not report to anybody.

I said I would transmit this suggestion to Department but felt I should point out immediately reaction that it would seem preferable to leave to GA task of forming a subcommittee or advisory group. Rau said he had not considered question of GA action on matter but thought that an advisory committee of sort he was now suggesting might in some way be of assistance to SC.

Comment: My impression during whole of our conversation was that Rau had been instructed to go slow pushing his proposal and that he was endeavoring to find an exit through which he could walk gracefully. I do not believe he himself attaches much importance to his advisory committee idea. Inasmuch as our tactics up to this point in not committing a frontal assault upon his subcommittee proposal have preserved his good will and at same time have not led to establishment of a subcommittee, I think that pursuit of same tactics with respect to his new proposal would also be a wise course.

It is not likely that he will obtain much if any support for this new proposal from other members of council, and I doubt that upon further reflection he will adhere to it himself. However, I promised that I would communicate with him Monday[1] morning and give him definitive Department reactions both to his request for our point of view concerning his subcomittee proposal and also concerning his newer advisory committee proposal. It will therefore be important to have instructions Monday mid-morning.

In light of foregoing and in view of fact that Department is now crystallizing its views re Korea in GA and contemplates initiating consultations with British and French on this subject next week, we feel it would be advisable and would help maintain good relations with Rau by among other things helping him get off hook, if we could be authorized to discuss in preliminary form our thinking re Korea in GA.

GROSS

[1] August 21.

330/8–1950 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

NEW YORK, August 19, 1950—6:49 p. m.
[Received August 19—7:05 p. m.]

334. Remytel 325, August 18. Following is text of letter from Rau to me and text of draft resolution enclosed, upon which we hope to have Department's comments by mid-morning Monday, August 21:

"I enclose herewith the draft of the resolution relating to my recent proposal as settled at a discussion between the non-permanent members of the SC. I shall be glad if you will kindly favour me with the views of your delegate as to whether you will support the resolution or oppose it or abstain from voting if it is presented to the Council. I hope you will be able to let me have the information by Monday, the 21st August 1950".

Draft resolution:

"The SC hereby appoints a committee consisting of its non-permanent members, namely, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Norway, and Yugoslavia—

"(*a*) To study

"(1) All proposals that have been or may be presented for the restoration of peace in Korea in accordance with principles of the UN,

"(2) All proposals for the future of Korea after the restoration of peace;

"(*b*) To submit its recommendations to the Council before———.

"The committee shall determine its own procedure and may at the appropriate stage invite any person, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give it other assistance in examining matters within its competence".

AUSTIN

795.00/8–2150

Memorandum by the Counselor (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1950.

With reference to your memorandum of August 17 about the Rashin bombing, I note that the President feels that we must take "whatever risks were necessary to destroy the points from which supplies were flowing."

Should you have any further discussions with the President of this matter, it might be useful for you to know that Park Armstrong and I have been unable to get from our military intelligence authorities any confirmation that supplies are flowing to the Korean battlefield in any significant quantities from that area. We have not even been able to learn from them what are the main arteries of supplies for the North Korean forces; and they have not indicated that they have any particular interest, from the standpoint of their own responsibilities, as distinct from requests we may make of them, in the state of transportation facilities along the North Korean border or the use being made of those facilities.

GEORGE F. KENNAN

795.00/8–2150

The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 21, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have Mr. Webb's letter of August 16 on the bombing of Najin. The bombing of Najin was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with their military responsibilities for the conduct of war operations. Najin is one of a number of highly important military targets in North Korea, all of which must be rendered incapable, as far as our forces are able, of providing logistic support to North Korean forces, if the success of our Korean operations is not to be seriously jeopardized. Your earlier objection to the attack which had already been made upon Najin was discussed with the President and the attack met with his approval.

Najin, being seventeen miles south of the North Korean frontier, is, of course, well clear of that frontier and its bombing is, accordingly, within the terms of the Presidential directive mentioned by you with respect to keeping bombing operations north of the 38th parallel "well clear" of the frontier. Also, the bombing of Najin is definitely within the terms of that same directive which authorized the extension of air operations "into Northern Korea against air bases, depots, tank farms, troop columns and other such purely military targets, if and when, in your judgment, this becomes essential for the performance of your missions . . . . . or to avoid unnecessary casualties to our forces." In connection with the foregoing, I must make plain, further, that the "well clear" restriction is, in my opinion, intended only to guard against the possibility of frontier violation and not to provide for political determination as to which military objectives within the area of North Korea may or may not be bombed.

The primary target at Najin is a petroleum storage plant. This petroleum storage plant is obviously a military asset to the opera-

tions of North Korean forces and, therefore, important to our own forces as a military target which must, in the interests of successful conduct of our own operations, be attacked until destroyed.

I cannot agree with the implication that the opinions of columnists, to the effect that our actual Najin objectives are the reduction of Soviet strategic capabilities or their submarine capabilities in the area, can properly be regarded as factual. Further, I cannot agree that the possibility of Soviet conclusion that our purpose is to reduce their strategic capabilities should logically have special weight in the matter. Otherwise, it would follow that our entire Korean campaign is, or may be, so regarded by the Soviets, thus placing in question practically all military features of our Korean operations.

While I share your concern as to the over-all implications of possible eventual Korean developments and, in fact, as to the entire international situation, I am convinced that there must be no weakening exception to our military effort within Korean territory if we are to permit responsible military authorities to perform their required missions and if we are to avoid unnecessary casualties to our own forces, particularly in the light of the precarious situation now existing in Korea.

I firmly believe in the importance of political considerations in politico-military decisions. However, I also believe that the conduct of military operations, once we are committed to such operations, are not subject to question in detail as long as they are conducted within the terms of the over-all decision and as long as our military commanders are held responsible for their successful conclusion.

In short, once war operations are undertaken, it seems to me that they must be conducted to win. To any extent that external appearances are permitted to conflict with or hamper military judgment in actual combat decision, the effectiveness of our forces will be jeopardized and the question of responsibility may well be raised.

I repeat that we interpret the spirit of the expression "well clear" to be that our planes must not violate Soviet or Manchurian frontiers. We are carefully complying with this spirit not only in our planning, but also in our instructions to General MacArthur.[1]

Sincerely yours,

LOUIS JOHNSON

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[1] According to a memorandum dated August 28 by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (McWilliams), Under Secretary Webb suggested to Mr. Acheson that no action be taken in regard to this letter, since no good would be served by continuing the correspondence. Mr. Acheson's staff as a whole felt that the letter showed a lack of understanding of the important issues involved and a lack of willingness to integrate military and political policies. It was agreed that the Department of State should take no action which could be interpreted as interference in the conduct of military operations. (795.00/8–2850)

795.00/8–2150

Memorandum by the Counselor (Kennan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1950.

I approve generally of the considerations set forth in Mr. Jessup's memorandum of August 17 about our position with respect to an eventual proposal for withdrawal of United Nations forces concurrent with the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th Parallel.

I am not sure that we will have to insist on United Nations supervision of elections "throughout Korea". I think it may be necessary to return to the divided status, leaving South Korea as a sort of U.N. trusteeship, protected by forces of other U.N. nations, under U.N. control.

GEORGE F. KENNAN

795.00/8–2150

Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1950.[1]

PROPOSED TERMS FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT PRIOR TO THE ASSUMPTION OF THE OFFENSIVE BY UN FORCES

The following terms are devised to meet only one particular contingency: an indication from the Soviet side, before the tide of battle has turned, that Moscow and/or Peiping are prepared to negotiate a settlement involving the withdrawal of the North Koreans to the 38 parallel.

1. The invading forces would obey a Security Council order for a cease-fire.

2. An UNCOK, revised to meet its new responsibilities, should forthwith dispatch by air teams to key positions along the 38 parallel to observe the North Korean withdrawal to positions determined by

[1] A covering note, dated August 22, from Philip Watts of the Policy Planning Staff to Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson, indicated that this document was the second draft of a memorandum which had been discussed at a meeting on August 21 involving Messrs. Rusk, Hickerson, Bonbright, and, presumably, Nitze and Davies of the Policy Planning Staff.

UNCOK, to inhibit removal of South Korean persons and property and to report twice daily to UNCOK on the withdrawal.

3. UN Forces, other than ROK, should remain south of the 36 parallel.

4. ROK forces should follow the North Korean withdrawal up to but not beyond 38 parallel. The ROK Government would, of course, return to the capital and resume governing authority over the ROK.

5. When ROK forces take up positions on the 38 parallel, UNCOK teams should proceed into North Korea to prepare the groundwork for forthcoming UN action, set forth below.

6. The North Korean forces should be demobilized and their arms placed under the custody of UNCOK pending the completion of the elections discussed in the following paragraph, at which time UNCOK would turn over the weapons to the new national government. Meanwhile the North Korean civil authorities should be held responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

7. UNCOK should supervise an election in North Korea which would provide for representation from that half of the country in the Government of the Republic. As requested by UNCOK, ROK constabulary units should enter North Korea to assist in conducting the elections and to assume, under the control of UNCOK, responsibility for the maintenance of order.

8. Meanwhile, having no disposition to retain armed forces on Korean soil, the United States would welcome the replacement of its troops south of the 36 parallel by units of other UN member nations which have supported the United Nations resolutions on Korea, particularly Asian members.

9. With the establishment of an all-Korean Government UN forces should promptly be withdrawn, unless the Korean Government requests and the UN agrees that they should be retained.[2]

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[2] On August 22, Mr. Emmerson sent the following memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State Rusk with regard to this draft memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff:

"John Davies suggests—and I agree—that this be telegraphed to Loy Henderson with the suggestion that it be conveyed in confidence to Bajpai. Having this reach Peiping's ears would irritate the Russians, promote the cleavage, and might possibly intrigue the Chinese Communists. What do you think?" (795.00/8–2250)

For Mr. Rusk's reply, see his memorandum dated September 8, p. 708.

795.00/8–2150

Draft Memorandum by Messrs. John M. Allison and John K. Emmerson of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1950.[1]

U.S. COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine what policies the United States should pursue in order to contribute to the restoration of international peace and security in the Korean area once the aggression has been brought to an end, either by the defeat of the Korean Communists or as the result of an early voluntary withdrawal of the aggressor forces to territory north of the 38th parallel.

ANALYSIS

Military Factors

2. The present military objective of the U.N. Command is to "repel the armed attack" of the Korean Communists and restore international peace and security in the area. The Security Council Resolutions in pursuance of which action is being taken, call for the withdrawal of the aggressor forces beyond the 38th parallel but do not specifically limit military ground operations of the U.N. Command to the area south of the 38th parallel.

3. The strategic importance of Korea to the Soviet Union is of such a high degree that the USSR would probably take *extreme* measures—excepting possibly those it deemed likely to bring on general war—to prevent the establishment of a regime in North Korea which it did not believe it could ultimately dominate or control.

4. Such Soviet measures might take the form of committing Soviet or Chinese Communist troops to action in Korea or at least occupying Korea north of the 38th parallel by such troops.

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[1] This memorandum was forwarded on August 22 to Ambassador Jessup with a covering note from Mr. Emmerson indicating that it represented a revised version of the earlier draft paper by Mr. Allison dated August 12 (p. 567), revisions having been made on the basis of comments received from recipients of the earlier draft.

The memorandum was then forwarded without change on August 23 to the NSC for NSC Staff Consideration Only as a Department of State Draft Paper on "U.S. Courses of Action in Korea".

5. However, it is believed that when the tide of battle begins to turn, the Soviet Union will not wait for U.N. Forces to reach the 38th Parallel before taking action. Such action may be expected when U.N. forces begin to have military successes and may consist of entry of Soviet forces, entry of Chinese Communist forces, a new effort at U.N. settlement, or a combination of these.

6. The strategic importance of the Korean peninsula to the U.S. is not such as to make desirable the commitment of large U.S. forces there. In fact in case of a global conflict, it would be a serious disadvantage to have U.S. forces so committed. However, a Kremlin-dominated Korean peninsula would be a threat to U.S. security interests in Japan.

Political Factors

7. After 45 years of either colonialism or division, the people of Korea have an irrepressible urge for the unification of their country and its recognition as an equal and respected member of the family of nations.

8. The division of Korea at the 38th parallel is an entirely artificial barrier violating the natural integrity of the nation. This division was never meant to be permanent and for five years the U.S. has endeavored to eliminate it by all possible peaceful measures, first through bilateral negotiation with the Soviets and later through initiating action through the United Nations machinery.

9. Since November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations has by overwhelming majorities passed three Resolutions looking toward achieving the objective of a free, independent and unified Korea. A U.N. Commission on Korea was established and has been and still is charged with seeking Korea's unification by pacific settlement. In its Resolution of October 21, 1949, the General Assembly reaffirmed its aims in Korea and called upon all member states "to refrain from any acts derogatory to the purposes of the present resolution." While the General Assembly for three years has sought to unify Korea by peaceful means, it has never formally considered nor explicitly approved the unification of Korea through military means. Neither has the United States taken the specific decision to include the use of military force among the means by which it would seek to bring about the establishment of a unified and independent Korea.

10. The Government of the Republic of Korea has been established in accordance with the Resolutions of the General Assembly, has been declared by the U.N. to be the only lawful government in Korea and has been recognized by 32 nations.

11. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities the Government of the Republic of Korea demonstrated, despite many weaknesses, a growing capacity to govern. In its report of June 26, 1950, UNCOK pointed

out that "there have been distinct signs of improvement in recent months in both economic and political stability of the country." Recent elections for the National Assembly gave significant gains to moderate and non-Government elements thus confusing those critics who had raised the cry of "police state."

12. The leaders of the Republic of Korea have stressed that the aggression from the North provides the opportunity to abolish the 38th parallel and unify all of Korea under United Nations auspices. President Rhee has insisted on the special position of his government and has formally notified the President of the U.S. that the Republic of Korea will not recognize the validity of any decision reached about the future of Korea in the making of which the Republic of Korea has not participated.

13. There is a growing sentiment in the United States favoring a "final" settlement of the Korean problem as opposed to any settlement which smacks of compromise or a "deal", although this sentiment has not taken the explicit form of using United States forces to bring about Korean unification after the North Koreans have been driven back.

14. On the other hand there are significant groups who believe further efforts should be made to find a peaceful solution. Should a peace offer be made or the aggressor retire or be forced back to the 38th parallel there would doubtless be strong efforts made by large sections of the public and the Congress to stop the fighting and return to a peace basis.

15. There is evidence that the UNCOK which is operating in the field will make recommendations of a far-reaching character designed to bring about the unification of Korea under U.N. auspices. (See USUN's 266, Aug. 11. Copy attached.[2]) The U.S. will have to take a stand on these recommendations.

16. Soviet domination of North Korea has brought with it the pattern of police and propaganda control well known throughout the Soviet world. Since the existence and stability of a unified Korea must in the long run depend largely upon the Korean people themselves, the tasks of the United Nations will include the reorientation of the North Korean people toward the outlook of free peoples who accept the standards of international behavior set forth in the United Nations Charter.

17. A quick and crushing North Korean victory over South Korea would have gained for the USSR its long-standing goal of the complete absorption of Korea into its orbit. Furthermore, the building of a "cordon sovietaire" from the Soviet borders of Sinkiang to the southern shores of Korea would have neared completion. Only Japan

[2] *Ante*, p. 564.

and the Philippines at the edge of the orbit, and Southeast Asia to the South, would have still remained outside. The aggression in South Korea, if defeated in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions, may result in the opposite effect—the failure to complete the cordon.

18. In this light, the situation in Korea now provides the United States and the free world with the first opportunity to regain territory from the Soviet bloc. Since a basic policy of the United States is to check and reduce the preponderant power of the USSR in Asia and elsewhere, UN operations in Korea can set the stage for the non-Communist penetration into an area under Soviet control.

19. Penetration of the Soviet orbit, short of all-out war, would disturb the political, economic and military structure which the USSR is organizing between its own Far Eastern territories and the contiguous areas. The bonds of Manchuria, the pivot of this complex outside the USSR, would be weakened, for a free and strong Korea could provide an outlet for Manchuria's resources and could also provide non-Communist contact with the people there and in North China.

20. The significance in Asia of the unification of Korea under UN auspices would be incalculable. The Japanese would see demonstrated a check on Soviet expansion. Elements in the Chinese Communist regime, and particularly important segments of the Chinese population, might be inclined to question their exclusive dependence on the Kremlin. Skillful manipulation might drive a wedge between the Chinese Communists and the Kremlin. Throughout Asia, those who foresee only inevitable Soviet conquest would take hope.

21. The above reasons, in addition to the strategic importance of Korea to the USSR, make it even more probable that the Soviet Union will exert vigorous efforts to block any settlement resulting in a Korean Government which it cannot control. However, notwithstanding its considerable military strength located in the Far East, the Soviet Union may not yet be ready to risk general war in order to prevent a determined and rapid effort by the U.N. to create a unified Korea. This possibility might be increased if the U.N. should adopt by a large majority a program recommended by UNCOK or by some other United Nations body and if it could be demonstrated to the Soviet Union that the proposed settlement was truly a U.N. and not a U.S. settlement and that it would not be directed against legitimate Soviet interests.

U.S. Interests and Obligations

22. The U.S. has pledged its support of a unified and independent Korea. Our intentions have been measured in our diplomatic support, military aid, and economic assistance. Our obligation to the United Nations to carry forward Security Council decisions to block a breach

of the peace is fixed. We have a moral obligation as well to support previous General Assembly recommendations on Korea.

23. The broad objectives of the United States were stated in NSC 8/2, approved by the President on 23 March 1949, as follows:

"*a.* To establish a united, self-governing, and sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the UN.

"*b.* To ensure that the government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.

"*c.* To assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and educational system as essential bases of an independent and democratic state. A more immediate objective is the withdrawal of remaining U.S. occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable consistent with the foregoing objectives."

24. The political value for the United States and to the United Nations of showing to the world the determination that aggression shall be repelled, and that the expressed will of the United Nations shall be respected, justifies our current military effort in Korea.

CONCLUSIONS

25. The following principles form the basis for consideration of U.S. actions:

a. Although the United States national interests are involved in the Korean situation, the problem of Korea is primarily a United Nations problem and its final solution must be one which is carried out under the authority of the United Nations and is consistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter.

b. The permanent unification of Korea can only be fairly and correctly resolved with the participation of representatives of the Korean people chosen as the result of free elections throughout Korea on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot held under the authority and observation of the U.N.

c. The Government of the Republic of Korea should continue to be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem.

d. The independence and unification of Korea conform with Korean aspirations, United States objectives, and the expressed objectives of the United Nations.

e. The tremendous problems of an economic, social and political nature attendant upon the establishment of a unified Korea are of such a magnitude as to require the assistance of the United Nations. Korea is an Asiatic State and the United States should therefore urge that the Asiatic members of the United Nations should play a prominent role in the assistance that the United Nations can give, and that their views regarding a solution of the problem should be given sympathetic consideration.

f. The establishment of a free and united Korea and the elimination of the North Korean Communist regime, following unprovoked military aggression, would be a step in reversing the dangerous strategic trend in the Far East of the past twelve months.

26. In order to effect the reorientation of the North Korean people, to cause defection of enemy troops in the field, and to train North Korean personnel to participate in activities looking to unification of the country, the following steps should be taken:

a. Establish the principle that the treatment of POW's, after their transfer to places of internment, shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and use for psychological warfare purposes, and for the tasks specified above.

b. Set up immediately on a pilot-plant scale an interrogation, indoctrination and training center for those POW's now in our hands in Korea. Personnel in charge of this project must be selected with the greatest care, taking into consideration Korean or Far Eastern experience, language qualifications, and temperamental aptitude. Full advantage should be taken of World War II experience in the indoctrination of German and Japanese prisoners of war and of recent experience with Soviet escapees.

27. The following limiting factors on action which should be recommended by the United States must be kept in mind:

a. The fact that up until the present the Security Council has not expressly authorized the use of force to effect the unification of Korea once the aggression has been repulsed.

b. The probability that any attempt either by force or through U.N. action to establish a unified and independent Korea would cause the Soviet Union to commit either its own forces or those of Communist China or both with the consequent danger of global war.

c. The fact that the military strength of the United States now is inadequate to assure the attainment of the objectives fixed by our national interests.

d. Possible reluctance of other members of the United Nations to agree to action necessary to effect the unification of Korea if it appears it would lead to the outbreak of a general conflict with the USSR or the breaking up of the United Nations.

28. In consonance with the above principles and having in mind the above limiting factors, the United States should take the following steps once the aggression has been brought to an end:

a. Take vigorous action through diplomatic channels and in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly to assure and solidify United Nation support of necessary action in Korea.

b. Be prepared to announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter and the general aims and principles which the United States believes should underlie such a solution.

c. When such an announcement is made, the United States should recommend or urge others to recommend, the creation of an appropriate United Nations body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accord-

ance with the principles enumerated above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as chairman of such a body.

d. Recommend to the United Nations that, after the successful repulsion of the aggression in Korea and the unification of the country in accordance with recommendations of the above named United Nations body, that body should advise as to the size and character of military forces and of internal security forces needed by the Republic of Korea.

e. The United States should express its view that for as long as the 38th parallel divides Korea, or until a stable, unified, and independent Korea is established, a U.N. military force should be retained in Korea to prevent renewed aggression or internal strife during the natural period of adjustment, and that such force should include substantial contingents from Asiatic countries. The United States would make it clear that its forces would be available to participate in enforcing a U.N. guarantee against unprovoked aggression; but would recommend that its contingents in the U.N. force referred to should be stationed south of the 38th parallel.

f. Recommend that the members of the United Nations, upon the advice of the United Nations body mentioned above give such political and economic aid to the Korean Government as may be necessary after the conclusion of hostilities.

g. Should the United Nations Commission on Korea make recommendations along the lines set forth in USUN telegram 266 of August 11, the United States should strongly support the general character of those recommendations reserving the right to suggest changes in certain sections as may appear desirable.

h. Press forward urgently with measures to build up the military, political and economic strength of the United States and other non-communist nations.

795.00/8–2150

Memorandum by the Counselor (Kennan) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1950.

Mr. Dulles recently asked me to give him a formal answer as to whether I approved of his latest draft of the Japanese peace treaty.[2] I have given him certain conditional answers, which avoid the larger question of our attitude toward the Japanese Peace Treaty as part of our whole Far Eastern policy. But his inquiry reminded me that I have never really set forth to you my feelings about Far Eastern policy in general, and has made me feel that perhaps I ought to try to summarize them for you, if only for purpose of clarification, before I leave the Department.[3]

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[1] An unsigned manuscript note on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State requested that no distribution be made of this memorandum.

[2] For related documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 1109 ff.

[3] Mr. Kennan left the Department of State at the end of August.

I would therefore like to say the following:

1. The course upon which we are today moving is one, as I see it, so little promising and so fraught with danger that I could not honestly urge you to continue to take responsibility for it. These are the main reasons why I feel this way:

a. We have not achieved a clear and realistic and generally accepted view of our objectives in Korea and sectors of our public opinion and of our official establishment are indulging themselves in emotional, moralistic attitudes toward Korea which, unless corrected, can easily carry us toward real conflict with the Russians and inhibit us from making a realistic agreement about that area.

b. By permitting General MacArthur to retain the wide and relatively uncontrolled latitude he has enjoyed in determining our policy in the north Asian and western Pacific areas, we are tolerating a state of affairs in which we do not really have full control over the statements that are being made—and actions taken—in our name.

c. Our policy toward the rival Chinese regimes is one almost sure to run us into serious conflict with other Asian countries and with England and the Commonwealth and to strengthen Peiping-Moscow solidarity rather than weaken it.

d. In Indo-China we are getting ourselves into the position of guaranteeing the French in an undertaking which neither they nor we, nor both of us together, can win.

e. By our intention to leave U.S. forces in Japan with full freedom of movement there, and with their presence sanctioned by the Japanese Peace Treaty, we are undermining our future political relations with the Japanese people and creating a situation which will obscure for them a correct view of their own national interest; in addition to this, we are thereby making an agreement with the Russians over Korea far more difficult than it would otherwise be.

2. In the light of this situation, what course of action would be dictated by considerations of pure national interest, leaving aside for the moment our domestic political inhibitions?

First of all, we should make it an objective of policy to terminate our involvements on the mainland of Asia as rapidly as possible and on the best terms we can get.

With respect to Indo-China, we should let Schuman know at the coming meeting of the Foreign Ministers[4] that the closer view we have had of the problems of this area, in the course of our efforts of the past few months to support the French position there, has convinced us that that position is basically hopeless. Stressing that this has been, and continues to be, their own responsibility, we should say that we will do everything in our power to avoid embarrassing the French in their problems and to support them in any reasonable course they would like to adopt looking to its liquidation; but that we cannot

[4] Documentation on the tripartite meeting of Foreign Ministers in New York, September 12–14 and 18–19, is scheduled for publication in volume III.

honestly agree with them that there is any real hope of remaining successful in Indo-China, and we feel that rather than have their weakness demonstrated by a continued costly and unsuccessful effort to assert their will by force of arms, it would be preferable to permit the turbulent political currents of that country to find their own level, unimpeded by foreign troops or pressures, even at the probable cost of an eventual deal between Viet-Nam and Viet-Minh, and the spreading over the whole country of Viet-Minh authority, possibly in a somewhat modified form. We might suggest that the most promising line of withdrawal, from the standpoint of their prestige, would be to make the problem one of some Asian regional responsibility, in which the French exodus could be conveniently obscured.

So far as Korea is concerned, my thoughts are not based on any regret for the basic determination to enter the Korean war, which was unquestionably the correct one; but I think we will be on very dangerous terrain if we fail to recognize the following subtle but wholly valid and vital distinction:

It was not tolerable to us that communist control should be extended to South Korea in the way in which this was attempted on June 24, since the psychological radiations from an acquiescence in this development on our part would have been wholly disruptive of our prestige in Asia;

Nevertheless, it is not essential to us to see an anti-Soviet Korean regime extended to *all* of Korea for all time; we could even eventually tolerate for a certain period of time a Korea nominally independent but actually amenable to Soviet influence, provided this state of affairs were to be brought about gradually and not too conspicuously, and were accompanied by a stable and secure situation in Japan and a quieting down of the existing tensions and fears in that general area.

My reasons for considering this distinction a valid one are these: It is beyond our capabilities to keep Korea permanently out of the Soviet orbit. The Koreans cannot really maintain their own independence in the face of both Russian and Japanese pressures. From the standpoint of our own interests it is preferable that Japan should dominate Korea than that Russia should do so.* But Japan, at the moment, is too weak to compete. We must hope that with the revival of her normal strength and prestige, Japan will regain her influence there. But the interval will probably be too long to be bridged over successfully by any of the expedients we have employed in the past or now have in contemplation. A period of Russian domination, while

*In his book on "Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War" Tyler Dennett described Roosevelt's policy toward Korea in 1905 as follows: "To Japanese ascendency in the peninsula the American Government has no objections. Japanese control was to be preferred to Korean misgovernment, Chinese interference, or Russian bureaucracy." [Footnote in the source text.]

undesirable, is preferable to continued U.S. involvement in that unhappy area, as long as the means chosen to assert Soviet influence are not, as was the case with those resorted to in June of this year, ones calculated to throw panic and terror into other Asian peoples and thus to achieve for the Kremlin important successes going far beyond the Korean area. But it is important that the nominal independence of Korea be preserved, for it provides a flexible vehicle through which Japanese influence may someday gradually replace Soviet influence without creating undue international repercussions.

As for Japan, we have here the most important single factor in Asia. We cannot, in the long run, continue successfully to keep Japan resistant to Soviet pressures by using our own strength as the main instrument in this effort. The only adequate "main instrument" for this, in the long run, will be enlightened self interest of the Japanese people, as translated into action by a Japanese Government. If we insist on keeping troops in Japan, their presence there will inevitably be a bone of political contention, and the communists will vigorously make capital of it. Precisely because we have forces there, we will not be able to establish a healthy diplomatic relationship to the Japanese, which could develop and enlist their sense of self-interest. Our commander and his position will constantly tend to stand in the way of such a trend of events. This is particularly cogent in its implication because of our seeming inability to keep large bodies of troops abroad without burdening local peoples physically and flaunting before them the visible evidences of a vastly higher standard of material comfort. Furthermore, the marked predilection of the American people for taking the side of any United States garrison commander abroad against the Government (and particularly the State Department) in Washington, will mean that we will not really have effective policy control over him. A military commander in a foreign territory is never a suitable vehicle of political policy. In addition to this, if the commander has a quasi-international status, as is now the plan, he will exploit this as a means of evading policy directives from this Government which do not coincide with his own predilections. Finally, if the Japanese agreement to the presence of such forces is anchored in a treaty of peace, which in turn reflects a duress implicit in military defeat and unconditional surrender, it will never have full legitimacy in Japanese eyes. This element of duress will always rise to plague us in all our future relations to the Japanese, and to divert Japanese attention to the problem of "how to get United States troops out" rather than "how to meet Soviet pressures against Japan."

In the event of war, I take it we would not try to maintain and supply an armed establishment in Japan anyway, if it were faced, as I think it would be, with active opposition and attack from Soviet

forces on the mainland. I assume, therefore, that the presence of our forces there is not necessary for this contingency.

Our best bet, therefore, at the present time would be to establish real diplomatic contact with the Russians (this means contact along the lines of the Malik-Jessup talks of last year) [5] aiming at the achievement of something like the following state of affairs: we would consent to the neutralization and demilitarization of Japan (except for strong internal police forces) whereas the Russians would agree to a termination of the Korean war involving withdrawal of the North Korean forces and of our forces and a period of effective United Nations control over Korea for at least a year or two, the U.N. utilizing for this purpose the nationals and forces only of other Asian countries.

Such an arrangement would have to have as its concomitants certain decisions of unilateral United States policy: to wit:

(*a*) A readiness on our part to get ourselves out of the line of fire on the question of Chinese admission to the United Nations, by a policy of abstention from voting on this subject or of the exertion of pressure on others;

(*b*) The adoption of a military policy in this country whereby we would maintain in being and in a state of readiness at all times a mixed combat force, commanded and operated as a unit, capable of dealing a sharp blow on a limited front almost anywhere in the world on short notice, along the lines of my recommendations to the Defense Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in 1947 (copy attached); [6]

(*c*) A determination on our part to see to it that the Japanese would be adequately equipped to look after their own internal security, even in the face of the worst that their own communists could do; and

(*d*) An approach to the Formosan question based on a U.N.-conducted plebiscite, again without U.S. participation, and complete subsequent demilitarization of Formosa under whatever regime might be established, the U.N. acting as permanent supervisor.

It should be noted that this does not imply any written agreement with the Russians. In fact, to try to negotiate anything of that sort would probably be disastrous. It implies only a general meeting of the minds, the sanction for which would lie in the readiness of either side to proceed with its part of the arrangement. Thus channels should be left open so that further Russian tactlessness in Korea could be followed by an immediate re-introduction of U.S. forces into Japan. If, on the other hand, we were to re-occupy Japan without provocation, the Russians could consider all bets off with respect to Korea.

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[5] See *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 694 ff.

[6] Not printed; reference is to a talk given by Mr. Kennan on January 23, 1947 before the National Defense Committee of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. For a summary of the talk, see George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925–1950* (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 311–312.

Such an arrangement, it should be noted, would involve the resumption of real diplomatic contact with Japan, as well as with the Soviet Union. This means contact not with the present Japanese Government but with the really influential circles which are now lurking in the political background. This cannot be done by General MacArthur or by anyone in his headquarters. It would take a real diplomatic envoy, backed by Presidential authority but instructed to operate quietly, patiently and inconspicuously.

3. So much for national interest in the abstract. There remains the fact that United States public opinion, aroused by the Korean aggression, and confused by the partisan attacks on the administration, is not prepared for this sort of a policy. I realize that an attempt to proceed along these lines would encounter, as things stand today, violent and outraged opposition both within sectors of the Executive branch and in the Congress. In particular, it would mean pouring oil on the fires already kindled by the Republican opposition in the charge that our Far Eastern policy has been over-lenient to Communism and therefore neglectful of our national security. Nevertheless, I think there is a clear problem of responsibility here involved, which begs for clarification. This is not really my competence, and I do not think I should discuss it in this paper. But I would be glad to give you my views orally, before I leave, if they would be of any interest.

GEORGE F. KENNAN

330/8–1950 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 21, 1950—1 p. m.

170. Reurtel 334 August 19 our position continues to be that set forth in Deptel 147 Aug 15 and Rau res text does not in itself suffice to meet points we have raised. As we understand GOI trying to kill Rau proposal, we believe we should do nothing to prop it up.

In discussion with Rau you may present fol views:

Fighting in Korea may be halted through accomplishment objectives SC resolutions June 25 and 27. Leading members UN such as India and US should be giving careful thought to problems arising for UN thereafter.

UN faces long-range problem of great difficulty after fighting ceases. It is incumbent upon these members to consider how the UN can carry out its political, security, and rehabilitation responsibilities.

Accordingly Dept suggests we, Rau, and others give attention to defining those problems, exploring alternative answers, and then considering procedures best adopted to arriving at reasonable and accept-

able UN answers; i.e. that we should make procedure the servant of substance and not vice versa.

Reurtel 325 Aug 18 advisory committee suggested. We will seek to encourage broadest possible debate and action in GA regarding the problem of Korea's future, and accordingly believe that any Committee including reps of countries not on SC might preferably await GA consideration.

ACHESON

310.2/8–2150 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, August 21, 1950—6 : 30 p. m.
[Received August 21—7 : 23 p. m.]

339. At consultation of SC members called by Malik at Lake Success, he opened by stating that the Soviet Union without changing its attitude toward the 25 June resolution felt that it was possible for the SC to agree on the simultaneous seating of the SK and NK authorities. He recalled consultation of August 17 when other delegates had spoken on the timing but not on the substance of the Soviet proposal. Hence, he had called for this informal exchange of views to receive any comments on substance. In the discussion that followed Sunde (Norway) was only member to speak except for one brief comment by Quevedo (Ecuador). After an exchange of about 40 minutes Malik suggested the following communiqué:

"An informal exchange of views of SC members took place on August 21 on the question of hearing in the SC, representatives of NK and SK. No agreement was reached on this question."

To summarize discussion, Sunde opened by recalling last consultation in which USSR maintained its position but asked all the others to concede. He thought it was clear why SC could not ask NK's to sit. During the police action the SC could properly hear only from the victim but during the final stage the question of seating the NK's would be a different one. Malik again spoke of the Soviet position based on the real fact that without both parties the case cannot be settled either now or in the future. He therefore restated his proposal that without further discussion of the 25 June resolution we invite the representative of SK and since both are needed for the peaceful settlement of the case we also make a decision on an invitation to the NK's. He referred to Sunde's comment that only during the pendency of the police action were the NK's not to be asked. There were no precedents in the charter for hearing only the victim and he referred to the practice of the Palestine and Kashmir cases. He stressed that

at all stages both parties are needed and concluded that if Sunde reflected the majority of the Council without prejudice to the rights of the NK's it seemed to him there was no purpose in continuing the exchange.

Sunde replied that a great number of SC members had debated this and these members had given authoritative interpretation to the 25 June resolution to the effect that a standing invitation has been issued to the representative of SK. Two presidents of the SC have acted on this invitation by stating that they invited the SK representative to the table and not using the phrase "unless there is objection". Sunde reminded Malik that he was asking the Council to reverse this decision. He felt that on this substantive question nine members of the SC endorsed the action of the two presidents. Malik attempted to draw out Sunde asking for clarification as to whether those nine members while insisting on an invitation to the SK's would take a decision on seating the NK authorities since, as he put it, "any lack of clear understanding would harm our business." When the other members remained silent Malik then noted the facts that Sunde did not deem it possible to take a decision on seating the NK's and therefore the exchange of views was complete. There was then discussion of the communiqué set out above and Sunde added in conclusion that he thought ten members of the SC were agreed on the formal point that the SK representative had been invited to the table.

AUSTIN

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on August 22 from 3 to 6:50 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV. 489. No substantive action took place, the entire meeting being devoted to a lengthy statement by the Soviet Representative accusing the United States of aggression in Korea, to which responses were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States. The Council then adjourned until August 25.

795B.00/8–2250 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 22, 1950—5 p. m.

89. There is growing tendency among correspondents and others to talk of short-comings Rhee Govt thus falling unconsciously for commie line that ROK is reactionary govt not representative of people which

has done nothing about land reform, locked up polit opposition, etc.

Dept thinks ROK record far better than its reputation. Greater effort required counteract this growing tendency with factual info about govt achievements. Handling serious refugee problem wld make excellent story this regard. Also excellent resistance ROK troops stressing large casualties, training ROK troop replacements, etc. Cld more be done with ideas ROK is after all legitimate govt confronted by great handicaps, gradually becoming stabilized, encouraging public education, responsive popular will evidenced by two elections in which people expressed free will, as results show? How about more effort publicize national assembly as representative, responsive body?

Suggest giving background briefing Amer fon correspondents such achievement, use every opportunity stress ROK activities. Dept realizes correspondents mostly interested actual war coverage but more serious ones shld be willing note polit factors too.

ACHESON

795.00/8–2350

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1950.

Subject: Revised Draft Paper on "U.S. Courses of Action in Korea"

The comments which follow relate to the revised draft, dated August 21, of the paper on "U.S. Courses of Action in Korea".

We appreciate the extent to which the Comments contained in my memorandum of August 13[1] have been taken into account in the preparation of the revised draft. However, there are a couple of points to which we attach very great importance which are not satisfactorily covered by the revised draft.

1. *Paragraph 28.*—In the introductory sentence to Paragraph 28 (which was previously 26), we note that the following phrase has been added: "once the aggression has been brought to an end". We are certain to be confronted with the necessity of developing our position and stating it publicly on the question of the future of Korea before the aggression has been brought to an end. It is quite clear from recent developments in the Security Council that there will be continued pressure for the development by the Security Council and even by the General Assembly of a program for the future settlement in Korea. It is essential that we be in a position to influence the development of plans for the future of Korea. For this reason it would be fatal to limit the statement of policy here by including the time element of

[1] Not printed.

having it done after the aggression has been brought to an end. We cannot delay longer than the consideration of the Korean question in the General Assembly a public announcement of our general policy with respect to the future of Korea. Accordingly, we urge most strongly that this phrase be dropped. Otherwise the value of the paper is to a very considerable extent nullified.

2. *Paragraph 28 (d)*.—The recommendation in the earlier paragraph that Korea be demilitarized has been eliminated and it is now provided that the United Nations body referred to shall "advise as to the size and character of military forces and of internal security forces needed by the Republic of Korea". We consider that an important element of the Korean settlement is the demilitarization of Korea. It is only on the basis of a mutual agreement between the contending parties to eliminate Korea as a source of military contention that there is any hope of obtaining a settlement which will establish peace and security in the area. This might possibly bring about Russian acquiescence in a settlement resulting in the unification of Korea. It seems to us that we should not envisage a settlement which would involve maintenance by the United States of strong military forces in Korea on a continuing basis. Demilitarization of course means that Korea must be assured of adequate protection by the United Nations.

In addition the following minor changes are suggested:

1. *Paragraph 8.*—". . . and later *by* initiating action through the United Nations machinery."

2. *Paragraph 11.*—". . . thus *confuting* those critics who had raised the cry of 'police state.'" Alternatively this clause might be omitted entirely,

3. *Paragraph 13.*—". . . although this sentiment has not taken the explicit form of *advocating use of* United States forces . . ." etc.

4. As paragraph 25 (*a*) now contains a reference to "the problem of Korea", paragraph 25 (*b*) may now begin simply, "The *problem* can only be fairly and correctly resolved" etc., instead of with the present awkward and somewhat misleading formula.

DURWARD V. SANDIFER

795.00/8–2350

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1950.

Subject: Proposed Naval Action in the Event North Korean Submarines Attack UN Ships.

Problem:

In the event a "North Korean" submarine makes an overt attack upon a UN vessel the Navy proposes that a declaration immediately be issued by the Commanding General of the Unified Forces to the

effect that all submarines passing through the area outlined in blue on the attached map [1] would be subject to immediate attack by UN forces unless proceeding on the surface under escort.

Discussion:

At present, instructions to the UN Naval Forces provide that they may attack unidentified, submerged submarines only if they remain in position to attack a UN vessel. Recently the US Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, and the British proposed the establishment of a "belligerent area" in the waters around Korea into which "neutral" warships would be warned not to enter. Neither the Department nor the Navy Department concurred in this proposal as it was considered to be an unjustified interference with the rights of neutral vessels on the high seas and as not having any legal effect beyond the exercise of the right of self-defense already contained in the orders under which the Navy was operating.

It must be recognized that the present lines of Naval communication with Korea are very vulnerable to submarine attack and if such an attack were made by "North Korean" submarines it would be important that the UN Naval Forces be able to take prompt countermeasures and not wait until a submarine came into position to deliver an attack as required by present instructions. However, the proposed area is so broad that unless the Soviets chose to comply with the conditions established for the passage of submarines through the area they would have no means of moving submarines from such places as Dairen and Vladivostok except by keeping within Chinese or Russian territorial waters for long distances.

Therefore, it is suggested that we propose to the Navy that:

(*a*) The area be reduced approximately to the limits shown in red on the attached map. This area would include only the waters immediately adjacent to Korea and the supporting supply lines for the UN Forces. It will give the USSR access to Dairen and Vladivostok without the necessity of their complying with the required procedures.

(b) To avoid incidents involving UN Forces and to protect UN Forces, full and ample notification be made to all Governments prior to initiating attacks on submarines in the area. The proclamation of the area should be by the Commanding General of the UN Forces at least 48 hours prior to initiating attacks in the area and should be immediately communicated through the UN to all Governments. During this 48-hour period the self-defense measures now in effect would operate.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you approve the communication to the Navy of the foregoing counter-proposal.

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[1] Not printed.

795.00/8–2350

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1950.

Subject: Declaration Concerning Action Against Submarines in Event of "North Korean" Submarine Attack.

In accordance with your instructions, I called on Capt. Orem [1] at the Navy this afternoon to discuss the above subject. I informed him that the Department was entirely sympathetic to the Navy's problem and was confident that a mutually satisfactory solution could be reached. I also informed Capt. Orem that it was the view of the Secretary of State that, regardless of the forum in which the final decision was reached, the President should be informed thereof. Specifically, I informed him that it was the view of the Department that:

1. The proposed area should be limited to the maximum possible degree to the waters immediately adjacent to Korea and the shipping lanes between Japan and Korea so as to permit USSR vessels reasonable freedom of movement from Dairen and Vladivostok if they did not choose to submit to the required procedures.
2. Full notification of the action should be made by all means available, including formal notification to all governments through the UN.
3. Not less than 48 hours should elapse between the public declaration and the initiation of the proposed attacks, during which period the present self-defense measures would operate.
4. Consideration be given to making the declaration at this time rather than awaiting an overt attack.

Capt. Orem was personally receptive to a further limitation of the area and we discussed various alternatives without reaching any final decision.

He indicated the Navy concurred on the proposals relating to notification including the 48 hours period of warning.

Capt. Orem was inclined to the belief that initiation and announcement of this action prior to an overt attack was not necessary or desirable, it being his personal view that an attack was more likely to be made by Chinese Communist forces against our vessels operating off Formosa, and that it would be desirable not to have any more differentiation than essential between the action permitted our forces operating in the Formosa area and that in the Korea area.

It was agreed no further action by the Department was necessary at this time, and that the Navy would again initiate action taking into consideration our views on the return of Admiral Sherman to Washington.

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[1] Capt. Howard E. Orem, Director, International Affairs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations.

795.00/8–2350

Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State for National Security Council Staff Consideration Only

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1950.

FUTURE U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To report upon the policy that the United States should pursue after the Korean communist forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel.

ANALYSIS

2. As U.N. forces drive back North Korean forces and approach the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U.N. members which are supporting the Security Council Resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities can be confined to Korea or will spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

3. In its Resolution of June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security Council (*a*) noted "with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea"; (*b*) determined "that this action constitutes a breach of the peace"; (*c*) called for "the immediate cessation of hostilities"; (*d*) called upon the authorities of North Korea "to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel"; and (*e*) called upon "all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities."

4. In its Resolution of June 27, 1950, the Security Council (*a*) noted "from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security"; (*b*) noted "the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security"; and (*c*) recommended "that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area".

5. In a third Resolution of July 7, the Security Council requested the United States to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized these forces to fly the U.N. flag. In response to this Resolution,

General MacArthur was designated as Commander of these forces. The Republic of Korea also has placed its forces under General MacArthur's command.

6. In his message to the Congress of July 19, President Truman stated that he thought it important that the nature of our military action in Korea be understood; that it should be made perfectly clear that the action was undertaken as a matter of basic moral principle; that the United States was going to the aid of a nation established and supported by the United Nations and unjustifiably attacked by an aggressor force.

7. The present military action in Korea responds to the Security Council resolutions which come within the scope of provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter dealing with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

8. The General Assembly Resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949 are a part of the U.N. effort which is strongly supported by the United States, to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea.

9. There are, therefore, two phases of the Korean problem: (*a*) the long-term effort to bring about unity and independence, and (*b*) the present enforcement action to repel North Korean aggression. This paper is addressed primarily to the latter phase of the problem, for the reasons set forth in the following paragraph.

10. The following contingencies are envisaged as the U.N. enforcement action develops, provided North Korean forces are not reinforced by U.S.S.R. or Communist Chinese troops; (*a*) voluntary withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel before UN forces have begun a counter-offensive; (*b*) a withdrawal in good order of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel at a time when they are being driven northward to a point approaching the 38th parallel; (*c*) a major defeat and disintegration of North Korean forces during the period when they are being driven back toward the 38th parallel; (*d*) continued resistance by North Korean forces after UN forces have reached the 38th parallel. Another contingency is the occupation of North Korea to the 38th parallel by Soviet or Communist Chinese forces before the UN forces reach the 38th parallel, or active support of the North Korean forces south of the 38th parallel by Chinese Communist or Soviet forces.

11. A need for important decisions will arise with a reversal of the military situation in Korea and the approach of UN forces toward the 38th parallel. It is probable that at the time when it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression cannot succeed and that eventually North Korean forces will be driven back north of the 38th parallel the Kremlin will take a decision (if it has not already done so) regarding a course of action in the new situation.

12. There is ample evidence of the strategic importance to Russia of the Korean peninsula. It is unlikely that the Kremlin at present would accept the establishment in North Korea of a regime which it could not dominate and control.

When it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression will be defeated, there might be some agreement between the USSR and the North Korean regime which would mean in substance that UN military action north of the 38th parallel would result in conflict with the USSR or Communist China.

While fighting is in progress south of the 38th parallel the Kremlin might bring about the occupation of North Korea either with its own or with Chinese communist forces.

The Kremlin might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities still are in progress south of the 38th parallel. We should guard against terms that would leave the aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

13. If North Korean forces withdraw or are driven back to the 38th parallel, continued military action by the U.S. forces for the purpose of imposing a settlement with a view to a unified and independent Korea would depend upon majority support in the United Nations. Account would have to be taken of possible reluctance regarding the multilateral use of force as part of the U.S. effort to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea.

14. It will be desirable to bear in mind both the eventual advisability of securing, through intensive diplomatic preparation, support on the part of the majority of United Nations Members for any action that might be taken beyond the 38th parallel, and the possible advantages of assuming a position which will clearly show that every effort has been exhausted to avoid carrying the military struggle into a new phase by a land offensive beyond the 38th parallel.

15. The future of the Korean people is an important consideration. The United States has supported the UN effort to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. However, the United States has not had and does not now have any commitment to use military force to bring about that independence and unity.

Having been the victim of armed attack from North Korea, the Republic of Korea naturally will want a settlement that gives a maximum guarantee against the danger of similar future attacks. The Korean people and Government already are insisting that the 38th

parallel division must go and that the present opportunity to unify the country must be seized.

16. Likewise, present public and Congressional opinion in the United States would be dissatisfied with any conclusion falling short of what it would consider a "final" settlement of the problem. A sentiment favoring a continuation of military action north of the 38th parallel already is arising. On the other hand, there may well develop a contrasting sentiment against using U.S. military forces to help establish an independent Korea.

17. The advantages of an effort involving the use of military force to attain the complete independence and unity of Korea after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel must be weighed against the disadvantages of such a course. If the North Korean forces are decisively defeated and if North Korea suffer heavy material damage from air attack, those forces are not likely to attack again soon. The United States and other UN members should be in a much stronger position to take effective action as present efforts have time to take effect. It seems likely, also, that a satisfactory permanent solution of the Korean problem can be hoped for only when and if a substantial accommodation is reached between the USSR and the non-communist world.

CONCLUSIONS

18. It is U.S. policy to help bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. That policy has a sound basis of right and principle. U.S. action to carry out the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council regarding North Korean aggression are in accord with our policy of strong support of the United Nations; but we have no commitment to use armed force in the effort to bring about Korean independence and unity.

19. The Korean problem must be dealt with in the wider framework of the conflict between the communist and non-communist countries. The necessity to maintain a realistic balance between our military strength on the one hand and commitments and risks on the other hand, together with the need for additional information which depends upon political and military developments in the near future, make it impossible to take decisions now regarding our future course of action in Korea. It seems clear that our national security and interest will be best served at present by maintaining the greatest possible degree of flexibility and freedom of action.

RECOMMENDATIONS

20. The present vigorous U.S. action in support of the United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding North Korean aggression should be continued.

21. Decisions regarding the course of action when the United Nations forces approach the 38th parallel should be deferred until military and political developments provide the additional information necessary to enable us: (*a*) to base our decisions on the situation in Korea and in other parts of the world at that time; (*b*) to consult with other United Nations members; and (*c*) to keep our military capabilities and commitments in safe balance.

22. Measures which might be necessary or desirable once the aggression has been brought to an end, either by defeat of the Korean Communist aggressors or as the result of a possible Soviet suggestion for an early voluntary withdrawal by the Korean Communists, should be the subject of immediate study and early report by the Department of State in cooperation with the Department of Defense.

330/8–2350 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, August 23, 1950—6 : 06 p. m.
[Received August 23—7 : 38 p. m.]

353. Gross and Ross called on Rau this noon at latter's request. Rau said he wanted to inform us that according to Malik Soviet Government attitude toward Rau's proposal of committee of non-permanent members was "unfavorable". Malik told Rau that while Soviet Government appreciated motives of Rau in putting his proposal forward, it considered it would be better to leave in SC matters Rau proposed to deal with in subcommittee.

Rau said it was not clear to him whether Malik would veto or merely abstain on resolution establishing subcommittee, if tabled.

Rau said he interpreted Soviet reaction as indicating Russians are really not sincere in their desire for peaceful settlement of Korean matter, but have returned to SC merely to take advantage of it as sounding board.

Rau said that under his present instructions, he of course, would not push forward with his proposal unless US and UK supported it. In other words, he said in effect that he would not wish to push for it

unless US and UK had "faith in us". He assumed we shared Indian objective of bringing conflict in Korea to an end as soon as possible "consistent with obligations of charter".

Rau said that he did not want to be Machiavellian, but it appeared to him that Russian unfavorable reaction to his proposal might provide us an opportunity (by supporting his proposal) to strengthen our propaganda position.

Gross, after thanking Rau for conveying information to us, said that we would not, of course, hide behind the Russian position regarding Rau's proposal. He said he would transmit information to Department, which had always been interested in views of other SC members re Rau proposal.

Referring to earlier conversation (USUN 325, August 18) concerning possibility establishing a UN advisory council, Gross asked if Rau had received any further clarification from GOI. Gross indicated our tentative reaction that GA would probably be considering problem of future of Korea and that GA itself might wish to consider establishing an advisory council.

Rau had not yet received any further clarification from his Government.

Gross indicated our primary concern that any consideration of war aims or peace aims should be based upon prior compliance with SC resolutions. Rau re-emphasized GOI absolutely firm on compliance. Rau referred to phrase in paragraph (*a*) (1) of his draft resolution (USUN's 334, August 19) reading "in accordance with the principles of the UN", indicating his belief that this formula protected SC resolutions on book. He referred to difficulty in drafting formula acceptable to Egyptian and Yugoslav delegations.

Comment: Information regarding Soviet position makes it even more important in our view to maintain non-commital position. We have now made clear to Rau Department views expressed Deptel 170, August 21. I have stressed to Rau importance we attach to maintaining close and frank consultation with Indian delegation here, particularly in the days ahead. It does not seem to us wise to give Rau opportunity, for which he may indeed be angling, to say that in effect US had made his decision for him regarding his subcommittee proposal. Accordingly, recommend we be authorized maintain line set forth Deptel 170, citing to Rau as additional factor that in view Soviet unfavorable reaction it is not likely his subcommittee would be effective instrument to expedite compliance SC decisions.

New subject: Rau told Gross he had received message from Nehru in which latter stated that because of domestic problems he was facing in India he did not think it would be possible for him to attend GA.

AUSTIN

795.00/8–2450

Memorandum by Mr. Max W. Bishop to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 24, 1950.

Subject: State Department Drafts on Korea Policy and the 38th Parallel.[2]

Jimmy Lay said this morning that he was somewhat surprised at the last State Department's drafts on the above subjects. He pointed out that the President had asked for policy recommendations on what we do when we reach the 38th Parallel. Jimmy said that he could hardly understand how, in the light of the President's specific request, we could reply to the President merely stating that we have no policy recommendations at this time.

I told Jimmy that these were working drafts and that they would, of course, be changed in the process of staff consideration. I pointed out that the response to the President's request might have to be negative but that nevertheless if that were the case, the reasons would be clearly set forth in the paper in the final draft which would be entirely responsive to the original request. I said that I hoped that the Staff Assistants could have a free exchange of substantive ideas this morning and that on the basis of that exchange, the Department of State would attempt to consolidate all of the agreed ideas into one or two drafts.

I hope to prepare for you today an analysis of the many papers on the Korean matter and some suggestions as to how we can best get forward.

M. W. B[ISHOP]

[1] Mr. Bishop, a member of Ambassador Jessup's staff, was the Department of State Representative on the NSC Staff Assistants, while Mr. Jessup was the Department's Representative on the NSC Senior Staff.

[2] See the draft memorandum by Messrs. Allison and Emmerson on "U.S. Courses of Action in Korea", dated August 21, p. 617, and the Department of State draft memorandum on "Future U.S. Policy With Respect to Korea", dated August 23, p. 635.

795.00/8–2450

Memorandum by Mr. Walter P. McConaughy to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 24, 1950.

Subject: NSC Staff Assistant's Meeting of August 24 on State and Defense Drafts on Korea Policy and the 38th Parallel.

The Armed Services representatives were strongly of the view that the two State Department drafts on long-term and short-term policies

[1] Mr. McConaughy was a member of Ambassador Jessup's staff.

in Korea should be combined into one. They felt that the matter of military action when the 38th Parallel is reached is so closely interwoven with future U.S. policy in Korea that the two cannot logically be separated. It was suggested that one paper be drafted to cover the entire subject with separate conclusions and recommendations for the immediate military question and the long range policy issue. Mr. Butler of S/P saw no objection to this.

The representatives of the other Departments apparently had no objection to the State Department's short-term draft [2] except that it was inconclusive and recommended a postponement of the urgent decision as to whether 38° should be crossed. They felt that the State and Defense drafts [3] could readily be reconciled if the State Department were willing to participate in making the essential decision now.

The Armed Services representatives pointed out that postponement would delay the military build-up which would be necessary in case of an affirmative decision. They stressed that it would take a long time to prepare for airborne or amphibious operations north of 38°, and that if there was any likelihood that such operations might be called for, an immediate decision was needed.

Mr. Butler felt that it should be decided whether planning should be based on a narrow interpretation of the UN Resolution on Korea (not specifically authorizing ground operations north of 38°), or a broad interpretation of the resolution, under which any military action required to "restore peace and security in the area" could be taken.

The consensus seemed to be that ground operations north of 38° subsequent to the withdrawal of North Korean forces from South Korea would probably lead to the direct involvement of the Soviet Union and Communist China, or both, in hostilities, which might well become generalized.

The question was raised as to whether there might not be some intermediate line north of 38°, but short of the Manchurian and Siberian borders, to which the UN forces might push without grave danger of provoking the Soviet Union to open hostilities. It was generally conceded that the occupation of North Korean points within easy striking distance of Vladivostok and other strategic centers would be more provocative than a limited occupation which stopped short of such points.

It was agreed to request the Senior Staff to pass on the following

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[2] Reference is to the draft memorandum of August 23, p. 635.

[3] The Department of Defense draft memoranda are dated July 31 and August 7, pp. 502 and 528.

question taken from paragraph 28, subsection B, "Military Objectives" of the Defense draft:

1. "Should the unified command seek to occupy Korea and to defeat North Korean armed forces wherever located north or south of the 38th parallel?"
2. "Should the unified command be instructed to pursue military operations in Korea without regard to the 38th parallel?"

WALTER P. MCCONAUGHY

357.AD/8–2450 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, August 24, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received August 24—1:17 p. m.]

357. Re tentative statement of UNCOK views on political settlement in Korea, our 266 of August 11, and Department's view in its 168 of August 19 [1] that we reserve comment in order to get wholly independent expression from Commission.

Preliminary US–UK conversations reported in our 342 of August 21 [2] indicate French desire that no such far reaching conclusions be put forward now, and we understand this view is shared by UK. In light of this fact and considering that France is a member of UNCOK, our recommendation is that we indicate to SYG concurrence with view that conclusions should not be formulated now. This would be without prejudice to UNCOK presenting these conclusions or others during course of GA, perhaps as supplement to report, or perhaps in response to GA request as suggested by Chauvel.

We agree with SYG that situation is fluid and that it is undesirable to freeze any plan by reducing it officially to writing, as Cordier's letter suggests (our 269, August 12 [3]). Suggested position would give us free hand to consider these tentative suggestions in light of Indian Advisory Council idea. This would also have some advantage for India as member of UNCOK. Since UNCOK is an instructed commission we feel it difficult to play a more complete hands off role than suggested above.

AUSTIN

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[1] See footnote 2 to telegram 266 from New York, August 11, p. 565.
[2] Not printed.
[3] See footnote 1 to telegram 266 from New York, August 11, p. 564.

795.00/8–2450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, August 24, 1950— 7 p. m.
[Received August 24—7 : 15 p. m.]

461. 1. At request Bajpai I saw him morning August 24. Referring to our conversation August 18 (Embtel 419, August 18) he said several telegrams had been received from Rau asking that he be permitted present resolution to SC calling for establishing committee to endeavor bring about cessation fighting Korea and to work out plan for future that country. In one telegram Rau had stated that sentiment among members SC as well as of American public appeared favorable. Probably Russia and US would abstain. Such abstention would have advantages because if either these powers should support resolution, other might become suspicious and oppose it. Rau failed indicate attitude UK. GOI, however, had been firm in insisting that no resolution be presented unless it could be ascertained in advance that all great powers would be favorable.

2. Bajpai asked if I had any information as to what US attitude toward plan was. When I replied in negative he said he did not wish complain, but it seemed to him US could be little more helpful in letting India know how it felt. Neither Madame Pandit nor Rau seemed know how US regarded proposed resolution and apparently American Ambassador Delhi also was uninformed. GOI was conscientiously trying find formula which might lead termination conflict or at least prevent spread hostilities. It could not carry burden alone. It did not expect too much from Soviet Union which was noted for its reticence, but it had hoped for certain degree cooperation from US. Rau had reported US delegation had been somewhat concerned lest attempt be made include Peiping in committee in case resolution should provide for members not belonging to UN. Rau had therefore been instructed abandon idea of including in committee nations not in UN.

3. I said I was confident only reason my Government had not made its views known was that it was not sufficiently acquainted with purpose committee to have any fixed views. I knew my Government desired keep even closer in touch with GOI in future than in past. It was difficult, however, for it to state its views re proposals which had not been clearly formulated.

4. Bajpai said Rau had inquired for more details re purposes committee and GOI had replied that purposes could be more clearly defined after it had become clear that great powers in principle were not disagreeable to setting up such committee. I again emphasized it must

be difficult for my Government to indicate that it agreed in principle to setting up committee purposes of which were not clear to it. Undoubtedly informal talks, even if not reported were taking place between our delegation and his. My Government probably had not given me instructions to discuss matter here because conversations on matter like this at two places might lead to confusion.

5. Bajpai said he also hoped there could be closer consultation between our two Governments. Present situation was not wholly satisfactory. He and I were able to have certain amount useful talks, but GOI knew little about conversations which might have taken place between Rau and members US delegation and Madame Pandit seemed rarely to have conversations of any importance. In fact maintenance Madame Pandit in Washington seemed almost to be waste Government funds.

HENDERSON

330/8–2450 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, August 24, 1950—8 : 47 p. m.
[Received August 24—9 : 16 p. m.]

363. At meeting with Gross requested by Jebb this p. m. Jebb asked for our ideas re first SC meeting to be held under his presidency in September.

Jebb agreed with Gross re desirability hold meeting September 1. Following tentative thoughts concerning procedure at meeting outlined by Gross as follows: (Department's reactions would be appreciated.)

1. Upon adoption agenda Jebb would forthwith invite ROK representative to come to SC table. Malik, if present, might either object on point of order or table motion for reconsideration of June 25 invitation. If Malik chooses first course Jebb will rule against Malik's point of order and upon Malik's challenge would poll SC. If Malik argues his vote to overrule Jebb's ruling has effect of a "veto" of ruling, Jebb will state his disagreement with Malik on ground that a ruling by President is inherently a procedural matter. Jebb will then proceed to next order of business. If on other hand Malik tables a motion for reconsideration, Jebb will put this to a vote after permitting ROK representative (who will be sitting at table) to make a statement opposing motion for reconsideration.

2. In lieu of customary presidential encomium of his predecessor Jebb will make a few well chosen remarks in opposite sense. Gross suggested Jebb might wish to make a statement to effect that he wished

record of President for August had permitted him to say nice things, but that he is sure he speaks for SC when he says that record for August bears eloquent testimony gross abuses Presidential powers during month of August. Jebb might then read a prepared bill of particulars from August record showing Malik's misbehavior. Jebb said he would consider latter suggestion.

3. Jebb would then state that regular order is pending US motion tabled 31 July and call upon ROK representative first speaker. SC would thereafter proceed to vote upon US resolution, as rapidly as possible, consistent with right of SC members to speak to motion.

AUSTIN

795.00/8–2550

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James W. Barco, Special Assistant to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 25, 1950.

Subject: United States Courses of Action in Korea

Participants: G—Mr. Matthews
FE—Mr. Rusk
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Emmerson
UNA—Mr. Hickerson
Mr. Sandifer
S/P—Mr. Butler
S/A—Mr. Jessup
Mr. McConaughy
Mr. Barco

At a meeting this morning to consider the Department's position on courses of action in Korea for guidance in NSC discussions the following questions were considered and recommendations agreed upon:

1. *Limitation on Military Action*—The question was raised whether any restrictions should be placed on the unified command on ground operations north of the 38th parallel.

It was agreed that under present directives General MacArthur has authority to make operational amphibious landings behind the North Korean lines, north of the 38th parallel. It was also agreed that if there was any doubt of this authority we would have no objection to such landings being made, our concern being that the UN forces should keep well clear of the Russian frontier. In this connection, it was recalled that the Defense Department has not regarded bombings within seventeen miles of the Russian frontier as being too close. On the East Coast it was agreed that UN forces might occupy the neck reaching into the mountain area up to the 39th parallel if it were strategically desirable in order to insure operational control of the area but that ground operations should not go beyond the neck into the mountain area at the 39th parallel.

2. *Should operational plans, including amphibious landings north of the 38th parallel, be executed if Chinese Communists or Soviet forces have entered the war.* A paper approved as a working paper for NSC 73 takes the position that if Chinese Communist forces have entered the fighting we continue our operations as if we were still fighting North Koreans and it was agreed that under these circumstances amphibious landings north of the 38th parallel in the eastern neck could be undertaken. The Joint Chiefs have taken the position in NSC 76 that if major Soviet units are engaged the US should minimize its commitments and execute war plans. To go beyond the 38th parallel would be to maximize our commitments, and it was agreed that we would approve the JCS position.

3. *If UN forces are successful in pushing North Korean troops back to the 38th parallel should UN forces stop at that point.* It was agreed that in the absence of Chinese Communist or Soviet participation we should not stop. It was recognized that it might be desirable for South Korean troops to pursue North Korean troops beyond the 38th parallel but that American unit participation should be minimized. In other words it would be politically desirable, if militarily feasible, for the South Korean forces to follow-up, and it was agreed that this might be indicated to General MacArthur, but that a blood bath by South Koreans against North Koreans should be guarded against. It was agreed that our desire should be to put brakes on full military occupation of North Korea by US troops without putting any limitation on the total destruction of North Korean troops. It was also agreed that it would be desirable to begin consultation at an appropriate time with countries contributing forces to the UN Army to insure that they would continue under General MacArthur's orders if and when UN forces have reached the 38th parallel, and that this became practical as other countries began active participation. The British should be the first to be consulted. It was also agreed that, while not an NSC matter, consideration of a deputy for General MacArthur should be taken up with the Defense Department.

4. *If Russian troops are observed to be Moving into North Korea could UN forces bomb them north of the 38th parallel?* It was agreed that in the absence of an announcement by Russia of its intentions of moving into North Korea we would bomb Russian troops as if they were North Korean troops. If the Soviet Union announces its intention to re-occupy North Korea we should take the case immediately to the Security Council as a matter for all of the Security Council to consider. It was agreed that we could not make a war issue with Russia out of their announced intention to re-occupy North Korea, but that

we should continue to destroy North Korean troops south of the 38th parallel and demand assurances that they would be disarmed north of the 38th parallel. Our course of action would be based on the assumption that Russia would undertake to withdraw North Korean forces to the 38th parallel and that Russia could not, by its action, place an umbrella over the supply lines to North Koreans fighting south of the 38th parallel.

5. *What should our course of action be for the ultimate solution of the Korean problem?*

(*a*) The first draft of the NSC paper on Korea [1] has taken the position that questions of ultimate solution should not be decided until the military situation has cleared up. The British and French apparently adopt this view. It was agreed that we should announce at an appropriate time that we have no unilateral desire to occupy Korea but that we will contribute as far as we are able what the UN feels necessary. We have no desire for permanent military occupation and are willing to withdraw but will not weaken in our support of UN measures. We should also announce that being willing to contribute our fair share, we would be happy to see US forces replaced by the troops of other countries.

(*b*) *Should we favor demilitarization and neutralization of a united Korea?* It was agreed that we should favor neutralization but that demilitarization presented certain dangers, the principal danger being that we would in effect be in the position of guaranteeing demilitarization without having indigenous forces to assist in action against aggression. It was agreed that we should favor neutralization of a united Korea with political undertakings by the Koreans and others not to engage in aggression, with Korea being free to have the necessary forces to protect its territory. It was suggested that a UN resolution in this sense might be adopted with provision for Korea and its neighbors, plus the United States and the United Kingdom as signatories.

6. *Further steps to be taken for liquidation of the war.* It was agreed that while leaving open the question of our war aims we should announce what we wish ultimately to accomplish. This would include provision for UNCOK to have free access to North Korea for supervising the demobilization of the North Koreans and the supervision of elections. Paragraph 28 of the NSC working paper on Korea should be amended to strike out the phrase "once aggression is brought to an end". It was agreed that we should not defer the announcement of our program for Korea.

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[1] See the memorandum dated August 21, by Messrs. Allison and Emmerson, p. 617, and footnote 1 thereto.

795.00/8–2550

Memorandum by Mr. Walter P. McConaughy, of the Staff of the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 25, 1950.

ROUGH NOTES ON NSC SENIOR STAFF MEETING ON KOREA, AUGUST 25, 1950

Mr. Jessup observed that as to the operational problem there were two aspects, namely, operations behind the lines, presumably amphibious or airborne; and straight ground operations involving occupation. There were many different contingents which would have to be considered under each heading.

Mr. Jessup inquired whether any limitation should be placed on the freedom of the UN Commander to carry on ground operations north of 38 degrees.

Mr. Finletter felt that the group should adopt tentatively the view that there was no essential differentiation to be made between air, sea, and ground operations north of 38 degrees.

Mr. Jessup felt that as to ground operations a caveat should be observed:—The UN Commander should be instructed to keep well clear of the border of USSR and China. Land operations should not come as close to the borders as sea and air operations. Land operations around the narrow bottleneck area between 38 and 39 would seem permissible.

Mr. Jessup suggested that in principle no limitation be placed on operations which are an essential part of the strategy of defeating the North Koreans. It was agreed that UN consultations on this point would be required, also possible direct diplomatic discussions with the interested countries to preclude the possibility of other UN contingents from being called back by their governments when the 38th parallel is reached.

Admiral Wooldridge[1] wanted a statement of what our eventual intentions in Korea were. He said that there was a very pessimistic CIA estimate dated August 18,[2] regarding the dangerous consequences of any UN attempt at the military conquest of all of Korea. The Joint Chiefs would want to know the probable consequences of operations north of 38.

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[1] Rear Adm. E. T. Wooldridge was the Senior NSC Staff member nominated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[2] *Ante*, p. 600.

Mr. Jessup brought up the question of what the US–UN position would be should Soviet–Chinese Communist forces enter the conflict. It was mentioned that if Soviet forces came in, the recommendations contained in NSC 76 [3] would apply. If Chinese Communist forces came in, the recommendations in NSC 73/4 would apply.[4] It was agreed that if the participation of Soviet or Chinese Communist forces should not be announced by their governments, such forces should be treated as if they were North Korean and might be fired upon without restriction. It was agreed that if the entry of such forces into the fighting was formally announced, "that would be something else again". All agreed that the Korean incident should not be permitted to lead to war with the USSR or Chinese Communists.

There was general concurrence that the UN Commander should be allowed to go in with ground troops north of 38 degrees, but he should keep clear of the borders. It was further agreed that this general authorization should be limited as follows: "If intelligence indicates that important organized USSR or Chinese Communists opposition is pending, the UN Commander should not go in without reference of the matter to Washington".

Mr. Jessup suggested that if the UN troops should be in hot pursuit of the North Koreans when 38 was reached, the UN troops should proceed, insofar as possible minimizing US participation and maximizing the participation of the troops of South Korea and other contingents. There should be no firm restriction on US participation, but the principle of minimizing the US role seemed desirable. Any suggestion of US occupation of all of Korea should be avoided.

Admiral Wooldridge wanted to know if UN forces would be in the front of any advance into North Korea.

Mr. Jessup thought that we would want to have diplomatic conversations with a few selected countries about that point. Various

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[3] Dated July 10, p. 346.

[4] At its 66th meeting on August 24, with the President presiding, the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury adopted NSC 73/4 as a working guide, with the understanding that final recommendations to the President regarding U.S. actions in the event of any of the contingencies envisaged would be deferred until it was established that the event was certain to occur (NSC files). Documentation relating to NSC 73 is scheduled for publication in volume I.

The paragraph of NSC 73/4, relating to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, read as follows:

"In the event of the overt use of organized Chinese Communist forces in Korea:

(1) The United States should not permit itself a general war with Communist China.

(2) As long as action by UN military forces now committed or planned for commitment in Korea offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, such action should be continued and extended to include authority to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U.S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further U.S. courses of action."

members suggested the following principles which did not meet any objections:

(1) Roll-back operations would be approved so long as the UN forces keep well clear of the border.
(2) It would be desirable for the North Korean troops to be destroyed south of 38 so far as possible.
(3) UN adherence to the principle of unification of all Korea strengthens the case for operations north of 38 degrees.
(4) The US has no desire to occupy Korea, but the Republic of Korea will need some help. We would be delighted to withdraw our forces altogether and let units of other UN members replace them. But we are not going to welsh on our UN commitment.
(5) It would be desirable for the UN to re-affirm its position on unification, get UNCOK to assist the Republic of Korea and provide UNCOK with UN forces.
(6) The permanent neutrality of Korea should be affirmed by the Republic of Korea and by multilateral declarations of all other states. But this does not call for the complete de-militarization of Korea.

Mr. Finletter wanted to know how soon after the end of hostilities elections would probably be held. He asked if one year would be a reasonable guess.

Mr. Jessup thought the time would probably be shorter—perhaps six months. Mr. Finletter wanted to know if UN forces would protect the government of Korea until elections were held and whether the UN forces could withdraw immediately after elections and the installation of the government of Korea.

Mr. Jessup mentioned that the State Department draft on Korea had something to say on this point.

Mr. Finletter feared that this would mean indefinite occupation of Korea, by UN forces. He suggested that if UN forces had to stay in Korea a "thin line" of such troops be kept near the frontier as a token force if requested by the government of Korea. The Soviets could not call such a token force a military threat to them. At the same time it would give us authoritative information on any border violations and make any communist aggression against the border a direct offense against the UN.

Mr. Finletter felt that US troops should get out of Korea as soon as possible with a clear indication that we have no obligation to return to defend Korea.

He thought we might give some thought to what we would do with our troops in Korea in case the going became very tough with increasing though covert support of the North Koreans by the USSR and Chinese Communist.

Mr. Jessup mentioned the possibility of North Korean guerrilla operations in the hills after formal hostilities have stopped. He in-

quired if the UN would have to mop up the guerrillas. The consensus was that the Republic of Korea would have primary responsibility for the job and that any necessary UN help should be provided by affiliated members so far as possible. The theme was repeated that we should pull the US out of major responsibility as fast as practicable.

It was agreed that if USSR forces should enter Korea, we should take it to the UN urgently. If our forces should be south of 38 degrees at the time, and if Soviet forces did not cross 38, it was surmised that the UN would probably do nothing. If our forces were north of 38 at the time and made contact with the Soviet troops, the evidence of Soviet aggression would be conclusive and the case for UN action would be stronger.

It was agreed that in case of Soviet occupation of either North Korea or all of Korea, the issue would be thrown into the UN and we would see what came out in debate. We didn't want to precipitate war on the issue of Soviet occupation of Korea.

If the USSR forces enter south Korea, we might have to fight at least a rear guard action in order to evacuate our troops.

Mr. Finletter believed that we could agree on these general principles in advance:

(1) Do not suddenly stop the UN offensive at 38.
(2) Avoid aggravating sentiment of the people in North Korea against the UN and the US.
(3) Refer any Soviet or Chinese Communist interference to the UN.
(4) In case of complications requiring UN action, "defend, localize, and stabilize" until further moves are decided in Lake Success and Washington.

W[ALTER] P. M[cCONAUGHY]

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on Friday, August 25, from 3 to 6:25 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.490. In the course of the meeting, Mr. Malik referred to and later had read into the record the text of a communication from Chou En-lai, dated August 24, accusing the United States of aggression against the People's Republic of China by its virtual occupation of Formosa (U.N. document S/1715). Ambassador Gross read the text of a letter from Mr. Austin (S/1716) responding to this charge. For documentation on this subject, see volume VI, pages 256 ff.

795.00/8–2850

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1950.
SFM D–7/3*a*

SEPTEMBER FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS

KOREA

The attached document has been cleared within the Department of State for use in the preliminary tripartite talks.

The document recommends that the U.S. seek support by the United Nations of the following position:

1. As UN forces approach the 38th parallel:

a. Constant assessment of the situation and continued consultations with UN members should be maintained.

b. The unified command should be authorized to conduct military operations without regard to the 38th parallel and should continue the advance northward in order to stabilize and unify as much of the country as is feasible, unless

(1) Soviet forces occupy North Korea to the 38th parallel.
(2) Major Soviet or Chinese Communist units engage or indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities against UN forces.

In these cases further UN decisions should be sought. In any event ground operations should be kept away from Manchurian and USSR frontiers.

2. With regard to restoration of international peace and security in the Korean area:

a. UN support of the final solution of the Korean problem must be assured and solidified.

b. Consideration and support should be given to the reports and recommendations of UNCOK.

c. An appropriate UN body should be created to study and make recommendations to the GA on the future of Korea.

d. Following the repulsion of aggression, this UN body should advise as to immediate post-war steps.

e. The UN should retain in Korea forces consisting substantially of Asiatic contingents until a stable, unified and independent Korea is established. U.S. forces should be available for protection from unprovoked aggression but would be recommended to be stationed south of the 38th parallel.

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[1] This document was prepared as a U.S. position paper by the Department of State Working Group for the preliminary tripartite conversations in Washington, August 29–September 1, in preparation for the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in New York, September 12–14 and 18–19. Documentation on these meetings is scheduled for publication in volume III.

f. UN members, upon advice of the UN body mentioned above, should give political and economic aid to the Korean Government as necessary.

g. These policies should be announced in the UN at an appropriate time.

[Annex]

Draft Position Paper for Meeting of Foreign Ministers in September

KOREA

Problem:

To determine (1) the course of action to be recommended to the United Nations for pursuance when United Nations forces approach the 38th parallel, and (2) the policies to be recommended to the United Nations in order to contribute to the restoration of international peace and security in the Korean area once the aggression has been brought to an end, either by the defeat of the Korean Communists or as the result of an early voluntary withdrawal of the aggressor forces to territory north of the 38th parallel.

Background:

United Nations responsibility in Korea has been affirmed by the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949. These form part of the United Nations effort, strongly supported by the United States, to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. The present military action in Korea responds to the Security Council resolutions which come within the scope of provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter dealing with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

The United Nations Security Council in its resolution of June 25, 1950 determined that the armed attack by North Korean forces constituted a breach of peace, called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel, and called upon members of the United Nations to render assistance in the execution of the resolution and to refrain from aid to the North Korean authorities. In its resolution of June 27, 1950, the Security Council noted that its resolution of June 25 had not been complied with by North Korean authorities, that urgent military measures were required, and further recommended that U.N. members furnish assistance not only to repel the armed attack but also to "restore international peace and security in the area".

Action by the United Nations therefore divides itself into two phases: (*a*) the present enforcement action to repel North Korean

aggression, and (*b*) the long-term effort to bring about unity, independence, and the establishment of peace and security in the area.

Reversal of the military situation in Korea, with assumption of the offensive by U.N. military forces, will undoubtedly impel the Kremlin to take a decision as to its future course of action. The strategic importance of Korea to the Soviet Union is such that the U.S.S.R. would probably take extreme measures—excepting possibly those it deemed likely to bring on general war—to prevent the establishment of a regime in North Korea which it did not believe it could control. Furthermore it seems likely that the Soviet Union would not wait until U.N. forces reached the 38th parallel to take action. Such action might be expected when U.N. forces begin to have military successes and might consist of the entry of Soviet forces, the entry of Chinese Communist forces, a new effort toward a United Nations settlement, or a combination of these. While fighting is in progress south of the 38th parallel, the Kremlin might bring about the occupation of North Korea either with its own or with Chinese Communist forces.

Should the U.S.S.R. announce the reoccupation of North Korea to the 38th parallel by Soviet troops, it is unlikely that there would be sentiment among U.N. members for taking action which would precipitate a direct clash with Russian forces.

While U.N. military forces are now engaged in air and naval action north of the 38th parallel, the use has not yet been made of amphibious landings and ground operations in North Korea. Such operations may be highly desirable as part of the strategy to defeat North Korean forces. The necessity for advance planning and preparation for such operations emphasizes the importance of decisions authorizing them or restricting their location for political reasons. For example, in order not to provoke unnecessarily the USSR and Communist China, the unified command might be instructed to refrain from amphibious and ground operations within a specified area adjoining the Manchurian and Soviet borders.

When North Korean forces withdraw or are driven back to the 38th parallel, continued military action to bring about the unification and independence of Korea will depend upon prior decision by the United Nations. Having been the victim of armed attack from North Korea, the Republic of Korea naturally will want a settlement that gives a maximum guarantee against the danger of similar future attacks. The Korean people and Government are already insisting that the aggression from the north provides the opportunity to abolish the 38th parallel and unify all of Korea under United Nations auspices. Certainly the decisive defeat of the North Korean aggression and the successful unification of Korea would represent a victory of the United

States and of the participating non-Communist nations of incalculable importance in Asia and throughout the world. The Japanese would be keenly impressed by the demonstrated check on Soviet expansion and any latent or active differences between Peiping and Moscow would be considerably stimulated. Soviet satellites in Europe would not be immune to the effect of such an event.

These considerations, in addition to the strategic importance of Korea to the USSR, make it even more probable that the Soviet Union will exert vigorous efforts to block any settlement resulting in a Korean Government which it cannot control. However, notwithstanding its considerable military strength located in the Far East, the Soviet Union may not yet be ready to risk general war in order to prevent a determined and rapid effort by the U.N. to create a unified Korea. This possibility might be increased if the U.N. should adopt by a large majority a program recommended by UNCOK or by some other United Nations body and if it could be demonstrated to the Soviet Union that the proposed settlement was truly a U.N. and not a U.S. settlement and that it would not be directed against legitimate Soviet interests. At any rate, the existence of the possibility justifies a plan of action by the United Nations to achieve a unified Korea.

United Nations support for any program for action in Korea is essential. Therefore it will be necessary to reach general agreement with the British and French Governments and with the other members of the United Nations, to the future course of action to be taken in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

Recommendations:

That discussion of the Korean problem with the British and French Foreign Ministers proceed on the basis of the considerations set forth above and that an effort be made to seek support by the U.N. of the general position outlined below:

1. Course of action to be pursued as United Nations forces approach the 38th parallel:

a. Constant assessment of the situation should be made and continued consultation held with U.N. members to seek general agreement to the course of operations.

b. Should Soviet forces occupy North Korea to the 38th parallel, U.N. forces should not proceed north of the 38th parallel unless so ordered by decision of the United Nations.

c. Should major Soviet or Chinese Communist combat units engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities against U.N. forces, the question of further U.N. action should be immediately referred to the Security Council.

d. Excepting in the situations envisaged in *b* and *c* above, the unified command should be authorized to conduct military opera-

tions, including amphibious landings and ground operations, without regard to the 38th parallel, However, ground operations should be kept well away from the Manchurian and USSR frontiers, and should not be conducted in the mountainous areas north of the 39th parallel except by special U.N. authorization.

e. Excepting in the situations envisaged in *b* and *c* above and unless the U.N. should have taken a prior decision to the contrary, U.N. forces, having arrived at the 38th parallel, should continue their advance northward in order to stabilize and unify as much of the country as is feasible. The extent of their advance and occupation would depend upon U.N. decision. Republic of Korea forces should make up the large percentage of such forces with U.S. participation minimized.

2. Policies directed towards the restoration of international peace and security in the Korean area:

a. The final solution of the Korean problem must be carried out under the authority of the United Nations and must be consistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter. Therefore United Nations support of action in Korea must be assured and solidified.

b. Due consideration and support should be given in the United Nations to the reports and recommendations of the United Nations Commission on Korea.

c. There should be created an appropriate United Nations body, with substantial Asian participation and preferably under the chairmanship of the representative of India, to study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea. Such recommendations should be in accordance with the following principles:

(1) The permanent unification of Korea can only be fairly and correctly resolved with the participation of representatives of the Korean people chosen as the result of free elections throughout Korea on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot held under the authority and observation of the U.N.

(2) The Government of the Republic of Korea should continue to be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem.

(3) The independence and unification of Korea conform with Korean aspirations and the expressed objectives of the United Nations.

(4) The tremendous problems of an economic, social and political nature attendant upon the establishment of a unified Korea are of such a magnitude as to require the assistance of the United Nations. Korea is an Asiatic State and the Asiatic members of the United Nations should play a prominent role in the assistance that the United Nations can give, and their views regarding a solution of the problem should be given sympathetic consideration.

d. The United Nations body referred to above, following the successful repulsion of the aggression in Korea, should advise as to steps to be taken to liquidate the effects of the war, and to neutralize the country, and should recommend as to the size and character of such military and internal security forces as may be needed by the Republic of Korea.

e. The United Nations should retain in Korea, for as long as the 38th parallel divides Korea, or until a stable, unified, and independent Korea is established, a military force to prevent renewed aggression or internal strife during the natural period of adjustment. Such force should include substantial contingents from Asiatic countries. United States forces would be available to participate in enforcing a UN guarantee against unprovoked aggression but the United States would recommend that its contingents be stationed south of the 38th parallel.

f. Members of the United Nations, upon the advice of the United Nations body mentioned above, should give such political and economic aid to the Korean Government as may be necessary after the conclusion of hostilities.

g. The policies outlined herein should be announced in the United Nations at an appropriate time and support sought for a determined effort to seek a solution of the Korean problem.

795B.5/8–2950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, August 29, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received August 29—10 : 04 p. m.]

1035. MAAG has received a communication from General Raguet to effect that French battalion for Korea will embark on October 1 at Cherbourg and will consist of 1,000 men plus 500 for maintenance with a 500-man depot to be set up in France for replacements. The communication states that battalion will have only light arms and proposes that all medical supplies are to be furnished by US Government against MDAP FY '50 program.

MAAG is sending detailed account direct to Defense and is informing General Raguet that this communication has been sent to Washington where it presumably will be discussed between Defense and French military there.

If it is desired we make any reply here, please instruct.[1]

BRUCE

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[1] Department telegram 1120, September 2, to Paris, not printed, informed the Ambassador that no reply was necessary (795B.5/8–2950).

795.00/8–3050

Memorandum of a Teletype Conference, Prepared by the Department of the Army [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1950—6:50 a. m.

Nr: DA TT 3708.

Subject: Far East Situation

PRESENT WASHINGTON		PRESENT TOKYO	
Maj Gen A R Bolling	G2	Maj Gen C A Willoughby	G2
Col R W Hayward USMC	ONI	Col E H F Svensson	G2
		Lt Col W A Hampton	G1
Col Mark Devine	G2	Lt Col R C Cassibry	G2
Col A G Stone	G1	Lt Col J A Berry Jr	G3
Mr Fisher Howe	State	Maj R H Anderson	G4
Mr R H Ingersoll	State	Maj R E Freeze	ADI FEAF
Col H B Hull	AFOIE	Lt (USN) J L Wohler	AFIO NAVFE
Lt Col M F Gilchrist	G3		
Cdr C H Mead	JIG		
Cdr S L Smith	CIA		
Lt Col H W Buchanan	G2		
Lt Col C E McHenry	G4		
Maj T B Strother	G2		
Maj L A Turk	JIG		
Lt H M Rolph	ONI		

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Chinese Communist reinforcements: [2]

Over a considerable pd info from Fru[?], Formosa, and FEC covert sources have reported troop movements from Central China to Manchuria for sometime, which suggest movements preliminary to entering the Korean theatre. As regards troop str, the physical potential of Chinese Communist reinf is evident. Total Communist regular forces, at present in Manchuria, are est to be aprx 246,000 comprising nine armies of 37 divs (aggregate str 6,000 each.) 80,000 have been variously reported in the vic of Antung, in varying stages of assembly. Many Koreans have served in these Manchurian units. Prior to the invasion, ethnic Koreans were combed out of Chinese Communist forces and released to the North Korean Govt in nbrs varying from 40,000–80,000. Further reinf through that channel are therefore not

[1] The source text is taken from a copy in *Korean Conflict.*

[2] The portion of the document herein printed represents a response from Tokyo to a question from Washington on the enemy situation in Korea.

to be discounted. On the other hand, this action probably would precipitate further Russian participation directly or indirectly. Consequently, it is believed that infiltration might take place but no organized participation with div or corps units. Air technical personnel in small nbrs have been described as Chinese and have been picked up in Seoul and Kunsan, and there is a possibility that air reinf may be flown in, since the Formosan invasion appears to be postponed and some Chinese air contingents, with Russian equip, could be employed elsewhere. After all, the precedent of furnishing grd and air support to South Korea by the US has been established and there is no legalistic obstacle for Manchuria to assist its neighbor, the North Koreans. In this connection, the recent broadcast from Mukden accusing American planes of violating the Manchurian border [3] conceivably can be the legalistic basis for air intervention. Finally, the recent preparation of revetments of fwd flds, below the 38th Parallel, on which 43 revetments have been constructed, indicates the expected fwd movement of acft in spite of the depletion of the present NK Air Forces.

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[3] For documentation on this subject, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.

795.00/8–3050

Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State for National Security Council Staff Consideration Only

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1950.

U.S. COURSE OF ACTION AS TO KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine what United States course of action as to Korea would be best calculated to restore international peace and security.

DISCUSSION

2. The present United States responsibility in Korea stems from the UN resolution of June 27, 1950 which noted that North Korean authorities had not complied with the UN resolution of June 25 calling for immediate cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel; that urgent military measures were required; and recommended that UN members furnish assistance not only to repel the armed attack but also to "restore international peace and security in the area". Earlier General Assembly resolutions on Korea which also have a bearing on U.S. re-

sponsibility in Korea are referred to in Appendix I.[1] Under the UN resolutions, the United States as a UN member, along with other UN members is obligated to: (1.) continue the present enforcement action to repel the North Korean aggression and (2.) participate in an effort to establish peace and security in Korea and bring about the unity and independence of the country under a representative government chosen by the Korean people in a free election.

3. Assuming that a UN offensive will be launched in South Korea within the fairly near future, both the United States and the USSR will be obliged to take critical decisions as to the course of action they will pursue in Korea. The USSR would not be likely to accept passively a situation where all or most of Korea would be under the control of forces not subject to its influence. Action by the Soviet Union to forestall such an eventuality might begin either before or after the UN forces reached the 38th parallel and might take the form of the entry into the conflict of satellite armed forces from Communist China, or Soviet forces. Such Soviet or Chinese Communist forces might be organized elements of the regular Soviet or Chinese Communist armies fighting under their own banners, or they might masquerade as North Korean forces fighting as an integral part of the North Korean Army. The former contingency would create a more serious issue for the United Nations than the latter. If Soviet or Chinese Communist forces should openly enter the fray, occupation by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces of all that portion of Korea between the battle lines and the Manchurian-Siberian borders could reasonably be anticipated.

4. Should the USSR announce its intention to occupy part or all of the Korean peninsula, or openly take part in hostilities with its organized armed forces, the UN members resisting the aggression in Korea would be placed in a precarious position and the prospects would be reduced that a united front could be maintained against the aggression. Notwithstanding the risks, it is highly desirable that the UN Commander in Korea have the maximum degree of latitude of strategic and tactical decision in order that he may carry out his mission at minimum cost and in minimum time. Military considerations might dictate the desirability of amphibious or airbourne landings or ground operations in North Korea, either after or (more likely) before the main body of UN forces has crossed the 38th parallel. Such operations might cut the supply lines and the avenue of retreat of the North Korean forces and materially hasten the end of the hostilities. The UN Commander should not be denied the au-

[1] Not printed; the resolutions referred to are listed in paragraph 8 of the Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State for NSC Staff Consideration Only dated August 23, p. 635.

thority to carry out such operations in his discretion without conclusive reasons for such denial. It should be decided immediately whether the Commander has authority to carry on operations north of 38 so that in the event of an affirmative decision there will be sufficient time for the considerable advanced planning and preparation required.

5. Clearly any operations which might be undertaken north of 38 should not needlessly risk drawing Soviet or Chinese Communist forces into either general or local conflict with forces supporting the UN. The objective should be to obtain the maximum strategic and political benefits from operations north of 38 with a minimum of provocation to the Soviet Union and Communist China.

6. Distinct from, but related to the issue of landings north of 38 while fighting is still in progress south of 38, is the question whether a straight roll-back of the main North Korean forces should be continued beyond 38 when the principal battleline reaches that parallel. It is unlikely that the North Korean forces can be entirely disarmed and dissolved south of 38. Hence a continuing threat to the UN forces would exist if those forces halted at 38. The important military advantages of momentum and initiative would be lost. There would be an imminent threat of a renewal of the offensive by rearmed and reinforced North Korean troops, regrouped and reconditioned under cover of the immunity afforded by the 38th parallel. The pacification and unification of Korea in accordance with the UN mandate could not be effected.

7. Thus a halt at this point would not make political or military sense unless the risk that it would provoke a major clash with the Soviet Union or Communist China were so great as to override all other considerations. The Korean Government would not be satisfied with a cease fire decision at the 38th parallel. Such action might be plausibly construed as a betrayal of the Korean people and a negation of the UN resolutions on Korea. The moral effect of a victory in South Korea would be largely dissipated by a refusal to press on, while a decision to continue the pursuit beyond the artificial dividing line would have world-wide psychological repercussions favorable to the United Nations and adverse to the Soviet Union.

8. The arguments for endeavoring to wipe out the arbitrary partition of Korea as a part of the UN military operation is bolstered by the fact that the Soviet Union may well have already made a decision to wage its counter campaign only on the political and propaganda fronts without risking general hostilities at this time, unless the strategic areas contiguous to key population and military centers in the Maritime Provinces and Manchuria should be occupied by the forces of a Great Power. Strong endorsement of and participa-

tion in a positive UN course in Korea by Asiatic and other more or less "neutral" members of the UN might have a deterrent effect on the Soviet Union. Certainly, bold action could not safely be participated in by United States without strong UN sanction enjoying the support of the great majority of the membership. The action would have to be a cooperative effort not identified solely with the interest of the great western powers. It should be crystal clear that any action taken will not pose a military threat to the Soviet Union and will not be aimed against any legitimate Soviet or Chinese Communist interest.

CONCLUSIONS

A. *Operational*

9. The risk of provoking a clash of the Soviet forces with the UN forces will be inversely proportional to the distance between the front line UN forces and the Siberian-Manchurian borders. The UN forces should, therefore, refrain from any ground activity, either combat or occupational, in areas close to the international borders of Korea, or in any more distant areas the occupation of which might reasonably by construed as greatly increasing the military vulnerability of Vladivostok or any other strategic center in Siberia or Manchuria.

10. The UN Commander should be informed: (*a*) that the foregoing is the sole restriction on his freedom to carry out operations north of 38 degrees as part of the strategy to accomplish the mission assigned to him by the UN; (*b*) that behind-the-line operations in the narrow neck of the peninsula [*near?*] the 39th parallel would be less provocative than operations farther north; and (*c*) that it is desirable that he confine any amphibious or airborne operations to that area unless compelling military considerations dictate otherwise.

11. The UN Commander should also be authorized to conduct continuous roll-back operations against North Korean forces well into the northern part of the peninsula if such operations are necessary to the dissolution of the North Korean armed resistance. In this connection, the UN Commander should be directed: (*a*) to seek new instructions before pushing on after North Korean organized resistance has been terminated; (*b*) in no eventuality to approach the international borders of Korea; (*c*) increasingly, as militarily expedient, to designate South Korean troops, and (secondarily) UN forces other than the United States contingent, to spearhead the advance north of 38 degrees; (*d*) in consultation with South Korean Government, assign to it a large measure of responsibility for determining the timing and the method of subjecting occupied territory north of 38 degrees to its jurisdiction; (*e*) to take due precautions against the indulgence of South Korean troops in unwarranted reprisals against the forces, officials, and populace of North Korea.

12. In order to insure that participating forces of other UN members will not be recalled by their governments when the UN forces reach the 38th parallel, the United States should seek an explicit prior understanding on this score through the framework of the UN or through direct negotiation, as desirable.

13. In the event of the overt use of organized Chinese Communist forces in Korea:

"(1) The United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China.

"(2) As long as action by UN military forces now committed or planned for commitment in Korea offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, such action should be continued and extended to include authority to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U.S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further US courses of action." (cf. NSC 73/4, paragraph 40*b*)

14. If major USSR combat units should at any time during military operations in the Korean area of hostilities engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities against U.S. and/or friendly forces the U.S. "should prepare to minimize its commitment in Korea and prepare to execute war plans. These preparations should include initiation of full scale mobilization." (cf. NSC 76—July 21, 1950)[2]

15. If unidentified and unannounced Soviet or Chinese Communist forces should enter the fighting under the North Korean banner, they should not be distinguished from North Korean forces.

16. Notwithstanding the authorizations contained in the preceding paragraphs, if the intelligence available to the UN Commander should indicate that there will be important organized USSR or Chinese Communist resistance, he should not advance farther without specific authorization and should immediately refer the matter to the United Nations.

17. If the Soviet Union should announce an intention to re-occupy North Korea, the United States should take the issue immediately to the Security Council as a matter clearly within the competence of that organization. United Nations forces should not risk open conflict with the Soviet Union while this issue is before the Security Council, but the UN forces should not cease their efforts to destroy North Korean forces south of 38. If the UN should be unable to prevent Soviet reoccupation of North Korea, the United States should seek UN action designed to extract assurances from the Soviet Union that North Korean forces would be disarmed and dispersed when they retreated north of the 38th parallel.

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[2] See the memorandum by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, dated July 10, p. 346 and footnote 2.

18. The United States should, in so far as possible, reduce the scope of United States participation in UN responsibilities for Korea after the organized armed resistance of the North Koreans has ended, without any intimation that the United States would not fulfill its UN commitments. After North Korean organized armed resistance is substantially liquidated, the forces of the Republic of Korea, assisted by the UN Commission on Korea should take the lead in disarming North Korean troops and enforcing the terms of their capitulation. Guerrilla activity should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of Korea with minimum participation by UN contingents, unless the Korean forces alone should prove unable to cope with the guerrilla activities.

19. After UN forces have crossed the 38th parallel, their general posture should be one of conciliation rather than retaliation. An effort should be made to encourage the gradual voluntary adherence of even larger areas of North Korea to the Republic of Korea through civil procedures. UN forces should constitute a stabilizing influence during the transition period and should endeavor to reassure both of Korea's neighbors as to the non-aggressive and temporary nature of the UN occupation.

B. *Political Objectives*

20. The political objective of the United States in Korea is to carry out the UN mandate of establishing under the auspices of the United Nations a unified and independent Korea without provoking a general war with the Soviet Union thereby. The United States should act in Korea only with UN sanction and should consent to the commitment of United States armed forces to the fighting in Korea only so long as employment of these armed forces does not lead to grave risks of a frontal clash with the USSR. The United States should continue to urge support of the United Nations position as to the establishment of a unified and independent Korea but should not unilaterally take action beyond that which is effectively supported by a preponderant majority of the UN membership.

21. The United States should recognize that the USSR and Communist China will make the strongest possible effort to aid the Korean Communists to infiltrate Korea and to seize control of the government by indirect aggression, if their effort to seize all of Korea by civil war is thwarted and that accordingly the legitimate government will be impelled to take strong counter measures for which it may require moral and political support from the United States.

22. The United States should make every effort, utilizing all information media, to turn the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean people away from the United States and direct it toward the Korean Communists, toward the USSR and,

depending upon the role they play, toward the Chinese Communists, as the instigators of the destructive conflict. These efforts should be increased immediately and special assistance should be given the field Commander and the U.S. Embassy in Korea to augment their present propaganda and information programs. The Government of the Republic of Korea should be encouraged to carry this message to the Korean people and should also be given material assistance such as portable radios, sound trucks and printing presses and leaflet materials to facilitate their efforts.

23. The United States should press for UN designation of the United Nations Commission on Korea or some other UN body to make recommendations to the General Assembly as to the future of Korea. The United States should urge that this United Nations body be guided by the following principles:

(1) The permanent unification of Korea should come about through the participation of representatives of all the Korean people chosen in free country-wide secret-ballot elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, the elections to be held under the authority and supervision of the United Nations.

(2) The Government of the Republic of Korea should continue to be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem. Its independence and stability conforms with Korean aspirations and the expressed objectives of the United Nations.

(3) An obligation rests upon the members of the United Nations to contribute to the solution of the tremendous economic, social and political problems certain to confront a unified and independent Korea. Asiatic members of the United Nations should make a substantial contribution to the requisite United Nations assistance in view of the special regional interest they have in Korea. Their views regarding a solution of the problems of Korea should be given weighty consideration.

24. The United States should also urge that this United Nations body be charged with continuing consideration of Korean problems and instructed to make recommendations as to the size and character of the military and internal security forces needed by the Republic of Korea and as to steps which might be necessary or desirable to insure that all countries will recognize and respect the neutrality of Korea.

25. If the United Nations should recommend the retention in Korea of a UN military force until a stable, unified, and independent government is firmly established, United States forces should be made available as a component unit in the UN forces for the purpose of assisting in the prevention of renewed aggression or disruptive internal strife. United States forces should however be minimized and should preferably serve only in conjunction with contingents of Asiatic and other UN members.

795.00/8–3050

United States Delegation Minutes: SFM Pre 4 [1]

TOP SECRET

PRELIMINARY CONVERSATIONS FOR SEPTEMBER FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING
AUGUST 30, 1950—3–5:30 P. M.

Delegations: *British:* Graves, Burrows, Greenhill [2]
French: Daridan, de Margerie, Millet, Fequant [3]
U.S.: Yost, Emmerson, Bancroft, Raynor, Jackson, Emmons, O'Shaugnessy, Hackler, Bacon, Ranney (recorder)

Subject: Korea

In opening the discussion on Korea, Mr. Emmerson said that the U.S. position was still tentative and we wished to hear the views of the other Powers regarding the future courses of action. It was unnecessary to detail the events which had led up to the present position. U.N. responsibility for Korea had existed for some time and present action in the country was clearly based upon the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950. As the U.S. saw it, the problem might be divided into two phases, (1) the question of present enforcement action and, (2) long-term objectives for Korea. Both matters, in the U.S. view, required urgent consideration. Reversal of the North Korean fortunes would compel a decision by the Soviet Union regarding its own course of action and the danger existed that the USSR might take extreme measures, either of open intervention or of large scale military assistance to the North Koreans. These questions would become particularly acute when the North Korean forces were driven back to the 38th Parallel, and the U.S. believed that continued military action would depend upon prior decision by the U.N. It was clearly desirable that efforts for the unification and independence of Korea be carried through to a successful conclusion. The U.S. stated, however, that it believed no step should be taken which might provoke a general war.

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[1] A cover sheet, not printed, indicated that at this fourth session of the preliminary tripartite conversations for the September Foreign Ministers meetings the subjects discussed were Korea and Formosa; for minutes of the meeting dealing with Formosa, see vol. VI, p. 500.

[2] Hubert A. Graves, B. A. B. Burrows, Counselors, and Denis A. Greenhill, First Secretary, British Embassy in Washington.

[3] Jean Daridan, Minister Counselor, Christian de Margerie and Pierre Millet, Counselors, and Albert Fequant, Second Secretary, French Embassy in Washington.

The U.S. proposed the following course of action as U.N. forces approach the 38th Parallel:

(1) Constant assessment of the situation should be made and continued consultation held with U.N. members to seek general agreement to the course of operations;
(2) If Soviet forces occupy North Korea to the 38th Parallel, U.N. forces should not cross the Parallel unless ordered by the U.N.;
(3) If major Soviet or Chinese Communist combat units engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities, the question of further action should be referred to the Security Council.

The U.S. put forward the following proposals with regard to restoration of peace and security in Korea:

(1) The final solution must be consistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter and U.N. support of action in Korea must be assured and solidified.
(2) Consideration should be given to the reports and recommendations of UNCOK.
(3) An appropriate U.N. body should be created to study and make recommendations to the GA on the future of Korea. Such recommendations should be based upon (*a*) permanent unification of Korea requires free elections in Korea under the observation of the U.N.; (*b*) the Government of the Republic of Korea should continue to be recognized as the only lawful Government and should be consulted on long-term solutions; (*c*) any solution must conform with Korean aspirations and U.N. objectives; (*d*) continuing U.N. support will be necessary.

The U.S. also expressed the view that it would probably be necessary to retain a U.N. force in Korea for some time after the cessation of hostilities. Such a force should include substantial contingents from Asian countries. U.S. forces would be available for this purpose, but the U.S. would recommend that its contingents be stationed South of the 38th Parallel. The U.S. also believed that members of the U.N. should give such political and economic aid to the Korean Government as might be necessary after the conclusion of hostilities.

The French representative began by mentioning that the Korean problem was at present under discussion in New York between the various delegations to the U.N. Without prejudice to the course of these discussions he could state the following general elements in the French position:

(1) Until the Security Council has passed a further resolution on the subject, U.N. forces should not cross the 38th Parallel, as this would create a new situation and might bring in the USSR and China;
(2) U.N. forces must remain in South Korea after the liberation of the country;
(3) It would be inconsistent with the high principles which have guided U.N. action in Korea for the U.N. merely to undertake a resto-

ration of the Rhee Government, which has revealed its internal weaknesses and corruption. Elections shortly before the invasion clearly demonstrated that a large majority of the people were dissatisfied with that Government. Moreover, re-establishment of the present regime might provoke a widespread terror in the country. France believed that new situations called for new formulas. Whatever formula is adopted, its application should be step by step, to gain time, allow passions to cool, and permit a period of guidance of Korean affairs by the U.N. In response to a question by the U.S. representative, the French admitted that any apparent effort to keep Korea in a state of tutelage might be resented by other Asian powers, but he said that the decision would be a U.N. one so that the Western powers alone could not be blamed for slowness in implementing a solution. It was obvious, in any case, that the U.N. could not stay in Korea "for only a few days".

The British stated that because of the nature of Korean operations their remarks at this meeting could be speculative and exploratory only. They were largely in agreement with the U.S. position as outlined, although there were some different points of emphasis. The British attached great importance to the remarkable array of unanimity in support of U.N. action in Korea and believed that every new phase of action should be designed to command widest support, especially in Asia. The U.N. therefore should endeavor to make just and reasonable arrangements for Korea, even if these arrangements in practice were difficult of attainment.

Some early statement should be made of broad U.N. objectives for the country. The British agreed with the French that something more than the mere restoration of authority of the present Korean Government was necessary. A limited objective of this kind would satisfy no one. The United Kingdom holds that the Government of the Republic of Korea has no title to sovereignty to those parts of the country where free elections have not been held. Rhee's pretensions that all Korea is under his Government are accordingly inacceptable and any solution for Korea based upon these pretensions would split the democratic powers.

The British suggested that one way of clarifying U.N. objectives might be a resolution of the GA that as soon as the situation permits, all previous U.N. resolutions with respect to Korea should be implemented and that free elections be held at the earliest date. Such a resolution need not commit us to the view that the 38th Parallel should be crossed—this decision could be made at a later date—but it would emphasize our desire to unify Korea on a democratic basis. In the British view, the GA was the most appropriate body for the consideration of broad objectives with regard to Korea.

The British doubted whether crossing of the 38th Parallel could be justified under the resolution of June 27, 1950, as this resolution

was aimed at repelling attack. Crossing the Parallel or establishing a permanent occupation of North Korea would be another matter requiring further decision by the Security Council. In any event, it was essential that a general statement of objectives be made prior to any extension of military activities beyond the 38th Parallel. Future circumstances would necessarily affect the decision as to the wisdom of committing U.N. forces north of the 38th Parallel, particularly the state of the North Korean forces at that time. The British shared the view that fighting North of the 38th Parallel would increase the risks of Soviet intervention. They believed the USSR did not wish to provoke a major war, but the Soviets might dispatch a volunteer force or large military supplies which would create a situation full of explosive possibilities. It was, of course, possible that the USSR might in any case occupy the country up to the 38th Parallel or take other action alleged to be in the interest of restoring peace. The Soviets might also revive previous proposals for a four-power trusteeship of Korea, although we could solve this problem by exposing Soviet motives and saying that the Koreans have demonstrated their ability to govern themselves. The British agreed that U.N. forces should be retained in Korea during the period of readjustment following cessation of hostilities to prevent renewed aggression and maintain order. In their view, permanent occupation of North Korea by U.N. forces should not be contemplated.

The British believed that UNCOK as now constituted was not an entirely suitable body for handling Korean affairs involving the establishment of the new state. A new Commission should be formed, composed largely of Asian representatives to make recommendations to the U.N. on problems relating to establishment of an independent and unified Korea. The Commission would also inform the Koreans of the intention to hold elections and if possible would arrange for U.N. forces to enter North Korea to supervise the elections. The Commission would be charged with preventing retaliation by the South Koreans. In the British view, such a Commission should be as strong as possible, composed of members who would carry considerable weight. It might remain in Korea for about a year, or whatever period was necessary for secure establishment of the new Government. The British were of the opinion that elections should be held in whatever part of Korea may be liberated by U.N. forces, whether or not it is possible to hold them North of the 38th Parallel. They had no definite instructions on this point, however.

The U.K. shared the view of the other Powers that the new Korean state would need continued military and diplomatic support because of the ravages of the present conflict and the danger of subversion which the Korean Government would have to face.

In reply to the views put forward by the British and French representatives, the U.S. representative stated that we appeared to be in general agreement, the chief point of difference being our attitude to the present Korean Government. The U.S. favored continued recognition of the Republic of Korea as the only lawful Government in the country, which should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem. The U.S. pointed out the importance of maintaining the prestige and continuity of the Republic of Korea, a nation sponsored by the U.N. and cited the democratic aspects of that Government in spite of its immaturity and inexperience. If Rhee is, in fact, not supported by the Korean people it will be up to them to change the Government by democratic processes.

The British and French representatives continued to express their dissatisfaction with the Rhee Government, although the French representative agreed that Korean pride should not be diminished and that this matter needed careful consideration. The U.S. stated that its position was to continue to recognize the jurisdiction of the Government of the Republic of Korea in the exact terms of resolutions which have been passed by the GA. The jurisdiction of the Republic might progressively be extended as free elections were held.

795.00/8–3150

Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1950.

UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION AS TO KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine what United States course of action as to Korea would be best calculated to advance the national interest of the United States.

DISCUSSION

2. The present United Nations' action in Korea is being taken in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950. The Resolution of June 25 called for "the immediate cessation of hostilities," called upon "the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel," and called upon all U.N. members "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." The Resolution of June 27 noted the failure of the North Korean authorities to comply with the

resolution of June 25 and recommended that "the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

3. In a third resolution (July 7, 1950), the Security Council requested the United States to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized that these forces fly the U.N. flag. In response to this resolution, General MacArthur has been designated Commander of the U.N. forces in Korea. The Republic of Korea has also placed its forces under General MacArthur's command.

4. The political objective of the United Nations in Korea is to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949.

5. The United States has strongly supported this political objective. If the present United Nations' action in Korea can accomplish this political objective without substantial risk of general war with the Soviet Union or Communist China, it would be in our interest to advocate the pressing of the United Nations' action to this conclusion. It would not be in our national interest, however, nor presumably would other friendly members of the United Nations regard it as being in their interest to take action in Korea which would involve a substantial risk of general war. Furthermore, it would not be in our national interest to take action in Korea which did not have the support of the great majority of the United Nations, even if, in our judgment, such action did not involve a substantial risk of general war.

6. As U.N. forces succeed in stabilizing the front, driving back the North Korean forces, and approaching the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U.N. members which are supporting the Security Council resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities are confined to Korea or spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

7. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will passively accept the emergence of a situation in which all or most of Korea would pass from its control, provided it believes that it can take action which would prevent this *and* which would not involve a substantial risk of general war. The Soviet Union may decide that it can risk reoccupying Northern Korea before United Nations' forces have reached the 38th parallel, or the conclusion of an arrangement with the North Korean regime under which Soviet forces would be pledged to the defense of the territory of the People's Republic of Northern Korea. Alternatively, the Soviet Union might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities are still in progress south of the 38th parallel.

In view of the importance of avoiding general war, we should be prepared to negotiate a settlement while refusing terms that would leave the aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of the aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

8. Although it does not appear likely that Chinese Communist forces would be used to occupy North Korea (because the Soviet Union probably regards Korea as being in its own direct sphere of interest), this contingency cannot be excluded. It also seems unlikely that Soviet or Chinese Communist forces will be openly employed in major units in the fighting in the southern part of the peninsula, for it is believed that neither the Soviet Union nor the Chinese Communists are ready to engage in general war at this time for this objective. It is possible that the Soviet Union may endeavor to persuade the Chinese Communists to enter the Korean campaign with the purpose of avoiding the defeat of the North Korean forces and also of fomenting war between the United States and the Chinese Communists should we react strongly.

9. It is possible, but not probable, that no action will be taken by the Soviet Union or by the Chinese Communists to reoccupy Northern Korea or to indicate in any other way an intention to prevent the occupation of Northern Korean by United Nations' forces before the latter have reached the 38th parallel. In this unlikely contingency it would seem probable that the Soviet Union had decided to follow a hands-off policy, even at the expense of the loss of control of Northern Korea. Only in this contingency could the U.N. forces undertake ground operations north of the 38th parallel without a substantial risk of general war. It is difficult to appraise this risk at this time, and our action in crossing the 38th parallel would create a situation to which the Soviet Union would be almost certain to react in some manner. While the risk of Soviet or Chinese communist intervention might not be lessened if only the ROK forces conducted the operation north of the 38th parallel, the risk of general hostilities as a result of such intervention would be reduced. In no circumstances should other U.N. forces be used in the northeastern province bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.

10. It will be desirable to bear in mind in the contingency stated in paragraph 9 both the importance of securing support of the majority of U.N. members for any action that might be taken north of the 38th parallel and the advantage of establishing a record that will clearly show that every reasonable effort has been made to avoid carrying the military struggle into a new phase by a land offensive beyond the 38th parallel. At some point after the U.N. forces begin to take the initiative and to drive back and destroy the North Korean forces, terms of

surrender should be offered. The question of the acceptance of such terms by the North Koreans would of course be determined by the U.S.S.R. in the light of its appraisal of its interests under all the circumstances then existing.

11. The U.N. forces are clearly committed by the Security Council resolutions to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel and there is a clear legal basis for taking such military actions north of the 38th parallel as are necessary in accomplishing this mission.

12. Military actions north of the 38th parallel which go beyond the accomplishment of this mission as, for example to accomplish the political objective of unifying Korea under the Republic of Korea are not clearly authorized by existing Security Council resolutions. Accordingly, United Nations approval for such further military actions is a prerequisite to their initiation.

13. Soviet domination of North Korea has brought with it the pattern of police and propaganda control well known throughout the Soviet world. Since the existence and stability of a unified Korea must in the long run depend largely upon the Korean people themselves, the tasks of the United Nations will include the reorientation of the North Korean people toward the outlook of free peoples who accept the standards of international behavior set forth in the United Nations Charter.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

14. It is evident from the above discussion that final decisions can not be made at this time concerning the future course of action in Korea, since the course of action which will best advance the national interest of the United States must be determined in light of the action or inaction of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists and in consultation and agreement with friendly members of the United Nations. Pending final decisions, the United Nations' commander should make plans to cover the contingency that the United Nations' forces, or at least the R.O.K. forces, will be called upon to occupy Northern Korea, provided a substantial risk of general war is not thereby incurred.

15. The United Nations' forces have a legal basis for conducting operations north of the 38th parallel for the purpose of compelling the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this line or of defeating these forces. The United Nations' forces should be developed so that operations to compel the withdrawal, to inflict maximum losses in the process, and, if possible and desirable, to occupy Northern Korea are within their capabilities. Plans for such operations should be perfected but major actions to carry out the occupation of northern Korea

should not be undertaken north of the 38th parallel by the United Nations' commander without prior authorization. Such authorization should be granted only with the explicit approval of the President, and would require consultation with, and the approval of, the U.N. members supporting the Security Council resolutions.

16. The United Nations' commander should undertake no ground operations north of the 38th parallel in the event of the occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, but should reoccupy Korea up to the 38th parallel. Bombing operations north of the 38th parallel should not be discontinued merely because the presence of Soviet or Chinese Communists troops are detected in a target area. However, if the Soviet Union should announce in advance its intention to reoccupy North Korea, either explicitly or impliedly giving warning that its forces should not be attacked, the matter should be immediately referred to the Security Council. Military action against North Korean troops south of the 38th parallel would continue. Under the general policy considerations applicable to engaging in full-scale hostilities with the Soviet Union in Korea, forces of the Unified Command would seek to minimize conflict with the Russian forces.

17. In the event of the open employment of major Soviet units south of the 38th parallel, the U.N. Commander should break off the action as rapidly as possible consistent with the orderly withdrawal of his forces. U.S. action in this event should conform with that outlined in paragraphs 35 to 36d of NSC 73/4.[1]

18. In the event of the open employment of major Chinese communist units south of the 38th parallel, the United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China; but as long as action by U.N. military forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, the U.N. Commander should continue such action and be authorized to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U.S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further U.S. courses of action.

19. In the event of an attempt to employ major Soviet or Chinese Communist units covertly south of the 38th parallel, the United Nations' Commander should continue the action as long as he believes his forces were capable of successful resistance.

20. Instructions as to the course of action in the event of the overt employment of major Soviet or Chinese Communist units north of the 38th parallel should be issued to the Commander simultaneously with

[1] Text scheduled for publication in volume I. These paragraphs dealt with U.S. response in the event of overt Soviet attack or Soviet-inspired aggression in various quarters of the world.

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any authorization to undertake major ground actions north of the 38th parallel.

21. Instructions as to the terms of surrender to be offered in the event of a sudden collapse and rout of North Korean forces shall be transmitted to the U.N. Commander as soon as they are formulated under the procedure outlined in paragraph 27. Pending the preparation of such instructions, the Commander should be given interim instructions that in such event he should offer terms requiring at a minimum the cessation of hostilities and the laying down of arms. If the terms offered should not be accepted, the U.N. Commander should continue his efforts to destroy as many of the enemy as possible before they retreat across the 38th parallel. He should request new instructions before continuing operations north of the 38th parallel with major forces for the purposes of occupying North Korea. He should not in any circumstances permit the use of U.N. forces other than R.O.K. contingents in the northeast province or along the Manchurian border.

22. If operations are undertaken to occupy northern Korea, the United Nations' Commander should, in consultation with the Government of the R.O.K., determine the timing and method of subjecting occupied territory north of the 38th parallel to its jurisdiction. He should forbid, as commander of the U.N. forces, reprisals against the forces, officials, and populace of North Korea except in accordance with international law and take such measures as are within his power to secure compliance with this directive.

23. In the event of Soviet reoccupation of North Korea or announcement of an intention to prevent U.N. occupation of North Korea (or in the unlikely event of such action by the Chinese Communists), the United States should take the matter to the Security Council, with the stated purpose of securing the cooperation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) in U.N. action to achieve the unity and independence of Korea. Since such cooperation would not be forthcoming, an attempt would then be made in the General Assembly to secure the condemnation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) for flouting the will of the U.N. majority. U.N. forces would be maintained at or near the 38th parallel to safeguard the security of the R.O.K.

24. In the event of the open employment of major Soviet units south of the 38th parallel, the matter should be taken to the Security Council with the purpose of explaining the breaking off of action by the United Nations' forces and of developing a basis for united action by as many members of the U.N. as possible at such time as the United States believed that action against the Soviet Union would be advantageous. U.S. action in this event should conform with that outlined in paragraphs 35 to 36d. of NSC 73/4.

25. In the event of the open employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th parallel, the matter should be taken to the Security Council with the purpose of condemning the Chinese Communists as aggressors. Other U.S. action should be as outlined in paragraph 18.

26. In the event of the attempted covert employment of major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces south of the 38th parallel, the United States should anticipate the probable forced withdrawal of United Nations' forces from Korea and should take the matter to the Security Council with the purpose indicated in paragraphs 24 or 25.

27. In preparation for the possible eventual retreat of North Korean forces, the United States should immediately discuss with certain friendly members of the United Nations the terms to be offered the North Korean forces. This will serve to develop support for action north of the 38th parallel to accomplish the political objective of the United Nations in Korea in the event that the terms are rejected *and* there is no evidence of a substantial risk of a clash with Soviet or Chinese Communist forces.

28. When organized armed resistance by the North Korean forces has been brought substantially to an end, the United States should attempt to reduce its share of the U.N. responsibilities for Korea, and announce its desire to do so, without, however, implying any unwillingness to fulfill its U.N. commitments. The R.O.K. forces, operating under principles established by the U.N. Commission for Korea, or such body as may be established to take its place, should take the lead in disarming remaining North Korean units and enforcing the terms of surrender. Guerrilla activity should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of Korea with minimum participation by U.N. contingents, unless the Korean forces alone should prove unable to cope with the guerrilla activities.

29. In performing their mission beyond the 38th parallel, the general posture of the United Nations' forces should be one of liberation rather than retaliation. An effort should be made to encourage the voluntary adherence of ever larger areas of North Korea to the R.O.K. The United Nations' forces should attempt to exert a stabilizing influence during the transition period. They should endeavor to conduct themselves in such a way as to emphasize the non-aggressive and temporary nature of the U.N. occupation.

30. The United States should recognize that the Government of the R.O.K. will have to take strong measures against Communist efforts to cause trouble in Korea and that it may require support in these measures from the United States. At the same time, the United States should recognize that social and economic reforms will be necessary in order to reduce the Communist menace to manageable proportions.

31. The United States should make an intensive effort, using all information media, to turn the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean people away from the United States and to direct it toward the Korean communists, the Soviet Union, and, depending on the role they play, the Chinese Communists, as the parties responsible for the destructive conflict. These efforts should be increased immediately and special assistance should be given to the field commander and the U.S. Embassy in Korea to augment their present propaganda and information programs. The Government of the R.O.K. should be encouraged to increase its propaganda output and should be given material assistance in this effort.

32. In order to effect the reorientation of the North Korean people, to cause defection of enemy troops in the field, and to train North Korean personnel to participate in activities looking to unification of the country, the following steps should be taken:

(*a*) Establish the principle that the treatment of POW's, after their transfer to places of internment, shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and use for psychological warfare purposes, and for the tasks specified above.

(*b*) Set up immediately on a pilot-plant scale an interrogation, indoctrination and training center for those POW's now in our hands in Korea. Personnel in charge of this project must be selected with the greatest care, taking into consideration Korean or Far Eastern experience, language qualifications, and temperamental aptitude. Full advantage should be taken of World War II experience in the indoctrination of German and Japanese prisoners of war and of recent experience with Soviet escapees.

33. The United States should advocate in the United Nations the adoption of the following principles to govern the action of the United Nations in Korea in the post-hostilities period:

(*a*) the unification of Korea should be arranged by representatives of the Korean people chosen in free secret-ballot elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, the elections to be held under the auspices of the United Nations.

(*b*) the Government of the R.O.K. should be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted on problems arising in connection with the unification of Korea.

(*c*) An obligation rests upon the members of the United Nations to contribute to the solution of the tremendous economic, social and political problems certain to confront a unified and independent Korea. Asiatic members of the United Nations should be urged to make a substantial contribution to the assistance program in view of their special regional interest in Korea.

34. In consonance with the above principles, the United States should take the following steps:

(*a*) Take vigorous action through diplomatic channels and in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly to assure and solidify United Nations support of necessary action in Korea.

(*b*) Be prepared to announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter and the general aims and principles which the United States believes should underlie such a solution.

(*c*) When such an announcement is made, the United States should recommend or urge others to recommend, the creation of an appropriate United Nations body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with the principles enumerated above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as chairman of such a body.

35. The United States should urge that the U.N. Commission on Korea or such body as may be established to take its place be charged with continuing consideration of Korean problems and instructed to make recommendations as to the size and character of the military and internal security forces needed by the R.O.K. The U.S. should recommend that the U.N. Commission should consider the desirability of permanent neutralization of Korea accompanied by political undertakings by the R.O.K. and by other states separately to refrain from any aggression. The question of U.N. guarantee should be studied but no U.S. commitment on this point should be made at this stage.

36. The United States should urge that U.N. forces be retained in Korea until a stable, unified, and independent state has been firmly established and should be prepared to make available United States forces as a contingent of the U.N. forces for the purpose of deterring renewed aggression or internal strife. The number of our forces should be reduced so far as possible, however, and should serve only in conjunction with other U.N. contingents, preferably including some Asiatic contingents.

795.00/8–3150

Draft Paper Prepared for the Preliminary Tripartite Conversations of the September Foreign Ministers Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1950.

COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

A. AREAS OF AGREEMENT

1. Every effort should be made to maintain the impressive degree of unanimity achieved to date among U.N. members on the Korean question.

[1] This paper, bearing the designation Document 5 [D–6/1], was prepared following the meeting on August 30 (p. 667) for consideration by the meeting of Ambassadors on September 1, *infra*, in the preliminary tripartite conversations.

2. United Nations forces should not be committed to proceed north of the 38th parallel without prior United Nations direction. Future circumstances would necessarily affect this decision, particularly the state of the North Korean forces at the time.

3. United Nations forces should not proceed north of the 38th parallel, if Soviet or Chinese Communist forces have occupied North Korea to the 38th parallel, or if major Soviet or Chinese Communist combat units have engaged or clearly indicated their intention of engaging in hostilities against U.N. forces.

4. A resolution formulating the broad objectives and intentions of the U.N. in Korea should be adopted in the General Assembly at an early date. Such resolution should emphasize the necessity of implementing previous U.N. resolutions directed to the achievement of the independence and unification of Korea.

5. A commission of representatives of senior rank, with a high percentage of Asian members, should be formed to make recommendations to the U.N. on problems relating to the establishment of an independent and unified Korea, including holding of elections.

6. U.N. forces, which should include strong Asian participation, should be retained in Korea during the period of readjustment following cessation of hostilities to prevent renewed aggression and maintain law and order. In the British view permanent occupation of North Korea by U.N. forces should not be contemplated.

7. Continued political and economic assistance to the Korean Government by the U.N. will be necessary.

B. QUESTIONS REQUIRING MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION

There was a difference of opinion on the attitude to be maintained toward the government of the Republic of Korea after the cessation of hostilities. The U.S. position was stated to be continued recognition of the Republic of Korea as the only lawful government in Korea, which should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem. The U.S. representatives pointed out the importance of maintaining the prestige and continuity of the Republic of Korea, a U.N. sponsored nation, and pointed to the democratic aspects of its government in spite of its immaturity and inexperience. The French representatives felt that the Rhee government did not enjoy the confidence of a large majority of the South Korean people and that an attempt simply to reconstitute and re-establish that government over Korea would not meet with wide approval inside and outside Korea. The British representative emphasized that Rhee's contention that his government held title to sovereignty over all of Korea could not be accepted. Therefore both delegations felt that a new situation would demand a new government and that elections on a national scale should be required.

The French representative favored a step-by-step approach to the Korean political problem, with a slow, deliberate application of formulae to allow passions to cool and to gain time for a settlement under the aegis of the U.N.

795.00/9–150

United States Delegation Minutes: SFM Pre 5

[Extracts] [1]

SECRET

PRELIMINARY CONVERSATIONS FOR SEPTEMBER FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS
SEPTEMBER 1, 1950, 10:30 A. M. TO 12:45 P. M.

DELEGATIONS

BRITISH	FRENCH	U.S.
Sir Derick Hoyer Millar [2]	Ambassador Bonnet [3]	Ambassador Jessup
Mr. Burrows	Mr. Daridan	Mr. Perkins
Mr. Graves	Mr. de Margerie	Mr. Yost
Mr. Burns	Mr. Millet	Mr. Raynor
Mr. Watson		Mr. Jackson
Mr. Marten		Mr. O'Shaughnessy
Earl Jellicoe		Mr. McSweeney (Recorder)

Ambassador Jessup welcomed the British and French delegations. He stated that the work done in preceding conversations had been very satisfactory. There are a number of points which cannot be dealt with at this moment. The function of these meetings should be to develop the points as much as possible, sharpening the documents so that they will contain the most important points for the Foreign Ministers. It was agreed that today's meeting would attempt to cover all the documents, leaving Tuesday [4] available for another meeting if necessary.

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Document 5 (D–6)—Korea [5]

The UK delegation suggested that the phrase "Similarly without UN direction . . ." be added at the beginning of A.3.

Ambassador Jessup pointed out that in the matter of military action north of the 38th parallel, we are not talking about military actions,

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[1] The complete text of these minutes is scheduled for publication in volume III.
[2] British Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
[3] Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador in Washington.
[4] September 5.
[5] Reference is to the Draft Paper dated August 31, *supra*.

such as bombing attacks which may be carried out for strategic or tactical purposes in the course of the present action, but rather of the use of UN forces, presently in Korea to prevent aggression, to bring about unification of Korea.

Ambassador Jessup raised the question of the meaning of "permanent occupation" in Paragraph 6, page 2, and stated that he assumed that this would not exclude the use of UN forces in the period of pacification of the area. The British delegation stated it felt the phrase meant something like "unduly prolonged occupation" but that the phrase was taken from Foreign Office instructions.

. . . . . .

795.00/9–150

Memorandum Prepared in the Preliminary Tripartite Conversations for the Consideration of the Foreign Ministers

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1950.
Document 12 [D–6/1*a*]

COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

A. AREAS OF AGREEMENT

1. Every effort should be made to maintain the impressive degree of unanimity achieved to date among United Nations members on the Korean question.

2. U.N. forces should not be committed to proceed north of the 38th parallel without prior U.N. direction. This would not preclude tactical operations north of the 38th parallel incident to action south of the parallel. Future circumstances would necessarily affect this decision, particularly the state of the North Korean forces at the time.

3. Without U.N. direction, U.N. forces should not proceed north of the 38th parallel, if Soviet or Chinese Communist forces have occupied North Korea to the 38th parallel, or if major Soviet or Chinese Communist combat units have engaged or clearly indicated their intention of engaging in hostilities against U.N. forces.

4. A resolution formulating the broad objectives and intentions of the U.N. in Korea should be adopted in the General Assembly at an early date. Such resolution should emphasize the necessity of implementing previous U.N. resolutions directed to the achievement of the independence and unification of Korea.

5. A commission of representatives of senior rank, with a high percentage of Asian members, should be formed to make recommendations to the U.N. on problems relating to the establishment of an independent and unified Korea, including holding of elections.

6. U.N. forces, which should include strong Asian participation, should be retained in Korea during the period of readjustment following cessation of hostilities to prevent renewed aggression and maintain law and order.

In the U.K. view permanent occupation of North Korea by U.N. forces should not be contemplated.

7. Continued political and economic assistance to the Korean Government by the U.N. will be necessary.

B. QUESTIONS REQUIRING MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION

There was a difference of opinion on the attitude to be maintained toward the government of the Republic of Korea after the cessation of hostilities. The U.S. position was stated to be continued recognition of the government of the Republic of Korea as the only lawful government in Korea, which should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem. The U.S. representatives pointed out the importance of maintaining the prestige and continuity of the Republic of Korea, a U.N. sponsored nation, and pointed to the democratic aspects of its government in spite of its immaturity and inexperience. The French representatives felt that the Rhee government did not enjoy the confidence of a large majority of the South Korean people and that an attempt simply to reconstitute and re-establish that government over Korea would not meet with wide approval inside and outside Korea. The U.K. representative emphasized that Rhee's contention that his government held title to sovereignty over all of Korea could not be accepted. Therefore both delegations felt that a new situation would demand a new government and that elections on a national scale should be required.

The French representative favored a step-by-step approach to the Korean political problem, with a slow, deliberate application of formulae to allow passions to cool and to gain time for a settlement under the aegis of the U.N.

Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 80

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1950.

NSC 80

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON PEACE OFFENSIVE CONCERNING KOREA

On the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and with the concurrence of the President, the enclosed memorandum by the Joint

Secretaries on the subject is circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury and referred to the NSC Staff for use in the preparation of a report for Council consideration.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1950.

Subject: Peace Offensives Concerning Korea

Statement

1. The past few weeks have produced the outline of the pressures for compromises in Korea. The Soviets have plunged into an avalanche of words on peace, U.S. aggression, and civil war. India, and other UN members, are seeking ways to end hostilities as soon as possible. Unless skillfully managed, these and other efforts plus growing casualty lists may build up into an uncontrollable demand for a settlement that would nullify the heroic resistance of American and South Korean troops and injure U.S. interests.

2. In a few weeks, barring large-scale entry of Chinese Communist or Soviet forces into Korea, a military stalemate may develop. This stalemate possibly could last several months. It is a bleak prospect for our troops, the American people, and the UN cause. In anticipation of this possibility, vigorous action on the psychological and diplomatic front, based on well-considered policy directives, should be undertaken by the United States almost immediately.

Recommendation

We strongly urge that you request the National Security Council staff to prepare a report on the courses of action to be taken to offset the psychological and diplomatic effects of a stalemate in Korea. Such actions would be taken, on the President's approval, with a view to bridging the gap until sufficient military force is available to launch a successful offensive in Korea.[1]

FRANK PACE, JR.
Secretary of the Army
DAN A. KIMBALL
Acting Secretary of the Navy
THOMAS K. FINLETTER
Secretary of the Air Force

[1] At its 69th meeting on October 12, 1950, the National Security Council, on the recommendation of the NSC Senior Staff, agreed to cancel this project (NSC Action No. 369c).

Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 81

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1950.

NSC 81

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

References: A. NSC Action No. 338 [1]
B. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Future United States Policy with Respect to Korea", dated July 17 [2] and August 30, 1950 [3]

Pursuant to the President's request the enclosed report on the subject, prepared by the NSC Staff, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury at the next regularly scheduled Council meeting on Thursday, September 7, 1950.

It is recommended that, if this report is adopted, it be submitted to the President for consideration with the recommendation that he approve the Conclusions contained therein and direct their implementation by all executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Enclosure]

DRAFT REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine what United States course of action with respect to Korea would be best calculated to advance the national interests of the United States.

ANALYSIS

2. The present United Nations action in Korea is being taken in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27,

[1] Taken at the 64th meeting of the National Security Council on August 10, it expressed agreement that the NSC Staff should expedite work on the preparation of the requested report on Future U.S. Policy With Respect to North Korea.

[2] *Ante*, p. 410.

[3] Not printed; it forwarded a memorandum dated August 29 from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in which the President concurred, requesting the NSC Staff to expedite work on its report so that it could be considered at the NSC meeting on September 7, 1950. (NSC files)

1950. The Resolution of June 25 called for "the immediate cessation of hostilities", called upon "the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel", and called upon all U.N. members "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." The Resolution of June 27 noted the failure of the North Korean authorities to comply with the resolution of June 25 and recommended that "the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

3. In a third resolution (July 7, 1950), the Security Council requested the United Nations [*States*] to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized that these forces fly the U.N. flag. In response to this resolution, General MacArthur has been designated Commander of the U.N. forces in Korea. The Republic of Korea has also placed its forces under General MacArthur's command.

4. The political objective of the United Nations in Korea is to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949.

5. The United States has strongly supported this political objective. If the present United Nations action in Korea can accomplish this political objective without substantial risk of general war with the Soviet Union or Communist China, it would be in our interest to advocate the pressing of the United Nations action to this conclusion. It would not be in our national interest, however, nor presumably would other friendly members of the United Nations regard it as being in their interest, to take action in Korea which would involve a substantial risk of general war. Furthermore, it would not be in our national interest to take action in Korea which did not have the support of the great majority of the United Nations, even if, in our judgment, such action did not involve a substantial risk of general war.

6. As U.N. forces succeed in stabilizing the front, driving back the North Korean forces, and approaching the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U.N. members which are supporting the Security Council resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities are confined to Korea or spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

7. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will passively accept the emergence of a situation in which all or most of Korea would pass

from its control, provided it believes that it can take action which would prevent this *and* which would not involve a substantial risk of general war. The Soviet Union may decide that it can risk reoccupying Northern Korea before United Nations forces have reached the 38th parallel, or the conclusion of an arrangement with the North Korean regime under which Soviet forces would be pledged to the defense of the territory of the "People's Republic of Northern Korea". Alternatively, the Soviet Union might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities are still in progress south of the 38th parallel. In view of the importance of avoiding general war, we should be prepared to negotiate a settlement while refusing terms that would leave the aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of the aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

8. Although it does not appear likely that Chinese Communist forces would be used to occupy North Korea (because the Soviet Union probably regards Korea as being in its own direct sphere of interest), this contingency cannot be excluded. It also seems unlikely that Soviet or Chinese Communist forces will be openly employed in major units in the fighting in the southern part of the peninsula, for it is believed that neither the Soviet Union nor the Chinese Communists are ready to engage in general war at this time for this objective. It is possible that the Soviet Union may endeavor to persuade the Chinese Communists to enter the Korean campaign with the purpose of avoiding the defeat of the North Korean forces and also of fomenting war between the United States and the Chinese Communists should we react strongly.

9. It is possible, but not probable, that no action will be taken by the Soviet Union or by the Chinese Communists to reoccupy Northern Korea or to indicate in any other way an intention to prevent the occupation of Northern Korea by United Nations forces before the latter have reached the 38th parallel. In this unlikely contingency it would seem probable that the Soviet Union had decided to follow a hands-off policy, even at the expense of the loss of control of Northern Korea. Only in this contingency could the U.N. forces undertake ground operations north of the 38th parallel without a substantial risk of general war. It is difficult to appraise this risk at this time, and our action in crossing the 38th parallel would create a situation to which the Soviet Union would be almost certain to react in some manner. While the risk of Soviet or Chinese communist intervention might not be lessened if only the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) forces conducted the operation north of the 38th parallel, the risk of general hostilities as a result of such intervention would be reduced. In no

circumstances should other U.N. forces be used in the north-eastern province bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.

10. It will be desirable to bear in mind in the contingency stated in paragraph 9 both the importance of securing support of the majority of U.N. members for any action that might be taken north of the 38th parallel and the advantage of establishing a record that will clearly show that every reasonable effort has been made to avoid carrying the military struggle into a new phase by a land offensive beyond the 38th parallel. At some point after the U.N. forces begin to take the initiative and to drive back and destroy the North Korean forces, terms of surrender should be offered. The question of the acceptance of such terms by the North Koreans would of course be determined by the U.S.S.R. in the light of its appraisal of its interests under all the circumstances then existing.

11. The U.N. forces are clearly committed by the Security Council resolutions to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel and there is a clear legal basis for taking such military actions north of the 38th parallel as are necessary in accomplishing this mission.

12. Military actions north of the 38th parallel which go beyond the accomplishment of this mission as, for example, to accomplish the political objective of unifying Korea under the Republic of Korea, are not clearly authorized by existing Security Council resolutions. Accordingly, United Nations approval for such further military actions is a prerequisite to their initiation. Should such approval not be forthcoming, accomplishment of this political objective would not be feasible. It would have to be recognized that a stalemate freezing the U.N. forces indefinitely in Korea or returning to the *status quo ante* June 25, would be undesirable.

13. Soviet domination of North Korea has brought with it the pattern of police and propaganda control well known throughout the Soviet world. Since the existence and stability of a unified Korea must in the long run depend largely upon the Korean people themselves, the tasks of the United Nations will include the reorientation of the North Korean people toward the outlook of free peoples who accept the standards of international behavior set forth in the United Nations Charter.

CONCLUSIONS

14. Final decisions cannot be made at this time concerning the future course of action in Korea, since the course of action which will best advance the national interest of the United States must be determined in the light of: the action of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, consultation and agreement with friendly members of the United Nations, and appraisal of the risk of general war.

15. The United Nations forces have a legal basis for conducting operations north of the 38th parallel to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this line or to defeat these forces. The U.N. Commander should be authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations in pursuance of a roll-back, north of the 38th parallel for the purpose of destroying the North Korean forces, provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. U.N. operations should not be permitted to extend into areas close to the Manchurian and U.S.S.R. borders of Korea.

16. Concurrently U.N. forces should be developed and plans should be perfected with a view to the possible occupation of North Korea. However, the execution of such plans should take place only with the explicit approval of the President, and would be dependent upon prior consultation with and the approval of the U.N. members.

17. The United Nations Commander should undertake no ground operations north of the 38th parallel in the event of the occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, but should reoccupy Korea up to the 38th parallel. Bombing operations north of the 38th parallel should not be discontinued merely because the presence of Soviet or Chinese Communist troops is detected in a target area. However, if the Soviet Union should announce in advance its intention to reoccupy North Korea, either explicitly or implicitly giving warning that its forces should not be attacked, the matter should be immediately referred to the Security Council with the stated purpose of securing the cooperation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) in U.N. action to achieve the unity and independence of Korea. Since such cooperation would not be forthcoming, an attempt should then be made in the General Assembly to secure the condemnation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) for flouting the will of the U.N. majority. Military action against North Korean troops south of 38 would continue, but action north of 38 should not be initiated or continued and if any U.N. forces are already north of 38 they should prepare to withdraw pending further directives from Washington.

18. In the event of the open employment of major Soviet units south of the 38th parallel, the U.N. Commander should defend his forces, make no move to aggravate the situation, and report to Washington. The same action should be taken in the event that U.N. forces are operating north of the 38th parallel and major Soviet units are openly employed. In either of these events the United States in common prudence would have to proceed on the assumption that global

war is probably imminent. Accordingly, the United States should immediately:

a. Make every effort in the light of the circumstances to localize the action, to stop the aggression by political measures and to ensure the unity of the free world if war nevertheless follows. These measures should include direct diplomatic action and resort to the United Nations with the objectives of:

(1) Making clear to the world United States preference for a peaceful settlement and the conditions upon which the United States would, in concert with other members of the United Nations, accept such a settlement.

(2) Consulting with members of the United Nations regarding their willingness to join with the United States in military opposition, if necessary, to the aggression.

b. Give consideration to the possibility of a direct approach to the highest Soviet leaders.

c. Consult with selected allies to perfect coordination of plans.

d. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the eventuality of global war, and therefore prepare to execute emergency war plans; but should, in so far as it has any choice, enter into full-scale hostilities only at the moment and in the manner most favorable to it in the light of the situation then existing.

e. While minimizing United States military commitments in areas of little strategic significance, take action with reference to the aggression to the extent and in the manner best contributing to the implementation of United States national war plans.

19. In the event of the open employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th parallel:

a. The United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China.

b. As long as action by U.N. military forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, the U.N. Commander should continue such action and be authorized to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U.S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further U.S. courses of action.

c. The United States should take the matter to the Security Council with the purpose of condemning the Chinese Communists as aggressors.

20. In the event of an attempt to employ Soviet or Chinese Communist units covertly south of 38, the United Nations Commander should continue the action as long as he believes his forces capable of successful resistance.

21. The United States should immediately make an intensive effort, using all information media, to turn the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean people away from the United

States and to direct it toward the Korean Communists, the Soviet Union, and, depending on the role they play, the Chinese Communists, as the parties responsible for the destructive conflict. Special assistance should be given to the field commander and the U.S. Embassy in Korea to augment their present propaganda and information programs. The Government of the R.O.K. should be encouraged to increase its propaganda output and should be given material assistance in this effort.

22. In order to effect the reorientation of the North Korean people, to cause defection of enemy troops in the field, and to train North Korean personnel to participate in activities looking to unification of the country, the following steps should be taken:

a. Establish the principle that the treatment of POW's, after their transfer to places of internment, shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and use for psychological warfare purposes, and for the tasks specified above.

b. Set up immediately on a pilot-plant scale an interrogation, indoctrination and training center for those POW's now in our hands in Korea. Personnel in charge of this project must be selected with the greatest care, taking into consideration Korean or Far Eastern experience, language qualifications, and temperamental aptitude. Full advantage should be taken of World War II experience in the indoctrination of German and Japanese prisoners of war, of experiences in Greece, and of recent experience with Soviet escapees.

23. In preparation for the possible eventual retreat or sudden collapse of North Korean forces, the United States should immediately discuss with certain friendly members of the United Nations the terms to be offered the North Korean forces. This will serve to develop support for action north of the 38th parallel to accomplish the political objective of the United Nations in Korea in the event that the terms are rejected *and* there is no evidence of a substantial risk of a clash with Soviet or Chinese Communist forces. If the terms offered are not accepted, the U.N. Commander should continue his efforts to destroy as many of the enemy as possible before they retreat across the 38th parallel. He should request new instructions before continuing operations north of the 38th parallel with major forces for the purpose of occupying North Korea. He should not in any circumstances permit the use of U.N. forces other than R.O.K. contingents in the northeast province or along the Manchurian border.

24. If operations are undertaken to occupy northern Korea, the United Nations Commander should, in consultation with the Government of the R.O.K., determine the timing and method of subjecting occupied territory north of the 38th parallel to its jurisdiction. He should forbid, as commander of the U.N. forces, reprisals against the

468-806—76——45

forces, officials, and populace of North Korea, except in accordance with international law, and take such measures as are within his power to secure compliance with this directive.

25. In performing their mission beyond the 38th parallel, the general posture of the United Nations forces should be one of liberation rather than retaliation. An effort should be made to encourage the voluntary adherence of ever larger areas of North Korea to the R.O.K. The United Nations forces should attempt to exert a stabilizing influence during the transition period. They should endeavor to conduct themselves in such a way as to emphasize the nonaggressive and temporary nature of the U.N. occupation.

26. When organized armed resistance by the North Korean forces has been brought substantially to an end, the United States should attempt to reduce its share of the U.N. responsibilities for Korea, and announce its desire to do so, without, however, implying any unwillingness to fulfill its U.N. commitments. The R.O.K. forces, operating under principles established by the U.N. Commission for Korea, or such body as may be established to take its place, should take the lead in disarming remaining North Korean units and enforcing the terms of surrender. Guerrilla activity should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of Korea with minimum participation by U.N. contingents, unless the Korean forces alone should prove unable to cope with the guerrilla activities.

27. The United States should recognize that the Government of the R.O.K. will have to take strong measures against Communist efforts to cause trouble in Korea and that it may require support in these measures from the United States. At the same time, the United States should recognize that social and economic reforms will be necessary in order to reduce the Communist menace to manageable proportions.

28. The United States should advocate in the United Nations the adoption of the following principles to govern the action of the United Nations in Korea in the post-hostilities period:

a. The unification of Korea should be arranged by representatives of the Korean people chosen in free secret-ballot elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, the elections to be held under the auspices of the United Nations.

b. The Government of the R.O.K. should be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted on problems arising in connection with the unification of Korea.

c. An obligation rests upon the members of the United Nations to contribute to the solution of the tremendous economic, social and political problems certain to confront a unified and independent Korea. Asiatic members of the United Nations should be urged to make a substantial contribution to the assistance program in view of their special regional interest in Korea.

29. In consonance with the above principles, the United States should take the following steps:

a. Take vigorous action through diplomatic channels and in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly to assure and solidify United Nations support of necessary action in Korea.

b. Be prepared to announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter and the general aims and principles which the United States believes should underlie such a solution.

c. When such an announcement is made, the United States should recommend or urge others to recommend the creation of an appropriate United Nations body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with the principles enumerated above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as chairman of such a body.

30. The United States should urge that the U.N. Commission on Korea or such body as may be established to take its place be charged with continuing consideration of Korean problems and instructed to make recommendations as to the size and character of the military and internal security forces needed by the R.O.K. The U.S. should recommend that the U.N. Commission should consider the desirability of permanent neutralization of Korea accompanied by political undertakings by the R.O.K. and by other states separately to refrain from any aggression. The question of U.N. guarantee should be studied but no U.S. commitment on this point should be made at this stage.

31. The United States should urge that U.N. forces be retained in Korea until a stable, unified, and independent state has been firmly established and should be prepared to make available United States forces as a contingent of the U.N. forces for the purpose of deterring renewed aggression or internal strife. The number of our forces should be reduced so far as possible, however, and should serve only in conjunction with other U.N. contingents, preferably including some Asiatic contingents.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its 494th meeting on September 1 from 3 to 7:10 p. m., with Sir Gladwyn Jebb of the United Kingdom replacing Yakov Malik of the Soviet Union as President. Mr. Malik objected to the President's ruling to seat the representative of the Republic of Korea, but Sir Gladwyn's ruling was upheld by a vote of 9 (including the United States) in favor to 1 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) against, with 1 (United Kingdom)

abstention. A Soviet draft resolution (U.N. document S/1751) to seat both Korean regimes then failed by a vote of 2 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia) in favor to 8 (including the United States) opposed, with 1 member (Egypt) not participating in the voting. For the record, see U.N. document S/PV.494.

At 10 p. m. on September 1, President Truman delivered a radio and television address to the American people on the situation in Korea; for the text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, page 609. Mr. Truman set forth an eight-point program on United States policy in the Far East and stated that there would be neither appeasement nor preventive war. He declared that the Korean conflict would not spread except by action of the Communist countries. He indicated that the United States would mobilize 3 million or more men for the present crisis. The United States, he said, had no territorial aspirations in Formosa.

795B.00/9–250

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PUSAN, September 2, 1950.

[Unnumbered]

Subject: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation of the Ambassador, President Rhee, and Dr. Noble

The Embassy transmits a memorandum of conversation of the Ambassador, President Rhee, and Dr. Noble, which took place September 1, 1950.

Although the Ambassador had conveyed substantially the same ideas to the President and other officials repeatedly since the Government had been established at Taejon, the immediate purpose of this conversation was to impress the President with reasonable handling of a conflict with the National Assembly which had just come to a head by adoption, by overwhelming vote, by the National Assembly of a Resolution calling upon the President to discharge the Prime Minister—Defense Minister, Captain Shin Sung Mo, and the Home Minister, Dr. Chough Pyung Ok. The Ambassador had also sent Mr. Noble to discuss this question with the Chairman of the National Assembly, Shin Ik Hi, and the senior Vice-Chairman, Chang Taik San. Mr. Noble had presented views similar to those described in the conversation and the two National Assembly officers had agreed that for the time being they would use their influence to stop any public legislature-executive conflict.

Following the conversation described above, the President decided to go, and did go, before the National Assembly and addressed them for about an hour in a friendly and conciliatory manner, while at the same time explaining why he found it impossible to accede to their request to discharge the two ministers. He also announced the appointment of four members of the National Assembly as part of the Korean Delegation to the Fifth General Assembly of the UN, which was taken by the Assemblymen as a conciliatory gesture. Unfortunately, in the question and answer period following his speech the President lost his temper and made some harsh statements about the Assembly which partially undid the good effect of his previous speech. Under the leadership of Shin Ik Hi and Chang Taik San, however, the Assembly proceeded to pass the budget and suppress the controversy for the present.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)

CONFIDENTIAL PUSAN, September 1, 1950.

Participants: Ambassador
President Rhee
Dr. Noble

Location: President Rhee's Office

I told President Rhee how disappointed I was upon arrival at Pusan to find men—both in and outside the Government—who pride themselves in being leaders, "knifing" men in responsible positions. I considered particularly deplorable attempts to inject selfish political bickerings into the army and police at a time when the very life of the state was at stake.

I reminded Rhee that this jarred me officially and personally, as twice in the past two years I had had the opportunity of throwing my weight against continuance of U.S. aid to Korea. Since the blow of June 25, there were at least two times before military aid arrived that the U.S. could have run out plausibly and left the peninsula to its fate. It would have been easy to have done that at Suwon and, a few days later, at Taejon. I am delighted that we hung on at that time. I am proud that President Truman made his bold, forthright decision to send air and sea support and two days later ground support to stop the aggression. At the same time, I feel a tremendous responsibility to the American people for the lives and effort being expended and cannot but expect all Koreans to work together and do their best expressing confidence they could and would thereby be justifying the support received.

I then mentioned that the UN Commission on Korea in its first two reports had done well by Korea and by what was being done here. I understood that the third report had just been signed [1] and that it was even more favorable to Korea. I continued that I was thrilled that 53 member states have endorsed what Korea, supported by the United States, had done. Many of these states were not only giving their moral support, but were coming now with material and military. The reports of the United Nations Commission on Korea had played a vital role in mobilizing world opinion on the side of Korea. I know that the delegates also hope that the Korean politicos will not nullify the confidence they have expressed in Korea.

Naturally, people throughout the world who are sending their loved-ones to fight here are going to be eager to know why they are here and what the Koreans are doing. The eyes of the people of the world, friendly and unfriendly, are on Korea. He, all the members of his cabinet, the National Assembly, and civic leaders—both in and outside of the Government—must be aware that they are living in a goldfish bowl. Some may feel that they can continue their sinister manipulating and get away with it. They had better be aware that even though they think they can get away with it, they cannot.

This general outline was used in conversations that I and members of my Staff have had with Koreans, both in and out of the Government.

J. J. M[UCCIO]

[1] The third report of UNCOK, covering the period from December 15, 1949 to September 4, 1950, was forwarded to the Secretary General of the United Nations on the latter date; see U.N. document A/1350.

795.00/9–450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PUSAN, September 4, 1950.
[Received September 4—7 : 56 p. m.]

159. For background purposes only, I have had increasing difficulty in dissuading President Rhee from making harmful public statements and actions; following are two illustrations:

a. On August 6, I outlined to President and later to war cabinet American proposal to include 100 Korean recruits directly into each American military unit. President said war cabinet were enthusiastic that Koreans were to be intermingled with Americans. Recruiting for Korean forces at rate of 1,000 a day was continued and additional accelerated recruitment for Americans was highly satisfactory to UN Commander Korea both as regards numbers and quality.

In Pusan the military and Youth Corps later resorted to impressment. Strong inducement tactics were probably used elsewhere. Without consulting cabinet, President issued order stopping all conscription. This delayed recruitment. I called on President and pointed out that I also was against forceful impressment but could not understand why Youth Corps, particularly its Youth Guard component and Student Defense League, were not tapped to furnish the requirements of Korean Army and UN forces. These two organizations appeared to be using their "goon" squads to impress other youth and were not furnishing any their own members. He brushed the query aside with "You do not understand the Youth Corps". I countered that the Youth Corps, especially the Youth Guard which had received six weeks' intensive military training last summer, and members of the Student Defense League should be called forward, inasmuch as everyone said that they were burning with patriotic fervor and only needed arms to defend the country. That President Rhee has not changed his mind in keeping Youth Corps as sort of "citizens' army" was reflected in his statement implementing conscription law that members Youth Guard Corps and Student Defense League are to register but are not to be drafted.

b. For about a month now President has been champing to issue statement "condemning negotiations behind his back". About two weeks ago President drafted message to the 53 nations supporting Korean case which he proposed issuing simultaneously to press, to effect that Korea would recognize no settlement in negotiations of which he had not participated, that Korean forces would not stop at 38th parallel, etc. Noble cautioned against such action. Some days later his new director of OPI called and showed me text similar original message. His FonMin called with another message to India that its position was hurting Korea. I cautioned in strongest terms possible any message, particularly messages as drafted, which publicly questioned motives of President Truman and other leaders spearheading fight against aggression as giving aid and comfort to enemy. I suggested that if President insisted on making his position clear, to do so by instructing his ambassador in Washington to do this informally with authorities there. FonMin accepted suggestion. Several days later director of OPI issued greatly watered down statement to non-Korean correspondents, text of which is being cabled separately.[1]

Sent Department 159, repeated information CINCFE for General MacArthur only.

MUCCIO

[1] Not printed.

795.00/9–450 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TAEGU, September 4, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received September 5—10:42 a. m.]

5. General Walker today issued orders that all but skeleton staff UN military headquarters Taegue shall remove to Pusan. Movement now in progress. Move was dictated by serious enemy encroachment in Kyongju-Yongchon area during past two days where ROK forces have shown little capability to hold enemy thrusts. General Walker intends remain Taegu to head up skeleton staff. He has advised ROK Prime Minister to move ROK military headquarters to Pusan and this probably will be done tomorrow. Prime Minister plans to shuttle between Taegu and Pusan. Home Ministry plans remain Taegu. Pending further developments Taegu Embassy offices will remain Taegu.

DRUMRIGHT

793.00/9–550 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

HONG KONG, September 5, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received September 5—3:06 p. m.]

508. Letter from Ch'en Yi, Shanghai journalist known to Sabin Chase [1] (ConGen despatch 275, August 23, 1950 [2]) brought ConGen today by Ch'en's friend. Letter reports following statements made recent Peking conference by Chou En-lai, repeated him by friend who attended conference. When asked position of China should North Korean troops be pushed back to Manchurian border, Chou replied China would fight enemy outside China's border and not wait until enemy came in. He added that it would require at least 30 divisions for US to accomplish anything in Korea and at least 300 if enemy wants to try anything in China. Every day China is getting better prepared and has already had more than a year's preparations in Manchuria, Chou declared. In meantime, Government policy is to nourish existing economic structure and not disturb it further. Important center still Europe, Chou concluded.

WILKINSON

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[1] Chief of the China Branch, Division of Research for the Far East, Department of State.
[2] Not printed.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on September 5 from 3 to 7 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.495. At the meeting the United States Representative drew the Council's attention to a communication from the United States Government (S/1758) dated September 5 relating to the shooting down of a bomber, bearing a red star insignia, which had attacked a United Nations fighter patrol off the west coast of Korea. The body of one crew member of the bomber had been recovered and identified as a member of the Soviet armed forces. Mr. Austin stated that the incident illustrated the desirability of adopting the United States draft resolution (S/1653) on localization of the fighting in Korea. In this connection, Mr. Austin also expressed United States concern at reports received of increased rail and road traffic in the area of North Korea adjacent to the Manchurian border.

761.5622/9–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

Moscow, September 6, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received September 6—11 : 16 a. m.]

622. Eyes only for Secretary. At his request I called on Vishinsky at 1 p. m. (Moscow time) today. He opened by referring to statement made by US Representative Security Council September 5 on Soviet plane incident off Korea September 4,[1] describing it as incorrect.

He then read me via interpreter Soviet note to US Government, in substance alleging Soviet plane unarmed training mission 140 kilometers distant Korean coastline. Presentation followed in reverse our note April 18 Baltic plane,[2] demanded investigation indemnification punishment those responsible.

I replied as follows:

"The information at my disposal indicates that the question to which you refer pertains to defensive action by United Nations Forces operating in the Korean area in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and that it has, in fact, been brought to the attention of the Security Council for appropriate consideration. I am therefore not in a position to accept on behalf of the United States Government the communication of the Soviet Government on this subject. It would appear to be appropriate for any representations on this question to be presented to the United Nations Security Council."

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[1] See the editorial note, *supra*.
[2] Text quoted in telegram 325, scheduled for publication in volume IV.

During further half hour Vishinsky attempted persuade me accept note using various arguments. I consistently adhered position subject matter under UN competence in Security Council where Soviets should make their representations. Details later.

KIRK

761.5622/9–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, September 6, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received September 6—1 : 58 p. m.]

623. As recounted mytel 622, September 6 after Vishinsky read note I said to him that the information at my disposal indicates that the question to which you refer pertains to defensive action by United Nations Forces operating in the Korean area in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and that it has, in fact, been brought to the attention of the Security Council for appropriate consideration. I am therefore not in a position to accept on behalf of the United States Government the communication of the Soviet Government on this subject. It would appear to be appropriate for any representations on this question to be presented to the United Nations Security Council.

VISHINSKY. We are in possession of data, as I read in the note, and as confirmed by Soviet Government that this incident was not a defensive action but was an attack by eleven American planes on a Soviet plane making, as I said, a training flight between Port Arthur and Haiyan-Dao Island. Since it was a training flight the plane had neither bombing nor torpedo devices which testifies to the fact that the crew did not have any hostile intentions. Furthermore, the resolution of the SC of June 25 because of the absence of two permanent members has no legitimate force. The question as to whether the matter is a subject for SC is special question and cannot be subject for our discussion. As to your statement that it is not possible accept on part of your government any communication this subject, this is contrary to generally recognized rules of diplomatic courtesy. There were occasions when notes which were not in our opinion within competence of Soviet Government were accepted by us in accordance with rules of courtesy. Again I ask you to accept note to facilitate course of settlement of this matter.

AMBASSADOR. Armed forces referred to are operating under command of UN under a commanding officer responsible to UN. Soviet Government has representative at UN and therefore has every opportunity to raise question there. This is not question between US and USSR and therefore I cannot accept the note.

VISHINSKY. This is exactly a matter connected with the relations between US and USSR because no matter how it is represented about subordination of these forces to UN fact is that forces are American, under command American national who receives instructions from American Government. There is no headquarters UN in that vicinity. I cannot understand attitude Ambassador wishes to display towards Soviet Government. It is contrary to norms of diplomatic courtesy. For third time I beg Mr. Ambassador to accept note and convey it to those to whom addressed. Moreover this note contains appeal to US Government regarding an investigation and one can hardly try to avoid such duty.

AMBASSADOR. Mr. Minister, in UN 53 nations have agreed to condemn aggression against South Korea. These 53 support UN action there with their moral and physical resources. US is but one of these and is acting under mandate of UN which is doing its best resist this aggression. Your problem is to deal with UN, not US, on this matter.

VISHINSKY. In my opinion there is misunderstanding on this matter. Incident took place 140 kilometers from Korea which has nothing in common with operation taking place in Korea. It is generally known we have nothing to do with Korean events. Were planes active in the vicinity of Korea then point of view of Ambassador would be correct. This not case. As said in note, plane was making training flight in region of Port Arthur and Haiyan-Dao Island in zone of Port Arthur naval base which according to treaty well known to US Government temporarily belongs to Soviet Union. All this could be understood if incident had any connection with Korean events. It is strange that American Government does not want investigation action of forces acting under its instructions.

AMBASSADOR. Your Government has a correct way of pursuing this problem through UN. It is question between USSR and SC. I do not see profitability of continuing conversation on this matter.

VISHINSKY. This is not correct. This is not question between USSR and UN but between our countries for reasons I had honor to state to you, Mr. Ambassador. It is question of relations between our two countries. I cannot understand how such a position as taken by Ambassador was caused—one which excludes any other estimate but the one I have given (*sic*). It is contrary to the norms of diplomatic relations and practices of the diplomatic corps. But it is up to the Ambassador to act as he wishes.

AMBASSADOR. I am sure you know I intend no lack of courtesy to you personally. I only wish stress point of view that this is not question of direct relations US and USSR, but between USSR and UN, and should be conducted through proper channels.

VISHINSKY. This is not question dealing with person of Foreign Minister, USSR, but one which deals with relations between our countries. I would like to ask Mr. Ambassador if matter is put this way what military action was effected by American destroyer in vicinity 140 kilometers from Korea and 18 kilometers from Haiyan-Dao Island which is in limits of Soviet naval base? What kind of military actions? If not, if no military actions then it was just an American destroyer. Just because there are military actions by UN—just because an American destroyer shoots at Soviet crew, does it mean no other relations can exist between the two Forces? So as I pointed out there is no other connection between this action and military events in Korea.

AMBASSADOR. US Government has already expressed its willingness to facilitate the conduct of investigation into incident in Manchuria. My Government is never against investigation of facts. It will welcome an investigation of this incident but this is a matter for the UN.

VISHINSKY. I must state Ambassador gave no answer my question. How we are to act in UN concerns only us, just as this question concerns only USA and USSR. I beg you to accept this note—not you personally but through you to US Government. In my opinion you are obliged as Ambassador to accept communication addressed your government.

AMBASSADOR. For reasons stated I cannot accept this note.

Brief conversation then ensued concerning Vishinsky's departure for Lake Success, I wished him *bon voyage* and departed at 1345.

KIRK

761.5622/9–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, September 6, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received September 6—3 : 23 p. m.]

624. Subsequent to Embtel 622 and 623 re my conversation with Vishinsky, Foreign Office delivered by messenger Soviet note I declined to accept during interview. At 1630 Moscow time this note was returned to Foreign Office under covering following note:

"I am returning herewith your note No. 52 of this date which has been sent to this Embassy subsequent to our conversation at 1300 today.

"As I stated to you during that conversation, the information at my disposal indicates that the question to which you refer pertains to defensive action by United Nation Forces operating in the Korean area in accordance with resolutions of the UNSC and that it has, in

fact, been brought to the attention of the SC for appropriate consideration. I am therefore not in a position to accept on behalf of the US Government the communication of the Soviet Government on this subject. It would appear to be appropriate for any representations on this question to be presented to the UNSC.

"Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my most distinguished consideration."

For Department's information translation of Soviet note No. 52, September 6, reads as follows:

"Government USSR considers necessary on basis verified data declare following to Government US.

"September 4 at 1244 local time two motored air plane of Air Forces USSR possessing neither bombing nor torpedo devices, carrying out training flight in region of Haiyan-Dao Island, projecting into limits Port Arthur naval base and situated 140 kilometers from the coasts of Korea, was without any basis or excuse attacked and fired upon by 11 fighters of the Air Forces USA. As result of attack Soviet plane was shot down and fell burning into sea 8 kilometers south Haiyan-Dao Island. Witnesses this attack of American fighters on plane Soviet Air Forces were two other Soviet planes carrying out training flight along with plane that perished, and also Soviet post of observation and communication service on Haiyan-Dao Island.

"In order camouflage this unjustified attack on Soviet plane representative USA in UN circulated false version that Soviet plane allegedly flew over vessel carrying out screening operation and headed with clearly hostile purpose towards center UN unit and allegedly opened fire on American fighters.

"In reality Soviet plane not only did not fly over American vessel but did not come close to it being at a distance of more than 10 kilometers from it and was carrying out, as already stated above, training flight and did not at all open fire on American fighters but was shot down as a result of [gratuitous] attack of 11 American fighters on it.

"Soviet Government categorically rejects American version and declares a decisive protest to Government USA against crime committed by American military aviation.

"Soviet Government places on Government USA all responsibility for criminal actions American military authorities sullying themselves with this crying violation generally accepted norms international law and insists on strict investigation and punishment of persons responsible for attack mentioned and also on compensation for loss caused by perishing of crew consisting three flyers and destruction Soviet plane.

"Soviet Government considers also necessary draw attention Government USA to serious consequences which such actions on part American military authorities can have." [1]

KIRK

[1] The Department of State sent the following message to Moscow in telegram 175, September 6, 8 p. m.: "Dept commends you prompt and able handling subject matter urtel 624 and previous. FYI identic note delivered Dept this afternoon was promptly returned to Sov Emb." (761.5622/9–650)

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on September 6 from 3 to 6:30 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.496. The Soviet Representative had the text of his Government's note to the United States Government on the shooting down of the Soviet plane (see *supra*) read aloud to the Security Council (U.N. document S/1766), but indicated that it was not his intent to have this inter-governmental matter debated in the Security Council.

Subsequently, the Soviet Union vetoed the United States draft resolution condemning North Korean defiance of the United Nations (S/1653; for the text, see the editorial note on the 479th meeting on July 31, page 501). The vote was 9 (including the United States) in favor to 1 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) opposed, with 1 (Yugoslavia) abstention. The Security Council then rejected the Soviet draft resolution calling for withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and extension of invitations to the Security Council to representatives from North Korea and People's Republic of China (S/1668; for the text, see the editorial note on the 483rd meeting on August 4, page 527). The vote was 1 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in favor, to 8 (including the United States) opposed, with 2 abstentions (Egypt and Yugoslavia).

795.00/9–650

Memorandum Agreed Upon by the French, United Kingdom, and United States Delegations to the United Nations [1]

SECRET NEW YORK, September 6, 1950.

PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS RAISED IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM

In discussions with the UK, French, and U.S. Delegations in New York on August 28 the points stated below were agreed upon. The substantive aspects of the Korean problem are considered separately in document No. 5 (D–6/1).[2] There are no questions under the above heading which require decision by the Foreign Ministers.

Points of Agreement.

1) The procedural problem of concurrent consideration of Korea by the SC and the GA arises because Article 12 of the Charter provides

[1] A cover sheet (not printed) to the source text, bearing the date September 11, indicated that this was a document prepared for the records of the Foreign Ministers Conference; it bore the designation "Document 19 [D–1/2]".

[2] Dated August 31, p. 679; see also Document 12 [D–6/1*a*], dated September 1, p. 682.

that while the SC is exercising its functions regarding a dispute the GA shall not make any recommendations with respect to it unless the SC so requests. A decision of the SC to remove an item from its agenda is not subject to the veto.

2) During the GA the SC should continue to remain seized of the specific item of "complaint of aggression against the Republic of Korea" and it should not request the GA to make recommendations regarding this matter. This position is subject to review should it prove necessary for the UN to take further affirmative action regarding the aggression or military operations and a Soviet veto in the SC appears likely.

3) Since the GA will have before it the problem of "the independence of Korea" and the report of UNCOK the GA will have wide latitude in discussing and making recommendations regarding the future of Korea.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its 497th meeting on September 7 from 11 a. m. to 6: 50 p. m.; see U.N. document S/PV.497. The Council rejected the Soviet draft resolution condemning United States bombing in Korea (S/1679; for the text, see the editorial note on the 484th Security Council meeting of August 8, page 546). The vote was 1 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in favor to 9 (including the United States) opposed, with 1 (Yugoslavia) abstention.

795.00/9–750

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 7, 1950.

NSC MEETING [1]

1. *Action at the NSC on the Korean paper.*[2] The paper has been approved, subject to the senior staff members from State and Defense getting together, principally on Paragraphs 15 and 17.

General Bradley's comments seemed to be that the paper contemplated a stabilization at the 38th Parallel, whereas, if General MacArthur could destroy the North Korean forces, then President Rhee might proclaim an election and police the whole country north of the 38th Parallel with Korean forces. He had not had time to study the paper closely but felt that it would preclude this.

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[1] The 67th meeting of the National Security Council was held on September 7.

[2] Reference is to NSC 81, September 1, p. 685.

I said that it had no such effect, and that Paragraph 15 should be rewritten to make it clear that if there was to be an actual invasion north of the 38th Parallel with fighting forces—American, etc.,—that decision had to be made in Washington.[3]

I also explained the trouble with Paragraph 17.[4] The President, Secretary Johnson and General Bradley agreed and thought there would be no problem about the paper. I am attaching General Bradley's memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, copy of which he gave me.[5]

. . . . . .

4. After the meeting General Bradley and Secretary Johnson raised with the President another bombing of Rashin. They said that one-quarter of the oil supplies of North Korea were at this point, and Secretary Johnson thought that it was the point through which most of the tanks came.

They wanted to bomb the installations and marshalling yards. They said they would do this, if the President approved, in daylight so as to be certain of not violating the border.

The President asked my opinion.

I said that I was not so much worried about violating the border as I was about bombing so close to the Soviet border and in so sensitive a spot; that it might provoke attack on the bombing expedition or Soviet reaction in the direction of occupying some or all of North Korea. If these eventualities occurred, or either of them, we would lose far more than we would gain by knocking out the gasoline.

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[3] Under cover of a memorandum dated September 7, not printed, to Mr. Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State Rusk forwarded the following proposed revisions in Paragraph 15 of NSC 81:

"1. *Paragraph 15, 2nd sentence.*

Delete the first four words, and substitute the phrase indicated:

It would be expected that the UN Commander would be authorized to conduct . . .

2. *Paragraph 15, bottom of page 6.*

Insert the following additional sentence after the 2nd sentence of paragraph 15, bottom of page 6:

Since such operations would involve a risk of major war with the Soviet Union and would directly involve the interests of other friendly governments, the UN Commander, should prior to putting any such plan into execution, obtain the approval of the President in order that he may give consideration at the time to the various elements involved." (NSC Files)

[4] The following revisions were proposed for Paragraph 17:

"3. *Paragraph 17, 3rd sentence.*

Delete the introductory word "However". Begin the sentence with "If".

4. *Paragraph 17, last sentence at bottom of page 7.*

Delete this sentence and substitute the indicated sentence.

It is assumed that Soviet occupation down to the 38th parallel would be accompanied by the withdrawal of North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel. Otherwise new decisions would have to be made as to the nature of U.N. military operations in the area." (*Ibid.*)

[5] *Infra.*

I also spoke about the danger of another action on our part in a sensitive area so soon after the episode of the plane.

General Bradley asked whether some postponement of the operation would be useful.

The President expressed considerable worry about the matter and asked the JCS to review the situation, asked me to review it, and asked that Defense and State get together and discuss the matter before laying it before him.

I would like Mr. Matthews to take charge of this and have a word with me at the 9 : 30 meeting tomorrow.

Executive Secretariat Files : NSC 80 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 7, 1950.

Subject: U.S. Courses of Action With Respect to Korea.

With reference to your memorandum of 1 September 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered NSC 81 and are of the opinion that the approach to the basic problem as outlined in this paper is unrealistic since that approach envisages the stabilization of a front on the 38th parallel.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after consultation by two of its members with General MacArthur, agree with his concept that the initial objective to be attained is the destruction of North Korean forces. We believe, after the strength of the North Korean forces has been broken, which it is anticipated will occur south of 38th degrees North, that subsequently operations must take place both north and south of the 38th parallel. Such operations on the ground should be conducted by South Korean forces since it is assumed that the actions will probably be of a guerrilla character. General MacArthur has plans for increasing the strength of the South Korean forces so that they should be adequate at the time to cope with this situation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur agree that the occupation of Korea by U.N. forces subsequent to the cessation of actual hostilities should be limited to the principal cities south of the 38th parallel and that any occupation by U.N. forces should be terminated as early as possible. In this connection it is considered that all United States forces should be removed from Korea as early as practicable. Such action will be of great importance to our position with respect to all of Asia.

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[1] This memorandum was circulated to the NSC on September 8 by the Executive Secretary (Lay).

It is our understanding that General MacArthur, in consultation with Syngman Rhee, has agreed that the government of the Republic of Korea, the only government recognized by the United Nations, should be re-established in Seoul as early as practicable. General MacArthur states that he has reached an understanding with Mr. Rhee that he, Mr. Rhee, upon re-entry into Seoul will immediately grant a general amnesty to all except war criminals and that he will call for a general election to fill the 100 vacant seats in the Korean Parliament, and thereafter set up a single government for all Korea.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that NSC 81 be redrafted to reflect the foregoing principles and that the redraft, in lieu of NSC 81, be considered by the National Security Council.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY

795.00/8–2250

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1950.

Subject: New *Démarche* to Bajpai: Proposed Terms for Settlement of Korean Conflict

Reference: Your memorandum August 22, 1950 [1]

It is believed that the reference project should not be undertaken for the following reasons:

(1) The conflict in Korea is primarily a concern for, first, the UNSC, and, second, the 53 members of the United Nations supporting the UN resolution of June 25 and June 27;
(2) Such a *démarche* coming from the United States alone would therefore be inappropriate and would cause some wonder in the mind of Bajpai as to, not only its propriety, its *bona fides*;
(3) The *démarche* as such would in fact commit us to a position which we have as yet neither cleared as a Government position nor cleared with other friendly Powers, and would therefore tend to create for us certain possible future complications;
(4) In view of the existing military situation in Korea and the position of both Moscow and Peiping, consideration of the matter outside the UNSC would appear in any event to be premature;
(5) The discussions with Bajpai are proceeding satisfactorily on the present basis and had perhaps better not be complicated by the interjection of a new controversial matter such as the present.

[1] See footnote 2 to the draft memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff on Proposed Terms for a Settlement of the Korean Conflict Prior to the Assumption of the Offensive by UN Forces, dated August 21, p. 616.

The proposed procedure for a settlement of the Korean conflict prior to the assumption of the offensive by UN forces, judged on its merits, has much to recommend it. It is suggested that it be kept on ice for possible future use.

795.00/9–850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1950.

Subject: Problems Relating to Korea.

Participants: Dr. John M. Chang, Korean Ambassador.
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary.
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs.

Ambassador Chang of the Korean Embassy called on Mr. Rusk at three o'clock this afternoon at his own request. The Ambassador mentioned that he had heard that the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers might discuss the Korean problem and felt that it was important that the point of view of the Korean Government be made known. He added that he is being frequently approached by members of the press and others on what the Republic of Korea position is with respect to the question of the 38th Parallel and to the future solution of the Korean problem. He remarked that he was often forced into the position of having to make some reply to such questions and that in these replies he had taken the position that the Republic of Korea no longer recognized the existence of the 38th Parallel and that the future solution to the question of Korean unification and independence must be based on the United Nations resolutions in this respect.

The Ambassador stated that his Government would not be satisfied with any solution which did not envisage the complete subduing of the Communist military forces and the removal of the North Korean regime. He added that there was now much talk about the holding of new elections throughout Korea; his Government felt that its authority should be extended over North Korea following a cessation of hostilities, and that the integrity of the present National Assembly, elected last May, should not be prejudiced by further special elections in South Korea under the United Nations.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that the United States could not now assume a definite position upon the problem of the 38th Parallel and, at this stage, would not support any predetermined line of action in relation to it, since the problem was one for decision by the United Nations

at the proper time. He therefore hoped that, in any public statements which the Ambassador might make, no position would be taken with respect to future policy towards Korea which would necessitate an open commitment on this problem by the United States at this time, inasmuch as we are not in a position fully to support the apparent attitude of the Republic of Korea on the question of the 38th Parallel under present circumstances.

In reply to the Ambassador's question concerning the Foreign Minister's meeting, Mr. Rusk stated that the general question of Korea would undoubtedly be discussed and that such discussion would probably revolve around what further long range action the respective governments could take in seeking a solution to the Korean problem through the medium of the United Nations. He added that he did not think that the specific matter of the 38th Parallel would necessarily be discussed.

Ambassador Chang suggested that his mission prepare, for the use of the Department, a memorandum on the position of the Republic of Korea Government with regard to the future of Korea. Mr. Rusk agreed that this would be a good idea but asked that the memorandum be phrased in such a way that no reply from the Department would be called for at this time. The Ambassador agreed.

The Ambassador then referred to the question of the formation of a Korean relief society, stating that he understood meetings were now being held in New York concerning this matter, at which Mr. Kim of his Embassy was present. He hoped that an early decision would be reached concerning the establishment of such a society.

The Ambassador raised the question of the supply of M–1 rifles to South Korean civilians corps in aid of the war effort, pointing out the importance which his Government placed on the early delivery of such arms. Mr. Rusk replied that, according to his latest information, supplies of such arms were being expedited and that this program appeared to be well under way.

The Ambassador next raised the matter of Paul M. Ro (Ki Nam Ro) the Korean Catholic Bishop of Seoul who was now in Tokyo. He stated that Bishop Ro's Cathedral in Seoul, together with his residence and a seminary, had recently been destroyed by American bombers. The Bishop was very anxious to get a visa for the United States, in order to collect funds for the restoration of his Cathedral, and the Ambassador said the Maryknoll Society and several of the American Catholic Archbishops, including Cardinal Spellman, had offered to assist him. He added that the Bishop did not speak much English but that he had a priest in the United States who could help him in this regard. He wished to lend the support of his Embassy to the Bishop's request for a visa.

Mr. Rusk asked the Ambassador's opinion concerning the possibility that the Chinese Communists might intervene militarily in Korea. The Ambassador did not think that the Peiping regime would do so on the grounds that the Chinese Communists would not want to make open war against the United Nations. He felt any such intervention as might be made would be limited to the covert supplying of "volunteers" to the North Korean forces.

The Ambassador stated that Louise Yim and Mr. Cynn, both currently members of the Korean National Assembly and now in the United States, would appreciate an opportunity to call upon the Secretary to pay their respects. He added that Miss Yim, who was shortly to return to Korea, also would like to see the President if this could be arranged. Mr. Rusk made no commitment on this.

396.1–NE/9–850 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, September 8, 1950—6 : 05 p. m.
[Received September 8—7 : 46 p .m.]

488. Jebb (UK) feels we should be prepared for action if Chinese Communists take military action in Korea. He made suggestion in which we concur that this topic should be on agenda for FM meetings.[1]

GROSS

[1] The Department of State's reply, in telegram 243, September 12, read as follows: "Korea on agenda FM mtgs reurtel 488, Sept 8, and aspect question to which Jebb refers can readily be raised as part of genl Korean discussion." (396.1–NE/9–850)

795B.00/9–850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PUSAN, September 8, 1950.
[Received September 9—1 : 15 a. m.]

169. National Assembly voted overwhelmingly September 6 request President dismiss Prime Minister-Defense Minister Sihn Sung Mo and Home Minister Chough Pyung Ok. President expected refuse.

Attack on Chough due to his arrest Assemblyman Kim Choon Tae (Embtel 124, August 15 [1]) at Taegu, charged with undercover Communist activity while Assembly in session and subsequent refusal release him. Assembly leaders claim concerned with constitutional

[1] Not printed.

immunities, not protection Communist, while Chough, President maintain dangerous release Communist agent while ROK fighting Communists, regardless immunities.

Assembly feeling against Sihn stronger than against Chough. Causes complex, partly from Sihn's alleged unbending foreign ways, more important desire group including Lee Bum Suk, Yun Chi Yung, Louise Yim, General Kim Suk Won get power and probably Speaker Shin Ik Hi ambition become premier. Assembly hostility general for Sihn's alleged failure warn them before he left Seoul and permitting General Chai prematurely blow Han bridge. Most recently Sihn's relief Generals Kim Hong Il and Kim Suk Won, for cause, by order General Walker being made political issue in Assembly where facts generally unknown and relieved generals are lobbying.

Embassy considers both Sihn, Chough doing outstanding jobs; also domestic quarrel this time possibly have serious external effects; has privately so indicated to Assembly leaders who appear impressed but whether they will take necessary measures stop movement from developing into open acrimonious legislative-executive battle unknown.

MUCCIO

Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 81/1

Report by the National Security Council to the President[1]

TOP SECRET
NSC 81/1

[WASHINGTON, September 9, 1950.]

UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine what United States course of action with respect to Korea would be best calculated to advance the national interests of the United States.

ANALYSIS

2. The present United Nations action in Korea is being taken in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950. The Resolution of June 25 called for "the immediate cessation of hostilities", called upon "the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel", and called upon all U.N. members "to render every assistance to the United

[1] A memorandum dated September 11 by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council read as follows: "The President has this date approved the Conclusions contained in the reference report on the subject and directed their implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government." This memorandum was annexed to the source text. (NSC files)

Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." The Resolution of June 27 noted the failure of the North Korean authorities to comply with the resolution of June 25 and recommended that "the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

3. In a third resolution (July 7, 1950), the Security Council requested the United Nations [*States*] to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized that these forces fly the U.N. flag. In response to this resolution, General MacArthur has been designated Commander of the U.N. forces in Korea. The Republic of Korea has also placed its forces under General MacArthur's command.

4. The political objective of the United Nations in Korea is to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949.

5. The United States has strongly supported this political objective. If the present United Nations action in Korea can accomplish this political objective without substantially increasing the risk of general war with the Soviet Union or Communist China, it would be in our interest to advocate the pressing of the United Nations action to this conclusion. It would not be in our national interest, however, nor presumably would other friendly members of the United Nations regard it as being in their interest, to take action in Korea which would involve a substantial risk of general war. Furthermore, it would not be in our national interest to take action in Korea which did not have the support of the great majority of the United Nations, even if, in our judgment, such action did not involve a substantial risk of general war.

6. As U.N. forces succeed in stabilizing the front, driving back the North Korean forces, and approaching the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U.N. members which are supporting the Security Council resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities are confined to operations against the North Koreans or spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

7. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will passively accept the emergence of a situation in which all or most of Korea would pass from its control, unless it believes that it can take action which would prevent this *and* which would not involve a substantial risk of general war or unless it is now prepared to accept such risk. The Soviet Union may decide that it can risk reoccupying Northern Korea before

United Nations forces have reached the 38th parallel, or the conclusion of an arrangement with the North Korean regime under which Soviet forces would be pledged to the defense of the territory of the "People's Republic of Northern Korea". Alternatively, the Soviet Union might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities are still in progress south of the 38th parallel. In view of the importance of avoiding general war, we should be prepared to negotiate a settlement favorable to us. Such a settlement should not leave the aggressor in an advantageous position that would invite a repetition of the aggression and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

8. Although politically unlikely, it is possible that Chinese Communist forces might be used to occupy North Korea, even though the Soviet Union probably regards Korea as being in its own direct sphere of interest. Similarly, it is also a possibility that Soviet or Chinese Communist forces may be openly employed in major units in the fighting in the southern part of the peninsula. Soviet decision in this regard would depend on whether the USSR or the Chinese Communists or both are ready to engage in general war at this time for this objective. It is possible that the Soviet Union, although this would increase the chance of general war, may endeavor to persuade the Chinese Communists to enter the Korean campaign with the purpose of avoiding the defeat of the North Korean forces and also of fomenting war between the United States and the Chinese Communists should we react strongly.

9. It is possible, but politically improbable, that no action will be taken by the Soviet Union or by the Chinese Communists to re-occupy Northern Korea or to indicate in any other way an intention to prevent the occupation of Northern Korea by United Nations forces before the latter have reached the 38th parallel. In this unlikely contingency there would be some reason to believe that the Soviet Union had decided to follow a hands-off policy, even at the expense of the loss of control of Northern Korea. Only in this contingency could the U.N. ground forces undertake to operate in or to occupy Northern Korea without greatly increasing the risk of general war. It is difficult to appraise this risk at this time, and our action in moving major forces north of the 38th parallel would create a situation to which the Soviet Union would be almost certain to react in some manner. If only the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) forces operate in or occupy Korea north of the 38th parallel, the risk of general hostilities would be reduced, although the possibility of Soviet or Chinese Communist intervention would not be precluded. U.N. operations should not be permitted to extend across the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea. It should be the policy not to include any non-Korean units in any U.N. ground forces which may be used in the north-eastern province

bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.

10. It will be desirable to bear in mind in the contingency stated in paragraph 9 both the importance of securing support of the majority of U.N. members for any action that might be taken north of the 38th parallel and the advantage of establishing a record that will clearly show that every reasonable effort has been made to avoid carrying the military struggle into a new phase by a land offensive beyond the 38th parallel. Therefore, at some point after the U.N. forces begin to take the initiative and to drive back and destroy the North Korean forces, terms of surrender should be offered. The question of the acceptance of such terms by the North Koreans would of course be determined by the USSR in the light of its appraisal of its interests under all the circumstances then existing.

11. The U.N. forces are clearly committed by the Security Council resolutions to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel and there is a clear legal basis for taking such military actions north of the 38th parallel as are necessary in accomplishing this mission.

12. Military actions north of the 38th parallel which go beyond the accomplishment of this mission as, for example, to accomplish the political objective of unifying Korea under the Republic of Korea, are not clearly authorized by existing Security Council resolutions. Accordingly, United Nations approval for military actions in furtherance of this political objective is a prerequisite to their initiation. Should such approval not be forthcoming, or should the USSR announce its intention, or take military action, to prevent the accomplishment of this political objective, its accomplishment would not be feasible. It would have to be recognized that a stalemate freezing the U.N. forces indefinitely in Korea or returning to the *status quo ante* June 25, would be undesirable.

13. Soviet domination of North Korea has brought with it the pattern of police and propaganda control well known throughout the Soviet world. Since the existence and stability of a unified Korea must in the long run depend largely upon the Korean people themselves, the tasks of the United Nations will include the reorientation of the North Korean people toward the outlook of free peoples who accept the standards of international behavior set forth in the United Nations Charter.

CONCLUSIONS [2]

14. Final decisions cannot be made at this time concerning the future course of action in Korea, since the course of action which will best

[2] The substance of the conclusions was transmitted to General MacArthur by the Department of the Army on September 15; see *Hearings*, p. 718.

advance the national interest of the United States must be determined in the light of: the action of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, consultation and agreement with friendly members of the United Nations, and appraisal of the risk of general war.

15. The United Nations forces have a legal basis for conducting operations north of the 38th parallel to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this line or to defeat these forces. It would be expected that the U.N. Commander would receive authorization to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations in pursuance of a roll-back in Korea north of the 38th parallel, for the purpose of destroying the North Korean forces, provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. Since such operations would involve a risk of major war with the Soviet Union and would directly involve the interests of other friendly governments, the U.N. Commander should, prior to putting any such plan into execution, obtain the approval of the President in order that he may give consideration at the time to the various elements involved. U.N. operations should not be permitted to extend across the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea. It should be the policy not to include any non-Korean units in any U.N. ground forces which may be used in the north-eastern province bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.

16. Concurrently the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be authorized to direct the Commander of the U.N. forces in Korea to make plans for the possible occupation of North Korea. However, the execution of such plans should take place only with the explicit approval of the President of the United States, and would be dependent upon prior consultation with and the approval of members of the U.N.

17. The United Nations Commander should undertake no ground operations north of the 38th parallel in the event of the occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, but should reoccupy Korea up to the 38th parallel. Air and naval operations north of the 38th parallel should not be discontinued merely because the presence of Soviet or Chinese Communist troops is detected in a target area. If the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists should announce in advance their intention to reoccupy North Korea and give warning, either explicitly or implicitly, that their forces should not be attacked, the matter should be immediately referred to the Security Council with the stated purpose of securing the cooperation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) in U.N. action to achieve the unity and independence of Korea. Since such cooperation would not be forth-

coming, an attempt should then be made in the General Assembly to secure the condemnation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) for flouting the will of the U.N. majority. Action north of the 38th parallel should not be initiated or continued, and if any U.N. forces are already north of the 38th parallel they should prepare to withdraw pending further directives from Washington. It is assumed that Soviet occupation down to the 38th parallel would be accompanied by the withdrawal of North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel. Otherwise new decisions would have to be made as to the nature of U.N. military operations in the area.

18. In the event of the open or covert employment of major Soviet units south of the 38th parallel, the U.N. Commander will assume the defense, make no move to aggravate the situation, and report to Washington. The same action should be taken in the event that U.N. forces are operating north of the 38th parallel and major Soviet units are openly employed. In either of these events the United States in common prudence would have to proceed on the assumption that global war is probably imminent. The United States should then take steps immediately to:

a. Make every effort in the light of the circumstances to localize the action, to stop the aggression by political measures and to ensure the unity of the free world if war nevertheless follows, such measures to include direct diplomatic action and resort to the United Nations with the objectives of:

(1) Making clear to the world United States preference for a peaceful settlement and the conditions upon which the United States would, in concert with other members of the United Nations, accept such a settlement.

(2) Consulting with members of the United Nations regarding their willingness to join with the United States in military opposition, if necessary, to the aggression.

b. Give consideration to the possibility of a direct approach to the highest Soviet leaders.

c. Consult with selected allies to perfect coordination of plans.

d. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the eventuality of global war, and therefore prepare to execute emergency war plans; but should, in so far as it has any choice, enter into full-scale hostilities only at the moment and in the manner most favorable to it in the light of the situation then existing.

e. While minimizing United States military commitments in areas of little strategic significance, take action with reference to the aggression to the extent and in the manner best contributing to the implementation of United States national war plans.

19. In the event of the open or covert employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th parallel:

a. The United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China.

b. As long as action by U.N. military forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, the U.N. Commander should continue such action and be authorized to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U.S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further U.S. courses of action.

c. The United States should take the matter to the Security Council with the purpose of condemning the Chinese Communists as aggressors.

20. In the event of an attempt to employ small Soviet or Chinese Communist units covertly south of the 38th parallel, the United Nations Commander should continue the action.

21. The United States should immediately make an intensive effort, using all information media, to turn the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean people away from the United States and to direct it toward the Korean Communists, the Soviet Union, and, depending on the role they play, the Chinese Communists, as the parties responsible for the destructive conflict. Special assistance should be given to the field commander and the U.S. Embassy in Korea to augment their present propaganda and information programs. The Government of the R.O.K. should be encouraged to increase its propaganda output and should be given material assistance in this effort.

22. In order to effect the reorientation of the North Korean people, to cause defection of enemy troops in the field, and to train North Korean personnel to participate in activities looking to unification of the country, the following steps would be appropriate:

a. Establish the principle that the treatment of POW's, after their transfer to places of internment, shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and use for psychological warfare purposes, and for the tasks specified above.

b. Set up immediately on a pilot-plant scale an interrogation, indoctrination and training center for those POW's now in our hands in Korea. Personnel in charge of this project must be selected with the greatest care, taking into consideration Korean or Far Eastern experience, language qualifications, and temperamental aptitude. Full advantage should be taken of World War II experience in the indoctrination of German and Japanese prisoners of war, of experiences in Greece, and of recent experience with escaped Soviet detainees.

23. In preparation for the possible eventual retreat or sudden collapse of North Korean forces, the United States should immediately discuss with certain friendly members of the United Nations the terms to be offered the North Korean forces. This will serve to develop support for action north of the 38th parallel to accomplish the political objective of the United Nations in Korea in the event that the terms are rejected *and* there is no evidence of a substantial risk of a clash

with Soviet or Chinese Communist forces. If the terms offered are not accepted, the U.N. Commander should continue his efforts to destroy as many of the enemy as possible before they retreat across the 38th parallel and only if so directed should continue operations north of the 38th parallel with major forces for the purpose of occupying North Korea.

24. If operations are undertaken to occupy northern Korea, the United Nations Commander should, in consultation with the Government of the R.O.K., determine the timing and method of subjecting occupied territory north of the 38th parallel to its jurisdiction. He should forbid, as commander of the U.N. forces, reprisals against the forces, officials, and populace of North Korea, except in accordance with international law, and take such measures as are within his power to secure compliance with this directive.

25. In performing their mission beyond the 38th parallel, the general posture of the United Nations forces should be one of liberation rather than retaliation. An effort should be made to encourage the voluntary adherence of ever larger areas of North Korea to the R.O.K. The United Nations forces should attempt to exert a stabilizing influence during the transition period. They should endeavor to conduct themselves in such a way as to emphasize the non-aggressive and temporary nature of the U.N. occupation in any part of Korea, and non-Korean forces should be removed as soon as practicable.

26. When organized armed resistance by the North Korean forces has been brought substantially to an end, the United States should attempt to reduce its share of the U.N. responsibilities for Korea, including withdrawal of its own forces as soon as practicable, and announce its desire to do so, without, however, implying any unwillingness to fulfill its U.N. commitments. The R.O.K. forces, operating under principles established by the U.N. Commission for Korea, or such body as may be established to take its place, should take the lead in disarming remaining North Korean units and enforcing the terms of surrender. Guerrilla activity should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of Korea with minimum participation by U.N. contingents, unless the Korean forces alone should prove unable to cope with the guerrilla activities.

27. The United States should recognize that the Government of the R.O.K. will have to take strong measures against Communist efforts to cause trouble in Korea and that it may require support in these measures from the United States. At the same time, the United States should recognize that social and economic reforms will be necessary in order to reduce the Communist menace to manageable proportions.

28. The United States should advocate in the United Nations the adoption of the following principles to govern the action of the United Nations in Korea in the post-hostilities period:

a. The unification of Korea should be arranged by representatives of the Korean people chosen in free secret-ballot elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, the elections to be held under the auspices of the United Nations.

b. The Government of the R.O.K. should be re-established in Seoul and recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted on problems arising in connection with the unification of Korea. That Government should be expected to exercise its powers with full regard to the desirability of eliminating the spirit of vengeance.

c. An obligation rests upon the members of the United Nations to contribute to the solution of the tremendous economic, social and political problems certain to confront a unified and independent Korea. Asiatic members of the United Nations should be urged to make a substantial contribution to the assistance program in view of their special regional interest in Korea.

29. In consonance with the above principles, the United States should take the following steps:

a. Take vigorous action through diplomatic channels and in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly to assure and solidify United Nations support of necessary action in Korea.

b. Be prepared to announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter and the general aims and principles which the United States believes should underlie such a solution.

c. When such an announcement is made, the United States should recommend or urge others to recommend the creation of an appropriate United Nations body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with the principles enumerated above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as chairman of such a body.

30. The United States should urge that the U.N. Commission on Korea or such body as may be established to take its place be charged with continuing consideration of Korean problems and instructed to make recommendations as to the size and character of the military and internal security forces needed by the R.O.K. The U.S. should recommend that the U.N. Commission should consider the desirability of permanent neutralization of Korea accompanied by political undertakings by the R.O.K. and by other states separately, including the USSR, to refrain from any aggression. The question of U.N. guarantee should be studied but no U.S. commitment on this point should be made at this stage.

31. The United States should urge that U.N. forces be retained in Korea until and only until a unified and independent state has been firmly established and should be prepared to make available United States forces as a contingent of the U.N. forces for the purpose of deterring renewed aggression or internal strife. These forces should be removed from Korea as early as practicable. Meanwhile, and in any event, the number of our forces should be reduced so far as possible, and they should serve only in conjunction with other U.N. contingents, preferably including some Asiatic contingents.

795.00/9–1150

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 11, 1950.

Subject: Considerations Surrounding Proposed Bombing of Rashin (Najin)

It is our understanding that the present policy of the United States, both military and political, is directed toward a localization of the conflict in Korea and the avoidance of any unnecessary extension of hostilities or the outbreak of a general war. If there is any lack of agreement on this point, it should be clarified without delay. It is obviously not the intention of the Department of State in any way to inhibit the progress of military operations, but at the same time it is the duty of the Department to attempt to assess the political risks and possible consequences of proposed military actions as they might affect this policy.

The proposal to again bomb Rashin, a town but seventeen miles from Soviet territory, is an operation which in the opinion of the Department entails serious risks. The directive to General MacArthur, approvided by the President, which authorizes bombing operations against specified military targets in Korea north of the 38th parallel contains a stipulation that planes engaged in such operations should stay "well clear" of the Soviet and Manchurian frontiers. This injunction to stay "well clear" of the Soviet frontier is by its terms more than an injunction simply to avoid a violation of those frontiers, or it would have been so stated.

The Kremlin has an intensive and almost pathological sensitivity regarding Soviet frontier areas. This has always been true with respect to the Far Eastern area and especially the immediate surroundings of Vladivostok. The latter is an area which Soviet authorities consider of vital importance to the security of the Soviet Union. Military operations of any character in that vicinity cannot but give them deepest concern and keep them in a state of constant alert. A specific risk involved in the proposed operation, by no means lessened by the

high speeds and high altitudes at which modern air warfare is conducted, is that either a violation or merely a Soviet conviction that a violation of the frontier was possible would induce the local Soviet commanders to endeavor to intercept our planes. This could well produce an incident with incalculable consequences. To say the least it would have most serious repercussions in both the United States and the Soviet Union given the present inflamed state of opinion. It would enjoy additional impact following so closely on the alleged violation of the Manchurian frontier by our planes and the recent episode involving the shooting down of the Soviet plane in the Yellow Sea.

Yet even in the absence of an incident and given this extreme Soviet sensitivity towards their frontiers, operations of the character proposed might well convince the Kremlin of the need to take protective measures against their possible violations and injury and thus lead to a reoccupation of North Korea by Soviet armed forces. In this connection, one cannot exclude the possibility that they might place Soviet strategic bombing planes at the disposition of North Korean forces for attacks against UN forces in Korea and even our bases in Japan.

In short, the bombing of Rashin or of any other place of equal proximity to the Soviet or Manchurian frontier runs the pressing danger of causing the Soviet Union to react in the very way we wish to avoid. It is therefore the Department's opinion that before a decision is made, the specific military advantages which might be expected to accrue from the proposed attack on Rashin should be carefully weighed against the risk of the grave political and military consequences outlined above. The Department of Defense has indicated that Rashin is believed to afford storage for about 28% of the petroleum supplies for North Korea, but the significance of this is not clear in view of the distance which separates Rashin from the fighting front and the town's proximity to Soviet territory which itself must offer extensive facilities for storage and stockpiling.[1]

DEAN ACHESON

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[1] Mr. Acheson saw President Truman on September 11, left this memorandum with him, and subsequently dictated the following memorandum of their conversation:

"I left with the President this memorandum, and briefly discussed it with him. He is inclined strongly toward our point of view and believes that General Bradley is pretty much of that mind. I said that a copy of the memorandum had been sent to the Defense Department so that they could have it in mind in making their report to the President." (795.00/9–1150)

The Department of Defense has supplied information to the effect that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already informed MacArthur on September 8 that they wished no further attacks to be made against Rashin for the present. On September 26, the Joint Chiefs of Staff terminated the bombing program entirely by rescinding the basic target directive. (See Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 346.)

795.00/9–1150 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 11, 1950—5 p. m.

117. UP desp Sep 10, reporting joint press conference of Pres Rhee and Gen Church quotes Rhee to effect UN advance imminent and "must not stop until Reds driven entirely out of Kor".

Dept fully appreciates difficulty limiting expression Rhee's views on advance beyond 38 and relation this subj to Kor morale. However, important that all Amer personnel dealing with Rhee and other senior ROK Govt personnel carefully avoid expressing views on this subj that cld in any way be interpreted as expression of US policy. This complex question is being considered at highest levels US Govt in light many changing factors including vital importance of maintaining high degree of UN support for whatever policies are adopted. You will be informed of decisions when reached, and, any communication thereof to Govt ROK can be made only by you as Amer Amb.

For ur info in reply to question on television interview on Sep 10 [1] Sec replied that he shld like to underline that whether or not "we stop at the 38th parallel" is a UN decision. He went on to state that "The UN have set up the goal of a united and free Kor. That was in their resolution in the GA in '47 and '48. Now, how this UN operation is conducted is for the UN to decide. And, . . . , the UN cannot decide that until it is clear as to how and under what circumstances its forces reach the 38th Parallel".

ACHESON

[1] For the text of this interview, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, September 18, 1950, p. 460.

793.54/9–1250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in The Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL THE HAGUE, September 12, 1950—8 p. m.

[Received September 12—1 : 18 p. m.]

397. Pass Defense. Chinese desk officer of Netherlands FonOff informs Embassy of following reports received from its Consuls Hong Kong and Canton and Chargé Peking:

(1) From Hong Kong and Canton reports continue be received about Chinese Communist troop movements from south to north and vice versa. FonOff officials say these reports not reliable and originate from Nationalist sources Taipei and Hong Kong and are

so conflicting and confusing as lead them (FonOff) conclusion that they have been "planted" for US consumption. As example their conflicting natures said 200,000 troops reported moving northward and over 50,000 moving south in direction Indochina border.

Absolutely no reports from Peking Chargé confirming these reported troop movements toward Manchurian-Korean border.

(2) Peking Chargé reports recent meeting there representatives CPG and private Chinese export interests wherein concluded that except for export certain strategic materials exports will be placed in hand private enterprise. FonOff comments that this may be purely temporary measure.

Apparently Chargé on friendly terms with Indian Ambassador Panikkar. Latter has informed him of recent talks with Chou En-lai who says CPG willing moderate attacks regarding Korean conflict on following conditions: (*a*) that Chiang regime make no moves regain former position of power and; (*b*) that outcome forthcoming UN session prove successful, i.e. that CPG be admitted. Panikkar, Netherlands Chargé and Netherlands FonOff all view future darkly if CPG not admitted UN, arguing USSR will capitalize on its championship Chinese people and their government while USA refusing even recognize "representative" Chinese Government. No mention made Panikkar's previously reported anti-western attitude. No mention of any kind appeared in controlled Peking press about indirect invitation from Madame Sun Yat Sen[1] to Nehru to come Peking for visit (which was declined).

CHAPIN

[1] Vice Chairman of the Central People's Government Council of the People's Republic of China.

661.93/9–1250 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

HONG KONG, September 12, 1950—noon.

[Received September 12—1 : 44 p. m.]

556. Chinese American source believed reliable with whom Consulate General has been in contact for some time obtained following information from Chang Yen-ching, former Minister Foreign Affairs in Manchukuo Government (Chang gave as reference Ambassador Stuart and Colonel Barrett[1] who may be useful in evaluating information). Chang

[1] J. Leighton Stuart and Col. David D. Barrett, Ambassador and Assistant Military Attaché, respectively, American Embassy in the Republic of China at Nanking (closed).

asserts old-time friend now high Communist official Szechuan few weeks ago returned to post from Peking via Hong Kong and told him following conclusions reached in high-level conference Peking.

(1) China cannot be neutral either with respect to Korea or third world war because of Mutual Aid Pact with USSR.
(2) China will provide 250,000 troops to aid North Korea. They will go into battle in North Korean uniforms. Li Li-san's trip to Korea [2] was for purpose signing agreement for this step.
(3) If world war breaks out, Communists will win initial battles but will eventually lose because of material superiority of West.
(4) In event world war, Chinese Communists will abandon coast line, which they consider indefensible against Western naval and air strength and withdraw to Northwest.

Consulate General arranging interview with Chang in order better evaluate above information and if possible learn identity original source.

Sent Department 556; repeated info Taipei 54.

WILKINSON

[2] Li Li-san, Minister of Labor in the People's Republic of China, was a member of a delegation headed by Kuo Mo-jo, Vice Premier, State Administration Council, People's Republic of China, which visited North Korea beginning August 11, 1950 to help observe the fifth anniversary of Korean liberation from Japanese rule.

795B.00/9–850 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 12, 1950—5 p. m.

121. Dept has been endeavoring wherever possible to meet increasingly critical attitude toward ROK Govt for its alleged polit and other shortcomings. With increasing influence of UN in future solution of Korean problem, ROK is being weighed in balance by member govts and public opinion. Dept therefore particularly disturbed over dissension and polit maneuvering within ranks of Korean leaders described urtel 169 Sep 8 at time when unity so critically vital to war effort and to future of Korea. Effect of this on world opinion under present circumstances cld be disastrous to ROK Govt. While Dept feels US must avoid appearance undue intervention in Korean internal affairs, suggest you consider discreet discussion along foregoing lines with Rhee and other ROK polit leaders, emphasizing grave danger inherent any demonstration lack of unity at this time.

WEBB

357.AD/9–1350 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, September 13, 1950—5 : 16 p. m.
[Received September 13—5 : 50 p. m.]

523. Cordier has given USUN in strictest confidence copy of following cable from Katzin to SYG, dated September 8, raising question regarding the role of UNCOK in investigating evidence of external assistance to North Korean forces. Cordier hopes to discuss with us in a few days the policy questions raised therein. We would appreciate Department's comments soonest.

"Recently the Commission agreed to include among the functions of military observers matters relating to external assistance to North Koreans, from whatsoever source or of any kind. As this is outside its terms of reference, commission in doubt without specific instructions from GA or SC whether it is competent report generally on this subject although they proceeded immediately request commander-in-chief UN forces furnish them with information upon which to reply to SYG's request in specific case queried. Delegates consider in absence of over-all request from SC or GA they would require to receive specific instructions from their governments in order regularize their position. At request of meeting this morning, have undertaken convey above to you. Above agreed chairman."

Specific SYG query mentioned above refers to SYG's request for any information UNCOK might have re Soviet plane incident. Copies of cables from Katzin on this and other matters, also given us in confidence by Cordier, follow by despatch.[1]

AUSTIN

[1] Not printed.

795.00/9–1450

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

TOP SECRET
SFM D–7/3a Revised

[WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1950.

SEPTEMBER FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS

SUMMARY FOR BRIEFING OF THE SECRETARY ON KOREA

The attached brief has been revised [1] to include a statement of the U.S. position as established in NSC 81/1.[2]

[1] For the text of document SFM D–7/3a, dated August 28, see p. 653.
[2] Dated September 9, p. 712.

[Annex]

SUMMARY FOR BRIEFING OF THE SECRETARY ON KOREA

During the preliminary tripartite discussions general agreement was reached on the following main points:

1. Every effort should be made to maintain the present impressive degree of unanimity in the UN on the Korean question.
2. UN forces should not be committed to proceed north of the 38th Parallel without prior UN direction. This would not preclude tactical operations incident to actions south of the 38th Parallel.
3. UN forces should not proceed north of the 38th Parallel if Soviet or Chinese Communist forces have occupied North Korea to the 38th Parallel or if major Soviet or Chinese Communist combat units have engaged or clearly intend to engage in hostilities against UN forces.
4. The GA should formulate its broad objectives and intentions with respect to Korea at an early date, emphasizing the necessity of implementing previous UN resolutions directed to the achievement of the independence and unification of Korea.
5. A commission of representatives of senior rank with a high percentage of Asian members should be formed to make recommendations to the UN on problems relating to the establishment of an independent and unified Korea, including the holding of elections.
6. UN forces with strong Asian participation should be retained in Korea during the period of readjustment following the cessation of hostilities.
7. Continued UN political and economic assistance to the Korean Government will be necessary.

Agreement with the British and French should be sought as to the future authority and competence of the present Government of the Republic of Korea in the following sense:

(*a*) The continuity and sovereignty of the ROK should continue to be recognized over Korea south of the 38th Parallel.
(*b*) The validity of the elections previously held by the ROK under UN supervision should not be challenged.
(*c*) Elections under UN supervision should be held when opportunity offers, in Korea north of the 38th Parallel for the ultimate extension of the authority of the ROK in that area.

With reference to paragraph 2 above, the U.S. position as established in NSC 81/1 may be summarized as follows:

Operations north of the 38th Parallel for the purpose of the occupation of North Korea would be undertaken only after consultation with and approval of United Nations members. The UN forces now have a legal basis for conducting operations north of the 38th Parallel to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this line or to defeat these forces. However, the UN Commander, before undertaking such operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations in pursuance of a rollback, would, in view of the risks involved, obtain further authorization from Washington.

795.00/9–1450

United States Delegation Minutes: SFM Min–4

[Extracts] [1]

SECRET

CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS

NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 1950

MINUTES OF THE FOURTH MEETING HELD IN THE WALDORF-ASTORIA 3:00 P. M. SEPTEMBER 14, 1950

MEMBERS

Mr. Acheson (US)
Mr. Schuman (FR)
Mr. Bevin (UK)

PRESENT

United States	*France*	*United Kingdom*
Philip C. Jessup	Henri Bonnet	M. E. Dening
George W. Perkins	Jean Chauvel	Sir Pierson Dixon
Dean Rusk	M. de Latournelle	Sir Oliver Franks
	Roland de Margerie	Sir Gladwyn Jebb

. . . . . .

Korea

MR. ACHESON noted that the UN delegations of the three countries had been in constant consultation on the Korean question and were agreed upon the course to be followed in the U.N.[2] Unless there were questions to be raised, it seemed unnecessary to discuss the issue further.

MR. BEVIN said that at a later time the United Kingdom wished to discuss the attitude to be taken toward the Syngman Rhee government, but there was no need to raise the issue now.[3]

. . . . . .

[1] The complete text of these minutes is scheduled for publication in volume III.

[2] See the memorandum agreed upon by the three U.N. delegations dated September 6, p. 704.

[3] The U.S. Delegation Summary Minutes of this portion of the meeting read as follows:

"Mr. Acheson noted that the Delegations of the three governments to the United Nations had had a full exchange of views on the subject of Korea and were fully agreed upon the course to be followed in the United Nations with respect to that problem.

"The Ministers *approved* the understanding reached by their Delegations in this matter." (Summary Minutes 4: 795.00/9–1450)

Editorial Note

In the early morning of September 15 (Korean time), forces of the United Nations Command successfully launched an amphibious assault against the North Korean-held port of Inchon. This was the first phase of a United Nations offensive to drive the North Korean forces out of the Republic of Korea. For details and references to other sources, see Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, pages 488 ff.

357.AD/9–1350 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 15, 1950—2 p. m.

269. Reurtel 523 Sep 13. Dept considers UNCOK may correctly interpret its terms of reference to cover observation of matters relating to external assistance to North Koreans, from whatever source or of any kind. Paragraph 1 (*a*) of GA res Oct 17, 1949 provides that Commission shall "observe and report any developments which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea." It is our recollection that "or otherwise involve" was addition suggested by Australians to obviate possibility of interpretation that, with outbreak military conflict, observation mandate of Commission would terminate. We understood it to mean that Commission had on contrary clear GA mandate, while military conflict should continue, to observe and report on any feature relating to such conflict.

WEBB

795B.00/9–1550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, September 15, 1950.
[Received September 15—8:17 p. m.]

180. Deptel 121, September 12. Embassy has consistently done everything within its capabilities to make Rhee, civic and National Assembly leaders fully aware of dangerous effect on UN support appearance Korean internal disunity and factionalism. Mytel 169 [1] was sent only after it became evident that Assembly was preparing conduct public political battle between executive and legislature nominally over question dismissal ministers Defense and Home Affairs and Rhee was preparing accept public challenge.

[1] September 8, p. 711.

After private Embassy conversations National Assembly leaders Shin Ik Hi and Chang Taik San agreed suppress controversy for present while Rhee appeared before Assembly making generally conciliatory speech while refusing dismiss ministers, and appointed four members National Assembly UNGA delegates.

Embassy will continue discreetly tender such advice as necessary. Appears for present key figures persuaded necessity presenting appearance unity. Two most disturbing influences, Yun Tchi Yun and Chang Taik San, will be removed shortly with their departure on missions abroad.

MUCCIO

THE PERIOD OF THE UNITED NATIONS OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 16–NOVEMBER 28, 1950: THE PROBLEM OF THE 38TH PARALLEL; UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITIES CONCERNING KOREA; THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

795.00/9–1650

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Assistance (Burns)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 16, 1950.

DEAR GENERAL BURNS: If the amphibious operations now in progress in Korea are successful, it is likely that in the very near future there will be either (1) Soviet or Chinese Communist direct intervention, or (2) a suit for peace or an armistice by the North Koreans. NSC 81/1[1] clearly sets forth the action to be taken in the event of Chinese Communist or Soviet intervention. However, it does not as clearly set forth the immediate action to be taken in the event the North Koreans sue for peace or armistice. It is, therefore, considered a matter of urgency that a decision be made as to the immediate reply to be made by the Commanding General of the Unified Command to any suit for peace or offer of cease fire which may be received prior to the conclusion of the discussions provided for in paragraph 23 of NSC 81/1.

This problem has two phases—1) immediate armistice terms, and 2) eventual peace terms. This letter concerns only the former. In the event the North Korean authorities should directly or indirectly approach the UN or any government participating in the present operations in Korea with a request for peace terms or a cease fire agreement, they should be informed by whatever means may be appropriate that a cease fire agreement is a purely military matter and accordingly they should communicate their offer to the Commanding General of the Unified Command, who is the appropriate representative to nego-

[1] Dated September 9, p. 712.

tiate any armistice or cease fire agreement. The Commanding General will look to the United States Government for appropriate instructions and the United States Government will be guided by any relevant decisions of the Security Council. The question of eventual peace terms is a matter for UN decision. However, armistice terms should, to the maximum possible extent, anticipate the eventual peace terms. Therefore, the United States Government should advise the Commanding General of the Unified Command for his guidance of the general principles which this Government considers should be embodied in any cease fire or armistice arrangement granted by him. Subject, of course, to changing military factors such principles might include the following measures for the consideration of the Departments of State and Defense:

1. All North Korean forces, regular and irregular, wherever situated, to cease hostilities forthwith and to comply with all military requirements which may be imposed by the Commanding General of the Unified Command in connection with the armistice or cease fire agreement.
2. All North Korean forces, south of 38°, shall be interned by UN forces pending a UN decision on peace terms.
3. Teams of UN forces shall be permitted to enter territory north of 38° for the purpose of supervising the disarmament of North Korean forces in that territory but such forces shall not be interned.
4. Pending the establishment of UN peace terms, the North Korean civil authorities shall be held responsible for maintenance of law and order in the area north of 38°. For this purpose the Commanding General of the Unified Command may permit a limited number of civil police to retain such arms as may be determined by him.
5. All UN prisoners of war and civilian internees now under North Korean control are to be liberated at once and provision made for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to places directed by the Commanding General of the Unified Command.

It is suggested that the Department of Defense may wish to consider the foregoing with the view to the establishment by both Departments of a position to be communicated to the Commanding General of the Unified Command in the event of a sudden North Korean collapse pending the conclusion of discussions with friendly members of the UN of terms to be offered to North Korean forces as provided by paragraph 23 of NSC 81/1.

Sincerely yours, H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

330/9–450 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 16, 1950—1 p. m.
PRIORITY

405. Urtel 551 Sept 4 [1] and with particular ref to landing UN forces Inchon, situation in Korea has reached critical stage for aggressors. Pls approach Bajpai early opportunity and state that in US opinion it is of utmost importance for Chi Commies themselves that they avoid intervention in Korean hostilities. Present change mil situation indicates UN may be able restore peace quickly in Korea and on the record of UN debate and action, it cld be expected that UN patently wld view with grave concern Chi Commie intervention. Say that we feel it might well serve purpose of preventing extension of war if Bajpai wld have Pannikar communicate this info to Peiping leaders. Such expression views wld of course be more effective if Bajpai were to communicate views as India's own (assuming his views to be in accord with ours) or at least associate GOI with them. US wld be happy have Bajpai consent do so.

Chi Commies cld be assured character of UN action and continued UN interest in Korea wld constitute solid guarantee that no threat wld come to China from that area in event peace restored along UN lines.

WEBB

[1] For the text of this message, see vol. VI, p. 482. It reported on a discussion held between Henderson and Bajpai on September 3 concerning U.S. policy toward China, during which Bajpai expressed the opinion that, on balance, the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations would be of advantage to the free world. (330/9–450)

795.00/9–1850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW DELHI, September 18, 1950—8 a. m.
PRIORITY [Received September 18—3:16 a. m.]

683. Contents of Deptel 405, September 16 were communicated orally to Bajpai at noon today. His reaction appeared to be entirely favorable. He said that he would inform Pannikar immediately of

the conversation and instruct him to express to Chinese Communist authorities the views of GOI that it was in the interests of world peace and of China that Chinese Peoples Government did not become involved in Korean hostilities.

Bajpai agreed that this expression views would be more effective as India's own and indicated that GOI in fact attached great importance to an independent expression of views completely dissociated from any which US Government might have.

Bajpai went on to say that the policy and efforts of GOI all along had been directed towards prevention extension of hostilities and restoration of peace so that it was natural thing for GOI to make such expression of views to Chinese Peoples Government at this juncture which he recognized as critical stage in Korean situation.

Bajpai said that he was fully authorized, in the absence of Prime Minister, to issue instructions to Pannikar; and concluded by asking that substance of the conversation, particularly his willingness to issue such instructions following US approach, be treated as matter of utmost confidence.

An appropriate expression of appreciation was given for his willingness to act in a favorable sense with such promptness as well as assurance that his decision would be closely guarded.

HENDERSON

Editorial Note

At the 502nd meeting of the United Nations Security Council held on September 18 from 3 to 7:30 p. m., the United States Representative read the text of the fourth report of the United Nations Command (S/1796) covering the period August 16–31, 1950. The report stated that the Soviet Union had supplied equipment and that the People's Republic of China had provided manpower for the expansion of the North Korean army by releasing a "vast pool" of ethnic Koreans who had served in combat with the Chinese forces in China. The Soviet Representative read the texts of two communications (S/1778/Rev. 1 and S/1800) from the North Korean Government requesting the Council to take action to stop United States barbarous bombings of nonmilitary targets. He denied that the Soviet Union was supplying arms to North Korea and pointed out that much of the North Korean artillery and equipment was captured United States material supplied to the Republic of Korea but captured by North Korean forces. For the record, see U.N. document S/PV.502.

795.00/9–1850

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John M. Allison of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] September 18, 1950.[1]

Subject: Korean Item in the General Assembly

Participants: Mr. John M. Chang, Ambassador, Republic of Korea
Mr. Ben C. Limb, Foreign Minister, Republic of Korea
Mr. John Foster Dulles, United States Delegation
Mr. John M. Allison, Principal Far Eastern Adviser, United States Delegation

The Korean Foreign Minister, Mr. Ben C. Limb was brought in late this afternoon by the Korean Ambassador, Mr. John M. Chang. The Foreign Minister had just arrived from Korea to be present at this Session of the General Assembly and he and the Ambassador not only wished to pay their respects to Mr. Dulles but also to make clear the Korean attitude toward United Nations consideration of the Korean problem.

The Ambassador outlined three points which were of immediate concern. They were

(1) The strong belief of the Korean Government and people that any United Nations solution of the Korean problem must make certain that the 38th° parallel not be perpetuated. Ambassador Chang said that the Korean Government believed that the United Nations forces should push right on to the former northern boundaries of Korea, that the North Korea army should only be permitted to surrender unconditionally and that after a suitable period had elapsed elections should be held in North Korea, under the supervision of the United Nations, to fill the hundred vacant seats in the Korean National Assembly. Ambassador Chang specifically stated that the Government of the Republic of Korea should assume sovereignty over North Korea after the defeat of the North Korea forces.

(2) It was urged by the Ambassador that the Korean item be considered by the Assembly as early as possible in view of its importance.

(3) Lastly, the Korean Government was concerned lest insufficient attention be given by the United Nations to the necessity for large-scale economic rehabilitation under United Nations auspices after the cessation of fighting.

With regard to point (1) Mr. Dulles made clear that the United States position remained as it had always been, namely, that any solution of the Korean problem should be in accord with previous

[1] The source text is a copy of a document in the IO Files, Department of State, bearing the designation US/A/2460 and the date September 19, 1950.

United Nations resolutions all of which envisioned the establishment of an independent and united Korea. There was no disagreement according to Mr. Dulles as to the aim of achieving a free and united Korea. The only problem was a practical military problem whether it would be possible from the military point of view to carry on in areas where Soviet Russia or Communist China might intervene actively with troops. With regard to point (2) it was agreed that early consideration of the Korean item was desirable and while it was not said just when it would come up on the agenda it was believed that the Korean wishes would probably be met. With respect to point (3) Mr. Dulles pointed out that the United States was equally concerned and that serious consideration was being given as to how the United Nations might best take part in the economic rehabilitation of Korea after the war.

Mr. Dulles informed the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador that while he was not personally going to handle the Korean case in as much as Senator Austin would do this, nevertheless he was extremely interested and would pass on to the proper authorities the views of the Korean Government.

JOHN M. ALLISON

320/9–1950

Position Paper Prepared for the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET
SD/A/C.1/340/Rev. 1

[NEW YORK,] September 19, 1950.

KOREA

THE PROBLEM

To determine the position which the United States should take in consideration of the Korean case in the General Assembly.[1]

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States Delegation to the General Assembly should be guided in its consideration of the Korean question by the following general policies:

a. The aim of the United States is to do its part under the direction and guidance of the United Nations to help the Koreans to enjoy their right to be free, independent and united, as set forth in the General Assembly resolutions of 1947, 1948, and 1949.

[1] The 5th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly began in New York on September 19.

b. The United States Delegation should avoid discussion of what our policy would be when UN forces reach the 38th parallel on the ground that this question must be decided by the Security Council.

c. The General Assembly should continue to seek to bring about the unification of Korea, which is a matter of the deepest concern to all Koreans and to the United Nations. The unification of Korea should be arranged by representatives of the Korean people chosen in free secret-ballot elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, and elections to be held under the auspices of the United Nations.

d. The final solution of the Korean problem must be carried out under the authority of the United Nations and in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

e. Maximum support of the other Members of the United Nations for each stage of any action proposed in the General Assembly should be sought. Every effort should be made to maintain and reinforce the impressive unity among the free nations of the world in respect to Korea.

2. The United States Delegation should advocate the adoption at this General Assembly session of a resolution formulating the broad objectives and intentions of the United Nations, and emphasizing the necessity of implementing previous United Nations resolutions directed toward the achievement of the independence and unification of Korea.

3. The United States should support the creation by the General Assembly of an appropriate United Nations Commission on which there should be substantial Asian participation, perhaps under the chairmanship of India, to study and make recommendations to the Assembly on the problem of Korea.

4. The United States Delegation should support substantive recommendations along the following lines:

a. The Government of the Republic of Korea should continue to be regarded as the only lawful government in Korea, having jurisdiction in the area south of the 38th parallel, and should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem.

b. Following the cessation of hostilities, United Nations forces should be retained in Korea so long as may be deemed necessary in order to prevent renewed aggression and internal strife.

c. The commission referred to in recommendation 3 above should be available in Korea to advise regarding post-hostilities rehabilitation and the unification of the country, to make recommendations with respect to the holding of elections in Korea, and to make recommendations as to the size and character of military and internal security forces required in Korea.

d. The commission should also give advice to Members of the United Nations as to the assistance which the Korean Government will require.

5. The United States Delegation should oppose the General Assembly's hearing representatives of the regime in North Korea so long

as they maintain their defiance of the United Nations. The Delegation should not oppose the thesis that the commission referred to in paragraph 3 above may in its discretion hear any Koreans.

6. There is attached herewith a list of points which might be included in a draft resolution regarding the problem of Korea. The United States Delegation should use these points as a basis for informal discussion with other delegations.

LIST OF POINTS WHICH MAY BE OFFERED FOR INCLUSION IN A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE PROBLEM OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOREA

1. Preambulatory paragraphs:

a. noting with satisfaction the prompt action taken by the Security Council on behalf of the United Nations to halt the aggression upon the Republic of Korea;

b. noting the report submitted by UNCOK;

c. reaffirming the General Assembly's purpose that the Korean people shall be enabled to establish with United Nations assistance a single government of their own choice to exercise sovereign authority throughout all Korea;

d. recalling its declaration of December 12, 1948 regarding the status of the Government of the Republic of Korea; and

e. expressing its determination to contribute toward the solution of the problems which have arisen from the hostilities in Korea and which must be met in order that the unification of Korea may be brought about and its independence consolidated.

2. A recommendation that following the cessation of hostilities United Nations forces should be retained in Korea so long as may be deemed necessary in order to prevent renewed aggression and internal strife.

3. A recommendation that there be established forthwith a United Nations Special Committee for Korea, superseding UNCOK and consisting of representatives of ( ), to observe and consult throughout Korea, and to make recommendations to the General Assembly regarding the independence and unification of Korea, the holding of elections, post-hostilities relief and the rehabilitation of war damages, post-hostilities maintenance of United Nations forces in Korea, Korean military and internal security forces, and the future international status of Korea.

4. Provision that the Special Committee should meet as soon as possible and not later than thirty days from the date of the resolution; should be authorized to travel, observe, and consult throughout Korea; should determine its own procedures; should have authority to recommend a special session of the General Assembly to the Members of the United Nations; and should remain in existence pending a new decision by the General Assembly.

5. A request that the Economic and Social Council, in cooperation with the Special Committee study the post-hostilities relief and rehabilitation needs of the Koreans, and make recommendations to the General Assembly for a program of assistance to the people of Korea by the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

6. A call upon Member States, the Government of the Republic of Korea, and all Koreans to afford every assistance and facility to the Special Committee in the fulfillment of its responsibilities, and to refrain from any acts derogatory to the purposes of the resolution;

7. A request to the Secretary General to provide the Special Committee with appropriate staff and other facilities.

BACKGROUND

1. The problem of Korea has been before the United Nations at the regular fall sessions of the General Assembly in 1947, 1948, and 1949. At each of these sessions the Assembly sought by appropriate resolutions and the appointment of United Nations Commissions to do what it could, in the light of the Soviet influence in North Korea, to bring about the unification of Korea and the removal of all barriers between the North and the South.

2. The present Government of Korea was established by elections held under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission in 1948. In its resolution of December 12, 1948 the General Assembly expressly declared that the Government of the Republic of Korea had been established as a "lawful government having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such government in Korea."

3. The United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) and its predecessor the Temporary Commission have been in Korea since January 1948, and UNCOK has submitted a report to the General Assembly on its activities since the last session. UNCOK has been giving consideration to the question of the post-hostilities problems of Korea, but it is not likely on its own initiative to submit recommendations on this question to the Assembly this fall.

4. Action by the Security Council since the outbreak of hostilities has consisted essentially of:

a. The resolution of June 25, 1950 determining that the attack on the Republic of Korea was a breach of the peace, calling for immediate cessation of hostilities, and calling upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw their forces to the 38th parallel.

468-806—76——48

b. The resolution of June 27, 1950 recommending that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore peace and security in the area.

c. The resolution of July 7, 1950 recommending that United Nations Members make their forces and assistance available to a unified commander under the United States, requesting the United States to designate the Unified Commander, and authorizing use of the United Nations flag.

5. At present because of the adoption of these three resolutions no further Security Council decisions are necessary to carry forward the military phase of the United Nations action to repel North Korean aggression. The United States, however, introduced in the Council a resolution the purpose of which was to localize the conflict; this resolution was vetoed by the Soviet representative on September 6.

6. The problem before the United Nations, therefore, divides itself into two aspects: First, the necessary action to be taken in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions to repel the North Korean aggression, and second, the problem of bringing about under United Nations auspices the unity and independence of Korea and the establishment of a general status of peace and security in the area.

7. The first of these problems comes normally within the domain of the Security Council and so long as the Security Council is not prevented by the veto or otherwise from taking such further action as the situation required, it would be more appropriate for the General Assembly to leave that phase to the Security Council. The second problem, however, of the long-term solution of the Korean question, comes naturally within the domain of, and should be handled by, the General Assembly. This is so because of the more representative character of the Assembly, because of the fact that the Assembly and its subsidiary body, UNCOK, have already given consideration to the problem, and because of the absence of the veto in its decisions.

8. It would not appear that Article 12 of the Charter, which provides that the Assembly shall not make recommendations on a problem while the Security Council is dealing with it, offers any barrier to this division of the case between the Security Council and the General Assembly. So long as the matter remains in the Security Council's agenda, General Assembly recommendations would be confined to those aspects of the Korean question which do not come within the area defined by the agenda item of the Security Council—"Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea"—and by the resolutions here-

tofore adopted by the Council. (A position paper regarding this question has been prepared for the Delegation's use).[2]

9. A particularly difficult aspect of the Korean question is to decide how much of the United Nations aspiration to bring about the unification of Korea should be adopted as a goal which the United Nations is committed to attain through military means. We recognize the fact that no decision as to how far United Nations troops should go in Korea can be made save in the light of circumstances which may exist at the time when it becomes possible to reach or pass the 38th parallel. We ought not to commit ourselves to anything in this regard in the General Assembly discussions. It is for this reason that the recommendation is made that the United States Delegation should avoid discussion of this subject and should say that this aspect of the problem is now within the purview of the Security Council.

10. While we must avoid commitment with regard to bringing about unification of Korea through military means, we will find it equally desirable to maintain that, as the General Assembly has decided in earlier years, Korea *should* be a single nation. The unity of Korea is the one aspiration which all Koreans share. Accordingly, while seeking to keep the conduct of the fighting in Korea and the restoration of its peace and security in the hands of the Security Council, we should urge that the Assembly make recommendations for the post-hostilities period which would include a reiteration of the principle that Korea should be united under a free and independent national government.

11. Even upon the conclusion of hostilities, Korean independence could not long continue if (*a*) United Nations forces were withdrawn at once; or (*b*) no provision were made for relief and rehabilitation assistance on the part of the United Nations. It is for this reason that the United States advocates a further continuance of United Nations forces in the country after hostilities are ended (though this should be for as brief a period as is safe). We believe these forces should include strong Asian participation, and that United States forces, although they would be available to serve as part of these United Nations forces, should not be stationed north of the 38th parallel if this can be avoided. Likewise we consider it necessary that the United Nations should nurse Korea back to health and strength. Such rehabilitation might be undertaken through the Economic and Social Council and the specialized agencies, and the United States would assume its share of the task.

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[2] The paper on procedural aspects of the Korean problem in the U.N. General Assembly, dated September 8 (SD/A/C.1/341), is not printed; its recommendations were based on the points of agreement contained in the memorandum agreed on by the French, U.K., and U.S. Delegations, dated September 6, p. 704.

795.00/9–2050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, September 20, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received September 21—4 : 11 a. m.]

716. Embassy officer called on Bajpai at noon today at latter's request. Bajpai read two telegrams which had just been received from Pannikar at Peiping in response to instructions (Embtel 683, September 17 [*18*] and Deptel 405, September 16) Bajpai had sent following conversation reported above Embtel. Pannikar's report seemed so important that Bajpai was asked to supply copies thereof and he immediately agreed to supply paraphrases first of which (that relating to possible Chinese Communist intervention in Korea) is quoted below:

"During my recent conversation Chou En-lai has continuously emphasized peaceful intentions of Chinese Government and even in respect of Formosa on which public feeling was deeply moved they have preferred so far to follow a peaceful line. As regards Korea they have shown no undue interest beyond expression of sympathy. Even that has been notably slackened during the last two weeks. In the circumstances direct participation of China in Korean fighting seems beyond range of possibility unless of course a world war starts as a result of UN forces passing beyond 38th parallel and Soviet Union deciding directly to intervene. I am satisfied that China by herself will not interfere in the conflict and try to pull others chestnuts out of the fire. Also following facts are significant. Not even elementary precaution against air raids is being taken in Peking itself. After experience of Korean cities Chinese are well aware that in case of conflict with America they will be subjected to large-scale bombing and yet there has not been any attempt in Peking, Tienstin, a major industrial city on coast, and Shanghai to educate public opinion in regard to air raid precautions or to organize any scheme of protection. Also apart from strengthening of defenses in Manchuria owing to geographical proximity to conflict there is no evidence of military preparations."

Bajpai stated that Pannikar had considered it inadvisable in circumstances described above to make representations to Chinese Communist authorities and would not do so unless further instructions received. Bajpai said that he agreed with Pannikar's judgment but added that if the US possessed information indicating that Chinese Communist intervention was threatening he would be prepared to send new instructions Pannikar.

Second paraphrase forwarded immediately following telegram.

HENDERSON

661.93/9–2050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, September 20, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received September 21—5 : 07 a. m.]

717. Bajpai following today's conversation re Chinese Communist attitude toward Korea (Embtel 716, September 20) read second message from Pannikar which he described as an "evaluation of Chinese Communist attitude towards Soviets". Paraphrase thereof which he supplied reads as follows:

"Turn of events in Korea has helped to bring home to Chinese weakness of Soviet policy and their own unhappy experience in past of direction of political stategy in the east from distant Moscow is likely to make them follow their own line while 'leaning to the side of the Soviets'.

Also it is necessary to emphasize the very considerable influence which non-Communist leaders have in present regime. Idea that they are only figureheads is not true. In fact even in internal matters like land reforms, educational policy et cetera, Mao Tse-tung has been anxious to carry non-Communist opinion with him, and has modified long-cherished policies. The failure of Korean adventure has strengthened hands of this group.

While China is desirous of obtaining technical assistance and capital goods from Soviets, tendency has been not to accept political leadership. Stalin's name seldom mentioned in papers and portraits of Stalin altogether absent. In fact while China is undoubtedly associated with Soviets she is not a satellite and consequently success or failure of Soviet policy on major issues has failed to have repercussion on Chinese attitude."

Bajpai gave impression in reading and discussing above quoted and immediate preceding message from Pannikar that he felt they were a complete vindication of GOI hopes for evolution Chinese Communist attitude both re extension hostilities in Asia and vis-à-vis USSR. He was obviously pleased to supply paraphases these messages and said he very much hoped that they would be understood and appreciated.

HENDERSON

IO Files

Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET

NEW YORK, September 21, 1950—9 : 15 a. m.

[Here follow a list of those present (45) and a record of the discussion on general developments and the Michael Scott case, the first two items on the agenda of the meeting.]

3. *Korea* (SD/A/C.1/340/Rev.1)[1]

Mr. Allison reviewed the recommendations set forth in the above numbered position paper. Paragraph 1 represented our overall policy toward Korea and emphasized the fact that our objective was to bring about a free and independent Korea consistent with the Charter and action by the Assembly. He referred to the relation between discussions in the Assembly and action by the Security Council on Korea. The Council was concerned with stopping aggression while the Assembly would devote itself to the long-term solution of the problem. He explained that the resolution appearing in the position paper was simply a first rough draft which would require some amendment in the light of the Secretary's speech,[2] particularly through greater emphasis on reconstruction and rehabilitation in Korea. The possibility of a separate commission to deal with this problem [was?] under consideration. He requested general approval for the approach outlined in the paper and suggested that thereafter the staff could draft an appropriate resolution to be brought back to the Delegation the first of the week.

He cautioned the Delegates that they would hear criticism of the Republic of Korea as a reactionary police state. He pointed out that the Syngman Rhee Government was the first modern government which Korea had ever had and noted that governments such as ours could not be achieved overnight. The Republic of Korea had progressed with substantial land reforms; in the elections last May there had been 2,000 candidates for 200 seats in the national legislature, thus evidencing interest in politics and, moreover, Rhee had not obtained a majority. These facts contradicted the allegation of a police state.

Senator Cooper[3] asked whether it was proposed that the United States would introduce a Korean resolution. When this question was answered in the affirmative, he suggested that in view of Soviet propaganda claims that Korea was dominated by the United States, it would be worth considering whether some co-sponsors should be added. Mr. Allison saw no objection to co-sponsorship.

Mrs. Roosevelt[4] observed that the paper indicated our readiness to have elections. Such elections, in her view, might easily result in a Communist victory inasmuch as all North Koreans had been forcibly indoctrinated with Communism, whereas no machinery to teach democracy had been set up in the South. If a Communist victory did result, she foresaw strong protests in the United States in view of

[1] For the text of this position paper, dated September 19, see p. 736.
[2] The text of Mr. Acheson's address before the General Assembly on September 20 is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 2, 1950, p. 523.
[3] John Sherman Cooper, Senator from Kentucky, 1946–1948, U.S. Alternate Representative to the U.N. General Assembly.
[4] Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly.

the assistance we had given the Republic of Korea. Mr. Allison agreed that there was always a chance of a Communist victory. However, immediate elections were not advocated, and we were looking to the projected United Nations Commission to arrange proper timing for the elections. In addition, the Northern Zone of Korea contained only one-third of the population, and there had been a very light Communist vote in the South.

Mr. Allison emphasized that the Republic of Korea had a large delegation at the Assembly and suggested that the Delegates should be very careful in dealing with them not to give them any reason to think they constituted the Government of Korea. If elections were held, we would be bound by the results.

Mr. Cohen [5] thought it quite important that the resolution should not simply be brought into line with what the Secretary had said, but that it should actually seem to have been drafted under the stimulus of the Secretary's speech. Otherwise the impression might be given that our propaganda and action were not quite the same. He believed further that, since we took the position that the question of the 38th parallel should be decided by the Security Council, we should bear in mind that unless an agreement between ourselves and the Soviets could be made there would be no Council decision. Some thought should be given to meeting this contingency. Ambassador Austin inquired whether this might not be a military matter completely beyond our control. Senator Lodge [6] asked what official statement had been made in this regard and Mr. Allison referred to the President's statement that the question would be answered when we reached the 38th parallel; [7] further we believed that any solution should be in line with past Assembly actions and the Charter. Senator Lodge concluded that these facts meant we had retained our freedom of action.

Mr. Dulles [8] believed that the resolution was quite unrealistic and basically unsound in the sense that it assumed the military and political aspects of the situation could be kept in completely separate, watertight compartments. Referring to Ambassador Austin's suggestion that the military should make the decision, he suggested this put the matter the wrong way round since the job of the military was to achieve political objectives. He himself had often felt that one of the great difficulties of American policy was failure to appreciate that military means were simply a way to carry forward political objectives. Obviously, political objectives had to be limited by military capacity, but it was unsound to allow the military to make political decisions.

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[5] Benjamin V. Cohen, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly.

[6] Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly.

[7] See footnote 1 to telegram 16 to the Embassy in Korea, July 14, p. 387; also editorial note, *infra*.

[8] John Foster Dulles was a U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly.

In Mr. Dulles' view, it was unrealistic to assume that elections could be held throughout Korea. He did not think we would ever occupy the extreme Northern provinces bordering on Vladivostok and Port Arthur. For this reason, he wondered whether, unless we could make a proposal sound in principle, we ought to take the initiative and responsibility of sponsoring a resolution, thus committing ourselves to an impossible objective. India always wanted to settle other countries' affairs. Perhaps we might say that Korea is an Asiatic problem and then sit on the sidelines and let India propose a solution; after that India might not be so eager to mix in other people's business. By adopting this approach, we could shoot at what was proposed rather than putting up our own solution to be shot at and thus put ourselves in an extremely vulnerable position. He questioned whether it was necessary for the United States to take the initiative and preferred to see us hold back and let Asiatic countries take the lead. Thereafter, we could provide constructive criticism. It seemed to him this position was satisfactory and wise inasmuch as we had no solution to offer which was sound in both fact and principle. Senator Cooper asked how, if the job of the military was to carry out political objectives, we could avoid the responsibility of putting forward our own resolution. Mr. Dulles replied that it was one thing to know what we are going to do, but another to keep our own counsel.

The Secretary [9] thought there was a great deal of wisdom in much of what Mr. Dulles had said. However, he could not agree that the situation was quite as bad as Mr. Dulles had suggested. At the present time we had good coordination between our political objectives and the conduct of our military affairs in Korea. If we were lucky and neither the Russians nor Chinese intervened in North Korea, General MacArthur could act consistently with our overall political plans. The Secretary suggested that Mr. Dulles' suggestions be considered carefully by the staff. Mr. Allison pointed out the importance of having the United Nations go on record as to what it considered the right solution would be in Korea; whether it could be achieved was another matter.

Senator Lodge asked how soon the United States would have to come out publicly on this question. Mr. Bancroft thought that Committee 1 would take up Korea next week. The paper before the Delegation permitted our position to remain fluid, and, referring to Mr. Dulles' remarks, he suggested we did not need to answer the "sixty-four dollar question" at the outset. We could certainly state unequivocally that the United Nations should do its best toward establishing a unified, independent Korea. Mr. Cohen agreed that the

[9] Mr. Acheson headed the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

greatest freedom and maneuverability should be maintained and suggested that holding back might get us into greater difficulty than the recommended position. For example, a resolution might be proposed which we could not accept. He believed we should take an affirmative stand on this problem from the beginning. Otherwise principles might be adopted which we would find embarrassing.

Mr. Dulles agreed that it would not be practical or wise to propose a resolution which did not state as our goal the unification of Korea. If less than that were done, it would hamper, if not destroy, our own position in Korea since independence was the goal of Korean people, north and south. However, we were carrying ninety percent of the burden of the fighting, and if we put forward a resolution requiring unification, we would have to consider whether we were willing to have our troops fight their way through to the north. Mr. Cohen asked what position we would take if this course of action were proposed by another Delegation such as that of India. In that case, Mr. Dulles believed the sponsoring delegation should be asked if it was prepared to commit its forces to the achievement of this objective. He went on to say that from our overall strategic position, we should not commit ourselves to a war deep in Asia against the Chinese Communists and the Soviets. Sponsoring a resolution for unification of Korea might drive us into this position and would go a long way toward committing United States forces.

Mr. Allison agreed we should study further whether it was desirable for the United States to sponsor the resolution. He suggested as a first step that some of the points raised during the Delegation's discussion might be used as a basis for consultations with other Delegations, during which we could obtain the ideas of such interested states as India and the Philippines, and afterward we would be in a better position to decide the question of sponsorship.

In response to a question from the Secretary as to whether Delegates or members of the staff should consult on this matter with other Delegations, it was agreed that for the present it would be desirable to keep our consultations informal and on the staff level. It was agreed further that the Delegation would review the situation next week after such preliminary consultations had been completed.

Editorial Note

At his news conference on September 21, Mr. Truman was asked the following question: "Mr. President, have you decided what our troops will do when they reach the 38th parallel in Korea? President Truman responded as follows: "No, I have not. That is a matter for the

United Nations to decide. That is a United Nations force, and we are one of the many who are interested in that situation. It will be worked out by the United Nations and I will abide by the decision that the United Nations makes." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, page 644)

795.00/9–2150

The Korean Ambassador (Chang) to the Secretary of State

[NEW YORK,] September 21, 1950.

YOUR EXCELLENCY, I am confident that Your Excellency is always interested in knowing the views of the Government of the Republic of Korea regarding the problems which face our country. On behalf of my Government, therefore, I wish to renew our expressions of respect and gratitude for Your Excellency's forthright declarations, and particularly for the steps taken by the United States to assist us in our efforts to repel the armed communist attack upon our Republic in order to restore peace and security in accordance with the decision of the Security Council of the United Nations.

My Government and my people have been tremendously heartened by the launching of the counter-offensive on the part of the forces of the United Nations, and we are confident that this move will culminate in disarming and subduing completely the communist aggressors.

Your Excellency will agree with me, I am confident, that we must think seriously of the future problems of the Republic of Korea. In this regard, I may say that my Government strongly appeals for your Excellency's attention to the desires and aims of the Korean Government and its people.

It is the view of my Government that the forces of the United Nations, in their attempts to implement the decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations, should not lose sight of the ultimate goal of crushing the communist invaders in Korea. The invaders have not only violated the Charter of the United Nations, thereby menacing world peace, but they also have caused incalculable damages in terms of precious human lives and in terms of property. We feel that these aggressors must be punished for their crimes, and we further feel that the roots of any future aggression of the kind brought upon the Republic of Korea and its people should be obliterated.

It is the further view of my Government that the 38th parallel should not be considered in any of the discussions of the future of Korea. The line along that parallel has divided our country of a homogeneous people, with common customs, language, and interdependent economic components despite the fact that it was set up as

a temporary division only to facilitate the receiving of the surrender of the Japanese forces.

It has been the constant effort of the United States—and the Korean people are deeply grateful for this genuine effort—to eliminate this division so that Korea might once again be united under a democratic government. However, Soviet imperialism, in its efforts to advance its aims, has blocked all attempts to bring about unification of my country. Thus the Soviet Union has consistently defied the will of the Korean people in this attempt to enslave them. The Government of the Republic of Korea, moreover, recalls that it was the decision of the United Nations by an overwhelming majority, that Korea should be united. Here again the Soviet Union has defied the will of the free world. My Government still firmly believes that the aim of the United Nations, which called for the unification of Korea, should be achieved at the end of the present hostilities in Korea. In order to do this, it is the most earnest hope of my Government and of the Korean people that the forces of the United Nations will march beyond the 38th parallel, since that is the only way of attaining the intent of the Security Council to restore peace and security in Korea. The traditional boundary of Korea must be the boundary of Korea after the present military action is concluded, since the 38th parallel has no legal basis as a division.

If I may venture to make a suggestion, it is the feeling of my Government that at a suitable time, the forces of the United Nations should make amphibious landings at various coastal points north of the 38th parallel as this may be one of the most effective ways of crushing the communist aggressors.

Still another point in which my Government feels the keenest interest is the fact that the Government of the Republic of Korea was declared the only legal government in Korea, having held successful elections in a free atmosphere, which were certified by the United Nations Commission on Korea as the valid expression of the free will of the Korean people. It is therefore the view of the Government of the Republic of Korea that as soon as it is feasible after the cessation of hostilities, our Government should have jurisdiction over that part of its territory north of the 38th parallel. It is desired by my Government that elections, observed by the United Nations, should be held in that area after a free atmosphere has been clearly assured. These elections, we hold, should select representatives who should occupy 100 seats in the Korean National Assembly, which have been left vacant for that purpose. When this has been achieved, the Republic of Korea will resume government by its citizens, and march along the road to progress, making successful achievements in continuing the democratic measures which our Republic instituted to the extent that many United States Government leaders and others in

the United States have described the Republic as a healthy society and a nation of freedom.

It is the aim and goal of the Republic of Korea and its people to make its society even more wholesome and to create for its citizens the enjoyment of even more freedom when our country is unified under the Government of the Republic of Korea.

In this regard, I wish to make it explicit that my Government under no circumstances can entertain any idea of a so-called trusteeship which, if created, would infringe upon the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea. It is, I am confident, the intent of the United States that Korea shall be unified, and it is recognized that the Republic of Korea, declared to be the only legal government in Korea, has not been able to extend its jurisdiction north of the 38th parallel only because of obstructions created by the Soviet Union.

My Government would feel sympathetic in principle, if such an idea is presented upon cessation of hostilities, to the idea of having a United Nations police force stationed in Korea, subject to negotiations with our Government.

My Government is deeply grateful to the United States, as well as to other members of the United Nations which have come forward with offers of relief to the war victims in Korea. In view of the tremendous need which has been created by the destruction and looting by the aggressors, our Government anxiously awaits speedy measures to relieve the suffering of millions of our people.

In addition, in view of the loss of railways, water supply stations, of bridges, factories, and other important facilities, my Government hopes that the United Nations will be sympathetic to our efforts to bring about proper and prompt reconstruction. It is our fervent desire that a resolution be introduced in the General Assembly of the United Nations which would term the task of reconstruction in Korea the responsibility of the United Nations.

I have the honor to request Your Excellency's attention to the points which I have outlined in this communication, and it is my sincere hope that you will convey these sentiments to His Excellency, the President of the United States, and to the responsible leaders of other friendly nations who are deeply interested in and concerned for not only the welfare of the people of Korea, but the peace of the world.

Please accept [etc.] [1]

JOHN M. CHANG

[1] A similar letter, not printed, was forwarded to Mr. Acheson by Ambassador Chang on September 25. On October 2, a reply was transmitted to Chang by Mr. Rusk acting for the Secretary of State; it expressed appreciation to the Ambassador for making his views known to the Department of State and assured him that they were being given the closest attention within the Department and by the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations. (795.00/9–2550)

795.00/9–2250

Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of State

SECRET [NEW YORK,] September 22, 1950.

US/A/2543 US/S/1437

Subject: Korea

It is no doubt sound that the United Nations should feel and exercise responsibility for the future military and political developments in Korea. However, this needs to be handled with great discretion:

1. It is unrealistic and sometimes dangerous when the *military* operations are dealt with in one compartment (Security Council) while *political* objectives are in another compartment (General Assembly). The two problems are inextricably related. A military operation should be designed to achieve political objectives and, on the other hand, political objectives should take account of whether there is the power to achieve them. The nature of U.N. organization may require a measure of separation, but the U.S. must be on its guard lest the General Assembly irresponsibly lay down political objectives which could not be achieved militarily, unless by victory over Russia in a general war.

2. We cannot know *now* whether it will be possible to "unify" Korea by United Nations action localized to Korea. That would involve an extension of what the Soviet Union would regard as U.S. influence and force into areas very close to Port Arthur and Vladivostok and which, if held by unfriendly elements, could neutralize or destroy these two main Soviet eastern bases. Any effort which seemed to imply this result might be met by Chinese Communist and Soviet force so strong that, as a practical matter, it could not be matched and commitment to attempt it would involved such concentration of U.S. forces in a remote Asiatic land area that it would endanger all of our objectives elsewhere in the world.

3. On the other hand, neither the U.N. nor the U.S. can repudiate the ideal of a united Korea. To do that would be to alienate the good will and support of all the Korean people, south as well as north, as unity is the one issue that the Korean people understand and will back with enthusiastic and sacrificial effort.

4. Under these circumstances it seems that the U.S., which has the primary responsibility for supplying the military force, should not take the initiative in the U.N. Assembly to propose political objectives which we cannot publicly repudiate but which, also, we may not be able to back up. I suggest that the U.S. should, in this respect, play a waiting game and let others take the initiative with respect to political objectives. It might be useful to explore putting more responsibility on

India. If it proposes political objectives which will be difficult to obtain, then we can ask India to supply forces to help achieve these objectives. If India proposes political objectives which the Koreans will deem inadequate and involve a reversal of U.N. policy, then that will hurt India's prestige and not ours.

There is, of course, the danger that India might propose a unity of Korea under conditions which would make it likely that that unity would be controlled by communist elements. However, it is not easy to see how this could be in view of the fact that under almost any peaceful conditions an election would give an overwhelming vote in the south against communism which, since the south represents two-thirds of the population, could not be overcome even by an almost unanimous communist vote in the north. Also, all Korea will depend largely on U.S. economic aid.

The vote might, of course, result in a strong communist minority representation in the Assembly which would be a cause of future trouble. But presumably, once a united government was established under predominantly non-communist control, and with U.N.–U.S. economic aid, the communist strength would recede, provided there were protection against subversive effort and a violent seizure of power.

795.00/9–2250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, September 22, 1950.

[Received September 22—1:43 p. m.]

193. ReDeptel 125, September 15.[1] Defense Minister Sihn Sung Mo made following statement upon Embassy inquiry: "Allegation appearing London *Daily Worker* on August 9, which has just reached attention of Korean Government, to the effect that several thousand 'political prisoners' were massacred by Korean police near Taejon early in July is an unequivocal falsehood. No civil prisoners have been executed in Korea excepting in accordance with due process of law, after trial and that action and sentence by courts of law under legal codes. No prisoners of war have been executed, but instead they have been well-treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention and generally accepted civilized standards."

MUCCIO

[1] Not printed.

795.00/9-2250

Draft Memorandum by Mr. John P. Davies of the Policy Planning Staff

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 22, 1950.

At some time during the past several weeks—but not later than last week—it must have become evident to the Kremlin that (1) we would not be thrown off the Korean peninsula, (2) the gamble for bringing all of Korea under its control was lost—at least for this inning—and (3) it could not count on its North Korean stooges alone to hold North Korea.

At that time of decision the Kremlin had two basic choices.

It could have in one form or another committed itself to the defense of North Korea (Peiping apparently having declined to snatch the chestnut from the fire). This would have been a clear warning well in advance of the 38 parallel's becoming an inflamed issue, allowing the United Nations time to reconcile itself to attempting no more than the restoration of the *status quo ante* June 25, and enabling the U.S.S.R. to make on the ground careful and detailed dispositions of its own. However, given what the Kremlin must regard as the mercurial American temperament, such action, in Soviet calculations, would have also involved the risk of war with the United States. Furthermore, such action, no matter how dressed up, would have had world-wide political repercussions unfavorable to the Soviet cause.

The second choice for the Kremlin was to remain uncommitted in the Korean conflict. This was the choice which was made. In so doing, the Kremlin abandoned the optimum opportunity for guaranteeing that UN forces would be prevented from pressing north of the 38th parallel. There could have been no solid reason to believe that delay in moving decisively to hold North Korea would lessen the risks or minimize the political disadvantages of such action. Rather, it was to be assumed that with the passage of time the risks and political losses from subsequent direct intervention would increase.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we are therefore warranted in drawing the following two alternative conclusions (which are likewise applicable to Peiping). The first is that, if the Kremlin is determined to retain North Korea, its present course involves a deliberate acceptance of increasing risks of war with the United States. The second is that the Kremlin is prepared to accept the loss of North Korea, as it did that of Azerbaijan—unless by chance an opportunity appears for intervention without what it would consider serious risks of war with the United States.

The logical development of the first alternative would be that the Kremlin may be seeking to lure us into over-commitment and over-extension deep into the peninsula, whereupon it would strike with overwhelming force. This is a possibility against which we must ever be on guard. It is a risk, however, which we accepted when we joined in the Korean conflict. It is one of the situations in human affairs when, threatened by dark and menacing uncertainties, the part of both prudence and wisdom is to proceed confidently and quietly about one's own business.

If, as we have reason to suspect, the Kremlin has made the fundamental decision that it is prepared to lose Korea, it by no means follows that the rulers of Russia will sit back and passively watch the collapse. Because they think, plan and operate in flexible, opportunistic politico-military terms they will keep playing the game for the breaks, not only in the final phases of the current military operations but on into the future.

In this contingency we may expect the Kremlin to attempt to prolong North Korean resistance as long as possible. If Moscow has been pressing Peiping to go to the rescue of North Korea, that pressure is likely to be maintained. Meanwhile, the Soviet and Satellite governments may be expected to seek, through the United Nations and other channels and by means of intimidation and offers of a deal, to bring hostilities to an end in such a fashion as to preserve North Korea. Any signs of hesitation over advancing north of the 38th parallel would be exploited. And as the final defeat of the North Koreans approaches, the Kremlin would withdraw most of the its native political stooges and such military elements as can be salvaged across the frontiers into the USSR and Manchuria. After we consider the North Korean conflict to be over and victory won, these elements and their successors will be employed for agitation, subversion and violence across the borders against Korea. This will continue so long as the Soviet system exists and Korea remains independent of it.

So much for a projection into the more distant future. Let us now return to the present situation. If the Kremlin is prepared to leave North Korea to its fate, a potentially divisive condition would exist between the native rulers of North Korea and the mass of the population. The regime is in the position of having betrayed the people it has dominated. For, although there may be some symbolic sacrifices by some of the leaders fighting to the bitter end, most of them will be looking over their shoulders for escape to USSR and Manchuria. For the great bulk of the North Korean soldiery and civil population there is either no possibility of escape or no desire to leave their native land. Once the average soldier and average citizen fully realizes this, such solidarity as exists amongst the North Koreans will be greatly

strained. If they see a hopeful alternative to all that confronts them now—defeat, reprisals and extinction—such psychological bonds as now exist between them and their rulers will give way.

What is now missing in this situation is a declaration from our side putting forward to the mass of North Korean soldiery and citizens an alternative—peace, no reprisals, unification and a tolerable future existence. But to advance such a proposal at this moment involves certain risks. A statement of the conditions for peace, liberation and unification implies an undertaking on the part of the United Nations, including ourselves, to fulfill those terms in North Korea. As such, it is a commitment on the part of those who make it, a commitment which we—and even more our allies—would not be willing to fulfill were the USSR to announce its determination to defend North Korea. Therefore, the cautious and sure course would be one whereby we would test Soviet (and Chinese) intentions by a probing military action well north of the 38th parallel and, if there were no reaction, to hold and expand that military position while simultaneously announcing the conditions for peace, liberation and unification.

If such a probing action can be undertaken two or three days hence, the proclamation of conditions might be delayed. But, if not, we should make the announcement forthwith. The probabilities of reducing enemy resistance, saving American lives and shortening the duration of the conflict outweigh the possible risks and difficulties involved.

795.00/9–2250

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Assistance (Burns)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 22, 1950.

DEAR GENERAL BURNS: Reference is made to my letter of September 16, 1950, on the question of armistice terms in the event a suit for peace or an offer of cease fire is received from the North Korean authorities prior to the conclusion of the discussions provided for in paragraph 23 of NSC 81/1.[1]

There is now enclosed a memorandum setting forth a program for concluding the hostilities in Korea, under the assumptions set forth therein, for the consideration of the Departments of State and Defense. It is considered urgent that the Departments of State and Defense reach a decision with regard to a program such as that set forth in the enclosed memorandum in order that necessary action to implement

[1] Dated September 9, p. 712.

those portions requiring recommendations to the President, and/or consultation with certain members of the UN participating in the present action, or decision by a UN body, may be taken as soon as possible.

It is recognized that some of the problems with which the enclosed memorandum is concerned are primarily of a military nature. However, in view of the close relationship between the political and military aspects of a program for the termination of Korean hostilities, they have been included therein in order that the problem may be considered as a whole.

Sincerely yours, H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

[Enclosure]

Draft Memorandum by the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 22, 1950.

PROGRAM FOR BRINGING KOREAN HOSTILITIES TO AN END [1]

ASSUMPTIONS

1. Soviet forces do not occupy North Korea.
2. Chinese Communist forces do not occupy North Korea.
3. Major Soviet forces do not enter Korea nor announce their intention of so doing.
4. Major Chinese Communist forces do not enter North Korea nor announce their intention of so doing.

BACKGROUND

The political objective of the United Nations in Korea is to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of 1947, 1948, and 1949. The United States supports this objective and favors action by the United Nations to bring it about, if such action does not substantially increase the risk of general war.

If neither Soviet nor Chinese forces enter the Korean hostilities and either a collapse of North Korean forces occurs or the unification of Korea is accomplished by military operations north of 38°, the resultant defeat to the Soviet Union and to the Communist world will be of momentous significance. It is, therefore, of supreme importance that the political actions which accompany military successes are di-

[1] An earlier draft of this memorandum, dated September 20, had been transmitted to Seoul in telegram 141, September 20, not printed, with the indication that it was a tentative program under discussion at the Staff level between the Departments of Defense and State (795.00/9–2050).

rected toward achieving maximum benefits for the United Nations and maximum losses to the Soviet Union and its satellites.

In accordance with NSC 81/1, it will be necessary to consult with and obtain the approval of UN members before the UN Commander can be authorized to understake the occupation of North Korea. In case of a collapse of North Korean forces, occupation can be accomplished without enemy resistance following the acceptance by the North Koreans of surrender terms. In case of a rejection of surrender terms and continued resistance by North Korean forces, the occupation would of necessity be carried out by military action.

It is, therefore, desired to initiate discussions with the representatives of friendly members of the United Nations in order to obtain their support, given the assumptions stated at the beginning of this memorandum, for 1) including the occupation of North Korea as a surrender term to be offered North Korean forces, in the case of their collapse, and 2) if necessary, for conducting military operations north of 38° for the purpose of occupying North Korea. The program which follows outlines the steps to be taken, whether capitulation is brought about by acceptance of surrender terms before UN forces undertake military action north of 38°, or as a result of such action.

As a basis for discussion with representatives of UN members, the following program of action in connection with the termination of hostilities is presented. This program embraces terms which might be included in a surrender agreement, others which might form part of a permanent settlement, and political steps which the United States or the UN should take.

Those points relating to the method of carrying out a military capitulation south of 38° are within the competence and discretion of the Commanding General of the Unified Command and do not require approval by UN members.

PROGRAM

A. *Surrender*

1. All North Korean forces, regular or irregular, wherever situated, should cease hostilities forthwith and comply with all military requirements imposed by the Commanding General of the Unified Command.

2. All North Korean forces south of 38° should be disarmed and interned, pending return to their homes. This return should be accomplished as soon as the situation permits, under the supervision of UN forces and in conditions whereby the movement of these troops to their homes would occur in safety and without molestation to them.

3. All North Korean forces north of 38° should lay down their arms. Supervision of their disarmament should be carried out by UN forces.

4. All UN prisoners of war and civilian internees under North Korean control should be immediately liberated and provision made for their protection, care, maintenance, and immediate transportation to places directed by the Commanding General of the Unified Command.

5. North Korean prisoners of war in the hands of UN forces should be permitted to return to their homes as soon as practicable.

6. The Government of the Republic of Korea should be re-established in Seoul. (NSC 81/1, paragraph 28, *b*)

B. *Occupation*

1. UN forces should occupy key points in North Korea.

2. The composition of the occupying forces should be predominantly ROK troops although there should be other UN participation. (NSC 81/1, paragraph 26)

3. The occupation of North Korea should be undertaken by the UN Commander in consultation with the Republic of Korea. (NSC 81/1, paragraph 24)

4. No non-Korean forces should proceed to the northernmost provinces of Korea. (NSC 81/1, paragraph 15)

5. The general posture of the United Nations forces should be one of liberation rather than retaliation. The UN Commander should forbid reprisals against the forces, officials, and populace of North Korea, except in accordance with international law, and should take such measures as are within his power to secure compliance with this directive. By all media available, North Koreans should be informed that they will not suffer retaliation and reprisal and that they should return to their normal occupations. (NSC 81/1, paragraphs 24 and 25)

6. Pending determination by the United Nations Commander, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of Korea, of the timing and method of subjecting occupied territory north of the 38th parallel to ROK jurisdiction (NSC 81/1, paragraph 24), North Korean civil authorities should be held responsible for the maintenance of law and order north of 38° under the supervision of such UN forces as are in the area.

7. The Unified Command and the Government of the Republic of Korea should declare a general amnesty for all North Koreans, including political prisoners, except for those who, in the conduct of hostilities, have violated the rules of war.

C. *Political Actions in Post-Hostilities Period.*

1. If time does not permit the establishment of an appropriate United Nations body to supersede the United Nations Commission on Korea (NSC 81/1, paragraph 29, *c*), the UN should take action, if necessary, to increase the authority of the present UNCOK and to

add to its membership, preferably by increasing the representation of Asiatic nations.

2. The present UNCOK, until replaced by action of the UN, should be permitted to perform its functions in Korea, should supervise elections when held, and should make recommendations with regard to relief, reconstruction, rehabilitation, the size and character of military and internal security forces required by the ROK, and other problems. (NSC 81/1, paragraph 30)

3. UNCOK or its successor should consult with the Government of the ROK and with the Commanding General of the Unified Command with a view to arranging the holding of elections at an appropriate date. These elections should be held in those areas of Korea where the Government of the ROK has not heretofore exercised effective jurisdiction and control and in those districts where vacancies exist, although general elections throughout Korea may be desirable to assist in stabilizing the political situation. (NSC 81/1, paragraph 28, *a*)

4. UN forces to remain in Korea in the post-hostilities period should include Asiatic contingents. Participating U.S. contingents should be reduced and removed from Korea as early as practicable. (NSC 81/1, paragraph 31)

5. The UNCOK or its successor should consider the problem of the neutralization (but not demilitarization) of Korea and should recommend steps to be taken by the UN to secure political undertakings of the ROK and other states separately to refrain from any aggression. (NSC 81/1, paragraph 30)

6. The United States should press for the admission of the ROK into the UN.

795.00/9–2350

Memorandum of Conversations, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bancroft)[1]

TOP SECRET [NEW YORK,] September 23, 1950.

MINUTES OF MEETING ON KOREA

Present: Ambassador Austin
Ambassador Gross
Mr. Rusk
Mr. Allison
Mr. Bancroft

Mr. Rusk said that there were three present contingencies which were being worked on in Washington:

[1] Mr. Bancroft was an adviser on the U.S. Delegation to the 5th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

The first of these was intervention by the Soviets or the Chinese Communists for the purpose of driving United Nations forces out of Korea or, more likely, to ensure control of Korea north of the 38th parallel. The National Security Council paper provides that if the Chinese intervene we would continue fighting but would make an effort to minimize the attack on the Chinese. If the Soviets intervene our military position is that we do not want to fight the Soviet in Korea and therefore would take appropriate measures to safeguard our forces and prepare for a major war on the ground that Soviet intervention indicated their willingness to start the war. Mr. Rusk said that we do not think that either of these will happen. The indications are that the Chinese have made no preparations for civilian precautions in their cities.

The second contingency is a suit for peace by the North Koreans or a collapse of the North Korean forces. This would be on the assumption that the Soviet had cut the North Koreans loose and are letting them go forward on their own. He said there was no indication at this time of the likelihood of a suit for peace. In this event we would try to obtain as much of the General Assembly's program as possible. The problem that faces us is not to commit ourselves to the war aim of a unified Korea, but at the same time to continue to seek United Nations action in favor of a united Korea. On this point the thinking in Washington is that we should let the Soviet make the decision for us as much as possible so that United Nations forces would carry on until we get some indication of Soviet reaction to their northward movement.

The third contingency is the orderly withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel and the establishment of a formidable line at the 38th parallel. Mr. Rusk pointed out that if we were to permit that to be brought about, it would be a most indecisive conclusion in Korea because it would require substantial forces in South Korea and the North Koreans would have the chance to start the whole thing over again when they want to according to their own choice. At the same time Mr. Rusk pointed out that there is doubt in many minds in Washington if the Soviets will accept a result of the Korean conflict which puts them in a worse position than they were before it started. Furthermore, the question is raised as to what support we would get from other United Nations Members for going beyond the 38th parallel. The question is further complicated by the fact that neither we nor any other United Nations Member recognize the Republic of Korea as the government of all Korea but only of that part south of the 38th.

Mr. Rusk said that we may have to face the situation very soon and other governments will want to know our views as their own views

will be dependent upon ours and upon the control that we have on the military situation.

Mr. Rusk said that as an interim measure they were thinking of having MacArthur send a communication to the North Korean military commander along the lines of the attached draft. This would provide a test to some extent of the Russian and North Korean attitude toward future phases in the military operations.

Mr. Rusk also said that they were working in the Pentagon on a more extensive program, which could later be put up to the President for his decision (Mr. Gross has copy).[2] This paper is deficient in that it does not take into account the nature of United Nations action nor the parliamentary situation with which we would be faced in the United Nations and which we must meet in order to get maximum United Nations approval. Among questions which were raised are the type of consultation which should take place here in New York and with whom it should take place. If the consultants are those who have forces in North Korea, you are then faced with how to get India involved in them.

There followed some general discussion of Mr. Rusk's remarks and of the papers which Mr. Rusk brought to the meeting. Ambassador Austin pointed out that in dealing with the Republic of Korea we must recognize that there are other interests involved: those of China, Russia, India, etc. He said in his view what the Russians want is a no-man's-land line south of their territory which can be used for their own protection.

Mr. Gross asked if any thought had been given to the idea of a frontal approach to the Soviet representatives while Vyshinsky is here asking them point blank how they would like to liquidate the situation. Mr. Rusk replied that consideration had been given to that and what worried them about that approach was the probability that the Soviet reply would be to stick to the 38th parallel and with the military situation moving as rapidly as it is, we don't want to have to negotiate with them on that point.

It was suggested that the Senator's opening speech which he might have to make as soon as Wednesday of next week [3] ought to point out what would be a good United Nations solution; namely, a free, united and rehabilitated Korea without committing ourselves as to what are our war aims.

Mr. Rusk said that one question which would arise very early in the debate would be the question of inviting the Chinese Communists as witnesses in Committee I. He said that one reason we could use

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[2] Presumably the reference is to the draft "Program for Bringing Korean Hostilities to an End"; see the enclosure to the letter from Matthews to Burns, dated September 22, p. 756.

[3] September 27.

for supporting their participation was the item which appeared in today's *Times* to the effect that the Chinese Communists had admitted that they had sent battle-trained Korean troops from Manchuria to participate in the Korean war.[4] It could be stated that the Committee should hear the explanation of the Chinese Communists of their willingness to let the Korean troops in.

Senator Austin agreed that we must grant the Chinese Communists a hearing in the Committee, but at the same time emphasize that such a hearing carries no indication that this is a first step toward the admission of Communist China as a United Nations Member.

The Senator also said that as far as the proposed communication from MacArthur was concerned he thought that it might be a little bit early in relation to the existing military situation. Mr. Rusk pointed out that it certainly couldn't be used today but the situation might move very rapidly and we were simply preparing for the future.

Following a meeting with Senator Austin we then met with Dening and Graves of the United Kingdom Delegation. Mr. Dening said that the United Kingdom was very anxious to find out the United States views on the question of crossing the 38th parallel. He handed Mr. Rusk a resolution which the British were thinking about and to which they wanted our reaction.[5] Mr. Dening also handed us two telegrams—one from Moscow and one from New Delhi which gave the reactions of the British Ambassador in Moscow and Pannikar's views as to the probabilities of Soviet or Chinese intervention.

Mr. Rusk said that we were giving a lot of thought to the problems raised by Mr. Dening and suggested that he and Mr. Dening get together later this afternoon after Rusk had had a chance to talk to the Secretary.

HARDING F. BANCROFT

[Annex]

TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE NORTH KOREAN FORCES: The defeat of your forces is at hand. In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum further loss of life and destruction to Korea, the United Nations Commander-in-Chief calls upon you and the forces under your command to lay down your arms in accordance with the following:

1. All North Korean forces shall lay down their arms and cease hostilities forthwith. The United Nations Commission on Korea shall arrange for the supervision of compliance with this condition.

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[4] In the item under reference, a spokesman of the Foreign Ministry in Peking was quoted as saying: "It is the proper right and sacred duty of Koreans in China to return to their fatherland to help in its defense and reconstruction. We shall forever stand on the side of the Korean people." (*The New York Times*, September 23, 1950)

[5] See telegram Delga 27, September 23, from New York, p. 763.

2. North Korean civil authorities shall be responsible for maintaining law and order pending further instructions from United Nations authorities.

3. All United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees under North Korean control should be immediately liberated and provision made for their protection, care, maintenance, and immediate transportation to places directed by the Commanding General of the Unified Command.

4. North Korean forces, including prisoners of war in the hands of United Nations forces, will be treated correctly and will be permitted by United Nations authorities to return to their homes as soon as practicable.

795.5/9–2350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, September 23, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received September 23—1 : 50 p. m.]

755. Bajpai, Secretary General MEA, in discussing question of UN military action when 38th Parallel reached, today said it was greatly to be hoped that North Korean forces would be trapped below Parallel and military operations thereby ended. GOI was of opinion that extension military action north of Parallel was generally not in interests of peace, and extension active hostilities to 38th Parallel would make for difficult decision. He recognized that breaking off fighting on reaching Parallel would be contrary to all military precepts and said he personally thought it would be necessary to decide question in light of circumstances when decision actually had to be taken. He emphasized that India attached greatest importance to unified and free Korea after question of aggression was resolved.

HENDERSON

320/9–2350 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, September 23, 1950—3 : 51 p. m.
[Received September 23—4 : 44 p. m.]

Delga 27. In meeting today Dening (UK) handed Rusk following proposed resolution on Korea. Dening said UK very anxious get US views on Korea, particularly question of crossing 38th Parallel.

"The GA having regard to its resolution of 14 November 1947, of 12th December 1948 and of 21st October 1949;

"Having taken note of the report of the UN Commission on Korea;

"Mindful of the fact that the objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to have not been fully accomplished and in particular that the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt

has been made by an armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the Government of the Republic of Korea;

"Recalling its declaration of 12 December 1948 that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the UNCOK was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the temporary commission; and that this is the only such government in Korea;

"Bearing in mind that UN Armed Forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendation of the SC of 27 June 1950 that members of the UN furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area;

"Recalling that a declared objective of the resolutions of the GA referred to was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in Korea;

"Recommends (*a*) that all necessary steps be taken to promote conditions of stability and security throughout the whole of Korea.

(*b*) That when such conditions have been created, new elections be held throughout the whole of Korea with a view to the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea;

"Resolves that (*a*) a commission be established consisting of ———, to be known as the UN Interim Commission in Korea, to be charged with the task of conducting preliminary discussions with North Korean representatives regarding the political future of Korea and in particular (i) to inform the North Koreans of the intention of the UN to hold new elections throughout Korea on a national basis with a view to the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government, (ii) to inform the North Koreans that any United Nations forces entering North Korea would do so for the purpose of maintaining law and order until new elections had been held and a new national Korean Government, itself capable of maintaining law and order, established,

"(*b*) A commission consisting of ——— to be known as the UN Unification Commission in Korea be established to be charged with the task of supervising new elections to be held throughout the whole of Korea and to assume the functions hitherto exercised by the present UN Commission in Korea, consulting as may be appropriate with the Government of the Republic of Korea.

"The UN Interim Commission should proceed to Korea and begin to carry out its functions as soon as the military situation permits. The UN Unification Commission in Korea should proceed to Korea as soon as the UN Interim Commission in Korea has completed its task;

"The General Assembly furthermore,

"Mindful of the fact that at the end of the present hostilities the task of rehabilitating the Korean economy would be beyond the resources of which Korea itself disposes;

"Recommends that the ECOSOC in consultation with the UN Unification Commission in Korea, should prepare a programme of economic and technical assistance."

ACHESON

746G.00/9–2250 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

SECRET

HONG KONG, September 22, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received September 23—7 : 57 p. m.]

642. I. Political.

For first time Consulate General has received evidence believed reliable that Chinese Communists do not intend invade Taiwan this year as well as indications that they may limit further aid to North Korea to token support. Above contained in 4 independent . . . reports received this week contents as follows:

. . . . . .

(3) Chou En-lai stated . . . that Chinese Communists would not get involved in Korean war or fight in any area outside China unless attacked. He said two reasons for this policy, first to avoid any action prejudicial to China's entry into UN (which made invasion Taiwan inadvisable at this time) and second, to permit concentration all efforts on reconstruction. Source . . . commented that token support in form of food and medicine would probably be given Korea.

(4) North Korean Ambassador visited Mao in latter part August and requested aid in form food, medicine and trucks. Chinese Service of Supply received instructions ship 100,000 first aid parcels and 500 tons food to North Korea before September 7. Other signs of Peking's paramount interest in gaining entry to UN were Chou En-lai's telegrams to UN branding as violation of charter Security Council's rejection of demand for admission Chinese Communist representative and demanding unseating Nationalist delegation in assembly in favor Chinese Communists. Editorials on UN in *Peking People's Daily* and Hong Kong *Wen Hui Pao* lent support to view that Peking making all-out effort get into UN. Additional significant straw in wind was noticeable decrease this week in NCNA articles on Korea or on US "aggression" against Manchuria.[1]

[1] The following report was contained in the weekly analysis submitted to the Department by the Embassy in Taipei in telegram 411, September 23:

"Reports of Defense Minister [of the Republic of China] partially confirmed by outside source state Chinese Communists have decided send 250,000 troops in North Korean uniforms to fight in Korea. All personnel must be able to speak Korean or Japanese. Report does not state whether Chinese Communist forces are to operate as units under own commanders or are to be used as replacements in North Korean units. Report further states necessary North Korean uniforms to be made presumably mostly by hand in Mukden by women's patriotic organizations. Comment: As weather in Korea will soon be cold uniforms will probably have to be padded cotton and production may take some time.

"M[inistry of] N[ational] D[efense] reports that Chinese Communists established supply center in Pyongyang, capital of North Korea and that a tank organization nature not stated has also been set up in North Korea." (794A.00 (W)/9–2350)

Department pass crypto army for CINCFE, CINCPAC, ComSeventh TaskFlt. CINCFE pass COMNAVFE. Pouched Taipei, Saigon and Hanoi. Joint WEEKA 38 from SANA.

. . . . . .

WILKINSON

795.00/9–2350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

PUSAN, September 23, 1950.
[Received September 23—10 : 53 p. m.]

202. Re Deptel 141, September 20.[1] Following are my comments on tentative program: General program described reference telegram considered excellent as regards both spirit and practicality. Generally speaking I feel CG UN forces in conjunction with Republic of Korea should be given widest possible latitude re definition of surrender and occupation terms in event of North Korean collapse or request for terms (latter seems unlikely at this juncture).

Specifically: Re paragraph B (6) suggest UN forces take over maintenance of peace and order in North Korea as speedily as possible. It is felt here principal North Korean civil authorities are not likely to surrender and even if they do, they seem hardly appropriate persons to deal with civil population for more than minimum emergency period.

Re paragraph B (7) this seems ambiguous and unclear. Suggest this be rephrased to read "the Government of the Republic of Korea should declare general amnesty for all North Korea except war criminals" it is felt here Republic of Korea as sovereign power should declare general amnesty and specific reference to political prisoners might be avoided.[2]

Repeated information OAFE unnumbered, USPolAd Tokyo unnumbered.

MUCCIO

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[1] See footnote 1 to the memorandum by Emmerson dated September 22, p. 756.

[2] Part 2 of this telegram was received on September 25; see *infra*.

795.00/9–2550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

PUSAN, September 23, 1950.
[Received September 25—2 : 45 a. m.]

202. Following is part two of my telegram 202, September 23,[1] which unfortunately was not forwarded with rest of message through error in transmission.

Re paragraph C(1) : If UNCOK is to be continued consider extremely important governments represented on UNCOK should be persuaded appoint top calibre men as replacements or for new commission; also UN Secretary General be urged appoint principal secretary higher quality than previous years. Consider continuation European, Latin American and Australian representation desirable. Suggest possibility substitution Thailand or Pakistan for China.

Re paragraph C(2 and 3) : Validity Republic Korea general elections last May 30, which were observed by UNCOK by ROK invitation cannot be questioned. UNCOK should observe by-elections upon invitation GOK, as in past. In 1948 UNCOK supervised elections south 38th parallel, since which time ROK established, approved by GA, and recognized as sovereign state. UNCOK should supervise elections for National Assembly north of 38th parallel, analogous to UNCOK action below parallel in 1948, with UN forces maintaining order.

Re paragraph C(5) : Question desirability proposing neutralization Korea; do not believe any Korean Government would accept such program. Koreans most suspicious of any attempt to treat them in any way different from other countries. While attempt to secure nonaggression pledges from neighbors ROK as well as GOK unobjectionable, consider best means achieving this objective would be ROK admission UN.

Repeated information OAFE unnumbered, USPolAd Tokyo unnumbered.

MUCCIO

[1] *Supra.*

746G.00/9–2550 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET HONG KONG, September 25, 1950—9 a. m.
[Received September 25—7:47 a. m.]

656. Former officer, Fu Tso-yi who says he is agent of Political Department non-government MND gave Consulate General political report said to be from another former subordinate of Fu's now working in Ministry of Water Conservancy. Latter who is still in Peking and sent word out by third party attended session of Research Institute of People's Revolutionary University group at which Chu Teh [1] spoke. Chu said "there was no need to fear outbreak of world war since decision as to whether such war would break out was not in America's hands but in ours". He said China would definitely not become involved in world war until fully prepared and pointed out that within five years it was expected Chinese industry would be restored to highest level reacted [*reached*] under Japanese occupation. He stated Chinese troops would not be sent into Korea although Chinese people sympathetic with Korean people and would give them other forms of aid.

Reporting officer has had no previous contact with source and is unable estimate his reliability. However, reported decision to avoid military involvement Korea and emphasis on importance reconstruction conform closely to statement attributed Chou En-lai (Joint Weeka 38, September 22).[2] In view source's alleged connection with MND in Taiwan it is worth noting that his report is in direct contradiction with view consistently expressed by pro-KMT press here that Chinese Communist troops would participate in Korean war.

WILKINSON

[1] Commander in Chief of the People's Liberation Army, People's Republic of China.

[2] See telegram 642 from Hong Kong, received at 7:57 p. m. on September 23, p. 765.

IO Files

Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET NEW YORK, September 25, 1950—9:15 a. m.

[Here follows a list of those present (42).]

1. *Korea* (US/A/C.1/1897)[1]

Mr. Rusk explained that the British had given us a copy of a draft resolution on Korea last night. Since the military situation in Korea

[1] See the annex to this document, p. 773.

was going rapidly, it might be necessary for the Assembly to express overall policy for Korea in a few days and to give guidance to the Unified Command. Remarking on the commendable initiative of the United Kingdom in this matter, he explained that the purpose of the resolution was to give maximum flexibility to the military command and to restate the objective of a unified independent Korea, as well as to establish a new commission to act in behalf of the United Nations in Korea. In this connection Mr. Rusk called attention to the language of the resolution. Paragraph (*a*) avoided specific reference to a unified Korea as a war aim. Paragraph (*b*) regarding elections was also in broad terms, thus allowing the United Nations Commission on the spot to take up the question of elections and deal with it in terms of the actual situation. The language in Paragraph (*c*) was particularly clever in that it provided that any United Nations forces entering North Korea should not remain "otherwise than so far as necessary" for achieving the objectives in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*); this language had been suggested by the British Solicitor-General.[2]

Referring to the contemplated commission, Mr. Rusk thought it should be strengthened both as to membership and functions, as compared with the present Commission, and expressed the hope that Asian members of the United Nations would be strongly represented. He pointed out that this commission would also supervise recovery and rehabilitation activities in Korea. An interim committee on Korea was contemplated which would permit the United States and the Unified Command in the field to get advice immediately from the United Nations, together with approval of action to be taken in the short range.

Mr. Rusk believed that the British draft required further elaboration with respect to Korean rehabilitation and to administrative matters. He explained that the British would like our general approval of the policy set forth in the resolution, after which India and other Members would be consulted in the hope of getting a considerable number of widely representative joint sponsors. It was anticipated that this resolution could be acted upon quickly by Committee 1. In response to a question from Ambassador Austin about consultation with other Members and in particular with the Republic of Korea, Mr. Rusk explained that such consultation would be undertaken later in the day.

Mr. Dulles said his first reaction was very favorable. He asked whether the British wanted us to sponsor the resolution. The Secretary thought we probably would not want to sponsor any resolution at all. Mr. Dulles referred to the legal formula in paragraph (*c*) which re-

[2] Sir Frank Soskice, Alternate U.K. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly.

ferred to unification in a negative sense. He considered it rather adroit drafting and thought the resolution constituted a good start. The Secretary agreed that the language was appealing.

It seemed to Mr. Cohen that the resolution gave the United States the freedom it wished. However, he was a little concerned as to how it met some of the problems which Mr. Dulles had raised at the last Delegation meeting. Our position was difficult since we could not know how the Russians would appraise our intentions. He thought it important to consider how our desire to reach a solution in Korea without the military going beyond the 38th parallel could be indicated. This raised for him the question whether in some way we should not indicate our desire to resume negotiations with the North Koreans. He could not see a better basis for such negotiations than this resolution. He thought we should give at least some thought to trying to foreshadow what we hoped might occur after we restored the situation before the breach of the peace took place. This would make the situation clear not only for ourselves but for the Soviets, and we might thereby avoid the possibility of any future incidents.

Mrs. Roosevelt asked whether there was any possibility that the Republic of Korea would announce itself to be the Government of all Korea and thus create difficulties for us. Mr. Rusk did not doubt that would be the position taken by the Rhee Government and believed it would be necessary for the Assembly and the United States to make it clear to the Korean representatives that the rest of the world did not accept it as the Government of all Korea. We had not pressed that point during the fighting because of the importance of maintaining the Korean morale. He thought it essential that the United Nations should continue with the process it had started looking toward a united, free Korea. Mr. Dulles thought that the Republic of Korea had not contended that as it was now constituted it was the Government of all Korea. He recalled that there were one hundred vacant seats in the Korean legislature left for representatives of the North and believed that paragraph (*b*) of the resolution would cover the problem raised by Mrs. Roosevelt. Mr. Cohen believed that while the legal position was what Mr. Dulles had described, there was a danger in the war situation that the Republic of Korea might proceed to exercise provisional authority in North Korea. The Secretary observed that MacArthur would be the authority in the North until elections were held.

Senator Cooper referred to paragraph (*c*) of the draft resolution and asked whether it would be interpreted to limit military action north of the 38th parallel. Mr. Rusk replied that it would not limit permission to enter this area, but it was a restriction on the right to remain there. Operations could proceed north of the 38th parallel so that the objective of a free, democratic Korea could be implemented. Senator Cooper asked if this resolution would mark the first time the

Assembly had authorized the entry of troops north of the 38th parallel. Mr. Rusk said this had been authorized by the Security Council resolution of June 27. In response to a question from Ambassador Gross as to the effect of this resolution on the Security Council situation, Mr. Rusk replied that the resolution had been drafted in such a way as not to intrude upon the Council's authority. Ambassador Austin remarked that nominally the Security Council under the resolutions of June 25 and 27, and July 7, was obliged to maintain jurisdiction until the end of military operations. If the Assembly resolution interfered with this responsibility, it would require modification.

Mr. Bancroft suggested that some provision should be made for consultation between the unification commission and the Assembly, or even to establish a relation between the Security Council and the commission. Mr. Rusk agreed that such an addition would be desirable. Ambassador Gross asked whether paragraph (*a*) might not be constituted as a commitment to take the necessary military action to bring about the result of a unified Korea. Mr. Rusk did not believe that recommendations of a general policy character should be regarded as an order to Members to carry out the recommendations. He pointed out that no country had accepted the previous resolutions as a mandate.

The Secretary asked what affect the following modification of paragraph (*a*) would have: "that the purpose of all United Nations action shall be to ensure conditions of enduring peace throughout the whole of Korea". Mr. Rusk believed this change would weaken the resolution and not put the General Assembly sufficiently behind the attempt to unify Korea. Moreover, it was important to emphasize the idea of removing the problem of the 38th parallel.

Mr. Cohen wondered whether there was serious objection to trying in some way to include the thought we would attempt to negotiate with North Korea unless military action was continued. He could not see any alternative to this except complete military occupation. For this reason, he believed there should be some provision in the resolution to indicate we would like to proceed this way if possible. Otherwise the resolution constituted a greater directive than was intended. Mr. Rusk observed that we had not recognized North Korea for any purpose. We hoped they would surrender. If negotiations were undertaken, the only purpose would be for the North Koreans to save themselves and that would involve restoration of the 38th parallel. The North Korean Government did not represent the people as evidenced by the influx of four million refugees into South Korea. Probably military action would be necessary to enter the North. Mr. Cohen suggested this position raised the question of a general conflagration.

The Secretary thought the situation had to develop over a considerable period of time. We might start with MacArthur calling on the North Koreans to surrender and then hold them responsible for order

in the North until the appropriate government authorities or the United Nations could take over. This would indicate we did not intend to rush in with troops. Then if the North Koreans surrendered, units of the South Korean constabulary could be sent in and perhaps other Asiatic troops such as Indians employed for occupation purposes.

Mr. Rusk commented that the British representative in Moscow believed that the Soviets would not intervene in North Korea. Our position assumed that, and the British resolution was likewise based on Soviet non-intervention. Of course, if the Soviets interfered, we would be confronted by a different military and political situation. He explained that the British felt that, if we showed any lack of initiative, the Soviets would seize upon it to reconstitute and freeze the 38th parallel. It therefore seemed desirable to him for us to move ahead without further negotiation. In response to a question from Senator Cooper Mr. Rusk indicated that this resolution would constitute the first explicit authorization for the entry of United Nations forces into North Korea.

The Secretary suggested that the resolution be shown to the Indians in its present text in order to determine their reaction. In this connection, Mr. Rusk referred the Delegation to a telegram from New Delhi expressing doubt as to the wisdom of United Nations forces crossing the 38th parallel.[3] Ambassador Austin suggested that the draft resolution should be taken up with other Asian countries, including China. Mr. Rusk said the British had mentioned our taking the lead with Romulo and with the Latin American states on this matter. Ambassador Austin suggested consultation with Sir Zafrullah Khan,[4] but Mr. Rusk believed that the British should take the initiative with the Commonwealth.

Mr. Lubin [5] referred to the fact that the Secretary's opening speech had asked that the Economic and Social Council prepare plans for reconstruction of Korea, and asked whether a provision to this effect should be incorporated in the draft. Mr. Rusk indicated his willingness to consider such an addition: it was possible also that two resolutions might be needed—one strictly political and the other dealing with Korean recovery and rehabilitation. Mr. Dulles thought, however, that there were advantages in tying the two matters together. Referring to instructions from the Department, Mr. Lubin recalled that it had been felt the Assembly should request the Economic and Social Council to develop plans and recommend machinery. Mr.

[3] See telegram 755 from New Delhi, September 23, p. 763.
[4] Foreign Minister of Pakistan and Head of the Pakistani Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.
[5] Isador Lubin, U.S. Representative on the U.N. Economic and Social Council.

McKeever [6] pointed out the advantages from the public relations point of view of including both points in a single package resolution.

[Here follows a record of the discussion on the other two agenda items: Chairmanship of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, and United Action for Peace.]

[Annex]

SECRET

SEPTEMBER 25, 1950.

US/A/C.1/1897

UNITED KINGDOM DRAFT RESOLUTION ON KOREA

The General Assembly

Having regard to its Resolutions of 14th November 1947, of 12th December 1948 and of 21st October 1949;

Having taken note of the Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea;

Mindful of the fact that the objectives set forth in the Resolutions referred to have not been fully accomplished and in particular that the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt has been made by an armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the Government of the Republic of Korea;

Recalling its Declaration of 12th December 1948 that there has been established a lawful Government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea;

Having in mind that United Nations armed forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendation of the Security Council of 27th June 1950, subsequent to its Resolution of 25 June 1950, that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area;

Recalling that the essential objective of the Resolutions of the General Assembly referred to was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government in Korea;

Recommends (*a*) that all necessary steps be taken to insure conditions of enduring peace throughout the whole of Korea,

[6] Porter McKeever, Public Information Adviser, U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

(*b*) that elections be held and other constituent acts be taken under the auspices of the United Nations to complete the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Government of all Korea,

(*c*) that any United Nations forces entering North Korea do not remain otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified in (*a*) and (*b*) above.

Resolves that

(*a*) a Commission consisting of ——— to be known as the United Nations Unification and Recovery Commission in Korea be established to (i) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the present United Nations Commission in Korea (ii) represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Government of all Korea (iii) organize and supervise United Nations activities directed toward the rehabilitation and recovery of Korea, consulting as may be appropriate in all these tasks with the Government of the Republic of Korea; the United Nations Unification and Recovery Commission should proceed to Korea and begin to carry out its functions as soon as possible;

(*b*) pending the arrival of the United Nations Unification and Recovery Commission in Korea, governments represented on the Commission should form an interim committee composed of their Permanent Representatives at the Seat of the United Nations to consult with and advise the United Nations Unified Command in the light of the above recommendations.

The General Assembly furthermore,

Mindful of the fact that at the end of the present hostilities the task of rehabilitating the Korean economy will be of great magnitude;

Recommends that the United Nations Unification and Recovery Commission in Korea should consult with the Economic and Social Council in preparing a programme of economic and technical assistance.

795B.5/9–2550

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) [1] *to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 25, 1950.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to your letter of 24 July [2] in which you outlined certain proposed procedures and principles for handling offers of assistance for use in Korea.

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[1] George C. Marshall assumed office on September 21, succeeding Louis Johnson who resigned effective September 19.

[2] The text of this letter is contained in the circular telegram dated July 24, 5 a. m., p. 457.

The processing of offers received in the Unified Command has been conducted in accordance with the procedure you described. More recently, representatives of our respective departments have agreed to a formal and slightly more detailed version of this procedure (a copy of which is attached) which will guide future processing of offers of military assistance for use in Korea.

Regarding the acceptance of military offers of assistance, it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which I concur, that acceptance does not necessarily carry with it an intent to commit forces in the combat theater. As you mentioned in your letter, a modification of the actual offer into usable form may result or, alternatively, the reply to the offer, when appropriate, may be expressed in such terms as to discourage activation or to preclude utilization of the forces offered until such time as they may be required. Regardless of the military value of an offer, however, the United States should manifest evidence of its constant interest in the offer.

In many cases, the Services have participated in the preliminary discussion and development of details as to the technical considerations of such offers prior to their submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This has been found to be a desirable practice. Such screening and technical guidance by the Services assists the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their decisions on the utilization of assistance offered.

As regards specifically the policy set forth in your letter, the Joint Chiefs, with whom I agree, are of the opinion that it should be enlarged to include the following:

a. In any conversation between U.S. representatives and those of any contributing nation, stress should be laid on the fact that General MacArthur has requested that military forces should come immediately and that organizations now in being should be dispatched if they are to be of material utility. U.S. representatives should also point out that all offers of military assistance should conform as far as practicable with the general criteria of useful military assistance (forwarded to you by letter dated 26 July 1950).[3]

b. When offers are incapable of meeting the general criteria, a full statement of the aspects of the offer should be recorded in order that a review may be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the practicability of utilization based on possible United States contributions of equipment and aid in organization and training.

In the sixth paragraph of your letter, wherein unilateral action on the part of the United States Government is envisaged, it is not believed desirable to commit ourselves to actual employment of military forces "in the combat area". Accordingly, it is believed that this phrase should be omitted from the policy outlined in your letter.

Sincerely yours,

G. MARSHALL

[3] See footnote 2 to the letter from Burns to Matthews dated July 27, p. 482.

[Enclosure]

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

EXTRACT FROM DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CM IN 11446

NR 257 [SEPTEMBER 13, 1950.]

"A. *Military Assistance.*

"1. Offers of military assistance from member govts will be transmitted to the SYG of the UN who, in turn, will transmit the offers to the Unified Command (USG), through the US Mission to the UN. Requests from the Unified Command (USG) for additional effective assistance in Korea may be transmitted to SYG for communication to the permanent delegations of the member govts.

"2. Upon receipt of the offer the Unified Command (USG) will enter into direct negotiations with the member govts concerned regarding details of the offer and its utilization or in respect to other effective assistance which the member govt might be in a position to provide.

"3. Upon completion of direct negotiations the Unified Command (USG) will inform the SYG of their results. The SYG will transmit this info to the delegation of the member govt concerned and, in consultation with the Unified Command (USG) and the delegation concerned, will release this info to the press."

IO Files

Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET NEW YORK, September 26, 1950—9:15 a. m.

[Here follow a list of persons present (46) and a record of the discussion on the first agenda item: United Action for Peace.]

2. *Korean Relief and Rehabilitation* (US/A/C.1/1902; US/A/2581)[1]

Mr. Lubin explained that the Department position had favored separation of relief activities from reconstruction, but he suggested that if the present rapid military advances continued, the problem might become entirely one of reconstruction. After referring to the probable need for at least $115,000,000 for relief for the rest of the year in Korea, Mr. Lubin summarized the suggested position as being to get the members of the United Nations seriously to consider making immediate contributions to Korean relief so that its financing would be a joint effort. He observed that most countries had neither made nor even offered contributions; Australia, for example, was unwilling to

[1] Neither printed.

take any action in this regard until machinery was established providing for efficient collection and distribution of relief; and it wanted to know what others were giving and whether requests made to individual countries were firm, or duplicated requests going to perhaps ten different countries.

It was proposed that a new item be placed on the agenda entitled "Korean Relief." The Secretary-General would state the problem involved, and then we would hope for a dramatic speech to be made by someone like Romulo calling upon all members to help in the relief effort, somewhat on the order of a Community Chest drive. Then a resolution could be adopted calling upon all governments, members and non-members alike, and specialized agencies to do all they could to aid the civilian population in Korea. The Secretary-General would be asked to report back before the end of the Assembly as to the contributions pledged. This would cover the relief program. Mr. Lubin noted that the financing of the relief program could be done by funds of the Army, but that we would prefer that other Members share this expense.

On the reconstruction side, Mr. Lubin explained that the Department believed that plans and machinery for reconstruction should be worked out at a special session of the Economic and Social Council, which would report back to this Assembly, which could then take the appropriate action. The Department did not agree that the Commission projected in the British resolution on Korea should do anything more than formulate the first general plans, after which actual planning and operations would be lodged in another body. Mr. Lubin thought there might be some question about complete separation of the relief and reconstruction programs, as recommended by the Department.

Ambassador Jessup thought there was grave danger that, through separation of relief and reconstruction, we would lose the spirit and purpose of the approach in the Secretary's speech in the general debate, which was designed to go beyond the Korean question in terms of the general beginning of a United Nations effort for improvement of conditions throughout the world. He agreed relief was the more immediate problem, but reconstruction followed closely on its heels. It would be unfortunate, he felt, to lose the spirit of the Secretary's speech for the sake of trying to raise a few extra dollars in the early days. This operation should not be diverted into the ordinary type of humanitarian appeal. The Secretary considered that this was right, and Mrs. Roosevelt agreed.

Mr. Lubin thought the two could be separated successfully if the war continued, but in the present situation he was not so sure. He thought it important to push forward with a plan for reconstruction

and believed the United States should be the first to come out with a commitment on reconstruction activities. He observed that unless the Korean people who had resisted knew that something was going to be done to put them back to work, we could not expect other peoples who were threatened to resist when they were attacked; this fact should be taken into account. The Secretary agreed action should be taken quickly. Mr. Lubin stated that the Department had recommended that the Economic and Social Council report back with plans about November 15, but he doubted whether we could afford to wait that long. Mrs. Roosevelt thought the basic relief job might have to be done before reconstruction could be undertaken. She believed plans could be made which would set the pattern for a similar operation anywhere in the world.

The Secretary asked how we could move ahead on this matter. Mr. Lubin suggested that the Assembly might ask the Unified Command to move ahead on relief. Mrs. Roosevelt thought there was no other way to proceed since no one else was in Korea to carry on relief. Mr. Ross believed the single approach contained in the Secretary's speech could be preserved by careful timing and tactics. Mr. Rusk hoped the Delegation was aware that a great deal of relief activity was already in progress through ECA, and contributions and commitments from other governments. As he saw it, the problem was to adjust the present effort in terms of a long-range United Nations program in Korea. Ambassador Austin inquired whether a plan setting up channels for relief offers was not already in existence. Replying in the affirmative, Mr. Rusk suggested that further relief plans could be developed out of what we already had.

Ambassador Austin asked whether we had not thought it might be better to separate the political and security aspects of the problem from relief and rehabilitation in Korea. Mr. Rusk recalled that Mr. Dulles had raised the question of tying all aspects together.

Mr. Lubin believed that something had to be done to stimulate activity on this side of the problem. Not all relief offers had been accepted. Action would stir things up, provide for expansion and get relief moving by making individual countries play their part in furnishing relief. The question of rehabilitation raised the further questions of establishing machinery, the kind of program, its extent, and its operation. He thought Korea should be treated as a unified problem for the sake of the psychological effects.

Mr. Dulles thought a unified Korea could be achieved more quickly through the use of doctors and engineers than by soldiers. If a resolution were adopted, he believed it would be a mistake to omit our intention to set up means for relief and rehabilitation. Mr. McKeever observed that from the public relations standpoint, separation would

result in the loss of much of the impact in the Secretary's opening speech. The Secretary agreed that relief and rehabilitation matters should remain in the political resolution. It seemed to him that this was the sort of thing which developed naturally if the resolution started with the idea that economic recovery was part of our projected Korean program. Then the next step would be to get some kind of group to start the actual program, perhaps a United Nations Recovery Committee. The thing had to begin somewhere, and there was no need to figure out the whole program in advance. It would grow as the United Nations got on with the job in Korea. A director would be appointed; he would collect rice and other materials offered and ask for more. Doctors, engineers, schools, public health officers would be started out. All that was needed was to set forth the program, get some people on the job and let them set up the organization in terms of the actual situation. He asked whether this was too simple. Mr. Lubin observed that there was such a United Nations Director now, but he was not equipped to do the job. The Secretary suggested that some other individual be gotten at once and put to work.

Mr. Popper [2] believed that the steering group should continue its consideration of this problem. The Delegation could consider the matter further when plans had been developed.

[2] Mr. Popper was Principal Executive Officer of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

961.61/9–2650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, September 26, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received September 26—12 : 35 p. m.]

773. Soviet press brief summaries of speeches September 25 Mao Tze Tung and Chu Teh clearly indicate that these leaders now assert foremost task Chinese Communists is to build up strong army. We assume full texts speeches will be published here shortly.

If Soviet press has not distorted their statements, new CPG line presumably is result events since June 25, as Mao spoke in opposite vein June 6. We believe highly significant abandonment by CPG of economic development, industrialization, and reconstruction as first priority objectives government, in favor "creation of mighty army for defense frontiers." In view critical economic problems facing CPG, new preoccupation with army suggests CPG conviction world situation so serious Chinese Communist survival requires immediate establish-

ment powerful army. Factors contributing to such momentous decision probably include following:

1. Soviet pressure, resulting from Soviet concern over speedup in arming of West, and free world unity, in face KPDR aggression.
2. Unpalatable awareness of CPG that US neutralization Formosa effectively stymied Red plans to seize island.
3. Awareness that air and sea power exposed industrial targets and communications far behind fighting lines in Korea to destruction, regardless of overwhelming superiority in numbers of North Korean Ground forces in early weeks of war.
4. Object lesson derived from Korean war: Soviet quite capable of sacrificing Asian Communists. Crushing defeat being now administered to North Korean forces while white Communist elder brothers sit on sidelines undoubtedly will result in some stock-taking by all Asian Communists. Another aspect of this object lesson is that Soviets were guilty of grossly underestimating free world reaction to KPDR aggression, and that this reaction has contributed to anti-Communist solidarity and strength.

Effects within China of CPG emphasis on army will be complex and far-reaching. Support of large, modernized army will place tremendous burden on country, which as usual will have to be borne largely by farmers. Diversion of funds to army, instead of utilization all possible resources for economic development will retard industrialization and establishment of powerful proletariat, upon which CCP hopes to depend for support. Equipment of Army could consume entire existing credits extended by USSR, and much more besides. Fundamental longing of Chinese people for peaceful existence, which contributed significantly to bringing civil war to swift conclusion, must be ignored by Communists, who will have to deluge Chinese people with alarmist war propaganda to justify army. Fact that CPG must continue to clearly align Chinese with USSR against non-Communist world will not be received favorably by Chinese people, who would prefer improvement in economic conditions and absence militarism and threat involvement in war against proven power of US, UK and other free nations.

Whether stress on Chinese army is indicative of any fundamental alteration in Soviet global war plans is difficult to estimate in absence further information, however, it strongly suggests that Kremlin feels it can no longer afford to leave China without a first class modern army, and that international situation requires heavy subsidization Chinese military machine without delay. Together with Soviet policy build up GDR army, pattern of increase Communist military strength in most significant satellite is clear.

KIRK

357.AD/9–2650 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1950—1 p. m.

317. For Allison from Johnson. Fol is text of draft JCS directive to MacArthur which will be formally transmitted from Secy Defense to Secy State this afternoon for approval and subsequent transmission to Pres for approval:

"1. This directive, based on NSC 81/1,[1] is furnished in order to provide amplifying instructions as to further military actions to be taken by you in Korea. These instructions, however, cannot be considered to be final since they may require modification in accordance with developments. In this connection, you will continue to make special efforts to determine whether there is a Chinese Communist or Soviet threat to the attainment of your objective, which will be reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a matter of urgency.

2. Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean armed forces. In attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38° parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. Under no circumstances, however, will your forces cross the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border. Furthermore, support of your operations north or south of the 38° parallel will not include air or naval action against Manchuria or against USSR territory.

3. In the event of the open or covert employment of major Soviet units south of the 38° parallel, you will assume the defense, make no move to aggravate the situation and report to Washington. You should take the same action in the event your forces are operating north of the 38° parallel and major Soviet units are openly employed. You will not discontinue air and naval operations north of the 38° parallel merely because the presence of Soviet or Chinese Communist troops is detected in a target area but if the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists should announce in advance their intention to reoccupy North Korea and give warning, either explicitly or implicitly, that their forces should not be attacked, you should refer the matter immediately to Washington.

4. In the event of the open or covert employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38° parallel, you should continue the action as long as action by your forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance.

[1] Dated September 9, p. 712.

5. In the event of an attempt to employ small Soviet or Chinese Communist units covertly south of the 38° parallel, you should continue the action.

6. You should immediately make an intensive effort, using all information media available to you, to turn the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean people away from the United Nations and to direct it toward the Korean Communists, the Soviet Union, and depending on the role they play, the Chinese Communists.

7. On the principle that the treatment of POW's shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and use for psychological warfare purposes, you should set up on a pilot-plant scale interrogation, indoctrination and training centers for those POW's now in your hands in Korea.

8. When organized armed resistance by the North Korean forces has been brought substantially to an end, you should direct the Republic of Korea forces to take the lead in disarming remaining North Korean units and enforcing the terms of surrender. Guerrilla activities should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of Korea, with minimum participating by UN contingents.

9. Circumstances obtaining at the time will determine the character of and the necessity for occupation of North Korea. Your plans for such occupation will be forwarded for approval to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

10. You will also submit your plan for future operations north of the 38th parallel to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that instructions are now being formulated on the Governmental level regarding:

a. Armistice terms to be offered by you to the North Koreans in the event of sudden collapse of North Korean forces; and

b. Course of action to be followed and activities to be undertaken during the post-hostilities period.["]

[Johnson]
WEBB

320/9–2650 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at New York

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 26, 1950—1 p. m.

Gadel 9. Fol for Allison from Johnson. Confirming our tele conversation, fol is revised text substantive portion UK Res:[1]

"Recommends:

(*a*) That all necessary steps be taken to ensure conditions of peace and security throughout the whole of Korea;

(*b*) That all necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea;

[1] See the annex to the Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the U.S. Delegation, September 25, p. 773.

(*c*) That such constitutent acts as are necessary, including the holding of elections, be taken under the auspices of the United Nations to complete the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea;

(*d*) That United Nations forces do not remain in either the northern or southern part of Korea longer than is necessary for achieving the objectives specified in (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) above.

Resolves that:

(*a*) A commission consisting of ——— to be known as the United Nations Special Commission for Korea be established to (1) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the present United Nations Commission on Korea; (2) consult with the designated representative in Korea of the Unified Command (US Govt), and the ROK in helping to carry out the recommendations made above; (3) exercise such responsibilities, if any, in connection with relief and rehabilitation in Korea as may be determined by the Gen Assembly after receiving the recommendations of the ECOSOC; (4) proceed to Korea and begin to carry out its functions as soon as possible.

(*b*) Pending the arrival of the UN Special Commission in Korea, Govts represented on the Commission shld form an interim comite composed of their permanent representatives at the seat of the UN to consult with and advise the UN Unified Command (USG) in the light of the above recommendations.

The General Assembly furthermore,

Mindful of the fact that at the end of the present hostilities the task of rehabilitating the Korean economy will be of great magnitude, requests the ECOSOC, in consultation with the specialized agencies, to develop plans for relief and rehabilitation on the termination of hostilities, to recommend organizational machinery for implementing a relief and rehabilitation program and to report to the General Assembly on or before November ———."

[Johnson]
WEBB

795.00/9–2650

Draft Memorandum by Mr. Robert G. Hooker of the Policy Planning Staff [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 26, 1950.

SUGGESTED POLITICAL ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT U.N. TROOPS MOVE NORTH OF THE 38TH PARALLEL

The necessity for offering terms for the restoration of peace and security in Korea in the near future, and for making an early decision on whether to move ground troops north of the 38th parallel, together

[1] An unsigned manuscript note in source text read: "Not considered by Staff".

with Malik's statement to the Baltimore group noted in this morning's papers,[2] all create a situation in which we must move not only firmly and decisively, but in a manner calculated to convey all possible reassurance to the U.S.S.R. and Communist China as to our real intentions.

It is therefore suggested that, if the decision is made to send ground troops north of the 38th parallel, we should take the following steps concurrently or slightly in advance:

(1) Propose formally before the General Assembly that (*a*) Korea should be neutralized, but not be demilitarized, either permanently or for a period of several years, such neutralization to be embodied in a consortium to which the U.N. powers and Communist China should be parties; (*b*) propose formally before the General Assembly that pending the execution of such a consortium or the holding of elections in Korea, whichever shall occur later, U.N. forces, *in which U.S. forces shall not be included*, shall remain in Korea for the purpose of assuring the implementation of the U.N. resolutions.

(2) Make known in some appropriate manner that the U.S. will insist upon provisions in the Japanese peace treaty guaranteeing the participants in the war against Japan against any future aggression by Japan.

The above suggestions are based upon the conviction that it would be imprudent if not genuinely provocative, if U.N. ground forces go north of the 38th parallel, unless at the same time we go as far as we can to convey to the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, in as substantive a manner as possible, assurance that the U.S. does not intend to use the Korean episode for purposes of aggression or to use Korea as a base to prepare later aggression.

[2] Mr. Malik had expressed the interest of his government in top level peace talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. A Department of State spokesman, commenting on this, called for deeds and not words to secure peace in Korea and elsewhere.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its 503rd meeting on September 26 from 3 to 7:55 p. m. The Soviet Representative introduced a draft resolution (U.N. document S/1812) condemning United States bombing in Korea; it was similar to the Soviet draft resolution introduced on August 8 and rejected by the Security Council on September 7 (see the editorial notes, pages 546 and 705). For the record of the meeting, see U.N. document S/PV.503.

795.00/9–2650 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 26, 1950—7 p. m.

151. Although Dept appreciates difficulties involved, in view apparent possibility imminent return of ROK Govt to Seoul request you make every effort discourage Rhee or other ROK spokesmen making pronouncements re ROK's unilateral extension authority north 38°. This matter being considered highest Govt levels; also of vital concern to all UN member states. Any unilateral public statement from ROK can only have harmful effect on attitude UN members. ROK delegation in confidential discussions with other UN delegations is at this time most effective method conveying ROK views. You shld emphasize to Rhee his cooperation with UN at this time of utmost importance to future ROK.

WEBB

357.AD/9–2650 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, September 26, 1950—7 : 50 p. m.
[Received September 26—8 : 17 p. m.]

615. The Secretary concurs with draft JCS directive contained Deptel 317 [1] but believes political guidance paragraph should be added as follows:

"As soon as the military situation permits, you should facilitate the restoration of the government of the Republic of Korea, with its capital in Seoul. Although the government of the Republic of Korea has been generally recognized (except by the Soviet bloc) as the only legal government in Korea, its sovereignty north of the 38th degree parallel has not been generally recognized. The Republic of Korea and its armed forces should be expected to cooperate in such military operations and military occupation as are conducted by United Nations forces north of the 38th degree parallel, but political questions such as the formal extension of sovereignty over North Korea should await action by the United Nations to complete the unification of the country."

ACHESON

[1] Transmitted at 1 p. m. on September 26, p. 781.

795.00/9–2650 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, September 26, 1950—7 : 50 p. m.
[Received September 26—8 : 22 p. m.]

614. For Webb from the Secretary. Believe State and Defense Departments should recommend to President that General MacArthur

be authorized at his discretion to broadcast message to North Korean Commander-in-Chief along following lines:

The early and total defeat of your forces is now inevitable. In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum further loss of life and destruction to Korea, the United Nations Commander-in-Chief calls upon you and the forces under your command wherever situated to lay down your arms and cease hostilities forthwith. United Nations forces will supervise compliance with this requirement.

All United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees under North Korean control must be immediately liberated and provision made for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to places directed by the Commanding General of the United Nations Unified Command.

North Korean forces, including prisoners of war in the hands of United Nations forces, will be treated correctly and will be permitted by United Nations authorities to return to their homes as soon as practicable.

The Republic of Korea will be immediately re-established with its capital in Seoul. The question of the future of Korea is now before the United Nations. The action of United Nations forces in Korea will conform to the wishes of the United Nations.[1]

ACHESON

[1] The text of the proposed broadcast, identical with that set forth above, was forwarded to President Truman by Acting Secretary of State Webb on September 27 with the indication that it had also been approved by the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Truman approved the proposal on the same date and the text was forwarded to General MacArthur by the JCS in telegram 92762 of September 27 (795.00/9–2750).

795B.5/9–2750 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, September 27, 1950—12 : 02 p. m.
[Received September 27—12 : 37 p. m.]

617. Remytel 593, September 22, USUN despatch No. 298 and USUN Doc US/S/1439.[1] There follow texts two letters dated September 26 from Limb, ROK FM, to Austin re future line of action Korea. Request Department's comments regarding reply to be made.

First letter:

"Following the discussion which I had with you on the morning of September 25, in which there was a cordial and understanding ex-

[1] None printed. Telegram 593 summarized and despatch 298 transmitted the text of a letter dated September 21 from Ambassador Chang to Ambassador Austin which was identical to the letter of the same date from Ambassador Chang to Secretary of State Acheson, p. 748. US/S/1439 was a memorandum of conversation, dated September 25, concerning a meeting between Limb, Chang, and Austin; the points discussed were substantially covered in the letters of September 21 and 25 from Chang to Acheson and the two letters of September 26 from Foreign Minister Limb, texts of which are contained in this telegram.

change of views on the situation now existing in Korea, I am pleased to set forth briefly the views of my government which were then expressed to you. I trust that this expression may serve in some degree to assist in the attainment of the fullest of mutual agreement between the Governments of the US and the ROK on the issues involved in the present situation.

The views of my government on certain basic issues involved in the present situation in Korea may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. My government believes that the UN forces now fighting in Korea should proceed beyond the 38th parallel and continue their police action against the Communist enemy until the entire Korean nation has been liberated and reunited;

2. My government would oppose any proposal to settle the present fighting in Korea by negotiation or compromise with the aggressors, but believes on the contrary that unconditional surrender of the Communist forces and leadership comprises the only proper and effective basis for a just and workable settlement;

3. My government has always considered and now considers itself to be the only legitimate government of all Korea. Only *force majeure* has kept this government from exercising its authority north of the 38th parallel in the past, just as currently *force majeure* prevents it from exercising its authority in large areas south of the 38th parallel. Any ambiguity which may have existed in the views of the GA concerning the jurisdiction of the ROK over the total area of Korea should be resolved in favor of recognizing the sole jurisdiction of the Republic in all parts of the reunited Korean nation;

4. My government believes that there will be no difficulty in deciding, with mutual agreement, on the terms concerning the time and the methods for holding a general election in Northern Korea, after a free atmosphere has been established, under the observation of the UN Commission, in order to complete the membership of the National Assembly of the ROK;

5. My government assumes that the principle and practice are already fully established that under no circumstances will individuals or groups of individuals purporting to represent Northern Korea be permitted to participate in any UN consideration of the Korean question, since no legal government exists or ever has existed independently in northern Korea;

6. It is the expectation of my government that no form of trusteeship or other limitations of Korean sovereignty will be accepted by the UN or by any nation or group of nations over any portion of Korean territory;

7. It is the hope and expectation of my government that UN forces, perhaps comprising a portion of the permanent UN police force which has been envisaged by Secretary Acheson in his address to the GA, shall remain in Korea by agreement with the ROK until such time as the security of the nation may reasonably be assured by its own armed forces;

8. My government welcomes and desires the continuance of the UN Commission in Korea for the observation of elections at a proper time and under suitable circumstances in Northern Korea and for the observation and report of any threat to the peace in Korea;

9. My government urges prompt consideration and enactment of adequate relief measures to care for the millions of people who have

been driven from their homes without adequate food, shelter, or medical facilities, whose homes have been destroyed in the fighting, and who face terrible deprivations and suffering in the winter weather which is already commencing;

10. My government is hopeful that adequate measures will be adopted by the UN providing for the reconstruction of devastated areas of the nation and for the rehabilitation of economic processes sufficient to provide a reasonable basis of continued stability and well-being;

11. Finally, it is the ardent hope and expectation of my government that a method will be found by which the ROK may take its proper and rightful place as a full and equal member of the UN.

Although our conference did not extend to further considerations than those which I have listed, it seems appropriate also to call attention to the fact that my government would be utterly unwilling to accept any settlement which necessarily involved the establishment of a coalition with Communists or which interferes with the free operation of the constitution.

With fullest appreciation for the noble role which the government of the US has played and is playing in the liberation and rehabilitation of the Korean nation, and with particular appreciation for the spendid efforts which you made as chief of the Delegation of the US in the UN to insure justice and helpful measures for the reconstruction of Korea, I am, (signed) Ben C. Limb."

Second letter:

"In elaboration of certain views which I had the honor to express to you in our conference on the morning of September 25, I should like to present certain reasons why the ROK Government considers it essential that the jurisdiction of the Republic should be extended fully and immediately over the entire area of the nation, both north and south of the 38th parallel.

1. The Korean nation is an entity, as it has been for over 4,000 years, and this entity has never been divided by any international agreements or by any consent of the Korean nation or people;

2. The 38th parallel division has never been declared by either of the parties originally agreeing to it, the United States and the Soviet Union, as constituting any permanent political division of the nation;

3. The UN explicitly proposed re-unification of Korea in its resolution of 14 November 1947. The resolution of 26 February 1948 of the IC explicitly called upon the temporary commission of the UN to observe elections 'in all parts of Korea accessible to it', thus carefully avoiding any implication of recognition of a permanent or even temporary political division of the nation. In the resolution of 12 December 1948, the GA explicitly recognized the ROK as 'the only lawful government' in Korea. In the resolution of 21 October 1949 the GA once again reconstituted the Korea Commission with the function of seeking to extend free and fair elections throughout Korea;

4. Jurisdiction of the ROK over all Korea has been solemnly affirmed in the constitution of the ROK and has repeatedly been assumed in several actions of the ROK in reserving 100 seats in the National

Assembly to be filled by elections in the north, and by the continuous efforts of the UN Commission to secure such elections.

Such considerations as are here set forth, Mr. Ambassador, are but a pale reflection of the indomitable Korean will to complete unity and independence, a will which has been staunchly and determinedly manifest during all the period during which Korean independence has been wholly or partly suspended. It would be tragically unfortunate if the noble efforts jointly and generously made to restore the unity of the Korean nation should end in conflict over the basic principle of whether the Korean people were, in fact, to exercise jurisdiction over their northern provinces under their own lawfully constituted government."

AUSTIN

795.00/9–2750

Memorandum by Mr. John M. Allison of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET [NEW YORK,] September 27, 1950.

US/A/C.1/1914 US/S/1449

Subject: Korea

Korean Foreign Minister Limb's letter to you of September 26 [1] raises in specific form certain questions which I believe should be resolved as soon as possible.

In paragraph 3 of Mr. Limb's letter he states "My Government has always considered and now considers itself to be the only legitimate government of all Korea." This position is in direct conflict with the position taken by the United States Government and by the other Members of the United Nations in the previous Resolutions and particularly in the Resolution of December 12, 1948 which says specifically that the Government of the Republic of Korea has "effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult . . .". Members of various delegations at the General Assembly have approached me within the last two days to make clear that they did not recognize the right of the Republic of Korea automatically to assume any jurisdiction in North Korea. Mr. Dening of the United Kingdom Delegation told me this morning that in discussing the draft United Kingdom Resolution with possible sponsors the chief difficulty was in connection with the desire of these possible sponsors to make clear that the Republic of Korea would not have jurisdiction in North Korea and that the Resolution should specifically provide for the holding of elections in South as well as in North Korea after the termination of hostilities.

[1] Reference is to the first letter quoted in telegram 617 from New York, *supra*.

This latter point (the holding of elections) is dealt with in paragraph 4 of Mr. Limb's letter where it is made clear that the Government of the Republic of Korea will only consent to elections in North Korea. In his discussion with me this morning Mr. Dening went so far as to say that in his opinion it was probable that if it were insisted that no mention be made of elections in South Korea and if there were insistence upon the right of the Government of the Republic of Korea to function in North Korea, there would be no sponsors and no Resolution. I explained to Mr. Dening the reasons which led me to believe that it was important to leave the question of the extent of any elections to be decided by the United Nations Commission on the spot but he maintained that India, Norway and Australia were all insisting on making the matter clear in the Resolution.

I believe that an early opportunity should be found to make clear without any question to the representatives at the United Nations of the Republic of Korea that the fact of the matter is that their Government is not at present recognized as having jurisdiction throughout Korea and that whether or not it eventually receives such recognition will depend in large part upon how it conducts itself during the coming days and upon its cooperating wholeheartedly with the United Nations in achieving a solution of the Korean problem. We should continue to maintain that the Republic of Korea is a legitimate government properly elected and that in all efforts to reach a solution it should be consulted but we should leave no doubt in its mind that it cannot expect to take over North Korea automatically and that whether it does so rests upon the impression it makes upon the rest of the United Nations. If we do not have such a clear understanding at the outset I am afraid that there will be recriminations and charges of bad faith which will make our position difficult not only with the Koreans but with all of our friends in the United Nations.

Most of the other matters treated in Mr. Limb's letter of September 26 deal with points on which there is no disagreement and we can reassure him on those points.

795B.5/9–2750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, September 27, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received September 27—1:40 p. m.]

788. 1. During course conversation with Bajpai, Secretary General MEA, today I asked him if GOI had given any more thought to problem of advance of UN Forces North of 38th Parallel (see Embtel 755, September 23).

2. Bajpai said GOI considered question most difficult. It had reason believe there was real danger Peking might intervene if UN Forces should cross Parallel and that world war might result. UK had informed India in confidence that it was agreed among three Foreign Ministers there would be no advance beyond 38th Parallel until matter had been taken up again in UN.[1] Original resolution of course related only to return to 38th Parallel. In his opinion when North Koreans were driven out of South Korea military phase might be considered exterminate and phase of negotiations and discussions to begin.

3. I told Bajpai I was under no instructions to discuss matter and had no idea what my government's attitude might be. Nevertheless it seemed to me it might be necessary for decision to be made in near future and quickly. It was I thought general opinion of free countries that artificial division of Korea should no longer be tolerated and that under UN supervision plebiscite should be held for all Korea to decide its future. North Koreans thus far under influence Soviet Union had steadfastly refused permit UN plebiscite in their territory or even allow UN officials to cross 38th Parallel. I was wondering if Bajpai or GOI had any ideas as to how other than by use of force North Koreans could be prevailed upon to permit UN representatives to enter North Korea for purposes conducting plebiscite. I had some doubt that mere requests would have any more effect on North Koreans in future than they had in past.

I added there seemed to me no number of courses which might be pursued. One course would be for UN Forces to push into North Korea, before North Korea Forces had time to reform, and to place that territory under temporary UN control pending plebiscite.

Another course would be for UN Forces stop at 38th Parallel while efforts were being made to prevail upon North Korean regime agree to plebiscite under UN auspices. If such efforts should fail UN Forces would then move into North Korea. This course would naturally result in greater loss of life, particularly American, than course first mentioned, since North Koreans would have time prepare themselves against invasion. Another course would be for UN Forces remain along 38th Parallel until such time as through some means or other North Koreans could be prevailed upon permit UN plebiscite. This might well mean that UN Forces composed mostly of Americans would remain for indefinite period in South Korea and would be continually called upon to defend border against armed attacks from North. I was afraid that if such a course should be followed certain elements in Asia including some in India would tend to overlook origin of Korean trouble and would begin to criticize US for occupying section of Asian continent.

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[1] See telegram 791, September 28, from New Delhi, p. 808.

I pointed out that it was much easier for countries citizens of whom were not being killed in Korea to regard situation leisurely and philosophically. Feeling on subject in countries like US in which casualty lists were steadily lengthening were likely to be more tense.

4. Bajpai said he could understand that Americans would be more emotional on subject than Indians. Furthermore due deference should be given to US point of view since US was bearing brunt of fighting. He felt however that it would be mistake for UN Forces proceed into North Korea until matter had been thoroughly aired among members of UN. It would of course be impossible to obtain any decision in SC against North Koreans in view of Soviet veto. Nevertheless, informal discussions among UN members might be helpful. He was somewhat surprised in view of rapid developments in Korea that GOI had not already been approached by US Government on this subject. He hoped that approach would not be at last moment. There should be time for full discussion.

5. During conversation Bajpai was extremely cautious and continually insisted that his government had not made decision as yet re this matter. From my knowledge of him and of his relations with Nehru I am inclined to believe that it is Nehru's present intention at least not to support any military action North of 38th Parallel. Whether GOI would go so far as to vote against such action in SC or GA or merely abstain I cannot as yet hazard a guess. I am convinced however Nehru would like to maintain his freedom to criticize US for developments which might occur if UN forces should enter North Korea. He might also complicate problem by again introducing subject of right Chinese Commies to participate in discussion.

6. Judging from editorial appearing in *Hindustan Times* of yesterday and from informal conversations which we have had with various Indian leaders I am inclined to believe that there are influential elements in India which might be willing to agree to occupation all Korea by UN Forces provided the entire country should be placed under control UN pending plebiscite; that is, that Rhee Government should not be allowed to remain in control South Korea or Commie regime in control North Korea. It is barely possible Nehru might be persuaded to go along with solution this kind.

HENDERSON

795B.5/9–2750

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the President

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 27, 1950.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am attaching, for your approval, a draft directive to the Commander of the United Nations' Forces in Korea

implementing the primarily military aspects of NSC 81/1 which contains the agreed U.S. policy on future courses of action in Korea.

The Secretary of State and I have concurred in this directive, which was prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff except for the final paragraph proposed by the Department of State.[1]

Your approval would permit the Commander of the United Nations' Forces in Korea to conduct the necessary military operations north of the 38° to destroy North Korean forces, subject to the conditions specified in paragraph 2 of the directive.[2]

Faithfully yours, G. C. MARSHALL

[1] The text of the draft directive as submitted to President Truman was as contained in telegram 317, September 26, to New York and telegram 615, September 26, from New York, pp. 781 and 785.

[2] The directive was approved by President Truman on September 27 and transmitted to General MacArthur on the same day by the JCS in telegram 92801.

795.00/9–2750

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 27, 1950.

Subject: Conversations between Indian representative in Peiping and Chinese Communist officials

Participants: Mr. Hubert Graves, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. Graves came down urgently this afternoon to show me "in strict confidence" three telegrams which had been received from New Delhi. He said he was not authorized to leave us copies and that it was desired to keep secret that Bevin and Nehru had been in personal communication on this matter.

The first two telegrams were copies of two messages apparently received today by Nehru from Pannikar in Peiping. The first of these reported a conversation he had just held with General Nieh Jung-chen, Chief of Staff under Chu Teh. General Nieh spoke bitterly of the Manchurian bombing by U.S. aircraft and said that "China would not take such provocations lying down".[1] When Pannikar reminded

[1] On September 24, the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China had sent to the U.N. Secretary-General a telegram complaining against U.S. bombing of Chinese territory (U.N. document S/1808). On September 26, the U.S. Government informed the Security Council that a bombing incident might inadvertently have taken place, expressed regret if such were the case, and offered to pay for damages shown by impartial, on-the-spot investigation to have been caused by U.S. planes (S/1813).

him of the tremendous damage from bombing which involvement in war would bring to China, General Nieh stated that he did not believe the United States could spare combat troops to fight in China and that no war could be won by air bombardment alone. Pannikar then quoted a conversation he had held with the Polish Ambassador to Peiping [2] who had just returned four days earlier from Warsaw. The Polish Ambassador stated quite frankly that China would not endure further provocation and sit idly by with folded hands in the face of it.

In his second message, Pannikar concludes that on the basis of these interviews and a reinterpretation on his part of a conversation had with Chou En-lai on September 21 when Chou En-lai said that "since the United Nations had no obligations to China, China had no obligations to the United Nations", there is no doubt in his mind that China has now decided on a more aggressive policy and he is inclined to expect indirect intervention in North Korea. In closing, he urged Nehru to send a personal message to Chou En-lai though even this action "may be too late".

The third telegram was a personal message to Bevin from Nehru responding to Bevin's personal message asking Nehru's support of the UK draft UN resolution on Korea. Nehru cites the care with which he has studied Mr. Bevin's proposal. He reports that he has sent a personal appeal to Chou urging patience and moderation on the part of China. Nehru expresses the conviction, however, that any suggestion that UN forces cross the 38th parallel is likely to precipitate a situation in which "world catastrophe is more than probable". Accordingly, he urges no action whatsoever of this character on the part of the UN. Nehru concludes with the recommendation that the UN merely announce that its objective is to secure a unified Korea coupled with an offer to the North Koreans to discuss with them ways and means whereby this may be accomplished.

Mr. Graves says that they do not take too seriously Pannikar's fears, believing him volatile and an unreliable reporter. They do, however, have to take into account the effect of Pannikar on Nehru and the latter's resultant attitude. Earlier, however, Mr. Graves had given me as his opinion the belief that the UK delegation would plan still to go forward with their resolution even though the Indians did not support it.

Mr. Graves told me in leaving that he understood Mr. Rusk had already been shown copies of these telegrams in New York by the UK GA delegation.

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[2] Julian Burgin.

794A.00/9–2750

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of States for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

[Extract]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 27, 1950.

Subject: Chinese Communist Intentions: Formosa, Korea

Reference: CA memorandum of August 17, 1950, "Present Situation in Respect to Formosa: Probable Nature of Hypothetical Communist Attack" [1]

Summary

The shift of the monsoon to the northwest [*northeast*] [2] in the last decade of September, added to current events in Korea, makes a Chinese Communist assault on Formosa less likely than heretofore. This situation may persist until spring. This conclusion is supported by the evidence contained in a Hong Kong telegram of September 22 [3] quoting a Chinese Communist official to the effect that the invasion of Formosa has been postponed. It is unclear whether this postponement was with or against the advice of Moscow. In any event domestic tasks facing the Communists are keeping them very busy at home. There is nevertheless a background of reports indicating that important elements of Lin Piao's 4th Field Army have moved into Manchuria, with 3rd Field Army troops taking their place in Kwangtung. These reports are paralleled by another Nationalist item reporting the arrival of Soviet units in the North China-Manchuria area in early August. That those Chinese troops will participate in the Korean fighting is the most interesting possible explanation of their movement. Peiping has belatedly admitted that certain Korean personnel have returned to Korea "to defend it and take part in building up their country".[4] If the Soviets were to permit the situation in Korea to develop to its logical conclusion, the extent of their political defeat would be clear for all Asiatics to see. If they feel that they cannot rely upon a veto to prevent any projected move of UN forces into North Korea, they may plan an intervention of either Chinese Communists, Chinese and Soviet forces, or Soviet forces in North Korea to restore the *status quo ante* Soviet withdrawal. If Peiping in some of its threatening statements may be

[1] Not printed.

[2] The monsoon ordinarily blows from the southwest from April to October and from the northeast for the period October to April.

[3] See telegram 642 from Hong Kong received at 7:57 p. m. on September 23, p. 765.

[4] See footnote 4 to the memorandum of conversations by Bancroft dated September 23, p. 762.

trying to bluff us, it is nevertheless not yet safe to assume that the USSR has played all of its cards respecting Korea. In any event Chinese military activity continues strong, and if there seem clear indications that they have temporarily postponed their invasion attempt against Formosa, there is nevertheless no sure guarantee that the Chinese Communist effort will not be thrust forth in another direction, toward the north or south, or at least toward the occupation of Quemoy and Matsu. The Soviet "peace camp", if still unready for World War III, is presumably nevertheless straining all sinews in preparation.

. . . . . .

795.00/9–2850 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, September 28, 1950—12:55 a. m.
[No receipt time.]

C–64730. Reurmsg JCS 92762.[1] I am in full concurrence with your suggestion. The broadcast will be initiated from Tokyo and Seoul[2] Sunday October 1st at 1200 hours Tokyo time. I have made minor modifications in the context of the proposed broadcast so that it will read as follows: "To the Commander in Chief, North Korean Forces: The early and total defeat and complete destruction of your armed forces and war making potential is now inevitable. In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United Nations Commander in Chief, call upon you and the forces under your command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision as I may direct—and I call upon you at once to liberate all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees under your control and to make adequate provision for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to such places as I indicate. North Korean Forces, including prisoners of war in the hands of the United Nations Command, will continue to be given the care dictated by civilized custom and practice and permitted to return to their homes as soon as practicable. I shall anticipate your early deci-

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[1] See telegram 614, September 26, from New York, and footnote 1 thereto, p. 785.

[2] North Korean resistance to United Nations forces in Seoul ended on September 28; see Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, pp. 534–536.

sion upon this opportunity to avoid the further useless shedding of blood and destruction of property. Signed Douglas MacArthur." [3]

[3] The above text was broadcast as scheduled at noon Tokyo time on October 1 (10 p. m., September 30, EST); concerning President Truman's premature disclosure of the broadcast at his news conference on September 28, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, p. 659.

795.00/9–2850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, September 28, 1950—12:43 a. m.
[Received September 28—4:55 a. m.]

Secto 57. Personal for Webb from Rusk. Dening (UK) read to me tonight two telegrams from UK HICOM Delhi containing messages from Nehru to Bevin on Korea situation and, more particularly, on strong views expressed to Pannikar by Peiping authorities on present situation.

Chief of Staff, Chinese Communist Army expressed great bitterness to Pannikar about refusal UN to admit Peiping and about unyielding US attitude on Chinese seat. Pannikar quoted Chou En-lai as saying that since UN seemed to recognize no obligation to China, China had no obligation to UN. Communist Chief of Staff stated in strong language that China would not accept US aggression without resistance, making specific reference to bombings of China by US planes.[1]

Chief of Staff stated that repetition such bombings by US planes, active support being given by US to CKS, attitude on UN membership had convinced Peiping that US attack on China is imminent and that Chinese must act accordingly. Pannikar got strong impression that Chinese intervention in Korea had become much more probable. Also obvious that Nehru has been strongly impressed by Chinese attitude and that he thinks present situation very serious. Nehru thus unwilling to sponsor UK resolution on Korea and urges no action beyond 38 since this might touch off more general hostilities.

Bevin has replied stating British view that Chinese attitude is predictable reaction to disappointment on UN seat, that India is probably being subjected to war of nerves and that British estimate is that Chinese intervention in Korea would be basically contrary to Chinese interests and not likely to occur.

Emphasis placed by Chinese on bombing incidents raises question whether we should not try to reassure India and Peiping by seeking

[1] See footnote 1 to the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, September 27, p. 793.

basis settlement of any legitimate claims Peiping may have as result such incidents. We know that at least two US planes did in fact unintentionally attack targets in China in connection with Korean operations. Merchant can supply details.

When this Chinese charge came before UN Security Council, we stated such incidents might have occurred and proposed that commission of India and Sweden be established by SC to investigate and determine any damages for which we should be responsible. Soviets vetoed our resolution.[2]

I have discussed this situation with Secretary and Jessup. Secretary believes we should authorize Bevin to send message to Nehru along lines indicated below, as follow-up on position we took in UN, but believes you should clear such action with President earliest opportunity. Purpose would be to deprive Peiping of such genuine complaint as they might have, of any pretext for any moves they might be considering, and of at least one element of pressure on India. Believe effect on India would be good if no effect on Peiping. Substance of proposed message from Bevin to Nehru follows:

We have discussed with Americans the question of the accidental bombing of Chinese territory by US planes. The Americans are surprised and concerned that this should appear to be a major source of friction since a procedure by which the matter could be handled was vetoed in the Security Council by the Soviet Union. In any event, the Americans would be the first to regret such unintentional damage and continue to be agreeable to having the matter investigated and any damage assessed by competent neutral judgment. Mr. Acheson has authorized me to inform you that the Americans are quite willing to have a representative of India and of Sweden look into the charges and assess any damages which it should be found the Americans should pay. They do not insist upon UN machinery and would accept an informal arrangement on the side. I send you this information in the event you think it might help to remove an unnecessary point of irritation."

Please telephone me USUN as soon as you have President's views.[3] [Rusk.]

ACHESON

[2] At the 501st meeting of the U.N. Security Council on September 12; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.501.

[3] For the text of the proposed message as handed to Mr. Bevin by Mr. Acheson, see the enclosure to the annex to the memorandum of conversation dated September 28 by Battle on "Alarmist Reports on Korea", p. 812.

A manuscript note dated September 28, presumably written by Troy L. Perkins, Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, on the file copy of telegram Secto 57 read as follows:

"Proposed message from Bevin taken up with President by Under Secretary. Cleared by Pres. & given to British, who agreed and sent the message."

IO Files

Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET NEW YORK, September 28, 1950—9:15 a. m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (46).]

1. *Korea* (US/A/C.1/1902/Rev.2;[1] US/A/C.1/1911[2])

Mr. Rusk reviewed the results of our consultations with other Delegations on the Korean resolution. He noted that the Indian reluctance to go along appeared to turn on its uncertainty as to what the Chinese attitude would be if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. Certain drafting changes had been made in the resolution to take account of various comments. In response to a question from Ambassador Austin, Mr. Rusk indicated that Romulo's several suggestions for revision of the resolution had been considered. The Delegation reviewed the text of the resolution in its present form.

Mrs. Roosevelt observed that the resolution appeared to provide for supervision of elections and then for the return of the Government to the Koreans. She wondered if a single election, held prematurely, to establish a new government might not result in a Communist victory. She hoped the plan would not permit anything of that nature to happen, since, in view of the American casualties in Korea, the American public would feel extremely bitter that so much had been lost in the interests of a democratic country which had been prematurely abandoned, to the advantage of the Soviets. She thought we should envisage supervision of elections by the United Nations for some time to come, until we were convinced that a truly democratic government was firmly established. Mr. Rusk replied that the wording of the resolution was intended to provide flexibility as regards elections. There would be special elections in South Korea to fill certain vacant seats in the legislature. In North Korea we might want a constituent election. Under the resolution any combination or pattern of elections could be held. Mrs. Roosevelt thought the time element would also be important and that individuals should not be elected for too long a period. She

[1] See the annex to this document, p. 807.

[2] Not printed. This paper, drafted by Mr. Allison, set forth a series of points entitled "Essential Elements of a Korean Solution", which are embodied in telegram Delga 43 from New York received at 8:37 p. m. on September 28, p. 817. In addition to the 11 points in that telegram, document US/A/C.1/1911 had contained a 12th point reading as follows: "If the United Nations succeeds, the world can take hope that through collective action peace can be restored and a constructive program for world advancement be carried out. If we fail through the intransigence of any of our members—the world will despair—but will know where to place the blame."

was glad to learn that the language of the resolution did not restrict us to a single election.

Referring to the language of the resolution, Mr. Dulles asked whether the language "all appropriate steps be taken" implied a mandate to send United Nations forces into all Korea for the purpose of establishing a unified Korean state. Possibly paragraph (*b*) qualified that objective, but he wondered who would make the final decision as to whether United Nations forces should move into the North and how far they should go. Mr. Rusk replied that if this resolution were passed, it would be permissive, but not mandatory for United Nations forces to cross the 38th parallel. The United States would have to make its own decision and then consult with other governments, especially those on the commission, as to whether troops should go beyond the 38th parallel.

The Secretary noted that the phrase "all appropriate steps" had been substituted for "all necessary steps". Mr. Rusk indicated this was an Australian suggestion which the British had taken because it gave greater flexibility to the resolution.

It seemed to Senator Lodge that the resolution authorized troops to cross the 38th parallel. He inquired whether our military authorities had expressed any recent opinion on this matter. Mr. Rusk said that the military believed that, in the absence of Chinese Communist and Soviet forces in the area, we should move north of the 38th parallel to bring about a united Korea. Senator Lodge observed we would also forestall future attacks by this action. Mr. Rusk agreed that preservation of the 38th parallel might lead to future difficulties and make more difficult a lasting conclusion of hostilities.

Mr. Dulles expressed concern at the use of the explicit phrase "whole of Korea" in the resolution. He felt that in all probability a united whole Korea could never be attained, and that we would have to compromise on some basis. The extreme northern and eastern provinces certainly could never be united. There should therefore, he believed, be greater flexibility in the resolution, perhaps by substitution of the phrase "in Korea". Even though military judgment favored crossing the parallel, he did not think we should necessarily go as far as the military suggested. In this connection, he referred to the military psychology of the preventive war. He believed this resolution gave too much authority to the military. Senator Sparkman [3] suggested that "throughout Korea" might be another alternative phraseology. Senator Lodge observed that this resolution was not a mandate, but Mr. Dulles thought a recommendation of this kind for all practical purposes was a mandate. He believed the phrase "whole of Korea" would be inter-

[3] John J. Sparkman, U.S. Senator from Alabama, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly.

preted by the Chinese and Russians as an attempt on our part to occupy all of Korea.

Ambassador Austin viewed the situation differently. He considered that the United States should do a complete job in Korea and not leave it half done. He did not interpret paragraph (*a*) as requiring that armed force be used to the end described, but as providing that the appropriate steps be taken. These steps might be quite different from garrisoning the northern provinces. He did not think the United Nations should flinch from its duties. Possibly stationing troops on the border would not be appropriate, but some other course of action would be. After all, Korea was involved and not China or Russia. He believed the resolution must cover all of Korea so that we would not find ourselves lacking authority to make decisions with respect to northern Korea. Mr. Rusk believed Mr. Dulles would be reassured by the position of the military people, who were very cautious about acting provocatively in North Korea. They believed that under no circumstances should United States forces be stationed in the two northern provinces, but that we should restrict our troops to certain key points while United Nations forces might take over in the extreme north.

Mr. Cohen thought the resolution would enable us to do or not to do whatever we thought best. What worried him was whether it would bring us United Nations support for what we might have to decide to do later. Possibly the resolution was too vague. He was also worried as to the way in which the Soviet would interpret our intentions. It was not so much a matter of the decision of going beyond the 38th parallel, but the situation involved a great many different factors. For example, what would happen if forces began to move on both sides of the parallel? Decisions would have to be made very promptly, and the resulting responsibility would be great and the decisions difficult. Mr. Rusk replied that this resolution represented only a part of the problem. We did not know the Soviet view, and among other things, the discussion of this resolution would clarify the Soviet attitude as to how to wind up the Korean situation.

The Secretary noted the need for swift action on Korea. Our resolution should authorize the taking of appropriate steps throughout all of Korea. Whatever we said, we actually meant throughout Korea. Mr. Dulles said he would not press his point in this regard although he would prefer to see the phrase in question omitted as it could be provocative. The Secretary noted that the present text used the phrase "of Korea" except in the one instance, and believed it would be very bad to start out with the phrase "whole of Korea" and then take it out later.

Mr. Cohen and Mr. Gross found some difficulty in the language in paragraph (*d*) which they suggested might be too artful. Possibly

it could be restated simply to say "United Nations forces entering Korea would not remain, etc". Ambassador Austin observed that two-thirds of the delegations had already seen the resolution in its present text.

Senator Lodge said that if this were the beginning, he would favor the language change proposed by Mr. Dulles, but he did not think it could be changed at this stage. He wanted to be sure the resolution permitted us to go where we desired. Ambassador Austin said he would prefer to see the present text unchanged, and the Delegation could consider the matter further if some specific proposals or objections were made. Mr. Cohen thought this problem could be met by making the change throughout the resolution, perhaps by saying "a unified Korea" in all three paragraphs. Such a change could be explained on the basis we thought it desirable to use the same language throughout the resolution. Mr. Allison considered this suggestion would be difficult to apply to paragraph (*c*) as it related to the position of the Republic of Korea, which did not desire elections throughout Korea.

Mr. Cohen wondered whether changes in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*) only would be appropriate. Mr. Tate suggested the possibility of dropping the word "all" in paragraph (*a*) which would give greater latitude in determining what was appropriate. Mr. Rusk believed "all" was better language for the United States, since it would constitute a stronger commitment for the United Nations.

The Secretary suggested that we might say to the British that this language was all right with us as it stood, but that if it encountered trouble from other Delegations, the langauge might be made to read "throughout a unified Korea" in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*). This would permit a change without receding from the original position. However, we should not ask the British to make this change. This was agreed.

The Secretary thought a change might be made in paragraph (*d*), keeping the sacred language of the British Attorney-General [*Solicitor-General*] but changing "would" to "should". Ambassador Gross queried whether provision should not also be made for withdrawal of troops from South Korea. It might be better to say United Nations forces should not remain in Korea. The Secretary thought this was a good point. Mr. Rusk agreed that the resolution might be redrafted in terms of a general objective, providing that United Nations forces would not remain in Korea any longer than necessary. Mr. Thurston [4] believed such a change would be very helpful in dealing with the In-

[4] Ray L. Thurston, Counselor of Embassy in Moscow, was an adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

dians, as well as other delegations. Senator Lodge likewise thought this suggestion appealing. Mr. Dulles observed that the theory in paragraphs (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) called for a unified Korea, whereas paragraph (*d*) had the effect of re-establishing the 38th parallel. Mr. Rusk did not entirely agree, and Ambassador Gross considered that paragraphs (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) were actually governing, and the provisions of paragraph (*d*) would have to be worked out jointly in the United Nations through the Assembly and the Korean Commission.

Mr. Bancroft said there was one unsettled aspect of the problem—hearing the Chinese Communists. The position paper recommended that, if the Chinese Communists requested a hearing, the United States should go along with a committee invitation to hear them. This recommendation was made on the basis that it would give the Chinese a chance to make their own position in respect to Korea clear, and it would also prevent the Indians from becoming the advocates for the Chinese. He inquired whether the Delegation wished to take a final decision on this point.

Ambassador Austin supposed the point was already settled. He reported that he had already told Tsiang yesterday that we were prepared to hear the Chinese Communists. Although Tsiang felt badly, he appreciated the situation. Ambassador Austin wondered if we would not also be confronted by an application for admission to the committee by the North Koreans. In this case should we take the same position of allowing a witness to be heard? The representatives of the Republic of Korea bitterly opposed such a step which they regarded as giving recognition to rebels, who where not a government at all.

The Secretary asked whether if the Chinese Communists were heard, they should be asked to accept the principles of the Charter. Mr. Bancroft recalled that Mr. Dulles had suggested that there might be some analogy to Article 35, but the staff would recommend that we not seek to impose any condition of this sort as the prerequisite of hearings. Such a condition would run contrary to the philosophy underlying the grant of a hearing. It might also mean a long controversy in committee.

Mr. Dulles referred to the point previously made by the Secretary to the effect that we should seek rapid action on Korea. He agreed with this, and believed it important in this case to demonstrate the capacity of the Assembly to function rapidly. If hearing the Chinese Communists and possibly discussing conditions for their participation would involve delay, he would be somewhat concerned since such delay might make the Assembly's action academic in view of the swift movement of events in Korea.

The Secretary suggested we might be able to say we were not interposing objection to such hearings, but wanted to be sure that no delay

468-806—76——52

would be involved. He inquired whether there were any Chinese Communist representatives who could arrive here within twenty-four hours. Mr. Rusk was doubtful, inasmuch as no visas had been issued; he thought several days would be required. As regards conditions, he thought Ambassador Austin might simply declare when the Chinese Communists appeared, that in our view they were accepting the obligations of the Charter. He observed that in the Security Council the Soviets had dropped their request to hear the Chinese Communists on the Korean case, although they had pressed such a hearing as regards Formosa. He believed our main problem would arise by a request for a hearing from North Korea. This would afford an opportunity for dilatory tactics. In his view it would be absurd in the North Korean case to insist that they could not appear until they accepted certain conditions inasmuch as they were engaged now in a war against the United Nations.

The Secretary wondered whether the two matters could not be separated. The North Korean request should clearly be refused on the ground that North Korea was not representative of anyone, had defied the United Nations, and was killing soldiers in the forces of the United Nations. Moreover, the proposed commission would be empowered to consult with appropriate representatives of the North Korean people. Mr. Allison observed that if North Korean representatives should be brought here, it might tie General MacArthur's hands since he would need to have people on the spot with whom he could deal. The Delegation unanimously agreed that the United States should not yield an inch as regards any request for a hearing from North Korea; it should be denied. Mr. Rusk noted that this would be consistent with our policy respecting hearings for the North Koreans for the past three years.

Turning to the question of hearing the Chinese Communists, the Secretary suggested we proceed with the view that we are not going to interpose any difficulty to such hearing, but at the same time make clear that action on Korea must continue to go forward. He asked whether we might get into any other trap. Ambassador Austin inquired if this position might be construed as the admission or recognition of the Communists as the Government of China, particularly if the condition that the resulting decision would bind Communist China were attached. In other instances we had been extremely careful not to refer to the Chinese Communists as a government. Possibly it would be enough to state that the Chinese Communists were simply being heard as witnesses who had indicated they wished to be heard. Mr. Bancroft thought this was correct and believed it would be rather

absurd to suggest that a private witness should accept Charter obligations.

Mr. Dulles asked on what theory the Chinese Communists would appear, since no direct charges, such as those in the alleged bombings, had been made. He could not see a similar capacity in this case, unless it was done on the theory that a neighbor of Korea was entitled to a voice. Mr. Rusk suggested such appearance would be comparable to that of the Arab Higher Committee or the Jewish Agency, as parties at interest. He believed it served a practical purpose to bring them to the Council table, since the Chinese Communists were the authority in China, and what happened here might have some effect on the policies of the Peiping regime.

The Secretary considered that the Chinese Communists had nothing to offer on the passage of the resolution. They could consult later with the commission. However, a hearing might reassure them with respect to our intentions in Korea. Mr. Cohen believed an additional reason in favor of a hearing was that a number of countries felt on the whole that it would make for better consideration of the question if the Chinese Communists were present. We would lose more by debating the hearing issue, which was confusing to the public, than we would gain by gracefully accepting hearings. Referring to the idea that the Chinese Communists should accept the obligations of the Charter, Mr. Cohen recalled that in the Greek case, Albania and Bulgaria had been asked to accept such obligations, but when they failed to do so, they were nevertheless allowed limited participation in the debate. This precedent seemed applicable in this case.

The Secretary expressed the hope that such a hearing would not hold up proceedings. Mr. Bancroft did not think this would happen; we could urge the necessity for prompt instructions to the Unified Command, although we might get into a debate on this point respecting the jurisdiction of the Security Council. He reviewed our present thinking on this point. Mr. Rusk thought we should not take the view that the Assembly was providing instructions to the United Nations commander in any case, but rather that we believed that the views of the General Assembly with respect to the outcome in Korea should be expressed as soon as possible. The Secretary suggested that Ambassador Austin might say that we're not going to make any difficulty about hearing the Chinese Communists but also that we had to get on with the decision on Korea. The Committee [5] would vote to let the Chinese Communists appear. Then, some delegate might raise the question

[5] Reference is to the First Committee of the General Assembly to which the Korean question had been routinely delegated on September 26.

whether action should not be postponed until the Chinese arrived; he wondered whether, if that situation arose, we would have enough votes to move right ahead. Mr. Rusk indicated other delegations supported prompt action.

Mr. Dulles wondered if it was likely that the Chinese Communists would come or whether they might not take the position that they would not come unless they were given the Chinese seat. Ambassador Austin observed that in the Security Council the Chinese Communists had demanded the Chinese seat. Ambassador Gross noted, however, that the Soviet motion on Formosa did not include that position; it seemed the Soviets were willing to have the Chinese come as witnesses, regardless of the fact that the Chinese letter had asked that they be permitted to join the Council.[6]

Senator Lodge asked why the question of hearing the Chinese Communists arose with respect to Korea. He thought it better to hear them on the charges of alleged American bombings and saw no reason why they had to be heard on Korea. The Secretary agreed that it was hard to find a logical reason for hearing them in this instance, although there was good reason for the proposed commission to hear them. It might be helpful, however, for us to be able to explain we were not fortifying the border and make clear our own intentions. We simply did not consider the issue worth fighting about since many other government, whose cooperation we needed, regarded the Chinese Communists as the Government of China, and if this issue were debated at length, we would lose more than we would gain. Obviously, we would not push for hearings, but if someone else proposed it, the Secretary favored our saying "yes", providing it did not delay the proceedings.

The Secretary inquired about the language in paragraph (*a*) regarding the functions of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Mr. Rusk replied that it had been designed to state functions in general. On the relief and rehabilitation side, Mr. Lubin noted the language was intended to keep the Commission out of daily operational responsibilities. Mr. McKeever suggested that, so far as the public was concerned, it would be desirable to do away with the "jawbreaker" title. Mr. Rusk said this was one of Romulo's suggestions which we had been able to accept, and he did not think the title should be changed.

[Here follows the record of discussion on the second agenda item: "Uniting for Peace".]

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[6] For documentation on the Formosa question in the United Nations, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.

[Annex]

SECRET [NEW YORK,] September 27, 1950.
US/A/C.1/1902/Rev 1

UNITED KINGDOM DRAFT RESOLUTION ON KOREA

The General Assembly

Having regard to its Resolutions of 14th November 1947, of 12th December 1948 and of 21st October 1949;

Having received and considered the Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea;

Mindful of the fact that the objectives set forth in the Resolutions referred to have not been fully accomplished and in particular that the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt has been made by an armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the Government of the Republic of Korea;

Recalling its Declaration of 12th December 1948 that there has been established a lawful Government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea;

Having in mind that United Nations armed forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendation of the Security Council of 27th June 1950, subsequent to its Resolution of 25 June 1950, that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area;

Recalling that the essential objective of the Resolutions of the General Assembly referred to was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government in Korea;

Recommends that:

(*a*) all appropriate steps be taken to insure conditions of peace and stability throughout the whole of Korea;

(*b*) all necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea;

(*c*) elections be held and other constituent acts be taken under the auspices of the United Nations for the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Government in a sovereign state of Korea;

(*d*) should United Nations forces enter North Korea they would not remain otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified in (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) above.

Resolves that:

(*a*) a Commission consisting of ——— to be known as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea be established to (i) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the present United Nations Commission in Korea (ii) represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Government of all Korea (iii) determine the general principles to govern United Nations activities in the rehabilitation and recovery of Korea and exercise general supervision thereof; the United Nations Unification and Recovery Commission should proceed to Korea and begin to carry out its functions as soon as possible;

(*b*) pending the arrival of the United Nations Unification and Recovery Commission in Korea, governments represented on the Commission should form an interim committee composed of their Permanent Representatives at the Seat of the United Nations to consult with and advise the United Nations Unified Command in the light of the above recommendations; the interim committee should begin to function immediately upon the approval of this Resolution by the General Assembly;

The General Assembly furthermore,

Mindful of the fact that at the end of the present hostilities the task of rehabilitating the Korean economy will be of great magnitude;

Requests the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with the specialized agencies, to develop plans for relief and rehabilitation on the termination of hostilities, to recommend organizational machinery for implementing a relief and rehabilitation program, and to report to the General Assembly on or before October ———.

357.AD/9–2850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, September 28, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received September 28—9 : 52 a. m.]

791. 1. I have just returned from lengthy conversation with Nye, UK HICOM, during which he informed me in detail re his conversations yesterday with Bajpai, SYG MEA, and Nehru, and re his exchange of telegrams with Bevin on proposed UK resolution to be presented in First Committee UNGA on Korea. He told me copies of his report were being sent Washington and that Department of State undoubtedly had already been fully informed. I shall, therefore, not undertake set forth herein substance of conversations or of report.

2. It seems that several days ago, under instructions his government, he presented Bajpai document containing decisions three Foreign Ministers re Korean situation. During my conversation with Bajpai yesterday he referred to this document and expressed surprise that I had not been also supplied with copy.[1]

3. Early yesterday morning Nye received telegraphic instructions from Bevin to acquaint GOI with contents proposed UK resolution and to obtain GOI views with respect thereto. Few minutes after my conversation with Bajpai yesterday morning (Embtel 788, September 27) Nye called upon him, presented to him message from Bevin enclosing draft of resolution. Bajpai expressed considerable concern at passage in draft indicating UN forces might advance beyond 38th parallel and said two telegrams had just been received from Panikkar, Indian Ambassador Peiping; that Peiping angered at attitude displayed towards it by UN and at possible presence of US forces in near future in territory contiguous to China, was threatening to intervene in Korea; and that danger of Peiping intervention would be much greater if UN forces should enter North Korea. Bajpai said that intervention Communist China in Korean struggle would almost certainly lead to third world war and that GOI would therefore probably not support UN military action north of 38th parallel. There was considerable discussion between Nye and Bajpai and Bajpai promised submit matter to Nehru. Bajpai gave substance Panikkar's telegrams to Nye who incorporated them in his telegraphic report.

4. In afternoon Nye had talk with Nehru who told him that GOI had definitely decided it would be unwise for UN forces to enter North Korea and that note on subject had already been agreed upon and would be handed to Nye later. GOI note immediately after receipt was telegraphed London and Washington. It is assumed that Department is acquainted with its contents.[2] I shall not, therefore, emphasize that language in it was quite strong in opposing extension conflict into North Korea.

5. Nye was also informed that message had been sent to Panikkar asking him to urge "moderation and restraint" upon Peiping Government.

6. Nye told me that during his conversation with Bajpai and Nehru, basing himself on information received from London, he had done his utmost to present American position in most favorable light. Among other things he had indicated that US did not wish to have its forces contiguous to Chinese and USSR frontiers and that therefore

[1] See telegram 468 to New Delhi, transmitted at midnight on September 28, p. 818.

[2] See telegram Secto 57, September 28, from New York, received at 4:55 a. m. on September 28, p. 797.

forces of some other powers would probably move into the frontier areas; that it was not present intention for UN forces to go beyond 40th parallel; and that the present idea was that the occupation forces of North Korea so far as possible would be composed of South Koreans.

7. Nehru in his note opposing entry of UN forces into North Korea suggested that they stop at 38th parallel and that negotiations be opened with North Koreans for purpose of prevailing upon northern North Koreans to permit plebiscite under UN auspices for all Korea (see paragraphs 3 and 4 of section numbered 3 Embtel 788, September 27).

8. I expressed my appreciation to Nye for giving me this information and for presenting American point of view to GOI.

[HENDERSON]

330/9–2850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Battle)

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, September 28, 1950.

Subject: Resolution on Korea

Participants: Foreign Minister Bevin
Secretary Acheson
Mr. Barclay [1]
Mr. Battle

In a conversation on several matters, Mr. Bevin and Mr. Acheson discussed the question of hearing the Chinese Communists on the Korean Resolution. The Secretary said that we would agree to hearing them, but that this must not be a move on their part to delay United Nations action. He said we could not hold up action on the Resolution until the Chinese Communists arrived. He said that he doubted that the Chinese Communists could contribute much on the Resolution itself, but said that they have a right to know whether the border is being fortified, etc. The Secretary emphasized his point that any hearings not be an excuse for delay.

Mr. Bevin asked if he could tell Mr. Nehru about this, to which the Secretary replied in the negative.

Mr. Bevin said that he had met that morning with representatives of the Commonwealths to discuss the Korean Resolution. He said that he was trying to get additional support for the resolution. He said that he had thus far gotten Canada, Australia and Pakistan. He thought

[1] Roderick E. Barclay, Principal Private Secretary to Mr. Bevin.

that Pakistan was very important as there is a large Moslem population in China. He mentioned that Sir B. N. Rau was sending the Resolution to Mr. Nehru with a message from Mr. Bevin. He also expressed the hope that he would be able to get Holland and possibly Norway to join in. He indicated the Philippines is joining in also.

L. D. B[ATTLE]

795.00/9–2850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Battle)

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] September 28, 1950.

Subject: Alarmist Reports on Korea

Participants: Foreign Minister Bevin
Secretary Acheson
Mr. Barclay
Mr. Battle

Mr. Bevin said that there had been some "alarmist reports about Korea." He said he hoped the United States would make some gesture to calm down the Chinese Communists. The Secretary handed Mr. Bevin the letter on compensation for bombing damage. A copy of this letter is attached.

Mr. Acheson told Mr. Bevin he would try to work out other things.

L. D. B[ATTLE]

[Annex]

The Secretary of State to the British Foreign Minister (Bevin)

SECRET [NEW YORK,] September 28, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. BEVIN: In accordance with the conversation last night between Mr. Dening and Mr. Rusk about a possible message from you to Prime Minister Nehru I wish to inform you that the President has now approved of this action. I am therefore enclosing a suggested draft message which you may wish to transmit to Mr. Nehru. Obviously the actual language of this message is for you to determine in so far as there is no alteration in the commitment of the United States Government as contained in the enclosed draft.

It is our hope that a message along the lines suggested will be of real help in the present situation. Your willingness to transmit such a message is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

[Enclosure]

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO PRIME MINISTER NEHRU

We have discussed with the Americans the question of the accidental bombing of Chinese territory by United States planes. The Americans are surprised that this should appear to be a major source of friction since a procedure by which the matter could be handled was vetoed in the Security Council by the Soviet Union. In any event, the Americans would be the first to regret such unintentional damage and continue to be agreeable to having the matter investigated and any damage assessed by competent neutral judgment. Mr. Acheson has authorized me to inform you that the Americans are quite willing to have a representative of India and of Sweden look into the charges and assess any damage which it should be found the Americans should pay. They do not insist upon United Nations machinery and would accept an informal arrangement on the side. I send you this information in the event you think it might help to remove an unnecessary point of irritation.[1]

[1] See footnote 3 to telegram Secto 57 from New York, received at 4:55 a. m. on September 28, p. 798.

795.00/9–2850

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John C. Ross of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [NEW YORK,] September 28, 1950.

US/A/C.1/1949

Subject: United Kingdom Draft Resolution on Korea

Participants: Dr. John Myun Chang, Ambassador of Korea to the United States
Mr. John C. Ross, United States Delegation

Dr. Chang and one of his associates buttonholed me for about a half hour at Flushing to express their great concern on the paragraph in the United Kingdom draft resolution concerning elections. Chang said in his conversation with Mr. Rusk the day previously Mr. Rusk had suggested that Chang draft the sort of language he would like to see on this point. Chang handed me the following text which I telephoned to Mr. Allison:

"(*c*) Election be held in the area where the United Nations Commission was prevented to enter, thus completing the national election and, there of [*sic*], a full jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea be extended over the said area, thereby constituting a unified, independent and democratic government in a sovereign state of Korea."

I told Chang that if any effort were made to introduce language along the lines of his suggested draft, this in turn would invite the introduction of amendments in the directly contrary sense, namely, that general elections should be held throughout all of Korea. I said I was certain that there were a number of Delegations that would insist on this formulation of the matter rather than the one which he and his government desired. I said if an effort were made to be specific in the General Assembly resolution as to where elections were to be held and where they were not to be held, a debate would be precipitated which, in fact, would be a debate not on the language of a resolution but on the status of his government. I said I thought this would be most unfortunate from every point of view. I then urged Chang to consider whether the language in the United Kingdom draft, which in effect would leave to the Commission to work out, in consultation with the Government of the Republic, the matter of elections, would not be the best course.

I am afraid that I did not convince Chang that there were in fact a number of Delegations, in addition to the Russians, who would have no hesitation in questioning the status of his government. It was quite apparent that other Delegations, and Chang apparently consulted many, are merely giving him double talk.

795.00/9–2850

The British Embassy to the Department of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.][1]

SUBSTANCE OF A TELEGRAM FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON EMBASSY DATED 28TH SEPTEMBER

CHINESE REACTION TO DEVELOPMENTS IN KOREA

As in the case of the U.S.S.R., there appear to be three courses open to the Chinese Government:

(*a*) Military occupation of North Korea (presumably by invitation of the North Korean Government) either openly or by means of "volunteers".

[1] A copy of this document was delivered to Mr. Rusk at 10 a.m. on October 2 by messenger from Mr. Graves of the British Embassy and circulated in the Department of State on the following day. Also received and circulated was a similar note dealing with the question of Soviet reaction to developments in Korea. The latter document, not printed, concluded that, on balance, a crossing of the 38th parallel by U.N. forces would involve increased danger of a head-on clash with the Soviet Union, but stated that the Soviet leaders would probably not risk provoking a general war on this issue. (795.00/9–2850)

(*b*) The maximum political effort to influence United Nations and particularly Asian opinion in favour of a compromise that would leave intact an independent North Korean Communist buffer state.

(*c*) The strengthening of Chinese military dispositions on the Manchurian/Korean border without military or political intervention in Korea.

2. Action by Chinese forces under course (*a*) can by no means be excluded since the Chinese might well regard the crossing of the 38th Parallel by United Nations forces and the prospect of the elimination of the North Korean Communist buffer state as constituting a serious threat to China's own security. Moreover the Russians might well consider the risk of any extension of hostilities (if they do not want general war) considerably reduced if Chinese rather than Russian forces were to move into North Korea. It might also be argued that the U.S.S.R. would be reasonably well content to take the risk of seeing China embroiled (though perhaps not inextricably) with what are predominantly United States forces and in this way staging a bigger war by proxy. A move into Korea by Chinese forces would also be more consistent with Soviet tactics of leaving the leading part in the execution of Communist Asian policies (in appearance at any rate) to China as an Asian power. It should perhaps be noted that in Pannikar's talks with Chou En-lai, with Chu Teh as well as with the Polish Ambassador, the emphasis is solely on China's concern at United States aggressive intentions in Korea and all reference to any possible Soviet interest in the matter is carefully omitted. (As realists, the Chinese must of course be aware that the Soviet interest in the Korean issue is in fact as great as their own.)

3. The two following considerations might also be adduced as possible pointers towards Chinese action along the lines of course (*a*):

(i) Peking's propaganda both internal and external has put increasing, deliberate and violent emphasis on United States aggressive action both against Korea and China.

(ii) Peking's notes to the United Nations might seem designed and worded not so much to secure her early admission as to demonstrate that United Nations action in Korea is illegal (and therefore not binding on China or anyone else) and that United Nations action serves to cloak United States plans for aggression.

4. Nevertheless on balance it would still seem unlikely that China would be prepared to take the risk of becoming involved in hostilities with the United States and possibly other Western Powers with no prospect of real benefit to herself and with the fate of Korea as a strong deterrent. Other arguments against China's intervention are:

(i) Her internal position has not yet been consolidated.

(ii) Her ambitious plans for economic reconstruction and industrialisation might have to be sacrificed. Her towns and communications would be liable to devastation.

(iii) Her military capacity to face major hostilities is doubtful although she may consider on the analogy of the war with Japan that her vast territory and population would ensure ultimate success.

(iv) Her people overwhelmingly want peace not war. To judge by Chinese popular reaction over Formosa, there seems no real difficulty in restraining outraged patriotism. If anything the difficulty particularly in the case of Korea might well be to whip up any indignation at all.

5. Thus, however closely in some respects China's policy may be coordinated with that of the USSR there is likely to come a point beyond which China would not move unless her own interests were clearly served. In Korea, she would therefore be unlikely to intervene for the sake of the Soviet Union rather than for any tangible Chinese benefits, especially as her intervention would coincide with the destruction of the North Korean Forces. If, on the other hand, the USSR were prepared to launch a general war and themselves come in, then China might feel compelled to move.

6. It would follow that China would almost certainly prefer course (*b*), i.e. to do everything possible to achieve the survival in some form of North Korea by diplomatic means rather than by open intervention. The threat of open intervention might however profitably be used in this diplomatic context and talks with Pannikar in Peking would provide a convenient starting point for action under course (*b*).

7. The initial purpose of Chinese diplomatic pressure on the Indians may therefore be designed primarily to break the United Nations front against North Korean aggression, but in view of Chinese propaganda and threats, of possible Soviet pressure on China, of the fact that China has an estimated troop concentration in Manchuria of between 400,000 and 600,000 men, the possibility of a Chinese move into North Korea in the event of diplomatic pressure failing exists as a real danger. Pandit Nehru, in fact, on the 27th September, expressed the extreme and perhaps alarmist view presumably based on the recent reports of the Indian Ambassador at Peking whose own views on Chinese intervention have undergone a complete *volte-face* in the last few days that "any decision or even suggestion that United Nations forces will move beyond the 38th Parallel is likely to precipitate what might well be world catastrophe, is I fear more than probable".

8. As regards course (*c*) the strengthening of Chinese military dispositions in Manchuria has already taken place. If the Chinese conclude that the difficulties and dangers enumerated above of becoming

embroiled are such as to outweigh the advantages, and this on balance would seem to be the case, then they would presumably concentrate on further defensive measures and adopt course (*c*).

9. To sum up, the prospect of control over North Korea by United Nations forces presents the Chinese with extremely difficult decisions. On balance, we consider they are not likely to intervene since they risk hostilities on an issue which would not appear to be vital to China. They would prefer to achieve the survival of a North Korean buffer state, by diplomatic means, but if this fails, the possibility of open Chinese intervention exists as a real danger. If there is intervention in North Korea Chinese forces are more likely to move in than Russian forces.

795.00/9–2850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PUSAN, September 28, 1950.
[Received September 28—3 p. m.]

215. ReDeptel 151, September 27 [*26*]. Have continued discourage ROK spokesman's statements re resolution 38th parallel problem. Have seen Rhee's speech prepared for his delivery upon entry Seoul; it contains no reference this subject. This morning I called on President, persuaded him not issue any statements re reported peace feelers despite strong insistence foreign correspondents that he do so, and Rhee's strong personal feeling must ask unconditional surrender.

Repeated info Tokyo unnumbered.

MUCCIO

795.00/9–2850

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John C. Ross of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] September 28, 1950.

US/A/C.1/1944

Subject: Korea

Participants: H. E. Cyro de Freitas-Valle, Chairman, Brazilian Delegation
Mr. John C. Ross, United States Delegation

After Freitas-Valle's dinner last night [1] he took me aside and after complaining about the British and in particular their conduct at the sponsors' meeting Thursday afternoon [2] on the draft Korean resolu-

[1] i.e., September 28; this memorandum of conversation was prepared on September 29.
[2] September 28.

tion, said that he had told Dening in the meeting that if someone should raise a point of order in the Committee against the jurisdiction of the Assembly even to imply authority to cross the 38th parallel he would have to support such a point of order. I discussed this question of jurisdiction and authority with Freitas-Valle, calling his attention to the restoration of peace and security in the area language in the Security Council resolution and indicating our feeling that in the event of any challenge our authority was secure.

Freitas-Valle then developed a somewhat different line as a corollary to his first point. He said that the United States was about to be judged for all of its activities in Korea. He said that all of our friends and he thought a great majority of the Assembly wanted to defend us. It was essential, however, that we put them in the position to make the most effective defense of us. He said that if the British resolution were put on the table on Friday as planned this would create a great deal of difficulty for many of our friends in regard to the jurisdictional issue. In effect he said the tabling of this resolution would impose a strong inhibition against MacArthur moving across the 38th parallel. Our friends would be in the position of having to argue in support of a theory of dubious validity. He recommended in very strong terms, therefore, that the British should not table the resolution for the next few days, that the United States Government as the Unified Command should give MacArthur whatever orders might be necessary to enable him to cross the 38th parallel and take whatever action the military situation required. Thereafter, Freitas-Valle said, all of our friends would be able to argue in our support on the basis of the fact of MacArthur's action. This, he said, he was sure would be very helpful to him, to many of his Latin American colleagues, and in general to the Asiatics including the Indians. Freitas-Valle asked that I communicate his views to Ambassador Austin with whom he said he hoped to have a chance to discuss the matter at Lake Success Friday afternoon.

I told Freitas-Valle that I would of course communicate his views to Ambassador Austin who I knew would be delighted to talk with him and I expressed our very great appreciation for his friendliness and frankness.

320/9–2850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, September 28, 1950—7 : 04 p. m.
[Received September 28—8 : 37 p. m.]

Delga 43. For Merchant (FE) from Allison (USDel). There is given below essential elements of Korean solution [1] as views [*viewed?*]

[1] See footnote 2 to the minutes of the U.S. Delegation meeting held at 9 :15 a. m. on September 28, p. 799.

by US Government and referred to in immediately preceding telegram:[2]

1. Korea should be free, independent and united country.
2. Method of unification must be in accord with principles of UN Charter and a UN commission should be in Korea to consult with Koreans and Unified Command and make recommendations as to method of unification and part which can be played by members of UN.
3. Korean people to be consulted should be chosen by free elections, with secret ballot, on basis of universal adult suffrage, such elections to be held under auspices of UN.
4. In that part of Korea south of 38th degree parallel ROK is duly elected representative of Korean people, recognized as such by UN, and it should be consulted in all matters pertaining to future of Korea.
5. Just as Korea has been a symbol of resistance to aggression any UN solution should hope to make Korea "vibrant symbol of life" in words of Secretary Acheson.
6. This cannot be done by mere return to *status quo ante bellum* but only by carrying out of will of UN as expressed in previous GA resolutions of 1947, 1948, and 1949, and;
7. By marshalling of UN resources under UN guidance, to carry out great tasks of relief and rehabilitation in country devastated by war.
8. Aggressors must lay down their arms and submit to UN settlement which should not be settlement dictated by any single nation but only by UN in cooperation with Korean people.
9. It must be made clear in any settlement that free, united and truly independent Korea will pose no threat to its neighbors but will live in peace and harmony with them.
10. To this end Korea should be admitted to UN and thus assume obligations of Charter as well as its benefits.
11. In all this we must remember that Korea is in very special sense responsibility of UN and that in all it does UN is engaged in attempting to give small nation right to live in liberty and independence free from political domination by anyone.

[Allison]
ACHESON

[2] The substance of telegram Delga 42, not printed, is contained in telegram 469 to New Delhi, transmitted at midnight on September 28, p. 819.

795.00/9–2850 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 28, 1950—12 midnight.
NIACT

468. Reurtel 788[1] Bajpai statement that "UK had informed India in confidence that it was agreed among three FMs there wld be no

[1] Received at 1:40 p. m. on September 27, p. 790.

advance beyond 38th parallel until matter had been taken up again in UN", fol for your background info.

On Sept. 1 agreement was reached by representatives of FMs in preliminary Washington meetings to effect that "UN forces shld not be committed to proceed north of 38th parallel without prior UN direction.[2] This wld not preclude tactical operations north of 38th parallel incident to action south of parallel. Future circumstances wld necessarily affect this decision, particularly state of NK forces at time". Thus this formulation antedated landing in neighborhood Seoul with resultant precipitous deterioration state NK forces.

At Sept. 14 FM meeting Sec noted that UN dels of three countries had been in constant consultation on Korea question and were agreed upon course to be followed in UN.[3] FMs passed over question without further discussion, thus neither affirming nor calling into question above formulation.

Dept position which we wld trust fully shared by UK and France is that UN forces have authority enter NK if necessary as military measure to destroy power aggressor and to restore internatl peace and security in area. Dept accordingly believes that in Bajpai's receipt this info misunderstanding may have arisen re distinction between occupation NK and tactical operations north of 38th parallel.

Re Bajpai statement "original resolution of course related only to return to 38th parallel" Jun 27 res recommended Members furnish to ROK such assistance as may be necessary to repel armed attack and restore internatl peace and security in area only after noting failure NK authorities heed June 25 withdrawal order. This govt wld strongly contend NK authorities since Jun 27 no longer entitled invoke latter.

WEBB

[2] See document 12 [D–6/1*a*], September 1, p. 682.
[3] See the minutes of the Foreign Ministers Meeting held on September 14 at 3 p. m., p. 726.

357.AD/9–2850 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1950—12 midnight.

469. Reurtel 791 [1] and Deptel 468.[2] British gave Rusk in New York substance of message from Nehru quoting Pannikar and Nehrus reaction to draft UK Korean Res as given you by Nye. Assume Nye has

[1] Received at 9 :52 a. m. on September 28, p. 808.
[2] *Supra.*

shown you text of res. Bevin sent strong reply last night to Nehru stating British view that Chi attitude is predictable reaction to loss of UN seat, that India is probably being subjected to war of nerves and that Brit estimate is Chi intervention in Korea basically contrary to Chi interests and unlikely to occur. Present US info tends to confirm Brit position.

Present military situation in Korea emphasizes possibility that military necessity may require ground action across the thirty eighth parallel before Assembly can express its final opinion on general problem. Dept and USDel at UN believe essential that GA take early stand on Korean matter so there can be no doubt re attitude of free world on this problem. General attitude US Govt on essential elements of Korean solution are given in immediately fol tel.[3]

In view of emphasis placed by Chinese on bombing incidents and in effort to reassure India and Peiping by seeking basis of settlement of any legitimate claims Peiping may have Bevin has been authorized to send message to Nehru stating that US is quite willing to have Indian and Swedish Reps look into charges and assess any damage which US shld pay and that US does not insist upon UN machinery but wld accept informal arrangement. In taking this step it is made clear that US was surprised that this shld be major source of friction since a procedure by which matter cld have been settled was vetoed in SC by USSR.

In considering question of 38th parallel believed there has been confusion between military and political phases this problem. Obviously military task is to restore international peace and security in area which demands that aggressor abdicate its military power or that this be destroyed by UN forces. In absence aggressors laying down arms this may well require operations anywhere in Korea at any time and Unified Command should have power take all necessary measures achieve this military objective. Long-run future of Korea north of 38th parallel as well as south is concern of UN and subject to UN decision. For your info you shld know that MacArthur has instructions that while ROK troops, as elements of Unified Command, may take part in any possible military actions north of 38th parallel question of jurisdiction of ROK in that area is one for UN decision. US believes important that no action by GA cast doubts on present status of ROK as Govt ROK is unquestionably freely chosen govt established through elections observed by UN Comm and approved by GA. In addition democratic character of May 1950 Natl Assembly elections was certified by UN Comm and Natl Assembly opposition to Rhee shld be interpreted as healthy democratic development rather than basis for repudiation duly constituted govt described as lawful

[3] Telegram 470 to New Delhi, not printed, transmitted the text of telegram Delga 43 from New York, received at 8:37 p. m. on September 28, p. 817.

by GA. However US has no intention of forcing ROK down throats of its UN Allies but hopes that ROK can be persuaded to cooperate with UN and show by its conduct during coming days that it merits confidence and consideration of UN. Question of holding elections in south is delicate matter which US believes shld be left for study and recommendation by UN Comm on-the-spot and not spelled out specifically in res. ROK Reps at GA meetings have taken strong stand on this point and insist that in as much as UN-approved elections were held throughout south as recently as last May it shld not be necessary to do it all over again. In any event there is general belief among UN Dels in which US joins that any elections either north or south shld not be hastily held while scars of war are still uppermost in minds of people. It may be that cooling-off period might last as long as one year in which case it wld be close to May 1952 at which time Rhees term of office expires. US believes question of who shld govern Korea is matter for decision of Koreans and shld not be influenced from outside one way or another. Shld new elections under UN auspices result in election of Rhee we believe results shld be accepted, shld Rhee not be chosen again we wld maintain same attitude towards results.

Dept believes active support by India of UK Res wld be of tremendous significance and consideration is being given to postponing presentation of res for short time in hope that India may reconsider. You might stress to GOI that now is time to press toward its consistent objective of unified independent Korea. If NK regime is given time to regroup its forces north of three eighth parallel, it will almost certainly defy UN as in past. In this event UN wld be faced with hard alternatives of yielding to such defiance by ruthless aggressor or of attempting to bring about unification by renewed and more costly military action. UN members shld not be dissuaded from support of firm UN action at this critical stage by implied threats of those who have supported aggression.

Dept regrets speed of events has made it difficult keep you currently informed developments and commends your conduct conversations with Bajpai despite handicap of inadequate info.

Rptd info New York Gadel 17.

WEBB

795A.5/9–2950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, September 29, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received September 29—9 : 02 a. m.]

792. My British colleague informed me yesterday that his government has learned from the Indians that Panikkar has

reported strong sentiment among Chinese Communist leaders in Peiping favoring Chinese military intervention in Korean war if UN forces cross 38th parallel. Apparently Panikkar has reported that decision on intervention has crystallized since mid-September and that it is based on Chinese Communist conviction that basic aim of US, if its forces enter North Korea is to carry war to Manchuria and China in order return Chiang Kai-shek to power in China.

Confirmation of attitude Peiping leaders was received by an Embassy officer in conversation with Dutch Embassy officer who stated that Dutch Foreign Office has received report from its Chargé Peiping that it appears Communists are actually thinking of armed intervention Korea if US forces cross 38th line. Same report states those elements among Chinese intellectuals who remain sympathetic to US feel that we would make grave error to cross line in view Chinese Communist determination on intervention and that they (sympathetic intellectuals) would be obliged abandon their position favoring friendship with west based on US altruism. Our Dutch source here added that Dutch Ambassador on September 20 was told by Indian Ambassador Radhakrishnan that Panikkar had reported Chinese intervention intention in case line crossed by US forces. It appears report of Dutch Embassy here re this statement by Radhakrishnan prompted Dutch Foreign Office request special report from its Peiping Chargé, substance of which described above.

On balance, I find it difficult accept these two reports (Indian and Dutch) as authoritative analysis plans Chinese Communists. Moment for armed intervention was logically when UN forces were desperately defending small area Taegu–Pusan, when influx overwhelming numbers Chinese ground forces would have proved decisive factor. From here it appears probable Chinese Communists, thru press propaganda and by personal contacts with foreign diplomatic personnel Peiping, have taken strong line since Inchon landing hoping bluff UN on 38th parallel issue.

Nevertheless, prudence is indicated and I would much appreciate any information re Peiping attitude which may already have reached Department otherwise. September 23 speeches by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh which have not been published here in full conceivably may have been timed as warning that military situation now receiving top attention.[1]

Department pass Delhi, Hague, London. Repeated info Delhi 39, The Hague 11, London 142.

KIRK

[1] See telegram 773 from Moscow received on September 26 at 12:35 p. m., p. 779.

357.AD/9–2950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, September 29, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received September 29—2:01 p. m.]

803. 1. Nye, UK HICOM informed me noon today of latest developments in correspondence and conversations between UK and India re Korea (Embtel 791, September 28).

2. I shall not furnish in detail what Nye said since I understand British are keeping Department fully informed. Nye gave Bajpai last evening message from Bevin in reply to Nehru's message to Bevin of preceding day. In this note Bevin expressed doubt Peking would be so foolish as to intervene in Korea at this stage and pointed out unless UN forces entered North Korea there seemed to be no way to effect unification of Korea. He also expressed hope Nehru would agree to and co-sponsor proposed British resolution, including passage relating to crossing 38th parallel. Later in evening Nye received reply from Nehru which he forwarded to Bevin with copy for Washington. This reply, though couched in friendly terms, indicated determination Nehru not to support at this time any move calling for crossing 38th parallel by UN forces. Nehru took position that it would be dangerous to assume that Peking leaders were bluffing when they intimated Communist China might intervene in Korean situation. He agreed to support resolution similar to that proposed by British provided it did not sanction entrance UN forces into North Korea. Note indicated that appeal to North Korea to cooperate with UN in carrying out purposes of resolution would not be appeasement and pointed out that if North Korea refused decision could then be made as to future course of action.

3. I called on Bajpai shortly after Nye's visit in order at his request to discuss another matter. Following this discussion Bajpai asked me whether I had anything to add to our conversations set forth in Embtel 788, September 27. I replied I had received nothing from Department which would permit me to discuss this matter further. I understood that British were taking lead in formulating resolution on Korea for GA and that it was my impression Department preferred that discussion with India re this resolution be conducted through British channels. Bajpai said that he had similar impression and then outlined conversations which had taken place between UK and India in Delhi during last two days. He showed me Nehru's latest reply to Bevin, asked if I had any comments, I replied in negative pointing out that I already, on personal basis, discussed matter with him on September 27 and it seemed to me that it was preferable without further

instructions for me to allow conversations on this subject to continue through British channels.

HENDERSON

320/9–2950 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, September 29, 1950—2 : 10 p. m.
[Received September 29—2 : 45 p. m.]

Delga 50. For Rusk from Ross. Trygve Lie called me in yesterday afternoon and after complaining that British (by implication US) had not consulted him re Korean resolution, said he had been thinking that Jebb as President SC ought to go privately to Malik and ask Malik series of questions adding up to whether Soviet Union would wholly accept and use its influence to carry out all previous decisions of GA and SC re Korea. After oral approach Jebb would confirm in writing and insist on reply in writing (which Lie anticipated would be negative) so that negative attitude Soviets could be placed squarely on record at opening of GA debate. This, said Lie, would make clear to "little man" around world the position of Soviet Union.

I argued against this procedure, first on grounds that we wanted matter Korea dealt with broadly and openly by UN and not on basis private deals with Russians; second, on basis we wanted avoid confusion SC and Assembly action. I questioned whether, if it were desirable to ask Soviets series of questions to expose their position on all aspects Korean matter, this might not best be done in open debate in Committee One.

Lie did not press his point but agreed questions might appropriately be asked of Soviets in committee. He then gave me suggested terms of settlement quoted below which he said had been drafted by Feller. He asked if we would consider these suggestions very carefully, which I said we would do:

"Suggested terms of settlement of the Korean question (based mainly on principles contained in existing resolutions of the GA and the SC)

a. The GA will, by resolution, demand that the North Korean authorities agree to the following conditions:

1. A general cease fire, withdrawal to the 38th parallel and demilitarization of North Korean forces, under UN supervision.
2. Entry of the UN Commission to North Korea and full opportunity for it to fulfill its functions.
3. Entry of UN relief personnel and full opportunity to supervise distribution of relief supplies.

4. A general amnesty for all persons who have taken up arms on behalf of the ROK and who may be in North Korean territory.

5. Agreement for a free election to be held in all of Korea within one year, at a date and under regulations to be promulgated by the UN Commission.

b. If the North Korean authorities accept the conditions under *a*, their *de facto* jurisdiction in the area north of the parallel will be preserved until after the election has been held. UN troops will not cross the parallel until after the election. After the election authority will be handed over at a date to be determined by the UN Commission to the new all Korean Government chosen in the election.

c. The ROK should be asked to agree to accept the conditions for and the results of the election, and to grant a general amnesty for all persons who have taken up arms against the ROK.

d. In the event of refusal by the North Korean authorities, the GA will recommend to the members that UN troops proceed to conduct military operations north of the parallel, with the objective of eliminating the North Korean authorities.

Upon the achievement of this objective North Korea will be placed under the jurisdiction of the UN occupation authorities (details of the appropriate UN political authority and of the composition of the occupying forces to be worked out), until such time as the Assembly or the SC decides that an election for all of Korea should be held."

[Ross]
AUSTIN

795B.11/9–2950

Memorandum by Mr. Frank Ragusa of the Division of Security Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

[WASHINGTON,] September 29, 1950—3:30 p. m.

Mr. Dulles had Miss Doyle dictate the following message to you by phone:

I hope we shall not give the impression of being disposed now with victory to ditch Syngman Rhee. He is far from perfect but he is a great patriot and anti-communist and organized his country so that they put up a good fight, and he is not as bad as Communist smear portrays him. If the Chiang Kai-shek episode is followed by what seems a similar treatment of Rhee, then it will seem to establish a pattern which would, I think, greatly discourage any Asiatic leaders from wanting to fight on our side.[1]

FRANK RAGUSA

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[1] The source text bore the following two manuscript notations: "I agree. D[ean] R[usk]" and "So do I. U A[lexis] J[ohnson]".

795.00/9–2950 : Telegram

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 29, 1950—3 : 55 p. m.
FLASH

JCS 92985. From JCS to personal for Genl of the Army Douglas MacArthur, SecDef sends. For his eyes only. Reference present report of supposed announcement by Eighth Army that ROK Divisions would halt on 38th parallel for regrouping: We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of 38th parallel. Announcement above referred to may precipitate embarrassment in UN where evident desire is not to be confronted with necessity of a vote on passage of 38th parallel, rather to find you have found it militarily necessary to do so.[1]

G. C. MARSHALL

[1] On September 29, the JCS, after clearance on the highest governmental level, approved General MacArthur's plan—submitted on the preceding day—for military operations north of the 38th parallel. The plan called for an attack by the 8th Army along the western coastal corridor to capture Pyongyang and for amphibious landings by the Xth Corps at Wonsan on the east coast of North Korea. (*Record of the Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Relative to the United Nations Operations in Korea From 25 June 1950 to 11 April 1951 Prepared by Them for the Senate Armed Forces* [*sic*] *and Foreign Relations Committees.* Dated 30 April 1951 (Secret) p. 44.)

320/9–2950 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

PLAIN NEW YORK, September 29, 1950—10 : 31 p. m.
PRIORITY [Received September 29—11 : 18 p. m.]

Delga 57. Following is text of joint draft resolution on Korea submitted September 29, 1950 by Australia, Brazil, Cuba, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines and UK (A/C.1/558) :

"*The GA*

"*Having regard* to its resolutions of 14 November 1947, of 12 December 1948 and of 21 October 1949;

"*Having received and considered* the report of the UN Commission on Korea;

"*Mindful* of the fact that the objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to have not been fully accomplished and in particular that

the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt has been made by an armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the government of the ROK;

"*Recalling* its declaration of 12 December 1948 that there has been established a lawful government (the government of the ROK) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the UN Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this government is based on elections which were a valid expression of free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such government in Korea;

"*Having in mind* that UN armed forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendations of the SC of 27 June 1950, subsequent to its resolution of 25 June 1950, that members of the UN furnish such assistance to the ROK as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area;

"*Recalling* that the essential objective of the resolutions of the GA referred to was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea;

"*Recommends*

"(*a*) That all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea,

"(*b*) That all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the UN for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea,

"(*c*) That UN forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified at (*a*) and (*b*) above,

"(*d*) That all necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea;

"*Resolves* that

"(*a*) A Commission consisting of ——— to be known as the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea be established to (I) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the present UN Commission in Korea, (II) represent the UN in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea, (III) exercise such responsibilities in connection with relief and rehabilitation in Korea as may be determined by the GA after receiving the recommendations of the ECOSOC; the UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should proceed to Korea and begin to carry out its functions as soon as possible;

"(*b*) Pending the arrival in Korea of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, governments represented on the Commission should form an interim committee

composed of their permanent representatives at the seat of the UN to consult with and advise the UN unified command in the light of the above recommendations; the interim committee should begin to function immediately upon the approval of this resolution by the GA;

"*The GA* furthermore,

"*Mindful* of the fact that at the end of the present hostilities the task of rehabilitating the Korean economy will be of great magnitude;

"*Requests* the ECOSOC, in consultation with the specialized agencies to develop plans for relief and rehabilitation on the termination of hostilities and to report to the GA on or before October ———"

AUSTIN

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met on September 30 from 10:45 a. m. to 1:25 p. m.; see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.346. The Committee took up the question of the problem of the independence of Korea, but debate related mainly to two draft resolutions: one by the Soviet Representative (A/C.1/562) inviting representatives of both North and South Korea to the discussions, and one by the Republic of China (A/C.1/563) inviting only the representative of the Republic of Korea to participate.

961.61/9–2650: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 30, 1950—1 p. m.

220. Urtel 773 Sep 26 Dept has noted recent tendency Sov press play up Chinese bravado to extent not justified by actual developments in China. Mao "speech" referred to by you was a congratulatory message sent "Natl Conference of Combat Heroes and Model Workers". It revealed no clear variation from standard Chinese Party line and in Dept's view does not in itself suggest decision shift goals CPG. Mao public statements, including major policy statement June 6, have all emphasized need for strong mil forces along with strengthened economy. Mao in Sep 26 message stressed econ problems. Other leaders making statements on same occasion centered attention even more on econ development.

WEBB

795.001/9-3050

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 30, 1950.

Subject: Chinese Communist Troops—Korea

Reference: CA Memo 9/27/50: "Chinese Communist Intentions"

GHQ FEC reports: "An analysis of Korean PW reports reveals conclusively that the Chinese Communist 164th and 166th Divisions were moved into North Korea, via Sinuiju and Nanam, during Aug and Sep 49, and were redesignated as the North Korean 5th and 6th Divisions, respectively. These divisions, prior to their transfer to North Korea, were composed of Koreans serving with the Chinese Communist Army, and as the 3rd and 4th Independent Divisions, fought against the Nationalists in Manchuria." *

Although this transfer took place in 1949, this report can be related to the recent Peiping admission that Koreans had returned from China to their homeland to participate in its defense and construction. It is of course possible, as implicit in the Peiping statement, that other Koreans have returned home at more recent dates.

Note the further report† that Canton Deputy Mayor Ku Ta-tsun stated at a secret conference in Macao on Aug. 4 that if UN forces opened a second front in Korea Mao Tse-tung would invade Indo-China and probably attack Taiwan at the same time; and, "part of the Communist offensive would be the capturing of military materiel in Hong Kong . . .". A source comment cited by GHQ FEC was that the report that Chou En-lai had told a conference that if the Koreans were pushed back to the Manchurian frontier China's policy would be to fight outside her borders and not wait for the enemy to come inside, and other reports, "indicate that Chinese Communist authorities are deeply concerned over the course of events in Korea and would regard the advance of UN forces to the Manchurian border as a serious threat to their regime. The final decision on whether the Chinese Communists will resort to overt participation in Korea may not be made until UN forces threaten to cross the 38th Parallel."

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[1] The memorandum was also addressed to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant).

*Intelligence Summary #2929, 9/16/50, China, Manchuria, p. 5. [Footnote in the source text.]

†*Ibid.*, p. 6. [Footnote in the source text.]

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its 508th meeting on September 30 from 3 to 4:50 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.508. The Council rejected the Soviet draft resolution introduced at the 503rd meeting on September 26 (see editorial note, page 784) condemning United States bombing in Korea. The vote was 1 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in favor to 9 (including the United States) opposed, with 1 abstention (Yugoslavia).

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met for the second time on September 30 between 3 and 6 p.m.; for the record, see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.347. The Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/562) inviting both representatives of North and South Korea to participate in the debate was rejected by a vote of 46 to 6, with 7 abstentions. The Chinese resolution (A/C.1/563) inviting a representative of the Republic of Korea to participate without the right to vote was accepted by a vote of 50 to 5, with 5 abstentions. The Committee then took up the eight-power draft resolution on Korea (A/C.1/558), the text of which is contained in telegram Delga 57, September 29, from New York, page 826. In the course of the discussion, Ambassador Austin made a statement wherein he referred to the 38th Parallel as an artificial barrier having no basis for existence in law or reason and endorsed the resolution's goal of a unified and independent Korea. For the text of Ambassador Austin's remarks, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 9, 1950, page 579.

611.9326/9–3050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, September 30, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received September 30—6:04 p. m.]

813. 1. Bajpai read to me this evening text of GOI telegram to Panikkar, Indian Ambassador Peiping, in which GOI outlined US suggestions received through Bevin for settlement any legitimate claims arising from US bombing (third paragraph Deptel 469 September 28). In this telegram GOI expressed willingness to appoint representative if Peiping was agreeable to act with Swedish representative in investigation and assessing damages.

2. Bajpai said GOI considered US generous and could not see how in face of it Peiping could continue to maintain US was not doing all it could be reasonably expected to do to compensate China for any damage which US planes might have inflicted on Chinese territory. He added if China agreed GOI representative would be Major General Himatsinhji, at present Deputy Minister Defense. I know General Himatsinhji personally and consider him to be man of integrity, friendly to US.

HENDERSON

357.AD/9–3050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, September 30, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received September 30—9:43 p. m.]

812. 1. Bajpai sent for me late this afternoon in order to discuss further problems re Korea. He read to me latest communication received this morning from Bevin and Nehru's reply thereto.

2. Bevin referred to recent changes which had been made in text of proposed UK resolution and expressed hope GOI could *now* co-sponsor it. Bevin stated UK had not meant to convey in previous message belief that Peking was bluffing in making threats, but rather opinion that Communist Chinese leaders were too statesmanlike to push China into war with UN forces.

3. Nehru's reply indicated that although GOI might not *oppose* resolution, it would make clear in GA that it would be preferable for UN before sending armed forces into North Korea to give North Koreans opportunity to lay down arms and to undertake to cooperate loyally with committee proposed in resolution in carrying out aims of UN.

4. Bajpai undertook explain what present GOI position is along following lines:

(*a*) GOI agrees that under SC resolutions of June, UN forces have right to enter North Korea for military purposes. It believes, however, that in interest of peace, UN forces before entering North Korea should give North Koreans chance to lay down arms and to undertake to permit UN to take jurisdiction over area for purpose of carrying out program set forth in draft resolution.

(*b*) Period during which this chance should be given could be so short that North Koreans would not be able to gain material advantage militarily for respite.

(*c*) It is not intent of GOI to *oppose* resolution. It may abstain or it may even vote for it. Its final decision depends upon facts brought out during discussions in GA and on international developments.

5. Rau has been instructed to make speech in first committee outlining India's views as set forth above. He is not, however, to undertake to propose any amendments to resolution. His speech will be confined merely to statement of how GOI considers matter might be most effectively handled in interest of peace.

6. Bajpai specifically requests that there be no indication to Rau or any other Indian official that US has knowledge of nature of instructions sent to Rau.

7. It will be noted that there has been a distinct shift in GOI position since my first conversation with Bajpai as reported in mytel 788.[1]

HENDERSON

[1] Received at 1:40 p. m. on September 27, p. 790.

Editorial Note

For the text of General MacArthur's broadcast on October 1 calling for the surrender of the North Korean forces, see telegram C–64730, September 28, 12:55 a.m., from Tokyo, page 796.

IO Files

Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET NEW YORK, October 2, 1950—9:15 a. m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (46).]

1. *Korea*

Mr. Bancroft reviewed the committee developments on Korea. One question had arisen on a Chilean amendment (A/C.1/564) which proposed the addition of a paragraph reading "Also recommends the Economic and Social Council to expedite the study of long-term measures to promote the economic development and social progress of Korea and meanwhile to draw the attention of the authorities which decide requests for technical assistance to the urgent and special necessity of affording such assistance to Korea." He indicated our preliminary reaction had been to accept this amendment, but that the Department was a little concerned about it and had urged the Delegation to dissuade Santa Cruz from pushing his amendment on the basis that the resolution already sufficiently covered this point. It seemed to Mr. Bancroft that this position might detract from the approach to Korean reconstruction contained in the Secretary's opening speech, but he noted that the Department seemed to fear that too many promises would be made to Korea in this regard.

The Secretary believed it was better to promise the same thing several times than to promise different things; the Chilean proposal did not add anything new. Mr. Ross recommended strongly that the Delegation support the Chilean proposal; in his position as President of the Economic and Social Council, Santa Cruz could help us; he already felt that the British had shoved him aside, and Mr. Ross feared he might think the same of us if we refused this amendment. Mr. Dulles thought it much better, from the purely technical standpoint, to accept the amendment. He referred to the fact that he was lunching with Santa Cruz to try to persuade him to withdraw the Chilean item on strengthening democratic principles and thought support of this amendment might be helpful. Mrs. Roosevelt also hoped we might support the Chilean amendment since she believed it would help obtain necessary Chilean support on our human rights position in the Third Committee. Mr. Dreier[1] considered, moreover, that support of this amendment would strengthen our position with all the Latin American delegations. Mr. Bancroft recalled that the Department had not suggested that the United States should vote against the amendment but merely attempt to dissuade Santa Cruz from pressing it; if it came to a vote, we would vote for it. Mr. Popper suggested that the points raised in the discussion might be brought to the Department's attention.

Mr. Dulles inquired whether the Chilean amendment differed from what the Secretary had said on Korean reconstruction in his speech. Mr. Bancroft thought that perhaps there was a difference in emphasis. Senator Cooper observed that Ambassador Austin's speech in the Committee had carried the same thesis. The Secretary requested that the matter be taken up again with the Department, which should be informed that the Delegation saw no particular harm in this amendment.

Senator Lodge asked under what authority United Nations forces were proceeding to cross the 38th parallel. The Secretary replied that the resolution of June 27, which referred to the restoration of peace and security in Korea, provided the sanction. Senator Lodge observed that the adoption of this resolution would not hamper the military operation; he hoped that had been made clear to General MacArthur, since it was not clear to the public. Mr. Ross believed Ambassador Austin's speech had helped to clarify this point.

Mr. Cohen thought it would be helpful for the Delegation to have some survey of the way other delegations interpreted the June 27 resolution for its own information and guidance. Mr. Ross stated that there was almost universal support for our position. Mr. Dreier said

[1] John C. Dreier, Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs, adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

this was true of the Latin American states. Mr. Bancroft commented that there was also a general feeling that there should be expeditious Assembly action on Korea.

Senator Lodge asked whether there was any way under the Charter to find out who was guilty of starting the Korean war and to punish them as war criminals. Mr. Allison thought the item in Committee 6, dealing with the establishment of an international criminal court, might be helpful in this regard.

Senator Cooper wondered about the Indian reaction to crossing the 38th parallel. Mr. Ross thought India would probably go along. Mr. Bancroft explained that India believed we could cross the parallel for military purposes but that in the interest of peace also felt we should give North Korea a chance to lay down its arms; to date India was in agreement with the steps taken.

Ambassador Gross thought it unfortunate not to rush the Korean action through the Assembly and believed the Committee should meet three times daily until the resolution was adopted, unless there were major policy reasons against such action. The Secretary agreed action should be taken swiftly and asked how this might be ensured. Mr. Bancroft explained that some key states were not yet prepared to speak and had asked for the necessary time to complete preparation of their speeches. Mr. Dulles referred to the speed-up of meetings in Paris and thought it as important to end a war as to wind up an Assembly session. Mr. Bancroft cautioned that if we over-emphasized the necessity for speed, it might raise embarrassing questions as to whether we had authority to proceed as we were now doing. Mr. Dulles thought the Assembly should be geared to handle such matters expeditiously; he noted that Congress also wastes time, but believed that on questions of war and peace, it always acted promptly. In his opinion, a similar sense of responsibility should be developed in the Assembly. The Secretary agreed it was important to move fast. However, two things should be distinguished. On the military side, we did not need a resolution to proceed; the North Korean armies were disappearing. On the other hand, we would soon encounter the problem of what authority there is in the North and what happens in the future—this was the area in which prompt Assembly action was needed.

[Here follows the record of the discussion on the second agenda item: Human Rights in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania.]

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly held the first of two meetings on October 2 from 10:45 a. m. to 1:30 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.348. No voting action

took place during this session which was devoted mainly to a lengthy speech by the Soviet Representative (Vyshinsky), followed by a shorter statement from the Korean Representative (Limb).

The Committee met again from 3 to 5:25 p. m.; see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.349. The meeting was taken up principally by statements by the Polish, Byelorussian, and Czechoslovak Representatives speaking in opposition to the eight-power draft resolution and the work of United Nations Commission on Korea. A draft resolution (U.N. document A/C.1/567) on the Korean question was submitted by the Soviet, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Czechoslovak, and Polish Delegations; for the text, see telegram Delga 63 from New York received at 7:24 p. m. on October 2, page 838.

In addition, two other draft resolutions were introduced by the Soviet Representative on October 2; one called for the cessation of United States bombing in Korea (A/C.1/568), the other called for disbandment of United Nations Commission on Korea (A/C.1/569).

795.00/10–250

Draft Memorandum by the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1950.

Subject: The Occupation of North Korea

A United Nations occupation of North Korea must be based on the concept that the purpose of the occupation is to establish peace and security in Korea and that to do this, unification of the country will be necessary. It should be recognized that the establishment of peace and security makes possible a solution of the Korean problem by the Koreans themselves. It should therefore not be the task of occupation forces to impose on the North Korean people a complete administration of government—staffed by non-Koreans. In the initial stages the occupation forces will concern themselves primarily with the restoration of law and order and the provision of emergency relief. Koreans will be used in these tasks to the maximum extent possible. The UN forces will act to restrain them from acts of reprisal and to assist them in re-establishing the minimum essential services. It should be recognized that during this interim period, while the Koreans will play the dominant role, the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea over the northern areas will not legally be extended until elections are held. During this interim period North Korea will therefore be in a status of occupation and will be subject to the authority of the Commanding General of the Unified Forces.

468–806—76——54

Three phases are envisaged in the post-hostilities period, as follows:

First Phase—From Cessation of Organized Resistance to Arrival of United Nations Commission.

1. Occupation of certain key cities in North Korea should be effected by units made up of UN forces, acting under the authority of the Unified Commander, who should consult with UNCOK to the extent practicable.

2. The composition of the units should be as follows:

a. The Commanding Officer should be a military officer of appropriate rank from one of the UN member countries supporting the UN action in Korea.

It will be preferable if as many as possible of these officers are not Americans. Efforts should therefore be instituted as soon as possible to invite UN members to select highly competent officers to fill these posts. It would be highly desirable if as many Asiatic countries as possible were represented.

b. Components of UN units should in general maintain a proportion of one-half ROK troops to one-half UN troops.

3. The tasks of the UN units during phase one will be in general as follows:

a. Disarmament of North Korean forces.
b. Provision of immediate relief to the civilian population.
c. Re-establishment of essential public services.
d. Filling of minimum essential governmental positions.

It should be made clear that the appointment of officials to fill local governmental posts is purely temporary pending the holding of elections. Selection of Koreans to fill these posts will be made by the Commanding Officer of the unit.

Second Phase—From arrival of UN Commission to Holding of national elections.

1. Following its arrival in Korea the UN Commission established by the General Assembly under the UK resolution, should visit the areas of North Korea occupied by UN forces.

2. The UN Commission should inspect conditions in each of the occupied areas and make recommendations regarding relief, reconstruction, rehabilitation, etc.

3. The UN Commission should make recommendations with regard to the withdrawal of UN forces occupying North Korea.

4. The UN Commission should make recommendations regarding the holding of elections:

a. The Commission may recommend the holding of local elections in some areas pending elections to the National Assembly.

b. The UN Commission should set a date for elections to the National Assembly.

Third Phase—From the Holding of Elections to the Withdrawal of Occupation Forces.

1. Elections to the National Assembly should be held under the supervision of the UN Commission.

2. Upon holding these elections, the Republic of Korea should assume jurisdiction over all parts of Korea where elections have been held.

3. Security forces should be established in Korea as recommended by the UN Commission.

4. Efforts should be made to obtain the neutralization of Korea through agreements by UN members and by the Republic of Korea.

795.00/10–250

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Popper)

SECRET [NEW YORK,] October 2, 1950.

US/A/C.1/1988

Subject: Composition of Korean Commission

Participants: Mr. Wainhouse, Department of State
Mr. Popper, United States Delegation

Mr. Wainhouse informed me that a meeting had been held this afternoon in the Department at which Messrs. Mathews, Hickerson, Rusk, Jessup, Merchant, Johnson and Wainhouse had been present, to formulate our view on the composition of the Korean Unification and Rehabilitation Commission.

Mr. Wainhouse dictated the following sentences which sum up the result of this meeting:

"It was agreed that the Commission should be made up of neutrals and that we should stress the need for having top level representatives on it. If it is proposed that the USSR or a Soviet satellite be put on the Commission, then we should counter with the suggestion that the Soviet Union, United Kingdom and ourselves be put on it."

I asked Mr. Wainhouse what was meant by the word "neutrals". He informed me that it meant all states except the Big Five.

611.93/9–1350: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 2, 1950—7 p. m.

487. Urtel 641 Sep 13.[1] Dept concurs desirability informal consultation Bajpai prior any attempt contact Chi Commie Amb. However Dept considers present not appropriate time for such move and desires

[1] Not printed. It conveyed the Embassy's belief that it might be useful to make contact with the newly arrived Ambassador from the People's Republic of China through Bajpai, if the latter felt that a talk between the Chinese Communist Ambassador and an Embassy representative might be useful. (611.93/9–1350)

you take no action unless Dept so instructs. This not intended prevent casual contact with Chi Commie Amb.

WEBB

320/10–250 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

PLAIN NEW YORK, October 2, 1950—6 : 37 p. m.
[Received October 2—7 : 24 p. m.]

Delga 63. Following is unofficial text of draft resolution submitted in committee 1 today [1] by delegations of USSR, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia:

"Mindful of the fact that the valid aspirations of the Korean people for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korean state have not yet been fulfilled;

"Having in mind that the principal task of the UNO is to bring about by peaceful means, and in accordance with the principles of international law and justice, the settlement of disputes which might lead to a breach of universal peace;

"Pursuing the aim of settling peacefully the problem of Korea and re-establishing peace and security in the Far East:

"The GA recommends:

"1. To the belligerents in Korea that they immediately cease hostilities.

"2. To the government of the US and the governments of other states that they immediately withdraw their troops from Korea and thereby establish conditions which would secure for the Korean people the possibility of enjoying the inalienable sovereign right to settle freely the internal affairs of their state.

"3. That after the withdrawal of foreign troops and for the purpose of establishing a government of a unified and independent Korean state, all-Korean elections to a national assembly be held as soon as possible on the basis of an expression of the free will of the population of all Korea.

"4. A parity commission composed of North and South Korea shall be elected at a joint assembly of the deputies of the Supreme People's Assembly of the PDR of Korea and of the National Assembly of South Korea to organize and conduct free all-Korean elections to the national assembly of all Korea.

"The joint assembly shall also elect an interim all-Korean committee to carry out the functions of governing the country and to operate pending the election of the all-Korean national assembly and the establishment of a permanent all-Korean government.

"5. That a UN committee, with the indispensable participation in it of the representatives of states bordering on Korea, be established to observe the holding of free all-Korean elections to the national assembly.

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[1] See the editorial note, p. 834.

"6. That for the purpose of rehabilitating Korean national economy which has suffered from the war the ECOSOC urgently draw up, with the participation of the representatives of Korea, plans for providing the necessary economic and technical aid to the Korean people through the UNO.

"7. That after the establishment of the all-Korean government the SC consider the question of admitting Korea to membership of the UNO."

ACHESON

795.00/10–350 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

LONDON, October 3, 1950—11 a. m.
[Received October 3—5 : 35 a. m.]

1934. Scott Foreign Office has just informed Embassy of receipt of telegram dated October 3 from Peiping stating that on October 3 Foreign Minister Chou En-lai called in Indian Ambassador Panikkar and informed him that if UN Armed Forces crossed 38th parallel China would send troops across frontier participate in defense North Korea. He said this action would not take place if only South Koreans crossed parallel.

Repeated niact Moscow 67, niact New Delhi 46. Moscow's 792, September 29 to Department, repeated London 142, Delhi 39.

HOLMES

IO Files

Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET

NEW YORK, October 3, 1950—9 : 15 a. m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (48).]

1. *Composition of Korean Commission* (US/A/C.1/1989)[1]

The Secretary considered that there were three main choices with respect to the membership of the Special Korean Commission provided for in the British resolution.

1. The Department had recommended that neither the United States, the United Kingdom or the USSR should be on the commission. The British agreed with this view. He saw one great difficulty, however, in that such a commission might not be very vigorous and American leadership would be helpful.

[1] See the annex to this document, p. 847.

2. The second alternative was to include the United States, but not the Soviet Union. While this would be highly desirable, if it could be done, it did raise certain difficulties in that it might result in loss of support for the resolution from states such as India.

3. The third alternative was to include the three Great Powers, although this would be almost certain to result in complete frustration of our own efforts, since a commission with Soviet representatives had never worked satisfactorily. There would inevitably be long speeches on the subject of American aggression and imperialism and the commission would never make any progress.

As the Secretary saw it, those were the choices open to the United States. After thinking it over and deciding that each of the three alternatives had disadvantages, his personal choice was to include neither the Soviets nor the United States. In his view, it would be almost impossible to explain including the Soviets to American public opinion, since it seemed inconsistent to fight a war and then to put the enemy on the peace commission. If we were not represented, he foresaw American criticism, but he thought the public would generally understand why we had not insisted on membership.

Ambassador Austin was moved by the Secretary's judgment. His own first thought had been that our stake in Korea was so great that we had to be on the commission. However, he had suggested to others that it was important to consult widely on this problem and consequently believed there was still time to canvass opinion with respect to the composition of the commission. Tentatively he favored the Secretary's viewpoint.

Mrs. Roosevelt believed it utterly impossible to include both the Soviets and ourselves on the commission. She thought the recommended slate of small states was the best which could be done, considered from the standpoint of trying to preserve the United Nations. At the same time, she thought there were a tremendous number of people who would feel that, because so many of our boys had been killed in Korea, if we did not achieve a democratic Korea it would be because we had shirked our duty and refused membership on the commission. For this reason, our position would be hard to get across. Possibly we could argue that this type of commission was the best way to achieve a democratic Korea. Nevertheless, she was nervous about the public reaction.

Senator Sparkman felt very much as Mrs. Roosevelt did. However, he would personally prefer to see a strong commission without the United States and the Soviet Union. If such a commission could do the job, that was the best alternative. However, if we did decide to eliminate ourselves from membership, he believed we should concentrate every effort on getting a strong commission that could and would do the necessary job in Korea.

From the Congressional standpoint, Senator Lodge had no doubt that the best arrangement would be the inclusion of the United States and the exclusion of the Soviet Union. Referring to the unhappy memories left by UNRRA, he considered that a number of Congressmen would go along with our policy more readily if the United States were included. He agreed with Mrs. Roosevelt that it would be difficult to explain our not being on to the American public. The situation might be helped, he believed, if a well-known American, who had the confidence of the Congress, could be included in the top staff of the commission. He still thought that it would be best to have the United States represented directly, both from the standpoint of Congress and the efficiency of the commission. From the overall political viewpoint, however, he saw the Secretary's argument for a commission of small states.

The Secretary thought this was correct. He went on to say that in any case the economic side of the Korean operation would be separately organized, probably under American direction. Senator Lodge thought it would be desirable to have an American in this post so that he could go before the Congress to explain the Korean program. If that could be accomplished without including the United States on the commission, he believed that we would successfully break the back of the public reaction to our exclusion.

The Secretary emphasized the fact that there would be operating in Korea the United Nations Commander, an American; a director of reconstruction; and the proposed commission, whose chief job would be to bring about the political unification of Korea. He observed that some [difficulty?] might be anticipated as the result of the Republic of Korea's insistence that it was sovereign in the area. He forecast that the Republic would announce that its authority covered North Korea.

Mr. Dulles asked whether the commission would have any authority over military operations. Responding in the negative, Mr. Bancroft indicated that the most important people in Korea would continue to be the Unified Command and the Economic Director. Mr. Dulles was uncertain whether the commission would interpret its authority in such a way that the military and economic officers were the more important. He noted that the resolution appeared to give the commission rather broad authority. He hoped that the debate and legislative history of the Korean resolution would clarify the authority of the commission. The Secretary recalled that General MacArthur would continue in command and did not foresee that he would have any difficulty in dealing with the commission. Mr. Dulles thought, nevertheless, that some friction might develop. Mr. Allison pointed out that the theory of the resolution was that the commission should not really begin to operate or have any authority to intervene until the military operations in Korea were concluded.

Mr. Cohen felt on balance that the recommendation of the Department was the best of the alternatives, though he agreed, like the others, that it had some drawbacks. He foresaw a real problem with respect to the authority of the Commission over the Military Command. The greatest difficulty would not be as regards authority over the military command in cases where it could be shown that action was taken under the Security Council resolutions, but in cases where question arose as to the authority of the military, where the advice of the Commission would become important. If the military were simply keeping order, he doubted whether the Commission would be in a position to interfere. The more difficult problem was that of coordination; there he saw room for some friction. He agreed that it would be desirable to get an American to head up the economic operation.

Senator Lodge asked whether it was true that the Commission would be carrying out some rehabilitation. The Secretary referred to the terms of the resolution and noted that the Economic and Social Council would be responsible for general planning in this area. The Commission might give some political guidance to this work. Senator Lodge observed that the Congressional reaction would partly depend upon whether the Commission would be empowered to spend money or not. Mr. Cohen noted that from the viewpoint of good administration, we would want to keep the commission free from the detail necessarily involved in the economic operation. Senator Lodge asked how the reconstruction plans would be developed. Mr. Cohen assumed we would try to get our ideas accepted in the Economic and Social Council. The Secretary thought we would wish to have a single person to administer the relief operation.

Senator Cooper thought it would not be acceptable to anyone to include the Soviets on the new Korean Commission. He favored the alternative supported by the Secretary, and believed that the fact that General MacArthur would continue to head up the military operation and that an American would probably be selected to direct the rehabilitation program would outweigh other considerations. The Commission would have to consult both, and in that way, the United States would undoubtedly be able to exercise great influence. He accordingly did not fear not having the United States represented on the Commission. Also, he wondered whether this position might not obviate our difficulties with the Republic of Korea. He thought it would be desirable to have Canada on the Commission; its membership would be helpful in creating confidence in this country in the Commission. Senator Lodge believed it would be unfortunate if after the magnificent effort in Korea, anyone could ever say that the affair had fizzled because we set up a commission which was not sufficient for the task before it. He hoped this was an imaginary rather than a real danger.

Senator Sparkman considered there was still another viewpoint to be taken into consideration. The American people were pretty well sold on the idea that Korea was a United Nations affair; that had been difficult at first, but now the idea that the United Nations was handling Korea had been accepted. We should be careful not to give the impression that the United Nations belonged to the United States. He rather believed that the establishment of the Commission, without the United States or Russia, as suggested, with the assurance that people were included who will lend vigor to it, would be the better part of wisdom in carrying on the idea of the United Nations rather than the United States acting in Korea. Senator Lodge agreed if we could get representatives with vigor.

Ambassador Gross saw the primary advantage of our not being on the Commission in the fact that, at least superficially, we would not be blamed for everything which happened. Nevertheless, he leaned toward putting the United States on the Commission or at least making itself available for service on the Commission at the will of our colleagues. We should be ready for service if wanted, but suggested the matter should be left in the hands of our colleagues. He was troubled by the fact that when India, in the Security Council, proposed a commission of non-permanent members, it had been done on the theory that small states were neutral and thus synonymous with disinterested parties. When a commission of this sort was established, it meant that almost no member had any interest in the subject as a matter of national policy so success would depend on the individuals which actually served on the Commission. He concluded from this that the major powers—particularly the United States—could not escape their responsibilities. If the Commission fell apart because of lack of interest from the small states represented on it, we would get the blame, since the world would realize that we had been the determining element in this situation.

The Secretary said that he had not supposed we would refuse to serve if there were a general demand for us, and the Russians were not included. Senator Sparkman agreed absolutely with Ambassador Gross. The Secretary stated that what he had in mind was that there was no chance of our membership without the Soviets. The moment our inclusion was suggested the Soviets would insist upon being put on; there would be a great sense of fright and there would result the compromise of including both. He referred to Ambassador Gross' remarks about the Indians, and said he had understood the Indians were being very cagey about their interest. Mr. Bancroft indicated that India would not wish to be included if the United States were represented.

Ambassador Gross did not trust that judgment on India. The Indians were playing the situation both ways. India wanted to be on the

Commission and to serve as its chairman. However, he agreed it was difficult to know just what the Indians really wanted. He did not think we should permit the Indian position to deter us from being on the Commission. He thought we should simply let our general willingness to serve, if wanted, be known. The Secretary observed that the resolution's sponsors did not want the United States on the Commission.

Mrs. Sampson [2] was concerned about the possible reaction of the American people. She said that she would like to see an attempt made to have the United States represented; she thought the majority of the United Nations members would like to see us on the Commission and that we belonged there.

With all due respect to the various views expressed, Mr. Ross considered that it was wishful thinking to try to set up a neutral commission, full of vigor, since all our experience with commissions—particularly when the United States was not a member—despite promises made of good personnel, showed that they simply did not work out that way. He believed that so-called neutral commissions were weak and generally lacked good members. If there were a general desire for the United States to be included on the Commission, in his opinion that definitely entailed the risk of Soviet membership. In this connection, he recalled that the Soviets had proposed a commission composed of states bordering on Korea. Other members might well regard that position as a reasonable one and wish to give the Soviets a seat—there would be a good deal of sympathy for that position. Senator Lodge thought this showed disregard for the Russians' role as war criminals. Mr. Ross said he was certain that if the United States wished to be on the Commission it would increase the desire of some members to include the Soviets. He recommended as the course we should follow the adoption of a neutral slate as an indication of the slate we would be prepared to accept, but at the same time we would make clear that if there were a strong desire for us to serve, we would accept, but would be opposed to the inclusion of the Soviets.

Mr. Sandifer observed that there was a calculated risk in not having the United States represented. The Department thinking was that we had taken a large part in the conduct of hostilities, and that subsequent action in Korea should be shared by other members. The Department was also interested in obtaining as much leadership in Korea as possible from the Asian members, particularly India, possibly as its chairman. Mr. Sandifer noted that there might be a question with respect to India in view of the present Indian attitude, but it still seemed to him, if it was possible to work it out, that it was desir-

[2] Mrs. Edith V. Sampson, U.S. Alternate Representative to the U.N. General Assembly.

able to have India, and that it would be the logical chairman. He observed that there was always a difficulty in getting states to appoint capable people to United Nations bodies. This had been especially true of the Korean Commission. India had not had an effective member, and neither had Turkey or the Philippines. The Department had thought it important to have a responsible state from Latin America; El Salvador had not delivered on the old Commission. When everything was balanced, he sympathized with Mr. Ross and Ambassador Gross, but felt almost bound to take the risk of not having the United States included, and to rely on our influence through the Unified Command and the Economic Director. He indicated that the Department's tentative thinking on the latter problem was in the terms suggested by the Secretary of a single United Nations administrator for the economic side of the operation. This could solve a very considerable part of the problem. The success of the Korean operation required responsible participation by other members, particularly by the neighbors of Korea.

The Secretary suggested that the matter be left in such a way as to make clear our determination to have a vigorous commission. The United States would be willing and glad to serve on such a commission if that was the desire of the members, but we were not seeking membership. We were absolutely opposed to any Russian or satellite being represented, and if any member felt considering membership for the United States required Russian inclusion, we would make it clear that we did not desire membership under that condition. We should do it in that way so as not to appear coy.

Senator Lodge observed that a rough test for the success of the Commission would be whether we could get a unified Korea. In the event we did not obtain a vigorous commission and it looked as if we were not getting anywhere, he wondered whether we had enough influence through General MacArthur and the "almighty dollar" to take care of the situation. The Secretary did not believe we could guarantee anything. The Commission would not provide the whole answer to the Korean problem. A good commission could do a lot to help, and a poor one could do some harm. An intermediate one would not do much either way.

Mr. Dulles thought that one of the practical problems would involve the relations between the Commission and General MacArthur. He foresaw the possibility of a frightful row between the two, if India, for example, was on the Commission, insisting upon policies which disagreed with what General MacArthur considered to be sound. The same situation might arise with the Philippines; in this connection Mr. Dulles recalled his attempt to get General MacArthur to permit Romulo to come either to Tokyo or Korea, which the General vehe-

mently resisted because of the Baguio Conference and other matters. There had also been difficulties with Australia in the past; the Secretary commented that in that case it had been the individual involved. Mr. Dulles hoped the change in the Australian Government might improve that situation, though this had not yet been sufficiently tested to be sure what would happen. He thought that it would be unfortunate to have any clash between the new Commission and the Unified Command. He hoped everything would be done to make sure that there was a chance for their working together in harmony.

Mr. Cohen thought that if we could arrange to substitute Canada for one of the other states on the Commission and, by talking to Mr. Pearson, make clear that we were depending upon Canada to send their ablest man as representative, some of our difficulties could be met. Mr. Dulles suggested a Canadian chairman would be helpful, and Mr. Cohen concurred.

Senator Lodge did not want to hear the criticism that America had won the war but once again lost the peace. If we considered the choice of this Commission in the abstract, we might get into trouble. He believed it should be hand-picked so that we would know what we were getting. In his view this matter was as important in its way as the June 25 resolution had been with respect to the military aspect of the matter. Senator Cooper asked whether we might not insist on countries appointing able, well-known individuals; this would provide some insurance against the Commission's failure.

The Secretary asked when this matter would come to the vote. Mr. Bancroft replied this afternoon. He observed that Canada did not wish to serve on the Commission. Mr. Raynor suggested that we might talk to Mr. Pearson; he noted that Canada wished to see the Commission weighted with Asian states. Mr. Popper pointed out the difficulty of including both Australia and Canada. The Secretary said that he would speak to Mr. Pearson this morning to ascertain the Canadian reaction. Mr. Bancroft noted that it would be important also to determine the sentiment toward United States membership; if that was unanimously opposed by the sponsors of the resolution, there was nothing we could do.

Mr. Lubin said that, as regards the rehabilitation administrator, it had been tentatively thought that if we did not get a qualified American, we should look for a Canadian. He suggested this factor should be borne in mind in connection with consideration of Canada for membership on the Commission. Ambassador Gross thought someone on the Delegation should speak to the Secretary General about the necessity for including top-flight personnel on the staff of the Commission.

The Secretary said that it seemed to him that there was in the Delegation some strong feeling that the United States should be included on the Commission but at the same time there was an equally strong feeling that this should not be at the price of the inclusion of the Soviets or a satellite. Mr. Dulles agreed to this latter point, subject to the qualification that a strong commission could be established without the United States.

[Annex]

Position Paper Prepared for the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL
US/A/C.1/1989

[NEW YORK,] October 2, 1950.

COMPOSITION OF PROPOSED COMMISSION FOR KOREA

Present Composition of UNCOK	*Sponsors of Resolution*	*United Kingdom Proposal*
Australia	Australia	Australia
China	Brazil	Netherlands
El Salvador	Cuba	Pakistan
France	Netherlands	Philippines
India	Norway	Turkey
Philippines	Pakistan	Latin America
Turkey	Philippines	(*Note:* The UK has spoken to all the above except Turkey and a Latin American State.)
	United Kingdom	

Countries Providing Military Assistance in Korea or Enroute to Korea

Australia
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
India
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines
Sweden
Thailand
Turkey
South Africa
United Kingdom

795.00/10–350

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 3, 1950—10:30 a. m.

The present status regarding London's 1934 of October 3 follows:

1. At the Department's request this message was relayed to General MacArthur for information by the Department of Defense at 8:30 this morning. Captain Murdaugh is calling it to the urgent attention of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Our Watch Officer repeated it to GA Del.

3. S/S is sending it to the President in his noon batch of important telegrams.

4. I have drafted a short Niact telegram to Loy Henderson asking for any further details and instructing him to point out to Bajpai the "inadmissible" character of the Chinese Communist threat.[1]

5. Park Armstrong arranged early this morning for an urgent query to Tokyo regarding this morning's AP radio report of a 100-mile column, including artillery, stretching from Manchuria across the Yalu River into North Korea. The Telecon this morning has nothing on this point.

6. The telegram was discussed at Mr. Webb's 9:30 meeting which I attended. I expressed my belief that we should treat it with extreme seriousness and not discount it as a bluff. I also expressed concern over the lack of clarity in General MacArthur's outstanding orders in the present circumstances. My impression is that the majority present were inclined to regard it as a bluff pending more information. It was agreed that:

(*a*) Before sending an evaluation of the report to the President, we should await confirmation from New Delhi and further information concerning the radio troop column report.

(*b*) This development should be urgently discussed in New York with the principal other Delegations concerned. I understand Doc[2] will discuss this with Jack Hickerson.

(*c*) This development should be urgently discussed at a high level with the Pentagon, which Doc will institute via the established General Burns channel.

[1] See telegram 492 to New Delhi transmitted at 1 p. m. on October 3, p. 851.
[2] Reference is to Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews.

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met on October 3 from 10:45 a. m. to 12:55 p. m.; for the record, see

United Nations document A/C.1/SR.350. The Indian Representative (Rau) expressed his Government's doubts concerning the wisdom of authorizing United Nations Forces to cross the 38th Parallel and indicated that India would abstain in the First Committee from voting on either the eight-power or five-power draft resolutions.

795.00/10–350

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 3, 1950.

Subject: Threat of Chinese Intervention in Korean Conflict.

Reference London's 1934 of October 3. Although the statement attributed to Chou En-lai undoubtedly contains a large element of bluff directed at forestalling decisive action on the UK resolution on Korea, I do not feel that we can assume it is entirely bluff.

For reasons which are not clear, unfortunately General MacArthur has not thus far committed across the 38th parallel any UN forces. If he had done so, the position vis-á-vis the Chinese would be much stronger. It appears that he may be testing ROK forces north of 38 with the thought that it might not be militarily necessary to commit UN forces north of the 38th. We are not openly committed to the use of UN forces across the 38th and it may, therefore, be well worthwhile further to explore the possibility of using entirely ROK forces for the subjugation of North Korea, of course, continuing our present logistic and tactical Air and Naval support, thus maintaining the UN umbrella. This would maintain the UN umbrella over the operation while reducing the grave risk of calling the Chinese bluff. Although this would extend *de facto* ROK control over North Korea, I do not think we would encounter serious difficulty in restraining Rhee from extending *de jure* control until the UN machinery had operated. While occupation by exclusively ROK units would be much more sanguinary than we had hoped, the UN Commission and American advisors attached to the ROK units should be able to exercise some restraining influence. This also has the added advantage of avoiding the great complexities of carrying out genuine UN occupation of North Korea.

I suggest that you recommend to Mr. Matthews that we immediately request Defense to ascertain (1) what General MacArthur's present intentions are with regard to the use of UN forces north of 38 and (2) his assessment of the capabilities of ROK troops to carry out this operation.

795.00/10–350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, October 3, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received October 3—11:57 a. m.]

813. Although Chinese Communists, like Soviets, have consistently ignored UN character of operations Korea and although Indian Ambassador Peking may be convenient channel to communicate Chinese Communist views to US and other western powers, Embassy surprised that message of such serious nature as that contained London's 1934 to Department not conveyed more directly to UN or US as case may be. British Embassy concurs our speculation that Chou En-lai's statements to Panikkar may be last minute Chinese attempt to play upon Indian apprehension to point where maximum profit for China and USSR can be salvaged from North Korean reverses.

Department pass London, Delhi. Repeated info London 146, New Delhi 41.

KIRK

795.00/10–350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, October 3, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received October 3—12:15 p. m.]

828. 1. Nye, UK High Commissioner, has just informed me that late this afternoon Bajpai, Secretary General MEA, told him that telegram had just been received from Indian Ambassador to Peiping to effect that Chou En-lai had advised Ambassador that Peiping had decided to intervene in Korea if US forces entered North Korea.

2. Bajpai said Nehru in Lucknow but in Nehru's absence he took on himself to give this important information to Nye with idea that London and Washington be informed so that US and MacArthur would realize gravity of situation.

3. Bajpai did not suggest that US forces be instructed not to cross border but tenor his remarks indicated he hoped such order would be given at least for time being.

4. Panikkar in commenting on Chou En-lai's statement said he was convinced that Chinese decision was final and that crossing line by US forces would therefore mean extension Korean conflict.

5. Nye has sent copies of communications to Washington so they should be soon in possession Department.

HENDERSON

795.00/10–350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, October 3, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received October 3—12 : 23 p. m.]

814. Reference London's telegram 1934, October 3, telegram from British Chargé Peiping received by British Embassy here about 1300 GMT.

Embassy officer has seen telegram, which in addition to information contained reftel, states Panikkar was called to Foreign Ministry at 0010 October 3 Peiping time, that Panikkar reports that Chou En Lai said American troops (but that this must be understood to mean UN troops), that Chou told Panikkar that he had reports that US troops already had crossed 38th line, that CPG was prepared to accept Indian position as described in Nehru's September 30 press conference (but only if US troops did not cross 38th line), and that CPG can accept no settlement Korea unless CPG participates in such settlement.[1]

Department pass London, Delhi. Repeated info London 147, Delhi 42.

KIRK

[1] At a news conference held on September 30, Prime Minister Nehru had issued a prepared statement on Formosa and Korea which was transmitted to the Department in telegram 810, September 30, from New Delhi (not printed). The portion under reference dealing with Korea read as follows:

"We are of opinion that every effort should be made to bring Korean war to conclusion and that it would be wrong to carry on military operations when peaceful methods can bring necessary results. Therefore we think United Nations forces should not go beyond 38th parallel till all other means of settlement have been explored. It is clear that objective in Korea should be a free and United Korea whose government is settled by will of the people. United Nations should see that this objective is given effect to." (795.00/9–3050)

795.00/10–350 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1950—1 p. m.

492. Re London's 1934, Oct 3, rptd New Delhi as 46, pls call urgently on Bajpai pointing out Chi Commie *démarche* lacks legal or moral justification and threatens overt defiance expressed will of UN. Any additional details which you can supply re Chou En Lai's statement to Panikkar urgently awaited here.

WEBB

793.00/10–250 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

HONG KONG, October 2, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received October 3—1 : 22 p. m.]

708. Full text important Chou En-lai statement October 1 [1] not yet available here as NCNA English text still not released and Chinese text was published in local press with many characters missing in crucial sections.

Consulate General's initial impression based on incomplete accounts available is that Chou's saber-rattling probably intended primarily to present Communist Government as champion of Chinese (and Asian) nationalism and solidify public support behind its pro-USSR and anti-US policy. Maximum of public support is essential for sacrifices involved in building modern military machine which is basic aim of Communist program. Chou's reference to "prolonged war of resistance" by "Korean people" implies no early change in balance of military force in Korea such as would result from large-scale participation of PLA despite warning that China would not stand aside "should imperialism wantonly invade territory of neighbor".

Further comments on statement will be deferred until full text available for study.[2]

WILKINSON

[1] Reference is to Premier Chou En-lai's report on September 30 to the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference commemorating the first anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, wherein he stated that "the Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbours being savagely invaded by imperialists". (*China Monthly Review* (November 1950), p. 103)

[2] Telegram 723, October 5, from Hong Kong, not printed, stated that a careful reading of the full text of Chou's statement confirmed the impression expressed in telegram 708. It went on to say that the most likely interpretation of the statement that China would not "supinely tolerate seeing their neighbours being savagely invaded by imperialists" was that the North Koreans could count on the Chinese Communists for diplomatic support and material assistance for their continued armed resistance to the forces of the United Nations. (793.00/10–550)

Editorial Note

The 351st meeting of the General Assembly's First Committee took place on October 3 from 3 to 5 : 45 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.351. The debate on the eight-power and five-power draft resolutions continued, but no voting took place.

795B.5/10–350

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 3, 1950.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department of Defense has considered the memoranda of 16 September 1950 and 22 September 1950 from Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews to Major General J. H. Burns, dealing with matters relating to the termination of Korean hostilities.

The Department of Defense perceives no objection, from the military point of view, to those matters, in both of the letters, which are primarily within its purview. From the standpoint of execution by the field command, the proposals in these memoranda are entirely feasible and practicable.

With regard to the "Program for the Cessation of Hostilities," the Department of Defense notes the effort of the Department of State to gain as favorable a reception as possible in the General Assembly for all parts of this program, and is in accord therewith. The Department of Defense would like to offer for your consideration the following suggestions, which are based on study and comment by the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force:

1) A provision might be included in paragraph A for the reorientation of captured North Korean troops before their return to their homes in North Korea, insofar as this is practicable in view of local conditions. It is important to our long-term objectives, in accordance with paragraph 22 of NSC 81/1,[1] to render these troops as politically harmless as possible and to rehabilitate the majority of them for reliable service in the post-hostilities period.

2) U.S. planning should allow for the possibility that North Korean civil authorities may not be able or willing to maintain law and order north of the 38°, pending the assumption of control by the Government of the Republic of Korea. In case of a complete breakdown of authority in areas north of the 38°, the U.N. forces should be prepared to assume direct responsibility for civil affairs.

3) In the light of the contingency mentioned in paragraph 2, and the responsibilities that may fall upon the United Nations' Command, the U.S. Government should seek the immediate creation of adequate U.N. organizations to handle the tremendous problems that will follow hostilities. It would appear that the present U.N. Commission for Korea is neither staffed nor equipped to meet all these problems. Therefore, the U.N. should create either one single combined or three separate agencies to handle the three major problems of relief and reconstruction, political unification, and the immediate and long-range security of Korea.

[1] Dated September 9, p. 712.

4) Paragraph 5B of the Program makes reference, by implication, to the possibility of war criminal trials. It is questionable whether the U.S. should commit itself to trying war criminals without the most careful consideration of the situation since, in any case, the real war criminals will not be reachable by any judicial process.

I wish to state, in conclusion, that the Department of Defense continues to believe that as few U.S. troops as possible should engage in the physical occupation and pacification of areas north of the 38°, once organized military hostilities have ended. It remains important, therefore, to increase the number of other U.N. troops sent to Korea, particularly from countries in Asia.

Faithfully yours, G. MARSHALL

795.00/10–350

Draft Paper Prepared in the Department of the Army[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 3, 1950.

PRIORITY

This radio is in two parts:

Part 1—General concept for occupation of North Korea. The purpose of the occupation will be to establish peace and security so that the Koreans themselves may solve the Korean problem. The occupation forces will not impose on the North Korean peoples a complete administration of government. However, it will be necessary to establish a substitute for the central government and also to establish and maintain supervision and controls over Korean *de facto* provincial and local governments.

Three phases are envisaged in this occupation. The first phase will begin with the fact of occupation and will last until guerrilla activities have been reduced to the point that they are no longer a major concern. The second phase will commence at the end of the first phase and will continue until national elections have been held. The third phase will commence when national elections have been held and the Republic of Korea has assumed responsibility.

During the first phase, conditions of security will be paramount and governmental actions will be limited largely to provision of relief and minimum assistance, the establishment and maintenance of law and order and the initial establishment or reactivation of *de facto* local and provincial governments. During the second phase, military security will be a matter of secondary concern and normal political and economic activity under the guidance of the United Nations Commission will be encouraged to the utmost. During the third phase, the

[1] This draft was prepared in the form of a telegram to CINCFE.

United Republic of Korea will assume authority and all United Nations troops other than those required for the security of the country will be withdrawn.

It is contemplated that throughout the first phase the Commanding General of the Unified Command of the United Nations will be the supreme authority in North Korea subject only to control by the United Nations and the United States Government as their executive agent. During the second phase the Commanding General will retain complete authority as stated above but will, nevertheless, give the utmost consideration to the advice and recommendation of the United Nations Commission or Commissions so far as they do not interfere with military security. During the third phase the Commanding General will be responsible only for the military security of the forces under his command to the extent that such forces remain in North Korea.

Part 2—Proposed Directive. Quoted below is a proposed directive for your civil affairs activities in North Korea. State has concurred. Request your comments to include not only amendments but additional matters which should be covered.

"1. *Purpose*

It is the purpose of this directive to prescribe the broad policies which will govern the conduct of your occupation as the United Nations Commander-in-Chief and Military Governor of that part of Korea which lies North of the 38th Parallel (hereafter referred to as "North Korea").

2. *Mission*

You will occupy North Korea in the name of and as trustee for the United Nations. It shall be your primary duty to so administer your occupation as to facilitate public order, economic rehabilitation and the democratic mode of life in the area and to prepare the way for the unification of the free and independent Korea.

3. *Command*

The United Nations, through such agencies as may be designated by it, is the supreme authority over the occupation of North Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States have been designated as the executive agency through which you will receive your instructions and to which you will report. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will issue such interim and emergency instructions and guidance as are necessary in the interpretation or in the absence of the United Nations directives. Within the policies established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will issue such implementary directives and orders as required for the fulfillment of your mission.

4. *Relationships*

a. The United Nations will establish in Korea one or more agencies to observe, advise and assist in the accomplishment of

the United Nations objectives for a unified Korea. You will, to the extent permitted by your mission, give these agencies full cooperation and support and will follow their advice and recommendation so far as possible. You are not, however, subject to their direct jurisdiction.

b. In order to afford the individual nations of the United Nations opportunity to participate in the reconstruction, reorientation and rehabilitation of the area and subject to such controls as will permit you to coordinate their action or as are necessary for reasons of military securement or operation, anthority to enter and operate in the area will be granted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject to your concurrence.

c. While the Republic of Korea has been recognized as the sole legally constituted government in Korea, its sovereignty over that part of the country North of the 38th Parallel has not been generally recognized. Although you are not authorized to recognize such sovereignty, it is desirable that in matters of national scope you consult with the Republic of Korea to facilitate eventual unification.

d. The Department of State will designate the American Ambassador to the Republic of Korea as your political advisor of North Korea in addition to his other duties. He will perform the normal functions of a political advisor with respect to your operations in North Korea.

5. *General*

All policies set forth hereinafter and all policies which you shall establish shall be so interpreted and implemented as to change as little as possible the conditions which you find when you enter North Korea. Land reform measures, nationalization and socialization of industries and similar matters having a serious impact upon individuals should be left in *status quo*. Any change should be made by the Korean people themselves after the unification has been accomplished, or on the firm recommendations of the United Nations Commissions. Similarly, your participation in the government of North Korea will be limited to the minimum necessary to assure law and order and tranquility. Any amendments or repeals of laws existing at the time of your entry will be limited to those necessary from the standpoint of military security and the success of your mission, or those recommended by the United Nations Commissions.

6. *Governmental Organization*

You will dissolve the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, its supporting communist party and all other subversive and totalitarian groups inimical to the occupation. You will not create a central government for North Korea other than as a part of your occupational control machinery. It is desirable that, to the extent practicable, native government be retained or reestablished at the local and provincial levels. You are authorized to retain, remove or appoint such officials, either native or United Nations, on all levels of government as you deem desirable and to make such changes in the political organization of the area as best to serve the occupational mission and to facilitate eventual unification.

7. *Rights of Individuals*

The mere fact that an individual is or was a member of the armed forces of the North Korean government, an official of that government or any local government or a member of any political party will not subject him to prosecution or reprisal and will not, by that reason alone, bar him from office or employment. You will apprehend and hold for trial by appropriate international tribunals, in accordance with the rules and customs of war and the precedents of the war crimes trials in Germany and Japan, all persons who are or may be charged with war crimes or crimes against humanity.

8. *Economy*

You will supply relief and assistance in goods and services in accordance with your judgment bearing in mind both United States humanitarian purposes and the desirability of dissemination of information through the entire world as to the promptness and effectiveness of United Nations relief. You will coordinate any additional relief, rehabilitation or assistance of other agencies which are authorized to function within the area. In your activities in connection with communications, transportation, health, welfare, reeducation, reorientation, taxation, banking, refugees and in all other proper and pertinent fields of endeavor, you will consult freely with the Republic of Korea, the various United Nations Commissions, and appropriate departments and agencies of the United States.

9. *Jurisdiction*

You will determine to what extent and for what purposes civilian representatives of United States and United Nations governmental agencies will be subject to North Korea jurisdiction or to the jurisdiction of tribunals established by you. Your determination of these matters will be transmitted to the United Nations for the approval of that body and thereafter all such personnel entering North Korea will thereupon be subject to such jurisdiction.

10. *Control Organization*

It is desired that so far as it is practicable, your occupational headquarters shall be separated from your tactical command; that it minimize the use of military personnel; that the maximum number of members from all friendly United Nations be utilized; that there be a minimum of United States and Republic of Korea personnel; and that it be susceptible without major reorganization to transfer *in toto* to a non-military agency, either of the United States or of the United Nations.

11. *Re-education and Re-orientation*

You will initiate and conduct an intensive re-education and reorientation program designed to establish in the people of North Korea the capability of choosing their own destiny and to expedite the unification of Korea under a freely elected government. This program will make maximum use of United Nations guidance and facilities.[2]

[2] An amended draft was sent to General MacArthur on October 9, in telegram WAR 93721, not printed, for his guidance and comment. For the final text of the directive as sent to General MacArthur, see telegram 256, October 28, 7 p. m., to Seoul, p. 1007.

795.00/10–350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

THE HAGUE, October 3, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received October 3—5 : 54 p. m.]

490. Secretary-General Boon gave me today résumé all recent cables from Dutch Chargé Peking bearing Korean situation. Explained while no date fixed therein this most recent information and based largely Panikkar's observation although checked by Dutch language officers with such sources as still available. Boon believed reports correct although inclined believe might be some bluffing.

"(1) Chou En-lai said private conversation China would fight in case 38th Parallel were crossed; when pointed out events UNO–Assembly and SC seemed indicate more favorable tendency towards China and event war with USA Chinese industrial resources and equipment especially Manchuria bound be completely destroyed, Chou En-lai insisted China had defended herself against 'further aggression' by USA; crossing 38th would be considered such.

"(2) Chief of Staff Chinese Army private conversation made statement China no choice but fight if 38th Parallel crossed; although realized war with USA would set back China's development 50 years or more, Chief of Staff opinion if no resistance offered this time, China would forever be under American control.

"(3) Furthermore learned from Peking, Nehru cable personal message Mao stating: (*a*) Great Britain, France and US decided New York 38th Parallel would not be crossed until after matter been discussed UNO. (*b*) India against crossing 38th Parallel by military forces. (*c*) India bringing much pressure as possible on UK prevent crossings".

Boon said telegram appreciation foregoing information that moment in from Peking high points of which he translated allowing me take notes.

Dutch Chargé convinced Peking Government does not want war but there real danger in moment panic Chinese Communists might precipitate situation if our forces cross 38th and penetrate deeply Korea. Known Chinese Communists have approximately one million their best troops Manchuria. Dutch Chargé reports it clear Panikkar himself fellow traveler or highly sympathetic Chinese Communist regime and cited Panikkar quoted as evidence US determined, war-like course that it had retained service Matthews as Secretary Navy after "preventive war" speech.[1] Panikkar stated US promises it would

[1] In a speech in Boston on August 25, Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews advocated that the United States institute a war to compel cooperation for peace, adding that the United States would thus become the first aggressor for peace.

withdraw troops Korea soon as stable government established all very well but not convincing and Dutch Chargé inclined however believe as Boon indicated (first paragraph this cable) some this belligerent Communist China attitude bluff although Chinese Communist feeling toward US still intensely bitter largely because arms, ammunition furnished Chiang Kai-shek during and after Chinese civil war.

Boon referred statement made me yesterday by Stikker that Indian delegation Lake Success at first strongly endorsed crossing 38th Parallel and UK peace proposals but when matter referred Nehru there had been complete about face. This would seem in line with numbered paragraph (3) above. Boon also made interesting statement he knew for fact Panikkar had in June strongly advised Nehru have India oppose UN declaration of North Koreans as aggressors but that particular case his message due communications difficulties arrived subsequent positive action Indian delegation Lake Success on Nehru's instructions. In almost every other case, said Boon, Nehru accepted Panikkar's advice as against that of Benegal Rau.

Boon emphasized above information must be closely guarded since if any leak occurred, sources information would dry up completely.

Am not repeating this any other post.

CHAPIN

795.00/10–450

Memorandum of Conversations, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 4, 1950.

Subject: Korean Operations

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks—British Ambassador
Lord Arthur W. Tedder—British Embassy
Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State

Sir Oliver Franks called me at the office last night and asked if I could drop out to see him and Lord Tedder. He preferred not to come to the Department at that unusual hour in order not to arouse speculation if the press happened to get hold of it.

When I arrived at the Embassy, the British Ambassador, Lord Tedder and Mr. Graves were going over some telegrams from London. Their immediate concern was to provide the answers to some questions which London had raised on a most urgent basis about the operations in Korea. The Ambassador pointed out that he did not wish to raise any questions of policy nor to indicate that any difference of opinion existed, but merely wished to know how to reply to the specific questions on which London wished answers. He had no indication of what London might think about the matters involved.

The first question was whether South Korean forces are in fact north of the 38th parallel and whether they went north of the parallel in pursuance to a directive from the Unified Command. I replied that our information is that South Korean forces are in fact north of the 38th parallel along the east coast, that this advance had not penetrated initially as far as the first press reports had indicated, but that I did not know how rapidly they were moving and could not say exactly where they are.[1] I stated further that I did not have precise information as to whether these forces crossed the parallel in pursuance to a specific directive from the Unified Command but that I supposed they were operating under general pursuit directives from the Unified Command.

The second question was whether any United Nations forces other than South Koreans were north of the 38th parallel. I replied that our present information is that no United Nations ground forces other than South Koreans are beyond the 38th parallel, that considerable resistance has been encountered by American forces between Seoul and the parallel, but that air and naval operations north of the 38th parallel were continuing and that raiding and demolition parties might of course be going ashore at any time as they had been throughout the operations.[2]

The third question was whether it is the United States view that operations by General MacArthur north of the 38th parallel are covered by the Security Council Resolution of June 27. I stated that we considered military operations by General MacArthur north of the 38th parallel to be covered by the June 27 Resolution, that there is a hostile army in the field which is still shooting at United Nations forces, that this army continues to operate throughout South Korea wherever it can do so, that it has refused to disgorge its American prisoners of war, and that it shows every indication of continuing the fight. In this circumstance we consider it militarily necessary for General MacArthur to continue the fight in whatever way seems appropriate to him and the 38th parallel would not itself impose a barrier, I stated, however, that we did not consider the June 27 Resolution in itself to represent a broad political-military objective looking toward the occupation of all of Korea for the purpose of bringing about a particular political result. This, we thought, would follow

[1] ROK patrols crossed the 38th parallel on September 30, and the ROK army advanced past the frontier in strength during the next two days. On October 3, General MacArthur made the first public official announcement of the crossing of the parallel. (Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, p. 615)

[2] U.S. forces crossed into North Korea on October 7 and commenced fighting northward above the 38th parallel on October 9. (*Ibid.*, p. 623)

from further United Nations action of the sort now being considered by Committee 1.

The final question was whether General MacArthur had received instructions to go north of the 38th parallel and the nature of these instructions. The telegram from the Foreign Office stated that Gascoigne (UK) in Tokyo [3] had been informed by General MacArthur that he was under strict instructions not to operate north of the 38th parallel without a specific directive from the President. Sir Oliver then said he thought that I ought to know that he knew about certain plans which were in existence for execution within a "finite time", and that he was not clear how Gascoigne's report and this information fitted together. He outlined the content of such plans sufficiently to make it evident that he had received excellent information, although he did not disclose the source or the channel. I told him that General MacArthur had received an operational policy directive which permitted operations north of the 38th parallel, that he had been asked to refer his plans for such operations back to Washington for approval in order that Washington could take a good look at the situation in the United Nations and the Russian and Chinese aspects before the plans were executed. I told him that General MacArthur had submitted such plans and that he had been given general approval although I could not tell him whether it would be necessary for General MacArthur to get a final word from Washington before carrying out his plans. I told him this was a matter of ignorance on my part since the matter had been handled on a very high level while I was in New York, but I reminded him that the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercised continuing responsibility and supervision for the source [*course*] of operations in Korea.

Sir Oliver stated that he thought the information I had provided would be helpful to London and would give them something to "chew" on pending the arrival of Mr. Bevin and Mr. Dening on Wednesday. I told Sir Oliver I felt that Mr. Dening had very considerable background on these matters which I had given him in New York and which would be most useful to the Foreign Office upon Mr. Dening's arrival.

Sir Oliver then asked me whether I could give him any further information on Wednesday morning [4] on the particular point as to whether General MacArthur requires any further check with Washington before carrying out his plans. I told him that I would let him hear from me on Wednesday morning.

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[3] Alvary Gascoigne, U.K. Political Representative in Japan.
[4] October 4.

After talking the above over with Mr. Matthews, I called the British Ambassador on the morning of October 5 [*4?*] and told him—

(1) We do not know whether the South Koreans moved north of the 38th Parallel on specific order of the Unified Command but presumed the South Koreans had a general pursuit directive and that the Unified Command was responsible for their operations whether a specific directive was issued or not.

(2) We do not know whether General MacArthur would be required to make a last minute check with Washington before moving north of the 38th Parallel with United Nations forces, but that Washington was following the situation on a day-to-day basis; in any event, it might be useful for Lord Tedder to have a talk with General Bradley, to which the Ambassador agreed.

DEAN RUSK

IO Files

Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET NEW YORK, October 4, 1950—9:15 a. m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (50).]

1. *Composition of Korean Commission*

Mr. Ross reported that our slate was somewhat "unhooked". While Pearson had been personally inclined to accept a place for Canada, St. Laurent[1] had refused on the basis that this was predominantly an Asian problem, although if India were not included, Canada might accept. It now appeared that India was not willing to participate in the Commission. There was still a possibility of adding India, Canada and Brazil to the six states now on the slate. Mr. Rusk had thought that it might be appropriate for the Secretary to talk to Sir B. N. Rau with respect to Indian membership, and a question had also been raised as to whether any further attempt to put pressure on the Canadians to accept membership should be made. It now appeared that Australia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, and Chile were definitely slated, and probably the Netherlands, although Romulo yesterday had begun to push Indonesia and the Dutch had drawn back. Mr. Ross thought it would be premature to give Indonesia such an assignment.

The Secretary thought it would be difficult for him to talk to the Indian Delegation; India believed that crossing the 38th parallel had been a mistake and was not now willing to share in the projected Korean effort. We had at least tried to get them to accept a seat on the Commission. Mr. Dulles was not inclined to press the Indians further. If India were included, he believed that the Commission would be-

[1] Louis St. Laurent, Canadian Prime Minister.

come a general forum for the discussion of Asian problems, and it was also important that India had not gone along with us in the committee.

After noting that six members were included on the commission, Mr. Dulles asked if it might not be better to have an odd number. Ambassador Austin believed this made little difference. The Secretary inquired whether it would be possible for the First Committee to report out a six-member commission and for the plenary to add others. Mr. Ross said this had been done in other cases. The Secretary thought this course would be preferable to anything which would mean holding up committee action. We could communicate this view to others, and perhaps this morning also talk further with the Canadians and with the United Kingdom, and perhaps India. The Secretary inquired what position we should take if Indonesia desired a place on the Commission. Mr. Ross thought we should agree, but Ambassador Austin did not like the idea at all; we wanted a strong constructive commission, and Indonesia would be a weak spot, exposing the Commission to vacillation and delay. Mr. Raynor suggested that if Canada were adamant in its refusal to serve, New Zealand might be considered. The Secretary agreed. He thought we should not favor Indonesia; we should conclude negotiations on the present slate, possibly adding India or New Zealand or Brazil, or all three later on.

Senator Lodge referred to a conversation which he had with Anne O'Hare McCormick[2] who felt it would be desirable to have some states from the Far East represented on the Commission. Mr. Thurston suggested Burma as a possibility; the Burmese delegate had made a constructive speech in the committee. The Secretary asked about Thailand. Ambassador Austin stated that the Republic of Korea had proposed Thailand and the Philippines. Senator Lodge thought it would be good politics to include a state from the Far East; Mr. Cohen concurred. Ambassador Gross remarked that neither India nor Pakistan, as he recalled, had recognized the Republic of Korea; their inclusion might embark the Commission on a course of mischief making. Referring to India, Mr. Bancroft said that the sponsors had wanted it and the Indian Delegation had requested instructions from Delhi; he thought we should simply sit back and let the Indian situation develop. The Secretary agreed that if India had been asked to serve that was enough for now. Otherwise he believed Thailand or another state in the area might be added.

[Here follows the record of the discussion on the second item on the agenda: Appointment of the Secretary-General.]

[2] American newspaper woman.

Editorial Note

The First Committee met on October 4 from 10:45 a. m. to 1:10 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.352. Debate continued on the draft resolutions and various amendments, preliminary to the voting which took place at the afternoon session (see editorial note, page 873).

795.00/10–450

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 4, 1950.

Subject: Chinese Communist Threat of Intervention in Korea

Reference: CA memorandum of September 27, 1950, "Chinese Communist Intentions"

The following additional thoughts are offered respecting the Chinese Communist threat of intervention in Korea.

Note in the complete message received from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Peking, as provided by the British Embassy in Washington,[1] that: Chou En-lai summoned Panikkar at 0010 hours local time, October 3, thus indicating urgency; Chou En-lai referred to "American" armed forces crossing the 38th; and Chou while stating that Peiping was prepared to accept the Indian Government's position re Korea as set forth by Nehru in his September 26 [*30*] press conference,[2] said further that China would accept no settlement of the Korea question to which China was not a party.

The Chou En-lai *démarche* cannot safely be regarded as mere bluff, although (1) made after presumed receipt by Mao Tse-tung of message from Nehru stating 38th parallel would not be crossed until after UN discussion* and (2) designed admirably to support the Soviet resolution in UN. His *démarche* must be regarded as having been made with foreknowledge and support of USSR. The political and military stakes are considerable, and Moscow and Peiping may be prepared to take considerable risks.

If China and USSR are prepared now to accept the danger of clash with UN in Korea, that means that they are prepared to risk the danger of World War III, and feel ready to meet that danger, given present comparative military strengths. In such case, we can-

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[1] Not printed.

[2] See footnote 1 to telegram 814 from Moscow received at 12:23 p. m. on October 3, p. 851.

*The Hague Tel 490, Oct. 3, 1950. [Footnote in the source text.]

not avoid danger either by retreating from it or by surrendering to the Peiping threat: either move would increase, not diminish, the danger inherent in the situation for us.[3]

Acceptance of either the Soviet proposition, or the Chou dictum that China must be party to any agreement affecting Korea, would obviously vitiate any arrangements for settlement of the Korean affair and rob the UN allies of fruits of their effort. The danger offered by North Korea in the first instance would thus continue in being. In the light of all of the circumstances neither Peiping's nor Moscow's suggestion seems to merit sympathetic consideration. The problem is, however, not one which, for reasons of either UN procedure or political expediency, we should endeavor to solve alone. Especially in view of the possible dangers inherent in the situation, we should proceed only with due regard to (1) our military position in the global field and (2) the political and military positions of our friends. We should continue to advance against the enemy in the world theater, but in the theater in question we should advance only if it is in accord with our own best interests and we have the general support of our UN allies. It would seem now that the North Koreans do not intend to surrender; at the best, therefore, we can evidently expect only (1) a costly military campaign, complicated by guerrilla warfare (as suggested in publicity in both Moscow and Peiping), during a time when our military forces perhaps had better be disposed elsewhere; (2) a likewise costly process of rehabilitation of sometime enemy economy; and (3) a possible further exacerbation of relations with hypersensitive and already embittered, xenophobic Orientals.

The Indian position should be taken into consideration. Conviction is best brought home to the Indians by maneuvers of the Chinese Communists and Soviet UN representatives themselves. It is evident that India itself desires a viable solution of the problem. It seems appropriate and politically desirable, particularly, to give full consideration to the Indian point of view (which is in any event so much closer to our own than the Russian) in these respects: (1) General MacArthur's surrender order could now be supported by a new order which, without repeating the demand to surrender, could give the Korean Communists a time limit of 10 or 15 days in which to accede to that surrender order and (2) the Indians could be asked to set forth on their own initiative concrete proposals respecting the procedure for unification of Korea and post-war rehabilitation of the country. Both of those aims have

[3] A manuscript note in the source text by Mr. Merchant indicated his agreement with this paragraph. Mr. Matthews had underlined in the first sentence the words "USSR" and "prepared to risk the danger of World War III" and placed a question mark in the margin.

the support in principle of Sir Benegal Rau. If the Indian delegation is given more responsibility for working on the problem, they may be more respectful of our own position. Taking due note of Chou En-lai's exception in favor of the South Korean forces, an attempt might first be made to deal with the matter through use of the South Korean forces alone north of the 38th: after all, General Walker did state that the backbone of the North Korean army had been broken (although current intelligence does not quite bear this out). It would cost little as an experiment, but of course strong hopes should not be attached to such an experiment.

Apart from the political problem of getting India's support, procedure had best be based upon the majority position. The recommendations of Australian Foreign Minister Spender have much merit,[4] but UN movement into North Korea should be on the basis of the consideration that the Chinese Communists might in fact intervene with armed force, and that if they did so intervene, the USSR might likewise intervene, and that the hostilities might not in such case be limited to Korea.

As practical steps it is recommended that (1) an urgent check be made through the Embassy at The Hague to get more details, if feasible, on the reason for Stikker's estimating that a major Chinese Communist military move was in the offing, (2) our missions at strategic points in different parts of the world be informed of the Chinese Communist *démarche*, its possible implications, and asked to report urgently any untoward developments which have recently come to their attention which might be relevant, (3) a close check be made on current movements and activities of Soviet Embassy personnel in Washington.

In view of the pertinency in this connection of NSC 81/1,[5] new consideration to the problem in point is perhaps merited. In any event, however, our action in the present circumstances should be moulded to the framework of the UN—and we should advance and fulfill our obligations to the UN in accordance with the majority will. It is fitting, however, that if the task is to increase in size, our UN friends bear a more proportionate share of the burden.

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[4] In a statement before the First Committee on October 3, Mr. Spender, while rejecting the claim of the Republic of Korea to be the sole executive authority for all of Korea, said that U.N. forces must cross the 38th parallel to destroy the North Korean aggressor and prepare the way for a unified Korea under the auspices of the proposed U.N. Commission for Korea (U.N. document A/C.1/SR. 350).

[5] Dated September 9, p. 712.

330/10–450 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

LONDON, October 4, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received October 4—2:49 p. m.] [1]

1978. Prompted by concern over danger possible Chinese intervention in Korea following statement to Panikkar by Chinese Communist Foreign Secretary (Embtel 1934 to Department, repeated Moscow 67, New Delhi 46) Bevin has cabled Foreign Office from *Queen Mary* recommending that Franks and Younger consult urgently with US Government with view to a statement being made in course of General Assembly debate on Korea which will have the dual purpose of discouraging China from intervention and offering China prospect of being heard. Bevin states that if US agreeable he is prepared to have UK delegate propose hearing of Peking Government on Korean resolution. Message came somewhat garbled. Foreign Office interprets it to mean that proposed statement should be made by US in current debate in Political Committee and thereafter UK delegate should propose that Chinese Communists be given hearing if this can be arranged without undue delay.

Subsequent telegram from Bevin directs Foreign Office to inform me of suggested action and to convey message from Douglas to Acheson that unless there are factors of which he is unaware Douglas considers this action should deprive China of any excuse for military intervention in Korea without producing compensating unfortunate result. Armed intervention by China would be a great catastrophe.

Department pass New York, repeated info niact New York 39, New Delhi 48, Moscow 68.[2]

HOLMES

[1] A note on the source text indicated that this message was relayed to New York at 3:50 p. m. and that advance copies were sent to the Bureaus of United Nations Affairs and Far Eastern Affairs and the Secretariat at 4:45 p. m.

[2] A manuscript note by the Deputy Director of the Office of U.N. Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) in the margin of the source text stated that this message came in after debate was over and during the voting in the First Committee (see editorial note, p. 873).

795.00/10-450

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John M. Allison of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [NEW YORK,] October 4, 1950.

Subject: Chinese Communist Participation in Korean Debate

Participants: The Honorable Kenneth Younger, M.P., Head of United Kingdom Delegation
Sir Gladwyn Jebb, United Kingdom Delegation
Secretary Acheson
Mr. John M. Allison, United States Delegation

Mr. Younger requested an urgent interview this afternoon to make known the contents of a priority message just received from Mr. Bevin, on the *Queen Mary*, expressing his concern over possible Chinese Communist action in Korea and instructing Mr. Younger to get the personal opinion of the Secretary as to the desirability of making some statement in the course of the Korean debate for the purpose of discouraging Communist China from intervention and giving it a prospect of being heard. Mr. Younger said that his instructions were that if the United States was agreeable the United Kingdom Delegation would be prepared to propose or second a resolution giving the Peiping Government the hearing on the Korean matter. Mr. Younger pointed out that obviously when Mr. Bevin had sent the message he did not realize how far advanced the Korean debate had progressed. The Secretary stated that in his opinion it was too late now to raise the question of bringing in the Chinese Communists and that if such an attempt was made it would only serve to confuse the issue, would delay passage of the Korean resolution and might well endanger the lives of American and British troops now in Korea. The Secretary further pointed out that while he agreed there was a risk in going ahead in view of the Chinese Communists position as conveyed to the Indian Ambassador in Peiping, nevertheless there had been risk from the beginning and at present he believed a greater risk would be incurred by showing hesitation and timidity. The Secretary pointed out that the Chinese Communists were themselves taking no risk in as much as their private talks to the Indian Ambassador could be disavowed, that they had not made any statement directly to the United Nations or to the Unified Command and if they wanted to take part in the "poker game" they would have to put more on the table than they had up to the present. The Secretary further explained that forces were in motion and plans were being made and that the Unified Command after a period of regrouping would be advancing into North Korea and that it was too late now to stop this process. In the Secretary's opinion the only proper course to take was a firm and courageous

one and that we should not be unduly frightened at what was probably a Chinese Communist bluff.

The Secretary admitted that the Chinese Communists did have legitimate interests in certain aspects of the Korean problem such as questions affecting power plants along the Korean side of the Yalu River which furnished considerable electric power to Manchurian industries. However, there was no reason why the Commission which was to be set up under the draft resolution of the United Kingdom should not consult all parties who might be concerned including the Chinese Communists and the Secretary said that this point might be made clear in the general debate on the resolution in the Plenary Session. It was agreed that no attempt would be made to bring in the Chinese Communists at this time and Mr. Younger seemed satisfied that he would be able to explain this to Mr. Bevin.

JOHN M. ALLISON

357.AD/10–450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, October 4, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received October 4—3:40 p. m.]

831. 1. Despite information given me last evening by Nye (Embtel 828, October 3) I was not in position approach Bajpai Secretary General MEA on latest Chinese Communist *démarche* until receipt this morning Deptel 492, October 3. Nye and I have agreement never to take up matters with Government of India on basis exchange information between us.

2. I called on Bajpai this morning and told him of information which we had received through London and pointed out that if this information correct US Government was of opinion that *démarche* lacked legal or moral justification and threatened over defiance of expressed will UN.

3. Bajpai said he had been intending call me in to discuss latest telegrams from Peiping and would have done so if I had not requested appointment. He had given contents telegrams yesterday evening to Nye and he assumed their substance was being made available to US through British channels. He had acted through British channels since previous conversations re crossing 38th parallel had been carried on through those channels. He then read to me excerpts from two telegrams received from Panikkar yesterday and another received this morning. He said he was not making full text available to US Government because he feared that remarks of Chinese leaders derogatory to US would widen breach between US and Communist China which Government of India was attempting to narrow. Even-

tually, however, he gave me full text these three telegrams to read and also read aloud text Nehru's message of several days ago to Chou En-Lai appealing to Peiping not to intervene in Korea.

4. In reading Nehru's message Bajpai obviously omitted several passages. Nevertheless, I believe he gave me fair idea of contents. Nehru stressed Government of India's efforts on behalf Peiping in and out of UN. He expressed conviction that if Peiping would show restraint in spite of position in which it had been placed by failure to obtain admittance into UN and by developments in Formosa it would eventually be admitted into UN. Sentiment was even growing in influential sections in US to admit Peiping into UN, et cetera. Devastating consequences of war which might result from Chinese intervention in Korea were stressed. Nehru described how Government of India was endeavoring to prevail upon UN not to send UN forces into North Korea and referred to three power agreement that such forces would not enter without approval UN. In general appeal followed lines of endeavoring to show that Government of India had interests of Peiping at heart; that it felt that Peiping was being treated unjustly; that justice would eventually be done if Peiping would refrain from engaging in rash adventures; and that rash actions might lead to world conflict from which all people including Chinese would suffer.

5. Telegrams received yesterday from Panikkar contained statements from Chou En-lai that Peiping had decided that if UN forces should enter North Korea Peiping must consider such entry as aggression against friendly neighboring state and would meet this aggression with armed force. There was argumentation to effect that crossing of 38th parallel from south would constitute aggression unless Korean conflict from beginning should be considered as civil war. It was hypocrisy for US to claim that entry of North Koreans into South Korea was aggression whereas entry of UN forces into North Korea was not aggression. Messages also contained praise of Nehru's press statement of October 2 re Korea with which Peiping fully agreed.[1]

6. In telegram just received this morning Panikkar said that Peiping officials had made clear that entry of South Korean armed forces into North Korea would not be considered as aggression and that therefore crossing 38th parallel by South Koreans would not necessitate Chinese intervention. Entry of forces other than South Korean into North Korea would be met, however, by Chinese intervention. There was nothing in this telegram, and Bajpai told me he had thus far

[1] Reference is to a statement made by Mr. Nehru on October 2 commemorating Gandhi's birthday wherein he expressed fears about the extension of fighting into a world war and condemned the destruction caused by U.N. air attacks. He said that though responsibility rested on those who attacked first, the heaviest destruction had been wrought by the "saviors" of Korea. (Telegram 824, October 3, from New Delhi; 791.00/10–350)

received nothing whatsoever from Peiping, which would indicate that Peiping considered that US forces had already crossed 38th parallel (see Moscow telegram to Department 814, October 3).

7. In one of Panikkar's messages there was statement to effect that Peiping would not recognize any decision re future Korea taken by UN unless it was member of the UN Commission on Korea. I asked if Government of India was in favor of Peiping serving as member of contemplated new Commission on Korea. Bajpai said that if I was referring to commission proposed in UK resolution before first Committee General Assembly he could tell me that Government of India was maintaining negative attitude re that resolution and various parts of it. Under Nehru's instructions, for instance, he had yesterday instructed Rau that India would not be member this Commission. I expressed some disappointment at this news. I said that if India should refuse to serve on this commission other Asian powers might follow its example and authority commission could be greatly weakened. Bajpai replied that unless it was made clear that 38th parallel would not be crossed by UN forces India would be compelled to maintain negative attitude with regard to resolution. He was of opinion that India could be more useful in maintaining peace if it did not participate in any plan connected with or flowing from crossing of 38th parallel by UN forces.

8. Bajpai asked if I had any comments or suggestions to make at this juncture in world affairs. I replied that it seemed to me that although UN forces at great sacrifices had won military victory over aggressor, international Communism by cleverly playing upon divergent aims and ambitions of free nations appeared to be putting the free world in a position of choosing between losing all advantage of this victory and allowing aggression to take its course or to face danger of new world war in extremely unfavorable circumstances.

It seemed to me there was [no?] likelihood that any appeal to North Koreans to cooperate with UN in establishing united Korea would have any effect other than to give North Koreans opportunity to strengthen themselves, and Soviet Union and Peiping time, if they chose, openly to declare that any invasion of North Korea would be considered an aggression to be met by force. Subsequent entry UN forces into North Korea could thereby be widely acclaimed as a new war, not continuation of war brought about by North Korean aggression. In fact, brief pause which had taken place has almost placed UN forces already in this kind of position.

On other hand if UN forces should decide not to enter North Korea they might be compelled either to remain there indefinitely in order to defend South Korea from sporadic attacks made by North Koreans, strengthened by arms, other supplies, and leadership from Communist

China and Russia, or to withdraw sooner or later and permit North Korea, backed by strength and prestige of its great Communist neighbors, to complete the work of conquest which UN had interrupted.

There was undoubtedly danger of expansion of hostilities if, regardless of Peiping's warnings, UN forces should proceed at once into North Korea. World war might commence with powers of West, at least in initial stages, differing among themselves re advisability taking steps in Korea which might involve Communist China, greatest Communist power of Asia, against free world; and with free countries of Asia led by India assuming position frankly unsympathetic with that of rest of free world. If Russia considered world war inevitable, it seemed to be managing well by playing on Asian feelings of nationalism, racial jealousies, on ambitions for Asian unity, and on outmoded suspicions of Asia of West, to introduce it with maximum disruption of free world.

I thought it great tragedy that leaders of Asian free world, instead of concentrating attention of free peoples of Asia upon merits of situation, were showing tendencies to criticise methods by which UN forces had been victorious in Korea and upon inadvisability of UN forces utilizing that victory in way which would most effectively discourage aggressors and potential aggressors. Little was being said by spokesmen for free Asia re dangers of permitting great Communist powers to prevent by threats peoples of small countries in their neighborhood from choosing for themselves the form of government which they were to have. If China would be permitted by mak[ing] threats to prevent collective action to be taken for preserving independence of united Korea there was grave danger that by similar threats, China or Russia could prevent collective action from being taken for security other nations lying in their shadow. If world was again relapsing into state where collective efforts to promote security of small nations would collapse in face of threats by great powers, then it might as well be frankly admitted that all efforts to preserve peace by means of collective security had been in vain and that international relations were to be governed by force—not by any code of international morality.

8. [*sic*] I told Bajpai that in talking to him in this frank manner I was not acting on instructions from my government, but I was sure that what I said must be views of many American officials who were faced with making in these trying days extremely difficult decisions. I said that the US deeply prized India's understanding and friendship. It did not like to launch on any course of international action which did not meet with India's approval. India's policy in opposing crossing of UN forces into North Korea was in my opinion placing US in most difficult position.

I hoped Government of India would understand that if US should decide that it must advocate entry of UN forces into North Korea this decision would have been made only after full consideration had been given to India's recommendations and it would probably be based on US conviction that for UN forces to halt just now at 38th parallel would represent capitulation to threats of aggression—capitulation which might more than offset such strengthening of cause of collective security as had been achieved thus far in Korea.

9. Bajpai was courteous in receiving my remarks. He indicated that Nehru was returning this evening to Delhi.

HENDERSON

Editorial Note

The First Committee met from 3 to 7 p. m. on October 4; for the record, see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.353. At this meeting, the Committee discussed the Korean problem for the final time and voted on the various resolutions proposed, after which the question was referred to the General Assembly.

The Representative of India (Rau) submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/572) calling for the establishment of a seven-nation subcommittee to consider all draft resolutions and proposals and recommend to the Committee, before October 6, a draft resolution commanding the largest measure of agreement. This draft resolution was rejected by a vote of 32 to 24, with 3 abstentions. Ambassador Austin indicated that the United States would oppose the resolution before the voting took place.

The First Committee then, after voting separately on each paragraph and amendment, approved the eight-power draft resolution (A/C.1/558; see telegram Delga 57, received at 11:18 p. m. on September 29, page 826), as amended, by a vote of 47 to 5, with 7 abstentions. The text of the resolution as now approved by the First Committee (A/C.1/574) was virtually identical with the text as approved by the General Assembly on October 7 (see editorial note, page 903), except that under paragraph 2(*a*) the seventh member of the Commission was left to be specified by the General Assembly, which chose Thailand.

The five-power draft resolution (A/C.1/567; see telegram Delga 63 from New York, received at 7:24 p. m. on October 2, page 838), after separate roll-call votes on each paragraph, was rejected by a vote of 46 to 5, with 8 abstentions.

The Committee also rejected the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/568) condemning United States bombing in Korea by separate roll-call votes of 51 to 5, with 3 abstentions on each of the resolution's

3 paragraphs. Finally, it rejected the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/569) calling for the disbandment of the United Nations Commission on Korea by a vote of 54 to 5.

795.00/10–450 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 4, 1950—8 p. m.

504. Re Deptel 492, Oct 3, 1 pm.

(1) As possible additional assistance in discussing this matter with Bajpai and Nehru, the fol is for your background info in addition to that given in Deptel 468.[1] Since beginning of Kor affair, Chi Commies have in defiance of UN given polit logistic and mil assistance to North Kor forces. It has been apparent from US intelligence and reconnaissance reports that Manchuria is very important line of communication and source of supply for North Kors. In addition interrogation of prisoners has definitely established that major portion of North Kor spearhead was composed of Chi Commie troops of Kor racial origins who had been transferred since the summer of 1949 as organized units, numbering 20–30,000 troops. A Peiping broadcast of Sep 22 quoted a spokesman of Ministry of For Affairs to the effect that Kors residing in Chi have returned to their "Motherland" to defend it and seeks to justify this on specious plea that these Kors have a right to return to their "Motherland" though many have resided many years or all their life in Chi.

Therefore, it is not quest whether Chi Commie intend to intervene in Kor conflict, but only of degree of their intervention. Indirect, obscure Chi Commie statements at this time cld, therefore, hardly be interpreted except as an attempt to dissuade the GOI and perhaps indirectly other members from support of firm UN action at this critical stage. As Chi Commies have heretofore not shown any hesitation in communicating their views directly to UN, it is difficult to place any other interpretation on Chou En-lai's statement to Panikkar.

(2) You might again stress to GOI it is obvious that any action which cld result in giving time to North Kor regime to regroup its forces north of 38° cld only result in increased defiance of UN as in the past and make more difficult the bringing about of GOI's achieving its consistent objective in obtaining a unified Kor.

You may give GOI strongest assurances that UN operations in Korea will constitute no threat to Korea's neighbors, that we have no

[1] Transmitted on September 28 at midnight, p. 818.

desire to extend the conflict, that we have no desire to establish U.S. bases there or to prolong UN occupation any longer than necessary for minimum security needs, and that we do not seek any special position whatever in Korea.

On other hand, GOI must appreciate that there is a hostile Army in the field which is continuing operations against UN forces, that it has given no signs of giving up the struggle, that it continues to fight wherever it can south of the 38° parallel, that it has been assured that it will be reorganized and re-equipped north of the 38° parallel, that it refuses to hand over UN prisoners of war and civilian hostages who are being brutally murdered in large numbers, and that the North Korean aggressor continues to receive political and military assistance from its northern neighbors.

WEBB

611.95/10–450 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 4, 1950—8 p. m.

506. Dept feels that present days are most critical time during which decisions and actions in Korea may determine course of events for long time to come.

It is at this moment uniquely and vitally important that we try to disabuse Chi Commies misconceptions they may hold as to US intents and purposes in Korea.

Up to now this Govt's sole channel communication with Chi Commies, except for public statements by officials, has been dubiously reliable intermediary Panikkar. Given latter's predispositions and free-wheeling proclivities, we cannot be sure what Chou-En-Lai says or hears in conversations with him.

Therefore, even though fol may consist to some extent repetition what you have already said to Bajpai and which presumably transmitted to Peiping, Dept feels you might seek some opportunity through Bajpai to meet Chi Amb and put directly to him this Govt's position re Korea. Shld this prove too difficult or impracticable to arrange, you might consider some alternative method, such as suggesting Bajpai or UK High Commissioner convey to Chi Amb summary US position.

Summary might take fol line:

As shld be abundantly clear, US has no desire whatsoever that hostilities develop between UN and Chi forces. Such eventuality would be tragedy for world and particularly for China. US wishes neglect no possible opportunity prevent misunderstandings which might lead to such result.

Therefore, fol facts shld be understood beyond shadow of doubt:

1) UN operations constitute no threat whatsoever to Korea's neighbors.

2) As evidence good faith US is prepared accept (by UN or through other less formal machinery) neutral unbiased investigation and assessment damages arising out of charges of bombing incidents brought by Peiping authorities.

3) US has no desire to extend conflict or to establish bases in Korea.

4) US does not seek any special position whatever in Korea.

5) UN Mission in Korea is to repel established aggression and to bring about conditions of peace and security in which Korean people can determine own destiny.

In view these facts there shld be no doubt that mil intervention by another power in Korea in defiance of UN, or threat of such intervention, wld be act hostile to world opinion dangerous in consequence and unjustifiable by any standards international law or practice.

Authorities in China shld not underestimate historical sympathy Am people toward those seeking to maintain territorial integrity and genuine political independence of China. Neither shld they underestimate determination Am people act in full support international peace in Pacific in accordance with decisions approved by overwhelming majority of nations represented in UN.

WEBB

795.00/10–550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, October 5, 1950—11 a. m.
[Received October 5—3 : 59 a. m.]

833. 1. In looking through Embtel 831, October 4, 1950, which was indicated and despatched under pressure in order that Department could obtain information at earliest possible moment, I find I omitted several items which might be of interest.

2. Panikkar's telegram received yesterday (see paragraph 6) took position that entry UN forces into North Korea was inevitable as was also consequent entry Chinese forces. Much of this telegram, however, was devoted to argumentation that even though UN and Communist China forces might come into conflict in North Korea, there was still possibility of limiting fighting to Korea. In other words it was not necessary in his opinion for UN forces to fight Communist China forces in China or any place other than in Korea. Bajpai remarked that this sort of argumentation did not reflect much credit on Panikkar's reasoning ability.

3. In one of communications from Panikkar which I was allowed to read hurriedly, there was indication that in some message not shown

to me GOI had endeavored to satisfy Peiping re its policies towards Indochina.

HENDERSON

795A.5/10–550: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1950—11 a. m.

9. Dept has recd info that on Oct 3 FonMin Chou En-lai at Peiping called in Ind Amb Panikkar and informed him that China wld send troops across frontier to participate in defense of North Korea if US armed forces crossed 38th parallel, such action not to take place if only South Koreans cross parallel.

Transmit soonest any info you have which wld throw light on any intentions Chi Commies or Sov Union to intervene militarily Korea or embark on other hostile course. No attribution shld be made above source.

WEBB

[1] Sent to the Embassies in Belgrade, Brussels, Copenhagen, Oslo, Paris, Praha, Rangoon, Stockholm, Taipei, and Warsaw; to the Legation in Bern, and the Consulate General at Hong Kong.

795.00/10–550

Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross of the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET

[NEW YORK,] October 5, 1950.

Here is the version of the story Hans Engen of the Permanent Norwegian Delegation here told me and I understand repeated later to the Secretary at Sunde's request.

Engen has apparently had a casual acquaintance with Vassili Kasaniev, a Soviet employee of the Trusteeship Division of the United Nations Secretariat. Yesterday Kasaniev invited Engen to lunch. Kasaniev initiated the conversation by asking Engen what the Norwegian Delegation thought about the U.S.S.R. resolution on Korea.[1] Engen replied to the effect that the clause in the Soviet resolution concerning the withdrawal of troops demonstrated the obvious lack of

[1] U.N. document A/C.1/567; see telegram Delga 63 from New York, received at 7:24 p. m. on October 2, p. 838.

sincerity of the whole resolution. Engen then countered by asking Kasaniev what the Russians thought of the 8-power resolution.[2]

Kasaniev replied that the 8-power resolution would permit United States troops to occupy North Korea. The Russians, Engen reported Kasaniev as saying, could not stand this. It was not only a question of their security but also a question of their prestige and standing in the area.

Engen then indicated to Kasaniev that it was not his understanding that U.S. troops wanted to stay in Korea but rather wanted to get out as soon as possible after the defeat of the North Koreans had been accomplished. Engen added, he told me, it was his understanding that possibly Asiatic troops (from Pakistan or India, for example) might be used for occupation duties in North Korea.

Engen's remarks apparently made a very strong impression on Kasaniev. The term does not make much sense in the context but Engen said that Kasaniev "paled visibly". Kasaniev asked Engen to repeat what he had said. Engen did so. Kasaniev then asked Engen whether he might repeat what Engen had said to Vishinsky.

Engen said that they were talking together as person to person and that he had no objection to Kasaniev repeating to Vishinsky what he had expressed as his personal understanding of the situation.

Kasaniev then asked Engen to repeat again what he had said which Engen did.

Engen then asked Kasaniev what the Russians had in mind. Kasaniev apparently replied along the following lines:

MacArthur should agree to stop at the 38th Parallel. The North Koreans would then lay down their arms and, third, a United Nations Commission would be allowed to go into North Korea to hold elections, et cetera.

Engen then said he asked Kasaniev how the Russians would feel about Asiatic occupation troops in North Korea. Kasaniev, to whom this was apparently a new idea, inquired about the possible composition of such troops. Engen replied by mentioning again by way of example Pakistan and Indian troops. Kasaniev then inquired whether the Philippine troops would be included. Engen said he replied to the effect that he would suppose so since the Philippines were, of course, Asiatics.

This was apparently the sum of the conversation. Engen said that immediately after they returned from lunch and before the Committee One meeting opened [3] he saw Kasaniev talking with Vishinsky in the corridor.

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[2] U.N. document A/C.1/558; see telegram Delga 57 from New York, received at 11:18 p. m. on September 29, p. 826.

[3] See the editorial note on the 353d meeting of the First Committee at 3 p. m. on October 4, p. 873.

Engen emphasized that the information he transmitted was a personal communication from him and not an official communication from the Norwegian Delegation, although he had reported the matter to Sunde who authorized Engen to transmit the information to us.

I gather that at Sunde's request Engen repeated this story to the Secretary late in the afternoon. Subsequently Engen came to me privately and very personally and said he was afraid that Sunde had given the Secretary an incorrect impression, namely, that the Norwegian Delegation had voted in favor of the Indian resolution to set up a subcommittee [4] because of the conversation Engen had had with Kasaniev at lunch. Engen said this was wholly incorrect and that the decision to vote for the Indian suggestion had been taken by the Norwegian Delegation the day before. This tends to be borne out by the reports from our Area Officers which based Norwegian support for the Indian proposal on the statement made by the Norwegian Prime Minister a day or two earlier.

I am sending this to you in single copy and as indicated on the phone I would appreciate it if you would inform Hickerson. The only people I am informing here are Ambassadors Austin and Gross.

[4] See the editorial note, p. 873.

357.AD/10–550

Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross of the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [NEW YORK,] October 5, 1950.

I read to Engen at Lake Success this afternoon the memorandum I sent you earlier today [1] (with the exception of the last two paragraphs) on his conversation with Kassaniev at lunch yesterday. Engen confirmed the accuracy of this report, adding the following comments:

Referring to the last sentence of the third paragraph of my memorandum Engen added the following comment: He said Kassaniev had used the phrase "our neighboring states". Although Kassaniev did not say so Engen interpreted his use of this term as indicating a preoccupation with Soviet relations with neighboring states in Europe as well as Asia. He interpreted Kassaniev as having in mind that the defeat of North Korea was the first example of a Soviet-established state being overthrown.

With regard to the fifth paragraph of my memorandum Engen amplified this somewhat as follows: He said that when he stated his understanding of the situation Kassaniev was so excited by what appeared to be to him a wholly new idea that he "paled visibly".

Engen said that the whole conversation and the fact, in particular, that Kassaniev asked him to repeat three times what he had said re-

[1] *Supra.*

vealed a conviction strongly held by the Russians that the United States wanted to occupy Korea permanently. The understanding which Engen stated seemed to be completely at variance with Kassaniev's psychological attitude.

Engen amplified paragraph nine of my memorandum as follows: Kassaniev apparently gave some indication that the United Nations commission would not only go into North Korea to hold elections but also to see to it that the North Koreans kept the surrender terms. Engen restated the point in this way: that Kassaniev indicated the North Koreans might accept the MacArthur terms if American troops stopped at the 38th parallel.

I asked Engen if Kassaniev made any distinction between "American troops" and United Nations forces. Engen said Kassaniev made no such distinction but talked only about American troops.

Engen also said that Kassaniev would not say anything at all about how the Russians would feel about having Asiatic troops in North Korea.

Engen told me that Kassaniev had today invited him to lunch again tomorrow, Friday.[2] Engen has accepted, and he promised to give me a report of tomorrow's conversation at lunch, sometime tomorrow afternoon.

I emphasized to Engen that the information he had given me was being restricted to very few people in our Government. I asked him if he had communicated this information to anyone else. Engen said that he had told only Sunde and Stabell of his own Delegation and that he would, of course, tell Foreign Minister Lange when the latter returns from Chicago.

I told Engen I felt it would be very wise if he did *not* reveal to Kassaniev that he had passed on to us this information. Engen said that he would not do so.

I asked Engen if he knew anything about Kassaniev. Engen said he really hardly knew Kassaniev at all. He had met Kassaniev about a year ago at some reception or dinner and off and on he had had a drink with him in the Delegates' Lounge. Engen has a very vague recollection in the back of his mind of having heard that Kassaniev was at one time Russian Consul or Consul General in New York.

[2] October 6.

791.13/10–550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, October 5, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received October 5—3 : 04 p. m.]

837. For Secretary and McGhee only. No other circulation.

1. During my conversation with Bajpai yesterday we had a little

exchange which I considered inadvisable to incorporate in Embtel 831, October 4, but regarding which I believe you should know.

2. When Bajpai read from one of Panikkar's telegrams statement that Chou En-lai heartily approved Nehru's press statement of October 2 on Korea[1] I said I supposed that approval included also Nehru's remarks re Rhee.[2] Bajpai who is hot tempered flushed and told me my remark was unnecessary—that it appeared to reflect on Nehru and it was his duty to defend his Prime Minister. I told him I regretted making remark—that in trying times like this sarcasm was always inexcusable but that it was difficult to remain placid in the face of series of statements made by Prime Minister during recent days which it seemed to me could partially offset certain efforts made by US and other UN powers at the cost of much blood to discourage aggression. I said that public remarks of Nehru re our actions and policies in Korea could do great damage because he was not only Prime Minister of India but also outstanding leader of Asia. I was hurt the more by his remarks because of my personal deep admiration and respect for him. Bajpai's anger subsided and he said he regretted he had lost his temper. His own position was difficult. He was not responsible for what his Prime Minister might say spontaneously but nevertheless it was his duty to uphold his chief. He said he supposed I was referring to remarks made by Nehru on October 2 to effect that "one's saviors sometimes lead to one's ruin".

I said that this remark unfortunately was only one of many which Prime Minister had made recently. I had made no list of them and had had no intention to refer to them. Nevertheless since subject had come up I might say that it seemed to me that perhaps unconsciously the Prime Minister had for some time been more critical publicly of activities and policies of UN particularly of US in Far East than of those of aggressor. For instance, his remark regarding President Rhee who was legally head of ROK might well add to difficulties of UN in re-establishing stable government in South Korea and would certainly encourage Communist groups who were doing their best to undermine ROK. During recent press conference Nehru also had listened sympathetically to allegations of correspondents re inhuman treatment by US soldiers of North Korean prisoners and had indicated

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[1] See footnote 1 to telegram 831 from New Delhi, received at 3:40 p. m. on October 4, p. 870.

[2] At his news conference on September 30 (see footnote 1 to telegram 814 from Moscow, received at 12:23 p. m. on October 3, p. 851), Prime Minister Nehru was asked whether he agreed with President Rhee's view that the 38th Parallel no longer existed. Mr. Nehru replied that the 38th Parallel should ultimately disappear and no longer be a dividing line barring a united Korea. He went on to say that if Rhee meant that all kinds of military steps should be taken to further his (Rhee's) aims, the Prime Minister would have to disagree. He added that he was no great admirer of Rhee in any case. (Telegram 819, October 1 from New Delhi; 791.00/10–150)

he did not approve such "uncivilized" actions. Journalists at press conference could not but obtain impression that Prime Minister was critical of US treatment of prisoners whereas in fact UN forces in Korea were making every effort to live up to international codes of treatment of war prisoners although North Koreans were murdering Americans and other prisoners of war.

I said that when North Koreans had upper hand Indian press openly and many Indian officials privately were intimating that victories were due to sympathies of people of population with North Korea. Similarly victory by Chinese Communist Army in China had been interpreted by Nehru as expressive of will of Chinese people. On heels victory UN forces in Korea Nehru had now given lead to Indian press by referring to "militarists" and "military minds". In other words, impression was being given in India and Asia that UN victory in Korea was victory of militarists whereas there had been peoples victory in China. While condemning American bombing Nehru had not pointed out that all horrors of war in Korea had flowed out of acts of aggressors. He had at no time referred to atrocities of North Koreans.

3. Bajpai said Nehru was kindhearted man. He hated to see human suffering and he could not keep quiet in face of suffering brought about by US bombing in Korea. Nehru also had been upset by ceremonial entry of MacArthur into Seoul, which he considered provocative and unnecessary, and he had not been pleased at prominent role assigned to President Rhee, who in his opinion had already been discredited.

4. I said that it was unfortunate that when US or UN committed acts or pursued policies which Prime Minister did not like he did not give his views privately rather than present them in such manner as to strengthen cause of aggressors. Bajpai replied that it was Nehru's nature to give public vent to his strong feelings on certain subjects rather than to convey them privately.

5. It had not been my intention to discuss with Bajpai Nehru's systematic undermining of US prestige and character by public statements. It is extremely difficult, however, to remain silent while Nehru is carrying on his sometimes subtle and sometimes openly vindictive campaign against US. It might be useful for him to know that we understand what he is doing. Unfortunately, there seems to be no other chief of mission here who dares take exception to anything Nehru says or does. UK representatives are so anxious to keep in his good graces that unless important UK interests are involved and they are under instructions they are inclined to follow policy of flattery, cajolery and apology somewhat similar to that employed by Nehru

in dealing with Chou En-lai. Canadian HICOM is even more supine and sometimes engages in anti-American statements to strengthen his position. Only diplomatic representatives accredited here who might in dealing with GOI loyally support US in these trying times are Australian HICOM and Italian Ambassador, both of whom are on home leave.

6. Nehru has not limited his campaign against US to public statements. He continuously attacks US for its various policies, particularly its Far Eastern policy, in private conversations with chiefs of missions, none of whom so far as I know, with exception Italian Ambassador, has had hardihood to disagree. That does not mean that chiefs of diplomatic missions here are in general anti-American. Most of them are people of small caliber who do not wish to risk displeasure Nehru by supporting policies and actions of US or UN to which he takes exception.

7. Since Nehru's personal victory in party congress at Nasik, other members of cabinet, although possibly not approving all that he does, no longer endeavor to restrain him in matters foreign policy. Cabinet foreign policy committee has apparently sunk into oblivion and he has free hand.

HENDERSON

320/10–550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, October 5, 1950—5 : 25 p. m.
[Received October 5—5 : 45 p. m.]

Delga 78. Von Balluseck, Netherlands permanent UN representative, called at his request on Gross. On instructions and stating he had personal doubts on subject, Balluseck read draft resolution which Netherlands is considering introducing in GA plenary statement on October 6 immediately after adoption 8 power Korean resolution.

In substance proposed draft called on North Korean Government to cooperate with UN in settlement provided by 8 power Korean resolution, and to indicate its willingness to comply on or before October 31.

It directs UN command to suspend all air, sea and land operations north of 38 parallel until October 31.

It provides that if North Korea indicates defiance or no intention to comply, Unified Command can resume all military action.

Balluseck stated that this resolution stems from his government's fear that military action north of 38 parallel may well involve Chinese Commies according to information from Hague. Hence such action

has important political implications and North Korea should have a chance to back down. He added that due to predominantly US troops and US commander, UC emphasizes US interests in FE, and there is feeling it perhaps should reflect caution of other UN members such as his government.

After Gross strongly indicated danger and difficulty of Netherlands proposal and that same result could be accomplished by having commander UN forces widely publicize 8 power resolution, Balluseck stated this reaction confirmed his own views and he would advise his government not to introduce any such resolution. Gross took the line:

(*a*) US has watched carefully and studied reports including those from Hague on possible Chinese Commie involvement. Commies have not committed themselves by actual forces thus far and lack of vigor and decisiveness by GA now might be an invitation for them to do so.

(*b*) It would be a very serious interference with military decisions which could cost many American lives to attempt to make military decisions for the UN Commander, particularly to tie his hands. No one could be more sensible than we whose troops are committed to elements of risk and evaluating them.

(*c*) Proposed resolution would be in reality a re-examination of whole Korean problem with new debate in first committee at a time when delay and indetermination are most damaging. That was why we opposed Indian subcommittee proposal.

(*d*) Gross added he would recommend to Department that fullest use be made of Korean resolution disseminating it to North Korea and felt this would effectively carry out true purpose of Netherlands suggestion. Balluseck was inclined to agree.

ACHESON

320/10–550 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 5, 1950—9 p. m.

NIACT

401. Dept understands that Neth Rep been instructed introduce in Plenary Session GA tomorrow amendment to Resolution on Kor of which they a sponsor passed by Comite 1 on Oct 4 to effect that operation of Resolution be suspended for 2 weeks period in order further explore possibilities negotiated settlement and inferentially require suspension mil operations across 38th parallel during that period.

Accordingly Rusk called in Amb Van Roijen and spoke to him along fol lines. Fol successful landings at Inchon, North Kor forces have been withdrawing as rapidly as possible with obvious intent reforming and regrouping behind 38th parallel. They have shown no

indication whatever of intent comply with Gen MacArthur's call upon them cease hostilities and are continuing hold UN prisoners and civilian internees. Supplies in very considerable quantities are continuing flow into North Kor from northern borders and there is every indication that they intend vigorously continue hostilities.

UN forces are now carrying out necessary re-grouping and reorganization in area around Seoul and while not expected will be in position renew attack northward for few days, obviously vital they do so as quickly as possible, there being direct correlation between length of period during which North Kors are able to re-group and re-equip and the subsequent casualties UN forces.

Re Chi Commie, it is our view that it is not quest of whether they are going to participate in Kor affair but only of degree of participation. Since beginning of Kor affair, Chi Commie have in defiance of UN given polit logistic and mil assistance to North Kor forces. Major portion North Kor spearhead was composed of Chi Commie troops of Kor racial origin and Manchuria is very important line of communication and source of supply for North Kors. Kor race of such troops no justification for such illegal assistance. Our estimate present indirect and implied threats of Chi Commie intervention directed at dissuading certain UN members from support UN action in Kor rather than genuine fear UN operations threat to Chi. We have used every possible method, public as well as indirect, to assure Chi Commie that UN operations no threat and that US has no desire for bases or special position in Kor, and if considered useful, Dutch Rep in Peiping cld so inform Chi. Obviously, with failure with Commie mil adventure in Kor, USSR and Chi Commie now hope to gain by delays, confusion and polit means what they were unable to gain by mil aggression.

In view of above facts, Amb was requested urgently inform Neth Govt our objections to course which it apparently has in mind. Amb indicated he wld immediately telephone Fon Off and cable foregoing classified info.

You shld immediately call upon For Min and in light foregoing info urge in strongest terms that Neth Govt not take proposed action.[1]

WEBB

[1] On October 6, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) recorded the following memorandum of conversation of a meeting with Ambassador van Roijen:

"Failing to reach Mr. Rusk by telephone, the Netherlands Ambassador called me just before 11 o'clock this morning to say that whereas he had had no news from The Hague when Mr. Rusk queried him this morning, he had just gotten through on the telephone to his Foreign Office. He asked me to pass the word on to Mr. Rusk that the amendment (intended to be offered at the General Assembly) would not be put forward by the Dutch." (320/10–650)

123 Henderson, Loy W.: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, October 6, 1950—noon.
[Received October 6—8:40 a. m.]

841. Deptel 506, October 4, 8 p. m.

1. Have appointment with Bajpai, Secretary General MEA, noon today and will discuss with him possibility of his arranging for me to have talk with Chinese Communist Ambassador.

2. Chinese Communist Ambassador has thus far followed stiff line in dealing with fellow-diplomats. He has not called on representatives of countries which do not maintain Ambassador or Minister in Peiping and has indicated in various conversations that he does not intend to have relations with such representatives. He, therefore, has no relations with UK High Commission.

3. I doubt that GOI will be prepared to endeavor arrange for me to see Chinese Communist Ambassador because (*a*) it might consider it embarrassing to be turned down, and (*b*) it rather enjoys its present monopoly on communications. I shall, therefore, ask Bajpai if it might be possible to arrange for such meeting, without making direct request. If he replied in negative, I would like approach Swedish Minister who appears to have better relations with Chinese Communist Ambassador than representative any other free country. I might ask Swedish Minister first if he would object to asking Ambassador if he would be willing to talk with me and if not, if he would be willing to receive message from me. Swedish Minister is man of discretion and fully trustworthy.

4. If Swedish Minister should be reluctant to make such approach to Ambassador, I might then ask Bajpai if he would be willing to undertake deliver message.

5. I may be compelled to change priorities or otherwise to improvise in my attempts discreetly to get contents message to Ambassador and hope Department will give me some leeway in this matter. I shall not approach Swedish Minister without Department's authorization.

Would appreciate early instruction.[1]

HENDERSON

[1] See footnote 1 to telegram 842 from New Delhi received at 10:03 a. m. on October 6, p. 890.

795.00/10–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, October 6, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received October 6—9 : 30 a. m.]

844. 1. In last paragraph Embtel 843, October 6 [1] I stated that Bajpai started to tell me about proposed new move on part Nehru for purpose preventing hostilities Korea but was interrupted by his summons to Prime Minister.

2. Bajpai told me when he began discussing this topic that what he said was for my personal information and it was not to be conveyed to Washington. Nevertheless I must violate this injunction in this instance in view of what seems to me to be importance of scheme which Bajpai began to outline.

3. He said GOI disturbed and annoyed at resolution introduced by Rau into Political Committee of GA providing for subcommittee to sift out resolutions re Korea thus far submitted to political committee. Rau had had no instructions to present any kind of resolution and by his initiative he had made it appear for the moment that GOI was aligned with Soviet bloc in UN when GOI was anxious to be attached to no bloc.

4. Nehru believed that Far Eastern situation was so serious that he should not remain idle. He was therefore considering advisability of making suggestion (Bajpai did not say whether through GA or through diplomatic channels and I had no opportunity to ask him) that agreement be entered into with China by UN or great powers whereby (*a*) North Koreans lay down arms and cease hostilities; (*b*) all of Korea be occupied by UN forces other than those which had participated in fighting; (*c*) that with these forces in occupation and under supervision of carefully selected UN Commission plebiscite be held to determine future government of whole country.

5. Bajpai said he was sure US would not object withdrawing its troops in accordance with an agreement of this kind and permitting them to be replaced by troops of other countries including India.

6. I replied that US certainly would be happy to have no troops in Korea if it could be convinced that without such troops Korea would be secure from further aggression and Koreans could freely decide their future. I started to point out, however, that it would be illogical to accord precisely the same treatment to ROK as that accorded to North Korea when we were interrupted.

[1] *Infra.*

7. I am hoping that I shall be given a chance to discuss this matter further and to ask Bajpai to allow US to comment on the proposed scheme before it is circulated in order that its submission may not further becloud international atmosphere.

HENDERSON

795.00/10–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

NEW DELHI, October 6, 1950—noon.
[Received October 6—9 : 47 a. m.]

843. 1. I deeply appreciate suggestion contained in Deptel 504, October 4 which reached me only this morning. In order that observations contained in this telegram might go in perhaps more persuasive form to Prime Minister and his foreign policy advisers I incorporated substance of them in document entitled "Informal Memorandum Setting Forth Some of the Considerations Which Are Affecting US Policies With Regard to Korea" attached this memo to secret personal letter addressed to Bajpai, Secretary General MEA, which I gave him at noon today. In this letter I told him that I had just received number of suggestions from Department for my guidance in discussing Korean problem further with him and the Prime Minister and that I had incorporated them in attached informal memo for his convenience.

2. Bajpai read through this memo and remarked that it was helpful in supplementing and enlarging upon some of our previous conversations. The important question however still was not answered and that was "What is to be done next?"

3. I replied that it seemed obvious to me from contents this memo that most effective course of action would be for every free nation opposed to aggression to give Commie China to understand that if it should intervene in Korea it would thereby lose any sympathy which it might have from any nations of the free world. It seemed to me that points in memo served to stress the fact that hesitation or equivocation at this time in the face of threats of Commie China might tend to encourage rather than to discourage intervention of Peiping in Korea. Bajpai said that Prime Minister was at this moment considering further move re which he would talk with me later. He started to give me in confidence an outline of proposed move when he was informed by telephone that the Prime Minister wished to see him at once. He apologized and said he would get in touch with me later.[1]

HENDERSON

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[1] See telegram 844, *supra*.

795A.5/10–650 : Telegram

The Chargé in Norway (Snow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

OSLO, October 6, 1950—10 a. m.
[Received October 6—9 : 53 a. m.]

353. Depcirtel 9, October 5, 11 a.m. Norwegian Foreign Office without information from representative in Peiping re Chinese plans defense North Korea.

SNOW

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123 Henderson, Loy W. : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, October 6, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received October 6—10 : 03 a. m.]

842. 1. In my talk with Bajpai SYG MEA at noon I told him that we wished to explore every reasonable avenue which might have any possibility whatsoever of serving to prevent extension of hostilities in Korea. Department had asked whether Bajpai might consider it possible or helpful for me to have personal talk with Chinese Communist Ambassador for primary purpose of supplementing GOI so endeavor to persuade Peiping that US had no hostile designs against Communist China. I said I realized that Communist Chinese Ambassador was boycotting diplomatic representatives here of countries not in full diplomatic relations with Peiping. Nevertheless Communist Chinese Ambassador might be willing to talk with me or at least accept message from me if Peiping had sincere desire to prevent still further widening of breach which already exists and to get first hand information regarding US purposes in Korea.

2. Bajpai was clearly taken by surprise and said he would like to think matter over but his first impression was that such contact might be quite helpful. He would let me know as soon as possible what his more mature ideas were.

3. I said that we, of course, did not want him or any official of GOI to undertake anything in this direction which might be against his better judgment but in present dangerous situation we for our part did not believe in standing on formalities.

4. In view of Bajpai's friendly attitude in this matter I do not intend to approach Swedish Minister until GOI has had opportunity either to make contact or to transmit message. If GOI refuses I believe it would be wiser to consult with Bajpai before approaching Swedish

Minister in order that so far as GOI is concerned we shall be doing everything above board.[1]

HENDERSON

[1] The Department's telegram 518, October 6, 8 p. m., to New Delhi read as follows: "Reurtel 841 and 842, Oct. 6. You are authorized to handle this matter in whatever manner you consider will be most expeditious and effective." (795.00/10-650)

Editorial Note

The United Nations General Assembly took up the Korean question at its 292nd meeting on October 6 from 10:45 a. m. to 1:10 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document A/PV.292. The Soviet Representative (Malik) proposed that the two Koreas be invited to participate in the discussions, but the proposal was rejected by a vote of 41 to 6, with 6 abstentions. This was the only voting action taken at the meeting which was devoted principally to discussion of the eight-power draft resolution (A/C.1/574) forwarded to the General Assembly with the First Committee's Report (A/1422) and the five-power resolution (A/C.1/567) which had been defeated in the First Committee but reintroduced into the General Assembly (A/1426). The United Kingdom Representative (Younger) recommended Thailand as the seventh country for the proposed Commission on Korea. Ambassador Austin spoke in favor of the eight-power resolution.

795B.5/10-750

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 6, 1950.

Subject: Transportation and Logistic Support for Field Ambulance Unit Offered by Indian Government for Service in Korea

In reply to a letter outlining the political importance of the presence in Korea of a field ambulance unit offered by the Government of India, the Secretary of Defense has indicated in a letter to me dated September 27 that the Department of Defense will be prepared to furnish certain supplies and services to this unit without reimbursement. However, the policies governing the utilization in Korea of foreign offers of military assistance, which were established with your approval, require other nations participating in the military action in Korea either to reimburse the United States for logistic services or supplies furnished, or at least to agree at a later date to undertake settlement of the accounts through diplomatic negotiation. Since the Indian Government is prepared neither to make reimbursement nor

later to undertake negotiations regarding settlement and wishes the United States to accept the field ambulance unit on its terms, the Secretary of Defense believes that necessary transportation, supplies, and other services should not be furnished to the Indian unit without your concurrence. The Secretary of Defense also suggests that if this assistance is provided, assurances should be obtained from the Government of India that these financial arrangements will be kept on a highly confidential basis in order that the principle of reimbursement or negotiated settlement may be preserved in the case of other members of the United Nations participating in Korea.

The presence of an Indian unit in Korea working with United Nations forces would be of great propaganda value in India and all other Asian countries, and the political benefits which the United States would derive from expenditures in this connection cannot be measured in terms of dollars. In view of the fact that certain Indian government leaders made the offer against considerable opposition in India, and the fact that the offer was made with the clear understanding that the Indian Government would not be in a position to furnish transportation and logistic support, it is quite possible that unless our Government provides the required assistance, the Indian Government may be compelled to withdraw their offer.

In view of the tremendous importance of our relations with South Asian nations today, and in view of the fact that our treatment of this Indian offer might well affect our relations with the Government of India, I strongly recommend that you approve this request.[1]

Copies of the letters under reference are attached.[2]

JAMES E. WEBB

[1] The source text bears the manuscript notation: "Approved Harry S. Truman October 7, 1950".
[2] Not printed.

795A.5/10–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Denmark (Anderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

COPENHAGEN, October 6, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received October 6—1 : 36 p. m.]

357. Depcirtel 9, October 5. We have no information which would throw light on intentions Chinese Communists or Soviet Union re Korea.

Foreign Office not yet in code telegraph communication with Denmark Minister Peking and latter's despatches show restraint owing to lack of safe courier service.

ANDERSON

795.00/10–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, October 6, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received October 6—1 : 45 p. m.]

850. Delhi English-language papers October 5 and 6 carried articles by PTI correspondent Peiping reporting "neutral authority" as stating major conflict in Korea now "looks almost inevitable". Articles report "high Chinese sources" as saying "there is no doubt the moment General MacArthur's forces cross 38th parallel they will clash with Chinese forces".

These reports are first articles noticed by Embassy coming directly from PTI correspondent Peiping and appear to be calculated contribute to war of nerves over Chinese intervention Korea.

HENDERSON

Editorial Note

The United Nations General Assembly held its second meeting of the day from 3 to 6:30 p. m. on October 6; for the record, see U.N. document A/PV.293. No voting took place, as the discussion on the draft resolutions continued.

795A.5/10–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Sweden (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

SECRET STOCKHOLM, October 6, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received October 6—4 : 44 p. m.]

449. In response to informal inquiry from Embassy Swedish Foreign Office states it has had no report from Swedish Embassy Peking concerning any intentions or attitudes along lines of last paragraph Depcirgram 9 October 5, 11 a. m. and has in fact received practically no reports from Embassy Peking in recent weeks, relations other than formal being practically non-existent. Entirely on its initiative, Foreign Office vouchsafed that Indian representative Peking is only diplomat who seems to have any relationship than formal. The Department can make its own estimate of reliability of information from that source.

BUTTERWORTH

795.00/10–650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1950.

Subject: Discussion of Telegrams

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
Mr. Hubert Graves, Counselor, British Embassy
Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large
Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary

The British Ambassador came in to discuss four telegrams which he had been asked to discuss urgently with the Secretary. In the latter's absence, he took them up with Ambassador Jessup and me.

The first telegram (a copy of which was not left with us) contained three questions on which Mr. Bevin wanted an answer:

1. The first question was whether U.S. policy was still to localize the Korean fighting. We replied that it continues to be U.S. policy to localize the Korean fighting and mentioned to the Ambassador our efforts to settle the Yalu bombing incidents, the public statements we have been making to reassure Communist China and the Soviet Union as to our intentions in Korea, and indirect messages we have attempted to get to Peiping privately along the same lines.

2. The second question was whether General MacArthur had clear instructions not to attack targets in Manchuria and Siberia and that such attacks would not be delivered without full consultation. We told the Ambassador that such was the case.

3. The third question related to the gap between General Assembly action and any major move on the part of non-Korean UN forces beyond the 38th parallel. Mr. Bevin attached considerable importance to there being a gap in order not to bring into question the good faith of many delegations voting in favor of the resolution in the Assembly. We replied that we did not have precise information but that we understood that there would be some gap if the Assembly moved promptly to pass the resolution. The Ambassador said that General Bradley had confirmed to Lord Tedder that there would be such a gap, but "not a large one". It was agreed that the U.S. and U.K. Delegations at Flushing should use every effort to insure prompt passage of the Resolution on Saturday. (This was phoned to USUN at once and the Resolution was passed Saturday.)[1]

The second telegram from Mr. Bevin is shown as Tab A and is self-explanatory as a covering telegram from Bevin to Franks.

The third telegram is shown as Tab B and was a covering telegram from Bevin to Nehru, and is self-explanatory.

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[1] See U.N. General Assembly Resolution 376(V), October 7, p. 904.

The fourth telegram is shown as Tab C and is a message from Bevin to Nehru which Nehru might pass on textually to the Chinese in Peiping, if Nehru desired to. Ambassador Jessup and I confirmed that the line of this telegram accurately reflected our own attitude, although we suggested that the wording in the penultimate paragraph "to construct no new permanent military bases or airfields" might be modified to read "retain no bases or installations" in order not to bar any construction which the military command might have to do in connection with current operations.

Sir Oliver then said that if Ambassador Jessup and I thought that we were fully representing the Secretary's views he would not ask that we get in touch with the Secretary and he was confident that Mr. Bevin would accept our judgment on this. We stated that we were confident that we reflected Mr. Acheson's views and that we saw no reason to attempt to get in touch with the Secretary in New Haven.

DEAN RUSK

[Annex 1]

TAB A

Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks—6th October 1950

I have been considering sending a message to Pandit Nehru with a view to influencing Peking and I would like you to consult Mr. Acheson urgently on the general merits of these tactics and also to ask his views on the preliminary draft texts which are given in my two immediately following telegrams. Please make it clear that I would not send the message unless Mr. Acheson approved the idea and moreover that I am anxious to know whether he concurs in their terms or whether he has any suggestions for amendment.

2. My two immediately following telegrams contain

(*a*) Draft of a possible message from me to Nehru, and
(*b*) Draft of a further message to Nehru from me in a form suitable for transmission at his discretion to the Central Peoples Government.

3. My purpose is to convey a message to the Chinese which may cause them to hesitate before taking precipitate action. If they have not already committed themselves to open support of the North Koreans, it may influence the Chinese if they can be assured that they will get a hearing from the United Nations Commission. If the message could also include some reassurance to the Chinese about the intentions of the unified command it would carry additional weight.

4. The action which I am suggesting may at the same time help to steady the Indians and perhaps to persuade them to join the Commission if that issue is still open when the messages arrive in New Delhi.

5. If the Resolution is strengthened to allow for consultation with the Chinese, i.e. amended to allow for a Chinese hearing or even for Chinese association with the work of the Commission, or if supporting speeches make it clear that it is the wish of members of the Assembly that Peking should be given a hearing by the Commission then paragraph 3 of the second draft message to Nehru could be strengthened accordingly.

[Annex 2]

TAB B

Following is draft of first message from Bevin to Pandit Nehru:

I have been giving much thought to the recent reports which you have been good enough to send me from your Ambassador in Peking about China's misgivings about developments in Korea and the movement of United Nations Forces northwards. I know that both you and we are in complete agreement regarding ultimate objectives and I particularly regret that you have not felt it possible up to now to associate India with the Resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom and other powers now before the General Assembly. I fully share the concern you have shown regarding any extension of the conflict. Armed intervention by China would indeed [*lead*] to a great catastrophe, more particularly if this were to come about as a result of her misapprehension of United Nations intentions.

2. In view of the disastrous consequences which would follow from any precipitate action by China I feel that every endeavor must be made to remove any misunderstanding. I wonder, therefore, if you would consent to instruct your Ambassador in Peking to tell the Central Peoples Government what our intentions really are. These are set out in my immediately following telegram. I have no objection if you so desire to the text of the telegram being shown to the Chinese but naturally I leave this entirely to you.

3. As I am sure you will have realised I still hope that you may be able to see your way to associating India with our 8 Power Resolution and I hope in any event that you will be able to agree that India will be represented on the Commission constituted under the Resolution and thus exercise her great influence in a settlement which is of such vital importance to Asia. If you could see your way to joining the Commission, any message to the Chinese of which your Ambassador in Peking was a bearer would have greatly added force. This indeed might prove to be a decisive factor in persuading the Chinese of the integrity of our intentions.

[Annex 3]

TAB C

Following is draft of second message from Bevin to Pandit Nehru:

We have been considering most carefully the statements of the Central Peoples Government re recent developments in the Korean situation. These show their concern about the future movements of United Nations forces in Korea and their fear that these forces may become a potential threat to China's security. We have also noted their wish to be a party to the final settlement of the Korean problem. In the light of this I feel it would be useful for me to take this opportunity to tell you how I—and I venture to believe many member States of the United Nations—view the present situation.

2. Our primary objective with which I know you are in agreement is to achieve as soon as possible a unified independent and democratic Government of the whole of Korea. We can make no real progress towards this until the fighting comes to end. This could be brought about at once if the North Koreans laid down their arms. If they will not do so then the United Nations Command has no alternative but to prosecute the campaign in order to prevent any recurrence of the threat to the peace of Korea. You will recall that the Security Council Resolution of June 27 imposed upon the Commander of the United Nations Forces the task of re-establishing international peace and security in the area. Whilst there can be no doubt that these necessary military objectives must be achieved there is no intention on the part of the Unified Command to take any action which could be construed as a threat to China's security. In fact it is the intention to withdraw all operational forces as soon as possible, to construct no new permanent military bases or airfields and to keep United Nations forces in Korea no longer than is necessary for the purposes of holding elections and setting up a new democratic Government for the whole of Korea. I also believe it to be the intention of the Unified Command that no troops other than Korean will be disposed near the China frontier.

3. I fully appreciate China's desire to be associated with all steps that are taken to secure a peaceful and final settlement of this problem. Her close historical association with Korea and her common frontier make this to my mind essential. I am sure that the United Nations Commission which is to be constituted under the 8 Power Resolution will accord the most careful consideration to the views of the Central Peoples Government.

[Annex 4]

[Here followed a telegram from the U.K. High Commissioner in New Delhi dated October 7, 1950, conveying Mr. Nehru's appeal to

Chou En-lai to "hold his hand for the present." The Chinese Government stated that it had no intention of taking any action if American forces did not cross the 38th parallel but was determined to do so if American troops moved into North Korea.]

357.AD/10–650

Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross of the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [NEW YORK,] October 6, 1950.

Subject: Engen–Kassaniev Conversations

The luncheon to which Engen was invited by Kassaniev today was not held because of confusion of place. However, Kassaniev came to Flushing this afternoon and talked with Engen along the following lines, reported to me by Engen late this afternoon at Flushing.

Kassaniev had reported to Vishinsky the first conversation with Engen. Vishinsky had expressed "very great interest". He also, according to Kassaniev, expressed regret that he had not heard previously (at an earlier stage) about the idea that other than American troops might be used for occupation duties in North Korea.

Vishinsky had apparently also expressed the viewpoint that by adoption by the First Committee and the GA of the Resolution on the Korean Question, this question was finished *as far as the UN was concerned.* Engen said that Kassaniev had stressed the underlined words. Engen went on to say to me that it was his clear interpretation (his feel) that the Russians want negotiations outside the UN. That is to say, he said, they are in a "bad way" about Korea and want to reach the best settlement they can.

Resuming Engen's report of this afternoon's conversation with Kassaniev, the latter said that he had a question he wanted to ask of Engen. Kassaniev then went on to ask whether Engen had considered whether the setting up of the Commission, under the Eight-Power Resolution, would block the setting up of arrangements for the kind of troops Engen had mentioned in his first conversation (Asiatic troops) to occupy North Korea.

The following point is not altogether clear to me. It is my understanding, however, that in discussion of the item mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, Kassaniev talked about occupation troops in North Korea being preferably troops from Asiatic countries.

Engen said he had replied to Kassaniev's question by saying that in his view the setting up of the Commission should not block anything but that the setting up of the Commission started a new phase.

Engen said that the foregoing was the gist of the conversation this afternoon. He said it went "back and forth" on these points. He said the conversation centered around the question of American troops in North Korea. Engen said he felt that the Russians were obviously convinced that the purpose of the whole undertaking in Korea was to give the U.S. a foothold in North Korea.

Engen said that although Kassaniev did not so state directly, the conclusion which Engen drew from the conversation was that in the Russian view the American troops and American Military Administration in North Korea would obviously produce an American puppet government which would involve the question of a threat to Vladivostok, etc.

Engen said that he had confirmed that Kassaniev was at one time Soviet Consul General in New York, thereafter for a time a member of the Russian Delegation here, and thereafter, in the Secretariat. He said that he thought it was quite obvious that Kassaniev must have some position of standing since he seemed to have quite free access to Vishinsky.

I asked Engen what he thought Vishinsky's position was. Engen said he thought that Vishinsky was simply a man sent abroad by his Government to present their case in the UN. I asked Engen if he meant by this that Vishinsky was simply an "advocate"—perhaps a very good one? Engen said he thought that was just the word to describe Vishinsky. He said that he felt that Vishinsky had little to do with the formation of policy. Engen added, parenthetically, that he thought that any fundamental change in Soviet policy would be reflected in the appointment of a Politburo member as a Soviet Foreign Minister.

In the course of my conversation with Engen, he asked me whether I thought the approaches of Kassaniev had any significance. I told Engen I felt that I was really not competent to judge this point. I said that I thought his conversations with Kassaniev were "interesting". I said that on the one hand Kassaniev might merely be a well meaning person and that the conversations might be of no importance whatever. I said, on the other hand, it was conceivable that his conversations with Kassaniev might have some importance. I repeated that I, however, was not competent to have a valid judgment.

In the course of the conversation, I took occasion to say that, expressing my own view, it seemed clear to me that the last thing the U.S. would want to do would be to become engaged in any kind of open conflict with the Chinese Communists or with the Soviet Union. I said that I thought Ambassador Austin's speech in the Plenary Session this afternoon [1] had made quite clear that we had no ulterior objectives in Korea.

[1] Text in U.N. document A/PV.292.

Engen said he had noticed what Austin had said. He said he thought it was very useful for us to keep repeating our objectives. He recalled a British diplomat who had once written that given the peculiarities of the Russian mind, one could never understand what they were after; therefore, the most important thing was to make sure that they understood what you were after.

Engen said he attached very considerable significance to the fact that this approach by Kassaniev had been made to him because before he came to New York (in April 1949) to serve with the Norwegian Delegation, he had been Foreign Editor of the *Verdens Gang*, an Oslo daily. He said that the Russians had very frequently approached him in Oslo when they had particular messages they wanted to communicate to Foreign Minister Lange, but which they did not want to pass through usual diplomatic channels. He said the Russians were aware of the fact that he, Engen, was a close, personal friend of Lange, of some years standing.

I reiterated to Engen my feeling that it was very important that the information he had given me be held very closely. I told him that if that kind of story got spread around it would almost certainly appear in the newspapers and publicity would almost certainly destroy any validity the conversations might conceivably have. Engen said that he fully agreed and was holding this information very close within his own Delegation.

I also suggested, and Engen agreed, that if either he or I should be questioned about our conversations together, we tell the same story, namely, that we had been consulting about the resolution on our united action for peace program.

Engen told me that Kassaniev had asked if he might see him again on Saturday [2] and Engen had agreed to do so. Engen asked if I thought he were wise in continuing to see Kassaniev. He added that he had made quite clear to Kassaniev that their conversations were quite informal, personal, and unofficial. I told Engen that I saw no reason why he should not continue to see Kassaniev casually as he had been doing.

I asked Engen about his plans over the weekend. He said that he was going to meet Foreign Minister Lange Saturday night on Lange's return from Chicago. He planned to be driving Lange out into the country somewhere for a pleasant luncheon on Sunday.

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[2] October 7.

795.00/10–650 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1950—8 p. m.

519. Reurtel 844, Oct 6. Dept concurs with ur comments to Bajpai on Nehru's scheme.

If Bajpai returns to matter you shld take sympathetic line and get full development Ind thought. US agreement wld require gov action, hence you must refer. Of course (*b*) urtel 844 presents the practical problem of who wld contribute and support forces which had not participated in fighting. US wld heartily welcome participation of Indian troops in difficult task of occupation. With respect to (*c*) resolution now before GA provides for all constituent acts necessary to unify the country including holding of elections. Believed such matters as timing and extent of elections best be left to judgment of UN Commission. However, as you stated, view of US that illogical to accord same treatment to lawful Govt of ROK as to North Kor aggressors. While we believe that maximum of Indian cooperation shld be encouraged, difficult to perceive basis for Indian belief that such scheme shld be worked out by impractical method of agreement with Chi rather than within established framework of UN.

WEBB

795A.5/10–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

PARIS, October 6, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received October 6—8 : 31 p. m.]

1824. Depcirtel 9, October 5. Embassy has no information along lines final paragraph reftel and inquiry Baeyens, Director FonOff Bureau FE Affairs, produced nothing. Re Chinese Communists, Baeyens explained Breal, former French ConGen Peiping, has now been replaced and Breal's successor's contacts highly limited with result relatively little information obtainable at Peiping.

BRUCE

795A.5/10–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

BRUSSELS, October 6, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received October 6—9 : 06 p. m.]

531. Re Depcirtel 9, October 5, 11 a. m. As Belgians maintain consular representation in China, and also have advantage of banking

and business representatives as well as many Belgian Catholic missionaries, Foreign Office obtains certain amount information from China. There, in absence Van Zeeland [1] who is in Paris on ECA matters, I asked De Gruben [2] whether he had any indications of possible Chinese reaction in face UN military action in North Korea (c.f. Embtel 490 September 28 [3]). He replied in negative adding he thought Chou En Lai's statements should be closely analyzed before jumping conclusions because Chinese evidently had to say number of things of an equivocal nature to please Russians but without definite commitment. Nothing he had seen would lead to conclusion that Chinese had any intention of direct military intervention in Korea and he believed present Chinese obligation so great and Chinese supply and economic situation so adverse that they would not risk such intervention. Chou En Lai might use various expressions to effect that "he would view with grave concern" and/or "would have to consider eventual Chinese course of action", etc. Belgium took all this with heavy grain of salt. Belgian Foreign Office has no information thus far of disturbing nature re Chinese intentions vis-à-vis Korea.

Subsequent check with desk officers in Foreign Office has revealed no telegraphic or other report from Belgian diplomatic missions indicating impending Chinese or Soviet hostilities.

MURPHY

[1] Paul van Zeeland, Belgian Foreign Minister.
[2] Baron Hervé de Gruben, Secretary General of the Belgian Foreign Ministry.
[3] Not printed. In this telegram, Ambassador Murphy reported de Gruben's view that U.N. forces should proceed past the 38th parallel and unify all Korea. De Gruben said that he had received a report from the Belgian Consul in Peking stating that the Chinese Communist Government had been taken by surprise by North Korea's attack on the Republic of Korea. De Gruben went on to say that he did not feel that Communist China wished to become involved in Korea, but that after the settlement of the Korean question the matter of Communist China's admission to the United Nations would have to be solved. (795B.00/9–2850)

123 Henderson, Loy W.: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, October 7, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received October 7—8:35 a. m.]

860. Embtel 842, October 6.

1. Bajpai told me noon today he had discussed with Nehru my inquiry re possibility of informal talk with Commie Chinese Ambassador and re willingness GOI to try to arrange meeting. Nehru and he had agreed that conversation this kind might be helpful and they had instructed Menon, Foreign Secretary, who is handling Chinese matter to feel out Chinese Ambassador on subject. In view of urgency matter he hoped to let me have reply shortly.

2. I expressed my appreciation and said it might be useful in case Ambassador should decline to talk with me to ascertain whether he would be willing to receive message from me through GOI channels. Bajpai said in his opinion GOI would be willing to do this but he thought that in first conversation with Ambassador it would be preferable not to suggest alternative to personal conversation between Ambassador and myself; otherwise Ambassador might choose alternative and not give proper consideration suggestion for face-to-face talk.

LOY W. HENDERSON

795A.5/10–750 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BERN, October 7, 1950— 5 p. m.
[Received October 7—9 a. m.]

518. Depcirtel 9, October 5. Swiss have no information which would indicate that Chinese, or Russians, plan direct participation in hostilities North Korea or elsewhere at this time. Zehnder, Under Secretary, states that on contrary, intelligence reaching Political Department indicated that Kremlin continues to desire localization of Korean conflict and does not favor direct Chinese participation. Mao Tze-tung is reported to have informed Indian Ambassador Peking in this sense some time ago. He feels this is still the case in spite of Chou En-lai's statement. Kremlin, he thinks would like to have Korean struggle prolonged while it prepares indirect aggressive action elsewhere. Our reaction to Korean move caught Kremlin off balance and it will require some time to recover offensive. This, he figures, is the logic of situation based on his intelligence but he admits that emotional factors such as "face" might upset calculations.

Personally, I believe we should cross the 38th parallel when set to do so irrespective of whether Chou En-lai is bluffing or not.

VINCENT

795.00/10–750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, October 7, 1950—noon.
[Received October 7—9 : 33 a. m.]

859. 1. Bajpai, Secretary General MEA, told me noon today that Nehru had so many misgivings re plan referred to in Section 4, Embtel 844, October 6 that he had decided before going any further to talk it over with Rajagopalachari and others. As result his conversations

Nehru had decided that proposal of plan of kind which he was considering might be misunderstood particularly in US and he had therefore decided to drop it and to make no further suggestions at this time. Bajpai asked me to forget his discussion on subject with me.

2. I asked Bajpai if GOI had reconsidered its decision not to participate in new Korean commission. I pointed out how greatly it would strengthen effectiveness this commission and cause of world peace for India to be member.

3. Bajpai said decision was firm. GOI was convinced it could play more constructive role by remaining outside commission. Its entry into commission would sharply decrease any influence which India might have at present in prevailing on Chinese to act with restraint.

HENDERSON

795A.5/10–750 : Telegram

The Chargé in Norway (Snow) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED
PRIORITY

OSLO, October 7, 1950—noon.
[Received October 7—10:35 a. m.]

357. Norwegian Foreign Office has now received from its representative at Peiping report similar to that contained Depcirtel 9, October 5, 11 a. m., except for two variations: (1) No reference made to abstention from action if ROK troops crossed Parallel; and (2) Chinese Communist Government would not recognize any settlement of Korean problem in which Peiping Government did not participate.

Norwegian Foreign Office has no indications Soviet intentions re Korea.

SNOW

Editorial Note

The United Nations General Assembly met at 10:45 a. m. on October 7 to conclude its consideration of the Korean question; for the record, see U.N. document A/PV.294. The Assembly, on conclusion of the general debate, considered first the eight-power draft resolution. After voting separately on each paragraph and amendment, the resolution as a whole was approved by a vote of 47 to 5, with 7 abstentions. For the text, see *infra*. The Assembly then took up the five-power resolution (A/1426). Separate roll-call votes were held on each paragraph which, in each case, reflected a majority opposed to adopting the particular paragraph; as a result, the draft resolution as a whole was not put to a vote. The Assembly then rejected by a vote of 52 to 5, with 3 abstentions, the Soviet draft resolution condemning

United States bombing in Korea (A/1427) and rejected by a vote of 55 to 5 the Soviet draft resolution calling for the disbandment of UNCOK (A/1428).

Resolution 376 (V), Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, October 7, 1950

The General Assembly

Having regard to its resolutions of 14 November 1947 (112(II)), of 12 December 1948 (195(III)), and of 21 October 1949 (293(IV));

Having received and considered the Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea;

Mindful of the fact that the objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to have not been fully accomplished and in particular that the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt has been made by an armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the Government of the Republic of Korea;

Recalling the General Assembly declaration of 12 December 1948 that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this government is based on elections which were a valid expression of free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such government in Korea;

Having in mind that United Nations armed forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council of 27 June 1950, subsequent to its resolution of 25 June 1950, that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area;

Recalling that the essential objective of the resolutions of the General Assembly referred to was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea;

1. *Recommends* that

(*a*) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea,

(*b*) All constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government in the sovereign State of Korea,

(*c*) All sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be invited to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of a unified Government,

(*d*) United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified at (*a*) and (*b*) above,

(*e*) All necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea;

2. *Resolves* that

(*a*) A Commission consisting of Australia, Chile, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey, to be known as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea be established to (i) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the present United Nations Commission in Korea, (ii) represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of all Korea, (iii) exercise such responsibilities in connexion with relief and rehabilitation in Korea as may be determined by the General Assembly after receiving the recommendations of the Economic and Social Council. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should proceed to Korea and begin to carry out its functions as soon as possible;

(*b*) Pending the arrival in Korea of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the Governments represented on the Commission should form an interim committee composed of representatives meeting at the Seat of the United Nations to consult with and advise the United Nations Unified Command in the light of the above recommendations; the interim committee should begin to function immediately upon the approval of this resolution by the General Assembly;

(*c*) The Commission shall render a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to any prior special session which might be called to consider the subject matter of the present resolution, and shall render such interim reports as it may deem appropriate to the Secretary-General for transmission to Members;

The General Assembly furthermore,

Mindful of the fact that at the end of the present hostilities the task of rehabilitating the Korean economy will be of great magnitude;

3. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with the specialized agencies, to develop plans for relief and rehabilitation on the termination of hostilities and to report to the General Assembly within three weeks of the adoption of this resolution by the General Assembly;

4. *Also recommends* the Economic and Social Council to expedite the study of long-term measures to promote the economic development

and social progress of Korea and meanwhile to draw the attention of the authorities which decide requests for technical assistance to the urgent and special necessity of affording such assistance to Korea;

5. *Expresses* its appreciation of the services rendered by the members of the United Nations Commission on Korea in the performance of their important and difficult task;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea with adequate staff and facilities, including technical advisers as required; and authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the expenses and per diem of a representative and alternate from each of the States members of the Commission.

795A.5/10–750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Sweden (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

STOCKHOLM, October 7, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received October 7—11 : 52 a. m.]

451. Deptelcir 9, October 5 and Embtel 449, October 6 not repeated New Delhi. Swedish Foreign Office just informed Embassy that Swedish Ambassador Peking has now reported in telegram October 6 that Indian Ambassador Peking informed him as follows:

On October 3 Chou En-lai called in Indian Ambassador and asked him to report that Chou's declaration October 1 [1]

"should be interpreted as implying that any transgression of 38th parallel by US forces will not be passively tolerated by Chinese Government and as a demand that Korean conflict not be resolved without Chinese participation".

Phraseology in Swedish Ambassador's report is being transmitted to Dept with special care because difference in emphasis as compared with report through Indian Foreign Office Delhi may be considered important by Department.

Repeated New Delhi unnumbered.

BUTTERWORTH

[1] See footnote 1 to telegram 708 from Hong Kong received at 1 : 22 p. m. on October 3, p. 852.

795.00/10–750

Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross of the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET

[NEW YORK,] October 7, 1950.

On the basis of my telephone conversation with you at noon today I saw Engen and, making clear to him that these were all personal

questions, suggested that if opportunity presented when he saw Kassaniev today he might raise the following points:

1. What is the purpose of the conversations? Is there anything that Kassaniev wanted Engen to do?
2. If there were in some degree an affirmative response Engen might indicate that it would be very difficult or embarrassing for him to do anything if there were not a genuine interest but the conversations merely a maneuver.
3. I suggested Engen might make clear that Kassaniev must realize there was no possibility of suspension of operations only to give extended time to the North Korean forces to build up their strength.
4. If the Russians were really interested in getting us out of Korea the best way would be for the North Koreans to lay down their arms. Otherwise the logic of the situation indicated that we would be likely to get further and further involved.
5. Since obviously the Russians do not believe public statements made by us and the British and the General Assembly Resolution concerning the purpose of occupation forces, what sort of assurances would they need?

Engen had lunch with Kassaniev after the Assembly meeting and gave me a full report as follows late this afternoon at the Vanderbilt. This report, as given below, is close to a verbatim record.

Engen said that Kassaniev initiated the conversation by asking Engen's opinion as to whether the point in the Soviet resolution regarding cessation of hostilities could be accepted subject to guarantees from the Soviet Government that the North Koreans would not start hostilities again.

Engen asked whether Kassaniev meant an immediate cessation of hostilities, the two sides resting on present positions. Engen used the phrase "under conditions existing today". Kassaniev replied in the affirmative. Engen said he stated his assumption that this meant before "United Nations" forces crossed the 38th Parallel. Engen said Kassaniev smiled at the reference to UN forces; it was apparent to Engen that Kassaniev had in mind United States forces. There was no mention of South Korean forces.

Engen then asked whether a United Nations "body" (commission) would get access to North Korea immediately. Kassaniev said that was his understanding.

Kassaniev then asked Engen's opinion. Engen said that the basis (starting point), he thought, would have to be the North Koreans laying down their arms. Engen said this was his opinion and he thought it would be the opinion of the "other side". Kassaniev made no comment but apparently shook his head.

Engen then asked Kassaniev what the latter thought about the assurances given in the Austin and Younger speeches in the plenary

yesterday.[1] Kassaniev replied by referring to Vishinsky's speech,[2] saying that as Vishinsky had said in his statement the Russians did not believe in these assurances. He mentioned Vishinsky's examples from history to the effect that occupations always last longer than it is said they would.

Engen then asked Kassaniev, since the latter did not seem to believe in the assurances given in the Austin and Younger speeches, what kind of assurances the Russians might want.

Kassaniev asked Engen whether he asked this question for his personal information.

Engen replied that he asked the question for his personal information since, of course, he was naturally interested in the lack of belief Kassaniev had expressed in the public assurances given by Austin and Younger.

Kassaniev then asked whether Engen had contacted any other delegations. Engen replied in the negative.

Kassaniev then said if he should ask Vishinsky (put Engen's question to Vishinsky) it would make a lot of difference to know if the question comes from Engen personally or whether Engen would convey what Vishinsky might answer.

Engen then repeated that he had asked the question for his personal information but said to Kassaniev that if the latter wanted Engen to convey any answer Engen would, of course, be willing to consider it. Engen added that his attitude would depend on whether Kassaniev had an interest in Engen conveying an answer. Engen said that it would also depend on what kind of an answer it was, that is to say, whether Engen personally thought the answer had any value. Engen said that up to now he had considered their conversations on a strictly personal basis. Kassaniev then said that he would tell Vishinsky, that he could give Engen no answer, that he did not know what the Russians would consider acceptable assurances, or whether they would want to have an answer conveyed to "others".

(It seemed clear from Engen's report that Kassaniev referred to himself and to the Russians more or less interchangeably in the first person, singular and plural).

Kassaniev then asked Engen whether the latter, if necessary, would be available to see Vishinsky if Vishinsky desired it.

Engen replied to the effect that seeing Vishinsky would certainly put the whole matter on a different level. He said he did not think he would be entitled to do such a thing without being allowed to by the head of his Delegation.

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[1] See U.N. document A/PV.292.
[2] See U.N. document A/PV.293.

(Commenting on this to me Engen said he did not like very much the idea of seeing Vishinsky. He said he thought it would be a little odd since there was no parity of level.)

Kassaniev then said that he would tell Vishinsky and he suggested to Engen that they meet again next week.

Engen said the foregoing was the substance of their conversation on this subject, the rest of his conversation with Kassaniev at lunch being of a general character.

After getting the foregoing report from Engen I explored with him his own estimate of the conversations he had had with Kassaniev as follows.

With regard to Kassaniev's own position in the matter Engen felt that Kassaniev probably had position enough to have freedom of conversation with a foreigner. I asked Engen whether he thought Kassaniev was holding these conversations on a permissive or on an instructed basis. Engen thought the basis was permissive rather than instructed. He thought that the purpose of the conversations was essentially exploratory on a permissive basis to see if anything might turn up.

Engen summarized his estimate of the conversations in two points as follows: (1) There is no way of telling, that is, there is no basis for valid judgment, whether the Russians have any desire to get into contact with the "other side", to try to achieve something (an arrangement). (2) If there has been any value in the conversations it has been that it was possible to become clear regarding a certain line of thought on the part of the Russians, that is, they are maybe trying to avoid by an "arrangement" access to North Korea of United States forces.

Engen amplified the second point as follows. He said he thought the main reasoning of the Russians was that they realize their attempt to unify Korea by force and the North Koreans taking over has failed. They are now, therefore, trying to cut their losses by having an arrangement which would allow the North Korean authorities to continue to exist in North Korea and play an active part in preparation for elections.

Engen said there were two primary things the Russians wanted to avoid: (1) occupation by American forces, and (2) elimination (liquidation) of the North Korean authorities.

In general Engen said he did not really think the conversations indicated a common basis for general negotiations.

I said to Engen that it seemed to me that two principal, related but separate, points emerged from his conversations, namely, the desire by the Russians to cut their losses, having suffered defeat, and possible fear on their part of a threat to their territory (Vladivostok).

Engen said that he thought the threat to Russian territory was the starting point in their reasoning. This, said Engen, was a military consideration. From the political viewpoint he thought the predominant consideration in the Russian mind must be that this was the first time since the war that Western troops would have penetrated into an area within the Soviet sphere of influence and overthrown a puppet government.

Engen said he thought the Russians were probably very concerned regarding the psychological effect of this development in other areas within their sphere of influence, in particular in Eastern Europe, not to mention Germany. As a third point Engen said he felt that the development, they fear, in Korea greatly touched their prestige in Asia and weakened the strength of Communist dominated authorities elsewhere in Asia, for example in Indochina.

From the foregoing Engen reasoned that the Russians might be willing to go very far towards an arrangement which to the fullest possible extent would continue the North Korean authorities.

On the other hand Engen expressed the view that it was conceivable that the Russians might be prepared to take a very great risk to resist elimination of the North Korean state. The worst risk they might take, he said, would be direct intervention; the next worst risk would be actively supporting the North Koreans with arms, et cetera.

Turning to another subject I asked Engen whether the question of Asiatic occupation forces in North Korea had come up in his conversation today. Engen said that this question had not come up and he had not thought it appropriate to raise it. He said that he could envisage a difficult problem in this regard from a military point of view, that is to say, where would these troops come from, how would they be organized, staffed, et cetera.

I recognized the existence of the problem he mentioned. Putting this problem aside for the moment, however, and supposing hypothetically that the problem could be overcome so that occupation forces in Korea would be predominantly Asiatic, if not exclusively so, I wondered what Engen thought would be the Soviet reaction. Engen replied that the answer would depend on what Asiatic troops would be involved. If, for example, Asiatic troops involved were Indian he said he thought very definitely that because of the prestige of India in Asia the Russians would look upon the occupation of North Korea by Indian forces as a lesser evil than occupation by United States forces. He said he thought it would be very much more difficult for the Russians to accuse the Indians of coming to North Korea for the purposes they now have fixed in their minds and accuse the Americans of seeking. He said he thought the Russians would not under these circumstances be afraid of elections in North Korea as an excuse for setting up an American puppet

regime. Engen said he thought the main purpose of considering such an arrangement (Asiatic occupation forces) from our (Western) point of view would be to remove from the Russians the opportunity of capitalizing on the propaganda theme of American imperialism in Asia.

I asked Engen if he thought there was anything that should be done over the weekend. He said he thought not, that he had left matters rather loosely with Kassaniev that they would get together again next week.

I said I assumed the conversations having reached the present stage that Engen would wish to report fully to his Foreign Minister who returns from Chicago tonight and would wish to proceed, if at all, in accordance with his Foreign Minister's views. Engen said this was the case, again saying that he planned to drive Lange out into the country for dinner tomorrow when he hoped to have an opportunity to talk the whole matter over fully with Lange. I told Engen that he knew the high regard in which we held Foreign Minister Lange and that if Mr. Lange had any views on the matter which he wished to communicate to us I would be very glad to receive and transmit them. We left it that we would get in touch with each other Monday morning.[3]

[3] October 9. See the memorandum by Mr. Ross dated October 10, p. 922.

Department of Defense Files

The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the President[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 7 October 1950.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is forwarded herewith, for your approval, a draft directive to General MacArthur regarding possible Chinese military intervention in Korea.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have advised the Secretary of Defense that neither NSC 81/1, on United States courses of action in Korea, nor the implementing directive based thereon, which you approved on 27 September 1950, specifically provide for the action General MacArthur should take if the Chinese Communists intervene, without prior announcement, in Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that such intervention is possible in the light of conditions obtaining presently in Korea, and that, therefore, General MacArthur should receive appropriate instructions for such a contingency.

[1] The source text bears the manuscript notation: "Approved 10/8/50 Harry S. Truman".

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that they be authorized to forward the attached directive to General MacArthur, subject to your approval, in accordance with NSC 73/4, "The Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation." [2]

The Secretaries of State and Defense concur in this attached directive, and recommend your approval.[3]

With great respect,

Faithfully yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

[2] Text and related documentation are scheduled for publication in volume I.
[3] The attachment also bears the notation given in footnote 1 above. The directive was transmitted to General MacArthur in JCS telegram 93709, October 9, p. 915.

793.001/10–750 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET HONG KONG, October 7, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received October 8—4 a. m.]

750. NCNA quotes October 5 Peking *Kwangming* daily as saying Korean war has "entered new stage". Daily elucidates "this will be drawn-out war of attrition". Implication this statement like those of Chu Teh and Chou En-lai, previously commented on by Consulate General, is that North Koreans will not receive open large-scale military support from Chinese Communists but will go on guerrilla resistance.

Consulate General and other American agencies Hong Kong have been unable obtain any reliable new information from Communist sources since dispatch of Congentel 684, September 29 [1] which would shed light on Communist intentions re Korea. Majority British and Chinese opinion Hong Kong is that Chinese Communists will not intervene militarily there. Of representative group informed Chinese contacted by Consulate General officers during past several weeks, large majority expressed opinion neither Chinese people nor government desire become embroiled in foreign war, particularly war fought on behalf USSR and Chinese Communists would successfully resist presumed Soviet pressure on them to intervene militarily in Korea. Although British officials naturally concerned over possibility such intervention, prevailing view expressed in official circles is that it

[1] Not printed. It offered the balanced estimate, based, however, on statements made by Chinese Communist leaders before the Inchon landings that Communist China would probably not openly send troops to aid North Korea. (793.001/9–2950)

will not take place. However PolAd states Hong Kong Government has no actual information on Chinese Communist intentions.

Re Department's intel October 4, 5 p. m.,[2] it seems most unlikely USSR could afford to risk political dangers involved in pushing its most important satellite into devastating war unless fully prepared to back it with Red Army, particularly in view of Sino-Soviet treaty. China, including important sections of CCP, would be certain to regard such action as betrayal.[3]

ReDepcirtel October 5, 11 a. m. Opinion of Consulate General and other American agencies is that if Panikkar actually was told by Chou that Chinese would send troops over frontier if US forces crossed 38th parallel, Chinese Communists must intend carry out threat. However, since there are many indications to contrary, it seems more likely that threat was conveyed to Panikkar indirectly so that it would not have to be backed up if bluff called. If Chinese Communists are prepared to intervene militarily in Korea, would it not be much more effective deterrent to UN advance for them to issue public warning that they would act if US forces crossed 38th parallel? We cannot perceive any advantage to their permitting issues to remain in doubt until US forces have crossed and then intervening. Furthermore, such action would be entirely contrary to previous Chinese Communist practice of careful psychological preparation of people in advance of military action accompanied by advance announcement of goal such as crossing Yangtze or preparing to take Taiwan and Tibet.[4] Communist propaganda on Korea has been decreasing rather than increasing in volume and public statements of Communist leaders have not appeared to be of type designed prepare Chinese people for involvement in major war. On contrary their repeated references to long-term war of resistance by Korea indicate the opposite.

Repeated Taipei 80.

WILKINSON

[2] Not printed. It transmitted the substance of the British estimates on Soviet and Chinese intentions in Korea, printed under date of September 28, pp. 812 and 813.

[3] Telegram 749, October 7, from Hong Kong, not printed, reported an absence of the usual adulation of the U.S.S.R. during the celebration of National Day in the People's Republic of China on October 1, reflecting an apparent response to a general feeling of resentment against previous public adulation of the Soviet Union. This, however, was not construed to represent a change in the relationship between Peking and Moscow. (746G.00(W)/10–750)

[4] For documentation on Tibet, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.

Editorial Note

On October 9, General MacArthur broadcast the following message, directed to the North Korean Commander in Chief and his forces:

"In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of prop-

erty, I, as the United Nations Commander-in-Chief, for the last time call upon you and the forces under your command in whatever part of Korea situated, to lay down your arms and cease hostilities. And I call upon all north Koreans to cooperate fully with the United Nations in establishing a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea, assured that they will be treated justly and that the United Nations will act to relieve and rehabilitate all parts of a unified Korea. Unless immediate response is made by you in the name of the north Korean government, I shall at once proceed to take such military actions as may be necessary to enforce the decrees of the United Nations." (Department of State *Bulletin*, November 13, 1950, page 763)

No official response was received from North Korea, but Premier Kim Il Sung, Commander in Chief of the People's Army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in a radio broadcast in Pyongyang on the morning of October 10, rejected it. (Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, page 609) See also the annex to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Jessup, October 12, page 931.

Also on October 10, the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China issued a statement which was quoted as follows in a Department of State memorandum setting forth a diplomatic roundup of Chinese Communist intentions:

"The American war of invasion in Korea has been a serious menace to the security of China from its very start . . . The Chinese people cannot stand idly by with regard to such a serious situation created by the invasion of Korea by the United States and its accomplice countries and to the dangerous trend toward extending the war . . .

"The Chinese people firmly advocate a peaceful solution to the Korean problem and are firmly opposed to the extension of the Korean war by America and its accomplice countries. And they are even more firm in holding that aggressors must be answerable for all consequences resulting from their frantic acts in extending aggression." (795.00/10–1250.)

795A.5/10–950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Burma (Key) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

RANGOON, October 9, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received October 9—10:03 a. m.]

231. Depcirtel 9, October 5. I learned from Permanent Secretary Foreign Office today October 9 that Indian Government had sought Burmese support for its compromise resolution re Korea and that Burmese had replied that at this late stage Burmese could not make *volte-face* such as would be involved in supporting Indian resolution.

Burma UN delegation had accordingly supported eight power resolution. However Burma UN delegation being instructed continue investigate any proposal which offers sound peaceful solution Korea problem within framework declared Burmese position.

During course this conversation Permanent Secretary revealed Burmese Ambassador Peking had recently been informed by his Indian colleague that Chinese Commies would intervene in Korea if any UN troops other than ROK crossed 38th parallel. GOB believes although without positive proof that Chinese Commies have large troop concentration near Korean frontier.

Repeated info New Delhi 9.

KEY

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 9, 1950—5:05 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 93709. From JCS for MacArthur. In light of the possible intervention of Chinese Communist forces in North Korea the foll amplification of our directive, incorporated in JCS 92801,[1] is forwarded for your guidance:

"Hereafter in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory".

[1] See footnote 2 to the letter from Secretary of Defense Marshall to the President, dated September 27, p. 793.

795.00/10–950

Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1950.

Subject: Proposed Meeting with General MacArthur

In thinking over since lunchtime the plan for a meeting between the President and General MacArthur, I incline more and more to the

[1] This memorandum was routed through the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk).

view that such a meeting would be interpreted to foreshadow some major new American move in the Far East.

If it is true, as I believe it is, that both the Chinese Communists and the Russians really believe that we are intent upon maintaining a foothold in Korea, they will interpret this meeting as bearing upon our plans to that effect. I think it is reasonable to assume that the Chinese Communists fear that we are mobilizing forces in North Korea to invade Manchuria or to engage the Chinese armies there while Chiang Kai-shek makes a landing on the mainland to the south. If the proposed conference closely followed or closely preceded another amphibious landing, the fears and suspicions would be heightened. The Indians and probably a number of others would no doubt share these fears.

I do not suggest that the foregoing possibility should cause an abandonment of the project, but I think the President ought to be aware of the possible interpretations and repercussions of such a meeting. I suggest that the possible bad effects of such a dramatic meeting might be avoided through some very carefully prepared statement issued by the President in advance as well as by what he said in his California speech on his return.[2] An advance statement might emphasize again our desire to restore peace and security in the area, to localize the conflict, and to terminate the mission of our troops in Korea as soon as possible. It would be important to telegraph such a statement to various of our Missions in advance.[3]

PHILIP C. JESSUP

[2] For the text of President Truman's address in San Francisco on October 17 following his meeting with General MacArthur on Wake Island, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, p. 673.

[3] President Truman's statement on his forthcoming meeting with General MacArthur was issued on October 10; text *ibid.*, p. 643.

795.00/10–950

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Perkins) to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1950.

Dean Rusk asked last Saturday[1] that we get in touch with the Pentagon in an effort to insure that there would be no bombing during this period of the Yalu River Dam or its power plants. As you know, this power development was a joint Manchukuo-Japanese (Korea) project.

Mr. Rusk also said that we might wish to reserve an attack on the Dam as a bargaining point in case it came to that pass with the Chinese Communists.

[1] October 7.

I called Kenneth Young in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on Saturday and he said that he would pass along informally the recommendation that no bombing be carried out at this point. He said that if we wished to be more formal an approach could be made through G–Mr. Matthews to General Burns.

I reported this to NA–Mr. Johnson, who said that he thought the ban on strategic bombing would cover the matter, but agreed that no harm would be done by pointing it out to the military.

711.5861/10–1050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

Moscow, October 10, 1950—2 a. m.
[Received October 9—7 : 18 p. m.]

844. At 10 : 45 p. m. Moscow time, Gromyko asked to see me at 11 : 45 and when told I was not available (in bed with flu) agreed to see Barbour 11 : 30.

Gromyko stated had note deliver US Government and upon request translation read text to following effect:

On October 8 at 1700 local time two US Shooting Stars F–80's attacked airfield at Dry River on seacoast 100 kilometers from Soviet-Korean border; Soviet Government protests incident and holds US responsible damages etc.

Barbour stated could not accept note which should properly be addressed UN or UN Commanding General MacArthur. No response inquiry whether such had been done. Gromyko said emphatically that US had no reason refuse note as incident involved US planes and Soviet territory. Barbour replied he had no information incident that note claimed US planes involved and in reply inquiry how known planes came from Korea, opined F–80's could not come from anywhere else.

Am somewhat mystified why Gromyko should attempt second effort have me accept note endeavoring implicate direct US–USSR relations Korea unless for record, and he was not particularly surprised reaction. However he did not give impression of attaching major importance matter and suspect his effort probably devised be capitalized Lake Success.[1]

Department pass Tokyo, USUN; repeated information Tokyo niact 34, USUN niact 88.

KIRK

[1] The Soviet Government released the text of its note to the press on October 10.

320/10–950: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, October 9, 1950.
[Received October 10—3 a. m.]

241. For Rusk. Colonel Katzin proceeding UN headquarters October 8 for consultation re implementation UNGA resolution. I have suggested that he visit you soonest.

We have discussed implementation several times here. I am sending you my preliminary thinking on several points raised. This thinking predicated on desirability of bringing the UN into the Korea picture to the fullest possible extent:

(1) Foremost all delegates to 7 Nations Commission must be of the highest caliber.

(2) High Commissioner for relief and economic rehabilitation serving as executive under commission should be outstanding hard-hitting businessman who has had experience in dealing with Orientals. Advantage of an American versus non-American in this position hard to evaluate.

Right man probably more important than nationality. However, I am inclined toward non-American to give further impetus to the UN character of endeavor. In this regard Katzin is inclined towards American and also feels ECA should be continued (he possibly has an eye to influence thereof on Congress and US appropriations).

United States and UN command are now functioning in area of activity affected by UN resolution:

(*a*) During period of hostilities UN command will continue to undertake certain activities under disease and unrest formula and to further military operations, which will have long range economic benefit; such as, essential repairs of railroads, motor roads, port installations, and airfields.

(*b*) Some activities are joint army–ECA undertakings; for instance, admirable joint effort made in restoring power and water to Seoul within one week.

(*c*) Relief and sanitation has been assigned by UN command to Public Health and Welfare. There should be gradual transition to full-fledged UN endeavor.

(*d*) In view inevitable difficulties and delays in recruitment personnel and establishment functioning UN economic organizations in Korea, I feel that ECA should continue its program for this fiscal year and have its activities in Korea phased gradually into international setup. Continuation ECA operations during transition period could be a part of United States contribution to joint effort. This procedure would make available to international agencies individual

talents and accumulated experience and capabilities of ECA mission and insure that there is no interruption of essential economic programs at this critical juncture.

(*e*) KMAG is now attached administratively to 8th Army. Post hostilities military advisory group should also be on international basis.

(3) I should also like to make the following remarks regarding general aims:

(*a*) Rehabilitation should not be merely "pouring in" materials and goods to replace war damages. Any program must keep in mind Korean capacity to absorb without indigestion, particularly the capacity of ROK to furnish non-inflationary local currency financing for projects. Income from sale of consumer goods and raw materials furnished by international agency would be principal source of such funds.

(*b*) Greater emphasis than in the past should be directed toward government administration on taxation, fiscal policy, and other intangible factors affecting economic stability and requiring as much attention and material aid.

(*c*) Special effort should be made in the field of education. We should bear in mind that the unpiloted unification of Korea including the liberation of North Korea from Communist domination places upon us a moral commitment of the first magnitude to remold the thinking of the Korean people along democratic lines. Communist indoctrination of North Koreans under the guise of public education has been extensive. Any less effort on our part would fail to restore the Korean people to sanity and would lay US/UN open to Soviet allegation that capitalist Democracies ignore educational aspirations of the masses. Embassy notes with pleasure Department's plans for greatly expanded USIE program in Korea, but believes that even this very large operation will not meet Korea's needs in school buildings and new text books. Since Department has again stated that Fulbright funds can be used only in accordance original terms of the act,[1] I recommend that UN be advised of the magnitude of the educational problem in Korea and requested to take positive measures of assistance.

(*d*) The general scope of aid should be kept within realistic levels. The use of ECOSOC and UN specialized agencies might bring into this field such idealists, dreamers, and perfectionists that the operation would not result in practicable programs.

(*e*) Greatest progress may be expected by transferring functions and responsibilities to Korea soonest, making them aware of their responsibilities and at the same time keeping tactful UN supervision over them.

MUCCIO

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[1] P.L. 79–584, August 1, 1946; 60 Stat. 754. Presumably, the reference should be to the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act, known as the Smith-Mundt Act, P.L. 80–402, January 27, 1948; 62 Stat. 6.

601.95B11/10–1050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, October 10, 1950.
[Received October 10—6 a. m.]

Unnumbered. Pass to Ambassador Chang. Following message for [*from*] the President:[1]

Only received text UNGA Korea resolution seventh since you failed cable it in time for GOK convey views to you for presentation political committee. You should make clear ROK accepts resolution as whole. But desires clarification that portion concerning national elections. ROK established following UNTCOK observed elections 1948, since which time National Assembly as Constituent Assembly established constitution, government created, approved by 1948 UNGA resolution, and recognized by over 30 states. GOK willing do everything possible cooperate with UN settlement Korean problem, especially unification, but should new UNCOK proceed to hold new elections for totally new National Assembly which would set up new constitution and create new government how can we legally participate in overthrowing our constitution, National Assembly and government now in existence? I assume, that references to ROK in preamble indicate not only reaffirmation acceptance sovereign status this government, but intention work through and with ROK in solution problem unification and complete independence Korea, but I urge you secure widest possible understanding this interpretation among interested governments, not only United States but also those represented on new UNCOK; in such discussions emphasize GOK will cooperate with UN fullest, but desires clarification to avoid any possible future misunderstanding. Syngman Rhee.

MUCCIO

[1] A note on the source text indicated that the Korean Embassy was informed on October 11. The text of this message from President Rhee had originally been sent out in telegram 234, October 8, from Seoul, which, however, because of delay in transmission was not received until 8:15 p. m. on October 11.

711.5861/10–1050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

MOSCOW, October 10, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received October 10—7:11 a. m.]

846. Text of note on strafing Soviet airdrome published press today (Embtel 845, October 10[1]) corresponds to text actually delivered

[1] Not printed.

Embassy 3 a. m. October 10 and returned to Foreign Office by messenger without covering note at 11 a. m. (Embtel 844, October 10 [2]). Noteworthy that despite recent Soviet emphasis on protection its borders e.g. awards to fliers who shot down American plane over Baltic and striking of medal for defense Soviet frontiers, Soviet failure to deal summarily with this alleged incursion apparent in published announcement.

Embassy of course without facts. However, if incident did occur this spot Embassy wishes point out it took place within perhaps most important and sensitive Soviet military area in Far East and one of similar concern China lying only 10 miles to west. Embassy does not need stress that in spite of apparent mild tone Soviet note operation American planes this vicinity, accidentally or not, inevitably viewed with great seriousness by Soviet Government.

Department pass Tokyo, USUN; repeated information Tokyo 35, USUN 89.

KIRK

[2] Received at 7:18 p. m. on October 9, p. 917.

123 Henderson, Loy W.: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, October 10, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received October 10—11:43 a. m.]

881. 1. Bajpai told me this afternoon that Menon Foreign Secretary had taken up informally with CC Ambassador matter of my seeing him in order to give him message and that Chinese Ambassador had indicated that since US had not endeavored establish relations with his government and in view US attitude re Formosa and Chiang Kai-Shek he considered it unwise to have even informal conversation with me or any other US official (Embtel 860, October 7). Bajpai said that in view of attitude of Ambassador he thought it would be mistake for me endeavor send him message either through GOI or other channels.

2. I am inclined believe we should follow Bajpai's advice in this matter. Regret my lack success.[1]

LOY W. HENDERSON

[1] The following message was sent to New Delhi in telegram 550, October 12, 3 p. m.; "Dept concurs no further attempt (urtel 881 Oct 10)." (123 Henderson, Loy W.)

795.00/10-1050

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 10, 1950.

CONVERSATION WITH MR. LOVETT

Subject: Siberian Bombing

The Pentagon has sent a very stiff message to General Stratemeyer directing a report within 48 hours, which would be tomorrow night, and, in the event that the bombing did take place, directing that the commanding officer responsible should be removed. Mr. Lovett thinks well of further orders making clear our original intention that all our planes on operational missions should keep a long way away from the border.

357.AD/10-1050

Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross of the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [NEW YORK,] 10 October, 1950.

Subject: Engen–Kassaniev Conversations

Confirming my telephone call this afternoon, Engen told me today that he had seen Kassaniev again yesterday afternoon. Kassaniev had said that he had reported the last conversation with Engen fully to Vishinsky. Kassaniev carried back to Engen from Vishinsky the message that Vishinsky presented his compliments and thanked Engen for communicating his interesting views.

Engen interpreted this as a polite cutting off of the conversations for the time being and he thinks the reason probably for cutting them off was the crossing of the 38th Parallel last weekend.

At the same time, there is no unfriendliness at all in Kassaniev's manner; on the contrary, it was agreed that they would get together again next week.

Engen said that he had also given a full report of the conversations on Sunday [1] to Foreign Minister Lange, who approved of Engen continuing the conversations as circumstances might arise. Lange's view was that at least they provided an opportunity for getting our views across.

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[1] October 8.

795.00/10–1050

Draft Memorandum by the Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, October 10, 1950.]

Subject: Department Policy Towards War Crimes in Korea.

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a basis for consideration of the attitude which the Department should adopt towards the assignment to persons in the North Korean Communist regime of war crimes responsibility for criminal aggression, and on this basis to determine what instructions should be sent to the United States Delegation to the United Nations.

The North Korean regime was established in September of 1948 under Soviet auspices and assumed the responsibilities of government following the alleged withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops from North Korea in December 1948. It inherited whatever authority it has exercised in North Korea directly from the Soviet Union and it has not in any sense been free from effective Soviet control. Not only did the Soviet Union assign numerous military "advisers" to the North Korean armed forces, but the evidence is strong that a large number of similar "advisers" were assigned to Korean counterparts within the administration. Indications are, furthermore, that these Soviet "advisers" have had the effective powers of command over their North Korean protegés, and it should be noted that General Shtikov, formerly military commander of the Soviet occupation forces, is currently the Ambassador of the USSR at Pyongyang. There is no doubt that North Korea was established and has been maintained as a typical Soviet puppet state.

While for political reasons the direct political, military and economic relationship of the USSR to the North Korean regime has been minimized by the Department in public, this relationship has nevertheless been a close one; it is inconceivable that the North Korean Communists could have initiated the attack upon South Korea which took place on June 25, 1950 without the approval of Kremlin. While it is not clear to what extent the Soviet Union may have exerted its influence in pushing the North Koreans into their military adventure, it is clear that the invasion could not have been carried out without Soviet acquiescence and active support in the military field. It is now notorious how extensive this support has been.

[1] This memorandum was routed through the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson).

One of the most difficult basic problems to face the United Nations in unifying Korea is that of overcoming the hatreds and suspicions engendered by the present conflict. Unless these hatreds and suspicions can be kept at a minimum and prevented from pervading the future relations between the North and South Korean populations, the political integration of Korea will be rendered immeasurably more difficult.

A further matter for consideration is the fact that from the date of its occupation by Soviet forces in 1945, the people of North Korea have been effectively shut off from contact with the non-Communist world and, most significantly, from the southern part of Korea where a free, democratic government has been established. Undoubtedly, the aggressive and virulent propaganda of the Communists in North Korea against the ROK has had its effect upon the North Koreans themselves who, not being aware of the true motives and democratic ideas underlying the establishment of the ROK, have fallen victims to Soviet propaganda concerning the alleged aggressive intentions and vices of the ROK and of the Western Powers which have backed it. This does not condone the cynical and cold-blooded action of the North Korean regime in launching an unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea. It does perhaps in some measure tend to relieve the North Korean leaders of what otherwise would have been their complete responsibility for what occurred.

It is the opinion of NA in the light of the foregoing considerations that a distinction should be drawn between the so-called *war crime* of aggression on the one hand and war *crimes* involving violations of *the law and customs of war* and *atrocities against the civilian population* on the other. These latter crimes are covered in a directive now being prepared for General MacArthur, which will instruct him to apprehend and hold for trial persons guilty of such crimes. As distinct from these crimes, however, the war crime of instigating and unleashing an unprovoked military aggression against the Republic of Korea involves significant political factors. Consequently, and since the crime was continued in defiance of the United Nations, it should be the United Nations itself which takes cognizance of the question of whether war crimes guilt should be assessed against the leaders of the North Korean regime.

In general, and although a precedent was set when the United States took an active part in support of the principle of trying persons responsible for the crimes of aggressive warfare (i.e., the International Military Tribunals at Nuremburg and for the Far East), considerable difference of opinion has subsequently arisen within the United States Government as to whether this policy was advisable or successful, and as to whether or not it may have had an unfortunate effect on our subsequent policy in Germany and Japan.

It is the view of NA that, in the light of the above circumstances, our Delegation should be instructed that the United States Government considers that the assignment of guilt against the North Korean leaders for war crimes of aggression is not desirable for the following reasons:

(1) The North Korean regime is not and has never been since its inception free from overriding Soviet control or influence. Therefore, primary responsibility for the aggression should be placed at the door of the Kremlin, against which at this stage, of course, no action can be taken. In this sense the North Korean regime may be considered as having acted only as an agent for Soviet policy.

(2) The Soviet Union prevented the North Korean regime and people from learning the true picture of the situation existing in the Republic of Korea. Consequently the North Korean leaders were not exposed to the moderating influences of the truth, but were subjected only to insidious and violent propaganda from Communist sources. An appeal to reason therefore probably would not have affected this course of action, once it had been determined for them.

(3) Any war crimes trials of a type such as that conducted before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg can serve only to intensify the hatred already unfortunately engendered between the populations of north and south Korea by intensive Communist propaganda and by the current hostilities, thus rendering the achievement of an effective and peaceful political unification of the peninsula much more difficult.

(4) As a practical matter, it is extremely doubtful that the North Korean Communist leaders primarily responsible for issuing the orders for the attack of June 25, 1950 will fall into our hands, since presumably they would be the first ones to flee the country and seek sanctuary in other Communist areas.

(5) Some of the effectiveness of punishing North Korean leaders for the crime of aggression, were they to fall into our hands, would be dissipated by the fact of Soviet influence over and connivance in the plan of aggression and its execution.

It is, therefore, suggested that our Delegation to the General Assembly be instructed to discourage the assignment, by the United Nations, of war crimes guilt in respect of aggression, to any North Korean leaders at this time. It is to be hoped that the question of such guilt in relation to the Korean conflict can be avoided or minimized in the United Nations.

795.00/10–1050 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Moscow

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 10, 1950—8 p. m.

242. Dept has not yet recd any report from US mil sources concerning alleged violation Sov Korean border nor has there been any

other news from Far East tending to substantiate or deny Sov allegation. Dept has requested Dept of Defense to have MacArthur in capacity Com Gen Unified Command make prelim report to UN taking cognizance Sov published version re alleged incident and promising investigation and early report.

Emb will be kept informed. FYI Sov Emb has not yet attempted deliver note here.

ACHESON

893A.2614/10–1150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL Moscow, October 11, 1950—noon.
[Received October 11—6:36 a. m.]

853. Embassy officer formerly in Dairen recalls most electric power for Port Arthur–Dairen as well as other parts South Manchuria was supplied by Suiho hydroelectric plant. Generators and most of plant located on Korean side of Yalu River but plant was built as joint enterprise by Japanese utility companies in Korea and Manchuria and designed to supply both areas.

General region Liaotung in Jap times was self-sufficient in electric power on basis thermal plants, majority of which looted by Soviets in 1945. Thus when Soviets cut off power in South Korea in 1948, they diverted supply to South Manchuria. In Dairen if not all Liaotung this power was distributed by Dalenergo, a Sino-Sov trust.

If Suiho is not a casualty from bombing, it doubtlessly will become a source of conflict involving Korean, Chinese and Soviet (Dalenergo) interests. Immediate problems are possibility of equipment removal by Communists to Manchuria, temptation to Chinese to guarantee their interest by physical occupation of plant and danger of incident between Chinese and UN troops. In long run, readjustment to restore to Korea its proper share of power may cause further Chinese antagonism. Astute handling this problem with recognition of valid Chinese claims without sacrifices of principle may well lay foundation for future Chinese-Korean relations, as well as draw attention again to the Soviet war booty operations of 1945 *et seq.*

KIRK

357.AD/10–1150

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 11, 1950.

Subject: Proposed United States Action in the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council in Connection with Korean Relief and Rehabilitation.

Problem:

The United Nations by the resolution adopted in the General Assembly October 7 has in effect assumed responsibility for the relief and reconstruction of Korea. The General Assembly in its resolution requested the Economic and Social Council to develop plans for relief and rehabilitation on the termination of hostilities and to report to the General Assembly by October 28. It is necessary for the United States Delegation to the Economic and Social Council, which will meet October 12, to propose or support organizational arrangements for subsequent decision by the General Assembly.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that you approve the following measures:

1. Establishment by the United Nations of a United Nations Korean War Damage and Reconstruction Agency to be financed by member states in accordance with a scale of contributions under which the United States would pay up to 70% of the total contribution. Although no accurate estimates are available, it is believed that necessary total expenditures may range between $200,000,000 and $300,000,000 a year for approximately three years or perhaps a smaller annual expenditure for a longer period of time.

2. Appointment of an Administrator as the head of the Agency responsible to the General Assembly who would be a person commanding the confidence of the American Congress and the American people, and who would himself be an American or have as a Deputy an American citizen.

3. The establishment of an Advisory Committee to the Administrator on which the United States Government would be represented.

4. Provisions in connection with the Agency which would make it possible for the Economic Cooperation Administration personnel to be transferred or detailed to the Agency to work under the Administrator as part of his international staff and which would make it possible for the Administrator to use the Economic Cooperation Administration facilities in establishing economic programs and for making necessary arrangements for the procurement and shipment of services and supplies especially as relates to the utilization of the United States contribution and procurement of supplies in the United States.

5. The preparation of legislation to provide a United States contribution which would permit the President to apply funds appropriated by the Congress either as a contribution to the United Nations program or, if the President should consider it necessary to the achievement of United States objectives, directly for expenditures by the United States Government; and legislation which would permit funds presently appropriated to the Economic Cooperation Administration to be used in Korea as part of the United States contribution to the United Nations.[1]

DEAN ACHESON

[1] The source text bore the manuscript notation: "Approved 10/11/50 Harry S. Truman".

795.00/10–1150

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 11, 1950.

Subject: Problems Relating to Korea

Participants: The Secretary of State
Col. Ben C. Limb, Korean Foreign Minister
Dr. John M. Chang, Korean Ambassador
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs

The Korean Foreign Minister, Col. Ben C. Limb, and the Korean Ambassador, Dr. John M. Chang, called on the Secretary by appointment at five o'clock today. The purpose of the visit was to permit the Foreign Minister to pay his respects to the Secretary and to exchange views on the Korean situation.

The Foreign Minister opened the conversation by saying that on behalf of President Rhee and the Korean Government and people, he wished to express their heartfelt gratitude for the profound assistance which the United States Government had rendered to Korea through the United Nations in the present conflict. He continued by saying that his Government realized its obligations and responsibilities to the United Nations for the aid thus rendered, and stated that his Government was fully resolved to cooperate with and assist the United Nations to the maximum extent in the attainment of its objectives in Korea and to support the new United Nations Commission in its work. He pointed out that the Government of the Republic of Korea had betrayed certain weaknesses during its first two years of existence, but had also had successes and added that his Government was

sincerely trying to improve itself and would continue to do so with such help and advice as might be rendered by the United Nations.

The Secretary pointed out the importance of such cooperation, that the present United Nations' solidarity in relation to the Korean problem must be preserved at all costs, and that the Korean Government had a most significant part to play in maintaining such solidarity. The Secretary added that there may be times when it will be difficult for the Republic to see eye to eye with the United Nations, but that a big effort should be made not to allow dissension to creep into the efforts to achieve a successful solution to the Korean problem.

Ambassador Chang remarked that he and the Foreign Minister felt very grateful that a new Commission was being sent to Korea by the United Nations, since the old Commission had left something to be desired. Both he and the Foreign Minister expressed enthusiasm for the presence on the new Commission of Pakistan as against former Indian participation, which they felt had tended to make their relations with the old Commission difficult in the past. The Secretary emphasized that the United States Government is endeavoring to impress upon the states represented on the new Commission the importance, in its view, of obtaining men of the highest caliber for the new Commission in Korea.

The Ambassador mentioned the concern of his Government that sufficient foreign military assistance be rendered to Korea at the end of the present conflict to ensure that an effective armed force can be maintained to defend Korea in the future. The Secretary replied that this was a matter which he understood was receiving very active consideration and that General MacArthur was even now in the process of strengthening the armed forces of the Republic.

The Foreign Minister next raised the question of a Pacific Pact and asked what the attitude of the United States Government was to such a Pact. The Secretary replied that we were in sympathy with the principle involved and would give encouragement to it. Thus far, however, we had been somewhat disappointed and discouraged at the lack of progress which the nations interested in such a Pact had made toward its establishment. The Foreign Minister remarked that he was gratified to hear this, that it was a matter to which his Government gave considerable importance and one which must of necessity involve its further attention.

In closing, the Foreign Minister mentioned that he would be in the United States until the middle of November and hoped that he would have an opportunity for another exchange of views with the Secretary.

320/10–1150 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, October 11, 1950—6:57 p. m.
[Received October 11—8:22 p. m.]

Delga 107. UKDel has instructions from London to suggest to members IC on Korea, providing US has no objection, that IC agree to make an early statement or other indication of their intentions that in the course of their work governments and authorities interested in the future settlement of Korea will be consulted. UKDel says this has hearty approval of Australia, Netherlands, and Pakistan. Proposal has been made in hope that some such action would help to reassure Chinese Communist regime that it would have opportunity to express its views and that some such action might help to deter Chinese Communists from using force in Korea.

USUN pointed out paragraph in Ambassador Austin's speech on Korea in plenary [1] in which he emphasized right and duty of commission to consult all interested parties and suggested that perhaps this particular paragraph might be brought to attention of Peiping authorities in lieu of special IC action. However UKDel expressed opinion that while this would be helpful it would be better to have some formal action by commission. Department's views requested if possible prior Friday [2] morning meeting of IC which will be attended by Ambassador Austin.

AUSTIN

[1] On October 6; see U.N. document A/PV.292.
[2] October 13.

795.00/10–1250

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 12, 1950.

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
Ambassador Philip C. Jessup

Sir Oliver came to see me this morning and left with me the attached message from Mr. Bevin.

Sir Oliver said that the only thing which he had omitted from the original message was a sentence at the end of paragraph 2 which left it to his discretion whether or not he should make the representation contained in the last sentence of that paragraph. The sentence in

question requests that there should be prior consultation between the United States and British Governments before any authorization might be given to General MacArthur to take reprisals against the Chinese Communists outside of Korea in the event of active Chinese intervention in Korea.

Sir Oliver said that he felt that it was appropriate to make this representation about prior consultation not only on general grounds but also because technically they had a right to do so since General MacArthur is acting as U.N. Commander and the British have forces participating under his command. Sir Oliver wished to make it plain, however, that he did not want to put the matter on the basis of a "right" but rather on the basis of normal consultation between the two Governments on an important matter of common interest.

Sir Oliver also commented on paragraph 5 (*b*), noting that he had not changed the rather abrupt form of expression, although he said that he personally might have put the point a little differently. He concluded with the request that the U.K. Government's views be communicated to the President. I told him that I would be glad to do so.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

[Annex]

SECRET

MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR OLIVER FRANKS
DATED 11TH OCTOBER, 1950

I have read an account of a broadcast by General Kim Il Sung, Premier of North Korea, in which, according to the translation, he said "The Korean People are not standing alone in our struggle and are receiving the absolute support of the Soviet Union, the Chinese People, etc." I have also seen a statement issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking on October 10th to the effect that the Chinese could not stand idly by in the event of the crossing of the 38th parallel on a large scale.[1]

2. The North Korean statement seems to show that they have no intention of responding to General MacArthur's appeal for surrender. Both statements are no doubt intended mainly for internal consumption, in North Korea and in China respectively, but in view of President Truman's impending meeting with General MacArthur I consider it of the highest importance that there should be no doubt what-

[1] See the editorial note under date of October 9 concerning General MacArthur's second surrender demand to the North Korean forces, p. 913.

soever in the mind of the United States Government about our view of the serious consequences that would flow from Chinese intervention in Korea. It is not possible to assess the prospects of such intervention. Whilst we cannot take Chinese statements at their face value, it is equally impossible to discount them completely. But should they in fact intervene openly I consider it vital that General MacArthur should not take reprisals against them *outside Korean territory* without express sanction from President Truman. I should of course like to be sure that this sanction would not be given without prior consultation between the United States Government and His Majesty's Government.

3. We hope and trust that the United Nations Forces are on the point of consolidating their brilliant military victory. No one can foretell how Korea will develop in the more distance future but if our military successes are consolidated and if there is no outside intervention by China or by Russia then the way will be clear for the United Nations to give Korea an opportunity to develop on democratic lines under a unified Government and with her economy restored and war damage made good. This will indeed be a great diplomatic victory for the United Nations, matching on the political front the striking successes achieved in the military field. But a false step on our part may force China into the war, with consequences which cannot be foreseen but which will certainly be of great gravity. India has done her best to restrain China and I think that the message from Mr. Acheson which Pandit Nehru transmitted to the Chinese about the bombing incident was wise and timely.[2]

4. It is, however, not quite clear whether the existing instructions to General MacArthur not to take action outside Korea would still stand in the event of Chinese intervention. We have complete trust in the President and rely on him to make General MacArthur aware of the great issues that hang on our conduct in Korea.

5. I am anxious that the views of His Majesty's Government on these points should be made clear to the President before he meets General MacArthur. These are:—

(*a*) the gravity of the situation that would arise in the event of Chinese intervention, and

(*b*) the need for categorical instructions to General MacArthur that even in the event of such intervention he is not to take action outside Korea without the express orders of the President.

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[2] See telegram 813, from New Delhi, received at 6:04 p. m. on September 30, p. 830.

795.00/10–1250

Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 12 October 1950.

A. THREAT OF FULL CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA[1]

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate the threat of full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

II. CAPABILITIES

2. The Chinese Communist ground forces, currently lacking requisite air and naval support, are capable of intervening effectively, but not necessarily decisively, in the Korean conflict.

III. FACTORS BEARING ON INTENT

3. *Indications of Intentions.* Despite statements by Chou En-lai, troop movements to Manchuria, and propaganda charges of atrocities and border violations, there are no convincing indications of an actual Chinese Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention in Korea.

4. *Factors Favoring Chinese Communist Intervention.*

a. Intervention, if resulting in defeat of UN forces, would: (1) constitute a major gain in prestige for Communist China, confirming it as the premier Asiatic power; (2) constitute a major gain for World Communism with concomitant increase in Communist China's stature in the Sino-Soviet axis; (3) result in the elimination of the possibility of a common frontier with a Western-type democracy; and (4) permit the retention of sources of Manchurian electric power along the Yalu River.

b. Intervention, even if not resulting in a decisive defeat of UN forces, would: (1) enable the Chinese Communists to utilize foreign war as an explanation for failure to carry out previously announced economic reforms; (2) be consistent with and furnish strong impetus to anti-Western trends in Asia; and (3) justify a claim for maximum Soviet military and/or economic aid to China.

c. Intervention, with or without assurance of final victory, might serve the cause of World Communism, particularly the cause of the Soviet Union, in that it would involve the Western bloc in a costly and possibly inconclusive war in the Far East.

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[1] This document was included in a briefing book of background material prepared under the direction of Mr. Rusk on possible items for discussion at the Wake Island Conference. Copies of the briefing book were sent to the White House and to the other participants at the Conference.

d. The Communist cause generally and the Sino-Soviet bloc particularly face the prospect of a major set-back in the struggle with the non-Communist world if UN forces are permitted to achieve complete victory in Korea.

5. *Factors Opposing Chinese Communist Intervention.*

a. The Chinese Communists undoubtedly fear the consequences of war with the US. Their domestic problems are of such magnitude that the regime's entire domestic program and economy would be jeopardized by the strains and the material damage which would be sustained in war with the US. Anti-Communist forces would be encouraged and the regime's very existence would be endangered.

b. Intervention would minimize the possibility of Chinese membership in the UN and of a seat on the Security Council.

c. Open intervention would be extremely costly unless protected by powerful Soviet air cover and naval support. Such Soviet aid might not be forthcoming because it would constitute Soviet intervention.

d. Acceptance of major Soviet aid would make Peiping more dependent on Soviet help and increase Soviet control in Manchuria to point probably unwelcome to the Chinese Communists.

e. If unsuccessful, Chinese intervention would lay Peiping open to Chinese resentment on the grounds that China would be acting as a Soviet catspaw.

f. From a military standpoint the most favorable time for intervention in Korea has passed.

g. Continued covert aid would offer most of the advantages of overt intervention while avoiding its risks and disadvantages. Covert aid would enable the Chinese Communists to:

(1) Avoid further antagonizing of the UN and reduce risk of war with the US;

(2) Promote the China-led Asiatic peoples' "revolutionary struggle," while ostensibly supporting peace;

(3) Maintain freedom of action for later choice between abandonment of aid or continuing such covert aid as might be appropriate to Chinese Communist needs in Korea;

(4) Satisfy the "aid Korea" demand in Communist circles in China and Asia generally, without risking war with the US.

IV. PROBABILITY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTION

6. While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950. During this period, intervention will probably be confined to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans.

795.00/10–1250

Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 12 October 1950.

B. THREAT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN KOREA [1]

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate the threat of direct Soviet military intervention in Korea during 1950.

II. CAPABILITIES

2. Soviet armed forces now in the Far East are capable of intervening overwhelmingly in Korea virtually without warning.

III. FACTORS BEARING ON INTENT

3. *Indications of Intentions.* The Soviet Union to date has given no indication that it intends to intervene directly in Korea. Since the beginning of hostilities the Soviet Union has sought in its official statements and in its propaganda to give the impression that it is not involved in the Korean situation. Moreover, the USSR has taken no political or military actions that constitute direct armed intervention in Korea. However, the Soviet Government for some months has been increasingly improving its military capabilities in the Far East as well as in other strategic areas.

4. *Factors Favoring Soviet Intervention.* The defeat of North Korea would constitute a major set-back for the USSR. It would involve:

a. The loss of a Satellite, and the establishment of a Western-oriented state on the frontiers of Communist China and the USSR.

b. Giving the Western Powers a potential strategic bridgehead which the Kremlin would always regard as a threat to the industrial, communication, and military centers of Manchuria and the Soviet Far East.

c. Weakening the Soviet military and political position vis-à-vis Japan.

d. A loss to Soviet political prestige in that it would demonstrate that the Kremlin is not willing to support its followers effectively in a Soviet-instigated action.

e. A loss to Soviet military prestige in that it woud lead to a tendency, whether or not justified, to re-evaluate the effectiveness of Soviet military equipment and tactics.

f. A reduction in the prospects of the Soviet Union for expanding its political control by means short of war in that it would demonstrate the determination and capability of the non-Soviet world to resist effectively Soviet-inspired aggression.

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[1] See footnote 1, p. 933.

5. *Factors Opposing Soviet Intervention.*

a. In weighing potential gains and risks of intervention, the Soviet leaders must calculate, as an overwhelming consideration, that their open intervention would lead to direct hostilities with US and other UN forces over an issue on which the Western world has achieved a new degree of unity. Soviet leaders would have no assurance that combat between Soviet and US forces would be limited by the US to Korea or to the Far Eastern theater. Consequently, a decision to intervene openly in Korea, in the ultimate analysis, involves a decision to risk immediate and probably global war with the US.

b. The Soviet leaders may estimate that it will be possible, without assuming this all-critical risk, to salvage some of the losses suffered from the Korean situation. US military activities could be obstructed by extensive guerrilla action, which might involve the US in an extended and costly occupation and which could contribute to Soviet efforts to develop in Asia a racial enmity toward the US and the Western Powers.

IV. PROBABILITIES OF SOVIET ACTION

6. It is believed that the Soviet leaders will not consider that their prospective losses in Korea warrant direct military intervention and a consequent grave risk of war. They will intervene in the Korean hostilities only if they have decided, not on the basis of the Korean situation alone, but on the basis of over-all considerations, that it is to their interest to precipitate a global war at this time.

795.00/10–1250

Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 12 October 1950.

G. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING A POSSIBLE SOVIET DECISION TO PRECIPITATE GLOBAL WAR [1]

1. The Soviet rulers are simultaneously motivated by Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine and by considerations affecting the position of the Soviet Union as a world power. They have made clear that their long-term object is to establish World Communism under the domination of the Kremlin. Their immediate concerns, however, are:

a. To maintain the control of the Kremlin over the peoples of the Soviet Union.

b. To strengthen the economic and military position and defend the territory of the Soviet Union.

[1] See footnote 1, p. 933.

c. To consolidate control over the European and Asian Satellites (including Communist China).

d. To make secure the strategic approaches to the Soviet Union, and to prevent the establishment, in Europe and Asia, of forces capable of threatening the Soviet position.

e. To eliminate Anglo-American influence in Europe and Asia.

f. To establish Soviet domination over Europe and Asia.

g. To weaken and disintegrate the non-Soviet world generally.

The Soviet Union will try to pursue these objectives simultaneously. In case of conflict between one and another of these objectives, however, it may be expected that the Soviet rulers will attach greater importance to the first four listed, and in that order.

2. On the basis that the long-term object of the Soviet rulers is immutable and dynamic, and that the Western Powers are not prepared to succumb to Soviet domination without a fight, there is, and will continue to be, grave danger of war between the Soviet Union and its satellites on the one hand, and the Western Powers and their allies on the other.

3. The Soviet Union will continue relentlessly its aggressive pressures on the power position of the Western nations.

4. The Soviet rulers could achieve, and are in a fair way towards achieving, the first three parts of their object (see *a*, *b*, *c* above) without risk of involvement in direct armed conflict with the Western Powers.

5. Parts *d*, *e*, *f*, and *g* of their object are improbable of achievement without the employment of armed force, though there are still factors in the existing situation which might well lead Soviet rulers to consider that, in certain circumstances, and in the absence of effective armed opposition by the Western Powers, they might ultimately attain these parts of their object without the overt involvement of Soviet armed forces.

6. In pressing to achieve parts *d*, *e*, *f*, and *g* of their object, the Soviet rulers will, at certain stages, inevitably impinge upon the vital interests of the Western Powers and so incur the risk of involvement in a general war precipitated through the necessary reactions of the Western Powers.

7. In the belief that their object cannot be fully attained without involvement in a general war against the Western Powers, the Soviet rulers may decide deliberately to provoke such a war at a moment when, in their opinion, the strength of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the Western Powers is at its maximum. It is estimated that such a

period exists now and will extend from the present through 1954* with its peak at about halfway, i.e., 1952.†

8. From the point of view of military forces and economic potential, the Soviet Union is in a position to conduct a general war of limited duration now if Soviet rulers thought it desirable or expedient.

9. While intelligence is lacking to permit a valid prediction as to whether or when the Soviet Union may actually exercise its initiative and capability to launch a general war, in view of the foregoing it must be recognized that the risk of a general war exists now and hereafter at anytime when the Soviet rulers may elect to take action which threatens, wholly or in part, the vital interests of the Western Powers.

*1954 being the date by which it is assumed that North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Europe will be built up to such a strength that they can withstand the initial shock of surprise attack; and when the gap between the relative strength of the Western Union forces and those of the Soviet Union will have begun to contract. [Footnote in the source text.]

† i.e., when the Soviet Union has made good some essential deficiencies in atomic bomb stock pile, and in certain types of aircraft; and before the North Atlantic Treaty Organization economy is fully geared to the war effort. [Footnote in the source text.]

320/10–1250 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, October 12, 1950—5:30 p. m.
[Received October 12—5:48 p. m.]

Delga 115. Following is text of Korea resolution adopted October 12, 1950:[1]

"*The IC on Korea:*

"1. *Considering* the provisions of the resolution adopted by the GA on 7 October, under which the IC on Korea is requested to consult with, and advise the UN Unified Command in the light of the recommendations contained in that resolution;

"2. *Having regard* to the GA's recommendation that all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections under the auspices of the UN, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea;

"3. *Recalling* that the Government of the ROK has been recognized by the UN as a lawful government having effective control over

[1] This resolution was adopted by the Interim Committee on Korea at its meeting on October 12; it was a slightly amended version of a draft resolution introduced by the Australian Representative on October 10 (320/10–1050).

that part of Korea where the UN Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult, and that there is consequently no government that is recognized by the UN as having legal and effective control over other parts of Korea;

"4. *Advises* the Unified Command to assume provisionally all responsibilities for the government and civil administration of those parts of Korea which had not been recognized by the UN as being under the effective control of the government of the ROK at the outbreak of hostilities, and which may now come under occupation by UN forces, pending consideration by the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea of the administration of these territories; and

"5. *Recommends* that the Unified Command take immediate steps to associate with all authorities established for civilian administration in acordance with the present resolution, officers from the several forces of members of the UN serving under the Unified Command in Korea;

"6. *Invites* the Unified Command to keep the IC informed of the steps taken in response to this resolution pending the arrival of the Commission in Korea."

AUSTIN

795.00/10–1250: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 12, 1950—7 p. m.

191. Wire service Oct 10 carries fol item: "South Korean Natl Police already are patrolling nine towns liberated in Red North Korea by troops of the Republic. Home Minister Cho Pyong Ok said the police in those towns are part of a force of 30,000 being recruited to keep order in all Red territory as it is freed from Communist rule."

Suggest you advise ROK spokesmen stress mil character these police and fact they operate under authority Unified Command. You shld also suggest primary emphasis be placed on fact that their duty will be to maintain peace and security in occupied areas in accordance with Security Council resolutions. Dept deems important UN members not receive impression ROK is attempting extend its jurisdiction over North Korea thru civilian police.

If these police not expressly under authority Unified Command advise Dept.

ACHESON

357.AD/10–1250: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 12, 1950—7 p. m.

39. Dept urgently concerned to ensure all states mbrs UN Comm for Unification and Rehabilitation Korea created by UNGA res Oct 7 be represented by persons outstanding ability.

You shld make clear FonOff Comm's tasks will be vital to future success UN action in Korea, since GA has charged it with function representing UN in bringing about estab unified, independent and democratic govt all Korea. If fruits mil victory are to be reaped, endeavor to estab such govt must succeed. This entails Comm's coping successfully with wide variety difficult problems, to which end it is essential representation be highest caliber.

You may your discretion suggest task essentially civilian not mil in character and broadly speaking calls for experience such fields as fon affairs polit science constitutional law or econs. You shld promptly submit biog info on rep govt may appoint.

Sent to Ankara, Canberra, Manila for info only.

ACHESON

[1] Sent for action to the Embassies in Bangkok, The Hague, Karachi, and Santiago.

320/10–1150: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 12, 1950—7 p. m.

392. Re Delga 107 Oct 11. Dept considers wld be unexceptionable if IC were to make statement of its own along lines of Amb Austin's remarks in GA plenary Oct 6 to effect Comm for Unification and Rehabilitation Korea has auth to get views of everyone interested in future and well-being of Korea, and were to express, on behalf govts represented on the Comm, their intention that upon its arrival in Korea it give hearings to interested parties.

Dept wishes point out that if IC were to express intention itself undertake such consultations very difficult question of presence Chi Commies representatives at seat UN might arise for first time. You shld inform UKDel Dept must object to that possibility arising initially in connection with IC deliberations.

Dept believes that the statement by IC regarding the hearing to be afforded by the Comm to "everyone who is interested" will accomplish objectives UK has in mind.

ACHESON

711.5861/10–1350 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Barbour) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, October 13, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received October 13—11 : 22 a. m.]

874. Regardless whether report alleged strafing Soviet airport on October 8 is substantiated or not, Department will not have overlooked pattern of Soviet protests against US military actions Far East which Soviets may be designedly developing, first incident having occurred September 6 and second complaint having been registered October 9. If such is case, purpose may be to make record for propaganda use in future, should subsequent developments dictate. In any event believe it behooves us exercise utmost vigilance minimize incidents on which they could capitalize and on our part to keep record clear. This taken, feel important inquiry instituted into this latest incident (Deptel 242, October 10) be pressed and upon determination facts, occasion be taken publicly report findings together with appropriate clarification our position.[1]

BARBOUR

[1] On October 19, the U.S. Representative at the United Nations sent to the Secretary-General a note in which the United States apologized for the border violation and offered to pay damages. The note stated that the attack was made in error, contrary to specific instructions not to violate the Siberian or Manchurian frontiers. The commander of the air group was relieved and appropriate disciplinary steps taken against the two pilots involved. (U.N. document S/1856; text in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 20, 1950, p. 832)

795E.00/10–1350 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, October 13, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received October 13—2 : 58 p. m.]

256. Deptel 185, October 12 [*11*].[1] Following reply assumes elections will be limited to North Korea for additional members National Assembly ROK, with continued recognition ROK sovereignty and validity May 30, 1950 elections. Any program disregarding ROK, as appears from preliminary reports to be nature at interim commission on Korea resolution October 12,[2] would have disastrous effect

[1] The text of this message read as follows:

"Wld appreciate your tentative views soonest on timing of elections in Korea: that is, do you consider it desirable that elections be held very shortly after liberation of North Korea or be deferred for considerable period?" (795.00/10–1150)

[2] See telegram Delga 115 from New York, received at 5 : 48 p. m. on October 12, p. 938.

here. Should peninsula-wide elections be considered desirable after careful study by new commission, they should be arranged only after discussion, arrangement with GOK.

Embassy considers it most desirable hold elections North Korea earliest possible time in accordance with security and popular understanding their meaning. Alternative would presumably be UN military government rule without reference to popular will. Believe US experience military occupation Korea, plus experience with ROK, has established that military government is inefficient, and largely ineffective in calling forth Koreans best efforts, and does little to develop understanding and experience of self-government, which ROK was great contrast, despite its deficiencies. While temporary period UN rule North Korea without elections acceptable for military reasons, consider most important that populace have earliest opportunity select candidates own choice for membership National Assembly. In that connection consider extent ROK laws which bar Commies from political activity should be enforced in North Korean elections. Would be undesirable for Commies infiltrate into ROK National Assembly or government after their recent activities.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/10–1350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, October 13, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received October 13—5: 02 p .m]

552. Pass Army.

1. FonOff just received telegram from Netherlands Chargé Peking he had received report "reliable sources" four divisions unidentified troops crossed Manchurian border into North Korea. Presumed be Chinese. Later report received Netherlands representative Tokyo confirmed crossing made. Said would keep Embassy informed further developments situation.

2. Regarding Truman–MacArthur meeting and reflecting Netherlands nervousness over Far East situation, official expressed hope leaders would agree not fight North Koreans clear to Korean-Manchurian border, rather hoped they would agree stop some point such as around 39.5 parallel where in opinion FonOff peninsula could be adequately safeguarded from subsequent attack.

3. FonOff somewhat apprehensive over selection Rhee provisional head ROK, stating he and party of type Chiang regime, and last elections had virtually repudiated group. Questioned further, official unable come forth more likely substitute.

CHAPIN

320/10–1350 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, October 13, 1950—8 : 33 p. m.
[Received October 13—9 : 26 p. m.]

Delga 123. General statement of US ideas on general principles which should govern UN action in Korea was made this morning to interim committee on Korea by Ross in absence of Ambassador Austin who was indisposed. Text by next following telegram.[1] Several members of IC expressed appreciation of contents of statement and said they would want to reserve questions on it until after they had an opportunity to study it more in detail. Santa Cruz of Chile asked two specific questions, but did not request answer today. These were: (1) In view of desire for early as possible withdrawal of UN forces, was the creation of a strong Korean army contemplated and if so, what would be the effect of maintaining such an army on the economy of Korea? Alternatively, was it contemplated that the frontiers of Korea might be guaranteed by the UN? (2) What was the thinking of the Unified Command on how a unified government of Korea should be constituted and specifically should there be elections throughout all Korea to set up a new constituent assembly or would the elections take place only in North Korea after which the present government of Korea would be extended to that area?

Ross stated that he did not wish to make a reply at this time, but that the importance of these questions was recognized and that while probably it would be necessary for the committee to work out the answers as they went along and learned more of the conditions on the spot, nevertheless an attempt would be made to obtain for the IC such information and ideas as might be useful in guiding their deliberations at this time.

After the meeting, Plimsoll of Australia stated privately that he did not believe the interim committee should go too deeply into such questions as Santa Cruz had raised, but that he personally would like any suggestions which the US Government might wish to make on the subject and which would help him in his duties as a member of the permanent commission. It is requested that USUN be provided with current Department thinking on these subjects for possible communication to members of the interim committee.

AUSTIN

[1] Telegram Delga 124 not printed. The statement by Mr. Ross, which is summarized in U.N. document A/1881, p. 13, followed the outline of the draft directive for General MacArthur on the occupation of North Korea (see the draft paper prepared in the Department of the Army, dated October 3, p. 854, and footnote 2 thereto).

795A.5/10–1450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Burma (Key) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

RANGOON, October 14, 1950—11 a. m.
[Received October 14—10:18 a. m.]

246. Re Depcirtel 9, October 5 and Embtel 231, October 1 [*9*]. Prime Minister [1] informed me October 14 that Burmese Ambassador Peking shared Indian Ambassador's apprehensions Chinese intentions Korea because:

1. Suddenness Chou En-lai's warning which was given late at night,
2. Feverish activity Peking and unusual security measures adopted preceding and following warning,
3. Reports indicating half million Chinese Communist troops massed in area adjoining Korean border.

Prime Minister feels Burmese Ambassador's fear of Chinese intervention while understandable even "inevitable" view political atmosphere Peking was exaggerated. Consequently, Burmese delegate UN had been instructed support eight-power resolution regardless Burmese Ambassador's forebodings. Prime Minister personally inclined believe opportune moment Chinese intervention has already passed: if China were fully determined save North Korea intervention should have taken place when it became apparent Seoul would be liberated.

Prime Minister expressed regret GOB unable give material support UN in Korea and could extend only moral support. Hoped we appreciated compelling reasons for this. Added he pleased note our unanimity and firmness as well as promptness our reactions in dealing Communist aggression. I assured him we fully appreciated Burma's vulnerability to her giant Communist neighbor and consequent necessity for caution. I expressed opinion that accordingly in backing eight-power resolution GOB had shown not only courage but readiness to face a fundamental issue of outstanding importance and congratulated him on his far-sighted and firm leadership.

KEY

[1] Thakin Nu.

320/10–1450

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 14, 1950.

Subject: British Proposal to Accept Chinese Communists Participation in Actions Respecting Korea, Re Delga 107, October 11, Department Telegram to USUN 392, October 12, 1950

In view particularly of the overtly antipathetic attitude adopted alike by the U.S.S.R. and Communist China respecting UN action in regard to Korea, and in view likewise of Chinese Communist threats still to take action to influence the outcome of the fighting in progress, it would appear basically incongruous and impolitic in existing circumstances to invite the Chinese Communists to participate in the settlement of the question of Korea. In the opinion of CA, the Chinese Communists should be so invited only if and when they adopted a new, more reasonable attitude respecting Asiatic affairs, only when and if, in short, they show evidence of a willingness to contribute to the maintenance of international law and order.

The above observations are predicated upon the assumption that the Chinese Communists will not be seated in the UN at the time when the Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea goes into action. If the Chinese Communists are in fact then represented, they will naturally occupy the same position as other UN members. Neither China's geographical propinquity nor the widely advertised violent temper of the Peiping regime alone, however, should be taken as just cause for the Commission to give special consideration to the views of the Peiping regime, whether or not a UN member, inasmuch as that regime has a clear record of support of international lawlessness in connection with the Korean case.

It is granted that the Commission should not be limited by mandate *prohibiting* it from conferring with any person or any political group or regime.[1]

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[1] A manuscript note on the source text read: "I agree. L[ivingston] T. M[erchant]".

746G.00(W)/10–1350 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET

HONG KONG, October 13, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received October 14—10:35 p. m.]

787. I. *Political.*

Crossing of 38th parallel by American troops brought prompt reaction from Peking in form of renewed warning that Chinese people could not "stand idly by" with regard to "serious situation created by invasion of Korea by US and its accomplice countries in dangerous trend towards extending war". Although news caused flurry in hypersensitive gold market, it did not seem to alter generally-held Hong Kong opinion that Chinese Communist unlikely become militarily involved.

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Department pass Crypto for Army for CINCFE, CINCPAC, COMSEVENTHTASKFLT, CINCFE pass COMNAVFE, pouched AmEmb Taipei, AmLeg Saigon, and American Consulate Hanoi. Joint WEEKA 41 from SANA.

WILKINSON

795.00/10–1450

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

ADDENDUM TO NOTES ON WAKE CONFERENCE OCTOBER 14 [1]

Prior to the meeting between the President and General MacArthur,[2] Ambassador Muccio talked briefly with a group of us and to me privately, about the situation in Korea. The following points supplement the account of the general meeting.

[1] President Truman's party set out from Hawaii shortly after midnight on October 14 (Saturday) for the Wake Island conference, which was held early on Sunday, October 15, local time; see *infra*. Presumably, this memorandum was drawn up following the conference and after the departure of President Truman's party from Wake Island for Hawaii, which involved returning across the international date line. This meant a return to Saturday, October 14, for the participants, accounting for the date on Mr. Rusk's memorandum. See Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 364, 367.

[2] Before the formal Wake Island conference (see *infra*), President Truman and General MacArthur met alone. For accounts of this private meeting, see Whitney, *MacArthur*, p. 387 and Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 364–365.

1. *Functioning of the Embassy*

Ambassador Muccio is very anxious to get his essential requirements for restoring the Embassy to full operation as quickly as possible. He laid most emphasis upon personnel and furniture. He said the Army was being very helpful, but that he hoped the State Department could give most urgent attention to his recent telegrams on the subject.

2. *Chief of ECA Mission*

Ambassador Muccio feels very strongly that Mr. Earl Johnson is not a suitable Chief of ECA Mission [3] and that his appointment would create great difficulties in Korea. He also said that Johnson's idea of having four ECA staff sections in Korea run by Johnson in Washington was absurd.

3. *Visit to Washington*

I told Ambassador Muccio that we were anxious for him to come back to Washington for a visit not later than early November and suggested the possibility that he might come on back with us. He thought that it would be desirable for him to have a week or ten days in Seoul before coming to Washington, and it was left that we would let him know what our wishes are.

4. *Colonel Katzin*

Both General MacArthur and Ambassador Muccio spoke most highly of the competence and general attitude of Colonel Katzin, the Personal Representative of Secretary General Trygve Lie.

5. *Elections in Korea*

Ambassador Muccio obviously felt strongly about not undercutting the Government of the Republic of Korea and treating it "on a par with North Korean authorities". I explained to him some of the problems in the United Nations and the need to get patience and understanding both on the part of the United Nations and Syngman Rhee if such questions are to be handled without unnecessary friction. He told me of his repeated efforts to keep Rhee moving in the right direction, that he had made repeated and strong representations to him. He said that he had thought a great deal about an alternative to Rhee but had thus far not been able to think of anyone who could do the job. He said the new military leadership was about the only possible source for a successor.

6. *Rice*

Ambassador Muccio said that the rice crop would be excellent, that little damage had been done to the crop areas of the countryside, and

[3] Presumably, the reference is to Edgar A. J. Johnson, Director of the Korea Program at ECA headquarters in Washington.

that this would be the third year in which Korea had had a good rice crop. He said he thought this would make a considerable difference politically to most of the farmers, that much of the stability of the population during the fighting was based on the fact that they were having three good years of crops.

. . . . . .

DEAN RUSK

Executive Secretariat Files: Lot 59D–95 (Wake Island Conference October 1950)

Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on 15 October 1950

TOP SECRET

COMPILED BY GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR N. BRADLEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FROM NOTES KEPT BY THE CONFEREES FROM WASHINGTON [1]

The following were at the table:

THE PRESIDENT
General of the Army DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Admiral ARTHUR W. RADFORD, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
Ambassador JOHN MUCCIO
Secretary of the Army FRANK PACE
Colonel A. L. HAMBLEN
Ambassador at Large PHILIP C. JESSUP
General of the Army OMAR N. BRADLEY
Assistant Secretary of State DEAN RUSK
Mr. W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

The conference opened at 0736.

THE PRESIDENT asked GENERAL MACARTHUR to state the rehabilitation situation with reference to Korea.

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[1] The main portions of this document were issued as a committee print by the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, under the above title, in May 1951. In a letter of transmittal, dated May 2, 1951, to Senator Richard B. Russell, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, General Bradley stated that the record was compiled on the return trip from Wake Island from the combined notes of General Bradley, Messrs. Harriman, Jessup, and Rusk, Col. A. L. Hamblen (Special Assistant for Occupied Areas, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army), Colonel Matthews (General Bradley's executive officer), and Miss Vernice Anderson (Ambassador Jessup's secretary). General Bradley indicated that in addition to those listed in the summary as present at the table were Colonel Matthews and General Whitney of General MacArthur's staff. Five copies of this report, according to General Bradley, were sent to General MacArthur on October 19, 1950.

For President Truman's statement, issued on October 15, following his meeting with General MacArthur, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, p. 672.

GENERAL MACARTHUR: It cannot occur until the military operations have ended. I believe that formal resistance will end throughout North and South Korea by Thanksgiving. There is little resistance left in South Korea—only about 15,000 men—and those we do not destroy, the winter will. We now have about 60,000 prisoners in compounds.

In North Korea, unfortunately, they are pursuing a forlorn hope. They have about 100,000 men who were trained as replacements. They are poorly trained, led and equipped, but they are obstinate and it goes against my grain to have to destroy them. They are only fighting to save face. Orientals prefer to die rather than to lose face.

I am now driving with the First Cavalry Division up the line to Pyongyang. I am thinking of making up a tank and truck column and sending it up the road to take Pyongyang directly. It depends on the Intelligence we get in the next 48 hours. We have already taken Wonsan. I am landing the X Corps which will take Pyongyang in one week. The North Koreans are making the same mistake they have made before. They have not deployed in depth. When the gap is closed the same thing will happen in the north as happened in the south.

It is my hope to be able to withdraw the Eighth Army to Japan by Christmas. That will leave the X Corps, which will be reconstituted, composed of the Second and Third Divisions and U.N. detachments. I hope the United Nations will hold elections by the first of the year. Nothing is gained by military occupation. All occupations are failures. (THE PRESIDENT nodded agreement.) After elections are held I expect to pull out all occupying troops. Korea should have about ten divisions with our equipment, supplemented by a small but competent Air Force and also by a small but competent Navy. If we do that, it will not only secure Korea but it will be a tremendous deterrent to the Chinese Communists moving south. This is a threat that cannot be laughed off. Again I emphasize the fact that the military should get out the minute the guns stop shooting and civilians take over. Korea is a land of poverty. It has been knocked down for a long time and a little money goes a long way. Houses are made of mud and bamboo. When knocked down they can be put up in two weeks. An estimate was made by ECA of the cost of rehabilitation and it was estimated to be $900,000,000. Another estimate was made locally and it placed the cost at about 1½ billion dollars. I believe these estimates are far too high. I do not believe that you can absorb and spend in Korea much more than $150,000,000 a year. I believe three years of that will place Korea on its feet and not only make Korea self-sustaining but give a higher living standard. I believe that half a billion dollars spread over three to five years will more than make up the destruction.

AMBASSADOR MUCCIO: The General has made an important point. Korea's capacity to absorb is limited. This applies to the economic field and to other fields. We should emphasize the mental and psychological rehabilitation more than the economic. The northern area has been under complete domination for five years. This is the first time we have moved into an area that has been dominated by Communists. We have a challenging opportunity. I want to see more emphasis on the education and information field than in the material rehabilitation. The economy of Korea is basically a very simple one. I believe with the General that $150,000,000 a year is all she can absorb. (Turning to General MacArthur) Is the cost of the Armed Forces included in that estimate?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: No. Equipment and military forces are not included.

SECRETARY PACE: Is the directive THE PRESIDENT sent sufficiently comprehensive?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: Yes.

SECRETARY PACE: What, generally, are the critical and over-all requirements of the Army during this period? We are in a critical financial situation. Our day of reckoning is going to come in the form of a supplemental in December.

GENERAL MACARTHUR: You gave us 40 days, 60 if necessary. We will have that estimate in 60 days. That will be about 30 days from now. This, you understand, is going to be some speculative guess work, but will be accurate to within 25%.

SECRETARY PACE: When the Army's responsibility ends, could the Army provide aid in psychological rehabilitation? Should KMAG continue?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: The KMAG group has been wonderful. As far as the military mission is concerned, I think it should be continued indefinitely. I want to pay high tribute to that group. I believe that 500 officers and men should be continued indefinitely. At the start of rehabilitation the Army will have to continue until the civil rehabilitation is organized. It should be organized as rapidly as possible. The United Nations should take it over. You will have a hard job getting good men to serve in Korea. It is not a nice place.

SECRETARY PACE: In the period of rehabilitation General Walker can assess the leadership qualities of the ROK men to take over civilian leadership.

GENERAL MACARTHUR: Mr. Muccio knows more about this than I do and the Embassy has a thorough knowledge of the Koreans.

AMBASSADOR MUCCIO: The Koreans are very obstinate. They have been pushed around so long they don't like it. They are convinced that we do not want Korea. The Mission has done a great job training the

young Koreans. They have pushed aside the old Chinese and Japanese trained Koreans. There is no hope in the old Koreans, but in the young ones there is great hope.

MR. RUSK: Is it undesirable to turn KMAG into a U.N. operation? Would that spoil its effect?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: From a political point of view it would be O.K., but militarily there must be unity of doctrine. The others may have different doctrines than we have.

GENERAL BRADLEY: It didn't work in Greece. We had to take it all over.

MR. RUSK: We might be able to work it out by using small numbers of other Nationals or by getting the U.N. to ask the U.S. to take it on a contract basis. The other question I had was that we would like to see military responsibility for relief and rehabilitation end, and would also like to see the U.S. operation moved over to the U.N. On the other hand, the U.N. is trying to do something it has never done before. It is going to have some responsibilities never before undertaken on the same scale. It may be necessary for an organization like ECA to stand by and resume some of the responsibilities. Is it fair for us to assume that the basic installations of the country—railroads, water, etc.—will be in adequate use before the U.N. take over?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: I believe a good deal of that will be done. I believe lots will remain to be done to put them back in good condition. The Army, the minute it takes a city, gets them going but it is only temporary. ECA is continuing to do that. The PRESIDENT sent a letter last week to Mr. Foster [2] and told them to go ahead with the long-term rehabilitation. ECA should continue to function.

AMBASSADOR MUCCIO: Heavy industries, railroads and utilities should be taken over by the Koreans and not wait for the United Nations to get in. The railroad from Pusan to Yongdungpo was put in operation within one week.

THE PRESIDENT: What about utilities and railroads?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: It will undoubtedly take time to put utilities back in operation. The ECA is continuing to function.

AMBASSADOR MUCCIO: The Army has done well opening railroads. ECA has helped. The Army has had the means and has done a great job with ECA, putting water and trains in operation. A group of transportation men who have been with the railroad company have been most helpful. Fortunately, we had an ECA man who had worked on new development for water works and within a short while he had water running in Seoul. A considerable number of new locomotives have been brought in.

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[2] Not printed.

SECRETARY PACE: Is there anything in terms of ECA and Army cooperation that we might do to help you?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: No commander in the history of war has ever had more complete and adequate support from all agencies in Washington than I have.

AMBASSADOR JESSUP: In regard to the figures which you suggested on the needs, does that include the cost of reconstructing industrial plants in the north?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: Yes, except munitions making. Those plants I would not include.

GENERAL BRADLEY: In regard to the reconstruction of the railroads, I had a lot of trouble in Europe, with pilots shooting up everything that moved and bombing the barracks that we were going to use later. Are you faced with the same thing?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: Me too (laughter).

MR. RUSK: To what extent is the other side stripping plants?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: They have to some extent. In Inchon I saw at least 20 flat cars which were loaded up with crated factory gadgets which they had not been able to get out. The North Koreans were not in the south long enough to do more than ordinary looting. I believe, however, that industry has not been seriously damaged in North Korea.

MR. HARRIMAN: Could we hear more about psychological rehabilitation?

AMBASSADOR MUCCIO: Bring in the Koreans more. They know their own people better than we do. We should provide them with radios and text books and also scientific guidance. We could set up a very effective system with a radio or loudspeaker in every school and village center. I had sound trucks which were very, very effective. With no newspapers and radio service, we sent them out to rural districts and village centers.

THE PRESIDENT: I believe in sound trucks. I won two elections with them. (Laughter)

MR. HARRIMAN: What about the psychological differences between North and South Koreans?

AMBASSADOR MUCCIO: Koreans are Koreans. There is no basic difference between them. 80% of them are farmers, anyway. There is no basic schism between North and South Koreans except for a few politicos and intellectuals.

MR. HARRIMAN: What about the 2,000,000 who came down south?

AMBASSADOR MUCCIO: They were, generally, people of some means. They will be going back to North Korea and will be very helpful to us.

GENERAL BRADLEY: What can you do with the 60,000 prisoners you now have?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: They are the happiest Koreans in all Korea. For the first time they are well fed and clean. They have been de-loused and have good jobs for which they are being paid under the Geneva Convention. I believe there is no real split, but their attitude is due only to the banner that flies over them. There is no difference in ideology and there are no North and South Korean blocs.

THE PRESIDENT: How will Syngman Rhee take the idea of the election?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: He won't like it.

AMBASSADOR MUCCIO: The last election was an honest election, about as honest as any ever held in the Far East. How are you going to ignore that? I hope the new Commission will not interpret that as requiring a nationwide election. How you are going to ignore members of the National Assembly is a major problem. The resolution was so worded that it could be interpreted in different ways. There have never been local elections or elections for provincial governors. These could be held.

MR. RUSK: We must not undermine the present Korean government. I think it may be possible to have your local and by-elections in the south and elections in the north, and then it will be almost time for the 1952 elections throughout the country. I think it will require a good deal of patience.

MR. HARRIMAN: How about the interim period between elections?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: North Korea will be under military control. The U.N. resolution calls for the maintenance of local governments wherever possible. This will not be possible. We expect them to either flee or be killed. Local government will be maintained by appointing local officials recommended by ROK officials.

AMBASSADOR MUCCIO: There is also the problem of currency to use and what land reform laws to retain in North Korea.

GENERAL MACARTHUR: In the interim the military will freeze land tenure, banks and currency. I will keep the North Korean currency in effect in North Korea without setting a rate to the dollar or ROK won until the civilian government can take over.

THE PRESIDENT: What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: Very little. Had they interfered in the first or second months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably not more than 100/125,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50/60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River. They have no Air Force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter.

With the Russians it is a little different. They have an Air Force in Siberia and a fairly good one, with excellent pilots equipped with some jets and B–25 and B–29 planes. They can put 1,000 planes in the air with some 2/300 more from the Fifth and Seventh Soviet Fleets. They are probably no match for our Air Force. The Russians have no ground troops available for North Korea. They would have difficulty in putting troops into the field. It would take six weeks to get a division across and six weeks brings the winter. The only other combination would be Russian air support of Chinese ground troops. Russian air is deployed in a semicircle through Mukden and Harbin, but the coordination between the Russian air and the Chinese ground would be so flimsy that I believe Russian air would bomb the Chinese as often as they would bomb us. Ground support is a very difficult thing to do. Our Marines do it perfectly. They have been trained for it. Our own Air and Ground Forces are not as good as the Marines but they are effective. Between untrained Air and Ground Forces an air umbrella is impossible without a lot of joint training. I believe it just wouldn't work with Chinese Communist ground and Russian air. We are the best.

MR. HARRIMAN: What about war criminals?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: Don't touch the war criminals. It doesn't work. The Nurnberg trials and Tokyo trials were no deterrent. In my own right I can handle those who have committed atrocities and, if we catch them, I intend to try them immediately by military commission.

THE PRESIDENT: Another subject—What is your idea about a Japanese peace treaty [3] without including Russia and Communist China?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: I would call a conference at once and invite them. If they don't come in, go ahead. After the treaty is drawn up, submit to them a draft of the treaty and if they don't sign, go ahead with the treaty. The Japanese deserve a treaty.

THE PRESIDENT: What would the effect on Japanese security be when our troops leave?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: Under the name of Police Reserve, we are organizing four divisions of Japanese troops to secure Japan. The present draft of the treaty by the State Department is very good. After friction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff it has been polished until it shines like a diamond. It will call for the security of Japan to be secured by the United Nations with the United States acting as the agency of the U.N. until the U.N. is in a position to do it itself.

THE PRESIDENT: Would we have to maintain three or four divisions in Japan until the Japanese can secure themselves?

[3] For documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 1109 ff.

GENERAL MACARTHUR: I should say that they would have to be maintained there for several years. At the present time the Japanese, in accordance with the laws of war, furnish a great many things for those troops. They put up $300,000,000 a year. This includes barracks, lights, etc. When this treaty of peace is made I believe this should be changed. The troops should pay their way. We should pay rental, etc. The Japs would not object if they didn't have to pay the bill for the support of these divisions.

GENERAL BRADLEY: Will the Japanese who have kept the faith while our troops were gone expect to receive different treatment from the troops when they return from Korea?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: Omar, there is complete camaraderie between the troops and the Japanese. The Japanese like our troops. I think that the presence of the troops means prosperity. They spend money and bring in so much. The Eighth Army was pulled out of occupation in January. When they come back they will have nothing to do with occupation.

GENERAL BRADLEY: The Eighth Army is returning to Japan soon. We have the problem of getting additional troops to Europe. As it now stands it will be April before we can get a division into Europe. Could the Second or the Third Division be made available to be sent over to Europe by January?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: Yes, I will make one available by January. I would recommend that the Second Division be selected, as it is a veteran division, better trained, and would make a better impression.

SECRETARY PACE: Would GARIOA end with the peace treaty?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: Yes, Japan will be self-sufficient in 1952, treaty or no treaty.

SECRETARY PACE: Should SCAP continue after the treaty of peace?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: SCAP should completely cease. I think these troops should be directly controlled by the Department of Defense, just like troops in the United States, and their relationship with the Japanese should be the same as garrisons in America. I don't think they should have anything to do with political aspects. SCAP should discontinue entirely. I told Mr. Dulles I believe I could sell that to the Japanese. Understand, if you skin them alive as Carlos Romulo, and some of the other boys want to, you won't be able to get anything from them. I think the text drawn up by the State Department is a very fine treaty.

MR. RUSK: In connection with those troops moving back from Korea to Japan, ideally, we should have a peace treaty before military occupations in Korea wind up, but your operations in Korea are going faster than the diplomats can go in getting a treaty.

GENERAL MACARTHUR: I hope to get the Eighth Army back by Christmas.

MR. RUSK: We cannot meet that. Should you let the Japs know we are going to have a peace treaty and make a statement to the Japs about the treaty to facilitate the return of the troops?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: Your thought is a good one. Last January I made some statement along those lines. This January I will scratch their backs again somehow.

MR. HARRIMAN: Should we begin to pay some of the expenses of occupation on return from Korea?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: Averell, that is what we should do. If we do this we can stop the GARIOA. We are taking more out than we are putting in. It is not the Japs' fault that we do not have a treaty. It is an iniquitous thing that we are taking more out than we are putting in. It is a breach among the allies which prevents a treaty. Three years ago they did everything we asked and we have a moral obligation to them. If we pay our way in Japan for part of the cost of the troops in lieu of GARIOA funds, this might be a satisfactory arrangement if it can be worked out.

SECRETARY PACE: I certainly think it merits consideration and no doubt it would have great psychological benefits. We have both internal problems in the Department of Defense and also with the Appropriations Committees of Congress. This isn't a final view, but my personal opinion is that it should be given consideration.

GENERAL MACARTHUR: I am sure that you are right. Congress will not like it. All Congressional groups who came over wanted to swallow up more from the Japanese economy.

THE PRESIDENT: You and State get together and work it out and bring it to me for approval.

SECRETARY PACE: Or disapproval. (Laughter)

THE PRESIDENT: I would like to hear your views, General, on a possible Pacific pact[4] or some other arrangements similar to that in the Atlantic.

GENERAL MACARTHUR: A Pacific pact would be tremendous, but due to the lack of homogeneity of the Pacific nations, it would be very difficult to put into effect. If the President would make an announcement like the Truman Doctrine, which would be a warning to the predatory nations, it would have a great effect. It is not possible to get a pact, since they are so nonhomogeneous. They have no military forces. Only the United States has the forces. All they want is the assurance of security from the United States. The President should follow up this conference with a ringing pronouncement. I believe

[4] For related documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 1 ff.

that at this time, after the military successes and the President's trip, it would have more success than a Pacific pact.

ADMIRAL RADFORD: I was in Manila last May during the conference Quirino called.[5] I didn't attend the meetings but I spoke to a number of delegates. There was generally the same feeling that General MacArthur brought out. They didn't feel they could get together but they would like to know in advance of any announcement. I am sure they would heartily agree but would like to be consulted. I believe such a pronouncement could be included in the U.N. speech and if they could be consulted, they would feel they were in on the ground floor. The peace will be upset again in six months if you do not take steps to stop it. We just have to face the facts of life. We must continue the policy followed in Korea to maintain the peace. The situation in Indo-China is the most puzzling of all as to what we can do or what we should do.

MR. HARRIMAN: When you speak of the Truman Doctrine, do you mean direct external aggression or do you mean the type of thing that has been going on in Indo-China and has previously occurred in Greece to which the Truman Doctrine was directed?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: I am referring to direct aggression. The situation in Indo-China is puzzling.[6] The French have 150,000 of their best troops there with an officer of the highest reputation in command. Their forces are twice what we had in the perimeter and they are opposed by half of what the North Koreans had. I cannot understand why they do not clean it up. They should be able to do so in four months yet we have recently seen a debacle. This brings up a question of far deeper concern. What is the capacity and caliber of the French Army? In the first world war they were excellent. In the second world war they were poor. The present French soldier is doubtful. If the French won't fight we are up against it because the defense of Europe hinges on them. They have the flower of the French Army in Indo-China and they are not fighting. If this is so, no matter what supplies we pour in they may be of no use. The loss of territory in itself is nothing, but the French failure is broader than this. I cannot understand it.

THE PRESIDENT: I cannot understand it either.

ADMIRAL RADFORD: The French seem to have no popular backing from the local Indo-Chinese. The French must train native troops. The rest of Southeast Asia—Burma, Siam—is wide open if the Chinese Communists pursue a policy of aggression. We probably have more chance of assisting in Indo-China than anywhere else. We must stiffen the backbone of the French.

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[5] See footnote 1 to the letter from Muccio to Rusk, May 25, p. 88.

[6] For documentation on Indochina, see vol. VI, pp. 690 ff.

MR. HARRIMAN: The French hold a key position both in Europe and Asia. I have been told by officers who were there that the French fought well in Italy. This is a matter to which we must give close thought. The French must change their attitude relative to Indo-China.

THE PRESIDENT: We have been working on the French in connection with Indo-China for years without success.

GENERAL BRADLEY: Some of the French fought well during the last war. I had under my command the Second French Armored Division and they fought very well, but they were selected people who had escaped from France to continue the fight. We cannot judge the fighting of all French troops by them.

THE PRESIDENT: This is the most discouraging thing we face. Mr. Jessup and others have worked on the French tooth and nail to try and persuade them to do what the Dutch had done in Indonesia but the French have not been willing to listen. If the French Prime Minister comes to see me, he is going to hear some very plain talk. I am going to talk cold turkey to him. If you don't want him to hear that kind of talk, you had better keep him away from me.

ADMIRAL RADFORD: Recently there were some French ships in Hawaii. I had the impression they were not anxious to go to Indo-China and were dragging their feet. They would have stayed in Pearl Harbor for six months if I had invited them.

THE PRESIDENT: I have talked at some length with General MacArthur about the situation in the Philippines.[7] The General suggested that Mr. Dodge[8] would be able to help out on this situation. I think if we could get him down there the job would be done.

SECRETARY PACE: Could he be spared?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: He is doing a job now in Japan and about two or three months after he is through he could be spared.

THE PRESIDENT: General MacArthur has suggested that I send for Quirino. Maybe I should send for him and tell him what we want done. I am not sure whether that is the right thing to do.

GENERAL MACARTHUR: If you are going to give him fifty million dollars, I think you should (laughter).

THE PRESIDENT: General MacArthur and I have talked fully about Formosa. There is no need to cover that subject again. The General and I are in complete agreement.

GENERAL BRADLEY: With regard to the offers of additional troops from the United Nations, are not some of them more trouble than

[7] For related documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 1399 ff.

[8] Joseph M. Dodge, Financial Adviser to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (Japan).

they are worth militarily? Politically they are fine. Some of the offers are still in nebulous form. Some are due to arrive in Korea in February or March. In most cases it will be necessary for us to pay for their transportation, maintenance and training and inasmuch as General MacArthur expects to have concluded military operations by November, is it worthwhile to continue working on them or should we ask only for token forces?

GENERAL MACARTHUR: They are useless from the military point of view and probably would never see action. From the political point of view, they give a United Nations flavor. I think that the balance between these two considerations should be struck in Washington. I cannot do it.

GENERAL BRADLEY: Perhaps the United Nations flavor could be retained but the cost reduced by having only token units as, for example, from Canada, which had proposed to send a brigade to Okinawa for further training.

AMBASSADOR JESSUP: Mr. Pearson, the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, has said that the Canadians would prefer not to send troops to Korea but were willing to put them into international service, possibly to earmark them for Europe.

ADMIRAL RADFORD: The Canadians have some representation. They have three destroyers in Korea.

GENERAL MACARTHUR: Their services have been excellent.

MR. RUSK: Not long ago Bajpai spoke to Henderson about a suggestion Nehru was turning over in his mind. This would be placing Indian and Pakistani troops along the Korean-Manchurian and Korean-Soviet frontier to act as a buffer between these countries and the U.S. Forces in Korea. While they were talking, Nehru sent for Bajpai who returned shortly thereafter saying that Nehru had dropped the whole idea. We might think this over in case Nehru comes up with it or something similar in the future. I wonder if General MacArthur thinks such a plan would be dangerous.

GENERAL MACARTHUR: It would be indefensible from a military point of view. I am going to put South Korean troops up there. They will be the buffer. The other troops will be pulled back south of a line from 20 miles north of Pyongyang to Hamhung. I want to take all non-Korean troops out of Korea as soon as possible. They ought to move out soon after the elections. The ROK troops can handle the situation. The greatest calamity in Asia would be if the Koreans should turn against us as a result of some UN opposition to the Rhee Government. They are quite capable of handling their own military

affairs. It would be a pity if we turned them against us. I have been shaking in my boots ever since I saw the UN resolution which would treat them exactly on the same basis as the North Koreans. As Ambassador Muccio has said, the Koreans are a sensitive people and we might easily turn them against us. It would be bad to turn out of office a government which had stood up so well and taken such a beating, and to treat them just like the North Koreans. We have supported this government and suffered 27,000 casualties in doing so. They are a government duly elected under United Nations auspices and should not be let down.

THE PRESIDENT: This cannot be done and should not be done. We must insist on supporting this government.

MR. RUSK: We have been working and explaining our point of view in the United Nations but there has been an effective propaganda campaign against the Rhee Government which has infected some of the UN delegations.

THE PRESIDENT: We must make it plain that we are supporting the Rhee Government and propaganda can "go to hell".

No one who was not here would believe we have covered so much ground as we have been actually able to cover. We might break up to have luncheon at twelve o'clock and in the meantime a communiqué [9] could be prepared and talks among the members of the staff can be carried on. Then I want to award a couple of medals to a couple of people and we can all leave after luncheon.

GENERAL MACARTHUR: If it's all right, I am anxious to get back as soon as possible and would like to leave before luncheon if that is convenient.

THE PRESIDENT: I believe this covers the main topics. Secretary Pace, did you have anything else to take up?

SECRETARY PACE: Yes, sir, but I can take them up separately with General MacArthur, and I imagine General Bradley has some also.

THE PRESIDENT: The communiqué should be submitted as soon as it is ready and General MacArthur can return immediately. This has been a most satisfactory conference.

The formal conference ended at 0912, Wake Island time. Informal discussions continued for one and one-half hours between various members of the two groups.

[9] See footnote 1, p. 948.

795.00/10–1450

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [Undated.]

ADDENDUM TO NOTES ON WAKE CONFERENCE OCTOBER 14 [1]

Following the general meeting between the President and General MacArthur, Mr. Harriman and I had some further conversation with General MacArthur. The following points may be useful in supplementing the notes of the principal meeting.

1. *French Problem in Indochina*

During his discussion with the President, General MacArthur had made several references to General Carpentier [2] as an officer who "enjoyed the highest reputation". Privately, we asked General MacArthur what he thought the essence of the problem was in Indochina. He replied, "They need to get an aggressive General". It was clear that General MacArthur felt that an aggressive General could clean up the Viet-minh forces with French Union troops now available in Indochina. He contrasted the Indochinese situation sharply with Korea and left the impression that our problem in Korea was more difficult from a military point of view than the problem faced by the French Commander in Indochina.

2. *Relation between Popular Support and Military Success in Indochina*

I asked General MacArthur how seriously popular opinion should be weighed as a military factor in such operations as Indochina and Korea. I asked him whether a hostile Korean population would have made any substantial difference to his Inchon landing. He replied that a hostile population could have, of course, made the task more difficult but it would not have been a decisive factor. He said that "armed men passing through a village in Asia are treated with the highest respect". He said the principal annoyance which comes from a hostile population is in the "logistic support which it gives to the enemy". He referred to furnishing food, water, care of wounded and, particularly, intelligence.

3. *War Criminals in Korea*

I asked General MacArthur whether the view he had stated in the principal meeting (that we should limit our action against war

[1] See footnote 1 to Mr. Rusk's memorandum on discussions held before the Wake Island conference, p. 946.

[2] Gen. M. M. Carpentier, Commander in Chief of the French Forces in Indochina.

criminals to those guilty of military war crimes) was based upon the fact that political leaders in North Korea were puppets and really directed from Moscow or whether on general grounds he objected to the trial of political war criminals. He said his view rested upon general grounds. He said that the responsibility given him to try major Japanese war criminals was the most repugnant task he had ever had to perform. He seemed to have in mind senior military war criminals because he said that "military commanders obey the orders of their governments and have no option about waging war".

I asked him whether he had any information that Kim Il Sung had ordered military atrocities as a matter of policy. He said that, if that were the case and he could catch Kim Il Sung, he would try him and execute him by military commission but that he did not have evidence that that was the case. He said that the conduct of North Korean troops toward prisoners and civilians varied greatly from unit to unit and he therefore doubted that it was a matter of general policy.

4. *Possible Chinese Declaration of War*

I mentioned to General MacArthur the fact that the Chinese have threatened privately to enter the Korean war if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. He said he did not fully understand why they had gone out on such a limb and that they must be greatly embarrassed by the predicament in which they now find themselves. I said that we assumed under great Russian pressure it might not be impossible (though improbable) that Red China might declare war on the United States. Such a declaration might cover merely a stepping-up of indirect support to North Korea. I asked General MacArthur whether he thought such a declaration should be treated with contempt or what he thinks our attitude should be. He said that he did not believe that Peiping would declare war on the United States without assurances of Russian support, that they would not declare war as a gesture, and that we should treat any such declaration with the "utmost seriousness".

5. *South Korean Military Performance*

General MacArthur expressed the greatest admiration for the ability of the South Koreans to reorganize their forces into an effective combat force during the period of general retreat and discouragement in the opening weeks of the war. He said that KMAG should have the highest marks for their part in this operation. He said that, had the South Koreans not pulled themselves together and fought well, the war might have had quite a different result.

DEAN RUSK

357.AD/10–1650 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the President

TOP SECRET

TOKYO [, undated.]
[Received October 16—3 : 45 a. m.]

CX66554. To President of the United States, the Honorable Harry S. Truman, information JCS and Secretary of State. I have just received the following message from President Syngman Rhee:

"United Nations' new committee's resolution [1] not acceptable. Korean people will insist on maintaining their inalienable right to hold elections and to set up any government according to their free will, under the observation of and in cooperation with United Nations Commission. But to allow any nation or nations, even United Nations, to interfere with the internal administration in cooperation with the existing Communist organizations imposed upon the people by alien power is impossible. After defeating the Communists at the cost of the precious blood of United Nations and Korean armies, the new committee's proposal to protect and revive Communism in the north is unthinkable. This government is taking over the civilian administration whenever hostilities cease by dispatching the governors appointed 2 years ago for 5 provinces of the north to restore peace and order. When the situation is ready for elections, the people will be allowed to elect their own governors in free atmosphere and the same civic rights and privileges enjoyed by the citizens in south will be extended equally to all people of the north. In deference to the desire of United Nations' new committee, I will resign in first opportune moment but must first settle the Communist problem which is the sole purpose of this war, and the will of people in north and south be carried out free from the influence of Soviet or any other outside power. Signed Syngman Rhee."

I am advising President Rhee that he should carefully avoid any action which might encourage further public controversy as to this matter pending the opportunity for a thorough review of the same in Washington. His message does, however, reflect that resentment of which I expressed my deep concern during yesterday's conference and I believe that every effort should be made by our government to reconcile the position of the United Nations' interim committee on Korea with the previous resolutions and commitments of the United Nations with respect to the establishment of the existing government of the Republic of Korea. As you pointed out in yesterday's conference, we must not unnecessarily alienate that government and the people it represents who during the past 3 months have displayed so determined and gallant a stand against aggression and in support of the US–UN

[1] See telegram Delga 115, from New York, received at 5 : 48 p. m. on October 12, p. 938.

principles, nor are we justified in ignoring decisions of the United Nations of the past 3 years, particularly as to the *bona fides* of the elections held on May 10, 1948 and May 30, 1950. To do so would be to create full legal and moral grounds for just such resentment. Ambassador Muccio fully concurs.

MACARTHUR

795.00/10–1650 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, October 16, 1950.
[Received October 16—5 : 08 a. m.]

265. In receipt this morning to Deptel 191, October 12, I endeavored see Home Minister but finding him out of town I went to see President Rhee and made representations to him re utilization of ROK police in North Korea. Rhee did not receive representations with good grace, his attitude was one of defiance of UN and determination to incorporate North Korea into ROK as speedily as possible. I urged him to avoid by word and deed acts which would put him in bad order [*odor?*] with UN. He assured me he would hold his tongue until he had chance to confer with Ambassador Muccio who is expected here Wednesday.[1]

I am awaiting return Home Minister in order ascertain definitely status of police in east coast area. All other north of parallel appear definitely under authority Unified Command.

DRUMRIGHT

[1] October 18.

IO Files

Minutes of the Twenty-first Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

[Extract]

SECRET NEW YORK, October 16, 1950—9 : 15 a. m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (50).]

1. *Korean Relief and Reconstruction* (US/A/2681/Rev 1)[1]

Mr. Lubin explained that the paper before the Delegation was a draft resolution for action by the Economic and Social Council, containing a second draft resolution for adoption of the General Assembly, with respect to the establishment of a Korean War Damage and

[1] Not printed.

Rehabilitation Agency. The draft resolution had been worked out with the British, French, Brazilians, and Canadians. While it was not yet finally accepted by those delegations, they had given it tentative approval. It was the general trend of thinking within our own Delegation that we should have voluntary contributions to the Korean relief program based upon certain percentages which each country would agree to contribute after consideration of an assessment scale in the Fifth Committee.

Mr. Lubin summarized the provisions of the resolution regarding the establishment of the Korean War Damage Agency and providing for the designation of a United Nations Agent General and his deputy to conduct relief operations in Korea. He pointed out that the proposed Agent General would be assisted by an Advisory Committee which we thought should be composed of the five states making the largest contributions to the relief work in Korea. He noted that the question of funds and procurement of supplies would, under this plan, be handled by the Agent General who would be able to use existing agencies insofar as practicable.

Mr. Lubin raised several questions which the Delegation would have to take into account. The first was whether the Unification Commission should be given more authority in the relief field. He noted that the Australians insisted, for example, that the Commission should be the principal authority, and that the Agent General should be made more directly responsible to it. The second question was whether we should insist that the Agent General be an American or whether we would be willing to take an Asian as Agent General, with a capable American national to serve as his deputy. The third question was whether the Advisory Commission should be composed of the five largest contributors. In this connection he observed that this advisory body had virtually no real authority.

Mr. Dulles inquired where the money for the Korean relief operation was coming from. Mr. Lubin explained that Committee Five would consider this problem after information was available as to the probable cost of the contemplated program. The Committee could then work out an arrangement whereby each country would be requested to give a certain amount. Mr. Dulles observed that the United States would, in fact, be putting up most of the money. For this reason he questioned whether we should hide ourselves behind an Asiatic serving as the Agent General. After all, one of the purposes of the program was to put on a demonstration of what we could do and to make the Asian people realize what a contribution the United States could make to their economic well-being.

Mr. Lubin called attention to another point of view in this connection; that was that if an American were running the relief opera-

tion, we would be accused of imperialism in the Far East, and this would be taken as further evidence of the fact that Korea was our special party. He pointed out that we were not permitting others to play a dominant role in the administration of the Unified Command. In order to overcome this feeling the suggestion had been made that it might be preferable for the deputy to be an American. Mr. Dulles recalled that when he was in Korea, the Americans had been extremely well-thought-of and were doing well. He had seen no evidence that American assistance was regarded as American imperialism in Korea. Mr. Lubin agreed with him insofar as Korea was concerned, but considered it certain we would subject ourselves to criticism from other states in Asia.

Senator Lodge thought it was important to choose an American for the top post. Such a choice would be symbolical as regards the United States and the Far East. In the Far East, an American would be regarded as a symbol of the economic help which the Secretary had referred to in his speech. With respect to this country it would help quiet certain feelings in Congress. In his opinion, the question involved in this case was far larger than Korea. It involved the entire Far East and our policy toward that area. What we did in Korea would raise the question of our position throughout the area.

Mr. Lubin observed that the President, in approving the Korean relief program, had reserved for himself the right to decide whether all money should be channeled through the United Nations or whether some should go through ECA. This was contained in a statement which he signed.[2] Our draft resolution looked toward working under the United Nations, but also through ECA. Senator Lodge observed that if every time the United States engaged in charitable activities, it was going to be accused of imperialism, it would make a great many people in this country terribly sad. He thought we should do things because they were right, and in this connection he referred to the statements coming from the Lucknow Conference.

Mr. Kotschnig[3] observed that as a result of the Korean victory won under United Nations auspices, there was a greater desire to carry through the relief program as a United Nations enterprise than might otherwise have been the case. He believed there was a very real chance of getting substantial funds from other countries for Korean relief for this reason. We would not probably have to pick up the entire check. He referred to his conversations with Colonel Katzin, the representative of the Secretary-General in Korea, who had said that

[2] See the memorandum by Mr. Acheson to the President, October 11, p. 927.

[3] Walter Kotschnig, Director of the Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs and U.S. Deputy Representative in ECOSOC, was an adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

whenever an American relief operation was started in a country, it was done on the most expensive basis. Katzin thought, for example, that the ECA operation in Korea was too large. He therefore felt it would be much cheaper to run the relief operation on a United Nations scale. Korea was a viable state, once it was united, and in his opinion $500,000,000 would carry the relief operation for the necessary three years. Mr. Kotschnig observed that our own experts talked in terms of a billion dollar relief program in Korea. Possibly these facts were in favor of a United Nations operation rather than a straight American enterprise as had been suggested.

Mr. Ross did not disagree with Mr. Kotschnig but wished to place a somewhat different emphasis on the situation. He recalled that while the Korean campaign had been conducted under United Nations auspices, the United Nations had been very glad to use the United States as the agent of the United Nations at that time. He would guess the United Nations would be equally glad to continue to use the United States as its agent in the relief operation. In his opinion the question whether the Agent General should be an American had been previously settled when the Delegation had discussed whether the United States should be on the Unification Commission. At that time we had decided against such membership, but it was thought that it would, under these circumstances, be essential to have an American relief commissioner, or failing that, a Canadian. He went on to recall that the Delegation had also discussed whether the principal secretary of the commission should be an American, and there too, we had agreed that if an American were not chosen, we should insist on a qualified Canadian.

Senator Cooper asked whether the problem before the Delegation was whether the relief operation should be done by the United States or the United Nations, or whether it was simply a question of the Agent General's being an American. Mr. Dulles thought the Delegation was considering only the appointment of the Agent General. He was personally concerned by the extent to which we seemed to be writing ourselves out of the Korean operation. Senator Cooper thought that by making the Korean relief effort one to which all the United Nations members would make contributions, any stigma of imperialism could be removed.

Mr. Kotschnig stated that the only serious candidate for relief administrator in Korea was Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar of India. His candidacy faced us with a real problem since he had great support in the United Nations and the confidence of many of the members. His Indian nationality did create a problem for us. Nevertheless, Mr. Kotschnig thought we would be faced with a very strong move for his

appointment. Mr. Allison observed that if an Indian were appointed Agent General, there would be considerable difficulty with members of the government of the Republic of Korea, who had lost all faith in the Indians. He wished to associate himself with what Senator Lodge had said, and that was that we should find the right thing to do in Korea and then go ahead and do it. He thought it important to have an American as the chief relief administrator; a highly qualified Asian could be chosen as his deputy.

In response to a question from Senator Lodge, Mr. Lubin reviewed the composition of the Unification Commission in Korea, the plan for the economic relief operation, and the body which would be set up to administer it. Mr. Lubin went on to say that on the basis of our preliminary preference for an American to be chosen as Agent General, our draft resolution provided for the nomination of a candidate by the Secretary-General, which we thought would make it easier to put up a qualified American. However, he noted that other members might insist that this individual be appointed by the General Assembly in which case we might encounter difficulty.

Mr. McKeever felt that since Americans had been left out of other vital bodies in Korea, it was particularly important that an American head up the relief program. In his view the only way to disprove charges of imperialism was to have Americans in positions which would disprove these charges. The real issue was to find an American who understood Asian problems. He had one other comment. He wished to see the words, "war damage", removed from the title of the commission. It would be better, he thought, to call it the "Korean Relief and Rehabilitation Agency". He observed in this connection that Communist propaganda already tagged this country as being responsible for the greater part of the war damage in Korea, and he thought we should not point up the war damage ourselves in choosing the title for this agency.

Mr. Dulles observed that while it was technically true that Korean political decisions would be made by the Commission, nevertheless, local relief people also would make political decisions. There was the question of to whom the relief should go, for example. He thought the fellow on the spot would have tremendous political influence. He believed we would be flying in the face of reality to consider that the relief operation could be carried out by an Indian without any politics.

Mr. Kotschnig thought it would be unfortunate to delete the phrase, "war damage". This was the reason certain countries were ready to participate in the operation. It had to be made clear that this relief agency would be concerned with rebuilding and not with economic development. A suggestion was made that the origin of aggression in

Korea could be clarified by the inclusion of appropriate language in the preamble. Mr. Kotschnig still felt that if this were done, a great many other countries would not be willing to participate in the operation. They had insisted on the use of the words, "war damage".

Mr. Bancroft called attention to the close analogy between this situation and the Palestine relief program. There, we had chosen a non-American administrator, assisted by an Advisory Commission on which the United States was represented. At that time we had not thought the choice of an American necessary. Mr. Ross, however, believed the particular situation of the United States in the Middle Eastern area distinguished the Palestine situation completely from Korea.

Mrs. Roosevelt inquired whether the emphasis should be placed upon war damage or upon rehabilitation. She could not see why both were not covered in Mr. McKeever's suggested language. Senator Lodge asked whether the Secretary's speech [4] had not suggested that the Korean case would be something of a pilot project, or model relief operation, to show what could be done. Mr. Lubin thought the Secretary's speech more precisely suggested Korea might be an example of what countries could do if they got together and worked cooperatively. Mrs. Roosevelt said her own impression of the purpose of the operation was to bring Korea back to conditions before the war. She did not think there was any intention of the United Nations going in to make a demonstration of how an economy should be run.

Mrs. Roosevelt attempted to sum up the feeling of the Delegation on this subject. As nearly as she could see, the only major suggestion which had been made was that of Mr. McKeever to delete the words, "war damage". Mr. Kotschnig, on the other hand, felt that it should be included from the standpoint of the position of other members. Mr. Cohen thought that proper language in the preamble would be helpful in this connection. Ambassador Gross agreed. Mr. Kotschnig observed that many countries objected to the use of the words, "relief and rehabilitation". The name was too much like that of UNRRA which awakened certain unhappy memories. The suggestion was made that possibly the name could be changed to Korean Reconstruction Agency, or to Korean Relief Agency. Mrs. Roosevelt thought that the problem should be met in this way. She assumed the sense of the Delegation was to prefer an American as the Agent General, but to recognize the difficulties raised by the particular Indian candidate. Nevertheless, it was the feeling of the Delegation that for the present we should try to get an American. Such an American should have a remarkable knowledge of the Asiatic situation and be able to take

[4] Reference is to Mr. Acheson's address before the U.N. General Assembly on September 20; text in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 2, 1950, p. 523.

advantage of the particular situation. She summed up the Delegation's decision as being in favor of an American as Agent General and of deleting the words, "war damage", in the title of the Agency. These decisions could be reviewed in the light of the developments growing out of our discussions and consultations with other delegations.

Senator Lodge said he was not prepared to agree without a convincing demonstration, that a large-scale, double barreled American effort would not be better than the suggested proposals. The fact that Americans did things in a big way and were not penny pinching was what had enabled us to be successful during the war. Perhaps this did not look wasteful to some, but our way cleaned up situations quickly, and we got better results in the end. Mrs. Roosevelt thought these observations were more applicable to a long-run relief plan. She said she would like to see any American reconstruction plan run in that way.

[Here follows a record of the discussion on the second agenda item: Mexican resolution on land problems in trust territories.]

795.00/10–1650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 16, 1950.

Subject: Extension of the Authority of the Republic of Korea into North Korea and the Holding of Elections

Participants: Colonel Ben C. Limb, Korean Foreign Minister
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs

Colonel Ben C. Limb, Korean Foreign Minister, called me at 11 o'clock this morning from New York concerning his interest in sending of a Korean GI to the *Herald Tribune* forum in New York on October 24. I assured him that the Department was aware of the problem and would support in principle his interest in the matter.

Colonel Limb then stated that he was going to talk with the members of the Interim Committee on Korea tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, and wished to give me certain impressions before so doing.[1] He stated that his Government was very perturbed over the attitude of a number of the foreign delegations to the United Nations (including Mr. Spender of Australia, with whom he had talked at length over the weekend) in supporting the thesis that new elections should be held throughout Korea. He also pointed out that the Republic of Korea was very concerned over the resolution of the Interim Com-

[1] For a summary of the meeting, see U.N. document A/1881, p. 15.

mittee of October 12 which would institute civil administration in North Korea under the Unified Command and apparently without consultation with the Republic of Korea. (In this connection, I referred to Seoul's telegrams Nos. 254 and 255 of October 13 [2] sent to the Department for the Korean Foreign Minister.)

I pointed out to the Foreign Minister that, while the Interim Committee Resolution of October 12 did not specifically require consultation between the new UNCOK Commission and the Republic of Korea, the General Assembly Resolution of October 7 so provides, and that the latter resolution was, of course, controlling. I told the Foreign Minister furthermore that as we had stated (Ambassador Austin's speech to the General Assembly of September 30) [3] the position of the United States Government was that the previous elections in South Korea should not be invalidated but that they should be considered to have full force and effect with respect to the status of the Government of the Republic of Korea south of the 38th Parallel, and that we had consistently argued for this position.

I then pointed out that as regards North Korea, it was our belief that since ultimate integration of Korea north of the 38th Parallel into the Republic was a United Nations matter, it was up to the United Nations itself to decide upon what steps would be taken toward the holding of elections in that area and the subsequent extension of the authority of the Republic of Korea north of the Parallel. I added that within this context, the position of the United States was in consonance with the Resolutions of the General Assembly of October 7 and of the Interim Committee of October 12, and that these resolutions were not mutually inconsistent. I pointed out that the Interim Committee would naturally be guided by the General Assembly Resolution of October 7, and that the Republic of Korea should not allow itself to become alarmed over the terms of the Interim Committee Resolution, about which they had evidently been misinformed.

I told the Foreign Minister that I believed considerable harm could be done to the cause of the Republic of Korea in the United Nations deliberations upon the scope of elections to be held in Korea, and on the question of the political integration of Korea into the Republic of Korea if, at this time, statements similar to those in body [*embodied*] in the Seoul telegrams, referred to above, were made the basis for official Republic of Korea protests to the United Nations or appeals in the press. I added that I hoped that the Government of the Republic of Korea would be patient and restrained in prejudging the actions of the

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[2] Neither printed. They transmitted, respectively, statements by the Cabinet of the Republic of Korea and the Acting Foreign Minister commenting on the U.N. General Assembly resolution of October 7 and the Interim Committee resolution of October 12 (795B.00/10–1350)

[3] Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 9, 1950, p. 579.

United Nations at this time in respect to the integration of Korea and would await a full exposition of the position of the United Nations on this problem. I solicited his support in endeavoring to moderate any unduly precipitate reaction, at least publicly, of the Republic of Korea at this time, emphasizing that this particular moment was of great importance in United Nations deliberations on Korea, and suggested that he request his Government to refrain from "rocking the boat" at such a critical juncture. The Foreign Minister agreed to telegraph his Government along these lines immediately. (See Department's telegram No. 203, October 16, 1950.[4]) I assured him that the United States and its delegation at New York were fully in sympathy with the aspirations of the Koreans for a unified Korea, and that we felt that the best way to accomplish this was through a series of orderly steps under the auspices of the United Nations. I also pointed out that decisions on the future of Korea involved the participation and support of all other friendly delegations at Lake Success and that their views would be of vital consequence to his government.

The Minister thanked me for my frank exposition of the foregoing point of view, and stated that he would modify his approach to these questions in his conversations with the Interim Committee and other delegations at Lake Success. He said he would telegraph his Government requesting that moderation be shown in prejudging any questions relating to a future solution to the problem of unifying Korea. He added, however, that he wished that a clarification could be made of the Interim Committee Resolution of October 12 with respect to consultation between the Unified Command, the United Nations Commission, and the Republic of Korea, which would tend to ameliorate the natural fears of the Koreans that the United Nations contemplates arbitrary action in North Korea without reference to the views or desires of the Government of the Republic of Korea.

[4] Not printed.

795.00/10–1650

Memorandum by the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 16, 1950.

KOREAN SECURITY PROBLEMS

The problem of Korean security divides itself into three parts, as follows: (1) the maintenance of UN forces in Korea, pursuant to the

General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950; (2) the establishment of Korean military forces; and (3) the permanent neutralization of Korea.

The General Assembly resolution provides that UN forces should not remain in any part of Korea "otherwise than so far as necessary" for achieving the objectives of (1) insuring conditions of stability throughout Korea and (2) of taking all constituent acts, including the holding of elections, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea. It should therefore be the task of the UN Commission for Unification to recommend the withdrawal of UN forces when it has determined, after consultation with the Unified Command, that the objectives specified in the resolution have been achieved to the extent that UN forces are no longer required. If, in the meantime, a General Assembly resolution should be passed providing for the maintenance of national armed forces elements for service as United Nations units, the forces in Korea could be considered as such units and would provide the precedent for their employment in other areas by the United Nations.

With regard to the establishment and maintenance of military and internal security forces for the Republic of Korea, the UN Commission for Unification, pursuant to its authority to "represent the UN in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea" should make recommendations to the Unified Commander for the establishment, in agreement with the ROK, of a UN Advisory Military Group in Korea. This group would in fact represent a continuation of KMAG but should be reconstituted to include personnel from UN member states. To effect this, the UN Commission on Unification should resolve that, in order to maintain its independence, Korea should be encouraged to establish a defensive military force under UN auspices and that, upon agreement between the ROK and the Unified Command, a UN Advisory Military Group would be made available to advise and assist the ROK in maintaining a defense force.

The problem of neutralization would apparently require further action by the General Assembly. NSC 81/1,[1] paragraph 30, provides that "the U.S. should recommend that the UN Commission should consider the desirability of permanent neutralization of Korea accompanied by political undertakings by the ROK and by other states separately, including the U.S.S.R., to refrain from any aggression. The question of a UN guarantee should be studied but no U.S. commitment on this point should be made at this stage".

[1] Dated September 9, p. 712.

It may be that if a "uniting for peace" resolution is passed by the General Assembly,[2] and if the Republic of Korea is admitted to the United Nations, the obligations thereby assumed might be considered as making unnecessary special international commitments with regard to Korea. It would be unlikely that either Communist China or the U.S.S.R. would participate in political undertakings to guarantee the neutrality of Korea and therefore an attempt to obtain such guarantee from Korea's neighbors would accomplish little more than a propaganda objective.

Since Mr. Santa Cruz of Chile has raised the question of a UN guarantee it seems that we might indicate our sympathy with a general discussion of this problem by the Interim Committee. However we might take the position that this is a question which will merit careful consideration and must be thought of in connection with other action which may be taken by the UN, such as the "uniting for peace" resolution, and the progress of the Commission's work in bringing about the unification of Korea.

[2] The "Uniting for Peace" resolution was approved by the U.N. General Assembly on November 3 as Resolution 377 (V); for related documentation, see vol. II, pp. 303 ff.

790.00/10–1750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

THE HAGUE, October 17, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received October 17—12 : 57 p. m.]

565. Foreign Office says Chargé Peking reports initial reaction Truman–MacArthur meeting as final phase leading US aggression against Chinese Communist Government. Chargé based observation of Peking press and conversations his acquaintances and "presumes that it also reflects attitude Chinese Communist Government officials".

Chargé also reports October 11 Peking press renewed attacks on US, charging US aggression Korea, imperialism, et cetera. Viewed this with significance since followed October tenth warning (third warning) Chou En-lai Chinese Communist Government would not sit by while North Korea "invaded".

CHAPIN

320/10–1750 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 17, 1950—7 p. m.

Gadel 51. Re Delga 123, Oct. 13. Chilean reps specific questions both relate to field where observation, study and recommendation by UNCURK is sought in order to furnish guidance for UN decisions on these matters. Dept agrees your suggestion that with establishment UNCURK imminent, Interim Committee on Korea shld avoid formulation any fixed attitude toward these matters. Chilean question re size Korean army and possible guarantee Korean frontiers by UN will be subject separate message in near future. Dept current thinking on question elections south of 38th parallel may be communicated informally to individual members Interim Committee. It is as follows:

Dept believes UN shld recognize continuing validity mandate ROK Natl Assembly members on grounds (*a*) ROK is sovereign state and in last analysis is clearly entitled to insist on unobstructed exercise sovereign will within territory where GA has recognized its effective jurisdiction and control; (*b*) these reps were chosen in free elections democratic character of which has already been attested by UNCOK.

Individual members Interim Committee may be interested in fol additional circumstances:

(*a*) While composition surviving body Natl Assembly reps not yet clear, there is no occasion to assume that they are by any means mere puppets of Rhee administration.

(*b*) Competent American observers recently returned from Korea report prestige ROK govt among people markedly enhanced through reoccupation Seoul. Precipitate action by IC before thorough study by UNCURK might adversely affect UN prestige in eyes these Koreans.

On other hand if friendly persuasion by UNCURK were to lead ROK to agree re desirability new national elections over entire territory, Dept wld not object to such ROK decision. ROK might itself derive from this course advantage that present surviving National Assembly members shld be able face electorate with confidence in view excellent records during dark days. Seizing favorable opportunity, they wld in most cases renew and extend mandates.

Dept considers that it will be up to UNCURK, if after due study it finds complete national elections greatly preferable, to win ROK acquiescence this course.

ACHESON

795.00/10–1750 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

HONG KONG, October 17, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received October 17—11 : 02 p. m.]

814. Hong Kong source furnished following report it considers reliable. Chinese Communist Party central authorities October 3 transmitted to Communist Party Municipal Committee Peking document with contents as follows:

1. With voluntary withdrawal Korean [People's] Army from Seoul September 30 war entered new stage.
2. During initial stage Korean peoples army made splendid record annihilating over 70,000 American-Rhee bandit troops and liberating over 95 percent Korean population and territory.
3. Present stage analyzed as follows:

a. Korean war has become long and exhausting one from which American imperialists will be unable extricate themselves.

b. Korean Army unbeaten and remains powerful force gaining recruits at home and abroad. Although it has abandoned certain territory it has gained enormously in strength.

c. Almost all American military forces in Far East committed in Korea and US will be unable send replacements for some time. UN also unable send more troops so in long exhausting war aggressors bound to be defeated.

d. As war becomes more difficult all Koreans become more firmly united behind Kim Il-sung.

e. Fighting will become more fierce every day. People's army will fight for every inch of ground but realizes outcome of war not dependent on possession or loss of a city. It can withdraw from Pyongyang as it did from Seoul. PLA abandonment Yenan is precedent this sort of action.

f. We predict Korean peoples army, with sympathy and support all peace-loving people, particularly people of China, will undoubtedly win final victory.

Comment: Document has ring of authenticity and strengthens opinion formed by Consulate General from study of recent public statements by Chinese Communist leaders that military support of North Koreans by Peking will be limited to covert assistance. Reference to

recruits from "abroad" suggests assistance will include enlistment of Koreans from Manchuria.[1]

Repeated information Taipei 90.

WILKINSON

[1] Telegram 856, October 20, from Hong Kong, not printed, transmitted information on the receipt of a report, evaluated F–3, on an emergency meeting in Peking during the previous week at which Communist China decided to participate in the Korean War. The report also said that 400,000 Communist troops were on the border, alerted to cross into Korea by October 20. (746G.00(W)/10–2050)

Editorial Note

On October 17, President Truman delivered a nationwide radio address at 11:30 p. m. (EST) from San Francisco. He reported on his meeting with General MacArthur at Wake Island, reiterated the desire of the United States for a unified, independent government for Korea, and stated that the United States had no aggressive design in Korea or any other place in the Far East. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, page 673.)

795.00/10–1850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1950—8 p. m.

214. To Muccio. Re msg from Gen MacArthur to Pres Truman transmitting, with comment bearing your concurrence, text tel from Pres Rhee.[1] Fol are Dept's comments:

From other tels recd here, it appears Rhee's concern re Resolution adopted Oct 12 by Kor Interim Comite may have been partially occasioned by incomplete info.

View here is that only two fundamental questions possible issue between UN and GOK are:

(1) Immediate and automatic extension authority GOK to territory north of 38th parallel and

(2) Holding of new elections throughout all Kor.

[1] See telegram CX66554 from Tokyo, received at 3:45 a. m. on October 16, p. 963.

With regard first point, UN and US are in agreement that jurisdiction GOK does not automatically extend over North Kor and, therefore, it is function of UN Comm to arrange for election and other constituent acts required to unify the country. For Interim Comite Resolution is essentially concerned with assignment provisional responsibility for govt those parts of Kor not hitherto recognized by UN as being under effective control GOK. Interim Comite Resolution unanimously advised Unified Command assume this responsibility. Dept considers position Kor Interim Comite as expressed in Resolution compatible with previous resolutions and commitments UN re Kor.

Dept has noted neither Emb nor CINCFE in commenting on draft directive (WAR tel to CINCFE 93721, Oct 9[2]) has raised objection to gen principle that Unified Command assume responsibility of govt north of 38th parallel pending further consideration this problem and consultation among several authorities involved.

Recommendations Interim Comite Resolution provide basis for Unified Command assume this responsibility and are expressly indicated as being of provisional character pending arrival in Kor of UNCURK which is to consult Rhee these matters and to subj them detailed study on spot.

Certainly no intention "protect and revive Communism in north". On contrary, Interim Comite Resolution seeks to assure close supervision by members of forces serving under Unified Command in Kor of all authorities established for civilian administration. This is contemplated in draft directive wherein NK civilian authorities now functioning wld be left in office only at discretion of CG, who wld consult with ROK and UNCURK. CG wld be authorized retain, remove, or appoint officials on all levels govt and directed dissolve so-called Democratic People's Republic and prohibit all activities by groups which may be inimical to purposes UN occupation.

With regard questions of elections, Interim Comite Resolution does not touch upon question except in preambulatory second para which merely quotes Section 1, Para (*b*) of GA Resolution Oct 7 on Kor. Dept views re elections in ROK have been set forth in subsequent tel to USUN which is being rptd to you.[3]

Pres Rhee and other high officials of ROK will have ample opportunity discuss these matters in detail with UNCURK before any

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[2] See footnote 2 to the draft paper prepared by the Department of the Army, dated October 3, p. 857.

[3] Telegram 216 to Seoul, not printed, repeated the text of telegram Gadel 51, October 17, 7 p. m., to New York, p. 975.

recommendations of definitive character reached by that body. Dept hopes you will be able persuade Pres Rhee of advantages of calmness and moderation.

ACHESON

795.00/10–1850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 18, 1950—8 p. m.

PRIORITY

215. To Muccio. Ref Deptel 214 Oct 18. Dept seriously concerned over Seoul UP press Oct 17 quoted No. 210, Oct 18.[1] If this press report has basis in fact and if Rhee insists upon outright defiance of principles laid down by UN looking toward effective and equitable solution to problem unification Kor through orderly processes, US Govt will be placed in position where it will be increasingly difficult if not impossible to continue its support and defense of Rhee administration in UN and elsewhere against pressure, in many quarters, for holding new elections throughout Kor. Dept has consistently sought to support principle that, since status ROK Govt already defined by UNGA, validity elections held by it under UNCOK observation shld not now be questioned.

Members of Interim Comite were particularly incensed over press despatch under ref and it was only with great difficulty that the US Del succeeded in preventing IC from taking precipitate action. Repetition of such reports wld unquestionably create a situation prejudicial to Govt ROK interest.

If facts bear out news despatch, suggest you urgently discuss with Pres grave dangers inherent in any line of arbitrary action which cld conflict with UN policy toward Kor and point out to him that such

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[1] The portion of the telegram under reference quoted as follows the UP despatch from Seoul:

"Synghman Rhee, President of South Korea, said today his government is sending civil administrators into liberated areas of North Korea, despite United Nations action to limit his authority to the South.

" 'The Korean people have a sovereign right to set up their own government', he said.

"Rhee criticized adoption of a U.N. Korean interim commission resolution restricting activities of his government to the area south of the 38th parallel and calling for nation-wide elections. He said he believed the Koreans were being sabotaged in the U.N.

"He admitted he is sending governors for five northern provinces. They were appointed by Rhee and have been functioning in Seoul for the last two years.

" 'This is only a temporary measure', he said. 'If the governors are unpopular with the people or unfit for their jobs, they will be replaced', he added." (795.00/10–1850)

course will seriously undermine position we have adopted in supporting him in UN and elsewhere. In addition we fear that such action on his part will tend to alienate friendly world opinion toward ROK.

Pls inform Dept urgently results any discussions which you may have with Rhee re foregoing.

If you consider that Rhee likely continue act in disregard UN policy on unification, suggest you consult with Gen MacArthur as to what steps might be taken by him as CINCUNC with responsibility for administration NK to prevent unwarranted exercise of ROK authority north of 38th parallel. Dept considers it of utmost importance that UN receive full and complete cooperation of Kors in program for future. Present is critical time in UN deliberations on problem when hasty or ill-considered actions by ROK cld have most disastrous effect.

ACHESON

793.001/10–250

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Assistance (Burns)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 19, 1950.

MY DEAR GENERAL BURNS: Officers of the Department have been in informal contact with your office concerning our views on the intentions of the Chinese Communist regime as interpreted by Indian observers, but I am confirming them in writing in reply to your letter of October 2, 1950.[1]

It is difficult to reach firm conclusions respecting the intentions of the Chinese Communists with respect to Korea and Indochina. The Department has given consideration to the various views of other governments with respect to the reports coming out of Peiping, together with all information available from other sources. In brief, the Department believes that (1) it cannot safely be assumed that the Chinese Communists in their several recent statements—public and private—were simply bluffing; (2) they possess the military capability to intervene in Korea, and Soviet and Chinese interests (that is, the interests of world Communism) in that area are such that they may have determined to do so. However, the most favorable moment for such overt intervention seems to have passed; and current estimates of Soviet global intentions and the history of outside Communist military participation in revolutionary movements in other countries alike lead to the estimate that such intervention, if it occurs, will be (*a*) limited in amount and (*b*) nominally covert instead of

[1] Not printed.

overt. This last conclusion is supported by our assumptions, based on evidence received from various sources, that the Peiping regime wishes to be admitted to the United Nations, and that the defeats suffered by the North Koreans in their aggression will logically have reduced any desire of the Chinese Communist regime to clash head-on with the armed forces of nations united within the framework of the UN.

There has been some question regarding the political sympathies and biases of the Indian Ambassador in Peiping, Mr. K. M. Panikkar, and his accuracy and objectivity as a reporter are subject to question. The Department is bringing up to date its biographic report of June 20, 1950 respecting him, copies of which were supplied the Department of Defense. I shall send you a copy of the revised report as soon as it is completed.[2]

While telegrams the Department has received concerning the intentions of the Chinese Communists have already been made available to you, there is attached as of possible use a summary of such reports.[2]

Sincerely yours, H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

[2] Not printed.

795.00/10–1950

Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs (Snow) to the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 19, 1950.

Subject: Permanent Neutralization of Korea

1. You refer[1] L/FE to NSC 81/1, September 9, 1950, paragraph 30 of which reads in part: "The United States should recommend that the United Nations Commission should consider the desirability of *permanent neutralization* of Korea accompanied by political undertakings by the R.O.K. and by other states separately, including the U.S.S.R., to refrain from any aggression. The question of United Nations guarantee should be studied but no United States commitment on this point should be made at this stage." You request a legal comment on this proposal.

2. *The Meaning of Permanent Neutralization*

The proposal is in effect that Korea be made a "neutralized state". A "neutralized state" is defined by Oppenheim as "a State whose independence and integrity are for all future time guaranteed by an

[1] See the memorandum by Emmerson, October 16, p. 972.

international convention of the Powers, under the condition that such State binds itself never to take up arms against any other State except for defense against attack, and never to enter into such international obligations as would indirectly involve it in war". 1 Oppenheim 217. The terms "independence and integrity" of course imply inviolability of territory, and Oppenheim holds that it follows from neutralization that the neutralized State can neither cede a part of its territory nor acquire new territory without the consent of the Powers. The creation of a "neutralized state" should be distinguished from neutralization of parts of states, rivers, canals etc (such as the Dardanelles); from protection in time of war arranged in special conventions for certain establishments (as the International Red Cross); from unilateral declarations that a State will always remain neutral (Iceland and the Holy See); and from undertakings made by bilateral treaty for a State to remain neutral if another State engages in war.

3. *Examples of Neutralized States*

There are only three examples of "neutralized states" in modern history,—Switzerland, Belgium and Luxemburg. Switzerland was neutralized by the Congress of Vienna, March 30, 1815 (reaffirmed after Waterloo, November 20, 1815). Switzerland acceded on May 27, 1815, and has since always succeeded in maintaining its neutrality. Belgium was neutralized by the Treaty of London, November 15, 1831, renewed at London, April 19, 1839. Its neutrality was violated in 1914, when Germany attacked, and was abrogated by the post-war treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon, and by the Locarno Pact of December 1, 1925. Luxemburg was neutralized at the Conference at London, May 11, 1867. Its neutrality was likewise violated in 1914. The neutralization of the Independent State of the Congo in 1885 has been considered a fourth example, but appears to have been an undertaking to respect the neutrality of a territorial area rather than a State and embraced no guarantees. It was terminated by annexation on the part of Belgium in 1907.

4. *Object and Effectiveness of Neutralization*

The object of neutralization of states appears to have been peace between the Great Powers, by eliminating the neutralized State as 1) a potential enemy on the border, 2) an avenue of approach for a hostile Power, or as 3) territory available for geographic expansion on the part of adjoining Powers. The effectiveness of the device appears to have been in inverse ratio to its necessity. In other words, in the case of Switzerland, where the physical nature of the terrain and the resolute character of the State, determined to maintain by force its

independence, its integrity and its neutrality, made neutralization by international convention unnecessary, it was entirely effective. In Luxemburg, on the other hand, where neither the terrain, nor the size and resolution of the State were of such a nature as to secure its own neutrality, international neutralization was entirely ineffective in the hour of crisis. Even in Belgium, where the resolution and military powers of the State in 1914 were sufficient to hold up the German invasion long enough to save the day for France, the nature and strategic location of the terrain was such as to invite violation of the international convention and to make the international neutralization nugatory. It must be concluded that neutralization, so far as history goes, has entirely failed of its purpose. It has not had any effective influence in maintaining peace between the Great Powers, or even in protecting the neutralized State from invasion.

5. *Compatibility of Neutralization with the Principle of the United Nations*

On February 20, 1920, a Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations affirmed that the conception of neutrality on the part of members of the League is incompatible with the principle that all members will be obliged to cooperate in enforcing respect for their engagements. Nevertheless the Resolution recognized that Switzerland was in a unique situation based on a tradition of several centuries that has been explicitly incorporated in the Law of Nations. Accordingly it was found that the perpetual neutralization of Switzerland was justified in the interest of general peace and compatible with the Covenant.

It is believed by L/FE that neutralization, as a system of conventional guarantee against war or the spread of war, is equally incompatible with the concept of the United Nations. The political and territorial security of nations today is being sought in the guarantees afforded by the collective force of all nations, brought to bear against an aggressor nation. The neutralization of a single potential member of the United Nations adds nothing to the security of that State against wanton aggression, which is already guaranteed by the United Nations, but subtracts from the power of the United Nations to enforce its guarantee. It not only removes the neutralized State from the roll of the United Nations that stand ready to oppose and punish an aggressor (unless the aggression happens to be directed against the neutralized state itself), but it may also hamper action against an aggressor State by preventing access to the aggressor across the territory and territorial waters, and the air above them, of the neutralized State. This would be potentially true of any proposition, for instance, to remove Belgium from the Atlantic Union and transform her again

into a neutralized State. It may be equally obvious should the Soviet Union or China become an aggressor, and the United Nations desire to project their defensive action across Korea.

357.AD/10–1650

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Assistance (Burns)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 20, 1950.

DEAR GENERAL BURNS: The President has requested that the following message be transmitted from him to General MacArthur:

"I have received your message of October 16 transmitting a message from President Syngman Rhee. I have reason to believe that President Rhee's initial reaction to the Resolution, adopted on October 12 by the Interim Committee on Korea, may have been based upon incomplete and inaccurate press reports as well as lack of full information concerning the exact purport of the Resolution.

"I understand that his Foreign Minister, who is now in the United States, has endeavored to clarify the situation for President Rhee and to correct apparent misunderstandings. Further information in this regard is being transmitted to you and Ambassador Muccio."

It would therefore be appreciated if the foregoing message could be transmitted to General MacArthur by the facilities of the Department of Defense.

Sincerely yours, H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

795B.00/10–2050: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, October 20, 1950.
PRIORITY [Received October 20—11:01 p. m.]

278. ReDeptel 206, October 17 [1] and WAR 93721, October 9.[2] I recommend that first and second phases of occupation North Korea envisaged be contracted to shortest possible period, that barest minimum civil administrative structure be set up and that elections be held soonest—not later than early in January. I had good fortune

[1] Not printed; it requested Muccio's comments as soon as possible on the draft directive for the governance of North Korea (795B.00/10–1450).

[2] See footnote 2 to the draft paper prepared by the Department of the Army dated October 3, p. 857.

being able to exchange views with General MacArthur to and from Wake and am confident this goes along with his thinking.

Since my return from Wake I have had protracted discussions with President Rhee and also with PriMin, HoMin and Chairman National Assembly. As a result I am satisfied that little disposition exists to question need retaining complete supreme authority North Korea in CINCUNC during occupation period. Mere thought that local North Korean civil authorities courts and police might be used for maintenance of law and order to maximum extent which military necessity permits has jarred Korean officials more than idea that Government ROK might be ignored by UN in achieving unification. However, I consider questioning UNC advisability retention local and provincial governments academic. Local and provincial governments in considerable portion of North Korea thus far liberated disappeared prior to arrival UN forces. As previously reported, I cannot conceive of any governmental machinery at national, provincial, or local levels being found anywhere in north. CINCUNC will therefore have to designate individuals to conduct necessary civil activities. Precise requirements for phases one and two cannot be foreseen and no attempt should be made to prescribe specific blue prints for such a complex operation. CINCUNC must be given widest latitude and discretion in establishment of peace and security measures without imposing on people of North Korea a complete governmental structure during this brief period.

I felt that understanding and spirit of mutual respect existing between Government of ROK, CINCUNC and this Embassy will facilitate eventual unification. President Rhee has agreed to avoid further public comment re authority in north and will send no officials or police north except as may be called forward by CINCUNC. Only police that have thus far gone north have been units attached to and operating with UN army organizations or such police detachments as have been required to safeguard fixed installations—all with concurrence EUSAK.

Re 4*c*:[3] State should not formally designate representative as political advisor North Korea. When and if needed Embassy can act in advisory capacity informally thereby avoiding accentuating impression that endeavor here is really primarily US.

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[3] This paragraph of telegram WAR 93721 read as follows:

"The Dept of State will designate a representative as your political advisor for North Korea." ["Your" referred to General MacArthur.]

Re paragraph 7,[4] "individual right": I concur that mere membership in any political party should not subject individuals to prosecution or reprisal. However, no member of Communist party or of its political affiliates or official of the North Korean regimes should be permitted to hold office during phases one and two. Continuance of any such individual in civil administrative positions would *ipso facto* give him a privileged position since no non-Communist organizations permitted North Korea past five years.

Repeated information Tokyo unnumbered.

MUCCIO

[4] This paragraph of telegram WAR 93721 read as follows:

"The mere fact that an indiv is or was a member of the armed forces of the North Korean Government, an ofl of that government or any local government, or a member of any political party will not subject him to prosecution or reprisal and will not, by that reason alone, bar him from office or employment. You will apprehend and hold for trial by aprop tribunals, in accordance with the law and customs of war, all persons who are or may be charged with atrocities or violations of the law and customs of war."

793.00/10–2150: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, October 21, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received October 21—1:59 p. m.]

963. Embassy officer has been given information by UK HICOM officer and shown telegrams sent to Foreign Office London covering recent conversations with Bajpai re China, particularly various reports of Chinese Communists military moves against Tibet.[1] This information indicated that Bajpai had expressed great indignation that CPR authorities, after GOI had gone to such lengths not only to prove India's friendly feelings for China but to expose their cause in UN and before world, should completely mislead GOI re CPR intentions in matter of 38th parallel. GOI had acted in good faith in matter toward other friendly nations only to be placed in invidious position of cats paw for Soviet-CPR maneuvers. Bajpai intimated that CPR statements had led GOI to take attitude toward UN action on 38th parallel and Korean Commission that it would not have taken had it doubted CPR statements or not been so informed by CPR.

Bajpai went on to say if CPR, after such conduct, should now invade Tibet or resort to brazen pressure tactics to force Tibet submission (after assurance GOI its desire for peaceful settlement) that GOI would be constrained to make most forceful representations.

[1] Armed forces of the People's Republic of China entered Tibet on October 7, but no announcement was made from Peking until October 25; for related documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.

UK HICOM officer stated that Menon, Foreign Secretary, who tends share Panikkar views toward China, has likewise expressed himself in strong terms on CPR action in above matters.

Embassy's British informant expressed view that Indians have had salutory experience with CPR which he thought might considerably influence GOI attitude in future where CPR involved.

HENDERSON

693.95/10–2150 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 21, 1950—3 p. m.

228. For ur info fol is text of letter transmitted from State to Defense today.

"In view of the possibility that the Chi Commies may take some precipitate action with re to the Suiho Hydroelectric power plant on the Yalu River near Sinuiju, it is suggested that Gen MacArthur make a special report to the SC to the effect that it is the intent of the Unified Command not to interfere in any way with the present operations of the plant and the existing arrangements for the distribution of electric power. Gen MacArthur's report might go on to state that he presumes that upon its arrival in Korea the UN Comm for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea will consult with all interested parties on this and the many other problems which will come before the Comm.

"It is believed desirable that Gen MacArthur and Amb Muccio consult with Pres Rhee with re to this action. It will be necessary that Pres Rhee understand the importance of doing everything possible to avoid a clash with Chi Commie forces at this time. The preservation of the *status quo* for the time being will not be derogatory to the auth of the ROK and, it is hoped, will make possible the consideration by the UN Comm of the problem of the Suiho dam as well as numerous other border issues which will inevitably arise."

ACHESON

357.AD/10–2150 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 21, 1950—3 p. m.

230. Fol tel recd from USDelGA Oct 19:

"Romulo has given USUN copy of draft resolution which he has presented informally to interim comite on Korea. He states he is not pressing for its adoption until he has had the opinion of Unified Command and that he is willing to accept any suggested changes. However, Romulo feels it important, in view of press statements by Rhee that

IC take some action on 'high planes' and in gen terms which will lay the basis for work of permanent comm when it arrives in Korea. Text of draft res has in gen been taken from statement by Ross to IC last week.[1]

The Austral and Turk representatives on IC have taken stand against any res but Romulo feels strongly that one is necessary, even a very short one.

While in gen, USUN sees no great objection to draft res, para 3 does raise question of relationship to Unified Command and cld perhaps be eliminated or amended. Romulo states that next mtg of IC is sched for Sat morning, Oct 21, but that he will postpone meeting if US not ready to comment on draft res by that time. Romulo wld appreciate Gen MacArthur's comments.

Fol is text of draft res:

'The interim comite on Korea:

'Considering the res of the GA of 12 Dec 1948, 21 Oct 1949, and 7 Oct 1950:

'Desirous of clarifying the principles that have been set forth in the above-mentioned res regarding the future Gov of Korea declares:

'1. That the measures necessary for the estab of a unified, independent and democratic Gov in the sovereign state of Korea shall be determined by the UN Comm for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, acting on behalf of the UN, after due consultation with the Gov of the Rep of Korea and with responsible elements in North Korea, and taking into acct all the relevant factors of the situation:

'2. That it is incumbent upon the UN, acting through its agencies in the field, the Unified Command and the UN Comm for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, to assist the Korean people in solving their problems and to discharge its responsibilities to all the people of Korea, exercising the requisite authority for that purpose until the unification of the country shall have been achieved under an independent and democratic Gov of all Korea;

'3. That, while making due allowance for the exigencies of mil operations and the necessity of maintaining law and order, a substitute for the central north Korean regime shld be estabd and *de facto* provincial and local govs reactivated as soon as possible under UN supervision and control, utilizing for this purpose, so far as may prove practicable and desirable, the services of responsible, trustworthy and cooperative elements in north Korea;

'4. That there should be as little change as possible in the fundamental political, economic and social structure which is found in North Korea, maintaining the land reform measures and the nationalized or socialized industries in their present status until such time as the Korean people, acting through their duly

[1] See footnote 1 to telegram Delga 123 from New York, received at 9:26 p. m. on October 13, p. 943.

constituted national Gov, are in a position to decide for themselves what changes are to be made, if any, and to determine the future of their country;

'Invites the full and whole-hearted coop of the people and Gov of the Rep of Korea and of the people of North Korea in carrying out the measures and objectives above set forth;

'Resolves to transmit this declaration to the Unified Command with the request that its contents be made known to the people and Gov of the Rep of Korea and to the people of North Korea by every possible means.' "

Since Romulo has indicated desire Gen MacArthur's comments, these have been requested by Defense.

Dept does not favor introduction res this type at present for fol reasons: Res wld openly and irrevocably commit IC and UN to adopt detailed policies and course of action re future Korea as outlined. Furthermore, it foreseen res containing firm declarations along these lines wld further aggravate and strengthen ROK protestations and uncooperative attitude toward ultimate solution Korea proposed by UN. Open defiance by ROK of program continued [*contained*] in res fol its publication wld place UN and particularly IC in difficult position. While Dept generally supports principles outlined in res which are, in many respects, similar to those embodied in North Korea Civil Affairs Directive (WAR 93721 Oct 9), it believes res already passed on Korea gives ample authority for adoption necessary policies and actions looking toward solution to Korean problem without dangerous restrictions to freedom of action which proposed res wld impose upon future course in Korea. Although formal IC res along foregoing lines considered undesirable, suggest possibility advantage might be gained by Muccio providing Rhee and ROK privately with statement of principles involved and in seeking their acquiescence in and cooperation with such principles.

Dept wld appreciate Muccio's comments on foregoing soonest.

ACHESON

611.002/10–2150: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Barbour) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, October 21, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received October 21—8:36 p. m.]

901. Am informed that in recent Peking interview with Panikkar and their [*three?*] Scandinavian Chiefs of Mission Vice Foreign Minister Chang Han-fu said he convinced US planning preventive war. Panikkar agreed adding that proof lies in continued tenure Matthews as Navy Secretary.

Source this information who claims it comes reliable sub-source said Scandinavians shocked by Panikkar's general sympathy with Chinese Communists.

Department pass Delhi. Repeated info Delhi 43.

BARBOUR

795B.00/10–2150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SEOUL, October 21, 1950.
[Received October 21—11:49 p. m.]

284. ReDeptel 215, October 18. In addition to several discussions subject matter reftel with President, as reported Embtel 278, October 20, same subject discussed by Noble with President Rhee lengthily today. His views transmitted for background information are essentially as follows:

(1) GOK determined act accordance with UNCOK throughout.

(2) Impossible expect former refugees from North Korea not go home; in that case they should be expected play significant role North Korea, and they are ROK citizens.

(3) President does not insist on his appointment officials in North Korea. He does want some statement, either from me, from MacArthur, or UN Commission that UNCURK will come to Korea to observe conduct elections in accordance with desires Korean people in free atmosphere. He states he is entirely willing accept results such elections if they are not previously prejudiced by appointment Communists to positions power from which they can control eventual elections results.

(4) He is unalterably opposed to use by UN military authorities of Communists, former Communists, or former Communist government machinery for rule in North Korea, however temporary.

(5) As regards provincial governors mentioned in UP story, he said they were appointed long before war; if they go north they do so on own responsibility; for them to gain or maintain power they must secure support and approval of local inhabitants. He says they will not be going as GOK officials. President says he has ordered investigation what persons of North Korea origin would be acceptable for various North Korean posts, including governorships; that he relies primarily for such information on North Korean organizations long established in South; says are such organizations for every North Korean province. When he has this information he will supply it to CINCUNC, perhaps three names for each potential post, for selection and appointment.

(6) GOK should not be expected to act completely accord with UN Interim Committee decisions if GOK not previously consulted, since GOK obviously interested party.

(7) GOK unalterably opposed establishment any military government North Korea; Rhee alleges there are former USAMGIK officers

in Seoul already engaged recruiting staff for such service from among persons formerly serving them who actually are hostile to ROK.

Subsequent conversation disclosed President possessed copy EUSAK top secret document re administration North Korea, dated October 9, "Civil Affairs Order 26 A".[1] Conversation disclosed his knowledge contents this document was chief source of concern and his fear Communists would be retained and possibly restored to power in some cases in North Korea, or that no attention would be paid to interests or desires of ROK. I believe were it not for President Rhee's knowledge contents this document, which Rhee said was generally known in Korean Government and whose contents he feared would speedily become known to Communists, that he would not have become so upset as to make declarations which have been construed as being defiance of principles laid down by UN looking forward towards proper solution Korean question.

Repeated info Tokyo unnumbered.

MUCCIO

[1] Reference is to the draft directive on the governance of North Korea; see footnote 2 to the draft paper by the Department of the Army, October 3, p. 857.

795.00/10–2250 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, 22 October 1950.
[Received October 22—5 : 03 a. m.]

C–67154. Urmsg JCS 94799.[1] . . . I do not believe it advisable to issue any statement with ref future opns of the Suiho Hydroelectric Power Plant near Sinuiju, at least until it is under our control and we have had the opportunity to determine the disposition being made of its power output. There would certainly be no intent on the part of this Comd to disturb any peaceful and reasonable application of this power supply and it would be repugnant to destructively interrupt any constructive uses to which it is being applied. If, however, this power is being utilized in furtherance of potentially hostile military purposes through the manufacture of munitions of war or there is a diversion of it from the minimum peaceful reqmts of the Korean people, most serious doubts would at once arise as to our justification for maintaining the *status quo*. Moreover, I do not believe it advisable for this Comd

[1] Not printed, but see telegram 228 to Seoul, transmitted at 3 p.m. on October 21, p. 987.

publicly to predict the future policies, decisions and actions of the UN Commission for unification and rehabilitation of Korea, at least without consultation with its membership. To do so could not fail to arouse international resentment at the unilateral action involved and might well impute the US in the eyes of the Korean people responsibility for the initiation of obnoxious and distasteful measures. For these reasons I believe that it would be inadvisable for the UN Comd to issue any statement on this matter at this time.

611.95A241/10–2350

Memorandum for the Files by the Acting Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs (Reinhardt)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 23, 1950.

Subject: Effort to Assist American and other UN Prisoners-of-war in North Korea.

Recent reports from Korea have indicated that United Nations prisoners-of-war were being subjected to the most brutal treatment at the hands of their North Korean captors. The latest reports indicate that many of the POW's were being forced to accompany North Korean units in their withdrawal toward the western and northern borders of Korea under conditions which have already caused many of them to lose their lives. The impending final collapse of North Korean resistance and the possibility that the POW's might either be exterminated by the North Koreans as a final gesture of defiance or alternatively taken across the frontiers into communist Manchuria or the Soviet Union have rendered it imperative that a serious effort be made to protect UN POW's at this critical juncture.

Despite the improbability that the Soviet Government would agree to exercise any influence in this matter and the probability that any approach to the Soviet Government by this Government would only meet with a crude rebuff, it was nevertheless felt that the circumstances outlined above dictated that these risks be run even if there were only a remote chance that thereby some amelioration in the situation of the POW could be achieved.

On Saturday, October 21, EE drafted a telegram for the Embassy in Moscow, instructing the Chargé d'Affaires to seek an immediate interview with the Acting Foreign Minister and to request of the Soviet Government, which had diplomatic relations with the North Korean authorities, its good offices in this matter. He was to point out the gross mistreatment which the POW was suffering and its sharp contrast to the treatment being accorded the POW held by UN forces,

who were being detained under conditions as prescribed in the latest Geneva Convention, and to whom representatives of the International Red Cross have regular access. He was to refer to General MacArthur's surrender terms of October 1 and request that the Soviet Government use its good offices to the end that UN POW's would receive treatment equal to the humane treatment accorded North Korean prisoners.

This message was approved by Messrs. Matthews and Jessup. Mr. Lovett [1] thought it was an excellent idea and perceived no objection to it himself but requested that before transmission it be cleared with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Bradley, whom it was not possible to reach until late in the afternoon, was of the opinion that such a direct approach to the Soviet Government would run a very great risk of rebuff and that in view of our general policy of handling matters of this kind arising out of the Korean conflict only through the United Nations, this *démarche* as well should be made through that channel.

Following consultation with USUN, in the course of which the Department stressed the importance that if this undertaking was to have any success it must be handled in the strictest confidence and with speed, the Department was informed that Senator Austin agreed that this was a matter which should be handled through the UN and was of the opinion that the Secretariat General rather than any other organ of the USUN would be the appropriate channel. In view of Mr. Lie's delicate position at the moment it was believed that M. Cordier, the Assistant Secretary General, would be the appropriate channel through which to approach the Soviet Delegation. Mr. Gross discussed the matter with M. Cordier Saturday night and the latter agreed to take it up the following day with Mr. Malik.

This morning Mr. Maffitt of USUN telephoned to report that Cordier had taken the following steps: Sunday morning he had telephoned M. Ruegger, head of the International Red Cross, Geneva, to ascertain whether the latter had any new information with respect to the POW situation in Korea. M. Ruegger said he had nothing beyond what was published in the press but that the IRC was very distressed and concerned by these reports and, since it had not succeeded in getting representatives into North Korea, was most desirous that the UN do anything it could to improve the situation. With this conversation as additional backing, M. Cordier proceeded to call on Mr. Malik, with whom he spent an hour and a half Sunday afternoon. He told him that although he was speaking quite confidentially and personally, he was conveying the earnest desire of the UN, the UN Command and the IRC that the Soviet Government, in view of its diplomatic relations with the North Korean authorities, use its good offices to improve the treat-

[1] Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett.

ment of POW's in North Korean hands. This was a matter which world opinion took most seriously. After lengthy discussion, which included a good deal of Soviet fencing, Mr. Malik agreed to take the matter up with Mr. Vyshinski but refused to give any commitment beyond that. Finally, Mr. Maffitt stated that USUN would submit a full report [2] of M. Cordier's conversation with Mr. Malik and of course report any development which might result therefrom.[3]

[2] Not printed.

[3] On October 30, Mr. Reinhardt drew up the following memorandum for the files:

"Mr. Maffitt (USUN) telephoned this morning to report the following on this subject:

"At Mr. Maffitt's request M. Cordier had had another conversation with Mr. Malik, apparently on Saturday, October 28, at which Malik told him that he had taken the matter up immediately with Vyshinski following the original conversation and that they had sent off a message to Moscow on the subject. As yet there had been no reply from Moscow. Cordier thanked Malik for his cooperation and again emphasized the importance of the matter and the closeness with which it was being followed by world opinion. He also took the opportunity to leave with Malik a copy of an International Red Cross appeal on this subject which has apparently just been released. . . ." (611.95A241/10–3050)

795.00/10–2350 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CLEAR WASHINGTON, October 23, 1950—6 p. m.

232. For your information, following is text UP Dispatch, October 23:

"Syngman Rhee, President of the Korean Republic, said today that he is assuming temporary civil control of all Korea despite United Nations efforts to limit his authority to the south until elections can be held.

"Rhee said in a copyrighted interview telephoned from Korea to *U.S. News and World Report* that he is sending governors into the north Korean provinces with 'temporary' commissions to establish his authority there.

"He said his South Korean Army and police will sample public opinion in the northern provinces and that the governors will be given permanent appointments if the people approve.

" 'If the people say the north and south should have a general election,' he added, 'It will be carried out'.

"Rhee said he still has not received official word that the United Nations General Assembly wants UN control over North Korea until elections are held.

"He said the UN 'has no reason to insist on controlling North Korea until the elections.'

"In any event, he added, the UN's only role in any Korean elections should be that of 'observer'. Otherwise, he warned, Communist propagandists could label the Korean Government a 'puppet' of the UN.

"Rhee asserted that his regime has popular support in both North and South Korea and that 'factional groups in the United States' have circulated 'false stories' to discredit him. He did not identify the groups."

ACHESON

795.00/10–2150 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 23, 1950—6 p. m.

234. Difficult reconcile statements Rhee made to Emb as reported urtel 278, Oct 20 and 284, Oct 21, with his purported interview with *US News and World Report* summarized immediate preceding tel.[1] Needless to say, publication interview will again exacerbate relations between UN and Govt ROK and cannot but operate disadvantage Govt of ROK.

Suggest you strongly urge to Rhee desirability immediately making carefully studied public statement containing points 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, mentioned urtel 284.

Point 6 shld be expressed in terms difficulty GOK intelligently cooperating with Interim Comite decisions unless consulted with regard thereto.[2]

ACHESON

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[1] Reference is to telegram 232 to Seoul, *supra*.

[2] The following message was sent to Seoul in telegram 239, October 24, 7 p. m.:

"With further ref Deptel 234 Oct 23 any such statement by Rhee shld under point 6 take into account (*a*) provisional character of Korean IC Oct 12 res, pending UNCURK consideration and (*b*) fact it was addressed to Unified Command rather than to ROK. These circumstances lead us to conclude IC consultation with ROK prior to its adoption was not indispensable.

Shld likewise be borne in mind Limb was heard by IC on Oct 17." (357.AD/10–2450)

Editorial Note

On October 24, General MacArthur issued orders to his ground commanders in Korea removing all restrictions on the use of United Nations forces in North Korea and instructing them to proceed, using all their forces and not just Republic of Korea troops, to the northern frontiers of North Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff questioned these orders as not being in accord with the directive of September 27, to which General MacArthur replied on the following day that the lifting of restrictions was demanded by military necessity, since Republic of Korea troops could not handle the situation in northern North Korea alone. General MacArthur added that he felt he had latitude

to alter his directive on the basis of Secretary Marshall's telegram to him on September 29, page 826. (See Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, pages 670–671; *Hearings*, pages 1240–1241.)

895B.00/10–1850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 25, 1950—6 p. m.

245. Urtels unno Oct 16 and 18,[1] econ developments Seoul area. Pyongyang radio formerly made extravagant claims widespread redistribution land in South Korea during period Commie occupation. While extent actual implementation this Commie program not known here, ROK's decision proceed full implementation land reform under previously enacted legis wld appear raise polit and econ problems if extensive dispossession new owners is arbitrarily carried out. Dept wld appreciate further info and analysis this problem and also your estimate whether ROK has taken implications inherent this problem into consideration in its planning.

Info also requested as to present ROK thinking on land program for North Korea. Dept believes it greatest importance that land program for north as well as south be orderly and equitable and hopes ROK will realize importance well-considered solution this problem. Such solution, however, shld remain essentially Korean and not directly identified with US policy or inspiration.

ACHESON

[1] Neither printed.

795.00/10–2550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 25, 1950—7 p. m.

246. Re telephone conversation Oct 24 with Johnson and WAR 93721, Oct 9,[1] draft Civil Affairs Directive North Kor.

Dept Def confirms our understanding that, as no disagreement in principle on draft directive, assume CINCUNC applying principles contained therein to civil affairs operations in North Kor pending formal issuance directive.

Directive being submitted for formal approval JCS Oct 27 whereupon will require formal approval Secs State, Def and Pres which

[1] See footnote 2 to the draft paper prepared in the Department of the Army, October 3, p. 857.

shld be obtained by Oct 30. Third sentence (retention local and provincial govts) of section 6 (governmental organization) being deleted.[2]

Full agreement here on ur view that first and second phases occupation be contracted to shortest possible period, but conclusion second phase depends on holding of elections, date for which must be decided by UNCURK.

For ur background and discussions with MacArthur, concept here is that during present initial phase Unified Command will retain general responsibility for relief and rehabilitation both North and South Kor until UN reconstruction agency has been established and assumes this responsibility. In polit field, not anticipated UN Comm will itself constitute or establish an operating organization for occupation of North Kor and, therefore, CINCUNC will continue exercise executive and operational responsibilities in field civil administration North Kor under consultative relationship with UN Comm as set forth in draft directive until termination second phase.

ACHESON

[2] The deleted sentence read as follows: "It is desirable that, to the extent practicable, local and provincial governments be retained or reestablished."

795.00/10–2650

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1950.

This morning Captain Murdaugh and General Duff [1] came over to see me (with representatives of NEA, WE and G present) to inform us unofficially that at their meeting yesterday the JCS had taken certain decisions from a military point of view relative to present and forthcoming national ground force units in Korea. Secretary Marshall is expected to sign a letter to the Secretary concurring in the JCS views today or tomorrow.[2]

In recognition of the rapid change in the military situation in Korea, the JCS would like to accomplish the following:

Turkey, Australia

Retain in Korea the Turkish and Australian units.

[1] Maj. Gen. Robinson E. Duff, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army.

[2] See the letter from Marshall to Acheson, November 2, p. 1027.

Great Britain

Return to Hong Kong the present British brigade when the reinforcement brigade from England arrives.

Philippines

Send back to the Philippines to fight the Huks, the Philippine battalion.

Thailand

Allow the Thais to come forward.

Greece

Allow the Greeks to come forward, but in battalion and not in brigade strength.

Canada

Allow the Canadians to come forward but in battalion and not brigade strength.

The Netherlands, Belgium, France, New Zealand, Australia

Cancel the sailings, or actually turn around on the water, the Netherlands battalion, the Belgian battalion, the New Zealand battalion and the second Australian battalion.

India, Sweden

Retain the Swedish and Indian hospitals.

Iran, Italy

Cancel the Iranian and Italian hospital units, neither of which is in an advanced stage of preparation.

Latin America

They also would like us to cease and desist any further efforts to obtain any military units, particularly in Latin America.

The Defense representatives recognize that political considerations might make it inadvisable to execute, part or all, of their wishes on this matter.

We pointed out to them that not only did we have to consider the individual political consequences which would take place in each of these countries, but also the overall UN reaction. We stated that the Department would urgently consider this matter with a view to providing the Department of Defense with a definitive expression of its views as promptly as possible after receiving General Marshall's letter.

A further meeting was held this afternoon with representatives of EUR, UNA, NEA, and ARA present. At this meeting it was agreed that:

1. The military situation in Korea has changed radically in recent weeks and some redeployment or revision of past plans seems called for.

2. The overriding political consideration is still to maximize the number of flags flying in Korea under the UN.

3. There would be no political objection to cutting down the size of the large units, assuming that the countries in question were anxious or willing to do so.

4. There would be no objection to cancelling or transferring troops from Korea if there were more urgent military duties for them to perform elsewhere (i.e., possibly the Filipinos to fight the Huks).

5. Pressure should be removed in soliciting troops from countries where the organization and training of a unit was so distant in the future as to make it improbable that there would be any need for any UN troops in Korea at the earliest date the unit would arrive.

On the basis of the foregoing it is recommended that the Department of Defense be informed in answer to General Marshall's letter when received that:

1. We are prepared to discuss with both the Canadians and the Greeks a reduction in their troop contribution from brigade to battalion strength.

2. We are prepared to ascertain from the Philippine Government its views as to the desirability of returning the present battalion to the Philippines and to accede to any request from the Philippine Government that this be done.

3. We are prepared to inform the Australians that we are prepared to release them from their commitment to send forward a second battalion.[3]

4. We are prepared to tell the British that we are prepared to permit the withdrawal of their troops currently in Korea upon the arrival of the brigade from the UK.

5. We are strongly of the opinion that the Belgian, Netherlands, New Zealand, French and Colombian units should be permitted to go forward to Korea without change in present arrangements.

6. We are prepared to inform the Iranians and the Italians that the need is no longer foreseen for their hospital units.

All of the foregoing would be done in the name of the Unified Command (USG). Careful attention will have to be paid to the political aspects, including the following steps:

1. Arranging for General MacArthur in his next semimonthly report to the Security Council to include a statement to the effect that the rapid change in the military situation in Korea permitted the Unified Command to reconsider its requirements for military units.

2. The UN, through the Secretary General, should be informed of the decisions of the Unified Command in this regard after the decisions have been reached and communicated to the individual governments concerned.

[3] In a memorandum, not printed, dated October 27, the Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Satterthwaite) pointed out to Mr. Matthews that Australia had not made a commitment to send a second battalion (795.00/10–2650).

3. No reduction in the present naval and air units contributed by other nations to the campaign in Korea would take place at the present time.

4. In the case of those Latin American and other countries (other than the Colombians, which are furthest advanced) on whom we have been putting pressure to organize and come forward with units, we would attempt to maintain their interest in such a program but transfer the frame of references from the Korean operation to the United States proposals for peace which include the designation of national units for future UN purposes.

Finally, it is recommended that the Secretary consider discussing the Department's views, when finally formulated, with the President in light of his continuing interest in this subject of UN military contribution.[4]

[4] A manuscript notation by Mr. Matthews indicated his approval of this memorandum.

320/10–2650

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1950.

Subject: Advisability of Contacts with Chinese Communist Representatives Scheduled to Appear Before the UN [1]

Reference is made to the question, which was raised at the Secretary's meeting of October 24, of the advisability of approaching the Chinese Communist representatives at such a time as they may arrive in New York to appear before the UN.

CA is of the opinion that advantage should be taken of the presence in New York of representatives of the Peiping regime to endeavor to develop through them an unofficial channel for bringing, where desirable, our views to the attention of the Chinese Communist authorities with minimum distortion. It is recalled that we have on several occasions used the Indians as a means for transmitting our views to Peiping. This channel, while it has some obvious advantages, has the serious disadvantage that such views must pass through Mr. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador at Peiping, who is believed to have a strong emotional bias with respect to the Chinese Communists. It was with this in mind that Ambassador Henderson was authorized to endeavor

[1] On September 29, the U.N. Security Council had decided to invite a representative of the People's Republic of China to attend its meetings—to be held after November 15—on the discussion of that Government's declaration regarding an armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa). For related documentation, see vol. VI., pp. 256 ff.

to establish an alternative channel of communication through the Chinese Communist Ambassador at New Delhi. Efforts by Ambassador Henderson to do this came to nothing owing to the unwillingness of the Chinese Communist Ambassador to meet Mr. Henderson or to transmit any expressions of U.S. views to Peiping.

It is very possible, perhaps even probable, that an attempt to approach the Chinese Communist representatives in New York would meet with the same negative response as did Ambassador Henderson's attempt to approach the Chinese Ambassador at New Delhi. The early experiences of our representatives in China support this tentative assumption. On the other hand there would seem to be sufficient new factors in the situation to justify an attempt.

It is suggested that our approach be neither precipitous nor at a forced pace;[2] that discussion of any substantive matters be preceded by general social contact; and that initial discussions relate to matters in which the Chinese Communists have a primary interest.

Initial matters for discussion might include U.S. aerial violations of the Manchurian frontier,[3] Sino-Korean frontier problems such as the Yalu River Dam and hydroelectric plant, or perhaps some aspect of Chinese Communist charges of American aggression against China as the Chinese Communist case is developed in the Security Council. Such discussion would fall logically and normally within the jurisdiction of the Communist representatives' official mission. If it is found possible to discuss these matters of primary interest to the Chinese Communists we might then, if the way seemed open, take up matters of primary interest to the U.S., such as exit permits for American businessmen in Shanghai, the release of Mr. Buol,[4] Chinese Communist treatment of American missionary and educational institutions and so forth. If, in turn, discussion of those subjects were possible on a satisfactory basis, we might then give consideration to discussion of political issues of more general interest—excepting, particularly, American recognition. It might, of course, become desirable at any time to use the Chinese Communist representatives in

[2] In a manuscript notation, Mr. Merchant indicated his strong agreement with this suggestion.

[3] On October 26, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai forwarded to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a note complaining against violation of the territorial integrity of the People's Republic of China by U.S. planes on eight occasions between October 15 and 25. On two of these occasions, strafing took place and, in one instance, a bomb was dropped on Chinese territory. Chou demanded that the Security Council take action to stop this aggression, adding that the Chinese people absolutely could not tolerate this extension of the war toward northeast China. (U.N. document S/1870)

[4] Robert Lawrence Buol, a Civil Air Transport operations chief, in Mengtze, Yunnan Province, was seized by the Chinese Communists in January 1950 and held until 1955.

New York as a channel for bringing our views to the attention of the Peiping authorities in connection with immediate problems which might arise, such as, for example, the release of American prisoners of war if they were moved from Korea into Manchuria.

357.AD/10–2650 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, October 26, 1950.
[Received October 27—9 : 55 a. m.]

299. Deptel 230, October 21 was received here this afternoon just prior to Ambassador Muccio's departure. He asked me to inform Department he strongly disapproves of proposed resolution. Passage of resolution, which seems scarcely within terms of reference of IC and wholly inappropriate on eve of departure of permanent commission, would be repugnant to ROK and would further impair delicate efforts being made to solve occupation and unification problems to satisfaction of all concerned. I doubt advisability of making essentials of principles known to Rhee, who has in his possession copy of civil affairs directive, who is strongly opposed to certain portions of directive and with whom virtually all facets of occupation and unification problems have been explored in recent conversations, including one this morning, by Ambassador Muccio.

I strongly recommend Department endeavor forestall adoption of proposed resolution pending consultation with Muccio who should be in Washington by weekend.

Repeated information CINCUNC unnumbered, CINCFE Tokyo.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/10–2750

Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 27, 1950.

Subject: Permanent Neutralization of Korea

I am much interested by the memorandum of October 19th on the question of permanent neutralization of Korea as referred to in NSC 81/1.[1]

I do not quarrel with the exposition of the legal concept of permanent neutralization. I think it is pertinent, however, to recall the

[1] Dated September 9, p. 712.

background of the suggestion which appears in NSC 81/1. When this provision was drafted, urgent consideration was being given to the problem of providing reasonable assurances to the Soviet Union and to Communist China that the United States did not intend to make Korea a base from which hostile operations could be carried on against either of those two countries. It was felt that some undertaking along these lines might be helpful in deterring communist intervention or promotion of guerrilla activities. As I recall the discussions at the time, thought was given to the possibilities of undertakings given by the Republic of Korea, restating its obligations under the Charter, and not to use force and not to engage in any aggressive action against its neighbors. As paragraph 30 of NSC 81/1 says, it was thought that parallel undertakings might be given by other states.

It is of course clear that we are not committed by the NSC paper to support such a solution, but I think we are obligated to suggest the idea to the UN Commission. In determining our policy on this matter, I think we can agree with the conclusions of Mr. Snow's memorandum that the neutralization itself will not by any means be a guarantee of peace or security in the long-run. It may still be possible that a gesture along these lines would be helpful in the short-run. The very fact of our suggesting that the UN take this under advisement would be a contribution toward the result which we had in mind.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

795A.00/10–2750 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

HONG KONG, October 27, 1950—9 a. m.
[Received October 27—8 : 38 p. m.]

904. Reliable source informed Consul General Chinese Communist observation group in Korea recommended against open military intervention because:

(1) Chinese unable cope with UN air power;
(2) UN artillery also greatly superior; and
(3) Even if USSR provided air support, group fears UN air power could disrupt transportation in China and make supply problem very difficult.

Same source says Chinese Communists now have 2 divisions China (not Manchurian-born Korean) troops in Korea. Troops if captured will claim to be part of Korean army and Chinese Communists believe UN forces will not retaliate against China in absence intervention by

troops openly part of Chinese PLA. However they have no intention of sending in more Chinese troops. Source also says in addition Hsiao Ching-Kuan, previously reported killed in Korea, Hsiao K E also killed there.[1]

Consul General uninformed as to means by which above information reached sub source in Hong Kong and therefore feels it should not be rated too highly. However it would explain how there could be Chinese troops in Korea as reported today's press despite reliable reports that Chinese Communists have decided against open military intervention.

Sent Department repeated information Taipei 110.

WILKINSON

[1] Presumably, the references are to Hsiao Ching-kuang and Hsiao K'o, both veteran officers of the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China, neither of whom was killed in Korea.

795.00/10–2850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 28, 1950.

Subject: Conversation between Mr. Hubert Graves, Counselor of the British Embassy and Mr. Dean Rusk.

Participants: Mr. Hubert Graves
Mr. Dean Rusk

Mr. Graves came in to bring the attached message from Foreign Minister Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks which Mr. Bevin had asked the Ambassador to discuss with Mr. Acheson.

I told Mr. Graves that the views of our two governments were very close together and that I saw no reason for the Ambassador to see Mr. Acheson personally. I said that I would call this to the Secretary's attention and inform Mr. Graves by phone that we could report that what I was about to tell him was in fact Mr. Acheson's view.

Regarding paragraph two of Mr. Bevin's message, I said our view was that the Government of Korea's authority does not extend automatically north of the 38th parallel, that this area will be under the military occupation of the Unified Command until the United Nations arranges for a political successor, and that General MacArthur would appoint civil authorities for North Korea with the assistance of Ambassador Muccio during the period of military occupation. I said that Mr. Syngman Rhee had made public statements which were not helpful from the United Nations point of view and would probably make some more, but that we would have to struggle through the situation

and insure that the UN have an opportunity to work out the unification of the country. I said that I thought it was most unrealistic for governments around the world to expect the Korean government to be an ideal western democracy under present circumstances. I said I had little sympathy with certain instances where those who were inclined to be critical of Syngman Rhee had fallen far short of democratic processes in their own countries.

With respect to paragraph three of Mr. Bevin's message, I said that there undoubtedly have been South Korean atrocities, that the fighting in Korea has been furious on both sides but that the policy of the Unified Command has been clearly against atrocities and that our responsible commanders are trying to do everything that they can to curb such atrocities. I said that under war conditions, particularly where extremely bitter fighting has taken place, there might be instances of atrocities committed by members of any of the armed forces engaged. I said that it is not easy to curb troops who find their comrades tied together and shot but that everything possible was being done in this regard.

I stated that we are generally in accord with the policies indicated in paragraphs four and five and the last sentence of paragraph six.[1]

[Annex]

Message From Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks Dated October 27, 1950

KOREA

I foresee difficulties arising in Korea and I want you to discuss them with Mr. Acheson.

2. I am concerned lest the United Nations Commission should be presented with a *fait accompli*. There are press reports that Syngman Rhee has appointed "Governors" and other officials from South Korea to proceed to the North, apparently intending to extend the authority of his government over the whole of Korea. If these reports are reliable, it means that decisions are being taken which the United Nations will be expected to support. I am not at all sure that this support will be forthcoming: the reaction may on the contrary be that the South Korean Government is usurping the responsibilities of the Unified Command and the functions of the Commission. I and my colleagues are disturbed about this. Public opinion in this country

[1] In an addendum, dated October 30, to this memorandum of conversation, Mr. Merchant said that Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews discussed the matter with Mr. Acheson who authorized Mr. Merchant to inform Mr. Graves that the views expressed by Mr. Rusk reflected those of Mr. Acheson. Mr. Merchant went on to say that he so informed Mr. Graves who expressed no surprise. (795.00/10–3050)

attaches much importance to the setting up of the Commission and would not accept derogation from its functions. I believe that opinion in Europe and Asia would take the same line.

3. Reports of atrocities allegedly committed by South Koreans are already being published here. We shall probably see many more such reports. These give opportunities for propaganda which the Russians will not miss, and this propaganda will have an effect. It would be a tragedy if the effect of military success and of resolute concerted action by the United Nations in defence against aggression were dissipated by mishandling the political settlement.

4. The South Korean Government has a very big task. It must cope with the immediate internal problem in South Korea, and its participation in the policing and garrisoning of North Korea in the interim period is indispensable. But the responsibility for the administration of North Korea, pending nation-wide elections and the formation of a new National Unified Government, does not lie with Syngman Rhee and his government—it lies with the Unified Command, advised by the United Nations Commission (and, I would hope, advised also by those nations with substantial military forces in Korea). That was what I had in mind when I addressed the Assembly and that was my intention in promoting the resolution of October 7th.

5. The issue at stake is even more than that of usurping the functions of the Unified Command and of the Commission. The Security Council were fortunate in securing the support of so many members for endorsement of the policy initiated by the United States Government of resisting aggression in Korea by military means. The South Korean Government may not be legally bound by the Assembly Resolution, but there is a strong moral compulsion on it not now, in the moment of victory, to brush aside the views of Members of the United Nations and not to settle the future of North Korea by arbitrary action. If it does so, not only the Korean Government but the Unified Command will be exposed to criticism.

6. I leave it to you how to make this approach, but you can assure Mr. Acheson that I have given much careful thought to the problem and that, in putting these views to him for the consideration of the United States Government, I do so in a spirit of cooperation. It is in the interests of both our countries that nothing should be done in Korea which might provoke adverse world reaction on the grounds that the Commission's functions are being usurped and world opinion ignored.

795A.00/10–2850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, October 28, 1950—7 p. m.
URGENT

256. Following is text of directive for Occupation North Korea approved by JCS, Sec State and Defense and Pres being transmitted Gen MacArthur today.

"Part 1—Hereafter follows the general concept for occupation of North Korea.

"The purpose of the occupation will be to establish peace and security so that the Koreans themselves may solve the Korean problem with the aid and assistance of the United Nations. The occupation forces will not impose on the North Korean people a complete administration of government. However, it will be necessary to establish a temporary substitute for the central North Korean government and also to establish and maintain supervision and controls over North Korean *de facto* provincial and local governments.

"Three phases are envisaged in this occupation. The first phase will begin with the occupation and will continue until internal security has been established throughout the greater part of the area. The second phase will commence at the end of the first phase and will continue until national elections have been held, and the united Republic of Korea has assumed responsibility. The second phase will be followed by a third phase which will continue until all non-Korean UN forces are withdrawn, in accordance with the recommendation contained in the United Nations General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950.

"During the first phase, conditions of security will be paramount and civil affairs actions will be limited largely to provision of relief and minimum assistance, the establishment and maintenance of law and order and the initial establishment of local and provincial governments. During the second phase, military security will be a matter of less immediate concern and normal political and economic activity under the guidance of the United Nations Commission will be encouraged to the utmost. During the third phase, the united Republic of Korea will assume authority.

"It is contemplated that throughout the first phase the Commanding General of the Unified Command of the United Nations will be the supreme authority in North Korea subject to control by the United

Nations and the United States Government as their executive agent. During the second phase the Commanding General will retain complete authority as stated above but will, nevertheless, give the utmost consideration to the advice and recommendations of the United Nations Commission so far as they do not interfere with military security. During the third phase the Commanding General will be responsible for such missions as may hereafter be assigned.

"Part II—In light of the general concept outlined in Part I, hereafter follows your military government [1] directive:

"1. *Purpose*

It is the purpose of this directive to prescribe the broad policies which will govern the conduct of your occupation, as Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, of that part of Korea which lies north of the 38th Parallel (hereafter referred to as "North Korea").

"2. *Mission*

You will occupy North Korea in the name of and on behalf of the United Nations. It shall be your primary duty to so administer your occupation as to facilitate public order, economic rehabilitation and the democratic mode of life in the area and to prepare the way for the unification of a free and independent Korea.

"3. *Command*

The United Nations, through such agencies as may be designated by it, is the supreme authority with respect to the occupation of North Korea. The US Gov acting as exec agent for the UN will formulate your instructions and will transmit your reports to the United Nations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States have been designated as the agency of the Unified Command through which you will receive your instructions and to which you will report. On behalf of the Unified Command the Joint Chiefs of Staff will issue such interim and emergency instructions and guidance as may be necessary.

"4. *Relationships*

a. The United Nations will establish in Korea one or more agencies to observe, consult and assist in the accomplishment of the United Nations objectives for a unified Korea. You will give these agencies full cooperation and support and will be guided by their views to the extent permitted by your mission. You are not, however, subject to their direct jurisdiction.

b. While the Republic of Korea has been accepted as the only lawful government in Korea, its authority over that part of the country north of the 38th Parallel has not been recognized. Although you are not authorized to recognize such authority, it is desirable that in matters of national scope you consult with the government of the Republic of Korea through the United States Ambassador to facilitate eventual unification.

[1] The words "military government" were subsequently changed to "civil affairs" (NSC 81 files).

c. The Department of State will designate a representative as your political advisor for North Korea.

"5. *General*

Within the framework of the United Nations objectives in Korea and until the United Nations Commission is in a position to put forward its views, you will interpret your directives so as to change as little as possible the fundamental structure which you find when you enter North Korea. For example, land reform measures, nationalization and socialization of industries and other matters which have a serious impact upon individuals should be left in *status quo*. Any change should be made by the Korean people themselves after the unification has been accomplished, or in response to the firmly expressed views of the United Nations Commission. Similarly, your participation in the local and provincial governments of North Korea will be limited to the minimum necessary to assure law and order and tranquility. Any amendments or repeals of laws existing at the time of your entry will be limited to those necessary from the standpoint of military security and the success of your mission, or those on which the United Nations Commission has expressed firm views.

"6. *Governmental Organization*

You will dissolve the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, and prohibit all operations and activities of groups inimical to the occupation. You will not create a central government for North Korea other than as a part of your occupational control machinery. You are authorized to retain, remove or appoint such officials on all levels of government as you deem desirable and to make such changes in the political organization of the area as best to serve the occupational mission and to facilitate eventual unification.

"7. *Rights of Individuals*

The mere fact that an individual is or was a member of the armed forces of the North Korean government, an official of that government or any local government, or a member of any political party will not subject him to prosecution or reprisal and will not, by that reason alone, bar him from office or employment. You will apprehend and hold for trial by appropriate tribunals, in accordance with the law and customs of war, all persons who are or may be charged with atrocities or violations of the law and customs of war.

"8. *Economy*

Pending the establishment of a responsible UN organization to deal with postwar rehabilitation problems, the following principles will obtain: You will supply relief and assistance in goods and services to prevent disease, starvation and unrest and to the extent required for the successful accomplishment of your mission. This assistance will be in accordance with your judgment, consistent with United Nations humanitarian purposes and the desirability for dissemination of information through the entire world as to promptness and effectiveness of UN relief. You will supervise any additional relief, rehabilitation

or assistance on the part of other agencies which are authorized to function in your area. In your activities in connection with communications, transportation, health, welfare, re-education, re-orientation, taxation, banking, refugees and in all other proper and pertinent fields of endeavor, you will consult freely with the Republic of Korea, the various United Nations Commissions, and representatives of appropriate departments and agencies of the United States.

"9. *Jurisdiction*

You will determine to what extent and for what purposes civilian representatives of United States and United Nations governmental agencies will be subject to the jurisdiction of tribunals established by you, or to the jurisdiction of tribunals established by North Korean authorities under your control. Your determination of these matters will be transmitted to the United States Government for the approval of the United Nations, and thereafter all such personnel entering North Korea will thereupon be subject to such jurisdiction.

"10. *Control Organization*

It is desired that so far as it is practicable, your occupational headquarters shall be separated from your tactical command; that the maximum number of members from all friendly United Nations be utilized; that, consistent with efficient operations and availability of other nationals, there be a minimum of United States and initially of Republic of Korea personnel; and that it be susceptible without major reorganization to transfer *in toto* to a non-military agency of the United Nations.

"11. *Re-education and Re-orientation*

You will initiate and conduct an intensive re-education and re-orientation program designed to facilitate the accomplishment of the United Nations objectives in Korea and to expedite the unification of Korea under a freely elected government. This program will make maximum use of United Nations guidance and facilities.

"12. *Fund Requirements and Allocation of Costs*

You will keep the Department of the Army fully informed concerning your requirements for funds necessary to discharge the above missions. In addition, you will maintain such records of expenditures made, costs of services furnished, and value of goods and services received as will permit you to report total costs in specific categories as may be necessary."

ACHESON

357.AD/10–2850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 28, 1950—7 p. m.

257. With reference para 10 of Civil Affairs directive [1] while it is expected that the United Nations will shortly establish an operating

[1] *Supra.*

organization which will assume responsibility for relief and rehabilitation activities throughout Korea, it is not expected that the UN Commission on Unification will itself constitute or establish an operating organization. Therefore it is expected that those elements of the occupational headquarters concerned with matters other than relief and rehabilitation will not for the time being be transferred to any agency of the UN but will continue to act as the executive and operating agency for the occupation of NK throughout phases 1 and 2 in consultation with the Commission and the Govt of the ROK as set forth in the directive.

In accordance with para 6 of the Interim Committee resolution of October 12 substance of directive will be made available confidentially to IC within next few days.

In meanwhile in accordance with principle embodied in para 4*b* of directive you should, if General MacArthur concurs confidentially inform Govt ROK soonest of principles embodied in directive emphasizing provisions for orderly transfer authority to the United ROK at end second phase, for consultation with Govt ROK during first two phases, and for the Korean people themselves to bring about necessary changes in the fundamental structure of North Korea as well as any other aspects of directive considered helpful.

ACHESON

895B.16/10–2850 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SEOUL, October 28, 1950.
[Received October 28—8:45 p. m.]

307. Deptel 249, October 27 on subject land reform.[1]

1. Detailed investigation status farmland redistribution program in South Korea under way and special efforts will be made to ascertain facts situation North Korea during reconnaissance that area early November in connection with war damage survey.

2. Findings in Republic of Korea to date confirm soundness Republic of Korea decision to proceed implementation its land reform program south of 38th parallel. Republic of Korea program, in process implementation at time Communist occupation, provided for transfer farm ownership to tenants tilling individual farms except in special or unusual circumstances. Therefore tenant farmers who planted rice crop in spring 1950 were in process becoming owners land they planted. They had been assured they could make first of

[1] The reference to telegram 249 is incorrect; it should be to telegram 245, October 25, 6 p. m., to Seoul, p. 996.

5 annual installment payments of 30 percent of production from 1950 crop.

3. Republic of Korea areas occupied by Communists included: 60 percent farmers who already held title to their land; 40 percent tenant farmers almost all of whom were in the process of becoming owner-operators. Therefore despite Communist propaganda claims there is no evidence the Communist land reform program greeted with any enthusiasm by most of farmers in South Korea. Basic reasons Communist program was not popular as follows:

a. Communist program in effect made former farm owner-operators (about 60 percent of total) tenants of the state, with only utilization rights their land. State in turn was to collect production tax in kind of 27 percent "paddy" field output or 23 percent output from upland fields. Since assessment tax percentages were arbitrary and often higher than provided by law, and since frequent additional assessments for special purpose were made, farm owner-operators opposed so-called "land reform." Same situation found [North] Korea, and reported as early as middle 1947 after visit Pyongyang area of American delegation joint commission.

b. Basic aspiration of tenant farmers is for security of tenure in situation where more farm families than farms promotes insecurity and promotes strong desire of farmers for titles to lands they farm. Utilization rights given by Communists dependent on continued favor ruling clique toward individual farmers. Security land tenure desired by farmers not provided by Communist program.

4. Preliminary evidence indicates Communists did not undertake wholesale dispossession of farm owner-operator or tenant farmers. Most of Communist-directed farm redistribution apparently politically motivated and involved dispossession strong Republic of Korea supporters in favor Communist sympathizers. Farmers dispossessed were usually independent owner-operators, who were relatively well-to-do and who frequently held positions of influence in their localities under Republic of Korea. Return of farms to these pre-invasion owners, who planted 1950 crop prior to dispossession, appears to be elemental justice. In case of tenant farmer under Republic of Korea who was dispossessed by Communists of farm he was in process of buying, fact that he planted 1950 crop appears to give him better claim than operator put on land by Communists during July and August. Usually these Communist sympathizers who were given farm land by Communist regime fled with retreat of Communist forces into mountains.

5. Reference Republic of Korea thinking on land program for North Korea. Following is part of statement (in translation) issued by President Rhee on October 23 through Office of Public Information: "The farmers must busy themselves in harvesting their autumn crops, of which they shall pay 20 to 30 percent to the government as land tax in accordance with the law now in force in South Korea (*sic*) and

the remainder, they shall be permitted to possess for their free disposal. After the harvest, the land reform law shall be implemented: The farmers must return farm-lands to their former owners, who, in turn shall sell them to the government at a reasonable price. The government, in accordance with the law, will distribute the farm-lands to the farmers, who, after complete payment of their officially fixed prices for the lands thus distributed, will become the legal possessors of the farm-lands. On the other hand, the land owners shall, as prices for their farm-lands, receive from the government some national bonds, with which they will be able to run a factory or other business. However, it seems to be too late to carry out that reform this year. It will be carried out next year. As to the financial, commercial and industrial matters, and the matters concerning the vested properties, the government will apply the same policies that have been carried out in South Korea. It is hoped that any government plan or change to be made on these matters will be well observed."

6. Most Republic of Korea officials desire to extend into North Korea their program for transfer of title farm land owned by absentee landlords to tillers of soil. Some former North Korea landlords now in Republic of Korea area of course, hope to repossess lands north of 38th parallel. However, prevailing Republic of Korea sentiment does not consider this possible or desirable, but does consider proposed payments to former landlords whose lands were confiscated without payment by Communists to be fair and just.

7. Embassy feels Republic of Korea land reform program which developed after several years of widespread discussion of the subject reflects basic aspirations Korean farmers. On other hand North Korea farm redistribution program, which was announced and fully implemented within 25 days in March 1946, not highly regarded by farmers in either North or South Korea. Main criticism of farm population in Republic of Korea areas regarding Republic of Korea program is slowness in implementation laws already promulgated.

Repeated info ECA Washington unnumbered, Tokyo unnumbered.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/10–2950 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, October 29, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received October 29—6 : 38 a. m.]

310. For Department's information only. Department will probably have noted press reports, some extravagant, that Chinese Communist forces are participating in North Korean fighting.

From discussions with Eighth Army it has been ascertained that to date 5 prisoners identified as of Chinese origin have been captured in Eighth Army area and 2 in Tenth Corps area. Eighth Army captives were seized in area north and northeast of Pyongyang. 2 or 3 of 5 wore complete North Korean uniforms while others wore part North Korean uniform and part civilian dress. 2 of captives under preliminary investigation asserted that they crossed from Manchuria on or about October 19 and were formerly attached to Fortieth Chinese Communist Army Manchuria. 1 prisoner is represented as stating he crossed into North Korea with unit of 2,000 Chinese troops.

Eighth Army Headquarters states its field units have not reported coming into contact with any sizeable numbers of Chinese troops. On basis current information Eighth Army is not inclined to accept reports of substantial Chinese participation in North Korean fighting.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/10–3050 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, October 30, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received October 30—4 : 21 a. m.]

313. ReEmbtel 310, October 29, 8th Army informs Embassy 5 additional prisoners of Chinese origin were picked up yesterday in Kusong and Onjong areas—about 70 miles northwest and north respectively of Pyongyang. Also 10th Corps reported additional 16 prisoners of Chinese origin were captured yesterday about 40 miles north of Hamhung, but details were lacking save for report some of the 16 stated they from 42nd Chinese Communist Army.

While information is still sketchy and confirmation lacking, 8th Army intelligence now feels there may be 2 regiments of Chinese Communists engaged in 8th Army sector or north and northwest side of peninsula. It appears Chinese in this sector may have crossed Yalu River between October 15 and 20. It not yet definitely established whether Chinese fighting as independent units or sandwiched among North Koreans.

ROK forces fighting in Onjong–Huichon area have met strong opposition past 3 days. It may be Chinese Communist forces instrumental in checking advance toward Yalu.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/10–3050 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

PLAIN
PRIORITY

SEOUL, October 30, 1950.
[Received October 30—4:59 a. m.]

311. Following is text of press release by President Syngman Rhee issued Seoul October 30:

"The United Nations Forces in Korea, under the inspired leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, are concluding the superb campaign of driving the Communists beyond our Northern borders. The political unification of our country and its economic rehabilitation now come to the fore as the most pressing problems.

"In this connection I desire to state categorically that the Government of the Republic of Korea is determined to act in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950, and to cooperate fully with the UN Commission on Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

"I should also like to point out that there are special circumstances prevailing in Korea which must be borne in mind in seeking the best and wisest solution to future problems. The Korean people are a homogeneous people. The tragic division of the country at the 38th parallel was not of Korean doing or choice. Because the hated Communist regime oppressed our fellow countrymen in the north, beginning in 1945 millions of patriotic, law-abiding Koreans came south to save their lives and their self-respect. These fine citizens will now be going home, to their ancestral residences in the northern part of the peninsula. Having taken part, through the franchise and in some cases through holding public office, in the democratic developments of the Republic of Korea, they may be expected to play a significant role in the future affairs of Northern Korea.

"As [for] elections there, I sincerely hope they can be held as soon as a free atmosphere can be created to allow the once-Communist-ridden people to vote according to their conscience without fear. I must point out, however, that this free atmosphere cannot be established if any Communists or former Communists are allowed to remain in any public office or position of any responsibility. I am unalterably opposed to the use of Communists, former Communists or the former Communist governmental machinery.

"It has been said that I have already appointed many officials or even composed a slate of officials for North Korea. There was a time, long before this Communist aggression began, when I did name provincial governors for the provinces then under Communist rule. This was done to emphasize to the people of the North that they were not forgotten and eventually they would be a part of their native land. These appointments were made in conjunction with the appointments of governors for the southern provinces. If these or any persons who have been previously mentioned for positions desire to go north at this time, they do so on their own responsibility. For them to gain

or maintain positions of authority they must secure the support and approval of the local inhabitants. They will not be going north as officials of the Republic of Korea. As soon as the situation is ready, which I hope will be a matter of few weeks after the cession [*cessation*] of hostilities, we should hold elections at the provincial level north and south, thus enable the people to chose their own governors, instead of appointing them by the Federal Government or the President. This question was raised in the National Assembly about a year ago and was agreed upon by the leaders of the Assembly and the Cabinet Ministers that this should be done when the nation has been reunited.

"Because of my great interest in good government throughout Korea I have ordered a preliminary investigation of what persons of North Korean origin would be acceptable for various North Korean posts. This information, in some cases, I plan to make available to General MacArthur and will be happy to transmit to the UNCOK as well. The information I receive comes from North Korean organizations long established in the south. These organizations, of course, have their roots in every province in the north. When the information I get is complete, we may find three able candidates from whom a choice can be made for every post. I shall forward all data to the proper UN authorities.

"As to the provisional resolution adopted by the UN's Interim Commission on Korea, I should have preferred to have had it conveyed to the Unified Command after consultation with the Republic of Korea and other interested groups here in Korea. Our government is obviously intensely interested in every decision reached regarding the Korean people and cannot automatically allow itself to be bound by programs made without reference to it or the citizens of Korea.

"Finally, I wish to extend the most cordial greetings to the new UN commission shortly to arrive here. Our government will work closely with it and will endeavor to be of service to its delegates, individually and collectively."

Repeated CINCUNC unnumbered.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/10–3050 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, October 30, 1950.

[Received October 30—10 : 33 a. m.]

314. Deptel 234 October 23. Rhee today issued statement along lines set forth Embtel 284,[1] text of which went forward in Embtel 311.[2] That text is best obtainable from Rhee. On whole we think it satisfactory and responsive UN position. Task now will be to get Rhee to live up to terms of statement.

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[1] Received at 11 :49 p. m. on October 21, p. 990.

[2] *Supra.*

In recent conversations, Rhee has been more conciliatory re North Korean problems. If we can assure him, Communists will not be utilized in North Korean Interim Administration and if a satisfactory arrangement can be made to utilize Koreans South of parallel, including North Korean refugees, in setting up Interim Administration in North, Embassy feels Rhee's principal points of opposition will have been surmounted.

Repeated CINCFE for info.

DRUMRIGHT

795B.00/10–3050 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, October 30, 1950—6:00 p. m.
[Received October 30—12:15 p. m.]

315. Embtel 306, October 28.[1] President Rhee visited Pyongyang yesterday, but took no Cabinet members except Acting Prime Minister. Neither did he take Assemblymen. Instead, he was accompanied by Korean's staff and other military officers. Rhee was persuaded by acting Prime Minister to abandon trip to Wonsan and Hamhung.

According Acting Prime Minister, Rhee addressed mass meeting of about 25,000 Pyongyang inhabitants. He was reportedly received with acclaim and his address which lasted for about 30 minutes was greated with great applause. There were no incidents. According Acting Prime Minister, Rhee told people ROK was anxious to help but could only do so now in conjunction UN agencies. He also counseled people to be patient. Acting Prime Minister stated Rhee careful and judicious in language and made no statements which could be regarded as offensive to UN.

Repeated info Tokyo unnumbered.

DRUMRIGHT

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[1] The text of this telegram read as follows:

"President Rhee, accompanied by a few Cabinet Ministers and National Assemblymen, is scheduled to make an informal, unannounced visit to Pyongyang and perhaps Wonsan and Hamhung areas tomorrow, traveling by air. Rhee party plans to return Seoul same day.

"Rhee has been pressing to make trip north for some time and it is felt he could no longer be denied opportunity to visit ROK forces in north without serious repercussions arising. It has been suggested to him and one or two of his intimates that he make his trip as unobtrusive as possible and that he avoid public utterances tending to prejudice relations between ROK and UN at this delicate juncture." (795B.00/10–2850)

795B.00/10–3050 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 30, 1950—3 p. m.
PRIORITY

Gadel 78. Deptel 452 Oct 28 [1] transmitting text Civil Affairs Directive for occupation North Korea.

This directive is being issued to Gen MacArthur pursuant to para 4 of the Interim Comite Res of Oct 12, 1950, and is believed fully to conform to text of that res as well as Gen Assembly Res of Oct 7, 1950. It also conforms to principle Ross expressed to Comite on Oct 13.[2]

In accordance with para 6 of IC Res of Oct 12, IC shld immediately be informed of substance of this directive on a strictly confidential basis pending decision re timing and method of releasing to press info concerning directive.

If considered desirable you may inform the IC that this directive is immed being issued to Gen MacArthur as a matter of urgency because of necessity of establishing promptly minimum of essential civil administrative machinery necessary to prevent starvation, disease and unrest, and of discharging responsibilities conferred upon UC under para 4 of IC Res of Oct 12. Upon advance into northern part of Korea, UN forces have found that, without exception so far as is known, all officials at all levels of North Korean regime, have fled their posts, and thus there have been no local auths which cld be made responsible for essential service to civil population.

ACHESON

[1] Same as telegram 256 to Seoul, October 28, 7 p. m., p. 1007.
[2] See footnote 1 to telegram Delga 123 from New York received at 9:26 p. m. on October 13, p. 943.

795.00/10–3150 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, October 31, 1950—4 p. m.
PRIORITY [Received October 31—5:25 a. m.]

319. Re Embtels 310, October 29 and 313, October 30. Eighth Army states that of approximately 400 prisoners captured in Eighth Army sector yesterday none were of Chinese origin. On basis information presently available, Eighth Army intelligence considers there possibly about 2,000 Chinese engaged in Eighth Army sector.

No definite information re Chinese participation in Tenth Corps area has been received here since yesterday.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/10–3150

Memorandum by Mr. William McAfee of the Office of Chinese Affairs to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 31, 1950.

Subject: Telecon for October 31

I have not as yet seen the Telecon [1] for today, but I did see Mr. Howe's summary of pertinent facts extracted from it which included the following information: The Third ROK Army captured 18 CCF prisoners and preliminary interrogation indicated that they are part of the 370th Regiment of the 124th CCF Division.* The strength of the Unit is unknown but the Telecon apparently included an estimate that its strength might be 2500 men. This Division, which was part of the Nationalist Army until April 1949, crossed the Yalu on October 16. The prisoners taken reported that they had had no food for three days.

Further interrogation of a prisoner captured last week revealed his belief that approximtaely 5,000 CCF troops had been selected from 3 divisions at Antung for duty in North Korea. According to the information obtained from these prisoners these troops were not integrated with North Korean units.

[1] Reference is to the text of the teletype conference between officers of G–2 in Washington and G–2 (CINCFE) in Tokyo; not printed.

*42 Army. [Footnote in the source text.]

793.00/10–3150 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET HONG KONG, October 31, 1950—11 p. m.

PRIORITY [Received October 31—2:35 p. m.]

945. Wang Cheng-po, Tientsin businessman known to Clubb, left Peking October 25 arrived Hong Kong October 31 and reported as follows:

At 11-day conference of top CCP leaders in August presided over by Molotov decision was reached for Chinese Commies participate in Korean war. Molotov presence Peking confirmed to source by Russian adviser Peking (source speaks Russian and lived five years Moscow).

Past two months spent in preparation for war, including massing troops in Manchuria and moving vital machinery from Manchuria to Outer Mongolia.

October 21 and 23 preliminary meeting of Central Peoples Government Council held and on October 24 formal decision made to enter war. All members of Council were present and Mao led off with brief statement that because US invading Taiwan and Korea China must fight US. Chou En-lai followed with reference to obligations under Sino-Soviet treaty and invaluable help received from Soviet Union, arguing that from foreign policy viewpoint China must fight in Korea. Each democratic personage then required to state his views following which resolution passed and all signed.

Source says elements of first, second, third and fourth FA in Manchuria totalling 20 armies. Fourth FA armies included are 41 to 48 inclusive. Four of these already in Korea in Korean uniforms.

Source known to Boorman [1] who does not entirely trust him but since much of information he provided to Peking Consulate was later confirmed, he feels above report should not be disregarded. Source is known to have high level contacts among CCP and democratic personages and is in position to obtain information such as above.[2]

WILKINSON

[1] Howard Boorman, Vice Consul at Hong Kong.

[2] A note on the source text by Mr. McAfee of the Office of Chinese Affairs indicated that the text of this message was transmitted to military intelligence offices and that G–2 in Washington would send it to G–2 (CINCFE) in Tokyo.

611.9326/9–3050 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 31, 1950—5 p. m.

645. Pls ascertain and report nature response FonOff has recd from GOI tel to Indian Amb Peiping (urtel 813, Sept 30). Swedish FonOff has already indicated willingness appoint Rep act in investigation charges U.S. bombing Manchuria.[1]

ACHESON

[1] Ambassador Henderson transmitted the following reply in telegram 1130, dated November 7:

"Ministry External Affairs after careful search files (Deptel 645, October 31) states last report from Panikkar this subject indicated CPR FonOff was studying matter. Panikkar had reported previously his impression that Chou En-lai would not object if SC should indicate desire send investigating committee. MEA doubts however whether Panikkar report any longer valid." (611.9326/11–750)

320/10–3150 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 31, 1950—7 p. m.

Gadel 84. Re Deptel 398, Gadel 41, Oct 13 and Gadel 52, Oct 17,[1] subject currency used North Korea.

As indicated reference tels, Wash agencies recommended Oct 12 to CINCUNC that ROK currency be used North Korea by authority UN Cmdr. CINCUNC reported that he had already directed that North Korean currency only be used. CINCUNC was advised Oct 20 that use North Korean currencies only was consistent with broad political recommendations UN Interim Committee and was appropriate as interim measure if operational requirements satisfactorily met.

CINCUNC has now reported that Communists have removed all plates and means of printing North Korean currency and have removed or destroyed practically all NK currency held in local and central banks, and has recommended use of a special UN scrip to be printed in Japan (CINCFE's msg CX 67690 being rpted to you.)[2]

Dept and other interested Wash agencies do not favor use of UN scrip in North Korea and believe preferable use ROK currency with qualifications set out Deptel 398, but consider matter shld be discussed urgently with Interim Committee. Ambassador Muccio will assist in presentation. Suggest that proposal for UN scrip be discussed as recommendation CINCUNC, but that endeavor be made obtain Interim Committee acquiescence in use ROK currency by order UN Command.

Foll additional points for your guidance:

1. Use ROK currency by order UN Command has no implications re future status ROK. No matter what government is hereafter recognized in United Korea, it will have to recognize validity of currency in circulation, and problems this government will be simplified and UN goal of unification will be served if fewer currencies in circulation.

2. No intent invalidate North Korean currency. It is recognized that equitable rate between ROK and NK currency will have to be fixed soon, to prevent further depreciation NK issues and loss to holders. Rate would have to be fixed soon even if UN scrip used because large amounts ROK currency being introduced. Use UN scrip would probably delay fixing status North Korean currency and lead to further depreciation.

[1] None printed.
[2] Not printed.

3. Already three currencies in circulation (old ROK Bank of Chosun notes, new ROK Bank of Korea notes, North Korean notes). Introduction of fourth will only augment confusion.

4. While technically UN scrip could be issued as occupation currency to be redeemed by future govt of United Korea without UN obligation, would represent precedent which should not be undertaken without serious UN consideration, which time does not permit.

5. Matter not previously discussed with Interim Committee because believed possible use only North Korean currency in phases one and two. Communists have now made this course impossible.

Reply to CINCFE recommendation awaiting consultation with Interim Committee.

ACHESON

795.00/11–150 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 1, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received November 1—9:58 a. m.]

323. Embtels 310, October 29, 313, October 30 and 319, October 31. Another Chinese soldier was captured yesterday by ROK 6th Division elements in Unsan area about 65 miles north of Pyongyang.

On basis information obtained from Sino prisoners which of course subject confirmation, 8th Army Intelligence considers there now two Sino regiments, possible a third, in 8th Army sector of North Korea. Appears these units were formed by taking one battalion each of six divisions said to constitute Sino 39th and 40th Armies deployed along Manchurian-North Korean border. It further appears Sino Communist units engaged in Northwest Korea are not integrated with North Korean forces, but fighting as separate units. Information developed thus far indicates Sino Communists brought own weapons and equipment into North Korea and it heterogeneous nature, some US, some Japanese, some Soviet. Sino prisoners alleged they compelled cross into North Korea and did not come voluntarily. Some claim to be former Sino Nationalist soldiers.

Information from 10th Corps area indicates total of 18 Sino prisoners taken through October 31. It believed these Chinese come from units of Sino Communist 42nd Army.

8th Army Intelligence is of view, with which Embassy inclined to concur, Sino Communists will avoid overt intervention.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/10–450

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 1, 1950.

Subject: Communist Intentions: Korea

Reference: CA Memorandum of October 4, 1950, "Chinese Communist Threat of Intervention in Korea"

The presence in North Korea of Chinese Communist forces is now confirmed. Although information is lacking respecting insignia borne by the troops in question, it is clear that in the event that they are participating as regular units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army the intervention cannot be conceived of as other than direct, even though there be a nominal attempt to keep it anonymous.

It seems unlikely that the Chinese Communists would be prepared to venture into the Korean theater in such a limited manner as would confront them with the danger of being promptly bloodied and thrown out by the force which they themselves have consistently characterized as "a paper tiger". The recrudescence of Chinese Communist propaganda whipping up enthusiasm of the Chinese people for "resistance to aggression in Korea" would appear to indicate that a larger effort may be involved. It seems unlikely in addition, however, that the Chinese Communists would be prepared to make that larger effort, or that the Soviet Union indeed would wish them to do so, without coordination and understanding from the side of the Soviet Union with respect to the Soviet contribution to the matter in point. The move of intervention would be designed, in short, to achieve some real measure of victory. Although firm information to reach conclusions is still lacking, therefore, it would be hardly safe to assume other than that (1) the Chinese Communists, if they are intervening directly in Korea, propose to do so in considerable force and (2) the Soviet Union would be behind that intervention in accordance with an overall military plan which presumably would purpose the springing of surprises and inflicting of defeats on the UN forces generally and perhaps U.S. forces particularly.

It is believed that the Chinese Communist intervention would not be limited in its purpose and objective to the protection of the Suiho Dam and Power Plant. In Communist ideology political factors generally are given precedence over the economic, and Chinese intervention in the present instance would not have been determined upon for economic factors alone—even where the economic factor was so

important an element as the Suiho power installation. In the overall Moscow and Peiping alike object to the presence of a non-Communist political entity in Korea, and they presumably have decided upon intervention with the aim of redressing what they consider the present imbalance. The propaganda line in Peiping has as yet made no reference to the Suiho power installation so far as noted, but instead is based upon the general concepts that (1) it is desirable to render assistance to the North Koreans and (2) China must resist what is essentially threat of aggression against its own frontiers. The question arises, however, whether the Moscow strategy contemplates action at this time only in North Korea. It is to be noted that Vishinsky recently alleged in the UN that the United States was using Japanese troops in Korea, and that this charge was repeated subsequently by Radio Sinuiju.* This general allegation was repeated by the Peking radio, being [*beamed?*] to Japan in Japanese, on October 29, stating that a conference was held recently, with General Willoughby and former Lieutenant General Sakurai participating, with the aim of determining how to use Japanese military forces in case United States takes military action in the Far East or particularly in China.† That it may be a Soviet design to lay groundwork for citation of the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Alliance of February 14, 1950 in justification of Soviet intervention at some appropriate time must be given due consideration. It is likewise possible of course that the Soviets plan action elsewhere to equal the Chinese Communist effort. The presence of four Soviet armies southwest of Berlin and the current feeling that the Soviets may be about to undertake some move to effect the consolidation of Communist power in Berlin are not to be disregarded. In sum, there is to be considered the definite possibility that the Soviets plan at this juncture to extend the area of conflict.

In the indicated circumstances it would seem highly desirable as a minimum that (1) the UN be kept fully apprised of all confirmed developments in order that our present solid front should be maintained, (2) prompt consideration should be given to the question of what reaction the United States should propose subsequently to the UN to make to Chinese Communist intervention, and (3) we should remain fully alert to possible open involvement of the USSR in the struggle, such involvement resulting "naturally" from the present developments wherein the Chinese Communists have become involved.

With reference to CA memorandum of September 27, 1950, "Chinese Communist Intentions: Formosa, Korea", reporting *inter alia*

*Tokyo, Reuters, Oct. 27, FBIS Daily Report No. 210, Oct. 27, 1950, p. BBB–5. [Footnote in the source text.]

†*Ibid.*, Oct. 30, No. 211. [Footnote in the source text.]

(page 4) the presence in Manchuria of 15 Soviet divisions, note that the GHQ UN and FEC Intelligence Summary No. 2962 of October 19, 1950[1] reports (China, page 5) the presence of 46,000 troops of the Mongolian (MPR?) Army located on the Ch'angch'un Railroad between Tashihch'iao and P'ulanien, and about 40,000 Soviet artillery troops "attired in Chinese Communist uniforms" in the Yangshui Mountain area near Fengcheng.

[1] Not printed.

795.00/11–150

Memorandum by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Smith) to the President

SECRET WASHINGTON, 1 November 1950.

Subject: Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea.

Fresh, newly-equipped North Korean troops have appeared in the Korean fighting, and it has been clearly established that Chinese Communist troops are also opposing UN forces. Present field estimates are that between 15,000 and 20,000 Chinese Communist troops organized in task force units are operating in North Korea while the parent units remain in Manchuria. Current reports of Soviet-type jet aircraft in the Antung-Sinuiju area indicate that the USSR may be providing at least logistic air defense for the Manchurian border. In addition, a radio broadcast of 31 October from the emergency North Korean capital of Sinuiju announced that a "Volunteer Corps for the Protection of the Suiho Hydroelectric Zone" has been formed to protect that area from the advancing UN forces. The broadcast emphasized the importance of the Suiho hydroelectric system to the industries of Manchuria and pointed out that Chinese People's Liberation Forces are concentrated along the Manchurian side of the Suiho zone.

This pattern of events and reports indicates that Communist China has decided, regardless of the increased risk of general war, to provide increased support and assistance to North Korean forces. Although the possibility can not be excluded that the Chinese Communists, under Soviet direction, are committing themselves to full-scale intervention in Korea, their main motivation at present appears to be to establish a limited "cordon sanitaire" south of the Yalu River. Primary objectives of the Chinese Communists in attempting to establish such a no man's land would probably be: (*a*) to guarantee security of the Manchurian border from UN forces which the Chinese have labelled

as invaders; and (*b*) to insure continued flow of electric power from the vital Suiho hydroelectric system to the industries of Manchuria. The preceding considerations, which are of direct concern to Communist China, would also be in line with the general desire to further international Communism by helping the North Koreans prolong their resistance.

The Chinese Communists probably genuinely fear an invasion of Manchuria despite the clear-cut definition of UN objectives. The reported evacuation of industrial machinery and civilian personnel from Mukden could be the consequence of such a fear although the possibility exists that this evacuation has been undertaken in an effort to anticipate possible retaliatory action by UN forces following Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. The Suiho hydroelectric system, with generator located on the Korean side of the Yalu River, provides a large part of South Manchuria's electricity and most of the power for the Port Arthur naval base area. To date, the UN has made no statement regarding the distribution of Suiho power after UN forces take possession, and Chinese Communist apprehension may have been increased by the recent statement of a South Korean general that all power to Manchuria would be cut off.

WALTER B. SMITH

795.00/11–250 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 2, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received November 2—12:29 p. m.]

325. Embtel 319, October 31 and previous on Sino-Communist participation North Korean fighting.

Eighth Army has received no reports of capture of Sino-Communist officers yesterday. Eighth Army intelligence is fairly certain, however, at least two regiments of Chinese are engaged in heavy fighting, mainly with ROK units, which has been going on past several days in area 60 to 70 miles North of Pyongyang.

Aerial reconnaissance yesterday indicates sizable concentration on both sides Yalu River in vicinity Antung, Uiju and Sakchu hydroelectric plant area. Another development of significance yesterday was intrusion of hostile aircraft. According Air Force reports, enemy aircraft sighted or engaged yesterday included Yaks and six jet aircraft, photos of which were taken and are being developed. Approximately 15 Yak type aircraft were reportedly destroyed or damaged on Sinuiju

airfield yesterday. Six hostile jet aircraft, with which USAFE [*USFEAF*] F–51's engaged inconclusively, are believed to have come from Manchurian airfield.

No reports received here yesterday Sino participation Tenth Corps area.

DRUMRIGHT

795B.5/11–250

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 2 November 1950.

PERSONAL

DEAR ACHESON: I attach herewith my letter to you,[1] forwarded at the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In connection with Paragraph P., the exception as concerns Colombia was inserted at the suggestion of the Secretary of the Army and is not a Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation.

From a purely military point of view, I concur in their recommendations. There is no question but what early action on concellation of certain requirements will materially reduce expenses to all governments concerned and will ease the logistical burden on our Far East Command.

I am, however, deeply concerned about the possible political implications in the United Nations, attendant upon certain of these cancellations and want you to know that I am fully aware of the problem confronting you in this regard.

Faithfully yours, G. C. MARSHALL

[1] *Infra.*

795B.5/11–250

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 2 November 1950.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In my letter to you of 25 October [1] regarding a recommended reduction in the size of the Greek force to be deployed to Korea, it was mentioned that in view of the improved military situation in Korea, general reductions in forces to be deployed to Korea by member nations of the United Nations could now be made.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the present and projected participation in Korea of other United Nations' ground forces, with

[1] Not printed.

particular emphasis on reducing the logistic burden on the United States while retaining the political advantages that derive from the participation of as many United Nations members as possible in the collective action in Korea.

As a result of their review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff propose the following operational decisions, in which I concur, and which I consider to be in consonance with the conclusions reached at the Wake Island conference:

A. Cancel the requirement for a Belgian infantry battalion.

B. Establish requirement for only one Canadian infantry battalion in Korea; cancel the requirement for the remainder of the Canadian Special Brigade.

C. Continue the requirement for the British 29th Group, now en route to Korea; terminate requirement for British 27th Brigade (from Hong Kong) upon the arrival of the 29th Brigade.

D. Establish a requirement for only one Greek infantry battalion in Korea; cancel the requirement for the remainder of the Greek brigade.

E. Cancel the requirement for the Netherlands infantry battalion now en route to Korea.

F. Cancel the requirement for the New Zealand artillery battalion.

G. Cancel the requirement for any additional Australian infantry units; retain the Australian infantry battalion now in Korea.

H. Terminate the requirement for the British Marine Commando unit now in Korea.

I. Continue the requirement for the Thai infantry battalion, now en route.

J. Terminate the requirement for the Philippine Infantry battalion (or the major portion thereof), now in Korea, at the earliest opportune moment.

K. Continue the requirement for the Turkish regimental combat team now in Korea.

L. Cancel the requirement for the French infantry battalion.

M. Continue the requirement for the Indian Hospital Unit now in preparation for embarkation at Calcutta.

N. Retain the Swedish Hospital Unit in Korea.

O. Cancel any requirement for Iranian and Italian medical units.

P. Discontinue efforts to obtain contingents from Latin America, with the exception of the Colombian offer. I have been informed that negotiations with Colombia have proceeded so far that a cancellation of the Colombian offer at this time would be mutually embarrassing to both Governments. I therefore suggest that they be continued with a view to stimulating early Colombian participation in Korea.

Your agreement to the foregoing proposals is requested. If you agree, it is suggested that the Department of State obtain the concurrence of the foreign governments concerned in order that the necessary orders may be issued. The early implementation of these proposals will materially reduce expense both to the United States and to the foreign governments concerned.

Attached for your assistance in evaluating these proposals and their implications are a tabular list of current and projected offers of assistance and a statement of the logistic aspects in each case.[2]

Faithfully yours, G. C. MARSHALL

[2] Not printed.

611.93/11–350

Memorandum by the Acting Officer in Charge of Political Affairs, Office of Chinese Affairs (Stuart)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 3, 1950.

Subject: Possible Measure to Lessen Tension with Communist China

CA notes with deep concern the present aggravation of hostilities in North Korea and the growing possibility that we may be drawn into warfare with Communist China. It is not necessary to list the military and political problems which such a development would create for us. Clearly, major hostilities with Communist China would be contrary to our interests and to the interests of the Chinese people; such hostilities could only benefit the USSR and the Chinese Nationalists. With this in mind it behooves us to leave no stone unturned in our efforts to avert what would be at least a tragedy to the American and Chinese peoples, and might lead to a disaster for the United States, should war with China spring World War III.

It is very possible that if hostilities spread to Communist China, this will be pursuant to a coldly calculated decision by Peiping and Moscow to provoke such action as a step toward furthering world revolution. However, we should not assume that this is necessarily the case. We should, accordingly, make sure that no failure by the U.S. or the UN to make crystal clear their intentions contributes to the spread of hostilities. By taking what may appear to us unnecessary or repetitive steps to make our own intentions clear, we may prevent the spread of hostilities; and if hostilities develop notwithstanding our every effort we shall most certainly stand in a stronger position for having made the effort.

It is understood that a bill of particulars of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea is being prepared for submission to the UN. It is recommended that after this move in consultation with friendly delegations and at the earliest possible date we seek to obtain a UN resolution specifically (1) calling upon the Chinese Communists to cease intervention in Korea and (2) assuring the Chinese Communists that if they do so their Korean border will be inviolate and their

[1] The memorandum was addressed to Messrs. Rusk, Merchant, and Clubb.

legitimate interests in matters relating to the frontier will be protected. We do not know whether a move of this nature might be best made in the General Assembly or the Security Council, but recommend discussion with UNA respecting this problem.[2]

Discussions should be initiated with friendly governments and particularly with the General Staffs of the NAT Powers regarding the new developments.

[2] A manuscript notation initialed by Mr. Rusk indicated his agreement with these recommendations.

795.00/11–350

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Barrett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 3, 1950.

Subject: Chinese in North Korea

Having appeared unduly disturbed over the Chinese in North Korea subject for several days, I'll now risk seeming really alarmist. Solely on the basis of the very unusual Chinese Communist propaganda campaign of recent days, it seems to us that:

1. At the very least the Chinese are building up to very large numbers (perhaps a hundred thousand or so) "volunteers" in Korea, with the probable purpose of keeping us bogged down in Korea for many months.
2. At the most they are building up to open employment of hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops in Korea with a full expectation that this will mean general war between the Chinese and ourselves (for which they are preparing their own people psychologically).

On the basis of propaganda alone, it would appear that they are *not* planning to limit their participation to anything like as small a force as the presently reported 18,000 "volunteers".

EDWARD W. BARRETT

795.00/11–350 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 3, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received November 3—1:20 p. m.]

332. Embtel 325 [1] and previous on Chinese intervention in North Korea.

[1] Received at 12:29 p. m. on November 2, p. 1026.

Eighth Army intelligence states careful recheck stockades, plus one additional Chinese captured yesterday, brings Chinese prisoners seized in Eighth Army area to total of 17. Careful and repeated interrogation of prisoners suggests: (1) there two Sino units operating in Eighth Army sector of North Korea; (2) these designated 55th and 56th units; (3) strength of each unit variously reported by prisoners at 2,500, 5,000 and 9,000; (4) these Chinese units were alerted in Manchuria as early as 10 October to move to vicinity of Pyongyang, but owing various delays crossed the Yalu River in three groups on October 19, October 25 and 26. Intelligence reports Sino forces show considerable aptitude for infiltration and guerrilla tactics.

2. Hostile Yak aircraft were shot down yesterday near Sonchon on west coast.

DRUMRIGHT

693.95A/11–350

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Perkins)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 3, 1950.

Subject: Comments of Canadian Official in Nanking Re Possibility of Chinese Intervention in Korea

Participants: Mr. Peter G. R. Campbell, Second Secretary, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Troy L. Perkins, CA

Mr. Campbell of the Canadian Embassy called by appointment today and handed me the attached summary of recent information which had been received by Mr. Ronning, Canadian Consul in Nanking. Mr. Campbell said that in reading this consideration would, of course, have to be given to the fact that Mr. Ronning had been in Nanking about 5 years, had been isolated for some time, and that his chief contacts were local Chinese. Mr. Ronning has spent most of his life in China.

In reply to my query Mr. Campbell said that the only other Canadian representatives in Communist China were George Patterson, Consul General, and his vice consul at Shanghai. He said that while the Canadians had code facilities, the amount of information sent in was not great. I took the occasion to tell Mr. Campbell that we were eager to receive any information which the Canadian Minister of External Affairs might receive on conditions in China and that we would be particularly interested in receiving spot information on Communist moves or activities which might be related to interven-

tion in Korea, this being a mutual service since, if the Chinese Communists are actually intervening in a large way, it is of mutual interest to all the UN allies participating in support of the ROK. Mr. Campbell agreed that it would be useful and that he would give us anything that would be of interest.

[Annex]

SUMMARY OF TELEGRAM, OCTOBER 25TH, TO OTTAWA FROM RONNING IN NANKING

Re: Possibility of Chinese intervention in Korea.

Opinion in local Chinese official circles is that possibility of China being involved in the Korean affair, is not yet past. (Reference to large number of troops on the border and recent declaration of Peking leaders.)

China actually has apprehensions about U.S. intentions due to

1) support of Nationalists;
2) talk of possibility of third group overthrowing present regime; and
3) Formosa—MacArthur and Chiang talks.

There is also a feeling of frustration of loss of face over Formosa, and failure to be admitted to United Nations.

While there is now evidence of sour-grapes attitude with regard to U.N., prospect of admission to the U.N. would do much to off-set possibility of intervention.

795.00/11-450

The British Embassy to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR OLIVER FRANKS, DATED 3RD NOVEMBER

[Re:] Your telegram Chinese Intervention in Korea.[2]

I do not favour taking precipitate action to refer this question to the Security Council. This might make it more, rather than less, difficult for the Chinese to climb down and avoid open commitment. I would have thought that there was everything to be said for ignoring limited Chinese intervention.

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[1] Although undated, this document bore a handwritten note stating that it was handed to Mr. Rusk on November 4 by Mr. Graves of the British Embassy.
[2] Reference is to a telegram from Franks to Bevin, not printed.

2. It is of great importance to establish the military significance of Chinese intervention. If the unified command are still confident that their plans can be executed despite aid from China to the North Koreans then there is everything to be said politically for not forcing the Chinese into a position from which they cannot withdraw. If, however, Chinese intervention gravely prejudices the success of the military campaign (whether this intervention takes the form of moving in substantial forces or of permitting the use of Manchurian airfields) then there would be no alternative to our taking the question to the Security Council. In that event we would also be in a much stronger position in doing so. Your telegram under reference indicates that we may soon reach this position and we are therefore working on a draft resolution as a possible basis for discussion in the first instance with the State Department.

3. The lines on which we are thinking are that the resolution whilst it condemns Chinese intervention and calls on them to withdraw at the same time should

(*a*) Recall the terms of the General Assembly Resolution of October 7th on which United Nations policy has been made
(*b*) Affirm the intention of the United Nations forces to limit operation to Korea itself
(*c*) Affirm the intention of the United Nations that their forces will withdraw from Korea as soon as possible
(*d*) Recognise Chinese interests in the ultimate settlement of Korea
(*e*) Suggest that the United Nations Commission should take the views of China into consideration when considering the future of Korea in accordance with the Assembly Resolution of October 7th.

4. Such a resolution while calling on the Chinese to withdraw at the same time provides an outlet for the expression by the Chinese of their legitimate interest in the future of their neighbour Korea. We feel that it should be stern but objective, moderate and reasoned in character so as to command the maximum support.

5. You should speak to Rusk on these lines explaining that these are my preliminary recommendations and that I would welcome the comments of the State Department although a resolution on the above lines would presumably be vetoed by the Russians it might have some useful propaganda effect. There could of course be no guarantee that the Chinese would in fact cease their intervention and the direct effect on the military campaign might be negligible. The graver implications of measures to prevent effective Chinese intervention would then call for most serious consideration. The criterion however to my mind is the degree of military significance to be attached to Chinese intervention and on this in particular I would urgently welcome the views of the United States Administration. In the meantime our objective should be to continue to build up the United Nations forces so that they can deal effectively with any force that can be put against them.

793.001/11–350 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

HONG KONG, November 3, 1950—9 a. m.
[Received November 3—9 : 19 p. m.]

969. Press reports of Chinese Communist troops and Russian made jets in Korea lend increased significance to Congentel 945, October 31. Since October 29 there has been sharp increase in NCNA articles on Korea and distinctly more bellicose tone toward US. Especially significant are two articles from *World Culture* datelined October 29 and October 31 article from *People's Daily* October 29 and statement by Maphsu-Lun at departure of delegation to second world peace congress October 29. Line followed in all these statements is that US bent on world conquest that aggression against Korea will be followed by invasion of Manchuria and that Chinese must aid Koreans in order defend own territory. Article by Teng Chao emphasizes weakness US ground forces and states Communist strategy will be effort to annihilate US manpower through fierce long-drawn-out guerrilla warfare. Article concludes it is essential to give every help to Koreans who are playing vital role in containing American aggression.

Certain recent reports indicate Chinese Communists urgently preparing for possible war with US. USALO has received report from reliable source of recent heavy troop movements into Manchuria possibly including elements of first and third FA as well as fourth FA. Same source reported tension in Mukden and schools being moved from towns into surrounding villages (Hong Kong 257 USALO October 31[1]). . . . large number reports from reliable sources that fortifications being rushed in Kwangtung coastal area during last two months and other . . . reports . . . state Swatow MCC early October ordered commercial goods administrative records and "military matters" moved out of city into nearby towns and that officials of Kokong MCC said if necessary evacuation south China would follow scorched earth policy. . . . report . . . that treasurer Hong Kong office CNAC stated . . . he had been ordered to Peking "in view of tense international situation" and that personnel of all Communist agencies here had been ordered gradually withdrawn. Source of unknown reliability . . . told ConGen Head of Bureau of Commerce and Industry Mukden had told his father they (Chinese Com-

[1] Not printed.

munist) would soon have to leave Mukden for unknown destination as Americans with aid of Japanese troops were coming into Manchuria. He gave father sum of money to tide him over and told him they would not destroy city as they expected to come back after period of guerrilla warfare.

It is extremely difficult to determine whether inspired statement by NCNA and scraps of information cited above mean (1) Chinese Communists genuinely afraid US intends invade Manchuria and help national government in South China and are taking appropriate defensive measures; or (2) Chinese communists intend intensify present limited intervention Korea and Indochina and are preparing for possible US retaliation; or (3) large scale military intervention by PLA in North Korea is imminent. From previous information forwarded Department we believed Chinese Communists probably would not openly send Chinese troops across border (Congentel 684, September 29).[2] Chang Shih-hao mission Hong Kong (WEEKA 41, October 13 [3]) analysis of Korean war transmitted Peking CCP Municipal Committee (Congentel 814, October 17) and similar analysis in October 16 meeting of United Front Department CCP East China Bureau . . . all supported this view. However, suddenly increased bellicosity of NCNA and statement of CNAC official cited above tend to confirm Wang Cheng-po report (Congentel 945, October 31) of very recent decision increase support of North Koreans.

We are not yet prepared accept Wang's interpretation that decision means early all out war against US by PLA. Official statements indicate long term guerrilla war still chosen method of wearing down US forces but Chinese Communists undoubtedly fear time is running out for North Koreans and may well feel it necessary take risk of sending in more of own units as less dangerous in long run than permitting UN forces consolidate position in Korea and thus from Chinese Communist point of view posing permanent threat to their border.

WILKINSON

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[2] See footnote 1 to telegram 750 from Hong Kong, received at 4 a. m. on October 8, p. 912.

[3] See telegram 787 from Hong Kong, received at 10:35 p. m. on October 14, p. 946. The mission referred to as being undertaken by the above-mentioned Chinese Communist official allegedly involved efforts to recruit former Nationalist Chinese diplomats for service under the Peking regime and also to establish contact—direct or indirect—with Secretary of Defense Marshall to present demands relating to Taiwan.

320/11–350 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 3, 1950—11 : 07 p. m.
[Received November 3—11 : 45 p. m.]

Delga 232. IC on Korea has notified US as UC that it today decided to invite US to attend all future meetings. It gave US notice that next meeting at 10 a. m. Monday, November 6, will be concerned:

(*a*) With formulation of principles upon which resolution of October 12 based that may guide UN Command in action in the light of the resolution pending arrival of UNCOK in Korea. In general, the principles will assert that, subject to UN command, South Koreans may properly be used north of 38th Parallel for technical and security purposes;

(*b*) IC would further like statement of military situation insofar as we can indicate it in Monday's closed session.

Cordier (SYG) reports that IC President Romulo has asked SYG to cable members of former UNCOK now in Korea for urgent report on military situation. USUN officer expressed personal view UC might be able supply some facts for Monday meeting and that request to UNCOK members might be premature. He also mentioned possible necessity for report to SC. Cordier was inclined not to cable before Monday on theory UC is best channel for quick report.

Request Department's guidance on general lines of informational content of any remarks by US representative regarding (*b*).

AUSTIN

Editorial Note

On November 4, General MacArthur, in response to a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the previous day, provided an interim appreciation of the situation in Korea in the light of what appeared to be overt intervention by Chinese Communist forces. He indicated that it was impossible at that time to appraise authoritatively the actualities of Chinese intervention but indicated that full scale intervention appeared unlikely. In the last sentence of his telegram, he recommended against hasty, premature conclusions and added that a final appraisal should await a more complete accumulation of military facts. (The text of General MacArthur's message, telegram C–68285, is printed in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, page 373; see also Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, page 762.)

795.00/11–450

The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 4 November 1950.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to your conversation, on or about 13 October, with the Secretary of the Air Force regarding the desirability of establishing a more explicit delimitation of air operations in the vicinity of the North Korean border, in order to ensure against a repetition of border incidents.[1] The considerations which you presented have been conveyed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the request that they review the matter in an attempt to determine (*a*) the necessity for U.S. air and naval unit operations within a fixed distance from the Manchurian and Soviet borders; (*b*) whether there are adequate military reasons for conducting such operations in the area in the present circumstances and (*c*) whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff should not send an amplifying message to General MacArthur in the light of the political considerations as well as the changed military situation.

The Department of Defense has given full consideration to the above questions and holds the following views thereon:

(*a*) The need for air interdiction operations in areas contiguous to the international boundaries of Korea is sufficient justification for not further delimiting air operations.

(*b*) Further, in light of information currently available it appears that U.N. ground force (including U.S.) operations will be required up to the international boundaries of Korea. Therefore, it is not considered desirable, from the military point of view, to deny these ground troops air and naval support in these areas; nor would acceptance of the loss of life entailed by such denial be justified.

(*c*) Moreover, there will be a continuing requirement for aerial as well as ground reconnaissance in areas contiguous to the borders for an indefinite period.

(*d*) In the light of various directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recent events, it is felt that General MacArthur and his subordinate commanders are fully aware of the necessity for avoiding any violations of Manchurian and Soviet territory. It would appear that a further directive on this subject is unnecessary at the present time.

Faithfully yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

[1] See the memorandum by Mr. Acheson, dated October 10, concerning a conversation with Mr. Lovett, p. 922.

795.00/11-450

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 4, 1950.

Subject: Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea: Estimate of Objectives.

The Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be viewed against the background of the earlier warning from Peiping that China would intervene in the event that UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel. The intervention was, that is, a calculated move for which preparations were made well in advance, and did not arise accidentally or through processes over which the Chinese Communists had no control. The Chinese Communists were well informed respecting UN objectives, and UN strength and capabilities, in Korea. They were thus in a good position to lay their plans accordingly, providing good margin for error, to the end that they might attain their ends—which are presumed to have been determined in consultation with the USSR side, possibly in the August conference at Peiping which has so frequently been reported upon.[1] It remains to determine the Chinese Communist objectives in their intervention.

I. *Hypothetical Alternatives:*

1. Protection of Chinese interest in Yalu power.
2. Establishment of a limited *cordon sanitaire* bordering on Manchuria and USSR.
3. Restoration of the *status quo ante* June 25 in North Korea.
4. Expulsion of UN forces from the entire Korean peninsula.
5. Creation of an excuse for involvement of Japan.
6. Offering of a springboard for World War III.

II. *Discussion:*

1. There has been no reference in Chinese Communist propaganda to the Yalu power-plant factor. The power installation, if important, is nevertheless not the only source of power for Manchurian industry. There are both hydro-electric and thermal plants which are probably adequate, in the main, for the supply of all Manchuria's needs, even though certain difficulties would undoubtedly be encountered in the first instance. The original Chinese threat of intervention had no reference to the Yalu River installation, the Chinese have at this juncture made no *démarche* respecting that installation, and the scale of their present intervention indicates clearly more than a desire to protect a local area.

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[1] See telegram 945 from Hong Kong, received at 2:35 p. m. on October 31, p. 1019.

2. The establishment of a limited *cordon sanitaire* does not appear envisaged in their propaganda approach to the Chinese people demanding support for the North Koreans and resistance to an alleged threat of aggression against China. The establishment of such a limited belt would militarily be difficult and, in the light of the North Korean refusal to surrender, from the political point of view does not appear approximate to the Communist minimum political objective.

3. The restoration of the *status quo ante* June 25 would perhaps have met the requirements implicit in Chou en-lai's earlier *démarche* to the Indian Ambassador—satisfaction of which would, however, have left Korea still in a divided and basically unstable state. It is doubtful whether the restoration of North Korean authority south as far as the 38th Parallel would now meet the present joint designs of the Chinese Communists and the Moscow strategists, particularly in view of the circumstance that the North Koreans nominally still maintain their original objective of establishing their authority throughout the entire Korean peninsula. It must be considered, nevertheless, as a minimum objective as determined by both political and military factors.

4. The expulsion of United Nations forces from the entire Korean peninsula could hardly be regarded as other than a desirable objective by the North Koreans, the Chinese Communists and by Moscow. The Chinese Communist forces now available in Manchuria number, according to SCAP, no less than forty-four divisions—with possibly more. No firm information is available regarding the number of Soviet troops in Manchuria (as distinct from the Dairen–Port Arthur area). Today's telecon refers to the presence of three Chinese Communist divisions identified as being in contact with the Eighth Army. Presumably the Communist strategists would contemplate expulsion of UN forces from Korea if it were considered within their capability to do so, by reason of the important benefit which would thus derive to the Communist camp in terms of both political and military factors. For them, time would be a less valuable commodity than for us. The mere tying down of UN forces might be considered a valid objective.

5. Both the Soviet and Chinese sides have already put on record the allegation that the United States is employing Japanese forces in the fighting in Korea. The Sino-Soviet Alliance of February 14 provides that one signatory shall go to war in support of the other if the second be involved in conflict with either Japan or a nation connected with Japan. Certain defense measures being undertaken in Manchuria would indicate a possible belief that Chinese action in Korea will bring a UN military reaction into China. It must be considered

possible that, in the event UN military actions were carried over the Manchurian boundary, this would be taken as an excuse for invoking the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Alliance with the charge that the Japanese had been involved in the fighting in Korea and/or that a nation connected with Japan was involved in an intrusion into Chinese territory. If this development were in fact taken as the occasion for citing the treaty in question, a prompt Soviet attack on Japan could logically be expected. In that event, although the hostilities might nominally be limited in the first instance to the Japan area, the USSR indubitably could be expected to be in a posture of readiness to accept, if need be, the challenges of World War III.

It is appropriate to deduce that Moscow, in its estimate of world political currents will have judged that the UN will refuse to cross the boundaries of Korea into Manchuria. But they will not have neglected the possibility; nor should we neglect the possibility that they plan to expand the area of conflict—whatever the excuse.

6. The Chinese Communist drive into Korea was not accompanied by a like surprise move by the Soviet Union against the United States in a new Pearl Harbor, and it is therefore to be assumed in the first instance that the present move is designed to constitute at most and worst an intermediary stage which will lead to the outbreak of World War III. This assumption that the Moscow aim in the present move is limited in immediate scope is supported by the circumstance that there seems to be some effort to disguise the intervention, if only nominally. One suggested route for arriving at the particular point of World War III's outbreak would be, as indicated above, by way of involvement in Japan; another would obviously be by springing one or more of a series of moves elsewhere in the world, while the United States had its major available forces pinned down in Korea, until the conflagration had reached the explosion point. Germany is an obvious focus of political moves, and Moscow's *démarche* vis-à-vis the American, British and French Ambassadors on November 3 may have some not-distant relationship to events in Korea. World War III might be reached, in short, by either a fairly direct or somewhat round-about route with Korea as its starting point.

III. *Tentative Conclusions:*

On the basis of the above brief delineation of the alternatives—all of which must be taken in view—it is concluded:

1. The Chinese Communists interest is not limited to the Yalu power installation and/or other border factors, and the establishment of a limited *cordon sanitaire* therefore would be without major political or economic significance and is, therefore, probably less than the minimum objective.

2. The minimum Chinese Communist objective must be considered to be either the restoration of the *status quo ante* June 25 in North Korea or the expulsion of UN forces from the entire Korean peninsula.

3. It is not safe to assume, even so, that Peiping and Moscow together have not made plans which envision the possibility that, in given circumstances, the area of hostilities shall be extended first to Manchuria, second perhaps to Japan or alternatively to Western Europe, with the result in either case to be the outbreak of World War III, soon or late.

IV. *Recommendations:*

1. That the united UN front be maintained at all costs, with the UN military and political responsibilities in Korea to be distributed more equally than at present among the concerned member nations.

2. That the essence of the standing directive to General MacArthur be maintained at least until the military situation is further clarified, that is, that the UN forces continue action against the enemy in Korea (but in Korea only) for so long as it appears possible to achieve UN objectives: if a sound drubbing could be administered to Chinese Communist forces, with the war localized within Korea, this could only have a salutary effect in Asia.

3. That the factors favoring continued UN and US involvement in Korea, however, be weighed against any other factors determined to be operating against US and UN interests in other possible theatres of conflict throughout the world, to the end that such involvement shall not be carried past a point where it would result in our being exposed to vital blows elsewhere.

Policy Planning Staff Files

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 4, 1950.

General Loper of the Defense Department[1] came to the State Department today at my request to discuss the question of possible U.S. use of atomic bombs to counter Chinese Communist military action in Korea.

If the bomb were used in Korea it would be for tactical purposes against troop concentrations and artillery support positions. Against such targets it should prove effective. However, such targets would probably not come about normally; they would have to be created by tactical maneuvers of U.N. forces. Very few atomic bombs could be used as few targets could be created. In addition to the purely military

[1] Brig. Gen. Herbert B. Loper was Assistant for Atomic Energy, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, U.S. Army.

effect, use of the bomb for these purposes might prove a deterrent against further Chinese participation. If the bomb were used for tactical purposes, it is unlikely that there would be large destruction of civilian life.

It does not appear that in present circumstances the atomic bomb would be militarily decisive in Korea, and there is a serious possibility that its use might bring the Soviet Union into the war. Furthermore, its use would help arouse the peoples of Asia against us.

If the bomb should be used for strategic purposes through attacks on such Manchurian cities as Mukden, Fushun, Anshan, Harbin and Dairen, this action would result in the destruction of many civilians and would almost certainly bring the Soviet Union into the war.

If we should consider the use of the atomic bomb in the Korean area, we should keep in mind that the military actions there are under U.N. auspices, that its use would have world-wide repercussions, and that there is a question whether we should use it only with U.N. concurrence. Obtaining U.N. concurrence beforehand might keep the moral forces of the world with us in the use of the bomb, whereas a unilateral decision to use it might leave us in a disadvantageous moral position. On the other hand, the publicity attending debate of this question in the United Nations would be of military value to our adversary.

PAUL H. NITZE

795B.13/11–450 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, November 4, 1950—9 p. m.
[Received November 4—2:51 p. m.]

335. Embtel 329, and 331, November 3,[1] on rejection of George Paek as Prime Minister. Rejection of Paek by National Assembly by secret vote 100 against, 21 for, and 2 abstaining, came after motion for brief consideration was ignored.

Overwhelming rejection of Paek, who is generally regarded as able and honest, can be attributed mainly to deep-seated Assembly hostility to Rhee and his Cabinet and to selfish political maneuvering. Another factor militating against Paek was suddenness with which Rhee presented his name. Although it appears Kim Sung So (leader of DNP)

[1] Neither printed. Telegram 331 reported that Acting Prime Minister Sihn Sung Mo had confidentially informed the American Embassy that he had urged upon President Rhee the reconstitution of the Korean Cabinet, tendered his own resignation, and suggested as his replacement Minister of Education George Paek, pointing out that Paek was able, honest, patriotic, and a native of North Korea. (795B.13/11–350)

and perhaps Shinicky were apprised of Rhee's intention evening of second, Paek's nomination came as surprise to most Assemblymen. There was thus no real attempt by administration to lobby in favor of Paek.

Embassy understands that at Cabinet meeting yesterday afternoon decision was taken to resubmit Paek's name, possibly within a few days time.

Open hostility between National Assembly and Rhee is further evidenced by introduction in Assembly today of resolution reportedly supported by 85 Assemblymen calling for resignation of entire Cabinet. Resolution was presented directly to presiding vice chairman, Chang Taek Sang who called for vote whether discussion should be initiated immediately or postponed until November 6. After two indecisive votes consideration of resolution was deferred to sixth.[2]

DRUMRIGHT

[2] Telegram 346, November 7, from Seoul, not printed, reported that the National Assembly had voted overwhelmingly in view of the seriousness of the war situation, to postpone a decision on the resolution calling for the resignation of the Cabinet. During the debate, several Ministers were severely criticized for their conduct in office since the outbreak of fighting. (795B.13/11–750)

795B.00/11–450 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, November 4, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received November 4—2:56 p. m.]

333. Re Hague 630, October 30, to Department; repeated info Seoul 1.[1] Following is Embassy's comment: Difficult evaluate *Times* article which unavailable here; from context reftel appears, however, article purports describe alleged ROK widespread brutalities against Commies caught Seoul. Although Embassy much interested this subject even fearing prior to its return here there might be blood bath Seoul streets, Embassy has been pleasantly impressed generally reasonable attitude ROK officials towards persons suspected aiding enemy during Commie occupation. Embassy has inquired at British Legation both re *Times* correspondent and Legation's possible possession information this subject. British Chargé says are no *Times* correspondents Korea present time; from date article appearing *Times* he believes must have been written by correspondent earlier here but then in Tokyo. Re charge brutalities, says only mention made him by

[1] Not printed. It reported on expressions of concern by officials of the Netherlands Foreign Ministry over an article in *The Times* of London, October 25, dealing with alleged mistreatment by ROK officials of fellow Koreans in the Seoul area accused of being Communists or collaborators during the North Korean occupation. (795.00/10–3050)

this man was of rough treatment sometimes encountered at police stations.

Embassy suggests Department consider forwarding to Embassy Hague for information Netherlands Foreign Office substance Embtel 281, October 20; Embtel 317, October 31,[2] and pertinent part Embassy unnumbered despatch October 1.[3] Considering nature Commie invasion three months occupation Seoul, perpetration atrocities including wide-scale murder and kidnaping, should be expected popular feeling against Commie agents very high especially among citizens Seoul who remained here during those three months; additionally, many police lost part or all their families although they themselves had gone south. Under such circumstances, Embassy considers ROK agencies have shown generally commendable restraint. Noteworthy as of October 27, of 9777 arrestees investigated approximately half released for lack legal evidence. Also noteworthy, those persons not arrested and tried for "collaboration", but for violation specific terms National Security Law and other laws, especially those covering conspiracy overthrow state with force arms, espionage, and murder.

Embassy also draws attention many thousand enemy POW's captured by ROK forces who treated in accordance with Geneva conventions according to testimony of International Red Cross representatives.

Reference to "policy permitting Rhee regime unfettered control ROK mistake" not understood here. ROK sovereign state with legally established government. Rhee's public and private statements regarding forgiveness enemies, ignoring small fry among Commies, seem highly commendable. Should Embassy learn of practices alleged by *Times* article, it would urge their termination, as presumably would CINCUNC Japan.

Embassy believes, however, *Times* article as described highly imaginative, little associated with facts present situation.

DRUMRIGHT

[2] Neither printed. They reported on the Republic of Korea's program for handling persons arrested for alleged collaboration with the Communists in the Seoul area. (795B.00/10–2050; 795.00/10–3150)

[3] Not printed.

795.00/11–550 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 5, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received November 5—8:05 a. m.]

337. ReEmbtel 332 [1] on Chinese Communist activity in North Korea. According Eighth Army Intelligence, only significant development

[1] Received at 1:20 p. m. on November 3, p. 1030.

emerging past two days has been spotting of considerable southbound vehicular traffic at various Yalu River crossings in northwest Korea. Inasmuch as Chinese originally entered North Korea with only three days' rations and 100 rounds ammunition each, it surmised southward traffic largely of supply character. With UN forces in Eighth Army area regrouping and generally on defensive, few prisoners have been taken past two days and only one found to be of Chinese race. No hostile air activity reported past two days which perhaps due bad weather.

Reports from Tenth Corps area which delayed as much as 30 hours in receipt here indicate US Marines in contact with Sino-Communist unit about 20 miles north Hamhung.

DRUMRIGHT

320/11–550 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 5, 1950—1 : 22 p. m.
[Received November 5—1 : 53 p. m.]

Delga 236. For Johnson, NA. Following is draft of statement of principles IC on Korea will consider Monday, November 6, 10 : 00 a. m. This is revision of original text made as result consultation between Plimsoll representing IC and Allison. Plimsoll believes it will gain general approval but neither he nor Allison made any commitments as to its acceptability. Department's comments urgently requested:

"In order that there may be no misunderstanding the IC desires to clarify some points in its resolution of 12th October 1950.

"The IC on Korea wishes to ensure that the people of the northern part of Korea shall have the opportunity to participate fully and freely in the establishment of a unified and democratic government of Korea. It therefore advised the Unified Command on 12th October to exercise administrative functions in the north until the commission has considered means of consulting the Korean people and their representatives.

"The IC on Korea considers that, subject to the needs of military operations and security, the following principles should govern any use in the north of Koreans from south of the 38th parallel in order to conform with the resolution of the committee adopted on 12th October 1950.

"1. Any Koreans south of the 38th parallel who are used in the north should be appointed by, under the control of and responsible to the UC and not act as the representatives or agents of any other authority;

"2. Such Koreans should not be used in a manner which would enable them to bring political pressure to bear upon the local in-

habitants or in any manner restrict the free expression of political opinions by the local inhabitants;

"3. Efforts should be made to use local residents wherever possible before using Koreans from south of the 38th parallel.

"These principles will be reviewed by the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea after it meets."

AUSTIN

795B.5/11–550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 5, 1950—5 p. m.

URGENT

476. FYI only. Following is text of draft special report from CG United Nations Command to UN now under consideration here. No action of any kind should be taken with regard to this draft report pending further instructions from Dept.

"I herewith submit a special report of the United Nations command operations in Korea which I believe should be brought to the attention of the United Nations.

"*Introduction*

"The United Nations forces in Korea are continuing their drive to the north and their efforts to destroy further the effectiveness of the enemy as a fighting force are proving successful. However, presently in certain areas of Korea, the United Nations forces are meeting a new foe. It is apparent to our fighting forces, and our intelligence agencies have confirmed the fact, that the United Nations are presently in hostile contact with Chinese Communist military units deployed for action against the forces of the United Command.

"*The Fact of Intervention*

"Hereafter, in summary form, are confirmed intelligence reports substantiating the fact that forces other than Korean are resisting our efforts to carry out the resolutions of the United Nations:

"*a. 22 August:* Approximately 50 bursts heavy antiaircraft fire from Manchurian side of Yalu River against RB–29 flying at 7,000 feet over Korea in the vicinity of the Sui-Ho reservoir; damage, none; time, 1600K; weather, 10 miles visibility, high broken clouds.

"*b. 24 August:* Approximately 40 bursts heavy antiaircraft fire from Manchurian side of Yalu River against RB–29 flying at 10,000

feet over Korea in the vicinity of Sinuiju; damage, none; time, 1500K; weather, 20 miles visibility.

"*c. 15 October:* Antiaircraft fire from the Manchurian side of Yalu River against a flight of 4 F–51's flying near the Sinuiju Airfield on the Korean side of the river; damage, 1 aircraft total loss; time, 1445I; weather, overcast at 8,000 feet; 8 to 10 miles visibility.

"*d. 16 October:* The 370th Regiment of the 124th Division of the Chinese Communist 42nd Army, consisting of approximately 2,500 troops, crossed the Yalu River (Korean border) at Man Po Jin, and proceeded to the area of Chosen and Fusen Dams in North Korea where they came in contact with UN forces approximately 40 miles north of Ham Hung.

"*e. 17 October:* Approximately 15 bursts heavy antiaircraft fire from Manchurian side of Yalu River against RB–29 flying at 10,000 feet over Korea in the vicinity of Sinuiju; damage, none; time, 1200I; weather, 8 miles visibility, low clouds 2,300 feet.

"*f. 20 October:* A Chinese Communist task force known as the '56th' unit consisting of approximately 5,000 troops crossed the Yalu River (Korean Border) at Antung and deployed to positions in Korea south of the Sui-Ho Dam. A captured Chinese Communist soldier of this task force states that his group was organized out of the regular Chinese Communist 40th Army stationed at Antung, Manchuria.

"*g. 1 November:* A flight of F–51's was attacked early in the afternoon by 6 to 9 jet aircraft which flew across the Yalu River into Manchuria. No damage was done to UN aircraft. A Red Star was observed on the top of the right wing on one of the jet aircraft.

"*h. 1 November:* Antiaircraft fire from the Manchurian side of the Yalu River directed against a flight of 13 F–80 aircraft was observed in the vicinity of Sinuiju at 1345 hours. This resulted in the total loss of 1 UN aircraft.

"*i. 30 October:* Interrogation of 19 Chinese prisoners of war identified two additional regiments of 124 CCF Division, the 371 and the 372 in the vicinity of Changjin.

"*j. 2 November:* Interrogation of prisoners of war indicates the 54 CCF unit in Korea. This unit is reported to have same organization as 55 and 56 units, but to be drawn from the 112, 113, and 114 Divisions of the 38 CCF Army.

"*k. 3 November:* Further interrogation of Chinese prisoners of war indicates 56 CCF unit organized from elements of 118, 119, and 120 CCF Divisions of the 40 CCF Army.

"*l. 4 November:* As of this date, a total of 35 CCF prisoners had been taken in Korea.

"The continued employment of Chinese Communist forces in Korea and the hostile attitude assumed by such forces, either inside or outside Korea, are matters which it is incumbent upon me to bring at once to the attention of the UN."

ACHESON

320/11–550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 5, 1950—8 p. m.

Gadel 95. ReDelga 232 Nov 3. With respect Par(*a*) urtel suggest that if IC desires to formulate such principles they be drawn in broadest possible term so as not to limit ability CINCUNC to make full use of all resources, facilities, services and personnel made available to him by all participating govts including Govt ROK in carrying out difficult task entrusted to Unified Command by IC resolution of Oct 12. Principle that South Koreans may be used north of 38° for only technical and security purposes raises difficult question of definition of terms "South Koreans" and "technical and security purposes". As IC is aware several millions persons unwilling to accept Communist domination moved from north of 38th parallel to south since 1945. Also, virtually without exception all personnel of the NK regime at all levels have left their posts. It would manifestly be impracticable and undesirable to require CINCUNC to use in other than technical or security positions only those elements of the NK population left in the area at the time of occupation by UN forces and prevent his use of former residents of the area who have now returned to their homes and who are sufficiently well qualified to assume positions of responsibility in civil affairs and who have intimate knowledge of the local population and problems of the occupied area.

It is believed that only limiting principle should be that all personnel, including Govt ROK personnel, used by CINCUNC in administration NK should be responsible only to CINCUNC and should in no way represent Govt ROK or exercise its authority north of 38th parallel. Govt ROK has already accepted this principle.

Any principles proposed by IC should be assessed in light of Civil Affairs Directive to General MacArthur which it is believed constitutes sound and workable basis for carrying out occupation consistent with views of UN as expressed by GA and IC resolutions. If considered desirable you are authorized to discuss in strict confidence full text of directive with IC. As it is view of General MacArthur that any public release of directive prior to cessation of major hostilities would possibly have adverse effect upon combat troops under his command as well as upon Govt ROK important that contents of directive not be directly or indirectly made public at this time.

Request that currency question (Gadel 84 Oct 31) be discussed with IC in light of principles formulated with view of immediately obtaining firm views of IC as urgent decision be reached Nov 6. In

addition to points for your guidance in Gadel 84, another consideration favoring use of ROK currency is time element. ROK currency is immediately available while making of plates and printing of UN scrip would require at minimum several weeks.

Instructions on requested report to IC on military situation will follow.[1]

ACHESON

[1] Not printed.

795.00/11–550 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET NIACT PRIORITY WASHINGTON, November 5, 1950—11 p. m.

119. Please deliver immediately to FonOff text Special Report by United Nations Command on Korea relayed as Deptels 2410 to Paris, 400 to Taipei, 399 to Cairo, 92 to Quito, 331 to Oslo, 377 to Belgrade, 185 to Havana and 672 to New Delhi.[2] Moscow and London no action. Inform FonOffs listed that Special Report is being filed with UN tonight for information Security Council and that US will ask for early meeting of SC to discuss unlawful intervention in Korea. USUN will be in touch with their dels in New York. Our objectives in Korea remain same. We wish to localize Korean fighting and prevent it from spreading. We believe UN must firmly insist that illegal intervention be promptly halted. On other hand, we hope Chi Commie authorities will come to senses and not force extension of hostilities which it had been UN purpose from beginning to avoid.

ACHESON

[1] Sent to Belgrade, Cairo, Havana, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Oslo, Paris, Quito, Taipei, and the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.
[2] See telegram 476, November 5, 5 p.m., to New York, p. 1046.

795B.5/11–550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, November 5, 1950—11 p. m.

477. There follows draft res for possible use in SC relating to Chi intervention Korea. This is not firm draft but can be used for discussion with UKDel but not at this stage with other SC members. In addition

to recitals set forth below Dept believes there should be further recital setting forth former findings by UN that North Korea was the aggressor.

Draft Resolution follows:

The SC

Recalling its res of June 25, 1950 calling upon all members of the UN to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities:

Recalling the res adopted by the GA on Oct 7, 1950 which sets forth the policies of the GA in respect to Korea:

Having noted from the special report of the UN Command operations in Korea dated Nov 1950 that Chi Commie military units are deployed for action against the forces of the UN in Korea:

Affirming that UN forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives of stability throughout Korea and the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea as set forth in the res of the GA dated Oct 7, 1950;

Insistent that no action be taken which might lead to the spread of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further endanger international peace and security:

Calls upon all states and auths to refrain from assisting or encouraging the North Korean auths, to prevent their nationals or individuals or units of their armed forces from giving assistance to North Korean forces and to cause the immediate withdrawal of any such nationals, individuals or units which may presently be in Korea;

Requests the UNCURK to hold itself available to assist in the settlement of any problems relating to conditions on the Korean frontier in which other states or auths have an interest and to utilize such members of the Commission as now have representatives in the area for this purpose. *End draft res.*

FYI Dept has transmitted to capitals of all SC members text of special report sent to USUN in Deptel 476.

ACHESON

795.00/11–650 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1950—2 a. m.

2344. Following is text of message from Secretary to Bevin handed by Secretary to British Ambassador this evening:[1]

"I assume you have received from Sir Oliver Franks the text of a special report of UN Command in Korea re Chin intervention in

[1] Telegram 2345, November 6, 10 a. m., to London, not printed, instructed the Embassy to change the words "this evening" to "evening Nov 5" (795.00/11–650).

present fighting in north.[2] You will also have seen General MacArthur's UN communiqué no. 11 dated November 4, 1950.[3] Our latest information does not change the picture as set forth in the report, but it appears that the enemy is continuing his attack in northwest sector and is reinforcing his effort by substantial vehicular traffic across the Yalu.

The report does not contain sufficiently detailed information to permit an immediate estimate as to Chin intentions in present situation. We are giving this problem most urgent attention both in Washington and in Tokyo and will keep in close touch with you. We should greatly appreciate any info or views which you might have on this most important point.

We are trying to determine whether the Chin are acting on basis of one or more of following considerations:

(1) Since it became general knowledge that Peiping had threatened to take some sort of action if UN forces crossed 38th parallel, present intervention might be demonstration that they are not 'standing idly by'.

(2) Since Commies may have learned of UN desire to hold UN forces back and use Koreans in areas of Korea along frontier, they may have decided to occupy area along border in order not to lose any chance to salvage at least that much of Korea if their opposition proved to be limited to South Koreans.

(3) Chin may have in mind making large enough commitment to establish *cordon sanitaire* within Korea, even though such action would bring them into direct clash with UN forces.

(4) Commies may be seriously concerned over prospect of losing hydroelectric power and may be acting to defend power installations along line set forth in recent NK broadcast from Sinuiju.

(5) Chin intervention may be 'token' both with respect to NKs and with respect to possible Soviet pressure for assistance to Koreans.

(6) Chin may have come to believe that UN forces are in fact aiming at Manchuria and present intervention may be based on fear of attack.

(7) Moscow and Peiping may wish pin down substantial UN forces in NK during coming winter, to produce strain and discomfort on our own military resources, to slow up readiness of expanding US forces by holding an important proportion of our trained officers and men

[2] See telegram 476, November 5, 5 p. m., New York, p. 1046.

[3] The text of this communiqué, issued on November 6, is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, November 13, 1950, p. 763. In it, General MacArthur reported the defeat and destruction of the North Korean armies, but went on to say that "the Communists committed one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of historic record by moving without any notice of belligerency elements of alien Communist forces across the Yalu River into North Korea and massing a great concentration of possible reinforcing divisions with adequate supply behind the privileged sanctuary of the adjacent Manchurian border." Whether these reserves would be committed to battle, said MacArthur, remained to be seen and was a matter of the gravest international significance.

in Korea, or to insure that these forces may not be available for use where other Commie adventures are already under way or planned.

(8) Chin may intend reoccupy Korea down to 38th parallel.

(9) Chin may intend attempt expel UN forces from Korea.

(10) Chi action in Kor may be a part of more general military program hatched up by Kremlin affecting entire FE area (Indo-China or Japan) or even involving new moves in other parts of world.

We are not ready for a satisfactory assessment, but military and supply factors lead us to preliminary view that explanation for Chin action lies in some combination of first seven or eight factors.

Whatever our conclusion on the above proves to be, there is no doubt but that Chi military intervention is substantial, that there is no reason to suppose that it will not increase, and that very serious political and military implications are thereby raised.

I repeat, perhaps unnecessarily, that our own purposes in Korea are unchanged, that we wish to act wholly within the framework of a UN solution for an 'independent united and democratic Korea', and that we most particularly do not wish to have hostilities in that country spread elsewhere. While I have no doubt about our own joint purposes, we are concerned about the program of aggressive action now being carried out by Peiping, combining as it does activity in Korea, Indo-China and Tibet, with more indirect attacks on other countries in Asia.

I have seen your message of third Nov to Oliver Franks and have had it very much in mind in considering what we ought to do at this time about Chi action in Korea. Whether what we now do will seriously affect Chi intention depends to some extent upon what those intentions are. I agree that we should do nothing provocative. On other hand, I believe that Chi intervention is now serious and that it cannot be ignored.

It seems to me that the first and essential step is to give the basic facts to the UN, as set forth in text of special report. We have officially ignored Sov arms and advisers, 'volunteers' from Manchuria and other assistance in the past even though whole world knew facts. We did so in order to leave other side a way out. I doubt that is possible to treat organized Chi units on same basis, even though there has not been an official espousal of these units by Peiping regime. The world fully understands nature of intervention and greatly intensified propaganda campaign inside China indicates full espousal by Peiping. It seems to us, therefore, that we must send the special report to SC promptly. It will be immediately preceded or accompanied by regular periodic report of UN Command covering period Oct 16–31.

The next question which would arise is the action to be taken in SC in light of special report. The fact of Chi intervention is such that a report can hardly be left on table and ignored. Further if Peiping discovers that nothing at all happens in the face of its intervention it will be emboldened to act even more aggressively by what it might consider proof of weakness or nervousness on our part. On other hand we do not wish to extend the fighting in Korea to China by pressing and proving a case of aggression against Chi in such a way as to lead to full UN sanctions against mainland Chi—certainly not at this present stage. We believe that our purpose should be to emphasize that we are trying to limit the fighting to Korea and to do everything we can not to spread the hostilities.

It seems to us therefore that we should ask for an early meeting of SC, for not later than Wed of this week,[4] to discuss the reports from the UN command. At this mtg, our debate shd be directed toward localizing the conflict and should be geared to a short and simple res along the lines of the res vetoed by Sov on same subject in Sept. A proposed draft res is being forwarded by separate message.

We welcome info that you are working on draft res and would be glad to give it most sympathetic consideration. I am sure that our purposes in the present situation are very close together.

You will notice that our draft res. takes into account a number of the points raised by your message of Nov 3. We have made only limited ref to Chi interest in Korea. We can see that Peiping has an interest in having a neighbor in Korea whose intentions are peaceful, with whom any border problems can be worked out with the help of UN, and in whose territory there are not established foreign military bases or installations constituting a threat to contiguous areas of Chi. We do not believe however that we should concede to Peiping any interest whatever in the internal affairs of Korea or in the unification and rehabilitation work to be carried out by the UN. The Balkan record[5] seems to us entirely persuasive on latter point.

As to timing we wish to report facts to SC at once. We envisage a day or two's gap between the filing of the special report and the convening of a meeting of the SC. Members of SC will wish to get report of their govts and we do not wish to embarrass members on such matters as instructions. That would give us a brief period to concert our own views as to how we handle the case in the Council."

ACHESON

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[4] November 8.

[5] The word "record" was inserted under instruction of telegram 2345 to London, not printed.

320/11–650 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET
URGENT

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1950—2 a. m.

Gadel 96. ReDelga 236 Nov 5. In addition to considerations mentioned Gadel 95 [1] it is suggested you call attention IC to vital importance of giving full consideration effect proposed action on ROK armed forces and Govt ROK which have suffered grievously because of the aggression from north of Korea and whose continued high morale will be of utmost importance to successful conclusion hostilities and accomplishment objectives of occupation.

With foregoing considerations in mind it would appear preferable that statement of principles such as that proposed with attendant publicity in Kor be deferred in favor of informal understanding between IC and UC or that any such statement be treated as strictly confidential.

However with respect to draft contained urtel 236 paragraphs one and two are in general acceptable as principles. Para three is acceptable if it understood that term "local residents" includes former residents of areas who were dispossessed or otherwise forced to flee by Commie tyranny and have now returned to their homes. It would manifestly be unjust and destructive of morale to treat such persons other than on at least a basis of equality with persons who remained in area and willingly or unwillingly contributed to support of aggression upon their fellow countrymen.

ACHESON

[1] Transmitted to New York at 8 p. m. on November 5, p. 1048.

795.00/11–650 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 6, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received November 6—3 : 42 a. m.]

339. Embtel 337 [1] and previous on Sino-Communist intervention in North Korea. Eighth Army states ROK units yesterday captured

[1] Received at 8 : 05 a.m. on November 5, p. 1044.

additional seven Chinese prisoners in area northeast Pyongyang. What appeared to be total number of 13 hostile Yak aircraft were observed over northwest Korea yesterday. Such aircraft appear almost certain to have risen from Manchurian fields.

On basis current information, Eighth Army intelligence estimates there now between 25,000 and 27,000 Sino-Communists engaged in northwestern Korean sector. Tenth Corps intelligence estimates UN forces northeastern Korea are engaged against Sino-Communist strength of about one division.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/11–650

Memorandum of Conversations, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 6, 1950.

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE BETWEEN SECRETARY ACHESON, [DEPUTY] UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LOVETT, AND MR. DEAN RUSK

Shortly after ten o'clock this morning Mr. Robert Lovett came over from the Pentagon with an urgent message from General Stratemeyer. This message reported that the Air Forces had been ordered to take off at one o'clock p. m. EST today on a bombing mission to take out the bridge across the Yalu River from Sinuiju (Korea) to Antung (Manchuria). They were to use radio controlled bombs and would attempt to bomb on the Korean side of the bridge.

Mr. Lovett expressed his view that from an operational standpoint he doubted whether the results to be achieved would importantly interrupt traffic and that the danger of bombing the city of Antung and other points on the Manchurian side of the River were very great.

Mr. Rusk explained that we had a commitment with the British not to take action which might involve attacks on the Manchurian side of the River without consultation with them. He also said that the British Cabinet was meeting this morning to reconsider their whole attitude toward the Chinese Communist Government and that ill-considered action on our part might have grave consequences. He also told Mr. Lovett that we had filed General MacArthur's report concerning Chinese intervention with the United Nations Security Council and had asked for an urgent meeting tomorrow or Wednesday at which we were going to present a resolution calling on the Chinese to cease activities in Korea, thus attempting to get UN support for

any action which might be necessary in the event of their refusal to accept the UN action. He also mentioned the possibility of Russian involvement under the Sino-Russian Treaty.

After some discussion we all thoroughly agreed that this action should be postponed until the reasons for it were more clearly known.

Mr. Lovett telephoned General Marshall, who agreed that the action was unwise unless there was some mass movement across the River, which threatened the security of our troops. Mr. Lovett called Mr. Finletter and instructed him to tell the Joint Chiefs the facts which Mr. Rusk had stated, as set forth above, and to add that he had talked with the Secretary of State, who believed that the situation was so grave that the action should be postponed until the matter had been laid before the President and his instructions had been received. He was to add that this was to be done as soon as possible and that another message would be sent.

I then telephoned the President in Kansas City and laid the matter before him, as outlined above. The President said that he would approve the action if it was necessary because of an immediate and serious threat to the security of our own troops. I pointed out that we had no information on this matter beyond General MacArthur's report of yesterday, which contained no statement of any further movements across the river, but only of reserves on the Chinese side. The President suggested that I call General MacArthur and ascertain what the facts were. I thought, and he agreed, that communications on military subjects should be through the Military Establishment. The President told me to handle the matter until his return in the way Mr. Lovett and I thought best, adding that he would be available on the telephone if necessary and that the security of our troops should not be jeopardized. He agreed on the importance of postponing the action if that could be done consistently with the requirement above. I gave Mr. Lovett the attached summary of the President's position, and he left immediately to read it to the JCS.

Our conference terminated at 11:15 a. m., one and three-quarters hours before the planes were to take off for Korea. Mr. Lovett will inform me of the action taken by the JCS.

Mr. Rusk later called Mr. Lovett to inquire whether we had been discussing the bridge only or whether the rest of the mission in the Sinuiju area would be flown. Mr. Lovett said that the entire mission

was being postponed and that a message went to Tokyo at 11:40 ordering General MacArthur not to attack targets within five miles of the Manchurian border and asking his estimate of the situation and reasons for the mission against Sinuiju and the Yalu Bridge in that area. The message also referred to our commitment to consult with the British in regard to operations affecting Manchuria.[1]

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 6, 1950.

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT AT KANSAS CITY

The President recognizes the great international complications which may follow the proposed bombing of the Yalu River bridge. He is willing to face these complications if the step is immediately necessary to protect our forces.

He believes under the circumstances that the Joint Chiefs should know from General MacArthur what the pressing reasons are for the operation. If the operation can wait until our international commitments are fulfilled, that would put us in the best position.

DEAN ACHESON

[1] See telegram JCS 95878, transmitted at 11:47 a. m. on November 6, *infra*.

795.00/11–650: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 6 November 1950—11:47 a. m.

FLASH

JCS 95878. From JCS personal for MacArthur.

1. Consideration being urgently given to Korean situation at governmental level. One factor is present commitment not to take action affecting Manchuria without consultation with the British.

2. Until further orders postpone all bombing of targets within five miles of Manchurian border.

3. Urgently need your estimate of situation and reason for ordering bombing Yalu River bridges as indicated in telecon this date.[1]

[1] General MacArthur's reply to this message was contained in telegram C–68396, November 6 (see Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, pp. 715–716). The text is here reprinted from Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 375.

"Men and material in large force are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from Manchuria. This movement not only jeopardizes but threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command. The actual movement across the river can be accomplished under cover of darkness and the distance between the river and our lines is so short that the forces can be deployed against our troops without being seriously subjected to air interdiction. The only way to stop this reinforcement of the enemy is the destruction of these bridges and the subjection of all installations in the north area supporting the enemy advance to the maximum of our air destruction. Every hour that this is postponed will be paid for dearly in American and other United Nations blood. The main crossing at Sinuiju was to be hit within the next few hours and the mission is actually being mounted. Under the gravest protest that I can make, I am suspending this strike and carrying out your instructions. What I had ordered is entirely within the scope of the rules of war and the resolutions and directions which I have received from the United Nations and constitutes no slightest act of belligerency against Chinese territory, in spite of the outrageous international lawlessness emanating therefrom. I cannot overemphasize the disastrous effect, both physical and psychological, that will result from the restrictions which you are imposing. I trust that the matter be immediately brought to the attention of the President as I believe your instructions may well result in a calamity of major proportion for which I cannot accept the responsibility without his personal and direct understanding of the situation. Time is so essential that I request immediate reconsideration of your decision pending which complete compliance will of course be given to your order."

795.00/11–650

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Assistance (Burns)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 6, 1950.

DEAR GENERAL BURNS: In the light of General MacArthur's special report of the United Nations Command of November 5 [1] with regard to participation of Chinese Communist military units in the action in Korea, and the United Nations Command communiqué number 11 of November 5, 1950,[2] the United States representative on the United Nations Security Council has been instructed to ask for an urgent session of the Council, for not later than Wednesday of this week,[3] to discuss reports from the U.N. Command. It is considered that at this meeting the debate should be directed toward localizing the conflict and lead to the introduction of a short and simple resolution along the lines of that enclosed.

[1] See telegram 476, November 5, 5 p. m., to New York, p. 1046.
[2] See footnote 3 to telegram 2344, November 6, 2 a. m., to London, p. 1051.
[3] November 8.

The Department of State would appreciate the comments of the Department of Defense upon the military aspects of the operative portions of the attached draft resolution,[4] as well as the views of the Department of Defense of the military significance of the Chinese intervention.

Sincerely yours, H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

[4] See telegram 477, November 5, 11 p. m., to New York, p. 1049.

795.00/11–650

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET [NEW YORK,] November 6, 1950.

US/S/1540

Subject: Korea—Chinese Aggression

Participants: Sir Gladwyn Jebb,
United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. C. P. Noyes,
United States Delegation

Sir Gladwyn indicated that he had received a telegram from the Foreign Office on the question. They had also received a copy of the Department's resolution.[1] Their attitude towards this resolution was favorable. The only comment he made was with respect to the last paragraph. He thought that after the word "authorities" we should add "notably the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China". He thought this would help to clarify the intent. I said I doubted we would be prepared to use the full title of the Peiping Government since this might involve some implication of recognition. I doubted that we would have any objection to making it clear that we had in mind particularly that regime.

Jebb also asked what the last clause meant—particularly the words "in the area". He suggested that we take out the words "in the area" and substitute "in Peiping". I said I thought that our purpose was to indicate that any contact that existed between the Commission and the Peiping Government should be utilized.

We discussed the question of sponsorship. I said that we certainly would be very glad if they would join us in sponsorship. The question of asking others to co-sponsor with us was entirely open. He suggested

[1] Telegram 477, November 5, 11 p. m., to New York, p. 1049, was repeated as telegram 2343 to London.

that it might be useful to bring in some other countries. He doubted that India would wish to. He thought Egypt was a question mark. He thought that probably France would be interested, and perhaps Norway. He seemed to feel that there was no advantage in having more than four.

As to the timing of the introduction, I indicated that our thinking was that it would be advisable not to introduce the resolution before the council meeting but to discuss the question and delay the introduction of the resolution until the debate was well under way. Jebb preferred this course, also.

Jebb raised the question of an invitation to the Peiping Regime. He said this question was certain to arise at the opening of the first meeting. He thought the same Members of the Council who had supported the invitation in the Formosa case would do so again. He thought there were great advantages in doing so in this situation. Since the Peiping Representatives were presumably about to arrive in New York for the Formosa case, they would be on hand very quickly. He thought the Council would do well to invite them and confront them point-blank with the present situation and find out directly from their own mouths what they were doing. He thought we probably would receive a tirade from them, including all the standard charges of fascist beast, etc. He thought, nevertheless, if that were the case we would know what we were up against and could then act accordingly.

I said I had no idea what our position would be on this but would raise the issue and let him know.

C. P. NOYES

795.00/11–650

Draft Memorandum by the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 6, 1950.

UNITED STATES COURSE OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

PROBLEM

1. To determine what United States course of action with respect to Korea would be best calculated to advance the national interests of the United States.

ANALYSIS

2. The objective of the United States and of the United Nations in Korea is to bring about and maintain the independence and unity of Korea. Action taken by the United Nations in Korea, pursuant to the

resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, has been dedicated to this objective.

3. Unless a massive intervention by non-Korean Communist forces takes place in Korea, the United Nations can proceed to establish the conditions of peace and security which will permit the maintenance of a unified and independent Korea.

4. In pursuance of NSC 81/1 [1] the Unified Command has proceeded to the occupation of North Korea and the United Nations has established machinery for bringing about the unification and independence of Korea in fulfillment of decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

5. With regard to the trial of war criminals, the Directive for the Occupation of North Korea approved by the President and transmitted to the Unified Commander, states as follows:

"The mere fact that an individual is or was a member of the armed forces of the North Korean Government, an official of that Government or any local Government, or a member of any political party will not subject him to prosecution or reprisal and will not, by that reason alone, bar him from office or employment. You will apprehend and hold for trial by appropriate tribunals, in accordance with the law and customs of war, all persons who are or may be charged with atrocities or violations of the law and customs of war."

6. With regard to the trial of persons charged with the crime of waging aggressive war, or so-called "Class A" war crimes, the following factors should be taken into consideration:

a) The North Korean regime was a Soviet satellite government and the responsibility for the decision to wage aggressive war cannot be fixed solely upon the North Korean leaders. We must assume that the USSR in actuality bears a heavy responsibility if not the major responsibility for the action of the North Korean puppet leaders.

b) Trials of North Korean leaders for crimes of aggression would prolong the psychological effects of the division of Korea and would increase the difficulties of a rapid unification of the country.

7. In view of the factors cited above and of the unlikelihood that any responsible North Korean leaders will fall into the hands of United Nations forces, the United States should not press in the United Nations for the holding of "Class A" war crimes trials in Korea.

8. It is expected that the restoration of "international peace and security in the area", within the meaning of the Security Council's resolution of June 27, 1950, will require continued action over a period of time by the Unified Command and by the agencies operating under the authority of the United Nations, that it will be necessary to maintain UN occupation forces in Korea for yet a temporary period,

[1] September 9, p. 712.

and that even when organized resistance ceases, the continuance of guerrilla activities will necessitate the carrying out of extensive counter-guerrilla operations.

9. In pursuance of NSC 81/1, it is expected that United States forces will be reduced as rapidly as possible and that forces of the ROK and those of UN members besides the United States, will be used to the maximum during the period of occupation, mopping up, and counter-guerrilla operations.

10. It is expected that, in pursuance of the General Assembly's resolution of October 7, 1950, UN forces (i.e. non-Korean) will be withdrawn from all parts of Korea as soon as appropriate steps have been taken to insure conditions of stability throughout Korea and all constituent actions have been taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea.

11. It may be assumed that the USSR will not permanently renounce attempts to effect Communist control of Korea and that, with Soviet assistance, preparations will be made by Chinese Communists and remaining Korean Communist elements for the reconquest of Korea by subversive means and by military invasion if necessary.

12. Following the withdrawal of UN forces, the security of Korea must depend upon the capability of Korean forces to defend the country.

13. It is in the interests of the United States, acting through the United Nations, to assist the Republic of Korea to maintain its independence and to provide for its security from outside attack and internal subversion. Military aid furnished by the United States will be dedicated to these ends.

14. The UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should make recommendations as to the size and character of the military and internal security forces needed by the ROK, as required by NSC 81/1. The United States should propose that, upon dissolution of the Unified Command, the United States be authorized to act as agent of the UN in establishing a Military Advisory Mission to the ROK. Through this Mission, whose staff would include personnel from UN members participating in the Korean action, the United States would act to effect the most efficient training and buildup of ROK military, naval, and air forces which may be deemed necessary for the adequate defense of Korea.

15. At the request of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations has considered the problem of relief and rehabilitation in Korea and has adopted the substance of a U.S.-

sponsored resolution to place the responsibility for these matters in the hands of an Agent General of the United Nations.[2] The economic, and in turn the political, stability of Korea will depend heavily on the success of a program of relief and reconstruction for an integrated Korean economy, which will take a number of years to complete and cost in excess of $500 million.

16. The ROK, in order to take its rightful place among the nations of the world and to bind itself to the obligations of the UN Charter, should become a member of the United Nations as soon as possible. To this end the United States should actively support the application of the ROK for membership in the UN and should endeavor to achieve its acceptance.

17. In fulfilling its mission to bring about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea, the UNCURK will face complex problems arising out of the common boundary between Korea and its neighbors, Communist China and the USSR. These problems will include such matters as the control of electric power output from the Suiho plant located on the Manchurian border at the Yalu River, navigation rights along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, the regulation of the coastal and river traffic in the Yalu estuary, the operation of through railroad lines between Korea and Manchuria, and various other problems of trade, communications, and security. The UNCURK might, for example, as a result of its investigation of various border problems, find it desirable to recommend the establishment of a neutralized or security zone along the Chinese and Soviet borders.

18. The United States should take whatever diplomatic action is deemed advisable in order to reduce the dangers of a repetition of Communist aggression against Korea. Pursuant to NSC 81/1, this should include recommendations that the UNCURK consider the problem of the neutralization of Korea. A proposal for "neutralization" might consist of an affirmation by the ROK of its acceptance of the obligations of the UN Charter and its commitment not to engage in any aggressive action against its neighbors. It should be proposed that parallel undertakings be entered into by other states including the USSR, Communist China, and Japan, the latter when a peace treaty is signed.

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[2] ECOSOC had taken this action on October 30. For the legislative history of ECOSOC's handling of the question of Korean relief at its resumed eleventh session, October 12–November 7, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950*, pp. 270–276. Concerning U.N. General Assembly Resolution 410 (V), December 1, 1950, on the establishment of the U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), see the editorial note, p. 1297.

CONCLUSIONS

19. The United States should reduce its forces in Korea as rapidly as the military situation permits but should retain U.S. elements within the forces under the Unified Command so long as any UN forces remain in Korea.

20. Without prejudice to any position assumed in the past with regard to the assignment of guilt for the crime of waging aggressive war, the United States should not propose or support in the United Nations the holding of war crimes trials in Korea, except those of persons charged with atrocities or violations of the law and customs of war.

21. The United States should urge the establishment by the UN, on the basis of negotiations with the ROK, of a Military Advisory Mission to the ROK. The United States should propose the UNCURK ask the United States to act as the agent of the UN in establishing and maintaining the Military Advisory Mission. The Mission should come into being upon the dissolution of the Unified Command, and its staff should, so far as feasible, include personnel representing nations participating in the UN military action in Korea.

22. The United States should extend military and economic aid to the government of the ROK in accordance with programs to be formulated and approved by appropriate UN agencies. Military aid so extended by the United States should be administered by the Military Advisory Mission as part of the military aid program. Economic aid extended by the United States should be administered as part of the United Nations relief and reconstruction program by the UN agency established for this purpose.

23. The United States should be prepared to support up to the extent of 70% of the total cost, the United Nations program of relief and reconstruction in Korea. While not a development program, it should be consistent with the requirements of Korea's future economic development. The influence of the United States should be exerted in every tactful way to promote closer economic relations between Korea and Japan.

24. The United States should urge UNCURK to consider the various problems arising out of the Korean common border with the USSR and Communist China. These problems might include such matters as transportation, trade, communications, electric power and the possible establishment of a neutralized zone along the border. The UNCURK would be expected to use its good offices for negotiations which might be deemed necessary between the ROK on the one hand and the USSR and Communist China on the other.

25. The United States should press for the admission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations.

26. The United States should suggest that the UNCURK consider, as an additional step toward the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Korea, the advisability of undertakings being entered into by the ROK not to engage in any aggressive action against its neighbors, and by other states not to engage in aggression against the ROK.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on November 6 from 3 to 6:10 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.518. At the beginning of the meeting, the United States Representative read to the Council the text of General MacArthur's special report of November 5 (S/1884; see telegram 476, November 5, 5 p. m., to New York, page 1046) and indicated that he would like a meeting of the Council at the earliest possible convenience to consider the subject. Before adjourning, the Council set the time of the requested meeting at 10:30 a. m. on Wednesday, November 8.

795B.00/11–650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 6, 1950.

Subject: Chinese Communist Intervention in North Korea.

Participants: Mr. Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador.
Mr. Charles Ritchie, First Secretary, Canadian Embassy.
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs.

The Canadian Ambassador, Mr. Hume Wrong, called on Mr. Rusk at 3:30 this afternoon at the Ambassador's request to discuss the question of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea.

The Ambassador stated that the subject of Chinese Communist intervention would be discussed in the Canadian Cabinet this week and wished to have the Department's views in relation thereto. Mr. Rusk summarized the information which the Department had on the size and capacity of the Chinese Communist forces now in North Korea, comparing them with the forces available to the Unified Command. He then gave the Ambassador an analysis based on eight possibilities concerning Chinese Communist motives in intervening, ranging from limited objectives which the Chinese Communists might be

seeking up to and including an all-out effort to throw UN forces entirely off the Korean peninsula. This latter possibility he tended to discount as not being very practicable from the Chinese point of view.

The Ambassador then raised the question of General MacArthur's recent communiqué on Chinese intervention [1] and implied a Canadian criticism that General MacArthur might be overstepping his role as a military commander. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the General was up against some hard, cold facts in North Korea and must have felt the importance of setting forth his ideas on how to meet the new situation, adding that perhaps a communiqué, however, was not the best manner in which such ideas should be put forth.

The Ambassador expressed the opinion that there was danger that the Unified Command might go ahead too rapidly in its reaction to Chinese intervention and thus might endanger some of the support provided by other nations contributing to the United Nations action in Korea. Mr. Rusk reassured him that it was not our intention to do this and that we would be in consultation, specifically with the British, on the situation. He assured the Ambassador that any concrete steps to meet the new developments in North Korea would be taken only after consultation with the other interested UN nations. In this connection he brought up the subject of a special meeting of the Security Council scheduled for November 8 in which the question would be discussed and handed the Ambassador a copy of a draft Security Council resolution on Chinese intervention which our delegation was now studying.

Mr. Rusk asked that this draft resolution be kept in strict confidence within the Canadian Government and pointed out that the terms of the resolution did not directly charge any specific foreign regime by name with intervention. He also stressed that this resolution called for no concrete action against the Chinese Communists, commenting that the presentation, however, should be no weaker than the minimum of what "the traffic would bear" in relation to United States public opinion. The Ambassador countered that it appeared to be about all "the traffic would bear" in regard to the state of opinion in the United Nations at this time.

The Ambassador expressed relief at Mr. Rusk's summary of the limited extent to which Chinese Communist forces appeared committed in North Korea thus far, and added that his summary of the situation and our line of approach on the question of Chinese intervention would be conveyed to the Canadian Cabinet.

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[1] See footnote 3 to telegram 2344, November 6, 2 a. m., to London, p. 1051.

795.00/11–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

LONDON, November 6, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received November 6—4:12 p. m.]

2623. Text Secretary's message to Bevin (Deptel 2344, November 6 repeated USUN 478) as forwarded via British Embassy, received FonOff 11 a. m. today. FonOff has drafted telegram to Washington stating (1) UK accepts U.S. resolution on Chinese intervention (Deptel 477 to USUN repeated London 2343) [1] with slight modifications and will be co-sponsor, and (2) Bevin will reply separately to Secretary's message as soon as it can be carefully studied.

Department pass USUN as London 43.

DOUGLAS

[1] November 5, 11 p. m., to New York, p. 1049.

795.00/11–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, November 6, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received November 6—4:12 p. m.]

2626. When I saw Bevin this afternoon I left with him copy of your message contained in Deptel 2344,[1] length of which precluded detailed discussion. However Bevin indicated that it was his belief that Chinese were so deeply involved that they would not now voluntarily settle for less than considerable say in Korean solution. He likewise expressed concern over serious possibility that developments in Korea might tie up extensive resources of West thereby undermining defense program in Europe.

Bevin had already received text draft resolution for possible use in SC on Chinese intervention but was as yet unprepared to comment.

DOUGLAS

[1] November 6, 2 a. m., p. 1050.

320/11-650

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 6, 1950.

Subject: Security Council Resolution Re Korea

Reference: CA's memorandum of November 3 recommending UN action, telegram 477 to USUN, New York transmitting a draft resolution for use UNSC, re Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

In order that there be left no doubt—if any in fact exists—in the Chinese Communist mind as to whether the U.S. position respecting Formosa and U.S. action in Korea is preparatory to U.S. aggression against China, and so that the public record is clear, CA believes any action in the Security Council having as its objective the cessation of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea should contain specific and forthright assurances that with cessation of such intervention the Chinese frontier and China's border interests would not be threatened. The draft resolution contained in the telegram referred to above appears deficient in that regard. CA accordingly suggests consideration of the attached alternative draft.

CA notes that General MacArthur's statement respecting the intervention of outside Communist forces in Korea has given public emphasis to the matter of Chinese Communist intervention and has increased the urgency of any steps which we may decide to take relative thereto. It seems, further, to give added warrant to the above move.

[Annex]

DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Security Council

Having in mind its resolution of June 25, 1950, calling upon all members of the UN to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities:

Taking cognizance of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on October 7, 1950, setting forth the policies of the General Assembly with respect to Korea:

Having noted from a special report dated November ———, 1950 of the United Nations command that Chinese Communist troops oppose forces of the United Nations in Korea:

Cognizant of the danger that the Korean conflict may spread to other areas thereby further endangering international peace and security:

Calls upon the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to cease and refrain from intervention in Korea and to cause the immediate withdrawal of any Chinese nationals, individuals, or units which may be now in Korea:

Affirms that if this action is taken the Chinese frontier with Korea will be held inviolate by UN forces and China's legitimate interests in the frontier will be fully protected.

795.00/11–650 : Telegram

The Chargé in China (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

TAIPEI, November 6, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received November 6—5 : 37 p. m.]

614. Information from Chinese military sources transmitted to Washington past few days by Embassy's service Attachés gives strong support to assumption Chinese Communists intend throw book at UNO forces in Korea besides stepping up efforts in Indochina. Obviously allowance must be made for wishful thinking among Chinese military, majority of whom see general conflict as only hope for liberation of China from communism. In present case however this qualification still leaves imposing array seemingly established facts plus evident sincerity of opinion among best informed Chinese here such as to make it entirely possible that preponderant view among them, anticipating all-out action by Chinese Communists in Korea is justified:

Among reasons advanced why Chinese Communists have delayed entry in force, without speculating on Moscow influences, are:

1. Chinese Communists assumed North Koreans would win and therefore were not prepared intervene on short notice.

2. Delaying major effort until fighting reached frontier region greatly shortened their lines of communication, which particularly important with UNO forces controlling sea, air, and gave them maximum time to prepare. Besides moving up troops from other parts of China it necessary replenish stocks, supplies and equipment in Manchuria which seriously depleted in aiding North Koreans.

3. In frontier area fullest advantage can be taken of extent to which world opinion already conditioned to acts of aggression and regards identification of few regiments on wrong side of border as something less than overt action. Meanwhile UNO forces can be weakened and exposure Chinese Communist bases and communications to bombing delayed. Evidence of all-out effort including expenditure Chinese Communist air force expected be postponed long as possible for reasons paragraph 2 above.

4. Much easier whip up support of public opinion in China for major military operations if immediate threat to Manchurian border can be

claimed; this despite general assumption Chinese Communist leaders know UNO forces have no intention cross frontier and would not attempt invade Manchuria with mere ten divisions in any event.

5. Most effective possible counter to UNO successes from Communist viewpoint would be crushing victory by Chinese Communists in North Korea, which would serve purposes of discrediting UNO, enhancing Asiatic and Communist prestige vis-à-vis western imperialism and eliminating large part existing US army as fighting force.

Foregoing are necessarily matters of opinion to considerable extent, but facts that Chinese military on Formosa have access to more sources of information on mainland and have had more experience in this field than anyone else outside curtain warrant most serious attention their views at present juncture.

Above paragraphs drafted prior to receipt MacArthur's communiqué.

Department pass Seoul USPolAd Tokyo repeated info Seoul 2 Tokyo 39 Hong Kong 108.

RANKIN

693.95A/11–650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, November 6, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received November 6—6:14 p. m.]

1098. Occasion taken by Steere[1] today to ask Menon whether Panikkar had reported any definite change in Chinese attitude toward Korean situation. Steere alluded specially to remark about Chinese action toward Korea mentioned in paragraph 3 Embtel 1015 October 28.[2]

Menon said Panikkar had reported nothing on that subject that he recalled. He sent for cable file however and gave Steere actual text Panikkar remark which followed immediately after his report Chinese protest of American planes alleged violations Chinese territory. Panikkar's remark was as follows: "While undoubtedly there have been violations of Chinese territory these protests would seem to be for purpose of justifying before the world action they have decided upon in regard to Korea."

Menon said unless Panikkar's drafting was very bad this meant that CPR had decided upon some action in regard to Korea, and that he would immediately cable Panikkar about the matter.

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[1] Loyd V. Steere, Counselor of Embassy in New Delhi.

[2] The paragraph in question read as follows: "Phrasing Panikkar telegram which was read to Embassy officer seemed highly unreal in some respects including obscure reference to Chinese action in or toward Korea, he might have intended to say 'Tibet' but on the other hand, he might have meant that some action toward Korea is contemplated." (793B.00/10–2850)

Menon further advised that GOI had had no report whatever from Sinha at Lhasa for five days and was beginning to be a little concerned about it.

HENDERSON

320/11–650 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, November 6, 1950—10 : 04 p. m.
[Received November 6—11 : 11 p. m.]

Delga 240. No distribution outside Department. Re Gadel 84.[1] Currency to be used North Korea discussed with IC today. Committee informed of CINCUNC's recommendation use UN script and US view preferable use ROK currency. Only member having definite views Australian, who favored UN scrip, suggesting that if delay serious ROK currency might be used in meantime. He assumed would be one for one with ROK currency, but this question not discussed.

Committee requested matter be put over to next meeting 2 p. m. Tuesday [2] to give time for consideration, and requested factual statement. Following is text, which corresponds closely to oral statement, of statement circulated confidentially to committee members:

"1. The United Nations Commander has directed commanders of the United Nations forces in Korea to use only North Korean currency in the area north of the thirty-eighth parallel. While this order has been obeyed by the commands, troops have carried with them substantial amounts of ROK currency, which is generally accepted by North Koreans.

2. The people of North Korea do not have confidence in the North Korean currency and it is depreciating rapidly.

3. The communist authorities of North Korea have destroyed or carried away the major stocks of North Korean currency, together with all plates and means of printing it.

4. It is urgent that the United Nations Commander authorize promptly the use of some currency in North Korea

a. In order that the United Nations forces may use it to pay requisitions and meet other military needs, and

b. In order that a rate may be fixed between the currency authorized by the United Nations Commander and the North Korean currency, to protect the holders of North Korean currency against further depreciation through lack of confidence.

5. In this situation General MacArthur has expressed readiness to print in Japan and issue a new "United Nations scrip", principally

[1] Transmitted at 7 p. m. on October 31, p. 1021.
[2] November 7.

because he believes this would be in accord with the political recommendations of the Interim Committee. He has estimated that it would take three weeks to print this scrip, which according to his recommendation would bear the United Nations emblem, the denomination, and the word "whan" in Korean, English and French. This scrip would be redeemed by the United Korean Government when established. No financial obligations would accrue to the United Nations since United Nations forces would settle with the United Korean Government for whatever amount they use, and the proceeds of the relief and rehabilitation supplies to be brought into Korea would more than equal the amount of scrip issued.

6. It is suggested that there are certain advantages in the use of ROK currency by the United Nations forces:

a. The delay resulting from printing and distribution of the new scrip would create difficulties in respect to military operations and with respect to the fixing of an exchange rate between ROK currency and North Korean currency, thus injuring the holders of the North Korean currency by reason of the further depreciation of that currency in relation to ROK currency.

b. While it is technically feasible to issue a military scrip in the name of the United Nations redeemable by the Government of United Korea, the issuance of currency bearing the name or seal of the United Nations would be a serious precedent, all implications of which should be carefully considered. For instance, if the impression were created that the United Nations was responsible for the redemption of the currency, it might circulate at a premium above the ROK currency; if, on the other hand, it were made clear that the United Nations is not responsible for its redemption, its acceptability would be impaired.

c. The issuance of still another currency in Korea would be confusing and would unnecessarily complicate the financial problems of the Government of a United Korea. There are already three currencies in circulation: the old Bank of Chosen notes of the ROK, the New Bank of Korea notes, and the North Korean currency. Whatever Government of United Korea may hereafter be formed will have to recognize the currency in circulation, and a single currency will facilitate its task of creating economic order in a unified country.

7. The use of ROK currency by the United Nations forces would not be a recognition of ROK sovereignty in North Korea. Such currency can be used without any declaration that it is legal tender, and by authority of the United Nations Commander, not of the ROK. It would be necessary, however, soon to convert the existing North Korean currency by reason of the possession of stocks and plates by former North Korean authorities.

8. For the reasons which have been indicated above, it is necessary that guidance on this subject be given promptly to the United Nations Commander, and the views of the Interim Committee are accordingly requested as a matter of urgency."

AUSTIN

320/11–650 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, November 6, 1950—10 : 19 p. m.
[Received November 6—11 :20 p. m.]

Delga 243. Interim Committee on Korea met and heard MacArthur special report on Korea without comment.

It will meet at 2 p. m. on November 7 to consider question of currency to be used by UNC north 38th parallel.[1]

It agreed upon the following principles concerning the application on [*of*] its resolution of 12 October. This formulation is to be part of IC record but not otherwise publicized and is for confidential assistance to UC.

"The Interim Committee on Korea wishes to ensure that the people of the northern part of Korea shall have the opportunity to participate fully and freely in the establishment of a unified and democratic government of Korea. It therefore advised the UC on 12th October to exercise administrative functions in the north until the commission had considered means of consulting the Korean people and their representatives.

"The Interim Committee on Korea considers that in order to conform with the resolution of the committee adopted on 12th October 1950, the following principles should govern any use in the north of Koreans from south of the 38th Parallel, subject to the needs of military operations and security:

"1. Efforts should be made to use members of the local population wherever possible. Any Koreans from south of the 38th Parallel who are used in the north should be appointed by, be under the control of, and be responsible to the UC and not act as the representatives or agents of any other authority;

"2. No one should be used in a manner which would enable him to bring political pressure to bear upon the local inhabitants or in any manner restrict the free expression of political opinions by the local inhabitants. These principles will be reviewed by the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea after it meets."

AUSTIN

[1] At that meeting, the Interim Committee on Korea adopted a brief statement advising the Unified Command that, subject to review by UNCURK, it had no objection to the interim use of ROK currency in North Korea; the text of the statement is printed in U.N. document A/1881, p. 15.

693.95B/11–650 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 6, 1950—10 : 19 p. m.
[Received November 6—11 : 29 p. m.]

788. Chauvel (France) thinks it is important that as soon as possible UC or CINCUNC issue a statement of assurance that the UNC will not damage or destroy hydro-electric facilities on the Yalu River nor interfere with normal power uses of these facilities. Chauvel believes such an assurance would "simplify and clarify" the issues presented by Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

Independently Bebler made same suggestion. Also Officer (Australia) [1] made similar suggestion, adding further suggestion that we might indicate that a neutral "cordon sanitaire" could be set up along the frontier perhaps on a 20-mile strip. This indication would be subject to present need for cleaning out hostile military elements.

AUSTIN

[1] Sir Keith Officer, Australian Representative to the U.N. General Assembly.

795.00/11–650 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 6, 1950—10 : 19 p. m.
[Received November 6—11 : 45 p. m.]

790. Bebler, November SC President, during course of lunch with Gross discussed problem of Korea in light of intervention by Chinese Communist forces. In general he thought this was manifestation of "infantile disease" of new Communist regime which in early stages of development lacks political judgment and sees problems as black and white. He thought CCP invasion of Tibet and reply to Indian *démarche* was another manifestation of this disease and a colossal mistake. He was thankful Yugoslavia had not made such mistakes in early years such as invasion of Trieste. Parenthetically, he felt relations between Italy and Yugoslavia are now improving every day.

He is convinced CCP feels hydro-electric works are threatened and that UN forces constitute a genuine threat to Manchuria. USSR certainly is trying to develop this feeling and Bebler felt it was fostered by phrases in MacArthur communiqué No. 11 referring to "present sphere of military action" and "present mission".

In reply to Gross' questions as to how problem should be handled, he thought assurance on these two points by US and UN might do much to remove these issues from current situation.

Re UN handling of Korea case, he felt UNCURK would be best means of developing the facts. He hoped that US would not rush a resolution through the SC and particularly one that contained a finding of aggression by CCP. However, if the matter were to be taken up in the SC, and he recognized that this might be a preliminary to Assembly action, he personally felt he could support a resolution with localizing the conflict approach. In answer to Gross' question, he further indicated that the problem of a Soviet veto might depend on timing of the resolution. He recalled that CCP representatives are due November 15. Therefore, it is likely that on Wednesday, when he agreed to have a meeting, the USSR would ask for postponement until CCP representatives arrived. He asked Gross whether the US had given these representatives visas which he understood were being sought at Prague. He requested definite information on this point at or before Wednesday's meeting. Assuming the US is facilitating travel of these representatives to Lake Success, he felt it would be proper to proceed with discussion in their absence rather than support any Soviet move for postponement. However, he recognized that this or a vote on possible resolution might draw Soviet veto solely on ground of CCP absence.

AUSTIN

795.00/11–650 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

TOP SECRET
FLASH

WASHINGTON, 6 November 1950—11 : 57 p. m.

JCS 95949. From JCS. The situation depicted in your C–68396 [1] is considerably changed from that reported in last sentence your C–68285 [2] which was our last report from you. We agree that the destruction of the Yalu bridges would contribute materially to the security of the forces under your command unless this action resulted in increased Chinese Communist effort and even Soviet contribution in response to what they might well construe as an attack on Manchuria. Such a result would not only endanger your forces but would enlarge the area of conflict and U.S. involvement to a most dangerous degree.

[1] See footnote 1 to telegram JCS 95878, transmitted at 11 : 47 a. m. on November 6, p. 1058.
[2] See the editorial note, p. 1036.

However in view of first sentence your 68396 you are authorized to go ahead with your planned bombing in Korea near the frontier including targets at Sinuiju and Korean end of Yalu bridges provided that at time of receipt of this message you still find such action essential to safety of your forces. The above does not authorize the bombing of any dams or power plants on the Yalu River.

Because of necessity for maintaining optimum position with United Nations policy and directives and because it is vital in the national interest of the U.S. to localize the fighting in Korea it is important that extreme care be taken to avoid violation Manchurian territory and airspace and to report promptly hostile action from Manchuria.

It is essential that we be kept informed of important changes in situation as they occur and that your estimate as requested in our 95878 [3] be submitted as soon as possible.[4]

[3] Of November 6, p. 1057.
[4] See *infra*.

Department of Defense Files : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET FLASH TOKYO, November 7, 1950—8:25 p. m. [1]

C–68465. Ref JCS 95949 [2] rqsting estimate of the Korean situation. Since my C 68285,[3] intelligence reports have confirmed the estimate contained in 2, 3 and 4 thereof, which I stated to be the most likely condition at that time. The military facts in substantiation were reported in the daily telecons and radio reports since furnished you. These reports confirm unquestionably that organized units of Chinese Communist forces have been and are being utilized against our forces; that while the exact strength is impossible to accurately determine, it is sufficient to have seized the initiative in the west sector and to have materially slowed the offensive in the east sector. The principle seems thoroughly established that such forces will be used and augmented at will, probably without any formal declaration of hostilities. If this augmentation continues, it can well reach a point rendering our resumption of advance impossible and even forcing a movement in retrograde. An effort will be made in the west sector in due course of time,

[1] The source text does not indicate the time of receipt of this message in Washington, but, given the time difference between Tokyo and Washington, it was presumably received by noon on November 7.
[2] *Supra*.
[3] Dated November 4; see the editorial note on p. 1036.

possibly within ten days, to again assume the initiative provided the flow of enemy reinforcement can be checked. Only through such an offensive effort can any accurate measure be taken of enemy strength.

I deem it essential to execute the bombing of the targets under discussion as the only resource left to me to prevent a potential buildup of enemy strength to a point threatening the safety of the command. This interdiction of enemy lines of advance within Korea is so plainly defensive that it is hard to conceive that it would cause an increase in the volume of local intervention or, of itself, provoke a general war.

The inviolability of Manchuria and Siberia has been a cardinal obligation of this headquarters from the beginning of hostilities and all verified hostile action therefrom is promptly reported. The destruction of hydroelectric installations has never been contemplated. Complete daily situation reports will continue to be furnished you as heretofore.

795.00/11–750

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 7, 1950.

General Marshall asked Secretary Finletter and General Vandenberg to call on me today at noon to raise the desirability of having Ambassador Austin include in his statement to the Security Council a strong presentation of the difficult problem posed for UN forces by the "sanctuary" aspect of the present military position in Korea.[1]

The Pentagon does not think we should take any action against Manchuria at this point but they feel very strongly that the whole world should understand the great problem created by forces which are in position to attack UN forces from within a safe haven. This would apply both to ground and air forces. We are now drafting something along this line for your consideration later in the day. You may wish to mention this to the President.

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[1] Under date of November 7, General MacArthur had transmitted the following message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in telegram C–68411:

"Hostile planes are operating from bases west of the Yalu River against our forces in North Korea. These planes are appearing in increasing numbers. The distance from the Yalu to the main line of contact is so short that it is almost impossible to deal effectively with the hit and run tactics now being employed. The present restrictions imposed on my area of operation provide a complete sanctuary for hostile air immediately upon their crossing the Manchuria–North Korea border. The effect of this abnormal condition upon the morale and combat efficiency of both air and ground troops is major.

"Unless corrective measures are promptly taken this factor can assume decisive proportions. Request instructions for dealing with this new and threatening development."

(The text is taken from Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 377; see also Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 465.)

795.00/11–750

Draft Memorandum by Mr. John P. Davies of the Policy Planning Staff

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 7, 1950.

CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA

It is possible that Chinese Communist intervention in Korea may be limited both in form and duration. In this context, Peiping may be nominally making good on its promise not to stand idly by, making a token show of force, seeking to intimidate the U.N., hoping that a peace-maker will bring about a negotiated settlement providing for at least a buffer zone on their frontier, but ready to yield all of these in the event that it is confronted with determined force. If this is the case, Peiping's intervention is essentially a bluff and the bellicose Chinese Communist propaganda is designed to persuade the U.N. to seek a solution of the Korean conflict by means other than military decision. The fact that so much of the frankly truculent propaganda about atomic bombing is broadcast in English to North America lends plausibility to such a thesis.

Other considerations, however, suggest that the situation is more ominous than indicated above. Chinese Communist capabilities are such that its intervention can be greatly expanded both in volume and duration. Even if intervention is limited in form it can easily be limitless in time.

Ideologically the Chinese Communists have every reason to foster Korean Communist resistance and, ultimately, expansion on the peninsula.

As the power in control of the mainland of China, the Peiping regime entertains governmental concern over the security of its frontiers. However mistaken it may be, the Peiping regime regards the U.N. forces in Korea as hostile. It undoubtedly recognizes that Korea and Manchuria are a geopolitical unit, that two wars have been fought to make them so. Yet Peiping derives no comfort from the fact that it is the U.N. and not the U.S. alone which was advancing on Manchuria. In its eyes the U.N. in Korea is acting not as a universal organization but in its alternate personality, as a free world alliance.

The fact that the United States is the moving spirit in the U.N. operation in Korea is of major importance in Peiping's reactions. Quite aside from their ideological antipathy to us, the Chinese Communists view us with morbid distrust and hatred. This is the product of five years of intensely bitter civil war in which they regarded us as allies of their enemies, culminating in the galling frustration of our action this summer with regard to Formosa.

We may assume that the Kremlin has done nothing to make Peiping any more understanding of us. To the contrary it is to be assumed that the Kremlin is actively egging China on to support covertly at least, the Korean Communists and to embroil itself more deeply with the West.

It would be rash to assume that Peiping has so parted with its senses as to have ignored the question of U.S. reactions to its intervention. Our reaction to the invasion by the North Koreans must have persuaded both Peiping and Moscow that the reactions of the American people and Government are not easily predictable. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that preventive war talk in this country is taken more seriously abroad than here. Therefore, it is likely that in deciding to intervene in Korea, the Chinese Communists took into account all possible retaliatory action to which we might resort. If this is so, it is probable that Chinese Communist propaganda assertions that they were prepared for our bombing of China were genuine. It, therefore, seems likely that Peiping has accepted the risk of violent United States reaction.

At the same time there are indications that the Chinese Communists know the limitations of what we can do to China. And this being the case, they may even have looked further and anticipated (whether rightly or wrongly) an American public reaction against the futility of war against China and a turning to the doctrine of a preventive war against the U.S.S.R. In this sense Peiping may genuinely anticipate and accept the imminence of World War III.

If all of this—or even a large part of it—is so, the Chinese Communists may be on the rampage. The invasion of Tibet—an obvious compensation for Formosa—is a clear indication that Peiping has reconciled itself to foregoing membership in the U.N., that it is not adverse to being regarded as an international outlaw. We must, therefore, take into our calculations the possibility that Communist China is in a mood to pursue a reckless, rather than a cautious, course throughout East and South Asia.

What is the relation of the Kremlin to the foregoing developments? Let us attempt to put into perspective the Kremlin's interest in the local situation along the Manchurian-Korean border.

The Kremlin's first concern is of course with Western Europe and the United States. Asia, in Stalin's mind, "should be regarded as the rear, the reserve of imperialism." As such it is for the Kremlin a theater of diversionary operations. If the United States, the United Kingdom and France can be drawn into deep military commitments in Asia, that is all to the good, provided that the Free World engages itself in hostilities with someone other than U.S.S.R. itself, permitting

the Kremlin to nourish its own strength for the main theater of conflict.

This strategy is as old as the U.S.S.R. As early as 1920 Lenin indicated that he was aware of the advantages to the U.S.S.R. deriving from bad relations between Japan and the U.S.* In 1936 Stalin instigated the Chinese Communists to make common cause with the Nationalists so as to form a joint diversion against Japan. Now the pattern is being repeated with Peiping joining with the Korean Communists and openly proclaiming that we are playing the role which the Japanese did in the 30's. No war is declared: it was the "China Incident", now it is the Korean police action.

It is not to be necessarily assumed, however, that the Kremlin was able easily to persuade the Chinese to embark upon this dangerous course of intervention. Korea is not like Formosa or Tibet, claimed as Chinese territory. Nor is it even, as Indochina is, a potential suzerainty. It has been since 1945 (North Korea actually and South Korea potentially) a particular Soviet sphere from which Chinese influence was assumably pretty well excluded. Therefore, the Kremlin may have had to introduce special inducements.

An obvious means of spurring Peiping intervention would be Kremlin stimulation of the already marked suspicions of the Chinese Communists regarding U.S. intentions toward China. In international affairs Mao and company are bigots and novices while the Kremlin is adept and practiced at provocation. The theme that World War III is not only inevitable but imminent was current in China at the time the new regime established itself and announced its policy of "leaning" to the Soviet side. It then lapsed and has only recently been revived in evident currency. In so far as it is believed by the rulers of Communist China it is a counsel both of defensive desperation and of tight alignment with the U.S.S.R. Finally, it is probable that Peiping asked for Soviet material support and will get it, within limits. And it may even have been able to exact the return of some measure of control over Manchuria.

Whatever the Kremlin may have had to give to induce Chinese intervention—it was worth it; even if it cost yielding temporarily exclusive Soviet control over the Korean Communist movement. It promises the possibility of bailing out world Bolshevism from an im-

*Lenin, Speech to Moscow Party Nuclei Secretaries, Nov. 26, 1920: "What saved us was that while Japan was gobbling up China she could not move westward, through all Siberia, with America in her rear, and she did not want to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for America. What would have saved us still more would have been a war between the imperialist powers. If we are obliged to tolerate such scoundrels as the capitalist thieves, each of whom is preparing to plunge a knife into us, it is our direct duty to make them turn their knives on each other. When thieves fall out, honest men come into their own." [Footnote in the source text.]

pending fiasco threatening greater demoralization and damage than even the Tito defection. And it probably removes, at least for the foreseeable future, the possibility of Chinese Communist exceptionalism. A termination of the factional feud in the Japanese Communist Party would be a reasonably sure sign of this.

The Kremlin is, of course, alert to the grave and unpredicable risks which flow from Chinese intervention. It may even be inviting them, seeking to precipitate World War III. What seems more likely, however, more in keeping with the Kremlin's political personality, is that it accepts rather than seeks the risks of general conflict. It cannot believe that the risks do not exist, even though it is twice removed from formal responsibility—itself to Peiping and Peiping to the "volunteers". The Kremlin undoubtedly realizes now that it is not dealing with controlled incidents—as it did with the Axis in Spain and the Japanese at Nomanhan. In this situation it is playing with the volatile fire of American democracy.

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of evidence at hand, we do not know what course Peiping and the Kremlin will follow in the coming months. Not only are their intentions veiled from us, but also—situations such as this tend to generate their own imperatives. We must proceed, therefore, on the basis that the situation confronting us contains a wide range of possible developments. At best we may be able to bring about a local solution to which Peiping and Moscow accede. At the worst we may find ourselves in World War III. Our objective should be to seek the first and urgently prepare for the second.

In a sense, these two objectives tend to be mutually exclusive. To commit ourselves to a local solution might, in certain circumstances, tend to defeat our preparations for global war. To prepare for global war, in certain contexts, might tend to impel the Kremlin to resort to arms immediately. Our policy must take into account these pitfalls.

Furthermore, we should avoid maneuvers uncoordinated with an overall plan. It is too late to expect that isolated assurances regarding the Yalu hydroelectric installations will mollify Peiping. Nor are threats of bombing or invasion likely to move us further toward our objectives.

What is needed is a unified policy directed toward our two objectives. It would be best defined and set forth in a special message by the President to the Congress along the following general lines.

The intervention of Chinese Communist "volunteers" in Korea is a matter of the gravest importance to the civilized world. It is an act of defiance to the law-abiding members of the world-community. It is

a clear warning that an outlaw is at large in the world community and that all peace-loving countries must look to the defense of their homes.

Accordingly, the United States is immediately mobilizing.

It is mobilizing as a matter of prudent defense. It is not mobilizing to take aggressive action. It will continue to support fully the United Nations action in Korea. It will assist the Korean people to defend their homes. But it will not take action which will give international renegades the excuse for plunging the world into chaos. If general war must come it will be through the action of the outlaws.

Meanwhile we will provide the arms and supplies necessary to enable Korea to defend itself. We will assist in the training of as many Korean soldiers as are necessary to expel and withhold the marauders. We will not withdraw our troops until there are Korean forces to take their places. And we will participate in the United Nations' constructive endeavors to rehabilitate Korea and further the development and progress of this free nation.

CONCLUSIONS [1]

On the basis of evidence at hand, we do not know what course Peiping and the Kremlin will follow in the coming months. Not only are their intentions veiled from us, but also—situations such as this tend to generate their own imperatives. We must proceed, therefore, on the basis that the situation confronting us contains a wide range of possible developments. At best we may be able to bring about a local solution to which Peiping and Moscow accede. At worst we may find ourselves in World War III. Our objective should be to seek the first and urgently prepare for the second.

First let us examine and dispose of certain alternative courses which we might follow.

Recognizing the grave risks that the present situation might degenerate into World War III, we might decide that we should withdraw our forces from the Korean theater in order to (1) avoid provocation, and (2) husband our strength for the great test with the Soviet world as a whole. Such a course would probably alleviate the present crisis, but new dangers would immediately ensue as a direct result. In the first place, the American people would be confused and humiliated by a decision of this character. It would be a body blow to morale at the center, the maintenance of which is essential if we are to win the world-wide struggle in which we are engaged. The effects of such action on the rest of the Free World would be little short of disastrous. In most of these countries, confidence and the will to resist Bolshevism

[1] The remainder of the memorandum was paginated separately but was attached to the main section of the manuscript in the original and was apparently intended to be a revised set of conclusions for the November 7 draft.

would be shattered. In the rest, it would be gravely shaken. To decide to withdraw from Korea would be to avoid a current crisis in exchange for which we would be confronted with a situation of even greater isolation and menace than that in which we now find ourselves.

An alternative course would be to break off contact with the enemy and fall back to a purely defensive position. This would be at best a temporizing course. It would be interpreted by the Kremlin and Peiping as a precipitate retreat inviting bold exploitation. It would have only delayed the necessity for our making a decision.

A third course would be to seek immediately to negotiate. In the present circumstances such a move would be made in the context of a reverse. To negotiate in the present circumstances would be simply to register the present situation which is, from our point of view, weak and unsatisfactory.

Finally, we might immediately carry hostilities to Manchuria and China Proper. At present the only feasible attack would be by air and naval action. Even these limited means would probably cause full-scale Chinese intervention from Manchuria. To provoke full-scale reaction at a time when the Chinese Communists are committed on a limited scale would be, at best, premature and at worst reckless—unless we deliberately seek to set off a chain of events designed to bring on World War III.

Let us now return to the recommended policy of (1) seeking a localized solution in Korea, and (2) preparing for the possible imminent outbreak of World War III.

It is essential that the dual phases of this policy be developed simultaneously and be made public simultaneously. In essence one is a course of moderation and, in Peiping's fevered eyes, perhaps even reassurance. The other is a warning. To attempt only to localize might be regarded as a gesture of weakness. To expand radically our military strength without indications of temperate intent would be regarded by our adversaries as an alarm signal of aggressive American design possibly requiring forestallment.

In pursuing a strategy of localization we should, obviously, seek to avoid action which we calculate would bring the Chinese Communists overtly into the Korean conflict. The same holds true with respect to our actions affecting the U.S.S.R.

Tactically this means that in the present situation we should not cross or take hostile action across the Manchurian border on land or in the air, nor should we advance into Chinese territorial waters or attack the Chinese coast. This rule is, of course, subject to revision by this Government and the U.N. in the light of later developments.

Inside Korea our tactics should be, if and when militarily feasible, to maintain the offensive; otherwise to accept a defensive stance.

Meanwhile we should promptly repair our neglect with respect to maintaining responsible private points of contact with the Peiping regime, both for obtaining interpretations of Chinese Communist intentions and conveying to Peiping information designed to influence its policy.

It is of major importance that we immediately begin to expand the ROK military force with a view to obtaining manpower to meet probable additions to Chinese strength in North Korea, provided that we calculate that the ROK will resist mounting pressure and that we can provide the necessary material.

Finally it is tactically essential that our activities be taken in the U.N. context, that we seek to bring other members of the U.N. along with us in our policy and that we avoid becoming politically isolated, as the Kremlin desires. To bolster Korean morale and win international support we should, in addition to pursuing military objectives, calmly and confidently lay stress on the constructive phases of the U.N. effort—rehabilitation, education and development.

Our strategy of preparing for the eventuality of World War III must concentrate on building strength at the center. This calls for implementing most of the recommendations of NSC 68 [2] at a far faster tempo and on an expanded scale. It is a policy closely approaching mobilization.

At the same time we must move ahead rapidly in the NATO—and if that proves immediately impossible, rethink our policy regarding Europe.

Japan must be built up. Its meagre capabilities to defend itself must be added to. Its abilities to product materiel, including arms, should be developed so that the strain on us for supplying an expanding ROK Army can be eased.

Finally the question arises regarding the risks of this dual policy. They are the same risks which we consciously accepted in June.

That of Soviet intervention is basic and ever present. If it occurs, whether thinly disguised or open, a new situation will have been created requiring a decision in the light of circumstances at the time. The present recommended course is designed to minimize these risks.

There is also the risk of alternating military commitments between the Chinese and the U.N. forces mounting to the point that general hostilities with Communist China eventuate. This is also recognized in formulating the recommended policy. The tactics involved in localizing the conflict are designed to meet this risk. If notwithstanding these efforts, we find ourselves drawn into general hostilities with

[2] The NSC 68 series dealt with U.S. Programs and Objectives Relating to National Security; documentation is scheduled for publication in volume I.

Communist China, it does not necessarily mean that the U.S.S.R. would honor its alliance with Communist China. The likelihood of that occurring would increase as we departed from retaliatory air and naval action and expanded the conflict in two respects—toward the Soviet frontiers and onto the ground. Were we to restrict our reaction to punitive air and naval action, to South Manchuria and China Proper, the U.S.S.R. might be content to limit its participation to supplying the Chinese Communists and we, for our part, might be able to foresee a termination to the action simply through air and naval disengagement. For us to become more deeply engaged in hostilities with Communist China would, in the foreseeable future, not only create a far greater risk of open Soviet involvement but also create a situation, even if the U.S.S.R. did not enter the hostilities, in which we could not impose a decision and from which we could not extricate ourselves.

795.00/11–750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, November 7, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received November 7—2 : 19 p.m.]

986. Having studied views set forth in Deptel 306, November 6 (to London 2344, USUN 478) following comments are submitted:

(*a*) Various possible courses action of Chinese as set forth cover wide range possibilities and I agree probabilities are against courses (9) and (10).

(*b*) We here cannot forget situation which existed between Soviet and Japanese Governments in mid-thirties when actual hostilities were engaged in along Amur River but without an open declaration of war. Also in Spanish Civil War there were German and Italian military units engaged but their presence overlooked or winked at by other great powers. Similarly, we have had recent experience in Greece where Maejos [*Markos*][1] guerrillas were equipped with many weapons coming from foreign sources and frontiers were opened to give sanctuary to Andartes.[2] It seems a pattern has developed in such matters which, until recently, allowed flagrant violations of older precepts of international conduct to proceed unchallenged. When UN turning spotlight on these transgressions it is not currently easy for per-

[1] General Markos was formerly Premier and Minister of War of the Provisional Greek Democratic Government and Commander of the Democratic Army of Greece, establishments of the Communist-led Greek guerrilla movement, and former member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). Documentation on the situation in Greece is scheduled for publication in volume v.

[2] Greek Communist insurgents.

petrators to escape publicity for their acts. However, actions of lesser degree than invasions may not seem to some hardy governments to entail consequences so serious as to stay their hands. It is possible such is the case with Peking authorities for it is noteworthy that according MacArthur's report (Deptel 305, November 5)[3] regular military formations have been broken to form special operational forces such as units 54, 55, 56.

(*c*) We also attach significance to declaration just issued by "Chinese Democratic Parties" as summarized Embtel 980, November 5,[4] as being addressed to considerable degree to Chinese people with view to laying groundwork for masses to understand why angvt [*active?*] line is being followed. It has seemed to us that declaration was as much concerned with home front as with foreign reactions, albeit certain implications therein are to be noted. It is suggested this declaration shows Peking Government's concern over their ability to control mass reaction in people who probably will be loath to believe USA really planning aggression against China.

(*d*) In Bulganin's[5] speech last night (we are still without text and are using our own wire recording as source) you will have noted attention to Korean struggle with again emphasis on USA as aggressor in chief. Also significant is his parallel with October Revolution, together with its foreign military intervention but ending in success. This morning in Red Square Marshal Budenny[6] in his speech declared in effect Soviet people express their solidarity with Koreans fighting for their independence. This expression of sympathy should not be overstressed in our thinking but is likely to encourage resistance in North Korea.

(*e*) It seems to me that we should expect and accept as natural that Soviet Government and Peking Government would be concerned over hostilities nearing their common frontier with Korea. Views these two governments on settlement finally arrived at in Korea are entitled to be heard insofar as matters of common interest are involved such as power plants on boundary rivers. I cannot imagine that were Mexico in so deplorable situation as Korea that US Government would not be considerably concerned over boundary and other questions when settlement terms were being arranged.

(*f*) Taking matter of Chinese intervention before SC or GA will, of course, require delicate handling. We are surely aware that many governments in Western Europe are nervous over possibility Korean

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[3] Same as telegram 476, November 5, 5 p. m., to New York, p. 1046.

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 2 to telegram 1124 from New Delhi, received at 11:13 p. m. on November 7, p. 1093.

[5] Nikolai Bulganin, Deputy Chairman, U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.

[6] Marshal of the Soviet Union Semen Budenny, Deputy Minister of Agriculture.

War may be enlarged and I would assume luke-warm support (if no open differences) might be sequel to drastic proposals on our part.

(*g*) While we and free world are not in dark as to who is pulling strings behind scenes, nevertheless it is my continued belief that Kremlin still wants to keep open a way out. We know what Sino-Soviet Treaty 14 February 1950 contains and we all realize such commitments can be distorted or disregarded as Politburo deems most expedient. I think we should persist in being very wary of letting Taiwan authorities make political capital out of this new aspect of Korean War. A misstep in that regard could have far-reaching consequences.

(*h*) As set forth by Secretary State in reference telegram, we (USA) are in danger of being forced to over-extend ourselves in this distant theater. Our friends in Western Europe are most certainly anxious in this regard since qbis [*it is?*] eccentric to the area of our and their primary concern, preservation of WE from Soviet inundation. Every addition to UN Forces in Korea that can come from other than American sources (save Taiwan Nationalist troops) will dilute our participation, and we should encourage further increments in order to withdraw portions our seasoned cadres for other and imperative duties.

Department pass London, USUN, repeated info London 184, USUN 135.

KIRK

795A.5/11–750

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 7, 1950.

Subject: Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea: Counter-Strategy

Reference: CA Memorandum November 4, 1950 "Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea: Estimate of Objectives"

I. *Chinese Communist Capabilities*

The possible objectives of the Moscow–Peiping Axis have been made the subject of estimate in CA's reference memorandum. The Communist allies must be presumed to have prepared for all eventualities they contemplate facing as a result of Chinese intervention in Korea, given known factors for the achievement of their aims. Those aims are undisclosed, but it is beyond question that they constitute objectives dangerous to the UN position in Korea. The Communist side have

full knowledge of the political and economic factors in being on the UN side, and it is to be assumed that they are bringing into play those factors which they have computed will be sufficient to overcome the forces ranged against them. That Communist calculation can be thrown off only by the introduction of new factors into the equation from the UN side. The following suggestions respecting the UN counter-strategy are offered.

II. *Political Détente*

GHQ SCAP still numbers the Chinese Communist troops at some three or four divisions. If that estimate is correct as of this date, the UN position is serious only in potentiality, not in actuality at this moment. We have time to consider the possibility of some *détente* that will give us opportunity to explore the possibilities of effecting a settlement through the UN apparatus. Granted that, by the record of Communism, the possibility seems slight, the very fact of exhaustion of all possibilities would tend to weld our allies closer to us—and one basic strategy must be to keep the affair in the UN framework. The Chinese Communists undoubtedly look askance at our support of the National Government, our efforts to keep Peiping out of the UN, our guerrilla contacts (which very probably have become known to the Communist side), our avowed anti-Communist position—even as we look askance on their motivations. The USSR has assuredly played on the Chinese Communist hopes and fears as a master-violinist on a fiddle. The two Governments have a formal alliance, and they are possibly bound by some agreement of August current. Even so, assuming the two sides have only limited objectives at this stage, they might be prepared to avail themselves of political means which might be offered to deal with the dispute—for so it is—in point. If their aims are unlimited, that is, if they assume the outbreak shortly of World War III, UN forces had better be elsewhere than in Korea.

This *détente* would be facilitated, possibly, by acceptance by Britain, France and the United States of the Soviet offer to discuss the problem of Germany. It is hard to see what could be lost by following this procedure, for it is not necessary that we surrender one iota of our position if we chose not to do so; but we might gain (1) a better understanding of the Soviet aims and (2) more time—which is sorely needed. It appears clear that the USSR chooses to proceed along the way to World War III by a path which makes it appear that the "peace-loving people's democracies" are being forced into war by "imperialist warmongers". Since ideas count for so much in war, we should not by sins of omission, in cases where action costs us nothing but a little time which may be of equal advantage to us, play into their

hands. It is hard to believe that, in the event of war at this time, we shall be able to avoid certain military defeats of serious nature for the UN side. It might be economic to concede the holding of a few conferences now, in the estimate that we might just possibly thus avoid the loss of a number of battles later. It is well, in times like the present, to leave no stones unturned.

The attendance of the Chinese Communist delegation at the UN in connection with the case of Formosa would offer, it would appear, a major opportunity for bringing about a political *détente*, both in respect to Formosa and otherwise, if such be possible. There might even develop an occasion for having informal discussions on the subject in which the Soviets might participate. The non-appearance of that Peiping delegation, on the other hand, would be an ominous sign that China, which has been clamoring to enter the UN, is in fact not now (if ever it was) interested in the rights and obligations of membership.

The virtue of considering the possibilities of moves in the field of diplomacy is pointed up in Mr. Peake's memorandum of November 6 [1] commenting on CA's reference memorandum of November 4, 1950. Mr. Peake's suggestion that Chinese Communist intervention is an effort to enhance the Communist bargaining position with respect to Japan, as well as to the status of Korea, Formosa and to the admission of the Chinese Communists into the UN, has some logical ground in the known fact that the Communists frequently adopt a threatening posture with the cold-blooded purpose of so frightening their enemies that the latter will surrender without a fight. If the Communist side were to rise to diplomatic bait at the present juncture, there would be some reason to assume that the present storm in China had been raised by the Chinese Communists for the calculated purpose of redressing the military balance in their favor by the means of a limited use of volunteers. The cloud of warlike propaganda is perhaps raised for the express purpose of showing the United States to be the aggressor, and the provocative actions of planes based in Manchuria may be designed to cause the United States Air Force particularly to take the actions with which we are to be charged. The Communist side would thus be offered an opportunity, on the eve of the scheduled hearing of the Chinese Communist charge of aggression against the United States, of proving their case by an approach from another angle, and of splitting the united UN front. The hostile planes as yet have patently constituted no real military threat.

[1] Not printed.

All of the above bears no suggestion, of course, of "appeasement": it does propose the use of such political avenues as may be available, in an effort to localize, in Korea, the new hostile moves from the Communist camp.

III. *Military Strategy*

One way to shift the military balance back into the UN favor in Korea would obviously be to throw in more troops. It would appear inadvisable, in the light of political strains existing elsewhere, substantially to increase the present United States complement. Efforts should be made to increase the proportion of participation of other nations, in terms of both personnel and materiel. The other UN members may refuse to accept the greater commitment, in which event the question arises as to the advisability of tipping the balance back by the use of new weapons or new strategies. The following seem to offer themselves: (*a*) chemical warfare; (*b*) indirect employment of Nationalist forces; and (*c*) strategic bombing in Manchuria. Chemical warfare would be effective against Chinese Communist troops, who are reputedly ill-equipped for defense in that regard. The loosing of Chinese Nationalist forces against the mainland (by technically withdrawing the Seventh Fleet without public warning but after prior confidential notification to the National Government) would offer them the chance they purport to have desired, under optimum conditions where they would have the advantage of surprise and only a thin force of Communist troops arrayed against them. Strategic bombing (even atomic) of certain selected targets in Manchuria, especially if prior public notification were made that the population of *all* major cities of Manchuria should evacuate, would indubitably shake the Chinese aggressor.

Neither the first nor the last of the indicated lines of action should be adopted, by all of the rights of the case, without common agreement with our UN comrades at arms. That agreement would be practically impossible to get. There would be strong opposition to the use of chemical warfare against "defenseless" Asiatics—especially in Asia. The unilateral loosing of Nationalist forces in what would be deemed a contravention of the June 27 ruling, particularly at a time when the question of Formosa is to be made the subject of debate in the UN, would set poorly in public opinion—and it is dubious whether the Nationalist forces could or would in fact stray far from the apron-strings on the basis of the advice "You're on your own: give performance and you may rehabilitate your position." Incursion into Manchuria would hardly be countenanced by the UN as such, and if undertaken with less than united opinion would probably by itself set off the next Communist move, in the direction of a further splitting of the

sometime united UN front and possibly the expansion of the area of armed conflict. All three measures would promise, in sum, the weakening of the UN front and the expansion of the area of conflict. Our measures should rather be devised to strengthen the UN front, and to limit the area of conflict: it is the Communist design which intends the opposite, and we should avoid the Communist traps.

1. *Refusal to Engage China Per Se*

Military strategy must follow that political strategy which, it must be emphasized, contemplates maintenance of the united UN front, for the safety of each and every one of those States which have resisted aggression in Korea. This is the main reliance for resistance to aggression throughout the world. Again it is to be noted that, in the presence of three new divisions and a very handful of enemy planes, there would seem to be no immediate cause for a panic reaction. There would seem to be time to stabilize and await further developments, in a situation where the Chinese Communists have thus far publicly done no more than call for volunteer aid to Korea, before reaching decisions on matters of major political and military importance. Premature conclusions here might lead us to exactly the move that the USSR desire that we make. It is clear that any action which would result in an enlargement of the scope of the present hostilities, it [*sic*] in the present circumstances would very possibly bring about a further enlargement, by the action of the USSR, to the distinct disadvantage of ourselves and our friends. We are in no posture now to resist Soviet arms in either Japan or Germany. And it appears clear that, for whatever reason, the atomic bomb alone can no longer be counted on to deter the USSR and its satellites from taking a course which runs the danger of war. Perhaps it is the fact that the Soviet armaments, now at their prime, will within a couple of years be outmoded, obsolescent; perhaps it is that the USSR plans to use other weapons, of either chemical or bacteriological warfare, which it estimates will balance the atomic bomb; perhaps they count on the initial advantage they would gain by causing the destruction of Washington and/or its inhabitants in a sudden, deadly strike; but, in any event, they can count on the advantage of having the initiative and the ability to accomplish a surprise move against an opponent that remains still in a posture of self-defense. In circumstances like those, it is elementary common sense that we proceed warily until the intentions of the enemy become clearer, in order that we shall not fall into a trap vaster in scope than anything dreamed of by Machiavellian strategists of former eras. Even if strikes against Manchuria meant nothing more than hostilities with China, it would be practically impossible to disengage from such a war, and while we were slowly sinking in the quagmire of that vast

waste over which no victory could be anything but pyrrhic, we might see Japan, Germany, and all of Europe be lost before our eyes—and the United States placed in a danger such as it had never known before. It may be hard enough not to fight China, as things stand, without us ourselves deciding that the present course of things shall take on a graver turn still. We should refuse to engage, in order that we can disengage at will. If we ourselves willed the engagement, there could be no turning back on the road to disaster.

2. *Temporary Holding Operation*

The battle for Korea should be continued on the basis of General MacArthur's standing JCS directive of October 9, pending definitive developments. The implementation of that directive, designed to localize the war, will admittedly be more difficult under the now changed conditions. It has not yet been established as impossible. The use of Manchurian airfields by enemy planes is an irritating factor. For so long as such planes do not appear in considerable numbers, real danger to either our ground forces or our air force seems absent excepting as a suspected potential. The presence of Chinese troops in the field in Korea is established, but the real reason for their being there remains something of a mystery in the light of the Peiping contention that they are volunteers and in view of the limited contact they have had to date with UN forces.

The temporary abandonment of an all-out offensive in favor of more wary tactics, with perhaps some withdrawals necessary for sake of strength and stability, may slow up time-schedules and throw previous planning awry. That we still have much room, strength and time for maneuver is shown by the very disposition of our forces on the northeast front, from which they could and would obviously be drawn back to consolidated positions across the neck of the peninsula if the high command considered that real danger threatened. This should be a period for some slowing up of military operations to permit political estimates and discussions with our allies, to the end that, in our haste to win a battle, we shall not lose the war.

3. *Political Support for a War*

It cannot be repeated too often that the Korean war must be kept within the UN framework. We should of course fulfill our obligations to the UN; we should not assume, however, that our will is the UN will, or disregard the fact that the obligations to be fulfilled are only as established by joint action in the UN, and also that others besides ourselves are rightfully called upon to fulfill the same obligations. We cannot go faster than the UN, or we shall find ourselves alone—which is the Soviet design. The form our strategy is to take in Korea must be determined, in the ultimate analysis, by the decision of the 53

nations who joined in resistance to aggression in the first instance. Our task is to support that united front, which gives us a framework for action. If it can truly be said that the experience of Korea has become an element of strength in the UN power of resistance to aggression, it can with equal validity be noted further that the continuance in being of the UN is more important than Korea—assuming, for instance, that the UN refused to go as far as we might like in respect to the problem of Korea. Even in the hypothetical event of our experiencing certain military reverses stemming from UN action in Korea, a UN which remained united would continue to be a bulwark against aggression. And, united, it may still win the battle for Korea, despite the Chinese Communist intervention.

330/11–750 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 7, 1950—7 p. m.

NIACT

482. In order that there be left no doubt in Chi Commie mind whether US or UN has any intention of aggression against Chi and so that public record is clear, Dept believes there shld be inserted new penultimate para in SC res,[1] following "Calls upon" para, along fol lines:

"Affirms that if the Chi withdraw and refrain from intervention against UN forces, the Chi frontier with Kor will be held inviolate by UN forces and Chi's legitimate interests in the frontier will be fully protected by the UN."

ACHESON

[1] See telegram 477, November 5, 11 p. m., to New York, p. 1049.

795.00/11–750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, November 7, 1950—9 a. m.

[Received November 7—11 : 13 p. m.]

1124. While delivering note Bajpai this morning (Embtel 1116, November 7 [1]) he read telegram from Panikkar stating latter had

[1] Not printed; it reported on the transmission to Bajpai of a note based on telegram 476, November 5, 5 p. m., to New York, p. 1046, which had been repeated to New Delhi as telegram 672. (795.00/11–750)

reports important CPR Ministries being moved from Peking to interior and that "air raid precautions were being alerted" and that it was generally expected reaction to declaration by Chinese parties (Embtel 1105 November 6 [2]) would be American invasion of China.

Bajpai said he did not wish to advise but it occurred to him that US statement of intentions might have useful effect at this time. He referred to statement contained Depcirtel 119 November 5 which Embassy had included at end of note handed him this morning and said he assumed US would make statement its attitude in SC meeting on Korea November 8.

Adverting to Chinese intervention Korea Bajpai said he thought there were three possible explanations:

(1) Defensive reaction to alleged American bombing of Chinese territory;
(2) Action to guard against Manchuria's loss of important sources power supply Yalu River;
(3) Action taken under the direct influence of Moscow (latter assumed worst possible reason). Referring to claim in joint party declaration (Embtel 1105) of Chinese interests in Korea and reason for intervention Bajpai remarked sarcastically this line of reasoning could as readily be advanced by India for sending troops into Tibet.

Bajpai's attention was called to Peking's charges of Anglo-American activities in Nepal (Deptel 673 November 6 [3]) and Nepalese Embassy's denial of US arms aid. Point was made to him this is exactly kind of charges Communist regimes used against countries upon which they had designs of one kind or other. Bajpai said it was most disagreeable and added he had heard from various sources that Nepalese were alarmed but that Nepalese Ambassador had not as yet made any approach whatever to him or other GOI officials.

HENDERSON

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[2] Not printed. It reported on the issuance of a joint statement on November 4 by the Democratic Parties in the People's Republic of China inaugurating a Resist-America, Aid-Korea Program. The statement linked the existence of the People's Republic of Korea to the security of China and drew a parallel between U.S. aggression and pre-World War II Japanese imperialism, while calling for resistance to U.S. actions in Korea. Ambassador Panikkar referred to the statement as the closest possible approach to declaring war without a formal declaration. (793.00/11–650) See also Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, p. 762.

[3] Not printed; it authorized Ambassador Henderson to deny such charges (790C.00/11–650).

693.95A/11–750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, November 7, 1950—10 a. m.
[Received November 7—11 : 23 p. m.]

1128. Embtel 1098, November 6. GOI inquiry of Panikkar re meaning his reference to action by CPR in Korea has brought reply, according Menon, Foreign Secretary, that his (Panikkar's) statement was "in framework" of earlier statement by Chou En-lai that CPR would not stand idle if UN forces should cross 38th parallel. Panikkar explained the CPR had had indirect support to North Koreans in mind, but that there were now indications of more direct assistance. He had information indicating that four divisions might be involved.

Panikkar went on to speak of "daily" violations Chinese territory by US aircraft and close approach American forces to Manchurian border as main reasons for CPR actions, and closed by stating his conviction that only big power discussion of Korea, with CPR participating, could now prevent conflict from becoming major war.

HENDERSON

795B.00/11–850 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, November 8, 1950—5 p. m.
PRIORITY [Received November 8—9 : 31 a. m.]

348. Embtel 339, November 6 and previous on Chinese intervention North Korea. Most significant development of past two days was aerial observation last night of extensive columns of vehicles crossing the Yalu River southward at Tantung and west of Sakchu. About 700 vehicles were sighted moving south on Sakchu–Kusong–Chongju road.

Several hostile jet and Yak aircraft, observed by UN pilots taking off from Antung airport, made brief sorties into Sinuiju–Sonchon area yesterday. These hostile aircraft engaged UN aircraft inconclusively and briefly, returning north Yalu River. Hostile planes failed to penetrate south to sensitive areas of UN military activity.

About 10 additional Chinese prisoners have been captured past two days. Additional those yesterday UN patrols probing northward toward Pakchon and Wunni observed numerous bodies of Chinese dead.

DRUMRIGHT

795B.00/11–850

Memorandum by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 8, 1950.

The Secretary called General Marshall this morning regarding the instructions which went out to Ambassador Austin with regard to the addition of a last [*sic*] paragraph on the resolution which is coming up this morning.[1]

The Secretary referred to his discussion with General Marshall yesterday and said that when the paragraph was discussed with the other sponsors, the French had raised objection because the paragraph looked like something of a threat. The Secretary said this was, of course, not the intention and it was felt better to delay introduction of the paragraph until the question of assurances to the Chinese Communists was raised in the course of the debate. At that time, it would be possible to bring forth the proposed paragraph and the legislative history of the proposal would then make clear that the paragraph was not intended as a threat but rather an assurance. General Marshall agreed that this was the wise course and thanked the Secretary for calling him.

L[UCIUS] D. B[ATTLE]

[1] See telegram 482, November 7, 7 p. m., to New York, p. 1093.

330/11–850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 8, 1950—10 a. m.
PRIORITY

483. At forthcoming SC meeting to discuss special report from UC, question may arise of invitation to Chi Commies to participate. Although US shld not itself initiate invitation, US rep shld acquiesce therein and vote for invitation. Basis of such support which US rep may wish express in SC is that in light of evidence of Chi Commie intervention in Korea, it is appropriate to get reps of Chi Commies in witness box in order that SC may hear their explanation of these activities.

ACHESON

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on Wednesday, November 8, from 10:30 a. m. to 1:10 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.519. Over the objection of the Soviet Representative, the Council voted to adopt the agenda which called for a discussion of General MacArthur's special report of November 5 (S/1884) on Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. The Soviet Representative then proposed the following draft resolution (S/1889):

"*The Security Council*

"*Decides* that during the discussion of the Korean question it shall be necessary to invite the representative of the People's Republic of China."

Following expressions of disapproval by the representatives of the United States and the Republic of China, the United Kingdom representative offered a counter-draft resolution (S/1890)—on the grounds that the Soviet draft resolution was not appropriate—which read as follows:

"*The Security Council*

"*Decides* to invite, in accordance with rule 39 of the rules of procedure, a representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to be present during discussion by the Council of the special report of the United Nations Command in Korea (S/1884)."

The United Kingdom representative expressed the opinion that, if the counter-draft should be adopted, the United Nations Security Council should not be deterred, pending the arrival of a representative from the People's Republic of China, from discussing the agenda item and taking any decisions thereon.

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

TOP SECRET FLASH WASHINGTON, November 8, 1950—12:53 p. m.

JCS 96060. From JCS. 1. We have been informed that effect of Chinese Communist participation in Korean war will be discussed by NSC on 9 November and that we will be required to give our views on military situation at that time.[1]

[1] See footnote 4 to the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated November 9, p. 1121.

2. We feel that introduction of Chinese forces to extent reported by you represents action on part of Chinese Communist Govt and constitutes "entry into North Korea by major . . . Chinese Communist forces" as used in JCS 92608 [92801].* We believe, therefore, that this new situation indicates your objective as stated in that message "The destruction of the North Korean armed forces" may have to be reexamined.

3. In view of apparent intervention of Chinese Communist Govt as outlined in your dispatches, discussion is certain to occur as to what further political approaches can be made toward solution of this new problem.

4. We would like your views earliest on this subject.

*Corrected to read "JCS 92801" by JCS 96069. [Footnote in the source text. Concerning telegram 92801, September 27, see footnote 2 to the letter from Secretary of Defense Marshall to the President, p. 793.]

711.5611/11–850

Memorandum by the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 8, 1950.

Subject: Use of the Atomic Bomb in China

If we use the atomic bomb in China it should be done only on the basis of over-riding military considerations. We should presumably have reached a point where the bomb is needed to produce decisive results either unobtainable by conventional warfare or obtainable only through expenditure of vastly greater numbers of men and quantities of materiel.

We should of course defer to a JCS estimate of the military effect of atomic bombing in China. One opinion would seem to be that China offers few suitable A-bomb targets, in view of scattered cities, low degree of industrialization, and immense area. Targets would presumably be 1) cities, 2) industrial complexes, and 3) concentrations of men and materiel in particular tactical situations. Obviously, the political effects, summarized below, would vary in degree according to the target. A repetition of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would produce the most damaging reaction, bombing of purely industrial targets the least. Nevertheless, we must consider that, regardless of the fact that military results achieved by atomic bombardment may be identical

to those attained by conventional weapons, the effect on world opinion will be vastly different. The A-bomb has the status of a peculiar monster conceived by American cunning and its use by us, in whatever situation, would be exploited to our serious detriment.

Therefore, if a decision to use the A-bomb in China should be reached, we should either:

1) Secure some form of sanction for its use from cooperating members of the UN, or
2) be prepared to accept the political damage in return for the strategic gain.

The following are foreseen as some of the political effects of a decision to use the atomic bomb in China:

1. *The Effect on the United States Moral Position.*

In view of the history of our attempts to secure international control of atomic energy and of the special place occupied by the atomic bomb as a weapon of mass destruction, the moral position of the United States would be seriously damaged as a result of use of the bomb, without international sanction, against China. Because of the difference in the moral, political, and psychological position occupied by China as opposed to that of the USSR, in the eyes of the world, the effect of using the A-bomb against China would be quite different from that of its use against the Soviet Union.

2. *Effect on the UN of a US Decision to Use the A-Bomb.*

Unilateral decision by the United States to use the atomic bomb against China would in all likelihood destroy the unity preserved thus far in the combined UN action in Korea. It is probable that U.S. use of the A-bomb would be deplored and denounced by a considerable number of nations who had up to that time supported the action in Korea. The results might therefore be a disintegration of the concept of UN maintenance of world security and a shattering blow to the future development of the UN in the direction indicated by the Uniting for Peace resolution.

3. *Effect on the USSR.*

Use of the atomic bomb in China would strengthen Soviet propaganda that the United States is bent on initiating general war. Furthermore, should the Soviet Union be prepared to launch a third World War, atomic bombing of China would encourage Soviet participation in war under conditions by which the U.S. moral position would be irreparably damaged while the Soviets would suffer the minimum condemnation.

4. *The Effect in Asia.*

Should the next atomic bomb be dropped on an Asiatic population, it is easy for foresee the revulsion of feeling which would spread throughout Asia. Fears that we reserve atomic weapons exclusively for Japanese and Chinese would be confirmed, our efforts to win the Asiatics to our side would be cancelled and our influence in non-Communist nations of Asia would deteriorate to an almost nonexistent quantity.

5. *Use of the A-Bomb Would Commit us Deeper in Asia.*

In order to obtain decisive results we should undoubtedly have to engage in atomic warfare on a wide scale. This would involve us deep in Asia and make it difficult, if not impossible, to withdraw in order to fight in another theater of war. On the other hand, should we be unable to achieve decisive results even with atomic bombing of China, the effect upon our world position, particularly as regards Western Europe and countries looking to us for protection against the Soviets, would be disastrous.

795.00/11–850

Memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)[1]

[WASHINGTON,] November 8, 1950.

Following are two paragraphs which Mr. Gross has just drafted with Chauvel and Jebb. They would go in place of the "Affirms" paragraph of our Resolution.[2] Mr. Gross said that if we could agree to this, the French would withdraw their draft Resolution on the dams[3] and become co-sponsors of our Resolution:

"1. *Affirms* that it is the policy of the UN to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect Chinese legitimate interests in the frontier zone;

"2. *Calls attention* to the grave danger which continued intervention by Chinese forces in Korea would entail for the maintenance of such a policy."

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[1] The memorandum was prepared by Mildred S. Studds of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs.

[2] See telegram 482, November 7, 7 p. m., to New York, p. 1093.

[3] The French draft resolution, not printed, was not formally submitted to the Security Council. It would have invited the attention of the Unified Command, with due consideration for the necessities of military safety resulting from adverse military action originating along the Yalu River, to take all necessary measures to prevent any damage to the installations of economic importance built along that river. (795.00/11–850)

795.00/11–850

Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency

SECRET
NIE–2

[WASHINGTON,] 8 November 1950.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE *

CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate the scale and purpose of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea and Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

2. Present Chinese Communist troop strength in North Korea is estimated at 30,000 to 40,000. Chinese Communist ground units are engaging UN forces at various points ranging from 30 to 100 miles south of the Korean-Manchurian border. Recent action has been marked also by the appearance of Soviet-type jet fighters in combat with US aircraft over Korea.

3. Present Chinese Communist troop strength in Manchuria is estimated at 700,000. Of this number, there are at least 200,000 regular field forces. These troop strengths, added to the forces already in Korea, are believed to make the Chinese Communists capable of: (*a*) halting further UN advance northward, through piecemeal commitment of troops; or (*b*) forcing UN withdrawal to defensive positions farther south by a powerful assault.

4. The objective of the Chinese Communist intervention appears to be to halt the advance of UN forces in Korea and to keep a Communist regime in being on Korean soil. In accomplishing this purpose, the Chinese Communists would: (*a*) avert the psychological and political consequences of a disastrous outcome of the Korean venture; (*b*) keep UN forces away from the actual frontiers of China and the USSR; (*c*) retain an area in Korea as a base of Communist military and guerrilla operations; (*d*) prolong indefinitely the containment of UN, especially US, forces in Korea; (*e*) control the distribution of hydroelectric power generated in North Korea and retain other eco-

*The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper is based on information available on 6 November 1950. [Footnote in the source text.]

nomic benefits; and (*f*) create the possibility of a favorable political solution in Korea, despite the military defeat of the North Koreans.

5. The Chinese Communists thus far retain full freedom of action with respect to Korea. They are free to adjust their action in accordance with the development of the situation. If the Chinese Communists were to succeed in destroying the effective strength of UN forces in northern Korea, they would pursue their advantage as far as possible. If the military situation is stabilized, they may well consider that, with advantageous terrain and the onset of winter, their forces now in Korea are sufficient to accomplish their immediate purposes.

6. A likely and logical development of the present situation is that the opposing sides will build up their combat power in successive increments to checkmate the other until forces of major magnitude are involved. At any point in this development, the danger is present that the situation may get out of control and lead to a general war.

7. The Chinese Communists, in intervening in Korea, have accepted a grave risk of retaliation and general war. They would probably ignore an ultimatum requiring their withdrawal. If Chinese territory were to be attacked, they would probably enter Korea in full force.

8. The fact that both the Chinese Communists and the USSR have accepted an increased risk of a general war indicates either that the Kremlin is ready to face a showdown with the West at an early date or that circumstances have forced them to accept that risk.

DISCUSSION

9. *Actual Development of Intervention to Date.*

Prior to mid-October, Chinese Communist support of the North Koreans consisted solely of logistical aid and moral support. Since that time, however, the Chinese Communists have been committing troops in increasing number so that at present UN forces are being engaged by Chinese Communist ground units in varying penetrations, ranging from 30 to 100 miles south of the Manchurian-Korean border.

To date, elements taken from the Chinese Communist 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd armies of the Fourth Field Army have been identified in the combat zone of Korea. Units of approximately battalion size from each division of three or more of the Chinese Communist armies along the Korean border in Manchuria have been combined to form units of approximately division size. One regular Chinese Communist division has been tentatively identified. Present Chinese Communist troop strength in North Korea is estimated to number from 30,000 to 40,000. This number, combined with an estimated 45,000 North Korean troops, constitutes an over-all enemy strength of 75,000 to 85,000. Of this total, an estimated 52,000 are in contact with UN forces.

The arrival of Chinese Communist ground units in the Korean fighting has been accompanied by a marked stiffening of North Korean resistance. The previously confused and disorganized North Korean units now appear to be in process of recommitment as reorganized and re-equipped combat units. There are indications that Chinese Communist forces in Korea are being reinforced.

Although the nationality of the hostile aircraft involved in recent incidents over the Korean-Manchurian border has not been definitely established, the fact that Soviet-type jet aircraft were involved indicates that the North Koreans are receiving air assistance from Manchuria in addition to direct ground force support from the Chinese Communists.

10. *Chinese Communist Capabilities for Armed Intervention.*

The over-all strength of the Chinese Communist ground forces is estimated at 2,800,000. Of this number, 1,770,000 are well-trained and well-equipped regular field forces, and the remainder are fairly well-trained and well-equipped military district troops. In addition, there are approximately 2,000,000 poorly-trained and poorly-equipped provincial troops.

Since spring 1950, there has been a general build-up of Chinese Communist tactical troop strength in Manchuria to a point which exceeds normal security needs. The movement of numerous major units from south and central China is estimated to have brought current Chinese Communist strength in Manchuria to approximately 700,000. Of this number, there are at least 200,000 regular field forces, comprising possibly eight to ten armies, plus elements of at least four other armies.

The Chinese Communist Air Force, not tested in combat to date, is believed to consist of 200 combat aircraft in tactical units. Of this 200, 40 are TU–2 light bombers, 40 are IL–10 ground attack, and 120 are LA–9 fighters. It is possible that the CCAF may include 30–40 Soviet-type swept-wing jet fighters formerly stationed in the vicinity of Shanghai, some of which are believed to have been the jet aircraft which have appeared in recent operations in North Korea.

With these ground forces and this air strength, the Chinese Communists could probably make available as many as 350,000 troops within 30 to 60 days for sustained ground operations in Korea and could provide limited air support and some armor. This could be done without jeopardizing their internal control in Manchuria or China proper. The Chinese Communist Forces are therefore believed capable either of: (*a*) halting further UN advance northward by matching any foreseeable UN build-up with piecemeal commitment of forces presently along the Yalu River; or (*b*) forcing UN withdrawal to defensive positions further south through a powerful assault.

11. *Chinese Communist Motives for Intervention.*

The Chinese Communist decision to commit troops in North Korea, entailing as it does the serious risk of widening the Korean conflict, would not have been taken by Communist China without Soviet sanction or possibly direction. It must therefore be assumed that both parties consider the anticipated benefits to justify the acceptance of the calculated risk of precipitating a general war in China which could eventually involve the Soviet Union. This calculated risk includes the possibility of a reaction on the part of the US directly to meet the broader issue with the USSR rather than to allow itself to become involved in an expensive and indecisive war with Communist China.

The immediate occasion for Communist Chinese armed assistance appears to have been the crossing of the 38th Parallel by US forces and the consequent swift collapse of North Korean resistance. Unless the Chinese had intervened, UN forces would soon have reached and secured the Yalu River line. The Korean People's Republic would have ceased to exist except as a government-in-exile and as a guerrilla movement. Confronted with this possibility, the Chinese Communists have apparently determined to prevent an early UN military victory in Korea and to keep a Communist regime in being on Korean soil.

It is significant that the Chinese Communists refrained from committing troops at two earlier critical phases of the Korean war, namely when the UN held no more than a precarious toehold in the Pusan perimeter and later when the UN landings were made at Inchon. The failure to act on those occasions appears to indicate that Peiping was unwilling to accept a serious risk of war, prior to the US crossing of the 38th Parallel. Since the crossing of the Parallel, Chinese Communist propaganda has increasingly identified the Peiping cause with the cause of the North Koreans.

The immediate objective of the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea appears to have been to halt the advance of UN forces. Chinese Communist military operations to date, including the nature of the forces employed, suggest an interim military operation with limited objectives. This view is strengthened by consideration of the limitations imposed on military operations by winter weather in this mountainous area.

In assisting the North Koreans, the Chinese Communists can derive several advantages for themselves, the Soviet Union, and world Communism. They are:

a. To avert the psychological and political consequences of a disastrous outcome of the Korean venture.

The prestige of the world Communist movement and, more particularly, the domestic and international political position of the Chi-

nese Communist regime, are linked with the fate of the North Korean satellite. A complete UN victory in Korea would adversely affect the power of international Communism to attract and hold adherents. For the Chinese regime itself, the total elimination of a satellite state in Korea would mean a serious loss of political face in China and in the world at large, most notably in the Asiatic areas that have probably been selected by the Chinese Communists as their primary sphere of influence.

b. To keep UN forces away from the actual frontiers of China and the USSR.

The establishment of a Western-oriented and US-supported regime on the south bank of Yalu River is probably viewed by Peiping as a threat to the security of the Communist regime in China. The USSR would likewise be sensitive to the advance of UN forces to the northeastern tip of Korea. The Chinese Communists apparently regard the US as a hostile power, determined to bring about their eventual overthrow.

c. To retain an area in Korea as a base of Communist military and guerrilla operations.

The terrain of North Korea adjacent to the Manchurian border is especially suitable for such a base.

d. To prolong indefinitely the containment of UN, especially US, forces in Korea.

Prolonged involvement of UN and US forces in Korea is favorable for Communist global strategy. The containment of these forces in Korea prevents their redeployment to Germany, or to other areas where they might be required to oppose Communist aggression.

e. To control the distribution of hydroelectric power generated in North Korea and retain other economic benefits.

Peiping has an immediate economic stake in the preservation of a friendly state south of the Yalu. The hydroelectric installations in North Korea, particularly the Suiho plant, are important sources of power for South Manchuria. The port of Antung in Manchuria is part of an economic entity that embraces the Korean city of Sinuiju across the river; trade in the area would be hampered severely if no arrangements existed for the operation of the Antung–Sinuiju port as a single unit. River traffic on the Yalu and the Tumen rivers is dependent upon workable agreements between political authorities in Manchuria and Korea.

f. To create the possibility of a favorable political solution in Korea, despite the military defeat of the North Koreans.

It is possible that the Chinese Communists and the USSR hope to establish a military situation that will make the UN willing to negotiate a settlement of the Korean conflict in preference to a long drawn-out and expensive campaign.

12. *Possible Developments.*

The Chinese Communists thus far retain full freedom of action with respect to Korea. They are free to adjust their actions in accordance with the development of the situation. Their current violent propaganda—centering as it has on (*a*) the "will of the Chinese people" (rather than the government) to supply "people's volunteers" to aid

the North Koreans and "defend China"; and (*b*) America's "use of Japanese" and "aping of Japan" in its "aggression against China"—is excellently adapted for preserving maneuverability. It could mean equally: whipping up of public opinion that seems chilly toward any Korean venture; a part of a general war of nerves; a real intention to organize an anti-UN military campaign on a "people's volunteer" basis; or a psychological preparation of the Chinese people for hostilities with the US, if not a world war.

If the Chinese Communists were to succeed in destroying the effective strength of UN forces in northern Korea, the Chinese Communists would probably pursue that advantage as far as possible, bringing in reinforcements from Manchuria to exploit the opportunity.

If the military situation is stabilized, the Chinese Communists might well consider that, with advantageous terrain and the onset of winter, their forces now in Korea are adequate to prevent a military decision favorable to the UN, at least until spring. Such a military deadlock would contain UN forces in Korea and expose them to attrition. It would also permit the reconstitution of North Korean forces and facilitate the development of guerrilla operations behind the UN lines. In these circumstances, the possibility of a political solution as the most convenient means of bringing the situation in Korea to a conclusion would be increased.

A likely and logical development of the present situation is that the opposing sides will build up their combat power in successive increments to checkmate the other until forces of major magnitude are involved. At any point in this development the danger is present that the situation may get out of control and lead to a general war.

The Chinese Communists appreciate that in intervening in Korea they have incurred grave risks of retaliation and general war, but have accepted the risk. They would probably ignore a UN ultimatum requiring their withdrawal. If Chinese territory were to be attacked, they could and probably would enter Korea in full force, with the purpose of expelling UN forces altogether.

The fact that both the Chinese Communists and the USSR have accepted an increased risk of a general war indicates either that the Kremlin is ready to face a showdown with the West at an early date or that circumstances have forced them to accept that risk.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on November 8 from 3 to 4:50 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.521. Ambassador Austin made a brief statement to the effect that Communist China should be summoned, rather than invited, to speak before the Council.

The Council then voted on the Soviet draft resolution (S/1889) which failed of adoption by a vote of 2 in favor (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia) to 3 opposed (China, Cuba, United States), with 6 abstentions. A Soviet proposal to amend the United Kingdom draft resolution (S/1890) by changing the words "special report of the United Nations Command in Korea (S/1884)" to "the question submitted by the delegation of the United States of America (S/1886)" was rejected by a vote of 1 in favor (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) to 2 against (China, Cuba), with 8 abstentions. The United Kingdom resolution was then adopted (S/1892) by a vote of 8 in favor to 2 opposed (China, Cuba), with 1 abstention (Egypt).

Editorial Note

On November 8, Mr. Acheson issued a statement to the press (text in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 20, 1950, page 818) on the United States position regarding the recent Soviet proposal for a Four-Power meeting on Germany; related documentation is scheduled for publication in volume IV. The statement observed that Germany was not a problem which could be isolated from the context of similar areas of tension elsewhere, but no specific mention was made of Korea. The Department of State had considered including in the November 8 statement a suggestion that the Four-Power talks be expanded to cover other areas of international tension such as Korea and Indochina, but Foreign Minister Bevin advised deletion of any mention of Korea and Indochina on the grounds (1) that it might give the Soviet Union the impression that these were the only problems besides Germany which the Western Powers wished to consider, and (2) that the Western Powers had thus far publicly refrained from accusing the Soviet Union of being behind the events in Korea and Indochina. (Telegram 2369, November 6, to London and telegram 2666, November 7, from London; 396.1/11–650, 11–750)

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET EMERGENCY TOKYO, November 9, 1950—3:19 p. m.[1]

C 68572. Re your msg JCS 96060, DTG 081753Z.[2] I cannot agree with the interpretation of your paragraph 2 which by reference to

[1] The source text does not indicate the time of receipt of this message in Washington, but, given the time difference between Tokyo and Washington, it was presumably received early on November 9.

[2] Of November 8, p. 1097.

JCS 92801 of 27 Sept would require a reexamination of the mission of the United Nations Command in Korea. On the contrary the present situation is fully covered by the amplification of that directive contained in your JCS 93709 of 10 Oct [3] reading as follows.

"Hereafter in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory."

In my opinion it would be fatal to weaken the fundamental and basic policy of the United Nations to destroy all resisting armed forces in Korea and bring that country into a united and free nation. I believe that with my air power, now unrestricted so far as Korea is concerned except as to hydroelectric installations, I can deny reinforcements coming across the Yalu in sufficient strength to prevent the destruction of those forces now arrayed against me in North Korea. I plan to launch my attack for this purpose on or about November 15 with the mission of driving to the border and securing all of North Korea. Any program short of this would completely destroy the morale of my forces and its psychological consequence would be inestimable. It would condemn us to an indefinite retention of our military forces along difficult defense lines in North Korea and would unquestionably arouse such resentment among the South Koreans that their forces would collapse or might even turn against us. It would therefore necessitate immediately a large increment of increase in foreign troops. That the Chinese Communists after having achieved the complete success of establishing themselves within North Korea would abide by any delimitations upon further expansion southward would represent wishful thinking at its very worst.

The widely reported British desire to appease the Chinese Communists by giving them a strip of Northern Korea finds its historic precedent in the action taken at Munich on 29 Sept 1938 by Great Britain, France and Italy wherein the Sudeten Lands, the strategically important Bohemian mountain bastion, were ceded to Germany without the participation of Czechoslovakia and indeed against the protest of that govt. Within 10 months following acquisition of that vital strategic bastion, Germany had seized the resulting impotent Czechoslovakia declaring it had ceased to exist as a sovereign state and that the Reich forces would thereafter preserve order. Of that settlement

[3] This message was transmitted on October 9; for the text, see p. 915.

our own State Department has this to say in its public document "Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation [1939–1945]" [4] page 14:

"The crisis occasioned by the German occupation of Austria in March 1938 was followed by the Munich crisis in Sept, when the weakness of peaceful efforts toward just settlements in the face of determined aggression was unmistakably demonstrated."

This observation of the State Department points unmistakably to the lessons of history. I am unaware of a single exception which would cast doubt upon the validity of this concept. In the case of the United Nations such action would carry within itself the germs of its own ultimate destruction, for it would bare its own weakness requiring that it limit the imposition of its decisions and orders upon the weak, not the strong. It is tribute to aggression which encourages that very international lawlessness which it is the fundamental duty of the United Nations to curb.

To give up any portion of North Korea to the aggression of the Chinese Communists would be the greatest defeat of the free world in recent times. Indeed, to yield to so immoral a proposition would bankrupt our leadership and influence in Asia and render untenable our position both politically and militarily. We would follow clearly in the footsteps of the British who by the appeasement of recognition lost the respect of all the rest of Asia without gaining that of the Chinese segment. It would not curb deterioration of the present situation into the possibility of a general war but would impose upon us the disadvantage of having inevitably to fight such a war if it occurs bereft of the support of countless Asiatics who now believe in us and are eager to fight with us. Such an abandonment of principle would entirely reverse the tremendous moral and psychological uplift throughout Asia and perhaps the entire free world which accompanied the United Nations decision of June 25 and leave in its place a revulsion against that organization bordering on complete disillusionment and distrust.

From a military standpoint I believe that the United States should press for a resolution in the United Nations condemning the Chinese Communists for their defiance of the United Nations orders by invading Korea and opening hostilities against the United Nations Forces, calling upon the Communists to withdraw forthwith to positions north of the international border on pain of military sanctions by the United Nations should they fail to do so.

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[4] Department of State publication 3580 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949). This publication was released in February 1950.

I recommend with all the earnestness that I possess that there be no weakening at this crucial moment and that we press on to complete victory which I believe can be achieved if our determination and indomitable will do not desert us.

IO Files

Minutes of the Thirty-sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET NEW YORK, November 9, 1950—9:15 a. m.

[Here follows a list of those present (48).]

1. *ECOSOC resolution on Korean relief and reconstruction.*[1]

Mr. Lubin explained that one main issue in connection with the Korean relief program which had had to be solved by the Economic and Social Council was whether the Unification Commission or some other agency was to run the relief and rehabilitation program. Australia, with the aid of Chile and Pakistan (all three members of the Unification Commission) wanted the Commission to run the show. State Department preference was to operate the program under the direction of an Agent-General with broad powers, who should be guided only in certain political matters by the Unification Commission. After extensive private negotiations with the Australians, Mr. Acheson had conferred with the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Spender, and had told him that Congress would not give money to the program if it were to be directed by a commission of this character. Agreement was then reached upon the appointment of an Agent-General to administer the relief program.

Mr. Lubin briefly summarized the responsibilities of both the Agent-General and the Unification Commission, which would guide the Agent-General on three particular political issues. Mr. Lubin explained that, in addition, in order to ensure even further control over the Agent-General, provision was made for an Advisory Committee of five governments—probably to be composed of the five largest contributors—to assist the Agent-General. The resolution provided that the Economic and Social Council should have only the function of reviewing the reports of the Agent-General and the comments of the

[1] The U.N. Economic and Social Council, in accordance with the request of the U.N. General Assembly contained in Resolution 376 (V), October 7, p. 904, had been considering the question of Korean relief and rehabilitation at its resumed 11th session from October 12 to November 7. On the latter date, it approved a comprehensive plan in Resolution 338 (XI), which was forwarded to the General Assembly. Concerning the legislative history of this resolution in ECOSOC, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1950, pp. 270–276. Concerning U.N. General Assembly Resolution 410 (V), December 1, on this subject, see editorial note, p. 1297.

Unification Commission and should report to the General Assembly on the way the program was proceeding. (Some members of the Council had favored a greater delegation of authority to the Council.) The Council had also agreed upon a set of general principles, making clear that the operation was for relief and rehabilitation only and did not include economic development.

Mr. Lubin explained that the method of financing the program was still an unsolved issue. The Department believed that individual countries should be assessed for their individual shares. However, opposition to this proposal was very great. Australia, France, Pakistan, India and the United Kingdom were absolutely opposed, wishing to see Korean relief financed in the same way as technical assistance. This would mean that a conference would be called, the United States would make a statement as to the amount it would be willing to contribute, and other countries would follow with their statements.

Mr. Lubin noted that there was also pressure to reduce the estimated cost of the Korean relief operation. He observed that the Unified Command had estimated the cost at $350,000,000, but about $100,000,000 of that would be spent by January 1. For this reason, we had agreed on an estimate of $250,000,000 for 1951. The pressure to cut that estimate was great. The British and Australians insisted that this estimate would scare away contributors. However, the actual decision as to how much money would be raised had been left in the hands of the Assembly. The Council had not decided the question, even though there had been pressure for it to take this decision. Mr. Lubin believed the $250,000,000 estimate would be cut by the General Assembly to about $200,000,000. Other members hoped that the United States would give a major share of that amount. Our problem was to get individual countries to give more than token contributions. For example, France had indicated it could only promise a token amount, and Belgium had said it would give 20% of the French contribution.

Speaking as one who knew Congress very well, Ambassador Austin believed it would be of great importance if we could go to the Congress—especially since the last election—with a statement of what other countries were contributing, even though some contributions were only token amounts. This would encourage Congress to appropriate the money for the United States contribution. He wondered whether there should not be some effort to promote that idea before the United States was required to state what contribution it was prepared to make. Mr. Lubin said there had been some talk along that line. The British, in particular, were softening their position in this regard. He hoped that the British would make a fairly substantial contribution because this would have some bearing on the amounts other states would be

willing to contribute. He felt it important that various governments should appreciate our Congressional situation. Perhaps our Embassies abroad could bring this matter to the attention of the appropriate governmental authorities, and thus indicate how important we considered the whole issue to be. This was the first time the United Nations had explicitly stated that a relief operation of this kind was its responsibility. For this reason, it was important to tie in the financing of the program with United Nations action in Korea.

Ambassador Austin repeated his question as to the possible strategy of having other countries first make their commitments for contributions. Mr. Lubin believed every country should give something. Ambassador Austin asked again whether it was intended that the United States should be the first to put its contribution on the dotted line. Mr. Lubin thought we should at least intimate first to other delegations how much we would ask Congress to appropriate. Otherwise he did not think other countries could be expected to do anything.

Mr. Hall [2] explained that the original proposal of the United States for an assessments scheme would have gone furthest in meeting the comments of Ambassador Austin, since a fixed scale of contributions would have been established. This plan, he noted, had been supported only by the Canadians, although other members of the British Commonwealth now appeared to be coming closer toward its acceptance. He thought it possible that the idea of dealing with the financing of this program in the Assembly might have to be abandoned. However, if a special conference were called, members could still be assessed on the basis of a fixed scale. There was growing support for proceeding in that manner.

Mr. Lubin raised the question whether the United States should insist that the Agent-General should be an American. We had discussed this subject with all the members of the Economic and Social Council. There was a general feeling that if an American were not chosen, the Agent-General should preferably be an Asian. The good political effect of such a choice would be obvious. The only Asian candidate appeared to be Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar of India. However, no member had specifically objected to the choice of an American.

Mr. Hyde observed that the Republic of Korea had considerable interest in what happened in this regard. After all, it was the government with which the Unified Command and the Agent-General would have to deal. There was a strong feeling among representatives of the Republic of Korea that India was an unfriendly government. He believed the choice of an Indian as Agent-General would create preju-

[2] William O. Hall, Director of the Office of International Administration and Conferences, Department of State, and Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

dice and bad feelings at the start; this would be unfortunate for the success of the program.

Mr. Ross referred to the question of the nationality of the Agent-General. While he saw some political advantage in the choice of a non-American, he still considered such a choice less practical and did not believe that it would outweigh the advantages of an American Agent-General both with respect to getting appropriations from Congress and in obtaining contributions from other governments. Certainly the chances of larger financial contributions were greater with an American as Agent-General.

Ambassador Austin asked whether the Delegation was agreed that an American should be chosen as Agent-General, providing a suitable candidate could be found. Mr. Lubin added that the Indian Delegation had informed him that if more money could be gotten for the program by choice of an American as Agent-General, it would prefer an American. The only real Indian objection to an American was based upon the feeling that an American would be obliged to bolster the Rhee Government, which India did not trust.

Mr. Hickerson thought the views of Senators Lodge and Sparkman, and of Mr. Wilcox [3] would be useful on this point. Senator Sparkman said that he had been under the impression that there was real opposition to the appointment of an American, and that resentment over the program might be aroused by such a choice. However, if the situation were what Mr. Lubin described it to be, he thought the choice of an American highly desirable. There could be no question that better results would be obtained from the Congress with an American in this post.

Senator Lodge thought the Department might face an entirely different psychology in the new Congress, which could certainly be expected to raise fundamental questions with respect to the whole foreign relief program. He believed our activities abroad would be considered *de novo*. In this particular matter, it would be impossible to go about the organization of Korean relief in any worse way than to label it a United Nations program, with only the United States and perhaps two or three other countries contributing funds, and an Indian as Agent-General. Such a move would encounter the roughest treatment in Congress. He even wondered whether it might not be better to have this an exclusively United States operation or perhaps to insist that only those states which contributed would get any credit for the Korean relief operation, and only their names would be associated with the program.

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[3] Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

Mr. Wilcox thought that not only an American, but a Republican, would have the best chance in the new Congress. In this connection, he referred to the experience of Mr. Paul Hoffman with the 80th Congress and believed that Hoffman's political orientation was perhaps one important reason for the continued support of ECA. If an American administrator could not be chosen, Mr. Wilcox suggested the choice of either an Australian or a Canadian. Senator Lodge agreed that the particular individual chosen was of the greatest importance. It would be desirable to find a man like Hoffman.

On the other hand, Mrs. Roosevelt believed that, if an American were not chosen, the Agent-General should be an Asian, not only because of political advantages, but also because an Asian might be able to carry on a program with a smaller budget. In her opinion, the only disadvantage in choosing an American was the fact that there were perhaps too many United Nations operations in which an American held the top post. It was necessary to keep some balance and to decide in each case, where it was most important to place an American in the top job. Certainly all top places could not be occupied by Americans. On the contributions question, Mrs. Roosevelt thought it vitally important that every country make some contribution, and, moreover, that other countries make their contributions before the United States.

Mr. Lubin pointed out the difficulty of getting contributions from the smaller states. He did not believe these countries would come through, even with token contributions, unless some word were sent to their government through our missions abroad that this government attached major importance to their part in the Korean relief operation. Senator Cooper asked whether this suggestion had been taken up in the Department. Mr. Hickerson said that he would undertake to see that the Department instructed our missions abroad to apply pressure in this regard. He agreed with Mrs. Roosevelt in the importance of every state making contributions. After all, this was a case where the dollar shortage was not involved. In this connection, he referred to the materials shipped, medicines, and other miscellaneous articles contributed by various members of the United Nations to the Korean military operation. He was sure the Department would be glad to use every ounce of diplomatic pressure which the United States had in the proper channels.

Ambassador Austin also thought it important that a number of countries should join in the relief effort, even though they made only token contributions. He did not believe we should give up too easily in our discussions with them. Tremendous work and effort would be involved, and he could only advise Mr. Lubin to tackle the problem again. Because of the trend of discussion in the Delegation, Ambassador Austin wondered whether it would not be sounder policy for the

Delegation to take no definite decision on these matters at this time. Mr. Lubin indicated that it would be important to have further consultations with other delegations on the matter of contributions. Mr. Dulles wondered whether the Delegation could not at least decide that it wished to have an American as administrator of the program. Ambassador Austin saw no objection to that decision.

Mr. Cohen thought it was perhaps relevant in that case to decide whether provision should be made for an advisory committee. He did wish to lay down a caveat on increasing the number of bodies involved in Korean relief since this would certainly create administrative problems. There was no further discussion.

[Here follows a record of the discussion on the second agenda item: the Invitation to the Chinese Communists Extended by the Security Council (concerning which, see the editorial note, page 1240).]

357.AD/11–950 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 9, 1950—noon.

303. FYI and background, fol is verbatim text res passed Nov 7 by Interim Comite on Korea:

"The Interim Committee on Korea,

Taking note of the special report dated 5 November 1950 from the United Nations Command in Korea to the Security Council, which report was brought to the attention of the committee by the Unified Command on 6 November 1950,

Believes that it should concern itself with questions relating to the Northern frontier of Korea in order that the frontier may be fully respected and that the United Nations Commission for the unification and rehabilitation of Korea, when organized and convened, should automatically continue to concern itself with this question,

Decides, in view of the urgent nature of the problem reflected in the special report of the UN Command referred to above, that such representatives of its members as are in Korea will, on behalf of the committee, and subject to its authority, lend all practicable assistance in respect of questions relating to the North Korean frontier,

Requests the Secretary General to provide necessary staff and facilities to carry out these functions."

Text this res also sent CINCUNC. Emb shld extend appropriate assistance this group, which will be charged with responsibility for active consideration polit problems relating Korean frontier. Muccio will have detailed background when he returns Seoul. Text of res unclassified and shld be given ROK.

ACHESON

795.00/11–950 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 9, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received November 9—12:35 p. m.]

353. Re Embtel 348[1] on Chinese intervention. Eighth Army reports there considerable decrease late yesterday and last night in number vehicles moving southward across Yalu from Manchuria. Movement on Sakchu-Chongju road was negligible; but movement on Kanggye–Huichon road was in excess of volume noted heretofore—numbering about 200 vehicles.

In Eighth Army sector UN ground forces have not made solid contact with Chinese forces past two days. It appears Chinese forces have withdrawn northward where they may be regrouping in conjunction North Korean remnants. UN forces probing northward yesterday on line from Pakchon to Kaechon found numerous Chinese dead—running into hundreds. Most of these Chinese evidently killed by aerial strafing. Vehicle columns moving south from Manchurian border were hard hit by UN aircraft moreover city of Sinuiju was virtually destroyed by heavy air assault yesterday on at least four occasions yesterday UN and hostile jet aircraft clashed near Sinuiju area with one hostile aircraft reportedly shot down and others damaged.

On basis information currently available, it difficult to determine Sino Communist intentions. It appears, however, Chinese intervention thus far cannot be regarded as of direct, open nature. Neither can it be regarded, on basis current intelligence, as all-out continuous effort on part Sino Reds. Unquestionably Chinese have suffered severe losses in men and materials past few days. Their failure to follow up early successes and their defensive attitude during past two or three days suggest any plans they may have had for all out intervention may have been modified. In any event next few days developments should determine conclusively what Chinese Reds real intentions are.

DRUMRIGHT

[1] Received at 9:31 a. m. on November 8, p. 1095.

795.00/11–950

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 9 November 1950.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to the letter of 6 November 1950, from Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews to General

Burns, regarding Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea. The Department of Defense sees no objection, from the military point of view, to the draft resolution for the Security Council which was enclosed with the above letter.

With respect to the request of the Department of State for the views of the Department of Defense on the military significance of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea, the Department of Defense has this matter under consideration.[1]

Faithfully yours, G. C. MARSHALL

[1] Under date of November 10, Secretary Marshall transmitted the reply (not printed) of the Department of Defense to the November 6 letter from Mr. Matthews to General Burns. Secretary Marshall indicated his concurrence with the conclusions contained in paragraph 12 of the JCS memorandum of November 9, *infra*, a copy of which he sent along to Mr. Acheson. (795.00/11–1050)

795.00/11–950

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 9 November 1950.

Subject: Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea

1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum, dated 6 November 1950,[1] the Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated the following views on the military significance of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea.

2. It has been suggested that the Chinese Communist forces intervening in North Korea might be composed of "volunteers." The objective of such an intervention, if this view were accepted, might be the interposing of sufficient Chinese Communist men and equipment in the paths of the advancing United Nations forces in order to delay them and to gain time for the defeated and disorganized remnants of the North Korean Army. The delay thus imposed on the United Nations forces might enable the North Koreans to make preparations for protracted guerrilla warfare in Korea and possibly to attempt to hold during the winter months the entire north central mountain region near the Yalu River. Intelligence reports indicate, however, that Chinese Communists are entering North Korea both as individuals and as well-organized, well-led and well-equipped Chinese Communist units, probably as large as divisions.

3. Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must have been motivated either by pressure of the USSR or by genuine Chinese reasons or by a combination of both. There is no conclusive evidence at

[1] Not printed.

hand upon which to draw sound inferences as to what governs. However, regardless of the motives involved, any one or combination of the following objectives is logical:

a. To protect the Yalu River and the Changjin–Pusan reservoir power complex and possibly to establish a *cordon sanitaire* in North Korea;
b. To continue the active undeclared war in Korea; and
c. To drive the United Nations forces from Korea.

4. *Protection of the Yalu River and the Changjin–Pusan reservoir power complex and possibly the establishment of a* cordon sanitaire *in North Korea:*

a. The Chinese Communists might fear that if the United Nations forces capture the Changjin–Pusan power complex they would either destroy or damage these facilities, or divert to Korea power now being received by the Chinese. It is understood that the electricity generated by these power systems furnishes light and power to Manchuria, including Mukden, Port Arthur, and Dairen and that the distribution systems are on the North Korean side of the Yalu River. If the Chinese Communists were prevented from obtaining electricity from these power systems it would be a severe economic blow to Manchuria;
b. If the Chinese Communists are attempting to protect the Yalu River and the power systems in North Korea, it would be to their advantage to establish the defenses at some distance from the river and the power systems, and to hold a buffer border zone in North Korea. In any event, to accomplish this objective it would be necessary to hold the central mountainous region of North Korea and thus flank the coastal approaches to the Manchurian border;
c. If the Chinese Communists have intervened in North Korea solely for this purpose, their withdrawal might be accomplished by an unmistakably clear announcement of a guarantee by the United Nations that:

(1) The United Nations forces would not infringe on the sovereignty of Manchuria;
(2) The dams, power plants, and electric distribution systems would not be damaged or interfered with; and
(3) The present distribution of electricity from the power plants would not be changed except by mutual arrangements of the contracting parties.

d. Such an announcement and guarantee, if made, would in any event clarify the situation, since if the Chinese Communists refused to accept the guarantee, this possible objective would be eliminated from further consideration.

5. *Maintenance of an active undeclared war in Korea:*

a. The Chinese Communists might place sufficient forces in Korea in order to continue the undeclared war in Korea and thus force the United Nations and particularly the United States to retain its armed forces now there merely to maintain the present positions;

b. Korea is at such a distance from the United States that it would be expensive for the United States in manpower, materials, and money to conduct an undeclared war in that area over a long period. Conversely, China is adjacent to Korea and it would be comparatively inexpensive for the Chinese Communists, with their practically unlimited manpower and with Soviet equipment, to carry on such a war indefinitely. The continued involvement of the United States forces in Korea would be in the interests of the USSR and of world communism by imposing a heavy drain on United States military and economic strengths;

c. It would also be in the interests of the USSR for the meager military forces in being of the United States to be committed in a strategically unimportant area. From the viewpoint of a global war, the United States would thus be off balance while the USSR perfects and completes its plans for global conquest and prepares to deliver a surprise blow;

d. The intervention in Korea would jeopardize the security of the United States if the undeclared war were to be permitted to sap our strength and leave us unprepared for Soviet attack elsewhere. The United States might, under such circumstances, win the skirmish in Korea but lose the war against the USSR if global war eventuates.

e. An undeclared war in Korea between Chinese Communist intervention forces and United Nations forces, if localized, would offer the possibility of settling the conflict by negotiation during the conduct of which South Korean military forces could be materially increased. Additionally, the time thus gained could be utilized for a further build-up of the industrial potential and the military strength of the United States.

6. *Driving United Nations forces out of Korea:*

The Chinese Communists might intend to commit enough forces to drive the United Nations forces out of Korea. However, it is doubtful if this could be accomplished without material assistance by Soviet naval and air power. In this event it would be evident that World War III was upon us and the United Nations forces should be withdrawn from Korea as expeditiously as possible.

7. As to military eventualities in other areas, the Chinese Communists can be expected to recognize the increased drain on the military resources of the nations of the Western world which will result from their intervention in Korea, and to assume that there would be a corresponding lessening of the military capabilities of those nations. Therefore, it is possible that if Chinese intervention in Korea is of limited nature it may well be accompanied by Communist aggression in other countries, such as by attempting the invasion of Formosa, by taking Hongkong and Macao, by intervening more actively in Indochina, by invading Burma, or by occupying Tibet.

8. Chinese Communist air units are operating in Korea from nearby bases in Manchuria; they are thus taking advantage of the present

technical inviolability of Manchuria to use it as a sanctuary. Similarly, their army units are able to move from the Manchurian sanctuary to the fighting lines overnight. Such a situation may well become intolerable. Although to a certain extent dependent on the relative scale of effort maintained by the Chinese Communists, there appears strong likelihood that the tactical situation in Korea will demand that the United Nations commander "be authorized to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China," as provided in NSC 73/4 [2] and NSC 81/1.[3]

9. Also depending on the relative scale of efforts on the part of the Chinese Communists, there are three courses of action open to the United Nations forces: (*a*) force the action to a successful conclusion in Korea; (*b*) continue the action on a defensive line short of the Korean border; or (*c*) withdraw. The first course may require some augmentation of military strength in Korea even if the Chinese Communist scale of effort is not materially increased. The second course is apparently feasible now and it might be a temporary expedient pending clarification of the military and political problems raised by Chinese intervention which are as yet unanswered. The third course, withdrawal, if conducted voluntarily would so lower the worldwide prestige of the United States that it would be totally unacceptable, and if conducted involuntarily could only be accepted as the prelude to global war.

10. The fact of military intervention by the Chinese Communists does not of itself provide conclusive indication that the USSR intends to launch a global war at this time. On the other hand, the United States should "recognize the increased strain on the fabric of world peace" arising from such intervention. The present situation brings to a sharp focus the statement appearing in NSC 73/4:

"Global war could come in one of three ways: (*a*) Soviet design; (*b*) by a progression of developments growing out of the present situation; or (*c*) by a miscalculation on the part of either the United States or the USSR."

Even though the United States makes every effort to localize the present conflict, a review of its probable eventualities leads to the conclusion that there now exists a greatly increased risk of global war.

11. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the following implications of military significance with respect to the Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea may be drawn:

a. The Chinese Communists are presently in Korea in such strength and in a sufficiently organized manner as to indicate that unless with-

[2] Text and related documentation are scheduled for publication in volume I.
[3] Of September 9, p. 712.

drawn they can be defeated only by a determined military operation.

b. The military objectives of the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea are not yet clear.

c. A sustained military campaign in Korea would serve as a heavy drain on our military potentialities.

d. From the military standpoint, the continued commitment of U.S. forces in Korea is at the expense of the more useful strategic deployment of those forces elsewhere.

e. It is not envisaged that the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans could drive presently committed United Nations forces from Korea unless materially assisted by Soviet naval and air power. In the event of the commitment of the latter, U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Korea as it would then be evident that World War III is imminent.

f. Under present restrictions the Chinese Communists are permitted to use Manchuria as a hostile sanctuary for aircraft directed against the United Nations forces.

g. There appear to be three general courses of action open to United Nations forces:

(1) Force the action to a successful conclusion in Korea.
(2) Establish and maintain a defensive position on a line short of the Korean border.
(3) Withdrawal.

h. The present conditions do not indicate conclusive evidence that global war is imminent but rather that the risk of global war is increased.

12. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

a. Every effort should be expended as a matter of urgency to settle the problem of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea by political means, preferably through the United Nations, to include reassurances to the Chinese Communists with respect to our intent, direct negotiations through our Allies and the Interim Committee with the Chinese Communist Government, and by any other available means.

b. Pending further clarification as to the military objectives of the Chinese Communists and the extent of their intended commitments, the missions assigned to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command should be kept under review, but should not be changed.

c. The United States should develop its plans and make its preparations on the basis that the risk of global war is increased.[4]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

[4] Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the above memorandum were read as the views of the JCS at the 71st meeting of the National Security Council on November 9; for an account of that meeting, see Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 378–380.

795.00/11-950

Memorandum by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Smith) to the National Security Council [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 9 November 1950.

In the present situation, the Central Intelligence Agency, with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, would restate previously agreed estimates (J.I.C. 531/10 [2] and N.I.E. 2 [3]) in the following terms:

1. To date there is insufficient evidence to indicate that the USSR intends to commit Soviet forces overtly in Korea. However, the commitment of Chinese Communist forces, with Soviet material aid, indicates that the USSR considers the Korean situation of sufficient importance to warrant the risk of general war.

2. The probability is that the Soviet Union considers that the U.S. will not launch a general war over Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea and the reaction thereto. The principal risk of general war is through the exercise of Soviet initiative which the Kremlin continues to hold. The probability is that the Soviet Government has not yet made a decision directly to launch a general war over the Korean-Chinese situation. There is a good chance that they will not in the immediate future take such a decision. At what point they *will* take a decision to launch a general war is not now determinable by Intelligence.

It is our opinion that action by U.N. forces to attack troop concentrations or air fields north of the Yalu River, or to pursue enemy aircraft into Chinese territory would not increase the already substantial risk that the situation may degenerate into a general war involving Russia. In other words, the Kremlin's basic decision for or against war would hardly be influenced by this local provocation in this area. However, such provocation would probably materially increase the extent of Chinese Communist reaction in Korea proper. (See par. 7, National Intelligence Estimate No. 2.)

WALTER B. SMITH

[1] This memorandum was read at the 71st meeting of the National Security Council on November 9; for an account of that meeting, see Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 378–380.

[2] Not printed. Documentation on the work of the U.S.-U.K. Joint Intelligence Committee is scheduled for publication in volume III.

[3] Dated November 8, p. 1101.

795.00/11–950 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET HONG KONG, November 9, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received November 9—6 : 53 p. m.]

1047. Wilkinson, Yager and Clough [1] have repeatedly heard expressed by non-Communist Chinese the belief that Chinese Communists actually fear US intends invade Manchuria and that this is important reason for their intervention in Korea. Lieberman, *NY Times* correspondent who is serious student of China and has many Chinese contacts, strongly urges new statement be issued by President in attempt convince Chinese Communists we have no such intention. He feels statement should not be in form ultimatum but dwell on long-term friendship between Chinese and American people and deplore their fighting each other. It should emphasize we do not intend invade China but make clear that we cannot tolerate despatch of Chinese soldiers to obstruct operation UN forces in Korea. It should state that if Chinese Communists really believe we intend invade Manchuria, this belief is based on most pernicious and deceptive intelligence. Only statement by President, Lieberman believes, would get sufficient play in Far East press and have enough impact on Chinese Communists to offer hope of success.

Consulate General not sanguine that such a statement would influence thinking of Chinese Communist leaders. However, situation holds such dangerous potentialities that no possibly hopeful measure should be neglected. At very least, statement would place American position clearly on record and be useful weapon for psychological warfare. Implication that Chinese Communists misled by deceptive Soviet intelligence would strike responsive chord among Chinese. Of course, statement would have to be so phrased and timed as to not interfere with any action being taken by UN.

WILKINSON

[1] Joseph A. Yager and Ralph Nelson Clough, Consuls at Hong Kong.

795.00/11–1050

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1950.

Subject: Possible *Démarche* by Swedish Ambassador at Peking

It is suggested that the Swedish Government, because of its concern in the general problem of maintenance of world peace, might desire

to instruct its Ambassador at Peking who is *persona grata* with the Chinese Communist regime to make an approach to the Peking Foreign Office for a discussion of the present situation arising out of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

The approach could have as its nominal motivation the desire to convey to the Chinese Communist authorities an outside point of view respecting developments in Korea and particularly to present the UN point of view. It has been noted that despite efforts by the UN generally and the U.S. in particular to indicate that UN operations in Korea constitute no threat to China, the content of current Chinese publicity respecting developments in that area would indicate that the Chinese Communist leaders view those UN actions as reflecting aggressive American intentions against China. The U.S. position in regard to Korea is identical with and a part of the UN position respecting Korea. It is in essence that the sole purpose of present UN operations (which include U.S. operations) in Korea is the reestablishment of order in that country, its unification on the basis of the principles of international justice and its economic rehabilitation. The tenor of UN thinking, and likewise U.S. thinking, is shown by the resolution currently being introduced in the Security Council by the Franco-Anglo-American delegations.[1] That resolution proposes that the UN forces operating in Korea are acting on the basis of a policy of respect for the boundaries of China. The traditional American position has been and is one of respect for the territorial integrity of China, and the present policy of the U.S. Government is to support and maintain peace in the Pacific area as well as elsewhere throughout the world.

This Government would be grateful if the Swedish representative at Peking could point out to the Chinese Communist leaders the many evidences of UN and U.S. *bona fides* in respect to the developments in point and could discuss with those leaders the situation which has been created as a result of the appearance in Korea of Chinese Communist troops.

It is this Government's idea that such a *démarche* might have the beneficial result of bringing about some *détente* in the present strained political situation and would, at the least, possibly bring out some indication of the present course of Chinese Communist thinking respecting this serious matter.[2]

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[1] See the editorial note on the 521st meeting of the U.N. Security Council at 3 p. m. on November 10, p. 1126.

[2] A manuscript note on the source text by Mr. Rusk read: "Approach was made. Score: zero. DR"

793.54/11–1050

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1950.

Subject: Action Respecting Korean-Manchurian Frontier

Because the whole Korean question is at the present time in the UN framework (note that the first substantive action on the question is scheduled for today) and presumably should remain there for exigent political reasons, it is believed that no military action should be carried over the frontier into Manchuria, whether "in hot pursuit" of enemy planes having their bases there or against AA installations which have fired upon our own planes in the Korean air, without UN sanction. Such action, even if proposed with UN sanction, had best be presented—again for political reasons—by an ultimatum directed to Peiping warning them of the consequences which would be visited upon such enemy planes or airfields or AA installations after a specified date in the event that such hostile action as has been experienced to date were to continue.

The above reasoning is based, I would note, on the following assumptions:

1. The destruction of bridges already accomplished in part is not in any event an adequate means of denying to the Chinese Communists the possibility of getting their troops across the Yalu, it remaining possible for them to use (*a*) pontoon bridges, (*b*) movement by boat at night, and (*c*) before long, traverse by ice.
2. The world political atmosphere is tense and the patent desire of friendly governments is that the present situation shall not be aggravated insofar as it is humanly possible to avoid such aggravation.
3. In those circumstances where the destruction of bridges is relatively inefficacious (and our troops by report stand in no immediate danger) and unilateral action might lose us some of the support now solidly behind us, it appears preferable by far temporarily to exercise restraint, if need be by again directing our aircraft to remain several miles from the frontier pending further developments. Those developments will probably come soon in the form of (*a*) renewed Chinese-Korean military action in the field, (*b*) the appearance (or non-appearance) of the Chinese Communist delegation scheduled to arrive at Lake Success on November 15, and (*c*) debate and action in the UN.

It seems preferable, in sum, to forego a relatively minor additional military advantage in order to avoid being placed in a position where we may be charged by the Chinese-Russian side with aggression against the air and soil of China. It is my theory, you will appreciate, that it may be part of the Moscow design to cause us to commit such military infringement of the Manchurian frontier to give them political basis for a planned further attack.

795.00/11–1050

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 10 November 1950.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In response to requests, on 8 November 1950, from Department of State officials for Defense views on certain resolutions to be introduced into the Security Council regarding Chinese Communist intervention, there are attached, for your information, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 9 November.[1] A copy of these views, with which I concur, has already been informally made available to Assistant Secretary of State Rusk.

While it is the view of both Departments that some form of reassurances to the Chinese Communists is called for, I believe it should be made clear that a sanctuary for attacking Chinese aircraft is not explicitly or implicitly affirmed by any United Nations action.

Faithfully yours, G. C. MARSHALL.

[1] See the memorandum dated November 9 from the JCS to Secretary Marshall on "Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea", p. 1117.

Editorial Note

The 521st meeting of the United Nations Security Council was held on Friday, November 10, from 3 to 6:25 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.521. The following draft resolution (S/1894) was submitted jointly by the Representatives of Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

"*The Security Council*,

"*Recalling* its resolution of 25 June 1950, determining that the North Korean forces had committed a breach of the peace and calling upon all Members of the United Nations to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities,

"*Recalling* the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 October 1950, which sets forth the policies of the United Nations in respect to Korea,

"*Having noted* from the special report of the United Nations Command in Korea dated 5 November 1950 that Chinese communist military units are deployed for action against the forces of the United Nations in Korea,

"*Affirming* that United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives of stability throughout Korea and the establishment of a unified independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea, as set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly dated 7 October 1950,

"*Insistent* that no action be taken which might lead to the spread of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further endanger international peace and security,

"*Calls upon* all States and authorities, and in particular those responsible for the action noted above, to refrain from assisting or encouraging the North Korean authorities, to prevent their nationals or individuals or units of their armed forces from giving assistance to North Korean forces and to cause the immediate withdrawal of any such nationals, individuals, or units which may presently be in Korea;

"*Affirms* that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone;

"*Calls attention* to the grave danger which continued intervention by Chinese forces in Korea would entail for the maintenance of such a policy;

"*Requests* the Interim Committee on Korea and the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to consider urgently and to assist in the settlement of any problems relating to conditions on the Korean frontier in which States or authorities on the other side of the frontier have an interest, and suggests that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea proceed to the area as soon as possible, and, pending its arrival, that it utilize the assistance of such States members of the Commission as now have representatives in the area for this purpose."

An effort by the Soviet representative to prevent inclusion of the Korean question on the agenda in the absence of representatives from the People's Republic of China was defeated by a vote of 10 to 1 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). The representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States then spoke on behalf of the draft resolution.

795A.00/11–1050: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 10, 1950—7 p. m.

495. Dept thinks it wld be useful if when reps of IC have established themselves and are available to lend assistance on questions relating to NK frontier in accordance with IC res of Nov 6 [7],[1] they shld report this fact to SYG. SYG in turn might then arrange to make authorities in Peiping aware of availability of IC's reps.

Suggest you talk to SYG and perhaps Romulo along these lines.

ACHESON

[1] See telegram 303, November 9, noon, to Seoul, p. 1115.

793.001/11–950 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET HONG KONG, November 9, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received November 10—10 : 14 p. m.]

1048. Many anti-Communist Chinese in close touch with political situation on mainland express view that although Korean intervention on large scale by Chinese Communists is underway there is still considerable element of bluffing Chinese Communist policy and that firm stand by UN will force them pull back. Among means suggested by these anti-Communist Chinese as effective in putting pressure on Peking are: (1) Far more stringent economic warfare to deprive Communists of urgently needed commodities which up to now have been slipping into China in fair volume through Tientsin; (2) heavy propaganda barrage directed at Chinese Communist troops in Korea to encourage defections, (3) strengthening of UN forces in Korea to point where serious setback can be administered overconfident Chinese troops imbued with concept American is "super tiger"; and (4) encouragement guerrilla activity in south and west China. Two further points relative to possibility forcing Chinese Communists back down have been mentioned. One is that they have avoided committing selves publicly to total war by referring Chinese Communists troops as "volunteers". Other is that Chinese Communists have in case of Formosa shown selves capable of halting military move when faced by superior force and turning off propaganda build up. ConGen reports above not as own view but as representative of current thinking of large segment political conscious Chinese.

In accordance Deptel 809, September 22,[1] ConGen has been closely following Chinese Communist press. Increasing scope and intensity of NCNA anti-American campaign past few days inclines us more and more to view that intervention will be on large scale. Chinese Communists are no longer talking of "long term war of attrition" but rather of "turning tide of war, annihilating and repulsing unconsolidated American invading troops and forcing aggressors accept just and peaceful solution of Korean question". (Editorial from *Peking People's Daily* November 6.) USALO continues receive reliable reports (USALO Hong Kong 266 November 6[2]) of heavy troop movements north indicating at very least that Chinese Communists aware of serious risk that war will spread as result their intervention.

[1] Not printed; it requested that special attention be given to reporting all obtainable information from inside Communist China dealing with Communist attitudes and intentions, political and military (793.001/8–2250).

[2] Not printed.

As feeling grows locally that US will be involved for considerable period with Chinese Communist troops in Korea ConGen being approached more urgently by individuals seeking US support for intelligence work or guerrilla activities in mainland. ConGen endeavoring in discreet way learn as much as possible about such agents but maintaining completely noncommittal attitude regarding possibility any US aid.

WILKINSON

795.00/11–1150 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 11, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received November 11—8 : 55 a. m.]

365. Re Embtel 363, November 10 [1] and previous on Sino intervention North Korea, 8th Army states there continued yesterday and last night to be no noteworthy contact with Chinese forces in Eighth Army sector. Altogether four Chinese were captured yesterday, three in 24th Division sector and one in Eighth ROK Division sector. First three stated they came from Sino Communist 40th Army while remaining one stated he member Sino Communist 125th Division which carried as part of Sino Communist 42nd Army. 125th Division and other elements Sino Communist 42nd Army appear to have been engaged almost wholly in Tenth Corps area of northeast Korea.

On basis current information, 8th Army Intelligence carries 54th, 55th, and 56th Chinese Communist "units" in 8th Army sector of northwest Korea. According prisoners testimony, foregoing "units" come from Chinese Communist 38th, 39th and 40th armies, respectively, which said constitutes portion Chinese Communist 4th Field Army deployed in Manchuria. 8th Army Intelligence considers most Sino Communist forces remaining in sector now concentrated mainly north of line running from point south Unsan to point northeast Tokchon. Current reports indicate Sino Communist forces in 8th Army sector continue to assume defensive attitude, digging in and refraining almost entirely from offensive operations.

An army officer with experience in China who questioned numerous Chinese prisoners states they claimed to be surprised to encounter American soldiers. Prisoners asserted they had been told by superiors they being sent North Korea to defend border area from ROK forces and American forces would remain behind so-called "MacArthur line" (which was given much publicity in recent *Newsweek* article). This

[1] Not printed.

seems hardly credible in face propaganda emanating from Peiping.

Air activity yesterday and last night was restricted owing poor visibility with result north-south vehicular activity unobserved. Navy and 5th AF planes clashed with small groups hostile aircraft on five occasions yesterday. One Mig jet was shot down near mouth Yalu River while one B–29 fell southeast of Chongju. Enemy aircraft were observed to disappear into Manchuria.

All bridges across Yalu River have by now been bombed and damaged although some still appear passable.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/11–1150

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward P. Maffitt of the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] November 11, 1950.
US/S/1568

Subject: Korea.

Participants: H.E. Dr. Victor Andres Belaunde, Chairman of the Delegation of Peru
Ambassador Warren R. Austin } United States
Mr. Edward P. Maffitt } Delegation

Dr. Belaunde came in this morning at his request to put what he termed a personal idea to Ambassador Austin. At the outset he stressed that he had not communicated the idea to his Government and would do nothing about it if it was unacceptable to the United States Government. He did not wish to do anything which might weaken or embarrass the United States since his Government was heart-and-soul with the United States, et cetera, et cetera.

Briefly Belaunde's idea was the establishment of a buffer band, say ten miles deep, around Korea's northern borders with the USSR and Manchuria, this territory to be demilitarized, and administered by a special Security Council commission which would include among its members a representative of Red China and a United Nations power friendly to Red China such as perhaps India. He said he had conceived this idea (and had mentioned it last night to General Romulo) as a result of a growing fear which he felt among fellow delegates that the third world war was close.

Belaunde went on to say that the United States should not propose such a step but that he could take it up with the Latin American caucus meeting on Eritrea at 3:00 p. m. with a view to having Ecuador and Cuba pose it to the Security Council.

In passing Belaunde said it was a step forward that the Red Chinese were invited to present their case in the United Nations but that he wondered whether the delegation would come. Ambassador Austin said he had some doubt that they would come. Belaunde said he shared that doubt.

Commenting in strict confidence and on a purely personal basis, Ambassador Austin described American public opinion as being increasingly bitter against the Red Chinese and increasingly opposed to anything which might give them face or recognition. He said that even people who had previously favored the admission of the Peiping regime to the UN in the cause of peace had become disillusioned and were now against the idea. He was extremely doubtful that public opinion would assent to anything that might look like appeasement or concessions to Peiping and he felt that we probably will take the position that nothing can be offered until the Reds withdraw the spearpoint at present menacing the UN forces in Northern Korea. He recounted past American services and help to the Chinese people and pointed out the effect on American opinion of Peiping's ingratitude therefor.

Ambassador Austin said furthermore that anything which appeared to be appeasement or yielding would simply stimulate the enemy behind the Red Chinese to press its puppets onward to ever-expanding aggression. He felt, however, that if the USSR found resolute firmness facing it, it would, as it had in the past, not push an unprofitable venture. He felt that the USSR had blundered and had over-reached itself in extending its political sway over the tremendous Chinese land mass, and was uncertain what to do next. The Korean adventure had turned out badly for its North Korean puppet and the Tibetan invasion was having unfavorable repercussions for its Peiping puppet. The USSR itself was still not committed to war and could keep Korea from becoming the beginning of the third world war. In fact, Ambassador Austin said he would not be surprised if, faced with an unyielding UN attitude in Korea, the USSR turned up with some attempt to negotiate its way out of its difficulty.

Dr. Belaunde said it would serve equally well if the creation of a buffer band should be proposed by the USSR.

Ambassador Austin added another reason why he felt it might be unwise to proceed with Dr. Belaunde's idea at this time. He said that the Red regime in China is not Chinese but Russian, not republican but dictatorial, and not popular but un-Chinese. Anything the United Nations did to give "face" to the regime would offend the people of China and set them against us.

Dr. Belaunde thanked Ambassador Austin for his frank expression of views and said that he would forget his idea. Ambassador Austin

said not to forget it because it was good in principle and might be useful sometime when and if it could be carried out without the great cost which he had outlined above.

Dr. Belaundo left after saying that he would not do anything at this time and would never do anything on the matter against the advice of Ambassador Austin.

EDWARD P. MAFFITT

895B.00R/11–1150 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, November 11, 1950—6 p. m.

2474. Pls approach Bevin urgently question UK financial support UN relief rehabilitation program in Korea. Matthews, UK Treasury Expert GA informed USDel GA that matter likely be given high level UK govt consideration Monday. Subject will arise in GA within next three or four days.

Total cost period covering calendar year 1951 and possibly extending into early 1952 approximately $200,000,000 to $250,000,000. US likely to offer 65 percent which is over half again as great as its percentage contribution to the regular UN budget. Any US contribution would of course be subject to Congressional approval.

Prompt and generous UK contribution to program for 1951 essential to set standard for other UN members and safeguard UN nature of Korean rehabilitation action. To this end Dept earnestly hopes that UK willing to contribute something in excess of its proportion of contribution to the regular UN budget which is 11.37 percent or about 23 million in term 200 million dollar Korean program. As UN Resol. permits contribution in currency, supplies, and services, major part of UK contribution could be made in form of supplies and services secured in UK with other supplies secured in sterling area.

Proposal of UK contribution something in excess percentage of regular contribution not unreasonable considering that UK contributed $610,000,000 or 16.95 percent of total UNRRA operating costs at time when UK economic position much less favorable.

If cannot persuade UK make contribution suggested above serious danger failure whole program as UN activity with consequent far reaching political ramifications. These ramifications would touch upon Congressional and popular attitude toward future economic assistance to foreign governments through all channels. Congress and people would find it difficult to understand failure of major free countries with which we have history of strong economic and defense financial assistance to support UN in a common program of Korean relief and rehabilitation.

Financial arrangements under which contributions will be made are now being discussed Committee 5. Contributions will be voluntary in sense will be conditioned on necessary parliamentary authorization and of appropriation funds all participating governments. With this reservation, US believes arrangements should establish as firm as possible commitment all participating governments to come through with contributions in agreed upon percentages. This very much in interest of governments like US and UK with record of meeting financial obligations to protect them from carrying unexpectedly large share program cost due failure other governments to carry through. Suggest you urge Bevin support US position in this respect as well.

Your negotiations should take account of fact may be complicated by UK realization that they will be expected to make substantial contribution toward Palestine Refugee Program requiring total of $50,000,000 in 1951 of which US may contribute between 50 to 60 percent, these figures not to be divulged at this point. If issue is raised you should emphasize that in US opinion success of both programs essential to effectiveness of UN both in political and economic field.[1]

ACHESON

[1] A similar message was sent to Paris in telegram 2683, November 17, for the Ambassador to convey to French Foreign Minister Schuman (320/11–1750).

330/11–1150 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

PLAIN
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 11, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received November 11—8:31 p. m.]

809. Re Chinese Communist delegation to SC. Following is text cable received from Chou En-lai dated Peiping November 12, received Lake Success 3:55 p.m., November 11. Cable addressed to UN SYG for transmission to President SC.

"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Trygve Lie's cable 36.[1]

In the name of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China I make the following statement to the UN SC:

We cannot accept the invitation decided upon by the 520th meeting of the SC on November 8, 1950, because according to the contents of the resolution this invitation deprives the representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China of the

[1] Text in U.N. document S/1898.

right to discuss in the SC the most pressing question to the Chinese People, namely the question of armed intervention in Korea, and aggression against China by the US Government, and limits the right of the Chinese representatives to the discussion of the special report of the so-called UN Command which was engendered illegally by the SC under manipulation of the US, during the absence of the two permanent members, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and whose report is therefore not only one-sided and malicious, but also unlawful, and absolutely cannot be taken as basis for discussion.

In the name of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China I hereby propose to the UN SC that, in view of the gravity of the two questions of armed intervention in Korea and aggression against China's Taiwan by the US Government, and in view of the fact that the two questions are closely related, it would be most proper that the SC combine the discussion of the accusation raised by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China against armed aggression on Taiwan by the US Government and discussion of the question of armed intervention in Korea by the US Government, so that the representative of the People's Republic of China, when attending the meeting of the SC to discuss the 'complaint against armed aggression on Taiwan' may raise at the same time the accusation against armed intervention in Korea by the US Government."[2]

Department pass Praha, Moscow, Belgrade, Praha 2, Moscow 5, Belgrade 4.

AUSTIN

[2] Telegram 808, November 11, from New York, not printed, transmitted the text of another cable from Chou En-lai to Trygve Lie informing him that a nine-member delegation led by Wu Hsiu-chuan, head of the Soviet and Eastern European Department of the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China, would proceed by air to Lake Success via Praha and London on November 14 to attend the Security Council sessions on the PRC complaint of aggression against Taiwan (330/11-1150). The Chinese delegation did not arrive in New York until November 24.

795.00/11-1250 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 12, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received November 12—1 p. m.]

368. Re Embtel 365, November 11 and previous on Chinese intervention, 8th Army reports there still virtually no direct contact with Sino forces yesterday or last night in 8th Army sector. Only two Chinese prisoners, both from Sino Communist 38th Army were captured yesterday. Poor visibility rendered ineffective aerial observation last night of vehicular traffic from Manchuria.

8 UN jet aircraft engaged 12 hostile Mig jets yesterday over northwestern Korea. 2 enemy jets were shot down and a third damaged, with no loss to UN aircraft. UN aircraft engaging in operations along south bank Yalu River past four days have been heavily fired at by anti-aircraft guns emplaced on north bank of river. Yesterday one or more of 4 UN aircraft shot down by ack-ack were hit by fire coming from north bank of Yalu. Yalu bridges continued to be hit by UN aircraft yesterday. However, most of these bridges still appear to be operable.

DRUMRIGHT

IO Files

Minutes of the Thirty-eighth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET NEW YORK, November 13, 1950—9:15 a. m.

[Here follows a list of those present (49).]

1. *Korean Relief and Rehabilitation (A/1493, A/C.2 & 3/L.32, Deptel 497)* [1]

Mr. Lubin recalled that the original draft resolution adopted by the Economic and Social Council [2] on this subject gave the Unification Commission certain responsibilities. The Assembly's overall Korean resolution had simply stated that the Commission should assume such responsibilities in the field of rehabilitation as should be decided. In connection with this provision, the Economic and Social Council had recommended that the Commission should be empowered, first, to determine the Korean authorities with whom the Agent-General should have political relations; second, to determine the areas in which the Agent-General should operate; third, to determine when he should start operations; fourth, to recommend such policies on rehabilitation as would enable it to carry forward its own responsibilities in the political field. Chile had now submitted amendments to the Economic and Social Council resolution, which was before the Joint Second and Third Committee, which amendments were designed to broaden the powers of the Unification Commission. We opposed these amendments since their adoption might mean that the Commission could become the directing force in the relief operations.

Mr. Lubin called the Delegation's attention to Deptel 497 containing possible United States amendments to the resolution. The real question

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[1] Not printed.

[2] See footnote 1 to the minutes of the U.S. Delegation meeting of November 9, p. 1110.

was how much pressure we should put on other delegations to maintain the original draft as adopted by the Council. The Chilean amendments represented an attempt on the part of the countries on the Unification Commission to get power over expenditure of the funds for the relief and rehabilitation program.

Mr. Dulles thought this matter was very important. However, it was also such a complicated affair that he doubted whether an off-hand Delegation judgment would be particularly helpful. Mr. Ross quite agreed that the situation was very complex. At the same time, the Economic and Social Council resolution had been discussed by the delegation before and had been approved in general. The present difficulty was created by the Chilean amendments and raised the question whether we should submit amendments of our own. He believed that it was better to stick to our guns on the Council resolution and to defeat the Chilean amendments rather than to put in counter amendments.

Senator Sparkman said his own thoughts were along the same lines as those expressed by Mr. Ross. We should move every stone possible to insist that the compromise accepted by the Council be adhered to in the Assembly. He did not believe we would get very far by offering counter amendments. Mr. Lubin thought the real question was whether we might not save time by submitting amendments. He personally felt we should fight for the original resolution as adopted by the Economic and Social Council. While the Department also preferred the original draft, these amendments had been suggested in order to formulate a compromise upon which the majority could agree. Senator Sparkman pointed out that the United States might find itself in a minority in insisting upon the original draft resolution. We would either have to have a "knock-down and drag-out fight" on this issue, or accept some sort of a compromise.

Mrs. Roosevelt thought nothing could be done except to leave it to Senator Sparkman as to the best thing which could be worked out in the circumstances. Senator Sparkman said that he had hoped that Senator Lodge would be present so that together they might confer with Romulo and Santa Cruz who were leading the move for amendments in this regard and point out to them the practical matters involved, including problems with the Congress. He planned to do this in any event but he had thought that Senator Lodge might lend a helpful Republican flavor to the conversation. There was no further discussion of this item.

[Here follows a record of discussion on the second agenda item dealing with the Palestine question.]

895B.00R/11–1350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

LONDON, November 13, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received November 13—11 : 22 a. m.]

2775. Embtel 2770, November 12.[1] Responsive Foreign Minister's request I called at Foreign Office this morning and reviewed more fully Department's position re contributions Korean relief and rehabilitation.

I said our estimate of total contributions required would probably run to between 200 and 250 million dollars; that my government was prepared to increase its percentage to about 65 percent; that we feel, in accordance UNRRA precedent, UK might be willing increase its percentage to about 17 percent, which could be in form of supplies and services from UK and sterling area; and that although we recognized most commitments must be ratified by a Parliamentary body we hoped in interests of US and UK all other nations prepared to offer contributions should make their commitments as firm as possible in order that we would not be left holding the sack. I stressed fact what we do in Korea will influence future relations with China and that US, more than other nations, being unjustly accused of being aggressors in Korea we were prepared contribute more than our share to prove we do not wish dominate Korea but help it to recover.

Bevin expressed view from SEA point of view we should move fast in resolving this problem. Were we able to do so it would have tremendous effect on Asiatic mind. He felt total relief figure might be made somewhat higher and that UN percentages could then continue to be used as guide in Korean relief and the same results obtained. He wanted avoid situation where only large nations carry burden and certain other nations contribute only resolutions. Gaitskell[2] thought best procedure would be to have special committee of UN deal with problems as in case of technical assistance fund. He said Younger well qualified represent British at Lake Success this matter. Bevin and Gaitskell both felt it highly important from point of view Soviet propaganda other UN countries contribute. They felt participation by Iron Curtain nations highly unlikely. Bevin particularly stressed desirability of getting substantial contribution from

[1] Not printed. It reported on a brief discussion between Bevin and Ambassador Douglas on the evening of November 12 wherein Mr. Bevin informed the Ambassador that the U.K. Government had the question of financial support for Korean relief under discussion but had reached no conclusions. (895B.00R/11–1250)

[2] Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Gaitskell.

India pointing out Nehru realizes he may soon be in difficulties and may wish seek protection UN umbrella. He hoped proper handling Korean relief problem might result in establishment of precedent for future cases where UN relief might be required. He said before he could make definite commitment UK contribution he would want full report from Younger on basis of which he could go to Cabinet. He thought he might do a little preliminary spade work in certain foreign capitals where it would do the most good.

In leaving I reviewed what I understood to be British position, in which Bevin concurred, about as follows: UK views with sympathy US position but cannot commit itself today. It believes proper place for negotiations is in UN. Important as many other countries as possible contribute. Especially important India and other Asiatic nations participate. In absence anticipated failure Soviet bloc contribute, other nations should increase percentage contributions. Above all necessity for early action realized.

DOUGLAS

795.00/11–1350

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR OLIVER FRANKS
DATED 13TH NOVEMBER, 1950

Before receipt of your telegram we had been giving some consideration to a proposal on the lines mentioned by you. My colleagues and I feel that in view of Chinese intervention in Korea we should endeavour to find a solution to the Korean problem which will not result in the hostilities dragging on in Korea with the ever growing risk of extension beyond Korea.

2. What we have in mind is a fresh approach to the problem which might be embodied in a resolution in the Security Council on the following general lines:—

The Resolution

(*a*) would recall previous resolutions and declare that with the destruction of the great bulk of the North Korean Armed Forces and the extinction of any threat from the North Korean Authorities the military campaign may in fact be regarded as at an end and that there need now be no delay in proceeding with the urgent task of political and economic rehabilitation;

(*b*) would propose the establishment of a demilitarised area from which all foreign forces and combatants would be withdrawn. This area would extend from a United Nations line (running roughly from Hungnam in the East to Chogju in the West) to the existing Manchurian-Siberian-Korean frontier;

(*c*) would declare that this demilitarised area is only to be set up for a temporary period pending the unification of the whole of Korea;
(*d*) would reaffirm the objectives of the United Nations already declared in relevant United Nations resolutions and reassure the Central People's Government of China that there is no intention to damage their interests.

3. The resolution would also have to provide for the assumption by an appropriate United Nations body of responsibilities in connexion with the demilitarised area and define those responsibilities. It would, in addition, provide for appropriate association of the Central People's Government of China with this United Nations machinery.

4. One problem of particular difficulty would be the disposal of the North Korean Government and the remnants of the North Korean Forces in the proposed demilitarised area. The best solution would be for the North Korean Armed Forces to lay down their arms and for a suitable *de facto* temporary administration of the area to be set up under the aegis of the United Nations, though admittedly this solution may be difficult to achieve.

5. From the political point of view the suggestions outlined above may afford us a means not only of terminating the whole Korean campaign earlier and thus liquidating a costly military commitment, but also of satisfying the Chinese that the United Nations have no aggressive intent against Manchuria. The most important difference between our proposals and the suggestion made in your telegram is that we omit any reference to territory lying north of the Yalu. To include any such reference would, in my view, defeat the whole object we have in mind as it would be inevitably rejected by the Chinese.

6. It can be argued that these proposals involve a unilateral concession on the part of the United Nations. This is however not the case. They will also mean that the Chinese themselves will have to withdraw their considerable forces already disposed in the proposed demilitarised area, thus giving up positions of considerable military advantage to them. I feel that this aspect of the problem, together with the grave risks inherent in the present situation of an extension of hostilities beyond Korea needs special emphasis. Indeed, the successful conclusion of the campaign on hitherto accepted lines seems no longer possible without serious risk of the conflict spreading.

7. From the military point of view there are considerable advantages in the proposals outlined above:—

(1) The United Nations line from Hungnam to Chongju is some 150 miles in length as compared with the North Korean frontier line which is some 400 miles long.
(2) Whatever line is eventually held, the threat of frontier guerrilla activity will remain, but if United Nations Forces occupy up to the

Korean frontier, advantage of air power cannot be taken without violating Chinese territory.

(3) It is doubtful whether, without striking at air targets in Manchuria, General MacArthur has sufficient forces to fight his way to the North Korean frontier and maintain himself there once he reaches it.

8. If the State Department are receptive to these suggestions, we shall work out a draft resolution on the basis of the first thoughts explained in paragraphs 2 to 4 above, and hope that the State Department will do so also so that the two drafts can be compared. Meanwhile, as you will have seen from my telegram to New York I have asked the United Kingdom Delegation to try to secure postponement of discussion of the resolution already tabled. If the United States Government like the proposal of a demilitarised area outlined above, it is important that there should be no further general advance by United Nations forces beyond their present positions.

9. Please consult Mr. Acheson and telegraph reply urgently. It is easy to see many objections to the course which we are proposing and no doubt detailed working out of the proposals may present difficulties. Moreover, it is possible that the Chinese would reject any such proposal. If they do so, their rejection can only mean that they are bent on making mischief.

WASHINGTON [, undated.]

795B.00/11–1350

Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense (Murdaugh)

SECRET WASHINGTON, 13 November 1950.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Interview between Secretary of Defense Marshall and Ambassador Muccio.

Present: Secretary Marshall
Ambassador Muccio
Mr. U. A. Johnson, Department of State
Captain A. C. Murdaugh, USN

Ambassador Muccio thanked Secretary Marshall for the excellent cooperation received by him in Korea from all military personnel with whom he had dealings. Conversation then turned to the question of UN rehabilitation plans for Korea and Mr. Muccio noted the tendency to progress too fast and to attempt to raise the Koreans too quickly from a primitive and agrarian economy.

Mr. Muccio described the effective work of KMAG. Through previous training efforts there now exist in the Korean Army a large number of officers whose primary loyalty is to the Government and not to any individuals. This is the result of discarding the older Japanese-trained officers.

Secretary Marshall expressed satisfaction at learning of this and discussed briefly the problem of a country the size of Korea supporting a ten-division army as proposed in current studies on the subject. While an establishment of that size would be necessary for the immediate future after the cessation of hostilities, he considered it essential not to overburden the country with too large an army which would either collapse or become a threat to civil authority and to financial stability of the country. The problem therefore to be solved is to adjust downward from ten divisions to some plan which can endure for a long time involving perhaps a truly strong quickly-mobilized unit on a national reserve basis. Our own National Guard does not become available quickly enough and should not be a pattern.

A. C. MURDAUGH

693.95/11–1350

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 13, 1950.

Subject: Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea

Participants: Mr. Erik Boheman—Swedish Ambassador
Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State

I asked the Swedish Ambassador, Mr. Boheman, to call at my office today.

I asked him if the Swedish Ambassador (Mr. Hammerstrom) is now in Peiping. He replied that he was. I asked if he seemed to have anything like normal relations with the Chinese Communist authorities; Mr. Boheman replied that his relations were normal, "within limits". I told the Ambassador that we had been wondering whether there might not be some advantage in asking Mr. Hammerstrom to sound out the Chinese Communists in order to determine just what their present intentions are and to discover whether there is in fact any basis for a peaceful settlement of any of their legitimate anxieties. I then outlined for him the principal ideas in the attached memorandum.

Mr. Boheman said that he would be glad to inquire of his government, but that he felt that Stockholm would be sympathetic to the idea.

I told Mr. Boheman that we had tried a discreet direct contact without result and that the Swedish Government might wish to explore the situation initially on its own account before leaving any indication that they were in touch with us. Otherwise, the effort might run into a simple rebuff. Mr. Boheman agreed to pass this suggestion along. I then gave him a copy of the attached memorandum.[1]

[Annex]

It is of the utmost importance that every effort be made to ascertain the actual intentions of the Peiping authorities with respect to their present intervention in Korea.

The most serious possibility is that the present move is part and parcel of an overall Communist offensive, coordinated from Moscow, in which the Korean affair is only an incident of much larger plans. The facts that the Chinese Communists are moving more or less openly in Korea, are giving considerable assistance to Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China, have selected this particular time to move into Tibet at the risk of straining their relations with India, and are making menacing propaganda moves toward Nepal, suggest that the Korean matter is not merely a local action. The additional fact that Chinese forces (although of Korean ethnic origin) have been moving into Korea over the past year suggests a longer-range purpose than can be related to immediate incidents in Korea.

If, on the other hand, there is any possibility that Peiping is acting in the Korean matter out of any real fear that UN forces have any designs against China or out of fear that China's legitimate interests in frontier matters (including hydro-electric power) may not be adequately safeguarded by the UN, it is important to ascertain that fact and to arrange the necessary negotiations and machinery to deal with such matters peaceably.

So far as the United States is concerned, we have no hostile intentions toward the China mainland, we are acting in Korea wholly within the framework of United Nations policy, have no interest in any military position or bases in Korea for U.S. forces, and see no reason why China's legitimate interests are not wholly reconcilable with the United Nations policy in Korea.

On the other hand, the United States will not accept a pattern of Communist aggression in Asia and must insist that the Peiping authorities act peaceably to avoid a result which will only bring disaster to China and comfort only to the Soviet Union.

[1] Mr. Acheson had previously shown the attached memorandum to President Truman and secured approval of it and the suggested plan of action involving the Swedish Ambassador in Peking (795.00/11–1350).

795.00/11–1350 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 13, 1950—5 p. m.

498. Eyes only for Austin. Purpose of this telegram is to set forth certain views regarding strategy and tactics of handling Korea case in UN as case proceeds. This in no sense qualifies splendid manner in which you have handled Korean case. All of us here are in complete and cordial support.

Unfortunately we do not have at this time reliable and accurate picture of ultimate Chi objectives beyond those set forth Deptel 478.[1] Further, the immediate military situation in Korea is unclear pending further action by UN forces to clarify the situation on their own front. Under these circumstances we must play our hand in UN with some care in order to achieve to extent possible objectives which we seek to obtain from UN consideration. These objectives are:

First. To localize Korean conflict to bring about withdrawal of Chi forces and prevent a world war or general engagement between Chi and UN forces with all consequences that might follow. This requires careful handling both politically and militarily. On political side it means that if Chi position is subject to satisfaction and negotiation (for example, fears concerning their frontiers or equitable allocation hydro-electric power) our handling of case should leave room for such negotiations. It may be, of course, that Peiping Moscow aggressive conspiracy has its roots so deeply in worldwide strategy that negotiation of local Korean issues is not possible.

Second. To obtain maximum support from international community for such action as may be required under various contingencies if character and extent Chi intervention change for worse. To mobilize this international support, it is essential that it be fully understood that our objectives are UN objectives, that we have no hidden purposes of our own, and that we are ready to take advantage of any opportunity to obtain UN settlement or to prevent general war with Chi Commies.

A *Third* objective is of course to bring about final settlement Korean question along lines Oct 7 resolution.

General MacArthur has pointed out that the initial mission of UN forces in Korea has been largely accomplished, i.e., to repel the aggression of NK forces against the ROK. Chi aggressive intervention appears as a new factor. From a propaganda point of view it would be comparatively simple to brand Chi Commies with aggression through the SC–GA procedure and thereby be free to take action against Commie Chi. Our overall national interest does not permit us

[1] Same as telegram 2344, November 6, 2 a. m., to London, p. 1050.

to move readily down this path. We must be careful that our political posture not run substantially ahead of the situation on the ground in such a way as to commit us to heavy involvements in Asia which we should try to avoid. Just as we pretended that Moscow was not committing aggression in NK so it may be necessary for us not to overplay the new factor of Chi intervention in NK until our combined political-military interests require that action.

Whether we should push six-power resolution through to a vote at maximum speed or let Council proceedings move forward more slowly depends to some extent upon the development of planned military operations in Korea. Also affecting tempo of SC consideration is question whether overwhelming majority SC will be dissipated by differences on bringing six-power resolution to vote before Chi Commies reach New York. If latter are obviously stalling, this question probably does not arise.

Similarly, we should not now make firm public commitments that Korean case will be brought immediately to GA following anticipated Soviet veto. Although present prospect is that we shall want GA consideration, we should not at this stage consider that as inevitable consequence of Soviet veto in SC. If Chi Commies position is "negotiable", we may find some move on their part or by other governments to find some negotiating procedure which is more flexible and which moderates prestige and face considerations more than full GA debate. For example, some conciliation procedure analogous to efforts of six "neutrals" in Berlin case in 1948.[2]

Above considerations arise from facts that risk of general war has been substantially increased in recent weeks and that our political and military decisions must be related to fundamental and overriding considerations of a worldwide sort and not merely to the precise issues of this specific case. Maximum firmness and energetic action are required but the main effort must be directed toward the principal challenge and not to diversive secondary threats.

ACHESON

[2] For related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. II, pp. 867 ff.

795.00/11–1350 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1950—7 p. m.

2487. Pls discuss with FonMin at earliest possible moment grave problem confronting UN forces in Korea in use by enemy of Manchuria as privileged sanctuary for forces which are in fact attacking

UN forces in Korea itself. See excerpt from Austin's statement to UNSC on Nov 10.[1]

This problem arises in two respects. First, ground forces can move into Korea and supply themselves from bases and lines of communications which are largely sheltered by immunity of Manchuria. Secondly, enemy aircraft (nationality not always known) operate from Manchurian fields, dash into Korea air space to strike UN air and ground forces and then fly to safety behind Manchurian border a very few minutes away.

UN Commander has strictest orders about violations Manchurian territory in addition to orders to use extreme care in operations near the frontier itself to insure that hostilities are restricted to Korea. This determination to play according to the rules imposes most serious handicap in face of an enemy which is willing not only to break the rules themselves but to exploit proper conduct UN forces.

US Govt is determined to do everything possible to localize conflict in Korea. This is illustrated by rigorous instructions to Commanders as well as by efforts made to adjust accidental intrusions into Chi territory by offering compensation for damages, etc. It is obvious, however, that the abuse of Manchuria by the enemy could easily impose an intolerable burden upon UN forces operating lawfully and properly on UN missions in Korea. Therefore, US Govt wishes to inform Govt to which you are accredited that it may become necessary at an early date to permit UN aircraft to defend themselves in the air space over the Yalu River to the extent of permitting hot pursuit of attacking enemy aircraft up to two or three minutes flying time into Manchurian air space. It is contemplated that UN aircraft wld limit themselves to repelling enemy aircraft engaged in offensive missions into Korea. We believe this wld be a minimum reaction to extreme provocation, wld not itself affect adversely the attitude of the enemy toward Korean operations, wld serve as a warning, and wld add greatly to morale of UN pilots who are now prevented from taking minimum defense measures and for whom in case of bomber pilots it is impossible under existing conditions to provide adequate air cover.

FYI we are not asking the concurrence of Govt because we believe the highly limited application of hot pursuit doctrine in this situation wld turn upon milit necessity and elementary principles of self-defense, but we think it important that Govt be notified of the problem. Pls telegraph any reactions niact.[2]

ACHESON

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[1] Ambassador Austin in his statement had referred to reports received on the afternoon of November 10 concerning the shooting down of two U.N. B–29 bombers by planes operating out of Manchuria (U.N. document S/PV.521).

[2] This telegram was repeated for action to the Embassies in Canberra, Ottawa, and Paris, and for information to the Embassies in Ankara, Moscow, New Delhi, The Hague, and Wellington.

357.AD/11–1350 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, November 13, 1950.
[Received November 13—11 : 17 p. m.]

372. Deptel 303 November 9. Acting Principal Secretary UNCURK Coates came to Embassy 10 November with telegram from Cordier directing former ascertain through Embassy or Sebald CINCUNC's intentions or wishes re IC resolution of November 7. Embassy duly took up matter with CINCUNC who has now replied at present state hostilities it not believed UN representatives now in Korea could render any additional services. CINCUNC went on state "remaining in a standby position to take advantage of any improvement in military situation which will tend to insure a secure hold of UN on North Korea and especially its northern borders, seems at present to be the limit of potentiality of IC's action. It is rendering a great service under most adverse conditions in continuing its state of preparedness."

Coates being informed of CINCUNC's views as stated above. Matter discussed this morning with Australian delegate Bullock who, as from tomorrow, will be only UNCURK representative remaining in Korea during next few days. Bullock has evinced desire proceed Pyongyang area tomorrow for brief investigatory trip. Embassy facilitating travel.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/11–1450 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY SEOUL, November 14, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received November 14—4 : 30 a. m.]

381. Re Embtel 374 November 13.[1] There continued yesterday to be little direct contact with Chinese Communist Forces in 8th Army sector. Three Chinese were captured who stated they from 119th and 120th Divisions of Chinese Communist 40th Army. All three were stragglers, having been separated from constituent elements for past three or four days. There mounting evidence North Koreans being used as protecting screen for Chinese Communist Forces. This tactic reportedly causing dissatisfaction and low morale among North Korean Forces.

Poor visibility hindered aerial observation last night of communications routes to Manchuria. However, some traffic was observed mov-

[1] Not printed.

ing in both directions with largest concentration (perhaps 100-odd vehicles) moving south from Chongjin toward Onyangni.

No enemy aircraft were observed over northwestern Korea yesterday. UN planes continued attacks against Yalu Bridges.

DRUMRIGHT

793.00/11–1450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Burma (Key) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

RANGOON, November 14, 1950—noon.
[Received November 14—9:09 a. m.]

314. Refintel November 9.[1] Following is estimate Chinese intentions and attitude Korea given me November 13 by high Foreign Office source based on recent report received from Burmese Embassy Peiping which was read to me:

1. Chinese Communists prepared to go "to any length" to aid North Koreans.
2. Any Security Council invitation discuss Korean settlement considered meaningless by Chinese Communists unless hostilities first cease, previous failure UN forces halt 38th Parallel reinforcing this belief.
3. Chinese Communists fostering mass hysteria based on alleged US intention invade Manchuria.

Soviet propaganda to which Chinese Communists seem be giving credence along following main lines.

1. War will spread into Manchuria.
2. If Manchuria invaded Soviets will support Chinese Communists under Russo-Chinese treaty.
3. Soviet Air Force considered superior to US Air Force.
4. It is believed US cannot spare any further ground forces for use in Korea.
5. A US dominated Korea will always constitute threat China.

Summarizing, Burmese Embassy Peiping believes Chinese Communists will not hesitate extend fullest military aid North Korea even if necessary going beyond "Indochina pattern" mentioned mytel 284, November 1.[2]

Department pass Moscow. Repeated info Moscow 7, New Delhi 15.

KEY

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[1] Not printed. It transmitted the information contained in telegrams 1124 and 1128 from New Delhi, received at 11:13 p. m. and 11:23 p. m. on November 7, pp. 1093, 1095.

[2] Not printed.

795.00/11–1550

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald)[1]

TOP SECRET Tokyo, November 14, 1950.

Subject: General MacArthur's Concept of the Korean Campaign.

Participants: General MacArthur
Ambassador Sebald

In response to my question regarding his concept of the Korean operation, General MacArthur said that his immediate objective is to destroy the bridges across the Yalu River in order to isolate the area between the present line of the UN Forces and the border. He said that he had given orders to his forces, and particularly to the Air Forces, that the border must be scrupulously observed, an order which is the object of considerable resentment on the part of many Air Force officers who complain that Communist planes use Manchuria as a sanctuary from which they operate and to which they retreat when convenient. Furthermore, the Manchurian side of the border contains many anti-aircraft batteries which are employed against UN aircraft. As part of the air campaign, the General said that orders have been given to destroy as much as possible of the built-up areas between the present UN front lines and the Yalu River, thus obviating any possibility of the Communist Forces living off the country.

With regard to Communist China, General MacArthur said that he was glad to learn of the proposed resolution calling upon Communist China to withdraw its forces from North Korea. He said that beyond this it would appear that little can be done by the UN under present circumstances, and that it looks as though the UN has now reached an impasse in so far as Communist China is concerned. He hoped that in view of Communist China's refusal to attend the discussions in the UN ("a slap at Soviet Russia by the Chinese"), the UN would refuse to receive Communist Chinese representatives to discuss Formosa. General MacArthur said that it would be a mistake, in his opinion, to allow the Chinese Communists to dictate as to what they would or would not discuss in the United Nations.

Concomitant with the destruction of the bridges, as previously mentioned, General MacArthur said that every effort is now being made to build up the supplies for the UN Forces preparatory to an all-out offensive designed to drive the Communist Forces across the Yalu

[1] This document was forwarded by Mr. Sebald to Assistant Secretary of State Rusk under cover of a letter dated November 15, not printed, which was received in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs on November 24. A manuscript notation on the source text indicated that the memorandum was seen by Mr. Acheson.

River.[2] The UN Forces would, of course, stop at the boundary. If this can be accomplished during the next several weeks and before the river freezes, General MacArthur feels that the Korean campaign would be at an end. Should the planned operation fail and the Communist Forces continue to stream into North Korea from Manchuria, however, he saw no alternative, from a military point of view, to bombing key points in Manchuria. He said that if this should become necessary "the fat would be in the fire", because such operations would, in his opinion, bring about a counter-move by Soviet Russia. Such counter-move, he felt, could only lead to a spreading of the war and he therefore hoped that it would not be necessary to resort to such drastic action.

General MacArthur expressed the opinion that the entry of Communist China into the Korean war was largely motivated by the Chinese themselves, and that such entry is merely one more manifestation of what he termed "Chinese imperialistic aspirations". He said that he is convinced that Communist China undertook the North Korean operation, the Tibetan invasion, and assistance to Ho Chi Minh on its own responsibility, and that Soviet Russia, despite its satisfaction derived from action parallel to its own objectives, has remained in the background. General MacArthur said that there is no evidence available that Soviet Russia is taking a *direct* part in the Korean war. While, admittedly, the materiel being used by the North Koreans and Chinese Communists is of Soviet origin, the General believed that the North Koreans and Chinese Communists have paid for such material either in cash or in kind.

General MacArthur felt that if his military operations, as envisaged above, are successful, the Korean campaign will be at an end. He expressed the opinion that the Chinese Communists would then feel that they had demonstrated their desire to be of assistance to the North Koreans, and had also proven to the world their ability to engage in a first-class war. He explained the late date of the Chinese assistance by saying that the Chinese Communists had not thought it necessary previously to enter into the war, as they had believed that the North Koreans would drive the UN Forces into the sea. It was only after the Inchon landings that it became apparent that something must be done. In consequence, considerable time was lost in the complete reorientation of the center of gravity of Chinese military force, requiring the shifting of Chinese armies and supplies from Central and South China to the northeast.

W. J. SEBALD

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[2] In the daily teletype conference held on the morning of November 14, officials of G–2, Tokyo, stated that the U.N. offensive, originally scheduled to begin on November 15, had been postponed due to logistic difficulties (DA TT–4011).

Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 81/2

Memorandum by the National Security Council Staff[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, November 14, 1950.]

DRAFT

INTERIM REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

1. The National Security Council has reviewed the situation created by the intervention of Chinese Communist forces in Korea. It has had an opportunity to consider National Intelligence Estimate No. 2[2] and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff circulated to the Council on November 10, 1950.[3]

2. It is of the utmost importance that the real intentions of the Chinese Communists be ascertained as soon as possible. To that end, the National Security Council recommends to the President the following courses of action pending the completion, as a matter of urgency of a Senior NSC Staff Study of the alternative courses of action open to the United States:

a. Continue military operations in accordance with current directives.

b. Intensify covert actions to determine Chinese Communist intentions.

c. Political action should be continued in the United Nations to insure that a solid and overwhelming majority of Members demand the prompt withdrawal of Chinese forces now intervening unlawfully in Korea and support the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly of October 7, 1950.

d. Other available political channels should be used to ascertain Chinese Communist intentions and, in particular, to determine whether there is any basis for arrangements which might stabilize Sino-Korean frontier problems on a satisfactory basis.

e. The missions assigned to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, should be kept under review, but should not be changed for the present.

3. The United States should meanwhile develop its plans and make its preparations on the basis that the risk of global war is increased.

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[1] This memorandum was prepared in accordance with NSC Action No. 378 taken at the 71st NSC meeting on November 9 and was circulated by the Executive Secretary of the NSC for its consideration. For further action, see the memorandum by Mr. Lay dated November 30, p. 1262.

[2] November 8, p. 1101.

[3] See the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated November 9, p. 1117, and footnote 4 thereto.

795.00/11–1450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

THE HAGUE, November 14, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received November 14—3:31 p. m.]

722. I discussed substance Department's 583 of November 13[1] Stikker who expressed greatest concern possible consequences our planes operating across Manchurian frontier. Said provocation undoubted and there could be no quarrel legal propriety proposed action hot pursuit for limited flying time into Manchurian air space if attacked, but wondered frankly whether would not lead all-out war Far East. Said as I knew, CPG expressed fears real purpose behind UN intervention Korea was desire part US maintain permanent military base Korea and attack CPG. I asked if he thought this feeling real or merely professed and he said while undoubtedly it exaggerated propaganda purposes was satisfied CPG fears real although obviously based no good grounds.

Said Chinese who threatened action 38th parallel and then done nothing and same again 40th parallel but who intervened on "voluntary basis" when UN troops approached close to frontier would certainly take—no matter how ill-founded premise—incursion UN fighter craft across frontier after strong statements hostilities would be restricted Korea as further indication aggressive designs US.

Stikker also professed concern possibility the more UN and specifically US forces might be pinned down Korea time when the situation so grave and these forces badly needed form hard core Europe.

Stikker made one very pertinent point when he inquired whether decision pursue attacking planes across Manchurian border was purely US decision or whether it UN decision. I replied it obvious any such authority could not be obtained over Russian veto SC but unable give any other particulars.

Stikker stated his latest information was there were 500,000 Chinese troops Manchuria addition 160,000 North Korea.

When I asked him whether his opinion Chinese policy with regard Korea dictated by Soviet Union, he replied felt it undoubtedly coordinated Russia but believed decisions being taken Peking.

CHAPIN

[1] Same as telegram 2487, November 13, 7 p. m., to London, p. 1144.

793.00/11–1450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, November 14, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received November 14—4:30 p. m.]

716. ReEmbdesp 440 August 31[1] and Depcirtel 148 November 11.[2] Netherlands FonOff has made available substance two telegrams dated November 11 and 12 from Chargé Peking. These present analysis of Chargé re Chinese Communist intervention in Korea and may be summarized as follows:

November 11 cable:

CPG intervention primarily influenced by fear US aggression, particularly US aims re Manchuria which CPG seems compare with pre-war Jap policy. This attitude discussed at some length new Chinese news agency. Chargé comments that, in principle, he believes this CPG fear real. On other hand, because this exaggerated by CPG, he expresses reservation that alleged fear being used as pretext for anti-US propaganda purposes.

He believes long term CPG aim Korea establishment really independent Korean state which would not be threat China. Primary CPG prerequisite could be demand that it be allowed discuss this view on status Korea in SC. (FonOff comments that what CPG really after is full UN membership.)

Short-term aim protection Chinese frontiers. Chargé believes they would be satisfied with 50 mile border zone free UN troops. Says argument for justness latter claim (1) fact that CPG did not intervene immediately upon UN crossing 38th parallel, (2) actual resistance began only when UN forces approached Yalu river, (3) Chinese troops suspended their resistance after repulsing UN troops some distance from Manchurian border. On other hand, Chargé observes opposing argument fact that Chinese planes have been operating behind UN lines from Manchurian bases. Nevertheless, believes CPG wishes avoid hostilities with UN troops, providing latter remain outside 50 mile zone. Actually that zone has now been created as result CPG intervention, yet intervention force composed alleged "volunteers" enabling CPG disclaim all responsibility. Chargé acknowledges "possibility remains that intervention may be part prearranged Sino-Soviet strategy" (FonOff comments that it believes latter "too complicated" to be likely).

November 12 cable:

Chargé comments SC invitation to CPG and most recent Peking propaganda trends give him another impression about three arguments (set forth above), that CPG strategy may possibly be intended

[1] Not printed.

[2] Not printed. It requested certain missions to establish a regular channel with the Foreign Ministry in order to secure intelligence on Communist China's political and military intentions in hopes that this would overcome the gap caused by lack of American representation in mainland China. (793.00/11–1150)

as trap for UN air force and planes with aim being extending conflict into Manchuria. By this, fiction of US intervention and aggression could be upheld. Furthermore CPG would be able rally full support Chinese people which interestingly enough Chargé describes as "still doubtful now." (Latter at variance with Netherlands FonOff thinking, because it has always contended Mao regime enjoyed popular support.)

Furthermore, extension of US action into Manchuria would give CPG opportunity appeal all other "people's democracies" that China now victim of aggression. (FonOff comments that such appeal would be useless because no "people's democracies" would come to aid CPG unless Soviet Union so instructed.)

Chargé gives little credence British MA report that there are half-million Chinese Communist troops massed along Manchurian border and 160,000 actually in North Korea.

Report concluded with Chargé urging greatest caution particularly that no UN forces should enter Manchuria thereby giving Mao strong rallying point.

CHAPIN

795.00/11–1450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, November 14, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received November 14—7 : 09 p. m.]

1023. Embtel 1013 November 13.[1] Devotion of entire back page of *Pravda* November 13 to blatant announcements and attempted justification of Chinese intervention in Korea followed by one column quoting three leading Chinese newspapers on same subject today, gives domestic readers and western world clear indication extent Chinese "volunteer" effort. It is possible that this theme will be featured by Communist propaganda (secondary of course to WCPP) during period pending participation Chinese Communist representative in UNSC meeting on Taiwan aggression and that this represents Soviet propaganda build-up for initial Chinese Communist appearance at UN. Although whole Communist propaganda structure is based on twin false assumptions that, first, US started Korean war and is aggressor, and second, that US real aim is to invade Manchuria, effectiveness of "big lie" in Communist controlled areas well known and objectives this campaign deserve study. Obvious that while first assumption above has been trumpeted by Communist world since outbreak Korean war, second is relatively recent, receiving attention with publication here November 5 of "Joint declaration Chinese democratic parties".[2]

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[1] Not printed.

[2] See footnote 2 to telegram 1124 from New Delhi, received at 11 : 13 p. m. on November 7, p. 1094.

As to implications this publicity re question of whether Chinese in fact intend to engage maximum resources in NK this time, while Soviet attitude may seem ominous, we are still inclined feel that CPG is not in fact inviting war with US and UN and in support this view offer following comments:

1. Chinese Communist Government has not yet made any formal statement, to our knowledge, committing itself to defense of Korea. Emphasis thus far has been on service of "volunteers". While the nature of this type intervention misleads no one, in realm international relations it retains significance and CPG has not chosen to go beyond this. It provides CPG with way out if UN is not intimidated by implied threat of large scale Chinese intervention and resolutely proceeds with mission in Korea. Despite ominous undercurrent in both "joint declaration" and November 11 statement by MFA representative,[3] CPG still retains degree freedom of action.

2. Strikes Embassy that both documents targeted as much for domestic consumption as for impact abroad. We do not believe Chinese people want foreign war or can regard without apprehension at this time prospect of war with US; certainly CPG must take strong steps if it is determined to sell idea. Degrees of opposition, antipathy and support can best be determined by reaction to statements such as those already issued. But caution of CPG reflected by fact that November 11 statement made by unidentified official, not Chou En Lai himself. And although "joint declaration" signed by all parties, no names of party leaders appeared (at least in Soviet press). In society where names of individuals carry much weight, thus far we know of no top rank CPG official who has publicly carried ball.

3. Publicity describing Chinese "volunteer" participation Korean war probably aimed at least in part at WCPP to furnish justification for intervention and possibly to establish model of approved method "fighting for peace".

4. Without minimizing present and potential danger of Chinese full scale intervention, we note that Soviets, who also share border with Korea, have given no publicity to participation Soviet "volunteers" in Korean war. This points to probability that Soviets are using Chinese for catspaws insofar as practicable but that Soviets still unwilling touch off World War III prematurely. If CPG continues be careful not to commit itself, it appears likely magnitude Chinese intervention will depend upon degree force exerted by UN and ROK and that CPG will not pour huge numbers troops into Korea indefinitely.

[3] The text of this statement is printed in U.N. document S/1902. It acknowledged the presence of Chinese volunteers in Korea and indicated that the Government of the People's Republic of China saw no need to hinder such efforts to aid the North Koreans. The statement pointed to French voluntary efforts to aid the American colonists during the American Revolution and, more recently, to American and British volunteers who fought on behalf of the Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War. It went on to call for withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea as a step toward a peaceful settlement there and condemned the United States for launching a war of aggression. Finally, it supplied a lengthy list of U.S. Air Force overflights and attacks in the area of Northeast China between August 27 and November 10, 1950.

5. Appears possible that present Chinese threat represents final Soviet effort salvage something from its gross miscalculation in ordering NK aggression on ROK. Seems doubtful that CPG, which did not come forward to assist NK when UN forces occupied only corner of South Korea, or when Inchon landing made and appearance strong Chinese forces might have halted UN advance at 38th parallel, would now decide on basis sober military estimate to enter fray all out. Despite their truculence and bombast, it appears to us here that Chinese Communists have scarcely proceeded far enough with their economic and social reform and development programs in China and with consolidations of their nationwide strength and popularity as a party, to plunge their country into a war against the most formidable array of opponents in the world today. If CCP has learned anything from Soviets, its leadership must be aware that risking its existence without better than fair chance of success is contrary to interests and normal strategy world Communist movement.

6. This raises question of how far Soviets want CPG to go at this time. In absence indications requiring revision Embassy estimate of Soviet intentions, we are reluctant assume Soviet yet prepared precipitate World War III. If this conclusion still sound, we feel that amount and number unofficial and semi-covert assistance to NK by Chinese "volunteers" (actually highly trained, well equipped and supplied regular troops), will probably depend on: first, their chances of preserving extensive area in NK for operations; second, on degree UN determination eliminate this intervention. Parenthetically, Embassy recalls relative success of ROK forces in reducing NK guerrilla activity below 38th parallel prior to June 25 and believes that major burden of driving Chinese forces from hinterland below Chinese frontier should be assumed by ROK army, which should be expanded as rapidly as practicable to cope with this task.

7. It is clear that continued use of Chinese territory for military operations (including AA fire on UN planes over Korean territory, air bases, and for movement military supplies) directed versus UN forces, presents UN with provocative and trying problem. From legal standpoint, we assume CPG will claim that no violation Korean sovereignty involved, as CPG recognizes NK and crosses frontier at latter's invitation (analogous to Allied position in Greece).

KIRK

795.00/11–1450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Canada (Woodward) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

OTTAWA, November 14, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received November 14—8:49 p. m.]

150. In absence of FonMin Pearson I called on Under Secretary Heeney this morning and left with him *note verbale* as instructed Deptel 95 November 13 [1] regarding use by enemy of Manchuria as

[1] Same as telegram 2487, November 13, 7 p. m., to London, p. 1144.

sanctuary for forces attacking UN forces in Korea. After reading *note verbale*, Heeney said this serious military development had been foreseen by Canadian Government which recognized its inevitability and gravity. For this and other reasons Canada had been anxious to give Chinese Communist regime firmest assurances no UN or US ambitions respect to China. Such assurances to be offered by some third power, possibly India, to which Chinese would give credence.

Henney stated Canadian Government would recognize justification of hot pursuit enemy aircraft across Manchurian border and would find this limitation placed upon UN forces admirable restraint, although he did not discount altogether future possibility of further military action beyond border. Heeney wished same restraint could be shown in all our dealings with China at this critical moment, obviously reference to presentation our case UN.

WOODWARD

357.AD/11–1450 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, November 14, 1950—8:22 p. m.
[Received November 14—8:49 p. m.]

825. Re instructions to certain Embassies (TS reference telegram Deptel 2487 to London, received USUN 5:15 p. m., November 14),[1] Canadian and Australian delegations upon instructions their Governments approached USUN today for clarification. Riddell (Canada) said note left by Woodward not clear in two respects:

(*a*) Whether action indicated had already been taken or was contemplated;
(*b*) If latter were case, was it contemplated action might be taken without further SC action. Woodward being unable to answer these questions, Riddell instructed to get answers from us.

Later in afternoon Sir Keith Officer (Australia) called on Gross requesting comments on message, particularly in light of prior discussions (mytel 806, November 10).[2] Sir Keith said he could understand tactical military requirements but was concerned lest action foreshadowed in reference telegram might lead to bombing Manchurian targets. Sir Keith expressed hope "provocative actions" could be avoided at least until Chinese Communist delegation arrived NY and we have further opportunity to ascertain their viewpoint.

[1] Dated November 13, p. 1144.
[2] Not printed. It reported on a conversation between Mr. Gross and Sir Keith Officer wherein the latter expressed the extreme worry felt by members of the Australian Delegation over the question of hot pursuit. (795.00/11–1050)

In light of telephone conversation between Gross and Hickerson, Riddell and Sir Keith were told that matter was being handled elsewhere, that Canadian Ambassador in Washington had been fully briefed by Department, and that American Embassy, Canberra was presumably fully briefing Australian Foreign Office.

Subsequent to foregoing calls, Gross phoned Hickerson requesting authority for USUN to inform Jebb, Chauvel and Sunde and such authority was given.

We think it pertinent to raise question whether broader consultations here might be useful. As Department is aware, many delegations here are genuinely concerned lest military actions be taken unilaterally which may precipitate or provoke expansion of hostilities. Our experience has shown that many of these delegations are more easily led than driven and that (always subject to prudent requirements military security) it will better assure mobilization of UN sentiment behind any military action thought necessary by Unified Command if there is opportunity, within limits of security and of military urgency, to have at least selective consultations. This, we are confident, will better assure accomplishment of tactical considerations outlined in TS Deptel No. 498, November 13.

Some specific questions certain to arise here are:

(1) Will consultations be held prior to military action in or over Manchuria other than type described reference telegram?

(2) Does US as co-sponsor of draft resolution tabled November 10 in SC, intend to request amendment of paragraph related to "inviolate" Sino-Korean frontier or does US interpret this paragraph and paragraph which immediately follows it as authorizing action beyond aerial hot pursuit?

AUSTIN

320/11–1550

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1950.

Subject: Relationship of Attendance of Chinese Communist Delegation at UN re Charge of American Aggression Against Formosa to Matter of Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea

Reference: USUN Telegrams Nos. 808 and 809, November 11.[1]

It is noted that Chou En-lai's two telegrams of November 11 and November 12, respectively, announce the intent that representatives of the Peiping regime will attend the meetings of the UNSC for discussion of the Chinese Communist complaint alleging armed aggression

[1] See telegram 809 from New York, received at 8:31 p. m. on November 11, p. 1133, and footnote 2 thereto.

against Formosa, and, while refusing the invitation to attend the meetings of the UNSC to discuss Chinese intervention in Korea, propose that "it would be most proper that the SC combine the discussion of the accusation raised by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China against armed aggression on Taiwan by the U.S. Government and discussion of the question of armed intervention in Korea by the U.S. Government" thus to enable the Chinese Communist delegation to raise an accusation "against armed intervention in Korea by the U.S. Government".

It is the CA position that the Chinese Communists should by no manner of means be permitted thus to confuse the issue. Their case as regards the charge of American armed aggression against Formosa is most weak and must inevitably fall of its own weight. It is the Moscow line that the hostilities in Korea are the result of aggression mounted by the Republic of Korea against the Communist regime in North Korea in accordance with a Machiavellian American plan. No consideration of the case based on law or logic, even though in the halls of the UN, would alter that point of view. The Chinese Communists, if they testify in the UNSC at all with respect to Korea, should be caused to do so only in connection with UNSC consideration of Chinese Communist intervention. No charge of "American aggression" should be permitted to reach the UNSC with respect to Korea where all of the present trouble has so clearly resulted from actions of the Communist side itself.

Editorial Note

On November 15, Secretary of State Acheson spoke at the Department of State before a National Conference on Foreign Policy; for the text of his statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 27, 1950, page 853. In the course of his remarks, Mr. Acheson attempted to allay any misunderstanding or anxiety existing in the minds of the Chinese Communist leadership that the United States had any ulterior designs concerning Manchuria or the territories and installations along either side of the Yalu River.

Assistant Secretary Rusk spoke before the same audience on the same day along the same lines (text *ibid.*, December 4, 1950, page 889). He emphasized that Chinese interests could easily be accommodated unless the Chinese were plotting the eventual seizure of all Korea, for which the United Nations could not stand.

795.00/11–1550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Canada (Woodward) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

OTTAWA, November 15, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received November 15—8:08 p. m.]

153. Reference Deptel 95, November 12 [*13*],[1] Embtel 150, November 14. After receiving statement and *aide-mémoire* on our position hot pursuit Heeney discussed subject by telephone with Pearson at Windsor. As a result Canadian position stiffened considerably as compared Heeney's reaction yesterday. Ambassador called this morning to hear statement changed Canadian reaction.

Following is text External Affairs draft paper in this regard.

"(1) We agree with the US Government that everything possible should be done to localize the conflict in Korea. We also agree that the abuse of Manchurian territory by the enemy could impose an intolerable burden upon the UN forces operating lawfully and properly on UN missions in Korea.

"(2) The immediate question is whether the burden has not become, or is likely shortly to become, so intolerable as to make it necessary for UN aircraft to pursue attacking enemy aircraft up to two or three minutes flying time into Manchurian air space. The answer to this question involves, of course, the careful balancing of purely military considerations against the political consideration that combat operations in Manchurian air space will increase the risk of the extension of hostilities.

"(3) In order to lessen the risk that the step which the US Govment has proposed would lead to an extension of hostilities and in order to give the Chinese Communists an opportunity to discontinue the present abuse of Manchurian air space by hostile aircraft, we consider it important that, before the UN Commander-in-Chief is instructed to permit pursuit, the Chinese Communist Government should be given a specific public warning, preferably by a representative of the Unified Command in the Security Council, that, if hostile aircraft continue to use Manchurian air space, United Nations aircraft will naturally have to defend themselves in the air space over the Yalu River to the extent of pursuing attacking enemy aircraft.

"(4) Such a warning might also help us to determine the real intentions of the Chinese Communists. If they take measures to stop the use of their air space by hostile aircraft, this will to some extent indicate a desire to limit the conflict on their Korean border.

"(5) It would therefore seem to us to be wise to delay a decision whether or not UN aircraft should be authorized to pursue hostile aircraft into Manchurian air space until reasonable time has been given for the Chinese Communist Government to show whether or not they intend to heed this warning.

[1] Same as telegram 2487, November 13, 7 p. m., to London, p. 1144.

"(6) In spite of the case which could be made under international law that the UN Commander-in-Chief has the right to authorize UN aircraft to pursue attacking aircraft into Manchurian airspace, the Canadian Government considers it most important that no military operations take place outside Korean borders without specific authority from the UN."

Heeney also said that according *NY Times* November 7 Gross has stated UN forces would not take action outside Korea without specific authorization UN [2] and he wondered how this reconciled with present position.

Aide-mémoire to come based on above quoted paper.[3]

WOODWARD

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[2] Telegram 301, November 16, from New York, made the following observation on this point:

"For information Department (re TS No. 153 from Ottawa, November 15), *New York Times* November 7 attribution to Gross was erroneous report of comment made at press conference. Only reference to subject is following, taken from stenographic minutes of meeting with press, held November 6, 1950 at Lake Success:

'Question. Can you tell us, Sir, whether General MacArthur's instructions would call for bombing of those frontier crossing points if he considered that was vital to the protection of his forces?

Answer. Well, the instructions of General MacArthur, as has been reported to the Council, are very explicit and do prohibit bombing of territory outside Korea. Crossing of the frontier or a military action of any kind outside of the boundaries of Korea are prohibited and of course he, himself, has issued those instructions, very strict instructions, to members of his command.'" (795.00/11–1650)

[3] Telegram 156, November 16, from Ottawa contained the following message in regard to the Canadian *aide-mémoire:*

"*Aide-mémoire* mentioned end of Embtel 153, November 15 now received. It follows exact wording of draft paper quoted in 153 except insertion one additional paragraph and word changes as follows: in first paragraph read 'the Canadian Government' for 'we'. In third paragraph read 'Canadian Government' for 'we' and read 'notice in appropriate terms' for 'a specific public warning'. In fourth paragraph read 'notice' for 'warning'. New fifth paragraph inserted reading 'It might also be useful if a representative of the United Nations could establish direct contact with representatives of the Chinese Communist Government with view to discussing border problems arising out of the present situation in North Korea.'

"Fifth paragraph renumbered six and in it read 'the Canadian Government' for 'us', also 'warning notice' for 'warning'. Sixth paragraph renumber 7." (795.00/11–1650)

795.00/11–1650 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 16, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received November 16—10 : 54 a. m.]

390. During past two days contact with CCF in 8th Army Sector extremely slight. One Chinese from 125th Division of 42nd Army was

captured yesterday about 25 miles west of Yonghung, furthest south any Chinese yet picked up.

Aerial observation last night and night before of border traffic impossible. However, during daylight hours yesterday UN pilots flying along on south bank Yalu sighted heavy railway concentrations in Antung marshalling yards, leading to supposition supplies for CCF and North Korea being funneled in from north. On November 14, hostile Mig jets numbering 12–15 dashed across Yalu from Manchuria and attacked B–29s. Two of latter were damaged by what appeared to be projectiles from 20 or 23 mm. cannon. Yesterday only one hostile plane was observed over North Korea at Hoeryang in northeastern sector.

DRUMRIGHT

Editorial Note

At his news conference on November 16, President Truman delivered a prepared statement on the situation in Korea; see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, page 711. Mr. Truman endorsed the six-power draft resolution before the United Nations Security Council and asserted that the United Nations had no intention of carrying hostilities across the North Korean-Chinese frontier. He went on to say that the United States "never at any time entertained any intention to carry hostilities into China. So far as the United States is concerned," he continued, "I wish to state unequivocally that because of our deep devotion to the cause of world peace and our long-standing friendship for the people of China we will take every honorable step to prevent any extension of the hostilities in the Far East. If the Chinese Communist authorities or people believe otherwise, it can only be because they are being deceived by those whose advantage it is to prolong and extend hostilities in the Far East against the interests of all Far Eastern people."

793.54/11–1650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 16, 1950.

Participants: Mr. Millet, French Embassy
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Department of State, NA.

Mr. Millet called with reference to our telegram No. 258[2][1] to Paris regarding the possibility of "hot pursuit" of attacking enemy

[1] Same as telegram 2487, November 13, 7 p. m., to London, p. 1144.

planes across the enemy frontier. He stated that he had no instructions but desired to obtain information as to whether our approach to the French Government was a request for "consultation" or merely "informing" it as indicated by Ambassador Bruce at Paris. I told him that we fully recognized the great interest of particularly those governments which were participating in the military action in Korea in decisions such as this and we had, therefore, immediately informed them of the possibility that a decision might have to be taken giving them an opportunity to express their views if they desired to do so. I said that in reaching our final decision, full weight would be given to any views which they may have expressed. Mr. Millet stated that he had no instructions to transmit any official views to us, but that from the telegrams which had been exchanged between the Foreign Office and Chauvel at New York, it was evident that both Chauvel and the Foreign Office were very concerned over the matter, and particularly over our apparent intent to make the decision without consultation with the UN. He stated that he expected Mr. Chauvel probably would have instructions on the matter by tomorrow.

I informally and personally discussed with Mr. Millet the various possibilities and probable results of various types of formal or informal consultations or action within the UN which might be undertaken to meet the apparent French views. He was unable to suggest any procedure which even he felt would be practicable from the standpoint of meeting the problem. I avoided making any commitment as to our course of action if the views of the French and other governments were unfavorable which was the evident primary purpose of his call.

In reply to his query concerning the newspaper reports of Mr. Rusk's reference in his speech yesterday to a "buffer zone",[2] I said that we would be interested in obtaining the details and developing the thoughts any government might have on this subject, but felt that it would be only equitable and just that such a zone be established on both sides of the Sino-Korean frontier.[3]

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[2] See the editorial note, p. 1158. In his speech, Mr. Rusk made the following statement:

"There has been some talk about a buffer zone. That perhaps they [—the Chinese Communists—] are trying to create in North Korea a buffer zone between themselves and United Nations forces. That is a matter which has come up for some discussion publicly around Lake Success and is a matter about which, undoubtedly, there will be more discussion in the future."

[3] On the following day, Mr. Johnson recorded two memoranda of telephone conversations with Mr. Millet, wherein the latter stated on instructions of his government that the views expressed by him on November 16 in regard to "hot pursuit" were the official views of the Government of France and also that the Government of France strongly supported the suggestion of Mr. Bevin for a Security Council resolution to establish a demilitarized area in North Korea. (795.00/11–1750; 330/11–1750)

795.00/11–1650

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 16, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department of State has learned through reliable channels that the Indian Ambassador to Peiping, Mr. Pannikar, has reported that the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Peiping told him that if United Nations planes bomb Manchuria, they would be attacked by the Air Force of the Soviet Union.

Although you may wish to pass this information to General MacArthur, it is requested that special security precautions be used because of the extreme sensitivity of the source.

Sincerely yours, ACHESON

795B.5/11–1650

The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 16 November 1950.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: With reference to my letter to you of 2 November, regarding general reductions in forces to be deployed by members of the United Nations to Korea, it is requested that due to the fluid situation in Korea, action be held in abeyance pending further study and recommendation by this Department.

With the execption of the Greek and Canadian contingents, the utilization of units already in Korea or projected for deployment to Korea will continue as originally planned. Since operational arrangements to ship to Korea only one Greek battalion and one Canadian battalion, instead of the larger forces (brigades) originally planned, have proceeded to an advanced stage, it would be both difficult and expensive to reverse these actions at this time.

No decision can be reached at this time concerning the diversion to Europe of the remainder of the Canadian brigade until the situation in Korea has been clarified. Meanwhile, the Canadian force will enter a period of additional training at Fort Lewis, Washington, as previously scheduled.

Faithfully yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

795.00/11–1650

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 16, 1950.

Like everyone else, I have been racking my brains as to possible additional steps, however small, which we might take to reduce the risk of hostilities spreading from Korea. I submit the following, allthough they may have been already considered and rejected:

1. Clamping down on statements out of Tokyo Headquarters and lesser commands.

It seems to me that there have been a series of irresponsible and provocative statements attributed to high American officers. Undoubtedly they have served to arouse further the suspicions of the Chinese as to our intentions. I suggest that the Secretary discuss this with General Marshall with a view to the JCS sending out a stiff warning for General MacArthur to transmit to all his subordinate officers.

2. Similar precautions with the Rhee Government.

I suggest a telegram to Muccio asking him to impress upon Rhee and his cabinet the vital importance at this point of avoiding any provocative or belligerent statements on the part of ROK officials.

3. Discuss delicacy of present situation with heads of wire services, papers or syndicates having representatives in Korea or Tokyo.

It seems to me that as a further protection against irresponsibility on the part of American or Korean officers and officials, the responsible American newspapers would be willing to exercise a voluntary censorship on publication of interviews or statements which might further increase the tension.

4. Presidential action at home.

If it has not already been done, it seems to me that the President should ask his cabinet and members of the Congress of both parties, through the Congressional leaders, to exercise extreme restraint in any public statements on Korea or Chinese intervention at this time.

All of the above relate to efforts to avoid any further strain due to unnecessary or irresponsible talk. The following three suggestions relate to efforts to make sure by direct contact that Peiping is left in no doubt as to our non-aggressive intentions provided they withdraw from their intervention:

5. A personal message from President Truman to Mao Tse-tung.

I think we should consider asking the British or Indians in Peiping to transmit personally to Mao Tse-tung a letter from the President which would reiterate our purposes. It should be firm but not minatory in pointing out the consequences of continued intervention on their part. I think it should, moreover, be kept secret at the outset and only published later if some advantage from such action appeared clear.

6. Sending an agent to directly contact Chinese Communist leaders in Hong Kong.

This should be someone who speaks the language, possesses means or contacts whereby he could be put in contact with Peiping agents, clearly an official and not a private go-between and yet not of a rank which would result in publicity. Specifically, I suggest Sabin Chase,[1] who I believe meets all of these qualifications and in whose judgment and discretion I have complete confidence. I think we should consider putting him on a plane in the next few days with a full briefing but no additional tools other than a signed letter from the Secretary stating that he has his full confidence; that he be provided with means of secure communication directly to the Secretary. The purpose would be to reiterate assurances already publicly given and to attempt to ascertain the Communists' true intentions.

7. Direct approach to Stalin.

I think we should consider instructing Kirk that he request an interview with Stalin for the purpose of re-stating assurances already publicly given the Chinese and asking him to endorse and transmit these assurances to Mao Tse-tung. I know this is a difficult problem of approach in order to avoid any appearance of weakness.

Any of the last three steps, before being undertaken, should be fully discussed in advance with the British and our other principal allies.

[1] Chief of the China Branch, Division of Research for the Far East, Department of State.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met from 3 to 6:30 p. m. on November 16 with debate continuing on the draft six-power resolution. No voting action was taken. For the record, see U.N. document S/PV.523.

357.AD/11–1450 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 16, 1950—6 p. m.

Gadel 116. Urtel 825, Nov 14, last para. As indicated by Deptel 2487, Nov 13, to London and certain other posts, Dept fully recognizes justified interest and concern particularly those govts whose forces participating in action in Kor over mil decisions of Unified Command which might entail possibility of extension of area of hostilities and will continue to keep such govts informed, as far as possible in advance of taking such decisions, in order that they may express their views to which full consideration will be given.

With respect to second question, view of Dept that six power draft res of Nov 10 must be considered as a whole and therefore, affirmation of policy of holding Chi frontier with Kor inviolate must be interpreted in relation to preceding para which calls upon CC to withdraw forces now in Kor, and subsequent para which calls attn to grave danger which contd intervention by Chi forces wld entail for maintenance of this policy. It wld appear difficult to assert that CC cld continue indefinitely to claim protection afforded by one section of res without accepting corresponding obligations of other sections.

ACHESON

795A.00/11–1650 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, November 16, 1950—6 : 24 p. m.
[Received November 16—6 : 54 p. m.]

835. Limb, Korean foreign minister, expresses strong hope that we will confer with him before reaching any decision on question of buffer area in Northern Korea along Yalu River. His Government is concerned by frequent rumors of such a formula.

AUSTIN

320/11–1650 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 16, 1950—7 p. m.

Gadel 118. FYI and comments following is text of msg from Bevin to Brit Amb copy of which delivered to Dept Nov 14. FonMin's pro-

posal receiving urgent and earnest consideration by Dept, but do not believe suggestions of this type shld interfere with or delay consideration of present six-power draft res.

[Here follows the text of the message from Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks dated November 13, page 1138.]

Any similar proposals put forward by other dels shld be promptly transmitted to Dept. While not commenting thereon, by questioning you shld develop concepts behind such proposals. Questions shld include such details whether any neutral strip wld be equally applicable to Chi side of frontier, who wld administer neutral zone, basis of possible acceptability to Chi Commies, whether it wld provide base for continued existence of rump NK regime, etc.

ACHESON

330/11–1650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, November 16, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received November 16—7 : 35 p. m.]

1231. 1. Bajpai today handed me following excerpt from telegram just received from Panikkar, Indian Ambassador to Peking:

[Here followed the message from Panikkar stating that the Chinese delegation to discuss the Formosa issue before the Security Council had left on November 15 and was due in New York on November 19. Panikkar understood that the delegation had been given wide powers to discuss Korea also, provided that the whole question of Korea was taken up and not just MacArthur's report. Panikkar stated that the Chinese were anxious to settle the Korean question but only on the condition that they were parties to the settlement. His impression was that they would be agreeable to a settlement through discussions held outside the Security Council in view of their firm belief that the original resolution on Korea was invalid because of Chinese and Soviet nonparticipation. Panikkar also understood that the delegation might be willing to discuss informally with the representatives of other powers, including the United States, issues of a general nature.]

2. Bajpai said that he was giving me this without comment because:

(*a*) He had lost confidence in Panikkar and;
(*b*) He did not want US Government to misunderstand motive in passing this along. GOI was not trying to bring pressure on US to come to understanding with Peking and did not know whether such understanding was possible. Nevertheless, GOI was still anxiously hoping some development would take place which would forestall another world war. This telegram was so different from others which have been received from Panikkar that he was hoping China was commencing have more sober thoughts about possibilities of third war.

3. Bajpai told me in utmost confidence that telegraphic instructions were being sent to Panikkar instructing him, in case Peking appears to be taking more friendly attitude than it has assumed since launching Tibetan campaign, again impress upon Communist China that no great powers have designs against it and express hope it will refrain from pursuing policies which may lead to war. He said Panikkar had been informed it would be useless deliver this message unless attitude Peking was more friendly than it had been during recent weeks.

Department pass London. Repeated info London 49.

HENDERSON

330/11–1750

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 17, 1950.

Subject: Probable Consequences of Carrying UN Hostilities into Manchuria

Ref.: CIA Memorandum November 9, 1950 for NSC

CA finds itself unable to accept the opinion expressed in the final paragraph of the reference memorandum that "action by U.N. forces to attack troop concentrations or air fields north of the Yalu River, or to pursue enemy aircraft into Chinese territory would not increase the already substantial risk that the situation may degenerate into a general war involving Russia", that such action would "probably materially increase the extent of Chinese Communist reaction in Korea proper [only][1]".

CA's reasoning is as follows:

As set forth in the JIIC report of November 9,[2] there was information indicating that a northward troop movement from the south and east China areas had been under way for the past month, and that it was apparently accelerated in late October, and that "almost all recent information points to a heavy and accelerated build-up of Chinese Communist strength in northeast China". The reference report noted that "Open Communist acceptance of responsibility for the fate of North Korea has also become apparent in statements from Moscow and Eastern Europe in the past few days. . . . The contrast of these statements with Communist Party efforts only a few weeks ago to play down the question of intervention in Korea is

[1] Brackets appear in the source text.
[2] Not printed.

striking. . . . the unreserved nature of the propaganda implies an intent to turn the tide in Korea through an unofficial war by the Chinese Communists." The report admitted that "it still cannot be determined conclusively whether the objective of the Chinese Communists is to tie down U.N. forces in Korea for an indefinite period or whether they are making preparations for an offensive to attempt to drive the U.N. forces out of Korea." It observed further that "The scale of the Chinese military build-up in Northeast China, however, is indicative of a growing military capability beyond any apparent defensive needs, and the increasing belligerency of Chinese propaganda also indicates the beginnings of a campaign to prepare their people for continuing if not augmented support of the North Korean Communists. The risk of war which the Chinese have assumed further raises the question of what commitment the U.S.S.R. may have made to China and at what point the U.S.S.R. would come to her aid, particularly if air attacks on Chinese territory should be made."

The last quoted item from the reference JIIC report has been made the subject of recent comment coming from the Netherlands Foreign Office which has transmitted the estimate of their Peiping office that Manchuria may constitute a trap for UN forces. This same subject is taken under consideration in Mr. Emmerson's memorandum of November 6[3] on Soviet and Chinese Communist intentions in Korea where, pointing to the circumstance that the Chinese Communists have braved the risk of UN bombing of Chinese cities by reason of their intervention, he said that the taking of the risk could mean as one hypothesis that "the Moscow–Peiping axis actually desires us to launch an attack on China which would bring into play the Sino-Soviet treaty, permit involvement of the USSR against Japan and eventuate in World War III".

The military commentator Hanson W. Baldwin, writing under Hong Kong dateline of November 15 (*New York Times*, November 16), while reporting the Hong Kong consensus of opinion that the Chinese Communist objective in Korea was limited to forcing us to fight a war of attrition there indefinitely, commented that "indications are strong that both the Chinese Communists and the Russians are preparing for any eventuality in Manchuria or the Korean area. The most important of these indications is the concentration of military forces now occurring in that area." Taking note of some of the recent Chinese Communist troops dispositions, he concluded that the enemy troops now concentrating in Manchuria were "a very powerful force potentially—by the sheer weight of numbers. How the Kremlin and Peiping intend to employ these hordes will determine the future fate of the world."

[3] Not printed.

Hanson Baldwin's estimate of the gravity of the situation gets support currently from many quarters both in United States and friendly capitals. In general line with that estimate is the quoted comment of Lt. Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer who, in an address yesterday at San Francisco, stated *inter alia* that "Recently catastrophic events in the Far East suggest strongly that the Communist leaders have elected to use military force . . . (and) we are on the brink of, if not already involved in, World War III . . . (and) face subjugation or even annihilation by the Communists."*

In sum, one is bound to conclude from the scale of the military movements undertaken by the Chinese Communists, from the defense preparations they are making at home, and from the violence of their propaganda that they are preparing for major events. How those major events are to be touched off still remains unknown to us. The possibility that the carrying of UN military operations into Manchuria would have been used as a springboard by the Communist side has already been suggested. The JIIC report under mention noted in passing that the USSR has in recent weeks made specific reference to the Sino-Soviet mutual defense treaty. Both the Chinese and Soviet propagandists have put on record their allegation that the United States has used Japanese troops in fighting in Korea.[4] The *New York Times* today reports a new Soviet allegation carried by *Pravda* that Japanese troops are participating extensively in the Korean war, and that a secret military agreement was under negotiation between General MacArthur and the Japanese Government providing for a 30-year occupation of Japan by U.S. forces of three divisions strength, with a tripling of the Japanese reserve police corps now numbering 75,000.

CA reiterates the belief previously expressed (CA Memorandum, November 10, 1950, "Action Respecting Korean-Manchurian Frontier") that the carrying of UN military operations into Manchuria would be attended by a strong possibility that there would be set off a violent political-military reaction which would be detrimental to the UN and U.S. political and military positions alike. CA believes that the relatively minor military advantage which might be immediately obtained by "hot pursuit" of hostile planes across the frontier would be far outweighed by the increased risk—already seemingly grave—of a general war.

**New York Times*, Nov. 17, 1950. [Footnote in the source text.]

[4] The Soviet representative on the Far Eastern Commission had made this allegation at the November 2nd meeting of that body and then released his statement to the press. At the November 16 meeting of the FEC, the U.S. representative (Hamilton) took note of the denials which had been made by the Departments of State and Defense as well as by General MacArthur. For the text of a similar statement made by Mr. Hamilton on November 30, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 11, 1950, p. 936.

795.00/11–1750: Telegram

The Ambassador in Australia (Jarman) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

CANBERRA, November 17, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received November 17—10:48 a. m.]

154. Gist of Deptel 132, November 13 [1] conveyed to Menzies within hour of receipt and notification sent safehand Sydney await Spender on arrival evening November 15. Watt [2] on instructions from Spender this morning gave Embassy tentative thinking with formal reply to follow. Australian Government position re Chinese Communist intervention Korea, pending further clarification objectives, remains in principle as stated Embtel 148, November 11.[3] On other hand government recognizes military situation described Deptel 132 cannot be allowed continue indefinitely. Seeking method avoid precipitate action while producing practical effect deterring Communist Chinese Government from pursuing apparent present course, Australian Government tentatively suggests following procedure:

(1) Further MacArthur report to SC giving full military facts relative Communist action over Manchurian border, if these not already available to SC.

(2) Consideration whether it practicable for SC after considering such report to issue "declaration" citing facts, then "(*a*) deploring breaches international law, (*b*) assuming Chinese Communist Government (not formally associated with operations over Manchurian border) will be fully conscious of need prevent further breaches, (*c*) pointing out UN Forces under heaviest provocation have acted so far with great restraint to own military disadvantage, (*d*) indicating it unreasonable expect restraint continue indefinitely, (*e*) stating if Chinese Communist Government unwilling or unable prevent further misuse its territory, UN Forces in self-defense may be compelled pursue for limited distances into Manchuria any planes attacking them in Korea and seeking refuge over border, (*f*) stressing SC desire limit area of conflict and respect integrity Manchurian border, (*g*) expressing hope Chinese Communist Government will take immediate action insure integrity of border respected from its side".

Watt offered following comments on tentatively suggested procedure:

(1) Any "declaration" must be in form not implying diplomatic recognition Chinese Communist regime.

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[1] Same as telegram 2487, November 13, 7 p. m., to London, p. 1144.

[2] Alan S. Watt, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs.

[3] The Australian Government felt that the intervention of Communist China produced a new situation calling for caution and careful examination. Despite the provocation caused by use of the Manchurian sanctuary by the Communists, the Australian Government felt that the consequences of violation of the Manchurian border by U.N. forces would be so great that it would be best temporarily to ignore this provocation to the extent possible. (743.00/11–1150)

(2) Suggestion of a "declaration" designed avoid possible veto of formal resolution.

(3) Suggestion made in effort devise procedure which while avoiding appearance of ultimatum would have effect of giving serious warning to Chinese Communist Government and might restrain present operations from Manchuria.

(4) If warning were ignored and present attacks continued so that military action of sort proposed became unavoidable, it would be clear all peaceful efforts had been exhausted.

JARMAN

795.00/11–1750

The British Embassy to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR OLIVER FRANKS
DATED 16TH NOVEMBER

I have now considered the memorandum given to me by American Ambassador in London [2] and regret that I cannot endorse the United States suggestion that violation of the Manchurian border may be necessary. To my thinking, the suggestion has potentialities of great danger, for it is likely to result in the very thing which we want to avoid, namely the spreading of the conflict.

You should convey my views to Mr. Acheson as soon as possible. I understand that the Chiefs of Staff are telegraphing to Lord Tedder.

WASHINGTON, [November 17, 1950.]

[1] A note on the source text indicated that this document was delivered to Mr. Merchant's office by Mr. Graves of the British Embassy on November 17.

[2] The memorandum, not printed, was based on telegram 2487, November 13, 7 p. m., to London, p. 1144.

795.00/11–1750

The British Embassy to the Department of State

SECRET

MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR OLIVER FRANKS
DATED 17TH NOVEMBER, 1950

CHINESE INTERVENTION

I regard Mr. Acheson's response as encouraging. In the circumstances I now agree that we should allow the present joint resolution to stand but consider that we should use the opportunity which the debate will offer to interpret the relevant passages in the resolution on

the lines of the suggestions for a demilitarised area outlined in my earlier telegram.

2. What I have in mind is that at a suitable opportunity during the debate Jebb should give a broad outline of these suggestions which he might present as a supplementary interpretation of the resolution and within its spirit. I hope that Mr. Acheson will be prepared to instruct the American representative on the Council to support such a line.

3. The Chiefs of Staff believe that in the meantime the offensive should be held up and are pressing for this through their own channels. I endorse their view. Nevertheless if the Americans feel that it is too late to call a halt now, I would still consider it essential to secure the demilitarisation of the area by the eventual withdrawal from it of United Nations and other Foreign Forces.

4. I am fully conscious that a solution still remains to be found for the other points raised in your telegram. These are being studied and I hope that if the Americans agree to the general lines of our suggestion we can sort these out together.

5. Please see Mr. Acheson again and put these points to him.

WASHINGTON, [undated.]

795.00/11–1750

The British Embassy to the Department of State

SECRET

MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR OLIVER FRANKS
DATED 17TH NOVEMBER, 1950

My immedately preceding telegram.

Chinese Intervention in Korea.

Chinese intentions are unpredictable but it is essential that every effort should be made to ensure that they understand the pacific nature of our intentions towards Chinese territory. I was very pleased to read the wise and statesman-like announcement by the President yesterday which does much to make the position clear.[1]

2. I am proposing to make a statement in the House of Commons designed to secure publicity in China. In it I would try to convince the Chinese that the objectives of the United Nations in Korea are those publicly stated, that we have no ulterior designs and no intentions to violate Chinese territorial integrity, that the implications of Chinese action in Korea are extremely grave, and that while it is

[1] See the editorial note on President Truman's news conference on November 16, p. 1161.

our earnest desire to prevent any extension of the conflict, the decision and the responsibility will lie with them.

3. But the situation is so serious that I think we ought to go further than making governmental declarations and attempt to bring our intentions home to the Chinese through any other available channels. I think it is also important from the point of view of public opinion in our countries that we can be shown to have tried all possible means to make our position clear.

4. It may be possible to make direct contacts with the Chinese Delegation when they arrive in New York and in preparation for this I am strengthening the Delegation by sending Mr. Lamb [2] to New York. But it looks as if the delegation may not arrive in New York for some time and meanwhile the situation may deteriorate. I therefore propose to take the following immediate steps.

5. Though Mr. Hutchison in Peking unfortunately has no *right* of access to the Chinese Government on matters of general policy, I propose to instruct him to try to see Chou En Lai (even at the risk of inviting a snub) or at any rate the highest available responsible official, to convey a statement on the general lines of paragraph 2 above. I do not propose to convey to the Chinese Government an indication of our proposals and ideas for a demilitarised area. If however the Chinese should give any opening to Mr. Hutchison in the course of conversation about future possibilities in the frontier area, I would ask him to enquire from them (as being an enquiry from him personally) whether they had ever given any thought to the idea of a demilitarised area in North Korea and if so whether they would like him to convey any suggestions regarding this to me.

6. I also propose to inform Pandit Nehru of the approach which Mr. Hutchison will be making to the Chinese Government and shall ask him to consider sending instructions to the Indian Ambassador in Peking to make a parallel approach.

7. Finally I propose to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow to inform the Soviet Government, in view of their declared interest in the maintenance of peace, of the views of His Majesty's Government on the gravity of the situation in the Far East. Sir D. Kelly would *not* raise the question of a demilitarised zone.

8. I do not much like Mr. Pearson's suggestion that the Secretary-General of the United Nations might get in touch with the Peking Government since this might detract from the efficacy of the approaches suggested above.

9. I should be glad if you would so inform Mr. Acheson. I am sure that the United States Government will agree with what I am doing

[2] Lionel H. Lamb, formerly Counselor of Embassy and Minister at the British Embassy in China.

as they share our views as to our common objectives (namely those outlined above). In view of our recognition of the Chinese Government we may however be better placed than they to take the initiative.

WASHINGTON, [undated.]

795.00/11–1750

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)[1]

SECRET [TOKYO,] November 17, 1950.

Subject: North Korean Military Action

Participants: General MacArthur
Ambassador Muccio

General MacArthur outlined in considerable detail his conclusions as to Chinese Communist motives in North Korea. These reflected mainly Chinese Communists imperialistic aspirations acting independently of the Kremlin. The General went on along lines similar to those recorded by Mr. Sebald in his Memo of November 14.

The General continued that he was sure the Chinese Communists had sent 25,000, and certainly no more that 30,000, soldiers across the border. They could not possibly have got more over with the surreptitiously covert means used. If they had moved in the open, they would have been detected by our Air Forces and our Intelligence.

The General then went on that he had finally received authorization to knock out the Korean end of the bridges across the Yalu; the Air Force was concentrating on doing so and, at the same time, destroying all resources in the narrow stretch between our present positions and the border. Unfortunately, this area will be left a desert.

The General stated that he is mounting an all out offensive[2] and is certain that the whole area still in the hands of North Koreans and Chinese Communists would be cleared within ten days. Upon attaining our immediate objectives, he plans to:

1. Release all Korean Prisoners of War with the admonition that if any should resume fighting, they will be subject to treatment as irregular forces. The question of the restoration of civil rights to these paroled Prisoners of War, of course, would be a matter for determination by ROK.

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[1] This memorandum was transmitted to the Department under cover of a letter to Mr. Rusk, not printed, which was received on December 4. The letter indicated that the conversation took place on the evening of November 16.

[2] In telegram C–69211, November 18, General MacArthur informed the JCS that the offensive would be launched on November 24; see Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, p. 774.

2. He will take all Chinese Prisoners of War to the border, release them, and send them across the line.

3. As a further means of emphasizing to the world the end of the Korean Military Action, he will, at once, order the Eighth Army back to Japan, leaving the stabilization of the situation to the Tenth Corps, UN National Units, and the ROK Forces.

J. J. M[UCCIO]

795.00/11–1750

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council Senior Staff

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 17, 1950.

Subject: U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to Korea

References: *a.* NSC 81/2 [1]

b. Record of Meeting of the Senior NSC Staff, November 16, 1950, paragraph 2.[2]

The enclosed draft interim report on the subject, submitted by the Senior Defense member [3] in accordance with the agreement at the Senior Staff meeting on November 16, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the Senior Staff at its meeting on Monday, November 20, at 2:30 p. m.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Annex]

NOVEMBER 16, 1950.

DRAFT FOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY (SENIOR STAFF)

INTERIM REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

1. The National Security Council has continued its review of the situation created by the intervention of Chinese Communist forces in Korea. This report is supplemental to the interim report of the Council dated November 14, 1950.*

2. The military operations of the United Nations in Korea are being carried out in accordance with current directives. The resistance by the North Korean forces, fortified by substantial numbers of Chinese Communists, continues. Men and materiel continue to flow across

[1] Dated November 14, p. 1150.
[2] Not printed.
[3] Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter.
*NSC 81/2. [Footnote in the source text.]

the Manchurian boundary to the support of the North Korean troops. Communist aircraft, notably the Russian built Mig–15, continue to engage our forces and to return to sanctuary across the Yalu River.

3. While hoping that the United Nations forces will achieve a rapid success in spite of this, the Council recognizes the possibility that the military situation may result in a request by the Commander in Chief of the United Nations forces for authority to reduce Chinese Communist support by air attack against targets in Manchuria.

4. The Council believes that two major policies should dominate our actions in Korea, one affirmative and one negative.

The affirmative policy is to continue our vigorous support of the United Nations and the consequent development of that organization as the medium through which it is hoped that aggression will be prevented and war eliminated as a human institution.

The second policy is to avoid having the Soviets succeed in involving us in a war with Communist China.

5. The Council believes that the creation of a situation whereby United Nations aircraft would attack targets in Manchuria would increase very substantially the likelihood that we would become involved in war with Communist China and therefore believes it important that all possible action be taken to eliminate the necessity for such attacks by United Nations forces.

6. At the moment the military action of the United Nations forces is going reasonably well and there is reason to hope that even without such attacks in Manchuria the United Nations forces may succeed in driving the Communist forces out of Korea.

7. On the other hand this happy result may not be forthcoming and it may be that the best that the United Nations forces can do, without undertaking air attacks against Manchuria, is to hold the line. Should this situation arise, the Council believes that such a line should be held as long as possible.

8. If, however, the Chinese Communists, through their assistance to the North Korean forces, succeed in causing the United Nations forces to retire, the Council believes that the most serious consideration should be given to a political course of action by the United States, within the United Nations, which would openly and effectively hold Russia responsible for the action in Korea.

9. To hold Russia responsible for this action would be a very grave step. The Council believes, however, that unless the prestige of the United Nations, built up at so much cost in the Korean war, is to be lost, and the cause of peace correspondingly harmed, the United Nations forces cannot accept a military defeat in Korea without making it clear to the world that such defeat is caused by the Soviet Union.

795.00/11–1750

Memorandum by Mr. John P. Davies of the Policy Planning Staff

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 17, 1950.

The Problem

To formulate United States policy with respect to the crisis posed by the present situation in Korea.

Analysis

To be understood, the problems which now confront us on the Korean-Manchurian border must be viewed in the context of the great power confrontation. Only if we have this understanding can we judge wisely the course which we should follow.

The Kremlin's Korean adventure was a symptom of Moscow's dissatisfaction with the previously existing ratio of power between the Free World and the Soviet Empire. It indicated that the Kremlin felt it necessary either to compensate for the gradual but steady advance of power in the Free World or to maintain the dynamics of the Bolshevik movement through further expansion, or both. It was obviously a carefully calculated design. But it failed to take into account the extent of our reaction. Instead of advancing its power position, the Korean adventure had by July begun to pose the threat of a major reverse and by October the reality of this threat was urgent and real. At this point the Chinese Communists moved to save the situation.

Because it is in the nature of the Kremlin to be well forearmed, it was to be expected that the Kremlin might at any time between the commitment of American forces and the Inchon landing have taken up positions along the 38th parallel to insure at least a continuance of the *status quo ante*. It did not do this, nor did the Chinese. Likewise, a natural defensive position at the neck of the peninsula was allowed to fall into our hands. It was not until our forces were near the frontier that the Chinese, not the U.S.S.R., moved with great vigor and decision to counter our advances.

Three deductions are to be drawn from what has been said thus far:

(1) Any action of ours which threatens to advance our power position or reduce the Kremlin's will produce a reaction from the Kremlin designed at least to compensate for its threatened loss.

(2) The Kremlin will be inclined, even at the sacrifice of immediate advantages and increased risks to itself, to create a situation in which our action is taken in a context which can be presented as aggressive.

(3) It will seek, if possible, to cause others to fight its battles for it.

Let us examine these deductions in more detail.

This concept of action and reaction in the power struggle is deeply engrained in Kremlin thinking. It stems from the very roots of Communist philosophy: the conflict between thesis and antithesis resulting in synthesis. In plain language, action to advance our power position must evoke a reaction to redress or advance the Kremlin's power position, thus creating a new situation. This situation may be stabilized (temporarily, of course) through political agreement registering its realities—and implications—from the Kremlin's point of view or, if such an agreement is unacceptable to us, we may be expected to act anew and the Kremlin correspondingly to react. Thus there is never a permanently stable power relationship. The struggle proceeds through a series of phases—action and reaction, perhaps a temporary adjustment, then another phase of action and reaction, always with the possibility that the phases begin to telescope with no intermediate period of accommodation. In this sense the Kremlin considers war inevitable.

It was with this approach that the Kremlin in mid-summer studied the Korean situation and planned its next move. It undoubtedly examined the Korean situation in depth, in terms of the global struggle for power and in terms of an indefinite chain of action and reactions. Thus it must have calculated that its reaction (through the Chinese) would create a new situation—which we could either accept or in which we could act anew. If we accepted the situation created by its reaction, it could be registered in a political settlement, provided that we would pay the price. If we would not, then we could be expected to act anew in an attempt, at least, to redress our power loss.

The Kremlin was not likely again to underestimate what we might do. In calculating what new action we might take, moving the power struggle into another phase, the Kremlin presumably took into account the extreme possibility—a chain process leading quickly to global war. That the Kremlin has nevertheless created this new situation is an indication that it accepts the extreme risk.

While it accepts the risk of general war it does not do so without qualifications. The fact that it and Peiping reacted neither at the 38th parallel nor at the natural defensive line at the neck and that the reaction did not occur until it could plausibly be made in a defensive context, accompanied by charges of our aggressive intent, reveals a Kremlin (and Peiping) concern regarding the mode of its reactions. This stems from deep within Bolshevik strategy—the theory that the capitalist world is "aggressive", that the Bolsheviks are "peace-loving" and that if war eventuates it must be in the context of what can be alleged as attack by the capitalists.

Thus every effort is being made in the present situation to create the atmosphere of U.S.–U.N. aggression and Communist self-defense.

The stage is feverishly being prepared to make any action of ours carrying the struggle into a new phase occur in an aggressive setting, to maneuver us into a politically disadvantageous light, causing others to shrink away from us, leaving us isolated. And so it would probably be in each successive phase.

The Kremlin's acceptance of the risk of World War III is further qualified by a desire to operate indirectly, deviously, avoiding the appearance of Soviet responsibility and, wherever feasible, inducing others to do its fighting for it. The North Koreans having collapsed, it has succeeded in transferring primary responsibility to the Chinese. Whether this was achieved by orders which were obediently obeyed, by coercion, by concessions or whether the Kremlin may even have had to restrain Peiping, we do not know. In any event the Chinese are holding the bag and would undoubtedly continue to do so were the struggle to move into a phase of Sino-American hostilities. The Kremlin is quite capable of remaining nominally aloof from such a new phase, provided that its power relationship to the Free World was not diminished thereby.

So much for background. Let us now examine the immediate problem before us—what to do in the present crisis.

It is possible that the Kremlin and Peiping are bluffing or that either one would welsh on the other, that they will not increase their commitments in Korea, that they will yield before U.N. military action and that we can establish U.N. authority to the borders. They might accept such a situation, accept a major defeat and the consequent serious decline in their global power position. But if they did, they would feel compelled to react elsewhere on a large scale, sufficient at least to compensate for the Korean and Manchurian border reverse.

The bulk of available evidence points, however, to the probability that the Kremlin and Peiping are committed at least to holding the northern fringe of Korea—and that, against our present forces they have the military capability of doing so, the Chinese in manpower and the U.S.S.R. in supplies. If this is so, what then are the alternatives before us?

Course 1

We could try to bring about an increase of U.N. military commitments and seek to drive the Chinese out of the North Korean fringe. Because it is unlikely that others would go along with us on such a plan, we would have to draw from our own existing military reserves for this purpose. Because they are limited and would probably not tip the scales in our favor, it would probably be necessary to call up more men to be committed to Korea. This process could proceed with no foreseeable point of termination even though we mobilized and committed ourselves to a large-scale war for the Manchurian border.

Going to these lengths we might achieve a decision—but we can neither be sure this would be so nor that we would be willing to pay the continuing price of such a course.

Course 2

We could write off Korea, promptly withdraw and prepare for any eventuality. This course would have so disastrous an effect on our prestige and influence throughout the world and so enhance the position of the Kremlin and Peiping that even were we to mobilize fully, it would not compensate for our reverse. Rather it might well create something close to the ideal climate, from the Kremlin's point of view, for the waging of global war. This situation would be little changed were we publicly to accuse the Kremlin of responsibility for what had happened.

Course 3

We could carry the struggle into the next phase by air and naval action against at least South Manchuria. The reaction to this could scarcely be less than overt Chinese intervention in Korea and Soviet Air Force resistance to our air attacks. Given enemy capabilities, it is difficult to see how we could impose a military decision or find an acceptable basis for a political settlement stabilizing the situation. Having pushed the military expression of the struggle one phase further and finding ourselves incapable of forcing submission, the settlement price of our foes would register our failure and therefore exceed what we could in honor yield. But were we to enter this further phase through purely punitive hit and run and blockade tactics and were we able to keep our prestige from becoming deeply engaged, we might hope to terminate this action without reverses, by simply ceasing operations. However carefully these tactics might be planned and executed, it is doubtful that we could avoid becoming caught up in alternately mounting commitments between ourselves and the Soviet Air Force. This would run the real risk of starting a chain of actions and reactions leading quickly into global war.

Course 4

Finally, we could follow the course which we had, by the terms of NSC 81,[1] intended to pursue had we encountered indications of firm Soviet or Chinese intentions to resist a U.N. advance anywhere north of the 38th parallel. We could take steps along the following general lines:

(1) Sponsor a U.N. resolution announcing the conclusion of full scale U.N. military action and calling for (*a*) the demilitarization of

[1] Dated September 1, p. 685.

northern fringe of Korea, (*b*) the withdrawal of all foreign military elements from that zone, (*c*) its administration by a U.N. Commission pending the holding of elections throughout North Korea and the establishment of normal civil administration and (*d*) the phased withdrawal of U.N. foreign forces from Korea;

(2) Immediately begin the retirement of all U.N. forces to a defensive position at the neck of the Korean peninsula;

(3) Cease military air action over the demilitarized zone but elsewhere continue whatever military action is deemed necessary;

(4) Accept in our planning the likelihood that part of North Korea will remain under effective Kremlin control and be a constant threat to the ROK;

(5) Build up the ROK armed forces to a condition where they can within a year hold at the neck of the peninsula anything short of a major Chinese or Soviet attack.

This course would probably halt for the time being the steadily mounting commitments between ourselves and the Moscow–Peiping Axis—a process in which, on the basis of existing intelligence, we are unlikely to be able to outdo the enemy short of pressing phase by phase to the ultimate action: initiating atomic warfare. These tactics would probably not provide a basis for a political settlement recording a clear-cut victory for either ourselves or the Moscow–Peiping Axis. The situation created by such a move on our part would probably represent a power stalemate. It might be registered explicitly in an agreement through the U.N. or tacitly by unexpressed mutual acceptance of the situation.

But what is very important to us is that if the Axis is determined to resume the struggle over Korea on a military plane, it will have to bear the onus of initiating clearly aggressive action. That is something which the Kremlin and Peiping will seek to avoid, something which will probably give them pause. For our part we will not only be in a better moral position to react as drastically as we deem necessary, we will also be in a better military position both in Korea and globally.

Conclusions

The United States should adopt Course 4.

Meanwhile, in view of the increased risk of general war, we should:

1. Expand the military program invisaged in NSC 68 [2] and declare immediately a state of national emergency [and] accelerate the implementation of the policy laid down in NSC 68.

2. Move ahead rapidly with the development of NATO and, if that proves impossible in the immediate future, reexamine our policy regarding Europe in the light of possible general hostilities in the near future.

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[2] The NSC 68 series dealt with U.S. Programs and Objectives Relating to National Security; documentation is scheduled for volume I.

3. Build up Japan to defend itself and increase its military supply production, while securing our lines of communication to Japan and Korea.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on November 17 from 3 to 7:10 p. m., continuing the debate on Korea and the draft six-power resolution, but no voting took place. For the record, see U.N. document S/PV.524.

The Security Council did not again meet to take up the Korean question until November 27, following the arrival of the delegation from the People's Republic of China.

795.00/11–1750 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

HONG KONG, November 17, 1950.—midnight.
[Received November 17—11:06 p. m.]

1164. ConGen has received numerous reports some from fairly reliable sources that Chinese Communists decision to participate in Korean War was made following consultations with Russians. However, ConGen has been unable obtain any reliable information as to extent to which Chinese Communists may have acted under Soviet pressure. It seems reasonable to suppose Chinese Communists intervention not only has Soviet sanction but also was urged by Soviets. Nevertheless there is sufficient identity of national interest between the two nations with respect to Korea, given Marx-Leninist theory which has strong influence on leaders of both countries, that Chinese may have felt they acted in national interest even though from our point of view they are simply promoting aims of Soviet imperialism. There are wide differences of opinion in Hong Kong on this question and so far as ConGen has been able ascertain opinions are based solely on observer's general attitude toward independence or lack of independence of Chinese Communists with relation to Moscow rather than any knowledge of what took place in discussions between Chinese Communists and Russians prior to intervention in Korea. Strong feeling exists among Western Europeans in Hong Kong that Chinese Communists acted independently as result genuine fear that US threatening Manchuria. Those holding this belief counsel compro-

mise in Korea and admission Communist China to UN. At other extreme are violently anti-Communist Chinese who believe every act of Chinese Commnists is dictated by Moscow and advocate strongest possible action against Chinese Communists including support of mainland guerrillas. ConGen believes truth lies somewhere between two extremes but evidence defining exact relationship between Peking and Moscow extremely difficult obtain. Fairly reliable reports have been received on top level Chinese Communists policy discussions but not a single report above rumor category has been received by any American agency Hong Kong on top level Sino-Russian conversations.

WILKINSON

795.00/11–1850 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 18, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received November 18—2 : 02 p. m.]

398. Contact with Chinese Communist forces in Eighth Army and Tenth Corps areas North Korea continued negligible yesterday. Only four Chinese stragglers were made prisoners, two from Chinese Communist 39th Army and two from Chinese Communist 40th Army. ROK Division reports taking 12 Chinese prisoners yesterday from Chinese Communist 125th Division, but this subject confirmation. Eighth Army Intelligence states Chinese Communist units concentrated on line running from Taechon through Unsan and on to Tokchon at east anchor their line. Chinese Communist appears have reserves deployed in Huichon. (Embtel 392, November 17.)[1]

Chinese Communist forces continue remain strictly on defensive giving ground invariably in face US units moving northward. CCF resistance against ROK units is generally more determined. Reports available to Eighth Army suggest CCF in Northwest Korea are not receiving reinforcements or replacements; it also appears supplies and equipment are not coming from Manchuria in any substantial quantities. Unless Chinese intervene much more actively than appears to have been case during past two weeks, main conclusion to be drawn is they fighting delaying action and consequently not committed to all-out intervention. Reasons for delaying action, if it indeed be that, are not clear. It could be to test UN determination in face threat of all-out war with Chinese, it could be to gain time to remove valuable

[1] Not printed.

Supong electrical installations, or it could be to give China more time to make necessary preparations for decisive military intervention, say after freezing of Yalu and Tumen Rivers. We cannot be certain Chinese will not intervene decisively, assumably in accordance with Kremlin desires, but information currently available leads us to believe Chinese intervention will in end fall short of all-out war.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/11–1850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

THE HAGUE, November 18, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received November 18—2:29 p. m.]

749. Foreign Minister Stikker called me to Ministry this morning and reference our discussion (Embtel 722, November 14, 7 p. m.) stated Netherlands Government gravely concerned over possibility "hot pursuit" Manchurian air space being permitted and handed me *aide-mémoire* substance as follows:

(1) Netherlands Government fully shares US opinion grave problem confronting US forces Korea in use by enemy of Manchuria as privileged sanctuary and admits such abuse Manchuria may finally impose intolerable burden UN Forces acting lawfully Korea.

(2) Notes with satisfaction US determination do everything possible localize conflict Korea.

(3) Netherlands Government remains convinced necessary continue efforts arrive understanding Chinese Peoples Government and therefor concerned learn that US opinion may become necessary early date permit UN aircraft defend themselves in airspace over Yalu River. Netherlands Government feels very strongly such measure may easily result extension Chinese aggression which ultimately "must" lead outbreak full-scale war China.

(4) In view its expected grave complications Netherlands Government considers aforesaid measure (hot pursuit) beyond scope authority granted Commander UN Forces. Government feels decision this important matter should not be taken without express approval SC or UNGA.

(5) Netherlands Government opines wording accepted resolution re UN military action Korea not liable interpretation permitting UN aircraft extend their operations outside Korean territory and doubts whether issuance such order within competence Unified Command.

CHAPIN

795.00/11–1850

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET [NEW YORK,] November 18, 1950.

US/S/1579

Subject: Plans for Handling Chinese-Communist Representatives

Participants: Ambassador Ales Bebler,
Yugoslav Delegation
Ambassador Ernest Gross,
United States Delegation
Mr. C. P. Noyes,
United States Delegation

Ambassador Bebler stated that he wanted to discuss with us the problems he would face as President of the Council in dealing with the Chinese Communists. The first question on his mind was how rigid he should be in confining them to the Formosa question during the discussions of this matter. Of course he recognized their Government and did not wish to be put in a position of being hostile to them. He was anxious not to give Malik the opportunity of pretending that this was the case. The question on the agenda is American Aggression Against China, and there would be some justification for the Chinese ranging fairly widely and in particular touching upon the Korean question. He understood that the United States position was that their action in regard to Formosa resulted from the necessity to neutralize Formosa during the Korean operations. He was anxious to know what our views are and to find out from the other Members of the Council what kind of backing he would get for whatever position he took.

Ambassador Gross indicated that we had always had great difficulty in confining discussions in the Security Council rigidly to particular issues. In this case there were probably advantages in letting the Chinese speak their mind, and he was sympathetic to the idea of the Chairman being fairly liberal in his attitude towards efforts to limit the discussion. It was possible, of course, that the Chinese Communists might take such an extreme position that it would be necessary to stop them.

Noyes pointed out that it might be highly useful if the President, in his preliminary discussions—if he had any—with the Chinese Communists, should warn them in fairly strong terms that he would, as President, be forced to call them to order if they insisted on speaking to the substance of the Korean question. It might be hoped then that the Communists would keep within reasonable bounds and that the Chairman could take a liberal approach.

Noyes pointed out that the Chairman might be in a difficult position if he should permit the Chinese Communists to refuse the Council's invitation in the Korean question and yet attain the advantage of saying their full say by disregarding proper Council procedure.

Bebler indicated he would hope to have advance talks with the Chinese Communists in his capacity as President, in order to find out a convenient time for meetings, and to explain to them the general situation.

Mr. Gross indicated that these talks might be most useful not only with regard to procedure but also to obtain some idea what is in their minds with regard to substance. He indicated that in view of the general situation, we were interested in finding out the Chinese Communist views on a number of subjects, in particular the Korean question, and that while we would of course take no initiative, we would have no difficulty in meeting the Chinese Communists informally and talking with them. This would of course in no way affect our position in that we did not recognize their Government, and we should have to take care to preserve our position in that regard.

Bebler raised the question of discussions in regard to Chinese Aggression in the Korean question. He understood the Chinese had refused the Council's invitation to be heard on that matter on the ground that they were invited as the accused to explain only their position with regard to MacArthur's Report.

Mr. Gross indicated that from the technical point of view there might have been some misunderstanding on this question. Mr. Malik's original motion had been too broad. The British motion which was passed might, on its part, have been misunderstood. He thought the true technical position was that the Council had invited the Chinese Communists to be heard in regard to the question on the Council's agenda, i.e.: Aggression Against the Republic of Korea. This invitation should not be interpreted to mean that they are invited to sit at the table for all discussions of that question. What the Council is particularly interested in, obviously, is the situation which had arisen as a result of Chinese intervention. He thought that the President might explain to the Chinese Communists that this was the situation.

Bebler asked what we thought of the idea put forward by Rau some time back that the nonpermanent members might be designated as a subcommittee of the Security Council to consider and make recommendations in regard to Chinese intervention. We discussed the precedent of the Berlin case,[1] and Mr. Gross left the impression with Bebler that this might be a useful instrument. In particular it might help get around the problem created by Dr. Tsiang's Presidency of the

[1] For related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. II, pp. 1197 ff.

Security Council during December. Mr. Gross indicated he thought Dr. Tsiang would step aside on the Formosa question, and he might also step aside when the problem of Chinese intervention in the Korean War is considered. This was less certain. In any case the possibility of following the precedent of the Berlin case, or something along similar lines, was worth considering.

C. P. NOYES

795.00/11–1850

Memorandum by the Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence (Howe) to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 18, 1950.

For whatever use it may be to you I attach a proposal for a revised estimate on the Korean situation. This we are submitting to General Smith for consideration in the Intelligence Advisory Committee. General Smith will then issue it, with whatever revisions the IAC makes, as a national intelligence estimate which can accompany your conclusions and recommendations. This, I believe, is in accordance with the plan we agreed upon.

General Smith tells me he is ready to move ahead on it with the view to submitting a final estimate to you on Tuesday.[1]

FISHER HOWE

[Annex]

TOP SECRET NOVEMBER 17, 1950.

ESTIMATE OF THE MOST PROBABLE COURSE OF SOVIET-CHINESE ACTION WITH REGARD TO KOREA

1. The immediate situation with regard to Chinese intervention in Korea is as follows:

a. The military activity of Chinese troops in Korea so far is not sufficiently extensive to indicate a plan for major operations.

b. Military preparations being carried out in Manchuria and China generally are on a scale that suggest (1) plans for a major operation of prolonged duration, (2) expectations of extensive US air attacks on Chinese, particularly Manchurian, cities.

c. The climate of opinion prevailing in China, including circles close to Party leadership, appears on the basis of extensive reports to reflect expectations of war.

d. Chinese propagandists for the past three weeks have mounted an intensive war spirit campaign centering on the charge that US military

[1] November 21.

action in Korea is aimed at an attack on China and calling for all-out sacrifices to meet and defeat this threat through support of Korea. A sub-theme of the campaign has been American impotence in a war with China.

e. Neither Chinese officials nor Chinese propaganda has thus far committed the Chinese Government to a line of action in Korea. Discussion of preparation for support of Korea has been only in terms of volunteer action.

f. The Soviet press has reported with approval Chinese preparation for support of North Korea. Soviet official statements and Soviet propaganda have identified the struggle of the North Koreans with the Communist cause generally. However, neither source has in any way committed the Soviet Union to any line of action, including support for the Chinese.

g. There has been no suggestion in Chinese propaganda or official statements that the Chinese support of North Korea has a limited objective, either protection of power plants, establishment of a buffer zone on the border, or withdrawal of UN forces to the 38th parallel. In fact, none of these has been mentioned by the Chinese. All Chinese treatment has been in terms of the necessity of bringing about a withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea.

2. While there are no indications regarding the role that the Soviet Union has played in decisions reached by Chinese leaders in regard to Korea, Chinese pressure on the US position supports known Soviet objectives, and, if successful would result in a substantial improvement in the Soviet power position as against the US; while a failure of Chinese pressure on the US would represent a notable worsening of the Soviet power position as against the US.

3. The Soviet Union has made no open commitment to support the Chinese. However, planes drawn from the Soviet air force have been increasingly observed in Manchuria and over Korea. Soviet propaganda has recently called attention to USSR obligations under the Sino-Soviet treaty to support China in case of aggression on the part of Japan or any power directly or indirectly associated with Japan. Soviet officials and propaganda have recently stressed US use of Japanese troops in Korea and US preparations to use Japan as a base for aggression.

4. Chinese activity in regard to Korea follows extensive indications of an acceleration and intensification of Soviet political and military preparations for war with the US and comes at a time when Soviet armed forces are in such an advanced state of readiness for war that offensive operations could be initiated on all appropriate fronts in Europe and Asia without additional warning.

5. Chinese activity in regard to Korea also follows a period of increased militancy on the part of the USSR in its prosecution of its struggle with the US. The releasing of the North Korean aggression

must be regarded as an integral element in this increasing militancy.

6. At no time since 25 June have the Russians taken any steps to diminish the likelihood of US mobilization, which they must regard as one of their greatest dangers. Indeed, they have taken or allowed only actions which would increase that danger.

7. In view of all factors involved, the intelligence organization of the Department estimates the most likely Soviet-Chinese course as follows:

a. Continuation of Chinese-North Korean holding operations in North Korea until Chinese over-all preparations have been completed and until prospects of securing US withdrawals from Korea through intimidation and diplomatic maneuvers have been exhausted.

b. In case of the failure of these tactics, increasing unofficial Chinese intervention in Korea to, if necessary, the point of large scale military operations.

c. Increasing Soviet support of the Chinese in the form of equipment, planes, technical advisers, and, if necessary "volunteers" to the extent required to prevent a Chinese defeat.

8. The intelligence organization of the Department estimates that the situation already existing in Korea and the events likely to follow carry with them grave risks of a general war developing and believe that Soviet rulers have allowed for this possibility and feel prepared to cope with it.

9. The intelligence organization of the Department also feels that the indications of a possible Soviet intention to launch general war, while definitely not conclusive, are sufficiently serious to merit close and constant attention.

795.00/11–1950 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 19, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received November 19—7 : 52 a. m.]

408. There continued yesterday to be virtually no contact between UN and CCF forces in North Korea (Embtel 398, November 18).

2. Chinese were taken prisoners yesterday by US 24th Division but affiliation not yet established. Some vehicular traffic, but not of unusual intensity, was noted behind enemy lines, particularly on roads leading north from Onjong. There was no hostile air activity yesterday over North Korea. However, this morning about 5 : 30 local time single hostile aircraft strafed Sunchon area and dropped three bombs.

[3.] Numerous reports being received Chinese preparing defensive positions on line running from coast north of Chongju to Taechon, thence to Unsan and thence Northeast to point east of Huichon.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/11–1950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, November 19, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received November 19—1 : 21 p. m.]

1051. Bevin's proposal for "fresh approach" to Korean problem to include establishment of demilitarized area (Department infotel November 17, 2 a.m.[1]) presumably will be unpalatable to Soviets. Continuance hostilities engaging major portion US and some UN forces in Far East would seem to be of considerable importance to Politburo in their current world strategy and that they envisage continuance of struggle by "people of Korea" for indefinite period has been theme of all their recent pronouncements re Korea. Further, in general Soviets are disinclined to negotiate losses.

Proposal also on face unacceptable to UN as envisaging less than complete achievement UN objectives Korea, and in implying possible weakness tending encourage Communist enemy.

However, it is manifestly undesirable continue indefinitely commitment UN (particularly major portion US forces) in Far East and advantages which would accrue from effective cessation hostilities Korea should, of course, be given major consideration in determining US and UN attitude.

In any event, it would seem inadvisable, in light of seriousness of risks involved in present situation, to close the door to negotiation and we presumably wish to maintain maximum maneuverability for attainment of an appropriate solution.

Of course, if Bevin's proposal is made and rejected by Commies, such rejection would have obvious advantage of further demonstrating (to those who for one reason or another have misgivings re righteousness of UN cause) the basic Commie objectives and degree of Commie determination to continue operations in Korea.

Obviously if Bevin's proposal is to be voiced, the manner of its handling is of utmost importance. In this connection, my British colleague informs me that he was instructed two days ago to see Gromyko and, in emphasizing British adherence to UN objectives in Korea and

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[1] Not printed; it summarized the information contained in telegram Gadel 118, November 16, 7 p. m., to New York, p. 1166.

British conviction that those objectives do not contemplate violation of Manchurian frontier, to take occasion, if such were offered, to explore Soviet attitude toward demilitarized zone. Kelly added that British Chargé in Peking has similarly been instructed to see Chou En-lai. On grounds that Gromyko would have taken his usual position of inquiring what specifically the British had to propose, Kelly was disinclined to make the suggested approach and was in the process of so informing the Foreign Office when he received a second instruction to delay his representations pending the results of Hutchinson's *démarche* in Peking.

We are apprehensive at this proposed British initiative which seems to us to play into Soviet hands in the same fashion as British talks on this subject last July. The Soviets inevitably welcome any unilateral action which could be interpreted as diminishing US–UK solidarity in that it implies divergence of views between our two governments, and British initiative in this instance can only tend to facilitate Soviet confusion of the issues. We are also unhappy for similar reasons that proposal is to be made by British at Peking, although perhaps some consolation may be had in the fact that representations there might tend to strike responsive chord among Chinese who may not be wholeheartedly in favor of course Chinese Government is now taking, presumably at Moscow instigation. In this connection, while Embassy notes statement Burmese Ambassador (and has been informed similar views are held by Pannikar and Dutch in Peking) that Chinese Government really apprehensive that US intends invade Manchuria, it seems possible to us that there may be some validity in the theory that Chinese authorities are, on the contrary, convinced we do not intend invade and would take increasing comfort in the possibility of their continuing to act with impunity if our intention to held that frontier inviolate should be over-emphasized.

We concur with Department that consideration of Bevin's proposal should not result in postponement or interfere with action on present six-power resolution.

(Unless above information re British instructions to British Ambassador Moscow has also been received through other channels, Department, London and Paris are requested not to reveal his having discussed these matters with me.)

Repeated info priority London 198; priority Paris 210.

KIRK

795.00/11–2050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 20, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received November 20—8 : 56 a. m.]

412. Two Chinese prisoners referred to in Embtel 408, November 19 as taken by the US 24th Division were found on interrogation to be from CC 117th Division. ROK Chief of Staff and G–2 state that during past few days 87 Chinese have been captured in ROK Second Corps area. Good portion of these prisoners are said to be from CC 42nd Army, including lieutenant who asserted he from CC 124th Division. Foregoing ROK reports should be accepted with reserve pending clarification.

Statement in Embtel 208 [*408*] there no hostile air activity 18th over North Korea is erroneous. Delayed report from Navy which conducted operations along Yalu 18th states Navy craft clashed with at least 14 Mig jets, of which 1 was shot down and 3 damaged. Eighth Army states there was no hostile air activity over North Korea yesterday.

MUCCIO

795.00/11–2050

Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1950.

UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA

POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION WITH SECRETARY MARSHALL AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine whether the present mission assigned to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, in Korea should be amended in view of the changed situation which results from Chinese Communist intervention and probable Chinese Communist intentions in Korea.

ANALYSIS

U.S. Objectives in Korea

2. Establishment of a unified and independent Korea. While the objective of the United States and of the United Nations remains the establishment of the unity and independence of Korea, the achieve-

ment of this objective does not necessarily require the military occupation of all of Korea to its northernmost boundaries. The practical elimination of "North Korea" as a defined territory north of the 38th parallel under an organized government, and the present situation in which at least ninety percent of the Korean population is in territory under the control of the UN forces, makes it possible to proceed now with the activities of the new UN Commission for the political and economic consolidation of existing gains. If an area in the North remains not wholly pacified and contains hostile elements of North Korean and Chinese forces, from a political point of view such an area can be regarded as being no different from those more restricted and scattered areas both north and south of the 38th parallel in which guerrilla activity still presents a military problem of pacification.

3. Localization of the Korean conflict. It is in the interest of the United States to avoid action which might entail major military involvement with Communist China or which might lead to general war.

Chinese Communist Intentions

4. The Estimate of Chinese Communist intentions contained in the CIA Memorandum for the President of November 8, 1950, reads in part as follows:

". . . Although the possibility cannot be excluded that the Chinese Communists, under Soviet direction, are committing themselves to full-scale intervention in Korea, their main motivation at present appears to be to establish a limited 'cordon sanitaire' south of the Yalu River . . ."

5. The CIA Memorandum of November 8 further states: "The Chinese Communists probably genuinely fear an invasion of Manchuria despite the clear-cut definition of UN objectives."

6. Intervention in Korea by the Chinese Communists, which we must assume to be at Soviet direction or with Soviet connivance, means the acceptance by the Kremlin and Peiping of risks of a spread of hostilities and of general war. While assuming such risks, the Moscow-Peiping Axis would prefer and probably aims to create a situation which portrays U.S. and UN actions as aggression against China, which commits U.S. forces in indecisive and prolonged warfare, and which still leaves the USSR uncommitted.

7. Actions taken by the United States and by the UN forces must be directed toward thwarting the Kremlin aim of creating the situation described above. If the foregoing analysis of Chinese Communist intentions is correct, it would further our policy if we could win a military success without taking action across the northern frontier of Korea and if we could maintain UN support and Korean coopera-

tion and bring about a political settlement. It is impossible to predict with certainty the effect upon the Chinese of further military advances. If we accept the estimates referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 it would seem logical to couple these advances with some type of political negotiations which would meet the assumed Chinese Communist fears. Naturally, such negotiations should be conducted in such a way as not to suggest weakness since weakness would make the Chinese Communists less willing to accept a negotiated solution. The principle of negotiation from strength applies.

Military Action

8. In the present situation there seem to be three courses of military action, each with variations of degree and character, which should be considered:

a. pursue the offensive with the intention of occupying Korea to the northern boundary from the mouth of the Yalu to the Siberian frontier;
b. establish a limit of advance short of the frontier;
c. withdraw to a defensive line established south of the presently held positions.

9. Under either course *b*) or *c*) above, the CINCUNC should not be precluded from taking such offensive military action in Korea against enemy units north of the limit of advance or line established, as in his judgment would be militarily desirable or necessary. As a political matter, however, the CINCUNC should be in possession of the clearest indication of the mission with which he is charged. As stated in paragraph 2, this mission is not to be considered as concentrating upon the principle of the occupation of territory.

10. It is not believed that total withdrawal from Korea should be considered a practical alternative at this juncture.

11. If course *a*) above can be accomplished speedily with the UN forces now available in Korea and without the necessity for military action across the northern frontier of Korea, it would have the advantage of removing any remnants of a Communist regime from Korea and of restoring the rightful boundaries of the country. In order to determine the political implications of such military action, it would be useful to have answers to the following questions:

i. Except for the area near the mouth of the Yalu, would it be a practical military possibility to hold the entire line of the Korean frontier against Communist penetration and infiltration?
ii. Would the holding of some other line at a distance from the frontier be equally or more advantageous from a military point of view?

iii. Would the holding of such a line be more feasible logistically?
iv. If it is attempted to hold the line at the frontier itself, would there be an increased risk of defeating the objective of localizing the conflict?
v. If an attempt is made to hold the line at the frontier in force and if this should result in the full commitment of Chinese capabilities, is it correct, as indicated in the CIA Estimate of November 8, that the Chinese Communists would have the capability of denying the UN forces the successful maintenance of this position?

12. Course *b*), unless accompanied by the establishment of a demilitarized zone in the area north of the limit of advance, would tacitly accept Communist control of the northern areas of Korea and the continued existence of a North Korean Communist regime. On the other hand, it might provide the basis for a termination of hostilities and permit the ultimate withdrawal of UN troops and the development of adequate Korean defenses to deter repeated Communist aggression.

13. Course *c*) might envisage the line across the neck or a line still further south. This course would presumably be necessary should Chinese forces be increased in such numbers that it became militarily infeasible to hold a defensive line at the present positions.

Political Action

14. The military and political actions taken by the United States are mutually dependent and must be correlated. Political steps should be modified if necessary, in order to obtain maximum support in the UN. Among the alternative actions which might be taken are the following:

a. press for the adoption of the resolution now before the Security Council; when vetoed, press for similar action in the General Assembly;
b. support in the UN the UK proposal for the establishment of a "demilitarized zone" or "security zone" in the area north of the Chongju-Hamhung line with a UN Commission to assume responsibility for this zone and for the negotiation of border problems between the Koreans, the Chinese and the Russians;
c. suggest a modification of the UK proposal to limit such a "demilitarized zone" or "security zone" to an area of from five to twenty-five miles in depth on the Korean side of the frontier, possibly including the whole Northeast province.

15. The methods by which the United States should undertake to determine Chinese Communist intentions and to carry out the political action suggested above, should include not only all facilities offered by the United Nations machinery but contacts with the Chinese Communist regime through friendly governments and private channels.

795.00/11–2050

Memorandum by the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson), to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1950.

Subject: Soviet and Chinese Communist Political Objectives.

On the assumption that the Chinese intervention in Korea has a limited objective, at least for the present, we must be prepared for a combined Soviet-Chinese political barrage intended to shift the issue in Korea to the questions of Chinese Communist admission to the United Nations and of Chinese Communist control of Formosa.

While it is quite likely that until recently the USSR may actually have not wanted the Peiping government in the UN, the Soviets' objective now, again assuming they do not want general war, is probably to get the Chinese into the UN as partial political salvage of their Korean adventure. The prestige of the Communist world would be considerably repaired by UN acceptance of Communist China and the prospect of Communist control of Formosa.

That the campaign has already started on the basis of the bargaining position attained by the Chinese "volunteers", is clear from the Chinese "peace proposals" leaked by the Polish UN delegate,[1] by the Soviet resolution of the Lie memorandum [2] and by Vyshinsky's most recent speech.[3] We may expect the arrival of the Communist delegation on November 24 to step up this political campaign.

There is reason to suspect that the Soviets and Chinese may win considerable support for the concessions they will demand. Not only the UN members, such as the UK and India, who have recognized Communist China, but many others who view with alarm the dangers of a Korean operation involving hostilities with China, would welcome a cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a buffer zone at what they would consider the comparatively cheap price of

[1] Reports had recently appeared in the press that the Chinese Communists might be willing to withdraw from Korea in return for creation of a buffer zone controlled by North Korea south of the Manchurian border, withdrawal of the U.S. Seventh Fleet from the Formosa Straits, withdrawal of U.S. recognition from the Republic of China, and a declaration by the United States that no more aid would be extended to the Chinese Nationalists. (See Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs, 1949–1950*, p. 514.)

[2] Reference is to a Soviet draft resolution pertaining to Mr. Lie's 20-year Peace Program proposed during debate in the U.N. General Assembly. The Soviet resolution, which called for Chinese Communist representation on the Security Council, was defeated. For related documentation, see vol. II, pp. 186 ff.

[3] Reference is to Mr. Vyshinsky's statement before the General Assembly on November 18 in debate on Mr. Lie's 20-Year Peace Program; see U.N. document A/PV.309.

deserting the Chinese Nationalist regime. The Soviets and Chinese Communists may be expected to exploit differences between our friends and ourselves and to keep up military resistance and guerrilla operations on a sufficient scale to give them continued bargaining power.

At some point we may face a decision between continuing an expensive operation in Korea with dwindling UN support or trying to achieve some semblance of a termination of hostilities by tacitly permitting Chinese Communist entry into the UN. The implications of such a decision, apart from domestic political ones, extend to our whole position in Asia and obviously and particularly to the disposition of Formosa.

It would seem, therefore, that, in addition to considering other alternatives of policy in Korea, we should as a matter of urgency analyze for ourselves the factors which must be considered in any political settlement of the type explored above and must attempt to discover what course would best serve the interests of the United States.

795.00/11–2050

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1950.

Participants: Dr. John M. Chang, Korean Ambassador
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, NA

The Korean Ambassador, Dr. John M. Chang, called on Mr. Rusk by appointment at four o'clock this afternoon. Dr. Chang stated that he had just come down from New York and wished to pay his respects to Mr. Rusk and to discuss the latest developments in Korea.

Mr. Rusk asked Dr. Chang what the views of his Government were toward Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. The Ambassador stated that he personally was somewhat out of contact with the situation, although he had recently received the impression from Seoul that his Government did not believe the Chinese were necessarily acting as free agents in intervening in Korea, that the Soviet Union was undoubtedly influencing them to do so and that his Government did not believe that the Chinese would go all out in a war against the West on the Korean question. He thought that intervention by the Chinese Communists more probably represented an effort on their part to test the resolve and determination of the UN in carrying out its objectives in Korea, and that the proper approach by the UN should be one

of stiff and unwavering action against them as long as the Chinese Communists remained on Korean soil. Mr. Rusk remarked that Chinese intentions in Korea might become clearer during the next few days with the progress of military operations.

Mr. Rusk then asked the Ambassador's opinion as to whether control over the Supong dam on the Yalu River might have influenced the Chinese to intervene. The Ambassador thought that this might be a possible factor. He went on to add, however, that his Government would insist that all of the power generated at the dam was Korean by virtue of the fact that the generating stations were on Korean soil, that the dam had been built by Korean labor under the Japanese and that, as former Japanese property, it now belonged to the Koreans. The Ambassador mentioned the possibility that some of the power generated might be reaching Russian installations and that this might be an influence in Sino-Soviet relations in connection with Korea.

The Ambassador then mentioned the fact that he was greatly preoccupied over his treatment at the hands of American correspondents who were consistently bedeviling him in an effort to obtain opinions on any and every subject related to Korea and frequently attempted to trip him up. He added that his Government was greatly disturbed over what he called a "smear campaign" against it in the press and stated that the correspondents who interviewed him were very sharp individuals against whom he had constantly to be on his guard. Mr. Rusk remarked that these tactics were common practice with certain elements of the press in an effort to probe for answers which would make news and that the State Department also was faced with the same problem.

The Ambassador referred to a proposal for a so-called buffer state or zone along the Sino-Korean frontier and asked Mr. Rusk where this idea had originated. Mr. Rusk replied that it appeared first to have been broached, at least in the press, in England and that undoubtedly in trying to analyze the various motives that might be impelling the Chinese Communists to intervene, perhaps the objective of a buffer zone might have been considered as a possible motive and had thus become the subject of discussion. The Ambassador was insistent that insofar as his Government was concerned it would be unwilling to accept the principle of a buffer zone at the expense of Korean territory, adding that since the Chinese were the aggressors in this instance, it should not be Korean interests that should be sacrificed. He reiterated that the UN should be uncompromising in its attitude toward the various Communist elements in Korea and should drive them from Korean soil without any thought of concessions.

Mr. Rusk asked the Ambassador if he had been in touch with the Indian Delegation in New York, to which the Ambassador replied that

in the past he had had several fairly lengthy conversations with Sir Benegal Rau. He said that Rau had given him to understand that the Indians were in sympathy with the ROK, but had indicated to him that one of the considerations in the Indian attitude towards the conflict in Korea was that further destruction and bloodshed should be avoided, citing the instance of Burma; the Burmese had been left to their own resources in rebuilding what had been destroyed. The Ambassador added that he had told Rau that even if his home were destroyed he, as a Korean, would still have favored an all-out attack against the North Koreans since no one could live with the Communists. He said that Rau did not appear particularly impressed by this argument and that he had seen very little of him since that conversation. The Ambassador commented that he was keeping in close touch with the American Delegation at the UN, particularly with Mr. Allison and Senator Dulles, and that it had been very helpful to have Ambassador Muccio here recently. The Ambassador added that he had received a letter from President Rhee praising Ambassador Muccio's efforts on behalf of Korea in the highest terms and that this was rather unusual since President Rhee was generally reserved in such comment.

Mr. Rusk then asked for the Ambassador's views on the problem of guerrilla activities in Korea. Dr. Chang replied that the ROK recognized the guerrilla problem as a serious one and agreed with Mr. Rusk's comment that action against the guerrillas would probably have to be conducted largely by the Koreans themselves since they were best suited to this type of operation. The Ambassador raised the question of the six-power resolution on Korea now under consideration in the GA and said that it was his feeling that the resolution was not strong enough in view of the fact that it did not threaten the Chinese Communists with reprisals if they did not withdraw from Korea. He felt that a paragraph should be added to the present resolution which would provide a threat of reprisals in case of non-compliance by the Chinese Communists. Mr. Rusk pointed out that if such a paragraph were added the necessary votes in support of the resolution would probably not be forthcoming in the GA, and suggested that the Chinese were already getting retaliation right now in North Korea through the active military action which was proceeding against them.

The Ambassador expressed the hope that the ROK would be given a voice in any peace treaty which might be concluded with Japan. (At this point Mr. Rusk, who had an appointment with the Secretary, excused himself and left and the conversation continued with Mr. Emmons.)

The Ambassador again reverted to his difficulties with the press and pointed out that he was frequently misquoted or that his remarks

were twisted to put himself or his Government in a bad light publicly and hoped that the Department realized his difficulties. Mr. Emmons assured him that the Department knew of his sincerity and that it also appreciated the problem with which he found himself faced. The Ambassador requested that any news articles or other published statements which might be attributed to him and which could be considered embarrassing be called to his attention because he was endeavoring, in every way, to avoid such embarrassment either to his Government or to the United States.

Dr. Chang stated that he had received word from Seoul that the arrival of badly needed civilian relief supplies, such as clothing and blankets, was being delayed and that many civilians were beginning to suffer extremely as a result of the onset of winter conditions. He hoped that the Department would do everything possible to expedite the arrival of these badly-needed relief supplies.

As the Ambassador was leaving, he again reiterated the concern of his Government over any possibility that a buffer zone might be established along the Sino-Korean frontier and hoped that the Department was not considering supporting such an idea, to which his Government was unalterably opposed. Mr. Emmons replied that the Department appreciated his frank statement of the position of his Government in this regard and that as far as he knew no commitment had been made along these lines, although he pointed out that naturally the Department must give consideration to every aspect of the numerous and complex problems which had come up as a result of the UN action in Korea.

795.00/11–2150

Memorandum by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 21, 1950.

At a meeting last night in the Secretary's office, he discussed in some detail the current situation in Korea and analyzed the problem along the following lines. He said there were four parts of this analysis:

(1) We should see whether General MacArthur has been told very clearly what to do and whether this is within his capabilities.

(2) We should examine the effect of various courses on the probability of bringing on general hostilities and war.

(3) What is the area of political adjustment and what are the pluses and minuses with regard to them.

(4) What is the effect of the general military posture of the United States and does this require change in policies.

With regard to (1) above, the Secretary said there was a possibility of some confusion in General MacArthur's mind because he has a straight military directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and also has general orders sent from the United Nations. On a straight military basis, he was told to pursue the enemy forces north of the 38th and destroy them as a military force. If the Chinese appeared, he was to continue the mission until it was evident he could not succeed. The Secretary felt that no one should change this part of the directive until General MacArthur had had a chance to "probe" the situation. The Secretary said that the civil affairs directive may have affected General MacArthur's interpretation of the military directive. He referred particularly to that portion on occupation. He said that the civil affairs directive does confuse and does not take into consideration the contingency of the Chinese communists coming in, as does the military directive. The Secretary said we must talk to the Joint Chiefs of Staff about this and clear up any misunderstanding, if one exists. We must point out that we are not interested in "real estate" but in an army.

With regard to (2) above, we are unable to answer this question until after General MacArthur has had a chance to "probe". There are several things which bear on the question. Sir Oliver Franks mentioned to the Secretary yesterday that the entire history of this part of the world indicates a concern over Korea as an entrance to Manchuria. Sir Oliver had mentioned that the Russians, the Japanese, and the British had all had this concept. If this is true, the Secretary said this led to some understanding of the concern which Russia and the Chinese communists might have over the use of Korea as a main highway. He said that he doubted that the communists believed that the United States would use Korea in that way but that their fear may relate to propaganda on the rearming of Japan. The Secretary said this might lead you to believe that there is more sensitivity here than the intelligence reports seem to indicate. He said this sensitivity had some bearing on the immediate situation but more on the long-range situation. If General MacArthur is successful in defeating the Chinese and driving them across the river, the situation might ease and he could let the Republic of Korea take over the border areas. If the Chinese were badly licked, it might reduce the chance of general war. However Chinese communist forces cannot be destroyed in Korea. If, on the other hand, strong resistance is met and we find that there is inevitably to be a long struggle, we must turn again to the field of negotiation and the sensitivity becomes even more important.

With regard to (3) above, this will take time. It will not be done quickly. If resistance is strong, the idea of a negotiated settlement and a quick withdrawal is impossible. We must have forces either in Korea or in Japan for some time on the assumption that the Chinese com-

munists could continue to cause trouble. The idea of a de-militarized zone is merely another way of saying that the Chinese communists will occupy that territory. The zone, nevertheless, has certain advantages in that it will permit a cooling down of the situation. It recognizes that there will be a dangerous frontier there for some time to come.

With regard to (4) above, in our judgment the maintenance of stability and peace requires that we be in the Far East longer with more forces than we had expected. This will not necessarily mean "forever" but probably for a rather long time. We cannot base our military plan on a Christmas withdrawal as we are under far too much pressure. This brings us to Mr. Harriman's point as set forth in the 9:30 meeting yesterday [1] about the need for getting more men. The conclusion we come to is that we need to get more men under arms faster than had been anticipated.

L. D. B[ATTLE]

Note: The above meeting was to consider the Department's line at the meeting with the JCS this afternoon. [Note in the source text.]

[1] The reference is presumably to the Secretary of State's daily staff meeting held at 9:30 a. m. on November 20, which Mr. Harriman attended.

795.00/11–2150

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to Colonel Marshall S. Carter, Executive to the Secretary of Defense

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 21, 1950.

COLONEL CARTER: At the meeting this afternoon Secretary Acheson expects to discuss informally the way in which our present problem in Korea shapes up as he sees it. He will not be speaking from a formal memorandum covering the subject of his remarks.

In conclusion, Secretary Acheson will suggest to the Secretary of Defense and the JCS certain points which represent our broad political objectives in Korea in the present situation. These points are listed in the attached paper. They are intended to be suggestive and are, of course, subject to further consideration. Secretary Acheson will raise with the Secretary of Defense whether it might be desirable for the JCS to consider these points and to determine what bearing they might have upon the course of our military operations in Korea and, specifically, whether General MacArthur's present directives should be expanded or modified.

DEAN RUSK

468–806—76——77

[Enclosure]

List of Points Prepared by the Secretary of State for Discussion With the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

1. To permit UNCURK to enter North Korean provinces as soon as the security situation in each province would permit UNCURK to carry out its political functions under the October 7 Resolution of the General Assembly looking toward the unification of the country.

2. To provide adequate security arrangements for provinces in which UNCURK is operating in order to prevent hostile attack or large-scale guerrilla disorder from blocking UNCURK's functions.

3. To support UN and US political action directed toward the withdrawal of the Chinese from Korea, and the surrender of North Korean remnants by military operations against enemy forces remaining in North Korea.

4. To conserve UN, and particularly US, manpower.

5. To establish as soon as possible ROK forces in position to take over all military responsibility for Korea, with first priority on anti-guerrilla operations and security missions along the northern frontiers.

6. To restrict the fighting to Korea; specifically, to avoid being drawn by the Korean situation into major hostilities against Communist China.

795.00/11–2150

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 21, 1950.

Subject: Situation in Korea
(Notes on meeting in Pentagon, 2:30 pm)

Participants:		
	Secretary Marshall	Admiral Sherman
	Mr. Lovett	Mr. Pace
	Mr. Harriman	Mr. Acheson
	General Bradley	Mr. Rusk
	General Collins	Mr. Matthews
	General Vandenberg	Mr. Jessup

SECRETARY ACHESON outlined the situation in accordance with the memorandum which had been prepared.[1]

MR. LOVETT said they had received nothing from General MacArthur to indicate he could not accomplish his mission. He inquired

[1] *Supra.*

about the attitude of other members of the UN and whether we could count on their continuing support.

SECRETARY ACHESON and MR. RUSK pointed out the anxiety which other friendly members of the UN felt about our becoming more deeply involved perhaps finally in war with Communist China.

GENERAL MARSHALL expressed satisfaction that Mr. Acheson had stated his belief that General MacArthur should push forward with the planned offensive. He expressed some doubt about the establishment of the zone and assumed that if one were established south of the River another would have to be established to the north. If there were a UN Commission in the zone it would have to have military protection. He preferred to consider first the political action based on the premise that General MacArthur will succeed in his pending military offensive. The time for making political proposals would be after MacArthur had had such a success.

SECRETARY ACHESON pointed to the possibility that there might be partial success without either complete success or failure. He noted that we had discouraged the UK from pressing its proposal for a zone. He noted the difficulty of securing agreement on a demilitarized zone on both sides of the border. The zone on the south side only would be better than continuing the war but we would want to be sure that the zone was not being used for the build-up of further Chinese forces.

MR. LOVETT raised the question whether instead of negotiating for a zone it would not be better as a matter of fact if General MacArthur withdrew to a defensible line after pressing his offensive forward successfully to the River.

SECRETARY ACHESON stressed the need for finding a way of terminating the Chinese intervention in the war and also stressed the sensitive area of the northeast province from the Soviet point of view. From the point of view of our partners in the UN, it is desirable to find some kind of an agreement and we are searching for something which would be useful instead of harmful to General MacArthur.

GENERAL MARSHALL stressed again the desirability of our making proposals while the UN Forces are advancing instead of waiting until other members of the UN advance proposals which might be unacceptable.

GENERAL VANDENBERG, at this point and later, emphasized his doubt whether we could find any solution which would satisfy the Chinese Communists, particularly in view of the Secretary's interpretation of their long-range fears.

SECRETARY ACHESON suggested the possibility of some kind of UN assurances which might suffice for the present and give us time. We do not have an interminable responsibility for the relations between Korea and China.

General Bradley, General Collins and General Vandenberg discussed from a military point of view the probable positions which it would be advantageous to hold. They agreed that it would not be useful to hold the line at the River but rather the high ground back of the River.

General Collins pointed out on the map a line, perhaps beginning with a small river which comes in about ten miles east of the mouth of the Yalu and then following the high ground which runs at a distance from ten to twenty-five miles back of the River. This line would be followed up to the main bend in the frontier which has now been reached by our forces, after which the line could come down more or less directly to the Coast.

Admiral Sherman emphasized the sensitivity of the Russians to the region near the Siberian frontier and the desirability of alleviating Russian anxieties lest they in turn put the heat on the Chinese to maintain their intervention.

General Marshall indicated that patrols would probably be utilized in the area beyond the high ground on the River boundary and that ROK forces could be used for this.

General Collins suggested that General MacArthur, after the attack is well launched and is succeeding, could announce that it was his intention only to go forward to destroy the North Korean units and that he intended to hold the high ground overlooking the Yalu with ROK forces, assigning the rest of the UN forces to rear areas while elections were being held and the government being set up.

Mr. Jessup queried whether there was any real difference between the space between the high ground on [*and?*] the River which the Chiefs had referred to and the zone to which Secretary Acheson had originally referred.

There was then considerable discussion of the relative advantages of an announcement of intention as against a negotiated arrangement.

Mr. Lovett thought it would be weakness if we burdened ourselves with self-imposed limitations without a negotiated settlement.

General Vandenberg seemed to share this view.

Secretary Acheson stressed that if we could get the Chinese Communists to take through negotiation what we would do any way (namely, holding the line of the high ground) that would be very satisfactory. One could defer until later the details about administration of the area between the line held and the River. It might be possible to ignore the status of this area.

General Marshall stressed his belief that we should take the initiative in suggesting a solution and not wait until somebody else had proposed something. He seemed to favor the possibility of an

announcement of intention by General MacArthur either formally or informally through the press. This could be followed by negotiation.

MR. HARRIMAN also stressed the sensitivity of the northeast area near the Soviet frontier.

After Secretary Acheson, General Marshall and Mr. Harriman withdrew, the conversation continued without introducing major new elements in the Korean analysis. The Chiefs seemed to agree that if it was decided that it would be desirable to concentrate on the line which General Collins had indicated, some changes in MacArthur's directive would be desirable in order to assure him that he did not need to occupy all of the rest of the territory. They all seemed to be agreed on the importance of leaving the northeast province alone.

There was a brief discussion of what would happen if General MacArthur's offensive bogged down. There was no consensus on what could be done at that time.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN, supported by General Vandenberg, took the view that we would probably have to tell the Chinese Communists that they must either quit or we would have to hit them in Manchuria.

There seemed to be some agreement with the view that as an expedient through the winter one could hold back of a line which would be the desirable objective and that this would not represent a defeat.

GENERAL COLLINS particularly, but the other Chiefs as well, stressed their concern with the long-range future and the need for getting our divisions out in order to use them elsewhere. This led to some talk about the possible increase of ROK forces.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that MacArthur contemplated leaving ten divisions, of which he now had about eight, and that this reached more or less the limit of ROK capacity.

GENERAL COLLINS, supported by the other Chiefs, strongly rejected the possibility of using units from other countries.

MR. LOVETT raised the question of the possible use of Chinese Nationalists under such circumstances.

MR. RUSK suggested that this would have to be weighed from a military point of view against the need for those forces to defend Formosa or their ultimate use against south China.

MR. JESSUP suggested the employment of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea would almost certainly lead to full involvement in hostilities with the Chinese Communists.

MR. RUSK pointed out that it was most likely that the British would refuse to have their troops fight along side of Chinese Nationalists against the Chinese Communists and suggested that 10,000 British troops were of more value than 30,000 Chinese in Korea.

MR. MATTHEWS asked whether this would not indicate that we should find some other way to raise more American troops so that we would be in a position to send the expected divisions to Europe provided we could not draw two divisions from Korea as had been planned. He pointed to the great importance from the aspect of the German situation of getting American forces into Europe as soon as possible.

There was general agreement with this but GENERAL COLLINS said they were clear that they should not attempt to send National Guard units overseas and that they did not have sufficient Regular Army units readily available here.

SECRETARY PACE said they had been worried about this situation.

GENERAL COLLINS said they probably could send one armored division to Europe.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

795.00/11–2150

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] November 21, 1950.
US/S/1581

Subject: Security Council—Korea

Participants: Mr. Dayal, Indian Delegation [1]
Mr. Charles P. Noyes, United States Delegation

Mr. Dayal gave me the attached draft resolution and requested US comments. His thought was that the Security Council might set up a subcommittee consisting of the six non-permanent members during the course of this week before the Chinese Communists arrive. This subcommittee could then continue its work while the Security Council was in the process of holding a series of meetings on the Formosa question. He thought this would have the advantage of finding a way to obtain the Chinese Communists' views and intentions with respect to the Manchurian border and their intervention in Korea. They had refused to appear before the Security Council. He thought they would probably be willing to state their position to this subcommittee in private session. The subcommittee would also have the advantage of avoiding the difficulty of Dr. Tsiang being President of the Council during December. Dayal indicated that, of course, the subcommittee members would remain in close touch with the US Delegation as well

[1] Rajeshwar Dayal, Alternate Representative of the Government of India on the U.N. Security Council.

as the delegations of the other permanent members. He doubted that they would make proposals which were undesirable from our point of view.

I reacted somewhat sympathetically to the Indian proposal with clear understanding that this was entirely a personal point of view. I broached with him the idea of following the precedent in the Berlin Case rather than having a formal resolution setting up a subcommittee. He thought this was worth considering but was inclined to feel that too much informality in the formation of a subcommittee might result in the Chinese Communists being unwilling to meet with it. He thought the Committee's recommendations would then have less weight. I pointed out that there was no indication that if this subcommittee were set up the Communists would attend its meetings and if they refused this would make the Council look a little silly. If the matter was handled as in the Berlin Case it would be possible to make sure that the Chinese Communists would meet with the Committee before going ahead with the plan. I also pressed the point of view that a formal resolution of the Council might be vetoed by the Russians or that they might try to do so. I suggested that the Russians might not like the idea of the Chinese meeting privately with the six non-permanent members. I also suggested that the Chinese might have some difficulty with the formal subcommittee and that such a proposal might involve a full fledged debate. I asked him what he would do with the present draft resolution. He had not thought of that but thought that it might be sent to the subcommittee or simply left in abeyance. I expressed feeling that even if the US would go along with their basic idea, we would probably have some difficulty with subparagraph *a*. Subparagraph *a* might well leave the impression that the subcommittee could re-examine the whole question of the nature of a peace settlement in Korea. I thought the Security Council should not take any step which would reopen any of the policy issues settled either in the Security Council or the General Assembly. Dayal was sympathetic to all of these comments and left me with the impression that the Indian Delegation would be willing to make any necessary modifications in their plan or in the text to meet these various points.

I told Dayal I would consult the Delegation and we would let them know the US position on their draft shortly.

[Annex]

The Security Council hereby appoints a Committee consisting of its six non-permanent members, namely, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, India,

Norway & Yugoslavia, to consider all proposals and suggestions that have been or may be made for the purpose:

(*a*) of restoring peace in Korea, and
(*b*) of preventing the present conflict from spreading beyond Korea

and submit its recommendations to the Council before ———.

The Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure, may meet in public or private, and may invite any persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

795.00/11–2150 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, November 21, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received November 21—3 : 29 p. m.]

2984. I assumed Department has seen text message Foreign Office sent Peiping November 19 for delivery CPG [1] describing mission UN forces Korea, stating no aggression Chinese territory intended and pointing out had UK and China established diplomatic relations there would have been channel through which any misunderstandings such as those on Korea could have been quickly resolved.

Hutchison wired back to Foreign Office suggesting certain minor changes in wording in order make message more palatable CPG. Foreign Office has now accepted these changes for most part and is urging him deliver message soonest.

HOLMES

[1] Not printed, but see the second message from Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks, dated November 17, p. 1173, and telegram 1051 from Moscow, received at 1 : 21 p. m. on November 19, p. 1191.

795.00/11–2150

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 21, 1950.

Subject: Message from Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks

Participants: Mr. Hubert Graves, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. Graves came in at 4 : 30 this afternoon to leave a copy of the attached telegram from Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks which arrived this afternoon.

At the outset Mr. Graves explained that the opening sentence was misleading in that from it one might infer that the Ambassador had reported that the Secretary had accepted the suggestions which he put to him last Saturday.[1] Mr. Graves assured me that the Embassy had merely reported that the Secretary "accepted the idea" and in that sense had suggested that if Jebb made his statement it should occur late in the debate on the Resolution.

Mr. Graves asked that we inform him as soon as possible of the Secretary's reaction to these suggestions. He also intimated that we would want to look long and hard at the proposal contained in 3(*c*). Mr. Graves is under the impression that if the Security Council meets tomorrow, the debate on the Resolution might go so fast as to require Jebb to make his statement during the course of the day.

[Annex]

SECRET

MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR OLIVER FRANKS
DATED 21ST NOVEMBER, 1950

I am very glad to learn of Mr. Acheson's favourable response to my suggestion that Sir Gladwyn Jebb should give the broad outline of the suggestions contained in my telegram of Nov. 13 during the course of the debate on the joint resolution.

2. As regards tactics, I think there is a lot to be said for deferring Sir G. Jebb's statement until after the Chinese arrive and talks have started with them, provided of course they do not show unwillingness to engage in any talks until such a lead has been given to them. We should therefore do what we can to prevent an early vote on the joint resolution, and, if possible, work for an adjournment of the debate until after the Chinese arrive. If however an early vote becomes unavoidable then I want Jebb to outline our suggestions before that vote is taken.

3. Next there is the substance of the statement which Jebb is to make. Though it would be unwise to go into too much detail at an early stage I agree that we must not risk failure through lack of precision. I have therefore in mind that Jebb's statement might:

(*a*) recount the broad outline of the suggestions given in paragraph 2 of my telegram of Nov 13;
(*b*) suggest that the responsibility for the administration of the area should be entrusted to the United Nations Commission for Korea, who would set up such temporary *de facto* administration as they consider suitable and who would consult with representatives of the Central People's Government of China where necessary;

[1] November 18.

(*c*) propose that in order to ensure the effective demilitarisation of the area and the maintenance of law and order the United Nations Commission, assisted by United Nations and Chinese Military observers attached to it, should recruit a small police force preferably from amongst Koreans. I for my part would be ready to accept the inclusion of some North Koreans in this force which might be supervised by a few experienced police officers furnished by other countries.

4. Please speak to Mr. Acheson urgently about these suggestions and ascertain his reactions.

795.00/11–2150 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1950—8 p. m.

2673. In message to Franks from Bevin today [1] it appears that Jebb may be instructed to present to UNSC UK proposals for demilitarized zone in Korea along lines Dept infotel Nov 17, 2 AM.[2]

There apparently was some misunderstanding on part Emb or FonOff as to our views. Problem of winding up present Korean operation is now receiving highest consideration US Govt. Question of some special security arrangement along frontier is one element in such consideration. We have at present no basis for agreement with UK as to nature of any demilitarized zone, method or timing of presentation or negotiation, or other important elements.

You are requested to see Bevin immediately and to urge upon him in the strongest terms our belief that it would be most harmful to have Jebb put forward the UK proposal in the immediate future. Our reasons are: First, that with the offensive about to start in Korea it would be most confusing to General MacArthur and his forces; second, that before the Chi have arrived in New York and with their attitude explored, such a proposal would constitute a commitment which will be regarded by them as a starting point for bargaining for something more; third, that the terms of the proposal will present grave military problems and danger which have not been adequately explored; fourth, until results of the forthcoming offensive are known, it is impossible to ascertain what course can and should safely be adopted. Dept is working with military on this whole matter and believes that situation will be gravely prejudiced by proposing Jebb action at this time.

Since we would be compelled to oppose such proposals if made, we hope that we can avoid a disclosure of divergence between US and UK

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] See footnote 1 to telegram 1051 from Moscow received at 1:21 p. m. on November 19, p. 1191.

in this particular phase of military operations and just prior to arrival Chi Commies Del Lake Success.

Secretary has explained above to Franks and has asked latter to urge Bevin not to proceed with this proposal pending further US–UK consultations.[3]

ACHESON

[3] The following message was received by the Department in telegram 3012, November 22, from London, which read in part as follows:

". . . FonOff has informed Embassy of telegraphic instruction just sent by Bevin to British Embassy Washington stating that responsive US representations UK agrees not to present proposal for demilitarized zone before arrival in Lake Success of Chinese delegation, it being understood that the 6-power resolution will not be voted on before then. Otherwise Bevin's ideas expressed in proposal still stand." (795.00/11–2250)

693.95/11–2250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in New Zealand (Scotten) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WELLINGTON, November 22, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received November 22—2 : 56 a. m.]

157. Deptel 91, November 13.[1] Although this sent Wellington information only gist of it was brought informally to attention External Affairs which has now advised Embassy attitude New Zealand Government in secret *aide-mémoire* to effect that New Zealand sympathizes with difficulties military authorities Korea and understands their anxiety grapple with problem confronting them nevertheless feels apprehensive lest proposed course action lead to spread of conflict an outcome which UN trying avoid as far possible.

SCOTTEN

[1] Same as telegram 2487, November 13, 7 p.m., to London, p. 1144.

795.00/11–2250

The British Embassy to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

AMENDED VERSION OF MESSAGE TO BE DELIVERED BY HIS MAJESTY'S CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES, PEKING, TO CHOU EN-LAI, OR TO HIM THROUGH THE HIGHEST AVAILABLE OFFICIAL

It is requested that the original version handed to the State Department on the 20th November,[1] be destroyed.

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 2984 from London received at 3 : 29 p. m. on November 21, p. 1210.

Message begins, It appears from published Chinese official statements that Central People's Government of China may be under some misunderstanding regarding the nature and purposes of current operations of United Nations Forces in Korea.

2. These forces are in Korea in pursuance of recommendations made by the Security Council with a view to re-establishment of peace and order.

3. At Moscow in December 1945 the Great Powers affirmed the aim of re-establishing Korea as an independent state. Since 1947, when the question first came before the General Assembly, it has constantly been the aim of the United Nations to achieve this end. For this purpose United Nation's Commissions have been in Korea for nearly three years. In furtherance of this, the General Assembly in their resolution of October 7th 1950 again re-affirmed their essential objective of a unified independent and democratic Korea and recommended steps to be taken to accomplish this task.

4. It was the hope of His Majesty's Government and of the overwhelming majority of members of the United Nations that North Korean Forces would lay down their arms so that the United Nations could devote their energies to assisting the Korean people in the work of relief and rehabilitation and of establishing a unified State; and so that the United Nations Forces might thereupon withdraw.

5. Recent reports show that resistance of North Koreans has been stimulated by support given to them by Chinese Nationals from across the border, and by aircraft based in Chinese territory. His Majesty's Government deeply regret that their efforts to arrange for an exchange of Ambassadors with the Central People's Government of China, and to secure representations of the Central People's Government on various organs of the United Nations, have not so far been successful. Had they been so, much misunderstanding might well have been avoided by mutual exchanges which the establishment of diplomatic relations and representation on international bodies afford.

6. I therefore wish to take this opportunity to make known to the Central People's Government of China facts concerning the purposes of the United Nations in Korea, so that no possible room for misunderstanding may exist.

7. These are, in brief, that objectives of United Nations in Korea are those publicly stated in various resolutions of United Nations. It is our aim to create a unified independent democratic and peace loving state living in friendship and amity with its neighbours and with the rest of the world. The *sole* task of the United Nations Forces in Korea is to restore peace and order so that United Nations may proceed to the attainment of these aims. There is therefore no threat to the security of China or of any other state.

8. Believing that a free and independent Korea is in the interests of China as of all peace loving countries, His Majesty's Government earnestly desire to prevent any extension of the conflict and deplores any action which may prolong sufferings of the Korea people. His Majesty's Government recognise that the Central People's Government of China are deeply interested in the future of their neighbour Korea and it is hoped that the presence of their representatives in New York will provide an opportunity to make it clear that fulfilment of United Nations aims in Korea will in no way endanger legitimate Chinese interests.

9. It is, further, the hope of His Majesty's Government that the Central People's Government of China will accept my assurance that United Nations entertain no hostile intent towards them, and it is our hope that Central People's Government will take steps to cause in violability of the frontier to be respected. His Majesty's Government have joined in sponsoring a resolution now before the Security Council of the United Nations which affirms that it is the policy of United Nations to protect legitimate interests both of Korea and of China in the frontier area, and to hold the frontier inviolate.

10. In sending this message to Your Excellency I wish also to assure you that the desire of His Majesty's Government is the maintenance of peace and strengthening of the United Nations Organization which was created for that purpose. It is our sincere hope that representatives of the Central People's Government will play their due part in counsels of Nations so that misunderstandings may be avoided and world peace assured. *Ends.*

WASHINGTON, 22 November, 1950.

795.00/11–2350 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 23, 1950—2:30 p. m.
[Received November 23—2:41 p. m.]

875. For Hickerson and Rusk from Gross. Re Korea—demilitarized zone.

I showed Jebb last night message to Embassy re UK proposals for demilitarized zone in Korea.[1] On basis discussion with Jebb, it appears a misunderstanding arose between Department and UK Government regarding procedures British had in mind for publicly raising question. In response to question, Jebb insisted not only that

[1] See telegram 2673, November 21, 8 p. m., to London, p. 1212.

he had received no instruction from Bevin to raise matter in Security Council at this time, but that Jebb himself realized that in view of vague and formless nature of British proposal at the present moment, there was not much to discuss publicly. Jebb said he, himself, had strongly objected to draft resolution originally outlined by Foreign Office, believing resolution already tabled by six SC members should not be subjected to amendment at this time. I asked for and received assurance from Jebb that latter would under no circumstances raise question in SC without prior notice to me and opportunity for discussion. Jebb professed his sole interest, and he thought this was also true of Bevin, was to keep an eye open to see whether at some appropriate stage question of demilitarized zone might be interjected into the SC proceedings in some appropriate manner.

I received impression that UK idea of what is appropriate may be different from ours. Accordingly, recommend Department advise British Embassy that we understand we have commitment from Jebb for prior discussion before latter raises question in SC.

It appears from what Jebb said that he has been closely tied in with British Embassy and UK Foreign Office on all discussions regarding this matter, despite impression of Department that matter was primarily being handled in Washington between Department and British Embassy. Accordingly we strongly recommend we be kept as closely informed on current developments as possible in whatever manner Department thinks appropriate. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

795.00/11–2350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 23, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received November 23—3 : 36 p. m.]

431. Continuing Embtel 412, November 20 and previous on Chinese intervention : contact with Chinese both on ground and in air has been virtually negligible last three days.

During this period, most significant development has been recovery of 27 wounded US POW's. While reports reaching Seoul are incomplete and subject to verification, these 27 appeared in US lines evening of 21st. Reports reaching here indicated they part of 8th [Army?] cavalry regiment which was cut off on November 3. These and other US troops were surrounded, overpowered and made prisoners by Chinese. They were then taken overland to the town of Pyoktong on Yalu River where they were kept in schoolhouse. They were treated well, not even their valuables being taken from them, and

they were interrogated, but the questions related mainly to their political ideas and beliefs, not military matters. On evening of November 19, 27 enlisted men were selected and put on trucks. They travelled southward two nights, spending intervening day in village. When within four miles of UN lines, their Chinese captors patted POW's on back and shook hands with them and directed they return to own units. Recovered POW's reported there approximately 300 other US POW's and 600 ROK prisoners at Pyoktong; UN forces have been endeavoring yesterday and today to effect contact through aerial reconnaissance, but thus far efforts not successful.

Recovered POW's now being interrogated carefully and verified report should be available by tomorrow. Chinese motive in releasing US POW's is not clear; however, it is recalled that during Sino-Japanese war, Sino-Communists on occasion released Jap POW's after political indoctrination in hope they could influence Japs against continuing hostilities.

MUCCIO

330/11–2350

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the British Ambassador (Franks)[1]

SECRET

Please convey the following message to Mr. Acheson in reply.

Begins. I have given careful consideration to your message of November 21st[2] and I have also had the advantage of a talk with Mr. Holmes who amplified it in response to my enquiries. I was particularly glad to receive his assurance that you had not changed your general attitude to the proposals and that what you had in mind was that I should instruct Sir Gladwyn Jebb as a matter of tactics to delay making them public at the moment.

2. I agree that it is not necessary to make these proposals public immediately. As I said in a recent telegram to Sir Oliver Franks, "I think there is a lot to be said for deferring Sir Gladwyn Jebb's statement until after the Chinese arrive and talks have started with them".[3] I did however make the qualification that if any Delegation on the Security Council should press the resolution to an early vote, I should want Jebb to outline my suggestions before that vote was taken. We should however be able to overcome this without any undue difficulty

[1] A notation on the source text indicated that this document was handed to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador on November 23.

[2] See telegram 2673, November 21, 8 p. m., to London, p. 1212.

[3] See the annex to the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, November 21, p. 1211.

if both our Delegations act together in New York to ensure that no member of the Council ends the debate precipitately.

3. In general I still feel most strongly that my suggestions for a demilitarised area offer the best chance of bringing the conflict to a speedy conclusion and that despite the obvious difficulties involved, we ought to pursue them with the utmost vigour, even if for the moment they are not made public.

4. I sincerely hope that you will be able to agree with these views. Meanwhile I am instructing Sir Gladwyn Jebb that he should not make these proposals public until I instruct him as to the exact timing. *Ends.*

WASHINGTON, 23 November, 1950.

611.95A241/11–2450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 24, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received November 24—7 : 13 a. m.]

435. Re concluding paragraphs Embtel 431, November 23 on returned US POW's. Interrogation reveals following information:

Number returned 27; all members First US Cavalry Division. Men captured night November 2; after capture by Chinese they were led back to central assembly area, some reaching destination in 1 day and others in 8. During this period POW's received hard treatment. On arrival at central assembly point US POW's separated from other UN POW's.

Here POW's were subjected to routine questioning. Most questions were of political nature: Why fight in Korea? Why aiding American imperialists and Wall Street tycoons? Et cetera. Both North Koreans and Chinese participated in interrogations. While at central assembly point POW's were billeted in farm houses. Millet diet provided initially but later rice, fish and other items were furnished. Some personal items were pilfered on trip north but after arrival at central assembly point personal possessions were not molested. POW's left assembly point by truck and were released near UN lines 21st. POW's told of destination only just before release.

POW's unable explain motive for release. However, intelligence officer who questioned POW's got impression decision must have been made on high level.

MUCCIO

795.00/11–2450

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [NEW YORK,] November 24, 1950.
US/S/1584

Subject: Korea

Participants: Mr. Vincent Broustra, French Delegation
Mr. G. Hayden Raynor, United States Delegation

Mr. Broustra last night told me in the strictest confidence that the French were considerably worried over what General MacArthur might do. Broustra said the French knew the ways of successful generals and also of course had heard of General MacArthur's reputation for independence. I attempted to assure Broustra that the General was under the strictest orders not to violate the frontier in any way.

Other members of the French Delegation, who were at the same dinner, made remarks with the same implications. Several of them indicated in their remarks the strong desirability in their opinion of the creation of a buffer zone.[1]

[1] Telegram 1067, November 24, from Tokyo conveyed the following message from the Political Adviser (Sebald):

"French Ambassador Dejean last evening at dinner importuned me in strongest terms on behalf proposed demilitarized zone along North Korean border. Similar views expressed with somewhat less conviction by Swiss and Swedish Chiefs of Mission." (795.00/11–2450)

795.00/11–2450

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ray L. Thurston, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] November 24, 1950.
US/S/1585

Subject: Indian Proposal for a Security Council Subcommittee to Deal with the Chinese Communist Delegation.

Participants: Mr. Dayal, Indian Delegation
Mr. D. L. Sharma, Indian Delegation
Mr. Ray Thurston, United States Delegation

I told the Indians today that after some discussion we were not favorably disposed towards their idea that a subcommittee of the non-permanent members of the Security Council be established to handle

the various Far Eastern items which will shortly be discussed in the Security Council with the participation of the Chinese Communists. I alluded to the fact that one of the most important reasons that have been adduced in support of the Indian suggestion was that it would eliminate long propaganda speeches having a tendency to exacerbate the situation and pointed out that even should the SC subcommittee partly meet this problem, we were now going to have the Chinese Communists in Committee I of the General Assembly, and it was almost certain that speeches of the kind in question would be made.

I asked the Indians whether they were going ahead with their scheme and whether they intended formally to present it in the SC when it meets. They answered that they did not intend to take such action and that their approach to us had been merely of a sounding out nature. I gathered that their soundings have produced negative replies generally and that they have lost their enthusiasm on this particular project.

795.00/11–2450

Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 24 November, 1950.
NIE–2/1

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE *

CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA

The Problem

1. To re-estimate the scale and purpose of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea.

Conclusions

2. The Chinese Communists will simultaneously:

a. Maintain Chinese-North Korean holding operations in North Korea.
b. Maintain or increase their military strength in Manchuria.
c. Seek to obtain UN withdrawal from Korea by intimidation and diplomatic means.

3. In case of failure to obtain UN withdrawal by these means, there will be increasing Chinese intervention in Korea. At a minimum, the Chinese will conduct, on an increasing scale, unacknowledged

*The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper is based on information available on 21 November 1950. [Footnote in the source text.]

operations designed to immobilize UN forces in Korea, to subject them to prolonged attrition, and to maintain the semblance of a North Korean state in being. Available evidence is not conclusive as to whether or not the Chinese Communists are as yet committed to a full-scale offensive effort. Eventually they may undertake operations designed to bring about the withdrawal of UN forces from Korea. It is estimated that they do not have the military capability of driving the UN forces from the peninsula, but that they do have the capability of forcing them to withdraw to defensive positions for prolonged and inconclusive operations, which, the Communists might calculate, would lead to eventual UN withdrawal from Korea.

4. So long as Chinese intervention continues, the USSR will continue and possibly increase its support to the Chinese by furnishing equipment, planes, technical advisers, and conceivably, "volunteers" as necessary to man the more intricate equipment.

5. The risk that a general war will develop already exists. The Soviet rulers may underrate this possibility but they appear to have allowed for it and to feel prepared to cope with it.

Discussion

6. The immediate situation with regard to Chinese intervention in Korea is as follows:

a. The military activity of Chinese troops in Korea so far is not in itself sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a plan for major offensive operations.

b. Military preparations being carried out in Manchuria and elsewhere in China are on a scale sufficient to support major operations of prolonged duration, either offensively in Korea or defensively in Manchuria.

c. Prevailing opinion in China, including opinion in circles close to Party leadership, appears to reflect expectations of hostilities, including expectations of extensive air attacks on Chinese, particularly Manchurian cities.

d. Neither the Chinese Government nor Chinese propaganda has thus far committed the Chinese Government to a specific line of action in Korea. Discussion of preparation for support of Korea has been only in terms of "volunteer" action.

e. Chinese propagandists for the past three weeks have been carrying on an intensive campaign centering on the charge that US military action in Korea is an attack aimed at China and have called for all-out sacrifices to meet and defeat this threat through "support of the Korean people." A sub-theme of the campaign has been American impotence in a war with China.

f. There has been no suggestion in Chinese propaganda or official statements that the Chinese support of North Korea has a limited objective such as protecting power plants, establishing a buffer zone on the border, or forcing the UN forces back to the 38th Parallel. In fact, none of these objectives has been mentioned by the Chinese. All

Chinese formulations have been in terms of the necessity of bringing about a withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea.

g. The Chinese decision to send a delegation to the UN has been announced in such a manner as to give no conclusive indication of Chinese intentions with regard to Korea. The delegation has been reported to be willing to reach a diplomatic settlement on Korea so long as it is arranged outside the Security Council. No terms have been suggested, and there are as yet no indications that the Chinese would accept less than the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.

h. The Soviet press has reported with approval, Chinese support of North Korea. Soviet official statements and Soviet propaganda have identified the struggle of the North Koreans with the Communist cause generally. However, neither source indicated that the USSR is in any way committed to any specific line of action beyond moral support of North Korea and of China.

7. While there is no reliable intelligence regarding the role that the Soviet Union has played in decisions reached by Chinese leaders in regard to Korea, Chinese intervention in Korea furthers Soviet objectives. Although the USSR has made no open committment to support the Chinese, planes drawn from the Soviet air force have been observed in increasing numbers in Manchuria and over Korea. Soviet propaganda has recently called attention to Soviet obligations under the Sino-Soviet treaty to support China in case of aggression by Japan or by any power directly or indirectly associated with Japan. Soviet officials and propaganda have recently stressed alleged US use of Japanese troops in Korea and US preparations to use Japan as a base for aggression.

795.00/11–2450 : Telegram

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins), to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (MacArthur)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 24 November 1950.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

WAR 97287. From CSUSA sgd Collins. Following from JCS: Other members of United Nations indicate growing concern over the possibilities of bringing on a general conflict should a major clash develop with Chinese Communist forces as a result of your forces advancing squarely against the entire boundary between Korea and Manchuria–USSR. This might not only result in loss of support within United Nations and leave US standing alone but would also involve increased risks of a military nature. Proposals in UN may suggest unwelcome restrictions on your advance to the north since some sentiment exists in UN for establishing a demilitarized zone between your

forces and the frontier in the hope of thereby reducing Chinese Communist fear of UN military action against Manchuria and the corresponding sensitivity on the part of the USSR with respect to Vladivostok.

A meeting was held Thursday [*Tuesday?*] [1] with Secretaries of State and Defense, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and other officials to review the situation developing here.

The consensus of political and military opinion was that there should be no change in your mission, but that immediate action should be taken at top governmental level to formulate a course of action which would permit the establishment of a unified Korea and at the same time reduce risk of more general involvement. On the assumption that your coming attack will be successful,[2] exploratory discussions were had to discover what military measures, which you might in any event wish to take, might lend themselves to political action which would reduce tension with Peiping and the Soviet Union and maintain a solid UN front. The following represent a search for such measures:

1. After advancing to or near the Yalu, you might secure the position which you had thus achieved by holding forces on terrain dominating the approaches from the Valley of the Yalu, from its mouth to approximately the position now held by the 17th Infantry. These forces would be principally ROK troops while other UN forces would be grouped in positions of readiness to insure the holding of the established line. This, of course, would be contingent on the cessation of effective enemy resistance.
2. The above position would be extended to the Japan Sea along a general line approximately east from the 17th Infantry's position with an outpost at Chongjin, which would be the limit for the present of your advance to the northeast.
3. It was thought that the above would not seriously affect the accomplishment of your military mission.
4. UN forces would continue to make every effort to spare all hydro-electric installations in North Korea; destruction of these facilities could result only as incident to resistance from enemy forces.
5. UNCURK would, at the appropriate time, enter into negotiations with appropriate representatives to insure an equitable distribution of hydro-electric power.

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[1] See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Jessup of the meeting which took place on Tuesday, November 21, p. 1204. No record of a meeting on Thursday, November 23 (Thanksgiving Day), has been found.

[2] General MacArthur flew to Korea on November 24 to witness the launching of the U.N. offensive. For the occasion, he issued a communiqué which concluded as follows:

"If successful this [attack] should for all practical purposes end the war, restore peace and unity to Korea, enable the prompt withdrawal of United Nations military forces, and permit the complete assumption by the Korean people and nation of full sovereignty and international equality. It is that for which we fight." (See Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, p. 774 and *Hearings*, p. 3491.)

6. In the event that the Chinese forces did not again attack in force across the Yalu, the conduct of orderly elections in North Korea and the unification of the country could proceed in accordance with UN action.

7. Ultimate handling of the extremely sensitive Northeast Province would await further UN procedures.

While it is recognized that from the point of view of the Commander in the field this course of action may leave much to be desired, it is felt that there may be other considerations which must be accepted and that the above procedure would not seriously affect the accomplishment of your military mission. At the same time it might well provide an out for the Chinese Communists to withdraw into Manchuria without loss of face and might lessen the concern of the Russians as to the security of Vladivostok. This concern may be at the root of Russian pressure on the Chinese Communists to intervene in Korea.

The above is suggested as a course of action upon which we would appreciate your comments. If it should prove feasible the second question would arise as to whether and how such a course of action might be announced. This would have to be worked out in such a way as not to impede your operations, but in such a way that the Chinese and Russians could not mistake UN intentions. Your views as to timing and source of such an announcement would be appreciated.

Since there are many political and military implications involved in these ideas and since other nations would be involved, no action along these lines is contemplated until full opportunity has been given for further consideration of your views, final decision by the President, and possibly discussion with certain other governments. [CSUSA.]

[COLLINS]

795.00/11–2450 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

LONDON, November 24, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received November 24—3 : 09 p. m.]

3050. Embtel 2984, November 21. Hutchison Peiping has reported to Foreign Office he delivered note to Vice Foreign Minister Chang on November 22.

On delivery message, Hutchison stressed UN Forces would respect Chinese frontier and were anxious for peaceful settlement. Then as on his own initiative, Hutchison inquired whether Chang could offer any suggestions which might help clear up misunderstanding in Korea. Chang did not comment. Hutchison then advanced "his personal view"

it might be helpful establish demilitarized zone in North Korea. Chang asked whether he was not speaking officially. In reiterating he was only expressing personal view, Hutchison gained impression (or so he reported to Foreign Office) that Chang was not taken in. Chang made no comment whatsoever either on message or on Hutchison's personal suggestion.

HOLMES

795.00/11–2450

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs (Jackson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 24, 1950—4: 15 p. m.

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
Mr. Dean Rusk
Mr. Wayne G. Jackson

The Ambassador called at Mr. Rusk's request. Mr. Rusk delivered to the Ambassador, on behalf of the Secretary, a message in answer to one received from Mr. Bevin which related to the latter's desire to give the British House of Commons certain assurances with regard to the conduct of military operations in Korea.[1] A copy of the Secretary's message to the British Ambassador is attached.

Mr. Rusk also delivered to Ambassador Franks a copy of a personal message from the Secretary to Mr. Bevin relating to the proposal for a demilitarized zone in Korea. This message is being sent by cable to the United States Embassy in London with instructions to deliver it to Mr. Bevin, the copy being given to Ambassador Franks for his

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[1] Mr. Bevin's message was thus summarized in telegram 2776, November 27, to London:

"Brit Amb Nov 23 showed Rusk message from Bevin noting Brit public opinion growing restive and all sides Commons anxious lest MacArthur commit UN forces Korea of which UK troops a part, to large scale hostilities with Chi. Bevin, while conceding MacArthur must be given discretion within broad limits conduct campaign on lines he thinks best and that in view mil requirements and with Russians back in SC there can be no question of SC issuing detailed instructions or of MacArthur's being required seek such instructions from SC through reps US, stated that in debate on fon affairs next week he must be careful not leave impression reason why instructions not made public is either because they give MacArthur more latitude than a strict fulfillment of UN res wld justify or that 'quite simply we have no knowledge their contents'. Bevin accordingly asked Amb urgently explain to Secy importance his being able assure House (1) objective MacArthur no more and no less than objectives UN, (2) proper consultation taking place, and (3) MacArthur through US is in fact as well as name agent UN. Re (2), Bevin asked Amb press US to agree consult confidentially at least those member states of SC who providing forces Korea on any contemplated action going beyond MacArthur's mandate and agree not issue instructions to MacArthur to proceed with such action unless those states consulted express agreement." (795.00/11–2750)

information. (The message is contained in the Department's Top Secret cable 2752 of November 24.[2]) Mr. Rusk added that the UN Commander was anxious to take full advantage of favorable terrain in determining where troops will be halted.

Mr. Rusk stated that we had some intelligence, the reliability of which was unknown, that Chinese communists were cancelling all contracts which called for delivery of goods from Hong Kong later than November 30. This might imply some threat to Hong Kong. He assumed that the British had the same intelligence but would see that it was passed to them. Ambassador Franks said that he did not know of any such intelligence.

Mr. Rusk referred to the fact that the Soviets had published the memorandum regarding the Japanese peace treaty which had been circulated to the members of the FEC.[3] This might have been done for strictly propaganda purposes if the Russians did not think negotiations on a peace treaty would lead anywhere. Hence, they might wish to seize the propaganda initiative. A more serious speculation was that the Russians might use it to tie in with their claims that Japanese forces were being used in Korea and might relate it to invoking the Sino-Russian treaty. It seemed useful to trying to figure out why the Russians had acted as they did.

Ambassador Franks said that the British Chargé in Peiping had seen the Deputy Foreign Minister who had listened with great attention to the British message (disclaiming any intention to invade Chinese soil or injure Chinese interests). The Deputy Foreign Minister had asked for the promptest possible delivery of the Chinese text of the British message.

Mr. Rusk said that he had been asked whether the timing of the UN offensive in Korea had had any relation to the arrival of the Chinese communist delegation in New York. He had answered that it had not.

[Annex]

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Franks)

SECRET [WASHINGTON, November 24, 1950]

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I refer to our conversation of Wednesday[4] about certain aspects of our Korean policy.

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[2] Transmitted at 8 p. m. on November 24, p. 1228.

[3] The text of the memorandum is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 4, 1950, p. 881. For documentation on the Japanese peace treaty, see vol. VI, pp. 1109 ff.

[4] November 23.

Please assure Mr. Bevin that the objectives of the United Nations Commander in the field are no more and no less than the stated objectives of the United Nations as expressed in its resolutions and that the United States directives to the United Nations Commander have as their purpose nothing more than the attainment of declared United Nations objectives. This assurance is hardly necessary in view of the statement of the President last week on the same subject. The reason why these directives are not made public is that, as Mr. Bevin properly suggests, it would not be in the interest of our common cause to reveal operational military directives during the course of the campaign.

I see no reason why Mr. Bevin cannot assure the House of Commons in terms of the three points contained in paragraph 5 of the message from him which you discussed with me on Wednesday.

I should be most happy to exchange with Mr. Bevin assurances that we shall both, in so far as we are able, seek to concert our policy and our action with respect to Korea and to maintain full and close consultation for that purpose.

For the reasons mentioned by Mr. Bevin, it is not possible for the Security Council to issue detailed military instructions to General MacArthur.

There would be some difficulty in our undertaking a formal commitment not to proceed with our United Nations responsibilities in Korea without the express agreement of individual members of the Security Council in cases where one or another of them may fear that action will be taken which would be beyond the United Nations mandate. The problem may be more theoretical than practical in view of our strong determination to act closely with our friends in accordance with United Nations policy, but a governmental commitment could not be offered on the basis of such a broadly defined concept and without some consideration of the circumstances attending the issue if it should arise.

That it is most unlikely to arise is shown by the great restraint which the United Nations Command has shown during recent weeks under grave provocation and considerable danger, by the constant consultation which this government has carried on with other interested governments, including His Majesty's Government, and by the concerting of views which has been achieved.

[DEAN ACHESON]

795.00/11–2450 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1950—8 p. m.

2752. Please deliver to Mr. Bevin immediately following personal message from the Secretary:

"I have just received word from our London Embassy that you have agreed not to present the proposal for a demilitarized zone in Korea before the arrival in New York of the Chi Commie Del on the understanding that the six-power res is not to be voted on before then. Since the del arrived today and since there will probably be a meeting of the SC early next week, I wish to lay before you in more detail than was possible in the brief message transmitted through Sir Oliver Franks on Nov 21 why I have the gravest apprehensions regarding the presentation of any such proposal pending such clarification and reconsideration of the situation following Gen MacArthur's offensive. My reasons are as follows:

1. Your proposal contemplates the creation of a very considerable demilitarized zone in NK. Your message of Nov 13 suggested that it would include an area running roughly from Hungnam to Chongju in the west. Gen MacArthur's forces in the west are taking off from positions which at many points are already north of this line in an endeavor to defeat the enemy and drive them from the proposed demilitarized area in the west. In the east a substantial part of his forces are already considerably to the north of this line both along the coast and inland. Therefore, to make such a proposal at any time in the near future in the UN would be suggesting that we abandon considerable areas and population in the east which had already been brought within UN protection and in the west that we should abandon positions which may be of very considerable military importance to secure, and for which Gen MacArthur's forces would at the very moment be putting forth a great effort under adverse circumstances and undoubtedly heavy losses. The effect of such a proposal on the conduct of military operations upon the morale of the troops, upon the morale of the Koreans and upon public opinion in the US which has furnished the great bulk of the troops would, in my opinion, be disastrous. I do not think that it is possible to fight a war or to maintain the support of the population in Korea under these circumstances.

2. Furthermore, I do not think that it is possible at this time to say that the proposal if adopted would have the benefits claimed for it. The idea of a demilitarized zone is to remove contending forces from it and interpose a buffer between them. Your message of the 13th indicates the gravest doubts as to whether the NK forces can be removed from the demilitarized territory under your proposal. So long as there is no assurance about continued organized NK resistance, I do not see how we can have any real assurance as to how the Chi, even if withdrawn from NK, can be kept from returning under such a proposal as you make. If our own forces are withdrawn from the territory and enemy forces continue to occupy it, all that we would have done under

the proposal, as suggested, would be to remove the frontier considerably to the south and hamper operations without resulting benefit.

3. It also seems to me that the effect of the proposal at this time and of this nature upon the Commie Del and its Govt would be unfortunate. I believe it would be taken by them as a starting point for negotiations to obtain something much more favorable to them and as an indication of the greatest weakness upon our part. I think that we will hurt rather than advance the prospect of aiding the situation by negotiation if at this time and in this way we put forward the proposal you suggest.

4. Under these circumstances, it seems to me of the greatest importance that Gen MacArthur's operation be given every support by the UN and by the countries contributing forces. The results of his operation will make much more clear many matters which are now obscure, the strength and effectiveness of the Chi forces, the intention and capacity of the Commie authorities to support and reinforce them, etc. If these matters become clearer, a number of alternatives will emerge, among which we would now not wish finally to choose. By taking present military requirements as a starting point, we may be able to stabilize the political situation by proposals which originate from a position of strength and which will help to end the fighting and achieve the results of the UN on a more permanent basis.

5. I do not think I need to dwell upon the possible divisive effects of making such a proposal under the circumstances, as outlined above. I think it is an understatement to say that the reaction to it in this country at the moment that our troops are making a great effort would be most violent.

6. I think we are all trying to do the same thing—that is, to devise ways in which political action and negotiation help in the most effective way to bring about the end of the fighting and the unification of Korea under circumstances which will amply assure its neighbors that neither the UN nor any of its members have the faintest hostile intention toward them. We are, as you know, working on possible measures which would keep western forces away from direct contact with Chi or Russian forces at the Korean frontier and which would clearly demonstrate that UN forces in Korea have no purposes beyond those set by the UN. I do believe most strongly, however, that the putting forward of any proposal at this particular time would do the greatest damage.

I have given you all my thoughts on this subject because I am deeply conscious of the gravity of the ensuing days and of the far-reaching consequences of any misstep. I shall continue, as I have in the past, to keep in the closest touch with Sir Oliver Franks and through him with you."

Dept. believes it might be useful for you to discuss the general lines of the above with Salisbury and Eden [1] without indicating that you had delivered formal message to Bevin on subject.

ACHESON

[1] The Marquess of Salisbury and Anthony Eden were respectively Leader of the Opposition in the House of Lords and Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons.

330/11–2450 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 24, 1950—8:21 p. m.
[Received November 24—9:08 p. m.]

885. Re Chinese Communists in SC: Gross called on Bebler to discuss various tactics. Bebler indicated that he sees situation as opportunity for Yugoslavs to have useful contact with CCP representative from point of view of Yugoslav interests.

Jebb had called on him and they agreed Formosan item should be first on SC agenda, since CCP representative unwilling to discuss MacArthur report. However, when Gross suggested as alternative that two items of Formosa and Korea be bracketed for simultaneous debate, Bebler was sympathetic although he did not commit himself. He agreed that bracketing items had certain advantages in that the USSR would have difficulty in objecting, and it would avoid CCP representative being out of order in discussing Korea. He saw advantage from US point of view in having ROK representative seated at the table during entire discussion. However, he feels it likely that whatever happens there may be a sharp issue raised by CCP as a matter of prestige to establish first of all that there are no strings attached to their invitation. He seemed to indicate agreement that Tuesday afternoon [1] would be good time for SC meeting.

Bebler stated in some detail what he proposed to say to CCP representative. He would point out that UN members are obligated to seek peaceful settlement of pending issues and that US as UN member is eager to do so. Also recent GA resolution obligates permanent members to confer and that extends to this issue.[2] Of course someone must initiate and make arrangements for consultation and as SC President Bebler feels that he is appropriate person and that by doing so situation would be avoided after 1 December for Tsiang to control negotiations. He proposes to contact CCP representative today or Saturday [3] and suggest meeting probably at Lake Success. He will point out to them that upon the way they conduct themselves depends whether tension is heightened leading toward war or an agreed settlement can be reached.

In commenting on this line, Gross emphasized that this is not a bilateral dispute between CCP and US but it is a charge by CCP against

[1] November 28.
[2] Reference is to Iraqi-Syrian draft resolution which was incorporated as part C of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 377(V), November 3, 1950, the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution; see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950*, pp. 189–190, 195. For related documentation, see vol. II, pp. 303 ff.
[3] November 25.

UN as a whole. Therefore it would be unfortunate if any individual acting as mediator created a contrary impression. As to the US attitude as UN member Gross stated we are entirely willing to discuss any of the issues now in the UN with CCP representative but it would not be correct to say we are eager to do so. Also Bebler should know that with an important military offensive in progress we should do nothing that might hamper in any way its successful conclusion by premature decisions as to the form of consultations. Gross also observed that there will perhaps be other self-appointed mediators, mentioning in this connection the Indians. Bebler commented that he understood US position but wondered whether presence of the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits is not in reality a bilateral issue since no UN action is involved.

Gross referred in passing to the Indians thinking about a resolution creating a subcommittee of six non-permanent members to negotiate with CCP representative. He thought this would be a questionable device which in any case would be vetoed by USSR and by Chinese Nationalist representative. Bebler was sympathetic but stressed importance of perhaps an informal arrangement to make possible centralizing negotiation CCP if Tsiang becomes President. He mentioned precedent of GA President in Greek case. Gross mentioned SC precedent in Berlin case and agreed that it would be desirable for Tsiang to step down as SC President not only on Formosa item but also on Korean item.

It was agreed that Bebler will call us as soon as and if he has seen CCP representative and will be on a standby basis over the week-end.

AUSTIN

795.00/11–2550 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, 25 November 1950.
[Received November 25—6 : 11 a. m.]

C–69808. Reurmsg W–97287.[1] The concern underlying the search for the means to confine the spread of the Korean conflict is fully understood and shared here, but it is believed that the suggested approach would not only fail to achieve the desired result but would be provocative of the very consequences we seek to avert.

In the first place from a military standpoint my personal reconnaisance of the Yalu River line yesterday demonstrated conclusively that it would be utterly impossible for us to stop upon commanding

[1] Dated November 24, p. 1222.

terrain south of the river as suggested and there be in a position to hold under effective control its lines of approach to North Korea. The terrain ranging from the lowlands in the west to the rugged central and eastern sectors is not adaptable to such a system of defense were we, for any reason, to sacrifice the natural defense features of the river line itself, features to be found in no other natural defense line in all of Korea. Nor would it be either militarily or politically defensible to yield this natural protective barrier safeguarding the territorial integrity of Korea.

Moreover any failure on our part to prosecute the military campaign through to the achievement of its public and oft repeated objective of destroying all enemy forces south of Korea's northern boundary as essential to the restoration of unity and peace to all of Korea would be fraught with most disastrous consequences. It would be regarded by the Korean people as a betrayal of their sovereign and territorial integrity and of the solemn undertaking the United Nations entered into in their behalf, and by the Chinese and all the other peoples of Asia as weakness reflected from the appeasement of Communist aggression. As pointed out in my message C–68572 of 9 November,[2] such action as tribute to international lawlessness and aggression would but encourage further international lawlessness and aggression. Furthermore, the political tension existing between the two countries requires that the international boundary be closed to reduce to a minimum lawless border incidents including bandit raids and smuggling and such action could not be effected if there existed a border zone beyond our immediate control.

Study of the Soviet and Peiping propaganda line discloses little to suggest any major concern over the potentiality of United Nations control of the southern banks of the Yalu River. Even what has been said concerning the hydroelectric facilities in North Korea is for the most part a product of British-American speculation, finding little reflection in any Soviet or Chinese utterances. Indeed, our info on these facilities and the disposition abroad of their power output fails to confirm that dependence upon this source of power is a major factor in the basic causes giving rise to the Chinese aggressive moves in Korea. Thus despite the fact that these hydro-electric facilities at Changjun brought under control of the X Corps had been closed down completely for a full month prior to the arrival of our forces with much of the vital machinery and other equip removed and dispersed and are not yet restored to operation, no suggestion of complaint has emanated from Soviet or Chinese sources over the deprivation of power consequent thereto. In view of these factual considerations one is brought to

[2] *Ante*, p. 1107.

the conclusion that the issue of hydro-electric power rests upon the most tenuous of grounds.

The entry of Chinese Communists into the Korean conflict was a risk we knowingly took at the time we committed our forces. Had they entered at the time we were beleaguered behind our Pusan perimeter beachhead, the hazard would have been far more grave than it is now that we hold the initiative and have a much smaller area within which to interdict their hostile moves. Our forces are committed to seize the entire border area, and indeed in the east have already occupied a sector of the Yalu River with no noticeable political or military Soviet or Chinese reaction. We have repeatedly and publicly made it unmistakably clear that we entertain no aggressive designs whatsoever against any part of Chinese or Soviet territory. It is my plan just as soon as we are able to consolidate positions along the Yalu River to replace as far as possible American Forces with those of the Republic of Korea and publicly announce orders effecting:

(1) The return of American Forces to Japan;
(2) The parole of all prisoners of war to their homes;
(3) The leaving of the unification of Korea and the restoration of the civil processes of government to the people, with the advice and assistance of The United Nations authorities.

I believe that the prompt implementation of this plan as soon as our military objectives have been reached will effectively appeal to reason in the Chinese mind. If it will not, then the resulting situation is not one which might be influenced by bringing to a halt our military measures short of present commitments. By resolutely meeting those commitments and accomplishing our military mission as so often publicly delineated lies best—indeed only—hope that Soviet and Chinese aggressive designs may be checked before these countries are committed to a course from which for political reasons they cannot withdraw.

795.00/11–2550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 25, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received November 25—7:36 a. m.]

444. Continuing Embtel 435 November 24 and previous on Chinese activity in north, UN units jumping off yesterday morning in 8th Army sector made advances ranging up to 10 miles without meeting more than nominal enemy (including Chinese) resistance. Few if any Chinese troops were encountered and no reports were received from Chinese POWs taken. Another 30 wounded US soldiers from 1st

Cavalry Division were reportedly recovered during yesterday's drive. Offensive continuing this morning with little enemy resistance except counterattacks early this morning against ROK 1st Division in Taechon area.

In X Corps area elements of US 7th Division pursuing enemy remnants along Manchurian border short distance southwest of Hyesanjin 24th reported receiving long range fire which appeared come from Manchuria.

Aerial reconnaissance late yesterday and last night of forward areas indicated light enemy vehicle movement, with most of it concentrated Sakchu–Kusong area. Considerable railway movement northward (from 4 to 6 trains) was observed in Kanggye–Manpojin area.

A flash report from Pyongyang suggests one Stalin model tank was captured yesterday; this report should be treated with reserve pending further investigation.

[MUCCIO]

795.00/11–2550 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

LONDON, November 25, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received November 25—1:31 p. m.]

3076. I saw Bevin this noon and handed him message contained in Deptel 2752, November 24. He said he had already received "bulk" of message from Franks and that there had apparently been some misunderstanding regarding his attitude as he had no desire to upset applecart and Jebb was already under specific instruction to take no action re Korean resolution in absence of definite authorization, instructions which would be reiterated.

He stated that he agreed there was nothing to be gained by introducing his proposed resolution at this moment but is obviously preoccupied with his internal political situation (see in this connection Embtel 3043, November 24[1]) and anxious to take any positive constructive action which may prove practicable and helpful. He said he hoped our action could be "synchronized" in New York but added jokingly that this did not mean he was promising not to take independent action. He gave definite impression that for time being at least we need have no worries that he will take precipitate action re Korea.

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[1] Not printed. It reported on a growing feeling of concern both in Parliament and the country at large regarding the Government's shortcomings in the conduct of its foreign and defense policies. The concern was related to fear of a drift toward another war, misgivings over the economic consequences of rearmament, and apprehension over General MacArthur's headstrong policies in the Far East. (741.00/11–2450)

In light of Bevin's helpful attitude, I feel it would serve no useful purpose to talk with Salisbury and Eden as suggested in last paragraph reftel, and in view Foreign Minister's delicate situation re opposition particularly in connection with Parliamentary Foreign Affairs debate scheduled for coming week, such action might have most unfortunate repercussions. Will, therefore, take no action on this line unless Department feels strongly on subject.

Repeated info USUN New York 49, Department pass USUN.

HOLMES

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its 525th meeting on Monday, November 27, from 3 to 6:15 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.525.

The President of the Council, Ales Bebler of Yugoslavia, proposed that two items be considered together: Complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa) and complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea. After prolonged discussion of the question, provoked by the objection of the Soviet Representative (Malik) to combining these two items on the agenda, the Council, by a vote of 7 to 1 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), with 3 abstentions (Ecuador, Egypt, and India), rejected a Soviet amendment to Mr. Bebler's proposal.

Before the adjournment of the meeting, the representative of the People's Republic of China, Wu Hsiu-chuan, took a place at the Council table.

795.00/11–2750: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 27, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received November 27—5:46 p. m.]

455. Yesterday UN elements in Eighth Army sector ran into heavy enemy opposition except on west flank. Last night and early this morning enemy units counter-attacked at numerous points between Taechon area in west and Yongwon area in east. Both Chinese and North Korean elements appear involved in counter-attacks, with Chinese reported concentrated mainly in Taechon-Unsan area. Enemy counter-attacking forces were well equipped with artillery, mortar and executed skillful infiltrating movements.

Yesterday for first time within week hostile aircraft were active over North Korea. Three Mig jets were observed taking off from Sinuiju

Airfield. About 8 o'clock last night a single transport-type enemy aircraft dropped leaflets over Pyongyang. Leaflets were addressed to Pyongyang citizens, told them Chinese and North Korean military forces were meeting success in military operations and invited them to create disruption behind lines. At 8:30 last night hostile fighter strafed Suichon and few minutes later another hostile aircraft dropped a few light bombs on Hongju.

Last night about 200 vehicles were observed moving along Huichon-Kanggye road and northwest from Kanggye to Manchurian border, one train was seen moving north between Huichon and Kanggye.

MUCCIO

THE PERIOD FROM NOVEMBER 28 TO DECEMBER 31, 1950: CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA; THE KOREAN QUESTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS; THE TRUMAN–ATTLEE DISCUSSIONS; RETREAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES

795.00/11–2850 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
FLASH

TOKYO, 28 November 1950—4:45 p. m.
[Received November 28—4:46 a. m.]

C 69953. The developments resulting from our assault mvmts have now assumed a clear definition. All hope of localization of the Korean conflict to enemy forces composed of North Korean troops with alien token elements can now be completely abandoned. The Chinese military forces are committed in North Korea in great and ever increasing strength. No pretext of minor support under the guise of volunteerism or other subterfuge now has the slightest validity. We face an entirely new war. Interrogation of prisoners of war and other intelligence info establish the following enemy order of battle, exclusive of North Korean elements, as reported by commanders in the field: 38, 39, 40, 42, 66, 50 and 20 CCF armies and 6 additional divisions without army identification, comprising an aggregate strength approaching 200,000. The North Korean fragments, approximating 50,000 troops, are to be added to this strength.

The pattern of Chinese strategy is now quite clear. Immediately after the Inchon operation the center of gravity of the Chinese forces was moved northward in China with heavy concentrations of their troops in Manchuria and a surreptitious mvmt by night infiltration of their organized forces into North Korea under the protection of the sanctuary of neutrality. After checking the United Nations advance toward the Yalu late in October, following the destruction of the North Korean forces, the Chinese partially broke contact before launching a general offensive in order to build up in overwhelming strength, presumably for a spring offensive. Their ultimate objective was undoubtedly a decisive effort aimed at the complete destruction of all United Nations forces in Korea. At the present moment the freezing of the Yalu River increasingly opens up avenues of reinforcement and supply which it is

impossible for our air potential to interdict. It is quite evident that our present strength of force is not sufficient to meet this undeclared war by the Chinese with the inherent advantages which accrue thereby to them. The resulting situation presents an entire new picture which broadens the potentialities to world embracing considerations beyond the sphere of decision by the Theater Commander. This command has done everything humanly possible within its capabilities but is now faced with conditions beyond its control and its strength.

As directed by your JCS 92801 DTG 272240Z Sept. 50,[1] as amplified by your JCS 93709 DTG 092205Z Oct 50, my strategic plan for the immediate future is to pass from the offensive to the defensive with such local adjustments as may be required by a constantly fluid situation.

[1] See footnote 2, p. 793.

795.00/11–2850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 28, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received November 28—3 : 10 a. m.]

462. Embtel 455, November 27. Excluding coastal area around Chongju, enemy yesterday and early this morning applied extremely heavy pressure to UN forces all along line in 8th Army sector. Enemy attack characterized by use massed manpower, artillery, rockets and mortars, but no air support. Enemy attack of such power and intensity is regarded in local military circles as general offensive and not series of counterattacks as first believed case. 8th Army intelligence estimates on basis information currently available there now 149,000 enemy troops in line versus UN forces, of whom 101,000 estimated to be Chinese. Considerable number Chinese captured past few days but no breakdown available. 8th Army intelligence believes in addition CCF already reported CCF 50th and 66th Armies are in field northwest Korea sector.

There were no hostile aircraft observed over North Korea yesterday. However at three o'clock this morning hostile aircraft dropped bombs in vicinity Pyongyang airfield. Air observation revealed enemy vehicular movement was light last night, only about 80 vehicles being observed. These were noted mainly on roads from Sinuiju to Chongju and from Sakchu to Kusong. One train each observed moving south from Sinuiju and Sakchu. Also one train noted moving north from Kanggye to Manpojin.

MUCCIO

795.00/11–2850

Memorandum by the Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1950.

Subject: Steps which might be taken in the light of all-out Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

Military Action

It is obvious that in the light of new Chinese Communist aggression in Korea and its serious implications as reflected in MacArthur's communiqué of this morning[1] that UN capabilities for carrying out its original objectives of restoring peace and security to the area and, following that, of withdrawing UN forces as quickly as possible, cannot now be carried out except at the cost of all-out war with Communist China. The U.S. cannot now afford this course and its policy under NSC 81/1[2] makes clear that if UN forces are confronted in Korea with Soviet troops no further move should be made to aggravate the situation. All-out Chinese involvement in Korea against the UN forces carries with it a strong implication of Soviet involvement through the Sino-Soviet treaty and present developments could easily lead to the invoking of this treaty.

As a result of the foregoing considerations it now seems evident that U.S. and UN policy in relation to Korea must be carefully and, at the same time, urgently reconsidered. If the original objectives cannot be attained what lesser objectives should be sought? Much will depend upon the ability of the UN forces substantially to hold what has already been taken. Militarily, for instance, if the present line cannot be held, a shorter one running from Sinanju to Hungnam might be maintained. If this is the case, then diplomatic measures should be taken to resolve the question by establishing in Korea north of this line a demilitarized zone from which both Chinese and UN forces would withdraw. Such an arrangement admittedly would be undesirable and would lead to the possibility or even probability of renewed aggression by the North Koreans against the ROK at some future time. The British proposal of a 50 mile neutralized zone south of the Yalu and Tumen rivers would now hold out no hope of acceptance by the Communists at this late date.

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[1] General MacArthur's Special Communiqué No. 14, issued at 5:25 p. m. Tokyo time (3:25 a. m. EST), reported on the Chinese Communist military offensive in Korea along the general lines of telegram C 69953, received at 4:46 a. m. on November 28, p. 1237; the text of the Communiqué is printed in U.N. document S/1920. It concluded with the following statement:

"This situation, repugnant as it may be, poses issues beyond the authority of the United Nations military council—issues which must find their solution within the councils of the United Nations and chancelleries of the world."

[2] Dated September 9, p. 712.

If it becomes impossible to hold the line referred to above then successive withdrawals will have to be made as necessity dictates until the 38th parallel is reached. If in turn the 38th parallel line cannot be maintained then every effort should be made to strengthen the ROK forces with what equipment is now in Korea. UN ground forces should be disengaged and withdrawn but air and naval support should continue to be rendered. Consideration might also be given to assisting Chinese Nationalist forces now on Formosa to come to the aid of the ROK. This would include water transportation and naval and air protection of convoys. The Seventh Fleet should be withdrawn and no further inhibitions placed upon actions of the Chinese Nationalists. American and/or other UN garrisons in Japan should be reinforced. Chinese Nationalist forces should forthwith be given a maximum of U.S. military aid.

Political Action

A resolution by the Security Council (after Soviet veto, then by the General Assembly) should be passed, condemning Chinese Communist aggression in Korea. All States should be called upon to refrain from aiding or assisting Communist China in any manner as long as her forces remain in Korea. Sanctions should be considered against any state violating this injunction. The resolution should explain that in order to avoid the spread of war due to Chinese Communist unlawful intervention in Korea in defiance of the UN it has been necessary to stop short of a full achievement of UN objectives in Korea, that in so doing the UN has been guided only by *force majeure* and through its desire to limit the conflict. Communist China might be called an international outlaw against the peace of the world and treated as an outcast in international relations. The resolution should pledge the continued interest of the UN in a settlement of the Korean problem.

General

Once the military situation has become clearer, immediate and urgent consultations should be had with the various governments contributing armed forces to the UN operations before any of the above steps are undertaken. The unanimity of the UN must be preserved at all costs to meet the test of the future.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on Tuesday, November 28, from 10:45 a. m. to 1:45 p. m.; see U.N. document S/PV.526. A pro-

posal by the Soviet Representative that the delegate from the People's Republic of China be heard first was defeated by a vote of 8 to 1 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), with 2 abstentions (India and Yugoslavia). Most of the meeting was devoted to a lengthy statement by Ambassador Austin wherein he accused the Chinese Communists of aggression in Korea, outlined United States policy in Korea and Formosa, reviewed the history of Sino-American relations, and asked questions of the Chinese delegate aimed at clarifying the number, organization, and composition of the Chinese volunteers in Korea. He also questioned whether the People's Republic of China was ready to abide by the central paragraph in the six-power draft resolution calling on all states and authorities to refrain from assisting North Korea.

795.00/11–2850 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

LONDON, November 28, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received November 28—1 : 11 p. m.]

3117. Personal for Secretary. Bevin called me to Foreign Office this afternoon. He said he had just read MacArthur's communiqué and in view of his anticipated difficulties in Parliament tomorrow and his desire to say nothing that would upset apple cart he wanted me to ask you personally for an "appreciation of the situation" which would assist him in tomorrow's debate. He would be grateful for this appreciation as urgently as possible hoping it might arrive before he retires tonight or at the latest first thing in the morning.

Bevin's mood was friendly and understanding but he anticipates he will face questions tomorrow along line of "is MacArthur getting us into full-scale war with China" and naturally wants as much ammunition as possible to use in reply.

Would appreciate immediate niact reply to be followed by any later information which can be received here before 3 : 30 local time tomorrow afternoon when Bevin scheduled to speak.

HOLMES

795.00/11–2850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1950.

Subject: Notes on NSC Meeting, November 28th, 3:00 p m
The White House

Participants:		
	The President	Secretary Acheson
	The Vice President	Mr. Matthews
	General Marshall	Mr. Rusk
	General Bradley	Mr. Nitze
	Mr. Frank Pace	Mr. Jessup
	General Collins	Mr. Finletter
	General Vandenberg	Mr. Lay
	Secretary Snyder	
	Mr. Averell Harriman	
	Mr. Stuart Symington	
	Mr. Lovett	
	Admiral Sherman	
	General Bedell Smith	

THE PRESIDENT asked Secretary Acheson if he had any comments to make.

SECRETARY ACHESON said he had been on the Hill all day and would rather hear about the military situation first from General Marshall and General Bradley.

GENERAL BRADLEY sketched the military situation on the map. He said that the questions which were now before us involved MacArthur's message that we were now facing a new war and whether a new directive should be issued to him. The JCS think no new directive is needed now although it may be after 48 or 72 hours had elapsed. MacArthur will be taking a defensive position pending UN action. It is desirable to wait for clarification. The country from which the enemy is launching its present attack is extremely mountainous with few roads and they may have transportation difficulties in sustaining it. Perhaps a little later we may wish to issue a new directive as executive agent or secure one from the UN.

There are some 300 aircraft back in Manchuria, including 200 two-engine bombers. They could strike a severe blow. The JCS do not think we should violate the border pending developments. Our airfields, both in Korea and Japan, are crowded and we are depending heavily on an airlift. Our fields are therefore very vulnerable. So are our road convoys. One enemy plane dropped a few bombs on one field and damaged six of our planes.

THE PRESIDENT asked whether we had any defense against such air attacks.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said not without bombing their airfields or without pulling back some of our planes to Japan to get them out of danger.

GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the meeting this morning of their Policy Committee which was attended by Dean Rusk and Averell Harriman. He had asked each of the three secretaries and the JCS to state their individual views. He had then asked the three secretaries and the JCS separately to formulate their views. He read a memorandum [1] prepared by the three secretaries. This memorandum proceeds on the following assumptions. We are engaged with other members of the UN in suppressing a Korean aggression. We are now faced by a new Chinese aggression. We should act through the UN and not individually. It is possible to hold a line. While the Chinese Communist action is dictated in large measure by the Politburo we should not publicly hold the USSR responsible now. Our purposes are to fulfill our UN obligations but not to become individually or as a member of the UN involved in general war in China with the Chinese Communists. To do this would be to fall into a carefully laid Russian trap. We should use all available political, economic and psychological action to limit the war. Strong military support is needed for the localized action. We should not go into Chinese Communist territory and we should not use Chinese Nationalist forces. To do either of these things would increase the danger of war with the Chinese Communists. We need a more rapid build-up in the West. We should increase the number of UN troops, other than US and have them available in Korea regardless of whether we have to pay for them. We should press for the second supplemental 1951 appropriation at once and give Congress notice we will need more. The 1952 budget should be revised. We should accelerate instead of decelerate, accelerating production and production facilities as a matter of special emphasis.

GENERAL MARSHALL made comments on this paper as follows: There should be no cuts in the estimates of personnel and materiel needed. In the next two weeks we should work in the UN and maintain our position in Korea. We should not now try to change our budgetary figures. We should find a way to go along with the UN approach without involving injury to our troops. A very difficult question is the danger of Chinese aerial bombardment to which our troops are not accustomed. This would pose a most difficult question. The question on how to line up our allies in the UN is for the State Department. He stressed once

[1] Not printed.

more the view of the three secretaries that we should not get into war with the Chinese Communists. He suggested that the general attitude in the UN would probably not complicate our decision in that respect.

GENERAL BRADLEY said we should not call out more National Guard or other units at this time. There are no more ground troops which we could now send. MacArthur has enough there and Navy. The situation may change in one or two weeks. The JCS feel just as strongly as the three secretaries that we should not be pulled into a war with the Chinese. Regarding extra UN forces, the JCS want them to be militarily effective if possible but could take them on a less satisfactory basis if the State Department thinks this is desirable for political reasons.

GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the situation in the Northeast part of Korea. One question was how the gap in the line could be filled in at its eastern end. This is a problem for General MacArthur. GENERAL MARSHALL assumes that he will withdraw his advanced forces. It is a problem to be considered here in Washington regarding involvement in a general conflict with the Chinese Communists but it would not be helpful to interfere in MacArthur's operations on the spot.

SECRETARY PACE spoke of the status of replacements in the United States. The only unit which would be available is the 82nd Airborne. The National Guard would not be ready until March 15th. Filter replacements will not be available until after January. The first new divisions could be ready to move March 1st which would give four months training of selectees.

THE VICE PRESIDENT spoke of General MacArthur's statement about getting the troops home by Christmas.[2] He wanted to know whether he did make the statement and, if so, did he know what was pending and if he did know, why did he make it.

THE PRESIDENT said that MacArthur did make the statement and the Vice President would have to draw his own conclusions as to why.

THE VICE PRESIDENT said that he couldn't have known about the Chinese Communists if he made the statement in good faith. He couldn't have gotten the boys home anyway.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether anyone could help supply an answer to the Vice President's questions.

SECRETARY PACE said he understood General MacArthur officially denied the statement.

MR. LOVETT said that they had the transcript of his statement but the General said there had been some misinterpretation of it. The statement was however made.

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[2] See Whitney, *MacArthur*, p. 416.

GENERAL BRADLEY suggested that General MacArthur might have had in mind making the statement for the effect it would have on the Chinese in order to make it clear to them that we would get out after the attack.

THE PRESIDENT said we could not cause the Commanding General in the field to lose face before the enemy. Loads of questions will be asked about this and he was glad that the Vice President had brought it up.

THE VICE PRESIDENT said that the statement was causing much speculation as to whether it was a hoax. He said, of course, the discussion of this matter here was strictly confidential in the room. He had great respect for General MacArthur's ability.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that General MacArthur had full confidence in the success of his attack. He had no inkling of the strength of the concentration in the high mountains on the right of his position. He had not supposed that so strong a force could be mounted from that area. It certainly was no hoax.

GENERAL MARSHALL said we would regard the statement as an embarrassment which we must get around in some manner. The present report of 200,000 Chinese was very much in excess of previous estimates but they are skillful in concealing themselves in that terrain. He referred to the meeting with the Secretary of State a few days ago in which, while he was present, they discussed plans on the basis of the assumption that General MacArthur would be successful. At that time he had considered it much harder to decide what should be done if he was not successful. The answer was not clear to him.

THE VICE PRESIDENT said that it was possible that they might put in even more men than now estimated. The prospect was very gloomy unless we could get more men in.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this was a gloomy possibility and that he did not know the answer. We want to avoid getting sewed up in Korea and how could we get out with honor.

THE VICE PRESIDENT pointed to the difference between war with the Chinese Communists and the problem of holding Korea.

GENERAL BRADLEY read the directive to MacArthur based on NSC 81/2,[3] explaining that this authorized him under the present circumstances to go on the defensive.

GENERAL COLLINS said we can get individual replacements after January 1 but no new units until March 1. A rather steady flow of replacements to meet losses could begin after the first of the year. These would fill the shortage in present units now in Korea which are short

[3] Dated November 14, p. 1150.

by thirty or forty percent. He thought that we could hold the line in the narrow neck unless the Tenth Corps is cut off.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought we could hold the line.

GENERAL BEDELL SMITH said that we had known for some time the size of the Chinese Communists forces in Manchuria which totalled about 500,000 men.

SECRETARY ACHESON said we were much closer to the danger of general war. He pointed out the need for understanding that there had always been a Chinese Communist involvement in Korea. There had been a progressive uncloaking of the extent of this involvement until now there was a fullscale attack. Behind this there was always the Soviet Union which was a more somber consideration. We must consider Korea not in isolation but in the world-wide problem of confronting the Soviet Union as an antagonist. There were certain objectives to reach and dangers to avoid. He thought the memorandum of the three secretaries and the comments by General Marshall were very wise. Our political purpose must including going forward in the UN to uncloak the Chinese Communist aggression. He agreed entirely that we would not, at this time, say the USSR is responsible because we could not do anything about following such a charge against the Soviet Union due to the attitude of our allies. It is clear, however, that we should charge the Chinese Communists with aggression. We should see what pressures we can put on the Chinese Communists to make life harder for them. He agreed with the three secretaries that it was not advantageous to involve the use of the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa. He had been asked about this on the Hill today. This question raised the problem of who would take them to China and who would bring them back if they ran into trouble.

General MacArthur has a new situation. We should be sure he understands his directive. He seems to have thought he had to occupy the northeast part of Korea. Perhaps we should tell him that from the UN and US point of view he need not occupy that territory. We want to achieve a termination of this involvement. We can't defeat the Chinese in Korea; they can put in more than we can. We should give very, very careful thought regarding air action in Manchuria. If this is essential to save our troops, it must be done. If we enter Manchuria it would be very hard to stop and very easy to extend the conflict. If we were successful in Manchuria, the Russians would probably enter to aid their Chinese ally without considering it war with us. We would get more deeply involved. One imperative step is to find a line that we can hold, and hold it. This would help meet the views of our allies and show them we are not aggressive and we await the next Chinese Communist move. We should know what line MacArthur thinks he can hold and we should press forward in the UN. We might

consider the question of a zone in North Korea. We should not say that we must push forward. We should hold the line and turn it over to the ROK as soon as can. Outside of Korea we must press faster to build our strength. We must liquidate the French objection to the development of the European Army.

SECRETARY SNYDER referred to the ticker item that the French Cabinet had just resigned.

MR. MATTHEWS reported that President Auriol had refused to accept Plevin's resignation.

SECRETARY SNYDER said that on the fiscal side everything was arranged for any action that was necessary.

MR. HARRIMAN called attention to the recent article in *Pravda* quoting from various papers in the United States. He urged that the President strongly assert his leadership in the United States and that the United States assert its leadership in the United Nations. He also urged that we move as rapidly as possible in our plans under the NAT.

THE PRESIDENT referred to the campaign of vilification and character assassination which has been going on in this country and that would constitute the best asset of the Soviet Union. He pointed out that he had made this remark at Key West some months ago. During the recent campaign, the Hearst, McCormick and other papers had fed that fight. We are confronted by certain facts and conditions and must meet them. He will meet them. The question was just how this should be done. In regard to sending a special message to Congress, he thought this was not desirable now. He did not think it desirable to have an individual approach to the problem pending UN action. He should, however, meet the campaign of vilification and lies in the United States.

THE VICE PRESIDENT said the situation was the same as he had found on his campaign tour. It was a diabolical attempt to poison the minds of the American people. We are in for a lot of trouble.

THE PRESIDENT repeated that we must meet it. He said that some would rather see the country go down than for the Administration to succeed. This was not true of all but it was of some.

MR. HARRIMAN said he was not sure that we will be able to rally our friends in the UN and in the NATO until the President asserts his leadership here in the United States.

THE PRESIDENT said that was a point which should be discussed.

MR. SYMINGTON said the most important thing was to get out of Korea as fast as possible. He said that labor and industry in this country don't know how serious the situation is. It was important for us to get strong as fast as we can even though we have to give up such things as refrigerators and television.

General Bedell Smith said the CIA did not wish to make any revision now in its intelligence estimate.

Mr. Finletter said that we had had a surprise on the ground and might get it in the air. Both Chinese and Russian units are available. A Chinese air attack alone would be very serious.

General Marshall said the MacArthur offensive was necessary in order to find out what the Communists were up to. Now we know.

The Vice President inquired whether there were any indications that the Chinese were willing to consider a peaceful settlement.

Secretary Acheson said there is no indication now that any arrangement could be made. He thought it would be disastrous for us simply to pull out of Korea at this stage.

Admiral Sherman said if there is an air attack from across the border we must hit back or we cannot stay there.

The President said he agreed and that we will meet that when it comes.

Admiral Sherman said we must face the fact that we cannot stay in the neck of Korea if we are under air attack.

The President asked what his estimate was about possible attacks on the Navy in Korean waters.

Admiral Sherman said they had 78 submarines in that vicinity.

Mr. Jessup noted the possibility that the Indian Delegation in the UN or some other delegation might come forward with a proposal for a cease-fire. If such a cease-fire proposal does not prevent the re-grouping of our forces, he wondered whether from the military point of view it would not be advantageous for us to agree.

The President said that that should be settled with the military.

(After the meeting General Collins expressed some doubt about such a cease-fire plan but said he wanted to think about it.)

Mr. Lovett said he wished to speak about NSC 68 [4] and the contemplated build-up. He said this might be the last warning for an increase of the rate of preparation and readiness. He thought the approach to the 1952 budget should be that we must get the most in the fastest way even if this results in "peaking" and dropping back later. He didn't want to do this but we may have to.

The Vice President said he should get what he needs now.

The President said the Vice President would sit up and take notice when he saw the proposals which were going to be submitted. They were getting these in shape.

The Vice President said that it ought to be ready; they had over two months to work on it since Congress adjourned.

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[4] The NSC 68 series dealt with US Programs and Objectives Relating to National Security; documentation is scheduled for publication in volume I.

THE PRESIDENT said they actually had only two weeks for various reasons which he would not go into.

MR. LAY inquired whether the President wished to have any decisions recorded and THE PRESIDENT said no.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its second meeting on November 28 from 3 to 6:50 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.527. Virtually the entire meeting was devoted to a lengthy statement by the delegate of the People's Republic of China, General Wu Hsiu-chuan, condemning United States policies in Taiwan and Korea. In conclusion, the Chinese delegate submitted the following draft resolution (S/1921), which was subsequently sponsored by the Soviet Union:

"*The Security Council*,

"*Recognizing* that the invasion and occupation of Taiwan by the armed forces of the Government of the United States of America constitute open and direct aggression against Chinese territory;

"*Recognizing* that the armed aggression against Chinese territory and the armed intervention in Korea by the armed forces of the Government of the United States of America have shattered peace and security in Asia and violated the United Nations Charter and international agreements,

"*Condemns* the Government of the United States of America for its criminal acts of armed aggression against the Chinese territory of Taiwan, and armed intervention in Korea;

"*Resolves* to demand the complete withdrawal by the Government of the United States of America of its forces of armed aggression from Taiwan, in order that peace and security in the Pacific and in Asia may be ensured; and further

"*Resolves* to demand the withdrawal from Korea of the armed forces of the United States of America and all other countries and to leave the people of North and South Korea to settle the domestic affairs of Korea themselves, so that a peaceful solution of the Korean question may be achieved."

795.00/11–2850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, November 28, 1950—8 p. m.

2810. Please express appreciation to Mr. Bevin for his inquiry Tues afternoon (urtel 3117 Nov 28) and give him following message. I recognize the difficulties which Mr. Bevin will face in Parliament to-

morrow and that these difficulties are not lessened by the lack of firm and final information on the immediate situation in Korea.

There is no doubt but that the Chi Commies have intervened with very large forces in an open and flagrant way in the fighting in Korea. There is also little chance that this intervention could have such limited purposes as securing their frontier, protecting hydro-electric installations or of providing token assistance to NK forces.

An important factor in the present situation is the unanimous and considered judgment of our JCS, supported by information from field commanders, that the present Chi offensive has been planned and staged over a considerable period of time. What in fact has happened is that two offensives ran into each other. This point is important not only because it removes any question that the Chi were merely reacting to the UN offensive but also because it clearly reveals an intention to attempt to destroy UN forces in NK. The Chi offensive was launched across a broad front, was well coordinated, had great depth and penetrating power, and involved a mass of troops in an operation which must, for military reasons, have been in motion for several days.

As Mr. Bevin knows, the timing of the attempted UN offensive was based on military factors and was not related to the arrival of the Chi Commie Del at Lake Success. There is every possibility, of course, that the Chi offensive was timed with such arrival in order to get maximum political effect.

The military position in Korea will continue to be confused for at least another day or two. We are sorely disappointed by the present situation. One of the purposes of our offensive was to clarify the situation. The lack of contact between the opposing forces for a period of two weeks was a serious factor in the surprise which we suffered as to the scale and disposition of enemy forces.

The present situation is serious but not in any sense disastrous. Two ROK divisions have suffered very heavily but the remainder of the UN forces are in good shape. The breakthrough obviously imposes problems of position and redeployment upon the UN Command. For Mr. Bevin's info, the present purpose of the Command is to stabilize the position along the general line of the narrow waist in NK.

In connection with the increased gravity of the position in Korea, you should reiterate the assurances I gave (Deptel 2776 Nov 27)[1] re the three questions raised by Mr. Bevin through Amb Franks. It is our purpose to deal with this massive and increasingly overt Chi aggression through the UN and not unilaterally. In arriving at our position, we will continue to consult closely with the UK and bear in

[1] The assurances referred to are covered in footnote 1 and the annex to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Jackson, dated November 24, 4:15 p. m., pp. 1225 and 1226, respectively.

mind the special interest of those nations represented by combat forces in Korea.

The scale of the Chi offensive makes it impossible to pretend that this is not an openly aggressive move by the Peiping regime. Amb Austin has stated this view in the SC. Please tell Mr. Bevin that our purposes in Korea remain the same, namely, to resist aggression, to localize the hostilities, and to wind up the Korean problem on a satisfactory UN basis and in such a way as not to commit US forces in large numbers indefinitely in that operation. We believe that the UN must make every possible effort to force the withdrawal of the Chi from Korea and so we believe it important that the six-power resolution receive urgent and favorable action.

This message does not purport to be a full examination of the problems arising from the present situation in Korea but is furnished after a quick review of the situation today in Washington and in order to be of some help to Mr. Bevin in the House tomorrow. Please tell Mr. Bevin we shall keep in close touch as the situation develops. I trust that Jebb's instructions will permit him to vote if resolution comes up Nov 29, as it may, even though prior to such vote he should prove unable to communicate with Chi leaders.

I expect to speak at Cleveland tomorrow night[2] and will say that we must meet the situation with resolution and firmness but that we are acting in Korea as a part of the UN and not unilaterally.

ACHESON

[2] See the editorial note, p. 1259.

795.00/11–2950: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 29, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received November 29—1:38 a. m.]

467. Embtel 462, November 28. Enemy forces, composed mainly of Chinese, continued exert heavy pressure yesterday in 8th Army sector, with main force being applied in center and on right flank where collapse of ROK Second Corps poses serious threat.

There was no reported enemy air activity yesterday. Aerial reconnaissance last night hampered by poor weather. However, 30 vehicles were observed moving south from Sinuiju and 25 south from Sakchu. Several trains were observed yesterday during daylight and last night moving along railways leading into Manchuria. Those seen moving during daylight were attacked with good results.

MUCCIO

795.00/11-2950

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 29, 1950.

Subject: Six-Power Security Council Draft Resolution on Korea

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
Mr. Dean Rusk, FE
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, NA

The British Ambassador, who called at his request, stated that because of British domestic political considerations he desired to ascertain whether there would be any proposal by the United States to amend the present six-power Security Council draft resolution on Korea. He stated that, while the British had no objection to whatever might be stated in debate with regard to the Chinese intervention in Korea, any attempt to amend the resolution to include a charge of aggression against China therein would at the moment pose political problems for the Foreign Minister. As there had been a Cabinet decision to support the resolution, the British could vote for it at any time, but if the resolution was amended he knew a Cabinet decision would be required. After checking with Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Rusk assured the Ambassador that we had no intention of amending the present resolution.

In reply to the Ambassador's question, Mr. Rusk stated that a decision had not yet been reached as to when or what action might be sought from the General Assembly upon the veto of the present resolution in the Security Council and that that was a matter which we would naturally desire to discuss with the British.

Mr. Rusk stated that very shortly there were other problems that we would desire to discuss with the British and, in reply to the Ambassador's request for an indication as to the type of thing we at present had in mind if a temporary stabilization of a line is achieved by UN forces in Korea, Mr. Rusk replied as follows:

1. How do we mobilize political and economic pressures on China?

2. It is now obvious that Chinese intervention in Korea had been planned over a long period, and it is probable that the decision to go into North Korea was taken in August, prior to the crossing of the 38th parallel by the UN forces. It also appears that the present Chinese offensive was launched without relation to the offensive of the UN forces. The question, therefore, is how we are to deal immediately with this disclosure of a larger threat and are the British and American estimates in this regard near alike. Also, how do we relate the UN General Assembly to the political and economic pressures needed to meet this threat?

In reply to the Ambassador's question on the present military situation, Mr. Rusk replied that the present problem was one of handling the Chinese Army attempt to split the Eighth Army and the X Corps. Mr. Rusk also mentioned the build-up of air strength in Manchuria and the grave danger that a sudden air onslaught from Manchuria would present to the UN forces which would have to fight back such an onslaught. Mr. Rusk raised with the Ambassador the question as to whether, in view of this danger, political action should be taken to make it clear that the onus and responsibility for any counter-attack that the UN forces might have to take against such an onslaught would rest with the Chinese Communists.

795.00/11–2950 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

TOP SECRET FLASH WASHINGTON, 29 November 1950—2 : 30 p. m.

JCS 97592. We approve your plan in last paragraph of your C 69953 [1] and any directive in conflict therewith is deferred. Strategic and tactical considerations are now paramount. What are your plans regarding the coordination of operations of the Eighth Army and X Corps and the positioning of X Corps the units of which appear to us to be exposed?

[1] Received at 4 : 46 a. m. on November 28, p. 1237.

795.00/11–2950 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 29 November 1950—2 : 35 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 97594. Your proposal (C 50021 [1]) is being considered. It involves world-wide consequences. We shall have to consider the

[1] Not printed. The thrust of this message was rendered as follows in *Record of the Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, pp. 66–67 :

"On 29 November 1950 CINCFE informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Chinese Nationalist armies on Formosa represented the only source of potential trained reinforcements available for early commitment to the war in Korea. He stated that troops drawn from this source could be moved to Korea in approximately fourteen days and much larger forces than had been previously offered would undoubtedly be made available if desired. He strongly recommended that he be authorized to negotiate directly with the Chinese Government for incorporation in the United Nations Command of such Chinese units as might be available and desirable for the reinforcing of our position in Korea."

possibility that it would disrupt the united position of the nations associated with us in the United Nations, and have us isolated. It may be wholly unacceptable to the commonwealth countries to have their forces employed with Nationalist Chinese. It might extend hostilities to Formosa and other areas. Incidentally, our position of leadership in the Far East is being most seriously compromised in the United Nations. The utmost care will be necessary to avoid the disruption of the essential Allied line-up in that organization.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on November 29 from 3 to 6:45 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.528. Debate continued on the questions of armed invasion of Taiwan and aggression upon the Republic of Korea, but no voting action took place.

795.00/11–2950 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 29, 1950—2:52 p. m.
[Received November 29—3:08 p. m.]

901. (1) Re Korea.

(2) Re possible meeting by Rau with Chinese Commies.

Following SC meeting November 28, Gross discussed with Rau position of India re six-power Korean resolution. Rau said his present instructions would not permit him to vote on the resolution at this time but in view of our feeling that the resolution should be promptly acted upon, he would at once communicate with New Delhi. Although Rau did not commit himself when asked by Gross whether he would recommend to GOI that he be authorized to vote for the resolution, he added that if he had not received requisite instructions in time for voting on November 29, he hoped we would not press for a vote until November 30 so as to give an opportunity to receive new instructions.

When asked by Gross re his efforts to meet with the Peiping representatives, Rau replied he had had a meeting scheduled for Tuesday a. m., November 28, but Peiping representatives postponed the meeting because of alleged conflict with SC meeting. Rau commented that he did not believe that such a postponement was actually necessary and would not have been suggested by Peiping representatives unless they had desire to make their statement in the SC before entering into any

discussions. In response to question, Rau said he had no firm time for meeting, but thought it might possibly take place morning of November 29.

AUSTIN

330/11–2950 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 29, 1950—2:53 p. m.
[Received November 29—3:24 p. m.]

902. Re Korea: Confirming Gross telephone conversation with Hickerson yesterday, following is report of Gross' conversation with Jebb and Chauvel November 28 re Korean developments.

Chauvel has present authority to vote for six-power draft resolution and to support taking matter into GA following Soviet veto. When Chauvel learned of my intention to charge Peiping with aggression, he reported fact by telephone to Paris. Schuman "took grave view of step" and apparently instructed Chauvel not to support UN finding of Peiping aggression without specific authority from Paris. Chauvel also advised Gross in confidence that he had received telegram from French Foreign Office suggesting he seek interview with Peiping representatives here to discuss Chinese Communist intentions re Indochina, and particularly to inquire concerning significance Peiping accusations France engaged in "barbarous bombings" in Indochina. Chauvel suggested to Paris this was not appropriate time for such step, and instruction accordingly appears to have been withdrawn or suspended.

Chauvel stressed that because of fears of French Government re disastrous consequences of spread of war in Far East, it is necessary to use greatest caution in connection with either (*a*) UN condemnation of Chinese Communists re aggression, or (*b*) extension of military operations to Chinese territory or airspace. He said it was view of French Government that either of these steps or measures would necessitate "intergovernmental consultations".

Jebb informed Gross that he had been instructed to attempt to obtain postponement of vote on six-power Korean resolution until there had been an opportunity to "put his ear to the ground" with regard to intentions of Peiping representatives upon their arrival here. He has not been successful in efforts to obtain contact with them, and complains that Peiping delegation is being closely watched and shepherded by so-called body-guards, apparently Czech or Pole. However

in view of urgency of situation, Jebb agreed to request authority to vote for SC resolution (Jebb advised Gross this warning [*morning?*] a. m., November 29, that he had received such authority).

Jebb took same position as Chauvel re necessity for intergovernmental discussions prior to condemnation of aggression or extension of military operations to Manchuria. Jebb added he is without present instructions re taking matter into GA but is asking for instructions.

Jebb outlined at some length his views concerning precarious position British Government in foreign policy debates scheduled in Parliament this week. He thinks Korean developments may affect governmental position adversely, commenting that if only a half-dozen or so Labor members absented themselves or abstained on a vote of confidence, the government might well fall. Jebb continued that particularly for this reason the UK position in the UN re Korea would probably be limited to support of pending six-power resolution without strengthening amendments and this might also apply to resolution in GA.

Gross stressed to Jebb and Chauvel in frankest terms absolute necessity for continuing solidarity, and expressed opinion that best chance of averting disaster is to maintain solid front based upon fundamentally common objectives. Jebb and Chauvel repeated familiar Western European thesis they were "on the front lines and wide open to Soviet military attack and that this fact accounted for growing public concern in France and England lest the Asiatic octopus squeeze out all our common strength". They also expressed frank concern re "preoccupation of General MacArthur in Far Eastern matters". Gross replied that common objective is to localize conflict in Korea and terminate it as quickly as possible, and that common problem was to agree upon most effective methods of deterring would-be aggressors. Both Jebb and Chauvel were visibly impressed by information relayed by Gross that Chinese Communists had prepared an offensive which was actually in motion at the time our offensive was launched and that accordingly Chinese military movements were not merely reactive.

Jebb and Chauvel both inquired concerning efforts to "talk matters out with Chinese Communists". Jebb commented in particular that Bevin's position would be greatly strengthened in the face of domestic criticism if he could say that genuine efforts had been made to develop an understanding with Chinese Communists and to ascertain their apprehensions. Gross told them in strict confidence of his understanding that efforts had been made directly and indirectly to establish contact with Peiping regime for these purposes. Jebb and Chauvel then stated that if this fact could be made known as soon as possible, that it would be of invaluable aid to the French and British Governments. Gross agreed to transmit their comments to Department for urgent consideration, pointing out that he was not familiar with time or nature of any

such approaches and that there might be serious difficulty in the way of giving publicity to them. Gross also advised Jebb and Chauvel that we had informed Rau and Bebler of our willingness to talk with the Peiping representatives if they desired to express their views on any matters of concern to them and had also advised SYG Lie to the same effect.

AUSTIN

795.00/11–2950

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 29, 1950.

Subject: Visit from Australian Ambassador

Participants: The Australian Ambassador [1]
Mr. David McNicol, Australian Embassy [2]
Mr. Shullaw, BNA [3]
Mr. Merchant, FE

In Mr. Rusk's absence, I saw this afternoon the Australian Ambassador who had requested an appointment. At the outset he said that he desired to communicate informally a message from his Government. He stated that it was concerned over the apparent lack of coordination between political policy and military action in Korea and most anxious to state its view that no political commitment be entered into without consultation. The Ambassador elaborated by expressing his Government's apprehension over the possibility that General MacArthur might involve the Australian Government by his actions. I replied that there were grounds for apprehension in the situation but that these arose from massive and overt Chinese Communist intervention and not from any lack of coordination in the past nor by the entrance through his action into any political involvements by General MacArthur. I referred to the restraint General MacArthur had exercised in not retaliating against aircraft operating from across the Manchurian border and referred to disciplinary action taken in isolated incidents where, contrary to orders, American pilots violated the border.

The Ambassador went on to say that his Government felt that General MacArthur's communiqués should be factual. I asked him what particular communiqué or passages in them gave rise to this fear, and

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[1] Norman J. O. Makin.
[2] Second Secretary.
[3] J. Harold Shullaw, Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs.

the Ambassador cited the final paragraph of the General's last communiqué into which he said other governments than his own had read an implicit request for expanded authority.[4] I replied that this communiqué like his others, insofar as I was aware, was factual in character and that the gravity of the situation arose from Chinese intervention which General MacArthur properly characterized as a new factor.

The Ambassador went on to say that Australia was prepared to continue to play its full part and carry its full share of responsibility but that they did desire to be consulted before political decisions were made and, to the extent possible, be kept currently informed of developments in the theater. I told the Ambassador that we were glad that he had spoken frankly, however unjustified we felt his apprehensions to be; that we recognized the special position Australia occupied as one of those nations supplying combat forces and that we would continue to consult closely with them.

[4] See footnote 1 to the memorandum by Mr. Emmons, November 28, p. 1239.

357.AD/11–2950 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1950—7 p. m.

657. Information has reached Dept to effect that certain members UNCURK in meeting Nov 29 favored earliest departure for Japan contending duties could be effectively carried out in Tokyo. After debate UNCURK decided postpone decision but possibility Commission's leaving Korea not averted.

You shld inform FonMin that in view this Govt is altogether indispensable this juncture that UNCURK be present Seoul in response to plain meaning terms reference of Oct 7 Res which not only vest in it an exclusive representative function on behalf of UN but likewise reiterate UN finding re lawful character ROK govt which has become victim act of aggression as determined by SC. Dept trusts that Govt will instruct its rep on UNCURK to vote in favor Commissions continuance Seoul.

This connection you shld assure FonMin Unified Command numbers among its principal responsibilities that of taking every precaution to ensure safety of UNCURK and secretariat personnel and of providing for their prompt and efficient evacuation from any area in Korea where they might become exposed to risk of military action.

Rptd to Karachi, Bangkok, Manila, Ankara, Santiago, Canberra; rptd to Seoul for info only.[1]

ACHESON

[1] The code room was instructed to add the following for Santiago and Canberra only: "Australian and Chilean reps in particular are opposing move by UNCURK to Japan."

Editorial Note

Secretary of State Acheson delivered a major foreign policy address on the evening of November 29 which was broadcast from Washington to the National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States meeting in Cleveland; for the text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 18, 1950, page 962. Regarding Korea, he termed Chinese Communist intervention a premeditated act of brazen aggression, called on the Chinese Communist authorities not to act as the dupes of others in opposing the United Nations, and reiterated that the United States had no special interests in the area apart from the interests of the majority of United Nations members in achieving peace.

795.00/11–3050 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
FLASH

TOKYO, 30 November 1950.
[Received November 30—1:39 a. m.]

C 50095. Re JCS 97592.[1] The X Corps geographically threatens the main supply lines of the enemy forces bearing upon the right flank of the Eighth Army. This threat is emphasized by thrusts from elements of the Corps all along its west flank as far north as Mupyong-Ni and as far south as the roadnets west from the Wonsan sector. This threat is now being met by the enemy commitment of a reported 6 to 8 Divisions which otherwise would have been available for use against the Eighth Army. The enemy's penetration southward could not be safely accomplished until this threat of the X Corps is contained or nullified. Any concept of actual physical combination of the forces of the Eighth Army and X Corps in a practically continuous line across the narrow neck of Korea is quite impracticable due to the length of that line, the numerical weakness

[1] Transmitted at 2:30 p. m. on November 29, p. 1253.

of our forces, and the logistical problems due to the mountainous divide which splits such a front from north to south.

The X Corps will contract its position, as enemy pressure develops, into the Hamhung–Wonsan sector. The Corps Commander has been enjoined against any possibility of piecemeal isolation and trapping of his forces. While geographically his elements seem to be well extended, the actual conditions of terrain make it extremely difficult for an enemy to take any material advantage thereof.

795.00/11–3050 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, 30 November 1950.
[Received November 30—3 : 33 a. m.]

C–50107. For info only. The Chinese Communists continue the buildup of their forces in North Korea despite all interdiction of our Air Command. Red troops located in Manchuria less than a week ago are now definitely indicated on our front and the two Army Groups, 4th and 3rd, are operating in our two sectors. The North Korea Command has been practically swept aside.

Troops from the neutral international border can reach the front in two night marches. This condition provides for a continuous and rapid buildup, as the enemy potential strength immediately available for prompt reinforcement comprises several hundred thousand troops which in turn are subject to replacement from other Chinese sectors. As a result, it is quite evident that the Eighth Army will successively have to continue to replace to the rear.

Everything leads to the conclusion the Chinese forces have as their objective the complete destruction of United Nations forces and the securing of all of Korea.[1]

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[1] The response from Washington to General MacArthur's telegrams 50095 and 50107 of November 30 was thus summarized in *Record of the Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, p. 68:

"In reply to both messages the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the elements of X Corps must be extricated from their exposed positions and suggested that the forces on the two coasts be sufficiently coordinated to prevent large enemy forces from passing between or outflanking them. Finally, they stated that the entire region northeast of the waist of Korea should be ignored except for military considerations relating to the security of the command."

795.00/11–3050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 30, 1950—10 p. m.
[Received November 30—9 : 23 a. m.]

484. Masses of CCF continued southward advance yesterday. On Western flank UN forces disengaged and thereby little fighting. In center and on right however enemy heavy pressure continued with UN forces seeking restore solid line. But pressure reportedly lightened this morning. Eighth Army Intelligence now considers there minimum six complete Chinese armies in field totaling about 200,000 men. It further considered entire Chinese Fourth Field Army committed.

Poor visibility hindered air operations yesterday and last night including reconnaissance. Despite weather however air observers saw long convoys moving south on roads from Sinuiju and Sakchu. Two trains with total about 60 boxcars were sighted at Huichon. There was no enemy air activity reported yesterday or last night.

MUCCIO

Editorial Note

President Truman held a news conference on the morning of November 30 which he opened by reading a prepared statement. In it, he promised that the United States would continue to work in the United Nations for concerted action to halt aggression in Korea and indicated that the United States would take steps to strengthen its own defenses and aid its allies to do the same against the possibility of aggression elsewhere. He also adverted to the repeated assurances given the Chinese Communists that no aggressive intentions were held by the United States or the United Nations. Responding to questions on General MacArthur, Mr. Truman said that he had done a good job and had not exceeded his authority.

In the course of questioning on the Korean crisis, the following exchange occurred:

"The President: We will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the military situation, just as we always have. [12.] Q. Will that include the atomic bomb? The President: That includes every weapon that we have. Q. Mr. President, you said 'every weapon that we have.' Does that mean that there is active consideration of the use of the atomic bomb? The President: There has always been active considera-

tion of its use. I don't want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women, and children who have nothing whatever to do with this military aggression. That happens when it is used."

Later on the same day, the White House issued the following press release:

"The President wants to make it certain that there is no misinterpretation of his answers to questions at his press conference today about the use of the atom bomb. Naturally, there has been consideration of this subject since the outbreak of the hostilities in Korea, just as there is consideration of the use of all military weapons whenever our forces are in combat.

"Consideration of the use of any weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that weapon.

"However, it should be emphasized, that, by law, only the President can authorize the use of the atom bomb, and no such authorization has been given. If and when such authorization should be given, the military commander in the field would have charge of the tactical delivery of the weapon.

"In brief, the replies to the questions at today's press conference do not represent any change in this situation."

For the complete text of the press conference of November 30, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, pages 724–728.

Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 81 Series

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 30, 1950.

Subject: United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea

References: A. NSC 81/2 [1]
B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 14, 1950 [2]
C. NSC Actions Nos. 389 and 378

The reference report on the subject, prepared by the NSC Staff pursuant to NSC Action No. 378 and submitted for Council consideration by the reference memorandum, has been approved to date by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, National Security Resources Board, and the Secretary of the Treasury and is currently awaiting action by the other Council members.

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[1] Dated November 14, p. 1150.

[2] Not printed; it forwarded NSC 81/2 to the NSC for consideration of approval by the members.

In view of recent developments in Korea and in the light of the discussion at the last Council meeting (NSC Action No. 389 [3]), the NSC Staff hereby withdraws NSC 81/2 from consideration.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[3] This action noted the discussion which had taken place at the NSC meeting of November 28, p. 1242.

795.00/11–3050

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Satterthwaite)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1950.

Subject: Situation in Korea

Participants: H. A. Graves, British Embassy
Amb. Norman J. O. Makin, Australia
F. H. Corner, New Zealand
W. Dirkse-van-Schalkwyk, South Africa
Amb. Hume Wrong, Canada
George Ignatieff, Canada
Eigil Nygaard, Norway
Jean Daridan, France
Amb. Baron Silvercruys, Belgium
Roger Taymans, Belgium
Faruk N. Berkol, Turkey
J. G. de Beus, Netherlands
Asst. Secretary Rusk, FE
L. Satterthwaite, BNA

In order to bring the representatives of the principal countries contributing military aid to Korea up to date on the latest developments in Korea, Assistant Secretary Rusk arranged a briefing meeting at the Canadian Embassy. The meeting was held at the Canadian Embassy rather than in the State Department in order to avoid press speculation and questioning.

Mr. Rusk thanked the representatives for meeting with him in a body and saving him a great deal of time. Mr. Rusk said that the official military reports of the fighting in Korea were always several hours behind the newspaper headlines which reflected cabled reports from the front line correspondents. These front line reports usually were more pessimistic than the facts warranted when things were going badly and more optimistic when they were going well. The situation was extremely serious and would not be clarified for two or three days, but our best estimates were that the UN forces would be able to stabilize the line across the waist of Korea without more reinforce-

ments than those already available to them. Because of the shortness of the lines and the long hours of darkness, the Chinese Communists were able in secrecy to mass a large number of troops (somewhere in the neighborhood of 200,000) in the mountainous region of north central Korea. It has become increasingly evident that this operation by the Chinese Reds had been planned for a long time and that the offensive was not a result of or in response to the recent UN offensive. UN forces had been out of contact with the enemy for ten days or two weeks. UN forces had spread out northward up avenues of easy access as a series of fingers. When the Chinese offensive started the fingers were withdrawn from the western part to form a fist. In the central part where the Chinese offensive struck, South Korean troops were employed and received the full weight of the offensive. The fact that they retreated more rapidly than parts of the lines is not an indication of inferiority. They happened to be in the way of the main Chinese drive. The South Korean forces received a bad mauling. The other UN forces (the American divisions, the British, and the Turks), although battered somewhat, have not been seriously hurt. The Tenth Army Corps in Northeast Korea is in a serious predicament, and it is not known yet what its tactics will be. Mr. Rusk paid tribute to the extremely gallant fighting of the Turkish contingent.

On the political side Mr. Rusk said that it is our purpose not to go beyond the Manchurian border and that we are doing everything in our power to prevent the entrance of the Chinese Army into the Korean War from touching off World War III. Mr. Rusk emphasized the restraint with which the UN forces were operating. He contrasted the fact that the UN forces have not sent airplanes or men across the border at any time with the 200,000 Chinese Reds which are in North Korea fighting and many thousands that have been there for some time. Yet if a single UN airplane as much as gets across the border a tremendous protest that the UN forces are provoking war goes up. One of the reasons that our Intelligence did not find out the extent of Chinese penetration in advance of the offensive was our inability to make reconnaissance flights across the border where the Chinese Army was being concentrated. At the present the UN forces have total air superiority. If the Chinese concentrate air power in Manchurian air fields and use it in Korea, it will be necessary for us to bomb the bases in Manchuria.

We will deal with the new problem of the Chinese Armies in Korea through the UN and not unilaterally. The situation is quite different now than it was in June when action had to be taken in a matter of hours or everything would have been lost. Now UN forces are there fighting and the need for immediate UN action is not as great. More time for consultation among the United Nations as to each step is available. We will continue consultation with members of the UN with

forces in Korea. We believe that the Six-Power Resolution must proceed. If, because it is vetoed in the Council, it is necessary to go to the Assembly, we believe the resolution should be rewritten.

The Australian Ambassador was puzzled by the disparity between the recent communiqué from the UN Commander when the UN offensive was begun indicating that this was the final phase of the fighting and the subsequent discovery that large Chinese forces were in North Korea. He wondered what had happened to the UN intelligence. Mr. Rusk said the intelligence of course was faulty but pointed out again the difficulties caused by the shortness of the distance between the Manchurian border (over which we could not send reconnaissance planes) and the North Korean hills where the Chinese Communists are. During the day we, of course, patrolled by air and ground along the border regions but the Chinese moved at night and hid during the day.

Mr. de Beus said that a report had been received several weeks ago from Peiping indicating there were about 160,000 Chinese Reds soldiers in Korea ready to go. In view of this report he wondered why the surprise. Mr. Rusk said that the report was one of hundreds, each one different, and it was impossible to tell in advance which one was right. There were so many reports in fact that one of them was bound to be right.

The Belgian Ambassador wanted to know what we thought the short and long range objectives of the Chinese Army were. Mr. Rusk stated a personal view that it seems clear that their objectives had been and are to get the UN forces out of Korea, but what their objectives were beyond this there was no way of telling.

795.00/11-3050

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1950.

Subject: The Korean situation.

Participants: Baron Silvercruys, Belgian Ambassador
Mr. Rusk—FE
Mr. Winfree—WE [1]

The Belgian Ambassador called today at his request.

He began by stating that his Foreign Minister, Mr. Van Zeeland, was, in his capacity as President of the Council of Ministers, a very active man who journeyed frequently to many of the Western Euro-

[1] Robert M. Winfree of the Office of Western European Affairs.

pean capitals to converse with the leaders of other Western European Governments. Mr. Van Zeeland was, accordingly, in a position to convey any opinions we might have to the heads of other European governments. Therefore, the Ambassador stated, although my discussion of Korea yesterday had been crystal clear, he believed that if I could give him a firm statement of policy that he could pass on to Mr. Van Zeeland, the Foreign Minister could assist us by helping to clarify our position before other governments. The Ambassador added that, as we knew, in certain European capitals there was great indecision as to what should be the attitude toward the most recent aggression in Korea, and that certain groups opposed to the democratic way of life were not averse to using such moments of indecision under the guise of nationalism to further their own ends. Therefore, he felt that Mr. Van Zeeland could help the common cause.

I told the Ambassador that, as he of course knew, the situation in Korea was serious but not disastrous; however, the United States did not intend to permit the United Nations troops to be driven out of Korea. While we were a peace loving and peace seeking nation and were prepared to do everything possible to avoid a general breakout of war, we were not going to withdraw from Korea. The Ambassador then referred to the President's statement regarding the use of the atom bomb and asked if I meant that we were going to use it. I replied that I could not say whether or not we were going to use the atom bomb. The Ambassador said that he presumed the President meant that he would be guided by the recommendations of the military commanders in the field, since the President alone could authorize the use of the atom bomb.

I told Baron Silvercruys that there were possibly some additional political and economic moves we could make in this situation. However, it had now become clear that the Chinese Communists had as their objective driving all UN troops completely from Korea and if the Chinese Communist delegation in New York had come to the United States to attempt to bargain with us, they were certainly not anxious to do so since they had surrounded themselves with a very effective iron curtain and had rebuffed crudely every attempt by third nations to contact them. I emphasized again that we had no intention of letting ourselves be driven out of Korea.

The Ambassador then referred to the meetings of the Security Council and stated that he was quite confident that we could expect a veto of our resolution in the Council and that the matter would then be turned over to the General Assembly. He asked whether we were going to present our same resolution to the General Assembly. I replied that I did not think we would use the same resolution but would present a new one to the General Assembly.

Baron Silvercruys then said that van Langenhove, the Belgian delegate to the United Nations, who was a very shrewd observer, had noticed a general feeling of indecision among the members of the United Nations in regard to action by the General Assembly. Many members were lacking instructions as to how they should vote when the question was raised in the GA. The Ambassador thought that we should get in touch with other friendly governments just as soon as possible in order that appropriate instructions might be sent to the delegates of other nations in time for the General Assembly meetings. I agreed with him on this and said that we would do so.

The Ambassador then asked what would happen if the United Nations failed to support the United States' proposals regarding Korea. I replied stating that the free nations of the world must present a united front on this issue. We would win together or hang separately. I also quoted to the Ambassador a remark I had heard some months ago: "Would the United Nations benefit by gaining Communist China and losing the United States?"

The Ambassador thanked me for the information I had given him, adding his opinion that we must act together in this crisis.

While Mr. Winfree was walking to the elevator with the Ambassador, the Ambassador stated that if we were to use the atom bomb, he could not see any particular value to using it against Chinese cities. Why not go a little further and destroy the Soviet facilities for manufacturing atom bombs which, according to the Ambassador, were not located at too great an air distance from the scene of our present operations.

795.00/11–3050 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 30, 1950—2:43 p. m.
[Received November 30—2:55 p. m.]

911. Re Korea: Kyrou,[1] on assumption GA action would be required, expressed view to Ross this morning that strong GA action in view of weak military situation would be impossible until defense line established. He added view that establishment defense line was essential for coordination with British of strong policy in GA. He referred to conversation with Younger in which Younger observed that events in Korea show that UK policy was right. Kyrou reported he asked Younger whether it would not be better for the UK to be

[1] Alexis Kyrou, Permanent Representative of Greece at the United Nations.

with the US on a wrong policy than apart from the US on a right policy. Younger replied, according to Kyrou, that there was something in that.

AUSTIN

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council concluded its discussion of the Korean question for the year 1950 at its 530th meeting on November 30 from 3 to 6:35 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.530. The Council's 529th session, which was held on the same day from 10:45 a. m. to 1:15 p. m., was taken up solely with French and English translations of Mr. Malik's statement made on the previous day.

At the 530th meeting, the following voting action took place:

(1) the Council rejected the draft resolution (S/1757) submitted by the Soviet delegate on September 2 condemning the United States for aggression against Taiwan (see volume VI, pages 476 ff.) by a vote of 9 to 1 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), with the Indian Representative not participating because of lack of instructions from his government;

(2) the Council rejected the draft resolution (S/1921) submitted by the representative of the People's Republic of China on November 28 (see editorial note, page 1249) by an identical vote;

(3) the Council failed to adopt the six-power draft resolution (S/1894) submitted on November 19 (see editorial note, page 1126) because of the Soviet veto, the vote being 9 in favor to 1 opposed (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), with India not participating.

320/11–3050 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, November 30, 1950—2:56 p. m.
[Received November 30—3:07 p. m.]

Delga 347. Re Korea. Feller gave Ross this morning text of following draft resolution Feller had prepared at request of Romulo pursuant to Quirino's suggestion to Romulo that POC be utilized. Text follows:

"The GA,

Noting with grave concern the hostilities now being conducted in Korea,

Noting that there is imminent danger of the extension of the conflict in Korea to other areas in the Far East,

Requests the members of the POC established by the resolution of 3 November, 1950 to organize the commission forthwith,

Requests the POC, upon notification by the President of the SC that the Council is not exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter with respect to the conflict in Korea, to observe the situation in Korea and in the neighboring area and to report at the earliest possible moment to the GA."

Feller further informed Ross that Lie is most anxious to be helpful. Lie feels that essential objective is to preserve free world coalition in UN. He is seeing Jebb and Chauvel this evening and will urge this point most strongly on them, indicating his view that if free world coalition falls apart then Europe will fall to Soviets.

AUSTIN

795.00/11–3050 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

LONDON, November 30, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received November 30—3 : 17 p. m.]

3195. For immediate delivery to Secretary. Cabinet has just met and decided that Prime Minister should make immediate trip to Washington to confer with President on problems of mutual concern including Korea as well as other matters of pressing common interest. Prime Minister is winding up foreign affairs debate tonight 9 : 30 London time. He feels that he must then announce his intention going Washington. He would like very much to be able to say this in agreement with President. Government has troublesome domestic political problem especially with certain elements own party. It would in my opinion be in general interest of all if word can reach Prime Minister in time. If President agreeable telephone me giving simple OK without revealing substance.[1]

HOLMES

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[1] A note on the source text by the chief watch officer of the Department of State indicated that London felt telephone communication was impossible at that time and that a reply should be sent by cable. As a result, the following message was transmitted to London in telegram 2837, November 30, 5 p. m.:

"Secy discussed with Pres (urtel 3195) who is agreeable. You may so inform PriMin. No publicity will be given here until after announcement London. Franks received similar message and now being informed our affirmative answer." (795.00/11–3050)

Mr. Attlee announced on November 30 that he would visit Washington for talks with President Truman which took place between December 4 and 8. On December 2, Mr. Attlee conferred in London with Messrs. Pleven and Schuman.

795B.5/11-3050 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

NEW YORK, November 30, 1950—3 : 25 p. m.
[Received November 30—3 : 25 p. m.]

912. Re: Urgent need for special MacArthur reports. Confirming telecon Wainhouse with Sandifer, UNA, this noon, I feel that there is building up among various delegations lack of confidence in US. Basis of this feeling appears to be an impression that UN commander in field is not sufficiently responsive to direction from Unified Command (U.S. Government). Lack of timely official reports from UC in this present military crisis seems to feed into this feeling of lack of confidence.

I urge in strongest terms the need for a UC factual report on current military situation and developments in Korea for submission to UN Saturday [1] noon at latest. I feel that such report would strengthen our hand in gaining support for US objectives in UN, and more particularly for the projected program Department has in mind in GA. During this period of critical military and political developments, I further believe it important to provide such factual reports to UN every 48 hours.

AUSTIN

[1] December 2.

795.00/12-350

Memorandum by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, of a Meeting Held on November 30, 1950

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1950.

The Secretary saw Mr. Lovett on Thursday afternoon, November 30, at the Secretary's request.

Following the meeting, he talked to several people in the Department about it. He said that he had told Mr. Lovett it was essential that action be taken immediately to determine where we went in light of the present Korean crisis. He suggested a meeting the following morning at which General Smith, Mr. Harriman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Marshall and Mr. Lovett, as well as certain people in the Department, would be present. The purpose was to take up questions left over from the last meeting of this group.

The Secretary said that it was imperative that we get a program immediately. He said that we could expect a veto not later than Monday of the six power resolution presented before the Security

Council. (I was called out during the course of the meeting and informed that the resolution had been vetoed that afternoon, which I reported back to the group).

The Secretary told Mr. Lovett that the first step was to stop the Chinese. He said that there was no use discussing anything else unless we could do that. He pointed out that our troops were at present badly dispersed in Korea. He said we must find a place which was suitable and hold it. We should then try to get sanctity to that position, a sanctity which would be aided by the passage of time. He said we must get our allies together and put all the backbone we could in them. He pointed out we must have a program in order to do this.

The Secretary said we must try to maintain the position at as little cost as possible.

Mr. Lovett mentioned the possibility of a cease fire resolution. It was pointed out there were many very nervous people in the United Nations and that a cease fire could probably be obtained as a United Nations move. If that is what we want, someone would undoubtedly propose it and we must consider urgently what kind of cease fire, when we want it, etc. The Secretary pointed out that it was desirable to get the kind of cease fire which allowed us to strengthen ourselves. The Secretary suggested consideration of using, if the cease fire were accepted, the Marshall tactic of getting a group of teams to assure compliance. One of these teams would be from the Chinese Communists, one from the United Nations Mission and one from General MacArthur's headquarters. The Secretary pointed out that it might be difficult to get the Chinese Communists to agree to a cease fire.

Arrangements were made for the meeting at the Pentagon the following morning. A record of this meeting was prepared by Mr. Jessup.[1]

L. D. B[ATTLE]

[1] See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Jessup, dated December 1, p. 1276.

320/11–3050 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 30, 1950—8 p. m.
PRIORITY

396. In view of possibility of UN GA consideration Chi intervention in Kor fol expected Sov veto of present six power SC draft resolution.[1]

[1] See the editorial note on the 530th meeting of the U.N. Security Council on November 30, p. 1268.

Dept believes wld be very helpful if UNCURK wld expeditiously transmit to UN special report on Chi Commie intervention.

Request that at ur discretion you suggest to UNCURK the desirability of such report and in conjunction with mil authorities offer facilities and assistance for its preparation.

To be of maximum usefulness, report shld be received first part next week.[2]

ACHESON

[2] On December 7, UNCURK adopted an interim report to the Secretary-General for transmission to the U.N. members concluding that Chinese forces in great numbers were attacking the U.N. Command and that these Chinese forces formed part of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China; see U.N. document A/1881, p. 9.

330/11–3050: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 30, 1950—7: 58 p. m.
[Received November 30—8: 58 p. m.]

914. Subject: Indians attempts contact Chinese Communist delegation.

Up until later afternoon, November 30, Indian delegation UN has been unsuccessful in attempts establish personal contact with Chinese Communist delegation. Upon arrival latter delegation, Indians sent letter to it suggesting talks. Chinese Communists replied in letter stating they would be glad have talks at early date when Security Council not in session. B. N. Rau had appointment see Chinese today 11 a. m., but was informed by telephone that Chinese too busy and could not keep appointment. In later conversation with Gross, Rau gave impression he considered further effort would be futile at this stage. This connection Rau stated he did not believe Chinese Communist delegation were "free agents".

Repeat to American Embassy, New Delhi as USUN 5.

AUSTIN

795.00/11–3050: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 30, 1950—8: 20 p. m.
[Received November 30—9: 26 p. m.]

916. For Hickerson from Gross: Korea and Formosa: UK, French, Indian, Brazilian views:

Lengthy discussion with Jebb and Chauvel developed following views re Korean situation.

Jebb had received instructions from Bevin this morning to seek postponement of vote on 6-power resolution but obtained reversal of instructions. Basis of instruction apparently was that in 2 or 3 days situation might be clarified sufficiently so that Jebb could make a statement which would include a "last call for the use of reason". Jebb summarized attitude UK Government in following manner:

UN Charter was not considered at San Francisco to be instrument suited to handling problem of war among major powers. Irrespective of who recognized what government in China, *de facto* situation which confronts world is prospect of precisely the kind of war with which UN is neither competent nor capable to deal. Regarding Korea itself, no one knew on June 25 whether victorious UN forces would proceed north of 38th parallel. In fact, original purpose and mission of UN action had been accomplished with "restoration of *status quo*" and restoring to power in South Korea of Syngman Rhee. Jebb added that for all practical purposes the Republic of Korea really meant South Korea.

A resolution which included a finding of aggression constituted undertaking to commit the already inadequate defense forces of free world to a campaign of reconquest and liberation of areas seized by Chinese Communists. This would be taking place at a time before the constitution of sufficient strength of western Europe "to make at least a pretense of defending itself against a Russian attack."

Basic understanding of UK had been that such forces would be created in western Europe and that had not yet been accomplished. Launching a quite obvious barb at France, Jebb added that the slowness of developments in western Europe along these lines had not been the fault of the British Government or people.

In any event, Jebb continued, he was certain from his discussions with other western European delegations during the past 2 days that they shared with the UK the tremendous apprehension that US was committing western Europe to conduct of war in the Far East at an impossible time and under the most difficult possible strategic conditions. Jebb mentioned specifically discussions he had held with Belgium, Dutch and Norwegian representatives here.

Jebb strongly favored a 2 step process, involving the tabling of a resolution in the GA along the lines of the pending SC resolution and subsequently, if necessary, the introduction of a stronger resolution of the sort we were discussing. In this connection, Jebb said he was bound to make clear that UK Government had not yet decided that the matter should be taken into the GA at all at this stage and Jebb was awaiting instructions on this point. The 2-phased procedure he described as his personal view.

Chauvel in general agreed with Jebb's analysis, differing however in 1 or 2 important respects. Chauvel said French Government did not share view Jebb had expressed regarding 38th parallel. He felt French view to be more in the direction of considering that a military line could be stabilized, perhaps at the narrow waist of the peninsula. This could be regarded as a "strategic frontier" and consideration could then be given of the next steps with regard to portions of Korea north of the "strategic frontier".

At this point, Jebb appeared to express personal agreement with Chauvel's analysis, repeating that his earlier expressed view had been his own personal observation and he thought probably his government would agree with Chauvel's analysis.

Chauvel's instructions authorized him to support introducing into the GA resolution along lines pending SC resolution. However, Chauvel read to me a telegram received this morning from Paris in which Paris expressed view that a finding of aggression was "inopportune" at this time and repeating instructions to Chauvel not to support such action until matter had been discussed at an "inter-governmental level".

Chauvel confirmed Jebb's analysis of attitude other western European countries, adding that Dutch representative had come to him "with tears in his eyes" asking whether Chauvel saw any hope of avoiding the war which was rapidly being precipitated. Chauvel's specific procedural suggestion was that SC transmit to GA vetoed resolution requesting GA to consider subject matter of resolution and make recommendations. Chauvel said such procedure would avoid problem of SC dis-seizing itself of whole Korean question and that the resolution could be amended in the GA.

Both Jebb and Chauvel urged that, assuming SC vote and veto today, we should allow several days for consultation before placing matter in GA.

Both Jebb and Chauvel expressed belief we would be in a much stronger position, particularly vis-à-vis western Europeans, if Chinese Communists defied a GA resolution along lines SC resolution. When I pressed Jebb to express his views concerning the second step in the light of what he had said earlier concerning the strategic implications of the situation, Jebb said that under circumstances of outright defiance of a request to withdraw forces, the issue "would then indeed be a question of war or peace", and he could see no way other than to follow the matter through to its logical conclusion.

New subject: At beginning SC meeting this afternoon, Rau told me that he planned to refer to the Formosa question in his SC statement this afternoon. His idea (which he said he had not put up to

his government) was that the resolution might contain a paragraph in effect calling upon US to withdraw the 7th Fleet if Chinese Communists withdrew forces from Korea. Rau thought this would "offer something" to the Peiping regime, which the present resolution does not. He added this would do nothing more than give effect to President Truman's statement of January 5. Rau said the gravity of the crisis, and the rapid movement toward war required everyone to search his conscience and present to the SC ideas which "might take root".

I strongly urged Rau not to raise the Formosa question in this manner and expressed the hope he would give us opportunity to consult with him. He agreed with some apparent reluctance to delete these passages.

New subject. Ambassador Muniz (Brazil) asked to see me during SC meeting and showed me message from President Brazil instructing him to seek views of US and UK delegations concerning probable international developments which Brazil Cabinet wished to discuss tomorrow morning. In particular, Muniz asked concerning our plan for action after the Soviet veto of pending SC resolution. I assured Muniz we would allow sufficient time for consultation with such close friends as Brazil prior to circulating resolution in GA and might indeed request Brazil to co-sponsor resolution. In response to a question whether we planned to request the GA to charge Peiping regime with aggression, I told him that was still under consideration and would probably be matter we would wish to discuss with Brazil within the next day or two. He expressed hope we would not table the resolution before Monday or Tuesday [1] at the earliest, and I assured him that we would allow time for consultation before circulating a resolution although we took it for granted that matter should be referred to the GA. Muniz agreed. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

[1] December 4 and 5.

330/11–3050 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 30, 1950—9 : 48 p. m.
[Received November 30—10 : 14 p. m.]

917. Indian contacts with Chinese Communist Delegation. Re mytel 914 November 30. USGADel informed by Indian Delegation after close SC meeting today that Sir B. N. Rau had definite appointment

call on General Wu of Chinese Communist Delegation tomorrow at 11 a. m. Indian informant stated Rau did not intend make any specific suggestions this occasion, but had primarily in mind ascertaining what nature Wu's thinking on present situation.

Department please repeat AmEmbassy New Delhi as USUN 6.

AUSTIN

795.00/12–150

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1950.

Subject: Notes on Meeting in JCS Conference Room, Pentagon, 8:30 a. m., December 1, 1950

Participants:

Secretary George C. Marshall	Secretary Dean Acheson
General of the Army Omar N. Bradley	Mr. H. Freeman Matthews
General J. Lawton Collins	Mr. Dean Rusk
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman	Mr. Paul H. Nitze
General Nathan F. Twining [1]	Mr. Philip C. Jessup
[Deputy] Under Secretary Robert A. Lovett	General Bedell Smith
Secretary Frank Pace	Secretary Francis P. Matthews
Secretary Thomas Finletter	Mr. Averell Harriman

SECRETARY ACHESON opened the discussion by referring to the desire to resume the very useful session which had previously been held. It was now necessary to consider the contingency which had not been covered in the previous discussion; namely, what to do in case the offensive failed. He summarized the action in the Security Council yesterday and referred to the virtual state of panic which seemed to exist among our friends in New York. Many are complaining that the United States' leadership has failed, and the present difficulties are the fault of General MacArthur's action. It is of the greatest importance that we should again bring about unity among our friends. The effect of disunity is felt not only in Asia but also in Europe. We must, accordingly, restore confidence so that we can get results in our European defense plans. It is essential that what we do in the political field be coordinated with military considerations and make sense from that point of view. He then summarized the various considerations under points one and two of the attached memorandum prepared by Mr. Rusk. He emphasized the thought, which he said he was advancing for

[1] Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.

purposes of discussion only and not because he felt sure it was the proper solution, that if a line could be established from a military point of view a political attempt should be made to attach some sanctity to it. If this could be done *de facto*, perhaps it would open up a field of negotiation. He raised the question of a military desirability of a cease-fire resolution if some of our friends suggested it in the United Nations. He discussed the possibility that we might agree to it and the Chinese would not, as well as the possibility that if the Chinese agreed they would still not carry it out loyally while we did. He suggested the possibility of armistice teams along the pattern which General Marshall had followed in China. He then passed to a consideration of subsequent actions and raised the question whether we could get out of Korea hoping the Chinese would also withdraw into Manchuria. We might then leave the ROK against the North Koreans. The question was where that would leave us. In any event, we must do something in Korea, and we must do something to counter the rapid resurgence of neutralism in Germany. He had under consideration the advisability of his going to New York next week to speak in the General Assembly, but did not wish to do so until the United States Government has an agreed plan. If from a military point of view it is impossible to hold a line, we are confronted with a new set of problems and must proceed on different assumptions. He requested guidance from the military.

General Bradley said it was hard to give answers now. Unless the Tenth Corps can succeed in regrouping, it is hard to stabilize a line. One cannot tell now. If our losses are heavy in the east, we may not have enough troops to hold a line. There is an indication of very heavy traffic representing large reinforcements coming in from Manchuria. We may have to fall much further back.

Secretary Acheson inquired where, from a military point of view, it would be most useful to have the Tenth Corps.

At General Marshall's request, General Bradley showed the Secretary a telegram the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent to General MacArthur last night.[2]

General Bradley said the telegram had been cleared with the President at ten after ten last evening. The gist of the message was that they felt it was desirable to group the Tenth Corps, and it ended with a statement which General Marshall said that he had inserted telling General MacArthur that from the point of view of his United Nations mission it was unnecessary to hold the territory northeast of the waist and that except for strategic and tactical considerations involving the security of his command he could ignore that area.

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[2] See footnote 1 to telegram C–50107 from Tokyo, received at 3:33 a. m. on November 30, p. 1260.

General Collins said it might well be that he would have to have a gap between the Tenth Corps in the Hamhung–Wonsan area and the Eighth Army on the west.

Secretary Acheson again inquired what would be the most advantageous thing for us to do; e.g., buying time by a cease-fire.

General Collins said we could not tell now. He thought that someone should go out to Japan immediately to find out the situation on the spot.

General Marshall agreed that it would be useful for General Collins to go today. He said it was hard to establish a line. The Tenth Corps on the east coast would have ports available for supplies or for evacuation if necessary. Such evacuation might succeed in taking out at least three-fourths of the force. However, it lets the communists converge all of its forces on either one or the other of our two main positions. The Chinese Communists may put in their air force at any time. A line of the kind that Secretary Acheson had referred to was not a practical proposition. We may be able to hold on both the west and the east separately, but we cannot give a firm answer on this now.

Mr. Rusk inquired whether the same considerations would apply to holding the line elsewhere, for example at the 38th Parallel or at the Han River.

General Collins replied that the waist was the shortest line, and there was no natural line at the 38th Parallel. There was still a question about the intentions of the Chinese Communists. He repeated it was very hard to move our two groups to any one place. Probably the only possibility would be to withdraw our troops from the east by sea around to the west. There would be no other way to withdraw. There are no really useful ports between Wonsan and Pusan.

Admiral Sherman said from a strategic point of view we should be on the islands and off the mainland, but the abandonment of Korea would be dangerous to Japan due to airfields in Korea. From this standpoint, it would be desirable for us to hold at the waist as a long-term strategic plan. We may end up with Inchon, Wonsan and Pusan as supply bases. For some reason, the Chinese Communists have allowed us to maintain sole control of the air. We should not interfere with this situation until our position is straightened out. Therefore, the advantage of keeping our air on our side of the frontier outweigh the disadvantages, but we must decide in advance what to do if the Chinese Communist air comes in. If Russian air were added, we might not be able to hold. There is a good chance to get a useful line of positions tied to ports avoiding any detached force not supplied by sea. If the position is stabilized, the question is what we do next. Shall we strengthen our Pacific Fleet at the expense of the Atlantic? Where do we get more ground troops for needs in the Far East?

General Bradley said the question was if the Chinese air comes in do we want to hit back. To do so might draw in the Soviet air. If this is true, we may have to defer striking. He was not sure this question should be decided in advance.

General Collins strongly supported General Bradley. If we hit back, it is a strong provocation of the Chinese and may possibly bring in Soviet air and even submarines. The only chance then left to save us is the use or the threat of the use of the A-bomb. We should therefore hold back from bombing in China even if this means that our ground forces must take some punishment from the air.

Admiral Sherman said that he did not disagree with this provided we do not have to take too much from the Chinese air force.

General Collins said he strongly dissented from Admiral Sherman's view about holding Korea. He thought Korea was not worth a nickel while the Russians hold Vladivostok and positions on the other flank.

General Bedell Smith said that they were now preparing a new estimate which would be distributed not later than Monday [3] which makes a much better case than they previously thought for Russian plans for war soon. It could be assumed that their first purpose is to defeat European rearmament. They probably do not plan on war now but are willing to have it if they can bog us down in Asia. They will never accept a Korea in hostile hands. We should get out of Korea although we do not solve the problem by getting out. The Russians are sure we don't intend to get into war in Asia, and so feel that they can push us as far as they want. The new estimate would indicate probable Soviet reactions during the next 12 to 24 months. They could bleed us to death in Asia while defeating the armament effort in Europe. The recent *Pravda* article is a clear indication that they fully understand our situation.

Mr. Lovett said he understood there was a consensus on two points: first, that Korea is not a decisive area for us; and second, that, while the loss of Korea might jeopardize Japan and perhaps bring about its eventual loss, Western Europe was our prime concern and we would rather see that result than lose in Western Europe. It was best to hold in Korea for political moves. We should regroup our troops and stall for time. We might then move in on securing a cease-fire or a truce along the model used in Palestine. We should deliberately admit to ourselves that part of the condition would be that the Chinese withdraw while we do too. This might involve the abandonment of Korea.

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[3] December 4. See the memorandum by the CIA, dated December 2, p. 1308.

General Collins said that he did not think that the loss of Korea would involve the loss of Japan, but in reply to Secretary Acheson's question agreed that the political consequences in Japan might be different. He said it was illusory to think of making a line and turning it over to the ROK to hold at least before a year had passed. The ten ROK divisions contemplated by General MacArthur were still raw and ill-equipped. His impression of their leadership was that it was not of much consequence and that they could not stand up against real forces supported by the Chinese.

General Twining said that, if the Chinese air is used against our ports, it would be very serious and we might have to go against their fields. In reply to General Marshall's question, General Twining went on to say that he definitely felt that, if they attacked in mass with air against our ports, we must hit their fields.

General Bradley agreed but said the decision must be made here if the situation develops and we should not now decide to give authority to the Theater Commander.

Admiral Sherman and General Marshall exchanged views on the question of hitting back at the Chinese, with Admiral Sherman indicating that he thought we must fight back but admitting that this might open up attacks from Vladivostok. He added that we could not operate our air bases which are very crowded in the face of very heavy air attack. He urged that no political commitments should be made which did not leave us a free hand to act quickly.

Secretary Acheson agreed fully with the last proposition. He pointed out that, as General Bradley had said, if we do hit back it may bring in Russian air support of the Chinese and we would go from the frying pan into the fire.

In an exchange between General Bradley and General Smith, the idea was expressed that if real Russian support of the Chinese developed, we would have to evacuate and probably would be engaged in war.

General Collins repeated that in this situation, we would have to consider the threat or the use of the A-bomb. It would be very difficult to get our troops out if Russian air were used.

Admiral Sherman said the Chinese were probably afraid of attacks on their cities and might hold off for that reason.

Secretary Acheson inquired what the view would be if there was a suggestion of our accepting a cease-fire and going back to the 38th Parallel. He inquired whether, from a military point of view, that would seem to be the best choice and whether they would consider we were lucky to get such an arrangement.

General Collins, Admiral Sherman and General Bradley indicated an affirmative answer.

GENERAL BRADLEY specifically said that any cease-fire would put us in better position but did not dissent from General Collins' answer to Secretary Acheson that we should not agree on it yet.

GENERAL MARSHALL thought that the acceptance of the cease-fire would represent a great weakness on our part.

[Here follows a discussion dealing with questions of European defense; documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in volume III.]

PHILIP C. JESSUP

[Annex]

Notes Prepared for the Secretary of State by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1950.

1. What are our primary objectives in the Korean situation?

a. To deny a success to communist aggression.

b. To localize the conflict, i.e., to avoid becoming involved in a more general war with China and/or the Soviet Union.

c. To end the Korean situation quickly on a satisfactory UN basis and disengage U.S. troops as rapidly as possible, even though complete withdrawal may take considerable time.

d. To maintain a solid front among our principal allies and, if possible, the solid support of an overwhelming majority of the UN.

2. If possible, we should try to attain all four objectives. If the situation forces us at some point to choose among competing objectives, we must make some difficult choices. In face of the present Chinese onslaught, how should we proceed in order to attain all four objectives?

a. We must first find a place to hold in Korea—and hold it.

This is primarily a military problem. Can we do it? How soon? Where can we hold? This raises a question about the X Corps. Is it being employed to the best military advantage? Insofar as future political problems are concerned, there would be advantage in a simpler configuration in our position, e.g., a line which cuts cleanly across the Korean peninsula.

b. Having found a line which we can hold for some time, we should try to stabilize it by both military and political means.

(1) Strengthening of ROK forces
(2) Political consolidation of Korea
(3) Build-up of political resistance in UN to any further communist encroachment of line
(4) Possible cease-fire (see below)

c. We should consider carefully the possibility of a UN cease-fire; we should try to delimit the conditions of an acceptable cease-fire in the light of the obvious political and military complications involved.

(1) Can we count upon sufficient military stabilization to avoid having to seek a cease-fire while we are in full retreat?

(2) Would it be to our advantage to have a cease-fire which permitted or prohibited the redisposition of forces on both sides?

(3) Could we accept a cease-fire and thereby be denied air action against enemy build up?

(4) What organization would be required to monitor a cease-fire? Teams composed of one member each drawn from the opposing forces and the UN?

(5) Since there might be, under certain circumstances, political advantages in our being willing to accept a cease-fire (such as maintaining solid UN support), are there serious military dangers in a cease-fire as contrasted with merely an absence of military advantage?

d. If a cease-fire appears desirable, and if it is accepted by the enemy, a process of negotiation might then follow with the purpose of getting a political settlement (plus or minus the cease-fire position).

3. The build-up of enemy forces, his probable and more ambitious intentions, and the inability to provide an equivalent build-up on the UN side may mean that a cease-fire would be rejected and that we should have to choose among our four objectives. Specifically, we may have to choose between a forced withdrawal from Korea and an extension of our blows against the Chinese. Certain questions obviously need examination:

a. At what point does it become academic to concern ourselves about whether strikes we make against China would provoke further effort by China against us? Is not China, except for air, in as full scale a war effort against UN forces as China can produce against us? Perhaps in Korea. But Hong Kong and Indo-China?

b. How can we most effectively strike China in such a way as to make a difference, without becoming involved with U.S. forces on the mainland? Blockade? Carrier Task Force strikes? Air and naval strikes and raider parties operating from Formosa? Rapid build-up of covert operations? What is China's vulnerability?

c. What action against China could affect the situation in Korea? Should our action be concentrated against Manchuria in the hope of affecting Korea?

d. To what extent is possible action against China inhibited by great risks of provoking action by the Soviet Union?

IO Files

Minutes of the Forty-seventh Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET NEW YORK, December 1, 1950—9:15 a. m.

[Here follows a list of those present (44).]

Chinese Communist Aggression Against the United Nations in Korea.

Colonel Hasbrouck briefed the Delegation on the present military situation in Korea and described future developments which might be anticipated.

Ambassador Gross reviewed the present situation in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Referring to the resolution of the Security Council of June 25, he explained that although the resolution was not specifically stated to be such, the action taken by the Council had been under Chapter VII of the Charter. He reviewed the terms of this resolution and recalled that as the first step it did not include a finding by the Council that there had been an act of aggression or a breach of the peace. However, on June 27 the Security Council had adopted a second resolution in the face of the continued North Korean defiance of the resolution of June 25. This resolution fell even more definitely under Chapter VII and included the determination that the armed attack against the Republic of Korea had constituted a breach of the peace. This resolution furnished the basis for subsequent action taken by the Council, including the establishment of the Unified Command.

Ambassador Gross noted that the item on the Security Council agenda, "Complaint of Aggression against the Republic of Korea," was the heading under which the present crisis in Korea resulting from Chinese Communist intervention had been discussed. Yesterday the Soviet Union had vetoed a resolution on the immediate situation roughly comparable to that of June 25 on the original Korean situation. He reviewed the terms of this resolution and pointed out that it did not call upon United Nations members to assist in the execution of the resolution or to give such assistance to the United Nations as might be necessary to repel the armed attack. In the Council, it had been explained that this resolution was designed to express the policy of localization of the conflict and to give reassurance to the Chinese Communists that their legitimate interests in the area were not threatened. Now that this resolution had been vetoed, the problem arose as to the next appropriate step.

Ambassador Gross explained that both the Department and the Mission were firmly convinced that the type of action necessary fell within the principles and concepts of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution adopted by the General Assembly earlier in the session, since this was clearly a case where action had been frustrated by the exercise of the veto in the Security Council. The important questions now involved were those of the timing of the presentation of a resolution in the General Assembly and procedures before this step in the Security Council in order to remove this particular aspect of the problem from the Council's agenda. In addition, we would have to work out the terms of the resolution to be introduced in the General Assembly.

As regards the problem of timing, Ambassador Gross believed that we ought to move as quickly as orderly and prudent consultation with our allies would permit. He then turned to the procedures which would resolve the difficulties arising out of the provisions of Article 12 re-

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specting Council and Assembly jurisdiction. If the Council were called upon to remove this part of the item from the agenda, a question might arise as to the means by which to keep alive the July 7 resolution establishing the Unified Command and setting up its relationship to the Security Council. In order to preserve this relationship, the question was not one of transferring to the Assembly the whole matter, but rather how to transfer the particular problem at hand which arose directly out of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. The Department had not yet made up its own mind as to the most appropriate procedure to be followed.

During consultations yesterday with the British and French, Ambassador Gross reported that Ambassador Chauvel had suggested it might be desirable and practical for the Security Council to transmit to the General Assembly the vetoed resolution in its present form with the recommendation that the Assembly consider the matter and make recommendations on the subject of that resolution. It was important, however, in the Security Council, to avoid the creation of any situation or to propose any procedure to which the veto might apply. In this connection, he noted that the simple act of removing an item from the agenda of the Council was a procedural step. One question arising in connection with Ambassador Chauvel's suggestion was whether a request by the Security Council for action by the Assembly was a procedural or substantive question.

Ambassador Gross thought that by far the most important question was the kind of action which we would want the General Assembly to take, as rapidly as consultations would require and permit. The view of the Department had been that time and events had overtaken the six-power resolution which had been vetoed yesterday in the Security Council, and it was considering an alternative text which would contain at least the following three elements: a finding of aggression against the United Nations, a call upon the Chinese Communists to withdraw their forces from North Korea, and a call upon members of the United Nations to furnish assistance in repelling the aggression against the Republic of Korea and the efforts of the Unified Command to restore international peace and security in the area. Such a resolution was now being drafted in the Department. In addition, the Department was considering on a tentative basis the possible inclusion of an additional paragraph which would request the Collective Measures Committee to make recommendations concerning collective measures which might be taken by members to bring about the desired result in Korea. Such action would relate to sanctions and would not rule out armed force procedures. Mr. Dulles noted that the intent of such a paragraph would be not to have the Collective Meas-

ures Committee engage in any activities interfering with the Unified Command. Ambassador Gross concurred, pointing out that we would not want the Assembly to get into the problem of relationships between the Unified Command and the Security Council. He went on to say that the Department was also discussing a possible paragraph calling upon members to sever all relations with the Chinese Communists and thus to brand and treat them as outlaws. He cautioned, however, that this suggestion was also highly tentative.

Ambassador Gross said that in weighing the various alternatives for action, the Department also wished to obtain the reaction of our principal allies. To this end, he had talked with Jebb and Chauvel of the United Kingdom and France, respectively, and had reported the results of these conversations in detail to the Department in a telegram which was available to the delegates. Both the French and British appeared to react violently against the introduction of a resolution into the General Assembly along the lines favored by the Department. Instead, they would prefer a two-phased operation in which the first step would be the introduction in the Assembly of substantially the vetoed Security Council resolution. Their instructions covered this step, but they were not authorized to support any resolution containing a finding of aggression on the part of the Chinese Communists. This position related to their fears that we might run the risk of committing the relatively small collective defense strength of the Atlantic Powers to the Far Eastern operation under almost impossible strategic conditions.

Turning to the second step envisaged by the French and British, Ambasssador Gross explained that after defiance of the resolution, they considered that the Assembly could take follow-up action by adopting a resolution along the lines of the resolution now preferred by the Department. They reacted strongly against an initial resolution which would include a finding of aggression, and which would call upon members of the United Nations to assist in repelling aggression in Korea. Jebb had indicated that the British regarded the situation as impossible from their point of view. It had been the British understanding that Western European defenses would be strengthened as rapidly as possible to a point consistent with fighting off Soviet invasion of Western Europe. This defense effort had not moved as rapidly as had been hoped. If a resolution were adopted containing a finding of aggression and calling upon members to assist the United Nations, that would constitute the clearest kind of commitment of United Nations forces to reconquer and liberate Northern Korean areas now occupied by China. In the British view, such a call could be interpreted as nothing else. In response to a question, Am-

bassador Gross indicated that the Department had not yet reacted to these British views.

Mr. Dulles did not think that the Department would agree with the British, rather, it considered that the situation should be characterized as what it was, namely, virtually a state of war between China and the United Nations, but the Department did not agree that this would commit countries in the sense suggested by the British. It would be reckless, on the other hand, to treat the incident as an isolated war. The Department wished to create legal freedom for action from the United Nations point of view but did not agree that we would be committed to exert all the strength we could muster in order to accomplish certain objectives.

Senator Lodge asked what would be accomplished by a statement on the part of the United Nations that a state of war existed between China and the United Nations when everyone really knew the Soviets were behind the whole thing. Mr. Dulles replied that it would then be far easier for us and there would be much greater unity. Moreover, we would be free to carry out diversionary activities in China. In this connection, he referred to the fact that our intelligence indicated considerable subversive activity was now going on in South China. Such a resolution might also permit the use of Chinese Nationalist troops now on Formosa. We could also stir up subversive activities in China from Hong Kong. In his view it was important to have sufficient United Nations authority to take such measures if they proved expedient.

Mr. Cohen asked whether it was true that the form of resolution was really an effort to localize the war. He asked whether that decision had been made or whether our real purpose was simply freedom of action. He indicated that in his view the resolution described might set in force forces on the other side which would compel action and end what hope might possibly remain for the negotiation of some arrangement on the Korean peninsula looking toward peaceful settlement of the situation. He thought the proposed resolution did raise a number of broad questions.

Mrs. Roosevelt inquired about the reaction of the Korean people to recent events. She recalled that she had read that Korea divisions had caved in immediately when the Chinese offensive had begun and asked whether that was because they were not happy under their government or whether this reflected a real division now, even in South Korea, as to what the people actually wanted. Mr. Dulles doubted that this was a factor in the present situation. Mrs. Roosevelt inquired whether we could count on Korean support. Mr. Dulles said if he were asked that question he would have to answer that we were on the way out in Korea.

Colonel Hasbrouck noted that it should be remembered that the South Korean forces had taken a terrible slapping around. Fifty percent of the South Korean Army had been decimated in the first five days of the war. He cautioned that the Delegation should expect a lot of bad news within the next week. Actually, we did not have much choice, since we had known all along that the Soviets had the capability of kicking us out of Korea whenever they wanted. He went on to observe that they could repeat this performance in a number of other places any time within the next five years and pick their own time. Mrs. Roosevelt said that if this were so, she did not quite understand why we had started operations in Korea. It seemed to her to put us in a worse position. Colonel Hasbrouck thought that the question was whether we would give up everything without a fight. Mrs. Roosevelt believed we were now in a position where negotiations had to be undertaken since there was nothing else we could do. Colonel Hasbrouck suggested that surrender might be a better word in this connection; Mr. Dulles agreed.

Ambassador Gross reported that the British attitude was that the United Nations mission in Korea has been substantially accomplished when South Korea had been liberated and the *status quo* restored. Once that had been done, the United Nations had accomplished its mission. In reviewing the present crisis, Jebb expressed the view that the United Nations Charter at San Francisco had not been considered suitable for handling problems of war among the major powers. Irrespective of the recognition situation, the actual fact was that war with a major power was involved, and that was a matter in his view with which the United Nations was not competent to deal. He distinguished this situation from that of June 25 in just those terms. In Ambassador Gross's opinion, it was hard to tell whether this British attitude was a cynical or practical one. He noted, however, that toward the end of his discussion, Jebb did say that if the two-phased procedure in the Assembly were adopted and the Chinese Communists continued in defiance, under circumstances of outright defiance, the issue would indeed be one of war and peace, and he could see no way out other than to follow suit to the logical conclusion. The problem was really not one of cutting and running completely. He noted that conversations with the Norwegian, Belgian and Dutch delegations had indicated some desire to cut our losses in Korea by the establishment of a strategic frontier on which a line could be stablized, and then the next steps could be considered. With this approach there would be no commitment to reconquer lost areas.

Senator Cooper referred to the remarks of Colonel Hasbrouck to the effect that we had known all along the difficulties which would be encountered if the Chinese Communists entered the fighting in Korea.

He thought consideration should be given to whether commitments could be made sufficient to meet all contingencies. He asked Ambassador Gross whether the suggested resolution gave us anything which we did not already have, except for the fact that China was definitely named as the aggressor. Ambassador Gross believed that the distinction was of a political, rather than a legal nature because an argument could be made that the June 27 resolution covered the present situation. There were two new steps. In the first instance, the United Nations was undertaking a commitment to take such reasonable, practical and honorable steps as were necessary to repel the Chinese Communist aggression, accepting fully that members could never undertake any particular tactical commitment in this regard. What would be involved was rather a commitment to take honorable steps to vindicate the authority of the United Nations. How the details would be filled in would be left to subsequent negotiations. He noted that the resolution in the form favored by the Department would definitely involve implicitly the authority to carry military operations into and over China.

Ambassador Austin remarked that an important factor in this situation was the views of other delegations and called upon Mr. Ross for observations in this connection. Mr. Ross indicated that there was not much point in discussing this in detail at the present time because the views of other delegations were still far too amorphous. In general, other countries were anxious to support the United States, but there was some feeling that we might want to go beyond a point at which the United Nations could effectively sustain action. For the most part, other delegations were waiting for an indication from us of our definite position. Ambassador Gross noted that the British and French probably correctly represented the views of the Western European states. Mr. Ross observed that there were also hopeful signs of support from the Arab states, who were obviously disappointed and disillusioned by the Chinese Communists.

Mr. McKeever observed that this was perhaps the most critical time the Delegation would meet and asked that members of the Delegation should be very cautious in their dealings with the press in order to make sure that all members of the Delegation were telling the same story.

691.93/12–150 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 1, 1950—11 : 15 a. m.
[Received December 1—11 : 47 a. m.]

921. For Hickerson from Gross. At Bebler's Security Council dinner last night Rau took me aside to tell me that the initiative for his

meeting this morning with Wu "this time came from them". Rau said Wu sent him a message at the Security Council table yesterday afternoon suggesting they meet at 10:30 Friday a. m. Because of Rau's tendency to leap out of the water at flies, I undertook to sound some warnings. I expressed view that on basis Wu's performance in Security Council it was clear he had a long way to go before showing up at Tito's headquarters. Rau nodded agreement.

Following this up, I asked Rau if he would forgive a tactless question and when he replied that I should feel free to ask him anything, I said suddenly "what is your appraisal of Panikkar?" Rau was startled by the question, and after a slight pause, he grinned and said "you have something of an answer in my delay in formulating a reply". Rau then proceeded with the frank comment that Panikkar was a fine person and great scholar, but that "the people in Delhi know how to evaluate him and give the proper discount". I then explained that I had asked the question because several months ago Rau had told me of Panikkar's conviction that Communist China was pursuing its own course, that it was not a Soviet satellite, and that it was more Chinese than Communist. I said we had always been skeptical of this appraisal, and that Wu's performance appeared to me to show up Panikkar's analysis.

I thought it was difficult to say how much of Wu's manner was due to political immaturity and how much to planned terror tactics. In any event, it seemed to me important to avoid entrapment in a situation which would affect momentum in UN and especially important to prevent the fact of his meeting with Wu creating false hopes among UN members.

I reminded Rau that Soviets had often tried to obstruct and divert free world efforts to concert their policies by propaganda trick of pretending to want "discussions". I expressed hope Rau would be wary of efforts on part of Wu to build up a climate of so-called discussions and that in any statement Rau might make after the meeting he would avoid falling into this familiar trap. Rau listened intently and throughout nodded his agreement. Referring to earlier discussions relating to our willingness to talk with Wu, I said Rau would forgive me if I again stressed that while we were not eager to talk with Wu, and indeed had nothing to offer him or to suggest to him, that if Wu had anything on his mind we were prepared to listen. Rau professed understanding.

He said he would like to see me this afternoon, to tell me of his talk with Wu and also to discuss our notions of what happens next.

Rau referred to news of Attlee's visit to Washington. He said it had occurred to him after hearing this news that it might be a good idea for Nehru to come for a talk with the President, if Nehru could arrange to do so. Rau stressed this was his own idea, just born, and

he did not know if it was practical. He thought I might pass it on the Department as Rau's personal and tentative idea.

Reverting to conversation earlier in day in which I had urged him not to launch in Security Council his plan to suggest including in resolution an offer to withdraw 7th fleet from Formosa Straits in return for Chinese withdrawal from Korea, I thanked him for acceding to my request. I explained in some detail the political and military dangers implicit in such a proposal, net effect of which might be to put UN and us under a commitment which we would honor but Communists would disregard at will and which moreover might well result in merely shifting the offensive to Formosa with Chinese troops released from their Korean adventure. Rau did not press his idea and acceded to my request that he talk with me before doing anything more with the plan. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

793.00/12–150 : Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

HONG KONG, December 1, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received December 1—12 : 47 p. m.]

1356. Wang Cheng-po's wife, just arrived Hong Kong from Peiping, says she learned via same channel through which Wang's previous reports derived (Congentels 945, October 31 [1] and 1099 November 14 [2]) that Standing Committee of CCP Control Commission met prior November 19 with Soviet advisers and agreed on following strategy in Korea: Aim of Chinese intervention is to attract largest possible proportion of American troops and equipment to vicinity Manchurian frontier where they will gradually be chewed up in long war of attrition by lavish use Chinese manpower. In addition to present six million man army Chinese Communists will raise additional six million through current "volunteer" campaign and conscription. Soviet troops will not participate.

Mrs. Wang's brother made trip to Mukden in November and learned from uncle who is Communist head of Northeast Government Department Civil Affairs that Communists are expecting bombing of Manchuria to begin any time. Except for skeleton staff still in Mukden, Northeast Government Departments and college have moved to Harbin and Changchun. Mukden converted into military headquarters and supply base for Korean war. Mrs. Wang's brother estimated Chinese

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1019.
[2] Not printed.

Communist strength in field army units alone in Manchuria about one million.

Mrs. Wang reported violent anti-American propaganda campaign being pushed at top speed among students, government organs and general public in Peiping to expedite mobilization. She says up to one-third of student body of schools and staff members of government organizations have "volunteered" for service in Korea. Subordinate organs of revolutionary military council have been dispersed from Peiping to Kalgan, Hsiahuayuan, Nankow and Pataling. In discussion groups Communists placing great emphasis on China's advantage in manpower and disadvantage US long supply lines.

Repeated info Taipei 163.

McCONAUGHY

795.00/12–150

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1950.

Subject: Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea—Counter Strategy

Reference: CA Memoranda July 12 "Korea and Over-All World Situation", November 17 [7], 1950 "Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, Counter strategy" [1]

The basic premises for this consideration remain the same as set forth in CA's July 12 memorandum, that is, in sum, that Moscow purposes the destruction of the United States, and the Communist operation in Korea is a part of the global strategic plan of world Communism and to be viewed accordingly. Those premises remain the same with the Chinese Communist intervention of late October. In fact, the Chinese Communist intervention is largely meaningless, unless it be regarded as a component part of a global Communist plan—for a war by China alone against the UN could bear only bitter fruits. It is believed that these assumptions get support from (1) the scale of Chinese Communist intervention, in terms of troops put in the field, (2) the defense preparations being undertaken on the China mainland, (3) the character of (and time limits imposed upon) Chinese Communist commercial and financial relations in the international market, (4) the identity of Peiping and Moscow propagandas and outlooks, particularly as evidenced most recently in the UN by General Wu Hsiu-ch'uan, and (5) Chinese Communist moves with respect to Indo-

[1] The memorandum of July 12 is not printed; for the memorandum of November 7, see p. 1078.

china and Tibet. The international character of Chinese moves is indicated, it is thought, by such a circumstance as the energetic repair and construction of airfields on mainland China, on a scale far in excess of any conceivable needs which might be imposed by the operations of China's own very limited air fleet: the only logical inference to be drawn from such action is that preparations are being made for use of Chinese fields by the Soviet air force.

It is repeated: the deduction logically to be drawn is that the Korean operation constitutes only a part of a larger operation planned by Moscow in the global theater. It is to be anticipated in the given circumstances that an enlargement of the present conflict is probably, from the Chinese point of view, deemed "inevitable".

It is to be accepted as probable, in the light of the flexibility of Communist strategy generally, that various alternative avenues have been selected for the development from Korea of the widening conflict. One possible course presumably envisaged by the Moscow strategists would stem from the hypothetical carrying of UN military action into Manchuria or China generally.* Such a UN reaction would offer the opportunity for the Communist political strategists to invoke the provisions of the Sino-Soviet alliance of February 14, 1950. In that event, at a time when the available U.S. forces were tied down in Korea and Europe, the first new Communist blows would presumably fall simultaneously on Korea and Japan. Another possible avenue of approach would be the development of other Chinese Communist offensives concurrently with that in Korea against Indochina and Hong Kong on pretexts which have already been openly stated by the Peiping propaganda machine. This drive could be extended either toward the Philippines or westward into Thailand and Burma. That line of peripheral approach could naturally readily be extended to Europe by active development of the situations now existing in Germany and/or Iran. A third alternative might be, for the present, the active continuation of the campaign in Korea alone with the objective of annihilating the UN forces there present, with an attack on Japan and the other indicated areas to take place only at a later date. That date, be it noted, might not necessarily be much later.

As a corollary remark, it is to be observed that at such time as a major move against Japan or Germany were undertaken the Soviet Union, which has undoubtedly studied well the history of Germany's two wars of this century, would probably strike as well at the vulnerable administrative and industrial centers in the U.S.: the U.S., if it possesses a strategic air force, is nevertheless at the present time

*c.f., CA's memorandum "Probable Consequences of Carrying UN Hostilities into Manchuria", November 17, 1950. [Footnote in the source text.]

largely stripped of trained ground troops and is weak in the tactical air force with which to oppose the Soviet Union's own strategic air force and air-borne armies advancing through Alaska and/or Canada. If American intelligence estimates do not at the present time seem to bear out this supposition of a Soviet capability of mounting an air-borne invasion, it is to be remarked that our intelligence of the Soviet Union, because of the effectiveness of the Iron Curtain, has serious gaps, and we cannot be assured that we are adequately informed of the direction, scope and timing of Soviet intentions. It would be relapsing into a Maginot Line philosophy to judge ourselves quite secure at home by reason of our stockpile of atomic bombs: the next "Pearl Harbor" may be even more surprising than the last. The USSR obviously need not maintain 170 divisions for use in Europe alone, and the Chinese Communist success in concealed penetration of Korea suggests possibilities that might be exploited by the Soviets against the American continent. If such a development is to be considered improbable for logistic reasons, the hypothetical possibility should not be left without consideration.

The present situation in Korea therefore is not to be regarded as purely a local problem. It is granted that the UN mandate cannot be abandoned. There are good reasons why it should not be abandoned, outstanding among which are the following: (1) The political consequences for the UN and the direct increment of strength to the cause of world Communism which would follow upon a UN withdrawal would be so serious that the undertaking should not be abandoned if it is possible to continue with it. (2) The naval and air superiority, and the technical superiority generally, of the UN forces are such that the UN ground forces with good generalship should be able to continue their campaign with *current* success despite the intervention of Chinese Communist forces in Korea, even if that intervention were to mount up to one-half million men. (3) The UN logistics, given access to the peninsula by sea and by air from a deep reservoir of supply, are more readily maintained than those of the Chinese Communists. (4) The economy of China in terms of industrial production and commercial circulation, as well as in terms of the people's livelihood, is too weak by far to permit the support of major operations for any considerable period of time. (5) The political situation in China, with deep discontents and much overt unrest, is such that outside pressure, if it can be applied, might start that rolling-up of the Communist power which is an absolute essential in the event (deemed improbable) that all-out war with the Soviet Union is to be avoided.

If the campaign in Korea is to be continued, however, it cannot be safely continued in the present manner: the time remaining before the next stage of development of the Soviet global plan is possibly, even probably, too short to permit us safely to keep our major available forces committed in that exposed position while other areas much more important strategically to the U.S. and the free world are left nearly unprotected. Those areas, particularly, comprise western Europe and Japan. China's very embarking on a program of military conquest at the expense of its seriously debilitated economy seems indicative of the existence of an earlier Communist schedule for war than had been thought. A change in strategy, and a shift of forces, would seem under present conditions to be essential. This argument draws force from the circumstance that it seems highly unlikely that a stable defense line, even if it could be thrown across the upper neck of Korea, could be effective. It is to be noted that Korea is at present in a war-torn state, that any massive program for rehabilitation cannot safely be undertaken, and that dissatisfaction and unrest will undoubtedly increase throughout the peninsula. By-passed North Korean guerrillas are already operating in south and central Korea, the Chinese Communists have already broken through the existing line, and guerrilla warfare in north and south seems bound to grow in extent and intensity. A line with the enemy on both sides of it would be largely meaningless.

With immediate reference to the existing military situation, the following suggestions are offered: (1) the UN forces should be consolidated in two major enclaves (or beachheads) respectively on the eastern and western sides of the peninsula, centering roughly on Pyongyang and Wonsan, with or without lateral contact; (2) our UN allies should immediately be consulted inside and out of the council halls of the UN, for the purpose of integrating Korean strategy into world strategy; (3) those allies should be asked to supply larger military contingents from their own sources, with new approaches made to UN members who have thus far failed to contribute troops to the enterprise; (4) the American commitment should, after stabilization of the UN position, immediately be reduced by the withdrawal of a number of U.S. divisions (four?) to Japan sufficient for the primary protection of that country, which is the truly vital area of the western Pacific for American defense, against a Soviet air-borne invasion which might be undertaken through Hokkaido; (5) the UN campaign should then be continued, on the basis of limited commitments, with the express purpose of fulfilling the UN mandate if possible, that is, continued in such manner that loss of the campaign would not constitute a vital blow to the military establishment of (*a*) the United States, (*b*) the N.A.T. areas, or (*c*) the Commonwealth nations. Continua-

tion on that basis would have the merit of maintaining our political position intact and of effecting a severe drain on the economic and political strength of Communist China. It would seem feasible in view of the superior equipment of the UN forces and their better logistical position. It would enable us to build up the international aspect of the UN operation well past the point where the charge of the Peiping–Moscow axis—that the operation is purely an American operation—could have any force. It would possibly enable us to avoid that involvement in a war with China which is so feared by our friends. It would enable us better to establish and strengthen our own military defenses and our military alliances against impending developments of an even graver nature than the present. And it would still be possible, in a more radical implementation of this general strategy, further to supplement the military operation by a tight UN economic embargo and even blockade of China, and even the fostering of opposition political movements in China itself.† On the eve or morrow of any later graver turn in the situation, it is further suggested, a heavy blow could be dealt against the Communist economy by the destruction (by A-bombs if need be) of not only the Yalu River Dam but the other power installations in North Korea.

As suggested above, the Moscow strategists probably conceive of alternative modes of development of their war against the free world. It is suggested that a new critical turn in events will probably not occur during the time while both the Soviet and Chinese Communist delegations are carrying on their propaganda campaign at Lake Success, and the Chinese Communist forces continue to operate in the guise of "volunteers". The earliest critical period is estimated to be possibly immediately following the termination of the UN sessions and the return of the chief Communist delegates to their homelands. A clear, violent break with the Soviet bloc in the UN would be—particularly since it would reflect a Soviet choice—a firm portent of an aggravation of military, as well as political, relations. It is estimated that another critical period would develop no later than early spring 1951, by which time, be it noted, new developments centering on Indochina can logically be expected. Tibet will also by then presumably have seen changes.

The above does not rule out reference to the means of political negotiation for the purpose of undertaking a political *détente*.‡ Presumably all means should be tried to gain further time for the free world. Those of our friends, particularly, who recommend the political ap-

†c.f., Mr. Merchant's memorandum of November 27, 1950 proposing a process of fragmentation. [Footnote in the source text. See vol. VI, p. 581.]

‡c.f., CA memorandum of November 7, 1950, pages 1–3. [Footnote in the source text.]

proach, should be encouraged to make their *démarches* at Moscow or Peiping. The tenor of the propaganda of the Moscow–Peiping axis, however, evidently does not offer any substantial promise that success could be achieved by reference to political negotiations. It is clearly only by negotiation from a position of strength that there would be any chance of success and our present position is not one of strength. Our position is, contrariwise, one of grave military danger. It therefore behooves the United States and its allies to undertake at the earliest possible moment such redistribution and rehabilitation of their military strength as would put us, first, in a better defensive position than we are in today and, second, in a much stronger political position as well.

711.5611/12–150 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

LONDON, December 1, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received December 1—3 : 19 p. m.]

3200. Depcirc 199, November 29, 3 p. m.[1] and further to Embtel 3191, November 30.[2] British public opinion deeply troubled over (1) Far Eastern situation and (2) possibility that atom bomb might be used in Korea thus setting off general atomic war. This anxiety has been only partly relieved by (1) Attlee decision to go to Washington and (2) White House statement clarifying position re atom bomb.

Embassy view is that British opinion from top to bottom (and not merely within Labor Party) is strongly opposed to any action that would contribute to UN forces becoming entangled in war with Commie China; that use of bomb in Korea which is regarded as Churchill said as "diversion" would be likely precipitate such an inextricable

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[1] Not printed. This telegram was sent to the Missions in Ankara, Athens, Brussels, Cairo, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, London, Oslo, Paris, Rome, Stockholm, Tehran, and Vienna and the Office of the High Commissioner in Frankfort. It requested an analysis of public reaction to the present situation in Korea and suggestions on what could be done in the psychological field to reassure and stiffen the public and to strengthen the unity of the free nations. (511.00/11–2950)

[2] Not printed. This telegram detailed some of the reasons for British concern outlined in telegram 3043, November 24 (see footnote 1 to telegram 3076 from London, received at 1 : 31 p. m. on November 25, p. 1234). Most British criticisms derived from distrust of the policies of General MacArthur and appeared centered in the belief that the U.N. offensive was launched in the midst of British proposals for a solution in Korea, that military pressure might now be exerted for authority to bomb Manchuria, and that U.N. orders were being flouted by open support of the "malodorous" Rhee regime. The criticisms were all leveled at General MacArthur, not at President Truman or Secretary of State Acheson. (741.00/11–3050)

entanglement and that there should be close Anglo-American consultations before any such decision taken.

Attlee's Washington visit closely linked in all British press today with atomic issue and his quick decision to go has plainly relieved what otherwise would have been serious public tension here. Importance of this aspect visit and of Truman–Attlee talks therefore should be borne fully in mind by all information media.

Foreign Office emphasized to Embassy Office today it believes important avoid overplaying or dramatizing visit to avoid disappointment later, and suggests publicity stress general nature of talks.

Embassy impression is that vis-à-vis present Far Eastern situation and explicitly prospect of becoming entangled in all-out war with China, British opinion, always very reluctant as evidenced by their reaction on Formosa, has now hardened against any statement, step or policy which appears to lead in that direction. But Embassy also convinced that this extreme British caution with its apparent undertones is confined to issue of war with China and would not extend to Europe which all British press and government spokesmen emphasize is crucial area. Embassy feels it is important keep this background in mind when handling information on Attlee trip and Washington talks. Meantime however Embassy feels there is special and urgent need to meet criticism here of MacArthur and of his recent strategy. In particular recommend high level statement (possibly Marshall) emphasizing with all possible documentary evidence, that Chinese Commies had mounted and were on point of launching major offensive against UN forces prior to MacArthur's thrust.

HOLMES

Editorial Note

The United Nations General Assembly held its 314th meeting on December 1 from 3 to 6 p. m.; for the record of the meeting, see U.N. document A/PV.314. The Assembly approved Resolutions 410 A and B (V), providing for relief and rehabilitation of Korea and financial arrangements related thereto. The vote in both cases was 51 to 0, with 5 abstentions. The resolutions established the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) under the direction of a United Nations Agent General and provided for a Negotiating Committee to consult with member and nonmember states concerning financial contributions for Korean relief. For the text of the resolutions, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950*, page 280, or *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents*, volume II, page 2585, or U.N. document A/1775, page 31.

795.00/12–150: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

SECRET PRIORITY NIACT WASHINGTON, December 1, 1950—6 p. m.

221. In light Sov veto of 6-power res on Korea we can see at this time no further fruitful action which can be taken in SC. Attitude of Chi Commie reps has been completely intransigent and non-conciliatory. Efforts that have been made by various dels which have recognized Peiping regime to consult with these reps have been repulsed, and reps in NY are being isolated from contact with all dels except that of Sov. Under these circumstances best way of bringing to bear full weight of world opinion is by airing in forum of GA real nature and gravity of Chi intervention in Korea. At present time it is only in this way that we feel that any influence can be exerted on future action of Chi Commie Govt and Chi people.

Furthermore, in light of Sov veto, to bring case before GA is fully in conformity with concepts which underlie res adopted at this session of GA called "Uniting for Peace". Having adopted that res by such an overwhelming vote, it wld be almost inconceivable for Members of UN to sit by in inactivity after 6-power res has been defeated in SC by Sov veto.

Furthermore, US believes that we shld exhaust in UN all processes for reconciling differences and bringing about peaceful settlement.

In our view most effective manner of bringing matter before GA wld be to have six sponsors of vetoed SC Res join in proposing a new item on Assembly's agenda, "Intervention of the Central Govt of the People's Republic of China in Korea", as a matter of importance and urgency.

In nr consultations it has been suggested and we agree that first step in GA consideration shld be adoption of vetoed SC res. Depending on new developments, views of other dels and response of Chi Commie Govt the GA might wish to make further recommendations or modify or expand that res.

Request you take up on urgent basis with FonOff our attitude on this question with view to having govt to which you accredited issue instructions to its UN del to join with us in referring matter to GA. We wld have in mind suitable announcement by 6-powers that we

[1] This message was sent to Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Belgrade, Cairo, Canberra, The Hague, Havana, London, Manila, Moscow, New Delhi, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Pretoria, Quito, Seoul, Stockholm, Taipei, Wellington, and the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.

were agreed to refer matter jointly to GA at earliest possible date and therafter formally to propose agenda item to SYG.

Specific actions re joint submission GA required in Embs Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, UK.

This tel being transmitted all members SC, and all countries having military forces in Korea, so that their FonOffs, except Sov, can be informed of US position and proposed course of action.

ACHESON

795.00/12–150 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 1, 1950—9 : 04 p. m.
[Received December 1—9 : 20 p. m.]

930. Indian contacts with Chinese Communist delegation. At 11 a. m. today B. N. Rau accompanied by Dayal called on General Wu and talked with him for about an hour. Present also were Ch'iao [1] and P'u Shan,[2] P'u Shan as interpreter. Dayal informed USGADel it was obvious to him that General Wu merely hardheaded soldier, while Ch'iao really brains of group. Dayal stated one encouraging outcome of conversation is that Wu has accepted invitation for dinner with Rau December 3, and Wu also indicated willingness for social contacts with other representatives, including British. In conversation with Gross, Rau characterized atmosphere of conversation as friendly and stated Wu expressed desire for "peaceful settlement" without, however, specifying what this means. Rau said he was not at liberty reveal parts of conversation but that he hoped to be able to do so later. From Rau's remarks regarding his talk with Wu, Gross derived impression Rau following weak appeasing line.

Please relay AmEmbassy New Delhi as USUN 7.

AUSTIN

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[1] Ch'iao Kuan-hua, adviser to General Wu in the delegation of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, was Vice Chairman of the Foreign Ministry's Foreign Policy Committee and Vice President of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, in addition to being Director of the International News Bureau in the Press Administration.

[2] Kung P'u-sheng, a member of the PRC delegation to the United Nations, was Deputy Director of the International Organization and Conference Department in the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China.

795.00/12–150 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, December 1, 1950—11 : 45 p. m.
[Received December 2—12 : 17 a. m.]

931. Reactions to President's statement on A-Bomb re Sandifer–Brown[1] telecon December 1. With exception of Latins, majority of delegates commenting expressed considerable concern when reports of President's statement first spread from newsroom. Number of European and Commonwealth delegates appeared greatly shocked. Subsequent clarification had calming effect but did not entirely satisfy them. In particular, they seemed have little confidence that fears aroused at home would be allayed. Coulson, UK, spoke with emphasis along these lines today.

Federer, German observer, felt threat or even use of A-Bomb would solve nothing. It would not frighten Chinese Communists or USSR Government, since sacrifice of life was not an important consideration. Opinion expressed by several European correspondents that President's statement would receive heavy play in Stalinist propaganda.

Among Arab and Israeli delegates, President's clarification and our own explanations by no means dispelled impression US has under active consideration use of bomb in Korea. Opinion expressed this would inevitably start world war 3 and that bomb then would be used by USSR in other parts of world. Several Arab delegates went out of their way to convey fear, as expressed to them by Asian delegates, that A-Bomb might be dropped again on Asian people. Baroody, Saudi Arabia, today spoke with deep emotion to Mrs. Roosevelt along these lines saying matter had been discussed at length among delegates of smaller countries and requesting their views be transmitted to President. He felt impression would spread in Asia that US intended to use bomb against a colored people. If bomb used, effect on US relations would be disastrous for years to come. Mrs. Roosevelt replied war itself was basic evil. Although she hoped it would not be necessary to use A-Bomb in Korea, choice of weapons would have to be decided in terms military situation at particular time.

Dayal, India, and several members Pakistan delegation were disturbed at initial reports but somewhat reassured by later clarification. Still, they agreed threat to use bomb would reinforce idea US willing use mass destruction methods on Asians but not Europeans.

In contrast, one or two Arab representatives seemed prepared to accept use of bomb if necessary and Kanellopoulos, Greece, Sarper,

[1] Benjamin H. Brown, Deputy Secretary-General of the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.

Turkey, Ardalan, Iran, Aziz, Afghanistan, Asad, Saudi Arabia, and Cooper, Liberia, seemed to understand President's statement and fully approved it.

AUSTIN

795.00/12–250 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Maynard) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

ATHENS, December 2, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received December 2—1 : 49 a. m.]

1776. Reference Depcirtel 221, December 1. Prime Minister promises to send immediate instructions along following lines to Greek delegate at GA:

"American Embassy advises that six sponsors of vetoed Security Council resolution will join in proposing a new item on General Assembly's agenda 'Intervention of Central Government of Peoples Republic of China in Korea'. You are instructed to join wholeheartedly with United States delegate in referring this matter to GA and to fully support American position Korea." [1]

MAYNARD

[1] Telegram 734 from Taipei, received at 1 : 55 a. m. on December 3, reported similar wholehearted support for the U.S. position being expressed by the Republic of China (795.00/12–350).

795.00/12–250

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, and by Mr. William J. Sheppard, Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 2, 1950—10 :30 a.m.

Participants:		
	Secretary	Mr. Rusk
	Senator Austin	Mr. Nitze
	Ambassador Gross	Mr. Battle
	Mr. Jessup	Mr. Sheppard
	Mr. Matthews	Mr. Hickerson

Mr. Acheson opened the meeting with the request that Mr. Trueheart of the R Area [1] give a briefing on the current situation in Korea.

After this briefing had taken place, the Secretary said that we had given careful consideration to the developments in Korea and had been in close touch with the Military Establishment. He mentioned that the Military were extremely pessimistic about the present situation

[1] William C. Trueheart, Intelligence Staff Officer, Department of State.

and said that it was uncertain just what the decision would be so far as establishing a line on which we could hold. He said that we were looking at possible political courses in the light of the extremely grave military situation. He said that our objectives in regard to Korea in the UN were as follows:

1. To increase the security of our troops that are fighting there.
2. To localize the conflict; that is, avoid becoming involved in a more general war.
3. To end the Korean situation quickly on a statisfactory UN basis and disengage US troops as rapidly as possible.
4. To maintain a solid front among our allies and, if possible, retain the support of a majority of the UN.

In order to further these objectives we would take the following line in the UN:

1. That the intervention of the Chinese Communists has raised the gravest danger to the peace of the world.
2. If it continues, this intervention will cause a chain of developments which will bring unparalleled destruction to large areas of the world;
3. That the entire purpose of the UN Charter would come to naught if this is not stopped;
4. That the first point is to stop the fighting in Korea immediately;
5. That the UN should call upon the Chinese Communists to halt their attack and when they have done so the UN forces will cease any further hostilities against them;
6. That we believe the alleged reasons for the Chinese Communists' intervention to be completely without foundation.
7. That the UN cannot be the place for settling disputes, which is one of its primary functions, while the fighting is still going on.

The Secretary said that he was aware that the Chinese Communists might be unwilling to agree to a cease fire or might state conditions, such as withdrawing to the 38th Parallel, etc. Senator Austin replied that one of the conditions might be the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet from Formosa.

The Senator said that many proposals were made to him. He mentioned that a Chinese, unknown to him, had stopped him in the corridors and suggested that Korea be made a dominion of the Peiping Government. Senator Austin said that he had no idea who this was, but he may have been a member of the delegation. He replied that this was absolutely impossible and the conversation ended there.

The Senator said his correspondence had been very large and was divided between those who went out all the way and recommended use of the atomic bomb and the opposite line of those who wanted to with-

draw from Korea entirely. He mentioned a letter from Mrs. Bolton,[2] which was turned over to Mr. Hickerson for action.

Ambassador Gross said that he thought the question at the outset is how to establish contact with the Chinese Communists, where to get in touch with them, and who should serve as intermediary. He said Sir Benegal Rau was the most obvious intermediary and that, while he was often unreliable, he may be the best available. Mr. Gross mentioned numerous conversations recently with people at the UN and said the general feeling was that we should exploit the Rau approach to General Wu. He said that he had not encouraged this but had told Rau that when they had something they wanted to discuss we would, of course, be happy to consult with them.

Mr. Gross said that the attitude of many of our allies hinged on the question of what we are doing in an effort to work things out, and he felt that we must consider this and the possible use of an intermediary.

Mr. Gross referred to his conversation with Mr. Rau after Rau had seen Wu. He said that Rau had said he could not disclose all that took place. Mr. Gross said that Rau had told Jebb the same thing and that Jebb thought that some offer might have been made by Wu. Mr. Gross did not get that impression at all from his conversation with Rau.

Mr. Gross said that Rau had expressed to him the Indian position that India felt that the recently vetoed resolution was inadequate and inappropriate to the present situation and that India would want the resolution changed to include other methods of dealing with the problem. He did not state specifically what these methods might be, but said that they were along the lines of the amendments which the Indians had suggested informally when the resolution came up before.[3]

Mr. Jessup said that if we decided to proceed through an intermediary we could visualize our views being presented through Sir Benegal Rau to General Wu through Mao to Moscow. The point he wished to make was that it might be better to make a more direct approach to Moscow in the beginning, perhaps having someone talk to Mr. Malik. Mr. Jessup elaborated on this by saying that the use of intermediaries is a very slow process and a more direct approach would save time. Mr. Gross said that we would not even need an intermediary with Mr. Malik because conversations between the United States Delegation and Malik are rather routine.

The Secretary said that we might decide that we should use all avenues, maybe even taking it into the Political Committee at the proper time.

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[2] Representative Frances P. Bolton, Republican, of Ohio. The letter is not printed.

[3] See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Noyes, November 21, p. 1208.

Mr. Gross reverted to the discussions between Sir Benegal Rau and General Wu and suggested that in this connection the Department ask Ambassador Henderson to request the Indian Government to authorize Sir Benegal to talk with us freely and not to hold back any significant information in connection with the Rau–Wu discussions. Mr. Matthews suggested that perhaps a better approach would be to ask Ambassador Henderson to talk to Mr. Bajpai to see what information he could obtain which is not now available to us. Ambassador Gross inquired whether we had written off a direct approach to the Peiping Government through some government represented there. Mr. Matthews noted that we had tried this earlier and had not been successful.

Senator Austin inquired at this point whether we had a draft paper which we wanted him to introduce in the General Assembly. The Secretary replied that we were still considering whether it would not be better to have conversations without putting any specific position in writing. If we didn't have the conversations first, we might later have to water-down whatever position we had introduced, and we had wanted to consult with Senator Austin and Ambassador Gross first. In this connection the Secretary noted that the whole atmosphere of our approach should be very calm and without vilification.

At this point the Secretary again referred to the line we would take in the United Nations in furthering our objectives. The Secretary indicated that he thought this approach would appeal to our allies in that it was a sober, responsible position which clearly indicated that this Government does not wish to provoke a larger conflict.

In connection with the method of approach, Mr. Nitze raised the question as to whether it wouldn't be better to proceed secretly with negotiations while at the same time maintaining a public attitude of firmness. The Secretary replied that we should consider this but at the same time should keep in mind that a more open approach allowed us to bring the maximum pressure on Mao.

Mr. Gross said there was no question but that Formosa and the seating problem would be bound to come up.

The Secretary stated that in this whole matter we must keep ourselves in position to do whatever we need to do to secure our troops and our course of action should not forfeit our flexibility in this respect.

Mr. Gross said that another course of action might be to use a subcommission of the Security Council. They could meet quickly and as their first recommendation suggest that there be a cease fire order. Prior to such an approach, specific suggestions could be made to Mr. Malik to determine his attitude.

Senator Austin said that he had spent so much time at the UN that he felt that he fairly well reflected their viewpoint; that he and his

staff had worked strenuously getting the delegations in line behind the resolution which was vetoed in the Security Council; and that as a result they had a certain amount of momentum underway with the other delegations. This momentum, he indicated, rests considerably on an attitude of firmness toward representatives of the USSR and of Mao. The Senator indicated that this momentum would need to be maintained and that he would find it difficult to return to New York and immediately start talking about some kind of an armistice. Mr. Gross said that it was his feeling that the momentum of the present resolution would not be inconsistent with further negotiations and that the negotiations would fit in with the line which we had been taking in New York.

Senator Austin suggested that we go ahead and let Sir Benegal make his amendments in the General Assembly along the lines which he is now thinking and in this manner neither side in the conflict would need to bear the onus of an initiative for stopping the fighting.

In conclusion, Mr. Acheson suggested that departmental staff work today with Senator Austin and Mr. Gross to produce a memorandum by evening for the President and Secretary Marshall which would outline a course of political action which might be followed in the event that the military situation requires it.[4]

[4] The text of this memorandum was incorporated in telegram Gadel 153 to New York, transmitted at 7 p. m. on December 2, p. 1307.

320/12–250 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

LONDON, December 2, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received December 2—11 : 26 a. m.]

3235. Depcirtel 221, December 1 discussed with Foreign Office this morning. Foreign Office states that its previous doubts over desirability GA consideration Chinese intervention in Korea were resolved yesterday and Jebb instructed vote in favor introducing vetoed six-power resolution into GA.

While Foreign Office not optimistic re recent indications Chinese delegation willing meet delegates other nations, it feels even slight hopes something helpful resulting from informal conversations should not be prejudiced and is therefore in no hurry to undertake formal action in GA. It feels that in any event there is not sufficient urgency warrant action before there is opportunity consider matter during or in connection with Attlee conversations.

HOLMES

795.00/12–250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

PARIS, December 2, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received December 2—2 : 53 p. m.]

3122. Bonsal[1] discussed Department niact circular 221, December 2 [1] with La Tournelle (Director Political Affairs) and Wolfrom (Subdirector United Nations Affairs) this afternoon. They expressed themselves in general agreement as to future action in UN in light Soviet veto in Security Council of six-power resolution on Korea. They are in close touch with UN delegation. They made following comments:

1. Before General Assembly can act on any recommendation or resolution it will be necessary for Security Council have procedural vote to remove item from agenda. Pending such action, General Assembly could of course discuss matter. Wolfrom stated that when "Uniting for Peace" resolution was under consideration, US delegation agreed as to continued applicability Article 12 of Charter.
2. Foreign Office reports agree generally with those published in press here to effect Chinese Communist representatives in New York have had conversations with Indian delegation and with Lie. Though these conversations are reported to have dealt in generalities, general impression not unfavorable.

Wolfrom believes placing of matter on General Assembly agenda function of General Assembly's secretariat and not of Secretary General.

BRUCE

[1] Philip W. Bonsal, Counselor of Embassy.

795.00/12–250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

THE HAGUE, December 2, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received December 2—4 : 51 p. m.]

818. I communicated Depcirtel 221 December 1 which received 2 p. m. today to Boon, SecGen FonOff. He said instruction to support vetoed SC resolution on presentation GA already sent the Netherlands delegation but in absence of Stikker and unavailability PriMin delegation cautioned not support any more strongly worded resolution until after communication FonOff. Boon agreed logical next step is referral question to GA.

Boon added government greatly perturbed existing situation and said FonOff had had no word from Peking since November 26. Said he checked with Swedes who experiencing same difficulty. Feared messages being held up.

My impression based on talks with other Netherlands officials and diplomats is that while during preceding crisis it is populace who worried, now it government which is frankly scared over possibilities of developing situation. Boon reiterated that Dutch attitude same as British, French, Belgians and representatives among whom Belgian Ambassador last night indicated many continuing perturbed consultations.

Though Boon in no sense advocated appeasement it clear to me from his remarks he echoing sentiments already expressed to me by NAT diplomats and Netherlands officials that primary concern of NAT countries naturally enough European defense and that even some loss of face at this time in Orient may be necessary to safeguard western civilization. They are most fearful US might take stronger action unilaterally despite assurances to contrary which would bring about all out war in Orient.

CHAPIN

320/12–250 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NIACT WASHINGTON, December 2, 1950—7 p. m.

Gadel 153. Eyes only for Austin and Gross. Set forth below is memo resulting from consultations this afternoon:

Recommended Steps in the UN. (1) Prompt submission to the GA by the six powers of new agenda item entitled "Intervention of the Central Peoples Govt of the Peoples Republic of China in Korea".

(2) Concurrent submission of explanatory memorandum in such form as to leave open nature of resolution which might be adopted by GA.

(3) Unless military situation requires different course of action, submission in GA of resolution vetoed in SC.

(4) In the event that military necessity requires an immediate cease fire, the following alternative courses shld be considered:

(*a*) An approach to the Russians or Chinese Communists or both either directly, or indirectly through an intermediary, with a view to obtaining their agreement to the issuance of an immediate cease fire

and confirmation of that agreement by resolution in the SC or in any other way satisfactory to them.

The approach to the Russians and/or Chinese Communists cld be made directly by the US, by the UK, by the Indian Rep, by the Norwegian Rep, or by some combination of the foregoing. If the approach is made in Peiping the Swedish Ambas cld be used.

(*b*) If it is deemed inadvisable to initiate an approach to the Russians or Chinese, either directly or indirectly, there cld be proposed in the GA a resolution calling for an immediate cease fire. This cld be done by introducing a cease fire resolution instead of the vetoed SC resolution and accelerate Assembly procedures so that the whole matter is taken up in plenary session. It is believed that it wld be possible to obtain a vote in this fashion within 24 to 48 hrs after the matter is placed on the Assembly's agenda.

(*c*) A third and slower alternative wld be to proceed in the Assembly by submitting the vetoed SC resolution in the first instance, and arrange for the introduction in the Assembly by amendment of that resolution or otherwise of a cease fire resolution in which we wld acquiesce and which we wld push forward to a prompt vote. It wld also be possible for some other delegation to introduce a cease fire resolution in the Assembly as an interim measure pending consideration of the vetoed resolution.

(5) If an approach to the Soviet and/or Chinese is made and rejected we shld proceed in the GA in such a way as to secure and maintain the maximum support of the free world for such action on the ground as is necessary under the circumstances.

ACHESON

795.00/12–250

Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, December 2, 1950.] [1]

SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION

1. Developments in Korea and Manchuria indicate that the purpose of the Chinese Communist intervention is to render the UN position in Korea untenable.

2. The attitude of the Chinese Communist regime and urgent defensive preparations in China show that this intervention was undertaken with appreciation of the risk of general war between the United States and Communist China and perhaps in expectation of such a development.

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[1] The source text contained no indication of date other than the note at the end of the document. This paper was presumably taken by Mr. Acheson to his meeting (see *infra*) with President Truman, Secretary Marshall, and General Bradley (see Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 473–474).

3. It is highly improbable that the Chinese Communist regime would have accepted this risk without explicit assurance of effective Soviet support.

4. The Soviet Union will probably:

a. Continue to support Chinese Communist operations in Korea by the provision of suitable materiel, technical personnel, and even "volunteer" units, as necessary.

b. Provide aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, with trained personnel, as necessary for the defense of targets in China against UN air attack.

c. Come openly to the military support of Communist China, under the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, in the event of major US (UN) operations against Chinese territory.

5. The Soviet rulers, in directing or sanctioning the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, must have appreciated the increased risk of global war and have felt ready to accept such a development.

6. Intelligence is inconclusive as to whether or not the Soviet intention is to precipitate a global war now. If the Soviet rulers do now intend to bring on such a war, they might well prefer that it should develop from the situation in East Asia. On the other hand, even if they do not intend to precipitate a global war, they must estimate that a broadening of the Korean war into a general war between the United States and China would be advantageous to the USSR.

7. Whether or not a global war were to ensue, the USSR could reasonably hope to derive the following advantages from the development of a general war between the United States and Communist China:

a. The diversion of effective US and allied forces to operations in an indecisive theater and their attrition and containment there.

b. The creation of dissension between the United States and its allies, which is more feasible with respect to Asian than to European issues.

c. The disruption of the coherence achieved by the UN with respect to the original Communist aggression in Korea.

d. The obstruction of plans for the defense of Western Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty.

e. The speedier achievement of immediate Communist objectives in Korea and Southeast Asia.

8. On the other hand, the USSR may estimate that the United States would decline the immediate challenge in Asia, in which case the USSR could proceed to collect the immediate stakes in Korea and Indochina.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

9. The Soviet rulers have resolved to pursue aggressively their world-wide attack on the power position of the United States and its

allies, regardless of the possibility that global war may result, although they may estimate that the Western Allies would seek to avoid such a development. Further direct or indirect Soviet aggression in Europe and Asia is likely, regardless of the outcome of the Korean situation.

10. The minimal purpose of the USSR in the current situation is to render untenable the UN position in Korea.

11. The USSR is prepared to accept, and may be seeking to precipitate, a general war between the United States and China, despite the inherent risk of global war.

12. The possibility cannot be disregarded that the USSR may already have decided to precipitate global war in circumstances most advantageous to itself through the development of general war in Asia. We are unable, on the basis of present intelligence, to determine the probability of such a decision having in fact been made.

[*Note:* This estimate is being issued by the Director of Central Intelligence as a National Intelligence Estimate, concurred in on December 2, 1950, by all members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.] [2]

[2] Brackets appear in the source text. This document was issued as N.I.E. 11, dated December 5, 1950.

795.00/12–350

Memorandum by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, of a Meeting Held on December 2, 1950

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1950.

On his return from the White House last night where he had met with the President, General Marshall and General Bradley, the Secretary said that it had been agreed to proceed with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the paper entitled "Recommended Steps in the United Nations".[1] These paragraphs concern the submission to the General Assembly by the six powers of a new agenda item entitled "Intervention of the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China in Korea". The paragraphs also provide for the concurrent submission of an explanatory memorandum in such form as to leave open the nature of the resolution which might be adopted by the General Assembly.

The President and General Marshall felt that the proposal in paragraph 3 of the paper for the submission to the General Assembly of the resolution vetoed by the Security Council was only a time-waster.

[1] The text of the paper is incorporated in telegram Gadel 153, p. 1307.

They felt that it might be a good stall for time but did not believe it would meet the current situation.

It was felt generally desirable to proceed with paragraphs 4 *a* and *b* of this paper but that any steps should be after the telecon with General Collins on Sunday morning, December 3.[2] It was also felt that action on these points should await Mr. Attlee's arrival.

The Secretary said that paragraph 4*c* was considered too slow and it was believed we did not have time for this action.

It was made clear that the provisions of paragraph 3 should be our public position for the immediate time being.

The President and General Marshall said that they felt that if any negotiations with the Russians took place, the United States should be in the talks.

There was a discussion as to the price which might be asked by the Chinese Communists as payment for a settlement of the situation. The Secretary said that he thought the least that they would ask was that we go south of the 38th parallel. General Marshall thought that it was most unlikely that the Chinese Communists would ask for this little, and the Secretary agreed. The Secretary said the next thing they might ask is that we get out of Korea. The next demand might be a seat in the General Assembly. The next, might be abandonment of Formosa. And the last, might be placing the Japanese peace treaty negotiations on a CFM basis with China represented. This would foreshadow an effort to get us out of Japan.

General Marshall mentioned that we were in a great dilemma of determining how we could save our troops and protect our national honor at the same time. He thought it would be difficult for us to abandon in good conscience the South Koreans. All agreed that we must think a long time before we come to any such conclusion.

The Secretary discussed briefly his conversation with the President and General Marshall on the domestic situation. He said that, regardless of whether it was really necessary from the standpoint of gaining authority, he felt that it was in the public interest to have the President declare a national emergency in existence. The Secretary felt that this would be highly desirable if the public was to be aware of the seriousness of the situation. He also mentioned that the President should consider use of his powers for freezing prices, wages, etc. He also urged that the President establish high and far-reaching production controls. He indicated the President said he agreed with what the Secretary had said on these points.

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[2] General Collins arrived in Tokyo on December 4, whence he proceeded to Korea after a brief meeting with General MacArthur; see Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 229–233.

The Secretary discussed with General Marshall and the President the urgency of getting our armed forces built up as quickly as possible, and also the need for getting the military establishment to place its orders for equipment, materiel, etc., as rapidly as could be arranged. They felt that additional funds in the form of appropriations would probably not actually be needed at present and believed that the funds presently available were ample to cover the accelerated program for the time being.[3] Mr. Acheson urged that orders be placed as rapidly as possible. When the accelerated production gets under way, the question of additional funds can be considered.

It was agreed at this meeting that the Secretary and such others from the Department as he designated should meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Sunday morning, December 3 at 9:30 and that following that the Secretary and General Marshall, and I believe General Bradley, would go over to see the President. The Secretary designated Messrs. Jessup, Rusk, Matthews and Nitze to attend the meeting from the Department and asked that I call Mr. Harriman and inform him of the meeting, which I did.

L. D. B[ATTLE]

[Annex]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

SUPPLEMENT TO MR. BATTLE'S MEMORANDUM OF DECEMBER 3 RECORDING THE SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT, GENERAL MARSHALL AND GENERAL BRADLEY

The following items appear in my notes and are therefore included in this supplementary memorandum.

At the outset of the conversation, General Marshall said the situation looked very bad indeed. General Bradley also took an extremely pessimistic view of the military situation and thought that not more than 48 to 72 hours would elapse before it reached a crash state.

General Bradley thought that the troops of the Tenth Corps could be evacuated in five days at least but wondered about the manner of the evacuation unless the cease-fire were secured. He thought the 7th Division might be saved and that the 3rd Division was nearer the ports and could get out. He thought we might lose Wonsan but might hold Hungnam. He said we could not take our troops out and leave the ROK Capital and other divisions behind.

[3] On December 1, President Truman had requested from Congress an additional appropriation of $16.8 billion for the Department of Defense and a supplemental appropriation of $1,050,000,000 for the Atomic Energy Commission; see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, p. 728.

General Marshall said that even a Dunkirk type of evacuation might be prejudiced if the Chinese brought in their air.

The President raised the question of General MacArthur's view about the need of operations across the frontier.

The Secretary repeated what he had previously said to General Marshall, namely, that the decisions should be based solely on whether it would help or hurt our troops. We need a very good military judgment as to whether knocking out the Chinese airfields would bring in the Russians. This decision should not be made by MacArthur but by General Marshall on the advice of General Collins, who should stay in Tokyo. We should not take this action for the purpose of holding Korea or merely for the purpose of retaliating against the Chinese but only for the purpose of permitting the evacuation of our troops, if necessary.

The Secretary stressed the importance of having at least the appearance of consultation with Attlee before definitive action was taken.

General Marshall indicated that we might have only 48 hours in which to reach a decision and we could not wait for the first meeting scheduled for Tuesday afternoon.[4] General Marshall suggested it would be better to have Mr. Attlee suggest a settlement rather than having us bear the burden of making the suggestion.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

[4] December 5.

795.00/12–250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, December 2, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received December 2—8 : 15 p. m.]

1132. We concur course suggested Depcirtel 221, December 1 re Chinese intervention Korea. While this new Assembly agenda item directly involves central government of Peoples Republic of China, which Chinese have apparently been making effort to avoid, and by so doing obviously tends to sharpen issue directly between Chinese regime and UN, any other designation of responsibility for Chinese action in Korea is obviously unrealistic, and, at present state of affairs, to give further lip-service to Chinese pretensions that action "voluntary", or in someway involves less than full responsibility of Chinese regime, would appear likely to encourage Communist extension of this spurious device, possibly in other theaters.

In connection with Soviet attitude and intentions Korean situation, Department will have noted that in contrast earlier strident support

North Koreans et cetera, Soviet press recently has been relatively subdued in pronouncements particularly insofar as so-called North Korean communiqués are concerned. Latter have notably lagged behind Chinese successes and have eschewed emphasis thereon. Also, it is reported that agitators and lecturers addressing groups Moscow are comparatively colorless on Korea. We would hesitate draw important conclusions from this evidence but it obviously suggests measure of Soviet uncertainty as to future course Korea. If such uncertainty reflects any essential apprehension at UN reaction continued Chinese intervention, firm line as suggested by Department might succeed dissuade Communists from all-out effort. In any event anything but firm line will inevitably, we believe, encourage them to continuance Hitler-like tactics to which imperialist dictatorships prone. Further, as unprepared as free world nations may feel themselves this time, Chinese Communists no doubt also in less favorable position now than they might be expected to be after further period consolidation their regime et cetera.

Re Department's infotel December [1] 7 a. m.[1] Assume withdrawal to stabilized line is military necessity in any case. However, as regards maintenance indefinitely of "defensive" line, we note that defensive action has disheartening and adverse effect on UN members and their unity. Accordingly, we think such stabilization if it is to be continued long must be accompanied by increased effort in pursuit of positive objective of building up Western Europe to which French attitude on German rearmament has so far been principal obstacle.

Concern expressed among GA delegates that military-diplomatic situation may deteriorate further and belief that adroit diplomatic action essential to conclude Korean affair is also widely held among my friendly colleagues here, whose thinking similarly based on defenseless position Europe in face uncommitted Soviet forces. A number of colleagues have been advocating various moves obtain cease fire along present or even less favorable line, including UN taking initiative in proposing negotiations for armistice, neutral zone et cetera and urging at some length that fiction CPR non-involvement be continued. However, in our view military-diplomatic position UN at moment is such that initiative this type or failure cite CPR responsibility would inevitably not only fall into pitfall of appeasement, but, as sign weakness, backfire in stimulating Communists to further efforts. As set forth above, we feel calm determined firmness in face this Chinese Communist, but at least Soviet blessed, campaign offers best possibility restoring balance militarily and diplomatically to point where it will

[1] Not printed; it conveyed the information covered in telegram 916 from New York, received at 9 : 26 p. m. on November 30, p. 1272.

be in combined Chinese-Soviet interest treat with us on suitable terms. We note this connection, recent Nenni [2] reference to armistice, which with previously cited attitude Soviet press et cetera, suggest that Communist thought does not rule out negotiated solution, although in present situation where things are going their way Chinese delegates refusal talk not unnatural.

We appreciate European apprehensions and, of course, united support UN as heretofore is of paramount importance. On otherhand, possibility *détente* now somewhat smacking of Munich is unattractive, even if—as we inclined doubt but feel unqualified to judge with assurance—same advantage of buying time for European build-up can be shown to exist now as was advanced in 1938.

Department pass London, Paris, Frankfort; repeated information London 208, Paris 241, Frankfort 150.

KIRK

[2] Pietro Nenni, Party Secretary, Italian Socialist Party.

795.00/12–250 : Telegram

The Chargé in Norway (Snow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

OSLO, December 2, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received December 2—9 : 51 p. m.]

562. Saw Foreign Minister Lange 6 p. m. today re Depcirtel 221, December 1. He informed me Norwegian Government viewed current Korean situation engendered by Chinese aggression so seriously that no decisions being taken in relation thereto without Cabinet approval and consultation leaders other parties. As small nation of people with extensive territory on edge of Russian domain and situated so as to be of strategic interest to Russia, Norway had to proceed deliberately weighing each move in terms all possible results it might have. Norwegian UN delegation had reported to FonOff this afternoon generally along lines Depcirtel 221. FonMin had then waited to hear our version before presenting matter to Cabinet. He would seek to obtain Government decision by Sunday night or early Monday,[1] meanwhile could only give his preliminary views which are following.

As for transferring Korean issue from SC to GA he would generally favor the tactic but would offer a few suggestions as to timing and procedure. First he believed the item should be formally stricken from SC agenda. Then he would be inclined to await even a slight further degree of stabilization in the military situation in Korea. It was of

[1] December 3 and 4.

prime importance that the 52 nation majority maintained complete solidarity throughout and he thought that some of the more vacillating members would have a better stomach for the endeavor if the military picture were a little less fluid and depressing.

Moreover, he thought the Chinese would also be more amenable to reason under those conditions. Then he suggested that the prospective meeting of Attlee and perhaps Pleven with President Truman in Washington would have an effect on the situation but one which was pretty hard to judge in advance. It might be well to wait at least until these conversations had begun before raising the question in the GA. He was in short in favor of avoiding the appearance of unnecessarily forcing the issue at this particular moment.

As for intransigent attitude of Chinese Communist group in New York, his UN delegation had informed him that Indian delegate Rau had finally succeeded in getting into conversation with Chinese group leader and was to have another talk very soon. Also, that Secretary-General Lie had established contact. He saw some slight hope in this and felt it supported his impression that the better course might be not to force the pace in the GA. He felt apologetic about offering this sort of advice to the US whose casualty lists were growing and who was carrying so heavy a share of the total burden. He presumed that domestic pressures were strong upon the Administration for prompt action.

Foreign Minister's speech in Storting this morning being reported separate message.[2]

SNOW

[2] Not printed.

795.00/12–250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Canada (Woodward) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

OTTAWA, December 2, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received December 2—10:36 p. m.]

165. ReDepcirtel 221.[1] Canadian Government has assumed from start that 6 power resolution Korea would be vetoed in SC and referred to GA. Text Deptel this subject under urgent consideration in FonOff since delivery early this morning. From final meeting this evening headed by Pearson we have message as follows:

(1) We are glad to note that the US view is that the first step in consideration by the GA should be the 6 power resolution.

[1] December 1, p. 1298.

(2) We consider that any formal decision by the UN at this stage that Communist China is an aggressor would be unwise.

(3) In the light of the situation as we know it at present we agree that there appears to be no further fruitful action to be taken by the Council. This situation however might change.

(4) We feel that the new machinery established to transfer problems to the Assembly is so new that it will be severe test to place upon it this particular problem.

(5) It may not be essential to link the reference of this question to the GA with the resolution.

(6) There should be no effort to press for an early vote in the Assembly. The timetable should be kept flexible since much will depend on the progress of diplomatic discussions.

Pearson now planning leave for New York Monday noon.

WOODWARD

795.00/12–250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, December 2, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received December 2—11 p. m.]

1381. 1. During conversation with Bajpai this morning, I told him that I regretted that my illness had prevented my having a chat with him for several days. In meantime, there had been number of important developments and events including veto on part of Soviet Union of Six Power resolution and abstinence [*sic*] of India. He smiled rather weakly and said that India had made certain suggestions for amending resolution; that apparently resolution had to be passed so hurriedly that when it was found that objections were not practicable there had been no time for instructions to be sent to Rau. I said net result was, I feared, international Communists might not be sufficiently convinced that all of free world was completely unanimous in condemning Chinese aggression in Korea.

2. Bajpai said that it seemed to GOI that most important objective at moment was to prevent spread of hostilities. I agreed, pointing out, however, that it was not easy for UN forces to carry on warfare in present circumstances with an enemy which maintained supply base in untouchable area across international frontiers. Since large proportion American army involved US public was not likely to remain quiescent over very long period while such situation existed.

3. Bajpai told me in utmost confidence (and I request that this statement be repeated to no other government and be guarded carefully) that GOI had just turned down suggestion from Pearson of Canada that it join in appeal for immediate cease fire. It feared that

such action on its part would be misunderstood.[1] He asked me not to repeat this to my government but I feel I must violate this injunction.

4. Bajpai said he wondered whether it was too late to endeavor to set up a neutral zone around areas in which China has particularly strong strategic and economic interests. I told him I could not comment on suggestion of this kind. It could best be discussed at Washington or Lake Success. I again stressed that US had sent its troops to Korea as component part of UN forces and that all the activities of these troops had been in compliance with decisions taken by UN and that UN had inescapable responsibility for safety these forces. If these forces were in danger, it seemed clear that UN should take forthright and courageous action to minimize such danger.

HENDERSON

[1] See the memorandum of conversation by Emmons, December 14, p. 1543.

795.00/12–350 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Philippines (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

MANILA, December 3, 1950—10 a. m.
[Received December 2—11 : 19 p. m.]

1489. Depcirtel 221, December 1. US position and intended course action outlined reftel were conveyed Acting Secretary Foreign Affairs Neri afternoon December 2. He stated that Romulo had already reported matter to Philippine Government, that it had been taken up with President Quirino, and that reply was sent Romulo earlier in day which incorporated President's views.

Neri stated that instruction envisaged active, categorical support for US position in regard Chinese intervention in Korea. He stated, however, that certain provisos were outlined in instruction sent Romulo: besides desiring know course action US proposed pursue in UN, Quirino was interested in ascertaining (1) results Truman–Attlee conversations and (2) how far US would go in support nations this part of world which are threatened by Communist aggression. He said Romulo had been instructed make appropriate inquiries. We have impression these inquiries motivated by Philippine Government fears Truman–Attlee conversations may result in our limiting our commitment Asia in favor of Europe.

Embassy officer pointed out that US has demonstrated in Korea its determination support nations threatened by Communist aggression, cited our attitude re situation Indochina as recently conveyed Philippine FonOff [1] and recalled that we have reiterated our inten-

[1] For related documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 690 ff.

tions so far as Philippines concerned and are demonstrating willingness within limits our ability help other states showing determination help selves. Neri seemed satisfied and concluded with remark that Romulo frequently makes countersuggestions when sent instructions and that he would inform this Embassy should there be any substantial modification in Philippine position this matter as result such countersuggestions.

CHAPIN

320/12–250 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 2, 1950—11 : 14 p. m.
[Received December 2—11 : 42 p. m.]

Delga 362. UNCURK report to UNSYG. Following is text of cabled report from UNCURK to UNSYG delivered USUN in confidence this evening. This report will not be circularized until attempts made to obtain certain modifications:

"Pursuant clause 2(*c*) of GA resolution 7 October 1950, Commission submits following interim report:

"1. In view of the new crisis that has arisen as a result of the increasing intervention of Communist China in Korea the Commission considers the termination of military operations in Korea unpredictable.

"2. The Commission considers under the circumstances the terms of the GA's resolution cannot be implemented.

"3. In present situation chances for practical work in the political field appear small.

"4. Nevertheless the Commission shall continue to carry out such work as may be possible.

"The Australian and Chilean representatives dissented from this report. They consider it is not necessary to raise the question of whether the Commission can fulfill its duties under terms of the GA's resolution. They believe the Commission has not so far surveyed the situation sufficiently to justify its expressing an opinion at this stage on the matters contained in this report. They agree with the view expressed by the rest of the Commission that the Commission should work actively to try to achieve the objectives of the GA resolution.

"The Australian representative wishes it added that he dissented specifically from the conclusion in the second paragraph of the Commission's report."

AUSTIN

795.00/12–350 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
FLASH

TOKYO, 3 December 1950.
[Received December 3—3 : 51 a. m.]

C–50332. Ref JCS 97772.[1] The X Corps is being withdrawn into the Hamhung area as rapidly as possible. The situation within the Eighth Army becomes increasingly critical. General Walker reports, and I agree with his estimate, that he cannot hold the Pyongyang area and under enemy pressure, when exerted, will unquestionably be forced to withdraw to the Seoul area. There is no practicability, nor would any benefit accrue thereby, to attempt to unite the forces of the Eighth Army and the X Corps. Both forces are completely outnumbered and their junction would, therefore, not only not produce added strength, but actually jeopardize the free flow of movement that arises from the two separate logistical lines of naval supply and maneuver.

As I previously reported, the development of a defense line across the waist of Korea is not feasible because of the numerical weakness of our forces as considered in connection with the distances involved; by the necessity of supplying the two parts of the line from ports within each area; and by the division of the area into two compartments by the rugged mountainous terrain running north and south. Such a line is one of approximately 120 air miles with a road distance of approximately 150 miles. If the entire United States Force of seven divisions at my disposal were placed along this defensive line it would mean that a division would be forced to protect a front of approximately 20 miles against greatly superior numbers of an enemy whose greatest strength is a potential for night infiltration through rugged terrain. Such a line with no depth would have little strength, and as a defensive concept would invite penetration with resultant envelopment and piecemeal destruction. Such a concept against the relatively weaker North Korean Forces would have been practicable, but against the full forces of the Chinese Army is impossible.

I do not believe that full comprehension exists of the basic changes which have been wrought by the undisguised entrance of the Chinese Army into the combat. Already Chinese troops to the estimated strength of approximately 26 divisions are in line of battle with an additional minimum of 200,000 to the enemy rear and now in process of being committed to action. In addition to this, remnants of the North Korean Army are being reorganized in the rear and there stands,

[1] See footnote 1 to telegram C–50107 from Tokyo, received at 3 : 33 a. m. on November 30, p. 1260.

of course, behind all this the entire military potential of Communist China.

The terrain is of a nature to diminish the effectiveness of our air support in channelizing and interrupting the enemy supply system; it serves to aid the enemy in his dispersion tactics. This, together with the present limitation of international boundary, reduces enormously the normal benefit that would accrue to our superior air force.

With the enemy concentration inland, the Navy potential is greatly diminished in effectiveness; amphibious maneuver is no longer feasible and effective use of naval gunfire support is limited.

The potentials, therefore, of our combined strength are greatly reduced and the comparison more and more becomes one of relative combat effectiveness of ground forces.

It is clearly evident, therefore, that unless ground reinforcements of the greatest magnitude are promptly supplied, this Command will be either forced into successive withdrawals with diminished powers of resistance after each such move, or will be forced to take up beachhead bastion positions which, while insuring a degree of prolonged resistance, would afford little hope of anything beyond defense.

This small command actually under present conditions is facing the entire Chinese nation in an undeclared war and unless some positive and immediate action is taken, hope for success cannot be justified and steady attrition leading to final destruction can reasonably be contemplated.

Although the command up to the present time has exhibited good morale and marked efficiency, it has been in almost unending combat for five months and is mentally fatigued and physically battered. The combat effectiveness of the Republic of Korea Forces now at our disposal is negligible; for police and constabulary uses they would have some effectiveness. The other foreign army contingents, whatever their combat efficiency may be, are in such small strength as to exercise little influence. Each United States division at my disposal other than the First Marine Division is now approximately 5,000 men understrength and at no time have they achieved their full authorized numerical complement. The Chinese troops are fresh, completely organized, splendidly trained and equipped and apparently in peak condition for actual operations.

The general evaluation of the situation here must be viewed on the basis of an entirely new war against an entirely new power of great military strength and under entirely new conditions.

The directives under which I am operating based upon the North Korean Forces as an enemy are completely outmoded by events. The fact must be clearly understood that our relatively small force now

faces the full offensive power of the Chinese Communist nation augmented by extensive supply of Soviet materiel. The strategic concept suitable for operations against the North Korean Army which was so successful is not susceptible to continued application against such power. This calls for political decisions and strategic plans in implementation thereof, adequate fully to meet the realities involved. In this, time is of the essence as every hour sees the enemy power increase and ours decline.

330/12–350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, December 3, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received December 3—8 : 33 a. m.]

1384. 1. In pursuance Depcirtel 221, December 1, 6 p. m., I called on Bajpai today. During our conversation I followed in general line laid down in that circular and said we would appreciate any views which GOI may have to offer as to our proposed move in UN.

2. Bajpai said that in GOI's opinion matter of further moves in UN re Communist China intervention in Korea should be postponed until after Attlee had had opportunity for full discussions in Washington. During protracted conversation which followed it became clear to me that:

(*a*) GOI hoping Attlee can use combined influence of various members Commonwealth and of other like minded powers in prevailing on US to agree to some kind of cease fire pending discussions either in or out of UN which would result in admission Communist China to UN, settlement Formosa problem in manner which would be at least acceptable to Communist China, settlement Korean problem in way which would save Communist China's face without sacrificing independence Korea et cetera.

(*b*) GOI desiring to avoid casting blame on Communist China for intervening in Korea so long as Communist China is deprived of what GOI considers its rightful place in UN.

3. I remarked to Bajpai that so far as I knew no responsible GOI leader has thus far indicated that Communist China had committed a reprehensible act by intervening in Korea and asked whether GOI was of opinion Communist China was committing aggression. Bajpai evaded reply. He indicated it would serve no purpose to formulate opinions of this kind. Problem was to work for peaceful settlement. He then explained at great length reasons why it was only logical that Chinese Communists should show their resentment at what they considered their unfair treatment from US by attacking UN forces in Korea. He said he wished to emphasize in explaining Chinese position that he was not defending it.

4. I shall not burden Department with description our exchanges. I tried to impress upon him that failure free world to present solid front in condemning Chinese aggression was likely to encourage aggressors and increase dangers to world peace.

HENDERSON

795.00/12–350

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1950—9:30 a. m.

Subject: Meeting at the Pentagon

Participants:

General Marshall	General Norstad	Secretary Acheson
General Bradley	Admiral Davis [3]	Mr. Matthews
Admiral Sherman	General Ridgway	Mr. Nitze
General Haislip [1]	and other officers	Mr. Rusk
General Vandenberg	Mr. Harriman	Mr. Jessup
General Gruenther [2]		

GENERAL RIDGWAY gave the briefing on military developments. This was based on yesterday's telecon since he said there was nothing really new in today's telecon. He stressed the adverse terrain and weather conditions. The Tenth Corps capability to withdraw is questionable. The Eighth Army probably can get down to Changdo.

In answer to Mr. Acheson's question, GENERAL RIDGWAY said he was not sure whether they could get to the Seoul area. The enemy can get down in force in a matter of days. We can hold the three beachheads of Inchon, Hamhung and Pusan for some time if we can get our troops in the beachheads. They could hold until a decision is made on the question of evacuation. He indicated they could reach the Seoul–Inchon area.

GENERAL BRADLEY said it was less clear that the Tenth Corps could get to Hamhung. There are some rail facilities—seven engines and 200 cars which can take the Capital Division and part of the Seventh Division part way. He expressed anxiety about radio reports on our troops strength and movements of the troops. This problem of release of military information to the enemy would have to be re-examined. General MacArthur has authority to impose censorship but he has not done so.

GENERAL RIDGWAY and ADMIRAL SHERMAN described the necessity for the Marines to regroup at Hagaru before the Division can withdraw. About 1,000 wounded have been evacuated by air.

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[1] Gen. Wade H. Haislip, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
[2] Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, U.S. Army.
[3] Vice Adm. Arthur C. Davis, Director of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

SECRETARY ACHESON asked whether this information gives the answer to the questions asked at the meeting last night with the President; namely, has the military situation reached a point at which it is necessary for us to get a cease-fire?

GENERAL BRADLEY said if this is possible it would be fine. There is still a question of the price to be paid. Do we get out of Korea and do they? The military situation would improve if we succeed in getting into the beachheads. We do not have much strength in Pusan.

GENERAL RIDGWAY, in answer to General Marshall, who asked about the 2,300 replacements scheduled for December, said they were being expedited but pointed out they were mostly recruits just finished with their fourteen weeks training. Men are being flown out.

GENERAL HAISLIP said that General MacArthur sets the priorities as between men, equipment, etc.

GENERAL BRADLEY raised the question whether if we cannot get a cease-fire in forty-eight hours through the UN must we conclude that we must take action ourselves. Should we take other means, for example, saying to the Chinese Communists that since they refuse a cease-fire we consider we are at war. If we get out of Korea are we to give up the whole of Asia? Against China we could use blockade of the coast, bombing and a good many other things to bother them, though we would probably not use the A-Bomb.

MR. JESSUP asked General Bradley what he anticipated the Chinese Communist reaction would be in regard to attacks on Hong Kong and Indochina. To which General Bradley replied that we could hurt them a great deal by air; he noted their shortage of gas.

MR. ACHESON spoke on the question of the price which might have to be paid for a cease-fire. Do we say in the UN that we must have a cease-fire? Such an offer would either be rejected or it would start talks. As General Marshall had pointed out, we must consider the security of our troops and the effect on the position of the United States in the Far East and the whole world. There is danger of our becoming the greatest appeasers of all time if we abandon the Koreans and they are slaughtered; if there is a Dunkirk and we are forced out it is a disaster but not a disgraceful one. It seemed to him that the Tenth Corps will be forced out but the others would not be just yet. If the UN declares a cease-fire and an approach is made to the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union they will ask terms. It would seem alright to agree to withdraw to the 38th parallel. This would not involve any loss of national unity. This, however, seems too easy and it is doubtful if they would agree. They might say we must leave Korea. We might agree to withdraw the Tenth Corps to Japan but not the Eighth Army. If this were accepted and we can get the Tenth Corps out they might soon start a new attack on the Eighth Army.

We are presented with a bitter choice. They may further ask that we withdraw the Seventh Fleet from Formosa and seat them in the UN. We must consider whether these are negotiable propositions. They might further demand that the Japanese Peace Treaty be concluded only by unanimous agreement of five parties, including the Chinese Communists. This would mean driving us out of the Far East.

General Vandenberg said that beginning negotiations on such matters involves the possibility of getting ourselves into a position from which we could not withdraw.

Mr. Acheson agreed that we would probably be drawn into negotiations. We get no support from our friends, except the Philippines, on refusing to withdraw the Seventh Fleet. The other countries agree that Formosa is not ours and have no sympathy with our position. On the other hand, if we can get a solid front among our Allies with our going back to the 38th parallel, this is a position with moral force and maintains cohesiveness among the Allies. The present tendency among other countries is to criticize us rather than the Chinese Communists.

General Vandenberg asked whether we were not getting into a trap; the Chinese Communists will say "No, but . . ."

Secretary Acheson said we must anticipate that someone will propose a cease-fire, for example, Attlee. The State Department can try to hold other governments on what is decent and right. We must avoid having the whole world think we are wrong. We can get support for not abandoning Japan and support for not abandoning Korea. There would be no support on Formosa or on the question of seating the Chinese Communists.

General Bradley said from a military point of view a cease-fire would be very useful to relieve pressure, etc., but the political price will be too great. If we suggested and the conditions are bad, what do we do then? If we are forced out by military or political action where do we go? If we are to be at war with the Chinese Communists we certainly don't want to hand them Formosa. He repeated that a cease-fire would be a help to us if the cost is not too great. Time has now run out on that proposition and we must consider it.

Secretary Acheson agreed. Regarding a state of war with the Chinese Communists we must consider carefully any steps against China generally. If a cease-fire is rejected and we have to fight our way out, all military steps against the Chinese should relate to the evacuation of our troops. Anything helping out that is alright. If measures against China do not contribute to that end and are mere retaliation, it would not meet this test. If we get into general war with China and there are grave chances of general war with the Soviet Union soon then we would fight without allies on our side.

GENERAL BRADLEY said we must weigh that against Korea and against the loss of prestige in Asia and Europe. We would lose Indochina and Formosa. The Germans are already saying we have proved that we are weak. Appeasement is gaining in Europe.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said there were only two ways to treat with the Chinese. We can say we are a weakened nation and will negotiate. This is not true. We have lost men and will lose more and one can say we have lost a campaign but we are not defeated. He thought we should not ask for a cease-fire. The only sound basis for dealing with the Chinese Communists would say that unless you stop you are at war with the United States. If after that they choose war, we get our troops out as best we can and fight the war. If we don't take this course others will begin to push us around. If any one can kill that many Americans and not be at war, we are defeated.

MR. RUSK asked regarding the evacuation of our forces without major destruction, what pressure is on us to pay some price to save that force.

GENERAL BRADLEY said it was a race to get into the beachhead. They probably won't agree to a cease-fire. It is a question of how long we can hold. It was also a question of how long the American public will stand this without saying we are at war with China.

SECRETARY ACHESON said the great trouble is that we are fighting the wrong nation. We are fighting the second team, whereas the real enemy is the Soviet Union.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that he would not advocate putting men into China but wondered whether we could come home and just forget the matter.

SECRETARY ACHESON said certainly not. He asked what the effect of war with China would be on our ability to fight the Soviet Union which would like to see us tangle with the Chinese. If our resources are devoted there, we cannot build up strength in Europe.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN urged that we avoid telling the Chinese or the Soviet Union that we will not do anything against them. We must avoid press, radio stories, etc., on what we are doing. We should make no commitment as to anything that we must do.

SECRETARY ACHESON said suppose we are at war with the Chinese Communists we must think what is the effect on our Allies and our relations with the Soviet Union. He thought many of them would quit us and deal with the Soviet Union.

MR. HARRIMAN said he was not sure of that yet on the basis of his information.

SECRETARY ACHESON thought that the other countries would not be willing to get into war with China in view of the Sino-Soviet Treaty.

GENERAL MARSHALL raised the question of Indochina and the dilemma of the French there and the resulting French attitude.

SECRETARY ACHESON said the French are so weak and shell-shocked they are anxious for a deal which would give an illusion of safety. He asked Mr. Rusk for his views.

MR. RUSK said the French would try to get a deal with Ho and then withdraw. They would not stay firm except with a solid UN front. The danger is that we might lose both our principles and our troops. The UN did come in in June. They are tied in with us and we with them in the UN. Unless we maintain the integrity of the UN, there is a question if we can maintain the integrity of our foreign policy. There must be no reward for aggression in Korea. We could solidify the UN with us on standing on the 38th parallel. If the Chinese cross the parallel it would solidify our UN support. The UN should be clear as to the Chinese Communist action. We are not actually at war yet and are therefore not committed to defeat Communist China. If the UN declares China an aggressor, the Chinese Communists get no political profit from aggression. The contrary would be true if they are seated as a result of the aggression. We must convince our friends. We cannot sustain here the theory of an absolute priority for Europe if we surrender the Far East. We could try to void China, making it hard for them to solidify their control and thus difficult to move into Southeast Asia. We could step up current action, if it would not involve too much sacrifice of our troops. It is a middle way between appeasement and full war.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked if we would confine the cease-fire to a line at the 38th parallel.

MR. RUSK said the only thing we should accept by agreement is the 38th parallel and that anything else should be taken only *de facto*.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked whether we would settle the Formosan problem.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said we may get some help out of Formosa if there are general hostilities with the Chinese. The UN must stand firm.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the attitude described in the UN was illogical, amounting almost to bad faith but that one had to recognize that such situations do arise in international relations. He recalled the reactions in the British press at the time of the Battle of the Bulge. We must accept the UN procedure and try to improve it but not expect perfection.

MR. HARRIMAN said that tactics in the UN must consider our moral position and American opinion. Our policy must be based on holding the US and the British Commonwealth in line. The European attitude

depends upon us and our attitude and what we are ready to do. More action in our defense effort is necessary. Many in Europe are ready to appease but not all of them will take this line unless we lose our leadership.

General Haislip pointed out that we can do nothing to help in Europe since we have only one Division and very few supplies to contribute.

General Bradley thought that Mr. Rusk's statement was fine. We might gain with the UN by proposing it but there was still the danger that we might get into a position of trading in regard to abandoning all of Korea, Formosa, etc. Again the question was how big a price will we pay. Perhaps we should make the gesture regarding the 38th parallel which might involve some gains but where do we go from there. Should we not say that if we don't accept this then we will be at war?

Mr. Nitze questioned whether the Soviet Union would want the Chinese Communists to accept it. If not, are we ready to follow the chain of events if the Soviet Union puts in its forces in support of the Chinese. There would be a slight chance of holding our European allies. It is not possible to hold the UK in line for early hostilities with the Soviet Union. He was not much worried about refusing to yield on Formosa and the question of seating the Chinese while we were under attack but there was the question of holding our allies in line. If we carry hostilities against China and the Soviet Union comes in what do we do?

Secretary Acheson asked whether anyone doubted that it would be desirable to have a cease-fire on the 38th parallel if some other country suggested it. (There was no answer to this but no dissent.)

General Bradley asked how much we could afford to lose by abandonment without further action against Communist China. He spoke of the reaction in Congress and among the armed forces. He doubted whether the Chinese would accept the 38th parallel if we crossed it first.

Admiral Davis said the UN proposal ought to be immediate.

Mr. Harriman asked whether anyone doubted the immediate necessity of a higher degree of mobilization.

Admiral Sherman agreed we should accelerate.

General Vandenberg questioned whether the Russians would move in Europe at the same time they might move in Asia. It might be better to get their Air Force involved in Asia. It would be very good from our point of view if we could force them to devote their air to Asia where they are more vulnerable and thus weaken their air force in Europe.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said we must not tie up troops in China and we must make no public statement regarding what we plan to do.

GENERAL BRADLEY said there were two questions. The political question was whether we ask for a cease-fire; the military question is when we draw back to the beachheads, do we begin to evacuate our troops or do we fight to a Dunkirk. We can evacuate personnel rapidly from Inchon but not the equipment. We can get out more if we begin at once. The same is true of Pusan but there was a question about Hamhung. An immediate decision must be made on whether we begin to withdraw.

SECRETARY ACHESON asked whether the materiel is vital.

GENERAL BRADLEY said we have nothing else but you cannot say it is "vital".

ADMIRAL SHERMAN explained that 60,000 men could be evacuated from Inchon in one day without their equipment but that it would take six days to evacuate one division with its equipment.

SECRETARY ACHESON asked whether we should evacuate the ROK forces.

MR. MATTHEWS said that we could not leave them there if they wanted to come out.

GENERAL MARSHALL returned to Admiral Sherman's point about starting from a complete admission of defeat. He pointed to the important psychological elements. On the political side he thought it would be useful if someone would put up the proposal of a cease-fire on the 38th parallel before we get there. Once we are in the beachheads the Chinese Communists can overrun South Korea. The line-up with the British Commonwealth is most important.

MR. RUSK suggested there was no sense going to Pusan.

MR. JESSUP raised the question whether the ROK forces should be evacuated to Japan.

MR. RUSK said that the Communists were very active among the Koreans now in Japan and that it might be risky to bring in the Korean Army.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN raised the question of the rearmament of Japan.

GENERAL BRADLEY asked whether we should begin evacuation of civilian dependents from Berlin and other exposed places. Was there any political or military gain? We have avoided this step hitherto because of its psychological effect. On the other hand can we go to full mobilization and leave them exposed. We need an answer soon on this.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN thought we should not allow any more dependents to go out to these places now.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said if there was any political advantage in it we should do it fast.

MR. MATTHEWS said there was certainly no political advantage.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said it might show the USSR we meant business.

MR. HARRIMAN said it would scare Europe very badly.

GENERAL BRADLEY said if the Chinese attack on us in Korea is not war would it be war if they overran our zone in Berlin.

SECRETARY ACHESON said we have already said it would be.

GENERAL BRADLEY recalled that we used to say that an attack on a platoon of United States troops meant war. Would anyone believe it now if we don't react to the Chinese attack. We might well be overrun by East Germans in Berlin.

SECRETARY ACHESON doubted if the Russians would deflect any of their forces from Europe to China. He thought they might begin making trouble in Berlin and Vienna.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that the proposed action against China would not affect our capacity in Europe. All we would need would be the naval blockade and the use of one or two air groups. It would be a long-range job.

MR. JESSUP asked whether it would involve the loss of Hong Kong and Indochina.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said the Chinese would take them anyhow.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated it would be harder for the Chinese Communists to hold their people under an attack; they would have a great problem with food and transportation, etc.

MR. HARRIMAN expressed agreement with Admiral Sherman's previous statement about treating with the Chinese.

GENERAL BRADLEY asked what the effect would be on our friends in going beyond what we are now doing. He repeated the urgent need for deciding the two questions about a cease-fire on the 38th parallel and evacuation of our forces from the beachhead.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said we could not give MacArthur an order about evacuation unless censorship had been previously imposed.

GENERAL RIDGWAY said we needed to accelerate now our mobilization. We have an uncommitted capacity for 75,000 more men.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN thought the President should announce a program of acceleration.

There followed a general discussion on details of calling up more men, the state of readiness of the camps, rebuilding, etc.

GENERAL MARSHALL kept pressing the question whether we need more money to do more than we are doing and GENERAL RIDGWAY and GENERAL GRUENTHER indicated that we did.

SECRETARY ACHESON suggested that the President should take public action, including a declaration of national emergency which was

not technically necessary but which would show the country the general attitude the President was taking.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed it was important to make the country realize the situation.

GENERAL BRADLEY suggested that we establish firm beachheads but do it on the principle that we are going to withdraw in an orderly way. We might then get some other country to propose a cease-fire in the UN on the 38th parallel.

MR. JESSUP raised the question of whether we should agree that all non-Korean forces should leave Korea as proposed by General Wu of the Chinese Communist Delegation in his speech.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said that he would rather take war with China than this.

MR. RUSK suggested that any withdrawal would be a phased withdrawal under UN supervision.

GENERAL VANDENBERG wondered whether the American people would accept it.

GENERAL BRADLEY was worried whether we could do this without striking back at the Chinese Communists.

SECRETARY ACHESON said that if we should start action against the Chinese Communists elsewhere, the military situation is we must get out of Korea and the choice is between being forced out in a Dunkirk with heavy losses or whether we have a negotiated withdrawal or whether we undertake it along with war against the Chinese Communists. We might be at a point at which we would find the UN was not at war with Communist China but at the same time if we are at war with Communist China we want the greatest possible support from others.

GENERAL BRADLEY said he didn't want war with Communist China. The effect of pulling out or being kicked out without war with Communist China would, however, be very bad. He would not propose any retaliation until after we had completed the evacuation.

GENERAL GRUENTHER asked him whether he would include an ultimatum to the Chinese that if they did not stop fighting we would consider ourselves at war putting a date a few days ahead as General Bradley had previously indicated.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said he didn't think the Chinese had fuel enough for a prolonged air effort.

GENERAL MARSHALL inquired about our anti-aircraft at Inchon. While we have lost a great deal of equipment there is still a great deal of anti-aircraft in the theater.

SECRETARY ACHESON said that if we concluded now for whatever reason, either American opinion or anything else, to continue hostili-

ties against the Chinese Communists we cannot take the course of proposing a cease-fire on any basis. We can't have a cease-fire and still go on fighting the Chinese unless they violated the cease-fire and renew their attack because in that case we alone would be starting a war in violation of the UN order. If we must go ahead with hostilities against the Chinese we must not take the course of ending the hostilities; we must be forced out of Korea and therefore we must resist a suggestion of a cease-fire. In that case, we would have to try to get condemnation of the Chinese and have them branded as an aggressor.

MR. JESSUP emphasized the point about unilateral defiance of a UN order.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed.

MR. NITZE said we would be better off if we had no hostilities with the Chinese if we could do this with honor and then get ready for the Soviet Union.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that with the casualties we have suffered, a cease-fire is unacceptable.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN distinguished between the Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire and the present proposal in which the UN itself is being pushed around.

MR. JESSUP said that Admiral Sherman's point was entirely logical but that unfortunately the members of the UN are not looking at the matter so logically.

MR. HARRIMAN questioned whether a cease-fire proposal would unite the UN.

MR. JESSUP suggested we would have to decide which would be the greater blow to our prestige—to accept a cease-fire or to be driven out of Korea.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed.

SECRETARY ACHESON said that the President must talk with Attlee before a decision is made for war with China. We could go ahead and take the first three steps in the memorandum.[4] We still have latitude with regard to the kind of resolution to press in the UN.

MR. HARRIMAN said that any other course would be very dangerous.

MR. ACHESON said that at the meeting last night we had thought we might have to take some other course, but that the reports he had heard this morning looked better with regard to the military position.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that it did look slightly better. There is no use in holding the Northeast part of Korea. The military estimate of possibly reaching Inchon was better than it had been last night.

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[4] Reference is to the memorandum in telegram Gadel 153 to New York, December 2, 7 p. m., p. 1307.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that if our beachheads are not strongly established we need to get out as soon as possible. However, several days are needed for the talks with Attlee and the questions in the UN. He said that they expected to lose Wonsan but hope to hold Hamhung or Hungnam.

SECRETARY ACHESON returned to the question of the desirability of censorship.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said it was most desirable but it was difficult. Perhaps the best way was to get the reporters out of the place.

SECRETARY ACHESON recalled that General Sherman's policy in the Civil War was to tell the correspondents all his plans and then lock them up in jail.

MR. RUSK stressed the importance of not announcing our plans in regard to evacuation of troops.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN urged that General MacArthur be ordered to get his troops into the beachheads at once.

GENERAL MARSHALL inquired whether he hadn't already received such orders and ADMIRAL SHERMAN indicated that the Joint Chiefs had indicated concurrence in his plans.

GENERAL MARSHALL said it was important that the President should talk with Attlee before final decisions were made.

GENERAL BRADLEY read a draft of an order to General MacArthur along the lines of telling him to hold the beachheads as long as required pending settlement of the general situation.

GENERAL MARSHALL questioned whether it was necessary to go into so much detail on the situation and future developments. He thought it would be sufficient merely to approve the grouping in the three-base areas. He wondered, however, whether this would bar General MacArthur from any other choice which might seem to him on the ground necessary.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that the Joint Chiefs were merely approving what MacArthur had suggested. He agreed it was dangerous to make any more commitments than necessary.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN suggested inserting a sentence to the effect that the safety of his forces was paramount.[5]

SECRETARY ACHESON said that from the political point of view the evacuation of the Tenth Corps was alright.

GENERAL MARSHALL noted his concern about the problem of the South Koreans.

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[5] The Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted the following message to General MacArthur at 1:41 p. m. on December 3:

"Your C 50332. We consider that the preservation of your forces is now the primary consideration. Consolidation of forces into beachheads is concurred in." (Telegram JCS 97917; 795.00/12–350)

GENERAL BRADLEY raised the question of the 160,000 north Korean POW's we hold.

MR. RUSK suggested that we might want to exchange them for some of the prisoners which they hold.

GENERAL MARSHALL said this matter must be considered and guidance sent later to General MacArthur.

795.00/12–350

Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

[WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1950.

Subject: Nehru's Message to Rau

Ambassador Gross telephoned me at 11:15 this morning and gave me the following summary of a message from Nehru to Sir B. N. Rau at New York. This is based on a telephone conversation between Rau and Gross.

The Prime Minister says there is great anxiety about recent developments, President Truman's mention use of the atomic bomb. The Prime Minister is most anxious to help in any effort to avoid war. The Prime Minister feels that the best procedure would be for representatives of the great powers to meet and to attempt to stop the rapid progressive deterioration. But even a temporary solution must now be quickly sought. Any such discussion must include "China" (note by Ambassador Gross: Rau made clear that this referred to Peiping).

Nehru believes that steps should be taken for a cease-fire as soon as possible followed by the demarcation of a demilitarized zone. At this time the Prime Minister thinks it is essential to have a frank approach which must be aimed at peace. If we can obtain a cease-fire followed by a demarcation of a demilitarized zone the whole question of a settlement in Korea and later of Formosa can be negotiated. Nehru is convinced that unless the question of Formosa can be disposed of along the lines of the Cairo declaration there is no hope for lasting peace in Asia.

Nehru wants to make clear he is not condoning Chinese intervention in Korea but it is necessary to face reality. The Prime Minister thinks the Chinese feel the United States has aggressive designs against them and makes special reference to "non-recognition" policy. (Rau did not read to Gross Nehru's comment regarding this point.)

Nehru believes that it is a matter of absolute necessity to avoid use of the atomic bomb. Such use would make war inevitable. There is a wide-spread feeling in Asia that the atomic bomb is a weapon used only against Asiatics.

Nehru will make a statement of "some sort" tomorrow in the Indian parliament. Rau is not sure of the nature of the statement.

J. D. H[ICKERSON]

795.00/12–350

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (McWilliams)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1950.

Subject: Meeting in Mr. Matthews' office, at approximately 12:00 Noon, re Korea.

Participants: Messrs. Webb, Matthews, Jessup, Nitze, Kennan, Hickerson, Rusk, Barrett, McWilliams

Messrs. Matthews, Rusk, Jessup and Nitze had just returned from a meeting in the Pentagon attended by the Secretary with the Secretary of Defense and his advisers. Mr. Matthews reported that the current thinking of the military was that while the military situation in Korea was extremely dangerous, it was not yet bordering on a catastrophe. It was felt that blocking positions could be established to enable the bulk of the 8th Army to retreat, if necessary, to the Pusan area, where they could be evacuated. The bulk of the 10th Corps has been ordered to concentrate in the Hamhung area, where they will be evacuated if necessary. It is the feeling of the military that we should continue to fight as long as possible and only evacuate in event of necessity. It is also their feeling that the South Korean troops should not be abandoned by our forces, but should either be transported to the south where they could disband and infiltrate back to their homes or be taken to some point outside Korea. The military people agreed with us that it would be unwise to engage in a complete war with the Chinese, but the Navy and Air Force believe that we should take some action in the event of evacuation to repay the Chinese Communists for their deeds. This might take the form of a complete blockade and a concentrated air effort over the major cities of China. This is not, at the moment, a decision, but merely represents thinking of some of the people at the Pentagon.

There was some discussion in this meeting of the latest national intelligence estimate on Soviet intentions and capabilities. Mr. Kennan said that he had looked it over but did not entirely agree with it. He said he did not believe the events of the past few weeks were the result of a master plan by the Soviets, but that they had been playing the situation by ear and through a series of favorable events had found themselves in a much more advantageous position

than they had ever hoped. He also said that he did not yet believe that World War III was inevitable and he did not believe that another Korea is likely to break out in another place.

Toward the close of the meeting Dr. Jessup said that he was greatly concerned over the matter of censorship and press speculation. He thought that the worst thing that could happen at this point was loose statements by Government officials, and he urged that the President be asked to issue an order stopping all speechmaking, press conferences, and interviews by individuals. He said he thought that the program which has been going on in the Department of having correspondents see selected officials for background should be stopped at once, and that consideration should be given to having questions submitted in advance of their press conferences to the President and the Secretary. Mr. Barrett and Mr. Webb both said they would give attention to this matter.[1]

[1] On December 5, President Truman issued a directive to all Cabinet officers and certain other officials of the Executive Branch "to reduce the number of public speeches pertaining to foreign or military policy". The directive laid down the necessity for clearing with the Department of State in advance any "speech, press release, or other public statement concerning foreign policy" and with the Department of Defense any such statement concerning military policy. The President also issued instructions that officials overseas, "including military commanders and diplomatic representatives, should be ordered to exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media in the United States". The directive was forwarded to General MacArthur by the JCS on December 6; for the text, see *Hearings*, p. 3536.

795.00/12–350

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat (Sheppard)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1950—3 p. m.

Subject: Report of the Secretary's meeting at the White House with the President, General Marshall and General Bradley

Participants:		
	The Secretary	Mr. Rusk
	Mr. Webb	Mr. Kennan
	Mr. Matthews	Mr. Jessup
	Mr. Hickerson	Mr. Sheppard
	Mr. Nitze	

The meeting was called so that the Secretary could report the discussion which he had had with the President, General Marshall and General Bradley at the White House late this morning.

The Secretary said that he had raised in the meeting with the President the question whether our position in the world required us to

continue hostilities with the Chinese Communists. He said he had advanced the viewpoint that if that were the case, it would mean that we would have to examine the policies governing our other actions to conform to that situation. He had further stated that if our world position did not require us to continue hostilities with the Chinese Communists, then it would be necessary to try to stop the fighting in Korea before the disintegration moved too far in order to save our forces.

The Secretary said that he went on to say that so far as the evacuation was concerned, it seemed to him to break down into three parts—the East Coast, Inchon and Pusan.

With respect to the East Coast the Secretary said he indicated that, so far as he was concerned, this operation is solely concerned with saving troops. He told the President that there was nothing to be gained politically by making a stand there. The problem was simply to do what you could to get them out. The Secretary told the President that he didn't wish this to appear as advice because it was a strictly military matter. However, if the military did need some kind of political action, such as a cease fire, in order to carry out the evacuation on the East Coast, then the military should let us know.

With respect to Inchon, the Secretary said he had advanced his opinion that for a couple of days, there were no decisions which had to be made. He continued that General MacArthur will probably have his hands full getting the troops to Inchon during this period. After that, it would seem to be a normal operation to remove wounded troops and disorganized units first. The Secretary said he told the group that as far as he was concerned these troops which were not combat effective should be removed. The Secretary said he had told the group that if there was a question as to where these troops should be relanded and refitted, he would suggest Japan over Korea.

The Secretary said that he had discussed the additional question as to what to do with the South Koreans. The Secretary had said that it would be dreadful to abandon them far from their homes and that he felt they should be picked up some way or other and relanded in South Korea to filter back to their home towns. He said that he had stressed that the main thing, though, was not to abandon them. General Marshall and General Bradley agreed that this was very important.

The Secretary said that he then discussed his viewpoint that it was essential to get some kind of censorship in the Far Eastern Command immediately. He had said it would be much better if General Willoughby were to have no additional press conferences in which he speculated about the possible courses of action, and the dire consequences which would flow from alternate courses. The President replied that he might just have to order censorship invoked. In re-

sponse to this, General Marshall indicated this would be a rather difficult thing to do.

The Secretary said that the question then came up about the price we would have to pay for the events in Korea. The Secretary said he replied to this that we were tending to dwell on a false dichotomy. The Secretary said he suggested that we should now put our minds on action in the United Nations. The Secretary said he suggested perhaps we should think along the lines of a cease fire at the 38th parallel, which raised the question whether such a resolution might be rejected. If it is accepted, the Secretary had continued, we will need to understand that we can't do things like bombing Manchuria and will be required to observe it ourselves; on the other hand, if we think the probabilities are that it will not be accepted, then that would be another thing. In any event, the Secretary said that he had assured the President that we would carefully analyze the possibilities and prepare a possible course of political action.

The Secretary said that he felt that the President would want to listen to Prime Minister Attlee and see what the general temper is of our allies. The Secretary said that he was sure the President was not prepared, at this point at least, to negotiate with anyone, or to ask for a cease fire.

Mr. Hickerson said that Ambassador Gross had called from New York to say that Mr. Dulles and the whole senior staff recommended that we go ahead in the General Assembly with the resolution which was vetoed in the Security Council. Mr. Gross had talked to Mr. Younger who was very reluctant to go ahead with the resolution with respect to Chinese Communist aggression in Korea. Mr. Younger urged that we await Mr. Attlee's arrival and give Mr. Younger an opportunity to talk to Mr. Attlee about it first. Mr. Hickerson said that if he had the Secretary's approval he would move right away and talk with the British on going ahead with steps 1, 2 and possibly 3 (in the telegram to USUN).[1]

Mr. Hickerson said that this brought us to face with the question whether we go ahead with steps 1 and 2 alone if the British disagree with us. The Secretary remarked that it is imperative that we not get separated from the British on the eve of Mr. Attlee's arrival. Mr. Jessup asked whether we would in fact become separated from them if they don't agree. Mr. Jessup said perhaps it would be possible to go ahead alone on steps 1 and 2, assuring the British that we won't do anything toward introducing a resolution until we consult further with them.

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[1] See telegram Gadel 153 to New York, December 2, 7 p. m., p. 1307.

The Secretary summed this up by saying the question was "If the British and the other sponsors of the old resolution disagree with putting this item on the agenda, do we want to put it on alone with Mr. Attlee arriving the next day?" The Secretary said he was inclined to think we shouldn't go ahead alone, and it was left that way.

795.00/12–350

The Counsellor of the Canadian Embassy (Ignatieff) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 3, 1950.[1]

DEAR MR. PERKINS: The Canadian Government wishes its views on the Korean situation, as set forth in the attached memorandum, to be transmitted to the Government of the United States immediately. The Ambassador has therefore asked me to deliver this message to you today.

Copies of this memorandum are also being transmitted to the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Ceylon, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey and the United Kingdom. I am giving a copy of this memorandum to the British Ambassador this afternoon.

Mr. Wrong has also been informed that the Canadian Government is most anxious at this time to keep in as close touch as possible with the Government of the United States, as well as the other Governments noted above, and that the Canadian Government would welcome an expression of your Government's views.

Yours sincerely, G. IGNATIEFF

[Enclosure]

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM ON KOREA
DECEMBER 2ND, 1950

1. Ever since the decision was made to resist the aggression on Korea, the determination of the democratic powers has been to use their utmost endeavors to limit hostilities in the Korean area and to have them come to an end as quickly as possible. The only country whose interests would be served by a war with China would be the Soviet Union.

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[1] A manuscript note on the source text by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) indicated that this note was handed to him by Mr. Ignatieff on December 3 at 4:30 p. m.

2. A war with China would commit to this theatre of operations a dangerously large proportion of the limited armed resources of the democratic powers at the expense of other fronts such as Western Europe, where the Soviet Union may intend to conduct its major campaign if a third world war should break out.

3. There is danger that a war with China would lead to Soviet armed intervention to assist China since the only assumption on which we can safely proceed is that before the Chinese Communist Government decided to intervene in force in Korea it had received from the Soviet Union assurances of assistance in the event of U.N. military retaliation against China.

4. The situation in Korea must therefore be looked at in the light of global strategy and of the present balance of armed forces between the Soviet world and the democratic world. Given determination by the democratic world, time is on our side and we should therefore play for time so long as we can do so without denying our obligations under the United Nations Charter.

5. It is moreover essential that public opinion not only in the Americas but in Western Europe and in the democratic states of Asia, should be convinced that we are doing everything we possibly can to avoid war. If, despite all our efforts, China and the Soviet Union should precipitate a war, it is essential that the democratic nations should be united in their resistance to aggression. This end would be more difficult to achieve unless there had been sustained common efforts to avert a catastrophe.

6. The door should therefore be left open until the last possible moment for a settlement with the Chinese Communists by negotiation. Consequently any formal decision by the United Nations at this stage that Communist China is an aggressor would, we think, be unwise.

7. Meanwhile, every opportunity for discussion of the issues with Communist China should be explored. Once the military situation has been stabilized, a cease fire might be attainable. This might be followed by the creation of a demilitarized zone. In these conditions, a *modus vivendi* might be sought by negotiation. In this connection consideration might have to be given to the other related aspects of the Chinese problem, such as Formosa and Chinese representation in the United Nations.[2]

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[2] No formal, written reply to this Canadian note was made by the Department of State. On March 6, 1951, Norris S. Haselton of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs talked with Mr. Ignatieff, who acknowledged that he had been in close touch with Department of State officials on this subject and indicated that no reply was necessary since most of the points raised in the Canadian memorandum had been overtaken by events.

320/12–250 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 3, 1950—5 p. m.

556. Confirming Hickerson–Gross telecon:

1. USUN is requested to seek agreement of other 5 sponsors of vetoed SC res to submit new agenda item and explanatory memo this afternoon, if possible.

2. Agenda item contained in urtel Delga 356 satisfactory.[1] In explanatory memo delete ref to Uniting for Peace res.

3. US would like very much to see 6 powers submit vetoed res to GA this afternoon and you should endeavor to reach agreement to do so. FYI we attach less importance to this being done today than step 1.

4. Under no circumstances should USDel take steps 1 or 3 without UK agreement. In order to obtain UK agreement to submission new item on GA agenda you may inform them that we will agree not to introduce any res in GA until after opportunity for consultation with Attlee.

5. USDel and staff should make no comment to press as to future action by US in UN. This is regarded as of maximum importance.

ACHESON

[1] Telegram Delga 356, December 2, from New York not printed. On December 4, the Delegations of Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States asked for the inclusion in the present session of the General Assembly of an agenda item entitled "Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea"; see U.N. document A/1618. An explanatory memorandum was forwarded to the Secretary-General on December 5; see U.N. document A/1621.

320/12–350 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, December 3, 1950—5 : 56 p. m.
PRIORITY [Received December 3—6 : 16 p. m.]

Delga 365. Re Chinese Communist conversations with UN SYG. Confirming Gross–Hickerson telecon Saturday, December 2, following is report of Gross conversation with SYG Lie and Entezam[1] held 6 p. m. Saturday evening.

[1] Nasrollah Entezam, Iranian Ambassador to the United States and Chairman of the Iranian Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, was President of the 5th Session of the General Assembly.

Regarding 1½ hour talk Lie held with Wu and other Peiping representatives December 1, Lie described conversation as taking place in friendly atmosphere. After discussing number administrative matters, Lie says he told Wu in direct language that Chinese were "committing aggression" in Korea and that the killing must stop as soon as possible. Lie reports he told Wu that there must be a cease-fire and that "it was no good" that they were killing American boys and Americans were killing Chinese. He says he told Wu that he should have more contacts with other delegates, those which have not recognized Peiping regime as well as those which have. If Wu had such contacts he would find out that everyone agreed with what Lie was saying about stopping the fighting. Reminding Wu that Lie had always favored seating Peiping regime in UN, he says he told Wu that course they were now pursuing would not bring about that objective.

When Wu indicated willingness to see other delegates, Lie arranged a dinner at his home 8 p. m., Monday, December 4. Guest list, submitted to Wu in advance and approved by him, includes Jebb, Rau, Zafrulla Khan,[2] Grafstrom, Sharett,[3] Zinchenko, as well as Wu, Chiao, Mrs. Kung and interpreters. Lie explained he invited Sharett not only because Israel had recognized Peiping but because Sharett speaks Russian. For reason Lie plans to put Sharett alongside Wu and Jebb alongside Chiao.

During course of conversation, Gross alerted Entezam to possible need for quick GA action on Chinese intervention question. Entezam expressed entire willingness to cooperate.

After Entezam left, Lie told Gross that Entezam was also "trying to get in touch with Wu" and appeared anxious to talk with him.

Lie gave strong impression to Gross throughout conversation, without expressly saying so, that he considered himself to be logical chosen instrument for mediation. Gross of course remained completely noncommittal.

AUSTIN

[2] Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Pakistani Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Delegation of Pakistan to the U.N. General Assembly.

[3] Moshe Sharett, Foreign Minister of Israel and Chairman of the Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

330/12–350 : Telegram

The Chargé in Norway (Snow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

OSLO, December 3, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received December 3—9 : 16 p. m.]

563. ReDepcirtel 221, December 1 and Embtel 562, December 2. FonMin Lange informed me 6 p. m. today that his preliminary views

expressed yesterday re UN action on Korea situation had been confirmed today by cabinet defense committee made up of Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Justice Minister and himself.

They understood from Norwegian UN delegation that proposal now was for delegations of 6 powers jointly to address letter to Assembly President tomorrow December 4 requesting item be placed on GA agenda as urgent priority matter. This would be expected bring on full debate beginning December 6 or very shortly thereafter. Debate in turn would aim toward early passage of resolution which would presumably receive more than ⅔ vote even if not all of 52 country majority. Seemed quite unlikely China would heed any such resolution particularly so long as Chinese troops were or thought they were winning. In opinion himself and his 3 colleagues end result would then be a state of declared war between the Communist Government of China and the UN.

Once this process were set in motion by putting the question on the GA agenda, the other steps would inexorably follow without possibility of stopping them.

They therefore consider that at least a few days more should elapse before the fatal sequence is started. Rau and Lie have told Norwegian UN delegation they are pessimistic as result their conversations with Chinese Communist group but do not yet feel approach hopeless. Still some remote possibility there which could be explored next few days, Lange thinks. Then also although latest military news is discouraging, defensible new line might be found which would improve UNs position. Thirdly Norwegian Government would hope that Attlee and President Truman would weigh consequences of proposed GA procedure during interval.

Lange said he believed we would find other western European countries thinking along these same lines.

Issue being placed before full cabinet tomorrow morning and then before Storting Foreign Affairs Committee composed all parties. Instructions to Norwegian UN delegation are to set forth above position and if other 5 delegations should insist on getting item on GA agenda without further delay, delegation is to seek further instructions.

Please instruct niact if Department wishes I press US view. Norwegian view that once matter gets on GA agenda it will head straight toward declared war or equivalent in short time seems to afford room for argument.[1]

SNOW

[1] A note in the source text by the Chief Watch Officer of the Department of State indicated that an affirmative answer was sent to Oslo by a service message at 11 : 30 p. m. on December 3.

330/12–350 : Telegram

The Chargé in Ecuador (Hamlin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

QUITO, December 3, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received December 3—11 : 25 p. m.]

170. Depcirtel 221 December 1. FonMin Ponce states will instruct Quevedo UN tomorrow to join 5 countries bring vetoed 6-power resolution on Korea before GA and that Ecuador will maintain its full endorsement of UN and US policy against aggression.

FonMin also received cable today from Quevedo recommending stay with group and requesting instruction.

Have appointment with FonMin tomorrow to see instruction.

HAMLIN

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123 Henderson, Loy W. : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, December 4, 1950—11 a. m.
[Received] December 4—5 : 02 a. m.]

1385. 1. I am this morning asking for opportunity to talk with Nehru before Wednesday.[1] I hope to discuss with him informally Far East situation prior to parliamentary debate on foreign affairs scheduled for Wednesday.

2. I am asking for this appointment because present indications are that during these debates GOI, or debaters operating under instructions Congress Party, may take attitude quite critical of US and friendly towards Communist China. Such information as comes to me is to effect that Nehru in off-record talks is vehemently denouncing any suggestion of use of atomic weapons; is rather violent in his condemnation of UN forces for crossing 38th parallel contrary to his advice; shows special hostility towards General MacArthur; et cetera. In addressing all India newspaper editors conference yesterday morning Nehru emphasized that no country should endanger world peace on mere grounds of prestige or anger. Inference drawn by those who heard him was that he meant to imply that present policy US was prompted by these motives.

3. It is my intention providing atmosphere permits to point out to Prime Minister unfortunate impression which would be created of US if government of friendly country like India should in this hour of great strain take position which would place major portion blame

[1] December 5.

for present situation on country armed forces of which, acting under UN direction, were making tremendous sacrifices and incurring terrific risks in order to curb brutal and open aggression. I intend do my best persuade Prime Minister that GOI, by publicly criticizing those opposing aggression while not denouncing aggressors, would not be contributing to solution of present acute situation or to discouragement of aggressors in future.

4. If Department has any suggestions would appreciate them urgently since they may arrive before interview.[2]

HENDERSON

[2] In telegram 1389, December 4, from New Delhi, Ambassador Henderson informed the Department that his appointment with Prime Minister Nehru was set for 12 noon on December 5 (123 Henderson, Loy W.).

795.00/12–450

Memorandum by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1950.

After the 9:30 meeting today the Secretary talked to Messrs. Webb, Jessup, Matthews, Rusk, Nitze and Kennan on the Korean crisis.

Mr. Rusk asked if the Military were in the frame of mind for the best possible effort which we could make there. He mentioned that they all appear to be extremely dejected and he had been thinking overnight whether we should not think long and carefully about mustering our best effort and spirit together to put up the best possible fight in Korea. He mentioned the difficulty that the British had been in in this sort of situation where the odds were overwhelmingly against them but they had managed to hold. Mr. Rusk thought that we might talk to the Military about making the best possible effort to consolidate our position to one point or points in Korea. He thought we could at least force the Chinese Communists to make a really major effort at great cost to themselves if they were to get us out of Korea. He said that we do have, of course, to consider the welfare and protection of our troops but thought that within that range we might be able to consolidate and make a really effective stand. He mentioned the great difficulty which would result to our position in both Europe and the Far East if we were to simply bow out at this point. He referred to the some 23,000 replacements which were scheduled to move into Korea and asked whether these and possibly others might not be thrown in to help hold a position at some point.

Mr. Kennan said that we were in a very difficult position—one which was similar to the one the British had been in in the last two wars when

they held on when there was no apparent reason for it. He mentioned the political desirability of retaining a position of some sort in Korea.

Mr. Rusk said that we must get a real estimate from the Military on its capacity to resist. He said we must make the best stand possible if we are unable to get a cease fire at the 38th parallel. He mentioned the possibility of using General Collins as a Field Commander with General MacArthur spending full time on the Japanese Peace Treaty.

The Secretary said that in order to do this we would have to strengthen the Military's will to resist and at the same time see that they did not bomb Manchuria. Mr. Webb said that there were two courses: one to let the Secretary talk to General Marshall; the second, to let the operating level in the State Department take up the matter with the same level in the Military.

Mr. Kennan said that with regard to any possible negotiations with the Russians, a request for a cease fire would look to the U.S.S.R. as a suit for peace. The U.S.S.R. would then want to extract every possible advantage and to damage wherever possible the prestige of the United States. He said their reply would inevitably be an arrogant one. He said that if others approached the Russians for us, the Russians would probably refer to the need for a general political settlement and would probably insist on the discussion taking place in the Security Council rather than the General Assembly. Mr. Kennan said that, if we try to negotiate under a threat to attack the Chinese Communists, the U.S.S.R. would probably appear indifferent publicly. He said that if we threaten general war with the U.S.S.R., they would probably decline to negotiate on that basis. He said that if we threaten to use the atom bomb that the U.S.S.R. would not negotiate under such threat of military action. He said that it was not out of the question that the Russians would agree to some sort of settlement in the Far East involving some sort of status for Korea but that this would inevitably be in the framework of United States concessions in the Far East. Mr. Kennan was speaking from a paper [1] which I believe he has put on file in the Department. I was unable to get full notes on all of his discussion.

Mr. Kennan concluded by saying that now was the poorest time possible for any negotiations with the Russians. He said that if there were validity to the theory that negotiations should be from conditions

[1] Not printed. For an account of the drafting of the paper and extracts therefrom, see George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1950–1963*, Volume II (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1972), pp. 27–31.

of strength, this was clearly a very bad time for an approach to the Russians.

Later Mr. Acheson spoke to General Marshall about the foregoing problems and Messrs. Rusk, Matthews and Kennan went over to see the General. Mr. Kennan is doing a memorandum of his meeting over there.[2]

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[2] Not printed. For an account of Mr. Acheson's telephone conversation with Secretary of Defense Marshall and the subsequent discussion between General Marshall and the Department of State officials, see Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 476–477. See also Kennan, *Memoirs, 1950–1963*, Volume II, pp. 32–33.

795.00/12–450 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET — SEOUL, December 4, 1950—3 p. m.

PRIORITY — [Received December 4—10 : 04 a. m.]

509. UN forces in Eighth Army sector continued withdrawal and regrouping actions yesterday and day before. CCF forces moved southward, but there only light contact and that mainly in eastern sector of front. CCF appeared be bringing up reinforcements and supplies, indicating further push perhaps imminent.

Hostile air activity past two days reportedly confined to single plane conducting strafing last night in area about 20 miles north of Pyongyang. Night before last there no observation activities behind enemy lines owing bad weather. Last night, when conditions good, at least 200 vehicles were sighted moving south, mainly on Huichon–Kunuri road. Only handful Chinese prisoners captured past two or three days. These appear to be from units already identified. No Chinese prisoners have been taken south of line running through Songchon.

MUCCIO

795.00/12–450

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley) to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET — WASHINGTON, 4 December 1950.

Subject: Korea

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Department of State position paper entitled "Korea", prepared for use by the President in

his discussions with Prime Minister Attlee, be changed as indicated in the usual manner in the attached revised draft.[1]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

KOREA

It is recommended that the President discuss with Mr. Attlee the following course of action with respect to Korea:

1. Inform Mr. Attlee of the military situation confronting United Nations forces and of the plan to assemble them in three beachheads in the Seoul–Inchon, Hamhung and Pusan areas. ~~Inform him that the X Corps will be evacuated from northeast Korea and moved to Japan in any way which proves to be militarily practicable. The precise handling of evacuated Korean forces will require special attention.~~

2. It would be militarily advantageous in the immediate situation if a cease-fire order could be arranged provided that considerations offered were not so great as to be unacceptable. It might insure full support of the United Nations if it were done on the basis of the 38th Parallel. ~~Before Chinese Communist forces have reached the 38th Parallel in strength, we should try to establish a cease-fire on the basis of the 38th Parallel, with the armies separated by a demilitarized zone. The principal purpose of this effort would be to attempt to deny a success to aggression and to consolidate an overwhelming majority of the United Nations behind this attempt.~~ Arrangements for a cease-fire on the basis of the 38th Parallel must not ~~be~~ impose conditions which would jeopardize the safety of United Nations forces nor be conditioned on agreement on other issues, such as Formosa, and the Chinese seat in the UN. ~~During this cease-fire effort the United Nations Eighth Army would retire on the Seoul–Inchon area but should not begin any evacuation until the result of the cease-fire effort can be determined.~~

3. If a cease-fire ~~can~~ should be effected which permits a stabilization of the 38th Parallel, United Nations should proceed with the political, military and economic stabilization of the Republic of Korea while continuing efforts to seek an independent and unified Korea by political means.

[1] In the enclosure, the underlined portions are those suggested for insertion by the JCS, while those lined out represent sections of the original Department of State draft recommended for deletion by the JCS.

4. If the Chinese Communists reject a cease-fire and move major forces south of the 38th Parallel, the United Nations ~~Eighth Army~~ forces will face a forced evacuation of ~~the~~ Korea. ~~Seoul-Inchon and Pusan areas.~~ The consequences of a voluntary acceptance of a successful aggression and of a voluntary abandonment of our Korean allies would be such that any United Nations evacuation must be clearly the result of military necessity only.

5. ~~If the Chinese Communists drive United Nations forces out of South Korea,~~ The United Nations must take immediate action to declare Communist China an aggressor and must mobilize such political and economic measures as are available to bring pressure upon Peiping and to affirm the determination of the United Nations not to accept an aggression. ~~The absence of available forces and the acknowledgment that the major threat posed to the free world comes from the Soviet Union would not permit an effort to impose a military defeat upon Peiping on the mainland of China. This would not exclude, however,~~ Also there is the possibility of ~~some~~ military action which would harass the Chinese ~~pending their acceptance of a United Nations settlement for Korea and would not exclude any~~ including efforts which could be made to stimulate anticommunist resistance within China itself, ~~including~~ such as the exploitation of Nationalist capabilities, imposition of a naval blockade, and disruption of communications by bombing.

In addition to the measures indicated above, the U.S. and U.K. should consult immediately about other steps which might be taken to strengthen non-communist Asia. These steps might include:

(*a*) Restoration of considerable self-government to Japan, the acceleration of efforts to obtain a Japanese peace settlement, the strengthening of Japanese capacity for self-defense, the greater utilization of productive capacity to strenghten the capabilities of the free world, and the prompt admission of Japan into international organizations. United Kingdom reluctance to move on these points should be discarded in light of the new critical situation.

(*b*) Appropriate military arrangements between nations in Southeast Asia capable of effective mutual support. ~~Further steps to organize collective security in the Pacific on a regional basis.~~

(*c*) Special efforts to convince non-communist Asia of the nature of the threat which confronts it and to urge upon the governments concerned the need for concerted Asian action to resist communist aggression in that area.

(*d*) Intensification of economic and military assistance to encourage the organization of resistance to communist encroachment.

(*e*) Intensification of psychological and covert activity against communist regimes and activity in Asia.

795.00/12–450

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1950.

Subject: Korea

Participants: Dr. John M. Chang, Korean Ambassador
Mr. Sae Sun Kim, Counselor, Korean Embassy
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs

Ambassador Chang called on Mr. Rusk at 11 o'clock today by appointment to make a farewell call before returning to Korea to assume his new post as Prime Minister. Mr. Rusk expressed his congratulations to the Ambassador on his new appointment and, on behalf of the Secretary, apologized for the necessity of having had to cancel the Secretary's appointment with the Ambassador for this afternoon at 2:30. The Ambassador said that he was planning to leave for Korea on Saturday, December 9, and hoped to see the Secretary before leaving.

Mr. Rusk reviewed the military situation in Korea and emphasized that this information was top secret and must be very carefully guarded. He asked the Ambassador whether the Korean units fighting guerrillas in South Korea were well-trained or were green troops. The Ambassador replied that he believed that the majority were in fact relatively untrained. The Ambassador added, however, that there was the Youth Corps which numbered some 500,000 and which if given arms could throw its weight into the fighting and that his Government would use every available man if necessary. He said that the Korean people were determined to fight Communism to the end but that the United States must help them by supplying the necessary arms. Mr. Rusk remarked that the Ambassador should in no sense feel any shame with respect to the Korean units which had been cut up in the breakthrough north of Pyongyang, since they had been overwhelmed by greatly superior forces and had borne the brunt of a major all-out attack.

The Ambassador expressed the hope that action could be taken in the United Nations with respect to the new crisis in Korea and stated that the present six-power resolution did not meet the requirements of the situation since it carried no threat of sanctions against the Chinese

regime. Mr. Rusk pointed out that if too much in the nature of sanctions were embodied in the resolution, many of the delegations would not vote for it and that it was more than ever essential to maintain the unanimity of the United Nations in the face of these new developments. The Ambassador replied that the Korean people were the ones who were now suffering destruction and death and while other nations, such as those of western Europe, were worried about their future defense, Koreans were fighting for their very lives. Dr. Chang emphasized that it was obvious that it was not the Chinese Communist regime that was alone responsible for the present intervention in Korea but that this represented an overall plan for Communist aggression and domination which was being directed and carried out from Moscow and that if it were to be stopped, the United Nations must strike at the cause.

The Ambassador believed that the Chinese people themselves were not inclined to support the Communist aggression in Korea and that, if given their choice, no such intervention would have taken place. He stated that the Chinese and Korean peoples had traditionally enjoyed good relations and that it was only through Russian pressure that the Chinese would have attacked Korea. He suggested that the United States might withdraw the Seventh Fleet and allow the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa to attack the Chinese mainland as a diversion to the Korean operation. If such a landing were made, he felt that there was a good chance that the Chinese people might rally to the Nationalist cause now that they had been exposed to Communist methods. Mr. Rusk replied that there were significant military considerations which must be taken into account in connection with this proposal, and that it must not be assumed that the Chinese Communists had left the coast of China opposite Formosa militarily uncovered as a result of their intervention in Korea.

Mr. Rusk suggested that during the remainder of the Ambassador's stay in the United States, daily conversations with the Department might be helpful and made appointments with the Ambassador for 11 A. M. on December 5 and tentatively for the same hour on December 6.

At this point Mr. Rusk was called away urgently to the Secretary's office and Mr. Merchant came in. As Mr. Rusk was leaving, the Ambassador asked him to impress upon the Secretary and upon the President that his Government would strongly oppose any attempt at appeasement of the Chinese Communists at this stage and that it would not agree to the establishment of a buffer state at the expense of Korean territory. He reiterated the firm resolve of the Koreans to fight Communist aggression to the end and hoped that the American

people not only appreciated this fact but that the United States and the United Nations were also determined to see the thing through. He felt that a strong statement by the President at this time along these lines would be helpful.

Following Mr. Rusk's departure the Ambassador again went over some of the ground he had covered with Mr. Rusk and again emphasized the sufferings of the Korean people and their determination to continue a fight to end Communism.

Mr. Emmons asked him whether the fact that Chinese armies were now invading Korea might not tend to create stronger bonds of unity within the Korean population against such a foreign invader and that as a result a more solid front against Communism might not develop. The Ambassador believed that such would be the case.

As he was leaving, the Ambassador again reiterated the determination of the Korean people to fight Communism to the last and his hope that the Americans not only understood this but would render them all possible support. Mr. Merchant replied that we fully appreciated Korean courage and determination in the new situation which had developed.

795.00/12–450

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1950.

Subject: Truman–Attlee Talks

Participants: Sir Roger Makins (UK Foreign Office)
Mr. Robert Scott (UK Foreign Office)
Mr. Philip C. Jessup

Sir Roger Makins and Mr. Scott called on me at 12:30 to inquire about the plans for the meeting this afternoon. I gave them an indication of the procedure which I understood the President was inclined to follow along the line of the "scenario." I said I thought that General Bradley would give them a review of the military situation and that then the President would probably suggest some consideration of Item 1 of the agenda—the General Review—prior to getting into the specific issues on Korea. I said we understood Mr. Attlee was prepared to state his views on this, and Sir Roger confirmed this. I said that I thought the President, after the discussion of the general situation, might set forth his general appreciation of the problems confronting us in Korea and the issues which need to be resolved and that he would hope to hear Mr. Attlee's views. Makins pressed hard for an indication of the conclusion which we had reached, and I said that I felt sure the President had reserved final decision until he could talk with Mr. Attlee.

At their request, I gave them a brief indication of the military situation indicating that, while it was serious, it was by no means desperate, that the grouping of the forces and the beach-heads was proceeding in an orderly way, that we still had considerable good forces and that we were not talking about throwing in the sponge.

I asked if it was correct as reported in the press that Mr. Attlee was going to urge some kind of cease-fire and whether he would present the view of all the British Commonwealth. They said that they did not think the Prime Minister had an absolute firm view on just what ought to be done and indicated that, so far as the general Commonwealth position was concerned, they had no concerted view since the recent military developments. Several times they indicated that an appreciation of the military situation was crucial to their reaching a decision. I confirmed their impression that it did not seem feasible militarily now to establish a firm East-West line, but that the beach-heads probably could be held at least for some time.

They revealed without fully committing themselves an inclination for some kind of negotiated solution with the Chinese, perhaps through the Indians. I pointed out the dangers inherent in the process of negotiation with the Chinese demanding more and more prices. I stressed the dire consequences of setting in motion a series of chain reactions which would lead the Chinese and Russians to the conclusions that the use of force could produce concessions on whatever they wanted. In this connection, I mentioned the possible repercussions in terms of an East German attack on Berlin, for example. They said that they had been naturally thinking a great deal about that end of it, and Mr. Attlee would probably touch upon this in his general review. They agreed on the importance of maintaining a common front in the United Nations. I noted the danger that a variety of self-appointed mediators might make different suggestions to the Chinese thus giving them an opportunity to choose among various proposals with the possibility of splitting our ranks. They thought it very possible that Trygve Lie might engage in such voluntary mediation. They seemed to try to press me to say that we felt a negotiated solution was the best and I repeatedly told them that we were not all satisfied that the matter should be handled by negotiation but were considering the possibility of some "arrangement" which might be brought about as the result of our holding of the beach-heads plus an overwhelming vote in the United Nations suggesting an acceptable solution. They seemed to recognize the danger of trying to bargain on such questions as Formosa, the seating of the Chinese Communists and the Japanese Peace Treaty and to accept the view that we should avoid paying a price to reward an aggression.

I asked them about Rau's conversations with Wu, and they professed ignorance; that after the first talk Rau had told them he could not

reveal the full nature of his talk without specific authorization from Nehru.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

320/12–450 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 4, 1950—1 : 59 p. m.
[Received December 4—3 p. m.]

Delga 368. For Hickerson from Gross—Re Rau talks with Wu (confirming Telecon Hickerson–Gross).

Rau, Younger, Jebb and Gross meeting called by Rau, 4 December, 10 a. m. Rau advised he wished to give a full account of his two talks with Wu and Chiao.

At meeting between Rau and Wu on December 1, Rau proposed to Wu an immediate cease fire with a demilitarized zone to be negotiated. Wu asked Rau for written proposal, without indicating any interest in discussing matter at the moment. At noon, on December 1, Rau gave Wu a written proposal, text of which was not produced by Rau in our meeting this morning. In reply to questions by Younger, Rau stated the written proposal contained a suggestion for immediate cease fire, for demilitarized zone to be somewhere south of the Manchurian frontier without specification. Wu stated he would transmit the proposal to Peking that same day.

On December 3, in the evening, Rau had another and apparently longer talk with Wu and Chiao. Wu said that he had received no reply from Peking and that communication time required three days before answer could be expected from Peking. When Rau asked whether he was computing three days from December 1, Wu replied that he was not, but that he meant he would receive a reply in three days from December 3.

Rau at his meeting with Wu Sunday night added to the suggestion he had made on December 1 the additional proposal that after agreeing to an immediate cease fire and to a demilitarized zone to be promptly negotiated, there should be a conference among representatives of "the great powers" for the purpose of discussing those matters which would clearly remain for discussion. According to Rau, Wu voiced very strong resentment against "the American ruling circles" and insisted that Peking Government had real belief that the US was intent upon war with China. Rau argued that the American people, just as the Chinese people, do not want war. Wu's reaction was cold and stated that if there were a war it would not be the fault of the American people but of the American rulers.

Reverting to discussion of meeting of representatives of great powers, I asked Rau specifically whether he had in any way made such a suggestion a condition or implied commitment with regard to the first steps he had proposed. Rau was quite clear that he had not done so but that he felt it necessary, upon instructions from his Prime Minister, to offer a specific forum in which political matters could be discussed as promptly as possible but in any event, after a cease fire and establishment of a demilitarized zone.

He made it clear that the great power meeting would be attended by Peking representative. Wu said he would transmit this additional suggestion for a great power meeting to Peking and would expect also to have that question answered by Wednesday.

I said that I wished it to be clearly and distinctly understood that I was absolutely without any instructions whatever concerning the matter of a cease fire. I said that I would be willing to listen to any suggestions Rau had and particularly interested to learn of his discussions with Wu on this subject, but that I would either refrain from comment or if I did comment it would be understood that I was completely without instructions or authority on the matter. Rau, Younger and Jebb all stated they understood this and Jebb and Younger stated they were in precisely the same position.

In discussing with Rau his concept of a demilitarized zone, he stated that he had not discussed details of any sort with Wu because he considered that question to be a matter for negotiation. However, Rau added that in his mind a demilitarized zone would undoubtedly mean withdrawal of Chinese troops beyond the Yalu River and the withdrawal of UN forces to an undetermined line.[1]

Jebb asked for Rau's ideas concerning the nature of the administration of such a demilitarized zone and in particular requested Rau's views concerning the position of North Korean forces in such a zone. Rau replied that he assumed that such North Korean forces as might be in the zone would lay down their arms, that the area would be "neutralized". With regard to the question of administration, Rau stated he had given no thought to the matter.

Rau stressed that the question of Formosa seemed to be if not uppermost at least very much in the minds of the Peking representatives. In referring to alleged American aggressive designs against China, Wu used Formosa as his main talking point rather than Korea. He did not mention the 38th parallel. With regard to Formosa itself, Rau told Wu that he did not consider it appropriate at this stage to discuss the matter although he felt that an ultimate solution should undoubtedly be along the lines of the Cairo declaration. Rau further informed me

[1] Telegram Delga 371, December 4, from New York requested that the wording be changed here by deleting "an undetermined line" and adding "a negotiated line to the 'south of the Manchurian border' ". (320/12–450)

that Wu made it clear that the importance which the Chinese Communists attach to Formosa was grounded in large part upon their belief that it was the purpose of the Americans to keep Chiang in power on Formosa with a well supplied armed force which would stand as a constant threat to the mainland and therefore as a constant peril.[2] Rau further said Wu had made it clear that while a solution of the Formosa question would be of the greatest importance to the Peking regime, they also attached considerable importance to being seated in the UN.

Rau said that throughout the conversation at repeated intervals, Wu referred to this matter, clearly indicating that it was one of the sources of Chinese Communist bitterness against the US and a symptom of our aggressive design toward them. Rau understood this to mean that our support of Tsiang in remaining seated was the political part of our military conspiracy for the potential use of Chiang.

With regard to Rau's suggestion for a great power meeting, I believe that he not only made the suggestion at the instructions of Nehru, but that he told Wu that this was Nehru's idea.

Rau insisted that in his discussion with Wu he made it clear that the important and essential thing was to cease hostilities. When Wu said at several points that it was the fault of the American interventionists that fighting was going on, Rau replied that without in any way agreeing with Wu he said that question was irrelevant. In commenting aside to Younger and myself, Rau said that he himself felt that the main objective was to let the trapped troops get disentangled as soon as possible. In reply to Wu's comment about American intervention, Rau said he used the figure of speech that "when a house is on fire" the first thing you do is to prevent the spread of the fire by creating a lane and that a continuance of the fighting undoubtedly was inviting disaster to everyone.

Turning to procedures in the General Assembly, I asked Rau what his own judgment was concerning the next steps. I told him, and Jebb and Younger both nodded agreement, that the six sponsors of the vetoed SC resolution felt it of the greatest importance to bring the matter within the cognizance of the GA and that we had agreed that it should be done by sending a letter to the Secretary General this morning and subsequently circulating the vetoed six power resolution with some editorial changes. Rau said that he had talked with Wu about the six power resolution. Wu very vehemently insisted that

[2] Telegram Delga 371 requested that the words "to security of China" be added here.

the six power resolution was part of an "American plot" to lay the basis for bombing of Manchuria. Wu said that if the six power resolution were introduced into the GA, "those who voted for it would have to be responsible for the consequences".

At this point, Younger and Jebb interjected that they were aware of the undesirability of proceeding too quickly to a vote upon the resolution and had increasing doubts as to its adequacy or appropriateness.

Rau quickly said that his Prime Minister had grave doubts on the same matter and had in fact advised Rau that he should not support this resolution. Rau referred to the amendments circulated informally by him on November 12 in connection with the six power resolution [3] and said he believed that Nehru felt these amendments were still appropriate except that in lieu of reference to the Peace Observation Commission, Nehru believed that a great power meeting was more appropriate to the present situation.

I pressed Rau concerning this matter and ascertained that he was more doubtful as to Nehru's attitude than his opening statement on the subject implied. In fact, he said he was not sure concerning the use of the POC, saying that from one point of view it seemed "slightly out of date". He said that if he [*we?*] wished him to, he would wire New Delhi for comments because the Prime Minister had not in fact referred to the POC either in his instructions to Rau or "in his telegram to Attlee". I said that I of course was not in a position to comment concerning this matter at the present moment, but that speaking quite personally, I thought there would be great difficulties in the way of setting up great [power] attendance, but also from the point of view of fixing an agenda. For example, would such meetings confine themselves to Far Eastern questions. Rau, without giving an explicit reply, said that he assumed they would be so limited. Younger then said that he doubted whether such questions as might be raised, mentioning Indochina and Formosa, could be effectively disposed of in this manner.

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[3] The amendments were reported to the Department in telegram 817, November 13, from New York, as follows:

"Rau handed Gross for consultation the following suggested substitute for last two paragraphs of Korean resolution before Security Council:

'Calls attention to the grave danger which the continued employment of Chinese (Communist) forces in Korea would entail for the restoration and maintenance of peace in this region:

'Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities;

'Decides that a peace observation commission composed as described in section B of resolution A adopted by the GA on November 3, 1950, with the omission of China which is a party to the present proceedings, be established and be directed—

'(*a*) to proceed to the area as soon as possible;

'(*b*) To consider urgently and to assist in the settlement of any problems relating to conditions on the Korean frontier in which states or authorities on the other side of the frontier have an interest.'" (330/11–1350)

Reverting to the POC, I said that again speaking entirely personally and without authority, I wondered whether we might not envisage three phases rather than two. First would be a cease fire; second would be interposition of POC which could supervise cease fire and provide requisite assurances to both sides; and third phase would be the use or establishment of some appropriate forum for discussing political issues. I expressed the personal view that to attempt to jump from a cease fire situation to a full fledged discussion of political issues might be a leap which could not be made. However, I said that of course I would communicate this whole conversation and in the meantime requested Younger and Rau to say or do nothing of any nature on the basis of any comments I had made in view of their purely personal nature.

I asked Rau what he thought his government would do in the event that we proceeded to table in the GA the six power resolution. He said he had no instructions on this point but thought that he might table at some appropriate time a resolution calling for a cease fire and demilitarized zone.

Rau has no present plan for seeing Wu again except that they will be together at dinner tonight at the home of Trygve Lie, in the company of Jebb, Zafrullah Khan, Sharett, Grafstrom. Wu told Rau he would get in touch with him as soon as he had received instructions but did not expect them until Wednesday.

I told Rau I would be in touch with him if possible later in the day, particularly with regard to whether we had views concerning the possible use of the POC. In this connection, Rau pointed out that in the amendments he had circulated November 12, he had provided that China would not sit as a member of the POC because they were party to the dispute but that China could be heard by the POC. In this manner, Rau said it had been his intention to by-pass the question of Chinese recognition. However, he did not know whether this remained a timely suggestion and in particular felt that the Chinese Communists would not accept this procedure. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

791.13/12–450: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 4, 1950—3 p. m.
NIACT PRIORITY

824. Marquis Childs,[1] on the basis of consultation with Mrs. Pandit who had been in touch with Nehru, suggested to McGhee yesterday

[1] American journalist.

that US invite Nehru to meet with Pres and Attlee. It was intimated Nehru cld be here as early as Dec 7. As indicated in Deptels 542 and circ infotel Dec 1 [2] there have been two previous indirect approaches re invitation Nehru visit US.

Dept not disposed act on or reply to these hints as we see little hope reconciling Nehru's thinking as indicated Embtels 1381 and 1384 [3] re Korea and Commie China with our own at this time. As matters now stand if we issued invitation initiative wld appear come from us and might be interpreted as indication we prepared make concessions to Indian views which we are not in fact prepared to make. Moreover urgency present situation does not permit delaying substantive talks with Attlee for arrival Nehru. Shld subsequent developments make it appear talks with Nehru wld be productive visit at later date not precluded.

Foregoing for urinfo only unless you are approached re possibility Nehru visit in which case you shld attempt discourage idea on personal basis using such of foregoing para as you deem wise. We wish avoid giving impression of rejecting any offer by Nehru which wld make contribution easing present difficult situation but in best interests India and US believe talks shld not take place unless and until productive results seem probable.

ACHESON

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[2] Neither printed.
[3] Received at 11 p. m. on December 2 and 8:33 a. m. on December 3, respectively, pp. 1317 and 1322.

795.00/12–450

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1950.

Subject: Message from Swedish Ambassador in Peiping

Participants: Mr. Erik Boheman, Swedish Ambassador
Mr. Dean Rusk, Asst. Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Asst. Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Gray Bream—BNA

The Swedish Ambassador called at his request this afternoon to inform Mr. Rusk that the Swedish Ambassador in Peiping had been unable to establish any further contact with the top Chinese Communist officials. The Ambassador said that he had called to report this

fact and to answer his own conscience by asking if there was any further action which we felt they could take at this time. Mr. Rusk thanked him and replied that we saw nothing further to be done for the present. Mr. Rusk then asked him if they knew whether or not Mao Tse-tung was in Peiping. The Ambassador replied that in response to this specific question, the Swedish Ambassador in Peiping had reported that he did not know.

The Ambassador asked what our plans were with respect to a resolution in the General Assembly and Mr. Rusk replied that the six sponsoring powers were seeking today to place the subject on the agenda of the General Assembly but that no final decision had been reached as to the nature of the resolution to be offered. The Ambassador suggested that the resolution vetoed in the Security Council would have very broad support in the General Assembly and, without definite commitment, Mr. Rusk indicated agreement with this thought.[1]

The Ambassador referred gloomily to the apparent military situation in Korea and suggested that disengagement with a view to gaining a breathing space seemed best course. Mr. Rusk said that a breathing space was alright provided that it was utilized to the full in strengthening ourselves. He also pointed out as indicative of the grave implications of withdrawal from Korea the fact that the United States faces both the Atlantic and the Pacific; that a large segment of the American people might, if they found themselves alone in the Pacific and forced to withdraw, reason that similarly they should withdraw from commitments across the Atlantic. The Ambassador indicated his understanding of the broad situation.

Mr. Rusk thanked the Ambassador for his call and expressed regret that the impending meeting at the White House [2] did not allow him the time he would like to continue the conversation.

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[1] On December 4, the Swedish Government informed the United States that it would support referral of the six-power resolution to the General Asssembly, the Norwegian Government agreed to join the other five powers in the actual procedure, and the Government of New Zealand indicated that it would vote for the six-power resolution in the General Assembly (telegram 657 from Stockholm, telegram 565 from Oslo, and telegram 175 from Wellington; all December 4; all 795.00/12–450).

[2] See *infra*.

795.00/12–450

United States Delegation Minutes of the First Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee

TOP SECRET
US Min–1

CABINET ROOM, THE WHITE HOUSE
MONDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1950
4:00 PM–5:35 PM

PARTICIPANTS

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
The President	Prime Minister Attlee
Secretary of State Acheson	Sir Oliver Franks
Secretary of Defense Marshall	Field Marshal Sir William Slim
Secretary of the Treasury Snyder	Sir Roger Makins
General Omar Bradley	Lord Tedder
Mr. W. Averell Harriman	Mr. Robert Scott
Mr. W. Stuart Symington	Mr. Denis Rickett [3]
Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup	
Amb.-designate Walter S. Gifford [1]	
Assistant Sec. of State Perkins	
Assistant Sec. of State Rusk	
Mr. George Elsey [2]	

THE PRESIDENT opened the meeting by expressing his appreciation of the Prime Minister's coming to the United States. The objectives of the United States and the United Kingdom are parallel, and he hoped they always will be. Accordingly, he believed these discussions would be very useful. The situation is so serious that he felt it was necessary to begin the talks as soon as possible, although he had wanted to give the Prime Minister time to rest after his arrival. After he had consulted with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, it had seemed that he ought to ask the Prime Minister to begin this afternoon since he did not want to come to any conclusions until after he had talked with him. He suggested that the Prime Minister might like to have the military situation presented by General Bradley.

[1] Ambassador-designate to the United Kingdom.
[2] Administrative Assistant to President Truman.
[3] Principal Private Secretary to Prime Minister Attlee.

GENERAL BRADLEY summarized the situation on the map. He said there had not been very much pressure on the western front during the last 24 hours. A new line was now being formed and then the forces would withdraw in an organized way to the Inchon–Seoul beachhead. The port of Inchon has been handling 3,000 tons a day and could handle more. The Tenth Corps is being concentrated in the Hamhung–Hungnam beachhead. This force had been scattered in order to unify Korea as part of the program of holding elections throughout the country. It had now been ordered to fall back. The Seventh Division was proceeding with its withdrawal without too much opposition, and the two Korean divisions were coming back. The First Marine Division and one regiment of the Seventh Division were fighting their way back from Hagaru but had a difficult problem in withdrawing over a road which was controlled by the Chinese Communists. Yesterday they had evacuated 1,100 wounded from improvised airfields and 978 the day before. They were being supplied by air drops, 270 tons having been dropped yesterday. In South Korea in the Pusan area, three ROK divisions and some smaller divisions were being supplied through Pusan. The position at Inchon was rather strong. The river protects one flank and support can be given by naval gunfire. One cruiser and two destroyers are now standing by to give support.

Our air has been very active, flying 600 missions yesterday; there were 230 missions by Naval air. It has been this close air support which has enabled our forces to stand up against odds of about seven to one. There has been very little enemy air lately. Yesterday four or five Migs jumped a reconnaissance plane and one other. The reconnaissance plane escaped and the other returned badly shot up.

FIELD MARSHAL SLIM inquired whether it was the intention to hold the beachheads or to evacuate them.

GENERAL BRADLEY said this made little difference at the time. No orders have yet been given as to which the commander is to do. No answer has yet been given to the question whether we should withdraw or hold them.

FIELD MARSHAL SLIM asked whether they could hold.

GENERAL BRADLEY replied that, if they get back in good shape, they could hold for some time. He noted the forces available include two good ROK divisions, two somewhat less good ROK divisions, a Turkish brigade, as well as the British and American forces. Contrasting the position which they have been in with the beachhead, General Bradley said they had had very little artillery, but on the beachhead with artillery and protected flanks they could hold pretty well. It would be some days yet before they could be assembled in the Inchon area. In the east, two divisions are moving by sea from Wonsan. It was

less certain we could hold in the east. He thought the Seventh Division could get back in good shape since it was now able to move by rail, there being seven engines and 200 cars available. The Third Division is expected to be able to keep its heavy equipment.

FIELD MARSHAL SLIM suggested that the Chinese forces and ours might arrive at the eastern beachhead at about the same time. He asked whether fresh equipment could be put in by sea.

GENERAL BRADLEY agreed that the Chinese might be able to get there at the same time and fresh equipment could be so landed.

FIELD MARSHAL SLIM remarked that it was very important to hold a beachhead in North Korea. This would constitute much more of a bargaining point.

General BRADLEY thought it was not much considering the size of the beachhead and the size of the enemy force.

FIELD MARSHAL SLIM suggested that nevertheless, while it was held, it might make the Chinese think we are building up. He inquired about the situation at Pusan.

GENERAL BRADLEY said we must at least hold this against guerrilla attacks for some time. It was our main point for bringing in supplies, handling about 30,000 tons a day. We also have 150,000 North Korean POW's in that area. It will take some time to get scattered ROK divisions down there.

FIELD MARSHAL SLIM inquired General Bradley's estimate of the reliability of the ROK forces.

GENERAL BRADLEY said they fight reasonably well; that so far as their officers were concerned, they did not have much training. No divisional commander has as much as three years' service, and it is difficult to develop proper officers in that time.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he understood there was no possibility of holding a line across the peninsula.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that was true since the enemy had too great a capability of infiltration. Even with all of our forces intact, there would have been a question of holding the narrow point at the waist.

GENERAL MARSHALL added that there were some 30,000 South Koreans without very much training with the Marines and the Seventh Division. The ROK main weakness was in the command. The individuals were good fighters and had shown great resiliency. After being badly battered, they were put together again and back in action with rapidity. On the west, unless the enemy cuts in from the northeast, there is a very good opportunity to get back without the forces being too much demoralized. On the northeast, there was still a question what shape they would come back in and whether the Chinese Communists would arrive in the area simultaneously. The ports there were small and, while they did not have the problem of the tides which bothered us at Inchon, their capacity was restricted.

468-806—76——87

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether we could keep our air cover.

GENERAL BRADLEY said there had been no trouble so far. We have five carriers standing off the coast and are operating from seven fields. The field at Wonsan is out, and the Hamhung field is of doubtful value. We have good fields at Kimpo (Seoul), Suwon, Taegu, Taejon, and Pusan. Suwon, however, may be too far to be included in the beachhead. The retention of Taegu and Taejon depends on the guerrillas. He recalled that at first we had operated out of fields in Japan, and that this could be resumed to some extent. If however we are run off the airfields in Korea, we will have to depend largely on the carriers.

GENERAL MARSHALL said it was important to realize the operations of the enemy with their forces scattered through the mountains and masses pouring in against our men without any regard to the losses. It was much easier for them to conceal themselves than for us, because of the way in which they operated and their ability to stand the hardship. For these reasons, air cover was less valuable than might be supposed.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Prime Minister would see that we have very grave military decisions to make. There are also decisions which have to be made regarding procedure in the United Nations. For this reason, he welcomed free and frank discussion of all points. He did not want to decide these questions before Mr. Attlee's arrival. In this face-to-face discussion, a mutual understanding could be developed much better. The United States has responsibilities in the East and the West. We naturally consider European defense primary, but we equally have responsibilities in Korea, Japan and the Philippines as the British do in Hong Kong and Singapore. It must be clear that we are not going to run out on our obligations even though these are hard to meet. One of the first things to consider was what the attitude is regarding the Chinese Communist aggression in Korea. He hoped that, after full and complete discussion, decisions could be made today or tomorrow. He asked the Prime Minister if he would wish to comment.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was very glad to be here and appreciated the President's willingness to see him. He, like the President, felt that they must take a broad view on a wide horizon. A first point was the maintenance of the prestige and authority of the United Nations. (The President expressed agreement.) The United States is the principal instrument for supporting the United Nations, and the United Kingdom is giving what help it can. This problem has now become very difficult with the Chinese Communists coming in. It is common to our thinking that we wish the Korean business to be limited to asserting the authority of the United Nations against aggression in Korea. We all realize that other forces might come in and might bring

on another world war. We are very eager to avoid the extension of the conflict. If our forces become engaged in China, it will weaken us elsewhere. (The President agreed.) As the President had said, the United Kingdom and France have other Asian interests, but it would help the Russians if we were fully engaged in Asia. (The President again agreed.) We do not have very great forces. The question is what is to be done. He had hoped that a line could be held, and that an opportunity would be afforded for discussion and perhaps some accommodation. A few weeks ago, we might have played those cards from a stronger hand. We now have a weak hand although we do have future potential strength. There is an obvious time factor. He did not know what the President's view was regarding reinforcements. So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, it would be impossible for them to get any there for several months, and General Bradley had indicated that the question of holding is for a limited time.

We must consider opinion in the United Nations and European, American and Asian opinion. He had been in close touch through all this time with the Asian members of the Commonwealth. If we become involved in war with the Chinese, we must consider what effect that would have on opinion in the United States, Europe and Asia. In his thinking, it was very, very difficult for any of us to contemplate this situation. It would seem to be handing the game over to the Russians. He had tried to look at the matter from the way in which the Chinese felt it. We ourselves look upon it as a stand by the United Nations against aggression. The Chinese Communists are not members of the United Nations and, therefore, are not obligated by any of those considerations. They regard it as action by those forces fighting against them especially the United States. Their attitude seems to include an element of fear, a genuine fear of the United States and of the European nations generally. So long as they are not in the United Nations and while they are feeling flushed with success in China, they feel they are entitled to come in. They want to have the fullest position of any Chinese government in recent times. They feel strongly about Formosa and a little less strongly about Hong Kong. He doubted if they wanted to throw themselves completely in the hands of the Russians. They would rather feel their own strength and independence.

The Prime Minister had been thinking whether there was some approach by way of discussion. An element of this would be some kind of a cease-fire while our forces are still on the ground. The question then was what the Chinese were likely to demand. There was danger that, if we showed a spirit of accommodation, the price would go up. What they would like to have is recognition as the government of China, settlement of the Formosan question, and settlement in Korea. One could not tell whether they wished all of Korea to be governed

by the North Koreans or what solution they sought. He hoped that these questions could be carefully considered today and tomorrow. It was necessary to decide what kind of things we wanted to negotiate and how far we could go. We should consider the limits on negotiation and the method that should be used; for example, whether we should proceed in the United Nations through third parties. The whole matter was serious and very distasteful. The United Nations might lose face, as we all would, especially in the Far East, but we must weigh the advantages on one side and the other. The British people had had to face some hard situations in their history. According to his view, we must not get so involved in the East as to lay ourselves open to attack in the West. The West is, after all, the vital part in our line against communism. We cannot take action that will weaken it. We must strengthen our hand in the West as much as possible.

Secretary Acheson, at the request of the President, commented on the points which had been made by the Prime Minister. In the first place, we had to bear in mind that the central enemy is not the Chinese but the Soviet Union. All the inspiration for the present action comes from there. There has no doubt been some arrangement between the Chinese and the Russians to make the Chinese think they have strong Russian support. While their counterattack goes well, there is little limit to what they will try to do; if they can drive us out, they will do so. No one knows how much further they might be inclined to go. The situation is already serious. Regarding the question of all-out war against China, if this meant land, sea and air action, there were not many of the President's advisers who would urge him to follow that course.

Concerning the Prime Minister's suggestions about arrangements with the Chinese Communists, he was far less optimistic that anything could be done. We did not have an alternative between negotiation and becoming involved in war with China. We are actually involved at this time. We did need to consider the consequences of any actions. Regarding a cease-fire, it would appear to be militarily advantageous to us, although he would defer to General Marshall's opinion on this point. If this was correct, then it would be disadvantageous to the Chinese, and they would therefore not be likely to accept it. There would be some political advantage in suggesting a cease-fire, but if you go into negotiations, the question arises what price will be asked. The Chinese would probably ask for the recognition of their government and seating in the United Nations. They would also ask for concessions on Formosa and might well insist that any Japanese Peace Treaty must be concluded with their assent. The latter point would certainly interfere with our relationship to Japan.

He wished to return again to the attitude of the Chinese Communists. He agreed that they do not think of this as being United Nations action against them. He referred to the editorial which appeared in *Pravda* yesterday, and the theme that the matter should be treated as an issue of military power between the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists and the United States. The Chinese Communists were not looking at the matter as Chinese but as communists who are subservient to Moscow. All they do is based on the Moscow pattern, and they are better pupils even than the Eastern European satellites. The Russians are no doubt pleased with the idea that we might be fully engaged in war with the Chinese Communists who are acting as their satellites. The questions raised by the Prime Minister were very grave. He referred to the reports of the talks between Sir B. N. Rau and General Wu of the Chinese Communist Delegation in New York. The means we should utilize should be considered in the broadest terms in relation to the whole Far East. If Formosa were turned over as a result of aggression, this fact would be exploited in a most devastating way. It is hard to believe that this is merely a burst of Chinese military fervor; and if we give them Formosa and make other concessions, they would then become calm and peaceful. On the contrary, if we give concessions, they will become increasingly aggressive. We may not be able to do anything about this on the mainland, but we can on the islands.

If we yield to the Chinese Communists, he questioned whether we would be able to keep the Japanese and the Filipinos in hand. The Japanese have been very cooperative, but at that point they might well say they have come to the end. This would have very grave consequences from the military point of view. The advantages of this course would not be equal to the disadvantages. If no settlement is made with the Chinese Communists, are we worse off than if we do make such a settlement? This depends on what we do next. This moment for negotiations with the communist movement is the worst since 1917. If we do not negotiate and do not have a settlement, what do we do? We may fight as hard as we can in Korea, keeping going as long as possible, punishing the enemy as much as we can. Our negotiating position would be no worse then. If we are pushed out later and cannot hold Korea, we are still on the islands. We must refuse to recognize their gains. We could make as much trouble for the Chinese Communists as possible and hold Formosa, retaining what strength we can. If the Communists are successful in Korea, this may so weaken the French in Indochina that they will pull out. He doubted if any one of the President's advisers would urge him to intervene in that situation.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired how long the beachheads could be

held as an annoyance to the Chinese Communists without too much loss.

GENERAL BRADLEY said it was hard to say. If we have heavy losses in the east, it might be a short time there. In Inchon it might be a matter of weeks or one or two months unless the Chinese launch an all-out attack regardless of loss of life. In that case, they might be able to overrun us in a short time.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that, regarding the northeast sector, in all probability it could not be held and this raised the question of how many units could be evacuated with their equipment. If these forces could be moved to the west, the situation would be better. His own thought was that we should get out of the eastern sector with the least possible loss. The western beachhead should be held till we could see the condition of the units as they are brought back. They have been in constant action since June, and everybody reacts to battle fatigue. We will have to see what our losses are and what help we can give. Probably the best we can do is put in more air; some is now on the way. In December we shall have 23,000 replacements available and in January larger numbers. We are sending materiel out to replace our losses, and in strict confidence he could say that this equipment was being taken from National Guard units on our West Coast. He was much more hopeful than he had been four days ago.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired what the reaction of people would be if we continued to hold the beachhead with continuing losses. Wouldn't there be a demand for all-out war against China?

THE PRESIDENT said that such demands are now being made. We need a united effort at home. Huge appropriations are being made. He hoped that the line could be held in Korea until the situation was better for negotiation. All of his military advisers tell him that there is no chance to do this, but he still wanted to try.

THE PRIME MINISTER said opinions differ on the extent to which Chinese Communists are satellites. He inquired when is it that you scratch a communist and find a nationalist.

THE PRESIDENT believes that they are satellites of Russia and will be satellites so long as the present Peiping regime is in power. He thought they were complete satellites. The only way to meet communism is to eliminate it. After Korea, it would be Indochina, then Hong Kong, then Malaya. There was no chance to approach a solution without seeing clearly the course we should follow. He does not want war with China or anyone else, but the situation looks very dark to him. We can get all-out mobilization very soon, but he does not wish to do that either. He is not shutting the door to negotiations but does not think that they would be successful.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that Russia has posed as the friend of Communist China.

THE PRESIDENT said that he thought the Chinese Communists had made up their mind where they were going. They think they will get what they want including a seat in the United Nations and Formosa. He repeated that he was anxious to get all points of view and would especially appreciate those of the Prime Minister.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired how the Japanese were likely to react.

SECRETARY ACHESON said this depends in the long run to the power relation. Our thinking is that, if we now give up in the Far East, we are through. The Russians and the Chinese are coming in and other Far Eastern peoples would make their best terms with them.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that this was the bandwagon psychology.

SECRETARY ACHESON said we would be better off if we took a strong attitude. It was hard to tell whether the Chinese Communists would remain satellites in the long run, but he wondered whether they would not act in the same way now regardless of the answer to that question. It was a mistake to count on their goodwill. It is a saying in the State Department that with communistic regimes you can't bank goodwill; they balance their books every night.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed agreement. If the Chinese Communists are satellites, they would play the Russian game. If they are Chinese nationalists, they might prefer to get into the club so that if the Russians go too far in Manchuria or elsewhere they would not be already in Russian hands.

GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the several meetings he had with Mao Tse-tung and many more with Chou En-lai when he was in China. He recalled the latter saying to Mrs. Marshall at the dinner table with great emphasis that there was no doubt they were Marxist communists and he resented people referring to them as merely agrarian reformists. Pictures of Stalin and Lenin were everywhere when he visited their territory. They made not the slightest attempt to conceal their Moscow affiliations. They regarded the Russians as co-religionists. This feeling was thoroughly indoctrinated in their troops.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that Tito was also a full communist.

THE PRESIDENT said he relied on the view of General Marshall who had dealt with these people for a year. They are fully tied to Moscow. The Chinese people do, of course, have national feelings. The Russians cannot dominate them forever, but that is a long-range view and does not help us just now.

THE PRESIDENT said that Secretary Acheson had suggested that perhaps it had not been made clear to the Prime Minister that we have made every possible move to keep out of war with the Chinese Communists. We do not want such a war and have shown great forbearance so far in withstanding their attacks. On Wake Island he

had told General MacArthur that he wanted to avoid giving any provocation to the Chinese in Manchuria and the Russians in Vladivostok. General MacArthur had agreed and gave his opinion that the Chinese would not intervene. General MacArthur had at that time arranged to shift two divisions to Europe because he was sure the Korean campaign would be cleared up, as it would have been were it not for the intervention of the Chinese Communists. However, they are now in. They intend to push the United Nations out of Korea if they can. He hoped we could find a way to prevent this. We had never taken a move or given General MacArthur an order unless it came from the United Nations. He wished to emphasize that we do not want to act independently. It was for this reason that he particularly welcomed these talks.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the problem was to find out how best we could avoid playing the Russian game.

THE PRESIDENT said this was exactly right.

GENERAL MARSHALL commented on the Japanese reaction. He had in mind their great triumph for a time and then their collapse. We had been much worse off after Pearl Harbor and had then destroyed them. That memory would influence their reaction. They had a fearful lesson.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it was also necessary to consider the effect of our action on Asiatic opinion.

THE PRESIDENT said this was indeed vital. The trouble was that Asiatic governments seem to condone Chinese action in Tibet and Korea and blame the United States for all that happens. Russian propaganda along this line has even gotten through to India. He had tried to make our position perfectly plain, pointing out that we are not trying to take anything away from anybody but to restore things to those who ought to have them.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Asiatics think that this is their show. He recalled the attitude which he had found in India almost twenty years ago in regard to the Japanese.

THE PRESIDENT said it was hard to offset this propaganda which had taken hold out there. We had to find a common policy for ourselves and the NAT powers in order to get a common front and must then attempt to keep from all-out war. The Russians only understand the mailed fist, and that is what we are preparing for them. The situation is very serious, and we must find a common course which we can all hold to. He suggested that it might be desirable to continue the discussion tomorrow to see if we could reach a common conclusion which would avoid all-out war.

THE PRIME MINISTER wondered how we could avoid being bled in the East so that we could save the West. It would be wise today to consider the most immediate problems.

THE PRESIDENT said we must make two decisions in a day or two which still leaves us time for some discussion. If an approach is to be made on the question of a cease-fire, this cannot be long delayed.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed, saying if we delayed very long something would blow up.

THE PRESIDENT then said he wished to read to the Prime Minister certain points as follows:

"1. It would be militarily advantageous in the immediate situation if a cease-fire order could be arranged provided that considerations offered were not so great as to be unacceptable. This might insure full support of the United Nations. Arrangements for a cease-fire must not impose conditions which would jeopardize the safety of United Nations forces nor be conditioned on agreement on other issues, such as Formosa, and the Chinese seat in the United Nations.

"2. If a cease-fire should be effected which permits a stabilization of the situation, United Nations should proceed with the political, military and economic stabilization of the Republic of Korea while continuing efforts to seek an independent and unified Korea by political means.

"3. If the Chinese Communists reject a cease-fire and move major forces south of the 38th Parallel, the United Nations forces may face a forced evacuation of Korea. The consequences of a voluntary acceptance of a successful aggression and of a voluntary abandonment of our Korean allies would be such that any United Nations evacuation must be clearly the result of military necessity only."

THE PRESIDENT here interposed that we cannot get out voluntarily. All the Koreans left behind would be murdered. The communists care nothing about human life. The President continued reading:

"4. If the situation in the preceding paragraph develops, the United Nations must take immediate action to declare Communist China an aggressor and must mobilize such political and economic measures as are available to bring pressure upon Peiping and to affirm the determination of the United Nations not to accept an aggression. Also, there is the possibility of some military action which would harass the Chinese Communists and of efforts which could be made to stimulate anti-communist resistance within China itself, including the exploitation of Nationalist capabilities.

"In addition to the measures indicated above, the United States and United Kingdom should consult immediately about other steps which might be taken to strengthen non-communist Asia. These steps might include:

> "(*a*) Restoration of considerable self-government to Japan, the acceleration of efforts to obtain a Japanese peace settlement, the strengthening of Japanese capacity for self-defense, the greater utilization of productive capacity to strengthen the capabilities of the free world, and the prompt admission of Japan into international organizations. United Kingdom reluctance to move on these points should be discarded in light of the new critical situation."

On this last point, THE PRESIDENT said that he attached great importance to this and would like to discuss it at more length with the Prime Minister later. The President continued:

"(*b*) Appropriate military arrangements between nations in Southeast Asia capable of effective mutual support."

THE PRESIDENT wondered whether there was very much that could be done under this point. Continuing:

"(*c*) Special efforts to convince non-communist Asia of the nature of the threat which confronts it and to urge upon the governments concerned the need for concerted Asian action to resist communist aggression in that area."

THE PRESIDENT thought that a good deal could be done on this line. He concluded with the following two points:

"(*d*) Intensification of economic and military assistance to encourage the organization of resistance to communist encroachment.

"(*e*) Intensification of psychological and covert activity against communist regimes and activity in Asia."

THE PRESIDENT said that he had been considering some kind of Marshall Plan for Southeast Asia. The ECA had done a lot of good work there. A special plan was now underway for the Philippines to stabilize their situation, and he hoped that it would be rapidly approved by Congress. All of these points were worth consideration and further discussion.

SECRETARY ACHESON said the Prime Minister knows the present position in the United Nations. The six powers have put the item on the agenda and have filed a memorandum without indicating any course of action. We might now put in the 6-power resolution which had been vetoed in the Security Council. It was important to take some action to avoid seeming not to know what to do. Perhaps there should be a resolution just calling for a cease-fire now. It might be necessary to take the position very soon in the United Nations, and this should be done after complete agreement is reached between the Prime Minister and the President.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that General Wu and the Secretary General were dining together tonight and something might come out of that.

SECRETARY ACHESON referred to General Wu's statement to Sir B. N. Rau that it took him three days to communicate with Peiping. He said he meant one to Peiping, one to Moscow, and one back. He doubted if much would come out of that approach.

SIR OLIVER FRANKS said that he would like to suggest the points which seemed to him had emerged from the discussion. He would not

attempt to assess these points but merely to list them and he hoped he would be corrected if wrong:

1. The military situation is such that we ought to make no assumption regarding prolonged occupation of any area of Korea. We may hold a beachhead for a considerable time but this is not certain. We are therefore holding a position of diminishing strength which cannot last long. In regard to talks with the Chinese, we must assume a position of military weakness.

2. We had been trying to guess what the Chinese were thinking about and what they would do in a negotiation. Would they go beyond Korea to include such questions as Formosa? This inquiry leads us to the problem of the slippery slope and the question where you end.

3. Mr. Acheson had suggested another possibility in which perhaps the military situation would be held as long as possible and until we were obliged to leave so that we would be forced out instead of withdrawing by agreement. In that case, we would not need negotiation but would need to think what steps we would take against the Chinese who force us out. Then new problems would arise on that line.

4. Criss-crossing these alternatives is the question of a cease-fire which, if obtained at all, must be in the near future. It was not clear to him how that fitted in to the above alternatives, but it seemed to fit into each and ought to be pursued on its own merits.

THE PRESIDENT said this was very clearly put.

SECRETARY ACHESON said it was very accurate. The only question which was posed by Sir Oliver was how a cease-fire fits in. If the United Nations puts forward such a suggestion, the United Nations would have said the Chinese Communists must cease and at the same time would say to the Chinese, "We tell you that our forces will cease fire also." At least that would result in your stopping the killing of people while you talk. We would pay little for that. If they say we should be behind the 38th Parallel, the answer is we soon will be anyway. Such a United Nations position which would be acceptable to us would mean that we are not the aggressors and that we are ready to stop if the Chinese will.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that, if it was generally agreed, the discussion could be adjourned until tomorrow.

SIR OLIVER FRANKS inquired what should be said to the press.

THE PRESIDENT read a draft release. This was discussed by Mr. Ross[4] with Sir Oliver and Mr. Roger Makins, and then adopted with slight revision as follows:

"The President and Prime Minister Attlee conferred in the Cabinet Room of the White House today from 4 p. m. until 5:35 p. m. (Others who were present are listed at the end of this statement.)

"In order to give Mr. Attlee the latest information on the serious military situation of the United Nations forces in Korea, the President asked General Bradley to summarize it.

[4] Charles G. Ross, Press Secretary to President Truman.

"Mr. Attlee and the President then reviewed the general world situation in the light of developments in the Far East. The relationship between these developments and the responsibilities of the two nations in Europe and the rest of the world were emphasized.

"The frank discussion which followed revealed the determination of Mr. Attlee and Mr. Truman to arrive at a mutual understanding of the serious problems faced by both the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as by other members of the United Nations. The common ground on which the two governments base their foreign policy was fully revealed.

"The Prime Minister and the President will meet again at lunch tomorrow and continue their discussion afterward."

795.00/12–450

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1950—6:30 p. m.

Subject: Truman–Attlee Talks

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
Sir Roger Makins
Mr. Robert Scott
The Secretary
Mr. Jessup
Mr. Rusk

SIR OLIVER FRANKS accompanied by Sir Roger Makins and Mr. Robert Scott came to the Secretary's office for further conversation about the matter discussed between the President and Mr. Attlee.

THE SECRETARY said that there was some point in Sir Oliver's summary during the meeting which he wanted to touch on and to clear up any possible confusion. Sir Oliver had seemed to indicate an understanding that our position was so weak that we had to proceed on the assumption that we were licked in Korea. THE SECRETARY said that he did not take this view and it should not be treated as a foregone conclusion that we are out of Korea. THE SECRETARY then went on to develop our general thought. Foreign policy in the East and in Western Europe cannot be separated. We must have a single foreign policy for both sides of the world. He touched on the problem of American opinion, pointing out that he was not referring to vociferous extremists but to the sound judgement of reasonable people. If we surrender in the Far East, especially if this results from the action of our Allies, American opinion will be against help in the West to those who had brought about the collapse. In order to avoid this kind of reaction we must take a steadfast position in the Far East. He pointed out that he was not falling back on the gild [*guild?*]

catchword "my public opinion won't let me". He was, however, appraising an important factor, namely, the trend of general American thinking. He pointed to the size of the effort here in terms of taxes, military service, etc. If as a result of the military defeat in a campaign in Korea we make a surrender which would lose to us all of the results of the Pacific war, American opinion would not accept such a situation.

SIR OLIVER said that he did not dispute the fact that the United States has prime responsibility in the Pacific area and that the UK did not wish to make us weak on the western side of the Pacific. In saying this he referred to our position in the island chain. He accepted the idea that the United States must take a two-ocean view and he did not wish to weaken that approach.

SIR ROGER MAKINS believed that our two countries differ in our estimate of Chinese attitudes and intentions.

THE SECRETARY said that a surrender to the Chinese would probably result in the loss of the island chain to which Sir Oliver had referred. If we surrendered Formosa, the Japanese would react to our surrender to the display of Chinese force. If we give up Korea by agreement the Filipinos and Japanese would run for cover. In this connection the Russian opposition to our proposal for holding the Ryukyus shows a general plan to oust us from our island defenses. THE SECRETARY then read the questions which had been prepared for the President but which the President had not read. (See page 4 of memorandum entitled "Suggested Procedure for First Meeting with Mr. Attlee".)[1] He called attention to the appearance of indecision which would result from a delay by the Security Council and the General Assembly action in the United Nations. The following steps could be considered in the General Assembly. We might go ahead introducing the six-power resolution. We would then be taking the same position we took in the Security Council—no stronger, no weaker. Someone might then intro-

[1] The questions referred to read as follows:

"(1) What is to be our joint attitude toward Chinese aggression in Korea?

(2) How are we to lead the United Nations to face this situation in such a way as not to wreck that organization?

(3) Can we find common policy and action which will reflect the common determination of our two peoples to oppose aggression and thus to prevent the Soviet Union from starting another war?

(4) How shall we satisfy our commitment of honor to the Koreans and thus avoid losing our moral leadership without which we have nothing to offset communist fanaticism?

(5) How can we act in the present situation so as to prevent a collapse of Asian resistance to communist penetration?

(6) How must we act to avoid giving the impression throughout the world that all must now come to terms with communism on the best obtainable basis?

(7) Can we find a course of action which maintains intact our principle of resistance to aggression without committing us to a concentration of effort in a secondary theater in the face of the primary threat of the Soviet Union?" (795.00/12–450)

duce in the Assembly a simple cease-fire resolution. We could press ahead with that resolution and get it passed in twenty-four hours, leaving the six-power resolution in abeyance. It is probable the Chinese would not accept the cease-fire and that others would then urge us to pay a price. We should ignore such arguments. If the Chinese do accept, we would reorganize our defenses as vigorously as possible. If thereafter the Chinese attack, we would be in a better world position and if we have to take a Dunkirk we will at least prove that we are not ready to surrender but are standing up to attack. After that we would have to go ahead and make trouble for the Chinese. It would be much easier to hold opinion on that course than by desertion and surrender. We must avoid rewarding the Chinese for their aggression and equally avoid putting an Army on the Chinese mainland and pulling in the Russian Airforce by all-out bombing of China.

Mr. Rusk called attention to the other affirmative steps in the Pacific which might be taken concurrently. These points had been read by the President during the meeting. (See points *a–e* in memorandum entitled "Korea".) [2]

Mr. Scott then spoke about the importance of holding Asian opinion. While he agreed in the course of the discussion that concessions made to the Chinese now would probably not change their general policy, e.g. in regard to Indochina, Malaya, the Huk troubles in the Philippines, etc., there was a chance to reduce the tempo of their activities and this was important. (It was apparent that in the minds of Mr. Scott and of the other UK representatives that "Asian opinion" meant the views of India. They dwelt at some length on the importance of Indian manpower to the UK in previous wars. The Secretary indicated rather strongly his view that the Indians could not be relied upon.)

Sir Oliver stated that it seemed to him that the United States was seeking a middle way between branding the Chinese as aggressors and negotiating with them. In this policy we end up merely by harrassing them.

The Secretary pointed out that our experience with the Russians, which should be applied here, showed that their basic theory of negotiating is to exchange something intangible for something tangible. In this case, we might be asked to give up Formosa, which is a tangible asset, in exchange for the hope that we might influence their future conduct.

The Secretary asked Sir Oliver whether after he had talked with Mr. Attlee this evening it would be possible for them to meet again tomorrow morning in order to submit some recommendation to the

[2] *Ante*, p. 1349.

President and Mr. Attlee for the 2:30 meeting. Sir Oliver doubted whether that would be feasible. He indicated that Mr. Attlee might wish to send a telegram to London. It was generally agreed, however, that it was undesirable to have the meeting this afternoon continue by repetition of the same points and Sir Oliver undertook to communicate with the Secretary before lunch in order that the plan for the afternoon meeting could be arranged.[3]

[3] For a further report on the above meeting, see the memorandum by Mr. McWilliams of the meeting held in Mr. Acheson's office on December 5 at 10 a. m., p. 1382.

791.13/12–450: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 4, 1950—7 p. m.

NIACT

827. Embtel 1389, Dec. 4.[1] You may wish to remind Nehru of US desire to consult with GOI re matters of mutual interest, and to speak to him along fol lines:

UN action in Korea against unprovoked aggression N. Koreans supported by great majority UN members including India. Decision cross 38th parallel in force followed failure NK authorities to respond to the Unified Command's appeal to lay down their arms and end hostilities. As Nehru knows lawless invasion NK by Chi Commie forces was unprovoked and carefully planned. Difficult avoid conclusion invasion Korea by Chi Commies is part of plan to over-run all countries of E. and S. Asia. If UN action in Korea fails guilt will rest squarely on shoulders of Chi Commies for whose aggression in Korea not a shred of justification. If UN prestige weakened as result failure successfully meet aggression in Korea, responsibility will rest on Chi Commies who have demonstrated they will stop at nothing to attempt conquest of a neighboring country.

US has gone to great lengths to make clear its participation in UN military action limited to stopping aggression against ROK. Difficult understand how any reasonable person can doubt US or UN intentions in face of orders to UN forces not only refrain from attacking Chi aggressors' bases in Manchuria but to refrain even from engaging in "hot pursuit" of Commie planes attacking UN forces from Manchurian bases. Such orders probably unprecedented in history.

No one hopes more fervently than US Govt that Chi Commies can be made realize their lawless actions cannot by wildest stretch of imagination be justified in eyes of world; and no one hopes more earnestly than US that Chi Commie rulers and people of Chi may

[1] See footnote 2 to telegram 1385 from New Delhi, received at 5:02 a. m. on December 4, p. 1345.

be made realize they are embarking on course which may throw all SE and S. Asia into chaos, and easily lead to disastrous world war.

No one knows better than Mr. Nehru that for months US Govt has hoped Chi Commie leaders cld be convinced US participation in UN action in Korea, and US action in connection with Formosan problem had as their goal the same goal Nehru has so often discussed—prevention of spread of hostilities. Chi Commies have now chosen commit aggression against Korea which may be forerunner of aggression against any or all other countries contiguous to Chi.

If UN action in defense of small weak country fails as result Chi Commie aggression in Korea it is difficult understand how men of vision can condone this aggression which may destroy UN efforts defend small nation. If UN is to survive it must have moral support of all nations who value their independence.

Regardless of outcome of UN action in Korea, high principles for which thousands of men in UN forces are fighting and dying will live. It shld now be clear to world at large no nation immune from threat of aggression. At no time has there been greater oppor for nations valuing their independence to uphold principles for which UN is fighting (*End summary*).

Dept well aware Nehru may not be impressed by these or any other arguments but knows you will endeavor imply clearly unwisdom of statements which may encourage Chi aggressors.

ACHESON

320/12–450 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 4, 1950—7 : 51 p. m.
[Received December 4—8 : 12 p. m.]

Delga 369. Korea—Lie–Wu talks. The following are further details which Lie gave to me with regard to the talks Lie has held with Wu.

Mr. Lie told Wu that he was prepared to travel to Peiping to consult with the Chinese leaders in an effort to maintain the peace and asked him to send a message to this effect to his Foreign Minister.

In respect to a cease-fire, Mr. Lie introduced the concept that the Chinese troops might withdraw to the Yalu and the UN troops withdraw below the 38th parallel.

Mr. Lie indicated that Wu made it very clear that the three demands of the Chinese Government were (1) withdrawal of UN troops from Korea; (2) withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet from Formosa; and (3) seating of the Chinese Communist regime in the United Nations; and that his position on these demands was very firm.

Mr. Lie indicated that he had made an independent cease-fire proposal to General Wu and that General Wu had told him that he had

passed this to Peiping and would get in touch with him when he received his instructions, which would take at least three days.

Mr. Lie said he had compared notes with Ambassador Rau as to their two conversations and they had agreed that there was no significant difference in General Wu's attitude as indicated in the separate conversations.

AUSTIN

320/12–450 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 4, 1950—8 : 44 p. m.
[Received December 4—9 : 28 p. m.]

Delga 372. For Hickerson from Gross—re Rau talks with Wu.

Following are incidental points relating to Rau talks with Wu (Delga 368 December 4) added as supplemental report for sake of completeness.

Rau considered Chiao to be "the important man in the delegation", commenting that he usually took the lead in the discussion and that Wu made few if any replies to questions without first consulting aside with Chiao in Chinese.

Rau seemed to have been impressed by fact that Wu kept referring to China and Chinese interests without mentioning Soviet relationships. Rau's inference (to which he is normally prone in any event) is that Peiping is not necessarily acting upon instructions from Moscow although when I pressed him, he confessed to his belief that Moscow and Peiping are closely coordinated. Rau had no information concerning relations between Peiping and the Soviet delegation here, but Jebb volunteered that his impression was that they were not as close as he had assumed they would be. Jebb appeared to have no basis for this reaction except "atmosphere".

Prior to arrival of Jebb and Younger, I spent almost ten minutes with Rau alone. He started by asking "how did this happen?" He said it appeared to him that there had been complete failure of information concerning size and disposition of Chinese forces. I replied I was not personally familiar with the situation in that regard, but that it seemed clear to me that in addition to the availability of information there was always the essential problem of evaluation of intention. I was sure that few people would have been prepared to believe that any man or group of men would have been capable of taking a decision with such obviously disastrous potentialities as the Chinese Communists had done. Rau replied by reminding me that his government

had passed on to the US Government some time ago advice from Panikkar reporting that the Peiping Government had made the explicit threat to him that they would intervene in Korea if our forces crossed the 38th Parallel. I expressed the guess that this information had undoubtedly been included in the evaluation of intention but that it was obvious that the practice of making threats was a weapon frequently resorted to by totalitarian regimes. The fact that we did not always discount such threats, I thought, was demonstrated by fact that when Peiping regime openly proclaimed its threats to take Formosa by force and massed forces on the mainland opposite the island, we evaluated their intention in a manner which led to the conclusion that it was necessary to interpose the 7th Fleet in order to prevent the carrying out of the threat. The fact that the Chinese Communists had taken incalculably grave step of invading Korea to overwhelm UN forces tended to confirm the correctness of our evaluation of the threat to Formosa and justify the decision to prevent the spread of hostilities in that area. Rau agreed to logic of this but said that what we had done by putting 7th Fleet into the Formosa Straits was to give to Peiping Government an assurance of safety from that quarter, thus releasing forces for use in Korea. I replied that if this were the case, it would merely serve to indicate the fraudulent nature of the Chinese Communists' assertions that we had aggressive designs against them. I pointed out that whatever the nature of their propaganda, both the Russian and the Chinese Communists seemed to take our assurances at face value in many specific situations and I had always doubted that their asserted fears of our intentions were anything but propaganda slogans or dogmatic rituals. As an example, I pointed to fact that both the Chinese Communists and the Soviet representatives had always attacked the reports of the UNCOK as emanating from a "creature of the Anglo-American imperialistic bloc", even though they knew India was a member of the Commission and had signed the Commission's reports.

Apropos of Rau's reference to 38th Parallel, I said we had been struck by fact that in Wu's two-hour opening speech in the SC, he had not once mentioned the 38th Parallel.

Rau's tone throughout was depressed rather than critical. It was my impression that Nehru is using Rau as his principal agent for the discussions with the Chinese Communists. When Rau subsequently in the conversation (Delga 368) referred to the delay in communications as described to him by Wu, I could not help wondering why New Delhi, which had obviously been kept closely advised, did not seek to expedite receipt of Peiping's views by requesting Panikkar to see Mao. Attitude of GOI toward Panikkar as reflected in Rau's comments may have some relevance to this. (Re mytel 921 December 1.)

One point which I forgot to include in my hastily dictated telegram (Delga 368) was that Rau mentioned that Wu had during course of his conversation pointed to fact that our offensive in Korea coincided with arrival at Lake Success of Peiping delegation. Rau said Wu appeared to attach great importance to this point, mentioning it along with our attitude toward seating Peiping representatives in UN and our "occupation of Formosa" as evidence of our hostile attitude towards Communist China. Rau somewhat naively asked me whether there was any significance to fact that our offensive had coincided with Wu's arrival and I assured Rau that to the best of my knowledge, and I was morally certain I was correct, the timing of the offensive bore no relation to arrival of Wu and I reminded Rau that the preparations for such an offensive required a long time, that it was launched on purely military rather than political considerations, and that none of us knew for a certainty of the date of arrival of Peiping group. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

795.00/12–550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, December 5, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received December 5—5 : 54 a. m.]

517. Contact between CCF and UN forces in Eighth Army sector remained light yesterday as latter forces continued withdrawal.

About 300 vehicles were sighted in enemy rear areas last night of which 220 moving south. Heavier traffic was observed on road from Sakchu to Unsan. Yesterday what appeared to be 5 Mig–15's attacked 2 UN F–80's northwest of Chongju, damaging 1 of latter. This represented first encounter of this type for 2 weeks.

Eighth Army Intelligence definitely accepts following Chinese armies in North Korea: 38th, 39th, 40th, 42nd, 66th, and 50th. At least 4 prisoners have been taken recently who claim to be from CC 37th Army. It possible but not confirmed 48th, 49th and 65th armies are in Eight Army sector. 37th army is carried as part of third field army and 65th and 66th as special army groups. Remainder above stated armies carried as fourth field army units. Chinese Communist 20th and 27th armies are accepted as being in X corps area. It possible but not confirmed Chinese Communist 30th army also operating in X corps area. Chinese troops encountered thus far have fought hard and well though losses have been extremely heavy. They well maintained, organized and disciplined. Numerous ex-KMT soldiers are found but proportion of whole not established. Officers and non-coms invariably

Communists and ranks leavened with Communists. Chinese troops have shown little disposition to surrender. Equipment mainly US and Japanese. CCF thus far have not had heavy artillery and few if any tanks. Their tactics reminiscent of those used by North Koreans in early days of war, infiltration and mobile warfare being stressed.

MUCCIO

611.00/12–550

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (McWilliams)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 5, 1950.

Subject: Meeting in the Secretary's Office, December 5, 1950, 10 a. m.

Participants:

Mr. Acheson	Mr. Nitze
Mr. Webb	Mr. Perkins
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Harriman
Mr. Jessup	Mr. Kennan
Mr. Rusk	Mr. McWilliams
Mr. Merchant	

The Secretary opened the meeting by saying that he had had a meeting last night with Ambassador Franks, Messrs. Makins and Scott of the British party, Mr. Rusk and Mr. Jessup.[1] The Secretary said he had suggested to Ambassador Franks that he attempt to work out with Mr. Attlee a means of getting a more relaxed attitude at future meetings with the President. He suggested to Franks that he ask Attlee to allow his subordinates at the meeting to initiate discussions on the subjects which come up.

The meeting which was held at 4:00 p. m. yesterday (December 4) was rather rigid and too many people were in attendance. The Secretary asked Mr. Harriman to speak to the President along this line and said he would do the same if he had the opportunity.

The Secretary said he could summarize the meeting at the White House yesterday in a few words. He said that Mr. Attlee had taken the position that at this time we had no choice except to negotiate with the Chinese. These negotiations would, of course, extend beyond Korea and it was certain the price the Chinese demanded would be Formosa, a seat in the UN, and recognition. The President stated that we were not prepared to proceed on this line and that was about all that the meeting produced.

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[1] See the memorandum of conversation by Jessup of the meeting held on December 4 at 6:30 p. m., p. 1374.

In the meeting in the Secretary's office last night the Secretary informed the British that we could not separate our foreign policy into two compartments—the far East and the European.

The Secretary went on to say that Americans would not accept a surrender in the Far East in accord with the desire of some of our Allies and then cooperate in Europe with the same Allies who have urged us to be concilliatory in the Far East. Americans demand that we must be vigorous everywhere. The Secretary said he tried to point out to the British that the consequences to their proposal was greater than they thought. He said that you can not, as the British seem to want to do, make a distinction between little aggressions and big aggressions. The British seem to be saying that we would take action to put down little aggressions but if a big aggression came along they would say that is a different matter and not act against it.

The Secretary pointed out to the British that if we accept surrender Japan can not be expected to stay with us. If we accept surrender, we would be conceding that Russia and China are the most powerful forces in the Far East and as a result of that all Asians would hurry to make the best deals they could with them.

In answer to the Secretary's presentation, Ambassador Franks said that the British felt that we were basing our position on a moral position but since our power had collapsed they felt we would have to change our moral position. The Secretary replied to Ambassador Franks by saying that he did not want to argue this but would rather examine the question to see whether this was a position which we could defend vigorously.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that we are now more powerful militarily than we were at the beginning of the Korean war. He based this statement on the fact that we had taken many measures as a result of the Korean war which have put us in a much stronger position militarily; and, although we have had and will have considerable personnel losses in Korea we are none-the-less in a stronger position militarily. He said that he conceded that we have lost prestige but we have not lost power.

The Secretary reported that the British then proceeded to argue against our proposals. He said he thought the British arguments would demonstrate some weaknesses in our line of action and that we should re-examine it closely. In brief he outlined our proposals as follows: (1) fight as hard as we can; (2) if someone proposes a cease fire, we will accept it but we will not pay anything for it; (3) if a cease fire is not accepted or is accepted and the Chinese later start fighting again, we will start again and we must fight the best we can—we will not run out; and, (4) if we are thrown out, we will try to harass the Chinese all we can by economic blockade or such action as we may be able to take. Under no circumstances would we agree to turn over Formosa as a condition to settle.

The British countered by saying that our position is one of getting thrown out of Korea and maintaining a position to harass China which could get us nowhere even though we were to carry it on for years. In addition, they pointed out that such action would make the British position in Hong Kong untenable. The British think that this would weaken everyone and alienate our friends. They said that the Asians now thought that we were wrong about Formosa and that this, of course, would further alienate them. They believe that if we pursue this course, the Asians would probably not join the Soviet camp but would probably rather neutralize themselves into a third force. The Secretary countered by saying that the Asians would probably do that anyway and he did not think we should pay a price for Asian opinion.

This brought the meeting of last night to the question of what should we do.

The Secretary had proposed to the British that we proceed with the first steps in the UN as now scheduled and that we follow this by filing the resolution vetoed in the Security Council to demonstrate that we have not changed our position. In the meantime, if some other party proposes a cease fire, he would like to see that passed quickly so that there would be no negotiation first on the price of a cease fire. The British agreed to take this up with the Prime Minister to see if he would agree to this.

This ends the summation of the meeting with the British last night.

The meeting then turned to a discussion of what course of action might be available to us. Mr. Nitze opened by saying that if there was no cease fire order and the pressure continued on us militarily, he would favor giving consideration to blowing up the dams on the Yalu River. Mr. Harriman said he thought this had merit since the Russians would depend on the industrial capacity of Manchuria in any war in the Far East and by destroying the major source of power we would then cripple that potential.

The discussion then turned to the question of whether or not a harassment of China would cause the Soviets to take military action. Mr. Kennan said he did not think that this would be the case. He said that it might happen coincidentally but that Russia would not take military action purely because of our harassment of China. He pointed out that the Russian desire is to split the Allies where ever they can. If they can do that, it makes military action less necessary. He pointed out that our harassment of Chinese would tend to split our Allies on that point and the Russians would consider this a very favorable turn of events.

Mr. Jessup said that he thought if we were to hold our Allies in Europe we must be prepared to agree to a meeting with the Soviets. Mr. Harriman said that he thought the way to hold unity is to move ahead on the European military organization.

Mr. Kennan then said that he did not think that what we have to do in the Far East need be a petulant effort of annoyance to the Chinese. He said that we have worried for years whether or not we are popular with other governments and we have bent over backwards to try to make them trust us and like us. He said the Chinese have now committed an affront of the greatest magnitude to the United States. He said that what they have done is something that we can not forget for years and the Chinese will have the worry of righting themselves with us not us with them. He felt that we should take our time in deciding what we do. He said we owe China nothing but a lesson. He said he thought we should attempt to get a stance and understanding with the British; that we have different views on the matter of China but that we must do what we must do and they should accept and understand that and be willing to cooperate at least on other things.

At this point, Mr. Jessup said that he was concerned as to whether our Ambassadors in the field were fully enough informed of our position in order that they might make it plain to the governments to which they are accredited. There was unanimous agreement that we should make a greater effort to see that our Ambassadors were informed and Mr. Rusk agreed to undertake this.

Mr. Rusk said that he felt our position with the British today should be that we intend to go ahead with our UN program and leave to them the problem of maintaining unity and the onus of not calling the Chinese action an aggression if they wish. He again pointed out that we can not accept the British proposal because this is a big aggression rather than a little aggression. Mr. Rusk thought that the merit of proceeding in this matter was to show the world that we are not appeasing and if the UN did not support our program they would be the appeasors and not us.

At this point, Mr. Perkins entered the meeting to report that Ambassador Bruce had just sent a message saying that the French are ready to agree to our position if the Secretary would send Mr. Schuman a letter along the same lines of the message sent to him last week. Ambassador Bruce has also asked for a telecon this morning on this subject and the Secretary said that if the telecon verified the facts above he thought it important that we push the British to get ahead with the European Defense Force Program as rapidly as possible.[2]

Returning to the Korean situation, the Secretary suggested that we might propose to the British that if the Chinese accept a cease fire we will stop shooting but we will not pay anything. We would then be willing to exchange agreements with the British on the protection of Australia and New Zealand. We would then see how vigor-

[2] Related documentation is scheduled for publication in volume III.

ously we could proceed in Europe. We could tell the British if they would do certain things, we do many—such as sending additional forces to the Continent, naming a supreme commander, etc. We could ask the British to help this program along and not buck.

The discussion then turned to the question of a stopping point in the UN if we were unable to make satisfactory progress. The consensus of the group seemed to be that if no cease fire resolution is passed, we should then pass the original resolution calling for the Chinese to withdraw from Korea. If the Chinese do not comply with this resolution, we should make it plain that we consider that the UN has done all it can and is no longer in control of the situation. We would then be able to act unilaterally as we see fit. At this point, 11:30 a. m., Mr. Battle informed the Secretary that the British Ambassador and his delegation were in the Secretary's reception room to see him and all except the Secretary, Mr. Rusk, Mr. Jessup and Mr. Harriman withdrew from the room.[3]

W. J. McWilliams

[3] See the memorandum of conversation by Jessup, p. 1390.

795.00/12–550

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [Washington,] December 5, 1950.

Subject: Situation in Korea

Participants: Dr. John M. Chang, Korean Ambassador
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs

Ambassador Chang called on Mr. Rusk at 11 o'clock this morning by prior appointment. Mr. Rusk briefly reviewed the current military situation in Korea and pressed upon the Ambassador the necessity of not letting oneself be entirely guided or influenced by reports and interpretations with respect to the situation in Korea appearing in the press. He added that he had met with members of the press, and might do so again, to impress upon them in the strongest terms the necessity of calm and accurate reporting on the Korean situation, adding that sensational or distorted handling of the Korean situation in the press could do nothing but give advantage to the enemy. He again emphasized to the Ambassador that he should not permit himself to be unduly influenced by press reports.

The Ambassador spoke to some length as to the terrible consequences to the Korean people of a withdrawal of United Nations forces from Korea and reiterated emphatically a number of times that if the situation came to this point the Korean people, as a nation, would suffer final annihilation at the hands of the Communists. Mr. Rusk reassured the Ambassador that it was not the intention of the United States in any sense to abandon the campaign in Korea or to withdraw our forces short of being absolutely forced to do so by military events, and that the Ambassador should realize that the military situation was not hopeless and might yet be stabilized. Mr. Rusk also emphasized that there were overriding military factors rather than political considerations, which dictated certain specified courses of action which we were now following in Korea and that all aspects of the situation were being given the closest attention.

The Ambassador again stressed the determination of the Korean Government and people to continue the fight against Communism to the last, and in this connection he mentioned the one-half million Korean youths who, if supplied with arms, were only too eager to add their weight to the forces combatting the Chinese Communists. He hoped that Mr. Rusk had conveyed his thoughts on this subject, expressed in his conversation of yesterday, to the Secretary.

While again stressing that there was no disposition on the part of the United States to withdraw its forces from Korea short of being militarily forced to do so, Mr. Rusk suggested that perhaps the Ambassador might wish to give some consideration to eventualities should this happen and to the possible establishment of a Korean Government in exile. He suggested that this might form an appropriate topic of conversation for the Ambassador's visit with him tomorrow at 11 a. m.

The Ambassador stated that although he had heard that his appointment with the President for tomorrow had been cancelled, he very urgently desired to see the President at the request of President Rhee and hoped that even a very brief interview could be arranged for tomorrow. Mr. Rusk replied that he would take up the Ambassador's request.

795.00/12–550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NIACT

PARIS, December 5, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received December 5—11 : 03 a. m.]

3164. French public and governmental views on the Korean situation and US policy in Far East largely parallel those of British

opinion as set forth in London's 3241 to Department December 3,[1] and Pleven's affirmation of "identity of views" with Attlee is generally accepted and welcomed here. As a matter of fact, Pleven's and Schuman's trip to London seems to have temporarily silenced those few voices who had criticized government for not acting independently enough, and fair amount of unity in foreign affairs, as exemplified by recent confidence vote in the Assembly, may be registered as one favorable factor in present situation here.

Recent events have at the same time inevitably caused a certain flurry of speculation about French neutralism, notably by foreign observers, and no doubt neutralist tendencies have received some impulse from existing fears that situation may be drifting toward general war. Sharp distinction must in our view be drawn, however, between neutralists, who are a very small *coterie* of intellectuals and whose attitude has in recent past become increasingly anti-American, and sentiment of large majority of Frenchmen who during present crisis show no inclination to dissociate themselves from France's western allies.

What is increasingly encountered here is feeling that there is difference between US and Western European approaches toward the Far Eastern situation and that France, together with Britain, must exercise moderating influence on US to avoid major war in Far East which would detract from US capacity to help create situation of strength in Europe. Peculiarly enough, what the French fear at this point is precisely the thing they welcomed last June, the spontaneous reaction of US public opinion to a challenge, and quick and decisive response to such a challenge by the US Government. Nearly all the polemics against MacArthur (most recently when he started his last offensive, and increasingly as the offensive developed into retreat) and against the President (for allegedly toying with idea of using atom bomb) spring from feeling that US must be brought around to more cautious attitude, rather than from feeling that France should in any way dissociate itself from the US.

Fact that no French troops are engaged in Korea may account for the different French psychological reaction to the Chinese aggression compared to that which was apparently caused in the US. As a matter of fact, although news of the Chinese counter-offensive was received with dismay and consternation, this was to some extent coupled with an I-told-you-so-attitude. In any event, developments with respect to Communist China's reception in the UN are largely looked upon from point of view of whether compromise solution is rendered more

[1] Not printed, but see telegram 3200 from London, received at 3:19 p. m. on December 1, p. 1296.

or less difficult. Certainly a compromise solution is what French public opinion hopes for, relief and hope in newspapers yesterday created by alleged Chinese proposal for settlement (on basis restoration 38th parallel, admission to UN and jettisoning of Formosa) is significant in this connection.

In spite of these feelings, the recent statements of Pleven and Schuman about complete French unity with the west, and firm adherence to the UN and principle of collective security, can be taken at face value, and France can in our view be counted upon to continue to make her contribution to build up of strength and unity in Europe and defense of this interest in Indochina. But the facts must be recognized that in the Far East France's war is Indochina and not Korea; that US policy on Formosa has never captured the French imagination; that the French were perhaps only prevented from recognizing Mao by the fact that Mao recognized Ho Chi-minh; and that Schuman is on record as having favored restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* in Korea (Embtel 1182, September 7 [2]). Consequently for French opinion a compromise involving, say, return to the 38th parallel and admission of Communist China to the UN, would be comparatively palatable.

What we are witnessing under present circumstances is emergence into the open of certain latent feelings about the US: feelings that due to geographic and psychological factors the US might decide more lightly about war and peace; that the US Government may be impelled into military commitments which are not in its own interests and a fortiori not in those of its European allies; that the US has in the past not sufficiently listened to real or imaginary counsels of moderation from its allies; and that France, together with Britain, must now play the role that it has from time to time successfully coveted in the past, namely the role of moderator and intelligent, detached advisor to its mighty and much-needed friend. All these feelings of course spring from the basic fact, which cannot be emphasized too often, that under present circumstances and given its geographic position, France feels naked in the face of possible Russian aggression in Europe and fears more than anything else a Soviet military occupation, even if it were to be of short duration.

Department pass Moscow. Repeated information London priority 775, Moscow priority 112.

BRUCE

[2] Telegram 1182 not printed. M. Schuman's statement was made at a news conference on September 6.

795.00/12–550

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 5, 1950.

Subject: Truman–Attlee Talks
Participants:

United Kingdom	*United States*
Sir Oliver Franks	The Secretary of State
Mr. Kenneth Younger	Mr. Averell Harriman
[Sir] Roger Makins	Mr. Dean Rusk
Mr. Robert Scott	Mr. Philip C. Jessup
	Mr. Jack Hickerson

Sir Oliver said that they had had a talk with the Prime Minister on the conversation in the Secretary's office yesterday evening. His conclusion was that the President and the Prime Minister this afternoon should devote themselves first to some of the short-range problems. He understood the proposal was to lay the 6-power resolution before the General Assembly. Someone else then might be prompted to introduce a cease-fire resolution. We would attempt to push through to a vote. The Prime Minister would be happy to get these points decided this afternoon.

As a procedural matter for the meeting this afternoon, he hoped that the discussion could be kept vigorous and alive. Mr. [*Sir Roger*] Makins said that there was another point about holding the bridgeheads about which Field Marshal Slim wished to speak. The British understand that it is our policy to hold as long as possible and they agree generally with this but there are various things which need to be done. The Secretary agreed with what had been suggested.

There was then discussion between Mr. Rusk and Mr. Younger regarding the parliamentary procedure in the United Nations. Mr. Younger said it would be hard to let the matter lie too long unless we were inclined to think this was necessary. Mr. Rusk thought some debate on the 6-power resolution would be useful before the cease-fire resolution were introduced. Mr. Scott urged that the soundings of the Chinese Communists should take place before people make speeches on the 6-power resolution. This suggested the desirability of some interval.

There was discussion as to whether the Chinese would be present. It was pointed out that, if the matter were handled in the Political Committee, the Chinese would be there since the Committee had already agreed to have them present for the discussion of any question in which they were interested. On the other hand, there is no procedure for inviting outsiders to the Plenary in the General Assembly, and it would be difficult to do this. The Secretary thought it was not too important to sound out the Chinese. As a matter of fact, this had

already been done by Sir B. N. Rau who was to receive an answer on the sixth. The tone of the debate ought to be sober and would not be affected by the Chinese view just as it would not affect them or their attitude. If we get the item on the agenda today, the debate could begin tomorrow and then someone could put in the cease-fire resolution.

There was also discussion of the possible necessity of a resolution in the Security Council to take the item off the agenda. Mr. Hickerson pointed out with Tsiang as President this month this might get us into a long and unfortunate debate in the Security Council and this should be avoided. It was agreed that Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Younger would sound out the views of the French and the Norwegians in New York and see whether this technicality could be dispensed with.

Mr. Younger pointed out it was possible to begin the debate in the General Assembly regardless of Security Council action. He, however, expressed some doubt as to whether the resolution should be filed today. He suggested that certain changes ought to be made. He thought the part of it relating to the Chinese border now would seem rather silly although it was applicable to the question of bombing. Mr. Hickerson thought it desirable to leave it alone except for a few editorial changes and Sir Oliver supported this to show that we had not altered the attitude which we had already taken in the Security Council.

Sir Oliver suggested that, in the discussion of the Far Eastern question this afternoon, we should face the fundamental difficulties of view. The attitudes of the two governments on current action are conditioned by their long-range views on China. These views are different. We needn't try to find a complete accommodation on the long-range results, but at least the United States should make the United Kingdom say what they think about China and then the United States should point out any fallacies. The United Kingdom view is that nationalism is virulent in China, that it has been transferred from Chiang to the Chinese Communists. They believe that they are both communists and Chinese, just as Tito is both a Yugoslav and a communist. The Russians were very clever in cloaking their aid to the Chinese Communists so that they have had the impression that they achieved their power by themselves. The Chinese are expansionists and have been for a long time. They now have the power to carry out this aim, and they are using it. Our main effort must be to direct that expansion in one way or another. It was therefore very important to determine our attitudes and actions toward the Chinese. If you put up a gallant fight ending up in a Chinese victory in Korea and then go on promoting friction with them by economic sanctions, etc., we don't see where we come out. He stressed British opinion, not in terms of the wilder views appearing in the press, but the sounder judgment on the future of China. This British opinion felt that there was coincidence between Chinese and Russian views rather

than Chinese subservience to Russian views. If we could talk these things out, it might lead to real accommodation. The Secretary said this was correct, but we must also consider the effect of immediate actions on our long-range views. He did not think the United Kingdom would find there was a vast difference in our views regarding the result of the policy of friction. The first point is what is the cost in terms of our security in the island chain, which is very important. The second point is the whole attitude of approval of our current action. We have nursed them for 50 years of friendliness and now find them bitter against us. We feel that we want to see the Chinese Communists prove that they are our friends. Their enmity would in the long run hurt them more than it would us.

The significance of a cease-fire is the cessation of hostilities, a fact from which many other things grow. Under those circumstances, we could not carry hostilities against them.

It was agreed that Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Younger would make a brief Minute which the President and the Prime Minister could approve this afternoon.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

795.00/12–550

United States Delegation Minutes of the Second Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee

TOP SECRET
US Min–2

ON THE "WILLIAMSBURG"
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1950
2:45 PM–4:45 PM

PARTICIPANTS

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
The President	Prime Minister Attlee
Secretary of State Acheson	Sir Oliver Franks
Secretary of Defense Marshall	Field Marshal Sir William Slim
Secretary of Treasury Snyder	Sir Roger Makins
General Omar Bradley	Lord Tedder
Mr. W. Averell Harriman	Mr. Robert Scott
Mr. W. Stuart Symington	Mr. Denis Rickett
Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup	Sir Edwin Plowden [1]
Amb.-designate Walter S. Gifford	Mr. Kenneth Younger
Assistant Sec. of State Perkins	
Assistant Sec. of State Rusk	
Mr. George Elsey	

[1] Chairman of the Economic Planning Board.

THE PRESIDENT asked Secretary Acheson to open the meeting.

SECRETARY ACHESON said it was hoped that the President and the Prime Minister could give immediate guidance on certain steps which need to be taken in the UN. They had had some talks since the meeting adjourned yesterday afternoon and had some recommendations to submit. The purpose was to get started in the UN. They had already reached agreement on certain matters and had put in the new item on the agenda. At the same time they had circulated a rather colorless memorandum concerning the item which does not disclose the next steps we will take.[2] Agreement had been reached with representatives of the UK on two further steps. The first step was the reintroduction of the six-power resolution which was vetoed in the Security Council. The main purpose of this step was to hold the international political front. It was difficult to change our position at this stage and while the resolution is not quite responsive to the present situation it shows that we have not gone either backward or forward from our old position. The second step would be a cease-fire resolution which might perhaps be taken up in the General Assembly before the other resolution. This resolution would merely say that the shooting should stop. Further steps beyond this could not be determined until the President and the Prime Minister had finished their discussions. The two indicated steps, however, were recommended. SECRETARY ACHESON then read the specific language of the recommendations as follows:

"1. That the 6-Power Resolution vetoed in the Security Council should be filed and circulated as soon as the six powers can agree on the minor editorial changes to put it in shape for General Assembly action.

"2. If a cease-fire resolution were introduced in the General Assembly, the United States and the United Kingdom should, in principle, be prepared to support it."

THE PRIME MINISTER asked if it were possible to read the 6-power resolution in question. He thought it might need some amendments to bring it up-to-date.

Secretary Acheson then read the text of the resolution. (UNDoc S/1894)[3] He said it was true that the resolution was now out-of-date but the great trouble was in trying to get agreement on amendments. It was quite clear that it needs some editorial changes; for example,

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[2] See footnote 1 to telegram 556 to New York, December 3, 5 p. m., p. 1341. At its 74th meeting on December 5, the General Committee considered the request for the inclusion of the new agenda item on "Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea", recommended favorably to the General Assembly, and suggested it be referred to the First (Political and Security) Committee for consideration and report (see U.N. document A/1628). For the General Assembly's action, see the editorial note on the 319th meeting held on December 6 at 10:45 a. m., p. 1421.

[3] For the text, see the editorial note, p. 1126.

the Korean Commission which is urged by the resolution to proceed to Korea is already there, but if you start to change the text you either must say that the Chinese intervention is aggression which must stop at once or else you weaken the resolution which raises serious problems. There is an advantage in saying that this is the same resolution which was vetoed in the Security Council, subject to minor editorial changes. If we try to wait until we get agreement on a satisfactory new resolution, considerable delays will be involved.

SECRETARY SNYDER said the resolution was appropriate when it was introduced in the Security Council, to which SECRETARY ACHESON agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked Mr. Younger, who had just come from the General Assembly, to speak on his estimate of the situation there.

MR. YOUNGER said that if any resolution was to be introduced, he thought that Secretary Acheson was right in sticking as closely as possible to the previous text. There were a few things which should be altered. For example, the original resolution says that "Chinese Communist military units are deployed for action against the forces of the United Nations" and there were other slight changes such as the one which Secretary Acheson had mentioned. In general, however, this resolution would get support and it would serve to initiate the debate. It would fit the mood of the General Assembly for the next few days.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought this was quite so.

THE PRESIDENT said that while the debate on this resolution was going on the General Assembly itself might put in changes which would make it more desirable.

MR. YOUNGER commented that the changes might also be less desirable.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked what the view was on the timing of this step.

SECRETARY ACHESON said that as to the exact day and hour he thought we should leave this to our delegations at Lake Success. The theory is to get something to show there is no difference of counsel between the UK and the United States and no uncertainty as to what we should do. It should not be put in too soon to discourage those who are talking with the Chinese Communists. We can introduce it and then start the debate as events develop. It might perhaps be introduced tomorrow with the debate started on the next day.

THE PRIME MINISTER questioned the title of the original resolution which reads "Complaint of Aggression upon the Republic of Korea".

SECRETARY ACHESON noted the new agenda item which had just been introduced reads "Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea".

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought the suggestions made were along the right lines.

THE PRESIDENT said that this was the only procedure we can follow under the circumstances. It is necessary that we should do something.

THE PRIME MINISTER said this would be followed up with a cease-fire resolution.

SECRETARY ACHESON said that this was correct and that we would hope that someone else would put in such a resolution simply calling for a cease-fire and saying that when the Chinese stopped fighting the UN would do the same. This would be put up and passed as soon as possible. The Chinese would know in advance what we were doing so that they would not be taken by surprise. If we delay the whole problem gets complicated by the question of negotiations.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought this was right.

THE PRESIDENT repeated that this was all we could do under the circumstances and asked Mr. Younger if he had anything to add.

MR. YOUNGER said that he had really nothing to add. The Indians were the ones most likely to introduce the cease-fire resolution. They might want to put more into the resolution in terms of conditions but perhaps it would be possible to persuade them to limit it. This was not a question, however, which could be settled at the present meeting.

SECRETARY ACHESON suggested that Mr. Younger and Mr. Hickerson could settle these details.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed.

THE PRESIDENT said that if it met with the Prime Minister's approval we would proceed on that basis.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked where we would go from there.

THE PRESIDENT replied that we should hold the line in Korea if that can be done. His military advisers told him that the line was too long to be held with the forces at our disposal. However, we cannot voluntarily back out of Korea. If that is to be the result we must be forced out. He hoped that if there were a cease-fire we could hold the line. He thought that if we abandoned Korea the South Koreans would all be murdered and that we could not face that in view of the fact that they have fought bravely on our side and we have put in so much to help them. We may be subjected to bombing from Manchuria by the Russians and Chinese Communists which might destroy everything we have. He was worried about the situation. He did not like to go into a situation such as this and then to admit that we were licked. He would rather fight it to a finish. That was the way he had felt from the beginning. He would like that to be on the record. He wanted to make it perfectly plain here that we do not desert our friends when the going is rough. He thought that the Prime Minister felt the same way in his heart.

THE PRIME MINISTER said "We're in this with you and we stand together." He spoke of the participation of British forces in the common effort in Korea. He said the question of how long we can hold is a matter of military opinion.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that we must not give up voluntarily. He was still optimistic that we can hold.

THE PRIME MINISTER said this depended on whether we get a cease-fire.

THE PRESIDENT said this was correct.

THE PRIME MINISTER said we should try to get some kind of situation in which the whole matter could be carefully considered. He said that the President can understand that the UK stands in with the United States and was with them in this whole affair.

THE PRESIDENT expressed his appreciation for this very fine declaration which the Prime Minister had made.

THE PRIME MINISTER said we would have to watch how the matter goes on the question of a cease-fire but we should be clear in our minds on where we go from there if a cease-fire is accepted.

THE PRESIDENT said that then would be the time for negotiations.

THE PRIME MINISTER said this was true which brought us back to the discussion yesterday on whether we stand pat as Secretary Acheson said yesterday. He wished to ask certain questions. We had started by looking at the immediate position and have decided on the next steps in the UN. While we are partners in this matter and while our position is very important, we must remember that we are acting as members of the UN. What will the UN say next? The UN took a firm line against aggression. It is vitally important to the whole future of the UN that it should not admit any condonation of aggression but we must all admit the limits on what we can do. We were all agreed yesterday on our major strategy in that we do not wish to be bogged down in an all-out war with China.

THE PRESIDENT agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER continued. We therefore do not want to bomb the industries in Manchuria and the various centers in China. As a matter of fact the Chinese get on without large industrial centers. In this respect they are like the Huns. They can also be supplied by the Russians. He wondered whether it was agreed that we had ruled out that kind of a war.

SECRETARY ACHESON inquired whether we could go along a little further with the development of the Prime Minister's idea.

THE PRIME MINISTER recalled that Secretary Acheson said that if we had to withdraw this should be the result of our having been forced out. Should we then attempt to count our losses or would we be planning to return. He thought that we had little chance of success on

that. He also thought there was little chance of success in striking the Chinese elsewhere. Secretary Acheson had said we might be in a position in which while not at war with the Chinese we would not recognize them and would do all we could to impede them. The Prime Minister thought that if we were to do that it must be under some UN resolution which would be difficult to obtain. If one asked what the Chinese would do under these circumstances, the answer would be that they would cause all the trouble they can. If we pulled out of Korea they would certainly have their armies and could take some of them to Indochina, Malaya, or Hong Kong. One had to consider the balance of forces. He doubted if the Chinese were very vulnerable to the kind of pressure which the Secretary of State had suggested. In regard to a blockade it should be noted that the Chinese were not greatly dependent upon the West and they could hurt us more on this than we could hurt them. It would be very hard to hold our own people and UN opinion on such a policy directed more against the civilian population than against the armed forces of China. We would be led gradually into a shooting war against China or into negotiation. The suggestion which had been put forward seemed merely to hold the line without getting us anywhere. He said that he thought we should talk very frankly about these matters in this meeting.

THE PRESIDENT entirely agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER continued that their appreciation of Chinese intentions differed from those of the United States. The United States thinks that the Chinese are completely subservient to the USSR and that they are not only Communists but Stalinists. There was a great difference here. They can be Marxists and yet not bow to Stalin. He agreed that it was quite true that the Chinese are hard-shelled Marxists-Leninists but it was quite possible that they were not Soviet imperialists. There was a chance of Titoism. The case of Tito was of very great importance as Stalin himself thinks. Stalin had gone ahead with his imperialist policy believing that wherever a Communist nucleus was established they had a unit fully subservient to them. In every case where the country owed its delivery to the Soviet and not to its own efforts, as in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and other satellites, this had been true but Yugoslavia was the one case where the people claimed that they had delivered themselves. Accordingly, Tito, while remaining a communist, was not a satellite. The Russians have not given very much help to China. The Chinese do not owe them very much. There is a strong mixture of Chinese nationalism in their communist attitude. One had to recognize that the old Chinese regime had become rotten and corrupt.

THE PRESIDENT interposed to say that was true and that was what the Communists had built on.

THE PRIME MINISTER said when you have such a regime the Chinese believed that communism offered them the only alternative to the old corruption. He had discussed this situation at length with Nehru.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had also.

THE PRIME MINISTER recalled that Nehru said that the communists took advantage of economic and social conditions to appear as deliverers. They failed in Europe where the standard of living was high but in Asia they had allied themselves with nationalism. In Burma and other countries, the UK had allied itself with nationalism and those countries resisted communism. In China all of the conditions were in favor of communism. It is easy to say that China is entirely in the hands of the Russians. This is a fatalistic attitude. At least you can hope that if you back nationalism you can get Chinese imperialism opposed to Russian imperialism. Therefore, the UK had tried to drive a wedge between China and Russia. We cannot lose by trying that. We may be wrong but if so we will find it out. If we can try this without losing too much we may set up China as something independent. China had been made a great power by Franklin Roosevelt.

THE PRESIDENT agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that at the time they had not agreed thinking that China was still an inchoate mass. However, what had been theory had now been accomplished by the Chinese Communists who were emerging as a great power with a strong military force. They had faced Chinese expansionism in Malaya, in the East Indies and in Burma. All over the East the Chinese had expanded as the dominant race. To this factor was now added their military force which gives them to a large extent the leadership in Asia. They had hoped that this leadership would go to India which had absorbed so much of the West. Accordingly, they had tried to create some division between China and the USSR because opinions do change when people get some of their objectives. The Indian nationalists had waged a violent campaign against the British. The British gave them what they wanted and a very considerable change had occurred, and the Indians now recognize the values of western civilization. He had seen a very great change in the orientation of leading Indians. It is not hopeless that the Chinese are not fully imbued with Soviet ideas. They will no doubt go quite a way in the communist direction as the only alternative to a rotten regime. But Chinese civilization is very old and is accustomed to absorbing new things. They may wear the Red flag with a difference. The question was what we could do to prevent the Chinese looking to the USSR as their only friend, as a result of which they would be completely absorbed in that huge land mass. If we say

that China is just part of the USSR, we link them together and play the game of Russian imperialism. The longer we can hold out without a major war the more likely it is that people behind the Iron Curtain will object to Stalin's iron rule.

THE PRESIDENT indicated agreement with this last point.

THE PRIME MINISTER wondered whether it was wise to follow a policy which without being effective against China leaves her with Russia as her only friend. This he said represented the general line of their thinking.

THE PRESIDENT asked Secretary Acheson if he cared to comment.

SECRETARY ACHESON said that he would like to make a few comments merely for the purpose of assisting the President and the Prime Minister in building up the background. We did face a very definite fork in the road if a cease-fire is adopted in the UN. If this were accepted by the Chinese Communists, hostilities would stop. Then all of the talk of our possible military action against China would not be in point since we could not start what had been stopped. Under these circumstances, as had been stated, we would enter the period of negotiation. What kind of negotiations would these be? Negotiations on the future of Korea should not be complicated by saying that we cannot start them until we seat the Chinese Communists in the UN and deal with Formosa and similar questions. Korea must be the subject of the negotiations.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked what would come after that. He had not intended to give the impression that he favored giving all of Korea over to the Communists.

At this point MR. RUSK handed the Secretary a report of a telephone call from Mr. Ross of the United States Delegation to the United Nations which reported that all of the Asiatic states were joining in calling upon the Chinese and North Koreans to issue a statement that they would not cross the 38th parallel.[4] Sir B. N. Rau had asked Mr. Ross to ascertain whether the US and UK would object to this proposal.

SECRETARY ACHESON said that this was a matter which was of sufficient importance to interrupt the discussion and he read the message aloud.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked what Asiatic states were included.

MR. RUSK said he had been told that it included all of the Arab states and the states to the east of them.

THE PRESIDENT asked whether Turkey was included and MR. RUSK said he had no information on that point. In answer to further questions he said that he understood that both Siam and the Philippines were included.

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[4] See the memorandum by Hickerson, p. 1408.

After a brief discussion of the President with his advisers and the Prime Minister with his, THE PRESIDENT said that if this proposal were unanimously made by all the Asiatic peoples and the Chinese refused to accept it would be favorable development. He thought it would not be wrong for us to accept it.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed. He said it would revise the timetable we had been discussing. It linked up with the discussion of the cease-fire resolution but comes at an earlier point. This proposal might be followed by a proposal for a cease-fire.

THE PRESIDENT agreed.

SECRETARY ACHESON inquired whether we could say we were in favor of the suggestion.

GENERAL MARSHALL remarked that we had not been asked to say we were "in favor" of it but merely whether we saw any objection. He thought it better to phrase any comment in that way.

THE PRESIDENT and SECRETARY ACHESON agreed and said they thought we should say that we do not see any objection.

SIR OLIVER FRANKS inquired whether this proposal was made within the UN framework or outside.

MR. RUSK explained that it was being discussed by delegations to the General Assembly at Lake Success but it was not planned as a resolution to be adopted by the General Assembly. It was framed as an appeal by the delegations.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that they might decide to put it in a resolution.

MR. RUSK said that was not, at the moment, the proposed course.

SECRETARY SNYDER said it was merely a declaration.

SIR OLIVER FRANKS suggested that in transmitting word to New York it would be helpful if word could also be sent to Sir Gladwyn Jebb that the Prime Minister and the President had agreed on this point.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether this action had been taken by the delegations on their own initiative or by instruction of their governments.

SIR ROGER MAKINS thought that they would not have acted without instructions.

MR. YOUNGER said that was true of most of the delegations but some of them are free to act without instructions.

THE PRESIDENT said that he understood there was no objection to the proposal and then called on Secretary Acheson to proceed with his comments.

SECRETARY ACHESON recalled the points he was making were thoughts which had been brought out by the remarks of the Prime

Minister. He had remarked that if we got a cease-fire a period of negotiation would follow and the pattern of his thought was that such a negotiation should center on Korea. He would return later to give his reasons for this. If a cease-fire were not accepted and the fighting went on we would hold as long as we could and until we were forced out. At that point we would have to consider the possibility whether we would engage in warfare against China or would take some other action which would not be friendly but which would be hostile to China. These indicated the two general courses of possible developments. Before coming to the long-range consideration regarding China, there was one important thing which ought to be mentioned and that was the attitude of the American people. He was not referring to the short-range political activities but to things which were deeply believed by sensible people. As the President said yesterday no Administration in the United States could possibly urge the American people to take vigorous action in its foreign policy on one ocean front while on the other ocean front they seemed to be rolled back and to accept a position of isolation. The public mind was not delicate enough to understand such opposing attitudes and even if it were that difference would be wrong. We were up against a fundamental proposition: if we accepted the proposition that because an aggression is a very large one we can submit to it we have changed our attitude very deeply. This would affect our attitude toward other things. This was not a question of logic but of the very integrity of the people. In common with other members of the UN we went out after a smaller aggressor. We are now faced by a big aggessor and we have been licked in this campaign. If we face that by saying that we adjust ourselves to it it affects the whole stand of the people. In that case we must adjust ourselves to power and aggression everywhere. This was not the whole story but it was an important point to keep in mind.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether we hadn't been forced to an attitude of saying where we could stand. The rape of Czechoslovakia was carried out under legal forms. They were not prepared to go in at that time and had to sit down. When the Berlin Blockade came along we went in. Now that we are involved in a matter including major powers we have to decide where we stand.

SECRETARY ACHESON said there was, however, a great difference between "taking it" and "liking it". There are indeed limits to power and we must adjust ourselves to those limits. Returning to the Prime Minister's remarks on China, he thought that he would not find much disagreement among the President's advisers on many of the fundamental points. He pointed out that he had probably been more bloodied by announcing these views than anyone else. He had stated them in

his Press Club speech in January. The question was not whether this was a correct analysis but whether it was possible to act on it.

THE PRIME MINISTER said this was quite so. He thought we should be clear that the presence of Chiang Kai-shek adds difficult problems. The problem of Formosa would be very different were it not for him. The Chinese Communists regard him as their principal rival but the fact is that he is on Formosa.

THE PRESIDENT said that this was quite a political issue in the United States since Chiang had many converts here.

THE SECRETARY agreed that we must face the fact that Chiang was on Formosa. The question was, however, whether the Chinese would act differently in the time period which was vital to us, namely 1950 to 1954, regardless of what we do to reach a settlement. If we could act during the next four years without vitally affecting our interests then perhaps in ten or fifteen years we might see a change in the Chinese attitude but we do not have that time available. It seemed to him that the Chinese would act in the same way although it had been suggested that there would be a difference of tempo if we now give them all they asked. This might or might not be true. The question was what you have to pay and what the consequences are. If in taking a chance on the long future of China we affect the security of the United States at once, this is a bad bargain especially if our security would be affected by the influence of these steps on Japan, the Philippines and other countries. All that the Prime Minister had said was correct if we had time but we can't buy our way into this poker game; the cost of coming in is too high.

THE SECRETARY stated that he had wanted to give the President and the Prime Minister the flavor of this way of thinking and he also wanted to point out that we must link this problem with the problems of Europe. Whether there was a cease-fire or not a possible line is one not necessarily involving us in the bombing of the Chinese and similar military actions but merely stating frankly that our attitude is one of hostility. For fifty years we have tried to be friends with the Chinese. They have now attacked us with their armies and have denounced us violently. They have done great harm to the work of the fifty years. It may be a decade before the American people are ready to forget it, and to take the attitude that they will overlook this conduct just as if it were a question of the Chinese Communists not having learned to have good table manners. If the Chinese Communists take an attitude of hostility to the United States they will suffer more than we do. Instead of our making an effort to prove that we are their friends we ask them to prove that they are ours. Formosa is too dangerous a thing for them to have to play with. We must hold the

islands. We must also proceed with vigor to our armament efforts in Europe. We must settle the questions now in dispute with the French and the Germans, we must appoint the Supreme Commander and have troops in actual formation rapidly. This would provide a better chance to get our people behind the effort and to draw on the power from the United States which actually is the only source of power. It is vitally important to hold the United States in this effort as such a source. We had furnished these ideas not for the purpose of arguing with the Prime Minister but to bring out certain points.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that we could not separate our discussion from the political problems we face. Mr. Acheson had brought out the need to carry our people with us. Our interest in the Pacific is too great to desert Japan, the Philippines, Canada or Alaska and to run out on it because we have been licked in a campaign in Korea.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was very sensible to those points but he would note that it was also important to consider the UN and the importance of Asian opinion.

THE PRESIDENT said there was nothing more serious than Asian opinion.

SECRETARY ACHESON suggested that to weaken the security of the United States would be even more so.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that this was an important part of it. We want to keep Japan and the Philippines, Indonesia, India and Pakistan and all the other Asian powers. We need to hold the line in the UN. He agreed strongly concerning the European question. The best line was to keep marching together. There was, however, a danger of a deteriorating situation in the East. He did not know enough of Japanese feeling to comment upon that. He thought, however, that the Japanese might think America's real objection to meeting with the Chinese was that China was an Asiatic power and that we were not willing to treat them as an equal. Of course, we must consider political opinion in both the UK and the United States. He was frank in saying that opinion in the UK had no sympathy with Chiang Kai-shek or on the question of Formosa. The United States must consider its opinion but both the United States and the UK must act as members of the UN.

SIR OLIVER FRANKS said he thought a good deal had been agreed upon in connection with plans in the UN. If a cease-fire is suggested without strings, we like it. If there is no cease-fire we don't wish to contemplate a voluntary withdrawal from Korea and allowing for our very different roles in Korea, the UK wanted to go along with the United States and therefore their units help to carry out the task. If resistance can be continued in Korea we may get to the negotiating

stage later. If the cease-fire were not accepted there would be no chance for negotiations. The Chinese troops, by sheer force of numbers, may compel an honorable withdrawal. We would not then be giving away. Then the UN and the United States which had suffered most would have done all they could for Korea even though that was not enough. The UN would have failed with honor. It had been said yesterday and elaborated by Secretary Acheson that we should follow up our attitude against aggression with determination to defend Korea as long as we could. We should maintain our attitude against aggression in the face of the greater aggression. In that connection, it had been suggested we should think of economic sanctions and aiding movements in China which might break down the Chinese Communist Government. For his part he was undecided and not convinced now that that attitude and that course of action was in the best interest of all of us. He did not see how even if we were both agreed on this course we could get much UN support. If there is little support in the UN, it is a ground for questioning this policy. It would be hard to go ahead without UN sanction. It would not be easy to bring damage to China quickly. On the other hand, considerable and rapid damage could be done to the UK in Hong Kong and Malaya. Would not the proposed course tend to provoke the Chinese to see what they could do against us in those places. It would increase the tempo of their action and he wondered whether we wished to do this. This made him, and he thought the Prime Minister, doubt whether the policy suggested by Secretary Acheson was the right one to follow. He thought this should be clarified in these discussions. He wished to return to the question of negotiations if there were a cease-fire or if continuing resistance proves to be possible in Korea without a cease-fire. He understood some of the American public opinion which had been referred to and had no comment to make on that. On the question whether or not Formosa should be involved in any negotiation, if he thought that this involved a stride on the slippery slope, he did not want to do that. Another question was Chinese Communist membership in the UN. This would probably come up in any negotiation on the Korean question and many Asiatics would support them. The United Kingdom had followed that position and was not changing it. They might be wrong but the point was bound to arise in any negotiation. He hoped that all views on this question would be brought out.

THE PRIME MINISTER noted that these questions were already on the table in the UN.

MR. YOUNGER said that both the question of seating the Chinese Communists and the question of Formosa were on the agenda but were in a quiescent state.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that accordingly, this would not be entering a new negotiation but going on with an old one. He wondered whether we should not continue to discuss the question of seating the Chinese Communists in the UN.

SECRETARY ACHESON said this was connected with the previous discussion. He did not say very much about it but hoped to provoke General Marshall to speak. He thought that Sir Oliver Franks had very forcibly raised the question of what we did do against the Chinese. He didn't think it was possible to know at this point. One aspect of the present situation was that any one who put up an idea subjected himself to powerful attack. It was hard to suggest any position which could not be successfully attacked. He agreed there might be great trouble in bombing China. This might lead to a chain of circumstances which had to be carefully considered. The question was not so much the ends of a policy but whether you start by accepting the results of aggression and say to the aggressors that they had licked us and can collect their price. Would we go on and say that we are friendly to the aggressors, that we want to trade with them and seat them in the UN? The proposal had that flavor. If there is a cease-fire and a negotiation, the approach should be that we would negotiate on the future of Korea. If the Chinese were intransigent on this point, he hoped that no one would be favorable to seat them in the UN.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that this certainly would not be good from the point of view of maintaining our position in American opinion.

SECRETARY ACHESON added that it was not so much the unreasonable political attacks in the United States—the President has successfully bucked that kind of attack, but it was a body of sound opinion on this question to which he had already referred.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that with the failure of the campaign in Korea, with the attitude of the Chinese in their triumph and with what goes on behind the scenes, we are greatly weakened if Formosa goes to them. As a military matter only, with Japan to the north and the Philippines and Indonesia, the problem which would confront us would be the driving of a wedge in among these island defenses. They could make it awkward for us and we could be greatly weakened.

GENERAL BRADLEY added that when we started in Korea we had felt we must draw the line somewhere. We may fail in Korea but if so, we must draw the line on Formosa. People could not understand why we changed so much if we yielded entirely.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that we must look at Formosa as a wedge. We would be taking a step to liquidate our position in the Pacific if we surrendered it. It is hard enough any way to settle the

Japanese question. From the military point of view it was very dangerous to give up Formosa. There were other dangers in Indochina, Malaya, and Hong Kong, but if we split the island chain that would really be serious.

General Bradley added the loss of Formosa would cut our line of communication. Planes which now fly directly from the Philippines to Okinawa would have to detour and would not have the range. The holding of Formosa by the enemy would also supply him with submarine bases and increase the range of their aircraft.

The Prime Minister said these were sound military points but that as a military matter it was not in accord with the Cairo Declaration in which we said that Formosa belongs to China.

Secretary Acheson said this was more of a problem for the UK than for the United States. The United States says it does belong to China and that the Chinese actually have it and are in possession of it. He recalled that the Cairo Declaration also talked about Korea. The Russians and the Chinese were violating the Cairo undertakings about Korea. In effect, they were saying that all their promises mean nothing but that we must give full performance on ours. He recalled that the doctrine of failure of consideration was an old legal proposition. At Cairo we had been talking about another Chinese Government not one equipped with Soviet planes and pilots. This is a very different situation.

Mr. Scott inquired whether it would be possible to separate Formosa from the question of the recognition of Chiang Kai-shek. The arguments on the military aspect of Formosa seemed to him to be very strong ones but Chiang was a definite provocation.

Secretary Acheson said it would be helpful to explore this point and wondered if General Marshall would speak since he was the expert on Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. Scott said in settling the Korean question we must settle the matter of the Chinese seat in the UN which requires a change in our attitude toward Chiang. At the same time it might be possible to safeguard Formosa. That question could be separated from the recognition of the government.

General Marshall said that from his knowledge he could say that it would be difficult to find a replacement for Chiang with his stature as a leader. It had been brutally evident that there was no aggressive leadership aside from him in his own or in independent parties, except perhaps for Mao Tse-Tung, who was then in the hills. He was now out of touch with the situation but the question depended on who would step into Chiang's place and fill his role vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists. General Marshall had held Chiang free from personal cor-

ruption but his followers and party were corrupt. Chiang was well-intentioned and was not personally getting rich but was the victim of his associates with whom he would not or could not break. It might be that the Prime Minister thought that no replacement was needed but then what would happen on Formosa.

MR. SCOTT suggested that it might be put on ice with a UN Commission.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that might be all right if you could do it but there would be heavy pressure against you.

SECRETARY ACHESON recalled that we had hoped that the Formosan question could be carried on in the UN but no UN Commission could defend Formosa against the Chinese Communists, only naval and air force could keep them out. There would not only be no right but a positive wrong in doing this. We would be merely going through a form and then letting them take it. He wondered whether the suggestion had been to leave Chiang on the island as a local leader or to take him off.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that a UN Commission on the island could hold it until the Chinese Communists behave.

SECRETARY SNYDER inquired whether he meant a UN Trusteeship.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had in mind something like that.

THE PRESIDENT said this was worth considering.

SECRETARY SNYDER said this pre-supposed that Chiang would cooperate.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether he would not have to do what he was told.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that the conversations had been most interesting and constructive. He hoped they would continue. He had to attend a Cabinet meeting at 5 : 00 and if it were agreeable they would adjourn until 11 : 30 the next morning and seek to reach agreement on the matters which had been talked about.

SECRETARY ACHESON said there was one matter which he wished to mention before they adjourned. The French Cabinet was to meet tomorrow morning. A proposal had been made that he should write a letter to Schuman explaining our attitudes on the French proposal.[5] The UK had not been sympathetic with this but in our view something must be done to move the matter along. He was sure that the Prime Minister would want to communicate with London on the suggestion and wondered if it would be satisfactory for us to continue talks with Sir Oliver Franks.

THE PRIME MINISTER and THE PRESIDENT agreed.

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[5] Related documentation is scheduled for publication in volume III.

SIR OLIVER FRANKS said that the matter was urgent and that they would need to send a cable to Mr. Bevin.

SIR ROGER MAKINS said that only last Monday, Mr. Bevin had spoken in Parliament and there was a very marked difference of opinion in what he had said and in the proposed line. He thought some discussion would be useful. The French position had changed in the last few days. On Saturday they had favored a proposal for a High Commissioner as an alternative to a European Defense Minister but now they had swung back to the latter alternative and were asking US blessing on that.

SECRETARY ACHESON said that any solution to move forward was better than doing nothing.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought that something could be done. He then read a proposed press statement which was approved by the Prime Minister:

"The President and the Prime Minister held their second meeting this afternoon on board the *Williamsburg*. They resumed their discussion of the situation in Korea and of steps to be taken to meet it.

"There will be a further meeting of the President and the Prime Minister at 11:30 tomorrow, Wednesday morning, at the White House."

795.00/12–550

Memorandum for the Files by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 5, 1950.

At about 3:15 this afternoon Mr. John Ross of the United States Delegation called and informed me as follows:

"Sir B. N. Rau has just handed to me the following declaration which he said the Asiatic States, with the exception of Israel, are thinking of putting out this evening as a public statement:

'On behalf of the following Delegations to the United Nations, we consider it our duty at this critical hour earnestly to appeal to the North Korean authorities and the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China immediately to declare that it is not their intention that any of their forces should cross to the south of the 38th parallel. Such a declaration will give time for considering what further steps are necessary to resolve the conflict in the Far East and will thus help to avert the catastrophe of another world war.'

Sir B. N. Rau said that the Asiatic States concerned are meeting again at six o'clock this afternoon. They would like very much to find out from us, as well as others immediately concerned (he mentioned the UK in particular), whether from our point of view we saw any objection to the issuance of this resolution by the Asiatic States. He said that an objection to this statement on our part might be the fear that it would imply that UN forces would have no business north of the 38th parallel."

I called the White House operator immediately and asked to speak either to Mr. Jessup or Mr. Rusk, who are now in the meeting on the *Williamsburg*. Mr. Rusk came to the telephone and I read this statement to him. He took down textually the proposed public declaration quoted above. I said that, in my opinion, we should state that we have no objection to the issuance of this statement. Mr. Rusk said that he would take this up with the meeting and call me back as soon as possible.

While I was waiting for a reply, Mr. Ross dictated the following further statement:

"General Romulo has just approached me with regard to the proposed Asiatic Declaration. Romulo gave me the following views which he has cabled to Quirino:

1. The Declaration affords the means of extricating UN forces, particularly American, from a desperate situation in Korea with a minimum loss of lives and face.
2. It makes possible establishment of a line which our UN troops can reorganize to man and hold there which many believe they cannot now set up otherwise.
3. It gives us a respite for negotiations.

Romulo said that the Asiatic group which met to consider the draft declaration at noon today at Rau's apartment all felt that the declaration should be issued as fast as possible. Many thought it should have been issued immediately after this noon meeting. Romulo insisted, and others backed him up, that the declaration should not be issued before we had a chance to comment."

At 3:50 p. m. this afternoon Mr. Rusk called me from the *Williamsburg* and said that I was authorized to inform Rau as follows:

"We have no objection to the issuance of this declaration."

Mr. Rusk asked that I put through a call for Mr. Kenneth Younger over our tie-line to the British Delegation in New York. Mr. Rusk asked whether we had a complete list of the States who would be parties to this and I replied that we do not but that Rau said it included all the Asiatic States with the exception of Israel. He asked if I knew who took the leadership in this. I said that Mr. Ross did not know but that the meeting took place in Rau's apartment and we assumed that it was Rau who had taken the initiative in this matter. Mr. Rusk asked if Turkey was associated with the declaration and I replied that we did not know.

At 4 p. m. I got Mr. Ross on the telephone and told him to inform Sir Benegal Rau immediately as follows:

"We have no objection to the issuance of this declaration."

I asked Ross whether he knew whether Turkey was associated with the declaration and he replied that he did not. He said that Romulo said there were fifteen States represented. I asked him if he could discreetly find out the names of all the States and he said he would. I asked him if Egypt was included and he said that he knew that Egypt was.

At 4:05 p. m. I called Mr. Rusk on the *Williamsburg* and told him that I had instructed Mr. Ross to give the statement recited above to Sir Benegal Rau.

I gave Mr. Rusk the information recited in the preceding paragraphs about the States involved.[1]

JOHN D. HICKERSON

[1] The 13 nations issuing the appeal on December 5 were: Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.

795.00/12–650

Memorandum by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, of a Meeting Held on December 5, 1950

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1950.

In a meeting yesterday afternoon following the meeting with Mr. Attlee, the Secretary, Mr. Jessup, Mr. Rusk, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Nitze and Mr. Perkins discussed several matters that were involved in the meetings with Mr. Attlee. Most of the discussion was general, vague and without conclusion.

At the close of discussion, however, the Secretary asked for a study which Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Rusk agreed to do with the assistance of their people.[1] The Secretary said that we must do some very careful thinking about the position we are in with the British in regard to Korea. He said we talked to the British about two lines of action. First, we take up the cease fire and if the Chinese Communists agree to that, we stop the shooting and begin to talk about Korea and the UN. What about the six power resolution? Does it make sense to continue or should we start negotiation on the issues behind the scenes? The Chinese Communists say they want to discuss the problem but only in the Security Council and only if they are in the Security Council. What is our attitude on that? Do we say that we won't be hammered into seating them? Should we set up a meeting

[1] See the annex to the memorandum of conversation by Jessup, December 7, p. 1439.

with the same people in the Security Council and with the veto and conduct them in that form?

If the British do not agree and say they will vote to seat the Chinese Communists, what then? Do we walk out or do we still talk? It is foolish to say any decision will be reached in the Security Council with the television going and the whole world listening.

What kind of settlement do we envisage? Do we accept something which is roughly comparable to the present situation in Korea, agree on some sort of front government with the North Koreans running it?

If we get some settlement, do we let the Chinese Communists bring it into the UN, if they are seated, and get UN blessing on it?

With regard to Formosa, the Chinese Communists say that it must be part of the deal. We will not agree. What about Security Council action on it? (At this point, Mr. Jessup suggested that we might go back to the old plan of putting it in the General Assembly. Mr. Rusk said that if the Chinese Communists try to tie in Formosa, we might tie in Indochina, Tibet.)

The Secretary continued by saying that whatever the settlement is, should we let it go through? This is on the theory that we had a cease fire, were still in Korea, and that there was a settlement. Also, on the assumption that we have to get out of Korea. Do we at that time try to block a settlement, or don't we?

What if at some point the Chinese Communists say they have had enough of the cease fire, if it is ever agreed to, and declare the cease fire over? What do we do then?

These are all things which we should think out. The Secretary said that we spoke of there being two roads, one based on the principle of negotiation, and the other on the principle of evacuation. He said that perhaps, in reality, there was only one road or that they both led the same direction.

L. D. B[ATTLE]

795b.5/12–550

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 5, 1950.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In light of recent developments in Korea, the Department of State has reviewed once again the prospects for obtaining additional ground force contingents from other United Nations members for service in Korea.

Apart from those countries which are already represented by units in the field, or for whom firm plans of which you are aware have been concluded, there appear to be very few further prospects. Discussions with several of the Latin American countries are, as you know, continuing and it is possible that a few additional units in the months to come may be available from that area. I doubt that at the present moment any pressures in Latin America beyond those already contemplated would accelerate desired results.

The Department is prepared, if you concur, to make another effort to obtain a Pakistani unit, although I am not hopeful as to the possibilities of success. The Department is also fully prepared to assist in any way, upon request of the Department of Defense, to secure the agreement of the Greek and Canadian governments to raise their contingents to the size originally contemplated.

There would remain then the possible desirability of requesting the governments of certain countries, such as Australia, Great Britain, Belgium, The Netherlands and Turkey, which have already placed small units in the field, to increase the size of their commitment. France has not been included in this list in view of the fact that French commitments in Indo-China make it undesirable in our view to ask France to divert forces for service in Korea at this time.

I realize that any effort in this direction requires a consideration of military resources and commitments on the broadest scale. It is also possible that the Filipinos and Thais could be persuaded to increase their units to the larger number which was originally offered.

As you know, reconsideration of the Chinese Nationalist offer is already under way.

If upon a review of this matter it is the judgment of the Department of Defense that an effort along these lines should be made, the Department of State will of course be ready to take any necessary action. Meanwhile, and unless I hear from you to the contrary, the Department will continue along existing lines. In general, it would appear to me that the most promising possibility for developing further units lies in the direction of the training and equipping of additional Republic of Korea forces.

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

320/12–550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 5, 1950—5 p. m.

Gadel 157. When item of Chi intervention in Korea is included in GA agenda, question may arise as to applicability of Art 12 of Charter.[1] Dept's views on this question fol.

1. SC is currently seized of agenda item "Complaint of Aggression Upon ROK". SC has, within meaning of Art 12, exercised and continues to exercise its functions with respect to this problem; adoption of resolutions of June 25 and 27 and extended subsequent consideration makes this clear. SC has also examined question of Chi intervention in Korea, particularly when it considered 6-power res vetoed by Sov. It can be argued however that in respect to this phase of Kor problem, SC is not exercising its functions because it was prevented from doing so by Sov veto of 6-power res. Accordingly, there is reasonable constitutional validity to conclusion that Art 12 imposes no limitation on GA recommendations as to Chi intervention because SC in fact is not exercising its functions in respect thereto. Dept wld not however wish to rely exclusively on this conclusion if other friendly UN Members believe it legally unsound or otherwise tactically undesirable.

2. At same time we do not wish remove from list SC seized items agenda question of Complaint of Aggression Upon ROK. Removal of this entire question wld raise doubt as to legality of continued UN operations under SC resolutions of June 25 and 27 and wld make it difficult without protracted debate to get item back on agenda in present form in event further SC action desirable.

3. Therefore, if it is later decided that Art 12 requires some action by SC before GA can make recommendations, that action shld be confined to procedural decision in appropriate forum that SC is not dealing with that aspect of Kor case relating to Chi intervention.

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[1] The text of Article 12 reads as follows:

"1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

"2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters."

4. Under present circumstances Dept believes SC meeting for this type action undesirable unless it becomes clear that it is tactically necessary. Certainly there shld be no SC meeting to effect partial removal until after debate has commenced in GA. Meeting of SC at this time wld open door to propaganda speeches and delaying tactics by Russians. Public attention wld be focused on SC meeting in a way that wld be most undesirable. Public wld not understand that sole purpose of meeting was to take procedural step made necessary only by technicalities of Charter. Furthermore, Sov might reverse its position that only procedural vote was necessary and get Council in parliamentary snarl by attempting to use double veto. With China in Pres chair, we cld not be assured that procedures to neutralize double veto wld be properly carried through.

5. As a result of conversations with UK in Washington today it was agreed that both US and UK would make efforts to persuade other dels that SC action not necessary under Art 12 and in any event SC shld not meet for that purpose until just before GA ready to make recommendation.

ACHESON

795B.00/12–550

Memorandum of Conversation, Dictated by the United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) From New York

SECRET DECEMBER 5, 1950—5:35 p. m.

Trygve Lie just informed me that yesterday at 12 noon Siroky[1] visited Lie and discussed the Korean situation. Siroky told Lie, in response to Lie's question concerning the intention of the Communists in Korea, that they "wanted peace". Lie asked him what he meant by this. Siroky replied that he meant what they have been saying all along, that is, that foreign troops should get out of Korea. Lie said that he assumed that under any circumstances it would be necessary to have a cease-fire and to have that as soon as possible. Siroky said that he did not think that was excluded. Lie pressed Siroky concerning his idea of withdrawal of foreign troops, asking whether he meant also Chinese troops. Siroky said "of course". Lie asked whether he meant withdrawal of foreign troops from all of Korea or merely from North Korea. Siroky replied that he was referring to the "status quo". Lie asked him what he meant by this and he replied "as of June 25". However, he said that in any event foreign troops would have to be

[1] Viliam Siroky, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, head the Czechoslovak Delegation to the 5th Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

withdrawn from all of Korea. Lie said that Siroky used the expression "status quo" several times during the conversation.

Lie did not get into a discussion with Siroky regarding details. Lie told me that he pointed out to Siroky that this was a very important matter that they were discussing and that he, Lie, wanted to know if Siroky was reflecting Vishinsky's views. Siroky replied that he was not speaking for Vishinsky but indicated to Lie that these were undoubtedly Vishinsky's views.

320/12–550 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 5, 1950—9 : 44 p. m.
[Received December 5—10 : 22 p. m.]

Delga 378. Chinese Communists: Following is account given by Sharett to Ross of conversations with Chiao at Trygve Lie dinner last night. Sharett had no conversation at all with Wu other than very brief exchange of amenities.

Sitting next to Sharett at dinner, Chiao said that a Chinese "student" en route through Israel had, without official status or authority, expressed opinion to someone in Israeli FonOff that Israel and Chinese Communist Government should exchange diplomatic representatives. Apparently naive and uninformed on question, Chiao asked Sharett who should take first step in exchange of representatives. Sharett replied question very simple so far as Israel concerned. They wanted peaceful relations with China. Their relations with China not very extensive. They did not know whether it would be necessary for them to maintain a representative in Peiping full time. They had thought they might accredit their man in Moscow to China and he might visit Peiping perhaps once a year. Said to Chiao Peiping might wish to consider some similar arrangement but of course Israeli Government would be glad to receive a Chinese Communist representative.

Sharett then suggested perhaps first step might usefully be exchange of visits by representatives the two countries. Chiao observed that might be very good idea. Sharett went on to say that even this step would of course seem to depend on peace. He then stressed that for a new country like Israel, preoccupied with reconstruction and development, peace was essential. Chiao observed that Communist China was in same situation as Israel. They too were preoccupied with their problems of reconstruction and development and wanted peace so that they could give their full attention to these tasks.

Sharett said that the principal conversation of the evening took place after dinner from about 9:30 to 10:30. This discussion took place in a group consisting of Chiao, Sharett, Lie, Zafrullah and Jebb. It was a close-knit group, uninterrupted by others. Wu spent the evening after dinner in a larger group with Mrs. Lie, the Lies' daughter, the woman member of the Communist delegation, Grafstrom, et cetera.

Sharett, according to his account, took the lead in the after dinner conversation with Chiao by asking Chiao how the Korean question could be solved. Chiao replied that question could be solved only by withdrawal foreign forces from Korea. Asked how he defined foreign forces, Chiao defined them as American. Sharett, assisted by Jebb, insisted that forces in Korea were UN forces. This apparently made little impression upon Chiao. Jebb asked Chiao whether the Chinese Communist forces in Korea were not foreign forces. This question evoked no reaction from Chiao.

Sharett observed that if all foreign forces were withdrawn from Korea the result would clearly be war in Korea. Chiao apparently shrugged this off, saying in effect "So what—it would be a civil war". Sharett then apparently took strong line that UN could not wash its hands of Korea, that UN was in Korea for legitimate purposes.

Chiao argued that if principle of UN intervention in Korea were admitted, then on same analogy one might argue that UN could have intervened in Chinese civil war in support of Chiang. Sharett apparently argued that the analogy did not apply, that the civil war in China, while a matter of importance in international affairs, did not directly involve international equilibrium. Sharett took line that although situation might seem paradoxical to Chiao, he and his government would simply have to learn to face political facts and reality. One political fact was that Korea is part of the world equilibrium. That equilibrium has been upset and peace cannot be restored until the equilibrium is restored.

Chiao then took off on line extreme bitterness Chinese people against US for supporting Chiang against Chinese people's struggle for freedom.

Sharett, assisted by Jebb, responded with analogy extreme bitterness various times between British and Jews but that real statesmen both sides maintained position that one great people could not hate another great people and hope to survive, that bridges for ultimate agreement must not be destroyed if either people hoped to survive.

Sharett then apparently went on to appeal Chinese Communist self-interest. He referred to China's orientation to the sea. He said he

could not envisage Chinese wishing to become landlocked power. He referred to the great naval (maritime) power of the US which had the capability of forcing China to become landlocked power. He referred in this connection to the great potential strength of US, industrially and otherwise.

To this line Chiao responded that the Chinese people were Asians seeking their freedom and they wanted no interference from outside world. He said that relations had not been broken with American people. He said that Chinese people were still trading with American people. He said that apparently their actions had not created bitterness against China among all Americans, referring in this connection naively, Sharett thought, to the flowers which had been sent to them upon their arrival. He also said, referring to the Seventh Fleet, that US was already blockading China.

On last comment Jebb and Lie asked Chiao if the Chinese Communists did not realize that the presence of Seventh Fleet was as much a protection for the mainland as it was for Formosa. Chiao responded that to say this was simply to repeat the lies of the American ruling clique. At this point there was what Sharett described as a "sociological" discussion of just what the term American ruling clique meant.

Jebb inquired if Chiao did not realize that if the Seventh Fleet were withdrawn a new area in the Far East would be plunged into bloody war. There was no reaction from Chiao to this question.

Jebb, Lie and Sharett raised the question of a cease-fire, a gradual withdrawal of forces on both sides and full use of the Peace Observation Commission. Chiao professed not to know what the POC was and this was explained to him fully. Sharett said there were no reactions from Chiao to any of foregoing three points, singly or in combination. Sharett said Chiao's attitude was "exploratory". He asked a good many questions.

At one point in the discussion question of Chinese representation arose and Chiao indicated very definitely that they wanted to be in UN.

Chiao apparently in this connection referred to six-power telegram to Lie requesting that item of intervention be put on agenda. Sharett said Chiao seemed to be very happy about the use in this telegram of title of Chinese Communist Government. He made some observation to effect that at last those people (Sharett thought he meant the people in Washington) are beginning to talk sense.

AUSTIN

611.00/12–550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, December 5, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received December 5, 1950—10:57 p. m.]

1400. 1. I talked to Nehru for perhaps half hour. He was courteous and apparently received what I had to say in friendly spirit. I told him that as result bitter experience US Government and people had become convinced during course last war that only way to prevent fresh world wars would be for all peaceful peoples to make it clear that they would unite to oppose aggression anywhere from any source; therefore since last war principle of collective security had become almost article religious faith for American people. It was to discourage aggression—not to advance any selfish US interest—that US had played so prominent role in opposing aggression in Korea. In interest maintenance world peace US had expended blood and treasure and had assumed great risks in Korea. Now much that had been accomplished was being undone as result of new massive aggression which was placing great strain on UN forces, backbone of which was elements from US armed forces. US people did not want another war. In particular they did not desire fight Chinese people with whom they were historically friendly. US Government and military leaders had been and were leaning over backward to prevent extension of hostilities beyond Korea. What US had done in Korea had been in pursuance of decisions of UN. US continued to act in framework of UN. Nevertheless in this hour of crisis and anxiety many voices condemning US and US leaders for events in Korea were being heard in various parts of world. In some countries which US considered as most friendly various individuals and newspapers instead of giving words encouragement were criticizing US, not the aggressors. Unfortunately even in India with which US had uniformly maintained friendly relations and which was also committed to oppose aggression there were loud criticisms of US and practically no criticism of Communist China in spite fact US was supporting and Communist China opposing by force execution decisions of UN. Tomorrow there would be debate in GOI Parliament on foreign affairs. What was said in this debate would be important.

Would substance debate be of comfort to, and encourage, forces of aggression? Would debaters under leadership Congress Party concentrate on criticizing US for not following Far East policy to India's liking and overlook fact that Communist China with Soviet backing was openly attacking forces of UN? I deeply hoped Prime Minister with all of his great influence would do what he could to prevent debate from following such trends.

2. Nehru maintained he was exerting his full influence to prevent debate from degenerating into series of blame-casting speeches. Situation was so grave nothing could be gained at this late date by looking for scapegoats for mistakes of past. He could not of course be responsible for all that various debaters might say but he hoped for display of temperance and restraint.

3. Prime Minister said he was sorely troubled as to what could best be done to prevent onrush of war. It was true that collective opposition to aggression seemed in long run most effective deterrent to war. But when house was on fire efforts for moment must be concentrated on extinguishing fire rather than on applying fire preventative methods. Fire was blazing in Korea. Problem was how to put it out. UN, he regretted to say, did not seem to offer much hope in this respect in present circumstances. He thought that only hope was across the table talks between powers most immediately concerned such as US, UK, USSR and Communist China—latter must be included because it was party to hostilities. First cease fire, then talks on subjects which had become inextricably interrelated—Formosa, entry of Communist China into UN, and settlement of Korean problem. Perhaps it was already too late for talks of this kind; perhaps war was inevitable and all that was left was for each power to get in or keep out of war as gracefully as possible. If single great power should be convinced that war was inevitable and should base its actions on that conviction war was of course inevitable. He had some concern lest Communist China had already decided that war was inevitable and therefore could not be deflected from its course.

4. Nehru said that he had sent some of his views re situation to US through Attlee and direct to Mme Pandit. I told him that I was sure that his views which were always welcomed by my government would be given careful consideration.

HENDERSON

795.00/12–550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET BELGRADE, December 5, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received December 5—11 : 14 p. m.]

628. Department's circular 221, December 1. Kardelj assured me today that Bebler has been instructed to seek passage by GA of resolution re Chinese intervention in Korea which was vetoed in SC.

Kardelj expressed hope that honorable solution to Korean situation could be found which would prevent extension of hostilities, but

he said he had received no intimation that Chinese Communists had become reasonable or that Rau–Wu conversations would be successful.

In response to my question, Kardelj said he attributed Chinese intervention in Korea primarily to expansionist tendency of Peiping regime and to desire of that regime to detract Chinese attention from internal difficulties. He thinks intervention, while supported by USSR, was primarily at Peiping's initiative. He suspects Chinese may have gone into Korea in larger force than Moscow wanted.

Kardelj expressed concern that if China should win in Korea, USSR might be encouraged to seek "compensating victory" in Europe.

I commented that American people were not accustomed to give up, once we had started, and that we were determined that UN, which we supported with much enthusiasm, should not lose its first fight. Kardelj expressed appreciation for this American characteristic but said that as a European, he only hoped we would not allow ourselves to get into situation where we were compelled to give disproportionate attention to Far East. He expressed confidence that you and President Truman were doing everything possible to avoid war with China and hoped, for Europe's sake, you would succeed.

Repeated info Paris 91.

ALLEN

795B.00/12–650 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Diplomatic and Consular Offices

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 6, 1950—8:25 a. m.

ALLEGED ATROCITIES BY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

In view of certain widespread criticisms of the Government of the Republic of Korea and the alleged ill treatment of collaborators and communists apprehended by Republic of Korea authorities, the following précis on the subject is forwarded for the information and guidance of your mission. The information is based on Seoul telegrams Nos. 251, October 13; 317, October 31; 333, November 4; 366, November 11; and 397, November 17;[1] but source should in no way be cited. Following information is unclassified.

In general, observers have been impressed by the reasonable attitude and restraint of officials of the Republic of Korea toward persons suspected of aiding the Communist authorities during the occupation. Newspaper articles to any other effect have usually been based on

[1] For the text of telegram 333, November 4, see p. 1043; the other telegrams are not printed.

spot observations and some have been written by inexperienced, biased or apparently highly emotional reporters.

In support of statement that Republic of Korea agencies have shown generally commendable restraint it should be pointed out that, of approximately ten thousand arrestees who were investigated, about half were released for lack of legal evidence. Also, persons were arrested not for "collaboration" but for the violation of the specific terms of the National Security Law and other statutes, particularly those dealing with the conspiracy to overthrow the state by force of arms, murder or sabotage. Most arrestees have been delivered to civil rather than to military courts. Attention is also drawn to the fact that enemy prisoners of war captured by Republic of Korea forces have been treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. The excellence of this treatment has been attested by International Red Cross Representatives in Korea.

The Government organs of the Republic of Korea have consistently urged moderation in the treatment of collaborators. President Rhee himself has publicly advocated forgiveness of enemies and "small fry" among communists. The Director of the Seoul Police Bureau and the Republic of Korea Home Minister have made statements that mistreatment of suspected collaborators not only would not be tolerated but would be summarily punished. The Korean National Assembly passed two bills setting up an 11-man commission to review collaboration cases and prohibiting search, questioning, apprehension, and punishment of suspected collaborators except by due process of law.

The steps taken by the Republic of Korea in regard to Communist collaboration should be contrasted with the activities of the Communist invaders and their wanton disregard of every civilized standard of behavior. It should be borne in mind that many of Korea's principal cities have been largely destroyed by departing Communist arsonists. Moreover, more than ten thousand civilians disappeared from Seoul after the occupation and countless more were murdered. The Communist atrocities have been summarized by a preliminary report by the United Nations Commission's report which stated: "The Commission condemns the complete disregard by the North Korean authorities of civilized standards of behavior as well as of the principle of the Geneva Conventions despite assurances to the contrary."

ACHESON

Editorial Note

The United Nations General Assembly met on December 6 from 10:45 a. m. to 12:30 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document A/

PV.319. At the meeting, the Assembly accepted by a vote of 51 to 5, with 4 abstentions, the recommendation of the General Committee for inclusion of an agenda item on the question of intervention by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea, which item was to be referred to the First (Political and Security) Committee for consideration and report.

On the same day, the Delegations of Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States submitted to the First Committee the draft joint resolution printed below (A/C.1/638).

"*The General Assembly*,

"*Recalling* the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 25 June 1950, determining that the North Korean forces had committed a breach of the peace, and calling upon all Members of the United Nations to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities,

"*Recalling* the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 October 1950, which sets forth the policies of the United Nations in respect to Korea,

"*Noting* that armed forces of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China are conducting military operations against the United Nations forces in Korea,

"*Reaffirming* that United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives of stability throughout Korea and the establishment of a unified independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea, as set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly dated 7 October 1950,

"*Insistent* that no action be taken which might lead to the spread of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further endanger international peace and security,

"*Calls upon* all States and authorities, and in particular those responsible for the action noted above, to refrain from assisting or encouraging the North Korean authorities, to prevent their nationals or individuals or units of their armed forces from giving assistance to North Korean forces and to cause the immediate withdrawal of any such nationals, individuals, or units which may presently be in Korea;

"*Affirms* that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone;

"*Calls attention* to the grave danger which continued intervention by Chinese forces in Korea would entail for the maintenance of such a policy;

"*Requests* the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to consider urgently and to assist in the settlement of any problems relating to conditions on the Korean frontier in which States or authorities on the other side of the frontier have an interest."

795.00/12–650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1950.

Subject: Latest developments in Korea.

Participants: Ambassador Chang, Korean Embassy
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge Korean Affairs

Ambassador Chang called on Mr. Rusk at 11 o'clock this morning by prior appointment. Mr. Rusk briefly reviewed the military situation in Korea as it had developed in the last 24 hours, adding that the U.S. and Great Britain were determined to back up UN forces now fighting in Korea. He also called the attention of the Ambassador to the fact that General Bradley's statement of yesterday, concerning a withdrawal from Korea, had referred only to the evacuation of the 10th Corps and other troops from the northeast coast, and that General Collins had reported that the 8th Army was now in a position to look after itself.

Mr. Rusk then referred to the statement issued yesterday at New York by the delegations of the 13 Arabic and other middle eastern countries which called upon the Chinese Communists to halt at the 38th parallel, and read the Ambassador the text of the statement.[1] The Ambassador emphasized that he and his Government were completely opposed to any arrangement with respect to Korea, such as that proposed, which would leave Korea disunited and render the Republic open to further armed attacks from the north. He added that the Koreans would rather die fighting than to sacrifice their principles and their freedom to Communism.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that the statement would have the obvious advantage of tending politically to separate the Chinese Communists from the rest of Asia if the proposal that they halt at the 38th parallel were not accepted by the Chinese. He stressed that the Koreans in the foreseeable future would continually be faced with the menace of Communist aggression from China and the Soviet Union, no matter what line might be drawn, and pointed out that the proposal, if accepted, would for the moment at least save south Korea, the only alternative to which might be the complete and immediate occupation

[1] See the memorandum by Hickerson, December 5, p. 1408.

of the whole country by the Chinese Communists, in which case all would be lost. Mr. Rusk also said that a halt at the 38th parallel would give the United Nations and ROK forces a chance to regroup and to strengthen themselves and emphasized that if this happened the ROK and Korean people would have to expend every possible effort to build up a strong defense for the future. He hoped that the Ambassador and the ROK would make no comment upon the 13-power proposal until sufficient time had been given to see whether or not the Chinese Communists were disposed to accept it and to halt their offensive and that this was of great importance.

Dr. Chang stated that he had received new instructions from President Rhee to put off his departure from the U.S. for several weeks and until the situation in Korea had become more clarified.

Mr. Rusk then remarked that he was very much disturbed by a report from Seoul concerning certain unfortunate remarks reportedly made by Chang Taek Sang upon his return to Korea relative to a conversation that he had had with Mr. Rusk, at which Ambassador Chang had been present. Mr. Rusk added that these remarks were false, entirely misrepresented the tone of the conversation and created a very unfortunate impression concerning relations between Chang Taek Sang and officials of the U.S. Government. Dr. Chang replied that he had not previously heard of these remarks but that he too was very disturbed at hearing of them and would like to see just what Chang Taek Sang had said. He promised to see if a rectification could not be made, since he personally could bear witness to the fact that the remarks were not based on the truth, if such were the case.

The Ambassador mentioned that he had received another instruction from President Rhee asking him urgently to solicit the assistance of the U.S. in supplying arms to Korean youth who were only too eager to throw themselves into the battle against the Communists, and that this additional manpower should prove of great help in stemming the Communist invasion. Mr. Rusk reassured him that all possible arms were being sent to Korea which it was within the capacity of the U.S. to supply and that we had dug deep into our military resources to provide all possible assistance to the forces fighting under the United Nations in Korea. He said that no question of policy was involved as to the extent of arms thus to be supplied but that it was merely a question of our capacity to do so. Dr. Chang said that he would also raise this question with the President when he saw him this morning.

The Ambassador indicated his great interest in seeing Mr. Attlee at some time during his visit and asked if Mr. Rusk could not assist him in so doing, adding that he had made a request of this nature through the British Embassy but had received no reply. Mr. Rusk

replied that he would be willing to discuss the question with Mr. Attlee's staff but that he did not expect to see Mr. Attlee personally.

Mr. Rusk stated that he would get in touch with the Ambassador concerning a future appointment with him at the Department, in line with his previous suggestion that these daily discussions be continued.

795B.00/12–650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of Protocol (Simmons)

[WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1950.

Subject: Call of the departing Korean Ambassador on the President

Participants: The President
The Korean Ambassador
Mr. Sae Sun Kim, Counselor, Korean Embassy
The Chief of Protocol

His Excellency Dr. John Myun Chang, departing Korean Ambassador,[1] recently named Prime Minister, called today by special request and on a basis of urgency. The Ambassador made a personal plea to the President to continue extending to Korea the military help which had already been furnished by the United Nations and which, he said, should be continued in spite of recent military reverses.

The Ambassador spoke of how grateful the Korean people were for what we had already done. He stated that Korea, both for its own sake, and for the sake of the world, must be saved from Communist domination. He stated that the Koreans would prefer death to such domination. He insisted that there are now approximately one million Koreans, faithful to the core, who are ready and willing to take up arms in defense of their country. All they needed, he said, was for the United States to furnish them the necessary equipment to carry out this purpose. He also made a plea for the use, in defense of Korea, of the Chinese Nationalist forces now in Formosa.

The President expressed great appreciation for the valor and patriotism of the forces of the Korean Republic, as shown in their operations since the invasion of last June. He said that the United States will see this thing through, and will do everything possible to save Korea. He gave, however, an indication of the difficulties which are involved in reaching any decision which might permit the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in the present conflict.

In closing, the President advised the Ambassador that, should he wish to carry this matter further, he might wish to undertake direct consultations with Generals Marshall and Bradley and Mr. Lovett.

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[1] See *supra*.

The Ambassador left with the President a memorandum touching on the points which he had mentioned in his conversation.[2]

JOHN F. SIMMONS

[2] The *aide-mémoire* from the Korean Embassy is not printed. On December 13, the Department of State transmitted an interim reply stating that the proposal relating to the arming of additional Koreans of military age was receiving immediate consideration (795.5/12–650).

Editorial Note

President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee held their third and fourth meetings on December 6 from 11:40 a. m. to 12:30 p. m. and from 3:30 p. m. to 4:35 p. m. The discussions dealt with economic problems, Western Europe, and accelerated defense efforts. There was no discussion of Korea and the Far East. The minutes of the meetings are scheduled for publication in volume III.

Also on December 6, Prime Minister Attlee gave an address before the National Press Club, the salient portions of which are printed in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1950–1952*, page 11,334.

330/12–650

The Australian Ambassador (Makin) to President Truman

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 6th December 1950.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Prime Minister of Australia, the Right Honourable R. G. Menzies, K.C., M.P., has asked me to convey to you immediately the following personal message, which has just been received by cable:—

"Top secret.

"To President Truman from the Prime Minister.

"I realise the heavy responsibilities which you are carrying at present. We are anxious to share your burdens and to contribute if we can to a solution of the difficult problems which confront the United Nations in Korea. It will greatly assist myself and my Ministers if you could have conveyed to us through whatever channels you may regard as the most suitable the views of yourself and your administration upon the following questions (*a*) What military line in Korea is it expected we shall be able to stabilize? (*b*) Having regard to the new factors introduced by the serious and large scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, what should be our military objectives both short term and long term? (*c*) What are the immediate military objectives of the Central Peoples Government of China? It appears to us extremely difficult if not impossible to determine the particular ways

along which United Nations political activity can best be directed until satisfactory answers are found to the questions which I have enumerated." (*Message ends*).

I have [etc.] NORMAN MAKIN

795.00/12–650

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ray L. Thurston, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [NEW YORK,] December 6, 1950.

US/A/C.1/2305

Subject: Indian Sponsored Appeal to the Chinese Communist and North Korean Authorities

Participants: Mr. M. Gopala Menon, Indian Delegation
Mr. Ray L. Thurston, United States Delegation

In a discussion with Menon today on the meeting which took place last night out of which emerged the appeal of thirteen countries, lead by India, to the Chinese Communist and North Korean authorities to halt at the 38th parallel in Korea, he said that the Turks had refused to go along because of their feeling that with Turkish troops fighting in Korea it would not be an honorable thing to "beseech" the Chinese Communists in this matter, while the failure of the Thailand representative to associate himself in the move was attributed to the fact that the Thai did not have any instructions from his Government to cover the matter.

Menon said that because of India's mediatory position it would abstain on all questions of procedure and substance connected with the GA item on Chinese intervention in Korea, and that the Indians were expecting a large number of the thirteen country bloc to abstain as well.

795.00/12–650 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Offices

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 6, 1950—5 p. m.

234. Reports reaching Dept indicate view advanced in number other countries, both Asia and Eur, that Chi Commie onslaught Korea was merely responsive to imagined threat presented by UN offensive. This theory doubtless advanced in part as result natural human tendency when faced by unpalatable reality and hard decision to find formula reducing situation to more comfortable dimensions and

relieving oneself of need facing hard facts. As such, theory probably impossible extirpate from credulous minds. Nevertheless, Dept considers it important that when you encounter such explanation you make clear it wholly at variance with facts.

As stated Depcirtel 198 Nov 28 (sent some posts as Depcirtel 207 Nov. 29),[1] it is unanimous, considered judgment JCS, supported by info from field commanders, that present Chi offensive planned and staged over considerable period of time and that what happened is two offensives collided. Obviously it fantastic suppose that offensive involving half million men cld have been prepared impromptu. Owing fact considerable displacement Chi Commie units began year ago, involving movement north of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army, it impossible say when concentration for purpose assault Korea began, but reports reaching us May and June from travellers arriving Hong Kong revealed railway traffic both north and south Hangkow clogged with troop trains moving north. Appearance on Korean front of Chi Commie troops of Korean ancestry, as individuals and units, began during initial NK assault and long before return to 38th parallel, indicating Peiping wld in any case feel free assert itself Korea regardless mil situation, distance action from Manchuria, and consensus non-Commie including Asian world.

Dept now in receipt unpublished report by neutral Asian journalist in Commie China written before current offensive which discloses that Commie China had by third week Nov completed preparations for mass advance against UN forces Korea designed drive them back length of peninsula regardless risk gen war and had secured pledge of Sov assistance in event reverses suffered. Report contains eyewitness acct of feverish movement of troops in readiness for invasion as early as second week Oct and of preparations for air raid defense in major north China cities recalling Jap days. This report paralleled from many other sources.

MacArthur interview transmitted Wireless Bulletin 294 Dec 3 contains statement "it wld be grave mistake to attribute to any incidents of the campaign the momentous action of launching war which had been taken by Chi army" as well as other info of value combatting erroneous impressions held some quarters. This connection, watch for UN Commanders 10th operational report to SC[2] which will be included Wireless Bulletin.

ACHESON

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[1] Not printed.

[2] The 10th Report, covering the period November 16–30, was transmitted to the U.N. Secretary-General on December 27, 1950; for the text, see U.N. document S/1953.

330/12–650: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 6, 1950—6:14 p. m.
[Received December 6—6:36 p. m.]

944. Re Korea. Following, authored by Colonel Katzin, given Ross by Cordier. Katzin discussed with Romulo. Romulo expressed interest to Ross. Asked for our comments.

"Suggested proposal based upon possibility of hoisting Communist China with its own petard in relation to statements before SC on part of General Wu Hsui-chung which ignored UN participation in Korean conflict and limited his charges to US intervention:

"1. The UN emphatically rejects the charges levied against the US and reaffirms that the actions of the US were and are taken in common concert with, and at the request of the UN.

"2. Nevertheless in an effort to display its good faith toward its already enunciated intentions towards the people of China and in an effort to avoid the spreading of the conflict and the needless shedding of blood the UN proposes as follows:

"(*a*) Both the US and the Chinese forces withdraw from Korea.

"(*b*) North Korean and South Korean forces lay down their arms under UN supervision.

"(*c*) A UN force without US elements and not to exceed a strength of 50,000 supported by a Korean police force not to exceed 25,000 will be retained in Korea to maintain internal security.

"(*d*) UN observers of non-US nationality will patrol the international and sea borders of Korea to ensure that no concentrations of forces or violation of borders or boundaries within a defined meaning, take place.

"(*e*) Free elections under the supervision of UNCURK take place in North and South Korea within 6 months of the withdrawal of forces, etc., as above.

"(*f*) UN security forces withdraw at end of said 6 months. All Korean police force left behind.

"(*g*) Border states and US guarantee to UN the inviolability of Korean borders for stated period upon completion of above provisions.

"3. In event proposals not accepted by aggressor within fourteen days, UN will authorize full force and collective resources at its disposal to be taken by UN Command without limitation and UN pledges to make available its utmost support and assistance to this end."

AUSTIN

795.00/12-650

Memorandum by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, of a Meeting Held on December 6, 1950

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1950.

MEMORANDUM

After the 9:30 meeting this morning, Mr. Acheson discussed the conversation which took place last night at dinner at Sir Oliver Franks' residence. He said that he would dictate later on the conversation, but would tell us the high points.

The Secretary said that twice before the talks with the President and the Prime Minister, General Tedder and General Slim said to the Secretary that they had muffed the ball on his kick-off on the defense business in the meeting yesterday afternoon. They said it had been hard for them to do anything since their chief did not lead off. They asked Mr. Acheson if there was any way they could retrieve the situation. The Secretary said it was up to them to handle it.

After dinner, Sir Oliver Franks, the Prime Minister, the President, General Marshall, General Bradley, General Slim and Mr. Acheson talked from about 9:30 until midnight. They were joined by others around 11 o'clock.

Both the President and the Prime Minister said they were pleased with the conversations. The British brought up again the defense matter discussed in the meeting yesterday and the Secretary said he did not feel they got very far. The Secretary said to them that there were two points he felt which should be borne in mind. First is that when the British leave, unless the President and General Marshall are convinced that the British are doing all possible in the direction of their own defense effort, the British have not accomplished much here. The Secretary told them that there was a feeling in Washington that the British were not doing all they could do. He said that if the President and General Marshall were convinced that the British were doing all they could, this would help a great deal in meeting the feeling in this country to the contrary.

The second point was that the only way we can do anything with NATO is for the United States and the United Kingdom to go ahead and act and force the others to follow. The Secretary said that he thought much of the talk on these subjects had been off the point. He said he admitted that the British had problems but regardless of the difficulty, the question is whether what is being done is adequate. The British said they understood. There was then much confused talk which the Secretary did not report in detail.

Prime Minister Attlee then said he wanted to raise a difficult and a delicate question. He raised the question of General MacArthur's direction of the effort in Korea. He said that there was a feeling in Europe that General MacArthur was running the show and also a feeling that the other participating countries had little to say in what was done. General Bradley and General Marshall then discussed the matter with Prime Minister Attlee and said that General MacArthur was doing what he was required to do by the United Nations which had given him direction to hold Korea and get elections there, etc. They emphasized that he was doing exactly what he had been told to do by the United Nations. The Secretary said that he did not participate in this portion of the conversation. General Marshall discussed the joint control by the Department of State and National Defense over General MacArthur's activities. General Marshall said that the British could not say they were not consulted and mentioned the questions of "hot pursuit", bombing of Manchuria, etc., on which consultation had taken place.

The British then proposed some sort of committee to direct the war. General Bradley said that a war could not be run by a committee. He said that decisions with reference to the Korean war must be handled with great dispatch and that a committee would not be able to meet this requirement. He said that if others did not like what was going on, they should say so and they would be given assistance in withdrawing. He went on that if they did not want to get out, they must accept the responsibilities assigned to the United Nations command.

The President then said that the United Nations had asked the United States to set up a unified command. He said that he was in charge and would run it as long as the United Nations wanted him to. He emphasized that he would have to continue running it unless the United Nations asked him not to. He said the orders to General MacArthur now were only concerned with the safety of his command. He said that if others came over to bomb the troops there, the President said that every airfield in sight would be bombed in order to protect our troops.

Mr. Acheson then spoke up and said that there were two things to consider here. The first was the Prime Minister's doubts about General MacArthur. The Secretary said he would stay out of this one. The second was whether the United Nations Command was adequate for what we are doing here. He said that the Korean war was not the only issue here and mentioned the possibility of the conflict being broadened and also the situation in Europe. He said that, so far as the bombing issues were concerned, the Prime Minister and the Presi-

dent were discussing that, and we could not get any higher authority. He said the important thing in regard to Europe was the bearing on the unified command which was under consideration for Europe. He said that if the same kind of concern were going to develop over General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander in Europe, we should know it now. He said that we would not have a Supreme Command if all countries had to be consulted. He said that the important thing was to get someone who was trusted by all. General Tedder said that the Standing Group arrangement in NATO was rather nonsensical. He said that we did not trust the French because of known security difficulties, and that the important thing was that the United States and the United Kingdom stick together, to which all agreed.

During the conversation the President said again that his attitude was that we stay in Korea and fight. If we have support from the others, fine; but if not, he said we would stay on anyway.

L. D. B[attle]

320/12–650 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 6, 1950—11 : 24 p. m.
[Received December 7—12 : 26 a. m.]

Delga 384. Re Korea: Gross and Ross had two-hour discussion late this afternoon with Younger, Jebb, Chauvel and Lacoste on current phase Korean case in UN. Subjects covered were handling Six-Power resolution and cease-fire.

Having agreed to file joint resolution at noon today British in particular, but strongly assisted by French, were strongly disinclined to proceed further in Committee 1 for time being. They thought it mistake that Committee 1 meeting had been called for Thursday,[1] seeing no particular reason why few days delay in committee procedure would make much difference. On British side principal objections were necessity awaiting outcome Attlee–Truman talks and substance of resolution itself. On first point Younger said he was absolutely without instruction and would be unable say anything on substance of resolution until he knew outcome Washington talks. On substance of resolution Jebb in particular referred to resolution as an absurdity, ironical and ludicrous in present situation.

[1] December 7.

Chauvel, although concerned with outcome Attlee–Truman talks, apparently did not feel resolution itself amounted to very much but he was principally concerned with question of where resolution might lead us if it were passed. In contrast with June 25 resolution which contemplated action if North Koreans failed comply with provisions of resolution, Chauvel could not see that anyone had a course clearly plotted for action in event failure Chinese Communists to comply with present resolution. He felt strongly we should know where we were going before committing ourselves too deeply to Six-Power Resolution.

We argued strongly that Six-Power resolution was both an action (withdrawal of Chinese Communists forces) resolution and resolution of principle which represented minimum which we felt great majority membership would insist upon to uphold UN principles. Passage of this resolution would in turn, unless we should decide upon some other course, be important factor as demonstration UN solidarity against Communist aggression. British in particular, but also French did not accept our estimate of majority desire, indicating strong Commonwealth and European as well as other dislike of Six-Power resolution. We also argued that it was essential to maintain momentum in handling charge Chinese Communist intervention and unity UN membership in order maximize bargaining position vis-à-vis Russians and Chinese Communists.

We also argued that with friendly chairman and friendly majority we could control future proceedings in light of developing circumstances, future proceedings being debate on procedural motion to take up Communist intervention item ahead of Soviet charge of aggression against US, debate on substance of Six-Power resolution and vote. British and French were most strongly opposed to bringing resolution to vote within predictable future.

After lengthy discussion along foregoing lines British and French finally agreed to have Committee 1 meet on schedule Thursday morning provided day's proceedings were limited to procedural question order of items and that there would be no debate on substance beginning tomorrow.

We then had lengthy discussion cease-fire question. We made clear throughout this discussion in variety ways that we were not soliciting directly or indirectly any initiative by anybody with regard to cease-fire. Referring to suggestion he had made earlier in day Chauvel wondered whether it would not be desirable for him or someone to seek Entezam's advice. In this connection Chauvel outlined rather

elaborate program of details of possible cease-fire which might be discussed with Entezam. Jebb could not envisage what form possible GA resolution re cease-fire would take. He felt that cease-fire was essentially matter of negotiation.

We indicated did not seem feasible for UN to get involved in cease-fire details. The most we felt Assembly could do would be along lines Rau's proposal in light Asian appeal last night, namely, (*a*) cease-fire, (*b*) withdrawal of Communists beyond Yalu and withdrawal UN forces to 38th parallel, and (*c*) machinery to work out details. British particularly, but French also, felt that Communists would never agree to cease-fire involving their withdrawal beyond Yalu except at price of political conditions. We made clear we were not interested in cease-fire with political strings attached.

Younger, taking at face value our statements re not soliciting directly or indirectly any initiative by anybody, said he supposed that they would have to consider whether to take initiative or suggest that others take initiative. Said first question that would be asked would be whether US would support cease-fire proposal. In order to convince others that such proposal would be taken seriously he felt it would be necessary inform others in light Truman–Attlee understanding that US would support (or favor) a cease-fire proposal. We argued this would be tactically very unwise and that tactically it would be much better not to commit our position but rather to indicate assumption that 53 members of UN supporting UN effort in Korea would without exception want cessation of killing in Korea.

British and French all agreed that there was no particular hurry about developing cease-fire proposal since this was essentially a process of negotiation which thus far had moved very slowly and could not reasonably be expected move much faster in next few days. Our conversation ended on this note with understanding discussion would be resumed tomorrow.

After French had left meeting we told Jebb and Younger, on basis earlier Hickerson–Gross telecon that we felt we had to be most careful in discussing matter in presence of French but that we assumed British realized that we thought a cease-fire would be militarily desirable, although we thought it very important that British give absolutely no indication to others that this was our position.

AUSTIN

795.00/12–750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, December 7, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received December 7—2 : 22 a. m.]

532. Continuing Embtel 524, December 6,[1] contact between CCF and UN forces in Eighth Army sector still broken off yesterday. No specific information available on developments in X Corps area. No Chinese POWs have been obtained in recent days. Air reports indicate CCF relying heavily on horses, mules and camels to bring up supplies.

Air reconnaissance last night was limited owing poor visibility. However, about 200 vehicles were sighted moving south from Sinanju toward Pyongyang and another concentration, number unestimated moving southwest from Tokchon.

Yesterday UN planes attacked about 20 hostile aircraft parked on field at Sinuiju destroying 2 and damaging 2. UN planes returning for second attack found field clear of planes. During latter operation UN planes were attacked by 2 Mig's but no damage resulted. Later in day flight of B–29's was attacked by unknown number of Mig's near Sinanju. 3 29's were damaged but managed return to base.

MUCCIO

[1] The text of telegram 524 read as follows:

"Contact between UN and CCF forces in Eighth Army sector remained virtually nil yesterday as both continued regrouping. (Embtel 517, December 5.)

"Vehicular traffic behind enemy line relatively heavy last night, about 400 vehicles being observed, mostly moving south with main concentration on Kanggye–Huichon road. Yesterday two Mig 15's attacked four UN jets in vicinity Kanggye, damaging one of the latter. Migs fled into Manchuria when pursued by UN planes." (795.00/12–650)

795.00/12–750

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1950.

Subject: Truman–Attlee Talks

Participants:

United Kingdom	*United States*
Sir Oliver Franks	The Secretary of State
Sir Roger Makins	Mr. Matthews
Mr. Robert Scott	Mr. Rusk
	Mr. Nitze
	Mr. Jessup

Sir Oliver suggested the desirability of a short meeting tomorrow morning between the President and the Prime Minister to tie things up. Presumably it could not be held before that because the group working on the raw material question would not be ready. This was agreed upon.

There was some discussion as to whether there should be an attempt to draw up agreed conclusions as a private record. It was agreed that there should be a public Communiqué. In regard to that, Sir Oliver said that anything in the Communiqué on the Far East was very important. In phrasing it, one must keep in mind that the worry in Europe, including the United Kingdom which the Prime Minister has represented in person here, is a very real thing. Sir Roger Makins suggested that the Communiqué might contain the thought that it had not been the purpose of these meetings to reach conclusions. There was no decision on these matters.

Sir Roger said that the Prime Minister this afternoon would want to make a statement on Indochina since he had talked with the French about this in London. This statement would not contain any concrete request and would not call for action. Mr. Attlee would also say something about Japan, but again there would be no specific points.

The Prime Minister may also touch on the question of US–UK organization and may hand the President a paper on this. He indicated that the Prime Minister approved the action which we have taken in sending the letter to M. Schuman, and that we could go ahead with the whole Spofford Plan operation. On the question of the armament effort, he did not think the Prime Minister was yet clear and that this would have to come up later.

Mr. Nitze reported on certain intelligence items which had come to us indicating the possible link between stepped up activities in East Germany and the developments in Asia.

The Secretary then went over orally the memorandum entitled, "United States Position on Two Principal Alternative Courses in Korea."[1] The following reactions were noted. The British agreed on *3a*, made no comment on *3b*, *c*, or *d*. On *e iii*, they agreed on the importance of the question; and on *iv*, Sir Oliver agreed on the first sentence. He and Sir Roger agreed that some United Nations forces would have to stay in Korea during the period of negotiations.

On *f* dealing with Formosa, Sir Oliver asked whether the foreign policy referred to included the following three points:

(1) Continued recognition of Chiang,
(2) Denial of Formosa to the mainland, and

[1] Annexed to this document.

(3) An assertion that in some way and at some time in the future Formosa would belong to China.

He wondered whether this was correct, or whether *2* was the main point. The Secretary said that was at least a starting point, and it was difficult in such matters to use such words as "forever". Sir Oliver said he had raised this question for general reasons.

Skipping to the second course, which is the failure to get a cease-fire, he thought the United States was assuming United Nations support which he thought would be hard to get.

In regard to Formosa, the British recognize the force of the military considerations which we had advanced and their military people also agreed. They were not however impressed by our position on continuing to recognize Chiang Kai-shek. They understood that the recognition of the Peking Government by the United States was out, but they questioned the continued recognition of Chiang.

The Secretary agreed there was a lot of trouble wrapped up in this problem, and he did not know the answer. If one starts with the proposition that we want to deny Formosa to the mainland, there is no question that Chiang is a factor in this denial. He is on the spot. While we did not like the situation any better than the British do, it is dangerous to talk about the point Sir Oliver raised.

Mr. Scott said he thought there were two alternatives and not three. The first was to make an effort to reach a settlement with the Chinese Communists, and the second was to get into war with them. On the first alternative, he said we must make the effort since so much world opinion and United Nations opinion expected it. Speaking personally, he thought it would be possible to make a settlement. He left to one side the question of recognition of the Chinese Communists by the United States, but they thought that in the United Nations there should be effective representation of China which was not now the case. The United Kingdom does not believe that the conduct of the government is the test to determine whether it should be seated. If they were seated, then they must either comply with their Charter obligations or be denounced. The Secretary asked whether their situation would be any different from that of the Soviet Union. Mr. Scott said no but Chinese Communists were now outlaws and there was much support of the idea that they ought to have the seat in the United Nations. The United Kingdom would like to put this to the test and see how they behave. He then analyzed their arguments about the way in which they were merely helping North Korea which is a government they had recognized, and he said they made out "quite a strong legal case" which appeals to a great many.

Mr. Scott then argued that we should try to establish a position of consistent and unwavering policy. Regarding Formosa, we had once said it was of no strategic importance and now we say it is. We ought to reaffirm the Cairo Declaration. In doing so, we would say it must stand or fall as a whole. We would argue that the part on Korea is the most important and that, before we looked at the question of Formosa and other questions, we should get implementation of the agreement on Korea. We should point out that this is a new Chinese Government which has repudiated some of the earlier Chinese obligations and we should ask whether they accept the principles of the Cairo Declaration which includes the renunciation of aggression and of any desire for territory. These general principles were stated in the Declaration in regard to Japan, but they were of general application. If China accepted them, that would be good. He did not think this course would settle the whole Far Eastern problem, but if war broke out in the East it would become a world war. At that point Korea would be very similar to the case of Greece in World War II. He admitted that the success of the policy he outlined was doubtful, but it would carry world opinion with us. It would safeguard both Korea and Formosa. It would show that our policy is not based on expediency and opportunism, but is consistent. He stressed the responsibility of the United Nations regarding Korea and said that his proposal offered the only hope for a United Nations solution regarding Korea. The United Nations might be able to do its job if the Chinese Communists were seated instead of having the United Nations in the ingenuous position of negotiating with outlaws.

The Secretary, without commenting on the proposals, inquired whether in the end this policy would mean that both Korea and Formosa would be in communist hands.

Mr. Scott recalled that, even before the present situation developed, we had both felt that at some time Korea might become communist. This was a risk but the risk would exist under any plan, for example, if we had all-Korean elections. He did not know whether under this plan Formosa would eventually be in communist hands, but this plan would not increase our risks.

The Secretary said that, while it was true Mr. Scott had outlined what might be considered a consistent and logical policy, he feared the end of it would be grave danger. He mentioned that as a matter of fact we did give Formosa to China but said that he did not wish to prolong the discussion by arguing what might seem to be merely a lawyer's point.

Sir Oliver said he would like to recall certain elements of British foreign policy over the last two centuries. They had never been a large land power and therefore they had always had to act on the basis

of working with other countries. The United States, in addition to being a sea and air power, was also a large land power with all of the industrial capacity which that involved. He thought, however, even if this great power of the United States were contrasted with the large world mass, the United States would need to accept the same principle which the British had followed. This principle of solidarity with other countries now works, whether for good or ill, through the United Nations.

The meeting had to adjourn so that the Secretary and Sir Oliver could keep a luncheon engagement.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

[Annex]

U.S. POSITION ON TWO PRINCIPAL ALTERNATIVE COURSES IN KOREA [2]

I. *The first course:* Early and unconditional cease-fire.

1. The first course assumes:

(*a*) A cease-fire, probably in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel, without political conditions.
(*b*) Regrouping of UN forces in South Korea.
(*c*) Freedom of action on the part of the Chinese to regroup their own forces north of the cease-fire line.
(*d*) Probable negotiations on Far Eastern questions (not to be proposed by U.S.).

2. Under this course of action, there would be a cease-fire on the ground, air operations against the enemy would be suspended, and hostile military action would not be undertaken against any part of the China mainland.

3. During the course of any negotiations or UN action which might follow a cease-fire, the United States should take the following positions on the questions indicated:

(*a*) *Six-power resolution:* Further consideration of the six-power resolution would be temporarily suspended in the UN General Assembly.
(*b*) *Discussion of Korea in the Security Council:* The United States should not accept any Communist demand that, as a precondition for the discussion of Korea in the Security Council, the UN should oust KMT delegates and seat Communist delegates in the Chinese seat. Otherwise, the United States should be willing to discuss Korea in the Security Council and to have the Peiping representatives seated at the table for that purpose.

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[2] The source text bears no indication of authorship, but presumably this was the paper drawn up by Messrs. Hickerson and Rusk at the request of Mr. Acheson; see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Battle, December 5, p. 1410.

(*c*) *Discussions outside the Security Council:* The United States should be prepared to take part in a negotiation respecting Korea with the interested governments and authorities, including representatives of the Peiping regime. Presumably, these discussions should be held at the seat of the UN.

(*d*) *The agenda of negotiations:* Every effort should be made to deal first with the question of Korea in any discussions or negotiations. We should specifically reject the linking up of other questions such as Formosa and the Chinese seat in the UN, in such a way as to reward the Chinese for their aggression in Korea. We should resist inclusion of any irrelevant items on the agenda in the first instance, particularly by thorough discussion of the matter and its implications with our friends. If it becomes necessary to enlarge the agenda to maintain unity with our friends, we should accept the inclusion of items other than Korea without, however, making any prior commitments with respect to our views on any particular problem. In this case, we might well include items of interest to us (e.g., Communist recognition and support of Ho Chih-Minh, Tibet, treatment of U.S. persons and property in China) along with items which the Communists may insist upon raising.

(*e*) *Korean settlement: Our maximum* aim in negotiation would be an orderly unification of Korea with extensive UN participation in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly. Our *minimum* aim would be a restoration of the *status quo ante* June 25, 1950.

In considering the details of a negotiated settlement in Korea, we must take into account the following:

(i) We now know that we cannot impose a full UN settlement in Korea by force in the present world situation.

(ii) We should like to reach a conclusion which gets our forces out of Korea by stages under honorable conditions and in such a situation as not to require their return.

(iii) We must take into account the fate of the South Koreans in any settlement.

(iv) Any solution for Korea must take into account the great pressure which will be exerted by its large Communist neighbors to turn Korea into a Communist state. At the present time, a unified Korea would be more likely to turn to Communism than would the southern part of a divided Korea. To the extent that UN supervision could be effective, the threat of Communism in Korea would be reduced or retarded.

In view of the above, the United States should be willing to accept a settlement for Korea along the following lines:

(i) Initially the Republic of Korea should be supported and strengthened south of the 38th Parallel. This should include action in the political, economic and military fields to place it in an effective position to maintain itself against pressures short of major overt aggression. Special attention might be given to friendly association between South Korea and Japan in order to introduce some countervailing influence to that of its Communist neighbors.

(ii) A United Nations commission should be given the task of arranging for the ultimate unification of Korea and to supervise the electoral and constituent steps by which this unification might be accomplished.

(iii) Pending the unification of Korea, the United Nations rehabilitation program should be limited to the Republic of Korea.

(iv) A United Nations Commission should arrange the phased withdrawal of Chinese forces from North Korea.

(v) Similarly, a United Nations commission should arrange for the phased withdrawal of United Nations forces from Korea; it should be understood that the situation in Korea may require the retention in that country of certain UN contingents for a considerable period to deter the early resumption of fighting. If other Members of the United Nations were themselves willing to accept the responsibility, the United States would be willing to withdraw all of its own forces.

(*f*) *Formosa:* We should seek to exclude the subject of Formosa from any negotiations about Korea, unless its inclusion is essential to maintain unity among our friends. If it is included, our position would be to maintain our present policy. We cannot alter our present position on Formosa as a reward for Chinese aggression in Korea. We are willing to have the question of Formosa considered in any appropriate forum for peaceful settlement. Pending a final disposition of the question, we reserve freedom of action to use U.S. forces to prevent a forcible seizure of the island. In any final disposition, account must be taken of the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of the island as well as of the existing strategic situation in the Pacific.

(*g*) *Chinese seat in the UN:* We oppose the seating of a representative of Peiping in the UN. We must take a very strong position on this issue so long as Peiping is in the role of an aggressor. If the issue is considered in a UN body in which there is no veto, the United States will oppose the Chinese Communists and will make no commitments about the use of its influence to support this position but will accept a parliamentary result and not walk out of any UN body. In the Security Council we should adopt the same position but should maintain that this question is not subject to the veto.

(*h*) *Japanese Peace Treaty:* The United States can make no commitment which involves a veto by the Soviet Union or by Communist China on the conclusion of the Japanese peace settlement.

II. *The second course:* Continuation of Hostilities.

1. The second course assumes:

(*a*) Rejection by the Communist High Command of a cease-fire, or the attachment of unacceptable conditions to a cease-fire.

(*b*) Continued resistance by UN forces to Chinese aggression.

(*c*) Possibility of evacuation of UN forces from Korea as a result of military necessity.

2. In this contingency, the UN and US will be confronted by the problem of refusing to accept an aggression without, at the same time,

becoming increasingly involved in a war in Asia which would further weaken the ability of the free world to deter or meet a Russian attack.

3. All reasonable effort should be made, consistent with the realities of our worldwide military situation, to increase military, material and moral support of the United Nations operation in Korea.

4. Our political effort in the United Nations should be directed toward mobilizing and maintaining the maximum degree of support for such action as it may be necessary to take against Communist China in order to resist the aggression in Korea, including the UN finding of aggression.

5. The United States believes that the United Nations cannot accept an aggression, even by a great power, without taking such action as it can to suppress it. The United States should not place itself in the historical role of accepting an open and flagrant act of aggression. Failing a cease-fire, United Nations forces should attempt to resist the aggression in Korea so long as there is a reasonable prospect of ability to do so; any United Nations evacuation of Korea should be clearly the result of military necessity.

6. In the event of a forced evacuation of Korea, the following course of action should be pursued:

(*a*) Continued air and naval action on a reduced scale against the enemy in Korea.

(*b*) The imposition of diplomatic and economic sanctions against the aggressor, including breach of diplomatic relations, postponement of further consideration of the Chinese seat in the United Nations, commercial embargo, and freezing of financial assets.

(*c*) Covert operations against the mainland of China, with the exploitation of Nationalist capabilities to contribute to such operations.

(*d*) It would not be our intention to undertake military action against the Chinese mainland, provided the Chinese Communists do not themselves extend the nature of their operations by large-scale air attacks against UN forces, attacks on Japan, Ryukyus or Formosa.

(*e*) While not excluding the possibility of a naval and air blockade of China, it would probably be desirable to attempt to effect the same result by concerted action of other governments in the field of economic sanctions.

While the above measures could more advantageously be taken as a part of general UN sanctions, the United States may wish to act unilaterally in particular cases, for example the freezing of Chinese Communist assets and trade restrictions. In addition, any or all of the above actions would have to be taken in the light of the global situation and our commitments elsewhere.

310/12–750 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW YORK, December 7, 1950—11 : 45 a. m.
[Received December 7—12 : 12 p. m.]

949. Personal for President and Secretary. Following is memorandum prepared by Ambassador Gross and Minister Ross, considered by USUN staff, and with which I fully concur.

"Mindful of our special responsibilities for and concern with UN affairs and considering that one of the basic premises of our foreign policy is the preservation of the UN, the following are our views:

The British, against their own best interests, are assuming at the UN an initiative with the Commonwealth and the North Atlantic group on a negative and defeatist basis.

They fail to understand the essential reason for pressing for action on the Six-Power resolution. This resolution symbolizes (1) the solidarity of the sponsors and of the other 47 members who supported UN action in Korea—and (2) the fact that the Soviet Union cannot by its veto thwart the will of the UN.

The issue of the cease-fire is a tactical military issue. If a cease-fire arrangement is necessary in order to preserve or liquidate a limited military situation, such an arrangement must not be permitted to undercut the essential requirement of preserving the political and moral authority of the UN.

It will assist, rather than hinder, the accomplishment of both objectives, i.e., obtaining an acceptable cease-fire and maintaining the authority of the UN, if we insist that we proceed to the adoption of the Six-Power resolution.

We must also make clear that if this resolution is defied, we shall urge the UN to name the aggressor and to call for the assistance of all members in repelling the aggression. The UN would thus show its firm intention to vindicate its authority when the means and circumstances permit.

No other course suffices to preserve the moral integrity of the UN. No other course can preserve the solidarity of the free world nor assure the survival of the UN itself. If the UN is thus destroyed, we shall revert to a chaos in which every nation, in isolation, must deal with the threat of Communist aggression and subversion.

Our declaration of intention to proceed on this course is the only way to prevent a rapid deterioration of confidence on the part of people all over the world in the enduring values of the UN and in American leadership. The UN won the first battle in the war against it by accomplishing the objective of repressing the North Korean invasion. It may lose the second battle, now being fought against it by the new aggressor. By following the course here suggested, it can prove that it will persevere in its intention to win the war."

AUSTIN

795.00/12–750

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1950.

CHINESE INTERVENTION IN KOREA—CURRENT INTENTIONS

Reference: CA Memorandum, December 1, 1950, "Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea—Counter Strategy"

The following comments are offered in respect to the situation which has arisen as a consequence of massive Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

Basic Assumptions:

1. The free world is now in the preliminary stage of World War III.

2. The next stage, by Moscow planning, probably envisages either (*a*) the rapid development of new peripheral conflagrations leading up to direct war between the U.S. and the USSR, or (*b*) the outbreak of war between the USSR and the U.S. immediately from the situation in Korea.

3. In either event the USSR would endeavor to isolate the U.S. from its present allies, insofar as possible.

4. The outbreak of war with the U.S., although having a background of Soviet propaganda, would be in the form of an unheralded sudden strike against U.S. power at points where it is exposed and accessible to Soviet military strength, with objectives on the North American continent included in that strike.

Moscow–Peiping Intentions:

The Indian messages of August current (see especially Delhi's 466, August 24 [1]) seemed to indicate that the Chinese Communists had only limited objectives with respect to American relationships with Formosa and Korea. Chou En-lai's warning (Delhi's telegram 831, October 4) was, it will be recalled, related to the 38th Parallel and by clear inference projected no Chinese movement unless foreign UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel: forces comprising only South Korean elements might go north over that line without the threat of Chinese intervention.

Meetings with high Soviet officials appear, however, to have been held in Peiping in both August and October. It is not clear that Chinese Communist objectives (that is, Moscow objectives) were not changed as a consequence of those meetings. It is clear in any event that Chinese Communist propaganda is now aimed at (1) the ousting of UN forces

[1] For the text of this message, see vol. VI, p. 446.

from the Korean peninsula or their annihilation; (2) the removal of the 7th Fleet from the Formosa strait; (3) the cessation of U.S. aid to the National Government on Formosa; (4) the seating of Communist China in the UN; and (5) Chinese Communist participation in a peace settlement with Japan.

UN forces are now in retreat, and no propaganda gloss put on communiqués from the UN side would be able to hide from the Chinese Communist commanders in the field the fact that the UN military position has badly deteriorated. Until the fronts are stabilized, we should be negotiating from a position of weakness and in those circumstances the Chinese Communist negotiators would surely ask for every conceivable political concession. They would possibly demand in addition that in the withdrawal of UN forces (if conceded) the forces should be without their arms and be under the watchful surveillance of the Chinese Communists. They might propose in addition that the UN bear the burden of Korean rehabilitation—of course under the direction of the "local authorities". There would appear to be little profit from a deal which not only conceded gratis all Communist demands but required that we foot the bill. Munich couldn't hold a candle to it.

Advantages of Continuation of UN Operation:

The objective situation in Korea appears to offer little promise that the UN forces would be granted a cease-fire arrangement which would leave them with a shred of prestige or even safety. Vyshinsky's reaction to the 11-Power proposal [2] would appear to be an augur of what can be expected from Peiping in reply to the *démarche* of Sir Benegal Rau.

If there appears to be little potential for a cease-fire and a subsequent compromise agreement, however, there are still elements in the situation which seem to offer some benefits from a continuation of the UN military operation in its present character. If it is militarily feasible, the UN forces might be kept in being in a relatively restricted beachhead with good port facilities which could be made into a "Stalingrad" that the Chinese Communists would find very costly to reduce. This should be practicable and possible in view of the UN possession of

[2] Reference is to the appeal of the 13 Arab-Asian nations; see the memorandum by Mr. Hickerson, December 5, p. 1408. During the General Assembly meeting on December 6, Mr. Vyshinsky had made the following statement:

"It is common knowledge that the United States armed forces crossed the 38th parallel with the approval, among others, of the authors of a statement issued by several Powers and published in the Press, in which they now plead that a halt should be called at the 38th parallel and that that line should not be crossed. Yet at that time they gave their full support to the northward march of MacArthur's legions beyond the 38th parallel and to the Manchurian border." (U.N. document A/PV.319)

truly superior weapons, including an air force, which contribute substantially to redress the balance of forces between the opposing sides. If this is, as postulated, one sector in the preliminary stage of world War III it should be exploited as such, for what it is worth to the global struggle.

There are fruits which could logically be expected to come from the maintenance of the UN position in Korea which are worth striving for. Certain developments which could logically be anticipated to follow from continuation of the UN action, and which would be beneficial to the UN allies, are the following:

1. The Chinese Communists, entering into Korea in such force as the present, can hardly avoid trampling upon certain political and administrative rights of the Koreans in the area invaded.
2. The Chinese Communists, if condemned by the UN as aggressors, will possibly suffer certain political disadvantages at home. Their drive for a UN seat would be effectively checked.
3. The areas under occupation, and particularly North Korea, have been badly torn up by war, and the Communist occupants will therefore sustain an additional burden of rehabilitation—and at the same time face the discontents of the Korean population.
4. The military action itself, as carried out against the UN forces, will constitute an attritive drain upon the resources of the Chinese nation. If it be argued that the Chinese are readily able to meet drains on their manpower whereas the Occidental UN member States supporting the UN operation are not, it is on the other hand to be noted that the Chinese nation lacks anything approaching the same capacity to meet drains on its material resources. This is particularly true at a time when the Chinese economy is still suffering from long years of war and civil war. Whether the USSR is in a position readily to make up those material deficits is an open question.
5. The very successes which have attended the Chinese drive will tend to increase their self-confidence, even their arrogance. This might possibly be true to a certain degree even vis-à-vis Moscow, as well as in respect to the so-called "imperialist camp" against which they are currently warring. This situation will be aggravated perhaps by the circumstance that the Chinese Communists will be in occupation of an area long considered by the Soviet Union (and before the USSR, by Tsarist Russia) to be of considerable strategic and political importance to Russia rather than to China. There does exist in the present situation, in short, the seeds of some possible dissension between the Moscow–Peiping alliance.
6. For so long as the Chinese Communists are engaged in Korea they will presumably be correspondingly braked as regards other ventures directed, by hypothesis, toward Indochina, Formosa, or other areas on their periphery. That would constitute a net gain.
7. Both dissident "guerrillas" and bandits, and other discontented elements in China Proper, would be emboldened by continuation of the present struggle, where they would be disheartened by a quick collapse of the UN forces under the blows of the People's Liberation Army. The initial roll-up of the enemy front in satellite territory,

suggested as one way of throwing the USSR off balance, would perhaps develop as a possibility in China. Morale in Formosa would also be maintained, where otherwise it would fail. The situation in Japan could better be held stable, where disquiet and vacillation would surely follow upon any rapid withdrawal from the peninsula. The support that a continuing UN campaign would offer to political resistance to Communism in Europe as well as in Asia is another goal to be achieved.

In sum, a new objective in Korea should now replace the first objective of UN forces, namely, the U.S. should strive through the localized UN operation to increase the strength of its political alliances throughout the world, which development should be paralleled by the progressive outlawry of the Moscow–Peiping combine and its satellite friends. The original UN view that the Korean peninsula can be conquered, unified, stabilized, and rehabilitated through UN military, political, and economic means must, however, now be abandoned; and, in certain contingencies, the UN military campaign itself may have to be abandoned. We should therefore make certain that we are found in a military position to accomplish evacuation of the UN forces in the event that (1) there intervene other major developments which make a redistribution of those forces advisable, or (2) it is the UN will that the project be abandoned as hopeless from a military point of view. The withdrawal, it should be emphasized, like the UN challenge to aggression in the first instance, should be by UN mandate.

Global Redistribution of U.S. Forces:

A concentration of U.S. military effort, or even UN military effort, on Korea alone would be justified only on the basis of the hypothesis that the Moscow–Peiping axis at the present time contemplates only a limited peripheral operation and not the development of the Korean hostilities in the near future into the dimensions of World War III. Such an assumption cannot safely be assumed. It is because of this circumstance that neither the U.S. nor any of its allies should be caused to keep in Korea contingents which cannot safely be spared from strategic areas of greater importance for the global defense of the free world. It is clear that the over-all world danger is increasing. It is truly desirable that the UN Korea operation be kept in being, in at least token form and preferably in effective form, in the anticipation that at least some of the benefits listed in the foregoing section may be gained, and in order that there shall be full exploitation of all reasonably safe opportunities that may develop for inflicting a defeat on some sector of the world Communist camp. The UN commitment, however, should be related to our over-all capabilities and demands on our strength from the main theaters of potential conflict, and the

circumstances and times alike appear to demand that the U.S. contingent particularly should be reduced substantially in order that we may strengthen other, more important areas. It is tentatively suggested that approximately all but two or three full divisions of the U.S. forces should be evacuated in the near future, while the UN nations support it, the UN action should be asked for stronger contingents. The UN force is not small: under General Walker's command alone there are 4 U.S. divisions, 8 ROK divisions, 2 British brigades, 1 Turkish brigade, the U.S. 187th Airborne RCT, and smaller Filipino and Thai units.* The ROK force particularly is presumably subject to expansion. Perhaps other contingents than the American can be built up as well. But if the U.S. partial withdrawal leads in due course to termination of the UN operation before an overwhelming Communist threat, so be it.

As suggested in CA's reference memorandum of December 1, it would seem essential that there should in any event be such redistribution of U.S. forces as would assure the primary defense of Japan. Germany and western Europe generally likewise have their demands on the forces of the allies. The defense of the U.S. itself and the training of its new armies of course should be given priority over all else.

Conclusion:

It is patent that the demands of both the Korean war and other theaters cannot now be met except by (1) making much heavier demands on the armed forces of other UN member States, and (2) mobilization of substantially larger forces in the U.S. itself. It should not be overlooked that the USSR in supporting Peiping's intervention in the Korean war presumably undertook certain commitments to help its ally directly or indirectly by actions of its own—depending upon developments, for the Communist tactics are flexible. It is not to be assumed as certain that the Soviet aid would be forthcoming only when and if the UN forces were to cross the border of Korea and intrude into the territory of China itself. The Soviet Union may plan for reasons of both military advantage and political prestige to balance the Chinese Communist operation in Korea by another operation of its own, whether near to or far from the Korean theater. The immediate present, and particularly the period when there may be in progress any evacuation of UN forces from the peninsula (which evacuation would naturally tend to strengthen other potential theaters of warfare in which the USSR presumably has an interest), would appear to be one critical period. Whether it is the most critical period remains to be seen. It does not appear in any event, however, that the free nations can afford to consider longer that they have until 1952 to prepare.

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*C.f., Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Command Line-Up", New York *Times*, Thursday, December 7, 1950. [Footnote in the source text.]

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met on the afternoon of December 7 from 3 to 4:15 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.409. At this meeting, the Committee by a vote of 42 to 5, with 4 abstentions, agreed to give priority to debating the question of intervention by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea. The First Committee, however, did not vote during the remainder of its sessions during 1950 on the six-power draft resolution (see the editorial note, page 1421).

795.00/12–750

United States Delegation Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee

TOP SECRET
US Min–5

CABINET ROOM, THE WHITE HOUSE
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1950
3:45 PM–5:10 PM

PARTICIPANTS

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
The President	Prime Minister Attlee
Secretary of State Acheson	Sir Oliver Franks
Secretary of Defense Marshall	Field Marshal Sir William Slim
Secretary of the Treasury Snyder	Sir Roger Makins
General Omar N. Bradley	Lord Tedder
Mr. W. Averell Harriman	Mr. Robert Scott
Mr. W. Stuart Symington	Mr. Denis Rickett
Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup	Mr. John Barnes
Amb.-designate Walter S. Gifford	
Assistant Secretary of State Perkins	
Assistant Secretary of State Rusk	
Mr. George Elsey	

THE PRESIDENT explained that General Marshall had been unavoidably detained but would be there shortly, and he suggested that they proceed with the meeting. If the Prime Minister had any statement to make, he would be very glad to hear it.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he first wanted to refer to all of the problems connected with the Spofford Plan and to tell the President that they were agreed to go forward at the meeting of the Deputies. He said that this did not commit the United Kingdom to the precise

time of the approach to Germany or whether the agreement should be reached through a formal meeting of the Ministers.

THE PRESIDENT said he was very happy to know it.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would like to return to the Far Eastern questions and see where there were agreements and where there were gaps in the agreements. He thought they were agreed we did not wish to become involved in a major war with China. We were also agreed that we should hold on in Korea until we are forced to leave. He thought these agreements led us to the point that sooner or later we must somehow get some kind of settlement in the Far East. They were standing on the Cairo agreement. The major point in that agreement was its provisions regarding Korea. These had never been carried out because of the Russian attitude, but the UK still wished to see a unified government in Korea.

THE PRESIDENT interposed that we did too.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that in due course Korea should be free and independent. This was a hard row to hoe and we haven't been able to get it both unified and free. In North Korea the government had become more and more communist, and in South Korea the government which had been set up would as soon as it got into power let its people down badly. It became very corrupt and inefficient. This at least was the general view held in the United Kingdom. It seemed unfortunately true that governments so set up in some places are not the best. They did not expect an ideal government in Korea, but it is still necessary to work for a Korea that will be free and independent. Some kind of settlement was required for this purpose.

Regarding the military situation, he wondered what was the first decision which had to be made. It seemed that we should hold out until we were obliged to get out. A cease-fire may be secured; then we could begin to talk. It was very important that this be regarded as a primary point. This was really a United Nations business, but our enemies are always trying to present the matter as if it were really a quarrel between the United States and China.

THE PRESIDENT said that this was right and we did not want that impression.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that we must therefore keep it on United Nations lines. We must work it out there so that we gradually approach an agreement. He had stated frankly that they thought it was better to have the Chinese Communists inside the United Nations. This question was already under discussion here. It was said that we could not have such a result while they were carrying on war against us. He recalled, however, that he had once had the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India sitting down around the table and discussing matters quite amicably when they were almost at war with each other

in Kashmir. Similarly, they had talked with the Israelis when they were being pretty nasty to the United Kingdom. Talks could not therefore be ruled out on those grounds. We should get to the point where we can discuss these things. We have a slightly different slant on the matter because of our differing judgments regarding the Chinese. They still felt that, if you rule out full war with China, you are led to some negotiation in some way at some time.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that the President had thrown out the idea that there might be some continuation of warfare against the Chinese; very frankly, he said, this had not appealed to him very much. He wondered what could be done in the way of economic warfare or subversive activity or through other actions which amounted merely to pin pricks that could really lead eventually to a settlement. Our cards were not good enough to lead to that effect. The policy suggested was for a kind of limited war and this did not appeal to the British people or to the bulk of those in the United Nations. They feared that, if we began on a limited war, this might become full war and thus defeat our objective. Therefore, the Government of the United Kingdom does not approve of limited warfare against the Chinese if this were not directed to the immediate terrain of Korea but become a kind of war around the perimeter of China. If the Chinese were in the United Nations, there might be a possibility of reaching some settlement by discussion. He realized that this might seem distasteful since it might look as if we were climbing down. But if there were to be a settlement, it was better to have it in the United Nations than to have it forced on any one of us individually. In Korea we are acting as servants of the United Nations and the questions must be settled there. If the Chinese Communists were seated in the United Nations, there would be less loss of face for them than if the United Nations were dealing with them as outsiders where they disregard their obligations. If they were in the United Nations, we could use arguments based on the principles of the United Nations which are not so effective when they are outside the club. He said he did not know how far we could go in considering moves in the United Nations which we might not initiate or even bless but which in any case might come along.

SECRETARY ACHESON, responding to an inquiry from the President, said this was a very difficult subject which they had been wrestling with in conversations with Ambassador Franks.

THE PRESIDENT said it was political dynamite in the United States.

SECRETARY ACHESON said this was true. One could approach this subject by a series of logical arguments and one could make a persuasive case for a consistent policy based on the Cairo Declaration. In this connection, one could stress that the Cairo Declaration dealt with

Korea as much as with Formosa and also contained principles against the use of force. The fact was that we were confronted with a series of dilemmas. It was quite possible to point out the differences, but that did not provide an escape from the dilemma. Putting the various suggestions to a pragmatic test revealed that the outcome would be one to which both Korea and Formosa became communist. This would give great prestige to the communists and would undoubtedly have a serious effect in Japan and in the Philippine Islands. We were all agreed to make every effort to make Korea unified and free. The trouble is that we may get it unified but that it would not be free. We do not have to accept a communistic Formosa; we have the power to prevent that. This raises the deepest possible problem. The Prime Minister made strong arguments against a limited war with the Chinese. His arguments were worthy of careful consideration. We must think that one out. If we agree not to be involved in war with China, the question is what can you do to the Chinese. It might be very little, but there were other things that we could do in the Far East as, for example, building up Japan as a counter-weight, or strengthening the Philippine Islands or other states in order to encourage their resistance to communism. The problem was to arrive at a sound judgment on the result of the two courses of action rather than to make logical arguments on both sides.

Disturbing things were happening in East Germany. The letter which had recently been sent by the leader of East Germany to Adenauer had a dangerous similarity to the kind of letter which the North Koreans had written to the Government of Korea just before they attacked. They indicated in effect that, if their proposal were not accepted, the choice was between peace and war. While this propaganda is growing in intensity in Germany, Vishinsky is making his speeches in the United Nations saying that our action was the first step to the third World War. We must step up our efforts in Germany and elsewhere.

At the same time, we must estimate where we are going. One had to ask how near we are to war. If we think that the movement is gathering speed and drawing to this conclusion, it would be a great mistake to make moves for unsuccessful attempts to buy off the aggressor just before the crash came. The question was whether you could buy him off or whether you would not merely get more pressure. He did not presume to know the answers and suggested to the President that he would wish to secure additional advice on this point. He would point out, however, that there was a lot of history regarding this sort of attempt. It was not the first time that attempts had been made to buy time from aggressors. The whole proposition of the

United Nations and of our post-war policy had been not to do that but to say that we would fight it out from the position we had taken. These attempts in the past had not often been successful, and if we tried them now it would be very hard to get the heart in our people to see a rough job through. In fact, such a plan would not work. One could buy some time but it would not be enough. It would only divide our own people and make them feel that we had betrayed our principles and we would have no moral position left if war came. He was not attempting to make a legal argument, although there were lots that could be made. What he would like to do would be to get to the real issue. As a matter of legal argument, one could say, for example in respect to the Cairo Declaration, that we did give Formosa back to the Chinese; do we have to do it again every year? Such arguments were not worthy of this discussion. We may have both negotiation and war and, if this were true, we would not want to have the negotiation. However, if the negotiation would have a profound effect upon the world, certainly one should think it over.

THE PRIME MINISTER said, in speaking about negotiations, the Secretary of State seemed to assume that there would necessarily be a retreat all along the line. It might be possible to get an agreement to hold in Korea on the 38th Parallel; on Formosa, one might admit that the Chinese were to get it eventually but that now it should be held in a neutral status. We then would not have given way, but we would get some settlement in the East and would not break our ranks or give up our principles.

SECRETARY ACHESON said clearly, if there were a cease-fire there would be a negotiation and we would be in the midst of it. If there were not a cease-fire and war goes on and the United Nations forces hold, we may have negotiation at some point or we might sound them out and then see about having a negotiation. We would tend to disintegrate unless we know where we are going. One needed to remember that not all United Nations armistices are firm.

THE PRESIDENT said that it occurred to him that, if the Chinese Communists were admitted to the United Nations, we will have a great deal of difficulty with our people. The Russians have been in the United Nations and have constantly given us trouble on a great many subjects including the attempts to get peace with Austria, Germany and Japan, and in connection with their handling of their satellites in Greece and earlier in Iran. It had been the same in Berlin. He wondered whether there was any reason to believe that we would have any closer approach to the Chinese Communists if they were in the United Nations than if they were out.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether it was any worse having two vetoes than having one.

THE PRESIDENT repeated that he thought it would be no better to have the Chinese Communists in than to have them out. He referred to the way in which they had treated our consular officers in China and the seizure of our property. There had also been various verbal attacks on the United States. He had to admit that all of this had not made him have any friendly feelings toward them.

SIR ROGER MAKINS said it was inevitable and essential that any policy we develop must be a United Nations policy.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed with this.

SIR ROGER MAKINS continued that, if this were so, then we must carry the majority of the United Nations with our policy. There is a strong sentiment in the United Nations in favor of an attempt to arrive at a negotiated settlement. The Canadians, for example, were strong for it and so were the Asiatics. Many of the Europeans feel the same way. A negotiated settlement may be impossible. If that were true, he did not know what would happen, but we would need the support of everyone we could rally. The question was whether we would get that support without a demonstration of our willingness to get a settlement and an ability to show good sound reasons why our effort had failed. This, he said, was the factual situation. On hard points like the seating of the Chinese in the United Nations and on Formosa and on Korea, actions had already been started in the United Nations. These could be extended and carried forward if that were part of our policy.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it was true that Russia was a nuisance in the United Nations, but on the whole he thought it was better that they should be in than out. He wondered if the same did not apply to the Chinese. He thought there was a case for seating them in the United Nations.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY RUSK said he agreed with Sir Roger Makins that we should rally as much support in the United Nations as possible and make every effort to find a settlement. However, the record indicates great doubt as to where we would come out. We have tried many times to find a settlement with the communists in various ways. When Prime Minister Nehru took the initiative in approaching the Soviet Union, Stalin published the correspondence at the wrong time and affronted Nehru. We have tried both direct and indirect approaches to the Chinese Communists. We had suggested that a United Nations Commission should supervise the border. In regard to the bombing incidents on the Manchurian frontier, we had suggested that a commission be sent to assess the damages. When the Chinese objected to that, we sent word privately to them through the Indians and told them that we would be glad to settle for the bombings by having per-

sons go to the spot privately outside the United Nations. He wondered if it was not merely the question of concessions which we were talking about here. We have never said we would not enter into talks with the Chinese Communists. Perhaps if the United Nations knew more of our efforts, their actual attitude might change.

THE PRIME MINISTER said this might be true.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the problem of world reaction and attitudes in the United Nations were not in his field and it was not for him to discuss them.

SECRETARY ACHESON interposed that General Marshall had been in that field much longer than he had.

GENERAL MARSHALL continued that, if there were any reasonable means by which we could avoid war with Communist China, we would want to take them because we were faced with the threat of a global war. We know we are dealing with people with whom it is almost impossible to negotiate. From the military point of view, it is very dangerous to go on in such a way as to weaken us in the field before we may have to fight. Specifically with regard to Formosa, among our military people some from time to time have said that it was not of great strategic importance to us but that it would become so if it were in enemy hands. It might be all right if it were neutral with Okinawa and the Philippines on each side, but it would be intolerable to have it in enemy hands. If we come out of negotiations with Formosa in hostile hands, we may have irreparably damaged our position in the Far East and in the world at large. It was hard to see how we could successfully negotiate a settlement with the Chinese Communists on these questions without making large concessions. He had nothing very constructive to suggest, but perhaps the passage of time would help us. He pointed out to the Prime Minister that the United Kingdom faced a predicament in Hong Kong but said this was not quite comparable to the Formosan question. The factors relative to a negotiation had already been discussed. We would be in an almost intolerable position if we made a big sacrifice of prestige in the western Pacific and abandoned our express commitment in Korea and also at the same time actually weakened our position. He repeated that he had no constructive solution but thought that a little time would be useful.

THE PRESIDENT said he would like to make a little comment on the Cairo Declaration. This Declaration was made at a time when the Russians, as he recalled, were not at war with Japan and Japan was the overwhelming power in the Pacific; and that our objective, if he read history correctly, was to establish power in the Far East that was friendly to the United Kingdom and the United States to offset the

vicious power of Japan. Now we were almost in the same situation with China, the great power we set up, having collapsed and its place having really been taken by Russia, since they really were Russian and nothing else. When we thought that Formosa was not strategically important to us, we never considered that the Chinese Government would be one which would be very hostile to the United States. There is no question now that it is very hostile to us. We went into Korea in support of a resolution of the United Nations. Fifty-three countries endorsed what we thought was the proper thing to prevent the vicious mistreatment of Korea. We were about to accomplish the purpose which we had started on June 25th. We had suffered some 35,000 casualties. If we surrendered Formosa, we left our flank open. Our position would then be wrecked and so would that of the United Kingdom. He just could not agree to do that, and he was sure the Prime Minister could see why. He said that he wanted peace just as Mr. Attlee did. He was not, however, in any mood for an unnecessary surrender to give in to China which is actually the Russian government. He hoped that time would bring them to realize that their friends are not in Siberia but in London and in Washington.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he didn't think we would make them realize that by continuing military action against them.

THE PRESIDENT said he quite agreed, but we couldn't leave the Koreans to be murdered.

THE PRIME MINISTER said they were agreed on that question.

THE PRESIDENT said if they licked us in Korea that was one thing, but after Dunkirk the British didn't surrender but they took it and went right on. He thought that perhaps we in the United States had inherited from the United Kingdom the spirit of not liking to pick a fight but of standing up to it when it comes to us.

LORD TEDDER inquired what military action in continuation of hostilities was contemplated and what military effect that would have on the Chinese and on our interests.

GENERAL MARSHALL said they had not drawn up any detailed preparations for such action. One suggestion had been for a blockade of the ports and possible air action against critical points. Another suggestion had been for undercover action in South China to make greater difficulties for them than they now have. This was not a proposal to hold the place but to make it harder for the Chinese. He had an open mind on these questions. He did not know how effective the blockade would be nor how soon results would come from any subversive activities. The question which was very much in his mind was the bombing procedure. This is always tangled up with the inevitable loss of civilian lives, which even in the middle of war is a very regrettable business.

GENERAL BRADLEY pointed out there was also a possibility of continuing hostilities in Korea itself.

LORD TEDDER thought that would mean a hot war.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had not yet boiled down the various considerations in his own mind.

FIELD MARSHAL SLIM inquired whether this kind of action against the Chinese Communists would not lead the Soviet Union to invoke their treaty with China.

GENERAL MARSHALL said it probably would.

THE PRESIDENT said that was what we were worried about.

SECRETARY SNYDER said he could not understand why they could fight us and we could not fight them.

GENERAL BRADLEY said they were actually sending military forces against us and did not call it war, and yet if we drop one bomb across the Yalu they say we are making war against them. It would appear from the way some of our friends talk that there was after all some value to the Soviet propaganda.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that there were also some Republicans who talked that way.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that he supposed if they attacked Hong Kong it would be war, but it was not considered war in Korea now.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed to the fact that Russian Mig's were taking part in the fighting in Korea and yet it was not considered war. We have to be careful now in regard to carrying the offensive across the river. The question was how much we would be pommelled before we hit back. He recognized that there was a fear of general war breaking out; he shared that fear but felt there were limits. He was inclined to think that the question of carrying bombing against them was too great a risk for small gains.

FIELD MARSHAL SLIM said that from a military point of view we would seem to gain little from such activities especially if we still had troops in Korea. If Russian air came in we would have to say goodbye.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it had not been intended to take any such steps until we were out of Korea.

GENERAL BRADLEY repeated this point. He recalled that as the Secretary of State had said, if we take this in the East people will wonder whether we are going to take the same kind of treatment in the West. It would be hard to see the difference.

FIELD MARSHAL SLIM said that in regard to Formosa he recognized its importance from the military point of view. He wondered whether agreement to engage in negotiations would involve giving up Formosa. He thought we might favor our having negotiation on Korea and the question of seating in the United Nations without dealing with the Formosa question. What he wanted to stress was that we should avoid a full-scale war which would tie us up in the Far East. He recalled that they also had troops involved there.

GENERAL BRADLEY suggested that if little things brought war then we were going to get into it any way. If we were, there was no point in turning over Formosa with its 300,000 troops; this was not sound from a military point of view.

THE PRESIDENT said it was not sound from the political point of view here and that he had to consider the political situation here.

LORD TEDDER said that if war started with the Chinese, the Russians might wait in Europe until it suited their book to come in. The Chinese would probably go on attacking Hong Kong and Indochina, hoping our troops would be drawn to Malaya, and at that point there might be a Russian strike in Europe. We must avoid that if we can.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that these suggestions were far away from his thinking. He wanted to avoid war with China. In thinking about the kind of continued action he had referred to, it must be borne in mind that this was something to be considered in case we were kicked out of Korea. We could either go back to Japan like a whipped dog or we could do something about it. This was all that had been thought of. Perhaps the suggested action would not be useful but he still wondered what would happen if we were led into negotiation. If it would bring about an avoidance of destruction that was something else to think of.

MR. HARRIMAN expressed the opinion that Indochina was worthless in terms of negotiation and for any other reason. There was no reason to think that the enemy would stop there. The question was one of the organization of the free world and the re-establishment of its morale. This could be accomplished only by strong action with a demonstration of strength in the Far East to the limit of our capacity and especially by pressing on with our NATO plans. We can't close our eyes to the Pacific. He doubted whether we could obtain the objectives of the Cairo Declaration. We might get into the situation of paying tribute to the Chinese Communists without getting results. Some of those in the UN hope for easy solutions. Actually the only way is to follow a vigorous policy to strengthen others and preserve a defense in depth in Southeast Asia by economic aid to Indonesia and similar countries, by strengthening the Middle East through our economic programs and mainly by getting ahead with the NATO plans. He wondered how we could do all of that if there were differences between the United States and United Kingdom regarding the East. That seemed to him the most disturbing thing in these talks. From a realistic point of view, he did not think that we could carry the American people in their support of NATO without common action in the East.

THE PRESIDENT said that we couldn't finish the job without some agreement on the Far East. There was a very difficult situation here in the United States and we could hardly talk about negotiating the question of seating the Chinese Communists.

MR. HARRIMAN said that, considering the possibility of war with Russia, our last chance was to act in accordance with the policy which the President had indicated and while we still have time get on with the constructive things which we can do.

THE PRESIDENT asked Mr. Symington whether there were any results to report from the meeting of the Working Groups on raw materials.

MR. SYMINGTON reported that another meeting was to be held at 5:00. They seemed to be getting close together on general policy and both sides felt that there was some help that each could give the other on specific things.

THE PRESIDENT said that if there were no further points that any one wished to bring up now we would resume the meeting at 11:00 tomorrow. He wanted to emphasize the importance of maintaining a solid front. It was very helpful to bring out all viewpoints and approaches. He felt that we must not end these discussions until we come out with a solid front. It would be disastrous if we could not reach accord. He wondered whether there was any desire to continue at that time unless someone had some new ideas to present.

SIR OLIVER FRANKS wondered whether our differences were as great as they seemed. In the first place he said we do not differ on the strategic importance of the island chain. Personally, he thought that the United Kingdom had been strongly moved by the military views on Formosa which had been presented. They were not asking the United States to give up Formosa.

THE PRESIDENT said that he was glad to hear Sir Oliver say this but he had never thought that they were.

SIR OLIVER FRANKS continued that he thought we were agreed on what we hoped to do in Korea. This attitude flowed naturally from the decisions which had already been made concerning aggression. He thought we further agreed that if at any stage we can have negotiations in an honorable way, that we would consider that this was sensible. We were agreed that if there were a cease-fire then there would be negotiations. No one had doubted this. It may well be that even if there were no cease-fire, there might in some other way be a chance for negotiations. He did not at the moment know how that might come about but he thought no one would say "no" to that proposition. If we were not to become involved in a major war, it seemed necessary to find some form of settlement.

THE PRESIDENT interposed that was correct.

SIR OLIVER FRANKS continued that he had no precise idea regarding the time at which there might be negotiation. What General Marshall had said was relevant to this point. They did not argue that negotiations should take place this week or next week but if the opportunity is offered to begin negotiations we should seriously consider it. That did not mean that concessions should be made in advance before we

begin negotiations. Nor did he mean to suggest that we should let ourselves go down the long slope of concessions. There was one thing on which they had not convinced the United States as yet and that was the question of Chinese Communist membership in the United Nations. From the British point of view, we did not think that agreement on this involved giving in much because they had been urging it even before the aggression started. They looked upon it as a question of fact and not as a question of whether one liked or disliked the Chinese Communists. They were, therefore, inclined to think of reaching an agreement on that point in negotiations and would not stumble over this difficulty as the United States would.

THE PRESIDENT interposed that this was indeed a vitally important point in the United States.

SIR OLIVER FRANKS continued that other points of difference were less than they had been. He was perturbed by the suggestion that if it was impossible to maintain some military force in Korea, our hostility to aggression would be expressed in some other way against the Chinese than through the continuation of the military action in Korea. That presented an opposite point of view to the one which considered that it was time to make a settlement. It might be that we were both agreed on wanting to reach a settlement in the Far East but from the UN point of view such actions as naval blockade and so on will get us into trouble as we have pointed out on both sides.

THE PRESIDENT agreed.

SIR OLIVER FRANKS continued that he thought it had been helpful to them to find that this point has not yet been settled. They were not pressing for negotiations at any price.

THE PRIME MINISTER said this was right.

SIR OLIVER FRANKS said he thought we were agreed on the prices which we should not pay. The development of a new situation changed our willingness in regard to paying the prices which we had been willing to pay months ago. Nevertheless, we should not neglect an opportunity for settlement if one were possible. Regarding the admission of the Chinese Communists to the United Nations, he thought there was not a great difference of approach but only one of emphasis. He thought that as time moved on our differences could be dissolved and that we would find a way. He was optimistic that we would be able to think up some idea for a solution, for example, in regard to Formosa. As a result of the talks they hoped that the United States would weigh the views which had been expressed on behalf of the United Kingdom with the problem of some decent negotiation.

THE PRESIDENT said that their views undoubtedly helped; the area of difference was not as great as had appeared.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that this was the case.

THE SECRETARY said that he hoped we could get on with the area of agreement. We were agreed that we must move forward with the resolution in the United Nations. A cease-fire was more likely if we keep a unified front and move forward. The United Nations now thinks there is uncertainty and difference of opinion between us. This impression centered on views which had been expressed by members of the Commonwealth—for example, Canada. We were now going ahead, especially with Canada, regarding the desirability of pushing for the six-power resolution. He hoped that we would move on steadily with this resolution but not too fast. Hesitation or delay would give an impression that we were nervous. He wanted to point out that all through the Korean affair we had been careful not to tell the truth about the Russian role in this matter. This put us at a great disadvantage and in a position of weakness. The Russians have a great advantage in their propaganda in saying this whole thing is an aggression by the United States and that it is not a United Nations action. When we have to say that this is just a matter of some North Koreans or of Chinese we are backing away from the real fact. We must not allow the Russians to appear as a disinterested friend of the Chinese, if we go into negotiations instead of having it plain that they are the ones who started the whole aggression. He called attention to the Russian attitude on the appeal of the group of Asiatic powers and said the Russians had by posing as a disinterested by-stander kicked the stuffing out of them. We must consider not formal steps to brand the Russians as aggressors but to say we understand this business that is going on; we understand that this is all Russian action and not just Chinese action. We did not need to decide this now but we were coming close to the time when we must remove the "fig leaves" as the expression was used in the State Department.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that perhaps if the Prime Minister agreed this was the time to adjourn.

The following communiqué was then mutually approved:

"The President and the Prime Minister, with members of their respective staffs, met at the White House at 3:30 this afternoon to continue their exchange of views on the broad aspects of the present world situation. This meeting is to be continued tomorrow morning to permit the two heads of government to consider reports which will be brought in by the groups working on raw materials.

"A Joint Communiqué will be issued at the conclusion of this meeting."

At this meeting, the Prime Minister handed to the President for consideration a document entitled "United States and United Kingdom Liaison Arrangements". (This document is attached as an annex to the minutes of the sixth meeting.)[1]

[1] The text of this document is scheduled for publication in volume III.

S/AE Files

Memorandum for the Record by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1950.

EXCERPT FROM MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER IN THE CABINET ROOM OF THE WHITE HOUSE, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1950

(This information not incorporated in official account of meetings.)

The President said he had just talked with the Prime Minister and that they had discussed the atomic bomb and its use. The President reminded Mr. Attlee that the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States had always been partners in this matter and that he would not consider the use of the bomb without consulting with the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister asked whether this agreement should be put in writing, and the President replied no that it would not be in writing, that if a man's word wasn't any good it wasn't made any better by writing it down. The Prime Minister expressed his thanks.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

This is single copy to be retained by Mr. Battle in the Secretary's office.[1]

[Annex]

Memorandum for the Record, by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State [2]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 16, 1953.

Subject: Truman–Attlee Conversations of December 1950: Use of Atomic Weapons

1. The position which Secretary Acheson discussed with the President, in anticipation of the British raising the question of the use of atomic weapons, is attached at Tab A.[3]

2. In the course of the Fifth Meeting of the Truman–Attlee conversations in the Cabinet Room of the White House, Thursday, December 7, 1950, the President spoke to the subject along the lines reflected in Tab B.[4]

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[1] Note in the source text.

[2] Mr. Arneson, previously Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, had assumed the position of Mr. Acheson's Special Assistant for atomic energy matters, effective November 13, 1950. He held the same post on January 16, 1953.

[3] See the subannex to this document, below.

[4] See the memorandum by Mr. Jessup, above.

3. As the Sixth Meeting began on December 8, 1950,[5] Secretary Acheson called for Mr. Arneson to join him at the White House to advise him as to what should be said in the Joint Communiqué concerning atomic weapons.

4. Shortly after 12 o'clock noon the President withdrew briefly from the meeting and went to his office to discuss with Secretary Acheson, Secretary Lovett, Secretary Snyder, Mr. Harriman, and Mr. Arneson the language to be incorporated in the Joint Communiqué. During the discussion, Secretary Lovett recalled that the Quebec Agreement [6] had provided that the United States had to obtain United Kingdom consent before using the atomic weapon. Members of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, particularly Senator Vandenberg and Senator Hickenlooper, had been very disturbed at this provision and had urged most strongly that steps be taken to abrogate it. Negotiations were undertaken at the end of 1947 [7] (Mr. Lovett was then Under Secretary of State) to supplant the Quebec Agreement with other arrangements. A salient objective of these negotiations was to terminate the provision concerning United Kingdom consent. The resultant *Modus Vivendi* of January 7, 1948,[8] provided, among other things, that the commitment concerning use of atomic weapons was to have no further force or effect. As the discussion proceeded, Mr. Arneson drafted the language which was subsequently incorporated in the final Joint Communiqué of December 8, 1950. The President approved the suggested language and asked Secretary Acheson to secure British acceptance thereof.

5. Secretary Acheson discussed the matter with Sir Oliver Franks and, with British concurrence, these two sentences were inserted as the penultimate paragraph of the Communiqué. (Tab C).[9] The United States Minutes of the Sixth Meeting state:

"The President then said there were a couple more sentences on which he and the Prime Minister had agreed and which were to be included in the communiqué. He then read the sentences dealing with the atomic bomb as they appear in the final communiqué. The President said we should find the proper place to insert them."

6. In the course of subsequent comparison of minutes of the meetings, Mr. Wayne Jackson learned that the British Minutes of the Fifth Meeting included a passage along the lines of the first statement which

[5] *Post*, p. 1468.
[6] Text in *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, p. 1117.
[7] See *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. I, pp. 781 ff.
[8] See *ibid.*, 1948, vol. I, Part 2, pp. 677 ff.
[9] The communiqué is printed as an annex to the Minutes of the 6th Meeting, December 8, p. 1476.

the President made on the subject. (Tab A).[10] The point was made at that time that this statement should be deleted since the President had corrected it and his correction constituted a change in the record of the conference itself. It was pointed out that the United States position on this matter was as reflected in the text of the Joint Communiqué. (For Ambassador Jessup's note on this point, see Tab D.)[11]

7. In subsequent conversations with Mr. F. W. Marten of the British Embassy, Mr. Arneson had occasion to make the same point, namely that the official United States position as agreed by the President and as accepted by Prime Minister Attlee, was set forth in the penultimate paragraph of the Joint Communiqué—no more and no less.

[Subannex]

Position Paper Prepared for the Truman–Attlee Talks

USE OF ATOMIC BOMB

PRESENT POSITION

The President has made clear (*a*) that by law only he can authorize its use, and (*b*) that he has not authorized its use.

The sensational action by the press in dealing with the questions and answers at the President's press conference[12] has given the impression that the President is actively considering use of the bomb in China.

BRITISH POSITION

That the bomb should not be used without consultation—and probably without agreement—with them and perhaps others. Probably, also, they are strongly opposed to its use in China.

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[10] Presumably, the reference should be to Tab B, i.e., Mr. Jessup's memorandum of December 7, p. 1462, which reflected President Truman's "first statement" on the subject.

[11] Mr. Jessup's memorandum for the record, dated January 9, 1951, read as follows:

"In discussions with the British about the minutes of the Truman–Attlee talks, Mr. Wayne Jackson was informed that in the minutes of the fifth meeting which they have in their own files they have included the first statement made by the President on the subject of the atomic bomb. We argued that the statement should be deleted since the President had corrected it and that his correction constituted a change in the record of the conference itself. They did not accept this argument so far as their file copies were concerned, but in the copy of their minutes which they are exchanging with us this paragraph is deleted."

[12] See the editorial note concerning President Truman's news conference of November 30, p. 1261.

OTHER FACTORS

These are known to the President.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ATTLEE DISCUSSIONS

(*a*) That no *commitment* be made restricting the action of the U.S.
(*b*) That our *desire* not to use the bomb be stressed.
(*c*) That our realization of the dire consequences for all of its use be stressed and our great sense of responsibility. We are, indeed, trustees for the future of the world in this respect.
(*d*) That our desire and expectation to move in step with the British be stressed. (Their role in this matter requires this.)
(*e*) That, if necessary after the preliminary discussions, further consideration of our position be undertaken.

795.00/12–850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, December 8, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received December 8—2:45 a. m.]

542. In continuation Embtel 532 December 7 and previous on Chinese intervention, in Eighth Army sector contact negligible yesterday.

Although air reconnaissance somewhat restricted, estimated 600 vehicles were sighted last night moving south through Unsan, part thence to Pyongyang and others to Tokchon. Poor visibility prevented observation of important Manpojin-Huichon highway.

There were 2 aerial encounters with Migs yesterday, both occurring in Sonchon area. 6 Migs comprised one attacking group and 4 other. 2 Migs were damaged, 1 of which probably crashed. Friendly planes suffered no damage.

Further to last paragraph Embtel 517 December 5, X Corps asserts following CCF armies operating that area: 20th, 26th, 27th and 30th. All these armies carried as part Chinese Communist Third Field Army.

MUCCIO

795.00/12–850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, December 8, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received December 8—5:35 a. m.]

544. News dispatch quoted in Deptel 423, December 7,[1] graphically illustrates frantic and almost universal desire North Korean civilians

[1] Not printed.

to escape further Communist oppression and misery. It of interest that this phenomenon is underlined in UNCURK report to UN on Chinese Communist intervention.[2] Desire to escape is enhanced because of knowledge Communists this time are alien Chinese who traditionally hated and feared by Koreans.

For Department's information, it had been hoped great majority of North Koreans would "stay put", but tide proved irresistible, particularly from Pyongyang and Chinnampo areas where deterrent steps could not easily be implemented. There is reason to believe large exodus is also under way south along coastal highway from Wonsan. Current policy is to direct refugees, who run into six figures, away from main supply routes and potential areas of military operations. Those moving south from Pyongyang area are being diverted to Haeju area. For military and security reasons, it has not been policy to encourage North Koreans to seek refuge in ROK where government and UN welfare agencies are hard pressed to care for those already here not to mention numberless others who will take to road in case Chinese Communists invade ROK.

MUCCIO

[2] See footnote 2 to telegram 396 to Seoul, November 30, 8 p. m., p. 1272.

795.00/12–850

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Henry S. Villard, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] December 8, 1950.

US/A/C.1/2341

Subject: Korean Resolution.

Participants: Mr. Sven Grafstrom, Swedish Delegation.
Mr. Henry S. Villard, United States Delegation.

I had dinner last night with Mr. Grafstrom, after which we discussed the Korean situation in some detail. The main points brought out during the course of our conversation were as follows:

(1) The Swedish Government fully supports the Six-Power Resolution and Mr. Grafstrom has his instructions to vote in its favor. He believes that the important thing is to get on with this resolution as soon as possible and to demonstrate by an overwhelming vote that it is

not merely the United States, but the United Nations which opposes aggression.

(2) Mr. Grafstrom's conversation with General Wu at Secretary-General Lie's dinner demonstrated conclusively, to Mr. Grafstrom's mind, that Wu was only a megaphone for Moscow and acting the party line under instructions without any will of his own. Grafstrom spent the major part of his time talking to Wu through an interpreter and found that his approach was no different from that displayed in the Security Council. It was futile to expect anything to come out of such talks.

(3) The situation today indicates that we have come face to face with the necessity for a showdown with Soviet Russia, that there is no compromise, no room for "negotiation" with those who seek to enslave mankind. "Black is white", "war is peace", "truth is false" are now Soviet dogma and there seems no possibility of reaching agreement on fundamental issues. There is a Swedish saying to the effect, "Better to end in disaster, than disaster without end". The only solution is for the free nations to unite against those who seek to spread their poison and infect the peoples of the world everywhere.

(4) Mr. Grafstrom considered it useless to transmit messages to Peiping through Rau or any group of Asiatic nations. However, he was inclined to favor the idea of sending a small United Nations commission to Peiping to discuss the situation directly with the authorities there and to impress upon them the unity of virtually all members of the United Nations. Direct representations on the spot to those in control of the Chinese Communist regime might penetrate the barrier of propaganda which isolates them from the world and tend to convince them of the peaceful objectives of the West and its desire to attain a reasonable solution. Sweden would be willing to serve on such a commission, said Grafstrom.

(5) Mr. Grafstrom asked that we keep in touch with the Swedish Delegation in order that it in turn may inform the Government in Stockholm as to the trend in our thinking. Stockholm was naturally looking to the United States for leadership in the crisis, although Grafstrom again emphasized that it was not the United States alone, but the United Nations which should be considered as acting against the aggression in Korea.

795.00/12–850

United States Delegation Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET
US Min–6

CABINET ROOM, THE WHITE HOUSE
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1950
11:15 AM–1:20 PM

PARTICIPANTS

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
The President	Prime Minister Attlee
The Vice President	Sir Oliver Franks
Secretary of State Acheson	Field Marshal Sir William Slim
Secretary of the Treasury Snyder	Sir Roger Makins
Attorney General McGrath	Lord Tedder
Postmaster General Donaldson	Sir Leslie Rowan [2]
Secretary of Interior Chapman	Sir Edwin Plowden
Secretary of Commerce Sawyer	Mr. Robert Scott
Under Sec. of Defense Lovett	Mr. John Barnes
Under Sec. of Agriculture McCormick	Mr. Denis Rickett
General Omar Bradley	
Mr. W. Averell Harriman	
Mr. W. Stuart Symington	
Mr. William Foster	
Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup	
Amb.-Designate Walter S. Gifford	
Asst. Sec. of State Thorp	
Asst. Sec. of State Perkins	
Asst. Sec. of State Rusk	
Asst. Sec. of Commerce Blaisdell	
Mr. Ralph Trigg [1]	
Mr. George Elsey	
Mr. Steven Early	

THE PRESIDENT opened the meeting by saying to the Prime Minister that General Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, had just returned

[1] Administrator of the Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture.
[2] Economic Minister in the British Embassy in Washington.

from a trip to Japan and Korea. They had begun these discussions with a briefing on the military situation by General Bradley and if the Prime Minister thought it would be useful he would ask General Collins to give a briefing on the situation as it stands now.

GENERAL COLLINS said that he had just returned from the four or five-day trip in which he had first gone to Tokyo where he had talked to General MacArthur.[3] He then flew to Seoul where he talked to General Walker and went on up to the western front, which at that time was somewhat south of the river. He talked to the Commanders in the field. He then flew to the Hungnam area to see the operations of the Tenth Corps and talk to General Almond. He said that as the result of his conversations, he felt that General Walker's Command, if not pinned down to any particular directive requiring him to hold the Seoul area or any other particular spot, could gradually withdraw in an organized way to the Pusan area. Pusan was an excellent port where we already had large supplies. The two-track railroad to Pusan was in excellent condition. The Eighth Army was not in danger. They were falling back now to a position north of Seoul. The ROK units were in contact only with small North Korean elements. He felt confident about the general position of the Eighth Army. He spoke of the shift in the position of United States, United Kingdom and Turkish elements in the general redeployment of the forces. He said that the United Kingdom forces had not been badly hurt. The Turks had given a very good account of themselves and had been rather badly hurt in the action. Our Second Division had suffered rather severe losses and had lost a good deal of equipment. The Second Division and the Turks were now being refitted north of Seoul.

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[3] General Collins held his final meeting with General MacArthur in Tokyo on December 7, at which time the latter gave his overall views on the Korea situation, which were then reported to the JCS by General Collins. General MacArthur felt that the full power of the United Nations should be assembled at once to meet the Communist threat in Asia, since it had appeared there. If reinforcements could be sent to Korea in time, the most advantageous maneuver would be a series of fighting withdrawals to Pusan to damage the Chinese armies as much as possible. If reinforcements could not be forwarded, he thought the Command should be evacuated from Korea. In any case, if the Communists continued their all-out drive and his Command continued to operate with the present restrictions, the forces of the United Nations would have to be withdrawn with or without an armistice. These restrictions, as listed by General Collins, were: (1) no U.N. air action against China; (2) no U.N. naval blockade of China; (3) no reinforcement of U.N. forces from Nationalist China; (4) no substantial reinforcement of U.N. forces from the United States. If the restrictions were withdrawn, and if he could secure 50,000–60,000 Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa, General MacArthur thought he could hold a line across Korea. If, on the other hand, the Chinese Communists could be persuaded not to cross the 38th Parallel, General MacArthur thought that the United Nations should accept an armistice based on the 38th Parallel, because that would be the most advantageous settlement which could be achieved in the circumstances. (*Record of the Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, pp. 70–72)

Turning to the eastern front, he said that the Seventh Division, which had been up on the Yalu, was now all back in the Hamhung bridgehead area, except for two battalions which were with the Marines south of the reservoir. He had flown out to the area where the Marines were fighting and at first they had had good weather and had been able to see the operation but a snow storm had then begun and they were only able to see part of it. He explained that the Marines had not yet started down the precipitous slope which leads from the plateau area on which they were to the valley below. Forces had been despatched northward from the bridgehead to make a junction with the Marines. In his opinion if we had any kind of a decent break in regard to the weather which would permit the operation of our air force they had a good chance of getting back. The Chinese were making a very strong effort to bar their progress but we should be able to get out if air cover can be supplied. He pointed out also that our artillery was now within range of the area involved to support the evacuation. The column had its tanks with them and the operation was being well handled. He said that General Almond feels he can hold the bridgehead, including the airfield and the two cities of Hamhung and Hungnam for a considerable time with air cover and could evacuate the forces without serious loss. If Russian air came in in strength, this would pose a more serious problem. General MacArthur's plans, pending any political decision requiring a modification, were to withdraw the Tenth Corps to the Pusan area perhaps dropping small units at Pohang which would then move inland. From a military point of view, he said that all considered, it was far sounder to go to Pusan than to try to go across to form a junction with the Eighth Army. He felt, and the Commanders in the field agreed, that we could hold a position somewhere south of Seoul. He did not think that we could hold the Seoul area itself but perhaps could fall back to a position behind the Han River or hold on the Naktong River front. In summary, from a military point of view he could say that our troops were not in a critical condition today. The position of the Marines, however, was serious. He thought, however, that the Tenth Corps could be concentrated in the Hamhung area and could be withdrawn. He thought further that a junction could be made with the Eighth Army and that they could hold the Pusan bridgehead indefinitely.

[Here follows discussion of the questions of raw materials and United States–United Kingdom liaison, scheduled for publication in volume III.]

THE PRESIDENT said it then appeared that this part of the work had been a very successful conference for both of us.

SECRETARY ACHESON raised the question of the final communiqué and suggested to the President that the group was too large to draft it.

THE PRESIDENT said clearly that the whole group could not engage in drafting. He told the Prime Minister that he would name the Secretary of State and any one that he wished to work on the matter, if that was agreeable to the Prime Minister. It was not possible to work out a draft in the entire meeting.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed and said that he would designate Sir Roger Makins to assist with the drafting on their side. He then referred to a paper which he had handed to the President yesterday on the question of perfecting the liaison between the United Kingdom and the United States (Annex B).[4] He wondered whether the President had had a chance to look at it. He had not proposed any formal arrangement but merely some informal steps.

THE PRESIDENT said that he thought the general idea was a good one but he had had no chance to talk about it with General Marshall yet but that he would do so.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked Sir Roger Makins if he could report on the present state of the communiqué.

SIR ROGER MAKINS said that a text was nearly ready to look at and that he thought they had no particular points to raise at the moment.

SECRETARY ACHESON suggested that the drafting group could look at the issues involved and bring back to the President and the Prime Minister any points requiring their decision.

THE PRESIDENT said the drafting group could get to work at once and then submit the results to the Prime Minister and to him. If the Prime Minister had not yet met the Vice President and the members of the Cabinet who were present this interval would give an opportunity to talk with them about various matters.

THE VICE PRESIDENT said that he had had the pleasure of meeting the Prime Minister some time ago and that he had spoken to him this morning and was glad to say that he found him even younger and more handsome than he had been five years ago.

In response to a question from the President, SECRETARY ACHESON said he would designate Assistant Secretary Perkins to take charge of the work on our side.

THE PRESIDENT asked the Prime Minister whether there was anything else he wished to bring up at the moment.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied he thought things were pretty well covered.

SIR OLIVER FRANKS said that all of the things they had wanted to bring up had already been covered and he thought in a very satisfactory way. They had nothing new to bring up at the last moment.

[4] The text of this document is scheduled for publication in volume III.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had nothing new in mind but that he did not want to cut off the discussion if the Prime Minister had wanted to raise anything else. The talks had been very satisfactory from his point of view.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he felt the same way.

THE PRESIDENT said we now know where each other stands and commented that the military report which they had had from General Collins gave a more satisfactory presentation than they had had before.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed.

THE PRESIDENT said that it was hard in such a military situation for those of us who are sitting at desks to know just what the situation is in the field. He recalled how in various military situations there is a tendency first to have one's feelings very high up and then very low down. He did not think that we were going to be kicked out of Korea.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that we must take a stand and see what happens. No rapid judgment should be made in a fluid situation.

GENERAL BRADLEY remarked that on the basis of the present situation we were at least not forced to negotiate under pressure.

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER agreed.

THE VICE PRESIDENT inquired whether the line that General Collins had referred to could be held by the forces already in Korea or whether we would have to send more.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that we could hold it with the present force supplemented by the normal flow of replacements.

THE PRESIDENT said that was very encouraging. The situation was not as gloomy as it had appeared on the day when the discussions had started. It was very satisfactory to hear from a man who had just been on the spot.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this was very good indeed.

There then ensued general conversation around the table in the course of which the President asked the Prime Minister to excuse him for a few minutes and withdrew from the room.

The President returned to the room at 12:35 and at 12:50 the drafting group returned with its text and the conference resumed.

THE PRESIDENT said that if it was agreeable to the Prime Minister he would ask someone to read the communiqué all the way through after which we could discuss the different points.

SECRETARY ACHESON suggested that Mr. Perkins, who had been in charge of the drafting, should read it.

MR. PERKINS read the communiqué.[5]

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[5] The draft communiqué read by Mr. Perkins is not printed.

SECRETARY ACHESON interposed at one point to ask the President whether he could raise a question then or whether the President wished the reading of the communiqué to continue and then to raise the questions.

THE PRESIDENT said he would prefer to come back later to specific points.

THE PRESIDENT then said there were a couple more sentences on which he and the Prime Minister had agreed and which were to be included in the communiqué. He then read the sentences dealing with the atomic bomb as they appear in the final communiqué. THE PRESIDENT said we should find the proper place to insert them.

THE PRESIDENT then asked Secretary Acheson if he wanted to bring up the point he had raised on the part dealing with the question of seating the Chinese Communists and Formosa.

SECRETARY ACHESON said there were two questions regarding the language which he would like to raise. In the present text, the explanation of the reasons for the United States not wishing to seat the Chinese Communist representatives in the United Nations was put in terms of our recognition of the Nationalist Government. He proposed the following substitute language: "The United Kingdom has recognized the Central People's Government and considers that its representatives should occupy China's seat in the United Nations. The United States has opposed and continued to oppose the seating of the Chinese Communist representatives in the United Nations."

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this alternate language was satisfactory.

SECRETARY ACHESON also called attention to the sentence which said that the decision on Chinese representation was, of course, a matter for the United Nations. He said this was obviously true but the question arose why it was inserted. It must have some significance. Some people might interpret it as meaning we don't like this situation but it is a fact. It was either a statement of a platitude or it had some special significance which was not apparent and he thought it was better to leave it out.

MR. HARRIMAN said that this was especially true since the thought was already expressed in the first sentence.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that the first sentence did carry the same idea, and it was agreed to delete the sentence in question.

FIELD MARSHAL SLIM wished to raise a question regarding the sentence about the appointment of the Supreme Commander. He hoped this could be modified to read: "It is intended that this appointment will be made soon." People in Europe are waiting for a definite decision on this point.

SECRETARY ACHESON said that he had no objection to the thought which the Field Marshal had advanced, but his language would sound

as if the President and the Prime Minister were announcing the intention of all of the NATO countries.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that he was very anxious to appoint the Supreme Commander.

SECRETARY ACHESON suggested it might be possible to say: "It is our joint desire that this shall be made soon."

THE PRIME MINISTER, FIELD MARSHAL SLIM and SIR ROGER MAKINS all expressed approval, and THE PRESIDENT agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that in the next to the last line in the sixth paragraph he would like to take out the word "world" before "peace." As the sentence now reads, it sounds as if we were anticipating the outbreak of world war.

THE PRESIDENT agreed.

SECRETARY ACHESON said to the President that it was recommended that the statement on the atomic bomb be inserted in the middle of page 7. In this context it would avoid having the statement refer to any particular part of the world whether Europe or the Far East. It comes in a section dealing with general military capabilities.

THE VICE PRESIDENT asked that the statement on the atomic bomb be read again, and THE PRESIDENT read it.[6] The Vice President wondered whether the statement meant that only the Prime Minister would be informed and no one else.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the Prime Minister represented the country which was especially helping us with raw materials and the general defense effort. He understood that the insertion was satisfactory.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL pointed out that on page 3 the language did not correctly state the purpose of the mission of our troops in Korea. They had been sent there not to unify Korea but to resist the aggression. The language in the communiqué did not sound as if this were true.

MR. HARRIMAN said he thought this was a very important point.

THE PRIME MINISTER and THE PRESIDENT agreed.

SECRETARY ACHESON suggested substituting the words "to end the aggression" but thought that the drafting group could fix it up. (There followed an exchange of suggestions in which Mr. Harriman, the Prime Minister and others participated ending in an agreement on the text.) The Secretary said that Mr. Early had pointed out a possible misunderstanding beginning at the bottom of page 6 where

[6] See Mr. Jessup's memorandum of December 7 and the annexed memorandum by Mr. Arneson supplementing the Minutes of the 5th Truman–Attlee Meeting of December 7, p. 1462.

the text said that the President and the Prime Minister had "reached the following decisions." Actually, this referred to only two conclusions and not to the balance of the paper. The two conclusions might be numbered.

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER agreed.

MR. HARRIMAN said the Attorney General suggested in the fourth line from the end on page 3 that the word "joint" be inserted so that the phrase would read "For our *joint* part we are ready. . . ."

THE PRESIDENT said that he and the Secretary of State did not think that the insertion of this word added anything.

SECRETARY SNYDER agreed and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL said he would not press his point.

THE PRESIDENT said that the word had better be left out and THE PRIME MINISTER said it was not necessary to put it in. THE PRESIDENT said it would therefore not be inserted.

THE PRIME MINISTER then returned to the question of the place in which the statement on the atomic bomb would be inserted. He wondered if it would not be better to insert it between the ultimate and penultimate paragraphs.

SIR OLIVER FRANKS added that if this were agreeable to the President they would be happy to have it in that place.

THE PRESIDENT agreed and said the insert should be put in the place indicated by the Prime Minister.

THE PRESIDENT then asked whether there were any other suggestions. If the communiqué was now satisfactory, it could be agreed upon.

MR. HARRIMAN said he thought there might be some concern in this country about the statement on page 9 which merely said: "We are fully conscious of the increasing necessity of preventing materials" reaching our adversaries. There was some feeling that this statement might create a good deal of discussion in the United States because of the strong feeling that we ought to do something about this problem.

THE PRESIDENT thought that the language was all right as it was. He said that actually we are doing something about it.

As the meeting closed, THE PRIME MINISTER thanked the President for his kind hospitality and for the way in which the President and his colleagues had received the Prime Minister and his associates.

THE PRESIDENT responded by referring to his statement that this had been a very productive and successful conference.

(Final Communiqué attached.)

[Annex]

Communiqué Issued at the Conclusion of the Truman–Attlee Discussions

Since Prime Minister Attlee arrived in Washington on December 4, six meetings between the President and Mr. Attlee have been held. Among those who participated as advisors to the President were the Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder, the Secretary of Defense General George C. Marshall, the Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman, the Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Mr. W. Averell Harriman, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board W. Stuart Symington, and Ambassador-designate Walter S. Gifford. Mr. Attlee's advisors included the British Ambassador, Sir Oliver S. Franks, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, Sir Roger Makins and Mr. R. H. Scott of the Foreign Office and Sir Edwin Plowden, Chief of the Economic Planning Staff.

At the conclusion of their conferences, the President and the Prime Minister issued the following joint statement:

We have reviewed together the outstanding problems facing our two countries in international affairs. The objectives of our two nations in foreign policy are the same: to maintain world peace and respect for the rights and interests of all peoples, to promote strength and confidence among the freedom-loving countries of the world, to eliminate the causes of fear, want and discontent, and to advance the democratic way of life.

We first reviewed the changed aspect of world affairs arising from the massive intervention of Chinese communists in Korea. We have discussed the problems of the Far East and the situation as it now presents itself in Europe. We have surveyed the economic problems and the defense programs of our respective countries, and particularly the existing and threatened shortages of raw materials. We have considered the arrangements for the defense of the Atlantic community, and our future course in the United Nations.

The unity of objectives of our two countries underlay all the discussions. There is no difference between us as to the nature of the threat which our countries face or the basic policies which must be pursued to overcome it. We recognize that many of the problems which we have discussed can only be decided through the procedures of the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The peoples of the United States and the United Kingdom will act together with resolution and unity to meet the challenge to peace which recent weeks have made clear to all.

The situation in Korea is one of great gravity and far-reaching consequences. By the end of October, the forces of the United Nations had all but completed the mission set for them by the United Nations

"to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." A free and unified Korea—the objective which the United Nations has long sought—was well on the way to being realized. At that point Chinese communist forces entered Korea in large numbers, and on November 27 launched a large-scale attack on the United Nations troops. The United Nations forces have the advantage of superior air power and naval support, but on the ground they are confronted by a heavy numerical superiority.

The United Nations forces were sent into Korea on the authority and at the recommendation of the United Nations. The United Nations has not changed the mission which it has entrusted to them and the forces of our two countries will continue to discharge their responsibilities.

We were in complete agreement that there can be no thought of appeasement or of rewarding aggression, whether in the Far East or elsewhere. Lasting peace and the future of the United Nations as an instrument for world peace depend upon strong support for resistance against aggression.

For our part we are ready, as we have always been, to seek an end to the hostilities by means of negotiation. The same principles of international conduct should be applied to this situation as are applied, in accordance with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to any threat to world peace. Every effort must be made to achieve the purposes of the United Nations in Korea by peaceful means and to find a solution of the Korean problem on the basis of a free and independent Korea. We are confident that the great majority of the United Nations takes the same view. If the Chinese on their side display any evidence of a similar attitude, we are hopeful that the cause of peace can be upheld. If they do not, then it will be for the peoples of the world, acting through the United Nations, to decide how the principles of the Charter can best be maintained. For our part, we declare in advance our firm resolve to uphold them.

We considered two questions regarding China which are already before the United Nations. On the question of the Chinese seat in the United Nations, the two governments differ. The United Kingdom has recognized the Central People's Government and considers that its representatives should occupy China's seat in the United Nations. The United States has opposed and continues to oppose the seating of the Chinese communist representatives in the United Nations. We have discussed our difference of view on this point and are determined to prevent it from interfering with our united effort in support of our common objectives.

On the question of Formosa, we have noted that both Chinese claimants have insisted upon the validity of the Cairo Declaration and have expressed reluctance to have the matter considered by the United Nations. We agreed that the issues should be settled by peaceful means and in such a way as to safeguard the interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific, and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute to these ends.

The free nations of Asia have given strong support to the United Nations and have worked for world peace. Communist aggression in

Korea increases the danger to the security and independence of these nations. We reaffirm our intention to continue to help them.

The pressure of communist expansion existed in Europe and elsewhere long before the aggression against Korea, and measures were taken to meet it. The need to strengthen the forces of collective security had already been recognized and action for this purpose is under way. Clearly, decisions regarding the Far East have their repercussions and effects elsewhere. In considering the necessities of the Far Eastern situation, we have kept in mind the urgency of building up the strength of the whole free world. We are in complete agreement on the need for immediate action by all the North Atlantic Treaty countries to intensify their efforts to build up their defenses and to strengthen the Atlantic Community.

We recognize that adequate defense forces are essential if war is to be prevented.

Accordingly, we have reached the following conclusions:

1. The military capabilities of the United States and the United Kingdom should be increased as rapidly as possible.
2. The two countries should expand the production of arms which can be used by the forces of all the free nations that are joined together in common defense. Together with those other nations the United States and the United Kingdom should continue to work out mutual arrangements by which all will contribute appropriately to the common defense.

We agreed that as soon as the plan now nearing completion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for an effective integrated force for the defense of Europe is approved, a Supreme Commander should be appointed. It is our joint desire that this appointment shall be made soon.

In addition to these decisions on increasing our military strength, we have agreed that the maintenance of healthy civilian economies is of vital importance to the success of our defense efforts. We agreed that, while defense production must be given the highest practicable priority in the case of raw materials whose supply is inadequate, the essential civilian requirements of the free countries must be met so far as practicable. In order to obtain the necessary materials and to devote them as rapidly as possible to these priority purposes, we have agreed to work closely together for the purpose of increasing supplies of raw materials. We have recognized the necessity of international action to assure that basic raw materials are distributed equitably in accordance with defense and essential civilian needs. We discussed certain immediate problems of raw materials shortages and consideration of these specific matters will continue. We are fully conscious of the increasing necessity of preventing materials and items of strategic importance from flowing into the hands of those who might use them against the free world.

In the circumstances which confront us throughout the world our nations have no other choice but to devote themselves with all vigor to the building up of our defense forces. We shall do this purely as a defensive measure. We believe that the communist leaders of the Soviet Union and China could, if they chose, modify their conduct in

such a way as to make these defense preparations unnecessary. We shall do everything that we can, through whatever channels are open to us, to impress this view upon them and to seek a peaceful solution of existing issues.

The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation.

In this critical period, it is a source of satisfaction to us that the views of our governments on basic problems are so similar. We believe that this identity of aims will enable our governments to carry out their determination to work together to strengthen the unity which has already been achieved among the free nations and to defend those values which are of fundamental importance to the people we represent.

795.00/12–850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 8, 1950.

Participants: Ambassador Bonnet
Assistant Secretary Rusk—FE
Mr. Godley—WE [1]

Ambassador Bonnet called this afternoon at his request to inquire as to the details of the Truman–Attlee talks and to discuss the present situation in the Far East.

I said that notwithstanding certain areas of disagreement the talks have been most helpful. I then briefly reviewed for the Ambassador the military situation in Korea pointing out that we were somewhat encouraged by the report made this morning by General Collins. Although the situation remains serious our troops in Korea still had a lot of fight left in them and the retreat has been orderly. We were, however, fearful of increased enemy air activity and had noted reinforcements, particularly bombers, of the air forces northwest of the Yalu River. For the time being enemy aircraft were appearing in very small numbers, three or six at a time, and we continue to have control of the air. Our tanks were giving a good account for themselves and the latest American tanks definitely outclass the Soviet T–34s. The French battalion is not yet in action but is being "processed" prior to entering the line.

The Ambassador inquired whether General Collins' report bore on the Truman–Attlee decision to continue the fight in Korea. I said

[1] G. McMurtrie Godley of the Office of Western European Affairs.

that it did not in that this decision was taken prior to General Collins' report.

With reference to the communiqué issued earlier today the Ambassador asked if I could give him any information regarding the discussions concerning Formosa, future economic action against China, and the subject of Southeast Asia. I replied that the discussions only touched briefly upon Formosa and that this, of course, brought up one of the points of disagreement, namely our relations with Communist China. As the Ambassador knew, the President and the Prime Minister did not agree on future action, possibly economic, against Communist China. With reference to SEA I said that this had not been discussed at the top level, but that I had spoken of it to Mr. Scott. We had discussed the matter generally, welcomed the recent French political action and noted that there was unanimity of US–UK views on that area. The Ambassador inquired several times whether the possibility of staff talks regarding SEA was mentioned to which I replied in the negative.

There then ensued a general discussion of Indochina during which the disorders in southern China and the strategic importance of Hainan were mentioned. The latter led the Ambassador to mention the importance his Government attaches to obtaining an aircraft carrier which might be used most effectively in the gulf of Tonkin.

In reference to UN action the Ambassador mentioned conflicting reports he had received from Ambassador Chauvel in New York and the Department relating to our attitude toward a possible cease-fire resolution. He had gained from Ambassador Chauvel the impression that we were opposed to any such UN action and he requested information on this point. I pointed out that Ambassador Chauvel's information was not quite correct in that although we could not take initiative on such action in the UN we would be interested in examining any such proposal in the light of existing circumstances. I added that while in view of the military situation we deemed it advisable to be neutral on this point, we were nevertheless interested in seeing whatever other countries might present. The Ambassador remarked that this seemed to be a logical and sound position.

The Ambassador then inquired as to the portion of the talks between the President and the Prime Minister relating to Europe and raw materials. I replied that although I had not been present at this portion of the conversations and could not discuss these points with him I understood there had been general agreement on these points. In this connection I remarked that we felt obliged to follow a rather straight and narrow path in that while we agreed that action in Europe must be intensified we could not permit this to result in a total disregard for Far Eastern matters and vice versa.

795.00/12–850

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ray L. Thurston, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [NEW YORK,] December 8, 1950.
US/A/C.1/2339

Subject: Failure of Chinese Communists to Receive any Instructions from Peiping.

Participants: Mr. M. Gopala Menon, Indian Delegation.
Mr. Ray Thurston, United States Delegation.

Mr. Menon told me late this afternoon that the Chinese Communists had not yet received any reply from Peiping to the communications which have been sent as a result of Indian mediatory action. He then referred to the Truman–Attlee communiqué and said it was very disappointing and indicated that no agreement had been reached on the substantive Far Eastern issues under consideration, that is, either Chinese representation or Formosa.

I told him that I was not sure about the accuracy of his remark on Formosa, since the communiqué rather left that question open.

In passing, Mr. Menon referred to Mrs. Pandit's call on General Wu last evening and said that nothing of consequence had been interchanged between them.

693.95/12–850 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, December 8, 1950—7:24 p. m.
PRIORITY [Received December 8—7:34 p. m.]

Delga 393. Following are DelGA decisions December 8: Chinese Communist aggression in Korea.

Contents and background mytel 949 [1] reviewed by delegation. Point was made that GA, after initial hysteria, seemed to be developing greater sense of confidence and appreciation of necessity for maintaining unity. Events in Committee 1 December 7, including reactions Austin speech, described to delegation.

While there was much in mytel 949 with which he agreed, Mr. Cohen questioned assumption re difference between ourselves and our allies, which he considered to be one of means and not of principle, as telegram suggested. He also disputed motives attributed to UK and other allies. He recalled that delegation last week had thought

[1] Received at 12:12 p. m. on December 7, p. 1443.

naming aggressor and calling for general support in Korea would mean extension rather than localization of conflict. In his opinion no GA delegation, aside from Soviets, was ready to forsake principles, although there was a legitimate difference of opinion as to best means of proceeding; it seemed highly questionable and lacking in humility and perspective to assume we knew the only solution. He did not believe telegram sufficiently recognized these elements in present situation, and wished his dissent to be recorded.

No decisions were taken.

Balance of meeting reported separately in Delga 392.[2]

AUSTIN

[2] Not printed; it reported on discussion of the question of Southwest Africa (320/12–850).

357.AD/12–850 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 8, 1950—8 : 11 p. m.
[Received December 8—9 : 33 p. m.]

Delga 394. Re Chinese Communists conversations with Rau. Confirming Gross–Hickerson telecon this afternoon, following is report of Gross conversation with Rau December 8.

Rau said that yesterday Chiao had asked Menon with regard to Asiatic declaration what assurances there would be that the UN forces would not cross the 38th parallel at some later date. Rau asked me what our position was on that matter. This led to a general discussion of the cease-fire situation and our attitude toward it along the following lines.

I said that we were not soliciting a cease-fire arrangement of any kind, were not taking any initiative looking toward one, and were not suggesting that anyone else take such initiative. However, in the event that someone else entirely on his own initiative proposed a cease-fire arrangement, we would be prepared to consider it on its merits, provided it contained no political conditions of any kind and provided that in all respects it was a clearly fair and honorable suggestion. I repeated that these comments on my part were not intended to suggest or imply any encouragement of initiative, and to stress this point I described the present military situation as from our point of view making it possible for us to "let nature take its course in the UN."

With regard to the specific question Rau had asked, I said that while I had no instruction on the matter except to listen to any comment

or questions that might be raised by others, it seemed to me that the basis of the question was not clear. I said that, of course, looking at the matter from a purely logical point of view, the UN forces would respect any cease-fire line or else it would not be a "cease-fire line". I added that the main problem was to avoid any political implication of any kind with regard to future settlement. This, I repeated, we were not prepared to consider at the present time in connection with any cease-fire discussion. On the other hand, if the point of the question asked by Chiao was what sort of assurances might be given that any cease-fire arrangement would be respected, that was another question and one on which I would seek advice from my government. I said I assumed that the mere fact of agreement on the part of the UN to a cease-fire arrangement with a fixed cease-fire line should in itself constitute sufficient assurance that the UN would respect that line. However, if the Chinese Communists were fishing for some implication concerning future political disposition or settlement, that was, in our view, an entirely separate matter which I was not prepared or authorized to discuss.

Rau said that his present instructions were that he was not to participate in a vote on six-power resolution until his government had had an opportunity to consider the matter in the light of reports they expected to receive from Rau and Pandit summarizing the results of the Truman–Attlee talks and the attitude of the UK delegation here based on those discussions. Rau, who is conferring with Madame Pandit at Lake Success this afternoon, told me that he expected to see the UK delegation this afternoon or evening following the conference with Attlee here which will take place in New York sometime this afternoon or this evening. For these reasons, Rau hoped we would not press for a vote on the six-power resolution at least until Monday.[1]

He said he thought he would be instructed to table the same proposal which he had circulated informally to the SC members on November 12.[2] I asked him what this signified with respect to both the cease-fire proposal embodied in those amendments and the use of the POC. Rau asked whether I thought it would be best to table the proposal as amendments to the six-power resolution or as a substitute resolution. I said that I thought we should proceed on normal schedule with the six-power resolution but that if the cease-fire proposal were tabled entirely on his own initiative, we would favor immediate consideration of the cease-fire proposal on its merits and subject to the conditions I had already specified. From this point of view it seemed to me to make little difference whether the proposals were

[1] December 11.

[2] See footnote 3 to telegram Delga 368 from New York, received at 3 p. m. on December 4, p. 1357.

tabled as amendments of [*or?*] separate proposals. Rau thought that one advantage of tabling them as a substitute resolution was that the Chinese Communists might be more ready to consider them since they had already announced their firm opposition to the six-power resolution and had warned Rau in their discussions with him that anyone who voted for the six-power resolution would have to be prepared to assume responsibility for the consequences.

Rau engaged in a long conversation re Formosa. It was perfectly clear from his belaboring of this point, and indeed he said so in so many words, that he felt it would probably be essential to "do something about the Formosan situation" in connection with the Korean question. When I pressed him on this, he said that the Chinese Communists had made it clear to him that they considered a solution of Formosa to be at least as important to them as a satisfactory settlement of Korea. Rau indicated he was playing with the idea of adding to his cease-fire proposal or amending the six-power resolution by some reference to disposition of the Formosan question. What he had in mind, he explained, was to propose that the UN should proceed to consider the Formosan question (this reasoning underlay his suggestion made to me on Thursday during the SC meeting and which I dissuaded him from including in his SC statement. This has previously been reported to Department).[3] I argued most strongly against relating these two questions and this precipitated a long discussion concerning the underlying motives of the Chinese Government.

Rau insisted that his information which turned out to be primarily from Peiping was that the Soviets "were attempting to exercise a moderating influence in the situation" and that the UN was facing not so much Communist imperialism as Chinese nationalism. On this appraisal, said Rau, the UN must beware lest it take action frustrating and driving the Chinese people closer to Moscow.

Saying that I was without any instructions on the Formosa question, it seemed to me that his appraisal of the threat to the UN was different from ours. I expressed the view that the UN was here faced with a revolt against it by an aggressive Communist movement and that if Chinese nationalism were being misused by its leaders, this was no different from what was happening in Russia where the Soviet leaders were perverting Russian nationalism in the direction of foreign adventures.

Rau indicated his awareness of our analysis and he did not press his analysis which in any event I said involved matters of such grave importance that I did not really feel competent to discuss them. I said that these were clearly issues which should be discussed at the proper political levels. Rau agreed and he did leave me with the impression

[3] For related documentation, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.

that he would not take the action re Formosa which he suggested unless both we and the British were in agreement. However, he repeated the importance which he attached to some handling by the UN of the Formosan question. He particularly stressed the 7th Fleet referring to the President's statement last January and I made the usual explanation and attempted to point out the vast change in circumstances and the gravity of the threat to the free world which had emerged since the President had made his statement in January.

I outlined to Rau on a very tentative basis our suggestion that after the adoption of the six-power resolution the next step should be consideration of a resolution naming the aggressor, calling upon all UN members to assist the UN in repelling that aggressor and perhaps calling upon the Collective Measures Committee to consider the matter and to make recommendations. He said he would report these views to his government for comment.

Reverting to the cease-fire discussion, Rau said that he believed that the demilitarized zone to which he had previously made reference, would under the present circumstances probably be the whole of Korea north of the 38th parallel. He agreed with me that the Chinese Communists must be called upon to withdraw their forces from Korea. He thought that the POC could supervise the implementation of the cease-fire. I did not discuss the question beyond this point fearing to become too deeply involved with Rau in a discussion from which he might imply that we were encouraging him to take an initiative on a cease-fire proposition.

Rau had opened the conversation by advising me he had received no further word from Wu and that no reply had been received concerning the Asiatic declaration. In answer to my question he said that he had no present plan for another meeting with the Chinese Communists.

AUSTIN

795.00/12–950

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 9, 1950.

Subject: Instructions from Prime Minister Nehru to Indian Ambassador

Participants: Mr. K. R. C. Pridham, Second Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Clubb, CA

Mr. Pridham called at his request to show me a cable received through the Foreign Office purporting to give the text of message

sent by Prime Minister Nehru on December 8 to the Indian Ambassador at Peiping, Mr. Panikkar, approving the line adopted by the latter in a conversation (undated) with "Chang" (Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs?). What line Mr. Panikkar had followed in that conversation was not clear from the cable.

Mr. Nehru went on to indicate that the first essential in respect to negotiations regarding Korea was the establishment of a cease-fire. Reference was made to the establishment of a demilitarized zone and to the withdrawal of UN forces south of the 38th Parallel. Mr. Nehru indicated, however, that any Communist demand for withdrawal of the UN forces from Korea entirely would be unrealized. The purport of his proposals for dealing with the question of political disposition of the peninsula was that Korea should be unified in accordance with the UN mandate.

The question of Formosa, according to this message, was complicated by reason of considerations of U.S. defense in the west Pacific, which had reference to both Formosa and Japan, and it was Mr. Nehru's recommendation that the matter therefore be brought up for consideration only at a later date.

Note: Mr. Graves of the British Embassy called later to request that the Department give no indication that it had knowledge of the message in point. It is recommended therefore that this message not be disseminated.

795.00/12–950 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 9, 1950—2 p. m.

PRIORITY

256. In view of uncertain military and political contingencies, it is not possible to plan far ahead in present Kor situation. Certain decisions can now be made, however, and in general, fol is current state of Dept's thinking:

Pres and PriMin communiqué makes it clear that there is no thought of appeasement, that aggression must be resisted and that peoples of world, acting through UN must decide how principles of Charter can best be maintained.

The action in UN that we will seek and tempo of UN action will to a large extent depend on our ability to mobilize and maintain

[1] Sent to Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Belgrade, Brussels, Cairo, Canberra, The Hague, London, Manila, New Delhi, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Pretoria, Quito, Seoul, Stockholm, Taipei, the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, Wellington, and to Moscow for information.

unity of free world and their determination to stand firmly against aggression. Leadership that we must provide to this end must be in such a way and at such speed as will carry with us a willing and resolute community of nations.

Action in UN.

1. *Cease Fire:*

We have not asked for cessation of hostilities in Korea and have not encouraged others to initiate move for cease fire. We will of course accept cease fire if agreed to by Chi Commies but we would not agree at price of political strings or other dishonorable conditions. If cease fire is achieved we are prepared agree to discussion of Kor question with Chi Commies in appropriate forum with view to peaceful settlement. We cannot of course commit ourselves as to substance of our position on any questions that may be involved in such negotiations.

2. *Six-Power Resolution:*

At present US is pressing in Political Comite of GA 6-Power res which was vetoed by Sov in SC. This res sponsored in GA by same 6 Powers does not brand Chi Commies as aggressors, but calls upon them to get out of Korea. Res also affirms that it is policy of UN to hold present frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Chi and Kor interests in frontier zone.

So long as Chi Commies are pressing their offensive against UN forces in Korea, adoption by GA of 6-Power res is minimum action that must be taken. This res, when overwhelmingly voted by GA, wld reassert unity of free world against aggression and in support of UN action in Korea. It wld underline principle of "Uniting for Peace" res, that Sov cannot by veto make UN impotent. Failure of UN to take action wld destroy its authority and its support among peoples of world, and particularly people of US.

We believe we must carry forward momentum in bringing this res to a vote in Comite and GA Plenary and not permit unwarranted delays. At same time we do not want to move so fast that other members will have basis believe that any opportunity for UN processes have been precluded. According to our present estimates the Comite shld reach vote on Dec 12 or, unless some indication of readiness for settlement by Chi Commie, at latest Dec 13.

If cease fire is agreed to we are of course prepared to suspend action on 6-Power res in GA pending outcome of any discussions or negotiations that may follow cease fire.

If hostilities continue we will continue fight in Korea in order discharge our responsibilities in accordance SC and GA res. If Chi Commies press their attack below 38th parallel in effort to drive UN forces into sea, further action by UN after adoption 6-Power res will be necessary. In light of appeal from Asiatic states we believe crossing 38th parallel by Chi Commies shld be treated as new and flagrant demonstration of aggression and evil design of reprehensible Chi

Commie leaders. In such circumstances with hope of peaceful settlement in Korea gone, reasons for treading softly and maintaining mild and conciliatory tone in UN will have largely disappeared. We will therefore seek support of nations which approved original UN action in Korea for resolution to brand Chi Commies as aggressors. Since UN branded NK as aggressors in June, it cld do no less with regard Chi Commies who are committing aggression not only against ROK but also against UN forces, and are also flouting authority of UN. We are still considering what other UN action shld be called for in such later res and we do not wish make that decision at this time in light uncertain military situation. We wld welcome views of other UN Members. To be effective, such GA action must command full support of dels of nations of free world.

Pls discuss foregoing with FonOff with view to getting their full support.

ACHESON

357.AD/12–950 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW YORK, December 9, 1950—5 : 27 p. m.
[Received December 9—5 : 45 p. m.]

Delga 397. Re Asian draft Korean peace plan. Below is draft plan dated December 5 and marked secret which was delivered to office of Gross in his absence this afternoon by Lopez, Philippines delegation. Marginal note in pencil on paragraph *d* on draft states "General Romulo objects to this paragraph". Lopez did not divulge origin of draft text. Covering note addressed to Gross and signed by Lopez is as follows:

Covering memo: "General Romulo, who is now in Washington, has asked me to show this general plan of a resolution to you. He doesn't know whether you have already seen it, and would only like to know your general reaction. The plan is tentative and, at this stage, unofficial.

I would appreciate a chance to have a word with you after the close of today's meeting."

Draft plans: "It is significant that in his speech before the SC, the Chinese representative at no time made reference to United Nations intervention in Korea as such, but restricted himself to charges against the United States and their intentions towards China. It might be well in this emergency for the UN, in taking note of this fact, to proceed as follows:

1. Repudiate in the strongest possible terms the charges levied by China against the US, re-emphasizing emphatically that the US action was taken at the request and as part of combined UN action and with its full endorsement and approval, which in every sense has United Nations backing.

2. Nevertheless, as illustrative of its determined intention to preserve world peace and to demonstrate the baselessness of the Chinese contention, and to bring an end to aggression, United Nations enunciates as follows:

(*a*) There will be an immediate cease fire in Korea.

(*b*) China will be requested to withdraw her troops from Korea and to cease concentrations of troops on Korean borders forthwith.

(*c*) UN will release US forces from participation in the United Nations force in Korea, and will request the US to withdraw all her troops immediately.

(*d*) The US will be requested also, to withdraw its fleet from Formosa simultaneously with the withdrawal of its forces from Korea, since with the cessation of hostilities in Korea, the commitments made by the US for the retention of its fleet in Formosa will have been fulfilled.

(*e*) The Government of South Korea would be requested to disarm its armed forces immediately and North Korean troops will likewise disarm forthwith; both to the satisfaction and under the supervision of a UN disarmament commission.

(*f*) A UN force of limited armament drawn from six member nations and not to exceed 50,000 men, without air or naval elements, will be retained by the UN in Korea as an internal security force. In addition a Korean police force of 25,000 will be maintained for like security purposes.

(*g*) UN observers will be stationed along the seaboards of Korea and along the borders of adjoining territories to assure that no infringement of the above provisions takes place.

(*h*) UNCURK will proceed to organize the holding of elections throughout Korea within six months of the cease fire order.

(*i*) Within three months of the holding of elections, the UN security force will be withdrawn from Korea and the duly elected all Korean Government will take its own steps to organize its own internal security forces.

(*j*) Within twelve months of the cease fire order and within three months after the withdrawal of the UN security forces, UNCURK will withdraw from Korea.

(*k*) Immediately after the cease fire order and for such period as might be necessary to achieve its mandate, UNKRA will operate throughout Korea to bring relief and rehabilitation assistance to the Korean peoples.

3. The United Nations will announce categorically that in the event of any parties failing to carry out the above UN rulings, immediately, then such party will immediately be declared an aggressor and a threat to world peace and the full strength of UN forces and armament of any description will forthwith be brought to bear

against them to the end that the aggression shall be thwarted and stopped." [1]

AUSTIN

[1] The Department of State sent the following reply in telegram Gadel 174, December 9, 9 p. m., to New York:

"Re urtel 397, Dec. 9, you shld at once inform Lopez US Govt unwilling accept any polit or other conditions to any cease fire proposal. If cease fire established US of course willing participate formally or informally in UN peaceful processes for settlement outstanding Far Eastern issues but naturally unwilling pay any price for start of such talks or make any advance commitment re its position on subjs which might be raised in such talks." (357.AD/12–950)

357.AD/12–950 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 9, 1950—7:56 p. m.
[Received December 9—8 p. m.]

Delga 399. From Gross. Re Chinese Communist conversations with Rau. Confirming Gross–Hickerson telecon today, following is report of Gross conversation with Rau December 9.

Rau advised me he had conversation with Wu this a.m., in which following points emerged.

Rau asked Wu whether he had received a reply from his government. Wu replied at first that he had not. Rau then pressed him by asking whether, if he had not received a specific reply, whether he had any indication of reaction his government either to discussions between Rau and Wu or to Asiatic declaration.

Wu then advised Rau that although he had received no specific reply, his government was anxious to see end to hostilities "which had been forced upon them by the US". Wu asked Rau whether he could not advise him of attitude "of the US or of the UN" toward the proposal which Rau had made. Rau replied that he could not comment about the "attitude of the UN", but that he had reason to believe US would be prepared to give consideration to a proposal for an immediate cease-fire, a demilitarized zone, and "further negotiations". Rau told me that, in connection with Wu's comment concerning the attitude of Peiping Government, Rau asked Wu whether the latter could confirm what Rau had told other members of UN concerning attitude of Peiping Government. Rau explained to Wu that he had expressed to other members of UN his (Rau's) belief that Chinese Communist Government did not wish a war. Wu repeated to him an earlier comment that his government was anxious to see an end to hostilities, repeating again that these hostilities had been forced upon his government by US.

With regard to Rau's question concerning Peiping reaction toward Asiatic declaration, Wu replied that the UN would see for itself from actions of Peiping Government. I pressed Rau for his interpretation of this somewhat cryptic reply, and Rau expressed view that Wu intended him to infer that Chinese Communists would heed the declaration. The primary basis upon which Rau apparently drew this inference was that Wu's manner throughout conversation with Rau was very friendly.

Rau told me that at end of his conversation with Wu, Rau attempted to summarize discussion. When he had finished his summary, Wu made following two points which he said he wished Rau to take as seriously intended:

(1) The Chinese Communist Government was anxious to have an end to the hostilities.
(2) Action upon the pending six-power resolution would "not facilitate matters".

Rau told me that he is awaiting further word either from Peiping or from New Delhi. He said Panikkar had been instructed to take up in Peiping the same matter which Rau had been discussing here with Wu. Rau thought he might have further word today or tomorrow re the Panikkar discussion. This connection, Thurston informed today in separate conversation with other member Indian delegation that GOI placing considerable importance on Panikkar negotiations with Chinese Communists at Peiping which were described as of "somewhat formal character" and "covering far broader scope than mere cease-fire in Korea". Inference was that other FE issues included such as Formosa and Chinese representation UN and also that GOI seeking high-level conference among UK, US, USSR and Peiping representatives as next step (Nehru's speech in Parliament yesterday cited on latter point).

Rau told me also that just before seeing me (he called me out of the political committee meeting to give me foregoing information), he had passed the word along to Kenneth Younger. Rau said Younger told him he was having lunch with me and would discuss matter with me. My lunch with Younger will enable me to confirm full accuracy of this report and I shall report later any impression which Younger may have derived.

At conclusion our conversation, Rau said that although he had not yet received instructions from New Delhi, he thought he would "probably" table the cease-fire proposal in political committee on Monday.[1] He was somewhat vague when I pressed him concerning

[1] December 11.

nature of proposal, although he indicated it would be along lines of our previous conversation, i.e., a call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and provision for demilitarized zone. I shall undoubtedly be in touch with Rau later today or tomorrow and will endeavor to obtain text of any proposal he intends to table. However, it is very important that I be in a position to make any comments on the text which Department wishes me to make, unless Department desires me to refrain from comment of any nature. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

357.AD/12–950 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 9, 1950—9:30 p. m.
[Received December 9—9:55 p. m.]

Delga 400. From Gross. Re Chinese Communist conversations with Rau and Menon. Confirming Hickerson–Gross telecon. At 6:15 p. m., December 9, I was called by Menon (Indian delegate) who asked whether I had received Department reactions to my talk with Rau earlier today (reported Delga 399 December 9). I said I had not been in touch with Department since, but that I had promptly transmitted report of conversation. Menon said they were "very anxious" to have our views, indicating that they were seeing Wu within the half-hour.

I said that under those circumstances it might be helpful to repeat what I had already told Rau. Our position is as follows: We are prepared to consider a cease-fire proposal on its merits but we are not taking the initiative in proposing one nor encouraging anyone else to do so. Therefore, it is extremely important for Rau, if he decides to continue discussions with Wu, to understand and to make it clear to Wu that he is doing so on his own initiative. Further, we would not be prepared to consider any cease-fire proposal so made unless (1) it assured the security of UN forces and (2) it neither contained nor implied any political conditions or questions of any sort whatever.

Subject to all the foregoing, we would be prepared to receive and consider any comments of the Peking regime.

I asked Menon whether he could explain what Rau meant when he referred to "negotiations" in his talk with me this morning (Delga 399 December 9 will indicate vagueness of Rau's response to my question in this regard). I said it was quite obvious that the word might mean different things, depending on the premises one had in mind. If it related to military aspects of a cease-fire, obviously, it was necessary to "negotiate" such questions as fixing a cease-fire line, possibly fixing a no-man's land, arranging for movement of detached or iso-

lated units and for feeding and medical assistance for troops, etc., we were, of course, prepared to negotiate these matters, on a military level.

If "negotiation" referred to political questions, that was another matter.

At this point, Menon asked me if we would negotiate with the Peking Government on "Korean questions" after a cease-fire. I replied that if satisfactory cease-fire arrangements were accomplished subject to the conditions I had described, we would be prepared to discuss Korean questions in or through the UN.

Menon asked if this meant we would negotiate with the Peking government. I replied that, of course, the Peking regime would be involved in such discussions, but that it must be clear this does not imply any change in our opposition to seating the Chinese Communists in the UN. Menon said that he understood this. I added that in my opinion the question of procedures for negotiations on Korean questions would be a matter for determination after a cease-fire arrangement had been put into effect. I felt that otherwise we would be, in reality, now discussing a political question as a condition of a cease-fire. However, we accepted in principle the idea of negotiating regarding Korean questions in or through the UN, and subject at all times to the maintenance of UN principles regarding Korea.

Menon said Rau might also have had in mind discussions relating to Formosa. I said this was outside the scope of issues we were now prepared to say we would discuss. I reminded Menon of my prior comments to Rau concerning our view that the Formosa question must be dealt with separately from the Korean question. (I believed it desirable to take this extreme a position in the light of Rau's proclivity to ride hard any horse he finds saddled for him).

Menon said Rau would call me back at 7:30 p. m.

Trygve Lie, in whose study I received Menon's call, heard my conversation.

At 7:45 p. m., I read the foregoing to Rusk and just as I finished, Rau phoned me. Rau said he had not received any word from Panikkar and did not expect to talk with Wu until sometime tomorrow. Rau asked me whether I had received any reactions from the Department to our conversation earlier in the day. I told him that I had talked about this with Menon earlier this evening but would like to take advantage of the fact that Rau was on the phone to recapitulate. I then read to Rau the substance of the foregoing telegram and then, for the sake of emphasis, summarized the most important points, particularly stressing the importance of Rau making clear to Wu that Rau is acting entirely on his own initiative, as well as the conditions precedent to our consideration of any cease-fire proposal resulting from Rau's initiative.

Rau said he thought he had our position clearly in mind. He asked me whether we would object to a single resolution which would mention the cease-fire, provide for cease-fire arrangements, and provide for the discussion of the Korean question after cease-fire arrangements had been effected.

I replied that subject to everything I had just mentioned to him I thought this would be an acceptable type of resolution.

Rau promised to keep in close touch with me tomorrow. He concluded by saying that he understood that my reference to negotiations in or through the UN re Korea meant that the Chinese Communists "would be included in such discussions". I confirmed this understanding.

Immediately following my conversation with Rau, I advised Rusk of the substance of the foregoing and said that since this might be the last clear chance to make any corrections in the position I had outlined to Rau, I would appreciate comments.

Rusk replied that his only comment related to what I had said to Menon regarding Formosa. Rusk pointed out that we were not taking an adamant position that we would not discuss Formosa as indicated by the fact that we had put the matter in the UN. I said that I understood this but that I thought it might be better at this stage to let the Chinese or Indians come back with something on this later than to suggest it ourselves, on the theory that we were dealing with Orientals who had only taken off the 6th veil. However, this is a point I will keep in mind in subsequent discussions. At the same time, I assume Department will wish me to avoid being drawn into a situation implying a commitment to discuss Formosa question at this stage in light of Gadel 162, December 5.[1] [Gross.]

AUSTIN

[1] The text of this telegram is printed in vol. VI, p. 589. It set forth the Department's position in favor of postponing General Assembly discussion of the Formosa question until the 6th session of the General Assembly in view of the current urgent discussion of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea (320/12–550).

357.AD/12–950 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 9, 1950—10:15 p. m.
[Received December 9—10:26 p. m.]

Delga 401. From Gross. Re Chinese Communist conversations with Lie. Following is a report of my conversation with Lie at 5:30 this evening.

Lie had seen Wu and other members of Peiping Delegation at Lake Success at 3:00 p. m. today. Lie began conversation with Wu by reading aloud wire service story that Rau had told press he had talked with Wu and believed Peiping Government desired peaceful settlement, and cessation of hostilities, and that Rau might have further word by Monday. Rau characterized statement as "inaccurate one" without elaborating.

Wu repeated he was for peace and was agreeable to a cease-fire. The world situation was prepared for a cease-fire including as it did the Truman–Attlee conference (as to which Wu's comment was that he found the communiqué "very interesting"), the fact that the threat of the atom bomb was "removed a little", the issuance of the 13 nations Asiatic appeal, and other factors.

Wu kept stressing interest, however, in US and UN formula for a cease-fire. He indicated doubts that Jebb and Rau were really indicating "views of UN and of US."

Lie said he agreed it would be helpful if Wu could learn to know UN and US formula for cease-fire and would try to find out. If Lie thought direct contact with US was desirable, would Wu prefer this or would he prefer to pursue discussions through Lie. Wu answered he would prefer latter for time being.

Lie told me he had feeling that if I had been there, matter might have been advanced.

Lie refrained from asking Wu his own views as to cease-fire, and did not think it appropriate to do so at the moment for fear of crossing lines with Rau. Wu did not mention Chinese representation or Formosa.

Lie told Wu he thought that they would have "better chance" on these questions once they stopped fighting and once a peaceful settlement for Korea had been worked out.

Wu said if 6 power resolution were adopted, it would be "an obstruction to understanding re a cease-fire". Lie replied "then we have very few days to settle the question. Next few days would be very decisive for China and Korea." Lie has impression Wu under instructions to prevent adoption of 6 power resolution and action which might follow.

Wu commented that none of 13 signers of Asia declaration had soldiers in Korea, mentioning specially India. Wu repeated he wondered about views of countries with soldiers in Korea, "especially UK and the US."

When Wu left, he told Lie he hoped "to see him again very soon." Lie indicated to me a real anxiety to "get into the act." He said he did not intend to mention to anyone else the substance of his talk

with Wu and that he hoped for advice from us, if possible on Sunday, re Lie's next steps. I said I thought it important to avoid confusion of channels and above all to avoid being trapped by a situation in which Wu had Rau and Lie bidding against each other. I therefore suggested, and Lie agreed, that he would do nothing until we had further developments from Peiping to Rau. I would talk with Lie again at that time. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

357.AD/12–950 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW YORK, December 9, 1950—10 : 25 p. m.
[Received December 9—10 : 31 p. m.]

Delga 402. From Gross. Re Asian draft Korean peace plan. Re Gadel 174, December 9,[1] when Lopez had been informed in sense of reftel earlier this evening, he agreed not to take any action on basis this or similar proposal without prior consultation and is so informing Romulo who will return NY Monday. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

[1] See footnote 1 to telegram Delga 397 received at 5 : 45 p. m. on December 9, p. 1490.

357.AD/12–950 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 9, 1950—11 : 52 p. m.
[Received December 10—12 : 36 a. m.]

403. For Hickerson, UNA, from Gross. Re UK–US talks. Report of conversation of Gross and Ross with Younger and Jebb, at lunch Saturday, December 9.

Younger, UK, and I matched our recollections of separate talks held this a. m. with Rau and nothing emerged from Younger's version which requires amendment of my report sent earlier today. According to Younger, when Rau asked Wu when latter thought Peking might reply to the Asiatic declaration, Wu answered that "the UK would be able to judge by the conduct of my government." I gave Younger fill-in on our talk with Rau at lunch on Friday (reported to Department same day).[1]

[1] See Delga 394 from New York, received at 9 : 33 p. m. on December 8, p. 1482.

We exchanged views on present situation as follows:

1. Cease-fire proposals. I stated our position in same sense as I had given it to Rau on Friday. I said that while Rau appeared to have no fixed or considered view on the question of the "demilitarized zone," he was still thinking of Chinese Communist withdrawal beyond Yalu and I had encouraged the idea. However, Ross and I agreed with Younger and Jebb it was almost unlikely that Chinese Communists would now agree to withdraw from North Korea merely in consideration of UN agreement withdraw to south of 38th parallel. I said that it was good to keep encouraging Rau to think in these terms, however unrealistic, at least until we studied Peking reply, if any.

On a wholly tentative and personal basis, I made following analysis, stressing it was not only ad referendum to Department but subject to careful analysis from military viewpoint. It seemed possible to envisage 3 phase cease-fire operation, all within purely military context. (1) Fix time for cease-fire, with concomitant military arrangements for relieving isolated units, regrouping separated units, feeding, medical aid, and other essential requirements: (2) fixing cease-fire line, for purpose of accomplishing troop movements on both sides of line. This, for example, might be a "military fix" on or near the 38th parallel, and would be without prejudice to political issues of any sort. This would involve negotiation and might indeed be agreed upon at same time as (1).The Asiatic appeal, in effect, seemed to me to fix this type of line in principle. Buffer zone might be considered in this context. (3) Question of Chinese Communist withdrawal from North Korea (assuming, of course, they do not agree to this step prior to (1) and (2)). Since this is likely to raise question of UN withdrawal from South Korea, the problem arises in form discussed by President and Prime Minister and, I thought, settled on basis that UN evacuation from Korea would not be on a voluntary basis.

Younger and Jebb expressed personal agreement with this analysis. We discussed the following two points and agreed that we both required urgent advice:

(*a*) What would be our position with regard to the problem presented by a demand by the Chinese Communists that we withdraw UN forces from Korea in return for their agreement to withdraw Chinese forces from the north? (In this connection we referred to the draft resolution tabled by Vishinsky in the 1st Committee this a. m. which, among other things, called for a "withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.")[2]

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[2] The text of the Soviet draft resolution (U.N. document A/C.1/640) read as follows:

"*The General Assembly,*

Calling attention to the grave threat to the peace and security of the peoples represented by the continued intervention in Korea of the armed forces of the United States of America and of the armed forces of the other States taking part in that intervention,

Seeking a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and the operation of peace and security in the Far East,

Recommends,

1. That all foreign troops be withdrawn immediately from Korea;

2. That the decision on the Korean question be entrusted to the Korean people themselves."

(*b*) What is our fixed position re a cease-fire line? If we have something in mind other than a military line running on or close to the 38th parallel we should make this fact known promptly, since the inference is being drawn by the UN membership that our expression of "no objection" to the Asian declaration implies agreement on our part to the 38th parallel as a cease-fire line.

We concluded this phase of the discussion by agreeing that it would be better for the British to attempt to ascertain from Rau his views concerning specifics re a cease-fire, on the basis that for us to do [so ran?] the risk of giving Rau the impression we were soliciting his initiative despite any express reservations on our part to the contrary. (We will ride the British coattails very hard on this, because experience has shown they are not always aggressive in pursuing an initiative of this sort.)

2. Six-Power resolution. We had lengthy discussion re relationship between cease-fire proposal, if tabled early next week, and action on Six-Power resolution. We agreed priority for discussion and action on cease-fire proposal, both in Political Committee and in plenary.

Differences of opinion developed re action on Six-Power resolution following GA adoption of cease-fire proposal. I expressed view that, within a very short time, possibly two or three days, after the adoption of a cease-fire resolution the 1st Committee should resume consideration of the Six-Power resolution unless, of course, the cease-fire proposal were accepted by Peiping within that time. However, Jebb expressed the opinion that following adoption of cease-fire resolution "we should shut up shop for about a fortnight." Younger said that he had not been thinking of this long a period, but thought that a week or so would be an appropriate lapse in order to give Peiping opportunity to consider the matter after receipt of the information that the GA had acted. I urged the view that such a delay would be inconsistent with our analysis, that action upon the Six-Power resolution would aid, rather than hinder, the effort to obtain a cease-fire. Our analysis was based upon the feeling that a demonstration of unity of action in support of the Six-Power resolution would be more apt to result in moral pressures upon the Peiping regime than would a period of UN inactivity. Younger and Jebb, on the other hand, believed that efforts to expedite action on the Six-Power resolution would only reflect disunity in the UN and Younger ventured the opinion that if we attempted "to force action" on the Six-Power resolution we would find that about half the members would abstain. He said he was sure this was true of the Commonwealth group and undoubtedly almost everyone else except the Latins. Although we think this an exaggeration, it is our estimate that there would be a damaging number of abstentions, including India.

Department's opinion urgently requested on question of timing.

3. UK delegation reactions to Truman–Attlee conversations and discussion of next steps. I said I would appreciate Younger's reactions to the Washington talks. Specifically, I asked him re next steps in the UN assuming no cease-fire and no compliance with Six-Power resolu-

tion. Referring to earlier conversation, Ross and I had had with Younger (reported to Hickerson by 'phone December 7)[3] I outlined on a tentative basis possible "second step resolution" in three main parts: naming the aggressor; calling upon UN members to assist UN in repelling the aggression; calling upon collective measures committee to make recommendations concerning steps to be taken. I expressed understanding that Younger had question of timing uppermost in mind but that I had derived the impression that in principle Younger's initial reaction had been favorable, subject always to agreement on timing. Younger replied that the reason he considered timing such a vital element was that the UK regarded this step as of decisive consequence, with vital implications for the future. Jebb commented that this step meant "the declaration of limited war" upon the Chinese Communists. Younger said that much consultation and long and hard thought would be necessary before this step was taken. He added that up to this point nothing but "amateurish consideration had been given to the means of conducting limited warfare" and that so far as he could see no one had sat down and thought out either the methods of doing so or the possible consequences of such action.

Younger said that he himself could not envisage taking the step of introducing a resolution along the lines I had described before the middle of January.

This led to a discussion of the conversations between the President and the Prime Minister. I attempted to summarize the points of view expressed by the President and the Secretary at the first meeting with Attlee on the basis of my knowledge derived from a reading of the minutes. Younger replied that the Prime Minister had expressed some differing opinions and that no agreement had been reached concerning the subsequent steps in the event of noncompliance with a cease-fire proposal or Six-Power resolution.

Apropos our view that Peking regime is willing satellite of Moscow, Younger commented there was "rather a difference of opinion about this" and that UK feeling was that Chinese had genuine fear ("however unwarranted") of US aggressive intentions against China. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

[3] See telegram Delga 384 from New York, received at 12:26 a. m. on December 7, p. 1432.

357.AD/12–1050 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 10, 1950—3:45 p. m.
[Received December 10—4:45 p. m.]

Delga 404. Re Asian draft Korean peace plan. Below is text of letter and memorandum received by Ross from Eban (Israel) this

morning. Eban was immediately informed of our basic position as set forth by Gross to Rau and Menon yesterday (Delga 400) and to Lopez (Gadel 174 [1] and Delga 402). Eban will take no further action without prior consultation. Said he would so inform others to whom he sent memorandum. We are covering these also.

Text of letter:

"I enclose the copy of a memorandum which we have sent to the Delegations of the United Kingdom, India, Sweden, Canada and Australia. Its purpose is to explore the possibility of a resolution on Korea which all members of the UN might find it possible to support.

Our object at this stage is only to clarify our thoughts on the matter and to test whether or not this line of thinking might be of assistance in realization of UN objectives in Korea. I need hardly say that we are keenly desirous of learning United States views on the utility of this approach.

This memorandum is entirely confidential."

Text of memorandum:

"1. The Israel Delegation suggests that it might be constructive for a group of states to propose a resolution in the GA containing the following elements in the hope of reaching a general UN agreement on Korea.

(I) An order for a cease-fire.
(II) The affirmation that the UN seeks to establish a united and independent Korea by free elections.
(III) The establishment of a UN Korean commission with the participation of the Central People's Government of China, and the USSR.
(IV) An agreement for the progressive withdrawal of non-Korean forces by June 1951, after the implementation of (III) above.
(V) A pledge by all states of strict nonintervention in the affairs of the reconstituted Korean state.
(VI) A programme for the rehabilitation of Korea under UN auspices.
(VII) An indication that the implementation of the present resolution would justify favourable action on the admission of the Central People's Government's representatives to the UN.
(VIII) A pledge to give consideration to claims and interests of the Central People's Government of China with reference to all outstanding questions (including the future of Formosa and Chinese interests in the frontier zone).

2. The recent turn of military fortunes in Korea raises issues of far wider import than the political future of that country. Nevertheless, it remains true that the military struggle originated in a conflict

[1] See footnote 1, p. 1490.

of views and interests amongst the great powers with reference to the destiny of Korea. The formulation of a political solution for Korea, which the UN can accept and in which the Central People's Government of China can both acquiesce, now appears as the only alternative to the continuing and progressive extension of the military struggle. It is clear that neither the UN nor the Central People's Republic of China will voluntarily abandon Korea and disinterest themselves permanently in the question of its future government. The prospect of terminating or even suspending the fighting without a new political departure by the UN appears remote.

3. During the closing stages of the Korean debate in the Political Committee of the GA, the Indian Delegation proposed that the Western Powers and the Soviet Union be brought together in an effort to obtain a resolution commanding unanimous support. 24 representatives supported this proposal.[1]

It is reasonable to suppose that but for the apparent prospect that the issue would soon be resolved by military action alone, an even greater number of representatives would have supported this attempt to reach an agreed solution.

4. On the assumption that the states associated with Soviet policy, including China, still adhere to the objectives set forth in the USSR resolution (A/C.1/567) tabled on 2 October, 1950,[2] it may be fruitful to examine whether these objectives can be reconciled with the policy outlined in the majority resolution adopted on 7 October, 1950 (A/C.1/558).[3]

5. The provisions outlined in paragraph 1 above, are those on which it might be possible to approach such an agreement, in the light of the declared policies of the majority of UN members on the one hand, and of the Communist states on the other. There follows a more detailed consideration of these possible points of agreement.

(I) Cease-fire:

The withdrawal of the Chinese forces would certainly be a more desirable objective than a cease-fire on present positions or at the 38th parallel. It must, however, be recognized that there is little tangible prospect that the Chinese army will halt in its tracks at a moment of victory and surrender its ground to the UN. The frame of mind which could now render this action possible would have precluded Chinese intervention in the first place. Moreover, there are many precedents in UN jurisprudence for the adoption of a cease-fire order as a provisional measure to be followed by full withdrawal, or by reductions and partial withdrawals of forces at a later stage. Thus the

[1] See the editorial notes on the First Committee meeting of October 4, pp. 864 and 873.

[2] See footnote 1, above.

[3] Same as U.N. General Assembly Resolution 376 (V), October 7, p. 904.

Security Council at various times adopted cease-fire resolutions which did not seek to restore the military *status quo* before attempting to facilitate a political settlement (e.g., entry of Arab armies into Palestine; the hostilities in Indonesia and Kashmir). In the Korean conflict a cease-fire was proposed by the majority of the Security Council on 25 June, 1950. In the Political Committee of the GA the USSR proposed a cease-fire resolution on 2 October, 1950. There is no refusal which any government can find more difficult to justify in the eyes of the world than a refusal to cease fire.

(II) Independent and unified Korea:

It should be possible for all members of the UN to reaffirm this objective. The UN commission for Korea is directed in the GA resolution to consult "both the North Korean and South Korean representative bodies" in establishing the elected organs of government in Korea. The USSR draft recommended that a national assembly be formed by "representatives of North and South Korea" in order to conduct Korean elections to the National Assembly.

(III) A UN commission for Korea:

Agreement should be sought on the constitution of a UN organ for Korea and its terms of reference. The UN resolution established a Korean commission to supervise the elections in Korea. The USSR draft proposed a UN committee "with indispensable participation of the representatives of the states bordering on Korea". In the light of recent developments, the representation of the USSR and of the Central People's Republic of China on that commission would appear to be inevitable, if it is proposed to influence the activity of Communist forces. It should be recalled that the USSR was offered membership on the original UN commission for Korea in 1947, and is a member of the peace observation group recently established by the GA. No change of principle is involved in the suggested extension of the Korean commission.

(IV) Progressive withdrawal of foreign armies:

The GA resolution on Korea declares that UN forces should "not remain in any part of Korea longer than is necessary for establishment of a unified democratic government" in Korea. The USSR draft recommended the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops to enable the Korean people to settle their political future. It should therefore be possible for both parties, in accepting the cease-fire, to reaffirm their understanding that all non-Korean forces, including Chinese forces, shall be withdrawn from Korea as soon as possible. The USSR proposal for the immediate withdrawal is however obviously unacceptable. The solution might be to set a date, about six months hence, by which all Chinese and UN forces shall be withdrawn. Such agreements for mutual withdrawal by a fixed time-table were often discussed and effected in the sequel of World War II, e.g., Iran.

(V) Non-intervention:

If all the above provisions were adopted it should be possible for all member states and other states not to intervene in Korea in any way or to impede the work of the UN commission. The unified state of Korea should be established in such a manner as to preclude any fear

that it may be used as a base for endangering the security of any neighbouring state. A special reference should be made to the inadmissibility of so-called mass "volunteering" in Korea.

(VI) Rehabilitation:

The GA resolution and the USSR draft contain almost identical provisions for the rehabilitation of Korea under UN auspices.

(VII) Status of the Central People's Government of China:

The implementation by the Central People's Government of China of these provisions including especially the cease-fire, the progressive withdrawal of forces and a pledge of nonintervention should be regarded by the majority of UN members as convincing evidence of its responsiveness to UN opinion, and as justification for the admission of its representatives.

(VIII) Negotiation of outstanding questions:

Simultaneously with the adoption of the above provisions the GA could offer to examine sympathetically other questions affecting Chinese relations with the UN including the interests and claims of the Central People's Republic in regard to Formosa and to the Manchurian–Korean frontier zone. This examination may cover all questions liable to endanger the peace and security of the Far East.

6. The Israel delegation suggests that this memorandum be read in the spirit of the following statement issued jointly by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain on December 8th:

'Every effort must be made to achieve the purposes of the UN in Korea by peaceful means and to find a solution to the Korean problem on the basis of a free and independent Korea. If the Chinese on their side show any evidence of a similar attitude, we are hopeful that the cause of peace can be upheld. If they do not, then it will be for the peoples of the world, acting through the UN, to decide how the principles of the Charter can best be maintained.'

7. The Israel delegation adheres to its previously stated position on Korean question. This memorandum should be regarded as a working paper seeking to explore ways of reconciling a conflict whose proportions and consequences endanger the peace of the world."

AUSTIN

357.AD/12–1050 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 10, 1950—9:16 p. m.
[Received December 10—9:38 p. m.]

Delga 409. Re Asian draft Korean peace plan. Following account of very brief and inconclusive conversation Gross and Ross with

Younger and Jebb at 3:30 this afternoon. Jebb said he had seen Rau this morning. Rau said he was thinking of a cease-fire resolution which, after a preamble, would in the first operative clause call for immediate cease-fire. The second operative clause would be concerned with negotiations for the establishment of a cease-fire line. In this connection Jebb reported Rau seemed to be thinking that each "side" would nominate someone as its representative. Jebb seemed to be very fuzzy about whether an attempt would be made to establish a cease-fire line in the resolution. The third operative clause, according to Jebb, involved consideration of a demilitarized zone. The fourth operative clause would be concerned with negotiations of outstanding problems related to the Korean question after the establishment of a cease-fire line. According to Jebb, Rau had the impression that a proposal along the foregoing lines had been agreed to by Gross in conversation with Rau.

Gross clarified that the discussion with Rau had been on the basis of a proposal which would (*a*) call for immediate cessation of hostilities, (*b*) provision of machinery for making cease-fire arrangements and (*c*) following establishment of cease-fire, provision for negotiations of outstanding problems regarding Korea.

Although Jebb seemed to understand that it would be difficult to establish a cease-fire line in a GA resolution, he commented that a cease-fire meant only that shooting would stop and that movement of troops would not be inhibited. For example, Chinese Communist troops might, even after cease-fire, flow down the east coast. Gross observed he had indicated to the Department, because of reference to 38th Parallel in Asian appeal, most members of UN would probably think of 38th Parallel as cease-fire line. He indicated we hoped to have instructions soon concerning cease-fire line that would be acceptable from military viewpoint. It was agreed tentatively that questions such as definition of cease-fire line and establishment demilitarized zone or buffer zone should be dealt with by machinery which would make arrangements for effectuating cease-fire.

Concerning such machinery, Gross speculated personally whether the most effective machinery might not be an individual (such as Swedish chief of staff), possibly assisted by a sub-committee of the POC or a separately constituted advisory commission. British seemed agree that an individual rather than a group would be best suited to deal with the effectuation of the cease-fire. They thought it might be a good idea to have some sort of advisory commission, Younger observing, however, that he thought POC was perhaps too large.

Younger wondered whether the designation of an individual (or a commission) would be complicated in view of the fact that MacArthur is the UN commander in the field. (The British, as well as the French

and others, seem to be bothered by fact that UN is one of antagonists in this situation.) Gross observed that he did not view this as a complicating factor, adding however, that we might be receiving quite definite views from the Department concerning preferred arrangements.

We had the impression in this conversation which, though brief, was revealing, that British are not very effectively following up with Indians.

AUSTIN

357.AD/12–1050 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 10, 1950—9 : 54 p. m.
[Received December 10—11 : 16 p. m.]

Delga 411. Re Asian draft Korean peace plan. Following is account of Gross–Ross conversation with Rau, Dayal and Menon at Rau's apartment for better than an hour this afternoon.

Gross, after indicating that the military situation seemed to be improving and was such that it would be inappropriate to leave with Rau any impression that we were encouraging any initiative with regard to a cease-fire proposal, and that in discussing the matter with Rau we did not imply any encouragement, initiated discussion by referring to Jebb's report of the latter's conversation with Rau this morning. In order to avoid any risk of misunderstanding or lack of clarity, Gross summarized his understanding of previous discussion with Rau concerning possible cease-fire proposal. As Gross understood earlier conversation with Rau, proposal involved (*a*) a call for immediate cessation of hostilities (cease-fire), (*b*) arrangements to effectuate the cease-fire and (*c*) provision that negotiations concerning Korean question might be undertaken after the cease-fire had been effectuated.

Gross indicated that in conversation with Jebb and Younger earlier in the afternoon, it was not clear from Jebb's report of his conversation with Rau whether Rau contemplated making provision in the proposal for a demilitarized zone. Rau indicated that as he had undertood earlier conversations with Gross, he had referred to the possibility of establishing, in connection with the establishment of a cease-fire line, a "buffer zone" perhaps five kilometers wide.

Gross indicated that while he saw no reason to believe that we would oppose establishment of such a buffer zone, this was nevertheless a military decision and we had not yet received instructions concerning

this and similar questions. In any event, Gross went on, he questioned whether it was necessary or desirable to refer to the question of a demilitarized or buffer zone in a resolution.

Rau replied that he did not contemplate such reference in a resolution. Establishment of a demilitarized or buffer zone is, as in the case of establishment of a cease-fire line, a matter which should be determined in military negotiations.

In a further endeavor to clarify understanding by Rau, Gross restated his understanding of what Rau said the draft cease-fire would contain as follows: (*a*) A call for the immediate cessation of hostilities, (*b*) provision for truce machinery to assist and supervise the making and execution of arrangements to effectuate the cease-fire and (*c*) some provision for negotiations on the Korean questions after the cease-fire had been effectuated.

Gross emphasized that regarding, in particular, the second two parts of the proposal, he was speaking personally, since we were without instruction. As a matter of timing, consideration had been given to these matters, but our government did not see how it would be possible to give our views even informally with regard to a draft proposal before Tuesday.[1] He wondered, therefore, whether introduction of the draft proposal might not be postponed until Tuesday. Rau said he appreciated our problem of time and doubted whether in any event he would be ready to table a draft proposal before Monday afternoon. (At a later point in the conversation Rau indicated that it is the Asian group as a whole which is considering sponsoring the draft proposal. This would not include Turkey, which has forces in Korea and is not willing to be in a position of appearing to plead for cease-fire).

Rau, although apparently anxious to table proposal as soon as possible, did not demur to slight delay (British earlier had indicated they would not object to delay until Tuesday) since he said that our views would be of very great assistance to him. He would like to know what we would consider a feasible plan; what in other words we would be prepared to accept; what we would view as the proper content of a resolution. He added that after all if the agreement of the Chinese Communists on the one hand and of the US and the UK on the other was not obtained, a cease-fire proposal would be a futility.

Gross indicated that our military had not asked us to seek a cease-fire and that we are not soliciting one. It was therefore a little difficult for us to advance suggestions of our own. On the other hand, if we knew somewhat more precisely his own views, we would of course transmit those views to the Department and comment to the best of our ability.

[1] December 12.

Rau indicated that his views had not yet crystallized. In the first place with regard to a cease-fire (and thinking of the Charter) the GA can do nothing but recommend to member states or to the SC or to both. He had been thinking with regard to the first operative clause of a resolution concerning a cease-fire that it might read somewhat as follows: "1. Recommends that there shall be an immediate cessation of hostilities." Rau supposed that the Chinese Communists and the NK's as well as the Unified Command would take this as a recommendation and he hoped act in accordance therewith. He had not decided whether a definite date should be set for the cease-fire in the resolution or whether the call should simply be for an immediate cease-fire or a cease-fire at the earliest possible date. He agreed with Gross' comment that the term immediate would seem to cover the situation. It was obvious that Rau was very much concerned about the peculiar relationship of the UN in the Korean affair. At this point Rau showed us the text of a preamble he had drafted. This viewed with grave concern the situation in the Far East, declared that steps should be taken to prevent the spread of the conflict and to end the fighting in Korea in order that further steps might be taken to deal with outstanding issues in the area. Commenting that this appeared to be in line with our thinking, but suggesting that the word "and" might be substituted for the phrase "in order that," Gross brought the discussion back to the first operative paragraph of a possible resolution by mentioning a possible formula we had discussed among ourselves in an effort to find a way to get over the difficulty which seemed to be bothering Rau and some others concerning the particular status of the UN. We had thought, said Gross, that the first operative paragraph might, in two parts, first, call upon or provide that the forces in action against the UN in Korea should immediately cease hostilities and, second, decide (determine, recommend) that UN forces in Korea should thereupon (at the same time) cease fire. Rau seemed to feel that this might meet the difficulty.

Moving on to the second operative paragraph of a possible resolution (machinery for cease-fire arrangements) Gross said that speaking personally (Washington might have something entirely different in mind) we had been thinking about four alternative possibilities as follows: (*a*) UNCURK, (*b*) POC, (*c*) a special commission perhaps composed, for example, of the Indian and Swedish chiefs of staff, (*d*) a single individual or (*e*) some combination of the foregoing, for example, an individual who might have the benefit of the advice and assistance of the POC or a subcommittee of the POC.

Ross observed that an examination of the precedents in UN as well as sound administrative doctrine would seem to indicate that for the type of job in hand a single individual would be more effective in

468-806—76——96

bringing about the necessary arrangements than a commission. Rau and his colleagues seemed to feel that this was probably the case.

Moving on to the third element in a possible draft resolution, Gross emphasized very strongly that we wanted to avoid any implication whatever that an indication of willingness to consider other questions after establishment of the cease-fire constituted a price paid for a cease-fire or a condition of a cease-fire. In other words, a cease-fire would have to stand on its own legs. Therefore any provision concerning future discussions would have to be drawn most carefully in order to avoid any implication that agreement to discuss other matters after a cease-fire was a price or condition. Rau said that he was very anxious to avoid any undermining of the authority of the UN. He said that his appraisal of present situation is that it is the result of misunderstanding. He said it had of course never been contemplated that the UN would launch a war against China. He also feels that the Chinese Communists have never contemplated launching a war against the UN. However, events, the results of which we did not foresee, have brought the Chinese Communists to the view that the rest of the world wants war with it. Previous resolutions, Rau said, have perhaps not been sufficiently explicit. We have never said explicitly that the UN should not or would not go beyond a certain point. He felt that this situation of misunderstanding could and should be put right without any suggestion of surrender or appeasement.

Gross responded that as a practical matter it was impossible for any discussions to take place while hostilities were going on. The preamble of a resolution might therefore make explicit that the continuance of hostilities made it impossible for discussions relating to the other issues to take place.

Gross expressed view that the third operative section of the resolution could be pitched to this key. It might, for example, provide that although the continuation of hostilities against the UN made it impossible to discuss the Korean question, the UN would resume discussion of the Korean question after the termination of hostilities, including in such discussions authorities or governments concerned or interested. He pointed out this approach would not merely avoid any implication that a political price was being paid for the obtaining of a cease-fire, but also it would avoid the unfounded implication that the UN had not in fact been considering the Korean question. He added that, after all, it was of the essence of the UN that it was a standing forum in which all issues affecting international relations and peace were under constant discussions and that the tone of the third section of a draft resolution should not undermine this proposition.

Gross questioned whether consideration should not be given to separating the element of future discussion from a cease-fire proposal in

order to avoid confusion or any risk that the question of future discussions might be linked by implication as a condition for a cease-fire. Rau explained that in order to make any resolution acceptable to the Chinese Communists it would be necessary to show them in the same resolution what would come next. Gross felt that if the third operative paragraph of a resolution were pitched to the thought he had just outlined, this objective could be met without impairing the prestige of the UN. At the same time such an approach would show the Chinese Communists that a cease-fire did not lead to a blank wall.

Rau inquired whether we had any thoughts about the composition of the body which might conduct negotiations after cessation of hostilities had been effectuated. Gross replied that this question seemed to us to be an important one but premature, and to become involved in that question would very likely color and confuse the cease-fire discussion. We are prepared in principle to discuss any questions if a cease-fire is effected. For the moment, however, we are not prepared to discuss such suggestions as that made by Nehru concerning great power discussions.

Rau indicated that he had not received any word from Delhi concerning Panikkar's activities nor had he been able to get in touch with the Chinese Communists today. He indicated that he would communicate with us anything of interest after the Asian group meeting this afternoon, in particular that he would communicate to us as soon as possible any draft resolution bearing in mind our time problem.

Later this evening Rau advised Gross that the Asian group had agreed not to table a cease-fire proposal until Tuesday. Rau said that he did not think it safe to wait until after Tuesday because of the gravity of the situation. He also said he had agreed to meet with the Asian group Monday, 11:30 a. m., to discuss a draft resolution. Gross asked him whether he would make the draft available to him before the meeting, on as confidential a basis as he wished. Rau seemed somewhat reluctant to do this, but said he would confer with his colleagues. Gross told him that he thought this would help him meet his own timetable.

AUSTIN

357.AD/12–1050: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 10, 1950—9:54 p. m.
[Received December 10—11:43 p. m.]

Delga 412. Re Asian draft Korean peace plan. Initial reaction Canadian delegation (Holmes and Riddell) to Israeli proposals

(reported Delga 404[1]) is similar to ours. Canadian representatives accept idea of not attaching any political or other conditions to any cease-fire proposal. They raised question as to negotiation of cease-fire arrangements in view of Chinese Communist insistence that the only Chinese Communist soldiers in Korea are volunteers and said Norwegians worried about same problem. US representative expressed view that it would obviously be necessary for some UN representative to discuss details military arrangements for cease-fire, including possible regroupment of separated sectors of UN troops (about whom Canadian delegation seemed especially concerned); that these discussions would probably have to be held on spot with whatever military commanders were in charge of enemy operations (whatever their nationality) and had authority to commit enemy on such military matters. Canadian representatives indicated that Pearson had not seen Israeli proposal and they were somewhat out of touch with his thinking for last two days. He is expected to return New York early Monday morning and they will communicate further with us.

General US position on cease-fire discussed with Pakistan representatives (Mohammed Ali and Ayub) prior to their meeting with rest of Asian group this p. m. They took view that there are really two practical alternatives: (1) simple cease-fire, unencumbered with political considerations or implications of any sort. They appreciated reasons why this would be only acceptable position of US at present time; or (2) a resolution which, in addition to cease-fire, made provision for "complete settlement" of Korean problem, including time tables for withdrawal various forces, elections, et cetera. Pakistan representatives characterized Rau's approach as being composed of three elements (*a*) cease-fire, (*b*) demilitarized zone, and (*c*) some "machinery or steps for resolving the existing conflict on all questions in the Far East." In terms of the two, clear-cut alternatives as Pakistanis see them, Rau's idea for demilitarized zone in connection with a cease-fire is unnecessary and impractical for following reasons:

1. Rau's original idea that this zone should be "buffer" area along North Korea boundary has been made anachronistic by events;
2. Concept of a demilitarized zone as a narrow strip of neutral territory between the two armies is unnecessary. As shown by Kashmir experience, opposing armies are not arrayed in solid lines; a certain "no man's land" naturally comes about through the disposition of opposing units by respective military commanders and the consequent minimization of possibilities of dangerous contact is thus worked out in process of demarcating lines, without necessity of specification of neutral zone;
3. Rau's idea that demilitarized zone should comprise all of North Korea and that Chinese Communist forces should withdraw com-

[1] Dated December 10, p. 1499.

pletely contravenes purity of concept of simple cease-fire and interjects one of the series of steps necessarily involved in working out the complete politico-military solution of Korean problem. This should not be done unless we are prepared to embark on the second alternative of working out now in one package the complete settlement. To bring up question of complete Chinese Communist withdrawal as part of cease-fire would thus bring in its train the concomitant and consequential problems of disbandment of North Korean forces, governance of North Korea in interim, withdrawal of UN troops from South Korea, et cetera which US is understandably opposed to considering at moment.

According to Pakistani representatives, Rau's third point, on which he has been to date equally vague, was to provide some machinery for resolving Korean and all related Far East problems. They accepted US position that if and after satisfactory cease-fire arrangements had been concluded, we would be prepared discuss other questions re Korea in or through UN, but were concerned at what UN machinery might be used for this purpose since at same time US maintained that willingness discuss such questions did not imply any change in our opposition to seating Chinese Communists. Pakistani representatives felt that simply to permit latter to participate in discussions in Committee 1 would not be sufficient and suggested that, among other alternatives, Committee 1 might appoint small subcommittee of US, UK, and USSR which would consult with Chinese Communists on methods of working out political solution of a free and independent Korea, following cease-fire.

From Australian representatives (Tange, MacIntyre and Shann) US representative learned that Colonel Katzin had drafted and discussed with at least Australian, Canadian and Philippine delegations, proposals which closely parallel those of Lopez (Delga 397 [2]). It thus seems clear that Katzin is real author of Lopez proposals. According to Australians, Pearson replied that the Katzin-Lopez proposals have no merit at all; Romulo reportedly liked them; and Australian delegation was completely noncommittal to Katzin.

Although Australian representatives stressed that Australian Government had not received or considered either the Israeli or the Katzin-Lopez proposals, the Australian representatives were inclined agree that former was unacceptable because they involved problems of political settlement in Korea, as well as a cease-fire. They felt that latter were even more difficult to accept because in addition they interjected Formosa and Chinese representation problems as well. On other hand, Australian representatives felt that unless military commanders were certain they could stabilize the situation at or near the 38th parallel by military action, acceptance of a cease-fire was probably

[2] Received at 5 : 45 p. m. on December 9, p. 1488.

necessary. They were convinced, however, that any simple cease-fire resolution would at least have also to include a reiteration by the UN of its political objectives of a free, unified, and independent Korea, etc. and probably also a declaration of the willingness of the UN to discuss, in the light of the changed situation, the best methods of achieving those objectives, permitting the Chinese Communist representatives to participate in such discussions. They stressed importance of UN standing firm on its declared political objectives, but clearly distinguishing between those and the military objectives which had always been limited to repelling the aggression and not, as a military objective per se, to unifying Korea by military force.

AUSTIN

357.AD/12–1150 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 11, 1950—10 : 03 a. m.
[Received December 11—10 : 21 a. m.]

Delga 413. Re Korea—views of LA delegations. During evening December 10 US GADel officer spoke separately with representatives of Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Ecuador describing current developments re cease fire and outlining US position as set forth by Gross and reported Delga 400.[1]

All 4 Latin Americans were pleased with developments and indicated approval US position. At the same time all expressed in varied degree considerable skepticism over possibility that PRC would accept cease fire agreement without requiring political concessions on our part which we would be unable to make. Gutierrez (Cuba) and Santa Cruz (Chile) emphasized importance of thinking now of next step in event cease fire negotiations fail. They also expressed view that situation is made more serious by failure of US and UK to agree to broad issues in Far East and by what they sense as lowered prestige of US among Asian and European countries because of military reverses.

It appears that the Latin Americans as represented by the above 4 delegations continue to be ready to support the US position in the Korean situation as part of the larger world conflict and await our lead.

AUSTIN

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[1] Received at 9 : 55 p. m. on December 9, p. 1492.

795.00/12–1150

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 11, 1950.

Subject: Point of View of ROK Toward Present Situation in Korea.

Participants: Dr. John M. Chang, Korean Ambassador
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs

Ambassador Chang called on Mr. Rusk this morning at 11:30 at the Ambassador's request. The Ambassador opened the conversation by saying that he had been instructed by his government to bring to the attention of the Department its complete and determined opposition to re-establishment of the 38th Parallel as any kind of frontier or any other form of compromise with or appeasement of the Communists. Dr. Chang repeatedly emphasized this point and stated that the Korean people would never accept such a solution in Korea and that after the terrible sacrifice and sufferings which they had undergone the Koreans were determined to fight to the bitter end for complete unification of their country, adding that no other solution, however temporary, would be acceptable to his Government.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that both the United States and the United Nations had never recognized the legitimacy of the 38th Parallel as a frontier, that they remained committed to the original principles of unification and independence for Korea, and were not now disposed to compromise these principles. He stressed, however, that the military situation was such that there might remain for the United Nations and for Korea only the undesirable alternatives of stabilizing the situation, through negotiation, at some line such as the 38th Parallel or of being driven entirely out of the peninsula by superior military forces. He asked the Ambassador which of these two disagreeable alternatives he thought would be considered the most desirable by his government, adding that because of its geographical location, Korea never could be free from having Communist China or the USSR on its borders.

The Ambassador replied that his instructions did not cover this particular point, that he would ask for further clarification of it but that in principal his government and the Korean people were determined not to accept any compromise with the Communists which would lead to a restoration, however temporary, of the 38th Parallel

or any other line south of the Yalu. The Ambassador said that at his recent visit to the White House, the President had assured him that the United States would not seek appeasement of the Communists in Korea nor abandon the basic principles which motivated our actions there, and that the United States was not disposed to withdraw from Korea unless forced to pull out by military action. The Ambassador believed that this statement by the President represented a close approximation of the position of the ROK which he had just described and that it would imply that the United States would never settle for even a temporary re-establishment of any artificial division of Korea such as the 38th Parallel. He asked Mr. Rusk to stress to the President, to the Secretary, and to the Department of Defense the position of the ROK which he had outlined.

Mr. Rusk stated that he had seen reports indicating that over 500,000 North Korean refugees were moving south from the area menaced by Communist re-occupation and asked the Ambassador if he had any information on this. The Ambassador replied that while he had no exact figures, reports from Seoul indicated a very extensive refugee movement into South Korea and remarked that over 2,000,000 refugees had come south after the occupation of North Korea by the USSR in 1945.

Mr. Rusk suggested that the Ambassador might wish to discuss the position of his government on any compromise solution to the Korean problem with his Asiatic colleagues and to bring to their attention the ROK opposition to such a solution. The Ambassador replied that he had done this on various occasions in the past but that these colleagues usually reacted by saying only that they would follow the United States lead. Mr. Rusk mentioned that frequently the same Asiatic representatives had taken with us a different and more critical view of United States leadership and that often we found that they were not fully keeping up with us.

The Ambassador raised the question of the group of Koreans in Los Angeles who had consistently tended to support the Communist line in relation to Korea and were now engaged in vicious propaganda against our current actions there. He asked if something could not be done to stop their activities. Mr. Rusk recalled that some time ago we had looked into the matter and said that we would follow up the question to see what the status of these individuals now is. He asked Mr. Emmons to investigate the matter and give him a report.

357.AD/12–1150 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW YORK, December 11, 1950—12:30 p. m.
[Received December 11—1:08 p. m.]

Delga 415. Re Korea. Confirming Ross-Hickerson telecon, Fawzi Bey gave us this morning with great reluctance and on most personal and most confidential basis in order protect his relations with his Asian colleagues, the following text of draft resolution for cease-fire which was basis for discussion in Asian group meeting yesterday evening. This text is being worked on by Sir B. N. Rau whose redraft will be basis for discussion at Asian group meeting 11:30 this morning. Text follows:

"*The GA*

Considering that resolving of the conflict in Korea is an important step towards the restoration of world peace and friendly relations among nations;

"*Reaffirming* its objective for the establishment of a united, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea;

"*Recommends* that:

"1. There should be immediate cessation of fighting in Korea;

"2. A cease-fire line should be demarcated;

"3. As soon as the cease-fire has become effective, representatives of ——— should meet to make recommendations for

"(*a*) Rehabilitation and restoration of normal conditions in Korea;

"(*b*) The establishment of a united, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea."

Authorship of this draft was claimed by Fawzi but we have reason to believe Pakistanis participated in draft.

Differences within Asian group centered around numbered paragraph 3. The general trend of opinion seemed to be that the specific countries to meet would be the Four Big Powers plus Communist China plus two neutrals (India and Egypt).

Second point of difference within group is apparently whether future discussions should be limited to Korea or be more comprehensive to include other FE subjects.

Fawzi said best authorities agreed that coupling Communist China with other governments in text resolution did not mean recognition

Communist China. He said that if anyone had any doubt about this question they could clearly state in Assembly that recognition would not be implied. He said Egypt would so state.

Fawzi said that he felt his draft took fully into account our concern, with which he agreed, that no political conditions should be attached to the cease-fire.

Ross took following line strongly but on personal basis:

(*a*) Getting into specifics or modalities of who would discuss what with whom or broadening possible future discussions beyond Korea if not implying could readily be misinterpreted as implying political conditions to a cease-fire.

(*b*) Getting involved in specifics regarding future discussions would seem to involve, from viewpoint of Asian group which is seeking the cease-fire, confusion of issues which might impair acceptability of cease-fire resolution to Assembly.

Fawzi said their objective was "cooperation from both sides (US and the other party)". He said the Asians wanted to cooperate with us but did not want to be in position of dependence on our views. They wanted to avoid having to act on basis of "green light from any quarter". He said he thought that if it were desirable to avoid specifics concerning future discussions he at least was willing to consider doing so without committing himself, however, on this point.

Fawzi then raised question whether we were prepared to give priority to cease-fire resolution over six-power resolution. Ross said that in principle we were willing do so; however, he added, we would have to reserve our position on this point until we knew specifically what Asian group wanted to propose.

In this connection, Ross went on, it was very difficult to give authoritative views of USG in absence of specific proposal. In this connection Ross asked Fawzi (*a*) whether Fawzi would not be willing use his influence at 11:30 group meeting to prevent final decision being taken before we had opportunity [(*b*)] to see any draft proposal that may emerge from 11:30 meeting before final decision is taken but without committing group to acceptance of any views we might have to express. He added they would try to give us draft about 1 o'clock but would hope to have our comments before end of afternoon to permit them to make final decision at further group meeting late in afternoon preparatory to filing draft Tuesday morning.[1]

With regard to point (*b*) Fawzi finally agreed to give us last night's draft on basis indicated above.

AUSTIN

[1] For a subsequent report on the meeting of the Arab–Asian representatives, see the memorandum by Mr. Noyes, dated December 12, of a conversation with General Romulo, p. 1527.

795.00/12–1150

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bancroft)

[WASHINGTON,] December 11, 1950.

Participants: Mr. Hickerson—UNA
Ambassador Gross—USUN

Mr. Hickerson called Mr. Gross to give him some reactions to the revised draft resolution circulated by Rau after the meeting of the Asians this morning.[1]

Mr. Hickerson pointed out that we had had a meeting with the military, who were still in the room,[2] and that he and Rusk had talked the question over with the Secretary in the last few minutes. The line that was agreed upon for Gross to take with Romulo was as follows:

The proposed resolution was filled with military bugs of various sorts, among which were the question of whether there was adequate provision to prevent the Chinese from building up their strength, either by bringing new units into Korea or reinforcing existing units; there was no provision for inspection to insure that the Chinese Communists complied with the cease-fire arrangements when agreed upon; there was no provision preventing movement of the Chinese Communist units in North Korea in such a way as to regroup to strengthen their position. All these things made it clear that it was difficult and disadvantageous for the Assembly to adopt a resolution for a cease-fire when there had been no agreement in principle by the Chinese Communists to a cease-fire. This was a unique situation which differed from other cases before the United Nations where it was known in advance that there would be agreement in principle to a cease-fire. Therefore, although we should not run out on the cease-fire and should not depart from our position that we would consider any cease-fire on its merits, we should tell Romulo that we thought the first thing was to seek to obtain agreement to a cease-fire.

Accordingly, the course of action which we preferred would be to have Entezam, as President of the Assembly, with the help of Rau because of his initiative, and perhaps Mike Pearson, try to negotiate a basic agreement for a cease-fire with the Chinese Communists and the Unified Command. This should be done quietly and without publicity of any sort.

Our second preference would be to have a General Assembly resolution asking Entezam to appoint a commission which would consider

[1] The text of the revised draft resolution was telephoned to the Department from New York, but no text has been found in the Department of State files.

[2] Messrs. Bancroft, Hickerson, and Rusk had met with 7 representatives of the military services including Vice Admiral Arthur C. Davis, Director of the Joint Staff of the JCS. A memorandum on this meeting by Mr. Bancroft, not printed, is in file 795.00/12–1150; the gist of the meeting is given in Mr. Rusk's memorandum, *infra*.

the problem of cease-fire from every angle and determine whether or not a cease-fire would be agreeable to the Chinese Communists and under what terms.

A third alternative approach to take with Romulo would be to suggest to him that there should be included in the cease-fire proposal terms which would make it unacceptable to the Chinese Communists.

An acceptable variant of the third alternative would be to take the first two operative paragraphs of the Fawzi Bey draft and to add a third paragraph asking the President of the General Assembly to appoint a committee of, say three, to supervise the arrangements to carry out the cease-fire and demarcation of a line.

Mr. Hickerson emphasized that by suggesting these alternatives, it did not mean that we were running out on our agreement to consider a cease-fire. He said he realized that it would be a difficult task for Gross to get this across to the Asian group.

H. B[ANCROFT]

795.00/12–1150

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON.]

NOTES ON MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
December 11, 1950

At the beginning of the National Security Council meeting this afternoon, the Secretary of State asked the President's permission to take up at once a problem which has arisen at Lake Success about a cease-fire in Korea. The Secretary outlined briefly what the Asian group of states have in mind as a cease-fire resolution. He then said that in discussions in the Department of State today representatives of the armed services had raised some question about the desirability of a cease-fire in the present situation. The Secretary felt it of the greatest importance, in view of the Truman–Attlee discussion on the same subject, to discuss this matter in the NSC in order that the President might give us guidance as to how to proceed.

I was then asked to amplify the discussion in the Department of State with representatives of the armed services. I said that serious military questions arise from the cease-fire proposal, some of them affecting the basic security of UN forces. I said that the military representatives had raised the question of the continued buildup of enemy forces at the front without being subjected to UN air attack and the great danger which could be created by an enemy concentra-

tion with large stocks of supplies immediately available in the event the enemy decided to break the cease-fire. I pointed out that there is a serious question as to the action of the Tenth Corps in Northeast Korea. I also referred to the desire of the military to hold certain strong points which are in fact north of the 38th parallel.

I continued by relating the cease-fire problem to our longer-range intention to liquidate our commitments in Korea when possible. I said there were three broad possibilities: (1) A complete UN victory throughout all of Korea, which the enemy is now militarily capable of denying to us; (2) A complete evacuation of Korea by being forced out of Korea militarily; and, (3) Some stabilization inside Korea either on a military basis or on a cease-fire basis in connection with which military and political factors should operate. I said that our attitude on the cease-fire ought to be connected with our longer-range problem of disengaging U.S. forces from Korea.

I then stated that we had considered as an alternative to the type resolution which the Asian countries were planning to introduce a suggestion that Mr. Entezam, President of the General Assembly, should be asked to constitute a small committee of perhaps himself, Rau and Pearson to negotiate the military conditions of the cease-fire prior to the introduction of the resolution in the General Assembly. Another alternative would be, if the Asian countries insisted upon introducing a resolution, to let them file a resolution asking the President of the General Assembly to constitute a small committee to negotiate the conditions for a cease-fire.

The President indicated that he thought these latter alternatives would be preferable to the type resolution which the Asians were now considering. It was pointed out to him that we could not, of course, guarantee that the Asians would not in fact introduce their resolution without regard to our view.

Secretary Marshall then asked Admiral Davis what the views of the Military Staff are about the specific military conditions of a cease-fire. Admiral Davis indicated the types of questions which would have to be considered but said that the Staff had not come up with any conclusions as to the exact requirements which would be needed.

Secretary Marshall then emphasized the indispensable condition that any cease-fire arrangements must be supervised by a UN commission with access throughout all of Korea. He said that otherwise we would not have any protection against major violations—and that he had had plenty of experience with such violations in the year in China during which he was dealing with the same people. He also indicated that this condition might in fact result in the Communists refusing the cease-fire—but that that was a result which we could accept.

General Bedell Smith raised the question as to why it would not be desirable to move immediately a cease-fire on the basis of the 38th parallel. He said that although certain UN Forces were now north of the parallel, he understood that it was not the intention or the capability of the UN Command to hold north of the 38th parallel. He said that there had been some indications that the Chinese Communists might not in fact go below the 38th parallel and that it might be possible to get an agreed cease-fire on the basis of that *status quo* position. The President said that it was his understanding that General MacArthur wished to hold his present position north of the 38th parallel tenaciously and that the President thought that was the proper thing to do. Secretary Marshall intervened to say that although General MacArthur was establishing a definite line in positions north of the 38th parallel, he would not favor any order to General MacArthur which would limit in any way his withdrawal to positions further to the south. Both Secretary Marshall and General Bradley indicated that the positions north of the 38th parallel were temporary but that if the enemy continued to attack it would be desirable to let him hold those lines before having to fight on lines further to the south. No decision was taken on the point of the 38th parallel and this is a point which will have to be resolved.

The Vice President said that he thought that any conditions attaching to a cease-fire should appear in an actual resolution of the UN and should not be behind-the-scenes understandings of any sort. He also said that it was very important that the United States not be in the position of opposing a cease-fire and said that it was very important that the other side bear the onus for rejecting a cease-fire if the terms were honorable.

Following the above discussion the Secretary of State asked the President if he would accept the following as guidance for the present and the President directed that the following be accepted as guidance:

We will consider a cease-fire in Korea but must insist upon a cease-fire which does not place UN forces at a military disadvantage and which does not involve political concessions.

Details of the cease-fire should be negotiated, in order to protect the security of UN forces before a cease-fire is accepted.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff will prepare as a matter of urgency the military conditions on which a cease-fire would be acceptable.

Although the following was not approved by the President, it clearly represents the sense of the meeting:

To insure compliance and to prevent a worsening of the military situation of the UN forces, there must be UN observation throughout Korea of the operation of a cease-fire agreement.

795.00/12–1150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, December 11, 1950—9 p. m.
[Received December 11—2:37 p. m.]

563. Situation described in Embtel 530, December 6 [7],[1] worsened through December 9, but yesterday and today there has been perceptible easing of tension. It would appear Truman–Attlee statement primarily responsible for calmer atmosphere of past two days.

Mayor of Seoul estimates that during past five or six days some 200,000 people have left Seoul for adjacent countryside or points south. While there has been steady exodus past few days, Embassy feels Mayor's estimate exaggerated. Outward flow appeared much reduced today. Public statements issued by Social Affairs Minister, ROK Army Provost Marshal, Home Minister and ROK OPI have contributed to exodus.

Since General Walker's return to Seoul, I have conferred almost daily with him about general situation. In conversation yesterday Walker expressed confidence enemy could not now push UN forces out of this area by frontal approach. Enemy might be able to maneuver UN forces out, however, by pushing in from northeast. The success of such maneuver would be contingent on ability to drive through ROK forces. ROK morale had been depressed since first encounter with CCF.

I suggested to General Walker it might be helpful for him to outline situation to Rhee and War Cabinet, pointing out military situation far from hopeless and it imperative to have revival of spirit of ROK troops and Rhee and Cabinet members, as Korean leaders, should do everything possible to bring this about.

General Walker concurred and later yesterday morning he and I met with Rhee and War Cabinet. At this meeting Walker made forthright explanation in much same way he had talked with me. Rhee, who has been nervous and jittery past few days, pressed Walker for commitments to defend Seoul and arm Korean youth. Walker replied his instructions are same today as when he arrived: "to destroy enemy". To carry out this mission, he had as first responsibility preservation of fighting ability of UN army. Rhee appeared either unwilling or unable to grasp Walker's explanation. However Embassy understands that following meeting with Walker yesterday morning, Rhee called special meeting of Cabinet yesterday afternoon and asked members to do everything possible to bolster morale of people and army.

[1] Not printed; it described the widespread uneasiness among the populace of Seoul during the past few days stemming mainly from the unfavorable turn in the military situation as a result of mass intervention by the Chinese Communists (795.00/12–750).

Among other things, he stated he planned to address mass meeting in stadium in day or two and would visit Korean army II Corps headquarters north of Seoul shortly.

Embassy understands that at his press conference this afternoon Rhee announced calling monster rally at which he would discuss defense of Seoul and related problems. President also stated he had sent instructions by cable yesterday to Korean Ambassador in Washington directing him to state that any negotiations aimed at re-establishing 38th Parallel barrier would be unacceptable to ROK Government.

On receipt here this morning of Depcirtel 256, December 9, I called on Rhee and read out pertinent excerpts. He appeared comforted by knowledge our stand re no appeasement, for it is clear apprehensions of some such move had been foremost in his mind past few days.

Repeated information Tokyo unnumbered.

MUCCIO

357.AD/12–1150 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 11, 1950—7 p. m.

PRIORITY

581. Eyes only for Austin and Gross. Fol sets forth our attitude toward cease-fire which shld be reflected in your conversations with reps of Asian group and in your discretion with other dels:

We will consider a cease-fire in Korea but must insist upon cease-fire which does not place UN forces at military disadvantage and which does not involve political consideration. Details of cease-fire shld be negotiated in order to protect security UN forces before cease-fire is accepted.

We believe further that to insure compliance and prevent worsening of military situation of UN forces during cease-fire, there must be UN observation throughout Korea of operation of cease-fire agreement.

FYI Joint Chiefs will prepare as matter urgency military conditions on which cease-fire wld be acceptable.

ACHESON

357.AD/12–950 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 11, 1950—7 p. m.

Gadel 177. For Gross. Fol Dept's views Delga 397 : [1]

[1] Received at 5 : 45 p. m. on December 9, p. 1488.

1. This plan or any like it must be kept to one side for the present in order not to confuse and prejudice the Rau negotiations looking to a cease-fire.

2. The approach of the plan is basically defective in attempting to spell out in detail both as to substance and timing the full disposition of the future of Korea. It is not possible to forecast, especially in point of timing, a rigid program for this purpose. Any effort to develop a plan based on this approach shld therefore be discouraged. If some del wishes to initiate cease-fire desirable method of proceeding wld be to get the cease-fire into effect then work out details of settlement in easy stages by negotiations. Of course if agreement is reached on details of settlement they cld later be confirmed by resolution.

3. As to specific paragraphs of the res Dept has fol comments for Romulo's interest and information.

2(*c*). While para 1 of the proposed res repudiates charges leveled by Chinese against US and re-emphasizes that US troops in Korea are UN forces fully authorized and indeed requested by UN, the body of the res, no doubt unintentionally, gives the impression that status of the US troops in Korea is no more legitimate than that of Chinese Communists. This para for example wld make it seem wrong for US troops to be in Korea. Any plan along these lines shld emphasize not withdrawal of US troops, but rather the character of UN troops which will remain.

2(*d*). This para referring to Formosa entirely unacceptable to US. We have made it clear that US has no designs on Formosa and wants no special interests there. We have indicated our desire for a peaceful settlement of the Formosa question, and have agreed to UN consideration of the question of Formosa at sometime after the Korean situation clears, but cannot accept any provisions dealing with Formosa in a res on the Korean settlement.

2(*e*). Disarmament ROK forces difficult to justify and might endanger stability ROK Govt.

2(*f*). The US has repeatedly expressed the hope that other nations wld contribute more forces, and particularly that forces of other nations shld carry maximum burden post-war occupation of Korea. Judging from past response it is far from clear that effective force of 50 thousand troops can be obtained from small nations for task envisaged.

2(*h* thru *k*). These paras far too detailed and seek to anticipate too far ahead. Time table attempts to be specific about matters as to which it is impossible to be this definite at this time.

Para 3. Not acceptable of course in present draft since some of the provisions which the US is called upon to accept are objectionable. Also US does not favor advance determination of circumstances in which state wld be automatically branded as an aggressor; it is always difficult to determine the facts and to examine possible justifications, and other factors which might go into a determination of whether aggression has taken place. Finally, a new para along these lines shld be directed more specifically at the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans, and not permit the possibility that it would be held to apply against other members of the UN playing some role in Korea.

ACHESON

468-806—76——97

357.AD/12–1150 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, December 11, 1950—9 : 31 p. m.
[Received December 11—9 : 48 p. m.]

Delga 419. Following are DelGA decisions December 11 : Ambassador Gross reviewed weekend developments on Chinese Communist aggression in Korea, including available information re Rau's initiative on cease-fire order, possible terms of cease-fire, prospects for action on six-power draft, and possible subsequent action. Contents Depcirtel 256, December 9 noted. Mr. Cohen expressed grave concern at present situation and thought it essential carefully to define our basic objectives and not to lose sight of them. He could envisage a contingency in which the attainment of these objectives and the maintenance of UN influence might best be furthered, in the long run, by action designed to bring about a peaceful settlement rather than by action designed to place the organization on record regarding the morality of the Chinese Communist position.

AUSTIN

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met on December 12 from 10 : 45 a. m. to 1 : 10 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.415. At the outset, the Indian Representative (Rau) introduced a thirteen power joint draft resolution sponsored by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen; the text of which read as follows (A/C.1/641) :

"*The General Assembly*,

"*Viewing* with grave concern the situation in the Far East,

"*Anxious* that immediate steps should be taken to prevent the conflict in Korea spreading to other areas and to put an end to the fighting in Korea itself and that further steps should then be taken for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

"*Requests* the President of the General Assembly to constitute a group of three persons including himself to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea can be arranged and to make recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as possible."

After a statement explaining the position of the Government of India, Sir Benegal Rau then introduced a twelve power joint draft

resolution sponsored by the above powers less the Philippines, the text of which read as follows (A/C.1/642):

"*The General Assembly*,

"*Viewing* with grave concern the situation in the Far East,

"*Considering* that the continuance of this situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of world peace and security,

"*Recommends* that the representatives of the following governments, namely _____, shall as soon as possible meet and make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations."

An Indian motion to give priority in the discussion to the thirteen power draft resolution (A/C.1/641) was then approved by the First Committee by a vote of 48 to 5, with 4 abstentions. The United States Representative announced during the subsequent debate that he would vote in favor of the thirteen power draft resolution.

795.00/12–1250

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [NEW YORK,] December 12, 1950.

US/A/C.1/2369

Subject: The 2 Resolutions on Korea Sponsored by Asian Delegations.

Participants: Mr. Gopala Menon, Indian Delegation
Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, United States Delegation
Mr. Ward P. Allen, United States Delegation

Mr. Menon reported that Sir B. N. Rau had not been able to contact the Chinese Communist Delegation Sunday or Monday (it was not entirely clear whether this was because of their refusal or because Sir Benegal had not tried). He hoped to be able to do so this afternoon (Tuesday) or tomorrow morning in order to obtain their reactions to the 13-power cease fire resolution.

Menon expressed the view that this first resolution would be useless and unproductive without the second resolution providing a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of existing issues and indicated he had previously understood that the U.S. and U.K. would not object strongly to the second idea provided it were not linked to the cease fire in one resolution. Ambassador Gross explained our objections to the second resolution as a concomitant. He pointed out that the psychological implication of establishing any special machinery at this time

was that a price was being paid on other issues in return for the cease fire. Ambassador Gross referred to the indeterminate terms of reference of the body to be set up as broadly including all "existing issues". Menon sought to find analogy in the Kashmir and other disputes before the United Nations and we sought to make clear our view of the essential basic differences—that in the present case and in a very real sense the United Nations itself is the other party to the dispute and the aggressors are challenging and threatening to destroy it. There is thus, in effect, no umpire. Ambassador Gross expressed the belief that a mistaken effort to analogize this situation to an ordinary international dispute had colored too much the attitude of certain Delegations. Menon sought to argue that the fact that the United Nations was a party made it all the more desirable for the United Nations, in accordance with the spirit of the Charter, to manifest its willingness to settle the matter peacefully by referring to specific procedures. This was desirable, he felt, even though it was pointed out that the Charter provides sufficiently for procedures and organs and that all of the relevant issues with which the Chinese are concerned are currently before the Security Council and the General Assembly.

During the conversation Mr. Menon, although granting the logic of the arguments and recognizing the United States position as explained to him, seemed to remain basically unpersuaded to our point of view.

WARD P. ALLEN

795.00/12–1250

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harlan B. Clark, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [NEW YORK,] December 12, 1950.

US/A/C.1/2359

Subject: (1) Reported Chinese Communist Agreement to Separation of Cease Fire and Negotiation Proposals
(2) Arab Attitude Towards Greek–Turkish Fears of Asian "Appeasement Policy"

Participants: His Excellency Sayed Hassan Ibrahim, Yemeni Delegation
Mr. Harlan B. Clark, United States Delegation

Sayed Hassan referred to our earlier conversations in regard to the Asian bloc's cease fire proposals, and asked whether the United States Delegation were satisfied with the steps which had been taken to separate the cease fire from the negotiation proposals as they had been combined in the Indian draft resolution. He seemed in good

spirits and well satisfied with the morning's developments. I said that, as he knew, the United States had agreed to consider a cease fire proposal on its merits and that it only remained to be seen what the Soviet bloc's attitude would be.

Sayed Hassan said he had little fear on that score, since Sir Benegal Rau had informed him yesterday that General Wu had agreed to separation of the cease fire and negotiation proposals. In other words, he believed the Communists had been agreeable to the cease fire proposal and to the principle of negotiating subsequently on outstanding issues.

Sayed Hassan and a member of his Delegation said it appeared from the questions that had been raised in Committee One this morning that the Turks and Greeks were afraid the Asian countries were defecting from the UN. This was not true at all. What the Arab countries sought was a cessation of hostilities so that outstanding issues could be discussed. If the Communists did not abide by the cease fire, they would prove their bad faith, and we should all treat them accordingly.

795.00/12–1250

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET [NEW YORK,] December 12, 1950.

US/A/C.1/2357

Subject: Korea

Participants: General Carlos P. Romulo, Philippines Delegation
Mr. C. P. Noyes, United States Delegation

Romulo described the meeting yesterday of the Asian Group roughly as follows:

Rau had submitted his original resolution. Romulo had taken this apart. He had pointed out that the United Nations was one of the belligerents and could not call upon itself to cease fire. In connection with the cease-fire line, he had pointed out that it was absolutely essential that the United Nations should protect its own forces and that therefore it must of necessity consult the Unified Command before attempting to settle any principles or any details. As regards the third paragraph, Romulo pointed out that out of the seven nations only the United States, and possibly France, could be expected to stand up against the Communists. The USSR position was known; the United Kingdom and India had recognized Communist China; and Egypt's position was one of desiring peace at all costs. He said that this was a stacked committee; that he would have nothing to do with it. He also pointed out that the sub-items in the Indian proposal covered

exactly the same ground as the terms of reference of UNCURK, and that it would be ridiculous for an Assembly to give to this new committee the same terms of reference as UNCURK. Finally, he pointed out that the final paragraph made it possible for the Chinese Communists to raise any Far Eastern issue they wanted, including Indo-China, Formosa, seating in the United Nations, the Philippines, Japanese Peace Treaty or any other issues.

Romulo stated that he urged the Group to stick to the simple cease-fire and suggested a committee appointed by the President to make the necessary arrangements if possible. He said he was supported in a number of these points by the Syrian and some of the others.

At about that point Rau was called out of the meeting and returned a minute or two later to say he had an important message from Prime Minister Attlee who favored the Indian proposal and in particular favored a single resolution which would have in it both a cease-fire and broad negotiations for peaceful settlement of existing issues. Romulo stated he told the Group he didn't care what the British position was; that he would have nothing to do with any such proposal. He was the only Representative present who had troops in Korea and as far as the Philippines were concerned, they would not be willing to tie negotiations up with a cease-fire. He added that if the Philippines were ever under Communist pressure, he would not want any of those present to be acting in a neutral manner—as they were at the present time. Thereupon he walked out of the meeting.

In general, Romulo is satisfied with the way Rau handled himself at this morning's meeting.[1] His general view was that it would probably be possible to avoid discussing the second resolution until the Assembly had received a report from the President, and possibly until it had passed a resolution approving cease-fire arrangements.

Romulo was somewhat bitter against the British and even against some of the Asiatics.

[1] See the editorial note on the meeting of the First Committee at 10:45 a. m. on December 12, p. 1524.

795.00/12–1250

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 12 December, 1950.

Attached hereto is the statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, signed by General Bradley, regarding the terms they feel are necessary and should be imposed regarding any cease-fire settlement in Korea.

I am in general agreement with the various conditions enumerated but I wish to state, however, that I do not consider the contents of

[1] This note and its enclosure were circulated on December 13 by the Executive Secretary of the NSC for the information of the NSC and the Secretary of the Treasury as NSC 95.

Paragraph 6 should have been included in this document. I am assured that the possible implication of that paragraph that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that a continued fight for the conquest of North Korea was not the purpose of the statement. Rather it was included merely to bring to the attention of higher authorities the certain possibility resulting from a cease-fire negotiation.

G. MARSHALL

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 12, 1950.

Subject: United States Position Regarding the Terms of any United Nations General Assembly Cease-Fire Resolution for the Korean War.

1. This memorandum is responsive to the directive of the National Security Council issued on 11 December 1950 which called for, as a matter of urgency, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the terms, conditions, and arrangements which should be agreed to prior to United States acceptance of any United Nations cease-fire resolution for the Korean war.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, cannot concur in any United Nations cease-fire resolution which does not include the terms, conditions, and arrangements set forth in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 below. Further, these must be agreed to by all governments and authorities concerned, including North Korea and Communist China, prior to the implementation of any cease-fire arrangement.

3. The cease-fire arrangement:

a. Shall be confined to Korea;

b. Shall require all governments and authorities concerned, including North Korea and Communist China, to order a cessation of all acts of armed force; the establishment of a demilitarized area across Korea; and all ground forces to remain in position or be withdrawn to the rear except that all forces which may be in advance of the demilitarized area shall be moved to positions in the rear thereof;

c. Shall provide for supervision of the general arrangements as well as specific details by a Cease-Fire Commission designated by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which Commission shall have free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea;

d. Shall require all governments and authorities concerned to cease promptly the introduction into Korea of any reinforcing or replacement units or personnel, including volunteers, during the cease-fire period;

e. Shall require all governments and authorities to refrain from introducing additional war equipment and material into Korea. Such equipment and material will not include those supplies required for the maintenance of health and welfare and such other supplies as may be authorized by the Cease-Fire Commission; and

f. Shall continue in effect until a permanent settlement of the Korean question has been arranged.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the following specific details to be essential to any cease-fire arrangement for the Korean war:

a. The demilitarized area shall be a zone on the order of 20 miles in width, with the southern limit following generally the line of the 38th parallel.

b. The cease-fire arrangement shall apply to:

(1) All opposing ground forces in Korea, wherever located. In addition, these forces shall respect the demilitarized zone and the areas in advance thereof;

(2) All opposing naval forces in the Korean area which shall respect the waters contiguous to the land areas occupied by the opposing armed forces, to the limit of three miles off-shore. Naval units designated by the Cease-Fire Commission for sea transport, supply, evacuation, surveillance, and humanitarian purposes shall be excepted from the foregoing provision while such units are engaged in these duties; and

(3) All opposing air forces which shall respect the air space over the demilitarized zone and the areas in advance thereof. Air units designated by the Cease-Fire Commission for air transport, supply, evacuation, surveillance, and humanitarian purposes shall be excepted from the foregoing provision while such units are engaged in these duties.

c. Military observers appointed by the Cease-Fire Commission, together with such United Nations Armed Guards as may be available and considered appropriate by the Commission, shall have freedom of movement anywhere throughout all Korea;

d. Prisoners of war shall be exchanged on a one for one basis, pending final settlement of the Korean question;

e. Organized bodies of armed forces initially in advance of the demilitarized zone shall be moved back or passed through to the area of their own main forces. Guerrillas, both north and south of the demilitarized zone, shall be withdrawn and be granted safe conduct through the demilitarized area.

f. Nothing in the agreement shall preclude commanders in the field from providing for the security of their forces, supplies, and installations, except that no security forces for this purpose will be permitted within the demilitarized area.

g. The Cease-Fire Commission shall be responsible for civil government, including police functions, in the demilitarized zone.

h. Refugees shall not be allowed to migrate in either direction into or across the demilitarized area.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel strongly that, before the United States should accept any cease-fire arrangement, provision must be made for a competent Cease-Fire Commission which shall inspect to insure that the terms, conditions, and arrangements as agreed to in the cease-fire resolution will be carried out by all armed forces including guerrillas in Korea. This Commission shall report promptly to the General Assembly of the United Nations all violations of the cease-fire resolution. The Commission shall be provided with a sufficient number of competent military observers to enable it to carry out its duties and functions.

6. In connection with all of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that execution of any United Nations cease-fire resolution will, in all probability, prevent the attainment of the United Nations objective of a free and united Korea.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman

795B.5614/12–1250

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Assistance (Burns)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 12, 1950.

MY DEAR GENERAL BURNS: Dr. John M. Chang, the Korean Ambassador to the United States, in several recent conversations with Mr. Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, at the instance of his Government has urged the importance, in the light of the current military situation in Korea, of arming the so-called Korean Youth Corps. The Ambassador has stated that this Youth Corps now numbers some 500,000 young men who he claims are only too eager to come to the defense of their country and to participate actively in military operations against the Chinese Communists. He has repeatedly emphasized that this additional potential manpower would not be an inconsiderable factor in redressing the military balance in Korea if the United States could provide sufficient small arms with which to equip them.

From a political standpoint, the Department of State recommends that favorable consideration be given this proposal provided that arms were given only to these Korean youths after they have been formed into organized units under the control and discipline of the military authorities in Korea.

Sincerely yours, H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

795.00/12–1250 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 12, 1950—7 p. m.

263. Observers seeking rationalize conduct Chi Commies in invading Korea are strongly attracted to hopeful hypothesis that their action reflects neither their subordination to Moscow's drive to weaken and destroy free world nor expansionist momentum inevitably developed by totalitarian regime seeking justify suppressive rule by rousing hysterical popular fears of fon enemy, but that, on contrary, Chi Commies motivated by genuine misunderstanding US purposes, which they see as comprising mil operations against mainland. According this theory, such misunderstanding has been encouraged by USSR, exploited by Chi Natls, given substance by extremist demands of Amer supporters of Chiang Kai-shek and interposition Seventh Fleet Formosan Straits, and confirmed by intentions credited to UN Commander. Corollary this theory is that reasonable settlement Korean conflict could be made on basis delivery Formosa and UN seat to Peiping. Effect is stigmatize US for failing agree compromise averting danger general war.

Obvious it essential all US officials expose fallacy this reasoning whenever encountered.

Our position in final analysis rests upon fact that if Chi Commie regime desires normal relations with us and is primarily concerned with welfare China and not with advancement Bolshevik interests or extension control over neighboring countries, then specific problems at issue between us—Formosa, representation UN, Korea, etc.—will fall naturally into perspective and prove soluble, but that if this is not desire Chi Commies, if in fact they are dedicated overthrow national govts other Asian states and destruction free world along orthodox Bolshevik lines, then attempts solve specific issues by concessions to their demands will prove futile and merely whet their appetites.

From time Chi Commies took Mukden, Peiping, and Nanking they had every opportunity explore our position in talks with US officials. Indeed, on numerous occasions when issues arose between us, our officials sought discussion with their authorities and were shunted aside. By outrageous treatment our reps in disregard all civilized standards, by encouragement extortionate demands and riotous action on part local employees our offices, by arbitrary and illegal seizure US official property, Chi Commies made plain they uninterested reaching any understanding and made impossible our maintenance any repre-

[1] This message was sent to all diplomatic missions outside the Western Hemisphere and to Frankfort; it was repeated by airgram to all the Western Hemisphere posts and to Tangier, Tripoli, and Tunis.

sentation Chi mainland. Withdrawal US officials by no means closed avenues possible exploratory talks between US and Chi Commie authorities, but consistent imperious aloofness latter has made unmistakable they totally disinclined any contact with us.

On our side we have taken every opportunity give assurance our belief in inherent congruence genuine Chi and Amer interests, our lack any desire seek voice in internal affairs Chi, and our intention observe scrupulously inviolability frontier China. In face serious provocation represented by attacks on UN planes by Commie craft sallying from and returning to Manchurian sanctuary, UN Commander has exhibited exemplary restraint. We have offered compensation any confirmed damage Chi side border inflicted by US planes in ignorance their whereabouts.

For their part, Chi Commies have from start subjected us to unrelieved stream of vituperation, singling us out among all nations for most violent vilification, exhibiting utter disregard truth and absence any desire ascertain it. While not one threatening gesture made their direction by UN Commander (who, be it noted, had received and declined offer Chi Natls supply 30,000 troops Korea), Chi Commies hurled half-million men against UN forces which supported by 54 nations UN (as well as by number other free nations whose membership UN blackballed by USSR although they far more eligible to be admitted UN than Peiping regime to represent Chi in UN) and which were on point winding up campaign with declared purpose thereupon withdrawing.

Plain fact is that given Chi Commie intentions as revealed, danger present serious situation was implicit in first response by UN to unprovoked assault on ROK by No Koreans and could not have been avoided by any action on part UN or US short of acquiescence in elimination ROK, which would have destroyed finally principle collective security and have left UN moribund.

Insofar as link-up of Formosa with Korea by intervention Seventh Fleet may be adduced as factor in Chi Commie invasion Korea, important remember that Seventh Fleet was placed Formosan Strait after aggression against ROK, which incontrovertibly must have had Chi Commies acquiescence and in fact, as now known, had their active support. Commie aggression against ROK preceded isolation of Formosa. Note also US simultaneously required Natls cease all attacks against mainland. Therefore isolation Formosa cannot be considered cause of Chi Commie intervention in Korea.

US maintains position that (1) aggression in one area cannot be recompensed by rewards in another, (2) solution Korea requires cessation Chi Commie aggression, (3) end Chi aggression and settlement Korea on basis satisfactory to UN must not be connected with nego-

tiation other issues such as UN rep and Formosa, (4) these issues are before UN, and while UN may have shortcomings, it is only agency we have for collective expression judgment of mankind, and (5) surrender to Chi Commie terrorization on these issues would speedily be followed by decisive further Chi Commie aid to Indochinese Commies, irresistible pressure on Thai Govt, advancement Chi claims to North Burma, stepped-up invasion Tibet, and tipping of now balanced scales in Malaya in favor of Chi Commie guerrillas.

US can only regard tendency adduce extenuating circumstances in conduct Peiping as testifying to success Soviet strategy. For it now unmistakable to anyone that while strains emitted by Peiping are Chi, organist is Russian and Dept is impelled to conclude that consistent singling out of US as enemy China by Peiping propaganda was essential element Soviet effort refrain from hardening attitude other countries toward Peiping and lead cleavage free world at time its greatest peril.

ACHESON

320/12–1250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, December 12, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received December 12—10 : 35 p. m.]

1459. 1. Basing myself on Depcirtel 256 December 9, 2 p. m., I outlined to Bajpai today what our thinking was as of December 9 re cease-fire, six-power resolution, possible additional resolution in GA in case Chinese Communists press attack below 38th parallel, etc. I emphasized we had been asking for cessation hostilities or encouraging others initiate move for cease-fire. I stressed how important it was that all nations of free world give full support to six-power resolution at once in case cease-fire is not arranged and explained why in our opinion UN should brand Chinese Communists as aggressors in case they press their attack below 38th Parallel.

2. Bajpai said that if efforts for cease-fire should fail and six-power resolution should come before GA without amendments of character which would make it fully acceptable to India, India would probably not participate in voting. If resolution should be presented to UN branding Chinese Communists as aggressors following crossing of Chinese Communists into South Korea might possibly also not participate in voting. Much would depend upon flow of events between now and time such measures should come to vote, upon contents of resolution

and upon what UN might contemplate in form of sanctions, etc., following passage such resolution.

3. Bajpai said GOI received telegram from Panikkar December 11 giving Panikkar's understanding of what present Communist Chinese attitude was re cease-fire and had telegraphed immediately substance Panikkar's telegram to Rau in Lake Success. Panikkar seemed to be under impression that Communist China might be willing agree cease-fire and withdrawal Chinese forces from Korea provided: (*a*) North Koreans could remain in control area north 38th parallel during conversation following a cease-fire; (*b*) it was understood that all UN forces would withdraw from Korea following termination conversations subsequent to cease-fire; (*c*) conversations to cease fire would include not only question of Korea but that of Formosa and withdrawal US Fleet which had been protecting Formosa. I have perhaps made conditions upon which Panikkar thought Chinese Communists would insist for cease-fire somewhat more clear-cut than outlined to me by Bajpai. Nevertheless I believe I have stated correctly their substance. I asked Bajpai if Panikkar had not mentioned admittance into UN, recognition, or other Far East problems in their conditions and Bajpai replied in negative.

4. Bajpai said GOI had understood US would not agree to discussion such questions as Formosa and entry Communist Chinese into UN during conversations following cease-fire whereas Communist China continued insist that at least question Formosa be discussed. GOI therefore on December 10 had instructed Rau support no resolution for cease-fire in UN unless he had strong reason believe in advance such resolution would be agreeable both to US and to Communist China. GOI did not wish its delegation in Lake Success to place either US or Communist China in difficult position by presenting resolution for cease-fire containing terms which one of them could not accept. Bajpai asked that I particularly stress GOI did not wish to make any move in UN which might give appearance before world that US was primarily responsible for failure achievement cease-fire.

5. Bajpai also asked me inform my government that idea of 13 Asian powers getting together in effort effect cease-fire did not originate in Delhi and was acted upon without authorization from Delhi. GOI had however given subsequent approval. GOI had also given Rau free hand to maneuver for some kind cease-fire arrangement and to support such arrangement in form resolution provided he was sure in advance arrangement would be acceptable both to US and Communist China.

[HENDERSON]

795.00/12–1350

Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET [NEW YORK,] December 13, 1950.

US/A/C.1/2379

Subject: Korea—Conversations, separately, with:

Participants: Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal, Indian Delegation
Ambassador Ales Bebler, Yugoslav Delegation
Mr. C. P. Noyes, United States Delegation

Dayal said that the Indians had had no talks with Wu in the last day or so in regard to their cease-fire resolution. They did not know what Wu's attitude was towards the Thirteen-Power resolution. They thought it was wiser not to approach him directly on this question but to leave it to the President of the Assembly and his committee to do so.

With regard to the procedure of the Assembly, Dayal indicated that the Indians assumed that if the cease-fire resolution were passed, Committee 1 would take no further action on the Korea question until the President of the Assembly had had time to make a report. He gave no indication that the Indians were in a hurry to get consideration of the Twelve-Power resolution.

After hearing Malik's speech,[1] Dayal said he thought it was difficult to judge whether Malik was attempting to influence the Chinese decision on the cease-fire resolution and make it almost impossible for them to accept it; or whether he was speaking in a sense on behalf of the Chinese Communists. He seemed to be very much shocked by Malik's speech and assumed there was little hope now for a successful cease-fire.

I spoke to Bebler immediately after he had held a five-minute conversation with Ambassador Rau. Bebler told me that Rau wanted to give assurances to General Wu that the President's public statement that the Seventh Fleet would be withdrawn from Formosa as soon as a peaceful solution of the Korean question was reached still stood. He said that Rau planned to make another public statement to the effect that of course the President's statement still stood since it had not been publicly withdrawn. He then hoped to point out to Wu that he was entitled to rely on the fact that this statement still stood.

[1] Reference is to Mr. Malik's statement before the First Committee which met on December 13 from 10:45 a. m. to 1 p. m.; see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.416.

795.00/12–1350

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [NEW YORK,] December 13, 1950.
US/A/C.1/2379

Subject: Korean Problem in Committee One

Participants: Mr. Kenneth Younger, United Kingdom Delegation
Lord MacDonald of Gwaenysgor, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. R. M. Hadow, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Ward Allen, United States Delegation

Mr. Younger, at lunch, took a very relaxed attitude towards Mr. Malik's speech in Committee One this morning saying he was neither surprised nor disappointed. He was reluctant to accept the view I expressed that the speech indicated Soviet intention to keep the war going in Asia under any circumstance, but preferred to believe the Soviet purpose was rather to prevent any real *rapprochement* between the Chinese Communists and the West. We have, of course, he said, no way of knowing whether the speech reflected Chinese Communist thinking or not but in any event neither the USSR nor Communist China, even if they were prepared to have a Cease-fire would ever admit it openly in the Committee and embrace the Resolution and so Malik could hardly have been expected to make any different sort of speech than he did. It did not necessarily mean, therefore, that no Cease-fire would come about. Mr. Younger objected to the tendency both of the press and of various delegates to take a volatile mercurial attitude towards statements by Soviet delegates and attach undue significance to them.

As to immediate tactics in the Committee, Mr. Younger felt strongly that after the Cease-fire Resolution is passed the Committee should *not* proceed to take up Soviet charges of US aggression against China. Notwithstanding his awareness of the problem of US public opinion and my reiteration that the fact that we are defenders in this case made our position on postponement difficult, Mr. Younger felt that the time was out of joint for Committee One to consider this propaganda charge while negotiations on the Cease-fire were in progress. To permit Wu in the Committee to make a slanderous irrelevant speech prepared in Peiping three weeks ago and to promote a Soviet Bloc to play the same record over again could do no good and might upset the applecart at this time. The UK Delegation feels that the best procedure is for Committee One to adjourn *sine die* after passage of the

Cease-fire and for the plenary to approve some such resolution for recessing the General Assembly as the Secretariat has proposed. He thought some procedural provision or understanding could be included in the resolution to the effect that the remaining three items on Committee One's Agenda (including Formosa) would also be postponed until after the current matter had been disposed of.

In this connection I mentioned the apparent intention of the Greek Delegation to introduce a motion, following approval of the Cease-fire resolution, to have the Committee decide the time of its next meeting and the order of the items. Mr. Younger was quite concerned and indicated it might be desirable for the UK to seek to dissuade Mr. Kyrou from this step (an idea which I did nothing to discourage).

795.00/12–1350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

NEW DELHI, December 13, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received December 13—3:45 p. m.]

1466. 1. I saw Bajpai this morning at his request. He wanted again to discuss Korean problem and talked in greater detail than he had on December 12 re conversations which had been taking place in Peking between Panikkar and Communist China.

2. He said that on December 8 GOI had instructed Panikkar approach Communist China inquiring whether they would be willing agree cessation hostilities in Korea under conditions as follows:

(*a*) Cease fire, (*b*) drawing up demilitarized zone, (*c*) holding of conversations for settlement Korean problem and subsequently for settlement of Formosa problem in all of which China would have equal participation.

With respect to setting up demilitarized zone GOI had expressed its opinion that Communist forces should not move south of 38th parallel and UN forces should be withdrawn from north of 38th parallel. Re question settlement of Korea GOI thought it would be unwise for Communist China insist on withdrawal UN forces from South Korea until government of united and independent Korea been established in compliance with decisions UN. Re Formosa GOI had expressed opinion that discussions should be based on decisions at Cairo and Potsdam that Formosa should go to China. Question of when and how Formosa should be turned over to China could be subject of discussions and Communist China should bear in mind that US at present considered Formosa important to maintenance peace and security in Far East particularly Japan.

3. Panikkar had reported in telegram received in New Delhi last evening that on December 11 he had had an hour's conversation with

Chou En-lai in which latter had insisted the Chinese wished peaceful settlement problems of Korea and of "Far East in general" but that before opening of conversations re future of Korea there must be preliminary announcement on part US to effect that subsequent conversations re Formosa should be based upon Cairo and Potsdam declarations and that settlement of Formosa problem would be accompanied by withdrawal of US fleet from between Formosa and mainland. Chou En-lai had pointed out that while Formosa might seem important to US it was vital to China. Chou En-lai had also made it clear that settlement Korea problems would be interlinked with problem Far East in general. During course of conversation with Panikkar, Chou En-lai had asked what assurance if any did GOI have that proposals made by GOI through Panikkar would be acceptable to US.

4. Bajpai told me that late last night GOI had sent text of Panikkar's telegram to Attlee since latter was acquainted with Washington's way of thinking and might be in better position to feel out attitude US towards proposals which had been made by India. He had not sent copy Panikkar's telegram to Washington and considered it unwise to give me copy since remarks of Chou En-lai re US contained in telegram were so critical that he was afraid text of telegram in US hands would do more harm than good. Nevertheless it would be extremely helpful if GOI would be able let Chou En-lai know through Panikkar whether US would be willing consider favorably proposals which GOI had made. Bajpai said he was inclined believe US would be agreeable to GOI suggestions re cease fire, establishment demilitarized zone, and participation of Communist China on equal basis in discussions re future Korea. He had some concern however lest US would not be willing go along with GOI suggestions that conversations re Formosa which would take place after future Korea had been settled would be on basis of Cario and Potsdam declarations. This concern was sharpened by fact that in announcement made following Attlee's conversations in Washington no mention was made of Cairo and Potsdam.

5. I promised Bajpai transmit this information to Washington but pointed out that from such information as I had received from Washington and which he would recall I had imparted to him December 12 (paragraph 1 Embtel 1459 December 12) I doubted US would be willing make any commitments at this time re Formosa other than those contained in the announcement issued following conversations between PriMin Attlee and President Truman.

6. Bajpai said that in any event it would be helpful to obtain US attitude but he was afraid that if US remained adamant on matter Formosa efforts GOI to bring about cease fire through diplomatic channels might fail. Bajpai indicated GOI did not place much hope

on obtaining cease fire through resolution in UN until after some understanding had been reached through diplomatic channels. He said that two resolutions introduced December 12 in GA had caught GOI by surprise. He would appreciate knowing what attitude US Government was with respect to them. Rau still under instructions not to introduce resolution in UN looking towards cease fire unless he had good reason believe such resolution would be acceptable to all of great powers concerned.

HENDERSON

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met on the afternoon of December 13 from 3 to 6:15 p. m., at which time it approved by a vote of 51 to 5, with 1 abstention, the 13-power resolution (A/C.1/641) introduced on the preceding day (see editorial note, page 1524); for the record of the meeting, see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.417. The resolution was then forwarded to the General Assembly with an interim report from the First Committee recommending its adoption (A/1717).

320/12–1350: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 13, 1950—6 p. m.

PRIORITY

584. Assuming 13-Power res is adopted and GA Pres group commences task thereunder, it is likely that other dels will seek obtain US views as to its position on negotiations with Chi Commies. Questions relating to forum, scope of agenda, and place of such negotiations and participants therein will doubtless arise. Dept does not wish at this time to adopt firm position on these questions. There fols however some preliminary and incomplete views which you may wish use in your talks with other dels.

In general our attitude shld be governed by Pres-PriMin communiqué that we are ready as we always have been to seek end to hostilities by means of negotiation and that every effort must be made achieve purposes of UN in Korea by peaceful means and to find solution of Kor problem on basis of free and independent Korea. Furthermore, our general position shld reflect necessity of carrying overwhelming majority of free world with us in further GA steps. Thus we do not wish to be subject to criticism that on question of nego-

tiations we have been unduly intransigent or inflexible on matters which do not involve basic principle.

1. *Forum.* We wld be prepared to take part in negotiations respecting Korea with interested govts and authorities, including reps of Peiping regime. These negotiations cld be either inside or outside existing UN Organs or special UN Commission established for purpose. If negotiations are to be held within UN we cld not of course accept demand that as precondition for discussion, UN shld oust Nationalist delegates or seat Communist delegates. In either case our willingness negotiate with Peiping Regime wld not imply any change in our attitude towards them in regard to recognition or UN representation.

2. *Agenda of negotiations.* Any negotiations which are held shld deal first with question of Korea and we shld attempt to confine agenda to Korean settlement. We wld not accept a Communist demand that settlement of Kor question is connected with or depends upon settlement of other questions such as Formosa and Chi seat in UN. This does not mean that we wld reject inclusion on agenda of other questions, but we wld reject linking up of such other questions with Kor settlement. If it becomes necessary to include other questions on agenda, it shld be made clear that their inclusion is without any prior commitment with respect to our views on substance. Under these circumstances we might well insist ourselves that agenda include other Far Eastern items of interest to us, for example, Communist recognition and support of Ho Chi-minh, Tibet, treatment of US persons and property in China, etc.

3. As to place of negotiations we shld seek have them at Lake Success. We wld not however reject completely some other neutral place if it became necessary make concession on this point.

ACHESON

320/12–1350 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 13, 1950—8 p. m.

3027. USDel GA reports FonOff position, as indicated by UKDel, is that in view Art 12 UN Charter Korean question must be removed from SC agenda before GA can make recommendations in regard Chi Commie intervention Korea.

Dept strongly of view SC shld not meet at this time to remove item from agenda, for fol reasons:

(1) Attempt remove agenda item at this time entails substantial dangers. Sovs might now take position vote to remove item from agenda subj veto, and get Council into parliamentary snarl by at-

tempting double veto. Tsiang who is presiding SC has indicated he will not rule to defeat such double veto. If action to remove item from SC agenda is instituted and fails, GA auth to take further steps re Korea might be challenged.

(2) In any event mtg SC at this time wld open door Sov propaganda speeches and delaying tactics. Also, public attention wld be focused on SC mtg expecting results, and public wld not understand that sole purpose mtg was to take procedural step made necessary by technicalities of Charter.

(3) In Dept's view, it can be argued SC action to remove item from agenda not necessary in this case. While SC is still exercising its functions in regard question aggression against ROK under res June 25 and 27, it is not exercising its functions in respect Chi intervention Korea having been prevented from doing so by Sov veto six-power res of Nov 10.

(4) If other friendly dels insist Art 12 does require SC take steps divest itself jurisdiction before GA can make recommendations in this case, Dept believes it highly undesirable remove entire Korean item from SC agenda. Removal entire question of Korea might raise doubts as to legality of continued UN operations under SC Res of June 25 and 27 and wld make it difficult without protracted debate to get item back on agenda in present form in event further SC action desirable. Any action by SC shld, therefore, be confined procedural decision in appropriate form that SC not dealing with that aspect of Korean case relating Chi intervention. However, for reasons indicated paras (1) and (2) above, even such partial removal by SC shld not take place at this time but shld be postponed until just before GA ready make recommendations to member states in regard Chi Commie intervention Korea.

Pls seek persuade FonOff, as matter priority that UK shld support and seek persuade others support foregoing position this question.

ACHESON

Editorial Note

The United Nations General Assembly met on December 14 from 10:45 a. m. to 1:50 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document A/PV.324. At this meeting, the Assembly adopted as Resolution 384 (V) the text of the draft 13-power resolution which had been submitted to the First Committee on December 12, page 1524. The roll-call vote was 52 (including the United States) in favor, to 5 (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Byelorussian S.S.R., Ukrainian S.S.R., Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) opposed, with 1 (Republic of China) abstention.

At the 325th meeting of the General Assembly on the afternoon of December 14, the Assembly's President, Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, announced that he along with Lester B. Pearson of Canada and Sir Benegal Rau of India would form the three-member committee to inquire into the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea could be arranged (see U.N. document A/PV.325).

357.AD/12–1450 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW YORK, December 14, 1950—1 : 08 p. m.
[Received December 14—1 : 29 p. m.]

Delga 434. Chinese Communist views re cease-fire. Following is text memo of conversation between Rau and Cohen at Plenary this morning:

"Rau said that their communications from Peiping indicated that there was a good chance of the cease-fire being accepted by Peiping if certain preliminary points could be cleared up. One was the withdrawal of foreign troops. This Rau said, would create no difficulty. Peiping would not insist on withdrawal until after the unification of Korea. The other and most sensitive point was Formosa and Peiping's desire to know that the Seventh Fleet would be withdrawn when the Korean situation was settled. Rau asked whether it would not be possible to get the President to reaffirm his statement regarding the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet. I inquired whether what he had in mind was a reaffirmation by the President of his statement independently of any discussions with Peiping. Rau said that was what he had in mind. He thought there would be no suggestion of appeasement if the President on his own responsibility restated his own position simply to make clear that his position had not changed.

I told Rau I would speak with our people. Rau said he hoped we would be able to act promptly on his suggestion."

AUSTIN

795.00/12–1450

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 14, 1950.

Subject: Exchange of Correspondence Between Foreign Minister Pearson of Canada and Prime Minister Nehru of India Concerning Settlement of the Korean Conflict.[1]

Participants: Mr. Peter R. G. Campbell, Second Secretary, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd—Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs

Mr. Peter R. G. Campbell called upon me this afternoon at three o'clock by prior appointment. He indicated that the purpose of his visit was to inform the Department of an exchange of top secret correspondence which had recently taken place between the Foreign Minister of Canada and the Prime Minister of India concerning a

[1] See telegram 1381 from New Delhi, received at 11 p. m. on December 2, p. 1317.

possible solution to the Korean crisis. He pointed out that the Canadian Government wished to inform the United States Government of this exchange of correspondence in order that there would be no feeling that Canada was acting unilaterally in the present crisis behind our backs and that the correspondence was initiated by Foreign Minister Pearson on a purely personal basis. Mr. Pearson had shown a copy of his message to Nehru to Prime Minister St. Laurent before sending it to New Delhi.

Mr. Campbell showed me a summary of the contents of this exchange of correspondence which he said he could not leave with me but which was along the following lines:

Message from Pearson to Nehru, November 30, 1950.

Mr. Pearson called attention to the possibility of an extension of the Korean conflict as a result of the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea and the violent and provocative tone adopted by Peiping which had accompanied the intervention. He referred to Mr. Nehru's unique influence and stature, both in Asia and in many western countries and felt that Nehru's personal intervention at this stage might give pause to the dangerous trend of events and provide opportunity for a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict. He suggested that Mr. Nehru might make a public cease-fire appeal and call for a cessation of Chinese intervention so that the possibility of a peaceful settlement might be explored.

Mr. Pearson realized that it might be difficult for Mr. Nehru to make such an appeal if he did not believe that it would have wide support. While Mr. Pearson felt that he could not give assurances of such support, it was his opinion that an appeal of this kind from Mr. Nehru would get a sympathetic reception in many capitals and in the hearts of millions of people.

Nehru's Reply to Pearson, December 2, 1950.

Mr. Nehru replied to Mr. Pearson's message of November 30 by saying that he had given Mr. Pearson's suggestion his most careful consideration. He added that the Indians had always been ready to exert themselves to obtain a localization of the conflict, sometimes by offering suggestions which have brought misunderstanding and criticism, but that this is worthwhile in a cause which may involve the future of mankind. Mr. Nehru was reluctant, however, to make a public appeal unless there was a reasonable chance of a favorable response from the parties to whom it was addressed. He was by no means sure in the present situation that such would be the case.

Mr. Nehru added that, following the receipt of Mr. Pearson's message, announcement had been made that Prime Minister Attlee would visit Washington, and he thought it probably wise to await the outcome of the Attlee-Truman talks.

In conclusion, Mr. Nehru stated that he had not misunderstood Mr. Pearson's initiative and added that "it is indeed heartening to me to know that we are all thinking hard how best to save the world from the catastrophe of another major war and resolve to do our best to accomplish that purpose".

795.00/12–1450

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 14, 1950.

Subject: Message from Swedish Ambassador in Peiping.

Participants: Mr. Ragnvald Bagge, Minister-Counselor, Swedish Embassy
Mr. Matthews—G

In the absence of Ambassador Boheman, the Swedish Counselor, Mr. Bagge, called at 6:30 p. m. today at his request. He referred to the earlier conversations which Ambassador Boheman had had with Mr. Rusk and me concerning the approach of the Swedish Ambassador at Peiping to the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister (see my memorandum of November 17, 1950 [1]). He said that Ambassador Hammarstrom had been requested to visit Vice Minister Chang yesterday afternoon, Peiping time. He referred to Chang as an official one grade higher than the Vice Minister Hammarstrom had seen before. Chang referred to Hammarstrom's previous visit and asked that the following message be conveyed to the Swedish Government (this is the English translation of Hammarstrom's telegram read to me by Mr. Bagge):

"China hopes for a peaceful and early solution of the Korean conflict which was caused by the attack of the American imperialists. How is this to be brought about? The solution lies solely on the American side where nothing has been mentioned about a 'truce'. Neither the United States nor the United Nations has hitherto 'given a concrete opinion about hope for peaceful settlement.' The six-power resolution since it criticizes the justified action of Chinese volunteers would by no means be an effective means to that end, but rather would 'hamper' a peaceful solution."

Hammarstrom added "My question whether China would not advance the matter by making a positive suggestion was answered in the negative."

[1] Not printed. In it, Mr. Matthews reported that Ambassador Boheman informed him that the Swedish Ambassador in Peking had expressed to the Chinese Foreign Ministry Sweden's concern over developments in Korea and the Far East, stated that neither the United States nor the United Nations had any hostile intent against the People's Republic of China, and indicated that any Chinese concerns about frontier problems or questions relating to hydro-electric power could be solved by negotiations, in which Sweden would be glad to assist. No response was made to the Swedish offer other than to say that an answer might be forthcoming in a few days, which Ambassador Boheman took to mean that the matter had to be referred to Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung. (795.00/11–1750)

I thanked Mr. Bagge for bringing me the foregoing message so promptly.

H. F. M[ATTHEWS]

357.AD/12–1450 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 14, 1950—6 : 39 p. m.
[Received December 14—7 : 25 p. m.]

Delga 435. Re Korea—Gross conversation with Lie and Entezam. At 1 p. m. Lie asked me to see him and I had following discussion with Lie and Entezam.

Lie said that he had asked Wu to see him this morning and had had hour's talk with him. Lie led off on subject of POW, asking Wu to assist in obtaining permission for representatives of IRO to inspect POW camps. Wu, taking blunt approach, said no and went on to say that CPG had nothing to do with situation in Korea. He asserted that only Chinese in Korea were there on voluntary basis and in the service of People's Government of Republic of Korea. Therefore, any requests re POW camps should be addressed to that government. Lie reminded Wu that former was not raising point whether Chinese troops in Korea were volunteers, but was merely asking Wu for whatever assistance CPG could render in obtaining entry for IRO in POW camps. Wu remained intransigent.[1]

Lie then turned to question of cease-fire resolution. He asked Wu for Wu's reaction, saying that as SYG he would undoubtedly have to make arrangements for conferences between Entezam's cease-fire committee and Chinese Communist delegation. Lie told Wu that since we were coming close to end of Assembly, it would be helpful for Lie to

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[1] In his telegram Delga 440, December 15, from New York, not printed, Ambassador Austin sent the Department a detailed record of the conversation between Lie and Wu on the question of prisoners of war, which record had been transmitted to the U.S. Delegation on a strictly confidential basis. This document contained the following concluding section:

"The SYG then summarized as follows the replies which he had received from Ambassador Wu:

'(1) There are no POW's of the UN army in China or Chinese territory.

'(2) The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China had no responsibility for POW's in North Korea.

'(3) Chinese POW's in the hands of the UC are the concern of the People's Government of the People's Republic of Korea.

'(4) Ambassador Wu could offer no help to the SYG in contacting the authorities of the People's Republic of Korea.'

"Ambassador Wu agreed that this was a correct summary." (357.AD/12–1550)

get from Wu any ideas latter might have concerning length of time of discussions between Chinese and Entezam committee. Wu replied by asserting that resolution was "illegal and not in any way binding on the CPG".

Wu proceeded to comment that Chinese could not participate in negotiations regarding a cease-fire under any conditions "other than those mentioned in Mr. Malik's speech yesterday".[2] Wu then summarized conditions as involving withdrawal of "all US and UN troops out of Korea, leaving Korea for the Koreans". Wu also said that question of Taiwan must be settled in connection with any cease-fire discussions and that any negotiations concerning foregoing matters must be "on equal terms". Lie did not press Wu for explanation of what he meant by "on equal terms", but it is Lie's personal impression that this was reference to seating of CPG in UN.

Lie said that Wu, before replying to Lie's question concerning conferences with cease-fire committee, had a long talk in Chinese with his second man, Chiao, and that Wu's replies appeared to be calculated.

Lie expressed his personal judgment that it was now clear that Chinese delegation here was "under the thumb of Moscow". Lie suggested that best course would be for cease-fire committee to address a letter to Wu, forwarding copy of GA resolution and requesting a meeting in order to discuss cease-fire conditions. Lie said that he was satisfied from Wu's answers to him that there was no hope whatever now for a cease-fire and that sooner the matter was disposed of and a vote was taken on 6-power proposal and GA adjourned, the better.

Entezam, who I thought indicated some dissatisfaction with initiative taken by Lie on eve of attempts by cease-fire committee to establish contact with CPG, disagreed with Lie's suggestion that he address letter to Chinese delegation. With some warmth, Entezam said that if it was Lie's idea that cease-fire committee should be used as political tool for forcing public negative reply from Chinese, "then I am not your man". I interjected at this point view that procedures for establishing contact both with UC and with Chinese should be left to committee and I expressed personal view that it might be better not to force public response by addressing letter. Lie withdrew his suggestion.

Lie, however, with some show of annoyance, said that in any event he wanted Assembly to adjourn this week. This led to rather lengthy discussion, in which both Entezam and I expressed view that Assembly must be in a standby position at least until cease-fire committee had submitted its report in accordance with GA resolution. Lie's argu-

[2] See footnote 1 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Noyes, December 13, p. 1536.

ments for adjournment of Assembly this week were (1) that many delegates would be leaving this weekend, (2) in his experience Assemblies which went beyond December 1 remained on almost indefinitely, and (3) his staff was overworked.

In a confidential talk with Cordier later this afternoon latter commented that SYG was not in good mood, to some extent because he was not a member of cease-fire committee and, more particularly, since he was very anxious to go to Norway for Christmas.

Entezam undoubtedly will discuss with other members of his committee problem of duration of Assembly and I am confident that committee will insist that Assembly be in standby position until committee has reached some conclusions, whether negative or affirmative.

AUSTIN

Editorial Note

At 10:30 p. m. on December 15, President Truman delivered a radio and television address to the American people announcing his intention to declare the existence of a state of national emergency on the following day. He stated that the United States was willing to negotiate if the Communists were, but would not yield to aggression nor engage in appeasement in the face of the great danger created by the rulers of the Soviet Union. The President announced plans to increase defense production, expand the armed forces, and establish wage and price controls. On December 16, the Office of Defense Mobilization was set up to direct and coordinate the mobilization efforts of the government. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, page 741)

795.00/12–1550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, December 15, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received December 15—4:18 a. m.]

575. Further to Embtel 565, December 12 [1] and previous on Chinese intervention. Past 3 days have seen no contact between 8th Army units and CCF. In X Corps area UN units continue withdrawal without any noteworthy CCF pressure. Only fighting of any consequence is occurring few miles north of Chunchon where ROK ground forces

[1] Not printed; it reported that during the past three days there had been almost no contact in the 8th Army sector between U.N. and either North Korean or Chinese Communist forces (795.00/12–1250).

have been in contact with elements of North Korean Second Corps who holding old North Korean defense positions on 38th parallel. There are indications these North Koreans being steadily reinforced by re-equipped North Korean forces coming from far north.

8th Army intelligence is without firm evidence CCF have moved south of Pyongyang in any significant numbers. However, vehicular traffic continues to be heavy but it not known whether this represents supplies or reinforcements. On night of 12th when visibility poor, more than 200 vehicles were observed moving south, mainly on Kanggye-Kunuri road. On night of 13th visibility again poor, but many scattered vehicles were sighted, mainly on Kanggye-Huichon road. During night of 14th almost 800 vehicles were sighted of which 430 were moving south and 329 stationary. Heaviest concentration was observed on Sinuiju-Anju road. Last night some movement of vehicles was seen between Pyongyang and Chunghwa. Also, aerial observers past few days have sighted considerable cart, pack animal, and troop movement, usually in small, scattered groups, southward in about center of peninsula. It not known whether these represent Chinese or Korean movements.

Hostile aircraft continue activity around Sinuiju, using Manchuria as base. On 12th there were 3 sightings of Migs. One encounter ensued during which 8 Migs attacked UN planes. One Mig was damaged. On 13th no hostile aircraft were sighted. On 14th there were 2 sightings of Migs both in Sinuiju area. One group of 24 Migs attacked 4 UN jets. One Mig and no UN planes were damaged.

Re last paragraph Embtel 542, December 8, X Corps now reports carrying 32nd Army in sector, making total 5 CCF armies in X Corps sector. Re Embtel 517, December 5, 8th Army continues to carry 6 CCF armies as definitely in sector and 4 others probably in area.

MUCCIO

357.AD/12–1550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1950—noon.

590. There fols generalized statement of conditions of cease-fire for use in first instance in consultation with Entezam comite. Gen US attitude towards comite's work shld be to make every effort to speed up process so as to avoid further waste of human life in Korea.

"The US Govt, as the UC of UN forces in Korea, and the Govt which has contributed the large majority of the forces engaged on

behalf of the UN in Korea, is of the opinion that the fol are indispensable elements in a cease-fire which the UN can accept:

(1) All govts and authorities concerned, including those of NK and Commie China, shall order and enforce a cessation of all acts of armed force. This cease-fire shall apply to all of Korea.

(2) There shall be established a demilitarized area across all of Korea of approx 20 miles in width with the southern limit following generally the line of the 38th parallel.

(3) All ground forces shall remain in position or be withdrawn to the rear; forces, including guerrillas, within or in advance of the demilitarized area must be moved to the rear of the demilitarized area; opposing air forces shall respect the demilitarized zone and the areas beyond the zone; opposing Naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the land areas occupied by the opposing armed forces to the limit of 3 miles from shore.

(4) All govts and authorities shall cease promptly the introduction into Korea of any reinforcing or replacement units or personnel, including volunteers, and the introduction of additional war equipment and materiel.

(5) Prisoners of war shall be exchanged on a one-for-one basis, pending final settlement of the Kor question.

(6) Appropriate provision shall be made in the cease-fire arrangements in regard to steps to insure the security of the forces, civil govt and police power in the demilitarized zone, the movement of refugees, and the handling of other specific problems arising out of the cease-fire.

(7) Supervision of the cease-fire shall be by a UN commission whose members, and its designated observers, shall have free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea and shall insure full compliance with the terms of the cease-fire. All govts and authorities shall cooperate with the cease-fire commission in the performance of its duties.

(8) The cease-fire shall be confirmed by appropriate action of the UN and shall continue in effect until superseded by further steps approved by the UN."

ACHESON

795.00/12–1350: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 15, 1950—2 p. m.

NIACT

916. Reurtel 1466,[1] you are authorized to inform GOI the US wld be agreeable to cease-fire, establishment of demilitarized zone north of 38th parallel, and subsequent negots to determine future settlement for Korea.

Mil arrangements for a cease-fire wld have to be worked out in some detail in order not to subject UN forces to increased dangers under

[1] Received at 3: 45 p. m. on December 13, p. 1538.

the cloak of cease-fire. For example, if enemy forces are permitted to concentrate massed strength and to build up supplies on a cease-fire line without interference by UN air, the Mil position wld be seriously and fundamentally changed in favor of the enemy and wld expose UN forces to sudden enemy onslaught with or without pretext or justification. Further, cease-fire wld require observation by joint teams comprising personnel from both sides and UN Reps which wld have right of observation compliance with the cease-fire throughout Korea. We do not suggest you discuss these details with GOI except as illustrative of problems which will have to be dealt with in any effort at Lake Success to bring about cessation of hostilities.

In respect to the two resolutions introduced in the First Comite, as you know, although we took no initiative re either, we did support and vote in favor of the res adopted Dec. 13. The second res recommends that reps of Govts (not named in the res) meet to make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of existing issues. Our position with respect to that res is that discussion of it now is premature. The first step, namely, to agree upon and put into operation a cease-fire, must be completed before there can be negot of polit issues.

In the event that a cease-fire is agreed to by the Chi Commies and suitable arrangements made, and if thereafter agreement is reached concerning procedures for negots with the Chi Commies, we shld seek to have the agenda of those negots confined initially to Korea. We wld not however reject inclusion on the agenda of other questions, including Formosa, but we wld reject the linking up of such other questions to a Korean settlement and wld not make any prior commitment as to our position on the substance of such other questions.

Accordingly, you shld inform GOI that US is always willing to consider any issue through processes of peaceful settlement and wld take part in any reasonable machinery for that purpose. We are not willing to purchase a seat at the conference table by advance concessions nor are we willing to make concessions the effect of which wld be to convert a blatant act of aggression into a profitable transaction for the aggressor.

You shld feel free to emphasize with GOI the consistent record of the US over the past several years in trying to find appropriate means of pacific settlement of outstanding issues with USSR and countries under its control. The record is filled with dozens upon dozens of cases of initiative (both public and private) on the part of the democracies to open the way for peaceful settlement. But the record does not disclose instances of initiative on the part of the USSR directed toward genuinely negotiated results.

The record of wartime and postwar agreements with the Sov Union clearly shows that the Sov Union has collected the benefits

which it expected to receive from such agreements, has denied, often by force, the rest of us the benefits to which we are entitled under such agreements, and then has sought to "negotiate" all over again the question of whether we get our part of the original bargain.

A striking example of this technique is shown in the Sov attitude toward the present Far Eastern situation. The very existence of a Commie regime in Chi is the result of a major breach of a wartime agreement by the Sov Union which had committed itself to support and assist the Natl Govt of Chi and to recognize it as the only govt in Chi. At the 1945 Moscow Conference USSR reaffirmed adherence to policy of noninterference in internal affairs of Chi and support for the Natl Govt (ref. Chi White Paper pp. 116–125 [2]). The Sov violations of these several obligations were not merely dipl but were supported by energetic action on the part of the Soviet Union to bring about a Commie regime in Chi. Similarly, the Soviet Union has consistently blocked the fulfillment of that part of the Cairo Declaration which provides for the freedom and independence of Korea while at the same time it invokes that Declaration on the Formosan problem. GOI might be reminded that US took initiative in 1949 GA sponsoring res on integrity of Chi and that Sov bloc alone voted against it.

It is important that GOI understand that Commie aggression in Korea was initiated months before the attack was delivered last June. For substantiating details, see info contained Seoul's 525 Dec. 6 relayed to you as 917.[3]

Nehru and Bajpai shld also be reminded of the many efforts which have been made both by the US and others, both publicly and privately, both directly and indirectly, to ascertain whether Peiping is being motivated by any concern about legitimate Chi interests which cld be dealt with by processes of peaceful adjustment. Most of these efforts were merely rebuffed; the others have not disclosed a Chi desire to protect its own interests by peaceful means but rather a full partnership of Peiping in a Commie conspiracy of aggression against non-Commie areas. Refusal of Peiping's amb New Delhi to talk discreetly with you, rebuff of many Dels by Peiping Del Lake Success, Sov veto of Indian-Swedish comm to settle early charges US bombing Manchurian terr are readily available examples of efforts made to find basis peaceful settlement and of rebuffs by other side.

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[2] Department of State, *United States Relations With China, With Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949).

[3] Not printed. It contained information obtained from North Korean sources on provision of Soviet military aid to North Korea in the form of equipment and the sending of units of ethnic Koreans from the armed forces of the People's Republic of China to bulwark the North Korean army long before the outbreak of fighting in June 1950. (693.95A/12–650)

After review Korean situation, you may in your discretion wish to raise with GOI broader problem as to how Commie aggression in Asia is to be met. Massive intervention in Korea, reports of preparation of Russian-held Jap POWs for possible operation against Japan, increasingly active assistance and potential direct armed intervention in Indo-China, use of force to change historical autonomy of Tibet, reported deals for assistance between Burmese and Chi Commies, increasingly active penetration Indonesia are samples of present phase Commie aggression. It is not our purpose to exaggerate this danger in discussions with GOI for any passing political benefit. What we shld greatly appreciate is benefit GOI's thoughts on subj which must be of most serious concern to India's own security. If security of Southeast Asia is important to the US, it is absolutely vital to the freedom and independence of India. The great problem confronting the free world now is how to defend those areas, the loss of which wld be so serious to the free world. Just as defense of Japan and, eventually, of US is directly related to success or failure of aggression in Korea, defense of India is intimately concerned with stability and independence of Southeast Asia. If situation continues deteriorating, India may need help. If consideration joint action comes too late, joint action will be far more difficult, and may be impossible. We are not suggesting any formal direct talks between US and India. We shld be glad to exchange informal views about this more serious situation. If GOI prefers to consider this matter within framework Commonwealth, we wld not wish to intrude. The important thing is that GOI know that we are conscious of increasing difficulties being created for India by Chi Commie aggressiveness in Asia and that we wld be ready to exchange views in any way in which GOI thinks helpful.

In conclusion (1) we shall act with determination in Korea and shall not voluntarily give up efforts to resist aggression being committed there, (2) we are willing to accept a cease-fire with mil arrangements which adequately insure the elementary protection of UN forces, (3) we believe it wld contribute to the success of a cease-fire to establish a demilitarized zone with its southern edge along the 38th parallel, (4) it wld be expected that a cease-fire in Korea wld be immed followed by efforts to settle the Korean question in UN by peaceful means, (5) insofar as other issues are concerned the US is always ready to attempt settlement by peaceful means and not under duress, (6) the US has tried persistently to settle outstanding issues by peaceful means, (7) intl Communism has apparently embarked upon a program of aggression which raises the gravest issues for the free world, and (8) the US wld be glad to discuss these problems informally with GOI in any way which wld be helpful.

ACHESON

357.AD/12–1550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 15, 1950—5 p. m.

591. Eyes only for Austin and Gross. ReDeptel 590.[1] Dept believes it tactically important that terms cease-fire set forth reftel not be identified by Entezam comite in their conversations with Chi Commies as US terms. Hence, strict secrecy shld be preserved as to fact that USDel has handed these terms to Entezam comite. Dept recognizes that Entezam comite will handle this problem in accordance with its own views but USUN shld stress with them tactical desirability of adopting terms set forth reftel as its own rather than those of US.

ACHESON

[1] December 15, p. 1549.

357.AD/12–1550 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, December 15, 1950—6:27 p. m.
PRIORITY [Received December 15—7:25 p. m.]

974. From Gross. Re meeting of Entezam Committee. Following is report of meeting this afternoon of Gross (representing Austin) and General Crittenberger,[1] as military adviser, with group of three established under GA Resolution re Korea.

At outset, Gross made preliminary statement reflecting point of view of US Government that UN forces were in Korea pursuant to UN mission, whereas Chinese Communists were there as outlaws and aggressors against UN; that we assumed UN would adhere to principle that Chinese Communists must withdraw forces from Korea even though this point was not covered in formulation of indispensable conditions of a cease-fire which group of three was about to receive; and that we understood this meeting to be for purpose of outlining UC point of view re the essential elements of cease-fire within military context.

Gross then set forth points contained in Department's No. 590, December 15, as revised at meeting this a. m. of Rusk, Hickerson, Critten-

[1] Lt. Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger, U.S. Army, was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Security Council's Military Staff Committee.

berger and Gross with Austin.[2] Text was not left with committee, all three members of which took full notes. General reaction of three members of group was that elements outlined were fair. Gross and Crittenberger stressed that these were indispensable elements and not a point of departure for bargaining purposes. This was understood by all three members, none of whom expressed disagreement.

After some discussion of best tactics of approach of group to Chinese Communists, it was agreed that the group, upon establishing contact with Chinese Communists, would go over with them the problem raised in each of the points and ascertain reactions and viewpoints of Chinese Communists without presenting UC views as a target against which Chinese Communists might shoot.

Re Cease-fire Commission, Gross made it clear we would welcome views of group as to composition of commission or use of one-man commissioner. Pearson tentatively suggested possibility of using POC in some manner, or some designee of POC. Gross suggested possibility of using UNCURK, or some designee of UNCURK, or establishing a one-man supervisory mechanism. Gross referred to experience in cease-fire problems heretofore handled by UN and pointed out that use of one-man truce supervisor seemed to be more practicable than use of commission which frequently injected political elements. It was understood by group that we were receptive to suggestions and that this point would be discussed further after the group had considered the matter and consulted among themselves.

No opposition was taken to any of the suggested points. Question was asked what we contemplated for "administration" of demilitarized zone, to which Gross and Crittenberger replied that we had no prejudgments on this matter except appropriate provision must be made in the cease-fire arrangements with regard to civil government and police power in the demilitarized zone. We referred to experience of US government in dealing with civil affairs problems in World War II.

At request of Gross, Crittenberger made statement concerning composition of teams of observers to be designated by the Cease-fire Commission. The general feeling was that these might be composed of representatives of opposing armed forces but group of three wished to consider this matter further.

With regard to neutralizing waters off land areas occupied opposing armed forces, question arose concerning possible introduction into those waters of Soviet naval vessels. Crittenberger pointed out that this problem was not covered in draft points, which referred merely

[2] No record of this meeting has been found.

to "opposing naval forces", but that we would object to use of these waters by Soviet naval forces. Group took note of this point.

Gross advised group that we would be available at any time from now on. No political questions were raised by any member of group and in particular no reference was made to what our position would be with regard to negotiations on political issues. Formosa was not mentioned.

Group had apparently not yet decided how it would proceed to attempt to establish contact with Chinese Communists. Pearson asked whether we had suggestions or information re command situation in North Korea, that is, whether forces there were under Chinese commander, what relationship was between Chinese Commander and North Korean command, and what we knew of the status of North Korean authorities. Crittenberger advised group on confidential basis without attribution to him, that the Chinese forces in North Korea were known to be under a Chinese commander, an associate of Mao Tse-tung.

Re publicity, it was agreed that in view of delicacy of negotiations and desirability of avoiding public discussion of points raised by either side, group would limit itself to brief statement merely stating discussions had been held with representatives of UC. On our part we agreed to limit ourselves to mere statement of no comment, explaining that we consider it inappropriate to make any public comments for fear of impeding the work of the group. Entezam and his colleagues made special point requesting that all efforts be made to avoid leaks in Washington and Gross agreed to pass this comment along to Department, Crittenberger to transmit same request to Defense Department to Joint Chiefs. Members of USUN all have been instructed to refrain from any comments. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

357.AD/12–1650 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 16, 1950—12 : 43 p. m.
[Received December 16—1 : 22 p. m.]

Delga 443. From Gross. Re Chinese Communist Delegation talks. Lie told me at midnight last night that Wu had come to see him during the evening. Wu said that the Chinese Communist Delegation had been here for about three weeks and felt that there was not much

use for them to stay around any longer. Wu said that the GA "had recessed" and that the matter which the Chinese had come to discuss had been postponed many times in the committee. Therefore, Wu was planning to leave with his group on Tuesday [1] by BOAC flight and Wu asked Lie to help make arrangements for their trip.

Wu also asked Lie to set up a press conference for Wu at Lake Success at 3:00 p. m. today. Wu's apparent intention is to announce publicly pretty much what he said to Lie last night. Lie told me that he urged Wu not to take this step and that he pointed out to Wu that from the point of view of Chinese Communists themselves this would be a harmful step for them to take at the very moment the cease-fire group was attempting to establish contact with them for the purpose of discussing the basis of a satisfactory cease-fire. However, Wu repeated that he was under instructions from his government to return to Peiping and added that they wanted him back there for the Chinese New Year and that in any event Wu could return to Lake Success quickly if that seemed desirable. When Lie pressed him further to be available for a meeting with the cease-fire group, Wu replied that he had already told Rau yesterday morning at a meeting between Wu and Rau that Wu would not meet with the cease-fire group and that he considered the GA resolution illegal.

Following his meeting with Wu, Lie called together the group of three and told them of his conversation with Wu. It was decided by the group of three that Rau, on their behalf, would seek a meeting with Wu this a. m. and make an informal approach for the purpose of making arrangements for a formal meeting between the group of three and the Chinese Communist Delegation.

In order to take an independent reading of the situation, I called Pearson this a. m. The latter confirmed the substance of Lie's conversation with the group of three. However, with regard to the Rau-Wu meeting yesterday a. m., Pearson said that after the group had left Lie, Pearson taxed Rau for full information concerning his meeting with Wu. (Rau had made no mention whatever to me of the fact that he had met with Wu yesterday a. m., despite the fact that at the lengthy meeting of Crittenberger and myself with the group of three we had discussed at considerable length the procedures by which the group might go about the problem of establishing contact with the Chinese as well as the matter of approach in any such meeting.)

Pearson said that Rau did not give to him quite the same flavor of his conversation with Wu as appeared from Lie's report of the Wu-Rau

[1] December 19.

conversation. Rau told Pearson that he had not lost hope as a result of anything Wu had said to him and that he did not get the impression from Wu that the latter was on the point of immediate departure from New York. However, Rau frankly admitted to Pearson that he was somewhat influenced to optimism by reason of the reports he was receiving from GOI concerning Panikkar's discussions in Peiping. It appeared from these reports, said Rau, that the Chinese in Peiping were not taking as intransigent or hard a line as Wu was taking in New York.

Pearson told me confidentially that he was preparing a message which he expected to clear with his colleagues on the group. This message would constitute a formal approach by the group to Wu and, among other things, apparently would state that the group was willing to see the Chinese Communists or North Koreans anywhere. I asked Pearson whether this meant the group was contemplating a flight to the Far East, to which Pearson replied "not necessarily", that they might request someone on the spot to see the appropriate authorities on behalf of the group.

In the meantime, Rau, if he succeeds in seeing Wu this a. m., will tell him that the reason the group had not wished to make a formal approach was out of consideration for Wu, since it seemed to the group better to make the first approach on an informal basis in an attempt to establish contact.

Pearson agreed with me that it was highly desirable for the group to send a formal communication to the Chinese Communists prior to the 3 o'clock press conference. I urged that they send such a note as soon as possible after (and if) Rau sees Wu and that I hoped that Pearson would not let himself be talked out of sending such a formal communication by any fuzzy analysis by Rau. A copy of the note, I thought, should be telegraphed to Peiping.

Pearson told me that Younger was coming to see him this a. m. and tell him about a talk which Younger had with Wu yesterday. I shall endeavor to see or talk with Younger myself later this a. m. in order to get a direct report and will communicate to Department as soon as possible.

At 11:45 a. m. today Pearson called to advise that Rau had not been able to establish contact with Wu and might see Wu tonight following the Wu press conference. Pearson agreed with me that it would be desirable for group to send formal communication to Wu prior to press conference, and Pearson will communicate at once with Entezam to make this recommendation. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

357.AD/12–1650 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 16, 1950—2 : 30 p. m.
[Received December 16—3 : 04 p. m.]

Delga 444. From Gross. Re Korea—cease-fire: On Thursday night I had a brief conversation with Younger in which I outlined to him in very general terms our thinking re a cease-fire and in particular our ideas re machinery for supervising such a cease-fire; arrangements for a demilitarized zone; and arrangements for withdrawal of the forces behind the zone.

Jebb called on me today to give certain comments which Bevin wished to make re certain points. Bevin agrees to the principle of the demilitarized zone which in his view should be patrolled by UN observers.

With regard to a supervisory commission, Bevin thought it should include representatives of the UC, the Chinese Commies and the NK and ROK. He felt it was particularly important that the Chinese Communists should be represented on the commission and on any other machinery set up for observing the cease-fire. I told Jebb that in our meeting with the cease-fire group we had already stated that we accepted the principle that representatives of the opposing forces would participate in the cease-fire machinery at the observer level.

Bevin had also commented that the Chinese Communists might oppose the principle of unrestricted access of the cease-fire commission to the whole of Korea. He suggested that I might be wise not to press this point at this stage and suggested language along the following lines: "The commission is appointed to supervise the cease-fire and shall be given such powers as the commission considers necessary to secure this objective."

I pointed out that this principle was an indispensable one because it was essential to the security of our forces that the Chinese Communists should not be permitted to bring in reinforcements across the Yalu River. Jebb suggested as a compromise that perhaps the commission could have access to the territory 110–150 miles north of the line but not all the way to the Yalu.

Bevin had also commented that the Chinese might regard a provision that there should be no reinforcement on either side as being favorable to the Unified Command because of the fact that they had large forces nearby.

I told Jebb that I had not given any text to the cease-fire group but had simply gone over with them the problems involved in the cease-fire and given them our views. I understand that the group did not propose to give the Chinese Communists any proposals as from the US, but, on the contrary, planned to attempt to discuss with them general problems; if they put forward any suggestions they would put them forward as their own.

Jebb reported that Younger's conference with General Wu yesterday had been most unsatisfactory. Younger had opened with a conciliatory statement and expressed the hope that the Chinese would consider a cease-fire. General Wu had stated very bluntly that the Chinese would not give consideration to any cease-fire proposal except on the terms set forth by Malik; and stated bluntly that all foreign troops must get out of Korea; that the US must withdraw the Seventh Fleet from Formosa; and that his government was entitled to China's seat in the UN. He stated that the GA cease-fire resolution was illegal and that he would not discuss a cease-fire with the three-man committee which the Assembly had set up under the resolution. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

357.AD/12–1650 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 16, 1950—6 : 07 p. m.
[Received December 16—6 : 37 p. m.]

Delga 445. From Gross. Re developments at Lake Success re Chinese Communists. SYG Lie advised me 4 :30 p. m. concerning developments at Lake Success re Chinese Communists group as follows:

After Wu's press conference,[1] Chinese Communist delegation called on Lie in order to complete travel plans. Lie unsuccessfully attempted persuade them to remain beyond Tuesday, but Wu insisted their departure plan was firm and requested Lie to give administrative assistance and telegraph to London and Prague to aid in making reservations, et cetera. Wu agreed to Lie making this information public.

Entezam group of 3 was at Lake Success for purpose of listening to Wu press conference and considering steps to be taken in light thereof. Lie advised me that group of 3 had sent note this a. m. to Wu advising Wu of desire of group to meet for purpose discussing basis of cease-fire arrangements and expressing willingness of group to meet with Chinese Communists and NK representatives at any place convenient

[1] In his statement at the press conference, General Wu denounced the "cease-fire first" proposal as an attempt to tie the hands of the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces in Korea.

to latter. Lie did not have text of note.[2] (During past 48 hours group has not kept Lie advised of their intentions and has not used Lie for administrative assistance in any way.) Lie sarcastically characterized note sent by group of 3 as a "bid for a trip to Peiping". Group of 3 sent to Peiping a telegram presumably embodying the substance of note delivered to Wu.

Lie informed Wu that group of 3 was at Lake Success and inquired whether Wu would be willing to meet with the group. After some consultation between Wu and Chiao, Wu refused to meet with group. However, at Chiao's suggestion, Wu did meet for about half an hour with Entezam as President of the GA, rather than as chairman of the cease-fire group. Lie was not invited by Entezam to remain and therefore did not know what was said.

Lie has strong view that we should press as rapidly as possible for adoption of 6-power resolution. He is convinced Chinese Communists do not intend to cooperate in any way in efforts looking toward a cease-fire. He is afraid that group of 3, particularly Rau, will now press for as much delay as possible in further UN action in the vain hope that Peiping will take position different from that taken here by Wu.

Rau is having dinner with Wu this evening, in accordance with arrangements made some days ago. Lie does not believe this of any significance. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

[2] The text of the note is printed in U.N. document A/C.1/643.

320/12–1650 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, December 16, 1950—7 : 12 p. m.
[Received December 16—8 : 08 p. m.]

Delga 446. Assume Department will have text Wu's statement at press conference today from Sunday press. UN press releases will be sent Department by USUN pouch Sunday evening. USUN daily unclassified summary account of press conference will be transmitted Department Sunday afternoon.[1]

USUN learned that following Wu press conference, Foote (secretariat) gave correspondents oral briefing as follows:

CPR delegation conferred with Lie and Entezam after today's press conference, spending about thirty minutes with each. Conversations were described as "cordial and friendly." In response to a question

[1] Not printed.

asked privately by one of the correspondents, Foote said he "certainly would not assume" that cease-fire had been subject of discussion. Later, in oral briefing, Foote told correspondents that CPR delegation on Friday, December 15, had asked SYG Lie to help them arrange departure by air next Tuesday for Peiping. Foote said these arrangements were "going forward."

Continuing oral briefing, Mat Gordon (secretariat) said cease-fire committee probably would have interim report for committee 1 on Monday, December 18. Gordon said Entezam committee would continue its efforts by every possible means. Gordon "did not exclude possibility that CPR may attend committee 1 meeting." Gordon added that Rau expects to see Wu over the weekend. Gordon said that he had approached Wu after the press conference and asked him to clarify his statement CPR "willing to try to advise the Chinese volunteers to bring to an early conclusion the military operations which they have been forced to undertake with the Korean people's army in their resistance against the US armed forces of aggression." Requesting that there be no attribution to UN sources, Gordon told correspondents Wu had indicated that CPR "might be willing to withdraw volunteers if certain circumstances were met."

AUSTIN

795.00/12–1750

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1950.

Participants: Mr. Hickerson
Sir Keith Officer, Head of Australian U.N. Delegation
BNA—Mr. Shullaw

Sir Keith Officer, the head of the Australian U.N. Delegation, called on me today at his request to discuss U.N. strategy with respect to Korea. He said he believed it was important to give the cease-fire committee sufficient time to attempt to achieve its objectives, and that it was also important that the First Committee adjourn for a few days to provide the proper atmosphere for the committee to carry on its work. Sir Keith said that recriminations in the First Committee could damage whatever chances the cease-fire committee might have of accomplishing anything. He also said that Mr. Pearson believed that the committee should not confine itself to negotiations with General Wu's delegation but should be willing to transfer its negotiations, if need be, to Peking. In response to a question from me, he said that he thought the three negotiators might require ten days or two weeks to determine whether or not their efforts would be

successful. I told Sir Keith that we would be agreeable to an adjournment of the First Committee.

In a discussion of our long range U.N. strategy on the question of Korea, I told Sir Keith that in the event cease-fire efforts failed and the Chinese Communists continued their operations in Korea, we believed it essential that they be branded as aggressors. I mentioned in this connection Mr. Spender's speech of December 10 in which he stated that we could not afford to distinguish between aggression by a small power and aggression by a large power and that we should not water down the principle of no appeasement by the terms of any agreement reached with the Chinese Communists.

I told Sir Keith that after branding the Chinese Communists as aggressors we favored requesting the Collective Measures Committee to recommend effective action which members of U.N. might take individually and collectively. I mentioned such possibilities as severance of diplomatic relations, financial measures, trade restrictions and possibly a blockade of the Chinese coast. I told Sir Keith that in the handling of this problem we had to seek a course of action between two extremes. We certainly do not intend to become involved in an all-out war with China—that is what the Russians would like to see happen. On the other hand we cannot afford to simply evacuate Korea now that a larger aggressor has joined the North Koreans, except, of course, as a result of military necessity. I said that in branding the Chinese Communists as aggressors we should also do what we have not done up to the present, expose the Soviet Union as the instigators of this aggression.

Sir Keith mentioned that he had been very much disturbed by a conversation earlier in the week between Ambassador Makin and Mr. Rusk on the question of Formosa. He said that he understood Mr. Rusk had stated that one of our interests in keeping Formosa out of Chinese Communists hands arose from our belief that Chiang Kai-shek might return to the Chinese mainland by the choice of the Chinese people. He said that he was certain that Chiang Kai-shek was thoroughly discredited and would never be recalled by the Chinese people. Mr. Shullaw said that he had been present at the conversation to which Sir Keith referred and that he was certain Mr. Rusk had not meant to imply that this was a major point in his review of the political, diplomatic and strategic significance of Formosa. Mr. Shullaw said that he understood it to be a casual reference and recalled that Mr. Rusk had used the phrase "choice by disgust" to describe such an eventuality.

J. D. H[ICKERSON]

795.00/12–1850

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 18, 1950.

Subject: The Australian Prime Minister's Message Regarding the War in Korea.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, recommend that the reply proposed by the Department of State to the Australian Prime Minister's message of 6 December 1950 [1] be changed to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner): [2]

"I appreciate your message of December 6, 1950, conveyed to me by your Ambassador. I am sure that you will understand that the present situation in Korea does not yet lend itself to exact determination of the capabilities and intentions of the enemy. However, ~~from~~ in view of the great mass of troops which they have committed, ~~it can only be assumed~~ military operations should proceed on the assumption that the immediate military objective of the Chinese Communists is to drive all United Nations forces from Korea. ~~While it is hoped that it will be possible to stabilize a line, the terrain and mass of the enemy may necessitate formation of beachhead bastions in which the United Nations forces can be most effectively deployed and supported.~~ While it may be initially desirable to stabilize a well-defined line across Korea, I am sure you will appreciate the impracticability, in view of the many imponderables in a fluid military situation involving maneuver, of predicting the moves and tactics which may be found necessary. While continuing every effort to localize the present hostilities, and while at the same time strengthening United Nations abilities to resist any further onslaughts that may be planned, I consider it vital ~~that we~~ to the United Nations that it not permit this aggression against Korea to succeed.[3] ~~while at the same time strengthening our abilities to resist any further onslaughts that may be planned.~~"

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

[1] See the letter from Ambassador Makin to President Truman, p. 1426.

[2] The underlined sections represent suggested insertions by the JCS while the portions crossed out represent deletions from the Department of State draft proposed by the JCS.

[3] The JCS version of the text was approved by the Department of State and forwarded on December 21 to President Truman who assented to this reply to Prime Minister Menzies on December 22 (795.00/12–2250). The reply was then transmitted to the Australian Ambassador.

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met on Monday, December 18, from 10:45 a. m. to 12:40 p. m. and approved by a vote of 50 to 5, with 4 abstentions, a proposal to adjourn until the three-member Group on Cease-fire in Korea was able to submit a report; for the record, see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.418. This was the last meeting of the committee in 1950, as the report of the Entezam Group was submitted on January 2, 1951; see U.N. document A/C.1/643.

795.00/12–1850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, December 18, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received December 18—1:41 p. m.]

585. Eighth Army and ROK forces remain out of contact with Chinese Communist forces (Embtel 575, December 15 and previous). Tenth corps continues withdrawal from Hungnam with increasing CCF pressure reported. Eighth Army still without firm evidence CCF have penetrated south of Pyongyang in any appreciable numbers. Unconfirmed reports suggest small groups CCF may have been in Sariwon and Namchonjom. Patrols operating as much as 30 miles north 38th parallel on east coast have found neither CCF nor North Korean forces. However, build up of North Korean forces north of Chunchon appears to be proceeding. North Korean prisoners taken in this area recently state it mission of North Korea to hold vicinity of 38th parallel pending arrival of CCF.

Vehicular activity between Manchuria and Pyongyang area remains heavy with heaviest concentration on Huichon–Anju Road. Last night when visibility good total of 600 vehicles were observed from air of which about 450 were moving south. Only negligible motor traffic has thus far been witnessed south of Pyongyang. Considerable traffic also observed last night on road leading down east coast from maritime provinces.

Hostile aircraft continue to offer opposition in Sinuiju area. On December 15, 4 UN craft clashed with 10 Mig's for 20 minutes, one of latter being damaged. Yesterday F–86's in action for first time, had encounter with 4 Mig's. Two of latter were damaged and probably downed.

MUCCIO

795.00/12–1850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

NEW DELHI, December 18, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received December 18—3:15 p. m.]

1508. 1. I called on Bajpai today and imparted to him contents of Deptel 916, December 17[1] which arrived here yesterday. In order that he might be able convey with accuracy what I had to say to Prime Minister and to Foreign Affairs Committee of Cabinet I prepared in advance informal memorandum[2] setting forth statements which I was to make to him. In giving him this memorandum I told him my statements should be considered as of oral and informal character and what I gave him in writing was merely for his convenience and to save his time in preparing memorandum of his own.

2. Sir Girja read memorandum carefully and when he had finished remarked that its contents were so important that he felt that he should give it at once to Prime Minister for a top secret discussion with certain members of Cabinet. He expressed particular interest in latter part of memorandum which indicated that time might be at hand when it would be advantageous for US and India to discuss broader problem as to how Communist aggression in Asia was to be met. Re question of cease-fire he said he feared hope in that direction was fast ebbing. He deeply regretted that resolutions for cease-fire had been introduced so hurriedly into UN before proper diplomatic preparations for them had been completed. He was afraid that failure of these resolutions to achieve any constructive purpose would make attaining of a cease-fire still more difficult. He was very depressed because it seemed that there was little that could be done prevent onrush war.

3. I told him that it was clear international situation was grave. It still seemed to me that main hope of averting war would be for all free nations to make it absolutely clear to aggressors and potential aggressors that they had no sympathy whatsoever with aggression and would throw their full weight against any power guilty of aggression.

4. Sir Girja said he hoped to talk to me again about this matter in few days.

5. I decided to have this discussion with Bajpai rather than with Prime Minister because Prime Minister has been so occupied recently with problems arising from death of Patel[3] that he has not been able devote much attention to international situation and is not acquainted with latest developments.

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[1] Transmitted at 2 p. m. on December 15, p. 1550.
[2] Not printed.
[3] S. V. Patel, India's Deputy Prime Minister, had died on December 15 at the age of 75.

6. As I was about make my departure telegram was laid on Bajpai's desk. In greatest secrecy Bajpai read excerpt from it. It was from Rau and stated that Chinese Communist delegate in New York had informed him categorically that Peiping would not permit UN Commission on cease-fire to enter China.

7. In memorandum which I gave to Bajpai I incorporated in appropriate place some information contained in Seoul's 525, repeated this Mission as 917, December 17.[4]

HENDERSON

[4] See footnote 3 to telegram 916, December 15, 2 p. m., p. 1552.

795.00/12–1850 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 18, 1950—6 p. m.

467. Weekend press reports on ROK mass executions of Commie collaborators and Rhee statement ordering speedup red trials and executions view mil situation and lack prison facilities creating exceedingly bad reaction here and abroad. Suggest you informally approach Rhee immed, urge all possible moderation in imposition death sentences and point out adverse effect reports on world public opinion and on UN, particularly those UN members now directly aiding ROK. Continuation present course will give Commie propaganda most effective weapon in further splitting already divided views in UN re acceptability ROK as presently constituted.

Suggest continued efforts have ROK put in proper perspective if possible by further detailing numbers arrested, tried, freed, sentenced to prison, to death; outline of investigation procedures, methods of trials, protection of defendants rights etc. Only way to counter emotional press reporting wld be factual account this nature if facts support such action. Note press reports state UNCURK investigating.

WEBB

357.AD/12–1850 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, December 18, 1950—6 : 35 p. m.
PRIORITY [Received December 18—7 : 30 p. m.]

Delga 448. Re Korea: Cease-fire subcommittee, Entezam, Rau and Pearson, invited Gross to meet with them Sunday evening, December 17. Present also at meeting which lasted over two and a half hours was Jebb.

Meeting was opened by Rau. He said that although the committee had not any official contacts with Wu, he had had informal discussions with him. Wu privately reiterated the PRC feeling that the 13-power Asian resolution re cease-fire is a trap in the sense that Communists are called upon to cease hostilities without any concrete assurances that there will subsequently be broad negotiations with them on Far East problems. He added that Wu had asked Rau to keep trying, that the Communists want peace and that while he must return to Peiping on December 19, a mission could always return. Gross commented that Wu's public utterances followed entirely the Malik approach and that if the Communists wanted to settle these problems they could do so. Gross wanted the record clear that the Communists have from the beginning singled out the US for vituperation and that this tactic should be seen for what it is.

Rau continued that in the light of his contacts with Wu and after conferring with the other members of the subcommittee, they had decided that the best way to meet what might be a suspicious, but nevertheless real fear of entrapment would be by passing immediately the second Asian resolution calling for the representatives of governments not named in the resolution to make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of existing issues. During the ensuing discussion, which ended with a rejection of this idea and the strong opposition to it by Gross, the following points were covered:

(*a*) Calling upon the representatives of governments to meet as soon as possible would mean as soon as possible after a cease-fire were in effect and therefore the resolution might never become operative. Rau would have been willing to accept an amendment to clarify the point.

(*b*) The peaceful settlement of existing issues which is language from the Truman-Attlee communiqué should be taken to mean existing Far East issues and that could be explained in speeches.

(*c*) Gross emphasized that another difficulty with the resolution would be that its passage would indicate a *quid pro quo* for a cease-fire. On this, Pearson argued quite strongly that there would be no added connection between the two resolutions by calling up the second one at once.

(*d*) The bulk of the discussion revolved around the idea of leaving blank the names of the representatives who should be called upon to make recommendations. Rau had suggested the US, UK, Soviet Union, and Chinese Communists and three others—perhaps India, Egypt and France. All sorts of formulas were suggested, all of which involved the US, UK, USSR and Chinese Communists, and none of which provided for the interests of the ROK or Nationalist Government of China. Entezam advanced several ideas for leaving blank the governments involved for a definite or indefinite period. Rau indicated that he would not accept an amendment which would avoid the blank and provide simply that representatives of interested or directly interested

governments should meet after the cease-fire became effective. At that point, the idea of adopting the resolution was discarded.

During the discussion, Gross emphasized very strongly the US interest in proceeding with the six-power resolution and the fact that we had slowed our pace simply to recognize the views of those who wished to try for a cease-fire. He gave to the group the substance of Deptel 584 of December 13, stressing that while the US is willing to negotiate with the Peiping regime, the question of the forum as raised by the blank in the Asian resolution is basic and we would not accept any demand that the UN should oust the Nationalists from such negotiations. He also pointed out the additional items which the US might wish to suggest during such negotiations.

He recalled that it is the Chinese Communists who are actually pressing an offensive and that we see the six-power resolution as the absolute minimum and the authority and future of the UN at stake. He suggested in the light of this that if some useful idea was in the second Asian resolution, perhaps it could be added as an amendment to the six-power resolution. Gross referred to strong domestic feeling in the US toward isolationism if we and our friends become separated on this question and he added that when the Communists and Russians single out the US for attack, it is only fair to expect our friends to point to the fallacy.

Pearson, asserting his concern to preserve collective security machinery, felt his government would have recognized PRC but for US view. He saw divided view in UN on true motives of that regime and felt that opinion must be respected, otherwise war in Far East without solid support could result. In same vein Jebb referred to Chiang Kai-shek as "dead duck". He felt that present situation could result in some UN members being at war with China without others and he did not construe Truman-Attlee communiqué as providing that Chinese Nationalist Government should take part in negotiations over Far Eastern problems of sort envisaged in Asian draft resolution. In summing up, Gross spoke from substance of Deptel 263.[1]

When idea of giving priority to draft resolution and passing it was abandoned, Pearson suggested that subcommittee make an interim report reciting their informal discussions with Wu, pointing out that Asian resolution previously adopted contains in its preamble indication that further steps should be taken for peaceful settlement. Report or statement would then point out that this means negotiations not to exclude Peiping regime.[2] He then expressed hope that US would state

[1] Transmitted at 7 p. m. on December 12, p. 1532.

[2] Mr. Pearson made a brief report to the First Committee on behalf of the Cease-fire Group at the First Committee's meeting on December 18; see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.418.

in committee that Truman-Attlee communiqué indicates that these governments would not exclude Peiping regime from discussions of the type mentioned in preamble of 13-power Asian resolution. However, this was a tentative view which the members of the subcommittee themselves wished to consider further.

Gross commented that he would ask instructions and that while it is a fair interpretation of the communiqué to say that the Peiping regime should not be excluded, it would have to be read in the light of other parts of the communiqué, such as the reference to excluding any thought of appeasement and the need for strong support for resistance against aggression. He also stressed the strong views of the US for proceeding with the six-power resolution and evolving policy from there.

AUSTIN

795.00/12–2150

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 19, 1950.

Participants: Secretary of Defense Marshall
Deputy Secretary of Defense Lovett
Assistant Secretary of Defense Leva
Secretary of the Navy Matthews
Secretary of the Air Force Finletter
Assistant Secretary of the Army Johnson
General Omar Bradley
General Hoyt Vandenberg
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman
General Wade H. Haislip
Assistant Secretary of State Rusk

Secretary Marshall invited me to come to a meeting of the above Policy group to discuss in a preliminary way the security of Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have received a telegram [1] from General MacArthur asking for substantial reinforcements for the security of Japan proper.

Secretary Marshall opened the discussion by stating that he has been concerned for a week or ten days about the extreme vulnerability of Japan in the event of a sudden Russian onslaught. He said that the American people were familiar with the general problem which would be created in Europe by a Russian attack and would expect the kind of

[1] Not printed.

difficulty we would have in the overrunning of West Berlin, in the advance of Russian columns into Western Europe and in air attacks against the British Isles. He said that an attack on Japan, however, would disclose a degree of vulnerability which would surprise the American people and the resulting shock would produce a very serious situation. Just as he and Mr. Lovett were discussing this matter between themselves, he was brought a telegram to the Joint Chiefs of Staff from General MacArthur asking for a major reinforcement of our forces in Japan. The question which he wished to raise for discussion was whether there was any way in which we could "withdraw from Korea with honor". He stated that he had spoken to me briefly yesterday afternoon on the matter and had invited me to come over to repeat my statement of some of the political problems which are involved.

I then spoke along the lines of the attached memorandum, covered the principal points mentioned, but telescoped a few of the questions in order to illustrate the nature of the investigation which would be required by this problem. In my conclusion I strongly emphasized the need for maximum improvisation in this situation in order to make full use of Korean and Japanese manpower. I stated that the questions which were being raised were of the greatest importance and that I could only express certain preliminary views pending the Secretary's return from Brussels;[2] Secretary Marshall indicated that the present discussion was entirely preliminary and exploratory.

Secretary Finletter then said that he thought we should keep in mind the great principle on which we had entered Korea and that we should continue to support that principle. The American people acted best in support of a great principle and we should not lose sight of that factor.

Secretary Matthews said that the considerations which he had put forward were very important and would have to be taken fully into account but that he was convinced that the American people would support a withdrawal from Korea if that proved to be necessary. He spoke of his recent trips around the country which had led him to that conclusion, despite the attitude of metropolitan newspapers which he doubted were representative on this point. He said he thought that the reaction of the American people would be much worse in the event of a forced withdrawal (a Dunkirk) than in the event of a voluntary withdrawal.

Assistant Secretary Johnson said that the basic benefit of the great decision which had been made in June, a decision which he thought

[2] Mr. Acheson was attending a meeting of the North Atlantic Council; related documentation is scheduled for publication in volume III.

was the right one, was that it had awakened the American people to the nature of the threat which confronts us and had unified the country behind the measures which will have to be taken to put ourselves in a position of strength. He said that we have now identified our principal enemy and are prepared to do what is necessary to meet that danger. We have stopped the downward toboggan of our military strength. Between now and the time when we can take care of ourselves, he believes we should make the necessary decisions on a purely military basis and that if these decisions are presented to the country by military leadership they would be supported by the public. He said political judgments on such questions as prestige and the effect upon the attitudes of others can vary in much the same way in which psychological reaction to stock market trends go up and down. He said such considerations are unreliable as a basis for action and that we should do what is militarily sound. He said that he did not believe that what we do will make very much difference to the other side and that our action in Korea will have very little effect upon other moves which international communism can be expected to make.

Admiral Sherman said that from a military point of view it would be desirable to withdraw from Korea. He did not favor further ground reinforcement from the United States. He said that we should play this problem "down the middle", decide what is right to do and that we would be supported by [*sic*]. He stated that he was convinced that Western Europe would be delighted to see us withdraw from Korea. He stated that there might be some loss of prestige and some adverse effect in Asia but that we might have to accept that and balance it off against our increased capacity to deal with the overall situation.

General Vandenberg expressed the view that, from a military point of view, it would be desirable to withdraw our ground forces from Korea and to continue operations by air and sea against China. He specifically mentioned the destruction of industrial plants and the disruption of communications. He was particularly concerned about the debacle which could ensue if the 8th Army were again outflanked and driven into a Seoul-Inchon beachhead and there subjected to persistent air and submarine attack. He said the problem of evacuating the 8th Army through Inchon would become well nigh impossible. He stated that we should give serious attention to the question of gaining time. If we now believe that the Soviet Union plans to initiate an early war, he thought the point of greatest danger would be August 1951, which he related to the completion of the European harvest. He said if that is correct, between now and August 1951 would not work in our favor since we would not improve our ground potential significantly but would in that period have given the Soviets a chance to

produce additional atomic bombs. He did not say so specifically, but the implication was that it would be better for us to precipitate hostilities at an early date in order to prevent further USSR atomic buildup.

General Haislip said that he was not in favor of sending General MacArthur the large reinforcements he requested, but that if it became necessary to send him an additional division an equivalent division should be sent to the European theater. He pointed out that the divisions now in training will not have completed their basic training before March 1, and that these divisions now have in them personnel who have not yet learned how to be a basic soldier.

General Bradley said that the decision in June was a governmental decision as well as a United Nations decision, that it was taken basically for political purposes (he did not mean domestic political purposes) and that any decision to withdraw from Korea should be made as a governmental matter and perhaps as a United Nations matter. He referred to my query about instructions to United Nations forces to remain south of the 38th parallel and seemed to think there might be considerable merit in the issuance of such instructions. He did not believe we should withdraw further until we had serious indication that the enemy would in fact advance in strength south of the 38th parallel. He though it unlikely that the 8th Army would be pinned up against the Port of Inchon and thought that it would be feasible to withdraw on Pusan. He pointed out that General MacArthur had available to him some 18 divisions, of which 10 were Korean. He stated that in all directives to General MacArthur it had been pointed out that the security of Japan was paramount and that General MacArthur has made his decision to reinforce Korea with that in view. He said he thought General MacArthur might well be able to spare one or two divisions from Korea for Japan without having that make the difference between success or failure in Korea. General Bradley felt that if the Chinese were really intent upon driving us out of Korea, they had the military capability to do so even if the reinforcements which General MacArthur had requested were used in Korea itself.

During the above exchange, I pointed out that we had not asked General MacArthur to defend the 38th parallel as such, or even the Seoul area, and that if further withdrawal became necessary from a military point of view we would not interpose any political objection. General Bradley thought that we should await clear enemy intentions to drive in force south of the 38th parallel and pointed to considerable criticism that our forces had withdrawn such a great distance without having been seriously engaged except at the time of the initial Chinese counter-offensive.

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

1. Political Factors Involved in a Voluntary Withdrawal from Korea:

a. The issue of aggression. We should be confronted at once with the crucial question as to what we do about Korean and Chinese aggression. To turn away from the issue of aggression would almost certainly start a chain reaction of defeatism and disillusionment both nationally and internationally which would be difficult to halt. To withdraw from Korea, on the other hand, and take other military action against China might bring about immediate and violent reaction from the USSR which we are trying to postpone. The best way to gain time would seem to be to continue the military operation in Korea until it is clear that military necessity requires us to leave. Of course, gaining time is of little value unless the time gained is in fact used to the best advantage.

b. The commitment to the Koreans. A decision to abandon our Korean allies would have far-reaching consequences. We would voluntarily turn over some 20,000,000 anti-communists to communism. It is an important source of anti-communist military manpower from a non-American source. If we abandon the Koreans, many other present and potential allies will get a lasting impression of our reliability. This would be particularly true in Japan and the rest of Asia. It would be interpreted widely as a signal that those who are exposed had best now come to terms with communism on the best obtainable basis.

c. United States military prestige. It would be a serious thing for us to act like a defeated nation on the basis of events which have thus far transpired in Korea. In the broadest sense, our armed forces in Korea represent about 10% of our present military manpower; this 10% has not suffered heavy casualties since the beginning of the UN offensive in late November. Our comparatively small force in the field has not been seriously defeated; it has been out-maneuvered and has been set back. In any event, this force is not the measure of American power. We should not act as if we had suffered a national calamity; by doing so, it will become a national calamity.

d. Chinese military and political prestige. A voluntary withdrawal in the near future would leave Chinese military and political prestige at its peak; this would give great impetus to Chinese aggression elsewhere and to the consolidation of communism in China itself. If militarily possible, we should give the Chinese a chance to expose their weaknesses and to run up against the heavy costs of any large scale effort into south Korea. They should be forced to take a large dose of American air, sea and fire-power—even if our ultimate withdrawal from Korea becomes necessary. Hardship in Korea will produce strains on troop morale, on communist leadership and on relations between Peiping and Moscow.

2. Political Factors Involved in the Reinforcement of Japan:

a. World deployment of U.S. forces for World War III. Before deploying additional forces to Japan from the United States to meet the contingency of what would be, in fact, World War III, it should be decided that this is the deployment we would want for World War III. If the Soviets attack Japan, World War III is upon us. Where do we want our available forces to be in that contingency?

b. Vital importance of holding Japan. It can be accepted that the holding of Japan (as well as Germany, Western Europe, the United Kingdom) is of vital importance to the U.S. If there is a clear choice as between Japan and Korea, priority must go to Japan.

c. Effect in Europe of major reinforcement in Japan-Korea area. The dispatch to Japan of the divisions now in training in the U.S. would have a disastrous effect upon the program for the defense of Europe.

d. Inter-relation between our position in Korea and the defense of Japan. We should not overlook the close connection between our posture in Korea and our ability to defend Japan, because of the highly important political and psychological factors involved. A determined attitude in Korea is probably essential to a capability to defend Japan with Japanese assistance.

e. There is no question but that it would be desirable to strengthen our military position in Japan; the question is how.

3. An approach to the problem, as seen from the political side:

a. Political and military action to stabilize a position in Korea

(1) cease-fire along the 38th parallel
(2) political deal calling for phased withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea
(3) assistance to increase effectiveness of ROK forces
(4) Korea to be left in hands of a UN Commission

b. Strengthening of military position in Japan

(1) staging of 3rd Division to Japan rather than Pusan
(2) rapid increase of Japanese constabulary capability
(3) stand-by plans for immediate evacuation from Korea to Japan.

4. Questions which require examination:

a. Are there new elements in the situation now which have not been present since the Chinese Communists intervened in Korea in October?

b. Do we lack military equipment for an increased Japanese constabulary? If so, would it not be better to give a portion of the equipment now in the hands of the 4 National Guard Divisions in order to utilize Japanese manpower? We can assume that the Japanese would fight at least as well as Americans for the defense of Japan; are we not better off to keep our Americans in this country with their heavier equipment, even if we give the light equipment to the Japanese?

c. What degree of mobility can we count upon in moving our forces from Korea to Japan in the event of World War III?

d. To what extent can we improve our ability to defend Japan by increasing our air and naval power in the vicinity?

e. How far should we go in making concessions on a Korean settlement in order to remove our forces to Japan with UN blessing?

f. Assuming the increased threat of general war, what do we estimate we need for the defense of Japan, quite apart from the Korean issue?

g. How do we relate the defense of Japan to the defense of Alaska as priority demands upon our capabilities?

h. Can we find a way in the near future to reinforce our garrison in the Philippines?

i. In the event of World War III, would the atom bomb be available to play any role in the Japan-Korea theater of operations?

j. Does the problem of the defense of Japan suggest any modification of our priorities as to mobilization, e.g., should we put any special emphasis on aircraft carriers or any other particular types of weapons?

k. Is there any way in which we can make more effective use of Korean manpower within our own units, thereby making up in combat strength for any gap caused by deployment of certain units from Korea to Japan? Can we reinforce our units in Japan by attached Japanese?

l. Should we ask Canada, Australia or others to provide additional forces for the protection of UN air bases *in Japan*, in the event they could furnish partially-trained units for limited service in Japan?

795.00/12–1950

Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 19, 1950.

It is suggested that Ambassador Boheman might be asked to call and that he be told we think it would be possible for the Swedish Ambassador at Peiping to speak to the Chinese Government along the following lines.

The Swedish Government has noted the statement of Vice Minister Chang to the effect that the United States had not so far given a concrete opinion about hoping for a peaceful settlement. The Chinese Government of course knows that the Swedish Government has very friendly relations with the United States. It is in a position to inform the Chinese Government that it believes that the United States desires a peaceful solution of the Korean conflict. More specifically, it believes that the United States Government would be willing for its part to support a reasonable arrangement for a cease-fire in Korea. The Swedish Government believes that the United States would not be willing to make any arrangements which were not approved through the appropriate channels of the UN but the Swedish Government, as a member of the United Nations, believes that the appropriate UN bodies would also support such an arrangement. The Swedish Govern-

ment further believes that if a cease-fire could be arranged it would thereafter be possible to initiate discussions either formally or informally about the solution of other problems in the Far East. It believes it possible, for example, to consider in regard to Korea arrangements for the withdrawal from the country of all non-Korean forces provided that a UN Commission suitably composed could participate in assisting in the process. (If questioned on the point it would be possible for the Swedish Ambassador to say that he did not anticipate difficulty in having a representative of the Peiping Government included in such a Commission.) In response to other questions he could also indicate that if the negotiations were arranged there is no reason to believe that any subject would be excluded from the agenda of such talks. He would not be in a position, however, to suggest what solutions of any of the problems might be agreed to if such talks should be initiated. It would be one of the purposes of the talks to explore possibilities of agreed solutions.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

795.00/12–1950 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

TOKYO, December 19, 1950.
[Received December 19—2 : 55 p. m.]

CX–51634. This is Sebald's unnumbered. Department pass Seoul. UN Command deeply disturbed by continuing reports of inhumane treatment of political prisoners by ROK. ICRC delegate Korea has sent full report on subject to Geneva and similar report being hand carried this date to President Rhee by ICRC delegate Tokyo. Complaints center around (1) atrocious conditions existing in Seoul prisons and (2) brutal and arbitrary mass executions of alleged political prisoners, including women and children, by ROK authorities. These executions reported having particularly demoralizing effect on British forces, in whose area many of killings have taken place. British troops reported on one occasion to have disarmed firing squad before execution could take place.

UN Command has regarded trial and punishment of collaborators and other political offenders as internal matter for ROK and has consequently refrained from taking any action with regard thereto beyond bringing atrocity reports to attention responsible ROK authorities. Representations of UN command and American Embassy Seoul appear from continuing reports to have had little effect, however, and it is feared these excesses may serve to cast discredit on entire UN Korean effort.

This message for information and possible comment.

SEBALD

320/12–1950 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 19, 1950—7 : 11 p. m.
[Received December 19—8 : 16 p. m.]

Delga 453. Following report Pearson-Ross telecon late this afternoon. Twelve-power Asian group met immediately after Committee 1 adjournment yesterday morning and thereafter expressed disappointment to three-power group that group had neither said nor done anything to reassure Chinese Communists that they would not be lured into trap by acceptance cease-fire with nothing open in way of discussions after cease-fire.

At meeting of three-power group yesterday afternoon Rau wanted to issue press statement calling attention to twelve-power resolution providing for discussions in relation to cease-fire resolution. Entezam and Pearson opposed any public statement at this time and any action pending contemplated Rau conversation with Wu this morning.

Rau saw Wu this morning and got nowhere; he reported, however, that Chinese Communists made cryptic remarks to effect they hoped to be back soon.[1]

Three-power group met at lunch today and were to meet again this evening to consider sending telegram probably tonight to Peiping along following lines: Three-power group anxious that there be no misunderstanding on part Chinese Communists, in considering telegram group sent last Saturday re cease-fire resolution, and no misunderstanding re twelve-Asian power resolution concerning discussions. Chinese Communists may be assured if cease-fire resolution implemented negotiations can follow at once as twelve-power resolution could be adopted by Assembly at once. It was view of twelve Asian sponsors of resolution calling for discussions as well as three-power cease-fire group that Government of CPR would participate in discussions. Group felt that adoption twelve-power resolution could provide channel for peaceful settlement outstanding issues in Far East affecting interests of US, UK, Soviet Union and China. Telegram would end on note that cease-fire must, of course, first be put into effect.

Pearson said that if telegram sent it would not commit anyone else to anything.[2]

With regard to procedure in Committee 1, Pearson said they had found out that three-power telegram to Peiping last Saturday was not received there until 7 o'clock yesterday morning. Pearson said that if

[1] The delegation from the People's Republic of China departed on December 19.
[2] The text of the message sent by the Cease-fire Group to Chou En-lai on December 19 is printed in U.N. document A/C.1/643.

reply not received by Thursday morning,[3] three-power group planned to send to Peiping that morning short telegram setting in effect a deadline, but not laying down an ultimatum, to effect that three-power group must begin preparation of its final report to Assembly not later than Tuesday, December 26. Pearson said group would prepare its report in course next week with view to Committee 1 meeting early first week in January. Report would include text of telegram referred to above concerning negotiations.

AUSTIN

[3] December 21.

795.00/12–2050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, December 20, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received December 20—2 : 11 p. m.]

589. Reference Deptel 467, December 18; Embtel 561, December 11.[1] Guards from West Gate and Mapo prisons, Seoul, executed total 39 prisoners tried and condemned by Seoul district court under National Emergency Law Number 1, in major cemetery area just north of Seoul on December 15. Executions were observed by British soldiers, one warrant officer making written report to this [*his?*] C.O. assuming executions of casual character with doubtful legality, and alleging small girl as well as two boys killed. These allegations reported to UNCURK and to foreign press, latter seeming accept at face value and cabling accordingly. UNCURK informally queries Home Minister and Justice Minister, as well as a Reuters correspondent who had not seen these executions, but who reported on some executions at Sariwon, North Korea, which were quite unrelated but which seemingly latter attempted to connect. (Both Embassy and British Legation previously had investigated Reuters reports on Sariwon, finding that anti-Communist NK guards employed by US civil assistance teams, had conducted Sariwon executions during period UN withdrawal.) Embassy informed today UNCURK has dropped question, following investigation and satisfaction executions, however badly handled, were results sentence passed by legally constituted court accordance with law.[2] UNCURK had sent military observer, Colonel White, Canada, to observe exhumation bodies on December 17, which was conducted under orders Home Minister and Justice Minister. Exhumation proved allegations re shooting children wholly false.

[1] Latter not printed; it provided statistical information on the disposition of Communist collaborators in the Seoul-Inchon area by the Republic of Korea (795.00/12–1150).

[2] For UNCURK's report following its investigation into the executions, see U.N. document A/1881, pp. 20–22.

Facts appear to be that civil courts (Seoul district court) from October 1 to December 15, under Emergency Law Number One, promulgated Taejon June 28, convicted, sentenced 391 persons, of whom 242 have been executed, all by shooting. Prewar executions by hanging, but death house destroyed during war, never restored, and prison authorities substituted musketry for rope. Article 12 this law permits execution either by hanging or shooting. Recently, owing uncertainty security, Seoul executions speeded up, leading to these executions. These figures do not include military executions following court martial, whose prisoners are handled separately.

Emergency Law Number One, June 28, states purpose to punish anti-national criminal acts rapidly and strictly in emergency situation caused by NK "puppet group" invasion, provides in article 3 for death sentences for those committing following crimes during emergency period, which period to end when public peace restored: (1) murder, (2) arson, (3) rape, (4) destruction or damage military transportation, communications, water supply, electric or gas facilities, government facilities, maps, important documents, (5) extortion, robbery, illegal distribution munitions or other important (war) materials in large quantities, (6) acts causing jail break. Most those convicted, executed, reportedly charged under (1), (2) or (4) especially (4).

Persons executed December 14–15 had been sentenced by Seoul district court between November 15 and December 10 as being guilty violation one or more of six crimes specified in law as carrying death penalty, youngest were 21 (2) and oldest was 50.

Owing public furor caused by second day's executions (British troops threatening shoot any guards attempting execute others in their area) and foreign correspondents cabling stories of mass executions without trial (allegedly by police who actually were not involved at all), government has suspended executions for time being until can find suitable execution place and method. Justice Minister reported to cabinet could not have executions in prison area since prisoners (over 5,000 now in West Gate prison) would riot if they heard shots. Embassy officer discussed subject today with Vice Minister Justice and chief penal administration, Justice Ministry, who agreed would cause erection triple gallows enable execution remaining 151 awaiting execution within prison, would not shoot any more.

President has issued orders to Justice Minister hereafter before any one executed his family must be notified, and be permitted take custody of body after death; chaplain of desired faith must be allowed give pre-execution solace and accompany prisoner during execution if requested. This is in addition to normal practice requiring attendance executions by physician and representative public procurator. In cases reported, two physicians and two public procurators were present. President has also stated to press is preparing program for review

capital sentences to see if cannot commute some of them. It is reported that President will issue amnesty list, either on Christmas or New Year's day, commuting some sentences and paroling or pardoning other prisoners.

Today Vice Minister Justice called at EUSAK headquarters and then at Embassy asking assistance arrange transportation 4700 prisoners from Seoul to Taejon, Taegu and Pusan prisons. These include 300 convicted and given life sentences, and 900 charged but not yet tried who are expected to receive life. Koreans greatly concerned that Communist-oriented prisoners should not be left in prisons for Communists to release if they should take Seoul. Last June Communists opened West Gate and Mapo prisons, armed prisoners, and many of latter became greatest scourge of Seoul citizens during Communist occupation, even more so than invading army. This memory haunts many Koreans, who are determined not to have the experience repeated.

Understand Korean Government intends issue statement explaining these facts.

Embassy believes same correspondents misunderstood President's reference to speeding up trials (Embassy officer was present). December 12, President had paid surprise visit to West Gate Prison, with Home Minister and Justice Minister, made careful inspection, left order (1) improve food and sanitation; (2) improve quality prison, hospital care; (3) speed up trial of prisoners so innocent could be released and present long delays before trial be ended. Embassy understands was reference to this which President made at press conference, rather than saying had urged speed up of executions.

Repeated information Tokyo unnumbered.

MUCCIO

795.00/12–2050

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] December 20, 1950.

US/S/1650

Subject: Dropping Korea Question from Security Council Agenda

Participants: Mr. Denis S. Laskey,
United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. C. P. Noyes,
United States Mission

Laskey reported that after the United States Embassy had discussed this question with the Foreign Office, the Foreign Office had

sent them new instructions. The present position remains as previously, that it is legally very doubtful that the Assembly has the right to make recommendations to Member States on the Korean question while the matter remains on the Security Council agenda. The Foreign Office therefore continues to feel that it is important that at some time the Security Council should drop this question from its agenda.

They realize that throughout this month there are very real political difficulties. They are willing, therefore, to go on for the rest of this month without raising the issue themselves. Laskey was not sure what their position would be if other Delegations, before the end of this month, raised this issue and it became a hot potato. This would put them in a very difficult position. He thought barring this eventuality his Delegation would have no difficulty in passing any resolution implementing a cease-fire—if that were possible—or the Six-Power resolution.

In regard to the Six-Power resolution, he thought it could be made an exception on the ground that in the same resolution the Council had been prevented from passing it; also that it did not make recommendations to Member States but merely stated a policy. The British certainly would have grave difficulties with any second-step resolution which did make recommendations to Members. Laskey thought the Foreign Office would be anxious, after January 1, to have the Security Council drop the matter from its agenda so as to eliminate this difficulty. He thought this could easily be done when Quévedo is President.

Laskey indicated that the British had discussed this in Commonwealth Meeting. He thought that the point of view he had expressed was the general feeling of the Commonwealth Group.

795.00/12–2050

Memorandum by Mr. Louis Henkin of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs to the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bancroft)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 20, 1950.

Subject: Ambassador Gross' Interpretation of Department's Views on Negotiations Concerning Korea.

Delga 448 from New York, December 18, reflects an apparent misinterpretation of the Department's views on the question of negotiations for a Korean settlement, particularly as to the forum of negotiations and the participants. I take it our position is as follows:

1. After a cease-fire is arranged, we are willing to discuss the Korean question and if necessary other Far Eastern problems.

2. We are prepared to consider these questions either in an appropriate UN organ or in diplomatic discussions of a more or less formal character.

3. In a discussion in a permanent UN organ in which China is represented we are prepared to let the Peiping regime sit at the table and participate in the discussion but we will not agree to its being seated to represent China. In such organ the Chinese seat would continue to be held by the present Chinese Delegation which could, of course, exercise full rights of discussion and vote like other members.

4. If discussions are held outside the UN we are prepared to deal directly with representatives of the Peiping regime. Though we would want to be sure that any group assembled was not "loaded" against us, we have no fixed views on what other governments might participate in such negotiations. Whether the Chinese Nationalists would also take part would depend on subject of discussion. E.g., we would not wish them to participate in a discussion of Korea; they would have to take part if Formosa were discussed.

If the above represents our position it seems highly misleading to say as Delga 448 does, "The question of the forum as raised by the blank in the Asian resolution is basic and we would not accept any demand that the UN should oust the Nationals from such negotiations."

Mr. Hickerson may want to call Ambassador Gross to clarify any misapprehensions on this matter.[1]

[1] No record of such a telephone call has been found, but see the instructions to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations contained in telegram 602, *infra*, which was approved by Mr. Hickerson.

320.2/12–2050 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 20, 1950—4 p. m.
PRIORITY

602. In view of the undeniably heightened danger of general war, we should overlook no honorable possibility of bringing about a peaceful settlement in Korea. We believe it therefore wise not to become overly entangled in the procedural maze into which cease-fire and other proposals have developed and to take stock of our basic purposes.

1. The reason for United Nations action in Korea was to repel North Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea. There has now been added the aggression of China. If the Free World is to survive, we cannot voluntarily permit aggression to be rewarded. On this point we will not compromise or bargain.

2. Our objective in Korea has never varied from that of the United Nations resolutions: the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic country. We had hoped and still hope to bring that about

by peaceful means under United Nations procedures. Neither we nor the United Nations were committed to bring it about by whatever force would be required; the enemy is now in fact capable of preventing a UN military success in all of Korea.

3. We have consistently desired and still desire the earliest possible withdrawal of United Nations forces from Korea; this must, as a minimum be accompanied by a cessation of North Korean attacks across the 38th parallel and withdrawal of Chinese forces. It is our earnest desire that the Entezam Group will be successful in arranging a cease-fire which could lead to a generally acceptable peaceful settlement for Korea, including acceptance by Korea's neighbors. To this end we are willing to discuss the matter in a forum or procedure which would include the Chinese Communists. Despite undoubted basic differences in ultimate purposes, there may at least be room for discussion leading to *modus vivendi*. If they desire, as they have stated, a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea, then some accommodation might be possible and we should be able to discuss a peaceful settlement. The holding of such discussions should not depend upon prior commitments from either side as to positions to be taken in discussions, and discussion itself does not constitute appeasement.

Our obligations under the Charter and our consistent record of seeking peaceful settlement of disputes make discussions in the present instance for us a natural course of action.

Therefore, if our friends in the UN, including Entezam, Pearson and Rau, and the Chinese Communists understand our basic willingness to talk and to use peaceful methods, they may be able to work out a situation to bring this about.

We have immediately in mind a cessation of hostilities with the military situation stabilized at the 38th parallel. We believe an effort to achieve this prior to any Communist offensive across the parallel is of great importance.

We suggest that you use the foregoing as a basis for discussions with Rau, Entezam and Pearson.

If the question of negotiation on other matters is raised you should be guided by fourth paragraph of Department's 916 of December 15 to New Delhi.

WEBB

320/12–2050 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 20, 1950—5 : 55 p. m.
[Received December 20—6 : 26 p. m.]

Delga 458. Re Korea—cease fire. Following is report of telecon Fawzi Bey and Ross on latter's initiative this afternoon. Fawzi said

that no meetings of Asian group as whole were being held, although various members of group were meeting separately. He said they were not dealing with anything at moment of any substantive importance. He said he thought we had to adjust our thinking to tempo somewhat slower than that of NY. He said he saw ahead of us necessity of making big choice between stiff position and appeasement. Asked his views concerning timing, he said he thought we should wait until two or three days after arrival Wu in Peiping so that from practical point of view we do not give Communists excuse that they have not had ample time to consult Wu. Fawzi thought that if no reply had been received by Monday or Tuesday [1] we should then actively consult with view to determining action in first committee. He commented parenthetically that Asian group had not even received reply to its first appeal that Communists not cross 38th parallel.[2]

AUSTIN

[1] December 25–26.
[2] See the memorandum by Hickerson, December 5, p. 1408.

320/12–1950 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 20, 1950—7 p. m.

603. Re Delga 453.[1] Dept believes US shld agree with procedure and timetable for Comite I advocated by Pearson. In indicating our willingness to go along with proposed procedure to Entezam group, you shld point out that if Chi Commies attack UN forces across 38th parallel in force we wld assume that procedure wld be modified.

WEBB

[1] Received at 8 : 16 p. m. on December 19, p. 1578.

795.00/12–2150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET SEOUL, December 21, 1950—2 p. m.
PRIORITY [Received December 21—2 : 26 a. m.]

596. Embtel 585, December 18. During past 3 days UN forces in Eighth Army sector continued out of contact with CCF. Light contact was maintained, however, with North Korean forces in 38th parallel area ranging from due north of Seoul to slightly east of Chunchon. Most significant development during 3 day period has been receipt of

intelligence reports indicating movement of CCF forces southeast from Pyongyang area and south from Koksan area toward parallel areas opposite Uijongou and Chunchon corridors leading to Seoul. These reports, while not firm, suggest there may be from 1 to 2 CCF armies deploying north of parallel. Unfortunately, visibility has been so poor past 3 nights that vehicles sightings have been inconclusive.

Communist air activity has been slight past 3 days. There were no sightings on eighteenth and twentieth; there were 2 sightings on nineteenth, one of which included two Migs observed as far south as Pyongyang.

MUCCIO

795.00/12–2150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SEOUL, December 21, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received December 21—12 : 03 p. m.]

595. Re Embtel 589 December 19 [*20*]. Although President had ordered suspension executions pending discovery appropriate means and place, and establishment method review as well as general amnesty, seemingly only civil side government has taken action comply. Justice Ministry issued necessary orders, is preparing an amnesty decree for issuance tomorrow which is reported will involve release about half those now in prison under charges violation Emergency Law No. 1, while reprieving most of those awaiting death sentences. Justice Minister has prepared public statement regarding law, trials and executions, which was expected have good effect, and to be issued today.

Yesterday afternoon ROK Army JAG office attempted conduct execution undetermined number persons convicted, sentenced by court-martial in same general area of encampment UK 29th Brigade where other executions had resulted in adverse publicity. Before British officers could obtain interpreter and interfere, 17 persons had been killed, according British report, "brutal" and "criminal" fashion, although facts supporting this conclusion not stated. Presumably refers to shooting in groups through back of head over open grave. British officers then stopped executions, examined warrant of execution, bearing appropriate seal of Chief of Staff and took name of JAG Major present. Execution party including undetermined number prisoners then returned Seoul.

Commanding Officer UK 29th Brigade has issued order prohibiting further executions this area, British troops will stop them and will

bring responsible person before him "by force if necessary to be dealt with". He informed British Chargé "I am less interested in the type of justice than in the effect on my troops".

Facts have been communicated informally to President, who is understood now issuing sharp orders to Defense Ministry for appropriate action.

Repeated info Tokyo unnumbered.

MUCCIO

795.00/12–2150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, December 21, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received December 21—1 : 54 p. m.]

602. Korean Army has instituted inquiry into conduct of executions in British area yesterday, has given assurances to British Chargé will be no further executions in British area, and that lieutenant in charge firing party is being held for court martial proceedings. Embassy officer examined court martial records yesterday's executions.

58 persons condemned to death by Military Court (57 for espionage and 1 for murder) were to be shot yesterday; 20 were shot before British stopped proceedings, remainder were returned to West Gate Prison. Of total 4 were women, youngest being 29; youngest man was 20. All executions now suspended pending investigation procedure and review of cases.

President issuing proclamation tomorrow announcing extensive amnesty effective December 23, is expected reduce prison population by between 30–50%. Wiring separately.

Minister Justice and Home Minister appeared before UNCURK this afternoon, made oral statements similar to that in Justice Ministry release (Embtel 600, December 20 [*21*] [1]) and announcing details amnesty program. UNCURK will make press release shortly describing same.[2]

Justice Ministry arranging with EUSAK for transportation for 2900 major criminals from Seoul to Taejon and Taegu prisons within next few days. Will leave approximately 2,000 ordinary criminals in prison here.

Repeated info Tokyo unnumbered.

MUCCIO

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[1] Telegram 600 not printed; the text of the public statement issued by the Minister of Justice is in U.N. document A/1881, pp. 20–22.

[2] Text *ibid.*, p. 22.

795.00/12-2150

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1950.

Subject: Our Course of Action in Korea

1. General MacArthur has asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for all four of the National Guard divisions now in this country in order to reinforce his position in Japan.[2]

2. There is attached (Tab A) a memorandum of conversation which I had with senior members of the Department of Defense on December 19. The preliminary line I took in that conversation is contained in notes (Tab B) attached to the memorandum of conversation.[3] These notes were prepared in consultation with Messrs. Matthews, Nitze, Jessup and Armstrong.

3. At Tab C [4] there is a proposed broad line of action for us to take in the light of the present situation in Korea. (This is not yet agreed to by all concerned.)[5]

4. It will be desirable to arrange a discussion with Secretary Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter before Christmas.

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

COURSE OF ACTION IN KOREA

1. U.S. objectives in the present situation in Korea should be

(*a*) to maintain the solidarity of the UN in resistance to aggression, fully exposing the character of the Communist assault upon world peace;

(*b*) to stabilize, if possible, a position in Korea at the 38th parallel by political means, and to reinforce this effort by military means if that can be done without risking the destruction of U.S. forces;

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[1] A manuscript notation on the source text by Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, indicated that Mr. Acheson saw this memorandum.

[2] On December 22, the JCS informed General MacArthur that no additional divisions would be deployed to the Far East pending a governmental decision on future U.S. courses of action in Korea (*Record of the Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, p. 76).

[3] See the memorandum of conversation by Rusk, December 19, p. 1570, and the annex thereto.

[4] Printed as the annex to this document.

[5] The parenthetical statement was written in manuscript on the source text, presumably by Mr. Battle.

(*c*) to prevent the extension of the hostilities in the Far East and to avoid heavier commitments of U.S. forces in that area in face of the danger of general war;

(*d*) to find means honorably to withdraw U.S. forces from Korea at the earliest opportunity;

(*e*) to use whatever time is available to strengthen Japanese and Korean ability to contribute to their own defense.

2. General MacArthur's directives should be clarified in order to make clear

(*a*) which major unit or units, if any, he is authorized to withdraw from Korea to Japan as a security force in Japan;

(*b*) that he should make the fullest possible use of Korean manpower in further fighting in Korea;

(*c*) that he is not required to hold any particular position in Korea regardless of cost, but that he should attempt to stabilize a position in Korea wherever there is a reasonable chance of success;

(*d*) that maximum effort be made by air and sea power to punish enemy forces, and to reduce their morale and military prestige, to disclose any weakness in their ability to maintain effective forces in combat over extended supply lines;

(*e*) that if it becomes impracticable to stabilize any position in Korea, it is contemplated that UN forces would withdraw on Pusan and be evacuated as a matter of military necessity;

(*f*) that in the event of any attack or direct threat against Japan, the security of Japan continues to be regarded as paramount;

(*g*) that maximum efforts be made to enable the Japanese to contribute more effectively to their own security by the further organization of mobile police reserves, coast guard protection, air field security, home guard, civilian defense, etc.

3. Our political effort should be directed toward

(*a*) a cease-fire in the vicinity of the 38th parallel;

(*b*) a settlement for Korea permitting the phased withdrawal of non-Korean forces from the peninsula;

(*c*) a course of negotiations on Far Eastern questions, the purpose of which would be (1) to gain time, (2) to seek a *modus vivendi* which would bar further armed aggression by China, or (3) fully to disclose the real character of Chinese Communist aggression and to enlist the energies of non-Communist Asia to meet it;

(*d*) a consolidation of the free world coalition.

4. Our program in the UN should be based upon the following steps:

(*a*) a cease-fire, followed by negotiations on Korea and other Far Eastern questions;

(*b*) if there is no cease-fire and a continuation of Communist offensives across the 38th parallel, the UN should promptly pass (1) the six-power resolution on Korea and (2) a further resolution naming

Peiping as an aggressor and asking the Collective Measures Committee to recommend to Members of the UN the collective measures it would be feasible to take under the circumstances.

795.00/12–2250

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 22, 1950.

Subject: Swedish Effort to Arrange Cease-Fire in Korea

Participants: Mr. Erik Boheman—Swedish Ambassador
Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State

I asked the Swedish Ambassador to come to the Department today and told him that, despite what appeared to be a Chinese Communist rejection of a cease-fire, we wished to leave no reasonable course unexplored. It seemed to us that it might be useful if the Swedish Government thought it possible for the Swedish Ambassador at Peiping to make another effort to disclose the basic American viewpoint to the Chinese Communists and to attempt to ascertain just what their real purposes are in the present situation. I thereupon went over with him the attached memorandum, explaining that we had drafted it as a statement which might be made by the Swedish Ambassador for convenience sake.[1] Mr. Boheman indicated that he fully appreciated this method of presenting our views.

Upon reading the memorandum Mr. Boheman thought that it was a very important and constructive step and he felt sure that his Government would wish to act immediately. He said that he would let us know of any results.

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[1] The text of the statement was identical with that in the memorandum of December 19 from Ambassador Jessup to Mr. Rusk, p. 1576, except that at the end of the antepenultimate sentence the following words were added after "such talks": "which would be appropriate for consideration by the parties involved".

357.AD/12–2250 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, December 22, 1950—6:40 p. m.
[Received December 22—7:41 p. m.]

Delga 460. Re Korea—cease-fire committee. Pursuant to Department's Top Secret 602 of December 20, Ross and Hyde called upon

Riddell, Rau and Entezam separately and thereafter had luncheon with Chauvel, Colson, Ordonneau and Laskey. Jebb joined us after luncheon.

In calling on the members of the Committee of Three we stressed the US earnest desire to see the group succeed, our realization that an attack across the 38th parallel might occur at any time and the belief that the effort to achieve cessation of hostilities prior to any such offensive is of great importance. We wanted to be certain that any questions or views of the group should be discussed and each of the three at least touched upon the question of withdrawal of UN forces. In discussing this, we developed the points contained in reftel. We added that we would like to see the group succeed rather than simply make a record.

The press had telephoned the three about a radio report that Chou En-lai had declared the Committee of Three illegal and that therefore PRC would not deal with it.[1]

Riddell had just heard this radio report and having talked to Pearson by phone seemed discouraged. He felt that it remained only for the committee to write its report, assuming that the radio information was correct. He thought it unlikely that the committee would receive any direct communication from Peiping. He thought that the UC military terms for a cease-fire were eminently fair if only there were some way to communicate them. He felt that they were the answer to at least one point made in the radio report, that a cease-fire would trap the PRC into allowing UN forces to build up their strength. He was interested in the idea of examining the general principles which would cover the possible withdrawal of UN forces and felt this would have been very useful to use a week ago but with no channel of communication now open, he was doubtful how this approach could be communicated.

Rau had just heard the radio report and while he was waiting for a confirmation and he had not seen any text, he assumed that it was a rejection of the committee's efforts. He considers the situation very serious as offering the alternative between war with China and the sort of negotiated settlement that is not likely to occur. He considered his own role extremely responsible and felt under great tension.

Early in the conversation he brought up the subject of Formosa and the 7th Fleet. In this connection he restated what he said in the conversation with Cohen reported in our topsec 434 of December 14. We pointed out simply that we would not reject the inclusion of such an item in any conversation following a cease-fire but that we thought his line looked in the direction of at least some advance commitment

[1] See telegram Delga 461 from New York, *infra*.

on the substantive question. Rau commented simply that he wanted reaffirmation of what had previously been said by US Government officials and that that was in no sense a new element. He pressed the point that in his view the US had made a mistake which it should be willing to recognize by the restatement of its position on Formosa.

He then mentioned the withdrawal of troops as one of the things that the Chinese Communists are particularly interested in but felt this presented no real difficulty to them or us. He thought it simply would be part of an overall plan which he would like to be in a position to present to them—a cease-fire and progressive withdrawal of troops after the unification of Korea and assurances on broad discussions of FE problems.

He felt that the US was too much committed to a military solution of the problem of Korea and we corrected this view by pointing out that our objective was that of the UN resolution and that neither we nor the UN were committed to bring about a solution by force.

He was worried that he could not himself explain or understand the motivation of the PRC or the USSR. He referred to a "report from Washington" that the USSR was in fact acting as a restraining influence on the PRC and he also mentioned a rumor that the USSR had some concern that the large troop concentration in North China might be a threat to it.

He reflected general discouragement and indicated no particular ideas about what the group might do next other than verify the correctness of the radio reports and write its own report. He did mention a hint which might be developed that negotiations might be undertaken with the NK regime to carry out the fiction that they were in control of the situation and form the key toward the withdrawal of Chinese Communist "volunteers".

Entezam was gloomy, stating that he had never wanted to be involved in the Committee of Three, he thought he had acquitted himself reasonably well in the GA and then found himself faced with this task which presented great difficulties for him personally in the light of his country's situation. From the start he had not seen how the group could succeed, but he had been willing to try his best. His approach was rather more technical than the others in that he could see no point in discussing a possible cease-fire unless and until a channel is opened up to talk with the PRC. He thought the radio reports were probably true and that it therefore remained for the group simply to write the best sort of report to keep the record straight. He felt that the US is primarily interested in what happens next and therefore should think about what to do next and write off the cease-fire group. He did mention the thought that perhaps some-

thing would come of trying to find out where the NK regime is and talk to them. He also suggested that the proposed CFM could deal with this. If there were any good will or willingness to negotiate the problem of Korea, it would not in his opinion be too difficult to work it out. He felt that the terms of the cease-fire suggested by the UC were entirely fair. He commented that of course the withdrawal of UN forces would be one of the first topics that would be taken up if a channel were opened. As far as the CFM is concerned, there would then be the problem of how to include the PRC, they being a directly interested party.

During luncheon with Chauvel and the UK advisers, we reported generally the above and Chauvel picked up at once and developed the idea of attempting to discuss the Korean question and a cease-fire in the projected CFM.[2] Jebb clearly disliked the idea of getting outside of European problems and wondered how the PRC could be heard. He also asked whether Chauvel would be willing for the CFM to consider IC. Chauvel replied he had no instructions but added that he felt that that problem was being effectively handled by France itself. Chauvel attempted to interpret our discussions with the members of the group of three and our desire to have them succeed as indicating a willingness to give them some mediatory functions for some indefinite period in the future. We pointed out that while we were willing to give them every assistance, we felt that if they received no answer or an equivocal answer from the Chinese Communists in the course of the next week, their usefulness will be largely at an end. He added that at least the committee was one device which could be used to attempt a political settlement. Jebb at once picked up and commented on the possible withdrawal of UN forces from Korea, which he characterized as a reestablishment of the *status quo*. We replied along the lines of Deptel 602 to show the incorrectness of that characterization. He did feel that possibility of withdrawal was an important element because it would be the next step after a cease-fire and the question would be how to convey the thinking along this line to the PRC. He suggested the possibility of a resolution in Committee I attempting to formulate the withdrawal principle. Laskey pressed strongly his feeling that we could not expect to negotiate a cease-fire until after an attack across the 38th parallel. If such an

[2] Telegram 612, December 27, to New York informed the U.S. Mission that the comments of Chauvel, Jebb, and Entezam reflected British and French thinking that a CFM meeting should and would be held. The Department indicated that the U.S. position was that such a meeting should be held only if preliminary talks indicated a mutually acceptable basis which would make a meeting worthwhile. The Mission was instructed to attempt to dispel the idea that a CFM meeting was certain to be held or that, if held, Far Eastern questions would as a matter of course be on the agenda. (357.AD/12–2250)

attack should come and we have the military strength to meet it, then the PRC would realize the costliness of a campaign and be willing to negotiate, but until then they have no real motive.

Jebb and Chauvel felt that the initiative is now with the PRC and that there is little that the rest can do. They as well as the members of the group of three all showed a tendency to sit back and wait, although they realized that the first committee must meet on or about January 2 and the next order of business is the six power resolution.

We left it with all of them that we would keep in close touch during the next few days and we emphasized the importance in our view, with which Jebb agreed, of being ready for a meeting of the first committee almost at once in the event of a sharp military attack.

AUSTIN

320/12–2450 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED NEW YORK, December 24, 1950—4 : 15 p. m.
[Received December 24—5 : 15 p. m.]

Delga 461. Re Entezam committee cease-fire proposal. Following is text message dated December 23 from Chou En-lai to Entezam. Committee at present does not plan release text to press.[1]

"Peking, December 23, 1950, Mr. Nasrollah Entezam, President of the Fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Lake Success.

The attitude of the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China on the so-called "three-man committee for cease-fire in Korea" and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question is to be found in my statement issued on December 22. Besides being broadcast by the Hsiu Hua News Agency on the same date, the said statement is hereby transmitted by cable for your information.

"Chou En-lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China, Peking, December 22, 1950.

"Statement by Chou En-lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China on the resolution concerning the 'three-man committee for cease-fire in Korea' illegally adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 14, 1950.

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[1] The text of this message from Chou En-lai was included in the report of the Cease-fire Group to the First Committee, dated January 2, 1951 (U.N. document A/C.1/643).

"The General Assembly of the United Nations illegally adopted a resolution submitted by thirteen nations concerning a so-called cease-fire in Korea. This resolution provided for the establishment of a three-man committee, consisting of the President of the current session of the United Nations General Assembly, Entezam, the Indian delegate Rau, and the Canadian delegate Pearson, both appointed by him, to conduct talks to determine whether it is possible to arrange appropriate and satisfactory conditions for a cease-fire in Korea, and then to make recommendations to the United Nations General Assembly. With reference to this resolution, Chou En-lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the the Central Peoples Government, the Peoples Republic of China, issues the following statement:

'1. The representative of the Peoples Republic of China neither participated in nor agreed to the adoption of the resolution concerning the so-called "three-man committee for cease-fire in Korea" by the United Nations General Assembly. Prior to this, the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China had repeatedly declared that the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China would regard as illegal and null and void all resolutions on major problems, especially those concerning the major problems of Asia, which might be adopted by the United Nations without the participation and concurrence of the duly appointed delegates of the Peoples Republic of China. Therefore, the government of the Peoples Republic of China and its delegates are not prepared to make any contact with the above mentioned illegal "three-man committee".

'2. The Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China has always held and still holds that the hostilities in Korea should be speedily brought to an end. In order to end the hostilities in Korea, genuine peace must be restored in Korea, and the Korean people must have genuine freedom to settle their own problems. The reason why the hostilities in Korea have not yet been put to an end is precisely because of the fact that the United States Government has despatched troops to invade Korea and is continuing and extending its policies of aggression and war. As far back as the beginning of the hostilities in Korea, we here stood for the peaceful settlement and localization of the Korean problem. For this reason, the Government of the Peoples Republic of China and that of the USSR have repeatedly proposed that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Korea, and that the Korean people be left alone to settle the Korean problem themselves. However, the United States Government not only rejected such a proposal, but also rejected negotiations for the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. When the invading troops of the United States arrogantly crossed the 38th Parallel, at the beginning of the month of October, the United States Government, recklessly ignoring warnings from all quarters and following the provocative crossing of the border by Syngman Rhee in June, thoroughly destroyed, and hence obliterated forever this demarcation line of political geography. In the later part of November, when the representative of the Peoples Republic of China was invited to take part in the

discussion by the Security Council on the charge against United States aggression in Taiwan, he again submitted the proposal that the United States and other foreign troops be withdrawn from Korea, and that the people of South and North Korea be left alone to settle their domestic affairs. But the United Nations Security Council, under the domination of the United States, rejected this reasonable peace proposal from the Government of the Peoples Republic of China. From this it is evident that since the United States Government has from the very beginning refused to withdraw its troops, it has absolutely no sincerity in ending the hostilities in Korea, still less in letting the Korean people have genuine peace and freedom.

'3. This being the case, why does the American delegate, Mr. Austin, now favour an immediate cease-fire in Korea, and why does President Truman also express willingness to conduct negotiations to settle the hostilities in Korea? It is not difficult to understand that, when the American invading troops were landing at Inchon, crossing the 38th Parallel or pressing toward the Yalu River, they did not favour an immediate cease-fire and were not willing to conduct negotiations. It is only today when the American invading troops have sustained defeat, that they favour an immediate cease-fire and the conducting of negotiations after the cease-fire. Very obviously, they opposed peace yesterday, so that the United States might continue to extend her aggression; and they favour a cease-fire today, so that the United States may gain a breathing space and prepare to attack again, or at least hold their present aggressive position in preparation for further advance. What they care about is not the interests of the Korean people and the Asian peoples, nor those of the American people. They are only interested in how American imperialists can maintain their invading troops and aggressive activities in Korea, how they can continue to invade and occupy China's Taiwan and how they can intensify the preparation for war in the capitalist world. Therefore, the representative of MacArthur's headquarters said bluntly that they could accept a cease-fire only on a military basis and without any political conditions. This means that, all the status of aggression will remain the same after the cease-fire, so that they can fight again when they are prepared. Further, they could take this opportunity to declare the existence of a state of emergency and to prepare for mobilization in the United States, in Western Europe and Japan, thus driving the peoples of the United States, Western Europe and Japan down into the abyss of war. Is this not what Messrs. Truman, Acheson, Marshall and MacArthur are doing now? With reference to the so-called proposal for cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards, irrespective of the fact that the proposal by the twelve nations had neither been adopted by the Security Council nor by the United Nations General Assembly and irrespective of what countries are to be included in the negotiating conference, and even if all these had been agreed upon, the agenda and contents of the negotiation could still be discussed endlessly after the cease-fire. If the conference is not a conference of the legal Security Council or of the legal five power conferences, or is not affiliated to them, the US Government in the last resort can still manipulate its voting machine. Thus to discuss the cease-fire and start negotiations now on the basis of the

withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the settling of Korean domestic affairs by the Korean people themselves is to act hypocritically and would therefore suit the designs of the US Government, and hence cannot satisfy the sincere desire of the peace-loving peoples of the world. The three-man committee—a cease-fire on the spot—peace negotiations—launching of a huge offensive; this Marshall formula is not in the least unfamiliar to the Chinese people, because in 1946, General Marshall assisted Chiang Kai-shek in this way, repeatedly for a whole year, and in the end had to admit failure and leave. Will the people of China, who had learned this lesson in 1946 and later gained victory, fall into such trap today? No, the old trick of General Marshall will not work again in the United Nations.

'4. Moreover, the present issues are definitely not confined to the Korean problem. While the United States Government was engineering the hostilities in Korea, it despatched the Seventh Fleet to invade China's Taiwan and then bombed northeast China, fired on Chinese merchant vessels and extended its aggression in east Asia. Against all this, the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China has repeatedly lodged charges with the United Nations. But under American domination, the majority in the United Nations has not only upheld American aggression against Korea and supported American invasion and occupation of Taiwan, the bombing of northeast China, but also rejected the three proposals submitted by our representative on the charge against the United States for armed aggression against Taiwan, and shelved the charge of United States aggression against China made by the delegate of the Soviet Union. Our representative was kept waiting for a long time and until the first committee of the United Nations General Assembly was indefinitely adjourned, he was not given a chance to speak.

'This attitude which was taken by the majority of the United Nations under the domination of the Anglo-American bloc, obviously violates the United Nations Charter and its purposes. They are furthering rather than checking American aggression. They are undermining rather than defending world peace.

'What particularly arouses the world's indignation is that, in spite of the fact that during the past several months the United Nations held innumerable discussions on China or on important questions concerning China, the delegates of the Peoples Republic of China, who are the only representatives of the four hundred and seventy-five million people of China, are still being kept out of the doors of the United Nations whereas the representatives of a handful of the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary remnants are still being allowed to usurp the seats of the Chinese delegation in the United Nations. To such an extent the Chinese people have been slighted and insulted!

'Therefore, the Chinese people, who, impelled by righteous indignation, have risen to volunteer in resisting the United States and helping Korea, and thus protecting their homes and defending their country are absolutely reasonable and justified in so doing. The Chinese peoples' volunteers, who have been forced to take up arms side by side with the Korean peoples' army to resist the American aggressors, under the unified command of the government of the Korean

Democratic Peoples Republic, are fighting for their own existence, fighting to aid Korea and fighting for the peace of east Asia as well as the peace of the whole world.

'5. It must be pointed out that the proposal for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem submitted by the majority of the delegates of the thirteen Asian and Arabian nations was originally based on their desire for peace, and this is understandable. But they have failed to see through the whole intrigue of the United States Government in supporting the proposal for a cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards, and therefore they have not seriously considered the basic proposals of the Chinese Government concerning the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem.

'The original thirteen-nation resolution was not wholly palatable to the United States Government, so it was separated into two resolutions. The first resolution, or the resolution providing for the so-called "three man committee for cease-fire in Korea", which is satisfactory to the United States, was, under pressure, given priority for discussion and was consequently adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. But the second resolution, or the resolution providing for a so-called "negotiating conference" "negotiating commission", with which the United States was either not satisfied, or not quite satisfied, was therefore shelved for the time being.

'The difference between these two resolutions was remarkably demonstrated by the attitude of the Philippine delegate. The Philippine delegate, who always follows in the footsteps of the United States, only agreed to the first resolution but withdrew from the second resolution. This trick of close cooperation displayed by the Philippines in the role of demanding a cease-fire and by the United States in the role supporting it has thus been exposed.

'From this fact itself, the lesson can be drawn that if the Asian and Arabian nations wish to gain genuine peace, they must free themselves from United States pressure and must abandon the "three man committee for cease-fire in Korea", and give up the idea of cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards.

'6. The Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China solemnly declares that the Chinese people eagerly hope that the hostilities in Korea can be settled peacefully. We firmly insist that, as a basis for negotiating for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem, all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea, and Korea's domestic affairs must be settled by the Korean people themselves. The American aggression forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan, and the representatives of the Peoples Republic of China must obtain a legitimate status in the United Nations. These points are not only the justified demands of the Chinese people and the Korean people; they are also the urgent desire of all progressive public opinion throughout the world. To put aside these points would make it impossible to settle peacefully the Korean problem and the important problems of Asia.' "

AUSTIN

795.00/12–2650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 26, 1950.

Subject: Korean Cease-Fire Efforts

Participants: Mr. Hume Wrong—Canadian Ambassador
Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State

Ambassador Wrong came in this afternoon to bring a message from the Minister of External Affairs Pearson concerning the Korean cease-fire efforts. He said that Mr. Pearson had been in touch with Nehru and Bajpai through Canadian High Commissioner Chipman in New Delhi. Mr. Chipman had reported that Panikkar had made little progress in their discussions in Peiping. Mr. Pearson asked Ambassador Wrong to inform us that the Indian Government is attempting to secure further information about Chinese policy and intentions. He said he doubted that the cease-fire group could accomplish anything now by direct communication with Peiping. Bajpai has said that the Chinese are not likely to be impressed by U.S. assurances of post-cease-fire discussions as these assurances are couched in language too vague to be persuasive. Mr. Pearson thought that New Delhi underestimates the difficulty in going beyond the American position in the face of Chinese fighting in Korea and in face of the Chinese attitude at Lake Success and Peiping. Nevertheless, Mr. Pearson thought that if the United States could be somewhat more specific in describing the subjects which, among others, could be included in post-cease-fire discussions, it would be more difficult for the Chinese to reject this offer, assuming, of course, that Formosa and recognition were to be mentioned. Mr. Pearson said that if the Americans cannot do this, the Chinese may reject both cease-fire and discussions on the grounds that the U.S. assurances were too vague to be worth anything. Although this Chinese position might be unjustified, it might not appear so to many other countries.

Mr. Pearson also said that the Chinese may reject any proposition made to them and may be entirely insincere in referring to negotiations; their basic agreement with the Russians may be to drive us out of Korea and to create as much confusion in the rest of the world as possible.

Finally, Mr. Pearson said he doubted whether we should expect the Chinese to isolate Korea from other Far Eastern issues, especially Formosa. He thinks we might go even further than we have gone in linking up general Far Eastern discussions with the cease-fire. As long as it is clear that nothing will be done until a cease-fire arrange-

ment is actually effective, Mr. Pearson does not think that this would amount to blackmail or "appeasement".

I told Ambassador Wrong that we had taken the position that we are prepared to talk about anything with the appropriate parties following a cease-fire. This arises from our basic commitment to employ peaceful methods of settling disputes and differences. I said I doubted that a more detailed statement of our views on the agenda would help, and it could make the situation even worse. I pointed out, for example, that if we now made it clear that we would want to talk about Indo-China, Tibet, the treatment of American citizens and property in China, the dismemberment from China of Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, and Chinese fifth columns in other countries in Asia, it would not improve the atmosphere in Peiping. We would not be willing to say on our own initiative that we would specifically discuss Formosa and recognition following a cease-fire because that would imply that we were ready to make concessions on those points. A failure to make concessions later would be looked upon as bad faith. I stated that under the present circumstances the Chinese are in position to establish a cease-fire, obtain a solution for Korea which would leave that country under enormous Communist pressure, and be admitted to the UN regardless of the U.S. position. It seemed to me that our possible assenting to all-out discussions is as forthcoming as we could be under the circumstances. In any event, a further statement from us specifically pointing to discussions on Formosa or Chinese recognition would appear to go beyond a mere willingness to negotiate and would become involved with substantive concessions in exchange for a cease-fire. I further pointed out to the Ambassador that it is beyond the realm of possibility that the Chinese Communists would make their own decision about a cease-fire on the basis of the vagueness or preciseness of the expression of our willingness to negotiate. Obviously, if they decide to deliver a major attack across the 38th parallel, as now seems inevitable, they will seize every flimsy pretext for presenting their action in the best possible propaganda light. But we should not confuse cause with pretext. I told the Ambassador that we would consider Mr. Pearson's views further and let him know if there were any change.

795.00/12–2750

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1950.

This morning the Secretary saw Mr. Jessup, Mr. Matthews, and Mr. Rusk and reported to them what took place at the meeting at

Blair House last night. He said that in addition to himself and General Marshall, Secretary Snyder, General Bradley and Mr. Short[1] were also present. He said the President wanted to discuss the situation in Korea, whether we could hold our position there, what we should do if we could not, etc.

The Secretary said that General Marshall mentioned to the President the meetings which had been held recently between the State Department and the Defense Department people and asked the President if he would like to attend. The President said that he would and Secretary Snyder indicated he would also like to come.

Mr. Rusk suggested that it might be best to bring the President into these meetings only when they were of specific interest to him or when the participants were ready to talk to him.

Mr. Acheson said that General Marshall had asked him to open the discussion last night. He had followed the line suggested in Mr. Rusk's paper on our future course in Korea.[2] He said that we were clear on our big objective. That objective is to take a stand against aggression on a collective security basis and retain that position as long as we could. He said that reverses did not warrant withdrawal. He pointed out that we were not hopelessly outnumbered in Korea and that the Chinese Communists had the burden of being on the offensive. The Secretary said that we should test out the Communists and see whether they had the vast power that they were supposed to have or whether they did not have this strong power.

Mr. Acheson said that the President agreed that we should not pull out of Korea and leave our friends there to be murdered. The Secretary said that we must consider, of course, how we could eventually disentangle ourselves from this situation. He pointed out that we had never intended to keep a large force there. He also mentioned the importance of not conducting a withdrawal which would result in a loss of these forces since they represented so large a part of our strength.

Mr. Acheson asked General Marshall about the directives which have been given to General MacArthur. He said he did not understand why we had taken the Third Division out of Japan and put it back in Korea when the defense of Japan was of primary importance under existing directives. General Marshall said that there had been so many directives issued in connection with the crisis in the Far East that he feared there was some confusion about them. He said that he thought all the directives should be reconsidered and rewritten as necessary.

Mr. Acheson said that it was agreed that we should get a complete restatement of the Korean problem for the President, saying what we want done, how to proceed, etc.

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[1] Joseph Short, Press Secretary to President Truman.

[2] See the annex to Rusk's memorandum of December 21, p. 1588.

General Marshall said he was worried about Japan. He also indicated his concern that if air attacks started in Korea, it might be very difficult to get our troops out. The General also said that he thought we could get our troops back to a line farther South without using [*losing?*] our forces or being cut off from them. He said it was important that we have a real plan for this movement so that the Pentagon would know exactly where it was going at all times.

Mr. Jessup asked at this point if we were clear that we would accept a withdrawal of the United Nations forces if the Chinese Communists withdrew. Mr. Rusk said that we would and said this was included in the October 7 Resolution.

Mr. Acheson said that in the meeting last night, the Military had said that we probably would be able to hold at the Kum River and a line going East. He said it would take all of our forces out there to hold it however.

Mr. Rusk said that FE was worried because no effort was being made to improvise in this area. He said that if we got into the matter too far, we would be interfering with the Military Establishment in its operation in Korea. He said he did feel that there were things which could be done in that area which would help out. He mentioned the desirability of getting U.S. dependents out of Japan, which would cut down our commitments out there. He also mentioned the desirability of creating a civil defense organization in Japan. He also said that we should get SCAP so that it could be moved around easily. He said that Japanese police battalions could be organized and used in the defense of airfields against possible paratroop invasion.

Mr. Acheson suggested that we make a list of these things for the Pentagon and take it up with them, stating that we assume the Pentagon is doing these things.

Mr. Rusk agreed that this was a good idea. He also said that the Military Establishment was assuming that they could go no farther on the Japanese Peace Treaty in view of the situation out there. Mr. Jessup said that we must get this question out of the JCS and get the Secretaries of the two Departments to make a decision on the matter.

Mr. Rusk felt that we should give the JCS a clear chance to come through with their views before getting the problem to the Secretarial level. Mr. Acheson said there was nothing else we could do to get a cease-fire resolution. Mr. Rusk said that we had said as much as we could to the Peiping Government in the message sent through the Swedish Government.

Mr. Jessup suggested we consider the same message to the U.S.S.R. that we did to the Chinese Communists. He said it was possible that

the Chinese Communists had not told the Russians about our message, and that there might be an additional value to having it go to them through a more direct channel.

Mr. Matthews asked what the Russians had to gain from a cease fire. Mr. Rusk said that if it were possible, although he doubted it, that the Russians were trying to restrain the various Communists, this might help.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that there had been no enemy air activity over Korea recently. He said there was a greater military capability here on the part of the United Nations troops than some of the U.S. military people seemed to think. He said it would be very bad for us to come out of Korea in defeat if there were any chance of our making a better stand.

Mr. Acheson went back to the meeting at Blair House last night and said that General Bradley was concerned over what would happen to the forces in Korea if war came. Mr. Acheson said he was asked whether the United Nations would pass a resolution condemning the Chinese Communists and asking them to withdraw if the Chinese Communists launched a great attack over the 38th parallel. Mr. Acheson said that he had replied that we thought that the United Nations would pass such a resolution if this attack were launched.

Mr. Acheson then said we must consider steps that we could take to bring the fighting to an end and permit us to get out of Korea. Mr. Rusk said there were three ways of doing this:

(1) To win a military victory in Korea and stabilize the situation. He said this was not within our capabilities.
(2) To make it in the interest of the Chinese Communists to accept some stabilization by making it so costly for them that they could not afford not to accept.
(3) To get out in defeat voluntarily or under pressure and then to continue our harassing tactics.

Mr. Rusk said that he preferred (2) above.

The Secretary asked whether if we intended to bring about (2) the Russians would bring in air and sea power. He said that if they wanted to deny us success initially they would want to now. Mr. Jessup said he doubted that they would bring in air and sea power locally unless they were willing to do it generally because this would set off a major war.

Mr. Rusk said that they could have dealt us a heavy blow by air attack during the evacuation and that they did not do so. He said that the blow could have destroyed any possibility we had of defending Japan. He said if they had wanted to start a general war, this would

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have been a good way to do it. Mr. Acheson said that the Pentagon was worried over a disaster of this nature and what might happen to our general situation if such a disaster occurred. Mr. Rusk pointed out that this same sort of thing could be done at any time in Europe. He said we took the risk in June that entry into Korea would lead to general war.

Mr. Jessup asked whether we had the air capabilities of knocking out both Port Arthur and Vladivostok, to which Mr. Rusk replied that we did not except by using the atom bomb.

Mr. Rusk said that we could get solidarity in the free world by holding in Korea until the Chinese Communists' intentions became clear. If they went into Indochina and their intent in Tibet became clear, we would undoubtedly have no difficulty in getting the British and French to stay with us.

Mr. Rusk said our other alternative was to pull out of Korea, let the Chinese Communists get a seat in the United Nations and possibly withdraw the Seventh Fleet from Formosa. He said that he felt that some continuation of the Korean operation was necessary for the rest of the world to see what they are up against.

Mr. Jessup asked whether we should bomb the power plants at the Yalu River if the Chinese Communists crossed the 38th parallel in great numbers. Mr. Rusk said that he thought that if a major attack occurred, we should attack any targets anywhere in Korea. He said that they had thought in FE that we should wait and see whether we had any bargaining position for a cease fire if we left the power plants alone. He said the Military had told him that it would take three weeks of conventional bombing to destroy the plants.

Mr. Matthews said that he did not think the power plants gave us any leverage on a cease fire. Mr. Rusk said that he thought it probably did not either.

Mr. Acheson said that the matter of additional guard divisions moving into Korea [Japan?] was not mentioned at Blair House last night.

Mr. Rusk again expressed his fear that we were not exploiting the situation as much as we should. He said that perhaps we should get General Marshall and see what could be done. Mr. Jessup said that he would think that the General would want the decisions made here rather than in the field by General MacArthur.

The Secretary suggested that we take the paper which Mr. Rusk had prepared and go over it again to decide what we wanted to accomplish, how to go about it, how much time it would take and then discuss with the Military how we moved ahead.

795.00/12–2750

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1950.

Subject: Swedish Approach to Chinese

Participants: Mr. Erik Boheman—Swedish Ambassador
Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State

The Swedish Ambassador called on me at noon today to tell me that Ambassador Hammerstrom had delivered to Vice Foreign Minister Chang the views which we had suggested to Mr. Boheman on December 22. Mr. Hammerstrom reported that he was "coldly received". He said that Chang asked a few questions about the proposition of the cease-fire commission, that Chang referred to the speech which had been made by Chu-Teh outlining the Chinese position,[1] that Chang had also mentioned the six points contained in Chou-en-lai's recent statement.[2] Mr. Hammerstrom had the impression that he would probably hear again from Chang but that he anticipated that Chang's reply would be in the form of additional questions.

Mr. Boheman said that he would let us know if his Government received anything further. I thanked him and asked him to thank his Government for their cooperation.

[1] Reference is to an address made at a mass meeting in Peking on December 24, held to celebrate the recent North Korean and Chinese victories in Korea and to welcome the Chinese Peace Delegation returning from the Second World Peace Congress in Warsaw; the text of the address is printed in *People's China*, January 16, 1951, Supplement, p. 8.

[2] For text, see telegram Delga 461, December 24, p. 1594.

795.00/12–2750

Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1950.

NIE–12

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE*

CONSEQUENCES OF THE EARLY EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES IN KOREA

Assumption: That hostilities have not spread beyond the borders of

*The intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of this estimate, and State, Army, and Navy concur in it. A dissent by the intelligence organization of the Department of the Air Force is appended as an annex. This paper is based on information available on 23 December. [Footnote in the source text.]

Korea at the time of a decision to employ Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea.†

1. The Chinese Nationalists have offered a task-force of 33,000 troops for service in Korea and possibly could provide a greater number without jeopardizing the security of Taiwan. Nationalist troops have undergone extensive and prolonged training, but due to inept leadership and poor living conditions there is some question of their morale. The majority of Nationalist troops on Taiwan have come from the more temperate zones of China, and a contingent for Korea probably would require training and some re-equipment before being committed to combat in cold-weather operations. In other respects, the initial Nationalist contingent for Korea would be well-equipped and could be transported to Korea in fourteen days. The Nationalist troops are experienced and familiar with Chinese Communist tactics. Nationalist units should perform comparatively efficiently under good leadership and adequate supervision, but might be susceptible to Communist propaganda and suffer a substantial number of defections if permitted to operate independently in areas beyond the immediate tactical control of UN commanders.

2. The presence or the absence of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea in the limited numbers estimated to be available within the immediate future would not be a major factor affecting the ability of UN forces to establish and hold a defensive line across the peninsula against numerically vastly superior Chinese Communist forces.

3. If a protracted defense of a beachhead is undertaken, the presence of Chinese Nationalist forces could make a substantial contribution, provided they were operating under good leadership and adequate supervision.

4. Whatever the military outcome in Korea, the employment of Chinese Nationalists there would, in the eyes of other nations, further identify the US with the Chinese Nationalists and would constitute a moral commitment for continuing US support of the Chinese Nationalist regime. In addition, the employment of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea would immediately raise difficult problems involving the feasibility of continuing the US policy of neutralization of Taiwan, particularly with respect to the employment of Nationalist naval and air forces other than in Korea and in Korean waters.

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†*Note:* This estimate considers only the consequences of the immediate employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea in the present situation and does not deal with the consequences of eventual employment of Chinese Nationalist troops either in Korea, in later and changed circumstances, or on the Chinese mainland as part of a larger undertaking. An estimate (NIE–10) is in preparation on the more general question. [Footnote in the source text.]

5. A majority of UN nations would probably reject a US proposal to use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea. There is a general apprehension that the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would give impetus or at least provide the pretext for increased militancy on the part of Communist China. This militancy would increase the danger of a general war with Communist China, which in turn might develop into a global war. In addition, the Western European nations would feel strongly that the US was jeopardizing the first-priority task of defense of the European continent by becoming involved in protracted hostilities in Asia. The employment of the Chinese Nationalists would alienate other Asiatic countries, which consider the Chinese Nationalists to be reactionary, politically incompetent, and already repudiated by their own people. Unilateral US action in using Chinese Nationalist troops would intensify these feelings.

6. The use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would remove whatever chance might remain of a political solution of the Korean conflict. Although it is evident that Communist China strongly supports general Soviet strategic objectives, this support might become even stronger as a result of the use of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea.

7. The USSR would probably welcome a unilateral US decision to use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea as: (*a*) further embroiling the US in hostilities with Communist China without engaging the USSR; (*b*) dividing the US from its allies; and (*c*) providing plausibility for international Communist propaganda concerning alleged US military aggressions and support of reactionary regimes.

Annex

1. The Director of Intelligence, U.S.A.F.,[1] dissents in NIE–12.

2. In general, this estimate has emphasized the military and political disadvantages of the employment of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea, and has failed to point out adequately the advantages which would accrue to the U.S.–U.N. campaign in Korea by the use of such forces. Specific points are as follows:

a. The discussions in this paper appear to have been governed by the acceptance of approximately 33,000 Nationalist troops as being essentially the total number available for employment in Korea. This office estimates this number to be far less than the total available.

b. The estimate does not give sufficient consideration to the fact that Chinese Nationalist Forces offer the only readily available force

[1] Maj. Gen. Charles P. Cabell.

for major augmentation of U.N. forces in Korea. In fact, such insufficient consideration fails to give planners grounds for looking upon the availability of these forces as a factor influencing the determination as to whether or not a beachhead should be held at all.

c. Introduction of a large number of Chinese Nationalist troops could make a substantial contribution by providing much-needed infantry to the U.S.–U.N. campaign in Korea, if a beachhead were retained.

d. This office does not believe that the reactions of all the various Asiatic nations to the employment of Nationalist troops in Korea can be assessed with sufficient accuracy to warrant the conclusion that these Asiatic nations will be irrevocably opposed to the utilization of these anti-communist forces. In this respect, more deference is paid in this paper to the attitudes of the governments, or majorities in the respective countries, than to the elements which fully recognize the Communist menace and would be encouraged by this new opposition to Communism's advance. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that even in Europe, public opinion might learn to applaud firm opposition, whether it be in Europe or in Asia, and in fact might prefer the fight to be made in Asia.

e. The estimate indicates that the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would eliminate any remaining chance of an immediate political solution of the Korean conflict. This dissent in no way is intended to contradict this conclusion. However, it appears to this office that the law of diminishing returns has set in with respect to the probability of a satisfactory immediate political conclusion. The discussion in the paper does not warrant a sound conclusion as to whether or not utilization of Nationalist troops would prejudice or aid an eventual political solution.

3. The estimate implies that the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would give impetus to, or provide the pretext for, increased militancy on the part of Communist China. It is reasonable that any increase in militancy, if such is possible (other than against Hong Kong), would be governed more by Chinese military capabilities and their own time-table than by any provocation which might result from the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea.

4. There appears to be insufficient data to justify the conclusion in paragraph 7 of this estimate that "the USSR would probably welcome a unilateral U.S. decision to use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea."

5. This office would revise NIE–12 as indicated below:

a. Reference p. 1, par. 2. Revise as follows: "*There is no immediate crisis in Korea requiring Chinese Nationalist troops to prevent a disaster, but this opportunity to begin the dynamic exploitation of any anti-Communist forces whose commitment could have a favorable effect on the Korean and possibly the entire Far Eastern situation should be given careful consideration. The Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa provide the only visible means for such exploitation.* The ~~presence or~~ absence of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea ~~in the limited numbers estimated~~

~~to be available~~ within the ~~immediate~~ *near* future *and later* would ~~not~~ be *an important* ~~a major~~ factor affecting the ability of UN forces to establish and hold a defensive line across the peninsula against numerically vastly superior Chinese Communist forces, *unless the US–UN introduced reinforcements directly.*"

b. Reference p. 1, par. 3. Add at end of paragraph as follows: "*An important requirement in Korea is for additional infantry. By using Nationalist infantry as a screening force, present UN forces in Korea could be used more effectively as a striking force. The defense of a beachhead requires a mobile reserve which can counterattack quickly at the points of greatest enemy pressure.*"

c. Reference par. 4. Amend first sentence and add a new sentence as follows: "Whatever the military outcome in Korea, the employment of Chinese Nationalists there would, in the eyes of *certain* other nations *at the present time,* further identify the US with the Chinese Nationalists and would constitute *a degree of* moral commitment for continuing US support of the Chinese Nationalist regime. *At the same time this act would identify U.S. intentions to utilize anti-Communist forces within its capabilities, and as such might have a positive psychological effect of potentially great value upon anti-Communist forces.*"

d. Reference par. 5. Revise as follows: *At the present time* a majority of UN nations would probably reject a US proposal to use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea. There is a general apprehension that the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would give impetus, or at least provide the pretext, for increased militancy on the part of Communist China. *Despite the repeated assurance of the US–UN to respect the Manchurian borders and the maintenance of the embargo against Chinese Nationalist operations on the mainland, Chinese Communist militancy has already reached a high level in committing the Fourth Field Army, which represents the best available Chinese Communist military force. It is difficult to see any new form which this militancy could take (other than in Hong Kong).* ~~This militancy would increase~~ *Therefore, there probably would be little increase in* the danger of a general war with Communist China, which *danger* ~~in turn might develop into a global war~~ *already exists. This, too, probably will have little direct effect upon the development of a global war. At least in the beginning,* the Western European nations ~~would~~ *might* feel strongly that the US was jeopardizing the first-priority task of defense of the European continent by ~~becoming involved~~ *a continued involvement* in protracted hostilities in Asia. *Later however, they might come to appreciate the determination of the US to take constructive action in an area of vital importance in the struggle against Soviet directed Communist aggression.* The employment of the Chinese Nationalists ~~would~~ *might* alienate *those elements in certain* other Asiatic countries, ~~which~~ *who* consider the Chinese Nationalists to be reactionary, politically incompetent, and already repudiated by their own people. *On the other hand, the employment of the Chinese anti-Communist forces could hearten the anti-Communist elements of all Asiatic countires and increase their will to resist Communist aggression.* ~~Unilateral US action in using Chinese Nationalist troops would intensify these feelings.~~ *In addition if the other nations should determine that it is necessary to make a stand in Korea, they will be more amenable when they recognize this as a*

method of relieving them of the necessity of providing more forces themselves."

e. Reference par. 6. Amend as follows: *"At a time of delicate negotiations* the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea ~~would remove whatever change might remain of~~ *might have prejudiced an immediate* political solution of the Korean conflict *deriving from those negotiations.* ~~Although it is evident that Communist China strongly supports general Soviet strategic objectives, this support might become even stronger as a result of the use of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea.~~ *This would not necessarily have precluded, however, a later political settlement. It was, therefore, important that a decision to use Nationalist troops be deferred until the probabilities of obtaining an acceptable immediate political solution were gone. However, Chinese Communist intervention on a massive scale is already a fact, and an immediate political solution deriving from present negotiations now appears to have reached a point of diminishing returns.*

f. Reference par. 7. Delete entire paragraph: ~~"The USSR would probably welcome a unilateral . . . reactionary regime."~~

357.AD/12–2750 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 27, 1950—6 : 18 p. m.
[Received December 27—8 : 05 p. m.]

Delga 464. Re Korea: Following is report of Ross' conversations today with persons indicated.

Grafstrom (Sweden) telephoned to ask how we viewed present situation and whether we had decided what course we were going to follow in First Committee. Ross replied we were of course giving most careful thought to situation confronting us in light Peiping attitude toward cease-fire group and its proposals and were in closest touch with Department on these matters. Said it would be most helpful to have benefit Grafstrom's thinking. Indicated our understanding present status cease-fire group as given by Riddell yesterday.

Expressing earnest hope we would keep him very closely informed so that he would have time consult his government and get instructions, Grafstrom went on to observe he did not think it would be desirable for cease-fire group to attempt any new approaches. Said he thought very little if anything to hope for along cease-fire tack. He said of course Sweden would vote for six-power resolution but that he and his colleagues in Swedish delegation had been considering possibility of new resolution. He subsequently sent us, on understanding it was entirely confidential and personal, text quoted below of outline for such resolution. He was informed we would of course

keep in closest touch with him and inform him our definitive views soon as possible.

Text of Grafstrom memorandum:

"(1) The responsibility for continued fighting rests upon the authorities commanding those troops which attack the UN forces during their fulfillment of the task given them in conformity with the Assembly resolution.

(2) On the same authorities rests the responsibility for the non-fulfillment of this task as well as the fact that the reconstruction commission may not be able, for the time being, to carry out its work.

(3) It is recalled that according to Articles 2, 5 of the Charter, every member shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the UN is taking preventive or enforcement action and that, consequently, a government which claims the right to represent a member state is likewise subject to this obligation.

(4) The GA maintaining the aims declared in the Assembly resolution recommends the member states not to recognize any political changes concerning Korea brought about in opposition to the principles of the Assembly resolution.

(5) The question of Korea should be maintained on the agenda."

Sunde (Norway) came in at his request and inquired our views and decisions in much same sense as Grafstrom and was given same response. He said he thought Norwegian attitude was very well summed up in sentence which he quoted from article in last week's *Nation* as follows: "We should learn to distinguish between processes of give and take which are essentials of all negotiations and on other hand appeasement in the Munich sense which involved buying an illusory security by giving away someone else's freedom." He said this rather exactly reflected general feeling of Norwegian Government and people. Asked to elaborate, he said that as matter of background, Norwegian Government had been very much in favor of negotiations since it was quite possible there may have been misunderstanding on both sides which could be clarified by negotiations. Further, he said he had thought great mistake had been made not to seat Chinese Communists last spring. He said he thought Russians had done everything in their power to prevent this. Said they were shrewd politicians and that it is not conceivable they would have committed the "blunders" if they had really wanted Chinese Communists in UN.

Sunde went on to say situation had of course now changed in view of Chinese Communists' attitude and insolent response to approaches of cease-fire group. He said he definitely was not in favor of seating Chinese Communists as condition of cease-fire. Said with regard to Formosa there was nothing in international law, in his opinion, which forbade US from intervening in favor of government which it recognized. He agreed with regard to matters such as Formosa and Chinese representation, aggression could not be rewarded.

Sunde said big question in his mind was whether US wanted or intended withdraw its forces from Korea. Ross replied that it seemed quite clear that UN would not wish voluntarily to withdraw UN forces from Korea or abandon objectives of unified, independent and democratic Korea.

Sunde went on to say that since we were not in position to give him our definite views today he would express his own assumption. It seemed very clear to him that in present situation US would want to proceed soon as possible with six-power resolution with strengthening amendments. Asked what sort of amendments he would consider as strengthening amendments, Sunde, emphasizing that he was speaking personally, replied he felt note would have to be taken of defiance of cease-fire group, that aggression of Chinese Communists would have to be condemned, and, of course, withdrawal provision of six-power resolution retained.

Asked whether he thought there should be any further strengthening provisions such as, for example, request to members to assist in repelling aggression, Sunde indicated he personally would find no difficulty with this, that such action with regard to Chinese Communist aggression would be analogous to SC action of June 27 with regard to NK aggression.

Sunde urged we let him know soon as possible what our decisions are so that he will have opportunity consult his government and avoid making last minute telephone calls to his FonMin.

Jamali (Iraq) at lunch expressed following views: He said that from beginning of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea he had felt it was essential to give them rope enough to hang themselves. For this reason he attached great importance to element of willingness to negotiate on outstanding FE issues after cessation of hostilities. For this reason he had felt it mistake to separate into two parts original draft of Asian resolution. This having been done he felt that Chinese Communists had been given no inducement (negotiations) to accept cease-fire. Resolution having been separated he thought it would have been better to pass second resolution calling for negotiations as extra length of rope.

Ross stated our views concerning future discussions after cessation of hostilities and called attention to fact that Chinese Communists had apparently chosen method of force rather than peaceful settlement, and pointing out in this connection Chinese Communists' unwillingness enter into real contact with established UN authority, he asked Jamali's views in light of tone and content of Chou En-lai's statements in reply cease-fire group overtures. Agreeing that Chou En-lai's statement did not seem to indicate real desire for peaceful

settlement, Jamali said he viewed present situation as follows: first, it was essential that we not allow situation to deteriorate into first-class open conflict between US and China. Second, he considered it essential that we not allow US or UN to be in position of cutting rope that would hang Chinese Communists. He said we must remain true to Charter and exhaust every effort of peaceful settlement.

Asked how we would go about this in terms of parliamentary situation in First Committee, in particular his attitude toward six-power resolution, for example, Jamali said he thought that in order accomplish purposes he had in mind in light of Chou En-lai's reply, it was necessary contemplate entirely new resolution. Such resolution in general terms, he said, should be appeal set forth in terms of ultimatum. Asked how he would develop this, he said he had in mind resolution which would make one last appeal for cessation hostilities, which would indicate a willingness to discuss outstanding FE issues with Chinese Communists after cessation hostilities, and which finally, having given Chinese Communists this last chance, would make clear that if they turned down once more appeal for cessation hostilities despite assurances to discuss other matters thereafter, they would have to bear full responsibility and consequences of their refusal. If they did in fact refuse, Jamali said next step would be perfectly clear to everyone. Chinese Communists would have to be condemned as aggressors and active steps would have to be taken immediately by UN to combat the aggression.

Jamali said Rau had called meeting of Asian group last Sunday night.[1] Seven members of group attended, including India, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan and Burma. Neither Iran nor any other Arab state was represented. At this meeting action along lines indicated by Jamali was apparently discussed. From Jamali's report it seemed fairly clear Rau was taking his familiar line re Formosa and Chinese representation. Jamali said he had stood fast against Rau and against paying reward for aggression. He had insisted, he said, that it should be made clear that negotiations on outstanding FE issues should take place only after cease-fire had been put into effect. Said he had also taken line with Rau that if UN stood fast in Korea Chinese Communists might be able to push UN out of Korea but then they would certainly lose any chance they might otherwise have of getting through negotiations Formosa or Chinese seat in UN.

Jamali said it was agreed at Sunday night's meeting that Rau would get in touch with us in order determine our attitude toward future negotiations and that he would also get in touch with Chinese Communists in order to determine whether assurance of future nego-

[1] December 24.

tiations would induce them to cease-fire. Rau was then supposed to report back to Asian group. Jamali was surprised to learn Rau had not gotten in touch with us. He was in a mood to burn Rau up and find out why Rau had not carried out decision of group but agreed not to do this for moment. He asked us to let him know at earliest possible moment our views concerning new resolution of type he outlined which we promised to do. He said he did not have any very strong ideas about sponsorship of such resolution but he thought that psychologically and politically there was great deal to be said for such resolution being sponsored by Asian group.

Fawzi Bey (Egypt) reports that Asian group will meet tomorrow (Thursday) or at latest following day to consider what should be done about second Asian resolution (negotiations). In considering this resolution they will consider interrelationship of all three pending resolutions, namely, six-power, Soviet, and Asian resolution. He said it was very important to consider our basic attitudes and what we are prepared to have UN do. Arrangements have been made for lunch with Fawzi tomorrow before Asian group meeting.

Riddell (Canada) reports this afternoon that cease-fire group met this morning and that in fact they are just marking time for moment, (awaiting result apparently of some contact made through Delhi). He thought preparation their report would take place actively over weekend, anticipating they would make report to First Committee next Wednesday. He said they do not contemplate anything other than straightforward, factual report, although he said they might decide certain amount explanation would be necessary. (This sounded a little like Rau). He said group had really not considered question its future status. Although they did not want close door and would of course remain available, he did not think any member of group felt there was very much further for them to do.

AUSTIN

795.00/12–2850

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1950.

Mr. Acheson spoke to General Marshall this morning about a suggestion which the General had made at the meeting at Blair House on Tuesday night.[1] The suggestion was that the President attend the meetings which the Department is having with the Military and with the JCS.

[1] See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Battle dated December 27, p. 1600.

Mr. Acheson said that he had some reservations about this suggestion and said that the NSC had, in the past, become a rather large meeting which resembled a town meeting and he feared if we had the President and other members of the Cabinet attending the meetings between the Department and the NME [Department of Defense] that we would get into the same situation we had been in before with the NSC. General Marshall agreed with the Secretary that this would be unwise.

The Secretary said that what we should try to do was to get to the place where the NSC became a place for real discussion and not just a meeting for approval of papers, etc. He felt that we should get the NSC so that the meetings were more working meetings.

General Marshall then mentioned a paper which he had sent over yesterday to the Department which consisted of some recommendations made by the JCS for a new directive to General MacArthur.[2] General Marshall said that he did not want to hold this up too long as the JCS were recommending this to the President and he felt he should not delay in acting on the JCS recommendations.

During the conversation, General Marshall said that he was aware of the important political implications of the draft directive to MacArthur and wanted to get the Secretary's wisdom on it but that he felt that it was essential that we move as quickly as possible on it.

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[2] The paper referred to, which represented a draft of the new directive to General MacArthur, is not printed. The text of the new directive is contained in telegram JCS 99935, December 29, p. 1625.

795.00/12–2850

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1950.

Mr. Lovett called Mr. Acheson today regarding the draft directive and memorandum sent over yesterday by General Marshall to the Department. He said that the paper was not originally supposed to have gone to the President for a decision but what they were trying to do was to bring up to date all instructions issued to General MacArthur so that they would be in one place and not strung out in a great many telegrams.

Mr. Lovett said that the covering memorandum was somewhat colored by the fact that General MacArthur had asked for four more divisions and for the authority to use the Chinese Nationalists. He said that he would not be able to hold if he did not have these additional forces. Mr. Lovett said that what they were trying to do was

to give the General some order of procedure and tell him that, in the opinion of the JCS, the time had come for withdrawal.

Mr. Lovett said that he did not like the memorandum because of the following points:

(1) First, it served notice that the "jig" was up.
(2) It was a mistake to tell General MacArthur to evacuate ROK divisions. He said that the ROK understood that it was fighting for its very life and that withdrawal of their troops would be widely misunderstood in South Korea.
(3) He had some question as to how the prisoners should be handled. He said that turning them loose in Korea to re-form would be dangerous. It was uncertain as to whether they should be evacuated.

795.00/12–2650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Perkins)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1950.

Subject: Use of UN Aircraft over the Manchurian Border

Participants: Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. T. L. Perkins, CA

Mr. Graves called yesterday to give orally some British views on the question of "hot pursuit" by UN planes of hostile aircraft over the Manchurian border. He left a paper (copy attached), which he emphasized was not a formal document but only an aid in reporting the views he had given. Mr. Graves said that he was merely reporting on a research finding which would be of interest, particularly as to Sir Eric Beckett's comments on simpler motives which might be used as a basis for pursuit.

[Annex]

Paper Handed to the Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Perkins) by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Graves) on December 27, 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

ORAL COMMUNICATION

Arising out of a consideration of a proposal to allow a limited pursuit of hostile aircraft over the Manchurian border the doctrine of hot pursuit came under examination by Sir Eric Beckett, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office. Sir Eric also consulted the Legal Advisers to the Canadian Department of External Affairs and the French Foreign Office.

The three Legal Advisers found themselves in agreement that the doctrine of hot pursuit is in no way applicable to the question of pursuit in the air over the Manchurian border. Sir Eric Beckett pointed out, however, that, from the purely legal angle, there do exist good grounds which could, where necessary, be invoked for the pursuit of aircraft across the border in the circumstances considered by the American authorities. The first of these grounds might be that, since the United Nations collective Police Force is engaged on a mission and is being obstructed by force in carrying out that mission, this international Police Force is legally entitled to take any action in any place which may be necessary to enable it to complete its task, and to protect itself from attacks in doing so. The second ground, which Sir Eric Beckett feels to be an even simpler legal reason on which to base a crossing of the Manchurian frontier, should it be desired that United Nations aircraft should cross it, is that while it is a principle of international law that frontiers should be inviolable, the right of any state to demand the observance of the inviolability of its own frontier entirely depends on that state observing the same principles and not sending or allowing any armed force to cross its frontiers into the territory of another state.

Quite apart from political considerations, the Legal Adviser does not, for the reasons given, consider that the invocation of the doctrine of hot pursuit would be at all applicable in the circumstances, though there might be other grounds that could be invoked to support action should this at some later stage be considered necessary.

WASHINGTON, 26 December, 1950

693.95/12–2850

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1950.

Ambassador Wrong brought in the attached memorandum this afternoon. He said it had been sent down from Ottawa and was an attempt on their part to get the situation in perspective. I think you may be interested in glancing through it.

I told him that the difficulty I saw in their paper was that they wanted to maintain the principles of the UN but at the same time they wanted to be very slow about calling Communist China aggressive. I wondered if these two were compatible. Hume said he personally recognized this and felt if the Chinese came south of the 38th parallel there would be very little choice anyone would have and that they would have to be called aggressors.

[Annex]

Memorandum Handed to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) by the Canadian Ambassador (Wrong) on December 28, 1950

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1950.

KOREA: ACTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Events have moved fast since the beginning of this month. The military situation in Korea appears to be becoming somewhat stabilized and it would seem as if there is now a good chance that a position in Southern Korea can be held more or less indefinitely. The General Assembly has suspended action on the six-power resolution and has appointed a committee to discuss the possibility of a cease-fire in Korea. It had been generally agreed that this committee must be given ample time to try to accomplish its purpose.

Decisions as to future action in the United Nations must be taken in the light of global strategy and of the present balance of armed forces between the Soviet world and the democratic world. Given determination by the democratic world, time is on our side and we should, therefore, play for time so long as we can do so without appearing to deny our obligations under the United Nations Charter. If, despite all our efforts, the Soviet Union and China should precipitate a war, it is essential that the democratic nations should be united in their resistance to aggression and this end would be more difficult to achieve unless there had been sustained common efforts to avert a catastrophe. The door should therefore be left open until the last possible moment for a settlement with the Chinese Communists by negotiation, and every opportunity for discussion of the issues with Communist China should be explored.

The principles of the United Nations Charter must be maintained but any action taken by the United Nations to cope with the aggression in the Far East should be decided primarily in the light of the main threat to these principles in other parts of the world, particularly in Europe.

The events of the past few months have demonstrated that the leaders of the Soviet Union are prepared to embark on policies which involve a grave risk of precipitating a general war. They may well have been encouraged to take these risks by their estimate of the present relative weakness of the forces which might be arrayed against them.

In these circumstances, the acceleration of defensive rearmament programmes will shorten the period of acute danger but will make the danger during that period even more acute. With China on the march

and all of Asia striking out on new paths, the strengthening of the free world which is now taking place may provoke the leaders of the Soviet Union to strike within the next few months before our defences reach the point where the Soviet leaders can no longer believe in the possibility of an easy victory in Europe and Asia.

It would therefore appear that the paramount consideration which the free nations of the world must take into account in determining their policy during the next twelve months' period of increasing strength is the necessity of doing nothing which might increase the danger of the Soviet Union precipitating a general war during this period. This means that our diplomacy must be wise and unprovocative, and that, in playing for time in which to get stronger, we must continue to be as conciliatory as possible. We shall have to make up our minds which positions are, in terms of our global strategy, essential and on which we stand firm, and where, on the other hand, we may have to accept rebuffs and local reverses.

Applying these general considerations to the situation in Korea it would seem to be unwise to decide in advance at what point it might become necessary for the United Nations to name Communist China as an aggressor. In order to leave the door open for negotiations, the United Nations has so far deliberately and wisely refrained from naming Communist China an aggressor. The United Nations should continue this careful course as long as possible.

At some point, it may become impossible for the United Nations not to name Communist China an aggressor. However, before the United Nations is asked to make such a decision, the nations principally concerned should first agree on the proposals for action which they would wish to put before the United Nations after a resolution branding Communist China as an aggressor had been adopted.

Even now a war with the Soviet Union is not inevitable. The risks of war during the next year or so, however, will be great. After that period, the strength of the free world, although still less than that of the Soviet Union, should be sufficient to deter the leaders of the Soviet Union from precipitating war. The uneasy equilibrium thus established may then make possible the working out of a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union.

320.2/12–2850 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 28, 1950—5 p. m.

615. As you know, Dept is considering commencement of active diplomatic preparation among friendly states to gain support for

necessary UN action in event threatened massive attack across 38th parallel begins.

There is possibility, however, that threatened attack will not occur prior to submission by Entezam group of its report and consideration thereof by First Comite at meeting now contemplated for Jan 3. Under these circumstances Dept believes USUN shld take fol position on consultation with other dels and in Comite:

1. If there is strong demand by Asian group to go through exercise of adopting 12-Power res, Dept wld acquiesce therein so long as (*a*) res expressly provides that meeting of proposed comite is dependent upon prior agreement on cease-fire and (*b*) composition of proposed comite is satisfactory. We wld regard as satisfactory a provision in res to effect that membership of comite shld be appointed by Pres of GA subject to confirmation by GA and understanding that on issues affecting China, CPR shld be represented.

2. We think 6-Power res shld be adopted with suitable modifications to make it reflect factual situation at time of adoption. Under hypothesis that Chi attack has not occurred, we wld be willing have 12-Power res adopted before 6-Power res and perhaps allow reasonable period to elapse between the two so that there cld be no complaint that Asian efforts had not been given reasonable opportunity to succeed.

3. Even if Chi offensive is held off indefinitely we nevertheless think that after 6-Power res is adopted and Chi Commies fail to comply, GA shld adopt stronger res. Other UN Members must bear in mind that Chi intervention and mass attack on UN forces flouted UN authority and was act of aggression, even if they do not now cross 38th parallel.

ACHESON

357.AD/12–2850 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 28, 1950—6:39 p. m.
[Received December 28—7:48 p. m.]

Delga 465. Re Korea—Indochina. Following is report of Ross' conversations with Lacoste (France) and Fawzi (Egypt) today. In both cases conversations on our side were essentially personal and exploratory in order to draw out thinking of others rather than selling any line of our own.

Lacoste came in at his request for exchange of views in light of his recent visit to Paris. After discussing French views concerning Brussels conference which are undoubtedly familiar to Department, he said

that French he saw in Paris did not have very many thoughts about current Korean situation. They professed to be completely in dark concerning military situation; they supposed there were four alternatives: (*a*) withdrawal altogether; (*b*) hold on at 38th parallel; (*c*) withdrawal to two beachheads (Inchon and Pusan); or (*d*) one beachhead (Pusan). They did not know which of these alternatives should be adopted either from military or political viewpoint. Generally they hoped very much we would not get involved even in limited war with China.

Lacoste then proceeded at his suggestion to give very gloomy analysis of situation in FE as he saw it. In this analysis he talked great deal about situation in Indochina in relation to Korea, emphasizing former much more heavily (he in fact several times turned conversation back to IC away from current situation in UN re Korea). He said so far as Korea concerned it was obvious that best available US forces were immobilized there. Best that could be hoped for would be to punish Chinese to some extent but that this would not appear to be very much relative to vast manpower resources of China. With regard to IC he had somewhat similar view. It did not appear to him that IC could be held very long against ChiCom manpower and material resources if ChiCom's decided give full-scale support to IC Communists. If IC fell he was quite certain that rest SE Asia (Nepal, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia) would fall very quickly to Communists and in turn India would not be far behind. This would mean fundamentally important loss sources of rubber, tin, sugar, petroleum, and other raw materials. US for six months past had been bearing major and highly disproportionate share of burden in Korea; France, however, had borne major share of burden in IC for last five years. Half of France's military budget was devoted to IC defense. They had been losing annually in IC flower of their officer corps at as fast rate as they could turn out officers at St. Cyr. Economic institutions such as the Banque de L'Indo-Chine had been smart enough to withdraw most their assets; there was not particular economic stake left for France in IC. Neither was there a political stake, France having signed that away in treaty with Associated States. They were therefore staying in IC only to hold line against advance of Communism throughout SE Asia and in order not to run out on Indochinese who had thrown in their lot with French and free world.

Lacoste observed that Moscow must be very pleased with situation we now find ourselves in IC and Korea. He also observed that in retrospect he felt we had probably made great mistake to go into Korea at end of June. He said when he was in Japan following 1945 he had

talked with great many our military and diplomatic people and it had been his understanding that Korea was not strategic necessity to protect Japan. In light of circumstances as they have developed since end of June he wondered whether it would not have been wiser for us to have denounced NK aggression, to have taken that aggression as basis for mobilization of free world against Communist aggression but to have refrained from going back into Korea.

In view of intense gloom of Lacoste's presentation Ross asked whether Lacoste drew conclusion from his remarks that we should get out of Korea and IC as soon as we could. Lacoste hedged somewhat in response. He said we should examine very carefully whether there were any reasonable chance of holding line in IC. If so then we should probably try to hold on as long as we could. France, he said, could not possibly do this alone without very substantial help from US. It might perhaps be not altogether unfair to draw inference from all of Lacoste's remarks that we should in effect beat a strategic retreat from Korea in order to support more fully Indochinese resistance to Communist aggression as well as husbanding our resources for defense in other areas.

On other hand Lacoste recognized importance of UN and of preserving its unity and integrity to maximum possible degree as an instrument which could be a very effective one for free world in resisting Communist aggression.

With regard to current parliamentary situation in UN Lacoste's principal concern seemed to be that we should avoid participating [*precipitating*] a crisis before we are ready to meet it. He seemed to assume that we would consider it essential at early date to name ChiCom's as aggressors and he personally indicated that he was fully prepared to accept this as well as further steps such as economic sanctions. In giving this indication it is probable, however, that he was not reflecting views of his government nor of Chauvel; in fact he gave some indication that Chauvel's mind was running in direction of some middle course which on one hand would be perhaps somewhat stronger than six-power resolution, but on other hand perhaps not so strong as to name ChiCom's explicitly as aggressors. In context of this part of conversation Lacoste observed that he thought we would have great deal difficulty with British in getting them go along with naming of ChiCom's as aggressors.

With regard to six-power resolution Lacoste dismissed possibility of withdrawing it. He thought it was probably not adequate in its present form and he assumed we should probably proceed on basis of some modification of six-power resolution. Mentioning pending Soviet resolution and twelve-power Asian resolution (negotiations) in pass-

ing, Lacoste said there was fourth possibility in present parliamentary situation, namely, possibility of four-power talks. On latter point Ross indicated (reference topsec Deptel 612, December 27)[1] that there was of course no certainty at all that ministerial meeting would be held or that if it were held FE questions would be discussed, and that for these reasons it did not seem very fruitful to consider any possible ministerial meeting as factor in parliamentary situation which confronts us now and with which we will have to deal no later than next Wednesday.[2]

At lunch Fawzi took line he wanted to talk about broad principles rather than routine of pending resolutions. He talked about necessity of maintaining unity of UN and said he was opposed to hardening of any Asian bloc along lines of LA bloc. On other hand he felt Asians perhaps had psychology and a feel for situation which would be helpful in preservation unity of UN. He then raised rhetorical question whether we (UN) were ready to name ChiCom's as aggressors and accept consequences. Answering the question he said UN was not psychologically or physically prepared for this step. Psychologically he said that Asian countries, even including India, realized in their hearts they had to side with us as part of free world and in interest of their own self-preservation. On other hand they were confronted with psychological fact that westerners and particularly Americans were shooting Asians. From physical point of view Asian countries recognized their own weaknesses; beyond this they recognized physical weakness of west at this time. It was essential in view of such factors and having in mind fundamental importance of preserving unity of UN, in present situation we must play for time, even if best we could gain by playing for time would be only six weeks or six months. Naming ChiCom's as aggressors would cast the die and lose us the chance of gaining even a little time.

Turning to NE in order to illustrate what he hoped could be accomplished or at least begun in direction of psychological and physical preparedness, he referred first to Anglo-Egyptian treaty and of developing true spirit with Egypt and other Arab states of comradeship in arms. He said neither his government nor any other Arab government could relegate its people to role of trenchdiggers, campfollowers or lackeys. If a true comradeship in arms could be developed then free world would in reality have strong defense in depth in NE which would more than adequately protect our interests in that area; he mentioned bases, transportation, communication, oil.

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[1] See footnote 2 to telegram Delga 460 from New York, received at 7:41 p. m. on December 22, p. 1593.

[2] January 3, 1951.

Second, he mentioned necessity of convincing under-developed peoples of NE that western world stood for "social justice". This must be done by further steps for technical aid and economic development. Third, on question of peace with Israel he said that while it was impossible at present for Arab states to enter directly into definitive and final peace arrangements with Israel they were nevertheless fully prepared to envisage treaty system based upon tripartite declaration that would give every possible assurance of protection for Israel.

Drawing conversation back to UN, Ross emphasized the stake which smaller and weaker countries have in UN collective security system. He emphasized feeling great many Americans had that if members of UN were not willing to support it in its efforts to combat aggression, then there was not much reason for US to support it. At same time if UN ignored defiance by ChiCom's of its efforts through cease-fire group and otherwise to achieve peaceful settlement, this would greatly weaken fabric of UN.

Fawzi said he was strongly opposed to appeasement or rewarding aggression.

He said he was trying to find and steer a middle course between appeasement and slamming door on whatever possibility might remain of achieving peaceful settlement; in light of Chou En-Lai response to cease-fire group and fact that there has not yet after month been any reply to Asian appeal to ChiCom's not to cross 38th parallel, he agreed there did not seem to be much desire on part of ChiCom's for peaceful settlement. He volunteered that if ChiCom's crossed 38th parallel it would probably undoubtedly be necessary name them as aggressors. He said in order maintain integrity of UN principles and its objectives in Korea he thought there should be no voluntary withdrawal from Korea. He said he would prefer to have us "thrown out". He thought best thing would be to try to establish very strong beachhead in Pusan area as a symbol of UN determination.

Turning to pending resolutions in Committee 1, Fawzi thought six-power resolution was out-of-date. He also thought preamble of this resolution would be so obnoxious to ChiCom's that it might have effect of slamming door. He did not urge twelve-power resolution in present form but on contrary queried whether proper approach in committee would not be to proceed on basis of a modified version of twelve-power resolution. He said he was opposed to pending Soviet resolution which was simply condemnation without investigation.

Both Lacoste and Fawzi urgently requested that we let them know as soon as possible conclusions our own thinking.

AUSTIN

795.00/12–2950 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1950.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

[JCS 99935.] From JCS personal for MacArthur. This Message has been handled here with the ultimate of security and it is suggested that the contents thereof be confined, for the present, to you and your Chief of Staff and to General Ridgway[2] and his Chief of Staff. Message follows:

It appears from all estimates available that the Chinese Communists possess the capability of forcing United Nations forces out of Korea if they choose to exercise it. The execution of this capability might be prevented by making the effort so costly to the enemy that they would abandon it, or by committing substantial additional United States forces to that theater thus seriously jeopardizing other commitments including the safety of Japan. It is not practicable to obtain significant additional forces for Korea from other members of the United Nations. We believe that Korea is not the place to fight a major war. Further, we believe that we should not commit our remaining available ground forces to action against Chinese Communist forces in Korea in face of the increased threat of general war. However, a successful resistance to Chinese-North Korean aggression at some position in Korea and a deflation of the military and political prestige of the Chinese Communists would be of great importance to our national interests, if this could be accomplished without incurring serious losses.

Your basic directive to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in that area requires modification in the light of the present situation.

You are now directed to defend in successive positions, as generally outlined in your CX 50635,[3] inflicting such damage to hostile forces in Korea as is possible, subject to the primary consideration of the safety of your troops. Every effort should be continued to mobilize the maximum Korean contribution to sustained resistance, including both conventional and unconventional means.

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[1] The source text is a copy of this message sent on January 2, 1951 to Mr. Rusk by Col. L. K. Ladue, Deputy Secretary of the JCS.

[2] Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway had arrived in Korea on December 26 to assume command of the Eighth Army following the death of Gen. Walton H. Walker in an accident.

[3] Not printed. The substance of this message was rendered as follows in *Record of the Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, p. 74:

"On 7 December 1950, CINCFE issued instructions for a withdrawal in successive positions, if necessary, to the Pusan area, the Eighth Army holding the Seoul area as long as possible without risking envelopment; and the X Corps withdrawing from the Hung Nam area and eventually rejoining the Eighth Army. This plan was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 December 1950."

Since developments may force our withdrawal from Korea, it is important, particularly in view of the continued threat to Japan, to determine, in advance, our last reasonable opportunity for an orderly evacuation. It seems to us that if you are forced back to positions in the vicinity of the Kum River and a line generally eastward therefrom, and if thereafter the Chinese Communists mass large forces against your positions with an evident capability of forcing us out of Korea, it then would be necessary, under these conditions, to direct you to commence a withdrawal to Japan.

Your views are requested as to the above-outlined conditions which should determine a decision to initiate evacuation, particularly in light of your continuing primary mission of defense of Japan for which only troops of the Eighth Army are available.

Following the receipt of your views you will be given a definite directive as to the conditions under which you should initiate evacuation.

357.AD/12–2950 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, December 29, 1950—9:07 p. m.
[Received December 29—10:29 p. m.]

Delga 467. Re Korea. Following is report Ross' conversations today:

Jebb telephoned this morning to ask our views on action in UN. He said he had asked London for instructions but had received nothing from them as yet. He said he assumed we were not pressing for meeting before January 3. He assumed cease-fire group would make factual report and that committee would thereafter (probably beginning January 4) have to take some action re report if only to take note of it. He said he thought 6-power resolution was out of date and would have to be modified, question being how it should be modified. Said he guessed his people in London would be worried about a finding of aggression against ChiComs at this time for fear of precipitating war with China with resultant threat to Hong Kong and he observed he thought French would be even more worried. He said he understood Israelis were peddling resolution (with Canadians, Swedes, et cetera) which, as he had heard of it, seemed unrealistic in that it seemed to assume that elections could be held, et cetera, with armies still in field. He said he was seeing Rau this afternoon and would let us know if he found out anything of interest.

Lacoste came in at his request to explain text of resolution which Chauvel and he had drafted (sent Department as Delga 466, Decem-

ber 29).[1] Lacoste said Dayal had come to see him yesterday and had argued against 6-power resolution on grounds that it was out of date, that it had been presented originally in situation which had been overtaken by events, and that if it were passed now it would in effect give MacArthur free hand to bomb Manchuria. Lacoste indicated he (and, by implication, Chauvel) shared Indian view of 6-power resolution, at least to extent of believing it was quite out of date. Lacoste said that in view of development of events since 6-power resolution had originally been tabled, Chauvel had drafted last night resolution based on 6-power resolution but which was in some respects stronger and in some respects weaker. He stressed that this initiative by Chauvel was entirely personal and that it was not based on instructions or even on any indication of French Government views.

Ross, emphasizing that he was thinking out loud and speaking entirely personally, expressed view that Chauvel's effort was interesting and that we would seek advice of Department and let him know soon as possible our official reaction which Lacoste had requested.

Referring to second paragraph of draft and to phrase, noting the report of the committee of 3, Ross queried whether they were not a very weak presentation of the facts in the case. He emphasized our continuing desire to find peaceful solution of Korean question but on other hand necessity of maintaining in the process the unity and integrity of UN which was more essentially a means of protection to smaller states than in fact to US.

Admitting in effect that draft resolution was perhaps not very well balanced between these considerations, Lacoste felt that stronger references to ChiCom aggression and their defiance of UN, in particular cease-fire group, might very well slam door on any possibility of achieving peaceful settlement with ChiComs.

At lunch with Dayal he in effect confirmed what Lacoste had reported re Indian attitude toward 6-power resolution. More specifically he said that paragraph in resolution calling attention to grave danger which continued intervention by Chinese forces in Korea would entail taken in conjunction with preceding paragraph would certainly be interpreted by ChiComs and Russians either as threat to bomb Manchuria or as empty threat which we were not able to

[1] Telegram Delga 466 not printed. The draft resolution in its second paragraph noted "that with the knowledge and consent of the PRC armed forces organized in large units and composed of Chinese subjects have crossed the Chinese border and are undertaking military operations against the forces of the U.N. in Korea." In its concluding paragraph, the draft resolution invited "the PRC to cease all assistance and encouragement of the authorities of North Korea, to prevent its subjects and all members and units of its armed forces from aiding the North Korean forces, and to recall immediately all its subjects and all members or units of its forces which may at the present moment be in Korea." (320.2–AB/12–2950)

back up. Referring to a meeting Thursday night[2] Dayal said press accounts were distorted. He said Rau had been delegated by group to get in touch with US and find out our attitude towards giving precedence to and passing 12 Asian power resolution. He implied very strongly that group did not want to go ahead with 12-power resolution on basis indicated without at least our acquiescence.

Emphasizing our desire to maintain unity of free world within UN, Ross drew attention to repeated indications we had given Rau and others of our willingness to seek peaceful settlement. Open defiance of cease-fire group and continued aggressive posture of ChiComs raised serious question whether UN could refuse any longer to face these simple facts. If UN refused to face these facts to what extent, if any, could UN be maintained as effective, collective security instrument, having in mind in particular security of smaller or weaker nations. From point of view of American public it must be apparent that there was strong body of opinion in this country which felt that if UN were to follow line of appeasement then US should look after its own security and allow others look out for theirs. Since the facts were so clear, would it not seem essential as minimum for UN to recognize facts.

Dayal did not disagree that facts were clear. He also recognized that survival of free nations, at least weaker ones, depended upon maintenance of UN. At same time he felt that to name ChiComs as aggressors would risk precipitating not only war with China but perhaps general war. He felt we must not give up our efforts to achieve peaceful settlement and that to name ChiComs as aggressors would in fact sacrifice what remaining chance there might be of peaceful solution.

Ross asked whether it would not be better to proceed with 6-power resolution as next step in committee. For reasons already indicated Dayal said he thought this would be very unwise.

It was clearly understood that foregoing conversation was personal and exploratory on both sides.

Grafstrom came in at his request. He said first that Israelis had been to see him with new draft resolution explaining that they want to discuss it with US but wanted get reactions from other delegations first. He said Israeli resolution had following components: (1) cease-fire; (2) declaration support objective of unified Korea involving elections, et cetera; (3) new commission in place of UNCURK on which USSR and ChiComs would be represented; (4) withdrawal by both sides; (5) reconstruction Korea under auspices UN; (6) hands-off Korea policy; (7) after foregoing accomplished, dis-

[2] December 28.

cussion outstanding issues including: (A) Formosa; (B) Chinese–Korean frontier; and (C) Chinese representation. Grafstrom said he had given Israelis no encouragement since he thought resolution quite unrealistic.

Grafstrom said he thought 6-power resolution might be all right as a quickie but that it was clearly out of date. He said in contemplating pending resolutions we were trying to ride two horses. He said he thought we should forget about cease-fire and forget about idea of negotiations and try new approach. He thought new approach might be based on reality of what UN could do and could not do in present situation. He thought it might be good idea for UN to withdraw its forces and save them for building up strength of free world. He would leave moral force of UN behind in Korea in form of UN commission stronger and bigger than UNCURK, supported by a UN guard. He said he thought there might perhaps be another body composed of US, UK, USSR and ChiComs. He said he would envisage withdrawal of ChiCom forces and the exacting of guarantees from NK's that they would collaborate with new commission and cooperate in restoration and maintenance law and order.

In substance Grafstrom said he felt we should give up Korea (leaving moral force only of UN behind) and let ChiComs find out hard way that they were not going to get Formosa or China seat in UN.

Grafstrom asked for reactions to his suggestions telegraphed Department; December 27 (Delga 464).

Padilla Nervo [3] telephoned and said he had been talking with several delegates, all of whom were worried about next steps in UN. He expressed view most important consideration was to determine action in UN on basis necessity safeguarding UN forces and what he termed prospective operations for future. Referring to various pending resolutions and modifications thereof, he said he thought we should not contemplate taking one step without knowing pretty exactly what next steps would be. In this connection he said number of delegations had commented to him on Lie statement to effect that putting responsibility on other side for general war did not meet point of necessity maintaining UN principles without endangering future of UN. He said he had talked with Urdaneta [4] who had urged taking up 6-power resolution and voting on it following report of 3. Padilla thought this was rushing matters too fast. He thought we might hear report of cease-fire group on Wednesday and then allow little time for full consultations and opportunity for delegates to get instructions

[3] Dr. Luis Padilla Nervo, Mexican Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

[4] Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez of Colombia, Chairman of the First Committee.

in view of gravity situation before rushing headlong along some particular course.

Fawzi telephoned and gave fuller version Asian group meeting Thursday night. Said he and Rau had been delegated to ascertain views other delegates re giving priority to 12-power resolution. Fawzi indicated, however, which Dayal had not, that group contemplated amendment of 12-power resolution, making everything conditional on cease-fire. Fawzi felt giving priority to 12-power resolution amended as indicated would be wholly consistent with US statements in committee and Attlee–Truman communiqué. He argued that another chance should be given to ChiComs. If this chance refused our (UN) position would be improved not worsened. We would be strengthened, he said, in whatever next steps we would have to take. Next steps might include 6-power resolution with appropriate modifications in light of new developments. Asked what modifications of 6-power resolution he had in mind, Fawzi said he had not thought this through. He then commented in same sense as Dayal concerning present form 6-power resolution to effect that if, in light of developments, 6-power resolution were now passed, it would be giving or interpreted as giving blank check to cross frontier and hit at bases from which trouble is coming. In light Fawzi's comments it seemed quite clear Asian group has not faced up to or thought through problem of what comes next if, following passage 12-power resolution, ChiComs and Russians maintain present attitude.

Fawzi emphasized strongly Asian group desire get together with US. He hoped for our positive support giving precedence 12-power resolution, amended as he had indicated. If US could not take positive stand in favor we could abstain as long as it was understood we were not strongly opposed. On basis talks past few days with Fawzi, Jamali and Dayal, it seems clear Arabs are endeavoring to some extent at least to protect our position vis-à-vis Rau, and are thus far at least seeking maintain some flexibility in hoping reach compromise and solidarity with US.

AUSTIN

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Department of the Army

TOP SECRET TOKYO, December 30, 1950—10:09 p. m.

C–52391. Personal for JCS. Reference JCS 99935.[1]

A comprehensive estimate of relative capabilities in the Korea campaign appears to be dependent upon political-military policies yet to

[1] Dated December 29, p. 1625.

be formulated vis-à-vis Chinese military operations being conducted against our forces. It is quite clear now that the entire military resource of the Chinese Nation, with logistic support from the Soviet, is committed to a maximum effort against the United Nations Command. In implementation of this commitment a major concentration of Chinese force in the Korean-Manchurian area will increasingly leave China vulnerable in areas whence troops to support Korean operations have been drawn. Meanwhile under existing restrictions our naval and air potential are being only partially utilized and the great potential of Chinese Nationalist force on Formosa and guerrilla action on the Mainland are being ignored. Indeed as to the former we are preventing its employment against a common enemy by our own Naval Force.

Should a policy determination be reached by our government or through it by the United Nations to recognize the State of War which has been forced upon us by the Chinese authorities and to take retaliatory measures within our capabilities we could: (1) Blockade the coast of China; (2) Destroy through naval gun fire and air bombardment China's industrial capacity to wage war; (3) Secure reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison on Formosa to strengthen our position in Korea if we decided to continue the fight for that peninsula; and (4) Release existing restrictions upon the Formosan garrison for diversionary action (possibly leading to counter-invasion) against vulnerable areas of the Chinese Mainland. I believe that by the foregoing measures we could severely cripple and largely neutralize China's capability to wage aggressive war and thus save Asia from the engulfment otherwise facing it. I believe furthermore that we could do so with but a relatively small part of our overall military potential committed to the purpose. There is no slightest doubt but that this action would at once release the pressure upon our forces in Korea, whereupon determination could be reached as to whether to maintain the fight in that area or to effect a strategic displacement of our forces with the view to strengthening our defense of the Littoral Island chain while continuing our naval and air pressure upon China's military potential. I am fully conscious of the fact that this course of action has been rejected in past for fear of provoking China to a major war effort but we must now realistically recognize that China's commitment thereto has already been fully unequivocally made and that nothing we can do would further aggravate the situation as far as China is concerned.

Whether defending ourselves by way of military retaliation would bring in Soviet military intervention or not is a matter of speculation. I have always felt that a Soviet decision to precipitate a general war would depend solely upon the Soviets own estimate of relative strengths and capabilities, with little regard for other factors. It was because of this and the growing tensions arising from the Soviets

increasing propaganda interest in Japan that for the past six months I have advocated the reinforcement of the Far East Command by a minimum of an army of four divisions. It has been my intention to commit this reinforcement to the defense of Japan and to provide a security cover for the gradual building up of Japan's own defense potential. It has never been my thought that they should be committed to the Korean campaign. Indeed, it was my understanding, in which I may have been in error, that the four National Guard divisions called to active duty in September were for the ultimate employment here should the necessity arise. If we are forced to evacuate Korea without taking military measures against China proper as suggested in your message, it would have the most adverse effect upon the peoples of Asia, not excepting the Japanese, and a material reinforcement of the forces now in this theater would be mandatory if we are to hold the Littoral Defense Chain including Japan against determined assault. Moreover it must be borne in mind that evacuation of our forces from Korea under any circumstances would at once release the bulk of the Chinese Forces now absorbed by that campaign for action elsewhere—quite probably in areas of far greater importance than Korea itself. On the other hand, the relatively small command we now have in Korea is capable of so draining the enemy's resources as to protect the areas to the south which would in itself be possibly a greater contribution to the general situation than could be made by such a force disposed in other areas for purely defense purposes, but not possessing the power to pin down and localize so massive a part of the enemy's potential as now committed in Korea. I have little doubt but that the entire ROK potential in case of our evacuation would disintegrate or become of negligible value. The loss of Korea would render the defense of Japan more vulnerable.

I understand thoroughly the demand for European security and fully concur in doing everything possible in that sector, but not to the point of accepting defeat anywhere else—an acceptance which I am sure could not fail to insure later defeat in Europe itself. The preparations for the defense of Europe, however, by the most optimistic estimate are aimed at a condition of readiness two years hence. The use of forces in the present emergency in the Far East would not in any way prejudice this basic concept. To the contrary it would insure thoroughly seasoned forces for later commitment in Europe synchronously with Europe's own development of military resource.

So far as your tactical estimate of the situation in Korea is concerned, under the conditions presently implied viz no reinforcements, continued restrictions upon Chinese Nationalist action, no military measures against China's continental military potential, and the concentration of China's military force solely upon the Korean sector it

would seem to be sound. The tactical plan of a successively contracting defense line south to the Pusan beachhead is believed the only possible way in which an evacuation could be accomplished. In the execution of this plan it would not be necessary for you to make an anticipatory decision for evacuation until such time as we may be forced to that beachhead line.

320/12–3050 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, December 30, 1950—4:44 p. m.
[Received December 30—6:55 p. m.]

Delga 470. Re Korea. Ambassador Muniz (Brazil) called on me this morning at his request and said that he was anxious to know where we stood. I indicated that the first item of our agenda was the 6 power resolution and we thought that the best course of action open to us was to proceed in normal course with that resolution perhaps with some modifications. I said I understood that the Asians were still interested in their 12 power proposal. Speaking for the United States mission, I said I felt that the passage of this resolution would lower the prestige of the UN and that I thought that it was clear that the efforts of the UN to obtain a cease fire had been rejected and had been rejected in insulting terms. The UN had received two slaps in the face from the Chinese. Was it appropriate now to repeat the same process and receive a third slap in the face? I said that I did not believe that anything useful could come of such an effort and indicated that it was not clear to us that the Asian states had made up their minds to press this step. There were indications that they might not do so unless they received a favorable response from the other delegations. I said that I rather hoped that they would not put this proposal forward at all.

I indicated that we were extremely conscious of the importance of maintaining the unity of the free world in the present situation. It was of great importance to us to have all the free world, including the Asian states and the Arabs stand together. We hoped that in the present circumstances it would be possible to take a first and relatively mild step forward basing our action upon the fundamentals of the 6 power resolution. This had received very wide support heretofore. It was not provocative. It did not close any doors, nor do we intend to close any doors to negotiation. On the other hand, it would be a first action which would begin to uphold the prestige of the UN. We were quite prepared to consider amendments to this resolution which would

increase its support among the members. I mentioned that some delegations were concerned that the resolution would authorize the Unified Command and MacArthur to bomb China. This was a misconception. If necessary, we were quite prepared to modify the two paragraphs which gave concern in this respect. We were also prepared to drop other paragraphs which were out of date and to try to work out with the Arabs and the Asians some additional paragraphs which might indicate that the door for negotiation was not being slammed.

I said that this was only the first step in a program. If the Communists did not withdraw or change their policy, it would, of course, be necessary to go on to firmer and stronger action. We are not yet prepared to discuss with our friends details of such a second stage. We felt, however, that it was of urgent importance that we work very closely together on this step as we had done in preparing the essentials of peace resolution. Passing the 6 power resolution now would give us the necessary time to work out the second stage resolution through diplomatic preparation so that before it was introduced we would be assured of wide support.

Ambassador Muniz expressed his appreciation and his agreement with this policy. He particularly noted the desirability of attempting to find a basis of agreement with the Asian group. It was essential in his view to have a very large vote in favor of the 6 power resolution. He agreed with my analysis of the 12 power resolution and thought that it would damage the prestige of the UN. Ambassador Muniz emphasized that in his view it was most important that we should work out an agreed program before the Wednesday meeting so that everybody would understand what was going to happen. Then there would be no public disputes. He said he would like to talk to his Latin American friends about the matter and I indicated that I would be glad to have him do so along the above lines.

AUSTIN

Editorial Note

On December 30, Secretary of State Acheson released a statement reviewing the events of 1950 and looking toward the prospects for 1951; for the text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 15, 1951, page 83. With particular reference to Korea, the statement read:

"Regardless of threats, this country will not compromise by appeasement its security or the principles by which a society of free men must live. We will not reward Communist aggression. In Korea, this means that this country will not be intimidated by the threats coming out of Peiping; but will continue under the United Nations to combat the forces of aggression."

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